Presented the Petition from lieutenant-general William Thornton:—

"That your Petitioner humbly prays your honourable House to take into consideration the danger arising to the Established Church, from the forbearance of enforcing the performance of both morning and evening Service on Sundays, in every parish church and parochial chapel, and the chapel of every extra-parochial place, throughout England and Ireland, whereby it is rendered impossible for many persons to obey the laws, or the dictates of their own conscience, by resorting to their parish church or chapel accustomed upon every Sunday, without leaving their habitations unoccupied, and thereby exposing their property to loss by robbers; the alternative obliging those persons who are by such omission deprived of the opportunity of attending the Established Service, and who think it a duty incumbent on them to go to some place of public worship, to resort to dissenting meeting houses, to Roman Catholic chapels, or to congregations denying the doctrine of the blessed Trinity; the only course, as it appears to your Petitioner, by which they can legally exonerate themselves from the penalties to which they are liable for not resorting to their parish church or chapel.

"Your Petitioner had the honour of a seat in parliament when the act of the fifty-seventh year of King George the 3rd, commonly called 'The Clergy Residence Act,' was passing; and as it appeared to your Petitioner that the forbearance of the bishops to enforce the power given to them by the said act would be no excuse to the clergy for such a neglect of duty as the non-performance of either the morning or evening service on Sundays, your Petitioner strenuously urged but without, success, that the clergy should be liable to some pecuniary penalty or forfeiture for any such omission, which should go and be paid to the person or persons who should inform and sue for the same. It was asserted, that it might be safely intrusted to the bishops to enforce the two services; but nearly twelve years of trial, since the act was passed, have but too truly proved the correctness of your Petitioner's sentiments.

"Your Petitioner, being firmly attached to the Established Church, thinks it a subject of joy and congratulation to all true Christians that it is no longer subject to the charge of bigotry and oppression; but your Petitioner is anxious to uphold the power all persons ought to enjoy of attending its public service on Sundays, or of bringing such minister to punishment as, by neglect of duty, deprive them of such opportunity.

"In conclusion, your Petitioner humbly prays your honourable House to adopt such measures as shall, in future, make imperative the performance of both morning and evening service on Sundays, in every parish church and parochial chapel, and the chapel of any extra-parochial place, throughout England and Ireland, for the benefit and security of the members of the Established Church."

Ordered to lie on the table.

urged the necessity of encouraging the cultivation of Tobacco in our own colonies. At present the whole monopoly was in the hands of the United States of America. Tobacco was now almost a necessary of life. The hon. gentleman concluded by saying that he should move, as an instruction to the committee, to provide a clause for the lowering of the duty on colonial Tobacco from 2s. 9d. to 2s. per lb.

said, that as there was no committee, the boa member could not move an instruction.

said, that prior to the law prohibiting the growth of Tobacco, in England, a considerable quantity had been cultivated in Gloucestershire, and it had been found to answer very well. Certainly, he could not see why Tobacco could not as well be cultivated in this country, as in Holland; and it appeared to him, that the intimation of a prohibiting law, was an act of cruelty towards the poor of this country, when there were so many labourers in a state of the greatest distress.

referred to the cultivation of Tobacco in Ireland; and as it had succeeded so well there, he trusted there would be something of the sort proposed with respect to England in the ensuing session. As all civil disabilities were now at an end on the score of religion, the laws of the two countries must be as assimilated, and he thought it much more reasonable in this instance that the Irish law should be brought over to England, than that the English law should be taken over to Ireland.

then moved, by way of amendment, that the Report should be re-committed.

assured ministers that a large body of people were anxious that the attention of government should be directed to the repeal of the prohibition on the cultivation of tobacco. The West of England Agricultural Society were of opinion, that tobacco might be cultivated in this country with considerable advantage, and representations to that effect had been made to several members representing the western counties.

observed, that the proposed reduction of the duty on tobacco would not have the slightest effect in enabling people to grow tobacco in this country. The cultivation of tobacco was prevented by a penal statute, which must be repealed, if it was thought desirable to grow tobacco in this country. As to Ireland, the growth of tobacco had been permitted in that country a short time since by way of experiment; and it would be extremely unjust to persons who had expended capital in the cultivation to prohibit them from carrying it on, merely for the sake of assimilating the laws in the two countries. As to the proposed reduction of duty, it would be giving a bounty to the colonies on the importation of tobacco. During the last year, 33,500,000 lbs. of tobacco were imported into this country, and of these only 64,000 lbs. were imported from British colonies. It might be said, that a larger quantity was not imported from our colonies because the importation was not encouraged; but the fact was, that there was a difference of 3d. in the lb. duty on tobacco imported from the colonies, which was more than one hundred per cent on the cost of production; and yet, with such an encouragement, our colonies had only produced so small a portion of the whole quantity imported. To reduce the duty to the amount proposed would be to give the colonist a bounty of 9d per lb., which was extremely objectionable; for, as the effect of bounties was, to encourage the investment of capital in the produce of a particular article, when it was found desirable to withdraw the bounty, the man who embarked his capital could always turn round and say, "By giving me undue encouragement you induced me to risk my capital, and now by withdrawing the bounty you involve me in ruin." Upon these grounds he must oppose the motion.

thought, that all the laws and regulations relating to tobacco should undergo a revision. He was confident, that, if the attention of the House was directed to the subject, it was impossible that the present high rate of duty, or the existing prohibition, could be endured much longer.

thought it was the duty of ministers to regulate all duties in such a way as would act favorably on British colonial interests. It would be a serious disadvantage to Ireland, however, if the permission to grow tobacco in that country was now withdrawn. He should therefore oppose any proposition to prohibit the cultivation of tobacco in Ireland.

The amendment was negative.

said, he should trespass on the House only for a short period; but he considered that the high Duty on Hemp was a great injury, not only to the Shipping interest, which it chiefly concerned, but to the Manufacturer and Artisan. How was it possible for the English ship-owner to compete with the foreigner when, leaving out of consideration the difference in the price of labour, the raw material was subject to a tax which the foreigner did not pay? The ship-owners, however, had not only policy and justice to stand upon, but they had the pledge of his majesty's government. A clause was introduced in the act last year, reducing the duty on cordage taken in by British ships in foreign ports; and it was then distinctly understood, that the duty on the importation of the raw material into this country was to be reduced; otherwise the reduction of the duty on cordage taken in at foreign ports would have the effect of driving the manufacture entirely out of England. The reduction of the duty on cordage taken in at foreign ports was desirable, for the law was constantly evaded, and all vessels trading with the Baltic had been long in the practice of taking in their cordage at the ports on that sea. The effect of the high duty on the raw material was, to ruin the rope-manufacturer of this country, and seriously to injure all persons engaged in the repairing of ships. It might be said, that it was desirable to continue the tax, because it yielded a large revenue; but the whole amount which it produced last yeas was 86,000l., and a considerable part of that amount, at least 10,000l., was paid by government itself. The real amount received by government last year, therefore, was not above 76,000l.; and it was not likely to be so much this year. The manufacture, however, was increasing in all the ports of the Baltic to the ruin of a number of manufacturers of cordage in this country. He would move, that the duty on raw hemp imported for manufacture should be reduced from 4l. 13s. to 5s. per ton.

said, that the House and the government were greatly indebted to the hon. member for giving them the benefit of his experience and information on this subject. He found no great fault with the hon. gentleman's statement, though he could not come to the same conclusion as he had done. Indeed, it could not be expected that at that period of the session, when the financial arrangements were nearly completed, that his majesty's ministers could consent to a proposition by which the revenue would confessedly lose so large a sum as 76,000l. He would go with the hon. gentleman so far as to admit, that it was wrong to lay a duty on the raw material, and that the shipping interest deserved relief and encouragement. The hon. gentleman, himself, however, had proved, that the reduction of the duty on cordage taken in at foreign ports offered no additional reason for a reduction of the duty on the importation; for he admitted, that British ships were in the habit of taking in cordage at foreign ports, and evading the law, before there had been any reduction of the duty; and it should be remembered, that the reduction was only on cordage taken in for use, and not on cordage imported into this country.

said, that the effect of the duty, as it stood, was to give a bounty on that which took away employment from the people of this country. He thought that some alteration ought to be effected, and would, therefore, support the amendment.

said, that the duty on hemp materially affected the ropers and sailmakers. It was a mistake to suppose that the ship-owners would not receive the reduction as a favor. He represented a place in which there were a considerable number of ship-owners, and nothing could be more acceptable to them than the proposed reduction.

congratulated the House upon the change which had taken place relative to free trade. The arguments of the hon. member for Dover were directly at variance with those which he had used it combating the several motions on the subject of free trade; and indeed he thought he saw a general disposition on the part of the House not to persist in the severity of those principles, but to modify them in the way which the exigencies of the times required. These duties were intimately connected with the prosperity of the shipping interest. He knew that many connected with the carrying trade, had sacrificed twenty-five per cent of their capital, to get out of a business which they found ruinous.

said, that his majesty's government were desirous to afford all the relief in their power by the remission of duties, if the financial arrangements of the year had permitted the indulgence of their wishes. He admitted, that, upon every sound principle, the duties on hemp ought to be remitted the moment the exigences of the State would permit the reduction.

The House divided: For the Amendment 40; Against it 60; Majority 20.

rose. He said, he thought it would be scarcely necessary for any man who addressed the House from that part of it where he generally sat, to disclaim being actuated by any spirit of party opposition to his majesty's ministers during this session. His own conduct in dealing with the motion which it was now his painful duty to bring forward, afforded a pretty fair sample of the principle and feeling which had guided all his friends in the course they had adopted since the very first day of this session, when he had intimated his intention to call the attention of the House to the present subject. For the first two months of the session he considered himself and his political friends as acting under a sort of sacred obligation not to do any thing which might appear even to ruffle surface of that hearty co-operation which experience had proved to be not more than necessary to the success of that grand healing measure brought forward by his majesty's ministers,—that measure which he trusted would be found the most beneficent ever adopted since the happy settlement of the Crown of these realms upon the House of Brunswick—a measure which would do only less than that to secure the constitution of England, and strike the death-blow to whatever attempts might be made on the part of other state to obtain the unbounded authority of the world. He could not now throw off the feelings that had actuated him in the course of the contest by means of which this great measure was effected. He could not so soon forget that he had fought by the side of gentlemen opposite for the attainment of that end. Such were his feelings upon the present occasion: he would endeavour to discharge his duty, but as he felt no hostility to his majesty's ministers, he should assume no acrimony. At the same time, he trusted his conduct would be found to be at an immeasurable distance from that lukewarmness which, in relation to such a subject, would be a disgrace and degradation to the national honour; and, to the injured and defenceless men whose cause was involved in the present question, an act of aggravated injustice. He was influenced, in the course which he meant to adopt on this occasion, by a wish to keep the character of the councils of the country unspotted in the eyes of the people of England, as well as to vindicate them in the eyes of the rulers of Europe. He was influenced by a regard for the disgraced and degraded condition hi which a most ancient ally was now placed in the eyes of the world—he was influenced by a regard for our national honour—he wished to show that we would not assist, or connive at, wrong inflicted upon others—and these others our friends and allies—any more than we would brook wrongs or injuries offered to ourselves. He confessed he held it, as a general principle, to be exceedingly beneficial and wholesome, that the attention of the House should be sometimes drawn to the state of our foreign relations: and this for the satisfaction of the people of England, in the first instance, in order to assure them that proper care was taken for the maintenance of the peace and security of the empire; above all, to convince them that care was taken of the national honour and integrity—the best, and indeed only guard of that peace and security. And inquiry should also be made into the subject out of courtesy to our fellow-members of the great commonwealth of European states; more particularly now that some of them were bound to us by kindred ties of liberty, and by the possession of institutions similar to our own. Some of these states were bound to us in bonds of the closest alliance. One was formerly our illustrious and most determined antagonist; but in future he trusted it would only be our illustrious rival. As these states had adopted our plan of a limited monarchy and a representative system, he thought there would be found to result from a discussion of the subject referred to, great use, not only to ourselves, but to time. And he was further influenced in the adoption of this opinion, by seeing that the habit of these discussions in representative assemblies, not withstanding any occasional political heat or intemperance which they might give rise to, did, in the long run, considerable service. They would be serviceable if were only as affording vents for political, animosities—proving the good will which subsisted between us—rooting more firmly the strong and growing passion for peace, which, whatever might be the political intrigues of some parties, he rejoiced to say was visibly extending throughout Europe, and which, he would add, was the best legacy left us by that fierce war that had raged from Copenhagen to Cadiz. He did not wish to magnify the difficulties, or under-rate the resources, of any one country,—a mode of dealing with political matters which was calculated to rouse national spirit into action, rather than to soothe and calm animosities. In dealing with the subject, he relied more on topics which related to the general welfare and dignity of mankind, than on particular cases or instances. If his passion for peace could have received any addition, it would have been strengthened when, on a recent occasion, he had heard the horrors of war deprecated by one who had given the most striking and memorable example, since the time, when, two thousand years ago, Scipio vanquished Hannibal at Zama, of the utter overthrow of a powerful army under one of the greatest military commanders. He confessed he felt a strong passion peace; for he must call it by that name. He trusted this feeling would ultimately become the ruling passion of Europe, and be the cause of protracting the continuance of tranquillity for a longer period than we had hitherto been accustomed to enjoy it.

If he might be allowed here to digress a little from the present subject, he would say, that this passion for peace rendered him extremely jealous of the creation of any new guarantees, with regard to the political condition of Europe. When he spoke of such guarantees, he would say that there were political guarantees, implied and understood, as explicit and openly recognised, which were as operative as any body could desire. If the preservation of the integrity of any parti- cular territory were made a maxim of the policy of Europe, that would be introducing a guarantee. And he deprecated this; for by such a course we virtually added to the usual chances of war, by possible and contingent events, which might arise out of that circumstance. He did not mean to conceal that be alluded to the introduction of the integrity of the Ottoman territory as a fundamental principle in European policy. It was difficult to imagine any case or instance of such a species of guarantee more objectionable than this; for, from its very nature and principle, it was a guarantee which of all others it would be the least possible to carry into effect. But, if it were practicable, what would such a guarantee be? What, but, an agreement between the powers of Europe, dooming the whole of the eastern and southern coast of the Mediterranean, from the Euxine to the Atlantic, to barbarism and slavery. He repeated, it would be an attempt to doom all those places which might be excited by the example of Greece to shake off their fetters to eternal slavery and anarchy. He doubted if this were possible: it seemed to him to be an undertaking that never could succeed: at least, he knew it ought not to succeed. Such attempts as he had alluded to, must end in forcing the great military powers in the vicinity, to a avoid the quarrel by cutting up the cause of it: they must recur to the old secret in politics of composing the difference in the speediest and most effectual manner, while they smiled at more distant powers, who, though possessed of great resources, would find that they were not of a nature to be successfully opposed to attempts made under such circumstances. He begged pardon for this digression, which he trusted the great importance of the subject to which he had alluded would atone for. He gave no opinion as to what might be done in the way of negotiation; but as to doing any act which would imply, that the preservation of the Turkish empire formed a fundamental maxim of the policy of Europe, he doubted if that could be considered consistent with the pacific course we ought to pursue. He could not avoid looking upon the establishment of such a principle as exceedingly dangerous.

With respect to Portugal, the case was one of an altogether different nature. Portugal was a country closely connected with Great Britain by alliances which had originated four hundred and fifty years ago—a connexion, he ventured to say, unparalleled in the whole history of mankind—a connexion which had not been interrupted by a cloud of disagreement for a single day. A treaty of alliance had subsisted between this country and Portugal for the space of one hundred and twenty years, which had never drawn England into a war, or exposed her to injury; but which, on the contrary, had exposed Portugal to invasion thrice—in 1761, 1801, and again in 1807; and it would seem that, in addition to these sufferings, she was now to be abandoned to the yoke of a usurper, who had made his way to the throne by a series of false hoods, perjuries, and frauds, which, in the case of any man amenable to law, would have subjected their perpetrator to the most disgraceful, if not the most extreme punishment,—a man who laboured under the imputation of private crimes—imputations uncontradicted and unconfuted, which rather reminded us of the acts of Commodus and Caracalla than of the tame and common-place character of modern vice,—a man who bore upon his brow the brand of a pardon which he received from his king and his father for an act of parricidal rebellion. It was disgraceful that the ancient and faithful ally of England should have fallen under the yoke of such a man. In this case, the vices of the individual constituted a great part of the misfortunes of the nation which he ruled, and this circumstance justified the allusion to, and the reprobation of, them. His majesty had twice told parliament, though in milder language than this, that he and all the other powers of Europe had been obliged to out off all diplomatic intercourse with this ancient and renowned member of the European Christian states, for nearly twelve months—a mark of displeasure almost if not altogether unexampled—a mark of displeasure short of an actual declaration of war, the strongest that pit was possible to affix upon any ruler. Europe had sat in judgment off the conduct to this man, who had brought dishonour on a once illustrious and still respectable country; and Europe, as a mark of its disapprobation of his proceedings, had pronounced the state which Don Miguel governed unworthy Of being allowed to maintain relations of amity with other powers, while she groaned under the yoke of the usurper. While Don Miguel received tokens of obedience from at least a part of his subjects, his majesty and his majesty's ministers had recognised the royal rights and privileges of Donna Maria, with a high feeling of courtesy and justice which did credit to the monarch and his advisers. He heartily approved of this part of our conduct towards the young queen: he spoke not now of consistency, and did not allude to the conduct of this country in other particulars. We had received Donna Maria with a degree of courtesy and respect, which her youth, innocence, royal rank, and grievous wrongs, were so well calculated to inspire. But meanwhile Don Miguel enjoyed the fruits of his crime at Lisbon, while his injured relative remained here an exile, deprived of her just rights and privileges. This was a case which—considering the Houses as the guardian of the national honour and entitled to watch over our deportment to our allies, ought to receive the closest examination at our hands, with reference to every circumstance connected with the present state of the relations subsisting between us and our most ancient ally.

In directing the attention of the House to this subject, he was under the necessity of stating as a reason for moving an address to his majesty for copies of various papers calculated to throw light on the relations subsisting between Portugal and this country, from the year 1826, up to the present time,—he was under the necessity of stating, he feared at considerable length, the peculiar circumstances of the case. In 1825, a treaty of reconciliation between Portugal and Brazil, on the ground of an amicable separation between the two states, was set on foot, under the mediation of England and Austria. It was concluded at Rio de Janeiro, in August, 1825, by sir Charles Stuart, who went out there from Portugal as the plenipotentiary of king John the 6th, in order to negociate it. It was a remarkable circumstance connected with this treaty, that sir C. Stuart, one of the most eminent and distinguished of English diplomatists, should have been concerned in arranging it. In the March following the conclusion of this treaty, John the 6th died, having appointed by his will the Infanta Maria regent, till the appearance of the lawful heir. As to any pretended rights of Don Miguel to the crown, he held him to be utterly debarred from exercising them, by his own solemn oaths and declarations; besides, he held these rights to be at an end, because the powers of Europe had acknowledged the regency of Donna Maria, and acknowledged Maria the 2nd as queen of Portugal, Which they could only do by disregarding the assumed rights of Don Miguel. He therefore laid these claims aside as mere lumber—not touching or appertaining to the real question. It was impossible for us to undo what he had done: we were bound by it. After the death of John the 6th, Don Pedro proceeded to execute the treaty of separation previously agreed upon between the two states. His situation, it must be admitted, was a very peculiar one: there was no instance in history of a case exactly analogous to it. By the treaty of separation Don Pedro had resigned all pretensions which he might be supposed to possess as king of Portugal: but still he had authority, both over Portugal and Brazil, to put the treaty into execution. Who was to do it, if not he? Though he was not king of Portugal, yet he was vested with authority over the two territories, which he was bound to see separated in the manner agreed upon and for the purpose of carrying that object into effect he was entitled to exercise the power he possessed. A reasonable time must be allowed to enable him accomplish that end; all that was necessary was, that there should be no mark of bad faith about his interference,—that he should devote himself, bona fide, to carrying the treaty into effect; and that no intention to retain what in appearance he had renounced should be veiled under the pretence of accomplishing the treaty. This being the case, how did Don Pedro act? He introduced three measurers, the better to accomplish the safe separation of the two states, and at the same time to maintain friendly relations between them. His first measure was the abdication of the crown of Portugal in favour of his daughter Donna Maria; his second was the arrangement of her marriage with Don Miguel, an alliance by means of which hope was afforded to all parties of securing tranquility, getting rid of dangerous enmities, and bringing about peaceable separation between the two countries, by means, harsh indeed in themselves, and no doubt exceedingly unpalatable to an affection ate father, who still perceived that his personal feelings must be sacrificed for the general benefit. The third mea- sure consisted in the introduction a constitution into Portugal without which the second measure would have been vain. Don Pedro thought that unless there were to be a reasonable distribution of power between the parties, so as to shield both, the treaty would be a mere paper grant of tranquility, but no real security for the continuance of peace. Let the House think what it would of the fitness or unfitness of the Portuguese for a constitution, he said this, that the parties were entitled to safety; and the granting of a constitution afforded the only real security for protecting the one party against the consequences of the triumph, perhaps the persecution, of the other. These three measures were adopted by Don Pedro in 1826, as affording the best means of bringing about the desired separation between the two countries. It then occurred, that this constitution was received in Portugal but observe by what bearer it came—it was borne back to Lisbon from Rio de Janeiro by the same individual, sir C. Stuart, who the year before went, from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro to negociate the treaty of separation between the two states, in the character of plenipotentiary from John the 6th. He was aware that some difference of opinion existed on the subject of sir C. Stuart's conduct in this affair, but he was persuaded that that individual acted as became an able and honourable man to act upon such an occasion: he evidently felt that he was called on to be the bearer of a healing measure, and he did not lose time in setting about it. Whether Stuart had acted judiciously this or not, had been disputed; but it should be recollected, that it was much easier to make comments on his conduct in this particular, than for individual circumstanced as he was to refuse to be the bearer of the constitution, when suddenly required to be so in that emergency. He called on the people of Portugal, by the circumstance of a British diplomatist acting as plenipotentiary of their late sovereign, and bringing the constitution from Rio de Janeiro. To Portugal Was there any man in the House who, if he had, been a Portuguese and observed this, would not have augured well, from this circumstance, of the favourable opinion and disposition of Great Britain towards the constitution which was thus offered? He wished to understate the case; he therefore merely asked, if this must not have been the direct tendency of the matter? Was this all? He spoke under correction, and in the presence of gentlemen who would correct him if he were wrong; and he said, that if he had not been greatly deceived, the government of Portugal at the moment, hesitating, as to the introduction of the constitution, and fearing to take upon themselves the responsibility of conferring even so great a benefit upon the people, did not venture to put the constitution into effect until they had taken the advice of his Britannic majesty through his authorized ministers upon the subject. With this view he believed despatches were transmitted from Portugal to London; and it was not until the constitution had been approved of here, that it was promulgated in Portugal. He violated no confidence in alluding to this fact: the changes of administrations in Portugal were. so rapid and numerous, that more than one set of ministers were necessarily informed of it, and the matter became one of public notoriety, and was generally known at Lisbon. Under such circumstances, might he not say, that most of the nobility of Portugal had been encouraged to make manifest their principles on the subject, because they thought they had now an opportunity of doing so with safety to themselves and with advantage to their country: as they believed that the constitution was befriended by England, their ancient and powerful ally? He begged it to be believed ally? He begged it to be believed that he had no intention to reflect on the gallant men, many of whom were now scattered abroad in consequence of the attachment they bore their country, but without any discredit to them, they might have thought that it would have been but a vain undertaking in which to embark, without the advice and countenance of Great Britain. Did he blame this country for the part it had taken on this occasion, or did he say our conduct was a breach of the rules of international law? Far from it. He considered it as only one of those good offices which one country might offer to another; which implied no dictation, and contained no just cause of offence. But he repeated, the Portuguese had evidently received strong encouragement from us to adopt the constitution.

Perhaps it would here be prudent to arrest the argument, in order to examine into the nature of that principle of the (laws of nations, which, should form;? s KOMP. t4,4.0-. 1.04.4.111.P. in. the discussion of this question—he meant the principle of neutrality. It was a word which required very exact definition. Neutrality was not a point, but rather a line. It was not in-difference alike to the interests of both parties; neither was it equality of good opinion or good wishes. It was not that detestable insensibility to right or wrong, which argued the extinction of the better and more generous feelings of our nature. As a consequence of these admissions, it would be found, that although this country considered itself bound by the principle of neutrality not actively to interfere in the case of the infamous partition of Poland, it had not considered itself restrained from reprobating that partition and spoliation, although at peace with those who effected that partition. Neither in the case of the sale of the island of Corsica had this country felt itself restrained from reprobating the conduct of France in concluding that shameful bargain. The principle of neutrality had not prevented this country from marking with its animated reprobation the conduct of its ally, France, when it designed and completed that most iniquitous invasion of another of our allies, Spain, in 1823. Having compared this principle to a line, he would follow up that observation by saying, that it was a ling of such a length, that being induced by feelings or circumstances to take up a fresh position on it, or by straying from one point to another of it we might change from a state or condition of a friendly nature towards a party to whom we had pledged our neutrality, to a state or condition which might almost be considered inimical to that state.

It was necessary to premise thus much as to the nature of that principle to which he had allude, ere he sought from the right hon. Secretary opposite an explanation why or how it had so happened, that an ancient friendly power, the long-protected ally of Great Britain, had been suffered to be invaded and laid waste by a cruel usurper. He would not detail the imposing ceremonies which took place on the appointment of Don Miguel to the provisional government of Portugal,—of the dispensation which had been applied for and obtained from the Pope for the purpose of sanctioning that marriage which it was intended should be the Consequence of that deputed power on the part of Don Pedro,—sorry certainly he ever must be that such a dispensation should have been granted at all,—nor the ceremony of betrothing which took place, in the presence of the Papal Nuncio and the Portuguese authorities. Suffice it to say, that on that day this descendant of the illustrious house of Braganza swore solemnly and publicly to support and maintain that charter, or constitution, which had been granted by the emperor of Brazil, Don Pedro, to his Portuguese subjects. This was the first marked act of that iniquitous career of fraud, usurpation, and perjury, which he had since run, so as to outstrip all preceding ambition of this kind. This was in fact, the first step he made in attempting to attain that summit of ambition which most persons would with justice imagine qualified him preeminently to attain in the end a summit of a very different description. The consequences of Don Miguel's conduct were such as to alarm the fears of the Ministers of that day, who quickly met the danger; and the landing of the British troops in 1824 on the shores of Portugal might well be classed amongst the most prompt, energetic, splendid, and honourable enterprises ever undertaken by a British statesman. It was thus that the British minister felt it his duty to meet the dangers of that crisis. By this one act Mr. Canning, repaid to Portugal the debt of friendship so long owing, and which had been maturing for three hundred years.

The hon. and learned member here went into the history of the negotiations which followed on the receipt of the intelligence of this usurpation,—the arrival at Vienna of the Portuguese agent of Don Pedro, with the decree and letters of the latter relative to the appointment of Don Miguel as lieutenant of the kingdom of Portugal, which he was to govern according to the charter or constitution granted by Don Pedro to his subjects there. Here it would clearly appear that there was a condition on which Don Miguel should enjoy, and a limitation which was to restrict, the exercise of that deputed power. In addition to these document, the marquis Rezende was the bearer of a letter to the king of England, entreating him, as the ancient ally of Portugal, to give this assistance in placing Don Miguel in the Regency; which he, as it was again stated, was to govern according to the charter and the fundamental law of the land. A similar letter was addressed to Don Pedro's father-in-law." The Austrian prime minister, prince Metternich, felt that the first point he had to get acquainted with was, whether the person so nominated to the government of Portugal would comply with the conditions of the grant of this viceregal power. He founds him very impracticable on one point; namely, as to the route which he should take to reach Portugal. It was thought, and justly, that his return to Portugal could hot fail to animate and keep up the spirits of the absolutists; but it was also thought, that if Don Miguel reached Portugal through England, it would be an encouragement to the constitutionalists to hope that he did not come from a country celebrated for its being the asylum of liberty, to put down the rising liberties of his own. After some hesitation, and stating that he believed there was a strong feeling in this country against him, which he expected would procure him an unfavourable reception in England, Don Miguel gave way to the pressing instances of prince Metternich. It would appear, that he knew this country very well so far, and did justice to our feelings in favour of liberty; but he did not do justice to his own shocking and abominable hypocrisy. Prince Metternich had expressed to him the emperor's disinclination to his entering Portugal through Spain, lest he should be accompanied by those rebellious spirits which had been driven out of Portugal, in consequence of their hostility to the charter. Don Miguel appeared to acquiesce, and was subsequently introduced to a still higher personage at Vienna, whom it might be expected he would have spoken truth, had truth been in him. He then stated his sacred and solemn intention to fulfil the commands of his brother Don Pedro, and to govern according to the charter. It would be asked, how did this right accrue to the Austrian minister, or this other illustrious person, to dictate terms to the young prince, or, as an alterative, retain him a captive in a foreign country? It might, perhaps, have resulted from the circumstance of Don Miguel's having been a prisoner after the attempt on the life of Don John 6th of Portugal, and his sudden transportation thereupon to Vienna, Further, the allies, it appeared, had pledged themselves to Don Pedro, to maintain and secure the peace and safety of Portugal. In that determination they felt the peace and interest of Europe to be also deeply involved. Hence they assumed that they had a right to exercise this control over this individual; and hence, too, they inferred that they had a right to put questions to him, relative not only to the route he intended taking, but as to the course he proposed to follow in his lieutenancy, when he assumed the reins of government in Portugal. They acquainted him with the alternative, that he must comply with their resolve as to the route to Portugal and with Don Pedro's, as to the manner in which he was to administer the laws there, or else they would detain him a prisoner at Vienna, until the ulterior determination of his brother, Don Pedro, should be known with respect to him. This produced a letter of acquiescence on the part of Don Miguel to his brother, also one to the king of Great Britain, and another to his most Christian majesty, stating it to be his intention to carry into effect the constitution which his brother, the emperor of Brazil had so wisely granted to the Portuguese nation. A similar letter was penned by him to his sister, the infanta, with liberty to publish it for the satisfaction of all those who were interested, or might entertain doubts as to his sincerity. There were in these letters a boldness, a perverted courage, and a shamelessness, particularly where he spoke of the constitution in Portugal as "la constitution par moi juré," which could not fail to shock the most indifferent observer. All these assurances were confirmed at the ceremony of his espousal; and thus, on the faith of these assurances, which were nothing more than one tissue of fraud and falsehood from beginning to end, he obtained at the hands of the allies, and particularly at the hands of his ancient ally England, every facility to reach Portugal by the most safe and convenient route. Thus was he enabled to achieve his meditated usurpation; and we were so far gulled by his fraud and perjury, that he was enabled to set at defiance his brother's right, and triumph over the prostrate liberties of the Portuguese nation.

From the conduct pursued by the allies in requiring a pledge of his intentions, it was clear that if they possessed the right to make these conditions, they might also prevent the accomplishment of designs laid in fraud, falsehood, and perjury. He wished to obtain all and every assurance from the right hon. gentleman, which might tend to remove the slightest speck of suspicion, which attached itself to this country, as not having done every thing in her power to exempt herself from the deep disgrace of being accessory to the present calamitous condition of the Portuguese people. The minutes or protocols of all these conversations, correspondence, and letters, were in the last resort despatched to Don Pedro, and owing to the inducements held out to him by his allies, the courts of London and Vienna, he dismissed that cautious distrust which he had so wisely shown up to this moment, and sent his daughter, Donna Maria, to Europe, for the purpose of being espoused to the enemy of his House. It appeared but just to infer that protocols, signed and drawn up with so much care and circumstantiality as these were, must have bound all the parties reciprocally to enforce the object for which so much labour had been spent in negotiation. It would seem, too, that the allies were more especially bound to see that the absent party, Don Pedro, should not be deserted as respected his interests, by those who were pledged to support those interests. The allies who had drawn up so minutely and jealously the terms of his coming to power, it must be inferred, had the means in their hands of checking his violence, and putting, possibly, an end to his odious usurpation. The last day of February, 1828, Don Miguel arrived in this country with a British minister. His arrival was not without exciting alarm in some persons who were aware of the usurper's disposition. The Conde Villa Flor, determined to escape from the den ere the wolf returned, solicited the post of ambassador to the court of Paris. It was represented to him by the court of Vienna, that his departure might be productive of alarm, and he yielded to these solicitations, and remained at Lisbon. This was again a source of encouragement to the constitutionalists to remain and dismiss all fears. On Miguel's arrival, however, in Portugal, Villa Flor felt he was no longer safe, and sought safety in flight. The next instance of the perjuries of this despot was that most shocking and scandalous oath (if oath it could be called) which he took in the presence of the diplomatic body at Lisbon, where he contrived by muttering something to himself to absolve his conscience from forswearing himself, although to all appearances taking the oath with a due regard to the seriousness of the occasion. There was such a mixture of cowardice and superstition in this dastardly and unprincipled attempt to escape the responsibilities of wilful perjury, that it was impossible not to feel indignant at this effort to evade the sanctity of an oath: more especially where a member of a family illustrious in history, condescended to an unprincipled meanness, which on some occasions was practised by the very lowest orders at the Old Bailey, with a view to deceive mankind, and cheat as it were the Searcher of Hearts. Such was the conduct of Don Miguel on his arrival. So tyrannical were his proceedings that the bonds of society were on a sudden loosed, and loyal men felt themselves challenged to rebellion. The lesson taught the tyrant, would have been decisive, if hot instructive; for at that time the constitutionalists could have overpowered his puny strength and shipped him off to his indulgent brother, again to be treated more leniently than he deserved. But, unfortunately, there was a limitation in the instructions to our troops at Lisbon, to protect Don Miguel from insurrectionary movements. They therefore found themselves hampered by a military order from proceeding to take vengeance on him who had waded to an eminent station through perjury and crime.

There was another view of the case arising from that paragraph of the King's Speech at the opening of parliament, in which his majesty declared, that he had entered into negotiations with the head of the House of Braganza, in the hope of putting an end to "a state of affairs incompatible with the tranquillity and prosperity of Portugal," to which he begged leave to direct the attention of the House; the rather, as although his majesty had justly declared his intention to duly respect the belligerent rights of both parties, the hopes and expectations raised by the declaration proved how strongly the national feeling of the Portuguese was in favour of their constitutional rights. Indeed, so strong was this national feeling against the usurpation of Miguel that, according to the best information he could procure on the matter, and according to the deliberate opinion of the most intelligent of the di- plomatic body in Portugal, but for unforeseen events and accidents of delay on the part of the commander-in-chief of the constitutional troops, it was, to say the least, extremely doubtful whether a very different kind of resistance would not have been successfully opposed to Miguel's usurped government. Indeed, he believed, that if the troops had not been retarded in their march against the insurgents of Coimbra, no obstruction would have been, offered to their further progress, and the constitution would have been preserved. This was the more probable, because it was well known, that Don Miguel's mother had prepared to fly into Spain, despairing of the successful issue of her son's perfidious usurpation. He repeated—all the consequences which had accrued to the constitutional forces were, according to the most intelligent of the diplomatic body, occasioned by the delay and want of decision of the commanding officer. An immediate consequence of this most unfortunate accident—for it was but an accident—to the constitutional, that was the royalist troops, was their being obliged to leave Portugal, on which occasion the double honour was paid them of being treated with ignominy and insolence by Spain, and of being; received with honour and admiration by France. Some of them landed at Plymouth, where they conducted themselves so creditably, that the inhabitants passed a resolution, expressive of their sense of the unimpeached integrity of the loyal subjects of the queen of Portugal, whom they further petitioned his majesty not to remove from Plymouth.

A negotiation relating to those Portuguese residents in Plymouth, which was carried on between the Brazilian envoys and the king's government, between November and February, could not be passed over by him; though the subject was associated with somewhat painful feelings. It was necessary to remind the House, that there were, in point of fact, three ambassadors from the House of Braganza in this country—the marquis Barbacena, the marquis de Palmella, and viscount Itabayana; the former being the ambassador extraordinary who accompanied the young queen Donna Maria to this country; the second the accredited envoy from the court of Portugal; and the latter the Brazilian ambassador to England. But though Don Pedro had yielded to the dictates of nature, duty, and policy, in securing, as far as he could, the interests of his daughter—in thus providing her with a suitable guardian, and himself with a suitable representative at the British court—yet we denied his right of interference, as head of the House of Braganza, or as the natural guardian of the young queen, and so far rendered the functions of those ambassadors nugatory. This was according to his experience of the courts of law, what would be called sharp practice towards Don Pedro. Was not the case one without parallel? A young queen yet in her minority, came to a friendly government, where she was acknowledged to be a queen; and yet, when the guardians appointed by her natural protector, her father and his ministers, were denied any right of interference; indeed, were refused official recognition: was not this placing a barren scepter in her hands? The proceeding was one without precedent, and could not be justified. In a different case, in the time of Elizabeth—that was, different in its details, but similar in principle—no such extreme severity was had recourse to. The case was that of the ambassador of the queen of Scots after Elizabeth had declared against her right to the crown of Scotland. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, Elizabeth, waiving her rights, treated with him for several years as ambassador; and it was not until he had engaged in a plot against her life, that he was denied the ambassadorial privileges, being for a short time imprisoned and enlarged. How different were the relations in which we stood towards Don Pedro, whose rights we nevertheless denied! Now, he did not assert those rights of Don Pedro on the ground of his being the emperor of Brazil—he waved that part of the case altogether—but on the express declarations of the protocol signed by two, and agreed to by all the great states of Europe at Vienna, and of the several treaties concluded between this country and the House of Braganza. In looking over those treaties, he was ready to admit that they, perhaps, might not be verbally binding on Great Britain to maintain an offensive and defensive alliance with military succour; but he contended, that the spirit of those treaties warranted the king's ministers in arriving at a different conclusion; for they guaranteed the integrity of Portugal as an independent kingdom, and gave that country the right to call on this for aid against foreign invasion. Don Pedro had the more claim to insist on the fulfilment of the protocol of Vienna, because it was that act—under the advice, indeed direction, of Austria and England—which had enabled Miguel to accomplish his purpose and usurp the throne of Portugal. Without taking up the time of the House by arguing this point, he would ask, was not this country bound to place Portugal as it was before Miguel left Vienna, were it only by the hopes which we created in the minds of the people of Portugal of our disposition to aid them in their efforts to maintain the constitutional institutions which they had reason to believe we were the chief agents in procuring for them.

Having said thus much on this part of the question, he would now proceed with the painful part of the history into which he had partially entered. The royal Portuguese troops had been residing some time in Plymouth, when a negotiation became necessary with respect to them, and it was carried on with his majesty's ministers, by his friend, the marquis Palmella. And having mentioned the name of that nobleman, he might be permitted to say that, for the sixteen years during which he had been engaged in public life, and particularly at the congress of Vienna, in 1815, he had approved himself one of the ablest men who had ever served his country in a diplomatic situation. He would venture to say, that there was not a man in Europe less capable than the marquis Palmella of practising any thing that approached to deception. The negotiation, arose out of a desire expressed by government, that the Portuguese troops stationed1 at Plymouth should be dispersed and sent into remote towns and villages in this country. He begged to be understood as by no means disputing the right of government to enforce such a measures; at the same time, he believed no serious apprehension could be entertained that by the troops remaining together in Plymouth any danger was threatened either to Portugal or this country. However, when government made the proposal to the marquis Palmella, that nobleman, after having consulted the principal officers amongst the emigrants returned for answer, that sooner than separate the officers from the men, and the men from one another—sooner than disperse, and thereby in effect, annihilate the last re- mains of the troops of Donna Maria—he would consent that they should retire from the country; and he proposed that they should be sent to Brazil. This was on the 20th of November; and from that time until the 23rd of December the marquis Palmella persisted in his proposition to have the. Portuguese soldiers sent to Brazil. On that day, however, he changed the place of destination from Brazil to Terceira, for reasons which would be found sufficiently warrantable. It would be remembered, that, in the month of June previously, the inhabitants of this island had proclaimed Don Pedro. An insurrection, at the instigation of some priests, took place; but it was entirely suppressed in September. On the 6th of December, Donna Maria was proclaimed queen by the legal authorities of the island, and on the 23rd of the same month the marquis Palmella received advices from Terceira, stating that the young queen was universally acknowledged by the inhabitants. The marquis on the same day changed the nature of his proposal to government, desiring to substitute Terceira for Brazil, and stating, as the motive for this alteration, the contents of his letters from the Azores. He was in possession of a large quantity of documents from Terceira, including proclamations and addresses from various bodies, from which it will appear that, though the peace of the island was now and then slightly disturbed, from the month of November, or with more certainty from the month of December, the authority of Donna Maria was universally recognised. He did not mean to say that a guerilla or two did not occasionally make an attack on some unoffending person; but he contended that, since the month above mentioned, there was not a single occurrence which could be construed into the expression of a disaffected spirit towards the young queen. Such, he could affirm, was the result of the papers which had been placed in his hands. Under such circumstances, the marquis Palmella very naturally concluded that no objection could be entertained by this government to the removal of the troops to Terceira, because it was a place not under the power of Don Miguel, In fact, he did not see how, upon our own principle, we could hinder the Portuguese from going where they pleased. At all events, the marquis Palmella imagined he had the right of send- ing the troops of Donna Maria to any place where her authority, as queen of Portugal, was submitted to, and that consequently Great Britain had no pretence for interfering with his arrangements. How this case could be answered he really was at a loss to determine. Let them look to the contrary case, and see how far it would hold good. Could England interfere to prevent Don Miguel from sending troops to any part of the Portuguese dominions where his authority was recognised. Surely there could be no breach of neutrality in our allowing Don Miguel to send his troops to such places as acknowledged his sovereignty; otherwise we had a right to interpose and prevent the marching of his soldiers from one parish to another in the heart of Portugal. The one case was not more monstrous than the other. It was said, that we were bound not to suffer an attack on the Azores. But Terceira was not the Azores. It was an Island whose inhabitants acknowledged Donna Maria for their queen, and the troops of Donna Maria had a right to proceed thither unmolested by any power which affected to observe a neutral course. Again, it was said that resistance should have been offered to the landing of any troops of a hostile kind But why was that assumed? The men were unarmed, and they went there to strengthen the garrison on behalf of Donna Maria. Let it be supposed that the suffering of those people to embark in our ports for Terceira was a breach of neutrality, did it follow that we were to pursue them over the world, and punish them wherever they were to be found? Where vas the authority for such a doctrine? Where were the cases, drawn from good times, to establish such a position? It sounded in his ear rather as an innovation, having not one good or valid reason to support it. That we might punish breaches of neutrality in our own seas was competent to us, no doubt; but who gave us jurisdiction over Portuguese vessels in distant waters; Who gave us power over ships in Portuguese seas—seas belonging to the queen of Portugal? By what authority did we presume to exercise command in the port of Terceira, and commence hostilities against the subjects of a foreign sovereign, in the dominions of that sovereign, without being at war with her? What was an amnesty? What sort of amnesty could we have expected from the man who commanded the late executions at Oporto, who had scourged Portugal? The only advantage held out to Don Pedro was, that his daughter should have the worst husband in Europe; the only advantage to tempt the father was the honour of joining her hand in those hands which had just been embrued in the blood of his fellow-subjects. An innocent girl, of the most tender years, was to be intrusted to his mercy, whom all the powers of Europe had pronounced unfit to hold an intercourse with other nations. If Don Pedro, under these circumstances, had protested against the wickedness of his enemies and the coldness of his friends—if he had protested, that he had no longer any hope in England, and that he should wait the course of events, and the dispositions of his subjects—and if, under these circumstances, he had instructed his ministers, that Donna Maria should return to his own care, he did not wonder at the feelings which had induced the father to adopt that determination; but as he had heard that two great powers had rather desired to dissuade his ministers from executing the instructions of Don Miguel, he trusted they would consider whether, after what had recently occurred, Portugal could exist, as an independent state, without some arrangement of this sort—whether such arrangements could be made without the consent of Don Pedro—and whether such consent could be expected at such a horrible sacrifice. He hoped these great powers would see that they had a right to require that Don Miguel should give up that power which he had obtained by a fraud practised on them. He forbore to make any observations on the interruption of the ships. He confidently expected that, on that part of the subject, the most explicit explanation would be given; but he could not help saying, that he wished that these soldiers of Donna Maria had not been reduced to the necessity of showing, in a port of France, the wounds which they had received from the arms of their ancient friend and ally. He could have wished that the most intimate connection between two nations which had been recorded in history for the space of nearly five centuries, had not closed, as it had now closed, with a scene which was apt to impress the minds of men more than reasoning, and to rise up in judgment against us. The capture of the Spanish frigates in 1805 was indisputably more reconcileable to the rigid laws of war; and yet he believed there were few who did not wish that transaction, however legal, effaced from the map of history. The present state of Portugal left this country in the strange position of being obliged to guarantee the territory of a nation unfriendly to it. There were two parties in Portugal, the absolutist and the constitutionalists. The first of these were enemies to Britain, and there was nothing to disarm them: they hated this land of liberty, by a native of which the constitution was sent to Portugal, under the administration of Mr. Canning. He would not mention the insults that had been offered to Englishmen at Lisbon and Madeira, for the purpose of complaining of the government. He had a high esteem for the noble lord at the head of the foreign affairs, and he was sure there was no man more anxious to discharge his official duties correctly; but he must call upon the House to observe the hatred entertained by the absolutists for every Englishman, and every thing that savoured of English extraction, in consequence of the institutions of this country being opposed to their system of petty despotism. On the other hand, the constitutionalists viewed us with distrust, from our having refused them assistance when our encouragement had induced them to require it. By neither party, therefore, was England regarded with affection. Miguel and the absolutists looked to Spain for aid and countenance—the constitutionalists to the progress of constitutional principles in France. We, then, had no friend in a country which we guaranteed to defend and preserve entire. But the conditions on which we concluded this guarantee were at an end, and so should be our obligation to observe it. We were justified by the principles on which Mr. Canning so eloquently advocated his policy in relation to Portugal in 1825. We guaranteed a stable, legitimate, constitutional government, and not a base, feeble degraded despotism.

The last, though not the least deplorable fact in his tragic story, which he would quote, was the atrocious conduct of Miguel in May last towards certain constitutional residents in Oporto. On the 7th of May, only three weeks ago, this perfidious usurper murdered—he said murdered—ten gentlemen in Oporto: for what? Why, Simply and solely for having, on the 18th of the preceding May, followed the example of England and Austria—not to talk of Russia, Prussia, and France—in recognizing the constitution granted by Don Pedro, adopted by the Portuguese, and sworn to by the usurper himself. Two of these unfortunate gentlemen were reserved for a more protracted suffering, under the pretence of being pardoned—one being sent for life to the lingering and agonising torture of the gallies, at Angola; the other, the brother of the Portuguese ambassador at Brussels; being condemned for life to hard labour. By an edict of the most fiendish tyranny; those gentlemen were compelled first to witness the murder of their brave and high-minded companions in loyalty to the constitution, which all Europe had acknowledged, England, encouraged, and Miguel himself sworn to observe—a species of torture which the generous mind most acutely felt, and which was aggravated by the heroic fortitude of their companions' sufferings. On the day of the murder, the city of Oporto was a spectacle of horror; the rich had abandoned the town and shut themselves up in their villas—the poor shut their doors, and the streets were abandoned to the executioner, the guards, and the ill-fated victims. The 16th of May was the day chosen by Miguel for this atrocious execution. It was a most deliberate act. It was not a mere punishment for offences which were legal, and for which an amnesty had been passed ten months before, and which had actually been planned before his arrival. No; it was a bold mid deliberate defiance of civilized Europe—of Christendom; the princes and ministers of which he burnt in effigy, for having a few weeks before withdrawn their representatives from his polluted kingdom as from a city of the plague. He thought, by this slaughter of alt who opposed his despotism, to force Europe into a recognition of his throne, to prevent the effusion of more blood. By dint of murder he hoped to force us to hail, as a Christian king, the man who despised justice and had violated every law that regulated civilized man; and he held up his bloody hands in open defiance of all Europe, telling its rulers that he scorned their judgment while he defied their power.—The right hon. gentlemen concluded, amidst loud cheers, with moving for copies and extracts of communications concern- ing the relations between this country and the queen of Portugal, illustrative of the several topics alluded to in his speech.

said, that the right hon. gentleman, who had just made an able and eloquent speech to the House, had reserved for the closing part an affecting address to their feelings. The right hon. gentleman had detailed the extreme severities alleged to have been committed upon certain residents in the city of Oporto. He was confident, however, that no sympathy towards the sufferings of individuals, and no indignation against injustice would withdraw the House from the calm and dispassionate consideration of those principles on which the public policy of this country had been founded with regard to the kingdom of Portugal. He could not but express his cordial concurrence in the hope that this country, through the forbearance, wisdom, and virtue of its constitutional counsellors, would continue to enjoy the tranquillity and harmony which for the last fifteen years, it had happily experienced. He trusted that efforts would be made to advance general instruction and civilization, and increased commercial intercourse between the nations, until the character of merely military conquerors was reduced to its proper dimensions, and until society was impressed with just notions of moral obligations and the blessings of peace. He hoped he should not be misconstrued, as a minister of this country, in using this language. It proceeded from no unwillingness to enter upon war, if the cause were just and necessary—from no diffidence in the resources of the country—from no fear of the ability of bringing such a contest to a successful issue; but no man interested in the general improvement and happiness of mankind, and charged with the superintendence of the concerns of a great nation, could be accounted as acting an unworthy part in wishing for the continuance of peace. He indulged the hope of being able to satisfy the House, that the course pursued with respect to Portugal had not only been in conformity to the strict principle of engagements—not only in conformity to the moral responsibility which England had incurred—but that it was better calculated to provide for the continuance of tranquillity, than that which, judging by this arguments and observations, the right hon. gentleman would have been disposed to recommend with re- gard to the kingdom of Portugal. He admitted with the right hon. gentleman the antiquity of the relations subsisting between this country and Portugal. He admitted that they had continued almost without interruptions for four hundred and fifty years; and although the right hon. gentleman said, that on three occasions Portugal was subjected to invasion in consequence of its adherence to England, yet he begged to remind the House, that England had not been backward in advancing to the succour of Portugal; and that the history of no country exhibited more proofs of the part taken by a powerful state to protect any kingdom in its interests and independence. The Portuguese were well entitled to the name of ancient allies: them inhabitants of the respective countries had united their arms in many fields, and almost always in fields of victory. The question now to be considered was, whether treaties existed imposing on Great Britain any obligation which of late had not been fulfilled; or whether any obligation imposed on her a duty to be fulfilled when called on by an appeal for further interference.

If the House would permit him he would notice in detail the several observations of the right hon. gentleman; and in the first place, those made rather with a view of provoking explanation than of criminating or accusing the advisers of the Crowns. The right hon. gentleman had stated that by a series of treaties, England was bound to protect the integrity and independence of the Portuguese territories. That statement was correct; but he denied that, either in the letter or in the spirit of those treaties, or in any engagement or obligations entered into by Great Britain, there was conveyed a guarantee of the succession of any particular individual, or a guarantee of the existence of any political institution in Portugal. No request for such a guarantee had ever been preferred before the year 1820. In consequence of the unfortunate dissentions since that time frequent applications had been made to England by different parties, either for the guarantee of certain institutions or the security of existing forms of government; but the uniform answer was, that the guarantee to Portugal was against foreign invasion, and not on behalf of particular institution, and that the general rule of England was not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, In 1822, his right hon. friend, Mr. Canning, being reappointed to the office of secretary for foreign affairs, was appealed to by the democratic government of Portugal for a guarantee of its political institutions. His right hon. friend referred the deputation to the declaration made by lord Castlereagh at the congress of Laybach, as the minister of England, that her rule was not to interfere in the affairs of other countries, and distinctly notified to the secretary of state of Portugal, that the general principles of lord Castlereagh's declaration applied to the institutions of Portugal. He held in his hand an extract from the note written by Mr. Ward under the direction of Mr. Canning. It stated, that, in reply to the doubts of Mr. Oliveira, he referred to the declaration of 1821, laying, it down as his Britannic majesty's principles, with respect to foreign states, to abstain, from interference in their domestic affairs; a principle which applied to all independent states, and was the more binding as depending on the law of nations. He referred, he said, to this note, to show that the present policy was not a line of conduct adopted for one occasion, but a principle expressly laid down both by lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, and which, notwithstanding our peculiar relations with Portugal, in consequence of treaties existing for four hundred years, was yet not considered applicable to Portugal more than to any other state. In 1822, when Brazil and England were engaged in negotiations consequent upon the declaration of the independence of the crown of Portugal, the principle was also considered applicable, and was observed throughout; and, in acknowledging the independence of Brazil, it was understood that it should not preclude an amicable arrangement between the two countries. The course adopted by Mr. Canning not only was sanctioned by sound policy and justice, but was the principle that had always guided England, when called on to interfere in the civil concerns Portugal. It was quite true that, in 1826, England sent an army to Portugal, and he thought then, and thought now that, in doing so, she not only acted in conformity with the spirit of ancient treaties, but of wisdom and sound policy. Nothing could be more express than the disclaimer by Mr. Canning, that the army was not sent out for the purpose of supporting political institutions, but at the express instance of the de facto govern- ment of Portugal, craving the assistance of England as a protection from foreign invasion. The principle of non-interference was distinctly recognised in sending out that army, and every instruction to the officer in command was to forbear mingling in civil dissentions, but to protect the kingdom from foreign invasion.

He brought forward these statements to show that England had throughout declined giving a guarantee for any political institutions or interfering in civil dissentious. Thai being the general rule, was there any peculiarity in the usurpation of Don Miguel, or in the claims of Donna Maria, to impose upon England the necessity of departing from her usual course? He was prepared to contend, in opposition to the interferences that might be drawn from the arguments of the right hon. gentleman, that there was no special case calling for a departure from our general system of policy. The first proof given by the right hon. gentleman of the duty of a qualified interference was drawn from the fact, that Don Miguel's accession or usurpation was in 1825, at the time when the treaty of separation between Brazil and Portugal had been entered into, and when the constitution had been sent from Brazil, through the agency of sir Charles Stuart, a British subject. The right hon. gentleman had stated, that this circumstance must have led the people of Portugal to believe that England was a party to the grant of the constitution, and as such bound to aid and support it. The answer to that point was quite conclusive. The affairs of Portugal would he so familiar to the House, that they would recollect that Don John, its late monarch, died in 1826, and that Don Pedro, his son having effected the separation of Brazil and Portugal, by treaty, was styled Emperor of Brazil. Don John died, and the treaty was ratified; but no provision had been made for the succession to the crown of Portugal. Don Pedro claimed the crown as king by succession, and determined on transferring it to his daughter, with the grant of a constitution. Now, the feet was, that England was not in any way responsible for that constitution. Don John died in 1826, and sir Charles Stuart brought the constitution to Portugal on the 11th of May in the same year; and, by the dates of the different events, it was physically impossible that England should have organized the charter. Sir Charles Stuart was not only the pleni- potentiary of England to Brazil, but was also employed in a similar capacity in adjusting certain differences between Brazil and Portugal; and, having discharged his duties as a British subject, he had remained at Rio Janeiro in the latter character. Sir Charles did not act by the advice of the British government, but was the mere bearer of the charter; and Mr. Canning, fearing that his residence at Lisbon might create an impression that this country was responsible for the charter, sent a circular to every court in Europe, disclaiming, on the part of the British government, any part in, or even knowledge of, the transaction; and he moreover ordered lord Stuart forthwith to leave Lisbon, lest his presence should be misconstrued into a countenancing of Don Pedro's constitution. The right hon. gentleman had inferred, that England had contracted to support the constitutional charter. Now, it so happened, that all delusion upon that point had been effectually prevented by the language of the minister for foreign affairs, who declared in parliament, that he had declined advising the king to interfere in the affairs of Portugal. Nothing could be more explicit then the declaration of Mr. Canning. As the subject was important, he trusted the House would allow him to refer to the words of Mr. Canning. On the 12th of December, 1826, in the celebrated speech which he delivered on bringing down the king's message respecting the affairs of Portugal, Mr. Canning expressed himself as follows:—"It has been surmised, that this measure (the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal), as well as the abdication with which it was accompanied, was the offspring of our advice. No such thing Great Britain did not suggest this measure. It is not her duty, nor her practice to offer suggestions for the internal regulations of foreign states. She neither approved nor disapproved of the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal; her opinion upon that grant was never required. True it is, that the instrument of the constitution charter was brought to Europe by a gentleman of high trust in the service of the British government. Sir Charles Stuart had gone to Brazil to negociate the separation between that country and Portugal. In addition to his character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain as the mediating power, he had also been invested by the king of Portugal with the character of his most faithful majesty's plenipotentiary for the negotiation with Brazil. That negotiation had been brought to a happy conclusion; and therewith the British part of sir C. Stuart's commission had terminated. But sir C. Stuart was still resident at Rio de Janeiro, as the plenipotentiary of the king of Portugal, for negotiating commercial arrangements between Portugal and Brazil. In this latter character it was that sir C. Stuart, on his return to Europe, was requested, by the emperor of Brazil, to be the bearer to Portugal of the new constitutional charter. His majesty's government found no fault with sir C. Stuart for executing this commission; but it was immediately felt, that if sir C. Stuart were allowed to remain at Lisbon, it might appear in the eyes of Europe that England was the contriver and imposer of the Portuguese constitution. Sir C. Stuart was, therefore, directed to return home forthwith, in order that the constitution, if carried into effect there, might plainly appear to be adopted by the Portuguese nation itself—not forced upon them by English interference." On the part of the government of England, it was evident, therefore, that no advice had been given on the subject of this charter, and that England was in no way responsible for it. Mr. Canning publicly avowed this fact; therefore there could have been no deception practised upon Portugal, nor could she have placed any reliance upon the participation of England in the transaction.

The right hon. gentleman, in the second part of his speech, had adverted to the discussions at London and Vienna, respecting the acceptance of the regency by Don Miguel as involving a necessity to support the claims of the young queen. But surely it was too much to contend, that, if England and Austria had taken certain measures respecting the appointment of Don Miguel to the regency, with the sanction of Don Pedro, they thereby became the guarantees of the queen's rights. It was true, that the king of Great Britain and the Emperor of Austria took certain measures to induce Don Miguel to comply with the engagements: and it was true, that the engagements he contracted with Don Pedro were not fulfilled. That circumstance might impair the individual character and conduct of Don Miguel, in any discussion regarding his private crimes and vices: but he would remind the right hon. gentleman, that the vices and the crimes of this individual were matter of consideration for the inhabitants of Portugal; and if ever we undertook to govern our public policy by considerations arising from the private acts of individuals, he feared that that influence, which he rejoiced to hear we were admitted to possess, would not long continue. These were considerations which ought not to influence the public policy of other nations. Then the question came to this—was England to undertake the conquest of Portugal for Donna Maria or not? That was the whole question. The right hon. gentleman said, that England and Austria ought to have compelled Don Miguel to have executed his office of Regent of Portugal. By what means? There was only one of two courses of action—either complete neutrality, or the conquest of Portugal for the queen. To give advice to Don Miguel, without intending to follow up that advice by force, if necessary, would be very likely to disappoint its effect; to threaten, without executing the threat, would be very inconsistent with the dignity of the Crown of England. To enter into any alliance with Brazil, with regard to the succession of the young queen, would, for various reasons, besides our proximity to Portugal, make England the principal in the war, and Brazil an inadequate sharer. It would be difficult to contend, that there was any thing in ancient treaties, or any part of our stipulations, which strengthened the claim on England to advance the interests of Donna Maria by arms, or to force upon a reluctant people a sovereign they, were not willing to accept. The right hon. gentleman had said, that at Vienna it had been intimated to Don Miguel, by the courts of Austria and England, that it he did not accept the regency on the conditions upon which it was offered to him, he should be detained at Vienna until instructions could be received from Don Pedro. He (Mr. Peel) did not recollect that any such intimation had been conveyed to Don Miguel. He had no recollection as to any intention of forcibly detaining him; and he could assert that England was no party to any such forcible detention. England was merely present by her ambassador. It was, no doubt, an indignity to England, that Don Miguel did not fulfil his stipulations, which had been entered into in the presence of her ambassador. But the question was, whether it was just or politic to make this a ground of war? He deplored, as much as the right hon. gentleman, Don Miguel's non-observance of those stipulations, and his want of faith; but he only contended, that there was no ground for the interference of England by force, still less for adopting a principle of interference which might lead to serious consequences.

Another subject to which the right hon. gentleman had referred was, the blockade of Terceira; and, without entering into all the particulars of that blockade, he should be able to justify the course pursued by government. The right hon. gentleman had lamented that England had respected a. blockade established by a de facto government. He would merely adduce, as a proof, that there was no partiality to Portugal in recognizing the blockade, the fact, that when Don Pedro disunited the Portuguese empire, and declared Brazil independent, in defiance of his father, he established a blockade. England, upon that occasion, pursued the same course she had now done. Without pronouncing upon the legality of the government, she respected this act. So, in the present case, without pronouncing on the legality of Don Miguel's government, finding a blockade established, we had respected it, as we had done in Greece and in South America, when a blockade was established by a competent force. Then the right hon. gentleman had contended, that there was a want of courtesy in not admitting the claims of the respective ministers of Portugal and Brazil. Now, there were three individuals in this country who had taken part in some diplomatic relations—the marquis Palmella, the marquis Barbacena, and count Itabayana. But when the marquis Palmella was applied to respecting the affairs of Portugal, he declared his functions to be at an end. Surely England could not be expected to recognize a minister who, when he was addressed upon public matters, declared that his functions as minister were at an end! With regard to the marquis Barbacena, he arrived here in charge of the queen of Portugal quite Unexpectedly. The queen had been sent from the Brazils to Vienna, in Order to be placed under her relation, the emperor of Austria. No notification had been .transmitted to this country of his intention to send hex here. Letters were actually received from Mr. Gordon, our minister at the Brazils, dated three weeks after, the queen, of Portugal had sailed, which mentioned no intention of the queen coming to England. It was not until the arrival of the; marquis, Barbacena at Gibraltar, that he determined to convey her hither,; and it was not too much for the government to ask the marquis, "in what character do you appear?" Still it was intimated to him, that notwithstanding the want of courtesy displayed in not notifying the intention of her majesty, this would not affect the conduct of the government, or the disrespectful reception of the queen. But this showed the absolute necessity of ascertaining, the character and powers of the marquis. Therefore, he could not think that his noble friend at the head of the foreign department, having to do with three ministers of one state, was, in fault, if he desired to know their powers before he treated with them.

He would again remind the hon. gentleman, that if Don Miguel did sway the destinies of Portugal, this was not owing to foreign influence; it was owing to the Portuguese themselves. He had been proclaimed king by the Cortes of the kingdom. An insurrection had, indeed, sprung up, but it had failed. The right hon. gentleman said that it failed through some mistake, and that if the insurgents had pressed forward to Lisbon, Don Miguel and his mother would have been forced to emigrate. But he (Mr. Peel) held, if to be quite unnecessary to discuss these points, or to inquire into the popularity, of the king, or; the, consequences which might have happened if the Insurgent-general had advanced. Don Miguel was the person administering, de facto, the government of Portugal, and he could not think it .prudent on the part of England to undertake to displace him, and to dictate to the Portuguese who should be their ruler.

The only other transaction to which the right hon. gentleman had referred in the second, part of his speech, was that of Terceira. He would attempt to explain, with, as much clearness possible, the course which the government had pursued in this affair. It was the determination of the English government to maintain a strict and undeviating neutrality in regard to the dissensions of Portugal; and they resolved not to be induced, by any appeal to their, feelings to depart from it. They considered that there had been no sufficient case made out for forcible interference, and they resolved not to interfere. When the insurgents in the north of Portugal were driven to take refuge in Spain, Spain objected to receive them, and England did interfere to procure them a milder treatment; They, however, determined to repair to England, and applied for leave, which was granted; and a body of from three thousand to four thousand men were received at Plymouth, and continued there for a considerable time. The right hon. gentleman said, that a notification was conveyed to them in November, that the officers were to be separated from the men; that, in consequence, the marquis Palmella informed the duke of Wellington of .their wish to retire to Brazil, and that on the 23rd of December they applied to go to Terceira. The right hon. gentleman's version of this transaction was somewhat different from his. On the 23rd of December, an intimation had been given to marquis Palmella that England would not permit them to go on a hostile expedition to any part of the Portuguese dominions. But the right hon. gentleman had not stated, that, on the 15th of October, two months before the period before mentioned, the marquis Barbacena had written to the duke Of Wellington to inform him that the government of the Azores had made preparations for the reception of the Portuguese refugees, and that the marquis applied for a conveyance of the troops to Tereeira, the largest island of the Azores. The other islands had acknowledged Don Miguel; in Terceira the garrison was in favour of Don Miguel; but there was a strong party in the Island in favour of the queen. The answer of the duke of Wellington, on the 18th of October, was, that England Was determined to maintain a neutrality in the civil dissensions of Portugal, and that the king, with .that determination, could hot permit the ports and arsenals of England to be made places of equipment for hostile armaments. It was intimated to the marquis of Palmella, that although the government were willing to give shelter to the troops, it was improper that they should continue to occupy Plymouth as a military body, and that they should distribute themselves in the adjoining villages. The answer to this intimation was, that their separation as a military body would relieve the Portuguese government of its apprehensions. Was it to be tolerated, that a Power not at war with us should see a force collected in England sufficient to excite apprehensions? The marquis Palmella was told, that the troops must give up their military character and become individuals. The answer was, that rather than separate, and destroy their military character, they would prefer going to Brazil. The reply to this was that we did not wish them to go to Brazil, but we would not obstruct them; and in order to protect them from Portuguese cruizers, a British convoy was offered and declined. The right hon. gentleman said, that application was made for permission for a body of unarmed men to go to Terceira. But it was necessary that the House should know certain facts relating to the export of arms in that Island, which, if permitted, every object they had in view would have been attained. He was sorry to be obliged to state these facts; but it was necessary to the vindication of the government; and those who were implicated in those transactions must suffer. At an earlier period than that mentioned by the right hon. gentleman; namely, the 15th of August, 1828, count Itabayana had applied to lord Aberdeen, for permission to export one hundred and fifty barrels()of gunpowder and a quantity of muskets to Brazil. Lord Aberdeen replied, that he would grant that permission, provided the arms and powder were not intended to he employed in the civil dissensions of Portugal; that if the emperor of Brazil had determined to attempt to conquer Portugal, England would not interfere; and he therefore required a bonâ fide declaration, as to the manner in which the arms and powder were to be employed. Count Itabayana's answer was, that he did not hesitate to give a clear and precise reply, and that there was no intention of so employing them. In consequence of this answer, lord Aberdeen gave the permission, desired; but the arms and powder were, notwithstanding this declaration, instantly transported to Terceira. Therefore, when application was made to the government for permission, for the troops, to leave this country for Terceira, they said, "we have been already deceived: you profess to sail as unarmed men, but you will find arms on your arrival at Terceira." They did, however, sail and the right hon. gentleman had asked what right we had to stop them on the high seas? He would tell the House, that they sailed with false clearances, which were obtained at the Custom-house as for Gibraltar, for Virginia, and other places; but the vessels really went to Terceira. Now, he begged the House to consider, and to decide on this statement of the ease, and he would ask, whether it was consistent with the character of England to permit a military body thus to wage war from our ports with a power with which we were not at war? We did not recognize Don Miguel, it was true; but we were not at war with Portugal. We still maintained commercial relations with that country, and had a Consul there. It was too much for Brazil to desire to place us different situation with Portugal from .that in which she was herself placed with that country, for she also had a Consul there. We had no reason to believe that Don Pedro meditated a conquest of any part of the Portuguese dominions; and the question was, whether private individuals were to be permitted to carry on hostilities with Portugal from Plymouth? The duty of neutrality was as strong in respect to a de facto government, as to one de jure. It was inconsistent with neutrality to permit an armed force to remain in this country. In addition to the Portuguese troops at Plymouth, three hundred Germans were enlisted in the north of Europe to reinforce them. Was this to he tolerated? When the Portuguese refugees went to Spain; we required that the officers should be separated from the men, and because Spain refused, we prepared to go to war, and actually sent five thousand men to enforce our demand. Was it the policy of England to prevent the dismemberment of the Portuguese empire? In 1825, we stipulated that Portugal should be separated from Brazil; so that motives of policy as well as neutrality called upon us to discourage these attempts, and above all to prevent thin country from being made the arena for the designs of other powers. What was to prevent Russia and France from making .a similar use of our ports?

He would now leave the House to decide, whether the government of England was not right in preventing its manifest intention being defeated by false clearances and false assurances. These were the facts of the case and he was satisfied that the character of England had been vindicated by not allowing its ports to be made subservient to such designs. These were the principles upon which government had acted. The officer who had been intrusted with the naval expedition to Terceira, had acted with the utmost perseverance. He gave ample warning; and it was not until a passage was attempted to be forced that he reluctantly fired a shot, which killed one man and wounded another. Having now given the explanations which the right hon. gentleman required, he came to his motion. It was impossible not to acknowledge the forbearance of the House with regard to the discussion of foreign affairs,—a forbearance dictated by a sense of the delicacy of interfering with pending negotiations, and prejudging measures; yet he had no hesitation in saying, that he was perfectly prepared to acquiesce in the motion of the right hon. gentleman, and probably the right hon. gentleman, instead of confining it to a call for certain papers, would allow his motion to stand as it appeared in the notice paper—"for copies or extracts of communications concerning the relations between this country and her most faithful majesty the queen of Portugal;" and he assured him, that every paper connected with the queen of Portugal, which it was consistent with the duty of ministers to produce, should be most readily given.

said, he would' trouble the House a short time for the purpose of setting his right hon. friend right with The House; and to prevent any idea going abroad, that there was, in any part of that House, a disposition maintain the opinion which the right hon. gentlemen had imputed to hit tight hon. friend—that the principle of nun-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states, was not a sacred and inflexible principle of policy. He was confident that his right hon. friend had been misunderstood, if he had been supposed to recommend any deviation from that rule. A tee was barely possible in which a government of a country might be plunged into such a state of anarchy as to render necessary for other, governments to choose between two parties. His objection to the measures of government was, not that they evinced too little disposition to interfere, but that there had been interference; and he should show that the principles of non-interference been departed. He should go back to a period long antecedent to that stated by the right hon. gentleman. Having done so much as we had for Portugal, had we a right to stop? Having produced the events under which it was now writhing,—not by a fleet or an army, but by counsels,—were we not bound to follow up our former course of counsels, and by the weight of our authority make safe what we had begun? In what had taken place with regard to the constitution of Brazil, there had been interference, though he did not think Mr. Canning was chargeable with it. But an English ambassador, taking charge of the constitution, and that ambassador exercising the functions of a .Portuguese ambassador, constituted a kind of interference, and had the effect of committing England. The advice of our government, it appeared, was tendered unasked; it could not be contended, then, that the government was not somewhat committed as to what followed from this measure; for the sufferers from Don Miguel's severity suffered for acts which we had recommended. We were then called upon to interfere, not by our fleets or our army, to put down the government de facto, but by the right of our influence, and by the authority of our name. He had listened patiently to the speech of the right hon. gentleman, anxious to hear an answer to his right hon. friend; but he confessed he was still ignorant of the defence, or of the right on, which we had acted, in our conduct towards the Portuguese refugees. He coincided with the principle laid down by the right hon. gentleman; but he had totally misunderstood his right hon. friend, .who did not deny the right of England to disperse a body of persons embattled in the country, when dangerous to its peace; he admitted that it was not only the right, but the duty of the government to do so. But he wished to know the ground of that authority acted on by the English government, of seizing foreigners on the waters of the high seas.—He should not impair the effect of what had been so justly said by his right hon. friend, with reference to Don Miguel; who was not to be ranked amongst modern petty tyrants, but amongst the prodigious monsters of antiquity. Degrading as was his tyranny, and though our prayers might be poured out that the term of his cruelties might shortly come, still we had no right to interfere. So long as Don Miguel remained in his, own country he was safe; but let him go beyond the bounds of his territory, and he then made it imperative upon other powers to interfere. He had done so in his blockade of Terceira, where he was no longer even a king de facto; the right and the fact both centred in Donna Maria, and the usurper of her crown was not even a usurper de facto at Terceira. Yet why should not her subjects be permitted to go to Terceira? Because Don Miguel did not like it. Was this acting up to the sound law of nations, and preserving the corner-stone of that peace, which it was declared to be the duty of the country to preserve inviolate? At all times, he had prayed for this valuable object; but especially now, when we might be said to be bleeding at every pore from the effects of war, he trusted that nothing would place that dearest object in hazard. He heartily rejoiced to hear that the ardour for military glory, and the thirst of fame, which was the curse of nations, and which our neighbours were more prone to admire than ourselves, had been so justly stigmatized that night. We had interfered, however, and interfered in favour of Don Miguel's policy, instead of against him; and he still desiderated an answer to the question which had been asked by his right hon. friend, by what right or title had we interfered with the expedition to Terceira. Was Terceira blockaded? According to the law of blockade, a paper blockade was never regarded; but this was not the case even of a paper blockade. When two belligerents, (continued the learned gentleman) engage in war, I, one of the belligerents, have a perfect right to exclude you, a neutral power, from carrying assistance to my opponent; but, if I pretend to exclude you by issuing an order, without having any force to maintain that order, you have a perfect right to break my paper blockade. Now, Don Miguel had sent some ships to Terceira, which were driven away; and he bad no force to accomplish a blockade, and therefore Terceira was unblockaded. If that place had been blockaded, he might have said to this country, that she ought not to suffer any assistance to go from her to a country which rebelled against its master. But Terceira was not Don Miguel's territory, and these Portuguese, who sailed out there, were the subjects of Donna Maria We had given them refuge in this country, and they either wanted, or were desired, to quit this country, and they wished to go to Donna Maria's country. What right, then, had we to say you shall not go there? Terceira belonged of, right and in fact to Donna Maria. Her subjects in this country say they will go there: we say no, you shall not; because Miguel, the: usurper of Portugal, where he has possession, is equally the usurper of Terceira, where he has no possession; and though he has no force to prevent your landing, yet we with our ships will execute his blockade. Admitting that we had a right to desire the Portuguese to go, out from this country, what right had we to follow them out of the country? If they choose to play tricks in our ports, let us prevent them; if they take a false appearance, let us stop them but, supposing the fact, that they pretended to be going to Brazil, to. North America, or Rio de Janeiro, and in reality meant to go to Terceira, yet they, having affected, their fraudulent purpose, and having actually cleared out of the ports, I maintain, that we have no warrant, either in our municipal law, or in the law of nations, for stopping them beyond the waters of this kingdom. Our jurisdiction does not extend further. It is the most common operation of the country for vessels to clear out for one place and to go to another; but did, any person ever hear of those vessels being stopped by a warrant of municipal law? After a vessel had cleared the Downs, did any one hear of its being accosted, and, demand being made where it was going? Did ever any one hear of a vessel being stopped on our own coast? But we go further than that, and tell the Portuguese, they shall not land at Terceira, and we stop them and fire upon them in the waters of the queen of Portugal. They had gone from this country at our desire, and they were fired upon because they chose to go: back to the country of their lawful sovereign, which sovereign had been entertained, and is still entertained, at our own court, and received with that hospitality due to her sex, her, rank, and her misfortunes. I cannot understand the right this interference as regards the municipal law, or the law of nations; nor, permit, me to add, can I understand the policy. It appears to me to be a departure from the principle of non-interference. It is an interference between Don Miguel and the queen Donna Maria,—between Portugal and Terceira,—between the usurper .in the old, and the pretender in the new, world. If the right hon. gentleman had not agreed to give the papers moved for, and if my right hon. friend had pressed his motion to the vote, I should have voted for the motion, concurring generally in the observations which have been made as to the priety of interfering between the mother country and the colony. Though many may think that the crimes of Don Miguel, and the sufferings of his unhappy subjects, give us a right to interfere with his government, and to tear him down from ,that height which by his crimes he has ascended, yet, however anxious may be my wish to see that tyranny put an end to, I should be the last man to counsel the stirring one step for the purpose of obtaining an object, which, though greatly to be desired, can only justly, can only safely, can only lawfully be accomplished, by those who live under his government. I would counsel strictly and rigorously noninterference with reference even to Don Miguel; not that I hate his, tyranny less, but that I love peace and the principles which lead to it more.

said, that in a love for peace he would yield to no man, for he had seen as much as any one the beneficial effects that arose from such a blessing. Every body, however, who had listened to the observations which had fallen from the right hon. mover, and from his right hon. friend, must have been, convinced, that the subject, was one of great intricacy, and he therefore claimed for himself and for every member of the House the right to form their opinions on the documents which were about to be produce, without being pledged to any fixed line of argument, by what might be delivered on the present occasion. The foundation of all the principle difficulties of the question .was to be traced: to the misfortunes which had arisen in the royal family of Portugal. In the year 1807, Don John had, been compelled to quit Portugal, and to emigrate to Brazil; the consequence of which was, that the relative position of the two states was changed: after this a war was likely, to ensue between Portugal and Brazil, and England offered her services to effect an amicable arrangement between the two countries. In consequence of that offer, Don John made a more distinct division of the two empires; and from that moment the separation of countries was recognised by all the States of Europe, with the exception, perhaps, of Spain. But though all this, was settled on an apparently firm basis, no arrange- ment with respect to the succession was made at the time that Dan John died. The consequence of this course, was, that Don Pedro had the option of which country he would rule over, and he elected in favour of Brazil, at the same time appointing his daughter, Donna Maria to be queen of Portugal. But the same time that he provided that country with a queen, he also provided it with a constitution; which, in his opinion, was an unwise and injudicious act. He therefore could not be surprised, that the constitution which had been sent to Portugal had not been universally adopted. This, constitutional charter, been brought to England by Sir Charles Stuart; but, at the same time, it should be observed, that he was, simply the bearer of that document and had taken no part in its formation; and it had already been proved by is right hon. friend, by dates; that it was impossible the government of, this country could have had any hand in the transaction. In fact, so far from Charles Stuart being any party to the formation of the constitution, he had protested against being made the bearer of it to Europe; and the government of England, or, at least Mr. Canning in behalf of that government, had, without the loss of A day, written to every court of Europe, to state, that the government had received information of the transmission a, the charter, bat that they Were no parties to it directly on indirectly. He stated most distinctly, that this country; never did give advice to regency of Porte gat to accept the constitution, and, therefore, the observations of the right hon. gentleman as to this point were evidently founded upon a misconception. What the go vernment of this country had done had been to tell the regency of Portugal, that they must take. the decision of the question upon them selves; and whether accepted it or whether they rejected it England would feel herself lf equally bound to support her I relations with the country. The only advice government had given—if, advice it might be called—was, that which way the regency might decide, it would, at least, be better to submit the constitution to the acceptance of the Portuguese nation as soon as possible so that no period of confusion and indecision might intervene. The government of this country had done all that she could do to put an end to the dissentions that existed in Portugal; and it was with that view that she united with the court of Austria in becoming as it were the guarantee for the convention by, which the marriage of Don Miguel with Donna Maria was agreed upon. The English government had recongnized Donna. Maria as the queen of Portugal; and that fact was spoken of as shewing that we could not countenance the usurpations of Don Miguel; but we were not alone in that position, for not only England but every other state of Europe had recognised her as the queen o Portugal. Don Pedro had himself made the king of England and the emperor of Austria the depositaries of his solemn engagements, and in the conditions he had imposed on his brother, he had made these two courts, in some measure, the guarantees for their performance. When Don Miguel came to this country, he received favour and protection from its Sovereign—he incurred a debt of gratitude, which he not Only never troubled himself to discharge; but he had performed acts of treachery—he had violated, his engagements, and had pursued such a line of conduct, that a minister of the Crown had been obliged An say that night that Don Miguel had been guilty of committing an indignity on the crown of. England. When be heard that stated, he felt quite convinced that nothing but sense of the weakness of Portugal, as compared to this country, had prevented that indignity from being suitably punished. He must say, however, that, Short of hostilities, it did become a country like this to mark such base conduct with its highest disapprobation; for he did not consider it for the interest of morality for the advantage of this, country, or for the benefit of the world at large, that we should do nothing, lest our in action should be construed into even negative countenance of his crimes. It was certainly not in strict accordance with the laws of nations for a body of Portuguese to assemble and arm in this country with a view of quitting it for the purpose of making war on Don Miguel; land the false clearances obtained by the fleet were a fraud the government of this country; but that fraud might have remained unpunished, when we had suffered to pass without notice so frauds on the part of Don Miguel. What Such base conduct as be had exhibited deserved to was unnecessary to say; for the judgment of the world had been already passed upon it. The true character of Don Miguel would be known by posterity, but it ought to be exhibited in its true colours at this moment: its hideousness should be painted to all the world, and in proportion as his character was known, the greater chance would there be that Portugal would be raised from her present state of misery and degradation. With respect to the instructions that had been given to the British army, he begged to state, that they were, in the first place, expressly directed to assist the Portuguese government in resisting any attempts at interference on the part of, Spain; in the next, they were ordered not to do any thing that might appear like interference on their part in the domestic divisions in Portugal; and in the last, they were directed to protect the Royal ,Family in Lisbon, in case of any disturbances endangering their safety in that city.

said, that there were two avowals in the right hon gentleman's speech which greatly, astonished him. The one that though the did not interfere, the administration of which he had formed a part did not approve of Don Pedro's having given any thing in the nature of a free constitution to Portugal; the other, that England had been concerned in urging on Don Pedro, the sacrifice of his infant daughter to an incestuous marriage with a profligate uncle.

said, that the British government had not recently made any proposition for the completion of the marriage, between Don Miguel and. Donna Maria, nor had it ever made any such proposition at any time except with the cordial concurrence of the emperor of Brazil. The moment the emperor intimated an Objection to the marriage, all communication on the subject on the part of the British government ceased. No proposition for the renewal of the proceedings would be made unless with the entire concurrence of the emperor of Brazil.

rose and said,—^* Sir, I am glad that the foreign relations the country have at last been brought under discussion in this House. It was, indeed; natural, that the, all-engrossing matters of domestic policy, by which we have been occupied during the present session should for a time halve withdrawn our at- tention from external affairs; but it would have been much to tie regretted if parliament had separated; Without affording the government an opportunity of giving suck explanations with respect to our foreign relations, as might be in their power, without violation of confidence, or prejudice to pending negotiations.

^* Inserted with the permission of Viscount Palmerston.

England, indeed, must naturally wish to have some knowledge of the spirit, in which her government have been exercising those full powers, with which her confidence has, invested them; and Europe has long been looking for some more authentic expression of the feelings of the British cabinet, than can be collected from those vague surmises, to which their silence has hitherto given such undisturbed existence.

It is just too, to the government them selves, that they should be judged upon their own explanations, and not merely by the construction which others may put upon their actions.

That some explanations are much required from the government if it were only for their own sakes, they cannot fail to be aware; for they cannot be ignorant, that impressions have gone forth, not in this country only, but throughout all Europe, that the foreign relations of England, for the last twelve months, have been conducted in a spirit far different from that, which, for some years previous, had animated our councils; and by no means such, as their declarations of May, 1828, had authorized us to expect.

If these observations apply more or less to every part of our foreign relations, they certainly bear with the greatest force upon our conduct with reference to Portugal; and there can be the less difficulty in calling for the fullest explanations on that matter, because that chapter seems unfortunately to closed; there appears to nothing be nothing on this subject to inquire into but Past transactions; and little hope can be entertained of prospective arrangements, which such an inquiry could embarrass.

The course which the British government has held with respect to the affairs Portugal, has excited Europe; and has inspired every Englishman, who values good name of his country, with deep mortification.

The civilised world rings with execrations upon Miguel and yet this destroyer of constitutional Freedom, this breaker of solemn oaths, this faithless usurper, this enslaver of his country, this trampler upon public law, this violator of private rights, this attempter of the life of helpless and defenceless woman, is in the opinion of Europe mainly indebted to the success which has hitherto attended him, to a belief industriously propagated by his partisans, and not sufficiently refuted by any acts of the British government, that the cabinet of England look upon his usurpation with no unfriendly eye.

In the opinion of many, this impression is confirmed by much which the government have done, and by much which they have omitted to do. On the one hand it is said, that they have shewn a great alacrity to back up his measures of war by their recognitions; and on the other it is thought, that they have displayed a very patient forbearance under indignities offered to, England, in the persons of British residents in. Portugal; while their steady refusal to interfere in cases in which their interference would have been prejudicial, to Don Miguel, has been contrasted with their promptitude and vigour to interfere, when their interference was subservient to his projects.

All these things, it is said, seem to shew, that they look upon his conduct and political existence with very different eyes from the rest of mankind; and appear to countenance, the supposition that they have attempted by negotiation to give a legitimate, sanction and permanent existence to his usurpation; and have even contemplated the project of delivering up to the keeping and custody of a man, who has attempted to embrue his hands in a sister's blood, that infant queen, whose life is one barrier between him and the throne which he covets.

For these reasons it is fitting that these matters should be inquired into; that the truth should be known; that if the government have deserved the censure of parliament, that censure may be awarded that if, on the contrary, they have been unjustly blamed, they and the country they govern, may at once be relieved from the odium under which we now labour.

The ground upon which my right hon. friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, has defended the doing of all that has been done, and the not doing of all that has been omitted, is the principle of non-interference. That is to say, the principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbours; and that one nation has no right to control by force of arms, the will of another nation, in the choice of its government or ruler.

To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound, it Ought to be sacred; and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation.

But in all discussions, it is of great importance, to come to a clear understanding of the precise meaning of terms used in debate; and let us therefore strip the word interference of an ambiguity which tends to perplex and confuse. It by interference is meant interference by force of arms, such interference the government are right in saying, general principles and our own practice forbade us to exert. But if by interference is meant intermeddling, and intermeddling in every way, and to every extent, short of actual military force; then I must affirm, that there is nothing in such interference, which the laws of nations may not in certain cases permit; and that the whole history of the connexion between England and Portugal, has been almost one unbroken chain of such interference on our part; nay more, that the complaint to which the present government is most justly exposed, is not that they have not interfered, but that they have interfered only on the wrong side.

It has been the opinion of the ablest English statesmen, that it is important to the security of England, that the Tagus should be in the hands of a friendly power. It has been thought by the most competent judges, that with Gibraltar our own, and with art ally at Lisbon, we might face the combined, hostility of France and Spain, should we ever be exposed to meet it, if not without effort, at least without alarm. This opinion too has not been confined to our ablest statesmen, it was shared by our ablest enemy, I mean Napoleon Buonaparte.

It has also teen the opinion of the wisest statesmen of Portugal, that the best security for Portuguese independence was to be found in the selfish interests of England; and that, as it was worth while for England, for her own sake, to make great efforts to prevent Portugal from being annexed to Spain, England therefore Was sure to be, the most sincere and fruity ally, to whom, in the hour of need. Portugal could turn for assistance.

These reciprocal interests engendered connexion and alliance: mutual usefulness led to good offices on one side, and to confidence on the other; treaties imposed obligations, and conferred corresponding rights; and hence it is, that Portugal has always solicited and received the advice of England, as that of a friend, whose interests were indentified with her own; and hence it is also, that England has been permitted to exercise an interference, and possess an influence in the councils of Portugal, which did not naturally belong to her, as regarding an independent state.

For proof of these assertions I would refer the House to the treaties of Charles 1st, of Cromwell, and of Charles 2nd; to the mar of succession; to the transactions of the eighteenth century to the wars and treaties of the century in which we live: from all which it will be seen, that it has been the practice and:conceded privilege of England, to concern herself in a peculiar manner in the affairs and destiny of Portugal.

But those who contend that it is the duty, and has been the practice of England, to withdraw herself entirely from all interference in the internal affairs of Portugal, and to stand aloof, a passive spectator of whatever there may, happen, have they forgotten the transactions even, of the last few years?

Have they forgotten bur active and successful interference in 1807, to prevail upon the royal family of Portugal, to traverse the Atlantic, and transplant their royal, stock to their South American, dominions?

Have they forgotten the spirited interference, 1824, of our then ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, against the proceedings of the Portuguese government towards its own subjects, interference which was attended with complete success.

Have they forgotten that by the urgent advice of that same our ambassador, the seat of the Portuguese government, was transferred to a British line of-battle ship in the Tagus? and that on the quarterdeck of an English man of war, with our hardy sailors as his, pages in waiting, and our menacing guns as his guard of honour, the king of Portugal received the homage of his subjects on the celebration of his birth-day; and from that self-same palace of council, issued a proclamation to his people, and gave out his decrees banishing the queen from court, depriving Don Miguel of his command; and ordering him to absent himself from Portugal?—But all this, I suppose, was no interference in the internal affairs of Portugal! Invert the case, put London for Lisbon, the Thames for the Tagus, and then let me ask you if this is interference or not.

I pass by the bringing over the constitution of 1826 from Brazil to Lisbon, by an English ambassador, Sir Charles Stuart because although that circumstance was considered by many of the Portuguese, unfortunately, as it has since turned out, by them so considered, as an indication that the British government had interfered, to procure for them the advantages of that constitution; yet it is well known as has just been stated by my right hon. friend, the member for Liverpool, that the selection of Sir Charles Stuart: to bring over that charter was accidental choice at. the Emperor Don Pedro himself; and that, the Portuguese nation were indebted for that gift, so valuable, if they, had known how to prize and preserve it, solely and entirely to the spontaneous liberality, and uncounselled wisdom, of that enlightened sovereign.

But have we forgot the active and successful interference of England, to bring about a separation of the crowns of Portugal and Brazil, and to obtain the abdication of the crown of(Portugal in favour of Donna Maria; an interference founded upon a just regard to the interests of England?—We should indeed do well if we could forget this interference, since we have been so backward to make any the slightest exertion to recover for Donna Maria that crown, which, in accordance with, our advice her father had placed .upon her head.

But if this interference on our part may be thought by some to impose upon us a kind of honourable obligation, to wards Don, Pedro or Donna Maria; on the other hand, there were, circumstances of ,interference on our part, personal to Don Miguel himself, which gives us, with respect to him individually, something like an absolute right, to I require him to desist from that course of tyranny and ,usurpation, which he has pursued, since last he set foot in Portugal.

I allude to those conferences, to which the right hon. Member for Knaresborough has already adverted, and which took place at Vienna, in October 1827, between the ambassadors of England, France, Austria, Portugal, and Brazil, To the protocols of some of these conferences, the approving and confirming signature of Don Miguel is said to have been affixed but at all events it is well known that some of the ministers then and there present, were fully authorized to speak and to contract for him. Out of these conferences arose a solemn engagement, on the part, of Don Miguel, to obey the. orders of his brother Don Pedro, as legitimate sovereign of Portugal in consequence of which engagement, Don Pedro, when he learnt it, completed his abdication in favour of Donna Maria out of these conferences arose also a letter of the 19th Oct. 1827, from Don Miguel at Vienna, to his sister Isabella, then Regent in Lisbon, informing her that he had accepted the lieutenancy of Portugal, under, and according to, the appointment of Don Pedro; that he had sworn to maintain inviolable, the laws of Portugal, end the institutions granted by Don Pedro; that he was determined to forget, past transactions, and to repress future factions; begging her to give to this, his solemn declaration, its due publicity and adding, that for the purpose of carrying into effect the intentions of his brother, he was proceeding to Portugal, through England.

This letter, according to his request, was officially published in the royal Gazette at Lisbon.

Now let me ask, when the Portuguese saw officially published this letter, breathing nothing but allegiance to Don, Pedro, obedience to the laws, sworn fidelity to the constitution, oblivion of past transactions, and repression of future factions; when they knew that this letter was written, under the eye, if not at the dictation, of the English ambassador at Vienna; when ,they saw Don Miguel instead of taking the direct and natural read through Spain, come, north about, and in the severest season of the year take England, in his way from Vienna to Lisbon: when they heard the honours, with which he was here received when they were told through every channel of public report, that the period of his stay, had not been devoted merely to amusement and parade but that the system of his future administration of Portugal had received its full share attention: when they saw him enter the Tagus, escorted by an English squadron, and attended by an English ambassador; and when they saw him march to his palace, surrounded by Eng- lisp troops; was not all this, justly calculated, to excite in the minds of the Portuguese, who were favourable to the constitution, that is to say in a large portion of the nation, expectations, the disappointment of which must indeed be calamitous to them? Was not all this calculated to induce those persons to commit themselves openly in favour of the constitutional system in a thousand ways, and to such a degree, as to mark them out for the devoted victims of vengeance, when the wolf cast off his borrowed clothing, and appeared in his own natural, garb?

But the fatal, influence of the interference of England did not stop here. Don Miguel found, on his landing, constitutional army, a constitutional ministry, a constitutional magistracy, and a constitutional legislature; but he found also a British force; a British force indeed, which had been sent to fulfil obligations of treaty, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal. The object for which this force had been sent, had been fully accomplished, and its stay had latterly been prolonged, only at the request of Don Miguel himself, that it might do honour to his arrival and that its presence at Lisbon, on his landing might testify to the world, the good understanding between him and the British government. I am not blaming this arrangement; I was myself a party to it; and if blame attaches, of that blame I must take my share. But it turned out unfortunately, and it makes an ingredient not unimportant, in the case of England against Don Miguel.

It was generally known at Lisbon, that the only event in which the British troops had orders to depart from a strict abstinence from all interference in the internal affairs of Portugal was, that of protection being required for the persons of the members of the royal family, and that this protection they were ordered to afford. This instruction, as has been already stated by my right hon. friend, the member for Liverpool, was not framed with any view to Don Miguel, but formed, a part of the instructions originally given to the, general officer commanding, when the troops first embarked for Portugal; and it had reference to persons more worthy than. the individual, who in the, end profited most by it.

It is obvious that no successful resistance could be made, to the steps taken by Don Miguel to accomplish his usurpa- tion, without imposing some temporary restraint upon his personal liberty; and any such restraint, it was understood, the British troops would think it their duty to prevent. The consequence was, that so long as the British troops remained, resistance would have been unavailing, and by the time they embarked, Don Miguel had made it impossible. Miguel thus contrived to make the British troops, who had been sent out for far different purposes, the protecting shelter, undercover of which he dismissed his constitutional ministers removed his constitutional officers, changed his constitutional magistrates, and prepared the dissolution of his constitutional chambers; and thus, all those means of resistance were paralyzed, which, had our troops been out of the way, the existing institutions of Portugal, would infallibly have, opposed to his projects.

Did not all these circumstances give us a right to insist, that Miguel should keep those oaths, and abide by those engagements, to which he had thus publicly, and in the face of Europe, made the king of England his witnessing sponsor? Did not a due regard for the honour and dignity of the English Grown, require that the ministers of the king should have used their best exertions to compel Don Miguel to do so?

If he had declined to enter into any engagements; if he had taken his stand upon alleged rights; if he had rejected our hospitality, and refused Our money; if he had fought his way into Portugal by himself and on his own account; much as we might have condemned his after conduct, we at least should not have been implicated by any course which he might have pursued.

But I say that the conduct of Don Miguel has been no less affronting to the king of England, than it has been disgraceful to Don Miguel himself.

Was it fitting that the king of England, should be made the stalking-horse, under whose cover this royal poacher should creep upon his unsuspecting prey? Was it becoming that the king of England, should be made use of, as the attesting witness, to engagements never meant to be fulfilled, and to oaths forsworn by the heart, ere yet they had found utterance form the lips?

I say, that if the insulted honour of a sovereign, is a legitimate ground of na- tional quarrel, we are intitled to demand, and to extort, reparation from Don Miguel. What that reparation ought to be, the voice of indignant Europe has long since declared.

But in the absence of all documents, and judging only from known events, what, let me ask, have our government done, to hold Miguel to those engagements, to which he thus studiously and publicly contrived to make us parties?

Why first, we took away from him his money; that is to say, our ambassador, who accompanied him, seeing indications, not to be mistaken, of an intention on the part of Don Miguel, to depart from his engagements; our ambassador acting upon his own responsibility, though; the act was afterwards fully approved by the government at home, sent back the money which had gone out with Don Miguel, and which luckily had not been landed. Rather a strong measure this; and bordering somewhat upon interference in the affairs, pecuniary at least, of Don Miguel.

Secondly, as was stated by a noble friend of mine, the present Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, in another place, towards the end of last session; secondly, remonstrance followed remonstrance, each couched in language stronger than that which preceded. Remonstrances, indeed, and in language of progressively increasing indignation! Remonstrances, pray, against what? why, against the manner in which Don Miguel was proceeding to administer the internal affairs of Portugal, And is remonstrance, strong and indignant remonstrance, upon such matters, no interference? and if all interference in the internal affairs of Portugal be interdicted, as is alleged by the government, who and what, gave us the right, thus to remonstrate? Why my noble friend himself answered this question? for he stated, that we remonstrated against indications, that Miguel intended to depart from those professions, which he had made while in this country; and here the government took the same view of this matter which I am now taking, and assumed, that the engagements which Don Miguel had entered into with us, and through us, with others, did give us a right to interfere. Well, but ought the government of a great nation to remonstrate strongly and repeatedly, and yet to remonstrate in vain? ought they officially to complain of violated engagements, and yet to sit tamely down under a disregard of their complaint, and a determined continuance of the violation?

It does hot appear that, at the time to which my noble friend alluded, such was the intention of the English government; for when our remonstrances were disregarded, the functions of our ambassador were suspended; and when those violations were continued, our ambassador was actually withdrawn; and both these measures were in fulfilment of intimations, previously given by him to the Portuguese government, that such would be the consequences of a perseverance in the course which they were pursuing.

Up to that period then, (about the end of May, 1828) by which time a provisional order of recall had been sent to our ambassador, which was to take effect upon the happening of certain things, which did actually occur a little while afterwards; up to that time, the government seem to have remonstrated, threatened, and executed their threats. But when our ambassador was withdrawn, the last bolt of the English cabinet seems to have been shot away; their quiver was exhausted; and then began a cessation of hostilities with the usurpation of Don Miguel.

The recall of our ambassador, a measure, in the usual intercourse of nations, big with fearful import, and commonly understood as the immediate forerunner of rupture, or rather as the public declaration of rupture already existing, the recall of our ambassador seems, in this case, to have no other consequences, than to deprive the British residents in Portugal, of the protection which the presence of our ambassador might have afforded them; and to relieve Don Miguel from the irksome necessity of listening twice a week to the very disagreeable truths which our ambassador had, from time to time, been instructed to tell him.

All that since has followed, as far as the public are informed, has been entirely of a different complexion. Then came our acquiescence in every sort of blockade proclaimed by Don Miguel, against the subjects of our ally Don Pedro; then came his infliction of every sort of injury, upon the subjects of the king of England, residing in Portugal. Then came the arrival of an ambassador from Don Miguel, who, though not formally acknowledged, is yet supposed to have been in frequent private communication, with the members of our government; then came the mission of our ambassador, lord Strangford to the Brazils the objects of which, I trust, for the honour of the country, have been much misrepresented by public report; then came the conquest of Madeira; and then, would that it could be blotted out from the naval records of England, then came the British expedition against Terceira.

With respect to the blockade of Oporto, I must take leave to say, that we have been in a great hurry to proclaim our acquiescence in the Miguelite blockades. I well know that it is not for the interest of England, to break down the respect for blockades, when real and effective, and established by existing governments; and that we are not to scrutinize too deeply, the legitimate origin of the blockading government, but should take people in this respect pretty much as we find them, and for what they give themselves out to be; but at the time when Miguel declared Oporto blockaded, was he in truth the de facto sovereign of Portugal? and if he was, did we take him for what he was, and for what he gave himself out to be? When that blockade was declared, civil war was raging in Portugal; the nation was divided; there were two governments existing; an usurping one at Lisbon, another in the name of the lawful sovereign at Oporto; why such breathless haste on our part, to decide that wrong must overpower right? and why, by thus publicly proclaiming our anticipation of the result, did we in some measure contribute to bring that result about?

Oporto marched troops against Lisbon; Lisbon launched a blockade against Oporto. The whole thing was a scramble. If the Oporto troops had been well led and commanded, they would infallibly have been in Lisbon, and have put down our de facto lieutenant, just about the very time, when we were officially announcing his blockade; and it was owing to the merest accident that this did not actually happen. But Suppose Oporto had had ships as well as troops, and had blockaded Lisbon? which it had a much better right to do, than Lisbon to blockade Oporto; should we have been as ready to announce the blockade of Lisbon?

Now, Sir, a word or two about the conquest of Madeira; and I beg leave to ask why the British government permitted Miguel to make that conquest?

I respect as much as any man the principle of national independence; but it is precisely because I respect this principle; because I think that one country and; one people have no right to impose upon another country and another people, by force of arms, any particular ruler or form of government; it is precisely for this very reason, that I condemn the conduct of our government, in permitting Miguel to go and conquer Madeira.

I deny that Miguel by usurping the throne of Portugal, could acquire any rights over Madeira, which England, denying, as she did, his right to the throne of Portugal itself could be bound to acknowledge. Two wrongs cannot make a right the wrongful usurpation of Portugal, could not render rightful, the subsequent conquest of Madeira; Miguel claimed to rule over Madeira, because it was a dependency of Portugal; but we who denied his right to rule over Portugal, could not admit, that his unjust usurpation of the mother country, could constitute a legitimate; title to the dependency. Those who deny premises cannot accede to conclusions.

He had no right to talk of the integrity of the dominions of the crown of Portugal integrity indeed, and Miguel! The very words refuse companionship. Who had broken the integrity of the dominions of the crown of Portugal? who but he, who brandishing in one hand the, sword of rebellion, uplifted in the other the sceptre of usurpation; he, who himself first began to dismember Portugal, he, least and last of all mankind, could urge the plea of the undivided entirety of the dominions of the, crown of Portugal.

I ask, then, was England bound by the obligations of any specific treaty, or by the general laws of nations, to stand by, and see Miguel conquer Madeira?

No treaty could oblige us, because treaties with Miguel, thank heaven, as yet we have none. Treaties with Pedro indeed we have; obligations of honour towards him and his daughter, have we also. But the spirit of those treaties, and the tenor of those obligations, might have led to any other course rather than that, which has been pursued.

The laws of nations could not bind us down to connive at this conquest, because the conquest, itself was a violation of those laws; and in like manner as in a particular community; any bystander is at liber- ty to interfere, to prevent a breach of the law of that community; so also, and upon the same principle, may any nation interpose to prevent a flagrant violation, of the laws of the community of nations.

The usurpation of Miguel was an outrage upon national law, whether at Lisbon, at Oporto, or at Madeira; and every one of the subjects of that sovereign whose crown he had placed upon his unworthy head, was not only at full liberty, but was bound by his allegiance, to resist that usurpation to the utmost.

If the people of Lisbon had a right to choose Miguel for their king, the people of Oporto and Madeira, had just as good a right to uphold the authority of Pedro or Maria. If the people of Lisbon had no right to choose Miguel for their king, still less could they have a right to impose him upon their unwilling fellow subjects. Upon no possible principle could the people of Lisbon have a right to impose fey force of arms, upon Oporto or Madeira, that Miguel, whom Lisbon perhaps had chosen, but whom Oporto and Madeira rejected.

Well then England was not bound by treaty, nor by international law to stand by, and see Miguel conquer Madeira; if England had, even by the laws of nations, a right to interfere, if she chose; what must have been the views and policy of that government, which could choose, not to interfere?

There could have been no difficulty in protecting Madeira. United to Portugal by diplomacy, it is widely divided from it by geography; we could have accomplished our purpose, without sending even a single keel to Madeira; by means no more hostile than words, by missiles no more deadly than a despatch. We had only to declare to Miguel, that we took Madeira under our protection, in trust for our ally Don Pedro or his daughter, so long, at least, as Madeira chose spontaneously to maintain its allegiance; and I think I may venture to affirm, that such a declaration from England to Miguel, would have met with an acquiescence no less prompt, than that of England, to his blockade of Madeira.

Did we want a precedent for such a proceeding? we need not have gone far back to look for it. The usurpation of Miguel, is not the first time in these our days, that the legitimate authority of the sovereign of Portugal has been forcibly suspended at Lisbon. In 1828, Miguel, if not backed and instigated by Spain, at least not disapproved by Spain, forcibly dethroned one queen of Portugal; in 1807, another queen of Portugal was forcibly dethroned by the arms of France, combined with the influence of Spain. What did the British government, then? They sent an expedition, to take possession of Madeira, and to hold it in trust for the lawful sovereign of Portugal. Aye, but I hear it said; those who dethroned the queen of Portugal, then, were at war with England. If those who have dethroned the queen of Portugal now, are not at war with England, it is because England had put up with indignities from them, which she never before has brooked from any other people in the world. Perhaps it will be said that it was France and Spain; who then dethroned the queen of Portugal, and that it is Portugal itself, that has done so done so now. A faction, indeed in Portugal, has done so now; and such has been the manner in which our government have managed these affairs, that if that faction shall triumph, its triumph will be the triumph of Spain; and if that faction shall be rooted out, we shall see planted in its place, the influence of liberal France. But if any man asks me, whether Miguel is the child of a faction, or the choice of a people, I refer him to the thousands and tens of thousands, of all that is distinguished or respectable in Portugal, who are now, either lurking in concealment, or wandering in exile or languishing in crowded prisons.

In all the treaties between England and Portugal most especial and particular stipulations have been made, for the security of the property and personal liberty of, British subjects resident in Portugal. By these treaties it is provided, that a judge conservator shall be appointed, for all causes relating to British subjects, and from this judge there is only a specified appeal; it is provided, that no British subject shall be arrested, (unless he is apprehended in the actual commission of a criminal offence), without an order in writing from this judge conservator; that British subjects may travel freely throughout Portugal and carry arms for their security. That they, shall not be liable to vexatious visits and searches, of their houses, their books, or their papers; that if they offend against the laws, those laws shall indeed be enforced, bat that false and malicious accusations, shall not be made the pretext for vexatious visits and searches; and that none shall ever be made, except by the sanction of competent magistrate; and in presence of the British consul. It is also provided, that even in case of rupture between the two countries, the existence of which is to be determined by the recall of our ambassador, British subjects shall have the privilege of continuing to reside and trade in' Portugal, without any manner of interruption, so long as they behave peaceably, and commit no offence against the laws; and in case their conduct should render them suspected to the Portuguese Government, and should oblige it to order them to remove, the term of twelve months is to be allowed them for that purpose, in order that they may retire with their effects and property, whether intrusted to individuals, or to the state.

Now it is perfectly notorious, that in the cases of at least five British subjects, Mr. Young, Mr. Noble, Sir John Doyle, Mr. Ascoli, and Mr. O'Brien; every one of these stipulations have been flagrantly and scandalously violated.

Their arrest; their long imprisonment without trial, sometimes in loathsome dungeons, sometimes in prisons crowded to suffocation; the seizure of their property; the visits, and searches, of their houses, books and papers; the mode of their trial; their condemnation; their sentence; were, I believe, all violations, either of the treaties with England, or of the law of Portugal itself. And how has our government performed its duty, of protecting British subjects, of enforcing our treaty rights, and of asserting the national honour? Why, by their established method, of remonstrance. And how has Miguel treated their remonstrances? Why, judging from what he has done, and not knowing what he may have said, with perfect indifference.

Our naval commander in the Tagus, is supposed at one time, to have made, by order of his government, a positive demand, for the immediate liberation of a British subject wrongfully imprisoned, and to have required a categorical answer in eight and forty hours. The time elapsed; the answer arrived; it was a positive and categorical refusal: What followed? any assertion of national dignity? was Fort St. Julien laid in ruins? was the Miguelite squadron burnt, sunk, and destroyed as per margin? or was Don Miguel even treated with, a courteous retort of one of his own fovourite blockades? Nothing of all this. Our naval commander puts his answer in his pocket, and in dignified silence proceeds to sail away. I am not criticizing the conduct, of a brave and distinguished officer, I am only commenting upon the orders, under which I must presume he was acting; but I say, that if the accounts which I have heard are correct, Buonaparte in the plenitude and insolence of his power, never treated the humble representations of a petty German principality, with more contemptuous disregard, than that, which our remonstrances have met with, at the hands of, Don Miguel.

The wrongs of the individuals in question, are still, I believe, unredressed; their losses are still unrepaired; unless I am to except the sum of 56l. 17s. or something thereabouts, which I have been told the Portuguese government, with the approbation of our own, has awarded to one of these persons, as a full compensation for an illegal arrest, for along and painful imprisonment, for an expensive trial, and for all the heavy losses, inevitably arising, from the sudden interruption of his business, and his abrupt expulsion from Portugal.

Thus then I say, that the personal honour of our sovereign has been insulted; the rights of our fellow-subjects have been violated; treaties, ancient and modern, have been broken; and for all these injuries, and affronts, which Europe has beheld with amazement, our government have only had recourse to a system of ineffectual remonstranoe.

What is the inference to be drawn from all this? Is it that our ministers are wanting in spirit, and in a nice sense of honour? No human being, who ever heard that great and illustrious name which stands foremost on the list; no human being who knows any thing of anyone of our ministers, could for a single instant entertain such an idea. Is it then that England is so weak and pennyless, that she is reduced to the hard necessity, of crouching to Portugal? There may be on the continent, those, who might wish it, there can be none, who, believe it. Well then, what is the solution? Why in public opinion it is this; Miguel is looked upon, as a sort of pet of the English cabinet; and like as a fond and indulgent parent cannot bear to chastise, even the most irregular frolics of a spoiled and favourite child, so also it is thought, that the British government have submitted to usage from Miguel, which coming from any other quarter, would have roused them, like a lion from his slumber.

Well, Sir, then comes the case of Terceira, and here indeed the lion has put forth his strength, when it were much to be wished, he had still continued to repose: or here rather, we performed the functions of a less noble animal, and hunted down the prey, that another might step in, and devour.

Here, at last, we openly departed from our boasted principle of non-interference; but here, as I before said our interference was on the wrong side. Here, no longer contented with bearing all the wayward contumelies of Don Miguel, we became his active and belligerent allies, and took his dependencies under our protection. His dependencies indeed his mere expectations, his intended conquests, his projected plunder; we did like the confederates in the street, who surround the passenger, and keep off assistance, that the robber may follow his vocation.

It has been said by my right hon. friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that the ports of England ought not to be made places of arms to organize attacks upon foreign and friendly powers: granted; and if we thought it due from us to Miguel, to say so, we might have said to the Portuguese at Plymouth, stay here if you like, quit England if you will; the world is before you, to choose your destination, with, one and the only one exception; to Plymouth from Portugal you came, from Plymouth to Portugal you must not return. That road is barred; all else is open to your choice. Thus much, if we thought it due by us to Miguel we might require; further than this we had no right to dictate.

In what character did these people come here, was it as prisoners of war, or as free agents? As prisoners certainly not; for with them and their sovereign, war we had none. As free agents, perhaps not entirely; because our constitution, and our duties as a nation, might interpose some limits, to the fullness of their free agency. They were certainly to be considered more in the light of an organized military body, though unarmed, than as a chance assemblage of unconnected individuals; and we might, therefore, justly require them to depart, if we thought fit so to do. We did require them to depart; at least we gave them an alternative, of removal into the interior, and of separation of officers from men, which in fact, left them no choice, but to depart.

If this alternative was prescribed to them, in consequence of any fear of danger, which might arise, to the peace of Plymouth, or to the safety of our arsenal, from the presence of these unarmed men; the government of course acted upon good information, and they are entitled to our confidence in such a matter. But if this alternative was prescribed to them in consequence of representations and remonstrances from Spain, then I say, that such representations and remonstrances ought not to have been complied with. Spain was not entitled to say to England, this: In like manner as you England required us Spain, 1826, to remove into our interior, and separate officers from men, the Portuguese deserters, who were then upon our frontier; so do we Spain, now require you England, to remove into your interior, and separate officers from men, the Portuguese refugees, who are now upon your coast. The cases were essentially different. Our right to demand that Spain, in 1826, should not collect, organize, arm, clothe, equip, and subsist Portuguese deserters upon her frontier, for the avowed purpose of hostile invasion of Portugal, backed and supported by a Spanish army, close in their rear, our right to make this demand, was founded upon our patent treaties with Portugal, which obliged us, if Portugal should be thus invaded, to send troops to assist in her defence. Spain has no such treaties obliging her to defend Portugal. That one aggravation is indeed happily wanting, to the full measure of her injustice towards Portugal at that time. But Spain, exempt from our obligations, is therefore not invested with our rights. Her very remonstrance, indeed, was a sort of interference in favour of the usurpation of Miguel, and we ought, on that account to have told her, courteously as we, pleased, but firmly and decidedly, that to such representations from her, we could not listen.

It being, however, determined, rightly or wrongly, that these people should depart, whither should they go? From Portugal they were warned off, by the bayonets of Miguel and the interdict of the British government; Brazil, since the separation of the crowns, was to them a foreign land; but though exiled and prescribed, they still had a sovereign and a country. Their sovereign was at that very moment receiving at the hands of the king of England, a generous and a delicate recognition; a recognition in which the inborn nobleness of royals nature contrived to infuse into the dry forms of state ceremonial, something almost, partaking of the charm and the spirit of chivalrous protection. Their country was Terceira, where the authority of their queen wag still maintained and obeyed. If there was any one spot on the face of the habitable globe, to which, when driven from England, they had a right to go that spot was Terceira. But even to this, their last asylum, the jealousy of Spain, and the vengeance of Miguel pursued them; their very sanctuary was violated; the blood of unarmed and defenceless men, was shed in the only harbour of their sovereign, and under the very shadow of her flag; and the navy of England, heretofore accounted the protector of the oppressed, and the avenger of the injured was made the subservient tool of tyranny and usurpation. Would that a veil could be drawn over a transaction, so uncongenial to British feelings, so inconsistent with British policy.

But it is said that there was civil war at that time in Terceira; there seems to be much doubt of this; when the documents are produced we shall see; but be this as it may, the government was carried on in the name of Donna Maria, and she was at that time de facto, as well as de jure, queen of Terceira.

It is said too that those people were armed if I may use the expression, in posse, if not in esse. That is to say, that arms had been previously sent thither, for their use, when landed, instead of those arms of which the Spanish authorities had deprived them. I hope and trust that this is true; I hope that these people being landed at Terceira; whether by American enterprise, or by French generosity, will there find arms to defend a cause, which heaven and earth pronounce to be just. But whether they were armed or unarmed, can make no difference whatever in their right to go to Terceira; though the fact that they really were unarmed, does give a painful character to the wrong, which we inflicted upon them there.

Well, but it will be said to me, what is it that you wished, what would you yourself have done? do you mean that England should; have gone to war with Portugal, on account of Don Miguel? Why the time has been, when the idea even of a war with Portugal, would not have been a very severe trial to the nerves of England; but to no such trial need we in the present case have been exposed. In the first place, to war against Miguel, would not be to war against the Portuguese nation; it would be to war in their aid, and to have them on our side as assisting allies. But no war would have been necessary at all; a strong demonstration of our feelings, a decided expression of our opinions, would probably have been enough: if we had countenanced and supported the government at Oporto, instead of helping to blockade it; if we had given succour to the Portuguese at Plymouth, instead of expelling and cannonading them; in short if instead of throwing our sword into the scale of Miguel, we had cast even our empty scabbard into that of his opponents, we should probably have accomplished our purpose, and his destiny would have kicked the beam.

Such is the view which I take of the foreign policy of the government, when looked at with reference to Portugal singly: is this impression altered, by even a cursory glance at their measures in other quarters? Has there been much more energy and promptitude in fulfilling our engagements to Greece, than in compelling Don Miguel to fulfil his engagements to us? July, 1829, is coming fast upon us, and the treaty of July, 1827, is still unexecuted; but out of the delay in its execution, has arisen one of the main evils which that treaty was intended to prevent, I mean a war in the east of Europe.

The Morea indeed has been cleared of the Turks. Sir, I am conscious that I am not strictly confining myself to the particular subject in debate, but the House will remember that this is the first and will be the last opportunity in the present session, of touching at all upon our foreign relations; that during the last twelve months, transactions of no common importance have occupied the attention of Europe, and that the seven or eight months that will probably pass away before parliament again assembles, are pregnant with events, of which no man can foresee the issue, Or foretell the consequences; and I trust, therefore, that I may experience for a few moments the indulgence of the House. The Morea, I say, has indeed been cleared; I wish the arms of England had had a more direct and prominent share in that honourable exploit. But why were the arms of France checked at the Isthmus of Corinth? Was it that France herself shrunk back with alarm at the consequences of a further advance? or was it that the narrow policy of England stepped in, and arrested her progress? Why did France go to Greece at all, unless it was to obtain by force what Turkey would not yield to persuasion, namely, the evacuation of that territory which is destined for liberated Greece? and if that was her purpose, why did she stop short, before that purpose was fully accomplished? Shall I be told that this purpose is accomplished, that the Morea and the Cyclades are to be this liberated Greece, and that the Isthmus of Corinth is its northern boundary? I say that will not be, that cannot be, it is impossible that it should be; a larger and wider limit, extending at least to the line drawn from Volo to Arta, is indispensably necessary, for Greece, it is indispensably necessary for reasons, which I shall not now go into, but reasons, political, commercial, and military; every man who has any local knowledge of the country, and whose judgment is worth having, agrees now I believe about this; be he English, or French, or Russian, or Greek; be he naval, or military, or diplomatic and even those, who were the greatest sticklers for the Morea simply, must now abandon the notion of establishing a Greece, which should contain neither Athens, nor Thebes, nor Marathon, nor Salamis, nor Platæ, nor Thermopylæ, nor Missolunghi; which should exclude from its boundaries, all the most inspiring records of national achievements, whether in ancient or in modern times.

But in this, as in clearing the Morea, France will hold the first, and England the second place; the merit of giving this extended limit will, in public opinion, be ascribed to the enlightened liberality of France; France will have the credit of being supposed to have dragged England reluctantly after her; England will bear the odium, of having vainly attempted to clog the progress of France. But why do not the allies deal with the country north of the Isthmus, as they have done with that to the south, and occupy at once, all that which must be assigned to Greece? I have seen that it has been said elsewhere, that the allies are negociating upon this subject with Turkey; I should have thought that the allies had had enough of negociating with Turkey about Greece; and that they had by this time discovered, that even Turkey herself would rather, that, on this subject they should dictate; why then do they not at once occupy Livadia and Attica, why do they compel the unfortunate Greeks to go toiling on, recovering step by step that territory which must be theirs, and thus force them to keep up that very state of hostility, which it was one of the first intentions of the treaty immediately to put an end to. The very first object of the treaty was armistice; that armistice the allies have enforced in the Morea, in the only manner in which it could be brought about; why do they not establish it in the same way up to Volo and Arta.

What form of government the allies mean to propose for Greece I do not ask; it would be improper to do so; but I must express my hope that the form to be adopted will be such, that while it provides for its own stability, it will give free political development to the intellectual faculties of the people; it is indeed to be presumed that, an alliance, in which two powers out of the three, are themselves striking examples of the advantages of popular institutions, will take care to secure to liberated Greece, the permanent enjoyment of similar blessings. In short, I hope the constitution will be of London and Paris manufacture, and not the production of any artist a capital nearer to Greece.

I said that the delay in executing the treaty of July, 1827, had brought upon us that very evil of a war in the east of Europe, which that treaty was calculated to prevent. In that war, my opinion is, that the Turks were the aggressors. I am pronouncing no opinion whether Russia has or has not ambitious views upon Turkey; it might indeed be thought that the Russian empire is sufficiently extensive, to, satisfy the most ambitious sovereign, or to find employment for the most enlightened, but on that point I give no opinion; I will not, decide either, on which side may be the balance of that general account of reciprocal grievances which has so long been standing between the two parties; but in that particular transaction, Turkey was the aggressor; she seized Russian ships and cargoes, expelled Russian subjects from Turkey, and shut the Bosphorus against Russian commerce, all in violation of treaties; and declared her intention not to fulfil the treaty of Akerman; and all this upon no other pretence, than certain things which Russia had done in conjunction with her allies England and. France, to prevail upon Turkey to accede to some arrangement about Greece.

Do I mean to infer from this, that England and France ought to have made common cause with Russia? far from it; but I do mean, that England and France ought to have used exertions to bring about an accommodation, which I very much doubt their having employed.

The opinion which I entertained upon this important matter, when I retired from the government this time last year an opinion which was known to my then colleagues, and which subsequent events in Europe have not changed, was shortly this:

That Turkey was the aggressor and that Russia, had therefore a right to compensation, for injury sustained.

That the interests of Europe, and the spirit of the treaty of July, 1827, required that this compensation should be in money, and not in territory.

That if the contest went on, it was obvious that it must either be waged between Russia and 'Turkey alone, or that other powers in Europe must be drawn in, to take a part.

That if other powers in Europe were drawn in to take a part, and the flame once spread to the west, no man could say where it would stop; and that it was impossible to contemplate, without the greatest uneasiness, the derangements of the present, system, and settlement, and state of possession in Europe, to which such a war, in which England must inevitably be involved, might eventually lead.

That if, the war was waged between Russia and Turkey alone, Turkey would infallibly have the worst of it; and that consequently a regard for the interests of Europe, and a regard for the interests of Turkey herself, ought equally to impel France and England to urge Turkey by all possible means, to make fair terms as soon as she could, since the sooner she made them, the easier they would be.

It was also my opinion, that Austria should be made clearly to understand, that the days of subsidies are gone by; and that it should have been distinctly explained to Turkey, that the people of England would be little disposed to pay for the recovery of unpronounceable fortresses on the Danube, after they had been lost by the obstinate perverseness of Turkey.

If this system had been acted upon in the early part of last year, with vigour and decision, I do not say that it would, but, it is just within the reach of possibility, that it might have prevented the last campaign; and, that it was desirable to prevent it is obvious, because if that campaign had ended according to general expectations, its results might have infinitely augmented the difficulties of an arrangement satisfactory to Europe. Success, however, was so nearly balanced, although the scale inclined in favour of Russia, that great facilities for accommodation still remained, even after the close of that campaign, The precious interval of winter has, however, passed fruitlessly away, and a second campaign is already begun.

What its result may be, I will not be so presumptuous as to predict; but that which is the least likely is, that it should replace Turkey in the state of territorial occupation in which she stood before the war commenced.

Have the government employed to the best advantage the opportunities of negotiation which they have had; have they, while on the one hand they set their faces against territorial acquisitions by Russia, have they, on the other hand, combated stoutly and firmly the intrigues of other powers to stimulate the obstinacy of Turkey; have they in short, laboured bona fide, and in good earnest, to bring about peace, in the only way in which peace can be accomplished?

If they have not, and if by any want of resolution and decision, they shall ultimately have endangered the tranquillity of all Europe; if balancing between a wish to assist Turkey, and an inability to find any pretence for doing so, they have by the ambiguity and mixed character of their language to Turkey, allowed her to be deceived by what she is to expect from England; and have thereby been instrumental in encouraging her resistance to a just accommodation; then, indeed, they will have incurred a responsibility, which I should be sorry to share.

From what I have said, it will be seen, that I do not place implicit confidence in the foreign policy of the government; my views of men and things differ so much from those of persons who are supposed to have much influence with them, that it is impossible I should. There are two great parties in Europe; One which endeavours to bear sway by the force of public opinion; another which endeavours to bear sway by the force of physical control;, and the judgment almost unanimous or Europe, assigns the latter as the present connexion of England.

The principle on which the system of this party is founded is, in my view, fundamentally erroneous. There is in nature no moving power but mind, all else is passive and inert; in human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion; and he who can grasp this power, with it will subdue the fleshly arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose. Look at one of those floating fortresses, which bear to the farthest regions of the globe, the prowess and the glory of England; see a puny insect at the helm, commanding the winds of heaven, and the waves of the ocean, and enslaving even the laws of nature,' as if instead of being ordained to hold the universe together, they had only been established for his particular occasion. And yet the merest breath of those winds which he has yoked to his service, the merest drop of that fathomless abyss which he has made into his footstool, would, if ignorantly encountered, be more than enough for his destruction; but the powers of his mind have triumphed over the forces of things, and the subjugated elements are become his obedient vassals. And so also is it, with the political affairs of empires; and those statesmen who know how to avail themselves of the passions, and the interests, and the opinions of mankind, are able to gain an ascendancy, and to exercise a sway over human affairs, far out of all proportion greater than belong to the power and resources of the state over which they preside; while those, on the other hand, who seek to check improvement to cherish abuses, to crush opinions, and to prohibit the human race from thinking, whatever may be the apparent power which they wield will find their weapon snap short their hand, when most they need its protection.

In the first of these conditions stood England two years ago; when our political influence among the nations of the earth was infinitely greater, not than our means of defending our independence or asserting our honour, but infinitely greater than any power we possess of controlling the conduct of others.

In the second of these conditions, stands Austria now; who by the narrowness of her views, and the unfortunate prejudices of her policy, has almost reduced herself, in point of influence, to the level of a second rate power; notwithstanding her vast dominions, her ample resources, her warlike population, and her centrical position, in Europe. Such England was; such Austria is: what England is now, parliament has no means of knowing except from vague and. uncertain report. I trust that when the time shall come that the lips of the government shall be unsealed, we shall find that we have maintained our former dignity, and have not lost caste in, Europe. But it is impossible for any man of late, to have set foot beyond the shores of these islands, without observing with deep mortification, a great and sudden change in the manner, in which England is spoken, of abroad; without finding, that instead of being looked up to as the patron, no less than the model of constitutional freedom, as the refuge from persecution, and the shield against oppression, her name is coupled by every tongue, with every thing on the continent that is hostile to improvement and friendly to despotism, from the banks of the Tagus to the shores of the Bosphorus; and that she is represented as the key-stone of that arch, of which Miguel, and Spain, and Austria, and Mahmood, are the component members. Time was, and that but lately, when England was regarded by Europe, as the friend of liberty and civilization, and therefore of happiness and prosperity, in every land; because it was thought that her rulers had the wisdom to discover, that the selfish interests and political influence of England, were best promoted, by the extension of liberty and civilization. Now, on the contrary, the prevailing opinion is, that England thinks her advantage to lie, in withholding from other countries that constitutional liberty, which she herself enjoys, Not that they fancy that the rulers of England can be insensible to the blessings and the energy which spring from these popular institutions which they themselves are daily administering. If any man were to say so, he would not be credited. But they think that because our government know the full value of these advantages, therefore, from political jealousy, they seek to retain the monopoly for England. It is thus that they imagine, that the atrocities of Miguel in Portugal are redeemed in our eyes, by his merit in destroying the constitution. It is thus, that they suppose we are making Austria our instrument, while she, fancies us her tool; it is thus, that they see in the delay in executing the treaty of July, not go much fear of Turkish assistance, as invincible repugnance to Grecian freedom.

I trust that when the time shall come, when the government shall feel itself at liberty, to lay before parliament, the whole course of its negotiations, and to explain the tone, and the spirit, and the objects of its communications with foreign powers, all these unfavourable impressions will be dispelled; and I rejoice, that by the present motion, such a development will be afforded, at least, in the case of Portugal.

said that every statesman who had hitherto undertaken the government of this country had felt it to be his duty to endeavour, as far as in him lay, to contribute to the maintenance of public tranquillity. It remained for his noble friend who had just sat down to pursue a different course. His noble friend objected to the course pursued by government, and for this reason, that his voice was for war, whilst that of the government was for peace. His noble friend said, that we ought to compel other nations to fellow our course of policy? But how could we enforce that compulsion except by measures of war? On what grounds, too, was it, that his noble friend would drive the country into war? Was it because Don Miguel was at the head of a faction, and that Portugal was not attached to him? A war with such an enemy might, at first view, appear easy of termination; but his noble friend ought to recollect, that the war of the French Revolution, which at its commencement appeared so easy of termination, did not conclude until after a long and expensive contest of five and twenty years. His noble friend, however, was not satisfied with plunging the country into one war for Portugal—he was also anxious to plunge it into another for the sake of Greece; and as if that were not enough, he recommended the military occupation of Madeira by British troops.—The right hon. gentleman said he must advert to an accusation which his noble friend had preferred against, the government; namely,—that it had neglected to make any remonstrance with the Portuguese government, in order to prevent the infliction of outrage and injustice on British subjects resident in Portugal. To prove how unfounded was that accusation, he read an extract from a despatch addressed by the British government in October, 1828, to the British Consul at Lisbon, to this effect:—"You will take the earliest opportunity of informing the government of Don Miguel, that British subjects shall not be injured with impunity, and that if compensation be not given to them immediately for the injuries which they have sustained, orders will be given to the commanders of his Majesty's forces to exact that satisfaction by force, which the Portuguese government refuse to give to your remonstrances." Could there be a stronger proof that the British government did not intend the rights of British subjects to be infringed upon with impunity? He was happy to say, that the effect of it, had been most salutary; for it had produced the liberation of every British subject who had been imprisoned by the government of Don Miguel. He could not conclude, without observing, that his noble friend, if he had intended to bring before parliament the whole foreign policy of the country, ought either to have made his speech at an earlier period of the debate, or to have given the House some previous notice of his intention. He only entreated the House to believe, that the suppositions made by his noble friend, in the course of his elaborate speech, were not facts, and that the transactions of government, when they came to be examined, would not be found to deserve that, vehemence of accusation in which his noble friend had so suddenly, and he must also add so unjustly, indulged that evening.

The motion was withdrawn. After which, Mr. Peel moved for "Copies or Extracts of communications concerning the relations between this Country and her most Faithful Majesty, the Queen of Portugal."—Agreed to.