moved, that the 6th of Anne, c. 7, be read. This having been done, the hon. Baronet proceeded to say, that, in bringing forward the Motion of which he had given notice, he wished to correct an impression on the subject which had by some means or other got abroad. It had been stated in the newspapers, and elsewhere, out of that House, that he brought forward his present motion with the sanction of his Majesty's Ministers; but this was not the fact, for, up to the period of giving his notice, it was not known to the Government that he ever contemplated submitting such a motion. Having made this observation, he would proceed, as briefly as possible, to lay the grounds on which his Motion was founded before the House. As he did not wish to occupy their time by unnecessary remarks, it would be sufficient for him to say, that the principle which the Bill he proposed to introduce was intended to establish had been constantly acted upon up to the time of the Reformation and afterwards, though not always so regularly. The two Acts that had placed the matter on its present footing, were the 6th of Queen Anne and the 41st of George 3rd. Before the Reform of Parliament, no member of this House, or of any former House, would have conceived the idea of disapproving of any portion of the check the people either possessed, or were supposed to possess, upon the influence of the Crown, or upon the appointment of its Ministers; but now that Parliament was reformed,—now that the people were substantially represented —now that it was utterly impossible for any administration to continue in power without the confidence, or contrary to the wishes of the nation,—it seemed to him that the provision was perfectly unnecessary, and that it could have no other effect than to embarrass the just prerogatives of the Crown in the choice of its servants. The people had obtained their rights, and he rejoiced at it; but the more their power and that of the House of Commons was thereby increased, the, more necessary it was to maintain the legitimate rights of the other branches of the Legislature—the privileges of the Lords, and the prerogative of the King. It could not be denied, that all popular assemblies were subject to sudden impulse: they were liable to be carried away by ambitious and unprincipled demagogues, and excitement prevailed upon no occasion more than at elections. The ultimate and deliberate opinion of the people was rarely wrong; they soon recovered from their delusion, in this island at least. In former times, when the vacating of seats might have been useful, it was constantly avoided, and became utterly fruitless. Now that it was unnecessary, it was most powerful and effective. While it was utterly inoperative for good, it was potent for annoyance. Hon. Members were, perhaps, scarcely aware of the manner in which it was formerly maintained; and the consequence was, that few of the principal ministers of this country had ever sat for populous places. Sir R. Walpole sat for Lynn; the first Mr. Pitt for Seaford; Mr. H. Pelham was almost a solitary exception, as he was a county member; Mr. Perceval sat for Northampton, then, in some degree, a nomination borough; Lord North sat for Banbury; Mr. Pitt and Lord Lansdown were members for Universities, which certainly could not properly be said to possess a popular constituency. Mr. Fox, for the short time he had been in power, was Minister, as it were, in defiance of the Crown; Mr. Addington represented Harwich; but the most remarkable instance was Mr. Canning, who sat for Liverpool until he became Minister, and then thought it necessary to relinquish it. But the custom of vacating seats, which before the Reform Bill was fruitless, at this moment was most effective and inconvenient. No Minister could now avoid it; he must sit for a popular place, since there were no others; nomination boroughs were at an end. Hon. Gentlemen seemed to deny that they were at an end; but if nomination boroughs were not entirely swept away, it must be allowed that there were not many of them remaining. He would not dispute, however, that there were still places in which individuals had a great and preponderating influence. A man might persuade his neighbours to elect a son, a brother, or a friend; but he would not be able to persuade them to withdraw their confidence from the Member whom they had chosen in order to confer it upon a stranger. The Member, too, however desirous of supporting the Minister, would not be able to give them his constant aid. In short, a Member could not be governed as formerly; the steward of a borough could not now reply, "I neither know nor care whom I have nominated;" nor would another returning officer be obliged to send to a distance to ascertain the name of the candidate before he could insert it. He repeated, therefore, that the practice of vacating seats, formerly merely nugatory, was at this time effective even to the disturbance of the King's prerogative. The most popular Ministry might thus be disorganized: a Member who well deserved the approbation of the rest of the community might be rejected on an appeal to his constituents, because he had opposed some local job. Almost every one acknowledged, that it had become absolutely necessary to find a remedy for the evil of Ministers now vacating their seats; and he had heard only two remedies suggested. One was that which he understood was to be proposed as an amendment to his Motion, namely, to give seats to certain Ministers of the Crown ex-officio upon their being nominated to their places in the Government. The difficulties of this arrangement were supposed to be renewed by not giving to such officers the right of vote, but only to speak. He confessed, he thought the House required no accession of talkers. He would ask, if they had proved themselves a House of such taciturnity as to make it necessary to import twenty or thirty additional talkers ex-officio, who were to have nothing else to do? He objected to such a plan. The scheme was French; and, however much he respected that country, and hoped long to preserve our alliance with it, yet her institutions did not suit us; and while we had good ones of our own, he was not disposed to go abroad for others. He was decidedly opposed to this remedy, because there was another perfectly equal to the object, and that was to abolish altogether the custom of vacating seats in that House upon taking office. Some had proposed, that the principle of not vacating the seat should be confined to a mere change of office, and that, in case of office under Government being accepted for the first time, the Member should vacate his seat. To this he saw many objections; and the first was, that it was not adequate to the evil. It seldom happened that a Minister was kept out of Parliament by such a change, though there was now a remarkable instance of it. But what would the country say to such a plan? Why, that the majority of the present House, who were friendly to the Ministers now in office, were disposed to put in their hands a power to keep themselves there by allowing them to make such changes without subjecting them to the control of the people; while, as soon as his Majesty should wish to choose their successors, then they called for a popular election. He should therefore propose a Bill upon the plan he had himself stated, and the officers he should include in it would be the following:—The Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Treasurer, the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State, the Secretary at War, the President of the India Board, the President and Vice-President of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of the Admiralty, the Secretary of the India Board, the Master-General of the Ordnance, the Clerk of the Ordnance, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, the Paymaster-General of the Forces, the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, the Attorney-General for Ireland, the Solicitor-General for Ireland, the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and the Military Secretary of the Commander-in-Chief. There were two other officers which, for obvious reasons, he had not included, and they were the Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds, and the Steward of the Hundred of East Hendred. It now only remained for him to state the period at which the Act should come into operation. As it seemed to him to be an obvious impropriety that hon. Members of that House should legislate that they themselves should not vacate their seats upon accepting office, he would leave the period blank; but, in his opinion, the Act ought not to take effect until after a dissolution. He concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to prevent the necessity of hon. Members accepting certain offices vacating their seats.

was of opinion, that this was a question, above all others, in which there ought to exist no misinterpretation on the part of the public as to the motives of hon. Gentlemen. It should not be brought forward by a Tory, lest it might be suspected to be a sly invasion of popular rights; neither should it be brought forward by a Whig, however liberal his views, who was in the habit of supporting the present Ministry. It was far better, that such a recommendation should come from an independent Member, attached to neither of the two parties, and, therefore, he had undertaken to propose an amendment, to which the hon. Baronet had alluded, the principle of which was, that Ministers should have a right to seats in this House by virtue of their office, but that they should not enjoy the privilege of voting, unless returned by some popular constituency. He was not satisfied with the proposition of the hon. Baronet, because he thought, while it violated a great theoretical principle, it did not remove the worst dangers of the present system. It violated a great theoretical principle, because it was obvious, that when a constituency chose an independent member of Parliament, they often chose him on account of his very independence. They might be dissatisfied with a government, they might elect a member exactly because he sympathized with them in that dissatisfaction, and the instant he was returned he might accept office, and for the next six years retain a seat, enforcing, as a Minister, that very set of opinions which he had obtained that seat by opposing as a member. It was a fiction to call such a man a representative of the people. He might have good reasons for his change; he might be an honest minister; but he was not a true representative. The principle of the Constitution was, not that the people should choose Ministers, but that they should have an immediate opportunity of deciding whether or not they wished their representatives to become Ministers; and this principle the present measure would entirely destroy. In short Parliaments the Bill would be less dangerous; but with the present long duration of Parliament, it would only be a shelter for tergiversation, and a shield to apostasy. But if the measure thus violated a great and sound principle, did it meet all the practical evils of the present system? The obvious and most glaring inconvenience of the present system was, that men might be chosen to office, not in proportion as they would fit the station with honour, but in proportion as they could vacate their seats with safety. The motion of his hon. friend certainly remedied that evil; but there were others more latent and more dangerous, which it did not meet. As the practical inconvenience of losing men of ability and experience just at the very time when their talents might be put to the greatest use,—as this inconvenience increased, and the public as well as the Government experienced its effects, there would grow up a disposition to wink at any means by which the inconvenience could be repaired; small boroughs, under the influence of property, would gradually be pressed into service in any emergency, and many a phœnix would silently rise out of the smouldering ashes—suppositos cineri doloso—of Gatton and Lostwithiel. He granted that, at the present moment, there seemed to be no danger of a want of vigilance on the part of the public, and that they seemed to be even morbidly anxious that no green spot should be found for the wandering ark of a disconsolate Attorney-general. But then that gentleman, and some others in a similar predicament, whatever might be their talents or services, were not very noisily or dangerously popular at the time they were so suddenly expelled from the paradise of those benches; the danger was, that in the first instance some very popular persons, darlings of the press and of the public, should by some accident, some local manœuvre, lose their seats, and that, in the excess of their popularity, any resources for their re-entrance into that House would be easily pardoned; the precedent once set in this instance, it would be very easy for an artful and crafty administration to establish and confirm it. These, then, appeared to be the evils of the present system—inconvenience to the public in the loss of able men; a probable undue pre- ponderance in the cabinet of the agricultural interest; a subjection to the wishes of peculiar constituencies, rather than an impartial view of the general interests of the country at large—a principle which, if faulty in an ordinary member, was most faulty in a Minister; and lastly, the great temptation afforded to corruption. Now, the hon. Baronet's measure, if it remedied the evils at all, only remedied them in part. The measure he would propose seemed to him to remedy them entirely. The hon. Baronet's bill did not apply to general elections, which, no less than in occasional contests, an honest and able servant of the public might lose his seat: it did not, therefore, prevent the temptation to close boroughs, nor the undue regard to the sectarian interests of peculiar constituencies. But the remedy he intended to propose seemed to him to meet all the evils. It was obvious that, if Ministers held seats by virtue of their office, there could be no local or temporary causes for not selecting, as ministers, the ablest men, whether in that House or out of it; that this balance of interests in the Cabinet could always be adjusted; that there would be a greater freedom from the undue influence of peculiar constituencies, and that there would be no inducement to an administration to attempt to effect once more the convenient resources of rotten boroughs. One objection might be urged, both to his project and that of the hon. Baronet: it would be said, that you take away a great check which the people hold upon the Government in making them see how far they were acting in accordance with, or in opposition to, the popular opinion. He would not include, in his proposition, all the dii minores of the Ministerial Pantheon; partly because the business of the state was not greatly interrupted, the machinery of legislation did not stand still, if a Lord of the Admiralty or a Lord of the Treasury suddenly left an aching void upon the opposite benches; but principally because the lesser officers were rather living proofs of the patronage of state than persons supporting high and responsible duties; and it might be well that they should be, from time to time, subjected to their constituents, in order that it might be clearly ascertained that they were not guided by a low ambition in the adoption of offices leading often to no further eminence, and having more connexion with profit than distinction. The measure he would propose should include one organ in that House of each of the principal departments of state, whether secretary or under-secretary, president or vice-president (because the heads of the office might, perhaps, be in the House of Lords)—such as the Home Department, the War-office, the Foreign-office, the Admiralty, the Colonies, the India Board, and the Board of Trade, to which he thought should be added the office of Secretary for Ireland; and as the presence of one law officer in that House was expedient, he thought it wisdom as well as charity to include either the Attorney or Solicitor-General. In his Motion, he should not, however, define the offices, but make merely a general proposition; the number of offices was a detail, and not a principle, of the measure. But this only he would say, that the precise number signified little, if none had votes, unless returned by a constituency; nor did he know one of the offices he had named in which an organ in that House was less necessary than another. He said, if they had no votes, unless they were bonâ fide members; for in allowing Ministers seats in that House ex officio, he never for a moment confounded them with the representatives of the people. He did not give them the great distinction of a representative—the right of voting. They would reap the advantages of the talents and the services of a Minister, but he did not propose to establish, as the hon. Baronet in some measure did, the dangerous precedent of allowing a man to vote on behalf of the people whom the people had not chosen. He left the Minister that which he was—an officer of the state, explaining his views and answering questions; hut he did not suppose the Minister to be that which he was not, a man intrusted by the suffrage of a constituency with the power of voting, as well as advising, on matters of legislation and finance. By preserving that distinction, it would be obvious, that while they promoted the public convenience and advantage, they guarded themselves against any infringement of a popular principle. Perhaps the most convenient period to fix for a Minister's continuance would be the remainder of the Session in which he retired, and the one following; if the retirement happened during the recess of Parliament, the following Session would be sufficient. The period of his continuance was, however, a detail, and not a principle in the resolution which he offered to the House, and would, of course, require more consideration than at this moment it might be necessary to bestow upon it. They might talk of popular principles being always sure to return a Minister; but how many constituencies were there which would reject a Minister for his very regard to the three most popular cries of the day—cheap law, cheap knowledge, and cheap bread. Let a people be ever so enlightened, there were always in the world bright and luminous minds, that cast their shadows far beyond the popular sight—the science of statesmanship was, indeed, a mockery and delusion, if there were not some of its professors who went beyond the multitude in the great principles of legislation, and offended the vulgar opinion by the very energy and providence of their views. If they adopted this, or some similar measure, they would obviate the most rational objection made to the abolition of close boroughs during the debates on the Reform Bill, but in a manner free from all the evils to which the system of close boroughs was exposed. They would advance the public convenience; they would give to an administration its legitimate energy—the unfettered power of selecting the fittest Ministers. They would guard the people in great measure from the influence of local jobbing and the temptation to future corruption; they would in no degree injure a popular principle; they would remove a serious obstacle to able and united government. Let them for once legislate in time before the mischiefs they foresaw came upon them. To prevent was an easy task; to cure was a most difficult one. A recourse to shifts and expedients, to hasty patchings-up of evils that could be endured no longer, was a very common, but always an ungracious and a very unsuccessful policy. Much better in this as in all respects, with the true providence of statesmen, to legislate afar off, and so avoid that task which they now in other things perpetually and vainly attempted—namely, the administering to evils long felt either sudden remedies or temporary palliatives. With the hope that this House and the Government might be so inclined, and while the worst consequences of the present system were yet in the bud, he moved the following amendment to the Motion of the hon. Baronet:—"That for the convenience of the public service, and the promotion of the public interests, it was desirable that one Member in each of the principal departments of state should have a seat in that House, but without the privilege of voting, unless returned by the suffrages of a constituency."

expressed his regret, that such propositions should have been made by the two hon. Members who had just spoken. He would vote both against the Motion and the Amendment, as it was not possible to make such a Motion palatable by any Amendment whatever. The principle of both was, to deprive the people, the electors of the kingdom, of one of their most valuable constitutional privileges; and the abandonment of this constitutional privilege would be the greatest insult that could be offered to the people by the Reformed Parliament, for it would be equivalent to saying, that the electors of the empire were unfit for, and unable to fulfil, those newly-received rights and duties which had been restored to them. Would hon. Gentlemen, then, venture to say, that the electors under the provisions of the Reform Bill were not as capable of exercising their judgment in the choice of their exercising as the constituencies, so to call them, of Old Sarum and the other boroughs which had been placed in schedule A. It had been urged by the hon. Member, that the privilege exercised by the people had in former times proved ineffectual. Now, however, it had acquired consistency and strength. And what was the result? Why, the moment it began to be efficacious and to produce those consequences, which it was considered desirable it should produce in former times, that moment came the hon. member for Lincoln to deprive, as far as he might, the people of England of the privilege they had of old enjoyed; and upon what principle was this?—on the principle of distrust in the people of England?—on the principle, that they were not able to judge for themselves in the choice of their representatives? The hon. member for Lincoln had, in fact, made a speech worthy of the highest Tory in the very worst of Tory times. He would say, let Government appoint whom they liked to office, but let the people decide who were fit to represent them. To what, he asked, were they indebted for this proposition—one, by the way, which could not fail to work serious injury to the constitu- tion and to the privileges of the people? It had so happened, that a Lord of the Treasury and an Attorney-General had not succeeded in being again returned for the places which they had vacated on accepting office. He might be sorry, that the House was deprived of the benefits resulting from the diligence and talents of his hon. friend the Attorney-General; but this he could not weigh against the privileges of the people of England; and he could not consent, in order to prevent the recurrence of such inconveniences to the Administration, to sacrifice one of their most valuable privileges. He strenuously denied, that the liberal portion of the House would suffer more, as had been asserted, from the exercise of this privilege, than did the Tory Members. The great object of the Reform Bill was, he contended, to cement the union between the electors and the representatives. If a man did his duty fairly and honestly in that House, he could not fail to enjoy the perfect confidence of his constituents, and when he came again to ask for their suffrages, he would be sure to receive that to which alone he was entitled—a reception in accordance with his deserts. It did not follow, and should not follow, that because the King chose to appoint an individual to office, the people should be therefore compelled to bestow their confidence upon him. To assert such a doctrine, to put men into that House, responsible only to the Crown, speaking opinions for which they were not answerable to the people, might be cultivating the prerogative of the Crown, but it was treating with great contempt the privileges of the people. He protested against having any man in the House who was responsible only to the Crown. He for one would at all events oppose it, even if he were to stand alone.

agreed with the hon. and learned Member who last addressed the House in expressing his strong disapprobation of the Motion originally brought forward, as one calculated to infringe the elective rights of the people. At the same time he thought it an object of the greatest importance, that the Ministers of the Crown should have ex-officio seats in that House, in order to explain matters and give information connected with their offices, which could otherwise only be arrived at by uncertain means. He would vote for the Amendment.

said, that to him the speech of the hon. member for Lincoln was incomprehensible. He could not enter into the hon. Member's refinements. He was strongly opposed both to the original Motion and to the Amendment; believing, as he did, that either must weaken the connecting link which bound the people to their representatives, and tend to raise an irresponsible power in the House. This tie he had hoped was drawn closer by the Reform Bill—it was at least more valuable, and he was not prepared to abandon it because Gentlemen whose opinions he for the most part shared were in power. For the sake of their immediate convenience, he was not prepared to cast aside his old convictions, and to place in that House men who were wholly irre-responsible. France and Belgium had been referred to but he was yet to learn, that they had got so much the start of us in the forms of their constitution and the arrangements of their assemblies, that we should be led to take example from the peculiar provisions of their popular institutions. He could not see why that expression of public opinion—in one, too, of its ancient and unobjectionable forms which in this country had hitherto carried everything which had been generally considered beneficial to the commonweal without force—should now be repressed; and he sincerely hoped, that both Motion and Amendment would be rejected by the House.

was quite opposed to the principle, that a Member, on accepting office, should not vacate his seat in Parliament, but it did not therefore follow, that Ministers of the Crown should not have ex-officio seats in that House. That might be very convenient; and if the principle were to be admitted that the members of Government should hold seats in that House by virtue of their office, in order to give information upon matters connected with their several departments, he could not see why the same principle should not be extended to give them a right to sit in the other House of the Legislature, where their explanations, after having been delivered in the House of Commons, might be repeated much to the advantage and convenience of all parties. He conceived, therefore, that the Amendment was deserving of support, but thought it should have been brought forward as a substantive Motion.

, being loudly called for, rose, and said, that he considered the question one of the greatest importance both to the House and to the nation. It had been objected to both the measures proposed, that they would have the effect of making a great change in the principles of the Constitution. The objection he had against agreeing to either proposition did not, he must admit, arise from any apprehension of that sort. There were two propositions before the House—the original Motion of the hon. member for Peterborough, which hon. Member wished to do away with the existing regulation, that a Member on accepting office under the Crown must of necessity vacate his seat; and the Amendment of the hon. member for Lincoln, who wished, that the acceptor of certain offices under the Crown should ex officio be entitled to a seat. It was said, that these propositions if agreed to, would be an infringement on the great principles of the Constitution; he could not say that he thought so. The Act which gave a constituency the right of expressing their opinion on their Representative's acceptance of office under the Crown, conferred, no doubt, a very valuable privilege upon the people, and one which they ought not to be deprived of, except for very strong and peculiar circumstances; but he did not think, that the deprivation would amount to any violation of constitutional principles. The regulation was adopted by Parliament as a sort of compromise in the reign of Queen Anne. It had been first proposed, that no person holding such an office should at the same time hold a seat in the House; but as it was foreseen, that this arrangement would lead to many inconveniences, the appeal to the constituents by the vacation of the seat was adopted as a sort of compromise or expedient; and on the several occasions when the expedient had been resorted to, there were very few instances of any inconvenience resulting to either the Government, the Member, or his constituency. In the proposition of the hon. Baronet, he (Lord Althorp) saw no tendency towards an infringement on the Constitution: but, in the Amendment proposed by the hon. member for Coventry, he did see an infringement of the Constitution. That hon. Member's proposition appeared to him calculated to produce a complete change in the Constitution. If he were obliged to choose between the propositions, he should adopt that of the hon. member for Peterborough; but the question was, whether the inconvenience sustained by the Government or people, was sufficient to justify any alteration at all. He thought not. The passing an Act whereby, for the future, any Member might accept office under the Crown, without being under the necessity of taking the sentiments of his constituents as to such acceptance, was depriving the latter of a very valuable privilege. On the other hand, the existence of the necessity of such an appeal had on several, though not many occasions, been an inconvenience to the Administration. An hon. Member had instanced Sir John Hob-house, as a case in point, but this was a mistake. Sir John Hobhouse had been re-elected after his acceptation of office: he was thrown out, after having resigned his seat on a subsequent occasion, which had no reference to his acceptance of office. The case of the Attorney-General, undoubtedly, was an instance in point, for that officer bad lost his seat in consequence of his acceptation of office, and his absence from the House had been felt as a great inconvenience by his Majesty's Government. During the discussion on the Reform Bill, it had been suggested to Ministers, that it would be well to introduce some regulation to this effect: it might or might not have been right to do so, but, in the circumstances under which Ministers were then placed, it was impossible to attempt it. The question now, however, was, whether the inconvenience which had been experienced by Ministers as yet, only in the single instance of the Attorney General—[Mr. Hume: There was a Lord of the Admiralty!] He did not consider that a case in point; but he did consider, that it was an extreme inconvenience to Government, that the Attorney General for the Crown should not have a seat in Parliament; nor was it merely an inconvenience to Government, but it was a very great injury to the public interests; and if the case were to occur often, that a member of the Government, whose presence in the House was so essential, was excluded from a seat, he should be disposed to agree, that an alteration in the law was called for as a matter of great public importance; but, as he before said, as such an inconvenience had, as yet, been only felt by the Administration in a single instance, however peculiarly hard upon them that instance, was, he thought, that at present there did not exist any necessity for agreeing to the hon. Member's proposition. He was one of those who had changed his opinion on this point of members of the Government having seats in the House. There was a time when he was of opinion, that members of the Government should be excluded from the House altogether; he had changed his opinion; but this change of opinion was not induced by his accession to office, for he had altered his mind on the subject before he became a member of the Government. Hon. Members seemed to laugh; he could assure them office was no such bed of roses; he should not be particularly annoyed at the occurrence of any incident which would render it necessary for him to go out of office, But to the question. The worst effect of members of the Government not having seats in the House would be, that such an exclusion must necessarily tend to lessen their responsibility; he did not mean to say, their legal responsibility, which was great, but their positive, actual, and practical responsibility in that House, which was also very great. Sitting there night after night to propose and defend their measures, and being always liable to attacks from those who thought they did wrong, or from their political opponents, if they were not able to make a good defence for their conduct, and to answer the arguments or charges against them, the extent to which their character was liable to suffer, appeared to him the most certain and strongest practical responsibility that any man could be subject to. That responsibility, however, would be greatly diminished, if the members of Government, by being excluded from the House, were rendered incapable of explaining or defending their views and measures. It had been said, that a member of Government vacating his seat on acceptance of office need be under no apprehension of not getting into the House, after a short interval at any rate, for that there were always vacancies occurring; and if the individual did not recover his former seat, he might easily get a seat for some other place. He, however, by no means agreed in that opinion. If an hon. Member, on vacating his seat under such circumstances, were to be rejected by his pre- sent constituents, it would be somewhat more difficult than was supposed to get other constituents to adopt him. Members, when rejected under such circumstances by one set of constituents, were very likely to be kept some time altogether out of Parliament. He was ready to admit his apprehension, that, at some future time, the inconvenience complained of might become so mischievous as to require some such alteration as that proposed by the hon. member for Peterborough; and, when such a necessity arose, he should be one of the first to recommend the plan. At present, he repeated, he did not think the necessity existed, and he should, therefore, recommend the hon. Member to withdraw his Motion. The proposition of the other hon. Member (Mr. L. Bulwer) he altogether disapproved of; to send an Administration into the House, with mere liberty of speaking, but without the right of voting, would be to place the members of Government in a position equally unpleasant and degrading.

wished again to draw the attention of the House to the case of this nobleman, who had suffered great injustice by having his estates in Alsace, of a very large yearly value, confiscated by the French at the time of the first French Revolution. Subsequently, a large sum of money was paid over by the French government to this country, to compensate such English subjects as had suffered by the Revolution, among whom was specifically mentioned the Baron de Bode. Notwithstanding this, not a farthing had been received by that nobleman, although he (Mr. M. Hill) could incontrovertibly prove his right to the amount as a suffering British subject, and that a specific sum had been paid over by the French government for the specific object of compensating the noble Baron. The Baron de Bode was said to be not one of those persons whom the treaty intended to relieve; he should like to know on what ground such an opinion was founded. The Baron de Bode was given to understand, that there was high authority against him, viz.—the judgment pronounced by the Privy Council, in the analogous case of Drummond. The fact was, however, that the case in question was not analogous, for the claimant there was both an English subject and a French subject. The Baron de Bode was an Englishman; he was an English born subject—the son of a German father and an English mother. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving, "That a Select Committee be appointed to examine into the facts and circumstances of the claim of the Baron de Bode, upon the fund received from the French government, for indemnifying British subjects for the loss of property unduly confiscated by the French authorities."

, in seconding the Motion, said, he thought a case was made out for giving this matter a re-hearing. He did not approve, under ordinary circumstances, of appointing Committees for the purpose of referring legal decisions to them for revision, but he thought it better that such a course should be adopted in this case, than that it should be altogether neglected. He did not hesitate to say, that he believed the case had been unjustly decided.

denied, that this was a trust in the hands of the Government, giving a claim to the Baron de Bode. The Act relating to all such claims gave a power of appeal from the decision of the Commissioners to the Privy Council, whose judgment was to be final. So far from the case not having received due attention, and been fully inquired into, it had run through all the modes of investigation that the Act of Parliament authorised. In 1822, a further period of ten or eleven months was given to the Baron de Bode, to procure fresh evidence to perfect his claim if he could. It could scarcely, then, be said, that he had not sufficient time, particularly when it was remembered, that the claim was launched in 1816. These facts did not, of course, preclude the House from making any grant, if it saw occasion, out of the public money; but he must say, that he considered them to conclude the question of right. He would submit to the House, whether a Committee was a proper tribunal to determine questions of law that had already received final adjudication? Unless the case was a very strong one, this alone would be an answer to the Motion. The Commissioners were charged with ignorance of the nature of the Baron de Bode's claim; but, according to a pamphlet, which he (the Solicitor General) had the honour to receive from the Baron, and in which the case was stated on very different grounds from those on which it was rested before the adverse judgment was pronounced, it appeared, that the Baron himself was ignorant of the nature of his claim. In fact, at the time the property was ceded by the father to the Baron de Bode, in order to escape confiscation, the latter was only fourteen years of age.

said, they were told, that it would require a strong case to justify the appointment of the Committee. They had a strong case. For the sake of the honour of the country, if there were a surplus after paying all the claims about which there was no difficulty, and if there were any miscarriage with respect to other claims, to their liquidation ought that surplus to be applied. The Baron de Bode was a British subject, born in England, of an English mother, his father being a German; of this there was no doubt. Nor was there any doubt that the Baron de Bode was possessed of some property, which was confiscated by France. Doubtless, also, a large sum was assigned over to the British Government to liquidate the claims of British subjects on account of the confiscation. It was beyond a doubt, too, that a large balance of the sum so assigned remained unappropriated. Equally clear was it, that a Commission was appointed to give those persons who had not perfected their claims, the benefit of further time. Now, he believed, that the Baron's case had not been understood; he would even say, that in his humble judgment, it had not been correctly decided. Then there were grounds sufficient for a further inquiry. The Baron de Bode's present claim was said to be inconsistent with that which he presented to the Commission; but let the House not forget, that the Baron was a soldier not versed in technical terms. Was he not to have his claim fairly decided, because he did not understand the full meaning of the terms, "heirship" and "remainder"? He pursued his claim according to his best judgment. He presented it; told them, that he was in possession, that his property was confiscated because he was a British subject, and he claimed his share of the sum paid as indemnity. The Commissioners asked him how he was entitled? He replied, that his father ceded, and he proved the ces- sion. Some of the documents could not be expected to be in his possession—others, which were necessary here, where we had a statute of frauds creating numberless difficulties, he was never asked for, and, therefore, did not produce. The Commissioners decided against him. He then applied to the Privy Council, who affirmed the judgment, because he did not prove, that his father ceded the estate to him according to our notions of legal propriety. The Commissioners appeared to consider, that the Baron de Bode had not any interest in the property at all. The fact was, the Baron had a claim to the whole of his father's property, but of that the Commissioners took no account. The Commissioners purported to act on the deed to which the objection was made, and this circumstance alone was sufficient ground for granting a Committee of the House. The deed was drawn up by an attorney, on the instruction of the Baron, who was at that time ignorant of the English language. It was, therefore, proper to try, whether an unintentional, though gross injustice, had not been done in the case; and it would become that House, if such were the case, not to sanction it. The House was not asked to come to a decision on the case. The Motion was merely one for inquiry, and this, he trusted, hon. Members, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, would not refuse.

said, that, having originally introduced this matter to the House some years since, he must declare that he still entertained the same impressions on this case which he then did. There might be, perhaps, some question as to the grounds upon which the Baron's original claims was attempted to be established, but he apprehended there could not be a question in respect to his reversionary claim; and, indeed, he (Mr. Littleton) had never heard any argument brought forward which could go to remove the opinion which he had entertained in the first instance upon this ground. He had felt an interest in the case from the fact of the Baron de Bode's family, on the mother's side, being one of the oldest and most respectable in Staffordshire. He knew, that the Baron had suffered much from pecuniary wants—that his family were residing in Russia—that he had experienced great misfortunes, and that he had followed this claim up with great perseverance and propriety. He sincerely hoped that the Baron having in vain attempted to obtain a re-hearing of his case by the Privy Council, and having at last addressed himself to the only tribunal—namely, that of the House of Commons, that no difficulty would be raised in allowing him to bring his case before a Committee. If, indeed, there was any validity in the opinion of Sir Launcelot Shadwell, and many other eminent authorities, he doubted not that that Committee would assist the Baron de Bode in the attainment of his object. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by saying, that he thought it right again to state, that he still retained entire and unaltered the impressions which he had first imbibed.

was understood to say, that a certain time had been given to persons claiming upon the fund—that the Baron de Bode had put in his claim, and had been heard before the commission appointed for appropriating the fund, which commission decided against him. It appeared the Baron complained that he had not been able to put his claim in its strongest light, and that therefore the decision was unjust; but surely from 1816, the period at which he first claimed, to 1822, he had full time to make out his case. It was urged, that the Baron being a soldier, and unacquained with the forms of law, should not be tied down to the technicalities of legal proof. He (Lord Althorp) did not think this a doctrine which should be acceded to. If, through the negligence of legal advisers, or any other cause, the proper forms were not adopted, the person so failing (no matter what his profession) should suffer the same consequences as others. He certainly should not accede to this principle, nor yield to the granting a Committee on these grounds, more especially as the case had been already decided by a sufficient tribunal.

, before the sense of the House was taken on it, begged leave to ask one question of the noble Lord (Lord Althorp). Before doing so, he would premise, that no lapse of time ought to interfere with the justice of the claim. He would ask the noble Lord, if other claims which had been shut out on the score of time had not been afterwards admitted? If then other cases had been admitted, was it not very hard that this, which was primâ facie so well founded, should be shut out from inquiry? The House should bear in mind, that it was inquiry, not decision, which was called for in this case, which was one where, the ordinary tribunals having failed in doing justice, an appeal was made to them. His (Mr. Hume's) only anxiety in speaking for the Committee was to ascertain the truth.

, having been asked the question, would only remark that there was a distinction between the cases. A certain period had been fixed for putting in the claims on this fund, and within the prescribed period the Baron had applied. His claim had been heard and adjudicated. The others had not applied, being ignorant of the limits as to time, and the allowance was therefore made.

rose to bring forward his Motion with regard to Education in Ireland. He was desirous of inducing the Commissioners to follow up a more liberal scheme than their now narrow means would permit. The means for effecting this would be found in the tithes in Ireland. The contrast between Ireland and America with regard to national education would best exhibit the deficiency of the former country. The number of persons going to school in America was one in four; in Norway and Sweden one in five; in the Netherlands one in five; Switzerland one in eight; in the Southern part of Germany one in four; whilst in Ireland it was but one in forty. This was a lamentable state of things, and to this were owing many of the misfortunes by which the country was afflicted. In every country where education was neglected, in the degree of that neglect was the debasement, the brutality, and almost the savageness of the country. It was from the want of such education, that the government of Ireland was found so difficult, and the greatest advantage would result from the establishment of national schools in that country, to which all those who availed themselves of them should pay in proportion to their means. To equalize her with the growing intelligence of Europe, Ireland would want 3,500 schools; whilst, in fact, several parishes, varying in population from 7,000 to 10,000, were without any schools. To furnish the necessary degree of education, a sum much more than Parliament could grant would he requisite; but by his plan a single shilling would not be required from Parliament. It was well known, that those who received the tithes were bound by an act of Parliament, at this moment in existence, namely, the 28th Henry 8th, to keep schools; and, on their induction to their parishes, they were bound by oath to act in conformity with this Act. The schools were established to teach English, under penalties of, for the first offence 6s. 8d.; for the second, 20s.; and for the third, the penalty was forfeiture of the benefice. Now, without interfering with any Parliamentary grants, the money could be thus raised:—There were 747 parishes, in which were no churches; there were 150 benefices, in which no service had been performed for three years past: these would amply supply more than the sum required; nor would it be in contradiction to the original intention with which these appointments were made, that those who held them should undertake the education of the people. The money would thus revert to its legitimate purpose, and law, justice, and the interests of the people, called upon the clergy to make the sacrifice. Now, an average of 20l. on every parish, according to its size, would leave 4,800l. per annum, and this would be fully adequate to the purpose. This plan proposed to invest the powers of governing this fund in the same Commissioners who now existed, authorizing them to borrow, if they thought fit, such sums as might be necessary for the first, which, of course, would be the greatest outlay. Thus the people would receive education out of funds clearly their own, their right to which had never been disputed, and of which they had never been deprived by Act of Parliament. Thus a saving of 44,500l., the sum now granted for the purpose, would be made to the country. On the advantages of education it would be unnecessary for him to dilate: Spain, Portugal, and Russia, put in comparison with the United States of America, best evinced its advantages. He would not trespass longer upon the House to press a subject sanctioned by such authorities as Dr. Chalmers, Dr. Doyle, Dr. Bell, and though last not least, Lord Brougham. He would therefore move, 'That a Select Committee be appointed to devise means for extending the present system of education in Ireland, by establishing one or more national schools 'in every parish, and a model or normal school in each province of that country, without any grant from Parliament. 1. And therein to inquire whether, in the first place, sufficient funds may not be derived from the ecclesiastical tithes in Ireland, without injury to religion, to provide for the education of the poor; and, 2ndly, whether such appropriation of a part of this property would be in accordance with the ancient usage, accompanying its possession, and with several Acts of the Legislature.'

seconded the Motion. He agreed with his hon. friend, that the revenues of the Church could not be more beneficially applied, nor in a manner more consistent with the objects for the promotion of which they were originally bestowed. He could only attribute the thinness of the House on such a question to the confidence which he supposed was felt by hon. Members in the anxiety of Ministers to support any measure calculated to improve the condition of Ireland.

thought, that the absence of those hon. Members who usually took great interest in all subjects affecting the welfare of Ireland might be taken as a sufficient indication, that they did not think such a measure expedient at the present time, or at least in its present shape. He was the last man not to admit the great advantages which a liberal system of public education would confer on Ireland; nor was there any question which he would support with greater spirit or with greater zeal, than the system of national education in Ireland, introduced by his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Stanley), which already had exercised a most powerful and beneficial influence in that country. 140,000 children were now educated in these schools, and he believed, that the steps already taken were only preparatory to more extended measures for the diffusion of its advantages. He did not wish to call on the House to give any opinion on the question. He thought it could be more advantageously discussed to-morrow, when the grant to the Irish Education Commission would be proposed; and he believed that, under all circumstances, he should best consult the feeling of the House by moving the previous question.

said, the absence of Irish Members might be accounted for by the fact, that the hon. Member's Motion was impracticable, and could not be carried into effect. The Motion was premature. The hon. member for Waterford had better have waited till the Government grant was proposed. He should therefore vote against the Motion.

attributed the absence of Irish Members on his Motion to a very different cause. It was because he voted only for men when he thought them right, and against them when he thought them wrong. It was because he would not suffer himself to be influenced by factious motives. Whenever, therefore, he came there to fight even in the same cause for which they fought, he was not supported by them, because he would not belong to their faction. Not wishing to run counter to the sense of the House, he would withdraw his Motion.