presented a Petition from certain inhabitants of the Cities of London and Westminster, being members of the Metropolitan Union, against any interference on the part of this country in the affairs of Greece. In the prayer of the petition he fully concurred, and pressed it upon the serious consideration of the House as one well deserving its attention.

also concurred in the prayer of the petition. He considered it highly fortunate for this country that recent events had extricated us from the risk we ran of being mixed up too much with continental politics. If Mr. Canning was entitled to the gratitude of the country for one act more than another, it was for having gotten rid of the unfortunate connexion which this country had with the Holy Alliance. It was his opinion that the Greeks, and all other nations, ought to be left, as much as possible, to themselves, and it was only right to inform his Majesty's Government that the great majority of the people of England were opposed to any interference.

concurred in what fell from the last speaker; he also agreed with those who thought that the resignation of Prince Leopold was extremely fortunate for this country: at the same time he could not help saying that it would be desirable to the utmost degree, were it possible for us to do so with safety, that we should use our influence for the purpose of securing to Greece the freedom to which she was entitled, having fairly conquered it for herself. If there were any mode by which we could do so without compromising higher duties, he should heartily rejoice at seeing some such measure adopted. He confessed he knew no way in which the House of Commons could interfere except by addressing the Crown, and in the present afflicting circumstances, that was not to be thought of. He sincerely wished to see the question regularly brought before the House, that independent Members would speak out, and not leave all the merit to the other House of Parliament of acting in the matter.

said, that there had been a shameful disregard of liberty in the case of Greece, which had been sacrificed by our Government.

hoped that a discussion on the affairs of Greece would be brought forward. He wished to avail himself of the present opportunity of expressing his admiration of the conduct of the illustrious Prince, who had denied being a party to the plan to limit its boundaries, and curtail it of its fair proportions.

Petition to be printed.

rose, to present a Petition, of which he had given notice yesterday, and to which he begged the attention of the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a few moments. It was from a very respectable body of men, the Chemists and Druggists of London and Westminster, and the Borough of Southwark, complaining of the unjust vexations to which their trade was subjected by the Medicine Stamp Acts. Similar petitions had already been presented from Manchester, Norwich, Lynn, and Exeter; and others were coming from Oxford, Bristol, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, and other important towns. The original intention of the Acts which imposed a stamp duty upon certain medicines was undoubtedly to protect Patent Medicines from the fraudulent substitution of quack compounds, but, by the looseness of wording in some of those Acts, it was left in the power of the Commissioners and Solicitors of Stamps to make a much more general application of their regulations than could have been intended. To the 42nd of the late King a schedule was appended, for the purpose of designating all the medicines which should be charged with stamp duty; but such was the latitude of its wording, that every possible medicine might be made subject to duty, and if that duty were not paid, the vendor was liable to a criminal information. He had some days ago moved for returns with a view to show the operation of these Acts, and he must say that they proved even more than he had expected, It appeared from those returns that in eight months and nine days no fewer than 381 persons were served with Exchequer writs for offences against the Medicine Stamp and License Acts. Of these 381 cases twenty-seven were dropped; 116 were still pending; and the remainder—namely, 238 persons, or commercial houses dealing in drugs, having memo- rialised the commissioners, paid a mitigated penalty, varying from 8l. down to 1l. instead of the full penalty of 20l. and this for selling such things as Carbonate of Soda, Tolu Lozenges, Friar's Balsam, &c, without a label, or for being a few days without a license. Now, of all these 381 cases, not one had come before the proper tribunal, the Court of Exchequer. Although the parties received several letters informing them that, if they did not choose to pay the mitigated penalty, they would be compelled to pay the full penalty, with costs; yet, where the individuals had the firmness to hold out, three Terms were passed over, and no further proceedings were taken against them. Now, he should be glad to know what were the shades of distinction which induced the commissioners to let some individuals off for 1l. or 10l. while they compelled others to pay nearly half the full penalty; and above all, he complained that most lenity was shown to those who resisted, and paid nothing at all. The regulations adopted in these Acts were attended with the most vexatious consequences to the respectable persons engaged in this trade. In the populous city which he had the honour to represent, it was astonishing what a number of persons came into the druggist's shop for a small quantity of Friar's Balsam—to cure a cut, for instance. If the druggist sold that article in a cup or in a spoon, without putting it into a bottle, with a label, and paying a duty on that label, he was liable to a prosecution. Now, he complained that in this, and other respects, the Commissioners of Stamps and the Solicitor to the Stamp Office, exercised a power which it was not intended by the Acts to confer upon any private individuals. Would it be believed that lozenges of all sorts were subject to a duty in the druggist's shop, while all the confectioners in the same street could sell them without paying any duty, and even the manufacturer and wholesale dealer was not called upon to pay duty? In the new Stamp Act the Chancellor of the Exchequer retained all the medicines formerly subject to stamp duty, and he also introduced additional ones. Again, the venders of drugs, not being allowed to export them duty free, were undersold in all the foreign markets by the Dutch and Americans. The House would be astonished when he stated the amount of the duty for the sake of which all these vexatious regulations were adopted, The duty amounted to 37,000l. a-year only, and out of that sum 12,000l. a-year was paid for soda-water alone; so that, deducting this sum, there was but 25,000l. a year for which the drug trade was subjected to these manifold inconveniences. It was not so much of the exaction of duty that these gentlemen complained, but of the uncertainty of the law, by which they were ignorant of the articles that were liable to duty; and the respectable members of the trade were confounded with those who would wilfully defraud the Revenue. The petitioners, therefore, requested that the medicine stamp duty might be done away with, or, if the Government would not consent to that course, at least that the schedule should be so drawn up that there could be no doubt of the articles which it was intended to comprehend. By doing away with the duties, he was satisfied that the Revenue would be improved. He did not mean to say that persons would be likely to take more medicine on that account—[a laugh.] It really was no subject of laughter to those who were dragged into the Court of Exchequer. But what he meant to say was, that the Revenue would be increased in the articles of sugar, spirits, and paper, which druggists used in sending their drugs abroad. He begged leave to bring up the petition, and, after it should be printed, he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would allow him to introduce to him some of the gentlemen of this trade. They would not physic him, because they hoped he did not stand in need of it; but they would lay before him such facts as would most probably induce him to take the subject into immediate consideration.

could assure the gentlemen who had signed the petition that he was quite willing to consider any question for their benefit, which should be consistent with the general interest and the protection of the public. If any such suggestion could be made, he should be not only willing, but happy, to consider it. As to the articles which were subject to duty, they were specified in the schedule; and, therefore, there could be no uncertainty regarding them, except what must arise from the inattention of the parties. If they were more particularly specified—for instance, if instead of vegetable syrup, Velno's vegetable syrup, were mentioned—the duty would not be paid at all; for parties would not be likely to put their names to medicines for the purpose of paying duty. With regard to the proceedings not having been carried to their full extent against certain parties, he could only say that, if they had, the Government might have been charged with harassing the individuals with unnecessary expense—while, if they made a distinction between what might be called venial errors, and real attempts to defraud the Revenue, they were accused of unjust favour.

complained of the vagueness of the schedule, and of its comprehending many articles in which there was no pretension to a right of patent, or to any occult art. He did not see why soda-water should be subject to duty.

said, that soda-water was not comprehended in the new schedule.

said, that since that was the case, and since the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given up 12,000l. of the duty, it was not worth while to collect the small remaining sum by such vexatious means. If the Government did not choose to give up the 25,000l. a year, let them reduce one of the 120 regiments, or discontinue the Governorship of Sierra Leone, or some other of the Colonies—and thus save enough to cover the deficiency. He thought the Chancellor of the Exchequer would consult the public convenience by converting the present system into a license system.

The Petition to be printed.

presented a Petition from the Parish of St Luke's Middlesex, relative to the New Church-Building Act. When the power had been given to the Commissioners under that Act, it certainly had never been expected or intended that they should prove a nuisance, or plague to the country. This, however, had too frequently been the case, and in many instances the public money that had been voted on this account had acted like a firebrand. The petition stated, that six years ago a chapel had been built by the commissioners in the parish of St. Luke; but so little was it wanted, that it remained for two or three years without even being fitted up. The commissioners, not with standing the remonstrances of a part of the inhabitants, and not with standing there was already more church room in the parish than was wanted, persisted in building another church. The churches that were already built were never half filled. The clergyman who served one of them, though he was an able man, could not get half a congregation. A correspondence had taken place on this subject between some of the parishioners who had been deputed by the whole body, and the commissioners, which was conducted on the part of the latter with very little propriety, considering as he believed that most of these commissioners were divines. Their conduct was most imperious—they had refused to see the parties who went to wait on them. The hon. Member then read extracts from the petition confirmatory of these statements, and extracts of a memorial which the parishioners had addressed to the commissioners, as well as extracts from the answer of the secretary to the commissioners, stating that, as they had purchased a site for the church, they saw no reason to take the memorial into further consideration. He should move that the petition be referred to a Select Committee, to inquire into the facts stated in the petition, and into the charges it contained. It was important that the charges made against the commissioners should be investigated, and proved or disproved. The parish was extremely poor, and would be reduced to great distress by the conduct of the commissioners, who did not care about producing great inconvenience to the public for their own partial interests. He understood that in the workhouse of St. Luke's there were upwards of 600 persons, and upwards of 800 paupers in the parish. The sum expended last year on casual poor was upwards of 3,400l., and the whole expense for the poor last year was 24,000. There were other parochial burthens, which altogether fell so heavily that the parish was almost in a state of insolvency. This, however, was no concern of the commissioners, and they insisted on putting the parish to greater expense. The hon. Member concluded by moving that the petition be brought up with a view of referring it to a Select Committee.

might, perhaps, better reserve what he had to say on this subject to some other occasion; but as the hon. Member had moved for a Select Committee, he would make a few remarks. He was much mistaken if the House would lend any support to the hon. Gentleman's Motion, for, even on his own showing, there was no ground for it what- ever. All the charge that he had to bring against the commissioners was, that they would not receive certain parties, but what the state of the question was when they applied to be seen, was not stated. The hon. Gentleman had probably not informed himself, at least he had not stated to the House, what were the reasons of the commissioners for refusing. It appeared, however, by the answer to the memorial, that the application was not made till the site was chosen. The hon. Member said, the commissioners would not hear the parishioners—that they were bound to hear them—and for this he demanded that the petition should be referred to a Select Committee of the House of Commons. But was it not very possible that they might have previously obtained all the requisite information from those who possessed the best means of being acquainted with the affairs of the parish? The Crown had made an unobjectionable selection of judicious and respectable persons, who were known to be fitted for discharging the duty of commissioners; and he could not now consent to have them put upon their trial, day by day, before a Committee of the House of Commons on the allegations of any petition. He thought it would be much better to repeal the bills altogether, or to say at once that there ought to be no churches at all. A certain sum of money had been placed at the disposal of the commissioners, for the purpose of enabling the community to enjoy the advantage of christian instruction, and fulfil the decent offices of piety; but it was not to be supposed that it was solely left to their own arbitrary discretion to determine how it should be appropriated. A rule had been laid down by Parliament for their direction, enjoining them to inquire in what parishes room was wanting for the adequate accommodation of the parishioners when they assembled in the exercise of public worship, to examine in what places there existed-a disproportion between the population and the space allotted for divine service, and provide accommodation in proportion to the number of the inhabitants. In compliance with these instructions, they had selected the parish of St. Luke as legitimately coming within the meaning of the said rule. The population in 1821 was ascertained to amount to 40,876, while there was not accommodation in the places of worship for more than 1,200 persons, and the commissioners proposed to give ac- commodation to 2,500 in addition to that number, making in all but 3,700, out of 40,876, who were supplied with the means of going to church. The assertion that the new church was almost empty, had no foundation whatever, if he might believe the testimony of the respectable clergyman who officiated. The church was calculated to accommodate 1,600 persons; 400 pew-sittings were generally let, and the average attendance was 1,200, together with 500 children who were disposed of in another part of the church; so that if there ever had been a proper case for the interference of the commissioners, it apppeared to be this. It was correctly stated, that the commissioners desired to build another additional church. They certainly did think another church necessary, and had applied to the vestry for a site, which the vestry had refused. They, however, had subsequently provided a site themselves on the border of the poorest part of the parish, where accommodation was much wanted, according to the representations of those who were best acquainted with the neighbourhood. With respect to the poverty of the parish, he should observe, that poor parishes, above all others, had entered into the contemplation of Parliament when it made a provision for building new churches. The parish in question seemed to him to have been peculiarly well selected, and he had no doubt that the portion of poverty which had arisen from misconduct and immorality, would be most effectually removed by providing free access to religious instruction, which was so much wanted by the description of persons alluded to; nor could he otherwise account for opposition to such an object, than by supposing that the parties who had raised it were inimical to religion.

said, he could only judge of the commissioners from their scandalous encroachments on the property of the people, and from local information relative to their abuses. They were continually bringing in bills, which exhibited a grasping and overreaching disposition; and their prodigality and extravagance were equally discreditable to those who passively suffered such excesses, and to themselves who had committed them. Their secretary had 1,000l. a year; and the clerk, who no doubt discharged the whole duty, had 350l. In addition to this wasteful expenditure, they persisted in continually inflicting churches on those who did not want more than they were in possession of already. The hon. Member then adverted to the case of Manchester which had occurred two years before, within his own knowledge, where after a parish had been peremptorily and unexpectedly summoned to provide a site within a given time, the church had been erected on the understanding that the inhabitants were to sustain no further expense and on whom heavy rates had been immediately afterwards levied for the support of the church, notwithstanding the agreement which subsisted between them and the commissioners. The conduct of these commissioners hitherto had shown them to be any thing but trustworthy, and he should therefore refuse to repose in them additional power, seeing that they were not fit to exercise that which they possessed. He thought that a Select Committee should be appointed to inquire into the subject generally, as the gross ignorance of the commissioners had led them almost every where to select inconvenient sites for churches, and to be guilty of other local abuses, which it was necessary to remedy or discontinue. He did not mean as a dissenter to impugn the Christian character of the established church, but he thought it had been already sufficiently endowed, and he felt that he should best advance the true interests of religion by resisting its further encroachments on the property of the people. In appropriating the church revenue, modern usage had widely departed from the original intention of our ancestors, as it was formerly destined to the establishment of poor-houses and the maintenance of hospitality, both of which were now entirely neglected, that the whole revenue of the church might be applied to the support of the clergy. He submitted, that he was the best friend to religion who sought to prevent cant and hypocrisy—the besetting sins of the day—and recommended to the church the adoption of greater Christian forbearance and humility. He concluded with hoping that the hon. member for Aberdeen would press for the appointment of a Select Committee, which should be authorized to inquire into the subject generally, and not confine its labours to an examination of this case alone.

deprecated the innuendo implied in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, when he appeared to insinuate that the hon. member for Aberdeen was an enemy to religion. Such language was both unparliamentary and uncourteous.

said, he should have been ready to support the hon. member for Aberdeen, if he had made out a shadow of a charge against the commissioners, but he could not consent to grant an inquiry into a case which was so manifestly frivolous as that contained in the petition. If a specific case were brought forward, the House ought to give it every attention; but he hoped they all entertained too lively a sense of justice to listen quietly to mere unsupported imputations of ignorance and fraud.

was favourable to a repeal of all the enactments which had been passed upon this subject, few parishes having taken advantage of the provisions of the Act in question without deeply repenting it. In the parish of St. George, in which he lived, the inhabitants had been unnecessarily saddled with an expense of not less than 43,000l. for building-churches. The hon. Member further instanced St. Peter's Pimlico, which cost 20,000l. and from which an income was derived of 1,081l. per year; out of that the minister was allowed 700l., the clerk had 30l. other expenses amounted to 50l. and the remainder went to form a fund to build a house for the clergyman. What he particularly complained of, and what he hoped to see remedied by the new bill, was the appropriation of the balance of pew-rent after paying the clergyman and the clerk. He would have that applied to pay the expense of pew-openers, &c. and whatever might remain after that, should be applied to pay off the debt incurred in building the church, not to provide the clergyman with a house. If there was any intention to propose a clause remedying the evil to which he alluded, he should not oppose the bill which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had in his hand, in its further progress through the House.

wished that his hon. and learned friend, the member for Preston, had not forgotten, when he stated the purposes for which the revenues of the Church were originally given also to state that a great part of those revenues had subsequently been taken away by a rapacious tyrant.

, in moving that the Petition be laid on the Table, said, he could not but express his surprise at the manner in which the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had alluded to his having treated some observations of the right hon. Gentleman jocularly. He confessed that he, as well as other hon. Members, had laughed at the tone and manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had said, by way of rebutting the allegations of the petition, that the "churches had been built in obedience to the votes of a Christian Parliament." Was a declaration of this kind the way to meet a question of fact? What churches, he asked, had been built in obedience to the vote of a Christian Parliament? None, unless he called empty stone walls Christian churches. There were 1,200 inhabitants of the parish of St. Luke, paying an average rate of 30l. per annum, who offered to prove at the bar of the House, that so far from the new churches of which they complained being wanted, those they had were never half filled. Who best should know the fact of the necessity of this new church, this or that bishop—this or that Member of the commission, who knew nothing of the wants of the parish, or 1,200 respectable inhabitants necessarily best acquainted with those wants, and necessarily most interested in their removal? There was, in fact, no parish in the metropolis better supplied with houses of worship, or of which the population was more truly "church-going." Not less than 5,000 persons attended several of twenty chapels which the parish contained every Sabbath day; showing that there was no necessity for building new churches. He repeated, he could not but express his surprise at the manner in which the right hon. Gentleman had met this important petition. He talked of the inhabitants being dissolute, and as such requiring additional means of spiritual correction; and, as usual, insinuated that those who ventured at all question to the immaculate purity of the church establishment were neither more nor less than infidels. To this he should only say, that the very worst enemies of that church were the traders in cant and hypocrisy, who unfortunately were too numerous, and who had not been as much unmasked as the public welfare required. But this was an age of cant and hypocrisy; it was not surprising, therefore, that those who dealt much in both should be ready to impugn the motives of those who probably had more religion in their hearts.

denied, that he had applied the term "dissolute" in the manner stated by the hon. Member. All he meant was, that where dissolute habits were owing to the poverty of any set of parishioners, the best remedy for the evil was the providing the means of improving their morals.

Petition laid on the Table. Mr. Hume gave notice that he should on Monday next move that it be referred to a Select Committee.

moved for returns of Copies of the Instructions sent to Sir P. Malcolm by the Lords of the Admiralty, in obedience to a despatch of the Earl of Aberdeen, written in July last, relative to raising the blockade of the coast of Greece by the British squadron; and also copies of the instructions and despatches sent to and from the Lord Commissioner of the Ionian Isles. He wished to know from the right hon. Home Secretary whether Ministers intended to lay before the House all documents relating to the conferences at Poros, which it was most desirable that the House should be in possession of previous to discussing the final arrangements which had been adopted by the Allies with respect to the new Greek territory?

said, the fullest information respecting the conferences at Poros and their results would be shortly laid before both Houses of Parliament. With regard to the papers then moved for by the hon. Baronet, he did not see what object could be attained by the production of the instructions sent to Sir P. Malcolm, as they were implied in the despatch of Lord Aberdeen which led to them. He did not throw this out by way of objection to producing the papers, but as a suggestion to spare the unnecessary multiplication of them.

thought that every document relating to the blockade by the Greek fleet should be produced, as the French ambassador would appear to have acted under the impression that there existed some discrepancy between the declarations of Lord Stuart de Rothsay and the despatch of the Earl of Aberdeen on the subject. He particularly alluded to the interpretation of the term "violence," as used respecting the raising of the blockade.

maintained, that no discrepancy other than verbal existed with re- spect to the interpretation of the term "violence" alluded to by the honourable Baronet.

was anxious to know whether it was intended to lay before Parliament copies of the correspondence between the British Government and the Court of St. Petersburgh, in relation to the settlement of Greece previous to the signing of the treaty of July, 1827?

felt a considerable objection to produce the correspondence which had taken place before the treaty had been signed, as he thought that not only no good could arise now from its production, but that the proper time for discussing the policy to which it related had passed over. Had the hon. Baronet, months since, when the subject was under consideration, moved for those returns, there could have existed no objection to discussing the policy which they illustrated.

begged leave to remind the right hon. Baronet, that the House had forborne to press for those and other documents relating to the treaty of July, 1827, at the suggestion of Ministers that the proper time for their production would be when the negotiations then pending had been concluded. Those negotiations had since been concluded, so that he saw no reason for withholding any portion of the correspondence which led to them.

was not insensible of the forbearance evinced by Parliament at the time alluded to by the hon. Baronet. Still, Ministers were now bound to look only at the public interests, and not to what had or had not been done on former occasions. In saying this, however, he did not mean to express more than a strong doubt on the expediency of producing the correspondence alluded to by the hon. Baronet.

begged leave to suggest to his right hon. friend the great advantage of laying before that House the additional documents relative to the conferences at Poros, which had been ordered in the other House, but which he understood were not, according to the letter of the Motion, to be also, as a matter of course, laid before the House of Commons as well as the House of Peers. He wished at the same time to remind his right hon. friend of something like a promise on a former occasion, to produce copies of the correspondence which had taken place between the British Government and the Court of St. Petersburgh, in the interval between the two Russian campaigns, with a view to bring about a favourable termination of the hostilities between Russia and the Porte. Both documents were highly important and necessary to a perfect understanding of our conduct in the transaction.

had only to say, that if his noble friend had been in the House a few minutes sooner, he would have heard him declare that it was the intention of Ministers to lay all the documents relative to the conferences at Poros before both Houses of Parliament. He could not take it upon him to say that he had promised the other papers alluded to by his noble friend; but if he had, it must be on conditions which he could not then recollect. Ministers had no objection to the production of every document essential to a thorough investigation of their policy in relation to the treaty of July, 1827, and its consequences.

observed, that as his hon. friend, the member for Callington, had a motion for to night similar to one of which he had himself given notice, he would with great pleasure yield precedence to his hon. friend; re serving to himself the right to throw out such suggestions as might subsequently occur to him on a subject of such vital importance to the people.

.—Availing myself of the courtesy of my hon. friend, and in discharge of a duty which he would have executed with greater ability, I rise to call the attention of this House, distracted as it has been with lesser objects, to a consideration of that condition of difficulty and distress, which prevails throughout the country, and which it is the first duty of the House to consider, to relieve, and to remove. I propose with this view, two measures, the effect of which will be to lessen, in some degree at least, the burthens and sufferings of the people,—to relax also in some degree that pressure which our present monetary system inflicts on productive industry; and which will mitigate, in perhaps a greater degree, the violence of those fluctuations, which have accompanied the introduction of our present monied system, have kept pace with its progress, and which will terminate, per haps, with its extinction alone. The measures I thus propose are, to affirm, by two Resolutions—first, that it is expedient, by making silver money a legal tender, to re-establish that legitimate and ancient metallic standard, which was suspended by the Act of 1797, and which the Act of 1819 professed, but failed, to restore; next, that it is expedient to assimilate the laws of the whole empire with regard to paper money, by rendering legal in England the circulation of cash notes of less amount than 5l.; as that circulation is now legal in Ireland and in Scotland. If I had pursued the strong conviction of my own mind, I should have submitted to the decision of the House, on this occasion, measures of a more comprehensive character. I should have submitted to the decision of the House the whole question relative to our present standard of value, both in its principles and its operation: and the necessity and justice of an entire revision of our monied system, as established by the Act of 1819. But when I see here the great parties of which the House is composed,—or rather when I see the individuals by whose opinions these parties are guided, who have pledged (un fortunately in my estimation for the country) their political consistency to the main principles of the Act of 1819; I adopt the more limited, but the more practicable course,—I prefer the lesser, but the more attainable good, and submit measures, which, whilst they are in accordance with the opinions of those who, with me, condemn altogether the present standard, both in principle and policy, are yet also in accordance with those very principles on which the Act of 1819 has been most strongly advocated. I adopt this course with the less reluctance, because, in explaining the connexion of the measures I propose with our present system; in evincing their policy, in demonstrating the justice and necessity of these measures; it will be necessary that I should bring under the review of the House, though I abstain from submitting to its decision, much of the whole question regarding the effect of our monied system on the interests of the country,—regarding the justice with which that system can now be maintained, and the necessity of its revision. I ascribe to that monetary system, and to the measures by which it has been established, the whole of the difficulties of the country; the whole of those alternations, as they have been called,—those destructive reverses, which have accompanied its introduction. I see no just or necessary reason, why there should prevail any general state of difficulty or distress in this country at this time. There is no difficulty, there has been no distress, except what is plainly resolvable into this,—a condition of pecuniary embarrassment amongst the productive classes. The source of the national distress is thus directly pointed out: a deranged, defective monetary system, a circulation inadequate to the engagements and burthens of the productive community. So manifest is this origin, that if a scale be taken of the pecuniary prices, of productions, of property, and of commodities, for the last fifteen, or the last thirty years, that table will give an accurate index, a faithful history of the prosperous or adverse condition of the kingdom during these periods. It would be seen by it, that when monied prices have advanced in the markets, such advance has not brought with it, as at former times, privations, sufferings, and distress, amongst the great body of the community. On the contrary, when markets have fallen, then amidst that evidence of plenty, according to all former experience, the means of subsistence have been placed out of the reach of the labourer. The evidence of plenty, and the sufferings of famine, have gone together. Scarcity has accompanied low prices; and this condition of things, stated with whatever exceptions any individual may please, but incontestibly true in the main,—does it not lead to the strong presumption at least,—I do not say to the necessary conclusion, for I desire no more at present than to evince the important character of the question now under consideration; does it not lead to the strong presumption, that to forced and artificial changes in the value of money, we must look for the origin of the public calamities! It is in vain to contend, that changes in the value of money have been experienced at former times. Our history affords one example, and one only, of a change in money as extensive as those we have witnessed. That alteration followed the discovery of the New World. Money fell then, as now, in value; but its fall was permanent. Money remained at the rate to which it had fallen. From that period to the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, no further great change in money was experienced, as measured in bread corn, its best criterion. But we have seen,—first, that money fell in value to nearly as great a degree a in the instance I refer to. It did not remain of that low value; money again advanced to its original level. Then took place a second depreciation, followed by a second re-action, each as violent as the former. And then a third depreciation, and another re-action; until money, the standard of value, the measure of property and of contracts, has, by those successive alternations, covered the country with bankruptcies, against which no prudence could guard, and has been the treacherous source of ruin or injustice to all those who have intrusted their fortunes to its security. If, indeed, these changes have sprung from natural causes, what reason is there to expect that they will now terminate? And continuing; the continuance of the career of this country in its commercial and manufacturing greatness is at its close; for manufactures and commerce cannot co-exist with disorders such as these. But I believe it not; I believe not that the character of money has changed; I believe not, that the character of the people has changed, or that they have dealt less prudently with money now than at former times. And it is demonstrable, that our proceedings have been calculated to lead precisely to the calamities which they have experienced. I will describe what those proceedings have been, and I go back for this purpose to the Bank Restriction Act of 1797, on which Act rests our present system, its justice, and its policy. The Legislature by that Act established, for the first time in this country, paper money, strictly and properly so called; not paper existing as the representative of money, payable in other money, and limited in its quantity by such exchangeability; but paper, performing in itself the office and functions of money, exchangeable into nothing, representing nothing,—limited by nothing but the will of the issuers, and which no man who held it could demand payment or exchange of from any other person. It was then, for the first time, that this description of money, a pure paper money as it is denominated, was known in this country. The Legislature abolished at that time—suspended, indeed, but abolished whilst it suspended—that ancient metal standard, which for more than two centuries, as regarded one of the precious metals, the predominant standard silver, had continued without variation, the measure of property and of value in this kingdom, Another standard was then substituted—the paper money I have described; but the Legislature of that day adopted no one precautionary measure to protect the new standard from debasement, or to maintain its value. The laws which maintained the purity and value of the old standard, had no reference to the character of the new money, nor were any other laws provided in their place. Thus established, and thus unrestricted, depending for its value on chance or accident, on the will or judgment of irresponsible individuals, this paper money became the sole practical standard in which all the pecuniary engagements of the people were formed, all public and private engagements and burthens contracted and imposed, for no less a period than two-and-twenty years. At the end of that long period, in 1819, this standard of value, thus established with out protection, was abandoned without inquiry; the metal standard was brought back, and all the engagements of the one standard made payable in money of the other. I repeat it, without inquiry; with no inquiry into that which was the only essential matter in an operation of this character, into the extent to which the debasement of the paper money had been carried; into the difference of value between the two monies, in one of which the contracts of the other were made to be discharged. A committee indeed of this, and one of the other House of Parliament, preceded by their labours the Act of 1819. But they stated in their Report, that it had been previously decided by the wisdom of Parliament to re-establish the standard of 1797, and that their duty was confined to a consideration of the proper time and manner to carry that into effect. The directions given to this committee, a committee sitting on a measure having the most extensive bearing on all the interests of the people were "to inquire into the state of the Bank of England, with reference to the expediency of proceeding to cash payments at the period appointed by law; and into such other matters as were connected therewith." On its Report was founded a law, the effect of which went to substitute one value for another, in every existing contract for money, rent, or debt, or settlement, throughout the realm; and the committee made no Report as to what extent this difference in value would go. It recommended this House,—the guardians of the public purse,—to pass a law, the necessary consequence of which was to make an addition, not to any particular tax; not to the land, the malt-tax, or the assessed taxes; but at once to make an addition to every tax then existing, which the war had imposed;—to every tax which the wars of two centuries had imposed;—all were to be at once increased; and the committee did not think it a matter therewith connected, to explain in their Report to what extent this addition would thus be carried;—to what amount new burthens were thus to be imposed on the people,—new taxes given to the Crown. Such were the characters of the inquiry which preceded the Act of 1819. The committee was discharging a higher duty than admitted of a reference to interests like these; they were in discharge of a task, which, said they, previous Acts of Parliament had rendered just, and therefore necessary. I dispute not now that plea of justice: for the present I admit it. Before I sit down I shall have occasion to discuss the question, and shall shew how utterly worthless is that fallacious plea, and that other plea which has been put forward, of the ten years' continuance of the present standard. But for the present I admit, that justice and the national faith required, in 1819, that the standard of 1797 should be brought back. That being necessary to be done, it was needless to inquire into the cost, whatever that cost might be, or to whatever extent the public interests would be exposed to danger. I dispute not now the justice of the Act of 1819; but I take these two measures together; I couple the Act of 1797 with the Act of 1819; I say, that by the one Act of Parliament was established in this country a money and a standard of value which had no protection from debasement; that, so established, this money became the sole practical standard of the people for two-and-twenty years; that, in this money were all pecuniary contracts, rents, settlements, and mortgages founded; that all the public burthens and taxes were in that money, during all this period, contracted, and imposed; that, at the end of this period, was brought back an ancient and an obsolete standard, unknown to the transactions of, it might almost be said, the then existing generation, unknown to all their engagements; and that all the contracts of the one money were made payable in the other, without any inquiry into the difference of value between the two. This is the character of these proceedings; and let any man who considers them, and who is desirous of understanding the real nature of the difficulties of the country, and their origin, turn his view from this picture of the proceedings of Parliament, to a consideration of the state of the country, on whose interests these proceedings were to operate; let him consider the state of society in this country, connected together by pecuniary engagements to an extent never before known here or elsewhere; let him consider the landed interest—the land bound on one side by leases, on the other by mortgages, and settlements, all expressed in money; let him consider manufactures and commerces, all dependent on, existing by, one great and general system of pecuniary credit; next the public debts and taxes; and then I would submit to the consideration of this House, what appears to me to require no consideration, whether in the history of the country, whether in the whole history of civilized legislation, there can be found any course of proceedings more calculated to produce extensive disorders; move destitute of all prudence, foresight, or wisdom; more utterly regardless of all the rights and security of property; more framed to effect a general confiscation of property; more pregnant with derangement, disorder, danger, calamity, and ruin. Hitherto I have admitted the validity of that plea, which urges the justice of returning, in 1819, to the standard which had, since 1797, been suspended. I have said that I shall explain, before I sit down, on what grounds that fallacy is founded; and even at present it is proper to remark, that those who vindicate the sacrifices imposed by the Act of 1819, on the ground that those sacrifices were demanded by good faith and justice, bring that defence forward under cir cumstances little favourable to its authority. That plea was not urged by its advocates when the Act of 1819 was passed. The House or the country was told nothing then of great sacrifices which justice demanded, or of difficulties which it was necessary to encounter. The advocates of the bill saw no difficulties; foretold no sacrifices. They treated as men of gloomy and visionary apprehensions those who foresaw in the Act of 1819 the fatal consequences with which it was pregnant. There is none but a trifling difference, said the friends of the measure, in the value of the paper, and of the metal money. They had provided themselves with an infallible test, by which they could readily do that, which the right hon. Baronet has since discovered to be so difficult to do: by which they could measure the varying value of the circulating medium from time to time. Paper they could put into one scale, gold into another, and weigh the value of the two with ease, certainty, and accuracy. It was not till that test was found to be fallacious, till its worthlessness could no longer be concealed, till the consequences of the tremendous error then committed, had spread immeasurable ruin throughout the country; not till then was the ground changed, and we were told, for the first time, that whatever was the ruin which should follow the imposition of the old standard, faith and justice required that standard to be re-established, and that ruin to be endured. But it is admitted, that the faith of contracts required the standard, suspended in 1797, to be brought back in 1819, and imposed on all the engagements contracted in two-and-twenty years, during which period that standard was unknown. I admit that statement, and I rest upon it the first measure of relief which I now propose. I affirm, then, that it is not the standard suspended in 1797, which the Act of 1819 has brought back. It is a new standard, unknown till that hour to the laws of this country. I affirm it decidedly. The ancient standard of this country, the standard which existed up to 1797, was not a gold money of 3l.17s. 10½d. an ounce, and could never be so described. There never existed a pecuniary contract in this kingdom payment of which could, until the Act of 1819, be enforced in money of the present standard. There never was a tax imposed which, till that hour, the King could require to be paid in money of the Act of 1819. The ancient, legitimate standard of this country is a gold money, coined after the rate of 3l. 17s. 10d. of money to an ounce of gold; or a silver money of 5s. 2d. of money to an ounce of silver, at the option of the payer. This is no immaterial distinction, but an essential part of the standard. The two precious metals, gold and silver, fluctuate from time to time, in their value as estimated against one an other. Gold is at times the dearest of the two; silver at other times. The laws of our standard secured to the debtor the option of the cheapest metal. For a considerable period after our standard was fixed, in the reign of Elizabeth, gold ad- vanced, and became the dearest of the two metals. In consequence, silver became, at that time, the money in which the people discharged their engagements, and was the principal instrument of circulation; and gold would have been driven from the country, but it was dealt with as convenience required, and as I shall presently explain. About the time of King William gold ceased to advance, it afterwards began to fall; and, throughout the greater part of the last century, gold became the cheapest of the two metals: people, in consequence, discharged their engagements in gold; and silver, in its turn, became less the instrument of transactions, and was partly driven from circulation. About the year 1783 the course of the precious metals took another direction, gold again advanced: it is now greatly the dearest of the two metals, and the interest of the debtor now is to discharge his engagements in silver, according to his undoubted right by the laws of our standard as they have existed, from the reign of Elizabeth down to the Act of 1819, or rather to 1816. I will shew to what extent this change affects contracts; and I rejoice that I see opposite the hon. member for London (Mr. Ward), who stated, on a former occasion, that he was unable to understand the meaning of the terms when men spoke of a double standard. The hon. Member is a considerable authority on these subjects, a great Exchange merchant, a Director of the Bank; one of those witnesses who misled the Committee of 1819 (for that committee put questions regarding the value of money, though they made no report on such value) into the fatal error they committed of taking bullion as their measure of debasement; and I will endeavour to explain to the hon. Member, and, through him, to the House, what the term "double standard" really implies. The first Lord Liverpool, in his Letter on Coins, thus explains what he understood by that term:—"Experience has proved, (said he) that where coins are made legal tender at given rates, those who have any payments to make will prefer to discharge their debts or obligations by paying in that coin which is overrated," that is to say in the cheapest. This is Lord Liverpool's notion of the term "double standard." My hon. friend and colleague (Mr. Baring) in that very able paper which contains his evidence before the Committee of Privy Council on Coins, in 1828, gives an explanation precisely similar. It is this—"If gold and silver were concurrent legal tenders at the old Mint regulations, silver would, at present, be the practical standard, as the debtor always acquits himself in the cheapest metal he is enabled to do by law." My hon. colleague found no difficulty in piercing the mystery of those terms which perplex the hon. member for the City. The double standard is an optional standard; and that view of it, as it works in practice according to the evidence of the two authorities I have quoted, agrees precisely with the intention and meaning of the law itself, from the first introduction of two metals as money in this kingdom. I have here the terms of the first Act which legalised gold money, in the reign of Edward 3rd., when coins of gold were for the first time to any extent circulated. That Act uses almost the very words which my hon. colleague has adopted in describing the practical working of the double standard. "And where any agreement had been made,"—by agreement being signified a contract taking the nature of a debt,—"where any agreement had been made, it should be at the option of the purchaser to pay money of gold or of silver, as he should think fit." And this option given by the law to the debtor, has continued, I believe, without any interruption, to be the law of the Mint, and a part of the standard, from the period I have quoted down to the Act of 1816, for establishing a silver coinage, when that option was, for the first time, taken away, and the debtor compelled to pay his debts in gold, as soon as the Bank Restriction Act should cease,—which it did by the Act of 1819. But I will shew what the result of the double standard will be in its operation when again re-established. Let it be assumed that my hon. friend the member for London (Mr. Ward) is in possession of an old mortgage on a landed estate which he desires to call up; the money was advanced, I shall assume, before the Restriction Act; lent in the double standard; the lender advancing the cheapest of the two metals, and knowing that the law would allow the debtor to pay also in whichever should be the cheapest metal: and all mortgages which have dates before 1819, were either founded on this optional standard, or on the still cheaper standard of the Restriction Act. The mortgage is called in. By that single standard, now, for the first time, made law,—that standard, the simplicity of which is so intelligible to the hon. Member,—he is enabled to compel his debtor to pay gold money of 3l. 17s. 10½d. an ounce; which, when he carries to the bullion-market, he finds of the full intrinsic value of 3l. 17s. 10½d. in gold, and perhaps somewhat more; but which, if he sell for silver bullion, will give him five per cent more silver than the debt paid in the ancient coin of the realm would give him, according to the law of the standard suspended in 1797; and he thus, by the abolition of the legitimate standard, has obtained an unjust advantage of five per cent, to the equal injury, unjustly inflicted, of his debtor. Now suppose the legitimate standard re-established, that double standard, which the hon. Member finds it so difficult to understand, let him be satisfied that his debtor will find no such difficulty, he will see at once through the mystery. The debtor will no longer pay gold money as now compelled; he will pay in silver money, of the ancient legal coin—of 5s. 2d. the ounce; which, when the hon. Member carries to the bullion-market, he will be able to dispose of at no more than 4s. 11d. the ounce; he will lose 5-per-cent, which his debtor will gain; or, in other words, will have to give up an advantage of 5-per-cent, which the present law has unjustly, and in violation of the faith of contracts, given to all creditors over all debtors. My hon. friend will thus, I think, be enabled to discover the meaning of the term "double standard," though he may not be satisfied of its propriety; neither is that a question which the Legislature has now, or had in 1816, or in 1819, the right to interfere with. It might, originally, have been just or unjust, reasonable or unreasonable, that debtors should have the power of discharging their engagements, either in one money or the other, as one became cheaper than the other: but this was a matter for consideration when that power was given. In the time of Edward 3rd, of Queen Elizabeth, of King William, or of George 1st, it was matter for decision; but having been decided, the power having been secured by law, that law forming a part of the standard and of the Mint, and being as absolutely a part of our standard, as the weight or fineness of the coin forms an essential part of it, that power cannot be taken away from the contracting parties, without a violation of faith and justice. I will take the case of a tax, and all taxes are contracts; for I know of no obligation on any subject of this realm to pay any tax, except that it is agreed to by his representatives, acting by and for him in this House, that he shall pay such tax. Take, then, the case of a tax imposed by Parliament and given to the Crown: it falls on a particular individual with a given weight. Let this be assumed as 21l. As the law now stands, the King can compel this individual to provide twenty guineas of the old coinage, or twenty-one sovereigns of the new, before he can obtain an acquittal from this demand. But let the ancient standard be established, that very standard in which this tax was imposed—for there does not exist a single tax which was not either imposed in the optional standard which I now claim or in the still cheaper standard of 1797. The subject will not then pay 21 sovereigns; he will take his 21 sovereigns to the bullion-market; purchase with them 85½ ounces of standard silver, at 4s. 11d. which is the price now, and which has been the price, (or nearly so, for I speak not of fractions, and I am establishing the principle, rather than estimating the precise difference,) for the last 5 or 8 years, of silver; and these 85½ ounces he will carry to the Mint, where, according to the laws of the Mint, they will be restored to him in coin, of the amount of 22l. 1s. 9d.; with 21l. of which he will discharge his tax, demand his acquittance, and retain 1l. 1s. 9d. for himself, as a relief from the burthen of this duty; and will pay the tax, not in base, depreciated money, but in money of the precise denomination, weight, and fineness, which, from the 43rd year of Queen Elizabeth, down to the Act of 1816, was the legal coin of this realm, without variation or interruption. But it may be said, as it has been said, that this advantage of 5 per cent would not be realized; that the price of silver would advance with the additional demand which making silver a legal tender would occasion. This would not affect the principle I maintain. Give the option; the debtor is entitled to it. Neither is it to be assumed, or is it probable that silver would advance. The rise of gold as compared with silver, which has taken place here, is common to us and to France, to the whole continent, and, I believe, to the world at large. Silver which, by the law of our Mint, ought to exchange against gold, after the rate of 15 1/7 ounces of silver to 1oz. of gold, is given in the bullion-market, at the rate of near 16 ounces for an ounce of gold. At the same rate these metals exchange in France; and as silver forms the principal money of all countries except this, it is not probable that such additional demand for silver, as an alteration of the law would occasion here, could have the effect of changing the proportionate values of gold and silver throughout the world; and without this effect the price of silver, as against gold, could not permanently advance here. Neither, in point of fact, would a great additional demand for silver take place. Men would not, in effect, pay their debts or taxes in bags of silver: they do not now pay them in bags of gold. Debts and taxes would be paid then as now, in paper instruments of credit, bankers notes and cheques; but these, could they to be discharged in silver, the cheaper of the metals, would be discharged with less burthen than in gold, the dearer of the two. Bankers and others who issue cash-notes, would find an advantage from the cheapness and from the security which the power of paying in silver would give them; they would maintain a larger amount of their paper-money in circulation. The channels of circulation would be more abundantly replenished—money, in greater abundance, would bear a less value; and to some extent, whatever it might prove, whether 4 or 6 or 7-per-cent, the establishment of the ancient standard would, in this manner, maintain a higher average rent of all land, than can be supported under the present standard; and thus would give some advantage to the landlord—a higher price would be established for all agricultural productions, which would give the farmer relief; whilst an equal advance on the wages of labour would be an equally necessary consequence, and thus the labourer would find some mitigation from the burthens which the taxes impose upon him. The consequences of the innovation introduced into our standard in 1819, being such as I have described,—such having been the operation on pecuniary contracts, of substituting a single standard of gold for a joint standard of gold or silver, it is somewhat hard to understand, what countervailing benefit the authors of this change proposed, or how they reconciled their measure with what was due to the faith of existing engagements. The first Earl of Liverpool appears to have been the first individual who urged upon the Legislature the scheme of making gold alone, a legal tender, and of abolishing the legal tender of silver. In his well-known letter to the King, on this subject, which letter was published in 1805, and was originally drawn up, as it is understood, to serve for a report from a committee of Privy Council, which sat in 1798, on the coinage, is probably to be found the best exposition, of the reasons which guided the Legislature in changing the standard of value. Lord Liverpool's report was not adopted by the Committee of Privy Council of 1798. Why it was rejected I know not. It has been said, that it was rejected in consequence of an opposition from the then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. The grounds of that opposition I do not know; but than this nothing can be more certain, that since, in 1798, when the Committee sat, the price of silver had fallen with respect to gold, so as to give some advantage to the debtor who should discharge his engagement in silver—the power of doing that if he pleased could not have been even then taken away from the debtor, without as gross an injustice—as gross a fraud, if it be desirable to introduce terms of this description into discussions bearing somewhat of an abstract character—as direct and as gross an injustice as was ever effected by any—the most fraudulent debasement or enhancement of the weight or fineness of the coins. The labours of the Committee of Privy Council on coins were suspended in 1798, and not renewed till 1816. The second Lord Liverpool, who had succeeded to all his father's opinions, and to more than all his power, was then successful in procuring the adoption of the measure rejected in 1798. In his father's letter to the King, the motives which influenced such adoption are to be sought; they seem to have been these:—Gold, according to Lord Liverpool, being a rich metal, is best adapted for the standard of a rich country. When countries are poor, he said, copper forms for them the fittest standard; as nations become richer, then silver comes into operation, and is the best standard; and when nations become very rich, then they adopt gold; and some countries there are, said he, so exceedingly poor, that metal baser than copper would form the most fit standard for such countries. Reasons more fanciful, carrying with them so little of solid weight were, perhaps, scarcely ever before proposed as the grounds of an important legislative measure. They are founded too on a false assumption of facts. It is not true that nations proceed with regard to money, as Lord Liverpool imagined; all experience contradicts the supposition.—Our own country—and it is by our own former experience that the proceedings of this Legislature ought to be mainly guided—this country never, when most poor, did use any standard of a cheaper material than silver. Silver formed our standard, from the first introduction of money amongst us; it continued a standard, according to our laws, with no intermission, down to the time of Lord Liverpool's project. Silver is now a standard in France, as it always has been; and as far as I know, there is no country in Europe but our own, nor in the world, however rich, where silver does not continue to be a standard of value. The advantages proposed, being such as these, how did Lord Liverpool reconcile to public faith the change from one standard to another, in reference to existing contracts? It will be found that his argument on this head overlooks altogether the main fact connected with it. He said, gold has already become practically the standard of the people; as the country became more wealthy in the course of the last century, the people found, said he, gold a more convenient money for their increased transactions than silver; they, therefore, made use of gold,—laid silver aside; and having so acted, and for such reasons, the Legislature can justly abolish silver as a standard altogether:—it will merely establish by law, the standard which the people have established in practice. All nations, he said, will act in this manner as they become rich; they will adopt gold without a law, or in spite of any law. Now, that the people of Eng land adopted gold in the last century on account of their wealth, is so far from being true, that it might with more justice be said, they so acted because of their poverty. Gold, during the last century, became the cheapest of the two metals. It was to the advantage of every man to pay his debts in gold; it would have been a loss to the debtor, of sometimes 2-per cent, at other times, 5, 10, and even 12-per-cent, to pay his debts in silver: and the poorer, therefore, the state of the people,—the more they were pressed by debts,—the more urgent was the necessity of paying those debts in gold, according to the option secured to them; and which option, if continued, would now make it advantageous to pay debts in silver. I hold here a table of the price of silver, as compared with gold, during the greater part of the last century. For the first twenty-five years of the reign of George 3rd, viz. from 1760 to 1785, debtors would have lost 6-per-cent by paying in silver money; that is the reason why they paid their debts in gold. After 1785, gold advanced; in 1798, and down to 1816, it became the clearest of the two metals; and so it has continued to be from 1816 to the present time; and an indisputable right have the people of this country to discharge in silver all their public and private engagements—a right which, without injustice, and a flagrant violation of the faith of contracts, no law can take away. We come, then, to 1816: a Committee of Privy Council then again sat, to consider of providing a new coinage of silver; it was a necessary measure; the old silver coins had been melted. But proceeding on Lord Liverpool's views, the committee acted in direct opposition to the facts before them. It was no doubt necessary, to secure the new coinage from the fate of our former silver coins which had been melted down, or carried abroad, and therefore to inquire whence that evil had arisen, in order to guard against its recurrence. Now, by referring to the price of silver and gold, from 1760 to 1785, we shall perceive the grounds on which the committee proceeded. The average price of silver for the whole twenty-five years is exactly 5s. 6d. the ounce, or 6¾ per cent above the Mint price. The price of gold, for the same period, is also above the Mint price; but only about ¾ per cent. During this whole period there was a profit, therefore, to be obtained by changing gold for silver, by bringing from abroad gold bullion, procuring it to be coined at the Mint, exchanging the money thus produced into silver coins of the full weight, and exporting those silver coins: thus a profit would be procured of 6-percent, and silver coins, it is plain, could not remain in circulation under such circumstances. To protect the new coins, therefore, it seems to have been thought necessary to reduce their intrinsic value by about 6-per-cent, and thus to leave no profit on such operations as those described; and in adopting this step, of reducing the intrinsic value of the coin, it seems to have been thought necessary, also, that the new coins so lowered should cease to be a legal tender: one measure followed the other. Now, in thus reducing the intrinsic value of the new silver coinage, in order to protect the coins, a danger was guarded against, which for a considerable period had not existed. After 1785, silver had fallen in price; in 1798, it had fallen to the ancient Mint price. It was seen, indeed, that throughout the French war, silver was high—as high sometimes as 10-per-eent, and at other times as 30-per-cent above the old Mint price; but these were the prices of depreciated paper. Estimated in gold, silver had fallen throughout the whole period of the Restriction Act; and if the Legislature in 1816 had so formed their calculation, it would have been shewn them that, gold money again established, silver coins at 5s. 1d. an ounce would be as secure as at 5s. 6d., or any higher price. The result would have justified that estimate; for in the whole period since the cessation of the Restriction Act, there would have been a loss of about 5-per-cent in melting silver coins of the old standard, for that standard is 5s. 2d. an ounce, and the market price of silver has been 4s. 11d. the ounce; and thus, therefore, with no debasement of the intrinsic value of the silver standard, would the new silver coinage have been as secure as it is now secure, or can ever be, against the danger of melting or exporting the coins. But in thus guarding against a danger which had long passed, the Legislature exposed the coinage to another danger, which an accurate calculation would have shewn them was imminent. By taking 6-per-cent from the intrinsic value of the silver coins, they offered a premium for fictitious coinage to that amount; and this premium would be of necessity increased by as much more, as silver should fall in the market below the old Mint rate. Silver in the market is now 5-per-cent below the old Mint rate; and a premium is now, therefore, held out of 11 or 12-per cent on surreptitious coinage. Whether a false coinage has really taken place to any considerable amount, I do not undertake to say, nor is it material to my argument; but it is yet a matter of great public interest. A general belief prevails that much of the silver coin now in circulation is of Dutch or American manufacture, The right hon. Master of the Mint thinks differently; but I do not consider the grounds he has assigned satisfactory. He has informed us that an assay has been made at the Mint, of coin supposed to be fictitious, and that it has been found to be genuine. But more extensive assays must be effect ed, before any assurance of the safety of the coin generally can be derived. And, further, I have to inform the Master of the Mint, and my belief is founded on the information of persons experienced in metals, that it is practicable to manufacture silver coin so nearly resembling the genuine coinage, as that, being formed of the same intrinsic alloy, it would not be possible for the officers of the Mint to discriminate between the real and the fraudulent money—between the coinage of the King and the coinage of the Dutchman or American. And I would like to ask the Master of the Mint, whether, since the period when additional coins have ceased to be issued from the Mint, a large accumulation of coins in silver has not been experienced at the Bank of England; whether the Bank has not expressed its opinion and apprehension, that this coin is much of it fraudulent; and whether, in fact, the Bank has not demanded payment from the Government of 11¾-percent on such coin, being the difference between its real and its current value? The Master of the Mint admitted that silver had accumulated at the Bank; but he said silver had nowhere else accumulated. To that fact I doubt if his means of information extend. Of one part of the kingdom I can inform him, where there is a great accumulation of silver coin. I can inform him of one establishment alone, where, within the last few months, has been accumulated above 80.000l. of silver coin, the difference between the intrinsic and the nominal value of which is about 10,000l. I do not urge this part of the question; but if the fact turns out to be, that silver money, Dutch made, is supplied here of a value 11¾-per cent debased below its current rate—and there exist no means of securing the pre cent coinage against such a substitution, of necessity that coinage must be withdrawn, and another adopted. Thus it is, step by step, that we have abolished the ancient standard of the realm, acting all along on partial views, and never arriving at any comprehensive understanding of the real character and importance of our operations. Abolishing the option of two metals, we have bound all contracts to one metal, and that metal the dearest. It is not unimportant to compare these proceedings with the course which, under circumstances nearly similar, this nation formerly adopted. About the period of the establishment of our standard in the reign of Elizabeth, gold advanced in price as compared with silver; as it has recently advanced. Let us then see what course was adopted by the statesmen by whom these questions were then regulated. I am appealing to the best days of the standard—to the times when the national interests, dependent on this standard of value, were protected by equal wisdom and equal justice. But I cannot refer to these times without saying, that no proceeding could be more unfortunate for themselves, than when the individuals by whom these important interests have been governed in our own times, have referred to former experience,—have placed themselves and their measures in juxtaposition,—have invited the comparison,—have invoked the authority, and appealed to the conduct of those great statesmen and monarchs, and greater patriots, and greater philosophers, by whom our standard was fixed, and by whom it was governed, from the time of Queen Elizabeth, Lord Burleigh, Lord Bacon, and Lord Coke, down to the time of King William, Mr. Locke, and Sir Isaac Newton. I am bound to tell them, no man can examine the measures of those different periods and be blind to the fact, that a contrast more striking it is impossible to find, between the prudence, the confidence yet caution, the decision yet circumspection, the sagacious foresight, looking to all consequences, protecting all interests, guarding against all dangers, which distinguished the series of former measures; and the total absence of all these characteristics, the narrow and timid presumption, the short-sighted ignorance which belong to the latter. Sir, immediately after the 43rd Elizabeth, gold advanced as it has recently advanced. The present advance of gold, as compared with silver, is, taking five years ending in 1830, and five years ending with 1785, about thirteen percent; taking-twenty years ending with 1785, and five or eight years ending with 1830, the advance is about eleven per cent. From the lowest price of gold in 1782, when an ounce of gold exchanged against no more than about 13 1/7 ounces of silver, to the present rate, hen it exchanges against 15⅞ ounces of silver, the advance of gold is more than twenty per cent. So circumstanced, we have rejected silver, and bound all contracts to gold. In 1605, four years after our standard was established, gold advanced also, as compared with silver, eleven per cent. What was the course adopted? Lord Bacon and Lord Coke directed that course: their proceedings were precisely the reverse of ours. They adhered to silver, and dealt with gold as I shall presently describe. Gold again advanced: the advance in seven years more was ten per cent. Gold continued further still to advance: the advance in the whole had reached thirty-two per cent by the time of Charles 2nd. By King William's time, gold had advanced thirty-nine per cent. During all this period, all this derangement of gold, the course of our Governments was uniform. Silver money had been coined by the 43rd of Elizabeth at 5s. 2d. the ounce; gold money at 2l. 15s. 11d. the ounce. By the 4th of James 1st, gold money was lessened in weight; it was then coined at 3l. 2s. 1d. the ounce: this was a debasement of eleven per cent. In the 9th of James 1st, gold money was lowered ten per cent by proclamation, which brought the ounce of gold to 3l. 7s. 7d. The gold money was again debased one or two per cent in the 17th of James 1st. In the 13th of Charles 2nd, gold was coined at 3l. 14s. 2d. the ounce, being a debasement of eight or nine per cent; and at that rate it continued, by the Mint indentures, until, in the reign of George 1st, gold was coined at its present rate of 3l. 17s. 10½d. the ounce. During all this period, silver money was held immutable and invariable; the same shilling, the same crown, possessing always the same weight and fine ness. But the sovereign of the 43rd of Elizabeth, coined for 20s. as now, weighed 7 dwt. 4 grs., being nearly forty per cent heavier than is the present sovereign. The sovereign in four years was reduced in weight eleven per cent, and called an unite; seven more years elapsed, and the unite was raised by proclamation to 22s. Then the laurel was coined, of 20s., but in weight having sixteen or seventeen per cent more metal than has our present sovereign. Charles 2nd took away eight or nine per cent from the weight of the laurel, and called it a guinea: the guinea being fixed by the Mint indentures at 20s., passed current for 21s. or 22s. amongst the people. During all these derangements, silver money was never changed; the silver standard, the ancient predominant standard of the country, was adhered to. To this was intrusted the faith of contracts; on this standard rested the security of property; and gold was dealt with as convenience required. It is, perhaps, difficult to imagine any single course of proceeding on which more essential interests were dependent than on this. If the course we have recently adopted of taking gold as the sole standard had been then pursued, what would the consequences, under such circumstances as I have described, have been? Every debt of the people, every contract, every tax would have gone on increasing during this whole period. With a constantly increasing value of money, a constant decline in monied prices, the improvement, the prosperity of the country could not have proceeded, nor those of any country. Every man who had then taken a lease, every man who had then contracted a debt, would have signed his own ruin; whilst all public burthens would have received a constant though silent addition. All the operations of productive industry would have been sacrificed and crushed. From these evils,—which, by individuals who have devoted their attention to such subjects, it will be known that I have accurately described,—the country was protected by the wisdom of her statesmen. But, in our times, with necessity a thousand times more urgent,—with debts and burthens, that the most sanguine amongst us will scarcely profess that he is confident can be safely borne, or that their security can be reconciled with the safety of the most important classes of the community;—so circumstanced, regardless or ignorant of consequences, we have adopted the opposite course, we have abolished the old and the easier standard; that which operated as a relief to the debtor and to the productive classes generally; and have bound all the burthens of the State, and all private engagements, to that metal, which is the most astringent, the most capricious in its value, the most dangerous,—a metal which is taken as its standard by no other country than this;—that metal, which Mr. Locke, whose steps we profess to follow, declared was not the money of the world, nor fit to be so. These are the main grounds on which I propose the re-establishment of silver money as a legal tender. But I call on the House further to consider how this matter stands with regard, to the consistency of their own proceedings. In returning to metal payments, after twenty-two years of paper money,—in imposing a metal standard on paper debts,—the House had a painful duty to perform; and heavily has the discharge of that duty fallen on the most valuable classes of the community. Men have been overwhelmed in ruin by thousands and ten thousands, who knew nothing of any difference in the value of different standards of money; ruined by contracts formed in ignorance—in excusable ignorance—an ignorance in which this House participated: and which was proclaimed to the country by a solemn vote in 1811. Whole classes of the people have been sunk in indiscriminate confiscation and ruin, and those the most valuable classes; men the most skilful and industrious; and the more skilful and effective in their own peculiar pursuits, the less likely to be instructed in the government standard of value: they and their property have been sacrificed and destroyed. But the House, it is pretended, could give them no relief. Were it proposed to mitigate the confiscation inflicted on these men, by permitting only their paper engagements to be discharged in silver money of the coinage of 1816, the answer was ready:—"The public honour is concerned; it is a breach of national faith to the amount of six and three quarters per cent;" to allow that the gold sovereign should discharge a debt of twenty-one shillings; "that would be a public fraud to the amount of five per cent." No relaxation could be yielded: not a jot or a tittle of abatement made; public faith, the national character, required that the old standard of 1797 should without alteration be re-established. Acts of Parliament were pledged; the course of this House was straight; dictated by justice; by blind, unmitigable, remorse less, inexorable justice. From that path you pretend you had no power to deviate, whatever consequences might follow, though you trod down the people in your course; though you sacrificed the landed interest; though your laws swept down the farmer like his wasted harvests; and drove the labouring classes to pauperism and to crime; and to an extent appalling to contemplate, has this consequence followed on your measures, though you crushed the labourers to the earth: yet you had no alternative; by former acts of Parliament you were invincibly bound; you could not alter a decree established: other evils would rush in; the bond to its letter must be executed: that has been your plea; and is it fit that this House—are there any men who will advise such a course with these pretensions recent on their lips—when that part of the people, amongst whom you have thus spread sweeping ruin, claims in its turn justice; demands also the letter of the bond: proves that with the letter the spirit corresponds; produces your acts of Parliament; establishes that the bond which could admit of no change for their protection has been itself falsified for their further ruin; will the House then be content to appear before the country in another character;—proclaim that its protestations of protecting faith and justice were a mere hollow pretext in which it had cloaked itself to conceal its deplorable blunders and miserable ignorance; that justice, when difficult, is beyond its power; that there might be a coinage to be destroyed; that for ten years this wrong has been committed; money all that time wrong fully paid on contracts, wrongfully received in pensions and salaries; that to remedy the whole of this wrong would be difficult,—to grant all the remedy due would be beyond the power of the House; that less than all would not satisfy its character; that therefore the injustice must remain; it has been inflicted ten years; it must proceed, must become perpetual; and that this House is the slave of political expediency of the meanest kind? I have stated but partially the violation of the legitimate standard effected by the Act of 1819. The ancient standard of this country cannot be alone described as a gold money of 3l. 17s. 10½d, the ounce, or a silver money of 5s. 2d.; or both at the option of the debtor. It is money of these two standards at the option of the debtor; but money protected also in circulation,—rendered more easy of acquirement,—by certain laws inflicting punishment and penalties on the making or exporting of the coins. The object of those laws, and their effect, was, to maintain a greater amount of money in circulation; and, consequently, to lessen its value; and these laws formed as essential a part of the standard, as the weight, fineness, and denomination of the coin formed a part of that standard, nor could, without injustice on contracts, one be changed more than the other. On what pretence were those laws abolished?—none has been given but this:—the laws, it was said, were not effectual; in spite of the laws coin was melted or exported. But to some extent these laws were effectual, and no laws are perfectly effectual. The laws against usury are evaded; but those laws, to some extent, reduced, during the whole war, the interest of money. The laws which protect property from theft are not entirely effectual: robberies are committed, property is violated; but property is more secure than it would be without those laws; and those laws are effectual in proportion to their severity, always supposing that their severity does not go so far as to hinder the execution of the laws. That the laws for protecting the coin were, to some degree, effectual—that they did maintain a larger amount of coin in circulation than, without them, would have remained there; and that those laws, consequently, lowered the value of money, and thus formed an essential part of the standard, I am relieved from establishing, because I find it admitted in terms sufficiently express in the Report of the Committee, on whose recommendation those laws were abolished. That Committee—the Committee of 1819,—describes those laws acting as a seigniorrage. These are their words:—"The prohibition, indeed, adds something to the difficulty, and consequently, to the expense of exportation, and may, therefore, be sup posed to operate in some degree, as a seigniorage upon our coin; but it is a seigniorage perpetually varying according to the lesser or greater facilities for smuggling, which may, at different moments, exist, and affording, therefore, an uncertain, and in point of fact, an inadequate protection." Here is, then, a protection; not effectual, but capable of being rendered more effectual as smuggling should be repressed; and to some extent, still effectual, and to whatever extent, acting as a seigniorage. This protection could not, without a violation of existing contracts, have been taken away; a violation as complete in principle as would be the alteration of the coin itself. The Committee of 1819, gives no estimate of the amount to which this virtual seigniorage went; but a reference to the Bullion Report of 1810, will give reason to believe that the Bullion Committee estimated this seignorage at about two per cent. I contend not for the accuracy of any estimate, but adding this vague calculation of two per cent to a calculation of the enhancement occasioned by abolishing the legal tender of silver, we shall find a violation of the standard of 1797 actually carried into effect of from five to six, or eight per cent by those who maintained that public faith required the old standard in its letter to be re-established. These are then the grounds on which in justice, I rest the proposition for re-establishing the silver standard of value. I will now address myself to its necessity; to the necessity of giving that degree of relief to the country which can be given consistently with the principles on which the old standard itself rests, and consistently even with those principles, by which a metal standard has been inflicted on paper con tracts. It will be necessary here to show to what extent was the actual difference in value between the paper and the metal money—to shew what the extent of debasement was to which the paper standard fell. No inquiry into this most important matter has the House yet instituted; for the Committee of 1819 rejected from their duties any inquiry into the extent to which the paper standard had become debased. The only attempt of the Legislature to investigate this debasement was made in 1810. In 1810, thirteen years after the establishment of a standard which had no protection from debasement, a Committee of this House was appointed to inquire into the fact, whether it had become debased or not. That Committee was the Bullion Committee, of which Mr. Horner was the Chairman. The terms of its appointment expressed that it was "to in quire into the state of the circulating medium, and into the cause of the high price of gold bullion." The Committee reported that the circulating medium was become debased. It expressed that fact in these words, "The paper money was in excess." Excess in paper money is synonymous with debasement. The Committee did not report to what degree the debasement had proceeded. It may be conjectured, from a perusal of this Report, that the Committee, or some of its members, measured the extent of debasement by the price of bullion, on which price the Committee rested mainly its proof of debasement. But if this were their opinion, they were in error, and the bullionists fell in taking the price of bullion as a measure of the debasement of paper, into a mistake similar to that of which they convicted their opponents. The House and the country was then divided, very much indeed, as at present, into two sects on these questions. On one side were the bul- lionists, or philosophers; on the other side the practical men, or men of business; each party then, as now, holding the opinions of their opponents in some contempt; and in this, at least, then, as now, I am disposed to believe that both parties had reason on their side. The Bullion Committee found certain practical men, who told them that the high price of gold bullion did not arise from any debasement of paper money, but was occasioned by many particular circumstances, such as wars on the Continent, movements of armies there; a practice of hoarding, and other similar events; to which the bullionists answered, "Circumstances, such as these, must, in a greater or less degree, have taken place at some other period than this; and yet, no other period can be pointed out when bullion advanced in value as it has now advanced. This advance of bullion must, therefore, be ascribed to some circum stance peculiar to the present time. There is no such circumstance, excepting the existence now of paper money, not payable in metal; and to this paper money must, there fore, be ascribed the high price of bullion; or, in other words, it is owing to the debasement of the paper." The bullionists in this, perhaps, were right, but they were wrong in taking the price of bullion as a measure of this extent of debasement. Bullion, severed from money forming no longer even the material of which money is composed, is to be considered merely as an article of commerce rising or falling in the market, like any other commodity; whilst the value of money is to be taken, not from the price of any one commodity, but from the price of all commodities generally. Now, commodities in general had advanced more than bullion. Bread-corn had advanced more than bullion; and if any one commodity gives, by its price, a better criterion of the general value of money than any other, it is bread-corn, the main subsistence of the labourer, always given of necessity for every considerable average period of years, in sufficient abundance, to enable him to maintain his strength and numbers, never, unfortunately, given at any time in much greater abundance; bread-corn, of consequence, corresponds in its average monied price, with the monied price of labour, with the monied price in consequence of all the productions of labour; and thus becomes the best measure of the general monied price of commodities; that is, of the general value of money: and so it has been accepted and considered by all writers of any weight on such subjects. Now bread-corn, which, previously to the Restriction Act of 1797, had never advanced, under any circumstances, in this country to a higher price than to the rate of about 50s. for a quarter of wheat, for any average of five years, did, in the paper money of the Restriction Act, advance to 70s., to 80s., to 90s. the quarter; and that for a considerable average number of years. The bullionists asserted that this great advance of wheat was occasioned by particular circumstances—by defective harvests, obstructed importations, by an increased demand for wheat, by an increasing population; facts somewhat at variance, it must be admitted, with each other; but the answer to these assertions is precisely the answer they gave to their opponents.—"Such circumstances as you describe, accurately or not, cannot have been peculiar to this period. In a greater or lesser degree, they must have been witnessed before; and yet, as at no former time, and under no combination of circumstances, did wheat ever before advance beyond 50s. the quarter, for any average period of five years; so the whole advance, which is beyond 50s., must be ascribed to the paper money in which wheat is now measured: or in other words, it arises from the debasement of the paper money, and is the best measure of the extent of that debasement." This is an important question in its bearings on the condition of the country, and as explaining the causes of such condition. If, as is undeniably true, the price of wheat, when paid in metal money, never advanced beyond the average of 50s. in this country—if the high price of wheat during the Restriction is to be ascribed to the debasement of the paper money of that Act, then the re-establishment of the metal standard necessarily brings back the old price of 50s. for wheat. And by establishing this matter, we clear the subject from those absurd theories and endless discussions with which this House deceives itself and the country, on every fall in the price of agricultural produce: 30s. or 35s. as the lowest, 70s. or 80s. as the price of famine,—50s. on the average,—are the rates we have fixed by our own measures; and it is in vain,—when we witness the inevitable consequences of those measures, when wheat descends to its lowest price,—that we deceive ourselves with accounts of harvests too productive, A harvest or two more or less productive, more or less defective, do no more than anticipate the settlement of the price of wheat. Whatever is the state of harvests, the average price is fixed at 50s. by our legislative measures. When this House adopted a metal standard of value, and imposed it on paper contracts, the House did that which, whether prudent or imprudent, just or unjust, was perfectly within its power to determine, But having determined that question,—having taken the precious metals for a standard, and fixed their weight by law, the effects to be produced,—the prices to be determined,—it was out of the power of the Legislature to control. The rate of prices these metals will give, is determined by a power beyond the reach of any law; by the laws of nature, and by the proportion in which nature has given the precious metals for the use and convenience of man. In this, nature has paid no regard to our necessities, or mistakes, contracts, debts, or taxes, The paper standard had this advantage,—we could proportion its quantity to the wants and engagements of the country; but, abandoning that standard, all further power and control is gone; our future prices must have reference, not to our necessities, but to the prices of the continent of the world at large, and to the value of money there, by which solely they must be governed. And what those prices and that value are, I believe, may be estimated from this:—That there has never yet existed any period, or any country, in which the precious metals have been found in so great abundance as that a greater quantity of those metals, than is contained of gold in about two of our sovereigns and a half; or of silver in about fifty shillings;—that is, about two-thirds of an ounce of gold, or about ten ounces of silver,—has been given in exchange for that quantity of wheat which is contained in one Winchester quarter, reckoning for any average period of five or of seven years. But, if it be really true, that to an extent which is thus to be estimated, we have changed the real value, whilst we have preserved the artificial denomination of money; if in the proportion thus to be taken—the proportion which fifty bears to eighty—we have effected a substitution of one value for another in every bond, and contract, and burthen of a pecuniary character—doubt less an operation like that could not be carried into effect without producing immeasurable ruin,—Have not the consequences been commensurate to the cause?—the tremendous effects of these measures to their monstrous character? The whole history of the kingdom during these operations has been nothing more than an exemplification of the effects of this opera tion—of the attempt to apply a metal standard to paper debts, contracts, and taxes—of the abandonment of that at tempt; returning to it; and repeatedly attempting and abandoning that effort. It is on no doubtful argument that this assertion rests, but on the evidence of incontrovertible facts—on an appeal to, and on the evidence of, experience. I know of no safer guide, either for nations or individuals, than an examination of their past measures, as a rule for future conduct; and I therefore proceed to bring under the review of the House a consideration of what our measures have been, and of the consequences which have followed and accompanied them. I go back to the war, and to the state of the country during the continuance of the war. That period was prosperous; with partial, with local distress, arising out of circumstances connected with the war itself, and plainly attributable to the events of war; but the general career of the prosperity of the country continued uninterrupted during the whole period of the war. There never was a year during that period in which the strength of the people was unequal to the burthens which then existed, or to greater, if greater had been required. It is in the nature of a depreciation of money, to contribute to the prosperous condition of a commercial nation. This is well known, and universally admitted. Commerce, manufactures, agriculture, population, are all assisted and increased by a money gradually undergoing depreciation. It was in accordance with these principles, which experience has established, that the country should prosper in all its productive interests during the war. The peace put an end to this state of things: it put an end to the progress of depreciation. The peace did more; it brought along with it an Act of Parliament which pro vided not only that depreciation should then cease, but that the value of money should be forced back to its original level. If depreciation of money yields prosperity, a reverse operation,—an enhancing the value of money,—must of necessity oc- casion distress and misery. With the peace an Act of Parliament came into operation, which required that all the engagements of the war should be discharged in the money of 1797. To this Act I call the attention of the House. It is the Act by which it is contended that the faith of Parliament was pledged to re-establish in 1819, the standard which was suspended in 1797; and pledged, also, to the payment of all debts and contracts in money of that old standard, and without any inquiry into the extent in which its value differed from the value of the money of the war. This Act of Parliament was passed in December, 1803. In December, 1803, the Bank Restriction Act of 1797, which had been renewed from time to time, temporarily, was made perpetual during the war, and made to expire six months after the establishment of peace. The Legislature by this Act, therefore, provided two things: they provided a standard of value for the war, and a standard of value for the peace. For the war,—however long,—a paper standard, without limitation, without security for its value; and for the peace,—however distant,—a gold money of a value which even then had been unknown for six years to the transactions and engagements of the country. Paper money depreciates by quantity, as metal money depreciates by adulteration". In its essential character, therefore, this Act of Parliament was equivalent to a measure which, being adopted during the existence of a metal coinage and standard, should take the Mint out of the hands of the Crown; which should place the Mint in the hands of a body of irresponsible individuals; which should say to these persons, "The Mint and its powers are in your hands; deal with the coin at your pleasure; adulterate, debase, diminish, as your judgment, as your interest, as your integrity, perhaps "(but I do full justice to the integrity of the directors of the Bank; and this nation owes to them a lasting debt of gratitude, that they abused no more than were abused, those powers which the Legislature so recklessly placed in their hands)—"your integrity may dictate. We impose on you no responsibility; we subject you to no control; we shall follow your steps—not, indeed, to control your proceedings,—but to make our measures correspond with yours. The more you debase the standard, the more debts we shall contract; the more you adulterate it, the more we shall put on taxes; the more you take from the weight of the coin, the more we shall add to salaries, pensions, and all the expenses of the Government. And for all these disorders, the remedy we provide is this;—That when the war shall come to a close, however long it may be, though it endure for the fourth part of a century,"—and the war did endure for eleven years from that time, and it might until now have endured, for it was brought to a close by events which could not have been foreseen by the wisdom of Parliament in 1803; it was brought to a close by the early rigour of the winter of 1812; by the elements; by the stars in their courses fighting against Napoleon; but for which, the war might be now raging;—when the war shall come to a close,—was the virtual language of the Act of Parliament:—"However long it may endure; to whatever extent you shall have debased money—whether to 10, or 50, or 100, or to 500 per cent; though your money be debased so much, that instead of 80s., 80l, be given for a quarter of wheat, into all this we inquire nothing, we leave to our successors no power to inquire; we provide one remedy and one alone, that when these disorders are to cease, the ancient money of the country shall be brought back; and all contracts, loans, settlements, debts, and taxes existing in the country and contracted for in the one money shall be paid in the other." This is the character of that Act of Parliament. If it were passed with a knowledge of its true character, with a meaning such as that now given to it, no measure of more treacherous, more monstrous profligacy ever disgraced the history of legislative proceedings; its atrocity would be its destruction. And if it were passed in ignorance, it is invalidated by that ignorance. Sir, it was in ignorance that this Act was passed; the Legislature had no such meaning as that which we now ascribe to them; they knew nothing of a difference of value between the two monies, one of which was to be substituted for the other. They meant nothing so monstrous, as that contracts and debts made in money of one value, should be paid in money of another value; they admitted of no debasement in the paper-money, and knew of none. Eight years after this Act was passed, in 1811, they proclaimed to the country by a Resolution of the House, that they knew of no difference between the value of the paper-money, in which debts were then contracted, and the gold money, for which the paper was substituted in 1797, and by which the paper was in its turn to be supplanted at the peace. The resolution of 1811 is decisive of this question. The Legislature had no such meaning as we now ascribe to it; and so far as the Act of 1803 is to be considered in the light of a contract; it must be executed,—as all contracts must ever be executed, as long as faith and justice govern the actions of men according to the meaning—the palpable, clear, and undeniable meaning—of those by whom the contract was made. This Act of Parliament, incredible, monstrous as it appears, was carried into full and complete effect. Immediately on the close of the war, the Government carried into execution this Act of the Legislature. It is from the close of the war that the present standard has its date, and not from 1819. That standard was established in 1816; abandoned in 1817 and 1818; again established in 1819, 1820, and 1821; abandoned again in 1822, 1823, and 1824; and brought back a third time in 1826. It may take its date from 1826; it may take its date from 1816; either from its first establishment or its last; but it cannot take its date from 1819. The old standard was brought into full operation in 1816. The first difficulty was, to obtain gold: none existed in circulation. Our gold money had been sold to the Continent; the merchants of the Continent had given us 5l. 12s. an ounce for the latter part of the gold sold them; and our Act of Parliament, dated eleven years before, required that gold should exist in this country, and remain in circulation here, at the rate of 3l. 17s. 10½d. an ounce. How was this task to be accomplished? How were the nations of the Continent to be induced to sell us gold at a lower price than they had themselves given us for it? This could only be effected by a forced and violent action affecting the price of gold; and, as gold then again became the mea sure of property, by consequences equally violent and forced on the monied prices of property. That task was performed,—the paper-money was lessened in its quantity,—raised in value;—the prices of all property were reduced,—the price of gold was reduced with other prices; gold was brought back,—that very gold for which the Continent had given us 5l. 12s. per ounce—was brought back to us for 3l. 17s. 10½d. the ounce; gold money of that value, circulating on a par with our paper-money, became the measure of property; all the debts, contracts, engagements,' and burthens, of the war, were measured in money of that value; and the disorder, the confusion, the ruin, the suffering and distress, which followed, were such, as never till that time, had been known in the history of the country. They were such as of necessity must have followed from an operation such as I have described. No other cause for the distress of 1816 can be shown to have been in existence at that time. The real state of the country was indeed, by Ministers then, as now, palliated or concealed; distress there was, it was admitted, amongst the people; but there had existed, it was said, distress also equally urgent during the war. Thus was it then attempted to delude Parliament. Doubtless there was distress during the war. A war such as that was, could not be carried on without great and severe calamities. The sudden closing of ports and markets; the efforts of France directed against English commerce, must of necessity have occasioned great disasters. Ten millions of property belonging to British merchants, seized in six weeks in the Baltic ports in 1810, and confiscated, must necessarily have inflicted injury on our merchants and manufacturers. But to the operations of war, were the calamities of the war to be ascribed. The severest and the most extensive suffering which the country was exposed to during the war, was occasioned by our disputes with the United States of America. Those States afforded then the greatest market for British productions. Seven millions annually of manufactured goods were sold there. This market was at once perfectly and entirely closed;—those goods were thrown back on the producers, with no further demand. The consequence of this was, great, extensive, and severe distress throughout the manufacturing districts. The hon. and learned member for Knaresborough, Mr. Brougham, undertook, in 1812, the task of bringing before the House the condition of the manufacturers, and of demonstrating the origin of their misfortunes: for then, also, was the existence of distress denied. Night after night, were seen arrayed at that bar, the deputies and representatives of the manufacturing districts, giving their evidence of the sufferings of the towns from whence they came, and their explanation of the cause from whence those sufferings had sprung. Now, Sir, I will give in evidence, the description which the hon. and learned member for Knaresborough,—the nearest observer of the severest distress of the war,—has given of the distress which followed the peace. I cite here from a speech of the hon. and learned Member, delivered in January, 1817, describing the condition of the country. "It was one most portentous difference," said the hon. and learned Member,—"one most portentous difference between the conclusion of this and of all former contests,—our calamities had almost entirely began with the peace." The distress of 1812 was but partial, and he appears to have considered it as nothing when brought into comparison with the ruin of 1816. "Each succeeding year," said he, "since the war ended, only made things worse; the distress, at first confined principally to our agriculture, had spread to every branch of our trade and industry, and the national misery had reached a height wholly without a precedent in our history since the Norman conquest."^* These are the terms in which he, the best witness—he, the nearest observer—of the most extensive and severe distress, which the people experienced during the war, described the state of the country which followed the peace. This state of distress did not long endure. Fortunate for the best interests and security of the country was it that it did not. The people, at that time less accustomed to calamity than they now are—less patient under sufferings—had recourse to the most dangerous, the most desperate measures. But the distress was relieved, and in what manner? By reversing every one of the measures by which it had been introduced—by proceedings which broke down and abolished the ancient metallic standard; which abrogated the Act of 1803; which drove back to the Continent every guinea of that gold which had been brought here during the distress of 1815 and 1816. Step by step, measure by measure, every one of those operations were reversed, which had prepared the introduction of the gold standard. The paper money of the Bank, which had been withdrawn, was again poured by forced measures into circulation—poured into circulation by means of loans to Government; as by repayment of such loans it had been withdrawn. The depreciation of the war was renewed; the pecuniary means of the people were rendered again commensurate with their burthens; and in 1818, was established in this country, the prosperity of the war in the midst of peace. I have ascribed these alterations, these changes in the value of money, the low prices of 1816, the high prices of 1818, to measures originating with the Government. I hold here the evidence of that assertion. I hold here in one short page the history and evidence of the origin from whence sprang these disorders. It is contained in the evidence given by the directors of the Bank of England before the committee of 1819. This is that evidence. "Was not," it is asked, "was not a great reduction of the advances of the Bank to Government made in 1815, and early in 1816, with a view to the resumption of cash payments?" And the answer from the Bank is, "Yes, there was a considerable reduction."—"For that particular purpose? "it is asked:—"I believe that was the object." It is asked, "Was it not then understood that the Bank advances were to be reduced to 20,000,000l., and did not such a reduction take place?" The answer is, "I think it did." Then follows a question bearing on the consequences,—"Was not 1816 a period of very considerable commercial and agricultural distress?"—"Very great, indeed!" answers Mr. Harman. "Did not that distress render it necessary to relieve the public by an increased issue of Bank notes?"—"Yes."—"Were not the advances made in that year by the Bank to Government a great instrument of relieving the distress you have spoken of, by affording more plentiful circulation?"—"Yes; in as much as they made money more plentiful." Here then is a history of the origin of the distress of 1816, and of its relief. An evidence of transactions, by which money was raised in value first, and then lowered privately, and by measures designed for those objects. This money was Government money, at that time the practical and the legal standard of the country; a paper money suffering debasement by increase of quantity, and enhanced in value by diminution of quantity: these transactions were measures of the govern- ment, without the knowledge, without the sanction of Parliament—concealed from Parliament and from the country. Those measures differed in nothing from measures which should privately adulterate at one time the legal metal coin, and enhance privately the value of that coin at another time: and times there have been in the history of this House, and those times may again return, and return they will, if the people obtain generally a knowledge of the real character of the transactions by which, for fifteen years, their property has been confiscated, their contracts falsified, and immeasurable ruin spread over the country; if a knowledge of the real character of these transactions be obtained by the people, before the disorders springing from them are remedied by Parliament, then will such times again return as there have been; when this House, on such a statement as I have now made—on the evidence I give of its truth—would have proceeded to an impeachment of every man engaged in those transactions. Of the effect of these transactions on the country, I can give other confirmation. Mr. Tierney, a great authority on these subjects, intimately connected with these operations, speaking at an after-period, in February 1819, of the cause of the prosperity which followed the distress of 1816, thus describes that cause:—"The right hon. Gentleman, in the month of June, 1817, had come down to Parliament with a smile of triumph, and told the House that every thing was now restored to the very condition in which he had long hoped to see it,—that it would be soon found that the revenue was increasing,—that stocks were rising, public confidence flourishing, & and when every body was looking for the realization of these gay promises, three or four months afterwards, down came a number of returns from the Bank, that explained the whole mystery; the secret of the triumph of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was exposed at once; for it appeared that the Bank had been increasing its issues—that country banks had followed its example, and that, in truth, the state of prosperity was nothing more than an increased paper currency."^* Nothing but increased paper money. But prosperity it was, however; and occasioned plenty to the labourer, profit to the trader, productiveness to the Revenue, and strength and security to the State. We have dealt with our money more in reference to the material which composed the money, than to the functions it discharged. Money of paper we have called—money of rags—and have treated it as we would treat rags or paper; and forgotten, that in dealing with money, however composed, we affected the most important organ in the social body. I cite another evidence, Mr. Vansittart himself, the principal mover in these transactions. Mr. Vansittart—speaking of 1816 and of 1818—in 1821, a period when the calamities of 1816 were all renewed, and by similar means, uses these words:—"The peace followed, and that very standard was restored, at which, by another process, the country had since arrived. A second depreciation took place, which probably arose from the large loan the Government had of the Bank on account of the repeal of the property-tax. It was never very considerable."^* Here, then, was the standard restored, admitted by him who restored it in 1816; restored as in 1820 and 1821, and as now. "A second depreciation, it is said, took place:" "It was never very considerable"—not if the price of bullion be taken as its measure, for Mr. Vansittart here falls into the error of the bullionists. The depreciation of money in 1818 was as considerable as at any period of the war. The prices of land, and of commodities were as high, and the prosperity of the country as great. But the prosperity of 1818 was transient. Why did not that prosperity endure? Whence came it, that the prosperity of 1818 was not as permanent as that of the war? The depreciation did not so long endure. Does any man believe that the prosperity of the war would not have ceased before the close of the war, if the Bank Restriction Act had sooner ceased? The prosperity of 1824 and 1825 also, the right hon. Baronet opposite told us, was short-lived. I will give him the reason.—Because his bill was long-lived. The prosperity of the country, and the security of his bill have not existed, and cannot exist, together. Precisely as the prosperity of the war was brought to a termination by the Act of Parliament of 1803, put in force at the peace, so was the prosperous condition of the country in 1818 reversed by Mr. Peel's bill of 1819 for restoring the old metal standard. I fear no charge of exaggeration when I speak of the calamities immediately consequent on the Act of 1819; that measure fell on the calm prosperity, the tranquil labour, of the people, on the thriving industry of the country; to confound, disorder, and destroy; the distress of 1816 in all its extent and severity was renewed. The shock was first felt by the manufacturing population: without employment; without wages; without the means of subsistence; exposed to artificial famine in the midst of plenty; ignorant from whence the blow came, the dense population of the manufacturing districts prepared for resistance. They re sorted to arms; by arms they were assailed, repressed and subdued. By military force was the government of this country upheld whilst this measure was inflicted. In its first progress the Act of 1819 was disfigured with blood. The blow descended on the land. The farmers in a mass, to a man, were ruined. Whoever shall faithfully describe the condition of the cultivators of the soil of England during this dismal period, it will be thought of him that he portrays the state of a nation subjected to the wild savage, to the sweeping confiscation, of some barbarian conqueror, rather than the condition of a people reposing under the shade of equal paternal or civilized laws. History scarcely furnishes a picture of more wide-spread and universal ruin than is to be found described in the evidence given by the farmers themselves of the state of British agriculture, before the committee which sat in 1821 to inquire into agricultural distress. This committee was in fact composed of the very men who, two years before, in 1819, had sat on that other committee from which originated Mr. Peel's bill. On one committee they had altered the value of money: on the other they were called on to witness the total failure of pecuniary contracts. Of all the calamities brought under their view, they had been themselves the cause. I give here a description of the country immediately consequent on the passing of the Act of 1819, from one of those pithy historical documents, called King's Speeches. But first, on the same authority, let us see what the condition of the people was before that Act passed. In January 1819, four months before the passing of Mr. Peel's Bill, thus describes the King the state of his people.—"The Prince Regent has the greatest satisfaction in being able to inform you, that the trade, commerce, and manufactures of the country, are in a most flourishing condition."^* This was the state of the manufacturers in January, 1819. That agriculture was equally prosperous, may be known from this fact—that the price of wheat was 84s. the quarter, for the average of 1818; and that, in 1818, the revenue increased, with no new tax, no less than 4,700,000. Now, then, I quote the state of the country, as also described by the King, in November, 1819, little more than four months after the passing of Mr. Peel's bill. The King says,—"I have observed with great concern the attempts made in some of the manufacturing districts to take advantage of local distress, to excite disaffection to the institutions and Government of the country. A spirit is now fully manifested, utterly hostile to the Constitution of this kingdom, and aiming, not only at the change of those political institutions which have hitherto constituted the pride and security of this country, but at the subversion of the rights of property, and of all order in society."† And then the King proceeds to call on Parliament for all their exertions, to protect the Constitution and the law against the assaults of that very population, in whom the Constitution and the law had found their surest bulwark; who had stood fast by the Constitution and the law in the hour of their greatest danger, when Europe and America were arrayed for their destruction. Again distress disappeared, and in consequence of measures precisely similar to those by which the distress of 1816 was relieved. By a third depreciation—by proceedings inconsistent with the existence of the standard established by the Act of 1819—by measures by which that standard was banished and abolished, and destroyed. The prosperity of 1823, 1824, and 1825, was not co-existent in this country with the standard of 1819. The property of the country was not then measured in that money; nor were its debts and contracts then paid in it. The gold which had been imported in 1819, 1820, and 1821, for which gold the distress of that period had been the price paid, was driven abroad in 1824 and 1825. By the end of 1825, not a sovereign was left in the Bank; nor, if the prosperity of 1825 had endured six months longer, would a sovereign have been left in the country. The House will well remember the measures which, in 1822, were brought forward to relieve the national distress. They consisted mainly in this:—that more money—Government money—state paper—the money of the Bank—was to be forced into circulation; to be issued on loans to Government—on loans to parishes—on loans to public works—on loans to the landed interest,—which of them was immaterial, the object was to force money into circulation. The additional amount thus proposed to be circulated was four millions. How was an additional circulation of four millions of Bank-notes to relieve the national distress? By lowering the value of money—by raising monied-prices, precisely as a similar operation had relieved the distress of 1816—as a similar operation would now relieve distress. Four additional millions of Bank of England notes could not now be forced into circulation, and distress or low prices long co-exist with them: four millions is a material proportion of the whole active circulation of the Bank: the issue would be followed by an equal proportionate addition to the notes of the country bankers; to the amount of bills of exchange; and to the amount of all instruments of paper credit. High prices, wages, rents, and profits would follow: but then would come next, a derangement of the currency: none of these can co-exist with our present system of currency and standard of money. All measures of relief are temporary, worse than useless, which are not founded on some change in our standard law. The Government, as that law stands, has no power to increase the circulation permanently by one single guinea, or to reduce it. The permanent amount of our circulation must be governed by the circulation of the Continent, and our prices must conform to the continental level. The Ministers seem in 1822 to have been sensible of this, even whilst they adopted measures inconsistent with such knowledge. Lord Liverpool, when he described, in 1822, the steps proposed to be adopted for relief, stated expressly that the means proposed had been objected to as being inconsistent with the safety of the monied standard. These are his words on the 26th of February, 1822:—"The object of his Majesty's Government was," he said, "to extend and quicken the circulation," and then he goes on:—"In order to prevent the occurrence from this measure of any inconvenience or difficulty, which might affect the present system of our currency, it is proposed to be one of the regulations accompanying it, that, in the event of any unfavourable turn in the exchanges, the Bank shall have the power of recalling each million at an interval of three months—a provision which, I conceive, is fully adequate to guard against all possible danger on that score."^* To affect "the present system of currency," is to affect the security of the standard, the security of Mr. Peel's bill. But if the issue of four millions of Bank-notes could relieve distress, must not the drawing these notes back bring this distress back? The notes were to be issued; distress to be relieved, if this could be effected consistently with the security of that bill; but if the notes endangered that bill, no relief was to be given. Here, then, we see the prosperity of the country fairly placed against the security of the standard: the safety of the people put into one scale, and the standard into the other; and the preference given to the standard. Compare, then, the state of the country at the period when these measures of relief were in full operation, with its condition since they were abandoned, and we shall see what is the cost we have paid for the security of the metal standard. I again take the state of the country, as described in 1825, in the speech of the King:—"There never was a period (said his Majesty) in the history of this country, when all the great interests of society were, at the same time, in so thriving a condition."† That state of the people, contrasted with their condition in 1822, and with their present state, when there exists no one great productive interest which is not exposed to ruin, exhibits the price we have paid for Mr. Peel's bill, and for the metal standard. I have quoted the apprehensions of Lord Liverpool, that the money he proposed to throw into circulation for relieving distress would be found inconsistent with our monetary system, and the course he proposed to adopt, if those fears should be realised. I find a statement of Lord Liverpool himself, which exhibits the whole operation—which explains that the danger he anticipated did take place—the money issued for the national relief was effectual, but it was inconsistent with the security of the standard; it was withdrawn, and the distress brought back. In February, 1826, Lord Liverpool, speaking of the panic then recent, and of these operations, says—"In March, 1825, however, they (the Bank) saw the necessity which was pressing on them"—danger to the standard I may observe is synonymous with pressing necessity to the Bank,—"and they then did begin to draw in and reduce their issues. In the month of March they reduced their issues 1,300,000l; between the 15th of March and the 15th of May, they made a reduction of 700,000l.; between August and November, they further contracted their issues, making altogether a reduction of 3,500,000l. in their issues."^* Here is the whole history of this operation, and of the state of the country. Measures of relief, consisting of the issue of four millions of Government paper, commenced in the distress of 1822. Relief was given; the paper was drawn back in 1825 to protect the standard; the last portion in November, 1825, and early in December broke out the panic. The condition of the people since that period, is no more than the consequence of inflicting the metal standard on paper debts. At this time, we are told, there are again symptoms of reviving prosperity. I believe it: generally, throughout the productive classes and districts, some slight relaxation of the fatal pressure of 1819 is felt. But paper money has to some extent again been forced into circulation by the Bank; I charge that distinctly upon the Government; they are again tampering with the circulation and the standard. The slight improvement, but general, throughout the country, is a consequence of it. I know not to what extent the paper money has been forcibly increased; but I charge the Government distinctly, that paper money has been forced into circulation—that it exists in excess—that it cannot be so continued in circulation—that either these paper issues will break down the standard and end in a Bank Restriction, or that the paper must be drawn back; and whenever drawn back, the distress of 1819 will again be renewed; with a panic probably, which I believe will be the last, with all its dangers and consequences. I revert shortly, Sir, to the result which this review, and this experience, establish. During the war the country was prosperous; but gold money of our present standard did not exist in conjunction with that prosperity; the gold circulation was destroyed. Again, in 1818, the country flourished greatly in all its in terests—but then again our gold circulation and standard was broken down. Seven millions of gold, all we possessed, was sent abroad, the whole of it, in 1818. In 1824 and in 1825, all the great interests of the country were again thriving; but necessity and danger pressed on the circulation, the standard, and the Bank. In neither of these periods was the prosperity enjoyed by the people coincident with the existence of a metal standard of the pre cent value. Let us examine them further. In 1816 we had a gold circulation. The standard was safe; but every great interest was prostrate and ruined. In 1819, 1820, 1821, and 1822, the standard was a second time restored—the national misery was such as I have described. In 1826, the standard was a third time re established. I refer not to the condition of the people then and since: it is known—and if any appearance of improvement at present exists, that improvement proceeds from measures inconsistent with the safety of the gold standard. If then there be any truth in the most indisputable facts; any wisdom to be learned from experience; the conclusion which a consideration of those periods establishes is this—that our present metallic standard of value is not reconcileable with the debts, taxes, and engagements, of the late war: that whilst these paper engagements re main, metal money, of our present value, is incompatible with the prosperity of this country, and with its security. It is on these grounds of policy, of necessity, and of justice, that I rest the first of the two Resolutions which I shall submit to the House. Upon the policy and necessity of giving to productive industry such relief, at least, from the infliction of the present system, as is consistent with the principles on which that system has been established; and by a measure which cannot be resisted without the open abandonment of all those principles. The principal advantage which I propose from the measure recommended in the second of the Resolutions now offered is, that it is calculated to lessen, in some degree, one of the tasks imposed on the country by the Act of 1819. There are at present, if the calculation of Ministers be correct, about twenty-eight millions of sovereigns in circulation, exclusive of those sovereigns which remain in the cellars of the Bank. I believe that calculation to be erroneous. A fair examination of those official returns which are in the possession of the House, will establish, I believe, the fact, that about twenty or twenty-two millions is the present amount of sovereigns in circulation. The quantity of gold coin in circulation prior to 1797 was calculated by Lord Liverpool at thirty millions: that was the lowest estimate any man had formed. Mr. Rose's calculation was forty-five millions; but I will assume the lowest estimate to have been correct. If thirty millions were necessary to support the prices and transactions of the country in 1797; with an increased population, larger transactions, and greater burthens, it can scarcely be estimated that a less amount than forty millions or forty-five millions will be now necessary to support even the prices which preceded the war. If this be so, the country has yet to draw ten millions or twenty millions more of gold from the Continent, before it will have effected the task which the re-establishment of a metal standard has imposed. And how is this additional gold to be obtained? The Continent will give no gold without some equivalent. How have the twenty-eight, or the twenty millions we already possess been obtained? The answer will give an explanation of the mystery, which, in the beginning of this Session, the Ministers were unable to comprehend:—an explanation of whence it was that, with an extra ordinary exportation of British productions, our manufacturers yet complained of distress. Their goods were sent out to bring back sovereigns. The law which compelled that gold should be brought here, and become the medium of our circulation, dictated also, a forced, ruinous, and extensive export trade. To drain its bullion from the Continent, our productions must be forced on the continental markets. Million by million, as the gold leaves the Continent, our effort becomes more difficult; carries more distress amongst the nations with whom we deal, and leaves more ruin at home. Every million we obtain advances the rate of the next million; additional goods must be sent out at prices continually falling. If, then, we issue five, ten, or fifteen millions of small notes, we have so much less of gold to obtain—less embarrassment to occasion abroad—less suffering to endure at home. And, with regard to the objections which may be made to this measure, I will not descend to occupy the time of the House by giving them an answer. I will not combat such objections as that Bank notes under 5l. cannot circulate in England without danger and ruin (I have shewn how the panic of 1825 was occasioned), when these objections, if urged at all, must be urged by men who are con tent that such notes shall circulate in Ire land and in Scotland. These, then, are the grounds of policy, of necessity, and of justice—of policy the most clear and decided, necessity the most urgent, and of indispensable justice—on which I rest the measures which I submit to the decision of the House. I have explained them in adequately, perhaps, and for that I owe an apology to the House; but that I have occupied with these questions, however long, the attention and time of the House, for that I offer no apology. Fit it is, that the attention of this House, its labours, its days, its sessions, should be given to the consideration of the important question I have brought under its review, and to the bearing of that question on the public interests—for it concerns deeply the character of the proceedings of the House; most deeply the character, and the honour, and the vital interests of the people. I humbly move, therefore,—"1. That it is expedient to repeal so much of the Act 56 Geo. 3rd, c. 68, as declares gold coins the only legal tender in payment of all sums beyond the amount of 40s., and to establish gold and silver coins of the realm, coined in the relative proportion of 15 2859/13640 lbs. weight of sterling silver to 1lb. of sterling gold, shall be a legal tender in all money engagements, as directed, and ordered by the proclamation of the fourth year of George 1st. 2. That it is expedient to repeal so much of the Act of 7 Geo. 4th, c. 6, as prohibits the issue or re-issue in England of any promissory note, payable on demand to the bearer thereof, for any sum of money less than the sum of 5l.; and also to repeal the Act of 9 Geo. 4th, c. 65, entitled 'An Act to restrain the negotiation in England of Promissory Notes and Bills under a limited sum, issued in Scotland or Ireland.'"

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. xxxv. p. 114.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. xxxix. p. 218.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. v. p. 131.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. xxxix. p. 19.

† Ibid, Vol. xli. p. 1.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. vi. p. 716.

† Ibid, Vol. xii. N. s. p. 1.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. xiv. p. 454.

seconded the Mo- tion. He regretted nothing in the able speech which had just been delivered but that it was too discursive. That could not, however, be said of the Resolutions, which were of so certain and specific a character that they could not be met, as motions for inquiry had been met, by saying that they offered nothing practical and useful. It was now shown, that the present plan of Ministers was not the plan followed by our ancestors, but a plan followed by nobody but the present Ministers. He did not know by what arguments they could defend their conduct. It was not enough to say, because the law had been made, that it was not to be altered, for that would make the House not only honourable but infallible. The antiquity of the innovation, which was dated fourteen years ago, could be no reason for continuing the present standard. During that period also it had been suspended two or three times; and, in fact, it did not come into operation fully and completely, till the small notes were abolished in 1826. He contended, therefore, that the present standard had nothing to recommend it but the assertions of Ministers. That standard was also an innovation on the previous practices of the country. Silver was, according to Mr. Locke, the universal measure of value, and gold only a commodity. He could support this view also, by the evidence of the Ministerial member for Callington, who had described our adherence to the gold standard as pedantic and injurious. Nothing was more injurious than to lower the rate of profit and prices on the continent. The adoption of the gold standard was reducing the prices here to a level with prices on the Continent. What made it more injurious was, that it enhanced taxation, while adopting a silver standard would at once relieve the burthens of taxation to the amount of six or seven per cent. Other nations, such as Venice and France, had tried to establish a gold coinage, and had failed; but Buonaparte, he believed, who had given a premium on gold coin, had more power than any Chancellor of the Exchequer. It would be less easy, then, for England to do this, which gave no premium to keep gold at home, and had less power to retain it, than it was for France. The present system also placed the nation at the mercy of speculators in gold. It had been lately seen that one money-broker's house had reduced the House of Austria to dependence on it, and had contracted all its operations, degrading that illustrious House, by a contest in which it was not victorious, because it tried to borrow in another money-broker's shop. Another topic to which he would refer was the great diminution of the quantity of metals produced by the mines of South America. Silver was reduced, he believed, four-fifths in amount, and gold was reduced still more in quantity. Notwithstanding this lessened production of the mines, silver had come much more into use than for merly—increasing the pressure felt by the want of the precious metals as coin. The hon. Member then referred to the opinions of Lord Liverpool, Sir Robert Peel, and Mr. Canning, to show that Ministers had in 1819, professed a desire to return to the ancient standard of value, which, in fact, was the optional standard, either silver or gold; but they had actually adopted the single gold standard, which never before was the standard of the country. He called on the Ministers to make their words good, and not adopt as the ancient standard, a standard which was not so in fact, and which was an exacerbation of all the burthens of the country, to the amount of eight per cent. He thought Ministers were at least bound, therefore, to support the first Resolution of the hon. Member, and he hoped they would remember their former words, and with the hon. Mover call for a restoration of the real ancient standard.

said, that Gentlemen, he believed, rather listened to speeches on the currency from a sense of its importance, than from any expectation of having their minds settled or confirmed by what they heard. He thanked his hon. friend, for attracting the attention of the House to the subject, and he should beg leave to say a few words on it. The two Resolutions of his hon. friend were essentially different—one related to the revival of the small notes, the other to the use of a concurrent standard; and it would be very difficult to show that this concurrent standard of the two metals was not the old standard of the country. After a debate of four days on the distress of the country, it was somewhat extraordinary that what caused the peculiar state of things, of which all complained, was not very clearly explained. That peculiar state of things had existed ever since the peace, for, with some slight exceptions, owing, as he believed, and as his hon. friend stated, to the banks having pushed out paper-money, though he believed that his hon. friend attributed too much to that cause,—but this peculiar, and he might say extraordinary state of things, had existed ever since the peace, and during that period all the great interests of the country had been affected. He had no doubt that this originated chiefly, he would not say exclusively, from the state of the currency, and from the alterations which had been made in it. It was impossible that a change so general as had affected all classes, could have been brought about, except by some general cause; and why should they not attribute it to the change in the currency, which they knew had also been universal? It was known that money had increased in value, and it was difficult to suppose that this was not the cause of the general depression. In his opinion the alteration of the currency accounted for every thing. When the value of money increased, that was shown by a general fall of prices, and this was the cause of that distress, which began among the upper, and afterwards extended to all classes. The prosperity we had experienced during the war, was owing to an opposite cause. It was worth while to recur to that, and to state that the description given of it by Mr. Thornton, in the debate on the report of the Bullion Committee in 1811, was the very converse of the present condition of the country. Money, it should be remembered, was then depreciated, and there was a universal rise of prices. Mr. Henry Thornton said on that occasion, It was material to observe that there had, since the beginning of the war, been a continued fall in the value of money—he meant of money commonly so called, whether consisting of cash or paper. There had been estimates by some at sixty or seventy per cent, and certainly it was not less than forty or fifty per cent, which was on the average, two or three per cent per annum."^* This was the remark of a gentleman who was a great observer, not a theorist, not a speculator, but a man of sound judgment, on whose opinion he set great value. He observed then, that the value of money, whether the precious metals or paper, was depreciated. He said, that in 1811, it had sunk to sixty or seventy per cent in some persons' opinion, but certainly not less than forty or fifty per cent. The most striking passage of the speech of that Gentleman was, perhaps, that in which he described the operation of the rise of prices. It was a gradual fall, in the value of money, of two or three percent, extending through several years, and was not sudden. "It was true," he said, "that men did not generally perceive that, during a fall in the price of money, they borrowed at this advantageous rate of interest; they felt, however, the advantage of being borrowers; the temptation to borrow operating on their minds, as he believed, in the following manner:—They balanced their books once a year, and in estimating the value of those commodities in which they had invested their borrowed money, they found that value to be continually increasing, so that there was an apparent profit over and above the natural and ordinary profit on mercantile transactions, This apparent profit was nominal, as to persons who traded on their own capital; but not nominal as to those who traded with borrowed money. The borrower, therefore, derived every year from his trade, not only the common mercantile profit, which would itself somewhat exceed five per cent interest, paid by him for the use of the money, but likewise that extra profit he spoke of."^* The case then was, that every man of business who went to sleep at night, found himself, when he woke in the morning richer than he was. Nothing was more influential on the prosperity of people than this continual rise in the value of their property. They were all continually getting richer. Now, during the last fifteen years, the very reverse of this had been going on. The farmers, the merchants, capitalists of every description, had seen their property decreasing in value year after year. On balancing their books at the end of six months or twelve months, they found their capital shrinking, falling away, and that they were less wealthy than they were. They were filled with despondency, and with all the feelings of going to decay. No doubt this was the effect of the alteration of the currency, which began with the resolution to get rid of the paper currency and return to a metal- lic standard, and of which the last act was, the getting rid of the 1l. and 2l. notes. If the House considered the extensive influence of the change in the currency, it would have no doubt that it was the cause of a state of things the very converse of that described by Mr. Thornton, and said to arise from a gradually depreciated currency. It was attended with a phenomenon which some persons thought was singular and difficult of explanation; which was, that during the depression, our exports continued to increase. This was, however, to be explained in this way. The merchants and manufacturers, who balanced their books every six or twelve months, on summing up their transactions, found themselves losers from carrying on their operations; but at the same time they saw that all other things had got cheaper. They found they could buy the raw material 5 or 10, or 20-per-cent cheaper, and labour was cheaper; and they hoped, in consequence of the cheapness of the materials, that they would make a profit the next year. There was a necessity to find a new market for these cheaper commodities, more of which were produced than before, and this led to the increase in the exports. He saw no difficulty, therefore, in reconciling our increased exports with our falling prices and continued distress. The case might be exemplified by the farmers—they had been losing for some time past; but as they lost, stock became cheaper, they could stock their farms cheaper than before, they were able, as it were, to undersell themselves, and so they were encouraged to continue their losing trade. The same symptoms were everywhere observed, and they all proceeded from the same cause. It was satisfactory to be able to ascertain the cause of our distress, for that might lead to avoiding it in future. It arose, then, from touching the currency, from tampering with the standard, from altering the measure of value, which had put to hazard and exposed to great risk all the property of the country and all its interests. He hoped that the lesson which this taught us would not be thrown away. He did not mention this, however, that the Government and Legislature should take it into their consideration, in recognising the cause of the present distress, whether or not they would again tamper with the currency. He did not hold it out as any inducement for them to do so, when the opinion of the House and the opinion of the country were decidedly against it. He at least hoped, having now gone through many years of difficulties, and having arrived at last, as he believed, at nearly the end of them, and having a metallic currency, that our money was now placed on a secure basis. The withdrawal of the small notes had, he believed, caused a considerable increase of our difficulties. It was not so much the amount of that paper in circulation as the facility it gave to carry on trade in the country. It encouraged country bankers—it established a local circulation—and gave a great facility for carrying on country trade. The general currency, on the contrary, tended to bring the whole circulation towards Lombard-street; it was, perhaps, an advantage for London, but it was injurious to the country; the withdrawal of the small notes had then added to the distress. At the same time he was impressed with the great difficulty of maintaining undepreciated our standard of value as long as they formed a large part of our circulation; and being sensible of that, he was willing to make a sacrifice for the advantage of being able to maintain, in time of pressure, our standard of value unaltered. When he remembered what happened in 1825, and in the different panics he had witnessed, he was doubtful how far we should be able to maintain our standard with many small notes in circulation. The examples of Ireland and Scotland were certainly conclusive as to the possibility, but it was difficult to say how far that could be with safety extended. Paper money might be allowed in one English county—it could not be limited to Scotland; but the wider it was extended, the more difficult it would make the maintenance of our metallic standard in a time of pressure. It had been argued that the solvency of the bankers who failed in 1825—a great proportion of them having since paid in full—was a proof that there was no danger from a paper circulation; but, in his view of the matter, the solvency of these bankers was an argument against the system. If it overthrew those who had property to meet the demand on them, was not that a proof of its being dangerous? His hon. friend proposed to repeal the law for preventing the issue of one pound and two pound notes, which, in his view, might be somewhat hazardous, To that part of the resolutions he was not disposed to accede. The other object proposed by his hon. friend was of very great importance, and on it he would say a few words. His hon. friend's proposition was, that the silver standard should be concurrent with the gold standard. That was a measure which, in the first place, would cause some depreciation; and, in the second place, it might be right to inquire if this depreciation would be justified. It might then be considered what would be its effect in preserving our metallic standard; and he must at once say for himself, that he thought it would greatly improve our chance of maintaining our standard. As to the extent to which it would cause depreciation, that he thought would be perfectly justified. The alteration would not extend beyond 5-per-cent, which, as it would increase the facility for preserving the standard, would not be a disadvantage. The hon. Member then entered into a brief history of our currency, to show that up to 1797, silver and gold had been concurrently the standard of the country. The Act of 1798 went to suspend the coinage of silver, until an alteration, recommended by a Committee, was effected; which alteration, in consequence of the introduction of a paper circulation and other circumstances, never actually took place. The case, then, as he apprehended, stood thus:—Up to 1798, the debtor had the power to tender a payment in either gold or silver, but after that time it was suspended by the Act to which he alluded; and it was not until the year 1816 that the suspension of 1798 was declared, by Act of Parliament, to be a permanent exclusion of silver from the legal tenders of the country. He said, then, give us the same standard as that which existed before the suspension of 1798; give us, he would say, that power of paying either in gold or silver, which existed before 1798, and which was suspended until the coinage could be put on a better footing. It might be said, however, and he did not deny its truth, that the difference between the gold and the silver payment would be full 5-per-cent, and that those who thus obtained the power to pay in silver would gain five pounds in every hundred which they paid to their creditors. But if, in the present circumstances of the country, and looking to the tremendous changes which had taken place, all adjustment of the claims of those who had con- tracted engagements in the depreciated currency was denied them, then he would say that those who refused this adjustment could not deny that the taking off 5-percent in this way was a fair method of making the debtor some remuneration for his loss. Considering that England was the only country in the world where such a standard as that of gold exclusively was to be found, and that every other country on earth had in some way or other admitted both metals for that purpose, he confessed that he should not regret to see that change take place, if it were merely to arrive at that favourable conclusion for the debtor which he had before described. He thought, too, that if the old standard were adopted, that standard which those who clung to antiquity must surely approve of, there would be much less probability of those derangements of our monetary system which a sudden change of circumstances might now produce. He knew that these things were much better understood by calm examination in the closet, than by explanation in that House, or by evidence before a Committee; but still he thought that such an examination would do much to prepare the House for the alteration. In reference to the silver standard, he would just make one observation on a part of the question which involved an objection, plausible enough at first, but in his mind totally illusory and unsatisfactory. It was said, then, by the Theorists and the Philosophers—he meant them no offence when he called them so—that if you take the two metals as a standard of value, you expose yourselves to all the variations which at all times prevail between these two things which you have adopted as a standard. The object of a standard, they say, is fixity, and by adopting the two metals, you take things which vary with respect to each other; whereas, by taking any one, you have a standard free from any such objection. Now, it was a singular thing, that those who started this objection should have forgotten the example of France, whose ingenious and scientific men had applied themselves much to the question of the variation of the two metals, and who, although they were acquainted with this objection of the Theorists, had surmounted all the difficulties it presented, and preserved the double standard with all its objections. It was still more strange, however, that these Theorists should not see, that if they looked at the whole medium of circulation, they would find the variations greater in it than any which could take place between the two metals. They would find, in fact, that the variability of the two metals, in reference to each other, was as a mere drop of water in the ocean compared with the variations which frequently took place in the circulating medium itself. Look, for instance, at the Bank of England circulation—look at the extensions and withdrawals of circulation in the year 1825—and they would find that the variations of that period amounted to full twenty-five per cent. It was for these, and similar reasons, and from the feelings he entertained on this subject, that he felt bound to vote for the first Resolution of his hon. friend (Mr. Attwood). He adopted that course, too, that he might mark his opinions on the question, although he confessed he would prefer, if he had his choice, recommending the whole question to be referred to a Committee. He could not quit this subject without referring, however, to the opinions once delivered by a Governor of the Bank of England, with respect to the two standards. He admitted that from the manner in which that great commercial Company generally conducted its business, he was not disposed to regard as an authority the statements of that corporation; but it was different with the statements of individual members; and there could be no question that the experience and ability of Mr. Harman, the gentleman to whose evidence he alluded, was entitled to the greatest attention. Mr. Harman expressly declared, then, that if he could be brought to believe there was a sufficiency of gold for the circulation of the whole of the United Kingdom, he should think the gold standard the preferable one; but as it was otherwise, he was inclined to favour the proposition for making silver also a standard. For his own part, he thought an unlimited paper circulation the greatest evil which could fall on a country; and as he was anxious that, if any such event as war did come, it should find us prepared to meet its difficulties without having recourse to such a device as a paper currency, he thought the admission of the two metals as a standard a measure much to be desired. He begged, however, to be understood as proposing any alteration in the present system with the very greatest reluctance. He was indeed unwilling, except from a strong conviction of its propriety, to give his vote for the appointment of a Committee; because he knew well how likely men's minds were to be unsettled by any prospect of changes; but he was willing to encounter all these evils, although he anticipated their full extent, because he thought the state of the circulation was not a sound one, nor calculated to meet the exigencies which might arise without some alteration.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. xix. p. 905.

^* See Parl. Deb. Vol. xix. p. 905.

said, that the hon. Member (Mr. Attwood), in the very able speech with which he had opened this discussion, and the hon. member for Shaftesbury, who had followed him, had, in his opinion, taken an entirely wrong view of the cause of the thin attendance of Members, when they attributed that thin attendance to a want of feeling on the part of the House to the wants and wishes of the country. In his opinion, the absence of hon. Members during the speeches of those two Gentlemen arose from a conviction in the minds of a majority of the House,—and he believed that the majority of the country entertained the same conviction,—that this question of the currency was now finally set at rest, and that any motion that any hon. Member might think proper to submit on the subject would not have the effect of producing any change whatsoever. Those two hon. Members might depend upon it, that if the majority of the House thought there was the slightest probability of this Motion ending in an alteration of the currency, the House would be crowded by the fullest possible attendance of Members, who would be drawn down for the express purpose of preventing such alteration. When he said that the hon. Member (Mr. Attwood) had made an able speech, he did not mean to say that that hon. Member had said any thing new upon the subject. For the benefit of those who had not heard the hon. Member's speech, he would just observe, that the hon. Member had merely repeated (with great ability, certainly, and with still greater pains) all that he had said upon former occasions, re-stating the same facts, and re-urging the same arguments; but introducing not a single new fact, nor a single new argument. The main question raised by the hon. member for Callington (Mr. Attwood) was, whether we should recur to the double standard,—for it was the double standard, and not a double standard, as hon. Mem- bers would quickly perceive. The position which the hon. Member had endeavoured to maintain, was—not that we should have the two precious metals in circulation,—but that we should have the two metals in circulation at certain fixed proportions, which condition must render the execution of the hon. Member's proposition strictly impossible. Let him not be supposed to be misstating or overstating the argument of the hon. Member. He called upon the House to bear in mind that it was an essential part of the hon. Member's argument, that the two metals should circulate in the proportions of 1798. The hon. Member said in so many words,—"Raise the depreciated silver to the same proportion to gold as that in which it stood in 1798." Not to detain the House with details upon a part of the question which did not call for them, it would be sufficient for him to observe, that it was perfectly well known that the proportion in which these two metals interchanged now in the markets of the world, was essentially different from the proportions of 1798. In fact, the hon. Gentleman had himself admitted this: nay, the hon. Gentleman had gone further, and told them that the difference between the two was as much as five per cent. This was not quite correct; the difference was not so great; but take it to be as the hon. Gentleman had stated it, and to what result did it lead them? Why, the hon. Gentleman, ingenious as he was,—practical as he boasted himself to be,—had gravely and seriously recommended that the Legislature should make gold and silver equally a legal tender in this country at the old Mint prices, although, in the very same breath, the hon. Gentleman acknowledged that these metals differed in value from those prices, as much as five per cent. He would venture to say that such a proposal was never before seriously made. The hon. Gentleman had, with great pains and minuteness, traced the history of our currency, and had told them how our ancestors had been obliged from time to time to adjust the value of these two metals, in order to keep them both legal tenders. Indeed, this was the whole object of Sir Isaac Newton's Tables; but the hon. Gentleman derided the wisdom of Sir Isaac Newton, and, in defiance of all these facts, which by his speech he had proved he was not ignorant of, he had said, "Let the two metals be a common tender, and let the debtor pay in which he pleases." Now, what, of absolute necessity, must be the first effect of such a measure as this? The hon. Gentleman had told them,—and it seemed to him (Mr. Herries) to be any thing but a recommendation to the measure,—that every individual who owed money would be enabled to pay five per cent less than he was at present engaged to pay. This would, of course, be quite true, if the debtor had the opportunity given him: but there was a difficulty in practice here, which he was surprised the other hon. member for Callington (Mr. Baring) had not pointed out to his hon. colleague. Suppose the Resolutions of the hon. Gentleman to be agreed to, what would be the inevitable result? Why, it would be proclaimed to-morrow from one end of the country to the other,—he need not specify how,—that this House had come to a Resolution, the effect of which might be shortly stated thus,—namely, that every man who had claims payable upon demand, every man who held notes of small or great value, every man who had debts outstanding, would, if he secured the amount of what was due to him before this Resolution passed into law, get the whole of his money; whereas, if he delayed beyond that period, he could only get 95l. for every 100l. It was terrible to reflect upon the consequences which must follow. What would become of the Bank of England,—what would become of every banking-house in the kingdom,—what would become of all debtors who were liable to pay upon demand all that they owed? Would not all transactions of commerce be suspended, and the whole country present one continued scene of confusion, and consternation, and ruin, when the House of Commons proclaimed to all who had debts due to them, that if they did not collect them on the instant, they would assuredly be losers to the amount of five per cent? But if this scheme were really practicable, as it evidently was not, let them next consider what was called the claim of justice; in which the hon. Member who opened the discussion had, very much to his surprise, been followed by the other hon member for Callington (Mr. Baring). Both these hon. Members had appeared to think, that previous to 1797 men could discharge their debts in silver or in gold, at pleasure. Now this was not the fact.

said, that every man had the right to do so, paying the silver by weight.

said, they could not, even by weight. There never was so great a mistake as to suppose that silver had been the standard of this country throughout the last century. The fact was, that in practice, independently of the law, silver had never been in a state to be used as a tender during the period to which the hon. Gentleman's motion referred. Latterly the law had enacted that it should not be a legal tender. His hon. friend (Mr. Baring) was quite wrong in "the case he had put respecting the debt of 100l. which his hon. friend contended ought in justice to be discharged by 95l.

I said, that if the law were still the same, a man who owed 100l. could discharge his debt for 95l.

was contented with that explanation, and still denied that his hon. friend was correct; for the law restrained a man from tendering silver to a greater amount than 25l.

said, that the law which limited the tender of silver to 25l. regarded silver coin only. By weight, silver was tender to any amount.

was very well aware of that. He had not forgotten how the law stood; but his argument was this,—namely, that the silver had become so depreciated, that, practically, there was no such thing as tender by weight, while the law limited the tender in coin to 25l. As to the double standard, he must repeat, it was clear that in 1792 silver could not be the standard. The prices of commodities were, after the middle and towards the close of the last century, in no inconsiderable degree affected by the worn state of the silver coinage. He should wish that we could avail ourselves of the double standard of coinage to the extent that other countries did, if it could be done without danger; but he feared it could not be done without great danger. There was, however, a great error in supposing that in any country the two metals circulated equally. They did co-exist, no doubt, to a certain extent, but they were not equal; the one rose with respect to the other,—one was the standard at the Mint, and the other was taken at a value which was conventional between man and man. If such a regulation could be made, that a creditor was obliged to take half his debt in one standard, at the will of the debtor, and that the debtor was not obliged to pay more than half in one, and half in the other, it might, perhaps, be practicable to have the two; but he did not see how otherwise the two could exist together. He merely threw out that as a suggestion. But to come back to the great point,—the measure of 1819: the question was, not whether that was the wisest and the soundest course which could have been devised, but whether we were now to alter the standard of currency,—whether we were to do this for the relief of those who had to pay money. Supposing we were to go that little way with the hon. Member in mitigation of the suffering experienced from the Act of 1819, was there any man who thought that we could stop at that little step? "Little," the hon. Member called it, though he did not think so. When the hon. Member had achieved that little victory, was it not more than probable that the hon. member for Essex would afterwards return to the charge he had before made, and endeavour to bring forward his plan of paper currency, and thus bring about a political relapse, which would be much worse than our former condition, and would inevitably end in panic, which would be the destruction of all public and private confidence? The experiment of a small paper currency, without a Bank Restriction Act, we had already tried between the years 1822 and 1826; and how did it end?—Was it not in panic and confusion? Would the hon. Member have another trial of the same kind? If he understood one part of the hon. Member's speech rightly, there was some mysterious kind of allusion to some supposed understanding between the Bank and Government as to the circulation of paper. All he would say on that head was, to pledge himself that no such understanding existed. Reverting to our present state, and to what our state might possibly be in future, though he meant not to prophesy, for that would be dangerous on a subject where so many had been deceived; but the hon. Member (Mr. Baring) had said, that having passed the danger of a decline of prices, we were now, at last, got upon a safe landing-place. He hoped we were so; but if we were, what inconceivable boldness to depart from that safe ground, to venture upon that which must again bring us into uncertainty and danger! And yet the hon. Member declared his readiness to vote for one part of the Motion before the House, which would take us from the certain landing-place. To such a step, however, he (Mr. Herries) could not consent. He had expected to hear much of the question of small notes in this discussion, but it seemed to have been discarded as it were by universal consent. The hon. Member who opened the debate had omitted it, and the hon. member for Shaftesbury had also left it out of consideration, with some expression of regret that the two questions should be at all mixed up. Under these circumstances, he (Mr. Herries) might be excused for not going into it. If, however, it were necessary to do so, he could have no difficulty in showing that a reintroduction of a small-note circulation would be most objectionable, on many grounds. He would only remark, that if the debtor was to be relieved by paying less than what he owed, for that seemed one great object, he would rather attempt it, as a choice of difficulties, by an alteration of the standard than by an infusion of a small paper currency. There certainly would be less mischief, less confusion, and less violation of faith in the former than in the latter remedy. He must say a word as to the temptations—no slight ones in such an audience—which the hon. Member held out in support of his plan: it was to raise rents, to increase profits, to stimulate industry and commerce, and to relieve the labouring poor. Admitting that it might have the effect of raising rents and prices, and thus assisting the rich, he was utterly at a loss to conceive how the raising the price of commodities could relieve the poor. If the labourer were under pecuniary obligations, he might be able to discharge them in a cheaper currency; but this was a condition in which he was not likely to be placed: but that he could get more wheat for the price of his labour, was what he could not understand. After all, the question came back to this—that it would enable parties to pay what they owed in a cheaper currency. No ground for the adoption of the plan could be made in the alleged want of a sufficient circulating medium. He had had opportunities of communication with those who were in circumstances to employ labour to a considerable amount, and he had never heard any complaint of a want of money from the removal of the 1l. notes. All those with whom he conversed, not only said that there was no such want, but expressed their surprise that there could be any doubt on the subject. Looking, then, at the wants of trade, the interests of commerce, and the general stability of property, he could see no ground for the adoption of a plan which would benefit none of those interests, except, as he had said, in the payment of debt. But, taking that as a desirable advantage, he would beg the House to consider at what a price it was to be obtained. See what were the contracts and obligations entered into since 1819, on the faith of the measures then adopted, and would it not be a greater evil to break those than to leave some debtors without the relief which they desired? Admit that injustice was done to many—to all who had to discharge pecuniary obligations by the measure of 1819, would the proposed remedy relieve those parties? No doubt it would not, but it would injure others to just the same, or perhaps a much greater, extent; and then he would ask, were we now to do injustice to the one party because we had heretofore done injustice to another? Such a proposition was monstrous, and had against it all the reasons which the hon. Member (Mr. Attwood) had himself urged against the measure of 1819, with this additional, and, as it appeared to him, insurmountable objection,—that the measure now proposed would in no way remedy the practical evil of the former. For these reasons, then, being opposed to the double standard as not practicable without great injury, and being satisfied that the standard was now in the same state as before 1797, he could not consent to a motion which he felt would have, before the setting of the next sun, an effect in creating a panic and confusion, such as could not be described, and which it would then be too late to remedy. He must, therefore, call on the House to join him in giving a decided opposition to the hon. Member's Motion.

said, that though he concurred in a great deal of what was said by the right hon. Gentleman—though he admitted that the proposed measure would not afford any practical relief from the measure of 1819,—yet, when he reverted to that, he must admit that great injustice had been inflicted by that measure. At the same time, he could not concur in the view taken by the hon. Mover. The hon. Member said, that the proposition would have the effect of restoring the ancient standard as it was before the year 1797. It would not be very difficult to give an answer to that statement, if the hon. Member himself, in the most eloquent part of his speech, had not given it a most satisfactory refutation. The experience of the last half-century had afforded practical illustrations of the danger of altering the standard to relieve those who were injured by former alterations. If, however, the hon. Member had confined himself to a motion for a committee upstairs to examine the subject, he should not object to go into such an inquiry. All that he had read, and all that he had seen, induced him to be extremely cautious in giving any countenance to an alteration of the existing system, without due consideration and inquiry. But, in refusing his assent to this proposition, he could not agree with much of what had fallen from the Master of the Mint, because he thought that the measure of 1826 was no decisive security against a recurrence of the same evil under which the country had suffered. The fault of our banking system, about that time, was not to be traced to any deficiency of solvent banks, because many of those banks which had stopped payment, afterwards redeemed their pledge. It was to a mixture of both, to a mixture of banks with property, and of banks without property, that all the mischief was to be traced. When confidence was destroyed, there was, of course, a stagnation of credit; and though the small notes were removed, confidence was as essential to our present system as to any other which this country had known. In 1825, we were on the point of a fresh Bank Restriction. And how was that prevented? Why, by the forbearance of the Bank of France, and by the generous conduct of some private bankers and merchants at home. But for the forbearance on the one side, and the liberality on the other, we should have been, as the right hon. member for Liverpool had said, in a state of barter within forty-eight hours. Now, if instead of a period of peace and tranquillity, this had occurred in a time of war and commotion, what must have been the consequence? Had 1l. notes been issued, there would of necessity have been a run on the Bank. It was not necessary for him to argue whether that state of things could have been remedied or not. His argument was, that, in point of principle, there was no difference between a circulation of 5l. notes, and a circulation of notes below that value. In each instance, the stability of the system depended on the power which the party issuing notes possessed to meet the demand in specie. Before he sat down, he could not but regret that the right hon. member for Liverpool had not taken this opportunity of moving for the appointment of a general committee, to inquire into the banking system of the country, of which he had given notice. He thought that the committee would agree with him on the subject of 1l. notes, and would put an end to that strange anomaly which allowed one system to prevail in England, and another in Scotland and Ireland.

said, that he had made inquiries relative to the supposed application to the Bank of France, and he had been unable to ascertain that any such application had been made by the Bank of England, or on its behalf. The fact was, that the Bank of England had not suffered any difficulty on its own account in consequence of the panic, for it was perfectly competent to meet all its engagements; but its embarrassments had arisen from the efforts which it made to relieve the difficulties of others. No establishment could be more secure against any inconvenience of the kind, so far as its own immediate concerns were in question; but when those who were largely engaged in money transactions found themselves embarrassed, the Bank exerted itself for the benefit of others, and if it had not been for the efforts made with that view, it would have experienced no difficulty whatever. The hon. member for Callington (Mr. Baring) said, that if a war were to break out, we should run the risk of a great embarrassment from having our currency limited to a gold standard; but he would beg to remind the hon. Member that it was not the last war which occasioned the difficulty in the gold currency. It was several years after the war, when various establishments had large payments to make abroad, that a difficulty was found in obtaining treasure. He did not undervalue the difficulties of dealing with the currency, but he thought they were exaggerated by the hon. member for Callington. He considered that it was better that those who were to influence the paper circulation of the country should be regulated by one metal than by two or three. If the Bank had the power to pay in any one of three metals, the moment it made a change from one to another, doubts would arise as to its solvency, and a panic would ensue. It was argued that gold ought to be regulated by the price of corn; but it should be recollected that, at one period during the last war, the expense of conveying corn to this country from abroad was 52s. per quarter. So in scarce years the standard would, by this regulation, be subject to very great fluctuations. The other hon. member for Callington expressed his regret at the withdrawal of the 1l, and 2l. notes. He was not delighted at that measure, but he felt that if a panic were to occur, its effect would be much worse with those notes in circulation than without them. The panic ought not to be attributed wholly to the alteration of the currency. It should be recollected that at that period large speculations were entered into, some of them very wholesome and prosperous, but others of a different character, which involved men in heavy engagements at home and abroad, and these, superadded to some little derangement of the currency, had caused the panic; but he could not help believing that the experience acquired on that occasion would be attended with beneficial effects. The nature of the hon. member for Callington's second Resolution was, that we should undo what had been erroneously done in 1826; but he could not help thinking, under all the circumstances of this country, that it was not advisable again to issue small notes. With regard to silver, it should be recollected that it was in greater abundance since the period alluded to by the hon. Member than before. On the subject of a double standard, he meant to say that he objected to it upon principle. More than one standard would amount in effect to no standard at all. If there were a double standard in money, why should there not be two bushels for measuring corn, two yards for cloth, or two furlongs for measuring distance. The principle would be the same. Another objection which he had was, that experiments were in progress in the mines, the result of which it was impossible to foresee. If there were a double standard, an opportunity would be given to persons owing money to discharge their debts in the cheapest metal: and should the result of these experiments be to throw a considerable quantity of silver into the market, the double standard would then be dishonest as well as disadvantage- ous. Whatever the standard might be, he thought it ought to be placed on such a basis as to guard against those fluctuations which had recently occurred, and which exposed the property of every man to risk. He should vote against the motion of the hon. member for Callington, considering it totally unsuited to the circumstances in which we were placed.

, though he greatly admired the speech of the hon. member for Callington, yet he could not help thinking that the whole of it favoured the very doctrine which he professed to oppose. The point which the House was called on to decide was this—whether or not it would agree to pass a Resolution, to the effect that silver, at a depreciation of 5-per-cent, as the hon. member for Callington thought, or, as he would say, at a depreciation of 3 or 4-per-cent, should be made the standard. If he were called upon to argue the question whether, in 1819, the Legislature acted wisely or unwisely, in not going back to the ancient silver standard, he should arrive at a very different conclusion from that which he should come to were the question put to him whether or not they should now abandon the gold standard, and have recourse to the old standard of silver. He was of opinion that silver was the best standard, and he found himself supported and confirmed in that opinion by the authority of Locke, of Hard, and of others. The very fact of silver being the standard in other countries ought to recommend it. That circumstance of itself gave it a value as a standard almost sufficient to turn the scale in its favour, even if other circumstances were equal. Again gold was more liable to fluctuations—for example, the war in the east raised the value of gold 1½ or 2-per cent. That fraction might appear of little value in the eyes of some hon. Gentlemen, but he could assure them that in the large money engagements of such a country as this, that fraction, small as it might appear, was a matter of considerable moment; further, he could not be induced to think gold a good standard, liable as it was to so many causes of depreciation. Then the state of South America should be borne in mind, and the fact particularly remembered, that very little was at present known respecting the mines in that country, though some information might speedily be expected, which information would probably most materially affect the value of gold, and it might become the cheaper metal of the two. The debtor was entitled to due protection', as well as the creditor; but how were they to pay due respect to the rights of both, if they interfered with the existing standard? Gold was now spread over the country, and should the issue of notes take place, ten or twelve millions of gold would instantly find its way up to London and be exported, and that would be succeeded by the series of fluctuations which took place in 1824, 5, and 6. For these reasons, and having paid the price of the change which had taken place, he should be averse to any further change, and should, therefore, vote against the motion of the hon. member for Callington. He could not conceive the possibility of a double standard. If they adopted two, they, in effect, adopted none at all. The other hon. member for Calling-ton had said there was a double standard in France, but the fact was, that standard existed more in name than in practice. Ever since 1785 gold was not practically the standard, and there, as well as in this country, before the war, silver was, in all cases, the standard. He complained of the measure of 1826, not as the repairing of a system that had done much service, but as the total breaking-up of the whole machine. A paper currency which that destroyed, was one of the greatest improvements of modern times, and a departure from it, he could not but consider as a return to barbarism.

expressed his perfect concurrence in the latter part of the speech of the hon. Member, and also in that of the noble Lord behind him (Lord Howick.) He believed that the time would soon come when the question of paper issue would be forced on the attention of Government, notwithstanding its repeated declarations that it had been set at rest for ever. In his own opinion, a limited paper currency, founded on a secure basis, and placed under proper regulations, would be the best means of administering relief to the people who had been so long suffering from distress. But these questions might be reserved for an early stage of next Session, when they ought not to lose a moment in entering at once into the subject, when he had no doubt it would appear that the principles advocated by the noble Lord and the hon. Member were sanctioned by those who were best informed on the merits of the question, and who therefore were most competent to form a correct opinion on our policy.

felt a difficulty as to the Resolution respecting a double standard, for which he could not bring himself to vote. He was quite aware of the immense advantage which commerce would derive from a silver as well as a gold standard; he acknowledged that it would prove a great resource at a period of calamity; he was convinced that they might have averted the public distress, a few years ago, if they could in this respect have followed the example of a neighbouring country; but he principally objected to the proportion which the hon. Member had talked of establishing between gold and silver. As to the other Resolution, he could by no means allow that the restoration of the small notes would be the means of depreciating the currency, or would be likely to create any change of price. A small currency was pre-eminently useful in the retail trade, and a cheap and secure currency would be most beneficial for the country. The hon. Gentleman concluded by saying, that he should vote for the second Resolution of the hon. member for Callington.

assured the House, that it was his intention to say only a very few words on the subject before them. He was perfectly convinced that the more frequently it was brought under discussion, the more clear-sighted would Members become as to the danger arising from an inordinate propensity to voyages of experiment, which too frequently involved the most fearful consequences that could befal such a country as that for which they were legislating. He rose, however, principally for the purpose of stating his impression that the result of the present, as well as of all former discussions on the currency must be a general conviction that they were now arrived, after all their sufferings, at a state at which wise men would be willing to stop, rather than place the whole system once more in jeopardy, by a renewal of unseasonable experiments. He entirely acquiesced in the opinion already given by the right hon. Master of the Mint, and trusted that this subject, as well as the Catholic Question, would be completely forgotten in the next and all future Sessions, although they had been but too often obtruded on their attention hitherto. Both of the resolutions submitted by the hon. member for Callington he should feel obliged to oppose, as the first would be productive of bankruptcy and ruin, whilst the second would lay the foundation of future panic and public danger. He agreed with the hon. Member opposite in his estimation of paper credit and paper circulation as one of the greatest improvements of modern times. The noble Lord near the hon. Member had alluded to his intended motion respecting banking, with reference to which he might take this opportunity of mentioning that he purposed, before the expiration of the present Session, to move a resolution to the effect that they should institute an inquiry into the whole banking system previous to a renewal of the charter of the Bank of England. He altogether concurred with the Master of the Mint in thinking that, if the House agreed to those Resolutions tonight, there would be a general panic amongst the people to-morrow, and that before the lapse of a week it was probable there would not be a sovereign remaining in the country.

, he should vote against the first Resolution because it was in favour of a depreciation, and not on account of any objection to a silver standard. It was his intention also to vote against the second resolution, but he did so for reasons distinct from those which influenced his vote upon the other. He thought with the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken that it was now high time for them to desist from venturing on hazardous experiments.

said, he should not detain the House many minutes, and whenever he made such a promise he invariably kept his word. The extraordinary abuse, however, which the hon. member for Callington had so liberally bestowed on the bill with which his name was connected he thought would be sufficient to justify him in making a few observations; and first, he begged leave to express his lively sense of the obligation which he owed to that hon. Member for having at length brought forward what he called his practical measure, as by doing so, he had certainly that night contributed more to the settlement of the question than by all the merely theoretical speeches which he had been delivering for years. Ever since 1819 had the hon. Gentleman been dealing out diatribes and invectives against the policy on which Government had then acted, while he kept in the back-ground his own notions as to what it behoved the Government to have done if it wished to relinquish the obnoxious and denounced system of paper-money not payable in gold. He had now, therefore, fairly abandoned declamation, and concocted a practical measure, which amounted to neither more nor less than a plan to enable every person to pay a debt of 100l. with 96l., deducting four per cent. He confessed he felt some surprise at seeing the hon. Member take the course which he was doing, as this was no proposal for a double standard, his object being merely to recur to the standard established by Sir Isaac Newton 112 years ago. It was impossible that the scheme suggested could be productive of any good whatever. He was willing, for the sake of argument, to concede that the bill of 1819 had been the means of effecting all the injury which its opponents had alleged it to have produced; but even assuming that to be true, the hon. Member would do still further injury to those who were supposed to have been injured by the measure of 1819. Many relying on the solemn resolutions and assurances of Parliament, would have wound up all their accounts prior to 1819, submitting to the loss which they had then incurred, and now therefore might stand in the relation of creditor, and as such would sustain new injury, instead of experiencing any redress. But the proposition, in fact, carried its own refutation with it at the very outset, for it could not be acted on before a month from the present time, so that the creditor might clearly take advantage of the interval. He was sorry to hear hon. Members speak of opening this wearisome subject once more next Session, because it ought now to be left at rest if ever. Four changes had taken place in the currency during the last thirty years, and it was surely at length time to try the effect of a continued adherence to one system. The system at present in operation he was confident presented as few objectionable features as any other that could be proposed, and had been strongly recommended by the first Lord Liverpool while the former system was yet in healthy existence. The notion of a double standard was totally fallacious, and would be found impracticable in effect, nor had it been ever for a moment entertained by Mr. Locke, or any others who had advocated a silver standard. It was now ten years since the measure alluded to had been the law of the country, and engagements and contracts had been entered into which it would be the worst of policy to unsettle or disturb, particularly as it was now impossible to administer the redress required. With respect to the 1l. note circulation in Ireland and Scotland he could see no absurdity whatever in its existence there while it was prohibited in England, although it certainly might be desirable to see it abandoned there also if the measure could be introduced without inconvenience. If they were to act as the hon. Gentleman recommended, in the event of a panic there would be a simultaneous call for gold; the applicants would not desist the more for being told that those on whom they had a claim were solvent and able to satisfy their demand if they would consent to a temporary delay; all would turn to confusion, and public ruin must be the consequence. He should, for these reasons, give his decided opposition to the first resolution, because it was unjust, and to the second likewise, because, though less unjust, it was equally inexpedient.

would vote with the hon. member for Callington should he press his resolutions to a division. The hon. Member had not been fairly met: indeed his arguments were irrefragable, and would make their way to the conviction of every unbiassed mind the more they were canvassed. It was absurd to say the question of the currency had been set at rest for ever. It was not set at rest—it could not be continued on its present footing; for the change which had been made in it in 1819—which by the way was not completed so as to have unchecked operation till the measure of 1826, abolishing the 1l. notes,—was the main cause of the distress under which the country had so long laboured. There was one class, and but one class, who were benefited by the present system of the currency, and who would be injured by its being restored to its ancient proper condition; namely, the pensioners of the Crown and the great officers of the State, who enjoyed, in the improved metallic currency the increased allowances granted in a depreciated paper one. Those gentlemen had an interest in resisting the hon. member for Callington's motion; but the public at large, who paid those pensions, particularly the industrious working classes, had a stronger interest in its suc- cess, and would, he was confident, ultimately triumph.

was opposed to both the resolutions of the hon. Member for Callington, because he thought the effect of the first would be, to expel all the gold coin from the country, while that of the second would be in the end to make paper occupy the place of the silver currency, which would be established by the first resolution.

was in favour of the resolutions. From the moment, he said, that the suppression of the 1l. notes should be extended to Scotland and Ireland, it would be found impossible to persist in the measures of 1819and 1826. Too many thanks could not, he thought, be bestowed on the hon. member for Callington for bringing forward the present motion, opposed as he was by all the placemen, half-pay officers, younger brothers, and other ministerial hangers-on in that House, who alone profitted by a system of currency which was destructive to the working classes, and injurious to all others. He had his reward, however, in the gratitude of the industrious poor, to the bettering of whose condition his efforts had been so ably directed.

replied: The right hon. Baronet has most unjustly ascribed to me motives, by which I have been in no degree influenced. He imputes that I bring this question before the House, in consequence of some challenge from him; but I assure him, that before I heard this assertion of his, no thought of that nature occurred to my mind; and I desire to assure the House, that in submitting to its consideration the measures I now propose, I have acted in discharge of a higher duty than admits a mixture of personal considerations. I regret to perceive, that the right hon. Baronet himself is unable to subdue that deep personal interest which involves him with this question, and to weigh the whole matter with reference alone to the claims of justice, and to the interests of the country. I complain of the hon. Baronet, that he unfairly misrepresents my argument, when he ascribes to me an inconsistency between the measures I now propose, and opinions which I have previously expressed. After having told the House, says the right hon. Baronet, of great errors committed by the Legislature, and of great advantages to be obtained by repairing those errors, now, when I bring forward a practical measure, I have nothing better to propose than a trifling relief of four or five per cent on public burthens, to be obtained by paying with 96l. debts of 100l.; and he has said, that I admit thus the erroneous character of opinions I have before expressed. But I distinctly affirmed, that in my view the claims of justice and the interests of the country demand the adoption of more comprehensive and effectual measures than those which I now propose; but that yielding to the declared, though mistaken opinion of political parties, and neither abandoning nor compromising any opinion I have ever expressed, nor my hostility to all the principles of the present system, I stated that I had brought forward the measures now proposed, because they were calculated to give some relief to the people, and were yet such as could not be opposed by the advocates of the Act of 1819, unless they abandoned all the principles on which they have recently rested their support of that Act. The right hon. Baronet, however, pursuing a course of inconsistency rarely equalled in Parliament; first, supporting the Act of 1819, on the ground that it was a measure of little difficulty; then abandoning that ground, and asserting that the faith and pledges of former Parliaments required in 1819 the re-establishment of the standard of 1797, whatever evils should be inflicted; he now abandons again this latter plea, the faith of Parliament, and the standard of 1797, and sees no necessity for regarding either. My first resolution rested on the very principles on which he has recently supported the Act of 1819, on the necessity of bringing back the standard of 1797. This is what I have proposed. But the right hon. Baronet says further, that by restoring now the standard of 1797, contracts formed in 1819 would be unjustly changed to the extent of four or five per cent; but he unfairly views my measures. I will shew him the other side of a question of which he views a part only. In this country exist innumerable contracts, every one of which has date before 1819; and was formed either in the double standard prior to 1797 or the still cheaper standard of the Restriction Act. This class of contracts he overlooks. His own salary belongs to that class. All the salaries of his friends around him belong to it. These have been all paid in money of unjust value for the last ten years, to the wrong of the country —in money of a value for which no pretence can be offered. Every existing tax, every pension, all the salaries and expenses of the Government, belong to this class; all of these the right hon. Baronet leaves out of consideration in order that he may impute injustice to my proposition. The right hon. Master of the Mint says, that I have mistaken the law, for that silver had ceased to be a legal tender for many years prior to the Bank Restriction Act, except for sums under 25l. This limitation, he avers, took place in 1774, and he quotes Lord Liverpool's letter in support of his statement. If the Master of the Mint's law be correct, there is an end of the whole question: I admit it. But he is mistaken. I hold here the work of Lord Liverpool, and his words are, which are in fact the words of the. Act of Parliament of 1774, "that no tender in the silver coin of this realm, for any sum exceeding 25l., should be counted a legal tender for more than the value by weight, at the rate of 5s. 2d. an ounce." Silver coin was, therefore, under this law, legal tender to any amount if of full weight, and to the amount of 25l. though deficient in weight. But even this law, which required silver coin to be of full weight, existed no more than nine years. It was enacted in 1774, and expired in 1783, after which period, silver coins of weight, or not of weight, were legal tender; and I cite, in support of that opinion, though no support is requisite, a statement of Mr. Vansittart, in this House, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, who said that, prior to the Bank Restriction Act, the interest of the public debt might legally be paid in crooked sixpences. The Master of the Mint has further urged, that prior to 1797, gold money was mainly the medium of circulation, and that silver money did not, in fact, exist to any great extent. I have shewn him the reason of that. Gold was the cheapest metal then, as silver is now. Silver was then generally five, sometimes ten, per cent above the Mint price. But the law remained then unchanged, as it had remained from the time of Elizabeth; the Mint was open by law. At no period from the time of Elizabeth, till the Bank Restriction Act, was any subject of this realm debarred from taking silver to the Mint, procuring it to be coined at 5s. 2d. the oune, and discharging his engagements in that money, if it were his interest to do so, which is what I now propose, But I am mistaken, the Master of the Mint tells me, in supposing that this measure can assist the labouring classes. It will raise the price of provisions, says he; and is the labourer to profit by that? I have explained it; and will do so again. Provisions will be advanced, and wages also. An alteration in the value of money will affect each of these alike; but the taxes will not advance. They will remain at the same nominal amount as now; and the labourer, to some extent, therefore, will be relieved from their pressure. This measure will fall on all who receive the taxes; on the right hon. Gentleman and all his colleagues; but it will relieve all those by whom taxes are paid. I advert, for a moment, to an argument of the right hon. member for Liverpool. He warns the House of the danger of unsettling the present monetary system. Great calamities and disorders, he says, have been occasioned by our former measures; and great dangers are to be apprehended if the House should be induced to revise what they have done. He proclaims, by this course, the incompetency of the House to deal with these great interests. But the right hon. Gentleman himself, with strange inconsistency, as he stated at the close of his speech, has a change to propose; and it is not a little singular that every individual Member who has spoken against this Motion has deprecated, as the member for Liverpool has done, any change being attempted by the House. They see nothing but disorder and danger in change or revision. But it is still more singular that every individual amongst them has, like the right hon. Gentleman, a change or scheme of his own; some scheme, project, or invention,—some little measure,—some petty nostrum, every Gentleman is in possession of, for improving the monetary system;—an improvement of the banking system is, I think, the scheme of the right hon. member for Liverpool. Amidst all the calamities which these previous experiments and improvements have occasioned, with all the evidence which the disasters of the country give of their incompetence; instead of acting as I call on the House to act; instead of retracing their steps—of revising their measures and their errors—of repairing the mischiefs they have occasioned, they still desire to proceed with unabated presumption to the execution of new experiments, improvements, projects, and inventions. The hon. Member, in conclusion, stated, that incompliance with the wishes of many who entertained opinions similar to his own, he should not divide the House on his Resolutions.

They were accordingly negatived without a division.

moved the second reading of the clause added to the Forgery Punishment Bill. The right hon. Baronet said, he would take that opportunity of making a statement to the House, in reference to something which had fallen from the hon. and learned member for Knaresborough last night. When he (Sir Robert Peel) stated that he had communicated with six of the most respectable merchants in London, expressing to him their apprehensions of the consequences if the punishment of death was abolished, he was met by the statement, that two of these very gentlemen had permitted a person charged with forgery to escape the hands of justice. Now, he held in his hand a letter, signed by all these gentlemen, dated that day, in which they asserted that the statement he had just alluded to was entirely without foundation; and they requested that he would communicate the contents in the most public manner to the House. He did not know any thing of the circumstances of the time, but, fortified by this authority, he wished to state it to the House.

, in the absence of the hon. and learned member for Knaresborough, would take the opportunity of saying, what he was sure that hon. Member would have said himself if he were here—namely, that he was sorry to have made any statement which could give pain to any party. This he did the more readily, because he was the channel of communicating the fact to the hon. and learned Gentleman. He hoped the House would be satisfied with this explanation.

could not concur in what had been stated by the hon. member for Dover. He had reason to believe that the statement was substantially correct as to the fact, though inaccurate as to date. The fact was, that a forgery was committed upon the house of Shipman and Co., of George-court, upholsterers; and, when it was recollected that the party accused was the father of nine children, some excuse would be made for these parties not prosecuting. But there was no doubt that the forgery took place.

knew a case in which a banker, though a member of the association, declined to prosecute a party accused of forgery, but, under circumstances which, when explained, seemed quite satisfactory.

said, the question was, whether the parties abandoned the prosecution from a dread of inflicting the punishment of death?

had been informed, on high authority, that the substance of what he had stated was capable of proof in every part, as stated by the hon. member for Knaresborough, except the date.

The clause read a second time, and the Forgery Bill passed.