addressed the Committee as follows:—I believe. Sir, that on former occasions of the renewal of the Bank Charter, it has been the practice of the persons who have held the situation which I now occupy, to move resolutions in consequence of a previous application from the Bank of England, for a renewal of that Charter. On all these occasions—although that has been the form in which the Bill has appeared to commence in this House—I apprehend that such propositions have not been introduced without a previous communication taking place between the Government and the Directors of the Bank of England, and without some kind of negotiation first occurring as to the nature of such propositions. I did not think that this mode of proceeding was more than a question of mere form, and I did not, therefore, consider myself bound strictly to adhere to it. I have thought it better to make the proposition from my own suggestion, without the form of first obtaining a demand from the Bank of England. The question which I am now about to bring forward, is one of the greatest importance to the commercial interests of this country—it is one on which the value of the property of every person in this country—not merely of those engaged in commerce, but of all others—must very much depend. And therefore, in considering this subject, I felt fully sensible of the importance of the matter; and I endeavoured, to the utmost of my power, to introduce such a proposition as should be productive of general satisfaction, and should give the most ample security to the monetary concerns of the country. During the last Session, it will be recollected, that for this purpose I moved the appointment of a Select Committee to consider of the subject. That Committee sat for a considerable space of time; and though they did not conclude their examinations, so as to be able to lay a full Report before the House, yet such have been the examinations, and such the extent of the inquiry into which they entered, as to make me think the subject had been sufficiently sifted, and, therefore, that it was not desirable that that Committee should be renewed. In the progress of that Committee, information was given which had not previously been placed before the public, especially information with respect to the subject of the management of the Bank affairs, and the state of their accounts, and that information has, I believe, changed the opinion of those who heretofore considered the subject, and from that moment the public have been more inclined to look favourably on the management of the Bank of England than they did before that inquiry. As I fear that I shall have to detain the House a considerable length of time in staling the propositions I have to make on this subject, I think I shall best consult the convenience of the House if, without further preface, I proceed to make the statement to which I wish to call their attention. With respect to the principle to which banks in this country and elsewhere, must first attend, it is the convertibility of the paper issued by such banks into money. It is only on that principle that they can pretend to say, that the paper issued by them is valuable as a medium of exchange, and as every departure from the principle of convertibility always has produced, as it always must produce, the most fatal effects to the manufactures and commerce of the country in which it has taken place. This, therefore, in the consideration of every such question, must be the point to which the House and the public must first direct their attention. The next great point is to secure the solvency of the banks which issue the circulating medium. Those two points require no lengthened arguments on my part to prove the necessity of attending to them. All men are convinced of the necessity of preserving the easy convertibility of paper into money, and all, I believe, are equally convinced that whatever means you adopt to secure the solvency of the bank which issues that paper, must be most important. But there is another part of this question which is scarcely less important, and that is, that you should obtain some security against an undue circulation with reference to its amount. I say that this is scarcely less important; for although the ruin that follows the want of solvency in a bank is immediate and extensive, it is only little less to be dreaded when it arises from an irregular and fluctuating circulating medium. If the circulating medium has been improperly increased, it may appear for a time to be a benefit, by encouraging speculation; but it only encourages that speculation at the moment to destroy it afterwards, for destruction must follow on the first fluctuation of the funds that have supplied the circulating medium. It is almost impossible in any paper circulating medium to prevent entirely these fluctuations. The only reasonable object of the Government, therefore, is to adopt such a system as will render these fluctuations as infrequent, and as Utile injurious as possible. The amount in circulation must depend mainly on the demand in the country; but in case of a great increase of the circulating medium so as to produce a depreciation in the value of the currency, the only safe and possible remedy is the effect of the foreign exchanges on the country. So long as you have a complete convertibility of paper into coin, the foreign exchanges will rectify the depreciation by the drain of bullion they will create, and by the change of currency consequent upon it. It is therefore most desirable, that in any arrangement that may be made, as little interruption as possible should be given to the effect of the foreign exchanges upon the currency of the country. Every endeavour to interfere with the exit of bullion from the country must be of mischievous consequence, and so must every attempt not only to prevent it altogether, but even to delay it; for the only consequence of that delay must be, to prevent the operation of the check upon a too depreciated currency, and to make the fluctuation greater and more lasting. The question, therefore, that the House has to decide will be, in what manner, for the future, the mode of supplying the paper currency of the country shall be carried into effect. It is perfectly well known, that the Bank of England, possessing as it does a monopoly of the circulation of the metropolis, has possession of the market at that point from which all the circulation of the country must flow. Whenever the foreign exchanges are against us, it becomes the interest of a party to send bullion abroad; and when such has been the case, what is the place to which be has gone to get bullion in order to send it abroad? Why, to the Bank of England. The question, therefore, for the House to decide is, whether it is most desirable that the management of the circulating medium of the country should be conducted by a single body, as a bank of issue, or by the competition of different banks. It appears to me, on looking at this question, that there are advantages undoubtedly in both systems, but that those of the former preponderate. It must be the interest of banks, assuming that they are in a state of solvency, to issue as much of their own paper as it is in their power to convert into money, when called on to do so; and it will be said that, in doing so, they will check one another in the amount of their issue. It may be perfectly clear, that no one among a number of rival banks would, on this account, be able to issue more than its due proportion. But if there should be a state of things in which speculations have become most extensive, it will be the interest, and it will be in the power of these banks, to increase the amount of paper in circulation considerably, although each may not issue more than its own proportion of the whole amount. And when, in consequence of the increase of the circulating medium, and the depreciation of the currency, and a failure of credit, and of the Exchanges turning against this country, each of these banks, looking only to its own interest as compared with that of others, shall feel it necessary to contract its issues, this must produce a sudden contraction in like manner, in the general circulation and general business of the country. That is a most important point, and requires to be most carefully considered. It appears to me that there would be considerably more danger from the effect of such a competition, than there would from the power being placed in the hands of a well-regulated municipal bank. There is one other point in favour of the large municipal bank, and that is, that in times of sudden distress, it will be able to give considerable assistance to commerce. It is perfectly well known, that at such a moment the exchange is in favour of this country. It is not then the object of the municipal bank to increase the issue at such a time; but if there were several banks in competition with each other, no one among them could, under such circumstances, come forward to give its assistance to trade, in consequence of the fear that each would entertain of the competition of its rivals. All that I have said necessarily assumes that the principles upon which a single bank is conducted are sound—that the single bank does not take advantage of the power placed in its hands, in order to make undue profits—that it acts upon the true principles of banking, looking to the state of the foreign exchanges for the regulation of its issues, and does not keep up the circulation of its notes by artificial means, but accommodates it to the state of the currency of the country. Its interest, undoubtedly, like that of any other party, is to keep as large an amount of notes in circulation as possible; and I therefore feel, that it is placing a power in the hands of a body of individuals, who certainly, under certain circumstances, have an interest in abusing it; it is certainly placing in the hands of one set of individuals a very great power; but I do not put forward either of these two pro-positions—the competition of different; banks, or the existence of only a single bank—as entirely free from objection. We are bound to look to a comparison of objections on the one side, and of ad-vantages on the other, and to form, a judgment from that comparison. My opinion is, that if you can contrive an adequate check upon the conduct of a single bank, it will be more advantageous that such single bank should manage the circulation of the country, than that it should be left to the competition of different and rival establishments. Various modes of effecting this check and control upon the conduct of the bank have been taken into consideration. I have spoken hitherto generally of one bank of issue; I have not stated whether it should be a commercial body, or one under the direct control of Government. It is certainly a question of great importance whether it is desirable to trust such a power in the hands of persons not legally responsible, or in the hands of a Government which is responsible; and another point is, whether the profits necessarily to be derived should belong to the Government, or be allowed to the Company, The advantages, and the only advantages, I have been able to discover in a Government Bank, instead of a private Company, are the responsibility of the managers and the profit to be derived from the undertaking; but, it seems to me, that they are much more than counterbalanced by the practical evils of such a system. I think the effect of having the Government the great bankers of the State, having the command of the circulating medium in their hands, might be most mischievous. In the first place, I refer to the temptation of the Government to abuse its power, and to the impossibility, or to the extreme impolicy in that case, of permitting any assistance to be given to the commercial interests of the country in periods of difficulty—a course hitherto frequently pursued by the Bank of England. If once Government were at liberty to assist those whom they thought fit in times of difficulty and distress, it appears to. me, that it would be such an enormous power ill the hands of the Minister of the day as would be almost destructive of the Constitution. On the other hand, if Such a bank as I have spoken of were to be tied down to any fixed and strict rules, from which at no time it was to be permitted to depart, though you might avoid one evil, you would fall into another. It would be almost impossible to estab-lishany precise rules, and when established, they might interfere with the grant of assistance at a time when it was most needed. Therefore, I apprehend, that we should throw aside any question whether it is fit to establish a Government bank for the management of the paper circulation of the country. Then another point has been much urged upon some occasions—that although a private company, or a mercantile corporation, ought to have the management of the circulation of the country, yet that Government ought to have a direct control over its affairs. I do not myself think, that this control would be very effectual, and to a certain extent it would be liable to the objection already stated; but I do not know what great objection there would be to adding to the practical experience of the Directors the opinion of the Minister of the day. I must say, that if we look to past experience—to the cases in which the Directors of the Bank of England have been supposed to have mismanaged their own property—if we look to the years 1797, 1822, and 1825 (without now meaning to give any opinion whether the Director son those occasions were right or wrong), we shall see, though their conduct has been liable at those three periods to suspicion of mismanagement, yet no man, I believe, is prepared to say, that the Government was not entirely cognizant of the conduct of the Bank on those occasions, and indeed, that it was not quite as much to blame as the Bank. Therefore I do not think, that establishing a Government control would be of any very great advantage; it might be of some advantage, but not to such a degree as, in my opinion, to make it desirable. The only remaining check (and I admit it not to be a perfect one), to which the attention of the public has been directed—the only check which, during the whole inquiry of the Committee last year, was stated as at all likely to be efficient, is the publication of the accounts of the Bank. I think, that this although, as I have said, not a perfect check, would be adequate to the purpose. The principle on which the Bank of England has managed its concerns during the five or six last years, has been fairly given to the public; the ground on which the Directors adopted that mode of management have been approved, and I believe may be justified on principle. Having decided that a proper proportion of bullion to be kept in its coffers was one-third of its liabilities, the great and main principle of the Directors has been to allow the public to act upon the currency of the country—not to force out any circulation by artificial means—but to allow the trade in bullion, which may take place by reason of the foreign exchanges being adverse, to act upon the circulating medium—contracting it as the bullion is withdrawn, and increasing it as the bullion returns. This is the principle on which the Bank has professed to act: and it seems to me the best possible principle, because it prevents sudden changes, and allows those circumstances that cannot be avoided to act gradually and naturally on the circulation. We have also experience of what has been the effect of this mode of management on the part of the Bank during a period of considerable difficulty. The House is aware, I believe—at least all who have attended to the subject are aware—that the exchanges were against this country from August, 1830, to February, or to the beginning of the year 1832. During all that time there was a constant drain on the circulation—a constant contraction, amounting to nearly 7,000,000l. sterling. I do not mean to say, that during this period there was not considerable pressure upon and distress among different classes, produced, no doubt, by the contraction of the circulation; but there was no general convulsion; and allowing the drain of gold to act gradually on the currency, the consequence was, that after a long trial, the Exchanges turned in our favour, and since the spring of 1832 they have been continually in our favour, increasing the circulation of the country and the amount of bullion in the Bank. It, therefore, appears to me, that this system is not only capable of being defended by reasoning, but that it is justified by experience, as far as experience can be applied to it. Publicity of accounts will enable all men to judge whether the Bank continues to act upon this wholesome principle or varies from it. It may be said, that the Bank Directors are not legally responsible for their conduct, and that they cannot be punished if they depart from their former practice. This is true, but we must admit, that there is a responsibility to public opinion, and that it will have its control upon men in every situation. I feel confident, that persons standing so prominent as the Bank Directors will be as completely controlled by public opinion as if they were acting under a legal responsibility. Therefore I am prepared to propose the continuation of a single bank of issue in the metropolis, subject to the control of publicity. I should hold this the wiser course, even if we were now, for the first time, instituting the system; but it is an additional, and as I take it, no mean advantage, that it is the least change that can be adopted. Unless we can distinctly see some paramount advantage in making a great change in the monetary system, nothing can be more foolish than to try the experiment. Therefore, my proposition is, that the Bank of England shall continue to have the monopoly of the circulation, and that that monopoly should be secured to the Bank by the same means as have hitherto existed—that is to say, not to allow any bank with more than six partners to issue paper within sixty-five miles of London. As to the precise distance I do not lay any great stress upon that—I believe that, were it much smaller, it would effect the object equally well: either way I do not think the public materially interested, but as in my communications with the Bank Directors, I found their wish strongly expressed in favour of sixty-five miles, I did not oppose it. The next point to which I shall call the attention of the Committee is the duration of the new Charter to be granted to the Bank. I certainly must feel, that it is not desirable to tie up the Government for too long a period, while, on the other hand, it is most expedient not to let the question float at large unnecessarily. I propose, therefore, that the usual Charter shall be continued to the Bank of England for the period of twenty-one years, subject, however, to this condition—that if at the end of ten years it should seem fit to the Government, the Charter may expire at the end of one year. By this means Government will not be entirely tied up, if at the end of the first ten years it shall see reason to alter the terms or condition of the Charter, al-though the subject will not necessarily be brought forward at that period, or at an earlier period than twenty years. As to the next point, to which I have already alluded—the publication of the accounts of the Bank—I propose, that a weekly account of the amount of bullion and securities on the one hand, and of the paper in circulation, and deposits on the other hand, should be presented to the Treasury, and that, at the end of the quarter, the averages of the preceding quarter should be published in The Gazette. I do not suggest, that the publication should take place weekly for this reason—that it might lead, on many occasions, to false impressions. It may frequently occur, from circumstances not at ail connected with the state of the currency, or with the State of the exchanges, that a large sum of bullion may be drawn out of the Bank at one period, which, if the account were published every week, might have an effect upon the public mind, neither just nor desirable. By taking the average of the preceding quarter, and allowing it to be published, the effect will be to prove to the public whether the Bank is continuing the system of management it ought to continue, and which experience shows will not be productive of evil consequences. I now come to a point on which I feel that there will, perhaps, be considerable difference of opinion. I have said, that it is most desirable, that no interference should take place, either by the Bank or the Government, to prevent the drain of gold from this country, should the Foreign Exchanges be against it. This, I apprehend, is necessary, in order to regulate the currency of the country; but it is not desirable, in my judgment, to give any peculiar facility or encouragement to an internal drain of bullion from the Bank. I have said, that the convertibility of bank paper into bullion is essential to the whole principle of a banking establishment; but having secured that—having secured also the publicity of the accounts of the Bank—having given every security that can be devised (and I should most readily apply any other security beyond what I have mentioned, if it could be pointed out), I do not see the danger of giving the Bank of England every power which can justly and fairly be bestowed upon it. Therefore, it is my intention to propose that the Bank of England paper should be legal tender excepting at the Bank itself, and any of its branches. Gen-men may feel, that it is making an alteration tending to produce depreciation; but I cannot think, that such would be the case, when we recollect the immediate convertibility of notes into gold at the Bank and its Branches, and the present rapidity of communication between different parts of the country. If we look at the consequences of such a change in the case of a panic or run upon the different banking establishments, I think the House will admit, that the plan has considerable advantages. In ordinary times, I do not think it will have any effect either one way or the other. One objection to this alteration is, that the effect will be to deprive the country of the circulation of bullion altogether. I do not apprehend, that this can possibly take place; it is perfectly well known, that paper and bullion of the same denomination cannot circulate together, and if you are to issue notes of the value of a sovereign, there is no doubt, from experience and reasoning, that sovereigns could no longer continue to circulate; but as the notes will not be of a lower denomination than 5l., I do not apprehend that the effect will be to drive gold out of circulation. Another objection has been stated, which I admit is an objection—that as the effect of the measure will be to render the evil and danger of a panic, and general run on banking establishments less detrimental to the Bank of England, the Directors will become less careful in adopting their issues to their own means, and to the wants of the country. I cannot, however, believe, that this will be the case to any extent, and it certainly does not, in my mind, counterbalance the advantages of the change. The chief advantage to be derived from it is, in the first place, that the Bank will be secure against any other drain upon it but that which is produced by the state of the Foreign Exchanges. The private banking establishments of the country will not be under the necessity, at a period when they expect a run upon them, to draw bullion from the Bank. When a country bank expects a run upon it, it provides itself with all the means of meeting that run which its resources can furnish; therefore, country bankers now call upon the Bank of England, not merely for the amount of bullion absolutely necessary, but for a much larger sum to meet the whole extent of their engagements. The effect therefore is, when a run takes place upon the country banks, there is through them a run upon the Bank of England; because they call upon it, not merely for the amount of bullion which is absolutely necessary to meet the run made upon them, but in order to guard themselves to a much larger amount. If the country banks were not required to make such drains,—as they will not be under the plan which I propose,—the Bank of England will be secured against these sudden internal drains, while the country banks will be themselves greatly benefited. I think, therefore, that these are very strong arguments in favour of the proposition which I submit in this respect. The next alteration I propose to make applies not merely to the Bank of England, but to all other banking establishments, and generally to the commerce of the country. It is most desirable that when the Bank of England wishes to diminish the amount of its notes in circulation, it should be able to effect that object. At the present moment they have the means of doing so; they can raise the interest at which they will discount; but the time is not long past when the interest of money being higher than the legal rate, the Bank had no means of checking the amount of its issues, but by refusing to discount. I intend to suggest to the Committee an alteration to a certain extent of the provisions of the Usury-laws. I propose that all bills not having more than three months to run should be exempted from the provisions of the Usury-laws. Hon. Gentlemen who have been long Members of the House, know that I have entertained no great partiality for the Usury-laws. For many years I supported an hon. and learned Member, not now in the House, in the various Motions which he made for the entire repeal of those laws. I am aware, however, that there are strong objections, and some of them may be reasonably urged, against the total repeal; but I do not think that the class of persons generally most inclined to make the greatest objections to the abrogation of the Usury-laws need object to the change suggested, relating, as it does, to bills only for short dates. I know that the provision may be open to evasion, but now abundant means of evading the Usury-laws exist, and the addition of one more opportunity is perhaps of little consequence. That portion of the capital of the country usually lent upon mortgage is not likely to be employed in the discounting of bills. At the present moment it can have no possible effect, the interest of money being scarcely half the legal rate; but the period when it is desirable that the Bank should have the power of checking its circulation is just the period when the interest of money is rising and when the Usury-laws come into operation and have a pernicious effect on trade. It is hardly necessary for me to state, that this alteration will be advantageous not merely to bankers, but to the commercial world in general. No one can doubt that the effect of bills which cannot be discounted, excepting at a certain rate of interest, does frequently very prejudicially interfere with the commercial interests of the country. Having stated these points I come now to that part of the subject which applies to the actual bargain with the Bank. At present the debt due from the public to the Bank amounts to 14,600,000l., or rather more. I think it must be evident to any person who considers the subject, that it is not at all necessary that so large an amount of capital should be locked up for the security of the Bank. The fact is, that the capital has accumulated not so much to give security to the Bank, as by advances made at different periods by the Bank to Government, on the renewal of the Charier, and for the concession of other privileges, It was originally never contemplated that so large an amount was essential to be deposited as a security, and I should certainly feel very little apprehension from a considerable reduction. But we must not fail to consider that though not calculated for that object, credit is a thing of such a nice nature—so susceptible—that it would be most imprudent in an arrangement of the kind to do anything which might even be suspected of affecting the credit of the Bank of England. I, therefore, do not propose to reduce the amount to any considerable extent, but the House will not fail to recollect that such an amount of capital being tied up makes the expense of management much greater than it would otherwise be. The Directors of the Bank state, though I am not inclined to go to that extent, that their loss in this respect amounts to one per cent. They undoubtedly lose something, and the consequence is, that they put this as part of the charge against the public, which the public is obliged to pay. Another point which ought to be taken into consideration is this:—That if at a future period, when the present arrangement expires, the interest of money should be high, the Bank would possess a powerful control over any new arrangement. Although at this moment part of the debt may be paid off without much inconvenience, the inconvenience might be great when the rate of interest is high. I propose to reduce twenty-five per cent. of the capital, leaving somewhat under 11,000,000l., as the debt due from the public to the Bank. I am certain no man will say that such an amount of capital, in addition to the other funds of the Bank, amounting to about 3,000,000l. will not be a perfect security for the solvency of the establishment. As I have no doubt that the plan I have detailed will be very considerably advantageous to the Bank Proprietors, I have felt that I had a right to call upon them to pay some equivalent for the proposed advantages. I, perhaps, may previously have asked them a larger sum than they thought I had any title to demand; but I have now to state that the Directors of the Bank have consented to what I consider a beneficial bargain for the public. They are prepared to give 120,000l. a-year, to be deducted from the amount paid to the Bank for the management of the debt, which I think a considerable sum, though some Gentlemen may perhaps think that we ought to obtain more. On former occasions, the Bank has paid for the renewal of the Charter, by lending money at a lower rate of interest than that given by the public—at one time at three per cent, when the general interest of money was five per cent. There were two modes of proceeding which I might have adopted. I might either have insisted upon a fixed share of the profits of the Bank, the amount of course varying from year to year, or I might have adopted the plan I have just presented to the House. I thought, taking into consideration the circumstances of the two parties, that it would be much better for the country to receive a stipulated sum than a speculative advantage. Spread over the whole length of time the Charter is to continue, the total sum saved to the public will somewhat exceed 2,500,000l. which is a larger amount than the Bank has paid on any former occasion for the renewal of the Charter. I know that this subject cannot be generally interesting, and I endeavour to state as briefly as I can, the principles I propose that the House should sanction. I now come to another part of the subject—namely, that which relates to the other banking business of the country. I suggest that the definition of a Joint Stock Company should remain as at present; every Banking Company, consisting of more than six partners, is to be taken to be a Joint Stock Company; and for reasons I will now state, I propose that all Joint Stock Companies shall, in future be established by Charter. By this regulation I do not wish, in the least degree, to interfere with the establishment of Joint Stock Companies, but, in order that those establishments should be properly regulated, I think it desirable that the conditions should be fixed by Charter. I do not, of course, apply this provision to Joint Stock Companies already existing: I would give them a certain period to decide whether they will or will not apply for a Charter; nor is it my intention to impose any conditions, by Charter, other than those which shall be beneficial to the establishments themselves. There can be no worse policy than to pursue a contrary system. I should state that the House must recollect that there are two classes of Joint Stock Companies, one issuing their own notes, and the other trading only with the notes of the Bank of England. I propose that no joint stock bank of issue shall be established within a less distance than sixty-five miles from the metropolis. At present country banks are prevented from drawing bills upon London, and issuing notes payable in London for a less amount than 50l. These restrictions I propose to remove. The only object I have in view is to prevent competition with the Bank of England; and as I am satisfied that they never can enter into competition, I have no objection to repeal these restrictions. I propose, however, to give the Crown a right to refuse the grant of such Charters, and it is by no means desirable that such a Charter should be granted as a matter of course. Joint Stock Banks issuing the paper of the Bank of England may be established of course within a shorter distance of the metropolis. I propose that a Charter shall be given to these companies under certain conditions. The first of these conditions will be, that in the case of a Joint Stock Bank of issue, half of the subscribed capital shall be paid up and the amount deposited in Government securities. I further propose that the partners in a Joint Stock Bank of issue shall be liable to an unlimited extent: and that the Corporation of the Bank of England as such shall not hold any shares, so that the public may not be deceived as to who are the partners. I will suggest also that the accounts of these banks should be periodically published. In the case of Joint Stock Banking Companies not issuing their own notes, I propose that one-fourth of their subscribed capital should be paid up, and vested in securities and that the shares in such banks shall not be less than 100l. each, and that the partners shall be liable or responsible only to the amount of their shares. It will be seen by this latter proposition that I give an advantage to the banks not of issue over those which are of issue, and this I think highly necessary. In a case where a charter is to be granted, it must be left to the discretion of the Government to decide whether the amount of capital subscribed is sufficient for the locality in which the bank in question is situated. The amount of capital which would be sufficient in an agricultural district, it is obvious, would not be sufficient in a great manufacturing district, and consequently it must be left at the discretion of the Government to determine whether the amount subscribed is sufficient, and whether the charter asked for shall be granted. He hoped, however, that every proper facility would be given to the establishment of such banks. I do not intend, with respect to private banks, as contradistinguished from joint-stock banking companies, to interfere in any way in the management of their concerns. It appears to me indeed very desirable, that by some means or other a better mode for estimating the circulation of the country banks should be established than exists at present. It is essential to the good management of those banks, on which the whole circulation of the country depends, that the amount of their notes in circulation should be accurately known. It is, for this purpose, and with a view to effect this object, that I propose that those country banks, instead of making a composition for the Stamp-duty payable on the gross amount of their notes issued, shall be compelled to pay 7s. per cent Stamp-duty upon the notes which they issue. It is desirable, that the country should know at all times the exact amount of country bankers' notes in circulation; and no real or substantial evil can happen in the case of any country banker from such an arrangement; and, further, I am of opinion, that it is desirable to know, not only the amount of each country banker's paper in circulation, but also the amount of his general assets to meet the demands upon him. I do not by any means desire to expose the affairs of individual bankers, for though I think it desirable to make the affairs of joint-stock banks known to the public, I do not consider it expedient to extend the principle to the case of private individuals keeping banks, who, with every certainty of ultimate solvency, might, nevertheless, be ruined by an exposure of their affairs under certain peculiar circumstances. I propose, however, that a statement of the accounts of each individual bank shall be sent up to London as a strictly confidential paper, which shall not be published in a separate form; but, the accounts being added together, the total result shall be given to the public periodically. These are the grounds of the propositions which I feel it my duty to submit to the Committee on this important subject. I will further observe, that the country banker may state the whole of his available assets. [Sir Robert Peel asked whether the statement included landed property?] Landed estates, although not immediately convertible, tend certainly to the security and ultimate solvency of the banker, and on that ground it may be matter for consideration whether the description of property referred to shall not be included in the account. These are the propositions which I have now to submit to the Committee. In the Resolutions which I shall lay on the Table, I have not thought it necessary to enter into details of various topics, many of which are likely to come under discussion and excite considerable difference of opinion; and I have confined myself to specific Resolutions, leaving the necessary details for a future opportunity. The tendency of my propositions is certainly to extend the issue of Bank of England paper. Undoubtedly, the principle which I stated at the beginning would, if followed out, lead to establishing only one bank of issue in the country; but whatever may be the opinion of any man on this subject in the abstract, I feel certain that in the existing circumstance" and state of the country it would be insanity to attempt to enforce such a system. I am ready to admit, that it would be a safer and more secure principle (if a banking system were now for the first time to be established), to have only one bank of issue; but in the present state of things that is impracticable, and the utmost extent to which any prudent man ought to go consists in encouraging the establishment of banks which shall not issue their own paper but that of the Bank of England. I have now stated all which I think necessary to trouble the House with. I informed the House last night that it is not my intention to ask for a vote on any of the Resolutions on the present occasion; I shall, therefore, content myself with placing them in the hands of the Chairman. The Resolutions were then read, as follows:—

said, that he fully concurred in the propriety of the course taken by the noble Lord in not calling for an immediate vote on his Resolutions, which it would be absurd to discuss without an opportunity of first hearing what the country at large thought of the plan. The late period of the Session presented an obstacle to going into so important a question with a view to its decision. The subject opened a wide field for discussion—Parliament being called on to consider, not only the nature of the bargain made with the Bank, but the whole question of the circulation. He should not attempt to follow the noble Lord in any connected series of remarks, but would content himself with throwing out such casual observations as occurred to him at the moment. The country bankers would be greatly deceived if they did not see in the noble Lord's Resolutions an attempt to get rid of their paper to a considerable extent, and substitute for it Bank of England notes. Whether that was a judicious plan or not, he did not pretend to say. However, that the principle had been favourably received by a number of country banks was clear from their present practice. Though the noble Lord deprecated the use of force towards the country bankers, he suspected that the noble Lord would not be unwilling to accelerate and extend Bank of England issues by a gentle shove, or a species of Quaker propulsion, which would effect the object the noble Lord had in view, and drive country bank paper out of circulation. He could not help again regretting that the Government, after keeping Parliament assembled for months without any effective legislation, except in the department of coercion, should now, at the extreme end of the Session, bring forward this important question, when there was not sufficient time for considering it in all its multifarious bearings. The noble Lord's Resolutions were of two kinds—the first regulated the banking system of the country; the other embodied the result of the Government bargain with the Bank of England. He admitted that the first duty of the Government was to put the general banking system of the country on a good footing, without reference to the advantages that might be conferred on the Bank of England thereby; but Ministers were, in the next place, bound to examine the nature of those advantages, if any, and demand, on the part of the public, a reasonable compensation from the Bank in respect of them. If, by extending the circulation of Bank of England paper, the noble Lord threw a considerable advantage into the hands of the Bank, it was only fair to expect a reasonable compensation for it. But the subject would be put in a clearer light by the correspondence and negotiations between the Bank Directors and the Government, to the production of which he took it for granted the noble Lord would have no objection. [Lord Althorp said, he had no objection to produce all written communications on the subject, but a great deal of the negotiations were verbal]. He should certainly wait for that correspondence, before finally making up his opinion. He certainly was not one of those who thought it advisable to make a very sharp bargain with the Bank, lest the Bank might have been driven to use all the artifices within their power to maintain their credit as a body, and the public would certainly have suffered in the end. He was glad, therefore, the Bank appeared satisfied; because, although an attempt towards driving a hard bargain was evident, still, at the first blush of the present proposition for a renewal of the Charter, he must confess he was disposed to believe that the Directors had had the best of the bargain. This might not appear when the correspondence was before the House, but at present he certainly thought that the noble Lord had not made a very advantageous bargain for the public. With respect to the details of the plan, he saw no objection whatever to pay off one quarter of the debt due by the public to the Bank of England, but with respect to the reduction of the sum paid to the Bank for the management of the National Debt, he must confess he did not clearly comprehend why that arrangement was made. The sum now annually paid to the Bank for this service was 248,000l., of which 120,000l. was in future to be annually deducted. Now the noble Lord did not state whether the charge for managing the public debt was so unreasonably large as to be fairly subject to this reduction, or whether this 120,000l., was to be looked upon as a compensation to the public for the grant of a fresh Charter. The late Mr. Pascoe Grenfell had, when in that House, made this annual charge the subject of a Sessional Motion, with a view to its reduction, and he (Mr. A. Baring) had always opposed this Motion, upon the principle that the sum paid was made a matter of bargain. When the Charter was renewed, it was unfair to depart from the terms of a bargain once made. He, therefore, took it for granted that the noble Lord did not look upon the 248,000l. as too large a sum paid for this service; and he must, therefore, consider the annual reduction in the light of a compensation for the renewal of the Charter; and then came the question of comparison between the compensation now paid by the Bank, and that which was paid at the time of the last renewal of the Bank Charter. The compensation then made by the Bank amounted to two per cent, on the whole amount of their capital of 14,600,000l., or, in other words, to the difference between three and five per cent, that amount being lent to the public at three per cent at a time when the Government would have been obliged to pay five per cent in the market, and two per cent on 14,600,000l., was not far short of 300,000l. a-year. Now, the present value of money in the market did not exceed two and a-half per cent.; three per cent was considered a large rate of interest, and yet the Bank were to be paid at the rate of three per cent for the capital lent to the public, although the noble Lord knew, that Exchequer Bills, which yielded an interest of two and a quarter, circulated at two and three per cent above par. It, therefore, seemed to him that the 120,000l. reduction on the annual payment to the Bank, was not tantamount to the compensation made by the Bank on the former occasion, and, in order to equalise the two, the rate of interest to be paid on the Bank capital ought to be reduced to one per cent. This was the view which he took of it at the first blush of the plan; perhaps a perusal of the correspondence might alter his views. The noble Lord had stated nothing as to the public balances in the hands of the Bank; he took it for granted that the noble Lord would hereafter give an explanation on the subject, particularly as the Government might do what it pleased with those balances in future, and invest them to the best advantage. On the subject of the Bank itself, experience had proved, that the general system of management was judicious. Besides, the Bank had so accommodated itself to the affairs of this country that no considerable alteration could be made in the system without producing the greatest inconvenience. The same system was found equally beneficial wherever it was adopted. The Bank of Hamburgh was now, he believed, the only one conducted on a different principle, and a principle which he considered a bad one. The plan of the Bank of England was adopted in all parts of America, and he did not think it admitted of any material improvement. He fully agreed with the noble Lord that there ought to be only one bank of issue in London. The other plan of having more banks of issue than one, was repudiated by every man of sense and experience, and in this the whole of the Committee concurred. The competition where there were more banks of issue than one, must produce a jarring which would prevent any bank from acting without previous inquiry into the proceedings of the other, without seeing what their rival was about, and thus could not fail to lead to great inconvenience and embarrassment. The next point to which the noble Lord adverted, was the limitation of distance within which other banks might be established with more than a certain number of partners; and he thought the noble Lord right in his limitation. There was no very considerable town nearer to London than sixty-five miles, and no benefit could therefore arise from bringing the privilege nearer to the metropolis. Now one word as to chartered banks. His opinion was, that this country had never yet sufficient experience of the principle to judge fairly of it. It was Mr. Huskisson's intention to have inquired fully into it had he lived. It was his (Mr. Baring's) opinion that it prevented capital from being employed in the business of banking by every proprietor being rendered liable to the full amount of his property. He approved of the French principle, always, however, taking care that the capital was really advanced, and not subsequently taken out. The Board of Trade could not employ itself better than in entering upon a careful revision of this important subject. The noble Lord said, that banks of issue would be unlimited in responsibility, but banks not of issue limited. He did not see upon what grounds the distinction was made. The noble Lord said, the present limitation which prevented country bankers from drawing bills on London for less than 50l. was to be removed, and that they might in future draw to any other smaller amount. If they might draw bills on London of 10l. or of 5l., it would be the same in effect as allowing them to issue their own paper. There must be some limitation to such a power. However, he should not at present venture to offer any opinion upon this part of the subject. As he said before, however, he did not wish to give any opinion just now upon the general question as regarded country banking. He unfeignedly wished, that they should have, in the first instance, the opinions of persons connected with the country circulation on the subject. Indeed, he thought that the discussion should be delayed until they had the opinions of those individuals on the subject. The noble Lord said, that all country banks should be obliged to pay 7s. per cent Stamp-duty upon the amount of their issues in circulation, and that with a view to ascertain the amount in circulation. Now, he should like to know how the noble Lord would ascertain the amount of such issues in circulation. Was he to take the account from the bankers themselves? The fact was, that this criterion of the amount of their issues would be anything but a true criterion. It would no more afford a true criterion of the amount of notes in circulation, than a Property-tax would afford a criterion of the real amount of any individual's property. For his part he could not understand the means which the noble Lord would have of ascertaining the real amount of the issues of those banks in circulation. There was one point in the noble Lord's arrangement to which he had personally a great objection, and an objection that was founded upon personal experience, not only in this country, but in other parts of the world. He was aware that it was an objection, which in the present temper of the times, and of that House, was likely to meet with little favour there. It was an objection to the publicity of the Bank accounts. He was quite sure that in times of difficulty the means of the Bank would be limited, and its operations would be cramped, by its being under the necessity of making an appearance to the country for the purpose of masking its operations. He was aware that the opinions given before the Committee were various upon that point. It appeared to him that it would be important for the House to know what the Bank as a body thought upon the subject. He (Mr. Baring) was of opinion that the publicity of the accounts of the Bank would, in times of difficulty, materially cramp its operations, and further, that it would sometimes create an alarm amongst the public where there were no real grounds for alarm. It was perfectly well known, that the Bank at times, like many persons engaged in large general business, would perceive a great disproportion between its issues and the means in its hands; but it would, at the same time, know, that by circumstances which were not explicable by figures, sometimes the next week, or the next month, all things would be set to rights, and the due proportion brought about again. The publicity of the accounts of the Bank in such periods, and under such circumstances, would occasion an alarm amongst the public at appearances which, properly understood, would afford no grounds for alarm at all. It should not be forgotten that, every difficulty and every restriction put upon the Bank, produced corresponding difficulties and restrictions upon the intercourse of the Bank with the world at large. Gentlemen should not imagine that in imposing restrictions upon the Bank, they were imposing them upon the Bank merely; they should recollect, that by the imposition of such restrictions, they were making it less useful for the purposes for which it was established and intended. He would refer for an illustration to the last period of difficulty since our return to cash payments—to the year 1825. In fair weather every bark might go to sea, and there was then little or no necessity for inquiring into its seaworthiness; but it was obvious that there must be in this country a description of vessel that would weather a storm like the only one that we had experienced since the return to cash payments—namely, the storm of 1825. Now of this he was quite certain, that if a necessary publicity of its accounts had been established at that period, the Bank would have stopped payment over and over again. He forgot to what amount its resources in specie were then reduced—he believed that it was to an extremely and almost incredibly low amount. The Bank knowing that all would be set to rights went on confidently, and things did eventually come about, but such would not have been the case if the public, at the time, had been let into its secrets. In point of fact, there was no inconvenience experienced from the present state of things as regarded the Bank in this respect; on the contrary, at the period to which he referred, in 1825 the power of secrecy on the part of the Bank was the safety and the security of the Bank. He was aware that such a state of publicity existed in other countries: but it did not exist there, at least in France, without the disadvantages which he had mentioned attending it. Undoubtedly, the noble Lord, by proposing that the publication of the accounts of the Bank be made every three months, instead of weekly, so far diminished the danger that was likely to be produced by such an arrangement. He would suggest this change in that part of the noble Lord's arrangement—namely, that the averages to be published at the end of the quarter should not be averages made up to that time, but to the middle of the quarter, for if they should be made up just before the payment of the dividends, they would exhibit a small amount of notes in circulation; and if made up just after the payment of the dividends, they would exhibit a large amount of notes in circulation. He therefore thought that by taking the averages up to the six weeks previous to the end of the quarter, they would have a greater chance of having a fair and correct return on the subject. To the making the paper of the Bank of England a legal tender he had no objection; on the contrary, he thought that the doing so would be productive of great benefit to the country. He thought that the noble Lord's second Resolution might be more judiciously worded, so as to afford greater security to the public. He would suggest that that Resolution should be altered to this effect—that so long as the Bank of England continued to discharge all its legal debts and responsibilities, its paper should be a legal tender in the country. It was not sufficient to say that so long as the Bank was bound by law to discharge its liabilities its paper should be a legal tender; it was more safe, as far as the public was concerned, to say that so long as it continued to discharge those liabilities, and no longer, its paper should be a legal tender. He had considerable doubts as to whether we should not limit the payment in specie on the part of the Bank to London alone. He, for one, was inclined to limit it to the Bank in London alone. The doing so would facilitate the issue of paper; and he thought that one place for payment in specie would afford sufficient security to the public. The late Mr. Ricardo's plan was, that there should be only one place—namely, London, and that payment in specie should be made only for every 100l.; and, undoubtedly, if his plan of paying in ingots were adopted, there still would be ample security for the public. He wished to know whether the noble Lord intended that the branch banks should be liable to pay in specie only for the amount of notes issued from them respectively, or whether they were to be called upon to pay for the whole amount issued by the Bank itself. He supposed that the noble Lord only intended, that those branch banks should be liable to pay in specie for the amount of paper issued by themselves. It was proposed by the noble Lord, that at the end of ten years the Government should have the power of giving notice to the Bank that its charter was to expire. Was that power to be reciprocal on the part of the Bank as well as on the part of the Government? The noble Lord proposed that, the Government should have the power of putting an end to the charter. Was the Bank, on the other hand, to have a similar power? There was a variety of points connected with this important subject, which would require much time for their consideration; and yet, it would be hard to call upon the noble Lord to give proper time for their discussion; for that would, in point of fact, be calling upon the House to sit there till Christmas next. It was greatly to be regretted, that their time should have been wasted upon measures of much less consequence, so that when a great measure like the present was brought forward, it must be disposed of in a hurry, as it was physically impossible for hon. Members to continue to sit for the period required for its due consideration and discussion. It was, however, of great importance that with respect to that part of the noble Lord's plan which regarded the internal circulation of the country, and the country banks, some time should be given to the persons connected with that circulation to pronounce their opinion upon it. Without entering generally into the question, he could not refrain from offering the observations which he had now addressed to the House.

said, that as far as he could understand and follow the points of the noble Lord's plan, he was not disposed to quarrel with the principle of it, but there was one point upon which he thought that the noble Lord deviated from the principles which he laid down in the commencement of his statement—he alluded to the publicity of the issues of the Bank of England. He concurred in every word that had fallen from the noble Lord as to the extreme importance of the publicity of the Bank issues, as the best guarantee to the public for the sound management of that body. It was not that he had any reason to find fault with its management hitherto, but he saw clearly that there was no security to the public for the sound management by the Bank of the circulation of the country, and more especially for its adhering to one uniform principle, except in the publicity of its accounts. The noble Lord had laid down that principle in the most emphatic manner at the commencement of his statement, but when he came to see the mode in which the noble Lord proposed to effect that publicity, and the extent to which the noble Lord would carry it, he owned that he felt deeply and grievously disappointed. The publication of the accounts of the Bank for a quarter at the end of the quarter was not calculated to give the public a proper insight into the management of the Bank, or to operate as a check upon the Bank itself. If, however, the series of weekly averages, which were to be made up during the quarter, and which, according to the noble Lord's plan, were to be laid before the Government, but not before the public—if that series of weekly averages, and the amount of issues in each week during the quarter, were to be made public at the end of it, the public would get a better insight into the management of the Bank, and he thought that such publication was necessary in order to enable the public to understand accurately whether the Bank Directors were right or not in their view of the results, and to ascertain whether the variations that occurred could be fairly and satisfactorily accounted for. He was of opinion, that it would be an improvement in the noble Lord's plan to postpone the publication of the accounts from three months to six months, if at the end of that time the whole series of weekly averages during the time should be given. No benefit, he conceived, would be derived from the publication as proposed by the noble Lord. He would not then enter into the other details of the plan; he would content himself simply with stating, that he saw no material objection to the plan as a whole, and there was one part of it, that which went to make the note" of the Bank of England a legal tender, which was of essential importance to the country.

said, that it would be seen from the evidence given before the Bank Committee, that the Bank never was afraid of any run upon it occasioned by an unfavourable state of the exchanges, as it was well known to the Directors that that would in time right itself. In the year 1825, as his hon. friend the member for Essex was aware, the Bank of England, to its highest honour, came forward and lent its notes to the country bankers. During the run that then took place those very notes were frequently, in the course of half-an-hour after their being thus advanced, brought back to the Bank to be exchanged for specie. If the Bank of England had only to meet its own engagements, then it would have had no difficulty in doing so. The noble Lord now proposed to 'make Bank of England notes a legal tender, which would prevent, in case of a run hereafter on country banks, such a run on the Bank of England for specie, a matter of the highest importance to the tranquillity of the country, and a measure that would in all human probability, prevent the occurrence of great distress. He thought that the Bank of England had a right to be paid, and well paid, for its management of the Public Debt, The noble Lord's plan, as far as it regarded country banks, was one of considerable complexity, and with respect to it he would not at present give an opinion. He could not agree with the hon. member for Essex in thinking that the plan of the noble Lord would go to destroy the smaller banks of issue in the country parts of England. He was sure that under this plan they would continue to flourish, and he certainly thought that their continuance would be of infinite use to the commerce of the country. He was of opinion, that on the whole the noble Lord had shown great judgment and good sense in the plan which he had brought forward. He thought the proposition of the noble Lord quite clear, and one that could not effect any injury to the Bank establishment. When the papers and other documents were printed and distributed, he did not doubt but the proposition would give general satisfaction.

hoped he might be permitted to put a question to the noble Lord upon a point which much interested a great portion of his constituents as well as Ireland generally. It was not his intention at this stage to enter into the general principles of the proposition; he was only anxious to obtain some information. The plan of the noble Lord made Bank of England notes a legal tender, and he should be glad to learn from the noble Lord if it was his intention to extend that principle to Ireland. He understood the noble Lord to intimate, that he did not contemplate any such extension, and he therefore must inquire whether, as the notes of the Bank of Ireland were not now a legal tender, the principles of the present proposition were in that respect to be extended to Ireland. His third inquiry was, whether it was the intention of the noble Lord to bring the consideration of the Bank of Ireland Charter this year before Parliament.

said, that the propositions which he had submitted to the House were intended merely to apply to England and Wales, and did not extend either to Scotland or Ireland. With regard to the question put by the hon. and learned member for Dublin, with reference to the consideration of the Charter of the Bank of Ireland, he could only say that Charier did not expire until the year 1837, when by Government paying off the Debt due to that body, and giving proper notice, the subject might be brought under the consideration of Parliament.

begged to remind the noble Lord, that he had not answered his inquiry as to whether it was contemplated to make Bank of Ireland notes a legal tender in Ireland.

replied, that it was not contemplated to interfere at present with the Charter of the Bank of Ireland.

regretted, that he felt called upon to differ from the sentiments which had been expressed by several hon. Gentlemen on this subject. He felt no hesitation in saying that to the negligence of the Bank of England was to be attributed the lamentable events resulting from the panic of 1826. At all events, he thought that those results would not have been so lamentable if proper diligence had been used. Experience had proved, certainly, that the Bank of England gave relief, but he was far from thinking, that no relief would on that occasion have been afforded but for the Bank of England; on the contrary, he was firmly of opinion that but for the mismanaged monopoly, the lamentable and eventful circumstances to which he had alluded would never have occurred, nor the severe losses then suffered have been sustained. He therefore could not but regret, that the public were again to be subjected to an extension of that monopoly for ten or eleven years longer, and he still more regretted this, because the public were not to be benefited by the renewal of the monopoly. He was aware that many hon. Gentlemen entertained an opinion that a Government bank ought not to be established, but he was of opinion that no body of individuals could manage such an establishment like the state itself, and that Government banks might be established with as able men to conduct them as at present, and with as little trouble to the Minister for the time being, as was at present experienced, and most unquestionably at a much less expense to the nation than by the monopoly and management of the Bank of England. He complained that the people were to be deprived, for a continuance, by the Bank of England of between 600,000l. and 700,000l. per annum; and he strongly objected to the enjoyment by any individual bank of a monopoly extending sixty-five miles round the metropolis. This appeared to him to be a departure from ail the principles to the full extent of which the noble Lord had stated himself ready to go in order to free the country from such monopolies; and he was sorry to find the noble Lord had been led to acquiesce in their continuance. With reference to the bargain which had been spoken of, it seemed to him to be ridiculous that the circulation of the Bank of England paper should be forced all over the country, and that all the people should get nothing in return. True it was, that the people would have to pay for the management of the debt 120,000l instead of 248,000l., but that was the only advantage to the public. With reference to the proposition that Banknotes should be a legal tender, he could only express his opinion that it would greatly increase the dangers to be feared from a paper currency, and would eventually drive a gold circulation out of the country; for, as the law now stood, every country bank was obliged to retain a certain quantity of gold in its possession to answer the demand, equal to the circulation of its notes; but under the plan proposed that was done away with, and, therefore, whenever a run for gold might arise, it would be directed to the Bank of England and its branches, and the danger consequently increased. The plan was wholly bad, and particularly as respected the renewal of the existing Bank monopoly. He saw no reason why the business of banking should not be opened the same as any other trade, business, or occupation. The hon. member for Essex had said, that by the establishment of two rival banks evil would follow, for they would be playing tricks. He must, however, remind the hon. Member that the responsibility of each establishment, arising from publicity, would be a sufficient check, and under it no danger could be incurred. So far from entertaining any fears from publicity, he thought, on the contrary, that it would tend much to the public advantage. On the whole, however, he must protest against this system of monopoly being continued, for he was sure the time would come when it would be regretted that such an important trust as that about to be conferred should have been placed in the hands of any set of individuals.

said, that though he considered the plan developed by the noble Lord, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to be in many respects an improvement upon the present monetary system, yet he could not discover how the dangers inherent in that were to be removed. Publicity of accounts, making Bank of England paper a legal tender, and relaxing the Usury Laws with respect to Bills of Exchange, were undoubtedly improvements; but evils of the greatest magnitude remained, for which it was not even attempted to apply a remedy. Long, varied, and calamitous experience had now established the fact—that a circulating medium mainly consisting of paper money, issued by irresponsible bodies, and convertible into cash, at the option of the holders, was the most fluctuating, insecure and dangerous currency which it was possible for a great commercial country to employ. The evils of this species of currency were made manifest to a considerable extent during the crisis of 1797, which terminated in the suspension of cash-payments. It would not now be contended that the pecuniary embarrassments of that period were occasioned by the war then raging in Europe, because in 1826, when for the five preceding years there had been peace with the world, a pecuniary crisis of a still more calamitous character occurred. The panic of 1825 and 1826, occurring during a period of profound repose, with universal peace abroad and perfect tranquillity at home—that panic traceable to no external or intrinsic cause, had its source and its origin in the nature of the system itself, and in the insecurity which belonged to a paper currency, when issued at the discretion of irresponsible bodies, and convertible into cash at the option of the holder. The Bank Directors, indeed, had stated in the evidence which they gave before the Secret Committee of last year, that they had, at length, become wise in their generation, and that, instructed by past experience, they now recognised and acted upon the principles which they formerly repudiated, and that in their new-born sagacity they would avert the recurrence of the evils which had arisen to the country. But was the conduct of the Bank Directors calculated to inspire the House and country with confidence in their professions? Quite the contrary. Their new and improved rules for regulating the issues of paper, so far from imparting steadiness to the circulating medium, occasioned deep and calamitous vibrations between deficiency and excess. The Directors stated that their improved system commenced in 1827. Now, in the first place, did the official accounts submitted to the Committee of last year establish the fact, that the new system adopted by the Directors of the Bank of England in 1827, had tended to give increased steadiness and uniformity to the currency? On the 27th of January, the amount of notes in circulation was 18,300,000l.; and on the 22nd of November, in the following year, the circulation had increased to 27,012,000l, being an increase of Bank paper in circulation to the extent of one-third, or upwards of thirty per cent.; and, during December, 1831, to the first week of January, 1832, the circulation was computed at 16,400,000l. Now, these fluctuations in the amount of the circulation which had been produced under the improved principles of management, which was to give steadiness to our monetary system, had exceeded the fluctuations which took place before the improvement was adopted. Between the years 1820 and 1826, the highest circulation was 26,511,000l., and the lowest 16,304,000l. Thus the facts, as recorded by the Directors themselves, showed that the fluctuations to which the circulation was previously liable had increased. The practical rule of the Bank Directors, as stated by themselves before the Committee of last year, was, when the currency was full, as indicated by the exchanges being at par, or about to become unfavourable, to keep in their coffers bullion and coin to the extent of one-third of their liabilities. Thus when the currency was full, if there was 10,000,000l. of gold in the Bank, their liabilities would be 30,000,000l., 10,000,000l. being issued upon the deposit of gold, and 20:000,000l. upon available securities; but supposing a succession of bad harvests or other unfavourable events to reduce the deposit of gold in the Bank to 5,000l. and supposing, while only this amount of treasure remained with the Bank, the exchanges were at par, or about to become unfavourble, then, upon the rule which the Bank Directors laid down for their conduct, they would have to reduce their liabilities from 30,000,000l. to 15,000l. But if abundant harvests or other favourable circumstances should increase the supply of the metals in the Bank to 15,000,000l., and should the continuance of a favourable exchange indicate a deficient currency then on their own rule the Directors would extend their issues of paper until their liabilities became equal to 45,000,000l. Thus, under the new rule of management of the Bank Directors, the currency of the country was exposed to the deepest vitiations. He regretted that his Majesty's Government should have proposed the renewal of the Bank Charter without any essential improvement, and left the country exposed to all the calamities of an insecure and deeply fluctuating currency. The establishment of a Government Bank, issuing a fixed amount of inconvertible paper, somewhat under the wants of the country—say 29,000,000l., and compelled, over and above this fixed amount of inconvertible paper, to issue inconvertible notes in the purchase of gold at the Mint price, and to receive them back again in exchange for bullion at the same price, then would the circulating medium be exactly upon the same fooling with respect to amount and to value as if it consisted entirely of the precious metals. The proposed bargain with the Bank was most improvident, and would assuredly disappoint the just expectations of the country.

said, that it appeared to him that the hon. and gallant Member had entirely misunderstood the principles upon which the Bank proposed to act, and therefore he did not wish that the impression which such a misapprehension would create should remain unanswered. It was true that the object of the Bank would be to keep in possession of bullion to the amount of one-third of their liabilities; those liabilities included their deposits as well as the circulation. The principle which the Bank Directors professed to adopt was, to keep the amount of their securities level, and the consequence was, that when bullion was drawn out of their coffers to go abroad, the effect was to diminish the amount of the circulation; while, on the other hand, when bullion came in, of course the circulation was increased; therefore, so long as the securities remained the same, a diminution of 5,000,000l. would occasion a decrease in circulation of that amount also, and not of 15,000,000l., as had been stated by the hon. and gallant Member. The increase of the amount of bullion would also create an equivalent increase of circulation.

said, that admitting that the deposits constituted part of the liabilities of the Bank Directors, yet he maintained that it tended still more to decrease the circulation, and was another element of fluctuation.

inquired from the noble Lord, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if it was intended that the country bankers who did not issue their own paper were to be compelled to return the amount of their circulation, assets, and securities; at the same time, he begged to observe that the making a 51. Bank of England note a legal tender was no boon to the country bankers, and had not been sought for nor solicited by them.

replied, that his proposition only applied to bankers issuing their own notes; and, therefore, if a country banker did not issue notes, he could not be called upon for an account of his circulation and assets.

remarked that the noble Lord had said, that his proposition did not extend to Scotland. From this a great evil or inconvenience would arise with respect to a legal tender, particularly on the border. This inconvenience was manifested by supposing a person living in Berwick-upon-Tweed, or upon the border, who might be compelled to receive from his English debtor that which he could not tender to his Scotch creditor.

said, that in Scotland 1l. notes were in circulation, and, therefore, the making Bank-notes a legal tender would exclude a bullion circulation altogether. Admitting, as he did, that there should not be a difference made in the circulation, yet still he thought that subject would involve a difficult question with one sufficiently difficult as regarded England and Wales, without interfering with the Scotch circulation.

, as a country banker, acquitted the noble Lord of any hostility to the body of which he formed a part, yet he was not sure that the noble Lord had not unwillingly been led into a scheme which had long been cherished by the Bank Directors, of monopolizing to themselves the circulation of the country. Such a measure would be most injurious. The system of country banking had its faulty parts he admitted, but taken in the aggregate it was much better than the Bank of England, inasmuch as it presented a smaller circulation founded upon a larger basis of property. The hon. member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. John Smith) was, he admitted, a high authority upon all subjects connected with banking; but he must venture to differ from that hon. member in his opinion that the measure for making Bank-notes a legal tender would prevent panics; on the contrary, he thought its tendency would be to increase their frequency and extent. The country bankers being released from the obligation now imposed on them of keeping a store of gold, whenever a demand for that article arose in the country, whether from political discredit or any other cause, there would be a simultaneous application for it from all the country banks to the Bank of England, which would thus be exposed to most severe and sudden drains. The Committee would recollect that it was an operation of this kind which caused the panic of 1825, and if this measure were adopted, he anticipated a repetition of such events. Indeed, so impressed was he with the conviction that people in the country districts would prefer paper directly convertible into gold, to that which was indirectly convertible, that he should think it would be the policy of country bankers, notwithstanding their protection from payment in gold by law, to issue notes which should express on the face of them that they would be paid in gold; and such notes he was inclined to think, would soon obtain pre-eminence over those of the Bank of England.

wished as briefly as he could, to bring the case of the West-India planters before the Committee, and he trusted the Committee would, on such a momentous subject, give him a patient hearing. He was most ready to admit that the time for emancipating the negroes had arrived—the only question was the manner and mode of doing it. This was a most important subject, implicating not only the property, but the lives of the white population of the West-India islands. Hon. Members ought to adjudicate on the plan of the right hon. Secretary, as if they were the Judges and the Jury. He would not say, that the Jury had been packed by the accusers of the planters, but everybody knew that the most powerful exertions were made at the last election, to prevent planters having seats in that House; and it became the duty of independent Members to see that justice was done to the accused. It could not be denied that the people of England, who had poured in countless petitions, entertained a strong feeling on the subject of slavery: it had been urged on the attention of the Government, by the large, respectable, and powerful party, called the Anti-Slavery Society, composed principally of persons dissenting from the Church of England. The Government had thought proper to take nearly the same view of this national question as that very influential party. He was one of a body of men personally interested in the settlement of this question which deeply affected the property of persons resident in England, and the lives of the white inhabitants of the colonies. In his observations, however, he would carefully endeavour to pass by all irritating and unpleasant topics, and although he might feel excited, he would attempt to urge the rights of the planters in a tone as conciliatory as the slanders heaped upon them would permit. He would begin by denying the right of the Parliament of Great Britain to legislate for the internal regulation or taxation of the colonies which had Local Legislatures. The laws of Great Britain had ever recognised, and had never taken away, the right which Jamaica acquired by charter to an independent legislature. The inhabitants of that island would insist that the Legislature of England had no right to pass a law to bind them; and they would not receive it. If they were bound to submit to that jurisdiction, they ought to be convinced by reason and argument, and not by force. The right hon. Secretary for the Colonies endeavoured to convince the House that it had the right to pass this measure, on the ground that whenever a power had been delegated by a legislature it could be resumed at any time. The right hon. Gentleman assumed that the Parliament did delegate; whereas the House never had the opportunity of delegating such power to any of the colonies. The legislature of Jamaica sprang, by charter, from the King, without the knowledge, consent, or approbation of the Parliament of England. He challenged any lawyer, in or out of the House, to show any act of delegation, or any authority for delegation. That the Parliament of Great Britain had the right to enforce this law on the Assembly of Jamaica, for the internal regulation of that island, had been supported by the right hon. Gentleman, on two Acts of Parliament; and the right hon. Gentleman said, that the Assembly of Jamaica had, by acting on those statutes, admitted the right. The right hon. Gentleman first referred the 11th and 12th William 3rd, chap. 7, for the more effectual suppression of piracy. But that Act never was admitted into the island of Jamaica, and never was attempted to be enforced there. It did not supersede any colonial tribunals in islands having legislative assemblies, nor apply to the colonies having charters in the nature of civil corporations. It would be a very good argument if a single instance could be quoted of an Act of Parliament acted upon in Jamaica, without having previously received the sanction of the local legislature. There was not one. The island of Jamaica had a Court of Admiralty before the time of that Act, and had continued that Court without ever recognizing the statute. The other Act the right hon. Gentleman referred to, was 5th Geo. 2nd c. 7., by which persons resident in England were quieted as to the fears which were entertained, whether their mortgages on property in the colony were legal on ac-count of the high rate of interest taken by them. The right hon. Gentleman forgot to say, that this Act of Parliament had been repealed as to the negroes; and he should have observed, that it was not passed for the purpose of interfering with property in Jamaica, but to protect the British merchants from the effect of the usury laws of this country. The legal rate of interest in Jamaica was six per cent, and the only object of that Act was to protect the merchants in advancing money at the legal rate of interest in Jamaica. Before that Act of the English Parliament there was a law of Jamaica, making negroes assets for the payment of debts, and they continued to be assets after that Act was repealed. "But, then," said the right hon. Gentleman, "I will give you the opinion of a distinguished authority on this subject," and the right hon Gentleman referred to Mr. Otis an American gentleman, but he (Mr. Godson) could show by the conduct of that gentleman, during the whole of his political life, that the right hon. Gentleman had been mistaken as to his opinions. He would read to the House an extract from an account of some proceedings at Boston, dated the 8th of May, 1770. Mr. Otis having retired to the country for the recovery of his health, it was voted—" That the thanks of the town be given to the hon. James Otis, for the great and important services which, as a representative in the General Assembly through a course of years, he has rendered to this town and province; particularly for his undaunted exertions in the common cause of the colonies, from the beginning of the present glorious struggle for the rights of the British Constitution, &c." In 1764, Mr. Otis said, "When the Parliament of Great Britain shall think fit to allow the colonists a representation in the House of Commons, the equity of their taxing the colonists will be as clear as their power is, at present, of doing it if they please." Did the right hon. Gentleman think, that by defending the rights conferred by the British Constitution, Mr. Otis meant that this Parliament possessed the right to make laws for the state of Massachusetts? All the acts of Mr. Otis's life, showed that he exerted himself to the utmost, in defence of the independence of the Colonial legislatures. He began public life by a speech against the "writs of assistance," which drew forth an eulogium from President Adams, in which Mr. Otis observed, that neither" King James nor King Charles could be supposed to intend that Parliament, which they both hated more than they did the Pope or the French king, should share with them in the government of colonies instituted by their royal prerogative." Mr. Otis was the first to resist the principles now attributed to him. He resisted, not only by state papers, but by bayonets; and such was the authority upon which the right hon. Gentleman relied, to justify an interference in the internal affairs of Jamaica. The right hon. Gentleman also referred to what Mr. Canning bad said, namely—" that the interference of this country might be imperiously called for; and that it required the greatest possible case of necessity to justify such an exertion of power—that there was an ultimate power in the parent state, which was an arcanum imperii not to be disclosed, but when strong necessity required." But that was a gratuitous assertion of Mr. Canning, unsupported by authority or practice. It was the tyrant's plea; and would justify the exercise of uncontrolled and irresponsible power. The right hon. Secretary called on those who supported the proposition that the Parliament had not the power and the right, to point out the laws which prevented such interference. He would show, both by the charters granted to the colonies, by Acts of Parliament, and by an opinion of the Judges, that the view which he had taken of the case was correct. He would confine himself to the island of Jamaica, as he was anxious not to distract the attention of hon. Gentlemen. Jamaica was taken from the Spaniards in the time of Oliver Cromwell, who never condescended to ask Parliament for a constitution for that colony. By the 7th article of the treaty signed at Madrid in June, 1670, the king of Spain ceded that island to the King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors, for ever, with full right of sovereignty. Charles 2nd had not such love for Parliaments, as to induce him to come down with a request of the kind. By a proclamation in 1661, he made all the inhabitants of Jamaica free denizens of England; and he afterwards granted his royal charter to Jamaica, which was framed upon the report of Lord Chief Justice North. By that charter an authority was granted "to the governor of the island to summon general assemblies of the freeholders and planters within the island, to be called the General Assembly of Jamaica, who should have power with the advice of the Governor and his Council, to make, constitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public peace, welfare, and good government of the island, and of the people and inhabitants thereof, and such other as shall resort thereto, and for the benefit of our heirs and successors;" which laws, statutes, and ordinances were to be "(as near as convenient may be) agreeable to the laws and statutes of the kingdom of England." It was provided that the acts of the Assembly should be sent to England for the approval of the King; and the Governor had the power of a veto. The approval of the acts of the General Assembly of Jamaica, was to be signified, not by the English Parliament, but by the King alone. Like all other legislative assemblies, the Assembly of Jamaica emanated from the King's prerogative, and flowed from the same fountain as the Parliament of England. Hon. Gentlemen were too well acquainted with the character of Charles 2nd, not to know that be attempted to obtain money in all sorts of ways. He made an experiment upon Jamaica, but failed. A similar attempt, equally unsuccessful, was renewed in the reign of Queen Anne, to obtain a fixed revenue from the Assembly of Jamaica. This body resisted; and although laws were sent out for their adoption, the Legislature of Jamaica would not yield. The Earl of Carlisle desired that the Assembly should give their consent to the laws which he had brought with him, without the power of objecting to, or the liberty of examining, any part of them. No threat was left untried, no persuasion neglected, no art omitted, which might induce the members to bend their necks beneath the yoke. They successfully resisted, and thus established their Magna Charta. The men of Jamaica know their rights now as well as they did then. In 1703, the Governor of the island renewed the demand for a permanent revenue, but the Assembly stoutly resisted the attempt, and carried their opposition so far as to prevent the landing of troops, and they refused to yield or to grant supplies, till the Governor admitted that the English Parliament had no power to enforce bills in Jamaica. This admission he was compelled to make. During the struggle, the Legislature of Jamaica was several times prorogued and dissolved; but they continued firm to their purpose. On one occasion, the opinion of the Judges was requested by the King, whether, by his Majesty's letter, proclamation, or commission, his Majesty had excluded himself from the power of establishing laws in Jamaica; and the Judges returned an answer establishing the independence of Jamaica. This colony then, had long been in the possession of a charter, and the inhabitants had resisted the attempts of the Crown to infringe on their rights. There was an opinion of the Judges in favour of the charter, which hitherto had been respected by this country. The King, by means of the Governor, had his veto; and such was the similarity of the Constitution of Jamaica to that of England, that the House of Assembly at Jamaica would not allow a Money Bill to pass which had not originated in their House. He had examined the question as if it were some general internal regulation, but he was prepared to show that it was in truth, a tax on the West-India planters. It was proposed that the master should employ his slave for seven hours and a half a day, and for which he should provide him with food, clothing, and lodging. That was fixing the rate of wages. The act of 18th George 3rd applied to that case, by which the Government of Great Britain gave up all right and power to tax her colonies. He was anxious not to be misunderstood—he did not urge this argument with a wish to hinder or prevent emancipation; but he placed these facts and reasons before the House, because it was fitting the House should know in what light the question would be received in Jamaica. The Assembly of that island would not tamely resign its rights. He wished to point out to the House the consequences of adopting the plan of Government, and to show that the power which they were called upon to exercise they did not possess. Did the House not having the right, intend to exercise the power, and raise up the opposition of the Assembly of Jamaica? He came to the plain question whether the slaves were property or not?—whether the possessions in the West-India islands were property or not? The right hon. Secretary spoke as if he considered the slaves to be property, but an influential party, who had many able advocates in that House, had stated that slaves were not property. The planters and inhabitants of Jamaica considered that they were property. Some parts of the possessions were, undoubtedly, property. Steam-engines, buildings, houses, were still property in Jamaica; and had the House a right to take away those adjuncts which it had forced upon the inhabitants of Jamaica, and which now alone made those things, admitted to be property in England, valuable as property in Jamaica? If so, the Jamaica man had a right to say, "If you take from me that which makes my property valuable, you ought, at least, to give me compensation." The planters of Jamaica could say that the evil complained of did not originate with them; that, from the time of the first monopoly of the slave-trade, in 1662, down to the present period, the Parliament had by its own acts, admitted that there had been something attached to an estate in the West-Indies, considered to have all the attributes of property. But, independently of Acts of Parliament, he would also refer to the opinions which had been expressed by the Judges upon the subject. In 1689, ten of the Judges, in reply to a demand from the King in Council, said, "In pursuance of your Majesty's Order in Council, we do most humbly certify our opinion to be, that negroes are merchandize." Here, then, was the opinion of the Judges of the land, deliberately expressed by Chief Justice Holt, and nine other Judges of that day, and the Committee could not come to a right conclusion upon this question, unless it took into consideration what the people of Jamaica might think of it. In 1760, the planters wished to stop the importation of slaves, and were proceeding to take measures to obtain that end; but Great Britain interfered, declaring that she would not suffer the colonies to put aside a traffic which was so generally lucrative to the empire. The mother country had by her acts forced upon the colonies that species of possession which it was now said to be a crime for them to retain. If it were a crime, those who forced the colonists to commit it must be as guilty as the colonists themselves. The Statute, too, of 5th George 2nd, so confidently referred to by the right hon. Secretary, as showing that Great Britain had the right to interfere in the internal legislature of the colonies, declared, that the negro might be made the subject of mortgage. If that Act of Parliament, then, were good for any thing it went to prove the validity of his case. The right hon. Gentleman would not surely contend that an Act of Parliament, good for one purpose, must, necessarily, be bad for another. The right hon. Secretary could not say, that this Statute proved the right of the British Legislature to interfere in the internal government of the colonies, without at the same time, admitting that it proved, that in the estimation of the Parliament at home, the negro had been considered the property of the planter, and made a legitimate subject of mortgage. He would refer to only one more Act of Parliament from among the many which supported his view of the question, and this was the 46th George 3rd, c. 157, in which it was enacted "that the slaves, and negroes, and stock, and cattle, and plantation tools which have been in the Crown before, shall be given to the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury for the time being, or to any three or more of them as he should be pleased to appoint, to be held in trust for his Majesty, his heirs, and successors." In this Act of Parliament, then, slaves were placed in trust under the King himself. Thus the slave-trade began with a monopoly to one of the Queens; and finally, this Act of Parliament invested the King himself with a property in negroes. And was not that an excuse for the people in Jamaica to consider the negroes upon their estates as a part of their property? Was it not an excuse for the comparatively illiterate planter considering that property which the United Parliament of England declared should be vested in the Commissioners of the Treasury for the benefit of his Majesty? Although this argument might, perhaps, convince the minds of persons who were not determined to prejudge the question—he did not expect that his or any other person's arguments would draw such an admission from the House. One hon. Gentleman who had spoken last night, in favour of the proposition of the right hon. Secretary, said: "Prove to me by all the laws of the world—prove to me by all the Acts of Parliament—by all the opinions of the Judges—that slavery has hitherto existed, and hitherto been sanctioned—still I contend, that it was wrong in the beginning, wrong in the continuance, and will be wrong lo the end." He was ready to adopt that sentiment; but he would ask them as men of sense—as men of intelligence—as men acquainted with the affairs of human nature—to say whether, having given to this species of possession every attribute—every essential quality by which other property was surrounded—it did not become them, in removing it from its present possessors, to effect that removal with honour and honesty? He had no objection to their retracing their steps, but he must maintain that they, who had inflicted a wrong upon one part of their fellow-creatures, had no right to call upon others to expiate their offence. Supposing it true the slave was not accurately the property of the master—still in depriving the planter of what he had originally paid for, and, therefore, considered his legitimate property, it was only just in them who deprived hit" of it to grant him a reasonable compensation. In the case of Dominica, where the Crown was actually paid for the land, a petition had been presented in the other House of Parliament in which the purchasers expressed their determination to resign the whole, if measures of this kind were to be put into force. Let them see the benefit this country had derived from the existence of the present system. The annual amount of the Custom-duties imposed upon the West-India produce imported was between 5,000,000l. and 6,000,000l. The annual amount of the exports of home manufactures to the West-India colonies, was between 4,000,000l. and 5,000,000l. Besides this, the ships employed in the trade between England and the West-Indies amounted to 9,500; the aggregate amount of their tonnage being no less than 260,000 tons. These were the profits which England had derived from her colonists possessing the "shameless property." Did not the British Government, too, in all its contracts with the United States of America, force Jamaica to take all her supplies, either directly from this country, or from some of its colonial possessions? If Jamaica wished to procure timber or corn from the United States, where it might be obtained with great advantage—did not England say, "No; we must support Canada—you must go to Canada for your timber or corn? If Jamaica wanted fish, was she not compelled to resort to Newfoundland? If she wanted salt provisions, could she obtain them unless from Ireland, although the United States of America would have supplied her at a cheaper rate. She must have her herrings from Scotland, and her hardware from England. Jamaica dared not refine her sugar in the island, because the freight would be less, and the refiners at home injured. Her rum was not allowed to disturb the profits on whiskey, and her molasses must not interfere with the breweries. In short both abroad and at home, Britain had always taken advantage of this shameless property to procure a benefit to herself. The two great principles developed in the plan of the right hon. Secretary were first, that the labour of the negro should be limited to seven hours and a-half a day, for which he was to receive the usual allowances of food and raiment, and be entitled to his house and land; and, secondly, that at the end of twelve years from the present period he should be free. He would declare, that he was ready to vote for immediate emancipation, and indeed that part of the right hon. Secretary's plan which proposed only a complete emancipation after the lapse of twelve years, met with the approbation of very few Members of this House. By the proposed plan, no class of negroes would be really free, not even the newborn infant. As long as the mother, who was to take care of her child, continued to labour for seven hours and a-half a-day, she could not attend to it after the first two years of its existence. As long as the mother was nursing it, of course care would be taken of it, but the child being free who was to provide for it afterwards? The mother for twelve years to come would continue to work as a slave for seven hours and a-half a day; who, then, was to take care of the child during those hours, after it was two years old? By the Resolutions which the right hon. Gentleman had moved, all negroes for the future were to be called apprentices; but, though free in name—they would, in point of fact, for the next twelve years, be slaves. This was one of the worst parts of the plan; and it would be much better to declare that, at some certain time—as short as possible—negroes of all descriptions, the old, the young, the active, and the infirm should be free. Fix some definite period—say Christmas-day next year—only so distant as to enable the colonists to prepare for the change. Every person who had any knowledge on the subject had declared that it would be impossible to retain the negro in a situation partially free, and partially in the nature of slavery; and that it would be much better for Government at once to emancipate him, but under such regulations as should seem best calculated to render him a good member of society. He had very strong objections to the stipendiary Magistrates, whom it was proposed to appoint with the view of enforcing the regulations contained in these Resolutions. They were to be sent out from this country, and have no connexion with the colonies. In that case, at least 4,000 would be necessary. A little court of session would be required in every parish in the colonies. Or if it were said, that it was only intended to send out a few stipendiary Magistrates, then for what purpose was every obloquy heaped upon the present Magistrates of Jamaica? Why was their conduct described in terms which would prevent every man of honour from acting in the capacity of a Magistrate? First Ministers induced the House to believe that the Magistrates of the colonies were not to be trusted; and then because they were not prepared to send out 4,000 stipendiary Magistrates—they said they believed the resident Magistrates would enforce their views. That part of the plan could never be acted upon. It was proposed that 15,000,000l. should be advanced to the colonies to compensate them for trying this (as the right hon. Secretary called it)" mighty experiment." That sum was not sufficient to produce the effect desired. It would not afford a compensation for the difference in the cost of cultivating an unencumbered estate; and in the case of estates which were heavily encumbered with mortgages and other charges, it could not be considered any compensation at all. As a national question in which light Ministers seemed anxious to regard it—it would establish a principle which it would be impossible not to have applied in other circumstances. When the full grown negro was told "Seven hours and a half a-day is the whole time that you ought to labour," a principle was established which might be applied to the free labourers of this country. In point of fact, every mechanic, every weaver, every spinner, was thus told, that for seven hours and a-half labour per day, he was entitled to a house and garden rent-free, and to food and raiment, and this at the time when it was in contemplation to make ten hours a-day the maximum of the labour of infants! It was also proposed, that the negro, when raised to a state of freedom, should sit upon Juries, and serve in the militia. After the late rebellion in Jamaica, the wisdom or the policy of giving him the latter privilege seemed doubtful. By placing arms in the hands of those who had so recently escaped from bondage, the safety and peace of the colonies would be endangered. One class of persons had not been contemplated in this plan, and for their losses no provision was made. What was to become of the white population of the colonies, who were not the owners of slaves, but who derived the means of existence from superintending or managing them upon the different estates. It might, perhaps, be said, that these persons must take their chance, as they were not the actual possessors of any of this species of property; but still, ill a plan of this kind, Ministers ought to consider the effect that would be produced upon them. The principal part of the revenue of Jamaica was derived from a poll-tax levied upon the negroes. If they were all to be made free, in what manner was this tax to be raised? The moment that these Resolutions became an Act of Parliament, that tax would cease. What must be the consequence? Had Ministers considered that there was such a thing as Government paper-money in the colonies—that public credit had to be supported there as well as at home? If the negroes were to be paid in money, there must be a very extensive silver coinage; for all the silver at present in Jamaica would not be sufficient to pay two weeks' wages to the emancipated negroes. Unless the planters themselves, as the parties interested, were consulted, and induced to support the Government plan, it would be impossible that it could be carried into execution. It would have been prudent, therefore, in the right hon. Secretary, not to have heaped so much obloquy upon the planters and the local authorities in the West Indies. It was true the right hon. Gentleman had a difficult task to perform; because, on the one hand, he had to prove that the planters had behaved in such a manner towards their slaves as to render it necessary for the Legislature at home to interfere for their protection; and, on the other hand, it was necessary that he should so carefully express himself as not to offend the prejudices of the planters. However well the right hon. Gentleman might have acquitted himself of the first part of his task, he had completely failed in the second—for his manner must irritate the resident planters of the colonies; and without their concurrence, mere passive resistance on their parts would be sufficient to prevent any plan from being carried into effect. The right hon. Secretary had not made out his case against the West-India planters in that candid manner which was to be expected from him. He appeared rather as the counsel of the prosecutor, than the calm, impartial, and unprejudiced Secretary of State. The West-India planters having been brought before the public, and the Bar of that House, by the vehement speech of the right hon. Secretary, it became necessary, before a decision be given, that some defence of their conduct should be made. The hon. member for Lancaster had, last evening, read several extracts from the communications of different Secretaries for the Colonies, with the Local Assemblies of the West-India islands. He (Mr. Godson) would read one of later date than any which were cited by that hon. Member. It was contained in a communication made by Sir George Murray to the Governor of Jamaica in 1830; in these terms:—" Your Lordship will convey to the Council and Assembly of Jamaica, the reiterated assurance of the most anxious desire on the part of his Majesty to co-operate with them in effecting those improvements in the slave code, which they have so repeatedly sanctioned by their recent enactments." Yet, with that document in his possession, the right hon. Secretary asserted in his speech, that, since the year 1823, the planters had done nothing to promote the views of the Legislature at home. On the contrary, every Colonial Secretary, from the very period that the right hon. Gentleman alluded to, down to the present time, had mentioned in his despatches to the several West-India islands, the satisfaction of the Government at the progress which the local legislatures of the islands were making in the advancement of the views of the mother country! It was true the colonies had not gone so far as was wished with respect to religious instruction. The Legislative Assembly of Jamaica, in 1802, had passed, an Act, by which they confined the ministry of the Gospel to the Church of England. He condemned that Act as much as any man could do. The colonists had omitted to grant religious liberty; but that was their only wrong. As far as regarded the improvement of the negro, and the modification of his condition as a slave, the colonists had acted up to the instructions and wishes of the mother country. The hon. Baronet, the member for Bristol, had gone through a number of cases, and must have convinced the House that the right hon. Gentleman was completely mistaken. In Jamaica, a great number of manumissions had, of late years, taken place. They amounted to 14,000 at least, for many occurred of which no register was kept. And was it to be made a charge against Jamaica, that its law with respect to evidence was not perfect? At the present moment there lay upon the Table of that House various Acts of Parliament to amend and improve the laws, and among them, one to improve the law of evidence in England. Could it, then, be made a serious charge against Jamaica, that she had not perfected that which had engaged the wisdom of the British senate for ages? He did not believe that there had been such instances as those mentioned or insinuated by the right hon. Secretary, of the separation of slaves. Every planter—every gentleman connected with the colonies—uniformly denied, that the practice had ever been put in force, except by legal process; and the nature of that process was such as to confine the possibility of the separation of a negro family to a very few particular instances. Savings' banks, he must mention, had been instituted in Jamaica. One was established at Montego shortly after the recommendation from the British Government was received; but not a negro would deposit anything in it. They were not accustomed to the institution, and did not know, that money, lent out, would produce them money again. The planters, then, had been calumniated and misrepresented. A Savings' bank had been instituted in Jamaica; and it failed from no fault of its founders. The most serious charge made by the right hon. Secretary against the planters, was, that the decrease in the number of the negroes in the several colonies was always in proportion to the increase of the quantity of sugar. The hon. member for Lancaster, in his able speech of last evening, had clearly and distinctly proved, that with respect to Demerara, the right hon. Secretary's calculations were founded on erroneous data, and were totally incorrect. In a pamphlet published by a very able accountant, who took as the basis of his calculations all the figures previously published by the hon. member for Weymouth, it appeared to be very satisfactorily proved—that the decrease in the number of negroes upon an estate always continued as long as there was a certain excess of the male over the female population; and that, when that excess became small in proportion to the whole population, a certain increase in the population was the result. It was clear, therefore, that the decrease in the black population of the colonies was not consequent upon the increase of labour. The charge which the right hon. Secretary had made against the colonies upon this point was one which every person in England must have heard with pain; and he was sure every planter in the West Indies would receive with indignation. Was it true that the planters of Jamaica had obtained an increased production of sugar, by working the negro to death? That was the charge made against them; and either it was true, or it was not true. That argument, if not used by the right hon. Secretary, had been used by some others who had taken part in the debate. The West-India proprietors denied the charge. They admitted, that there had been a decrease in the amount of the population; but that circumstance was accounted for by the disproportionate number of the male and female population. By the pamphlet he had just referred to, it would be found that in all the different colonies, the increase in the population had taken place, as the number of females had preponderated over that of the males; and, on the contrary, the decrease in the population had been proportionate to the excess of males. In 1823, the excess of females above males, at Barbadoes, amounted to 6,498, and in 1829, it amounted to 6,520; and the population, from 1823 to 1829, increased from 78,816 to 81,902. In the parish of Portland, in Jamaica, at first there was a great excess of males, but afterwards of females. In the island of Jamaica, in 1829, there was an excess of females of 5,913 above the males; a number so great, that the time must be at hand when there would be an increase of the whole population. The right hon. Secretary had also stated, that the diminished value of West-India property was not owing to the agitation of the slave question in this country. The right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to prove, that the West-India colonies had been in a state of equal distress at former periods. He stated, that in the year 1804, there was presented to this House a petition from Jamaica, showing, that great distress existed at that time, and declaring, that unless some immediate relief were extended to the colonies, the ruin of the planters must irretrievably follow. "This," said the right hon. Gentleman, with an air of triumph,—" this was in the palmy days of the slave-trade. At that time the planters, he said, declared, that their estates were good for nothing; and therefore, if they were good for nothing in 1833, there could be no reason for attributing the loss in their value to the agitation of the slave question. But the right hon. Secretary omitted this fact, that the Parliament of England, at the time that the colonists complained in 1804, had recently interdicted the intercourse between Jamaica and the United States of America. The inhabitants were alarmed lest that interdiction should bring a famine similar to that which had swept away 15,000 negroes; and an intercourse so beneficial to the colonists having been interdicted by the British Legislature, was it not natural that they should petition, and say, we are ruined—it is impossible that we can go on—your measures of foreign policy oppress us; we, therefore, call upon you for assistance. It may be good for the community at home that you should cut off the communication between us and the United States, but it occasions to us great injury, and we therefore pray for assistance." By the omission of that fact, the right hon. Gentleman obtained an applause from the House which would have been withheld had he stated the whole case. But the right hon. Gentleman's argument upon this point was shallow and inconclusive; because there was distress without any agitation of the slave-trade in 1804, he jumped to the conclusion, that, after a ten years' agitation of the slave question in 1833, the former was in no respect, and in no degree, to be attributed to the latter. Without dwelling upon the various causes by which the value of land was affected, this was the fact upon which he relied for a complete refutation of the argument advanced by the right hon. Secretary—namely, that since the year 1823, estates in the West-Indies had not been saleable; the produce of the estate had found a market, but the estate itself had been as if it were without a title. In 1804, the value of the produce of those estates was destroyed; but, in 1823, agitation made the estates themselves valueless. He had hitherto referred to Jamaica; but he would now call the attention of the House to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, in reference to some of the other islands;—and first with respect to Barbadoes. The right hon. Gentleman asserted, that in no one island had the law of evidence been placed upon the same footing as in England. He had been requested by the agent from Barbadoes to deny the correctness of that assertion, as far as regarded the island with which he was connected. The Legislative Assembly of Barbadoes, in pursuance of the recommendations which were sent out from the Government of this country, passed an Act, by which they provided, that the evidence of negroes should from that time be taken in the same form, and be subject only to the same rules and regulations as all other classes of his Majesty's subjects in that island. Another of the charges against the colonies was, that they had refused to appoint protectors of slaves. This, again, was incorrect with regard to Barbadoes; for in that island, the Local Legislature enacted, that the Speaker of the Assembly, the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and the Attorney General, should be considered as constituting a Committee for the protection of slaves. It was further provided, that those three functionaries should have the power of appointing a secretary, who should be considered as the acting protector of slaves. The right hon. Gentleman would have acted more candidly, if he had not invariably taken extreme eases as a test and sample of the system. While he pointed out delinquencies, he entirely overlooked the meritorious exertions of those colonies which had done their duty. For the sake of producing an effect, and of gaining the applause of the House, he collected together all the faults of the worst colonies, and spoke of them as common occurrences, even in the best. That was most unfair. As to compensation, he would assert that the 15,000,000l. which had been mentioned would not be sufficient to compensate the planters for giving up all their rights. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of the colonies as if it were almost a matter of indifference whether we retained them or not; and it had been urged, again and again, that if the whole of our West-India colonies were taken from us, we should still get a sufficient supply of sugar. But this country wished to have the market here supplied with sugar, the produce of free labour. If, after losing the West Indies, we depended for our supply of sugar upon the produce of other countries, would the object so anxiously desired be accomplished? Where were we to obtain sugar, the produce of free labour? From Brazil? No. From Cuba? No. From the French colonies? No. Slavery existed in them all. Those, therefore, who were anxious to have sugar produced by free labour, must have a strong interest in keeping up our own colonies, because it was to them alone that they could look for the accomplishment of that great and desirable object. [Question! question!] He requested the House to listen, at least with the semblance of a decent attention, to his statements, after they had paid so much attention to the arguments on the other side. He was about to state, that the colonies of this country ought to be kept in such a state, that, by being worked, they might be of value; and it was impossible they could be made of value, unless there were in them a number of resident planters, which the new plan certainly would not encourage. The plan itself did not contain that "executory principle" of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke, and which, he said, was so essential to it. Ministers had injured their plan, by excluding the Legislative Assembly, and the Magistrates of the islands, from any participation in its execution, and, in his opinion, a little addition of money would have the effect of procuring their concurrence. His proposition for the expenditure of a considerable sum of money could certainly not be very palatable to the House at the present moment. The right hon. Secretary had stated, that the decrease of the duty on sugar, from 27s. to 24s. per cent, had not benefited the consumer, and that, if the 3s. per cwt. were again put on, the consumer would not suffer. This additional 3s. would produce to the country a revenue of 600,000l.; and 1d. a pound in coffee, would produce 100,000l. more. If the consumer did not suffer by thus raising the revenue upon the production of the West Indies, could there be any harm, anything wrong, in endeavouring to conciliate all the parties, by giving such a sum of money, as the additional 700,000l. should be the interest of? If the taxation upon the West Indies were increased to the amount of 700,000l., Government might afford to give them a sum, of which the 700,000l. should be the interest, at three per cent. That sum would be 20,000,000l.; and it ought to be given to the West-India planters, as a compensation for the loss which they would sustain, and as an inducement to them not to resist a law, which, but for some aid of this kind, must involve them in utter ruin. The resolution with which he would conclude, embraced four distinct propositions—first, it would grant immediate emancipation to the negro; secondly, it would enable the resolutions of Ministers to work in practice, by conciliating the prejudices of the planters; thirdly, it would provide a fund for the raising of a capital of 20,000,000l., which ought to be paid to the colonists as a compensation; and, fourthly, it would pledge the House to lend 10,000,000l. to the planters, on the security of the colonies themselves. Those who had been so anxious for emancipation, who desired that the slave should be immediately free, should vote for his resolution, because, by it, emancipation would be given at once. In the midst of all the difficulties, all the troubles, and all the dangers of this subject, would the House, for a comparatively inconsiderable sum of money, sell, not only the honour of Great Britain (as far as the West Indies were concerned), but teach a lesson to the other colonies, that no reliance was to be placed on the faith of the Mother Country? He should base the resolution which would contain the four propositions he had stated, upon the two plans which had been laid before the House—the one by the right hon. Secretary, the other by the noble Lord, the member for Northumberland. He, therefore, begged leave to move an amendment to the first resolution. It followed the Resolution verbatim to the end, and then introduced an addition to it. He would move, 'that it is the opinion of this Committee, that immediate measures be taken for the entire abolition of slavery throughout the colonies, with the concurrence and assistance of the local legislatures and authorities; and that, in consideration thereof, his Majesty be enabled to grant the sum of 20,000,000l. sterling to the proprietors in his colonial possessions, according to the number of slaves belonging to each proprietor; and that his Majesty be further enabled to advance, by way of loan, the sum of 10,000,000l. sterling to the local legislatures of each colony for that purpose; such loan to be repaid in such manner, and at such rate of interest, as shall be prescribed by Parliament.'

said, that it was with no small degree of surprise he had heard the right of the British Legislature to legislate on this subject for the colonies questioned in that House. The right of the British Legislature had repeatedly been asserted in different Statutes of the British Parliament, had been repeatedly recognized by the Colonial Legislatures, and uniformly admitted by all the great lawyers who had ever discussed the subject. The rights of the British Legislature had never been abandoned by any act of their own, except in the case of internal taxation. Both in Acts of Parliament and in Acts of the Colonial Legislature, the right of the English Parliament to legislate for the colonies had been directly asserted, and indirectly admitted. The opinion even of Mr. Burge supported this doctrine; for that gentleman, with no view to diminish the authority of Colonial Legislatures, had distinctly admitted the right of the British Parliament. In his evidence upon the right of the Colonial Assemblies, he said, "the common law of England prevails in this colony, except in those cases in which it has been altered by the Acts of Assembly here. But British Statutes, passed since the acquisition of the island, are not in force in this colony, unless in express terms they have been extended to the colony"—a statement which distinctly admitted, that if these Statutes were expressly extended to the colonies they would be in force there. The right to legislate seemed to him most clearly established. The next point to be considered, therefore, was—upon whom the expense of this emancipation of the slaves was to fall. He thought that the guilt of the origin and continuance of the odious system of slavery was divided between the Legislature and the planters. As there had been a common guilt, he thought there ought to be a common reparation. He despised that cheap humanity which was willing to do justice at the expense of others, but was unwilling to do it if it cost anything. He therefore supported the plan for the gradual abolition of slavery; but he must say, that he was opposed to that total change which was recommended by those who advocated the immediate abolition of slavery. There was no pressing occasion for it; and there was every reason to shun it, on account of the danger which must inevitably ensue from the adoption of such a measure. He feared, if the Parliament did not agree with the proposition for making a change in the condition of the negro, that we should have to regret the loss of our colonies. Let the House take warning by the case of St. Domingo, which, in 1789, produced a revenue of 6,000,000l. a-year to France. Not only was emancipation refused, but the most rigorous decrees were made, and attempted to be enforced against the negroes; and the result was, that the island was lost. A Society called Les Amis des Noirs had, in the first instance, with the purest motives, instilled into the negroes feelings that made them desire freedom. Among that Society were men of the highest prudence, as well as virtue and honour, and they would carefully have avoided doing anything that might be likely to drive the negroes into rebellion. But the general members of that Society acted differently, and then, what with the passing of severe decrees, and the revocation of them, the effort to oppress, and the contempt excited by the futility of that effort, the colonists were driven into rebellion, and the colony was lost. Any plan for making a decided, but gradual, alteration in the condition of the slaves, should have his support; and he again warned the House, that the example of St. Domingo was an instance of what might be expected if the amelioration of the condition of the slave, and the means of making him free were longer refused. The great object of all parties seemed to him to be, to stimulate the labour of the slave. Having that object in view, he could not but admire that part of the right hon. Gentleman's proposition, which not only allowed, but would induce, the slave to work out, day by day, his own emancipation. Under these circumstances, he should give his support to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman.

rose amidst confusion, and said, that if he had been in the habit of frequently addressing the House, or when addressing it, of trespassing on its time at any great length, there might be some reason for those symptoms of impatience; but the House, he was sure, would do him the justice to recollect, that he was the only Member who had yet proposed to limit the length of hon. Gentlemen's speeches, and bring them all within a moderate compass: and though his proposition had not been adopted, and a great waste of the public time had consequently been allowed to take place, yet he considered himself under a tacit pledge to enforce his precept by example, and to prove the sincerity of his advice by practising himself the conduct he would recommend to others. In the lateness of the hour, he should feel an additional reason for condensation and brevity; but, as he intended to touch on a branch of the question hitherto undebated, and to show the preference of an immediate, over a gradual, abolition of slavery, he trusted that he might have the ear of the House for the short period to which he would confine his claims on their attention. When the Government plan was so ably and fully developed by the right hon. the Secretary for the Colonies, he felt that there were many parts of it extremely objectionable; and, if he had had an opportunity, at an earlier period of the debate, to have explained the grounds of this feeling, he would have done so at some length. But, for the present, he would content himself with saying, that the two principal features to which he should object were these—namely, the protraction of the period of emancipation to twelve years, and the making the negro pay, by a portion of his daily labour, during that time, for a liberty which ought never to have been taken from him, and which should be restored to him instantly and without cost. The latter part of the plan, he rejoiced to find, was to be given up; and seeing that the Ministers had thus yielded to the popular opinion, in abandoning that part of their scheme, he confidently hoped that, by the Amendment he should propose, and the discussion to which it would give rise, they might also be induced to relinquish the other part of the plan, and give freedom to the slave in the shortest possible period of time, instead of continuing his bondage for so long a period as that originally contemplated. It was in this hope, at least, that he had framed his Amendment; and in this hope he would persevere with it to the end. He would not go over the ground already so fully occupied by the hon. member for Bristol (Sir R. Vyvyan), on a former evening, and by the hon. members for Kidderminster and Banbury (Mr. Godson and Mr. Tancred), on the present, as to the right of the Parliament to legislate for the colonies at all. Neither would he advert to the evils or the horrors of slavery in general; because, as all parties had now admitted, that the system was bad, and that it must be abolished, he should deem it a waste of time, and an unnecessary irritation of the feelings of opposing parties, to say one word on the subject. The past should be now forgiven and forgotten, if we could only secure the blessings of freedom for the future: and to the attainment of this he would therefore strongly recommend that the exertions of all parties should be exclusively devoted. The motives which had led to the almost universal demand throughout this country for the abolition of slavery were three-fold. There were, first, those—by far the largest number, and the most zealous and uncompromising—who demanded it as enjoined by religion; who deemed slavery sinful in the eyes of God, and contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. There were, secondly, those who contended for freedom as a claim of justice, and who held slavery to be inconsistent with the rights of man, as proclaimed and protected by the British Constitution. There were, thirdly, those who saw in slavery a most degrading, impoverishing, unsafe, and costly system of subjection—and who, on grounds of policy alone, demanded its abolition. Now, every one of these three classes advocated immediate, rather than gradual, abolition. The religious class, because whatever was sinful ought, they contended, to be abandoned without a moment's hesitation or delay; the philanthropical class, because they equally contended, that injustice ought to be remedied at the earliest possible moment of time; and the political and commercial class, because they conceived that the longer the system of slavery lasted, the greater would be the amount of evil to be redressed; and the greater the difficulty of restoring freedom to the enslaved. All these were, therefore, for immediate emancipation, without any further delay than was absolutely indispensable for the protection of the public peace: and this conclusion was, indeed, borne out by the fact, that out of the thousands of petitions presented on this subject, bearing the signatures of more than a million of persons, they nearly all prayed for immediate, rather than gradual, emancipation, and demanded that the freedom they claimed for the slave should be given him at once, and secured to him for ever. This demand, however, was opposed by the Ministers, as well as by the West Indians, on various grounds: the principal of which were these—first, that by immediate emancipation, there would be great danger of insurrection, which would lead to the murder of the whites and the loss of our Colonies entirely; secondly, that if this did not take place, the natural indolence of the slaves was so great, that no stimulus but the whip would ever make them labour, even for a bare subsistence; thirdly, that as sugar could not be cultivated by free-labour, the abolition of slavery would lead to the extinction of the growth of sugar in the West Indies; and fourthly, that the slave colonies of other countries, thus becoming the only places in which sugar could be grown, we should be giving them a benefit at the sacrifice of our own possessions, and encouraging that very slave trade, which our aim was to abolish. These, he believed, were the principal objections raised to immediate emancipation, and he would answer each of them in detail. First, then—as to the danger of insurrection; the causes of insurrection generally were, a strong sense of wrong, and a determination to shake off some burthen or yoke. As long as slavery was continued, call it by what name they might, whether apprenticeship or servitude, or by any other term, as long as forced subjection to an individual master, without power of removal, or of improving wages, remained, so long would there be danger of insurrection: for so long would there be powerful motives to rebel. But when freedom had been granted—when the yoke had been taken off—when every man might seek his own employer, and fix his own terms of reward; when the blacks were elevated to the same enjoyment of equal rights with the whites, what was there to rebel for? What greater good could they hope to attain? It was not the usual conduct of mankind to rebel against their benefactors, nor to break out into insurrection when freedom was accorded to them. In general the people of all countries were too happy to receive the smallest boon from the hands of their rulers; and it was only when rights were withheld, and justice denied, that insurrections or rebellions ever did take place. They were frequent in the West Indies now—they occurred often in the East—they happened perpetually in ail the despotic states of Asia, and they took place occasionally in the worst governed countries of Europe—of which Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, were examples. But there were no insurrections in America, and none in England; and if there were any, they would occur, not because rights were conceded, but because rights were denied. The rule was universal, that men never rebelled because freedom was granted to them; and that the only danger of insurrection lay in a denial of rights which were justly due. But, as to the murder of the whites—What was to hinder that taking place now, if the hatred of the blacks was so strong? Nothing but military force. Let, then, such force be still further strengthened by a preventive police, and a body of independent Magistracy, until the change from slavery to freedom should be complete; and as the slaves would have no addition to their numbers or their force by being made free, while all the motives to rebellion or revenge would be greatly lessened, we could not, for a moment, apprehend insurrection as a consequence of their obtaining their immediate freedom, though we might dread it as the almost inevitable consequence which must and would ensue on that freedom being longer withheld. Secondly—As to the indolence of the slaves, and their incapacity or unwillingness to labour for their own support. It could not be denied, that the love of ease was as common to the negro race as to every other. It was not necessary to resort to Africa to discover this propensity. All men disliked to labour more than was necessary to obtain for them the enjoyments of life; beyond this, they desired leisure, or at least the entire direction and control over the employment of their time. It was also true, that, in warm climates, repose was a greater luxury than in colder ones. But notwithstanding this: how stood the fact? Was it not established by evidence the most varied and unimpeachable, that wherever the experiment had been tried, it had been found that the negroes, like other men, were beings made up of hopes and fears, and operated upon by the stimulus of rewards and punishments? They had been granted for their own use, in some cases, a day in each week; in others, an hour in each day: and in both they had shown that in the hour or day devoted to their own use, and the produce of which was to be for their own benefit, they had done more than in twice or thrice the time employed for the benefit of others. Had he had the good fortune to have caught the Chairman's eye in an earlier part of the night, he was prepared to establish this by evidence, which he had brought with him for that purpose; but at this late hour, and under the pledge of brevity he had given, he would abstain from reading the evidence he had brought. He might direct, however, those who still entertained doubts on this subject, where it would be found; and he would accordingly name the works he held in his hand. They were not anonymous, but each the productions of authors well known and highly esteemed, both in the political and the literary world. The first was Mr. Jeremie, for many years a resident in the West Indies, as President of the Council in the island of St. Lucie, and subsequently appointed in an official capacity to the Mauritius. This gentleman, in his "Essays on Colonial Slavery," presented a large mass of evidence to prove, that the emancipated slaves were among the most industrious of men: that, under every imaginable disadvantage they acquired property, and became industrious, frugal, and prosperous artisans and traders. He gave an interesting history of the town of Castries, in St. Lucie, where the great part of the population were free blacks, and people of colour, and by whom a large amount of property was held in houses, lands, ships, &c., many individuals possessing from 2,000l. to 3,000l. of value; and all acquired entirely by their own exertions. The other work was one entitled "Wages, of the Whip," drawn up by Mr. Conder, a well known author, in which was collected a body of evidence to satisfy the most sceptical of this great truth, that wherever coercion or force was applied to draw forth the exertions of the negro, he gave his labours unwillingly; and it was consequently unproductive: but wherever the stimulus of hope and reward were offered, his vigour became redoubled, his industry was untiring, and his labour was rendered profitable both to the employer and the employed. There was not the slightest ground, therefore, for the assumption, that, if liberated, the negroes would fail to support themselves; and the best proof, perhaps, that could be given, that the Ministers did not entertain this view of the case, and consider the negro a peculiarly indolent being, was this—that though they urged his natural unwillingness to work, as an argument against his immediate emancipation, and justified the keeping him in slavery for twelve years longer, on the ground that it was necessary to teach him habits of industry (as if the unfortunate slave had not been taught those habits, by being kept at hard labour all his life), yet they expected this "indolent being," who they alleged could not be induced to labour, by the stimulus of hunger and nakedness, to supply the want of food and raiment, which could only be thus obtained—they expected him, when all his wants had been supplied by the seven hours and a-half of labour for his master during the day, to labour the other two hours and a-half, without the stimulus of hunger and nakedness, but with the prudent forethought and design of laying up a provision for a future day! Now, both of these positions could not be true—the negro could not be at once the most indolent and improvident, and the most industrious and prudent of the human race; though the Ministers assumed him to be either, as it best suited their purpose. The truth was, that he was in neither of these extremes; but his character was that of the common average of humanity under similar circumstances to his own: whatever was bad about him, was the result of his enslaved condition, and could only be eradicated by his being made free. Whatever was good about him was part of his human nature, and, as such, was capable of progressive improvement; the first step to which must be his emancipation. And, as all slaves hitherto made free had bettered their condition from the moment of their freedom being attained, there was no good reason for doubting but that all the slaves in future to be emancipated, would run the same career of improvement, some faster and some slower than others, but all at least rising above that lowest point in the scale of existence, which now marks them the next link in creation to the beasts of the field, but which, being broken, they would rise, like other rational beings, to the enjoyment of all the privileges and all the virtues of manhood and humanity. Thirdly—As to the cessation of our supplies of sugar, which it is contended, can only be had from the West Indies, and only be cultivated by slaves. It was certainly remarkable, that such an argument as this should be advanced by any one pretending to geographical, or political, or commercial information; and yet it had been dwelt upon at great length. But could hon. Members be ignorant of the fact, that in our own immense empire of the East Indies, any quantity of sugar might be obtained, the entire produce of free labour; and even now, under all the disadvantages of its growth, so much cheaper than the sugar of the West, that, to protect this, a heavy extra duty had been placed on all the sugar imported from Bengal, without which the West-India sugar, produced by slave labour, would, long ago, have been driven out of the market? It was true, that at present, the East-India sugar was inferior in strength and quality to that of the West: but when the same protection of person and property should be extended to residents in Bengal, as was now enjoyed by the inhabitants of all our other colonies—when British capitalists should be permitted to hold lands in India, establish mills, and apply the capital, the science, and the skill, of Europe, to the cultivation of sugar in the East, as they now do in the West—there was no doubt, in the mind of any person who had resided in India, that its quality might be made quite equal to that of any sugar in the world; and, therefore, that all alarm on the subject of failure of supply in this necessary or luxury of life, was perfectly groundless. Fourthly—As to the encouragement which would be given to slavery in other colonies, and the extension of the slave trade for their supply, by the cessation of slavery in our own, he thought the remedy for this perfectly easy:—If, instead of the unjust preference which had hitherto been given to the produce of slave-labour over that of free industry, the Ministers would but reverse the rule, and tax heavily the produce of slave colonies, while they admitted the produce of free labour on easier terms, slavery would then become so much more unprofitable than freedom, even to the planters themselves, that it would not long be continued. And as to the slave trade, he contended, that if the Government of England would only be just enough, courageous enough, and virtuous enough, to declare the slave trade to be piracy, wherever practised, and by whomsoever carried on—and make some severe examples of those captured in its perpetration—it would soon be swept away, as it deserved to be, from the face of the earth. There was one remarkable inconsistency in the opinions held on slavery and the slave trade, to which he must, for a moment, advert. All parties were now agreed to speak of the latter with detestation and horror, even those who saw nothing in slavery itself so bad as to require its abolition. But, for himself, he deemed slavery to be the worst of the two. The slave trade consisted in the capture and conveyance of men from Africa to the West Indies, in a most inconvenient and uncomfortable manner, it was true; but what was slavery but a perpetuation of this state of suffering and wrong, for all the rest of the victim's life? It was a crime, no doubt, to seize the free man, and make him a slave: it was also a crime to transport him by force from his native home to a foreign shore: but was it not equally a crime to purchase this injured victim, and to keep him in cruel bondage all the rest of his days? For his own part, though he knew it was against the commonly received opinion, he considered the subsequent bondage of perpetuated slavery to be even worse than the original capture and banishment of the slave, to which it gave rise. He thought that the subsequent slavery, though coming after, in point of time, was, in reality, the parent of the slave trade itself; for had there been no receivers of stolen men, men would not continue to have been stolen: had there been no buyers of slaves, there would soon have ceased to be sellers; and he therefore could not understand the philanthropy of those who affected such extreme horror at the slave trade, as the means by which the victims were procured, but had no indignation whatever towards those who kept those victims all their lives afterwards in bondage, subject to misery, to stripes, and to chains. The time, he hoped, was arrived, when both slavery and the slave trade were about to be extinguished together. Let England set the proud example first; and use all her great political and moral influence with other countries, to follow it; and he did not despair, even before he sunk into the grave himself, to see slavery abolished in every colony of the West, whether British or Foreign; as well as in the United States of America, where it had too long been a blot on the free institutions for which that country was otherwise distinguished. He had thus endeavoured, much more briefly than he could have wished—as, in deference to the convenience of the House at that late hour of the night, he had omitted many arguments on which, had he been earlier in the debate, he should have felt it his duty to dwell—to show that all the reasons alleged against immediate emancipation were capable of being refuted: and that as such immediate emancipation was more just, and not more dangerous, than any protracted scheme, it ought to have the preference of all parties, whether they wished the abolition of slavery on the grounds of religion, justice, or policy—all of which were opposed to any delay whatever, beyond the shortest possible period, with in which adequate arrangements could be made to carry the emancipation into effect. In conclusion, he would say a few words on the prospects which such a measure as he advocated would open to the colonies, as well as to the mother country. The negroes being released from their present degraded and depressed condition, would become subject to new motives, animated by new hopes, and cheered by new enjoyments. The means of instruction being afforded them, their leisure would be devoted to the acquisition of knowledge. Religious and moral, as well as entertaining and useful instruction, would teach them that the wants of man could be best satisfied by industry and prudence; that, next to the satisfaction of the physical wants, the attainment of knowledge was at once a duty and a pleasure. The developement of every new mental faculty would expand the desire for further intellectual attainment; and thus the now dormant powers of the negro mind would be brought out into progressively increasing exercise, till they became fitted for the highest enjoyment of all social and domestic pleasures. With increased intelligence, augmented wealth would be acquired; new desires would require new materials for satisfaction; the further developement of the resources of their own industry would furnish the means of payment or exchange; and the demand which would thus be created for British manufactures of every sort and kind, would be the most ample, as well as the most satisfactory, repayment of any temporary sacrifice which we might now be called upon to make, to carry this great measure of immediate emancipation into effect. If loss should actually accrue for the first few years, from the change from a system of slave labour to one of free industry in the cultivation of the soil, he should have no objection whatever to such loss being compensated; though, he believed, that the planter as well as the slave—the colony as well as the mother country—would be benefited by the change. As his Amendment was but the first of a series of Resolutions growing out of it, which he should be prepared, at the proper time, to submit to the House, he should, for the present, content himself with following the example of the Ministers, who, though they had laid four Resolutions on the Table of the House, were going to divide only on the first. He would, therefore, submit only the first of his Resolutions by way of Amendment; and when the sense of the House had been taken on it, he would shape his course with respect to the others accordingly. His Amendment was as follows:—"That it is the opinion of this Committee that immediate and effectual measures should be taken for the entire Abolition of Slavery in all the British possessions, without further delay than may be necessary to organize a body of Magistracy and Police, for the preservation of order and peace—and without subjecting the emancipated slaves to any payment or burthen whatever as the price of their redemption."

observed, that he was a free judge on the present question, having no recorded opinions upon it, and no interest at stake. He had no hesitation whatever, in saying, that the immediate abolition of slavery was absolutely necessary. The wishes of this country, and the situation of the colonies, imperatively demanded that it should be no longer delayed. And yet, he could not forget the tremendous difficulties which stood in the way of that abolition; difficulties involving in themselves not only the existence of the colonies, but the prosperity of this country. He could not forget that there were two parties to be considered; and that while the negroes ought to have justice done to them, the rights of their masters ought not to be neglected. Whoever had a large body of constituents must have among them many who on this subject were hurried on by an inconsiderate zeal, which, nevertheless, did credit to their hearts, although it made them dangerous guides. In his opinion, if the House were to adopt the Resolution of the hon. member for Sheffield, they would take a dangerous and impolitic step. He was anxious for the immediate abolition of slavery; but he could not shut his eyes to the danger attendant upon it. Let the House recollect the misery that had been produced by sudden emancipation at St. Domingo; misery ten thousand times greater even than that of slavery itself. He was friendly, therefore, to a course which would subject the slave to a course of probation. But while he stated this, he objected to the proposition of the right hon. Secretary of State. He thought the slave ought to have such wages as would, in a few years, enable him to purchase his emancipation. Ashe intended to take the sense of the Committee on the right hon. Gentleman's fourth Resolution, he would say a few words on the subject of it. When he considered how loudly the people of this country complained of the pressure of existing taxation, he could not assent to the policy of imposing an additional tax on colonial produce. He thought, also, that the gift of 15,000,000l. would be the most fatal boon to the colonies. The depreciation of West-India property had been so great of late years, that there could be no doubt that that sum of 15,000,000l. would soon be absorbed. Nor was that all. The produce of the West Indies was so considerable, that it did not meet with adequate consumption in this country. Would the consumption of that produce be increased by increasing the duty upon it? On the contrary, to increase that duty would inevitably be, to increase the difficulties of the planters. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the produce of the increased duties would afford ample means of paying the interest of the loan. The returns of late years proved that this was a fallacious expectation; and there could be no doubt that the country would be saddled with the permanent interest of that loan, or 600,000l. The true course would be, not to increase, but to diminish the duty. That would at once relieve the planter, and, by increasing the consumption, give a stimulus to all trade in connexion with the islands. Even if it diminished the revenue (which was doubtful), that diminution would be trifling compared with the perpetual charge of 600,000l., which would be incurred by the proposed plan. Before he sat down, he begged to repeat that there was no warmer friend than himself to the immediate abolition of slavery, as far as that was consistent with real justice and humanity.