begged to put some questions to the noble Lord respecting the constabulary force in Ireland, and the rumoured resignation of the gallant officer who for some time past had had the chief superintendence and control over that force. As the questions which he had to put were grounded on the discussion which took place in the House at the time when the change in the law respecting the Irish constabulary was made, he begged particularly to refer to that discussion. The House would probably recollect, that in February, 1836, the noble Secretary for Ireland proposed a bill making material alterations in the mode of appointing the constabulary force in Ireland. The proposal was to transfer the selection of constables from the local magistracy to either the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, or to some officer acting under him, and having charge of the force; and, in order that no mistake might be made about the noble Lord's expressions on that occasion, he (Sir R. Peel) begged to quote the very words used by the noble Lord, which were these:—

"With respect to transferring the appointment of the police force from the local magistracy to the Government, although that appointment would be nominally in the Crown, it would be practically in the hands of the inspector-general. He (Lord Morpeth) contended, that such an officer as the inspector-general would be able to exercise a much more careful and a much more unbiassed choice than could be expected from so numerous a body as the local magistracy. Without imputing any improper motives to that body, without ascribing to them any other political feelings than would be found to exist in any equally numerous body of the same station in society, it was clear that the magistrates would, in most cases, be very desirous to appoint their own friends. Now, as he apprehended, the inspector-general would be influenced by motives much more unbiassed, and his only object would be to make his force as efficient as possible for the public service."^*

The noble Lord was followed by the noble Secretary for the Home Department, who held similar language, observing that—

"There was another inconvenience arising out of the present system, which it would be the object of the Bill now introduced to remove—namely, that while a great part of the police force was by common consent appointed by the inspectors, another part was appointed by the magistrates, and by this means became subservient to local interests, to party views, and to the motives and feelings of particular individuals. The object, then, of the present Bill was to place in one inspector-general the direction of the whole police force of Ireland, to give him a complete control over it, to empower him to organise it into one system, and thus to make the police in Leinster and in Connaught act under the same rules and directions. This, he thought, it would be admitted, was an object which belonged not to any particular party, or to one party more than another; it was a national object, an object which all who desired to see the efficiency of the police improved by a proper system of organization, and by that means wished to contribute to the maintenance and preservation of peace in Ireland, would be anxious to see accomplished."†

These reasons had had considerable influence with him and with many of his friends, though they had entertained strong objections to the proposed transfer. The noble Lord had added, that it had been the object of Government in selecting an inspector-general, to find "some person who had been for years unconnected with any party in Ireland, and who would perform the duties imposed upon him with entire impartiality and exactness;" and when, in order to remove all suspicion, and to give satisfaction to all persons interested in the matter, the noble Lord communicated to the House the selection Government had made of Colonel Shaw Kennedy, "an officer on whose temper, discretion, judgment, and impartiality, every dependence could be placed," and appealed to him (Sir Robert Peel) to confirm the statement he had made respecting Colonel Shaw Kennedy's high character, he (Sir Robert Peel) thought himself warranted in stating, that many of the objections which might have been urged against the proposal were, to a certain extent, if not entirely removed, by

^*Hansard, (Third Series), vol. xxxi, p. 534.† Ibid, page 541.

the announcement which had been made of the appointment of a gentleman free from all imputation of party bias, of the highest integrity and impartiality. He had, therefore, concurred in the arrangement proposed, but it was with a distinct reservation. He had said, that "the appointment of police officers was a trust which, if honestly administered, he thought had better be intrusted to the hands of the representative of the Crown than to any local authority. But he made that admission on the assumption that the trust was to be administered with perfect honesty. If it were otherwise—if the power conferred by the trust were perverted to other purposes, and were employed to gratify party animosities, or to confirm political advantages, then he would say, that the efficiency of the Bill would be totally destroyed. He thought that the noble Lord should adopt the same rule in Ireland as had already been adopted in the metropolis; and that those who were responsible for the good conduct of the men should have the appointment of them; and that the Government ought in no case to interfere in the nomination of officers for the purpose of gratifying any of its political friends if Colonel Shaw were to be appointed to the head of the force, let him have the nomination of the men; and if he (Sir R. Peel) knew anything of that gallant officer, he would undertake to say, that he would exercise the power thus confided to him with honesty and discretion, and that, in a much less time than could otherwise be hoped for, a well-disciplined and efficient police force would be established in Ireland. And he felt bound to say, with great deference to the opinions of his hon. Friend, who had taken a different view of the subject, that he thought if the police force of Ireland were appointed and directed upon this principle, there would be a much stronger guarantee for its sufficiency, and freedom from all local and party prejudices, than could possibly be the case if the appointment of the men of whom it was to be composed were entrusted to the local authorities."^* This principle he had conceived to be fully acquiesced in by the noble Lord, and it was this assumption that had induced him, among others, to waive any objections he might have had to the proposition. Now, it had been publicly stated that Colonel Shaw Kennedy had

^*Hansard (Third Series), vol. xxxi. p. 544.

tendered his resignation; and what he wished to ask the noble Lord, was, first, whether the same rule was pursued in the appointment and promotion of officers and men in the Irish constabulary force as prevailed in the metropolitan police force? secondly, whether it were true that Colonel Shaw Kennedy had tendered his resignation, and whether that tender of resignation had taken place in consequence of any differences between him and the Government in the execution of his public duties? and the third question he wished to ask was, whether, supposing the resignation to have been tendered and accepted, it was intended that the same principle which the noble Lord had professed to be guided by in the selection of Colonel Kennedy would be observed in the appointment of his successor?

could not undertake to answer all the right hon. Gentleman's questions, for he thought that with respect to the rule of appointment and promotion in the Irish constabulary force his noble Friend, the Secretary for Ireland, could give a much clearer account of the matter than he could. In reference to Colonel Kennedy he had to inform the right hon. Baronet, and it was with great regret, that Colonel Kennedy had tendered his resignation, and that it had been accepted. As to the grounds on which the resignation had been tendered, he did not think he could state them without sowing the seeds of future discussion on the subject, which, in a case of this kind, he did not think desirable. With respect to the course to be pursued in naming a new inspector-general, and conducting the future management of the constabularly force in Ireland, he had only to say, that having the highest reliance on the integrity, the great good sense, and honour of Colonel Kennedy, it was the intention of the Lord-Lieutenant and himself (the parties more immediately concerned) to take the opinion of that officer in reference to the future general management of the force, before his successor was appointed, in order to ascertain what improvement could be made in that department. As to another point suggested by the right hon. Baronet he could only say that he did not not think it would be possible to introduce an exact similarity between the rules for managing the constabulary in Ireland and, those for managing the metropolitan police force. No one knew better than the right hon. Gentleman that the metropolitan police force was totally unconnected with the general government of the country, whereas it was essential that the executive in Ireland should have an immediate connection with the constabulary.

said, the noble Lord had misunderstood him. He had not asked whether the noble Lord intended to consult Colonel Shaw Kennedy or not, but whether the same principles which influenced the Crown in the choice of that gallant officer would preside over the choice of his successor? On the former appointment the noble Lord said it was a matter which ought not to be used for party purposes; it was a matter, the success of which concerned all equally—one in which all must feel a common interest, and that, therefore, it would be made solely on public grounds, and exclusively with reference to the fitness of the individual. What he wanted to know was, would the same principles govern the next choice?

had no hesitation in saying, that the same principle would govern the appointment of the inspector-general who should succeed Colonel Shaw Kennedy.

said, the right hon Baronet had correctly quoted, he believed, the very words used by him in introducing the Bill, and in every instance of an appointment to the force since that time it had always been left in the hands of the inspector-general.

inquired, whether it were the prevailing practice in the constabulary force that promotion to the upper class took place from the inferior class as the reward of good conduct?

said, that promotion to the rank of head constables was confined to those who had served as sub-constables; there was no rule whatever to make them the superior officers of the force.

wished to offer a suggestion to the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) on a matter in which he believed the House would be animated by the same sentiments—he alluded to the projected measures for the improvement of the tribunal for the trial of controverted elections. Whatever might be the opinion as to the nature of the tribunal to be constituted for that purpose, the opinion, he believed, would be almost universal—that it would be exceedingly desirable to have a declaratory act, clearing up, as far as possible, the intricacies of the law, and to prevent the inconsistent determinations of election Committees. He would rather not make the proposition himself, because he felt it would have more effect if made by the Government. He wished, however, to offer this suggestion to the noble Lord, that there might be great advantage in having an examination of the evidence taken before election Committees, for the purpose of ascertaining what were the points in respect of which the greatest doubts prevailed, and the most inconsistent decisions had been come to. There would be great expense, and possibly there might be other objections to the printing of the whole of the evidence; and yet it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the precise amount of decisions unless the evidence were read on which they were given. He had heard many decisions quoted as authorities, which, on looking into the evidence, were found altogether inapplicable. It seemed, therefore, worthy of consideration, whether a Select Committee might not be appointed for the purpose of examining the proceedings before the election Committees during the present Session, and extracting such parts of the evidence on important points as would enable the House to see the precise grounds of their decisions. Although, possibly, there might be objection to calling for the evidence before a particular Committee, he did not think any could be raised to the production of all the evidence before all the Committees which had sat this Session. He suggested the appointment of a Select Committee, singly and solely for the purpose of ascertaining what decisions within a recent period it would be most important for the House to consider, with a view hereafter, by some declaratory act, of settling the law and guiding the determination of future Committees. He was indebted for the suggestion to his noble Friend, the Member for North Lancashire (Lord Stanley), and he could not help thinking a declaratory law might be passed with the general consent of all parties, which would cut off a fruitful source of uncertainty, promote uniformity of decision, and greatly diminish the expense, by simplifying and shortening the proceedings before election Committees.

said, he should certainly take the matter into his serious consideration. He had no objection in principle to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman, but he confessed if it were adopted he was not very sanguine as to its results, because those who were best able to judge of such matters, being Members of that House, and having great practice at the bar, could hardly be expected to pay that attention to the Committee which would enable them to come to a decision of great authority on the subject. At the same time, he should be very glad to see the experiment tried.

could not help thinking the difficulty apprehended by the noble Lord might easily be got over, as the case lay in a very small compass, and the opinion of the legal Gentlemen might, therefore, easily be had.

never knew anything connected with law to be in a small compass. He thought the appointment of such a Committee would only be the means of continuing the present abuses by turning them into a different shape.

said, that objection did not apply to his proposition. The Committee should have no discretion to report on anything, except the decisions of Committees on litigated points, the evidence bearing on different decisions, and the decisions themselves.

, in that case, should only say, the plan would be altogether inoperative.

thought, the best mode of diminishing the expense before election Committees would be properly to define the qualification of voters. Until the register was made final in every part of the country it would be vain to hope for any diminution of the expenses of an election Committee.

said, it was to prevent adverse decisions on that point that he had suggested inquiry.

said, he was anxious to call the attention of the House to the clause. He thought it a great hardship that the defendants in all cases were obliged to pay costs when in the wrong, and the Commissioners were exempt from costs when they happened to be in error. He begged to ask whether it was the intention of the noble Lord to alter the clause, so as to make the wrong-doer, whoever he may be, pay the costs.

said, he must abide by the clause in its present shape.

begged to mention a case very nearly similar, which occurred to himself. A quit-rent collector went out of the barony and parish in which he was authorised to collect quit-rent, and distrained a tenant of his for 5l., which the farmer, sooner than let his cattle be driven off the ground, paid. The tenant came to him to complain, and it turned out that the town-land was free from quit-rent. He hunted the matter up, and though he met with the greatest civility, he obtained no redress. He was informed, that if he sued the man and failed, he should have to pay the costs; but what was worse, it appeared that if he sued him and succeeded, he should still have to pay the costs; and so it was with the present clause.

thought, the hon. Member was peculiarly ill advised not to proceed against the wrong doer. With respect to the clause under consideration, he should object to giving costs against the Commissioners.

said, that in the discussion of a former part of the Bill, the Government undertook that there should be a Commissioner permanently resident in Dublin, to an office established there for the purpose of receiving applications, and affording information to all who might be concerned in the administration of the Poor-law in Ireland. He admitted, there was an advantage in having the whole system, both in England and Ireland, under the direction of one board—but that would be too dearly purchased if the Commissioners were all resident at Somerset-house, in which case the business of Ireland must necessarily be postponed to the more pressing demands upon their attention from England. The present clauses were only permissive as to one Commissioner acting in Ireland. He, therefore, could not agree to them without an express understanding from the Government that the entire attention and time and presence of one Commissioner, at least, should be devoted to Ireland.

said, that it was intended that there should be one Commissioner permanently resident at Dublin, and that there should be an office at Dublin for the carrying on of the business of the Poor-law Commissioners. It might happen that in case of illness among the Poor-law Commissioners in London, the Dublin Commissioner might be called to this country; but in that case, an Assistant-Commissioner would be appointed for the time, so that the business of the Poor-law Commissioners would always be attended to in Dublin.

said, he understood a clause was to be introduced, making it necessary that one Commisioner should reside in Dublin. As the clause stood, it merely made it permissive in place of peremptory. The people of Ireland were decidedly of opinion, that there should be one Commissioner at the least resident in Dublin. Perhaps, therefore, the noble Lord would have no objection to introduce words to this effect:—"That there shall be an office in Dublin where one of the Commissioners shall be generally resident."

had no objection to introduce the words.

said, he was by no means satisfied with the clause as it stood; nor could he allow it to pass without entering his protest against it. It was absolutely indispensable to working out the measure that there should be a resident board in Dublin, and this was the unanimous opinion of the people of Ireland. It was his intention to move an amendment to the clause, and would leave it to the Committee to negative it if they thought fit. He should move, that three persons be appointed to sit in Dublin to administer the Bill. He should wish to see one of the Commissioners from the English Board; also, an eminent medical man; and the third, a person intimately acquainted with all the localities of Ireland. Such was the kind of board he purposed to substitute for the one resident Commissioner.

said, the Committee having before expressed a very decided opinion on this point, he should not now re-discuss the question. He considered that his noble Friend, having adopted the suggestion thrown out on the other side, had done all that was required.

opposed the insertion of these words. The Government had never intended that ministers' money should be made chargeable to the poor-rate; it would be unjust in principle, as a departure from the bill, which only professed to be a charge upon land, as against the landlord or quasi landlord in fee, in which light the tithe-owner was regarded in respect to composition rent, but could not be as to ministers' money; and it would practically bear with great hardship upon a class of income which was most difficult of collection by the clergyman, and in regard of which he had no benefit from the tithe composition acts. He protested against the shabby course the Government had taken in this matter; they not having introduced, or of themselves meaning to introduce, any substantive enactment, rendering ministers' money liable to the poor-rate, yielded to the pressure of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. O'Connell), and now, in the interpretation clause at the end of the bill, as it were, smuggled in words, merely by way of interpretation, imposing a tax upon the clergy of a personal nature, to which no other class was subjected. He was aware that he would have a bad division, as his friends were quite taken by surprise, not having expected that such a course would have been adopted by the Government; but still, to show his sense of the injustice of that course, he would divide the Committee against the amendment.

said, that so far from the question being decided the other night, the clause was allowed to stand over for consideration. His learned Friend, the Solicitor-General, had since looked into the acts, and had found the act creating ministers' money in Ireland to be very like that creating the stipend in lieu of tithe in London, and therefore he saw no necessity for exempting ministers' money from the payment of poor-rates.

had not heard any principle suggested from the beginning to the end of these discussions to warrant the rating of ministers money. The principle of the bill was, that nothing should be rated but lands or hereditaments, and therefore tithe was fairly subject to the rate, and the law dealt with it as land in all its qualities. On the other hand, ministers money was granted by statute, in the nature of pecuniary aid, in which the clergyman had no vested right, inasmuch as it was quite optional with the Lord-Lieutenant, in council, whether it was granted or not. Under all the circumstances of the case, he thonght it his duty to oppose the introduction of the words.

contended, that ministers money was to all intents and purposes a charge upon the land, and therefore ought to be subject to poor-rates.

said, he thought it quite clear that on principle this money should not be rated to the poor. If this money were the same as tithe, then it must be rateable, but, according to the Irish acts, it was impossible that it could be viewed in that light. He would suggest to the noble Lord, that he should propose a substantive clause relating to this matter, in order that the opinion of the House might be regularly taken on it, and the point set at rest.

thought, that there was no evidence to show that ministers money was not assessable. In London it had been ascertained that this species of impost was liable to rates. It was a contribution in respect of each house levied in the towns of Ireland for the support of the clergy, payable by the occupier.

said, the law was quite clear upon the subject. Now Dean Dawson had 1,100l. out of the parish in which he (Mr. O'Connell) resided. The parish extended as far as Rathfarnham, so he, of course, received tithes from part of it, and on that portion of his income he would have to pay pror-rates, while it was sought to exempt the portion of his income derived from Merrion-square. Ministers' money was an annual income charged upon the house, and not the person: there was a remedy for non payment by distress. The contribution was levied on the same principle as tithes, and therefore ought not to be exempted from rates. He could not much congratulate the clergy of Ireland on the conduct of their friends, who struggled to exempt the ministers of the church in towns, where the greatest distress existed, from the payment of any amount towards the relief of the destitute.

maintained, that though the clergy paid rates on tithe, it did not follow that they ought to pay rates on the commutation received on their other allowances. Many clergymen were paid by stipend, and it was not sought to charge them with poor-rates. The words of the act referred to were conclusive. "Whereas there was little or no tithe." Now, when there was none payable, ministers money could not be said to be in lieu of tithe.

thought, if an impost arising out of the land was burdened with rate, a charge on houses ought to be liable to it also.

said, rent charges were exempt from rate; the present charge arose in the same manner, and ought to be exempted also. He insisted that there were no words in the Acts of Parliament bearing on the point which gave ministers money as tithes, or in lieu of tithes. It was not because the rate would be payable by the clergy that he wished them to be exempted from it, but because this kind of rent charge was not rateable in the hands of laymen, and therefore could not, on any principle of justice, be rateable when received by the ministers of religion.

said, he possessed some land on which he paid tithe—he built a house upon it, and the churchwardens forthwith demanded ministers money. He paid both for a while, but he now paid only the ministers' money. There could, therefore, be no doubt that ministers' money was received in lieu of tithe.

would not enter into the discussion of the legal question; he rose merely to state, that there was not the slightest warrant for the injurious terms in which the right hon. Gentleman had spoken of Ministers on this occasion, for the question had been mooted one night last week, when Government had distinctly reserved it for further consideration; and the words now proposed for insertion had been printed and circulated, and in the hands of hon. Members for the last four days.

said, the right hon. Member for Ripon had fallen into a mistake in assimilating this to a rent charge, for it happened, unfortunately for his argument, that rent charges were not exempted from rates by the bill. But this was not a rent charge; it was really and substantially a payment given by Act of Parliament in lieu of tithe, and as a substitute for it. Whether, however, it was considered in the same light as the money paid to the clergymen of London, or as a rent charge, it was impossible that the argument of the right hon. Gentleman could hold good.

said, he had drawn the clearest distinction that words could express between a rent charge and a perpetual rent charge, which placed its owner in the position of a landlord.

, in rising to propose the omission of this clause, said, he should be ashamed to present himself before his constituents if he allowed a clause appointing paid guardians to pass without taking the sense of the House upon it. He firmly believed, that there was no part of Ireland in which virtuous and component persons would not be found to form a board of guardians, ready to work out the bill in a spirit of fairness and probity. He should not trouble the House with any lengthened argument upon the subject, but would merely express a hope that no Irish country gentleman of spirit would be found to sanction the clause.

thought it possible, that circumstances might arise which would render the appointment of paid guardians necessary. He could not understand why the hon. Member for Limerick should take offence at Government providing against a fatality which was, at all events, of possible occurrence. In the west of Ireland, he very much feared that such a provision would be found necessary, and he could not bring himself to believe, that the Commissioners would have recourse, unnecessarily, to the powers with which the clause invested them. On the whole, as he could not see, that the honour of the country was at all involved in the decision to which the Committee may come, he should support the clause as it stood.

suggested, that as the Bill gave the power to divide the country into electoral districts, each district in which a paid officer was appointed ought to support such officer itself.

said, that if he really believed the true meaning of the clause to be that suggested by the gallant Member for Donegal, he should not object to it; but as he put a very different construction upon the meaning of the clause, he must oppose it.

was of opinion, that if guardians appointed by the parish refused or neglected to serve, they ought to be fined like grand jurors or other officers appointed to perform public duties. If, however, it turned out in any particular locality that there was not a sufficient number of resident guardians, or if any other state of circumstances arose to call for the interference of the Commissioners, he did not think, that there could be any objection to the power given to the Commissioners to appoint paid officers.

thought, that the imposing of a fine upon persons for not performing a work of charity, would be rather a new mode of legislation. The measure, as it stood, in point of fact, imposed a fine in the most attenuated shape. If the resident guardians appointed by the rate payers refused to serve, and that paid officers were in consequence appointed by the Commissioners, the effect would be an increase in the amount of rates. That would prevent the continuance, or, at least, the repetition, of the refusal to serve, in which cases the Commissioners would probably revoke the appointment of paid officers, and allow the duties of the guardians to revert to the natural protectors of the poor. The clause, as it stood, appeared to him to be an extremely wholesome one, and guarded as much as possible against the occurrence of abuses. Supposing the workhouse to be built and the guardians refused to act, would it not be monstrous to allow all the machinery of the Bill to remain idle, and the expense and trouble to be gone to in vain.

did not object so much to the whole clause as to the words, "such and so many paid officers as the Commissioners shall think fit to appoint." These words would give the Commissioners the power of appointing an indefinite and unlimited number. The powers so conferred were much too extensive, and might afford a handle for abuse.

thought it was somewhat inconsistent and fastidious to limit the power given to the Commissioners in this clause, after the extensive powers which were conferred upon them in other and antecedent clauses of the Bill. He did not think it likely that the Commissioners would be guilty of an abuse of the powers confided in them, the more particularly as public opinion would operate to prevent them doing so.

had an amendment to propose, which he thought would meet the views of the noble Lord opposite (Castlereagh). He proposed to leave out the words, "such and so many paid officers as the Commissioners shall think fit to appoint," and substitute for them the words, "the Commissioners may make order for the payment of such and so many of the guardians as they shall think fit." The consequence would be, that the persons to be paid by the Commissioners would be the guardians appointed by the ratepayers, and not independent officers of the Commissioners own selection. He thought the House should look with great distrust upon an attempt to place unlimited power in the hands of those who were not immediately responsible for its exercise. If the Commissioners were persons well acquainted with the state of the country, the case would be different. The whole spirit of the Bill would be changed if the clause was allowed to remain in its present shape. If a system of the kind proposed worked well, it would alarm him more than any single thing that could occur. If the unions were as large as were proposed, it would be impossible for the guardians to attend, and therefore paid guardians would be at once appointed. He was astonished that the present Cabinet, above all others, should bring in such a clause. They were bound, he thought, to render this Bill palatable to those who would, with their very hearts, support them. He was in the habit of receiving letters day after day from various parts of Ireland, saying there would be no objection to the Bill if the people were allowed themselves to work it, but the present clause put an end to the possibility of their doing so. The noble Lord concluded by begging of his hon Friend, the Member for Limerick, to take the division on bringing up the report.

said, that the line of argument pursued in opposition to this clause was as if the Commissioners would be anxious to make it impossible for the guardians to execute their duties, in order that paid officers of their own nomination might be appointed. Now he could not presume anything of the kind. The effect of the clause, as it stood, was, that where the guardians did not duly and effectively discharge the duties assigned to them by the Act, in such cases the Commissioners should appoint paid officers. This power, therefore, was a remedy only in cases of default on the part of the guardians, and where the Bill could not operate. It was, moreover, a remedy, the effect of which would be to induce the guardians to execute their duties properly. But what would be the effect of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord? Why, that in cases where the guardians did not perform their duties, they were to be induced to do so by the offer of a salary. Now, he was very much afraid that such an offer would be a motive to the guardians not to execute their duties gratuitously, but to neglect them, in order that they might obtain a salary. He thought, that the clause, as it stood, was preferable to the noble Lord's amendment.

said, the noble Lord had mistaken the gist of his noble Friend's argument. The noble Lord was not entitled, having avoided retracting what he said on former occasions as to the size of the unions, now to have the benefit of retracta- tion. Now, in a union in England, containing 100 parishes, a farmer by acting might save to himself 25s.; but what could the Irish guardians save by acting? Only 3d., one-half of which he would only have to pay.

thought, the Bill was a tissue of fraud, and held out expectations which would never be realised. If the Bill could be worked out at all, the effect of it would be a confiscation of property, without the slightest benefit to the poor. So determined was his opposition to the Bill, that upon the bringing up of the report, he would move, that it be received that day six months.

said, that the chief object of his amendment was to get an expression of the noble Lord's opinion as to the payment of guardians elected by the people, rather than have the Commissioners appoint paid officers of their own selection. As, however, the words he had used in his amendment might not be suited to the intended object, he would withdraw the amendment altogether.

was sure, that the clause would be very rarely called into action. The people of Ireland, he was satisfied, would do their duty with respect to this Bill, and it was only in default of guardians refusing to act that this power would be given to the Commissioners—a power which there was no doubt the Commissioners would not be likely to abuse.

said, he would now move an amendment, that in cases where an unpaid guardian could not be found to act in a district, the paid guardian appointed by the Commissioners should be paid out of the funds of the electoral district, and not out of the funds of the whole union.

said, that in preceding clauses of the bill the persons appointed by the Commissioners were styled paid officers, and not guardians.

thought the object his hon. Friend, the Member for Monaghan, had in view was a very desirable one. It was but just, that the electoral district in fault should be visited with the expense.

wished to ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman, the Attorney-General for Ireland, if the board of guardians should refuse to act, what number of paid officers could be appointed by the Commissioners?

replied, that if the board of guardians were found inefficient, the Commissioners would have power to appoint paid officers to act instead. The judgment as to efficiency must be vested somewhere, and he did not see where it could be better placed than in the hands of the Commissioners.

said, that if difficulties should occur, as no doubt there would be, in getting the guardians, or a sufficient number of them, to attend, the exception of the appointment of paid officers would soon become the rule; and if the power of appointment of paid officers once got into the hands of the Commissioners, it would be almost impossible for the people to get it back again. It was on this ground that he wished to have paid guardians, and he was sure that the bill would never work well without them.

said, if it was possible to make the bill more unpopular in Ireland than it was at present, this clause would make it so. The House had just heard what was the opinion of one of the warmest supporters of the Government upon the clause. He certainly never could be brought to vote for the bill after the expression of opinion against it which existed in the part of the country which he represented. Except the bill united the feelings of the Irish people, it would be in vain to suppose that it would work well through the assistance of paid guardians. He thought it desirable to omit the clause altogether.

had listened with attention to the arguments on both sides, but had heard nothing to induce him to support the clause. He agreed with his noble Friend, the Member for the county Down, that the bill, in its present shape, was most objectionable—the bill, without the clause in question, was sufficiently so, but with it it was quite intolerable. He was opposed to the formation of large unions—the clause could only be necessary for large unions, and for that reason alone he should oppose it; but it was not on that ground solely he rested his objection to the clause—he opposed it on principle, as tending to increase the patronage of the Crown, by the creation of more commissioners, where too many existed already. He thought the clause would be productive of jobbing, and he should therefore oppose it.

said, it was unfair to tax Government with a wish to create patronage. The hon. Member for Limerick wished to have three Commissioners, whereas the Government were satisfied with one. He said that the necessity of the case justified the clause and the powers intrusted to the Commissioners. Without the clause the bill would be inoperative. He, however, thought the success of the measure would chiefly depend on the spontaneous exertions of the inhabitants in the different districts. He denied, that the Government were pledged that the unions should be any particular size.

said, his noble Friend had not convinced him of the necessity of the clause. He objected to such unlimited and despotic power being conferred on any commissioners. The clause as it stood gave them the power of appointing all over Ireland.

said, it came to this, that if the bill would not work, it was to be forced upon the people. If so, he would prefer not having the bill at all.

said, the bill would be ineffective without the clause.

would support the clause. The office of the paid guardians was not intended to be permanent, and the ratepayers could get rid of those officers if they were found to be inattentive to their duties.

said, that if the power were given to the Commissioners to employ paid guardians, all the other officers would require compensation for their labours; and in that case the expenses would be much heavier than the Irish gentry and farmers could afford. These appointments would be very much to the advantage of the Government. If this power were conferred no officers would act without payment. The bill altogether was most unpopular in Ireland. There was no man who had an acre of land who did not dread its provisions. He received letters every day from those who agreed with him in politics and with those who differed from him. There was one point, however, upon which they all agreed—namely, in opposition to this bill. He did not think it possible it ever could work, and he should therefore oppose it.

thought her Majesty's Government were peculiarly sparing in their reasons for forcing this clause upon the people of Ireland. He maintained that where the Irish Members expressed a decided opinion upon a clause of the bill it was the duty of the Government to meet their wishes. On an amendment of his the other night, charging jointures, &c., he had twenty five Irish Members to eleven; and on the right hon. Member for the University's amendment there were three to one in favour of it; and yet upon neither did the Government give way. He for one could not be accused of being an opponent to poor-laws. For the last seven years, both by writing and speaking, he had been their advocate; but rather than this bill should pass, he would prefer one to this effect:—"Be it enacted, that the Poor-law Commissioners at Somerset House he authorised to tax all the property in Ireland." The power conferred by this clause was at variance with those principles of self government contended for by the Government in the corporations and other institutions of the country. If the 25th Clause were allowed to remain in the bill, he could only say, that Ireland was not fit to have a poor-law at all, If Irish Gentlemen on the division should be content to allow the Commissioners of Somerset House to tax their property, the blame would lie with them and not with him.

observed, that it was always very easy to select a particular clause, or a case which very seldom occurred, as the ground for condemning a whole bill. This was the course taken by the hon. Member for Limerick in the present instance, as he took this particular clause, attacked it for the powers which it proposed to confer, and said that this was the principle of the bill. He totally denied that the principle of the bill was such as the hon. Gentleman had represented. When the absence of self-government and local government was alluded to by the hon. Gentleman, he would remind him that the guardians under this act were to be elected by the different districts, and were to supply the poor with relief. Did the hon. Gentleman mean to say, that such a provision was opposed to local government? He was aware that this clause was not in the English bill; but he recollected that when that measure was under discussion it was argued that the most despotic powers were given to the Commissioners. And there were certainly some provisions introduced which would seem to justify that description. For instance, in the case of the guardians neglecting to act, it was made competent for those magistrates who were ex officio guardians, to assume the whole authority. Yet would it be just to say, that because such powers, in an extreme case, were given, magistrates appointed by the Government were to be intrusted with the execution of the provisions of the law? Now, that was the sort of argument used to prevent this clause from passing. This clause only provided for particular instances in which no boards of guardians were made. It was impossible not to see that such a case might occur. Now there would be relief given under these circumstances by the English bill, even when no magistrates attended, and it was not fair that a district should omit to bear the burthen of its own poor merely from the default, the resistance, or disobedience, of the guardians.

supported the clause, because he considered it absolutely necessary to the working of the bill. The bill certainly conferred great power on the Commissioners, but the great difficulty had been the doubt as to there being sufficient machinery in Ireland to do without this. In England the case was different; but there the power so given was limited in its duration. Although there were many objections to the principle, yet he considered the clause so necessary in a practical point of view, that he should certainly support it.

withdrew his amendment, and the Committee divided on the original motion: Ayes 35; Noes 33: Majority 2.

objected to this clause, and to the new clause which the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) had printed with reference to tithe-owners. He thought he had convinced the noble Lord the other night, that it would be much simpler and fairer to estimate the annual value of the lands without deducting the tithe, and to let the occupier pay the rate in the first instance, and then stop the tithe-owner's proportion as in the case of the landlord, where the occupier was liable to the tithe, and to let the occupier stop the half of the entire rate from the landlord, and then the landlord stop the tithe-owner's share from the tithe-owner, where the landlord was liable to the tithe. This could be done by omitting the proviso from the 60th Clause, which would leave the land and the occupier liable for the whole rate, in the first instance—and then, by adding a few words to the 69th and 70th Clauses, which adjusted the proportions of rate, the former as between occupier and landlords—the latter as between the different landlords receiving rent out of the, same land, the proportions between the occupier and tithe-owner, or landlord and tithe-owner, as the case might be, would be as easily settled—while, on the other hand, the plan of the noble Lord would involve much difficulty, intricacy and injustice; first, by deducting the tithe in the valuation under the 60th Clause, and rating it separately, you kept alive the distinction between rent and tithe, which it had been the policy of recent legislation to merge; secondly, by the proposed new clause for the recovery of rate on tithe; the noble Lord, pressed by the difficulty of finding a remedy except through the occupier, proposed, that after two months, if the rate was not paid by the tithe-owner, then the guardians might applot the occupiers as if they had been primarily liable, which was but a roundabout process of arriving at what he proposed in the first instance. And thirdly the noble Lord did not provide against the injustice which he admitted would be inflicted upon the tithe-owner in taxing him for tithe he might not receive by the second part of the proposed new clause; for, though it gave the tithe-owner, by a very cumbrous machinery, the right to make a declaration in writing that he had not received his tithe, and then sent the guardians to applot upon the tithe-payer, yet that was only in case the tithe-owner had not received in the whole tithe sufficient to pay the rate, so that though but one parishioner might have paid his tithe, and all the rest be in arrear, yet that one sum must be paid over as poor-rate by the clergyman on the entire of his benefice. There really could be no comparison between the two plans in point of simplicity, convenience and justice; and if the Government did not adopt his (Mr. Shaw's) proposition, he should move it as an amendment.

would adopt the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Shaw), charging, however, the tithe-owner, according to the principle of the bill, with the whole poor-rate, by way of deduction. He admitted it was more simple to charge the occupier in the first instance, and then the tithe-owner would not be taxed till he was paid. He (Lord J. Russell) therefore, would withdraw the clauses for the present, and amend them according to the plan of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Shaw).

then said, he had a clause to propose between Clauses 48 and 49 He was unwilling to take up the time of the House—but this was a subject on which deep interest was felt, particularly in that part of Ireland which be had the honour to represent. Petitions had been sent up from all parts of Ireland as to this bill, and from the reports on public petitions, it appeared that the number of petitions against the bill was 55; in favour of it 3; while the number of signatures against the bill was 27,259; in favour of it 252, and several petitions of those which he had presented were signed by the churchwardens on behalf of public meetings. He had presented a petition that day from the county of Down, against the bill. It was in deference to the wishes of these petitioners, that he begged now to move a clause empowering the Commissioners to exempt from the operation of the Act such parishes as were willing to take upon themselves the care of their own poor— which had hitherto been the case in many parishes in the north of Ireland, and with great success, for the number of the poor had been diminished, and the country greatly benefitted by this system. The people of Ireland, therefore, prayed that they might not be forced to abandon a system which had been found to work well, and to adopt one which they could not but regard as an experiment.

said, he should oppose the second reading of the clause, as it would render the bill entirely nugatory—it would be leaving it to the option of the people of Ireland whether they would accept the bill or not.

remarked, the clause contained no machinery by which the parishes were to manage themselves for the purpose of carrying it out.

agreed with his noble Friend (Lord Castlereagh) that it was a very serious question, whether a poor-law should be introduced into Ireland at all. But, if it was once introduced, he thought that excepting any particular district from the operation of the bill, but giving that district the power to tax itself, and then administer relief to the poor, according to such plan as the rate payers of that particular locality might adopt, would be full of danger, and, giving the managers every credit for the best notions, might induce all the abuses and intricacies of the old English system of out-door relief, labour rates, settlement, &c. Now he felt that the measure was a great and painful experiment, but if it was to be tried in Ireland, at all events, let them have the benefit of one uniform and simple plan, with the checks it afforded, the best of which be considered was the exclusion of out-door relief.

observed, that the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell) would find in his right hon. Friend (Mr. Shaw) a most able ally in the progress of this Bill, and his right hon. Friend had better go over, perhaps, to the other side. He would support the clause, because it operated against the workhouse system, to which he was diametrically opposed. All that the parishes who were willing to adopt the clause asked was, that all the inhabitants should be compelled to pay their quota of the rate. The people of Ireland had been taken by surprise by this frightful measure, and were against it.

withdrew the clause.

then moved a clause, similar to the 26th clause in the English new Poor-law Bill. By that clause all the parishes of the union were liable to the charges for the maintenance of the workhouse, the pay of the staff, and the general expense of the union; but each of the parishes composing that union still con- tinued liable to support its own poor. His proposition was, that a similar clause should be adopted with respect to Ireland, and that each of the parishes of the union should be separately rated for, and be liable to the maintenance of its own poor, although it should, at the same time, be liable to bear a proportionate part of the general expenses of the union in other respects.

thought his hon. Friend (Mr. Lucas) would find it impossible to define who were the poor of any particular district. They could only be actually found at the workhouse where they applied for relief; and any attempt to discover and charge the district from whence they came, would be adopting the principle the House had already decided against of a law of settlement. In Ireland, above all places, it would be difficult to discover from whence a pauper came; particularly if he knew that his own district was to be charged, he would consider it a point of honour not to tell the truth.

said, that the power of the Commissioners had already, he feared, been so cramped by the amendments in the Bill made in Committee, that he doubted whether the proposed clause could, under any circumstances, be carried into operation. The hon. Gentleman had said, that the clause he had moved was exactly similar to a clause in the English Poor-law Amendment Act; but there were two circumstances which the House ought to consider before coming to the conclusion that a clause which was applicable to England would be equally applicable to Ireland. The first of those circumstances was, that in England there had existed "a separate system" previous to the passing of the Poor-law Bill. And the second was, that in this country the law of settlement had also previously existed. It was, therefore, easy to carry the provisions of a clause similar to that which the hon. Gentleman had proposed into operation in England; but the circumstances of Ireland were so different, that he feared such a clause would be productive of injury rather than good, and be should therefore feel it to be his duty to oppose it.

said, when this Bill was introduced, the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared that any attempt to get rid of these duties would be absurd. He, on the contrary, believed their doom was sealed, and that if not at present, within a very short period, the right hon. Gentleman must reduce his expenditure, or look out for a substitute for them. As in the reign of William 3d the Treasury was compelled to give up the duties on glass, as being destructive to its manufacture in this country, so, for the same reason, a similar fate must await the present duties—duties imposed as a war-tax in the reign of George 2nd, and continued with fatal impolicy down to the present day. The attention of the public once drawn to this question, it would never be endured that a necessary of life, of the importance which belongs to glass in a climate like ours, should be considered and taxed as an article of luxury; that a manufacture amounting in annual value to 2,000,000l. sterling, employing upwards of 50,000 workmen, and which would in a short time treble itself if it was allowed fair play, should be hampered by regulations declared by the Commissioners of Excise Inquiry in their 13th report to be harassing, vexatious, and oppressive, and described as a tax upon industry, and a bar to invention and improvement. These Commissioners—gentlemen whose laborious research and sound judgment are universally admitted—have recorded their conviction, that by those duties and regulations, not only is the consumption of glass materially checked, but that the employment of labour and capital is restricted, and the accumulation of national wealth seriously retarded; that under these regulations an illicit trade is carried on to a great extent, which in many instances has driven the fair trader out of the market, and forced him to abandon his business altogether. In the evidence taken before those gentlemen, it was fully established by Mr. Bower and other practical men, that great improvements would probably have taken place in the manufacture of glass, but for the operation of the Excise-laws, which prevent the free progress of invention and improvement, not only as regards the article itself, but in the different arts and sciences to which it is subsidiary: it appeared that under these laws our foreign trade had gradually fallen off, and that if they were continued, our colonial trade must inevitably be taken from us, as it is already materially injured by the importation of German and other continental glass: it appeared by this evidence also, that the manufacture of glass beads and other ornaments, which was at one time extensively carried on in this country had latterly been entirely abandoned. We find the Commissioners stating, after the most searching inquiries, that they "have no hesitation in affirming these duties to be highly prejudicial to our foreign trade"—a conclusion, the correctness of which he (Mr. French) contended could not be disputed, as by those high duties the manufacture of glass for telescopes had been transferred to foreign countries, and by the laws as they now stood, the fabrication of one valuable description of this article, the stained window glass, for which this country was formerly so celebrated, was actually prohibited. The materials of which glass is made were abundant in this country; skill, capital, and intelligence, had been largely expended in its manufacture, but still it had not prospered, because of the vexatious duties imposed upon it. Other countries may have cheaper labour, whilst this country boasts of far greater skill and enterprise, notwithstanding which our manufacturers were now undersold in our own colonies by other nations. Nay, even into England itself, one description of glass, such as decanters, tumblers, and wineglasses, could be imported from Germany cheaper than they could be manufactured here. By referring to the reports on the separate classes into which this manufacture is divided, the House would find, that half the amount levied as duty on bottle glass was returned as drawback, which fact would alone be sufficient to call for its repeal. Mr. Cookson, of Newcastle, an extensive manufacturer, examined by the Committee, stated, that the materials of which bottle-glass was composed, were various; that manufacturers of crown-glass have a refuse which is too impure for theist to use, but which had been used by bottle manufacturers, and the use of it had improved the colour of the common bottle-glass, inasmuch as it was employed particularly for chemical purposes, and in snaking large vessels for oil of vitriol and carboys, and the finer the material the tougher will be the glass; but this refuse is considered by the Excise an improper thing to be used in common bottle metal; it is consequently prohibited, and must be thrown away, although a highly useful article. The House would scarcely believe that the only ground suggested for this strange prohibition was, that the use of this material would make the goods so fine as to bring them into competition with flint glass. This article called crown cullet, is utterly useless for making crown glass, though a cheaper and better material for its purpose than any now used in the manufacture of bottle-glass. On this subject the Commissioners very justly remark, that "it would be hardly possible to imagine an instance in which the inju- rious operation of Excise regulations could be placed in a stronger light; we see hundreds of tons of an article which is known to be the cheapest, and at the same time the best which could be used in one of our most extensive and most useful domestic manufactures, lying uselessly at the very doors of our manufacturers, who are prevented from employing it solely by their dread of the construction which might be put on a doubtful clause of an Excise statute." The effect of the augmentation of duty on crown glass was to diminish the consumption on the average of three years from 114, 725cwt. to 95, 451cwt. It might be well to mention, as an instance of the useless and harassing regulations to which the manufacturer of glass was subjected, the manner in which the convenience of the manufacturer was interfered with, without any corresponding advantage to the revenue. There are thirty-two clauses of regulations, penalties, and prohibitions, which are as expensive to the public as they are vexatious to the manufacturer; a costly staff must be kept up for surveys, which are to be taken every four hours; no month ever passed over the head of the manufacturer in which he did not subject himself, in one way or another, to penalties; he was, in fact, at the mercy of the Excise, who could ruin him if they pleased. But, to return to the report on crown glass; the House would there find, that in consequence of the repeated frauds practised within the last few years, the trade had become wholly unproductive to the honest manufacturer. Mr. Cuthbert states in his evidence, that the regulations would occasion very strong grievances if carried into effect, which was not done because it was not practicable. The charge on the exportation of this glass was from 200 to 250 per cent. more than it ought to be; duty was charged upon duty, the duty percentage being taken upon the price of the glass, duty included, instead of on the amount, as in fairness it ought to be, of the value after deducting the drawback. The whole quantity exported now did not bear the proportion of a twentieth to that exported to the Baltic twenty years ago. For proof of the little regard paid to the convenience of the manufacturers, he should refer to the evidence of Mr. Chance, who stated, that the notices he was required to give were so numerous, that he was obliged to have them printed by thousands: he was giving notices all day long, but still every now and then he was summoned before a magistrate for some omission. He was certain that the House would agree with the Commissioners that the expense and inconvenience arising from this course must be heavily felt in the generality of establishments. In the report on plate glass, the House would find, that the duty prevented a successful competition in small plates with foreign countries, and had an effect scarcely less injurious upon the home market, by preventing the use of a superior description of article. It would be found, that the continuance of the duty on flint glass was productive of public injury far beyond what could be compensated by the small amount secured by them to the revenue; that in the cost of collection each flint-glass-house cost the revenue no less than 300l. a-year for officers alone: that the duty was continually evaded, and the market supplied with articles at a price which, if the duty were paid, would be disposing of them at a loss. Articles were in the market at 3s. or 4s. which, if the duty had been paid, could not be sold for less than 6s. Many small orders were refused on account of the expense of the bond (10s. 6d.) The abolition of the duty would lead to a great extension of the trade: many articles would then be made of glass which now are not. The alteration in 1825 almost annihilated the exportation of flint glass. Was this, he would ask, a tax which ought, under all the circumstances, to be maintained? Mr. M'Culloch states in his Commercial Dictionary, that the only difficulty he labours under, is to decide whether the regulations under which the duties are levied, or the duties themselves, are the most oppressive; that the wealth and population of these countries have more than doubled since the year 1790; and that he is convinced that the manufacture of glass, had it been left to itself, would have increased in a still greater ratio; but so far was this manufacture from advancing, that it had positively declined, and was actually less at this moment than it was forty years ago. This extraordinary result was entirely to be ascribed to the exorbitant excess to which the duties had been carried. One third of the amount levied was returned in drawback, and the expense of collection bore no fair proportion to the sum levied. The right hon. Gentleman, the President of the Board of Trade, in a statement made by him a few years ago, proved that, for the sake of about 500,000l., the net proceeds of this tax, nearly a million of mony was levied; and he found by a return recently laid before the House, that out of 966,136l., the grost amount of the duty, 322,789l. was returned in drawback. How, in the face of a statement like that, with the recorded opinion of an influential Member of the Cabinet and the report of the Commissioners of Excise Inquiry so strongly opposed to him, his right hon. Friend could persevere in maintaining this tax, he was utterly unable to imagine. The treatment which Ireland had received in this matter of the glass duties was still more iniquitous. In Ireland, previous to the year 1825, flint glass paid no duty, and bottle glass paid by tale of 2s. 6d. per gross until the year 1828, when Mr. Goulbourn, on pretence of the frauds practised by the English and Scotch manufacturers, under the drawback, thought proper to equalise, as he was pleased to call it, the duties in both countries, the result of which operation was to double the price of glass in Ireland. The process was this: he increased the duty on Irish glass from 1s.3d. per cwt. to 7s., and decreased the duty on English from 8s. 2d. to 7s. The injustice thus practised towards Irelend was manifest and most striking. Coals were delivered to the bottle manufacturers of Scotland at 7s. 6d. per ton, and to those of Newcastle at 4s. per ton, whilst in Dublin they average from 15s. to 16s., besides the expense of carriage from the vessels. The consequence might be imagined; while England and Scotland have from thirty to forty bottle-houses, the number in Ireland was reduced to three; and although the entire duty collected in Ireland is so trifling, yet it was necessary that five officers of Excise should be in daily attendance at each of the bottle-houses. But he did not complain of the effect on the manufacturer alone; the consumer was taxed at the rate of 200 per cent. higher than he ought to be. An article of indispensable necessity was placed beyond the reach of those whose welfare and comfort it ought to be the study of the Government to consult. The interests of Ireland, and the health of the inhabitants should not be put in competition with a few thousand pounds; and it was clear that pestilence could not be eradicated, nor habits of cleanliness introduced among the people, so long as this tax was continued. At the present price of glass, it was vain to expect its general introduction into the cottages of the lower orders, and so long as light and ventilation were excluded, periodical fever and unchanged habits of sloth and wretchedness must be looked for as the inevitable consequences. The continuance of this tax would give the last blow to one of the few struggling manufactures of Ireland; the equalisation of the duty had already diminished the quantity manufactured more than one half—from 23,000l., which the duty amounted to in 1829, the year of the equalization, to about 10,000l., its present amount. Could any person, under these circumstances, advocate the continuance of this impost, destructive, as it was proved to be, of our foreign, and injurious to our home trade—unjust in its principle—vexatious in the details of its operation—and pernicious in its effects upon the health of the people? If his right hon. Friend should not consent to the abolition of these duties, he was bound at least to show how they might be accompanied by such a modification of the Excise-laws as would mitigate the evils complained of. Let him remember that the Commissioners of Excise Inquiry, appointed by his own Government, have called for the total abolition of these duties, as the only means by which this branch of our commerce may be restored to its former prosperous condition; they declare that they do not know of any tax which combines a greater variety of objections, or is more utterly opposed to all sound principles of taxation; and they have not hesitated to state as their decided opinion that these duties, whether viewed with regard to their influence on our native manufactures and foreign commerce, or the amount of revenue derived from them, merit, as they receive from the Commissioners, the most unreserved condemnation.

observed, that the speech of the hon. Member was more applicable for a motion, of which the hon. Gentleman had given notice, for a repeal on the duty on glass, than for the second reading of a bill the object of which was to consolidate the laws on the subject of the glass duties. He admitted that, if they kept up the duty, it was advisable to take care that the regulations that were imposed to prevent frauds on the revenue in the collection of the duty should be made as little as possible vexatious to the trader, and this was one of the objects of the bill before the House. The Treasury had already, on their own authority, car- ried into effect many of the recommendations of the Commissioners of Excise Inquiry for the removal of restrictions on the glass manufacture; and the present bill contained more of their recommendations, and those which could not be adopted without the sanction of the Legislature: for instance, the change that was proposed in the bill respecting the exportation of glass, and the drawbacks, and the getting rid of the vexatious regulations that had been so much complained of. He believed that he might assert, that, when the present bill passed, there were only one or two of the recommendations of the Commissioners which had not been adopted. He thought that it would be admitted by all that it was desirable that all the laws relating to this subject should be brought together and consolidated into one clear and intelligible enactment. The bill was drawn up last year, and was submitted to the trade, and such alterations had been made in it to suit their convenience as could be done consistently with a regard to the security of the revenue. It should also be recollected, that the inquiry of the Commissioners took place when there was a much higher rate of duty than there was at present. He was happy to say, that the reduction that had been made in the duty had operated most beneficially, and had almost entirely put a stop to the smuggling and illicit manufacture, which obtained to such an extent as to be highly injurious to the fair and honest trader. With respect to what was stated by the hon. Member as to the glass manufacturers being prevented using the broken materials or refuse of the crown glass in the manufacture of another article, it had been a doubtful matter whether they could not be so made up, but this had been set at rest by direction of the Treasury. The objection, therefore, of the hon. Gentleman was, in fact, one which no longer existed. It certainly was a very unwise and unfair prohibition to prevent the refuse of the manufacture of one description of glass being used in the production of a coarser commodity, but this and a great number of other vexatious regulations which were formerly complained of, it was the anxious wish of the Government to remove. The simple principles they wished to act upon were, that the regulations for the security of the revenue should be as little as possible vexatious to the manufacturer, that as much as possible of the duty paid should be received by the Treasury, and that all should pay alike. He proposed to give ample time for the consideration of the details of the bill, as he should not propose that it be committed until after Easter. He, however, intended that it should be committed pro forma at an early day, that some amendments should be introduced into it.

said, that before the Bill was passed he had a clause to propose, which he had before brought under the consideration of the House, and which he had now so modified that be hoped it would be found unobjectionable. At this late hour, now after midnight, he should not enter at any length into the reasons for proposing this addition to the Bill, but should content himself with stating generally, that originally the governorship of Queen Anne's bounty was principally lay, but that it had now become entirely clerical—in reality, the Bishops were the only existing governors—and all the other governors were, by the course that was pursued, in effect excluded from the management of the funds. The Bishops alone had notice of the time and place of holding the meetings or Courts of Directors; no other persons, though there were 400 or 500 other governors, were invited to attend, and of course no others did attend: for of upwards of 100 Courts of Governors held during the last ten years, it appeared from a return which he had moved for in this House, and which was now upon the table, that not a single layman had been present at one, and that for the reason he had stated, because they were not informed in any way whatever either of the time or place of holding the meetings, while there was previously to any such court or meeting a circular sent by the treasurer of the bounty fund to all the bishops, but to none other of the governors. He (Mr. Baines) thought it desirable, on many accounts, which were too obvious to require particular explanation, that the mixed character of the governorship should be restored, and as Queen Anne in her original charter had provided that there should at least be two laymen present at every court, a privy councillor and a judge or Queen's counsel,—the effect of the clause which he now offered 4) the House was—first, to insist that the holding of the courts should be advertised in the London Gazette, and, secondly, to provide that the proceedings of no court should be held valid, unless, at least, two laymen out of a quorum of seven governors were present.

opposed it on the ground that it was interfering with the power of the Crown, as it had in its original charter reserved to itself the power of making alterations in the constitution of the board. No doubt at the original constitution of the board, certain laymen had been appointed on it, but it was found impossible to make these persons attend; therefore an alteration was made. At any rate, it was impossible that the House could proceed with the present clause unless the consent of the Crown had been previously notified.

said, that he should not like the clause to be opposed on the ground that had been stated by the right hon. Gentleman, the want of the previous consent of the Crown, but he felt that there was an insuperable objection to the very principle of it. The clause proposed to make it necessary that one of the judges, or one of the Queen's counsel, should be present to constitute a board. Now, it was a general subject of complaint, that the judges had already so much to do, and it would be impossible to enforce the attendance of Queen's counsel. Unless they had some persons belonging to this class habitually to attend, the clause would only do harm, and there would be the semblance of security which only existed in name. The attendance of the class proposed by the hon. Gentleman never could be assured without some inducement.

said, that the right hon. Gentlemen who had urged their objection of the want of consent of the Crown as a bar to his motion, had forgotten one very material consideration, and that was, that if it was an impediment to the introduction of the clause which he (Mr. Baines) proposed for restoring the board to its original constitution, it was an objection to the whole Bill now before the House, every part of which as much required the assent of the Crown as the clause he had the honour to propose; and he begged to ask his hon. Friend, the Member for Nottinghamshire, whether he had the consent of the Crown for the introduction of all the other clauses that related to the altered constitution of the Board? If not, and if the doctrine held by the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for the University of Cambridge, was to be insisted upon, the Bill must be withdrawn till the consent of the Crown was obtained for its numerous provisions. No answer being returned to this appeal, and the objection being thus removed, Mr. Baines proceeded to say, that as to the objection made by his hon. and learned Friend, the Solicitor General, it did not appear of much force. The number of Privy Councillors was very considerable, and so was the number of Queen's Counsel, and surely one of each of these, if the Judges could not attend, might be expected to be present at proceedings in conducting the business of a Board, which involved the interests of 10,000 poor clergymen; and so strongly was his mind impressed with the necessity of the presence of laymen at all such Boards, that he should feel it to be his duty to divide the House upon it. His objection to the Boards of Governors, as they had been held for a long period past, was not an objection of form, but of substance; for it might happen that questions would arise at those Boards—indeed, they were now almost sure to arise—whether the Board, as trustees for the poor clergy, and as guardians of their interest, ought not to apply to Parliament to have the first fruits and tenths paid upon their improved value at the present day, rather than upon their value in the time of King Henry 8th. And as the Bishops, who now solely managed the funds, had a clear and distinct interest in keeping the payment down according to the ancient valuation, by which they were required to pay not one-tenth part of what was fairly due to the poor clergy, it was proper that lay governors, who had no such interests, should be present to protect the rights of the poor clergy, by aiding any effort that might be made, in or out of Parliament, on behalf of the persons who were to derive benefit from this fund, and from its due augmentation.