having moved that certain Members constitute the Select Committee on the London Police Bill,

took the opportunity of his being appointed to serve on the committee to state his opinion, that there ought to be some fixed rule laid down with regard to the attendance of members on private committees. He wished to know whether it were understood to be the rule of the House, that a Member should be present during the whole of the evidence, or whether it were competent to him, after the absence of a day, to attend the committee during the remainder of its sittings? He was now a member of a private committee, on the subject of which his constituents were much interested; and he much feared that he could not consent to be named on this committee, if a stringent construction were put on the rule to which he had referred with respect to private business.

was placed in the difficulty to which the right hon. Baronet had adverted. He was nominated on two committees—one public, and the other private; and having been obliged to be absent for a day on the latter, he considered himself disentitled to sit any longer. There was, however, a different interpretation put upon the rule by other Members; and, at all events, it was important that all doubt with regard to it should be cleared up.

found himself in a similar situation to the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel). He did not think that it was the intention of the House, that so stringent an interpretation should be put upon the rule, as that to which the hon. Member for Lambeth referred. All the House required, in his opinion, was, that no Member should vote on any question arising out of the proceedings before a private committee, without, hearing the evidence relating to it.

thought, on the contrary, that the rule should be strictly enforced, or not laid down at all. He considered the functions of the Members of a committee similar to jurymen, and not admitting of any absence.

declined serving on the committee, which was appointed.

rose to call the attention of the House to a subject closely connected with the privileges of the House, and, as he believed, intimately connected with the best interests of the people of the kingdom at large—a subject which involved the infraction of a principle which, for the last two centuries, had remained unquestioned—a subject in which every Member of the House must feel deeply interested. The House, in the exercise of that which had hitherto been always considered its undoubted privilege, had ordered that certain papers should be communicated to the public with the view, on the one hand, of informing the public mind, and, on the other, of enabling the House effectually to perform its duties. One of the papers so ordered to be published related to the management of the gaol of Newgate, and pointed out various abuses in the management of that institution. Amongst other things, it stated, that the morals of the prison were corrupted by the introduction of obscene publications. The publication of that statement was made with the view that the abuse might be remedied, and that the House might proceed to pass a measure to protect the morals of persons under confinement in that gaol. A person of the name of Stockdale brought an action against Mr. Hansard, an officer of that House, who was authorised, and indeed directed, by the House to distribute the publication. Upon a petition of Mr. Hansard to that House, stating that such an action had been brought, the House passed a resolution, by which the Attorney-general was directed to appear in the action, and to defend it. In obedience to the instruction which he had received from the House, he (the Attorney-general) did appear in the action, and had defended it to the best of his ability. It now became his duty to state to the House what had been the result of these proceedings. That day the Court of Queen's Bench had pronounced judgment in the case of Stock-dale v. Hansard, and had unanimously decided that the defence had failed, and that the action was maintainable. He most cautiously abstained at that moment from expressing any opinion with respect to that judgment. Coming from so high a quarter, it was to be received with respect and reverence; and he had no hesitation in saying, that each of the learned judges who concurred in it acted most honourably and conscientiously; but, at the same time, it was his duty to inform the House of the extent to which that judgment would go. If carried out, it would go to an extent that would be quite alarming, and that would place the House of Commons in an entirely new position. The Court of Queen's Bench had determined, that the House of Commons had no right to issue such a publication, nor to make such an order as had been made in this instance—that neither House of Parliament had a right to instruct the people, or to convey instruction to them through the medium of such publications; that the right which either House of Parliament claimed of doing so was not a privilege, but an usurpation. But the ground upon which this judgment proceeded rendered it more important and more alarming. Hitherto, in his humble apprehension, the judges of Westminster Hall had considered that the two Houses of Parliament were exclusively the judges of their own privileges. The judges of the Queen's Bench, in the decision of that day, had repudiated that doctrine, and announced, that they themselves were the judges of all the privileges of Parliament—that the privileges of Parliament might be submitted to their determination, and to the determination of the lowest tribunals in the country; and that finally the judgment pronounced by any of those tribunals might be submitted to the House of Lords; so that according to this decision of the Court of Queen's Bench, all the privileges of the House of Commons might finally come to be determined by the House of Lords. Nay, the Court of Queen's Bench had determined, that even with respect to commitments for contempt, they could examine into the subject matter of the contempt, and declare, whether in their judgment the House of Commons was justified or not in the course it had pursued. The result of this judgment would be, that the House, in the publication of papers, must take care, not only that not more than 658 copies were printed and distributed; but more than that—in the course of his argument upon the case, he (the Attorney-general) had pressed this difficulty upon the consideration of the Court—"If you limit the distribution of such papers to the use of the Members of the House, what is to be done upon a dissolution of Parliament, and what is to be done if Gentlemen cease to be Members of the House, either by the determination of an election committee, or by the acceptance of the Chiltern Hundreds?" He was told by the Court, that neither of these contingencies presented any difficulty at all, because, upon a dissolution of Parliament, or upon a Gentleman ceasing to be a Member of Parliament, all the papers that he had received as a Member of the House, in which there was anything criminatory upon the conduct of others, were immediately to be destroyed—that there was to be a grand conflagration, in which all papers of this description were to be committed to the flames. Thus it followed, that if, after a dissolution of Parliament, any individual who had been a Member of the House should have in his library a paper which he had received as a Member of Parliament, and should venture to read that paper, or to show it to another, he might be subject to an action of libel, or to a criminal prosecution, and be made liable to fine or imprisonment. At the present moment he most cautiously abstained from entering into the merits of the decision made by the Court of Queen's Bench; but it would be seen, from what he had stated, that it was of the last importance that the House should determine without loss of time upon the course which under the circumstances it should deem it most proper to pursue. When the subject was last brought under the consideration of the House, he was told by the House to appear in the action, and to defend it. He had done so, and had been defeated. He now appeared again to receive the instructions of the House, and as the servant of the House he should punctually and faithfully observe whatever directions he might receive. Whether the House would take strong measures for resisting the judgment of the Queen's Bench was, of course, a matter that remained entirely in the breast of the House itself. But after the statement he had made, it became his duty, as a Member of that House himself, to point out the course which he would recommend the House to adopt. It appeared to him, then, that it would be most advisable to appoint a committee to inquire into the proceedings in the action of Stockdale v. Hansard, and to give an opinion to the House as to the course which the House should follow; and if that should accord with the pleasure of the House, he would propose, that the Members who constituted the former Committee, and who still continued to be Members of the House, should be re-appointed upon the present Committee, with such additions as the House in its wisdom should deem fit. If he might venture so far, he would propose, in addition to the names which stood upon the former Committee, the names of the Solicitor-general, Sir E. Sugden, Mr. Goulburn, Mr. Pemberton, Dr. Lushington, Mr. Warburton, Mr. Bernal, Mr. Easthope, the Solicitor-general for Ireland, and the Lord Advocate of Scotland. This was no party matter. He recollected, with admiration, the manner in which, on a former occasion, the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Tamworth, vindicated the rights and privileges of that House. In doing so, the right hon. Baronet entitled himself to the gratitude, not only of the House, but of the whole community of the United Kingdom. He repeated, that this was not a party matter; and if to the names he had already mentioned there were any others that it might be thought proper to add, he should most cheerfully acquiesce in any proposition to that effect. It was also his intention to move for a copy of the record in the action of Stockdale v. Hansard, and for a copy of the short-hand writer's notes. It appeared to him, that it would be impossible for the House to come to a satisfactory conclusion upon the subject, until they knew the grounds upon which the judgment of the court had been given. For that reason he deemed it most proper to move for the appointment of a Select Committee, to inquire into the whole proceedings. Supposing his motion to be agreed to, he hoped that, considering the urgency of the case, the Committee would not refuse to meet to-morrow for the sake of arranging the course it should ultimately pursue. He hoped that, in the consideration of this most important subject, there-would be no exhibition of warm feeling—that all would be calm, temperate, and moderate. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving the appointment of a Select Committee.

had that day listened with great attention to the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, as delivered by Justices Coleridge and Patteson, and confessed, that he had either totally misunderstood those learned judges, or else had fallen into a complete misapprehension of what had been stated by the Attorney-general.—[The Attorney-General: In what respect?] In the first place, he understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to say, that the judges of the Queen's Bench had decided that no papers of that House could be published by order of the House,—["No, no!"] He certainly understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to say so; whilst, on the other hand, he understood the learned judges to say—and they seemed to guard themselves most strictly upon the point—that they did not mean to assert that, by no order of that House, generally speaking, papers might not be published; but certainly, that papers could not be published by the authority of the House which were libelous upon the public. He appealed to the House, whether the hon. and learned Attorney-general had made that distinction. Then, with, regard to commits meats, he certainly understood the learned judges to pronounce their judgment in a sense entirely different from that described by the hon. and learned Attorney-gene- ral. As he understood the learned judges, they stated, that there were commitments over which the House of Commons had an absolute control; but that, at the same time, there were also commitments which the House might make improperly. Between these two kinds of commitments, the learned judges drew a marked distinction, carefully guarding themselves in the opinions they expressed, and the language they used. But the hon. and learned Attorney-general represented them as dealing with the point in the broadest, most general, and most sweeping manner. He did not profess to have so accurate a knowledge of these matters as the hon. and learned Gentleman; but this he must say, that having heard the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman in that House, and the judgment of the learned judges as delivered in the Court of Queen's Bench, he certainly should not have recognised one in the other. There were other Members then present in the House who were also present in the court when the judgment was delivered, and he was sure they would be good enough to state, whether their impression of what transpired coincided with his.

observed, that it was to prevent all possibility of misunderstanding as to what the judges had laid down, that he moved for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the whole of the proceedings. But he was sure that there really was no substantial difference between the opinions expressed by the judges and the statement he had made to the House. For what did the difference alluded to by the hon. Member for Sussex amount to? It was quite clear, that it was unnecessary for the learned judges to say that the House of Commons might publish that which all mankind may publish—namely, matter that was not of a criminatory nature, and which did not affect the character of any individual. Then with regard to the power of commitment, the hon. Gentleman had confirmed his statement, because he said that the learned judges had drawn a distinction between the cases in which the House had power to commit, and the cases in which, as the court asserted, the House had not the power to commit. That was exactly what he (the Attorney-general) had laid down as the doctrine propounded by the learned judges, He maintained, that that doctrine was entirely new; for from the case of Lord Shaftesbury down to the case of Sir John Hobhouse, there never was an instance in which a court of law said that it could inquire into the causes of commitments made by the Commons, whatever those commitments might be.

had his doubts if the matter in question were such a breach of privilege as to justify the House in proceeding, instanter with respect to it, as the hon. and learned Gentleman proposed. If any difference greater than another existed in the minds of the people of these kingdoms, between them and this House, it was in regard to the extent of the privileges, claimed by this House. No one could doubt what had been the current of public opinion upon this subject two years ago. The House should pause before it committed itself in any other quarrel of a similar character with the legal authorities of the country. On that occasion, he had called on the House to pause; he now called on it to do the same thing; the grounds were in their recollection. If the case were a breach of privilege, then it was certainly entitled to a pre-audience of all other business before the House, and he should bow to the decision. But if it were not—and if he understood the hon. and learned Gentleman correctly it was not, inasmuch as the Judges of the Court of Queen's-Bench had only decided on a question submitted to them by that House—then he did not consider that there was any necessity for the precipitate course proposed by the Attorney-general. The Attorney-general stated distinctly, that the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench would prevent either House of Parliament from publishing matters for the instruction and enlightenment of the people of England. But unless enlightenment and instruction could be conveyed in no other forms of publication than those of libels, he did not see the relevancy of the hon. and learned Gentleman's deduction, as affecting the question at issue. If, as he had said before, the House decided that the question was one of pure privilege, then he should bow to that decision, though he might not acquiesce in it; but if it did not, he should venture to suggest to the hon. and learned Gentleman that, perhaps, it would be better, as it certainly was more formal, to give notice of his motion for the committee. The hon. Ba- ronet concluded by calling on the Speaker to pronounce on the question as a matter of privilege.

concurred in the principal part of the opinions of his hon. Friend, but he deprecated the idea of throwing the onus of pronouncing upon the question of privilege upon the Speaker. He agreed with his hon. Friend, however, that the Attorney-general should give notice of his motion. If the House agreed to the appointment of the committee at once, it would not, in his opinion, display that sound judgment which befitted the circumstance and the occasion, but would rather prove itself hasty and precipitate in its proceedings. If the hon. and learned Gentleman had moved for a copy of the record, and the short-hand writers' notes, confining himself to these alone, he should have had no objection to it; but he could not agree to the motion for a committee.

did not think, that either the hon. Baronet, the Member for the University of Oxford, or the right hon. Baronet who had just spoken, had correctly understood the proposition of his hon. and learned Friend. One would certainly suppose, from their arguments (which would be correct enough, if their premises were right), that some immediate decision of the House was called for, and that that decision was to be a decision against some parties for a breach of privilege. No such decision was called for. His hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general, felt, however, that it was a matter deeply affecting the privileges of the House, and, therefore, had brought it forward at the earliest and most proper period. No one, he thought, would deny, that it was a question deeply affecting the privileges of the House. The object of his hon. and learned Friend's motion was not to charge any one with a breach of privilege, but merely to ask the House to appoint a committee to inquire into the proceedings by which its privileges were likely to be so deeply affected. Was this a new course of proceeding? By no means. It was a proceeding naturally arising out of the course which the House took upon the former occasion when this subject was under its consideration; and be it remembered, that that was not a precipitate nor a violent course, but a course of great moderation and temper, merely directing the Attorney-general to plead in a case then pending din a court of law. It appeared that the judges had now pronounced a judgment in that case, and nobody, he imagined, would deny, that that judgment deeply affected the privileges of the House. In point of fact, it affected them so nearly, that there was no doubt (supposing the force and validity of the judgment to be admitted) but that the Speaker, in the discharge of the duties of his office, might do that which to-morrow morning might be called in question, and himself be made subject to an action at law. The votes of the House might contain an accusation, or a sneer, against some individual, in the form of a motion, or a notice of motion—that accusation or sneer might be made the foundation of an action of libel, and the Speaker, as the officer of that House, might be made liable for the consequences. In the natural course of proceedings, the Speaker, by the direction of the House, might have to sign some paper containing a motion of that kind—it would go with the Speaker's name, and, according to an order of the House, might be circulated throughout the country tomorrow morning. Why, some person might immediately proceed against the Speaker, or against the printer, or any other person taking part in the publication, for a libel, in consequence of what had taken place in Parliament that evening. Therefore, he said, that whether the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench were a right decision or a wrong one—whether it were a new decision,—or a decision strictly in accordance with all ancient laws—it was, at all events, a decision upon which the House of Commons should not pause, but should immediately appoint a committee of inquiry. He did not say, whether the statement of his hon. and learned Friend, or the statement of the hon. Gentleman opposite—which was, in fact, very little different from that of his hon. and learned Friend—was the correct and accurate account of what took place in the court of law. All he could say was, that he should support his hon. and learned Friend, in asking for the appointment of a committee.

thought, there could be no manner of doubt, that any Member having matters to state, which he thought related materially to privileges of the House, was fully entitled to pre-audience. He thought, too, that nothing could be less precipitate, or less objectionable, than the course proposed in this instance to be pur- sued by the hon. and learned Attorney-general. The matter was a very urgent one, and it was highly expedient, that the House should lose no time in the consideration of it. What was the position in which the House stood? Look at the events of the last two or three days. A person named Lovibond was reported by a Committee of the House to have been cognizant of an act of forgery: for that act of forgery, the Speaker was directed to reprimand him; and the Speaker accorddingly administered the censure of the House. The whole of those proceedings were entered upon the votes of the House, and had been signed by the Speaker, who had also given directions to the printer to print them. The present Speaker then stood in precisely the same situation as Mr. Speaker Williams in the reign of Charles 2nd. In that case, a person laying before the House an information, accusing the Duke of York of an act of high treason, that information was ordered by the House of Commons to be printed. The Speaker, as the officer of the House, licensed the printer, which was afterwards made the subject of an action against him, in which the plaintiff was successful, and the Speaker was fined. In his opinion, they ought to lose no time whatever in taking proceedings to ascertain what were the real facts of the case, in order that the House might be in a condition to take such steps as might be considered necessary.

begged to explain. He ought to state, for the information of the House, that the judges of the Court of Queen's Bench were of opinion that the Speaker personally would not be liable to an action, but that the printer and all the officers of the House, acting under the authority of the House, would. The motion he had made rested on this ground, that the Court of Queen's Bench having decided the case in question, and in favour of the plaintiff, it was now indispensably necessary that the House should give directions what course he was to pursue. If the judgment should be entered on the record, a wilt of inquiry would be issued and execution levied, unless a writ of error should be brought; it was, therefore, necessary the House should come to a conclusion what course should be pursued.

thought, under the special circumstances of the case, it was indis- pensably necessary that the House should proceed at once to appoint a Committee. The moment the House of Commons considered anything to affect their privileges, it was their duty to direct their attention to it. He would pronounce no opinion upon the grounds of the decision come to by the Court of Queen's Bench; but he certainly would not lose a moment in instituting an inquiry, first into the facts of the case, in order that they might be presented in a formal shape to the House; and next, as to what it behoved the House to do in support of their privileges. The Court of Queen's Bench could not complain that they were departing from the usual forms in proceeding without giving notice, because notices of motions were not absolutely necessary. Strictly speaking, every Member had a right to bring forward a motion without notice; and if ever there was a case that justified a departure from the usual forms, it was a case in which the privileges of Parliament were concerned. He would not prejudge the case, nor give the Committee power of instituting any proceeding; but the House ought not to lose a moment in considering, with all the deliberation and decorum belonging to the gravity of the case, what course it ought to pursue.

did not rise to offer any opposition to the motion of the Attorney-general. He agreed that it was quite enough, immediately it was found, that a decision had taken place affecting the privileges of the House, to justify the House in taking immediate measures upon the subject. He therefore concurred in the proposition for the immediate appointment of a Committee, in order that the proceedings in the late action might be regularly brought under the consideration of the House. But if he thought, with the hon. Member for the University of Oxford, that by acceding to this motion he implied, that any breach of privilege had been committed, either by the Court of Queen's Bench, or by either party in the action, he should unhesitatingly oppose the motion. They ought to have brought under the consideration of the House, not only the proceedings on the action, but the short-hand writer's notes of the judgment delivered by the learned judges. Another reason why he acceded to the motion was, that he felt firmly convinced that the more the judgment of the learned judges was made known to the House and to the country, the more assured would those learned judges be of meeting with the entire approbation of the people. It was because he felt that the judgment of the court was calculated to preserve the dignity of the House and the liberty of the people that he desired the most extensive publicity to be given to it. He could not sit down without expressing his regret, that while the Attorney-general was proposing to have the proceedings in the action brought before the House, he did not limit himself to stating the grounds of his motion, but should have thought fit to advert to particular parts and portions of the judgment of the learned judges. He would venture to say, that when that very sound, enlightened, and constitutional judgment should come before the House, many of the remarks of his hon. and learned Friend would be found to be wholly incorrect and unfounded. He would venture, with all humility, to assure the right hon. Gentleman whom he was then addressing, that there was no danger of any action being brought against him for any act he might do under the authority of the House, and that no such doctrine had fallen from the learned judges. He would venture to add, that none of the learned judges would be found to have said that it was not competent for the House to instruct and inform the people of this country; and yet, if his ears had not deceived him, he had certainly heard his hon. and learned Friend say this evening, that the judges had decided that it was not competent for the House of Commons to instruct and inform the people. He also understood his noble and learned Friend to have said, that the Court of Queen's Bench had determined, that if any Member of the House, either by a decision of a Committee, or by accepting the Chiltern Hundreds, ceased to be a Member, it would behove him, for the sake of safety, to burn the papers that had been delivered to him under the orders of the House. Now be (Mr. Kelly) would venture to say, that the judgment of the judges would be found to contain nothing to warrant that statement. He was afraid he had occupied too much of the time of the House; but having seen a substantial difference in the description given of the judgment by the Attorney-general, and by the hon. Member for Sussex (Mr. Darby), he felt bound, in common candour to say, having listened attentively to the judgment when delivered in court to-day, that the statement of the hon. Member for Sussex was the more correct and just account of that judgment.

would not detain the House, as he understood an unanimous vote was about to be given, but he must express his conviction, that if the plaintiff in the action in the Court of Queen's Bench had not been guilty of a breach of privilege, they might as well walk out of the House, and shut the doors, because it would be utterly impossible for them to do the public service. It was quite true the judges had not shut out publication altogether. Every laudatory publication might issue. They might praise all the world, whether they deserved it or not. Praise was never a libel. But it was a libel to tell the truth of a man who deserved to be reprobated. At present, the only control over the judges was a decision of the House of Commons. They were not responsible to the Crown. They could not be removed, except by a vote of that House. Since his time one judge had been removed, on addresses to the Crown, by the two Houses of Parliament. The judge was Sir Jonah Barrington, the vote of the House stating, that he had been peculating with the money of the suitors. According to this decision of the judges, Sir Jonah Barrington might have gone before the Court of Queen's Bench and indicted the officers, or have brought an action against them; and how would the House have acted had the court decided against the parties? Suppose a Jefferies should be restored to-morrow, and be placed in the room of a Denman, how could the House proceed against him, if they did not let the public know the ground of their procedure? It was admitted, that the House might proceed against a corrupt partial judge, but, in order to do so, it was necessary to bring before the public all the facts of the case. But those facts would be so many libels, according to the decision of the judges. It was impossible that the House could tolerate that decision; and his opinion was, that the four judges who had given that decision, ought, tomorrow, to be called to the bar of the House. Yes, that was his deliberate opinion. What he was then saying might possibly be published in the newspapers to-morrow. It was certainly in disparagement of the judges of the Court of Queen's Bench—and they might, if they pleased, take up the publisher of the newspaper; or, if what he said were inserted in the votes, they might take up the printers of the votes, and send them to gaol for contempt of the Court of Queen's Bench. What remedy would the parties have? None by appeal—for there was no appeal. The judges might confine the parties for any time they pleased for an alleged contempt, and there was no way by which the parties could obtain a legal and judicial reversal of that sentence. The judges were not responsible to any other tribunal than to the House of Commons. But how could they be made responsible, unless they let the public see the grounds on which that responsibility attached? It was a question belonging to the Commons of Great Britain. The Members of that House were the concentration of the people of the country, the judges being appointed by the Crown, while the Crown itself was mater patriœ. This decision was made by the representatives of the Crown against the representatives of Great Britain.

had not purposed to make any observations upon this question, but, after the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Dublin, he felt he should not discharge his duty if he remained entirely silent. Without disputing the regularity of the proceedings taken by his hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general, in bringing this subject before the House without any notice whatever, he thought that every. body would agree that it was not convenient, because many of those gentlemen who took, a deep interest in the subject were not only wholly ignorant that the motion would be brought on to-night, but even that the decision had been given, and it was by mere accident, when he was coming down to the House, that he himself had heard that his hon. and learned Friend had made this motion. He believed that there was no one who disputed the propriety of making this inquiry, and the only question between himself and his hon. and learned Friend was, whether the House would be more likely to adopt a course consistent with its own dignity and the interests of the people of this country, by delaying the discussion of this question for a few days, or by proceeding at once precipitately to take that course which his hon. and learned Friend had recommended. Now, if he wanted any proof of the advantage which would be derived from delay, it would be the temper which had already been exhibited, and he would ask if it were desirable, that upon the mere statement of his hon. and learned Friend, they should at once decide upon taking the step which the hon. and learned Member for Dublin considered as proper, for this reason, that the judges had been guilty of a violation of the privileges of the House, for which, in the opinion of his hon. and learned Member, they ought to be ordered to its bar. Now, what were the facts of the case? If there were any breach of the privileges of the House, it had been committed in consequence of what had been done by the House itself. An action had been brought by a private individual against another private individual. The House of Commons thought proper to declare that this was an attack upon their privileges, although the question of their privileges only came before the Court incidentally. The House could not stop these proceedings; they might commit the plaintiff, they might commit his counsel, or his attorney, but neither the forms of the House, nor the laws of the land, gave them the power of stopping any action brought by one person against another. On the former occasion, his hon. and learned Friend said, that if he attempted to do this, the House must either be defeated, or be driven to subvert the laws of the land. Well, then, what was the consequence? The House of Commons directed the plaintiff's counsel to plead their privilege. His right hon. Friend, the Member for Tamworth, had said on that occasion, that if it should turn out that the law was against them, the House would find the means of vindicating its privileges. He had a great respect for the courage of the noble Lord, and of those who cheered that sentiment, but he believed that no man would dare, or daring would succeed, in what was called vindicating those privileges, which the sworn judges of the land had declared were untenable. If the attempt were made, sure he was that it must fail, Now, let them observe what the state of the case was. The House was called upon to stop this action at its commencement. The House allowed the action to go on, and now, when the judges, having no power of refusing to hear the action, had decided the case, and no man doubted that they had decided it according to the law of the land, an hon. Member of that House got up in his place, and stated that the four judges ought to be summoned to the bar of the House. The House said, in effect, to the judges, "Decide this case by all means; we submit to your jurisdiction; but mind, you must decide it only one way. Decide it in our favour, and you will commit no breach of privilege, but decide according to your own opinions, and we will drag you to our bar." He would ask if there was ever a doctrine propounded more monstrous and unconstitutional than this? It was not because it was convenient or desirable, or even necessary, that the House should possess the power of publishing evidence, that therefore it should be possessed against the law of the land. The decision which had been given had greatly increased the evil against which they had formerly to contend. They might formerly have had a declaratory law, but such a step was now impossible, after the judges had formally pronounced their decision. Although, however, such a step was now impracticable, they might still have that protection for their privileges which the transaction of business required, simply by taking that course which was just, and which they might adopt without any compromise of their rights, or of their opinions. If they went on in opposing the courts of law, what would be the result? It could not be doubtful that, if the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench was not impeached, the example would be followed, and what would the House do, when they saw plaintiff after plaintiff commencing proceedings of a similar nature? They could not stop such proceedings, even if they had recourse to violence: They had no means of preventing such actions or such decisions, except they were treated as con-tempts of the authority of the House, and there was therefore no effectual mode of preventing such proceedings. The House would not attempt to call the fifteen judges to the bar, or to send them to the prison of their own court. The House would therefore do well to consider the steps which they were about to take, and not to enter into a contest which could only terminate in a manner injurious to the best interests of the country. If they embarked in that contest, when it came to that point where support would be necessary he much doubted whether that House would find the people standing up to de- fend the course which they were pursuing. One course might be followed, which would lead to no inconvenience, and which would not compromise their privileges, but if they adopted a different course, and opposed the laws of the land and the judges, such a proceeding would not fail to prove injurious to the best interests of the country, and ruinous even to the House itself. He should not oppose the appointment of a committee, although he could not but regret that the present discussion should have taken place. He trusted, however, that the Government would apply itself to the consideration of the subject with calmness, in order to adopt the best way for securing the House in the enjoyment of those privileges which were necessary for the exercise of their legislative functions, but which, at the same time, would lead to nothing injurious to the institutions of the country. If they persisted in hostility to the decisions of the judges, they must necessarily hurt other institutions of the country, which were permanent in their nature, while a Parliament was not permanent. It was not the first time that that House had come into collision with the judges, but on every occasion on which they had done so, the House had been defeated. On more than one occasion, such collisions had taken place; but what had been the result? Why, the contest had been terminated by a dissolution of Parliament, which at once had terminated the dispute, and left the judges in full possession of their authority. Whether the noble Lord contemplated any proceeding of a similar nature in the present instance, he, of course, could not say; but, whatever might be his views, he would entreat the noble Lord to adopt that course which alone could redeem the House from its present state of difficulty, and put an end to a contest which, whatever party might triumph, from the very nature of the contest, would inflict a serious injury upon the people.

would cheerfully support the appointment of a committee, but beyond that, he was unwilling to express any positive opinion on the course which it was proposed to pursue. In regard to the second motion which the hon. and learned Gentleman, the Attorney-general, had submitted for the consideration of the House, he wished to say a few words. That motion was, that the notes of the shorthand writer, containing the decision of the judges, should be laid before the committee which it was proposed to appoint. Now, they had heard two hon. Members opposite express very different opinions from those which the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-general, had expressed, in regard to the terms in which the decision was couched, and he thought, therefore, that the notes of the shorthand writer, however accurate they might be, ought not to be taken as authority. When they considered that the record itself, and the minutes of the judges, in regard to which there could be no sort of doubt, would completely raise the whole question which it was necessary for the committee to investigate, he would ask the House to consider, whether it was desirable to take the decision of the judges, on the authority of the shorthand writer, more particularly in a matter so liable to misconstruction as the words of the judges. He would, therefore, suggest to hon. Members upon both sides of the House, whether the question of privilege would not be brought sufficiently before the committee, by the record and minutes of the judges, and whether it was not prudent to abstain from a course which might involve the House in a fruitless contest about words, which could hardly fail to be the case, if they relied on the notes of the shorthand writer.

said, that chiefly in consequence of what had fallen from the hon. and learned Gentleman near him (Mr. Pemberton), he wished particularly to ascertain what the precise objects were for which the committee was to be appointed. He a apprehended, that the committee was not to be required to express any decision whatever. He conceived that the whole matter was open for their investigation; that they were to examine all the important questions which the case suggested, but that they would have no power to decide. The committee would examine fully, and lay before the House, all the important considerations which might arise during the investigation, and it would then be for the House to decide. Whether the House was to acquiesce in the decision, or whether they should determine to resist, or to have the powers and privileges confirmed by a legislative act—all these questions would be settled by the decision of the House, and not the decision of the committee. It was upon these grounds that he had supported the motion for the appointment of a committee, and he now wished to he informed whether he had formed a correct opinion.

said, the right hon. Baronet had taken the same view of the duties of the committee as himself. The committee would do nothing but inquire. He could not help saying, considering, that inquiry was the only object in view, that the observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite were out of place, more particularly so, as he had in-tended to put the hon. and learned Gen-man upon the committee. He again repeated, that nothing would be done by the committee but inquire.

could not help thinking, that it would have been better if notice had been given of the motion brought forward by the hon. and learned Gentleman, the Attorney-general; but, if the course which had been followed was satisfactory to the House, so let it be. He hoped, however, after what had fallen from those who had heard the decision of the judges, that it would be found, that that decision was expressed in a manner different from what had been represented by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-general.

rose to submit to the House the impropriety of placing on this committee those hon. Gentlemen whose opinions, they having served on a former and similar committee, were now matters of record. He thought it would not be wise to place the same Gentlemen on the present committee, and although he had not divided the House on the question that a committee be appointed, still he was strongly disposed to take a division upon this point, and on the propriety of producing the notes of the short-hand writer as evidence of the terms in which the decision of the judges had been delivered. If the House insisted on the production of those short-hand notes, he contended that they would be arrogating to them-selves a jurisdiction which had never before been claimed by the House of Commons, and which, he was persuaded, would be alike injurious to the House and to the people. In such a case they would practically be calling the judges of the land to the Bar of the House, and putting them to trial on the evidence of the short-hand writer—a proceeding which he was fully persuaded was a violation of their rights, and also in direct hostility to the best interests of the people.

thought, that it was duo to the judges and to the House, that the House should fully and clearly understand the precise terms in which the decision of the judges had been delivered.

believed, from the acknowledged accuracy of Mr. Gurney, that the House might rely on the correctness of the shorthand notes. If, then, such was the case, surely for their own sakes, as well as for the sakes of the judges, they ought to have the exact grounds upon which the decision had been made, and the precise terms in which it was delivered, laid before the committee. When those notes were laid before the House, it would be found, that the statement he had made was fully borne out by the facts.

thought, that it would be more respectful to ask the judges to communicate their decision to the House than to make a motion on the subject.

thought, that the notes of the arguments of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-general ought also to be before the committee.

agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman, that it was desirable to have the notes of the arguments of the Attorney-General laid before the committee, and he believed they would be produced under the form of the motion which had been proposed.

asked whether the committee were to have power to send for the judges? Before he consented to this motion, therefore, he should wish to know whether the committee meant to exercise that power? He did not believe, that any person would consent to a motion that the judges of the land should be brought to the Bar of the House; and what the House in its collective capacity could not do, ought not to be given to a body of fifteen or twenty private gentlemen. So that, unless he heard a statement from the Attorney-general and the noble Lord, the leader of her Majesty's Government in that House, that they did not intend to call the judges before the committee, he, for one, should divide the House on the question.

asked, whether the hon. Baronet meant to say, that the judges were not to he called before the House, or even before committees of the House? If he did, the practice had been different. In the Record Committee the judges had been called upon to give their opinions. He could see no difference between the cases. Did the hon. Baronet mean to lay down a rule, that the judges of the land were to be kept so apart from all other persons, that they were not to be called before a committee of the House for their opinions?

only wished to ask his noble Friend and the Attorney-general, whether they intended to call the judges before the committee?

said, it was a monstrous doctrine to say, that any individual in the country was not amenable to this House. He had seen the Lord Chancellor before a committee of this House; and he had never heard that any individual was exempted, if his presence was necessary for the purposes of justice. Of course, it must rest with the discretion of the committee, but if they thought it necessary, he hoped they would have the judges before them. If necessary, he would be ready to move or to second a motion, on any occasion, to call the judges to the bar of the House.

said, that his hon. and learned Friend and himself, in the appointment of this committee, had no view to the examination of the judges on any judicial question; they had no such intention, and his hon. Friend need not suppose they had; at the same time they did not mean to preclude themselves from giving to the committee the power which was usually given by the House.

said, as far as he was concerned, he felt the most sincere respect and reverence for the judges, and he believed, that the judges of the Queen's Bench had, on this occasion, acted most honestly and conscientiously. But at the same time, that the committee should be fettered by any such contract as that proposed by the hon. Baronet, was a proposition he utterly disclaimed. The Lord Chancellor, as had been stated by the hon. Member for Kilkenny, had attended a committee of this House, and other judges had done the same, without any scruples.

observed, that the Lord Chancellor was a Peer, and attended by his own consent and at his own discretion, so that the case was not in point. If the judges were sent for by the committee on any matter connected with their judicial capacity, he ventured to say, that they would not obey the order.

disclaimed the doctrine, that the judges could not be called before this House. Suppose a motion to be laid on the Table of the House, containing a charge of corruption against a judge. It used to be the practice to appoint a committee of corruption for the express purpose of inquiring into the course of justice. It was not likely that there would be any temptation to summon the judges before the committee, and if any individual were to attempt to exercise such privilege the committee would check it. But it would be better to let the discussion drop here.

repeated, that unless there was an understanding, that the committee were not to call the judges before them, he should divide the House.

observed, that it was necessary the committee should have the judgments of the judges before them, and as they were written judgments, there could be no difficulty in obtaining them. The committee would then have the exact reasons of the judges before them. The judgments would be printed in a few weeks, and circulated amongst the Members; and it would be no disrespect to the judges, but, on the contrary, it would be respectful to them to desire to know what were the reasons they assigned for their decision.

said, it was not the notes of the judges that were called for, but the shorthand writer's notes, which the committee might call for, if they pleased, without the authority of the House.

recommended the hon. Baronet to withdraw his opposition. He had not known when he before spoke, that the judges had delivered their judgments from written papers, which there could be no objection to have printed for the use of the House. He did not recede from his proposition, that the House could not come to any conclusion as to the opinions of the judges which were laid before them on the authority of Mr. Gurney, or any shorthand writer in the world.

moved, "that during the remainder of the session, orders of the day have precedence of notices of motions upon Thursdays, except on a special direction of the House with respect to a notice of motion."

hoped that the noble Lord would make an exception in favour of his motion, which stood for the 6th of June, respecting the Bank of England.

said, he could not do that without laying himself open to similar applications.

observed, that this was giving Government greater power than a private Member of the House, and no individual Member had now any possible chance of bringing forward any measure, except on the special direction of the House, and he did not know how that was to be obtained.

moved, that the County Courts Bill be read a second time. He should not wish the discussion to be taken until after the bill had been referred to a Select Committee upstairs.

said, he could not allow the bill to be read a second time without entering his protest against the principle of the measure. There was this palpable objection to the bill, that it went to repeal the whole law of England with regard to debts not exceeding 15l. He should certainly feel it his duty to oppose the bill whenever he could find an opportunity.

must declare his opinion that much in the bill was exceedingly objectionable. He would have been prepared to oppose the measure on the second reading, if the noble Lord had not arranged that the discussion of the principle should be taken after the reference to committee. Under the provisions of the bill a very considerable number of appointments were contemplated, such as chairman, receiver-general, clerk, and a variety of other officers, the salaries of all whom were to be defrayed, it was probable, from what was to be called the county fee fund. Now it was the opinion of every Gentleman whom he had consulted, and decidedly it was his own opinion, that this fee fund would be found quite inadequate and he wished to know, therefor, whether the noble Lord was prepared in that case to take any, and if so, what means, to make up the deficiency?

said, he was anxious to express his opinion upon this most important subject. The question was, were they prepared to concede to the very strong and generally expressed opinion of their constituents a means of providing cheap and speedy justice? That was the whole question. Difficulties there were in the way, no doubt, but difficulties inherent in the subject. If the fees were small, then they must have an inferior description of persons to administer justice in those courts. They were bound to this. If they determined to continue the present system of expense, it was the same thing as to say that they would shut the door of the courts to all but the wealthy classes. But, what was all that had been urged by the hon. Members opposite considered as a reason against the second reading? They must run the risk of not doing such good justice by doing this cheap justice. They could not afford anything better. It was better that injustice should be done than that no justice should be done. He was prepared to support this position, and he said, that it was better that a poor man who had a debt of 5s. owing him, should go before a tribunal which should decide the question one way or the other, whether right or wrong, than that he should feel that he was utterly without any kind of means of redress—that the courts were beyond him. The present state of things made the poor man feel, and he feared with too much reason, that law was a luxury which was reserved only for the wealthy. The bill, he trusted, though he confessed he had certain objections to parts of it, would effect a change in a state of things so much to be deplored.

begged to know whether, in case the fee fund fell short, it was intended ultimately to throw the expenses of the machinery of the bill on the county-rates?

said, it was supposed that the fee fund would furnish sufficient means for the payment of the judges under the bill. If the committee thought otherwise, they would report otherwise. But he should say, if upon experience it were found that the fee fund were insufficient, that the measure was one of those in aid of which Government and the Parliament should see the propriety of incurring some expenditure.

begged to know, why the county of Middlesex was excepted out of the bill? This was the more inexplicable, because every one who knew the county must be aware, that there was no county court in England, Ireland, or Scotland, in which the administration of justice was so objectionable as in the Middlesex County Court.

said, the reason why the Middlesex County Court had been excepted was, that it had been intended to introduce provisions into the Metropolitan Police Courts Bill for the purpose of providing judges for that court.

said, nothing was so much required throughout the country as this bill. He entirely approved of the spirit of the Solicitor-general's remarks, and he was convinced that they would be approved in every part of the country. If this was a Government job, as had been insinuated, he wished they would bring forward more such jobs. Let them go on with such jobs, and then see how they would be applauded from one side of the country to the other.

asked, whether they were going to discuss the principle of the bill after all? He had understood the noble Lord to say, that he did not intend to take the discussion on the principle of the measure at present, but the hon. and learned Solicitor-general had gone so deeply into the subject that he (Mr. Godson) almost thought the discussion ought to proceed.

said, he had no objection to the principle being discussed then. What he proposed was, that a bill on this principle should be sent to a Select Committee, after having been read a second time; if the House affirmed the principle of giving the people cheap justice, there could be no objection against sending the bill up stairs.

must express his opinion, that the expense, whatever it might be, and whether it were to come from the fee fund or from the the county, would be cheerfully paid by the people.

said, that this clause did not form a part of the original bill brought forward by her Majesty's Government, last session, but it was subsequently introduced by the hon. Member for Knaresborough. But though he must do the Government the justice to say that they did not originally propose that there should be in all the prisons salaried teachers for every religious persuasion which could be found to germinate in this country, yet he must say, that they yielded without much reluctance to the proposition, or, in other words, he might say, that they adopted it with considerable alacrity. What was the clause? It was neither more nor less than a declaration by the Legislature, so far as that House was at present concerned, that there was no distinction whatever between the truth or falsehood of different forms of religion and belief. If it could be said that all religions were equally true, it might, in like manner, be Said, that all were equally false. The proposition, which was now adopted by her Majesty's Ministers, recognised the principle that whatever men, or any set of men, to the number of fifty, believed to be true, shall be taught as truth by persons paid by the Government. That was the principle which he protested against last year, and he felt it his duty not less earnestly to oppose it now. There was no difference between adopting this principle for persons confined in a prison, and applying it to any other aggregation of human beings; and if the principle were recognised in one case, it must be extended to others, and it would be equally the duty of the Government to hire chaplains of different creeds for different persons to be found on board our ships of war, and for our military regiments. The hon. Member for Knaresborough last year stated that the clause would apply to only three or four places in the empire, and he mentioned London, Lancashire, and some other populous parts, urging that the measure was not of that character, in as far as its practical extent and working was concerned, as to justify the opposition to which it had been exposed. But it was not to the degree or extent in which this principle was to be carried into operation that he offered his opposition; it was to the establishment of the principle itself. It was to the deliberate recognition of the principle by that House, that there was no such thing as difference of truth or falsehood in different religious persuasions, but that the Government was bound to pay the teacher of doctrines which were opposed to the established religion of the country that he was opposed. There was a great deal of difference between the toleration of other sects of religion and that maintenance and encouragement and support of them which the present clause proposed to afford. Regarding this clause, then, as the first step in the progress of a principle which he held to be destructive to the legitimate rights of the Established Church of this country, regarding it as making no difference between truth and falsehood, and regarding it as a principle which, if once admitted could not be afterwards altered, but must be carried out still further, so that if it were adopted in this case, religious teachers of different persuasions could not be excluded from workhouses, or from the army and navy, he thought it better to stop where they were, and therefore he moved that this 14th clause do not stand part of the bill.

read the first passage of the clause, and said, he must protest against the principle of making religious instruction dependent on numbers. If the principle was a sound and good principle, that persons not members of the established church confined in our gaols should be provided with religious instruction according to their own tenets, for if they amounted to fifty in number, it must be an equally sound principle for forty-nine prisoners—it would be an absurdity, a gross insult to common sense, to say, that religious instruction ought to be withheld from forty-nine prisoners, which would be given to them it' they had only another partner in crime. Religious instruction was a blessing which should be given to all; and the only question was, in what way the Legislature was bound to provide it. There was another objectionable point in the clause, and that was, the discre- tionary power given to the magistrates to appoint or remove the chaplains of prisons at pleasure. That appeared to him to be a complete abandonment of the functions of Parliament, and an imposition of a discretion on those who were appointed to carry out the law which they ought not to be called upon to exercise. The amount of salary, and other minor matters, might be safely left to their discretion, but he protested against the extreme unfairness of calling on the magistrates to decide whether the principle of the law was a good one, and whether it should or should not be carried into effect. Such a measure must, if passed, operate very unequally, for there might be fifty persons of one sect in prison in Liverpool, white at Birmingham the number might be less, and thus the population of two different places would be living under different systems. But there was another reason why he was opposed to this clause. When he saw the rapid strides which the Roman Catholics were making in this country, he must say, that he did not feel at all disposed to make this further concession to them. He was by no means disposed to interfere with that principle of British law by which every man was tolerated, and could hold his theological opinions without let or hindrance; he held that to be a true principle of our Legislature, but he must nevertheless give his decided opposition to this clause.

expressed his entire concurrence in the remarks of his hon. Friend who had just sat down. He had presented a petition to the House against the clause, signed by a most respectable body of persons, and he should feel it his duty to vote against it.

thought the noble Lord would be compelled to give up this measure ultimately, although he might that night succeed in getting a majority in its favour. He admitted that Dissenters and Roman Catholics ought to have the privilege of receiving religious consolation from their ministers, but he objected to any clause of this kind, because he knew that Roman Catholic priests and dissenting preachers were not satisfied with administering consolation to those who belonged to their own sects, but that they would interfere with those who did not belong to them. He knew instances in which Roman Catholic and Dissenting teachers endeavoured to force their principles upon others— ["Hear," and a cry of "divide.") "I do not wonder," said the hon. Baronet, "that hon. Members opposite are so anxious to go to a division on the clause, because we are not in a situation to divide. I know that if we divide now, we shall be beaten. But if the House were full of Members, I am perfectly sure that we should negative this clause. But we are in a most unfortunate condition. I neither see the argument nor the gentlemanly feeling of laughter, and I think it is a course of proceeding which is not fit for the House of Commons. If we had fair play, I am sure we should reject the clause." Being convinced that it went directly against the Protestant feeling of the country, he should follow the course of his hon. Friends who had spoken.

said, that to take money from the public funds for the support of other creeds than that of the Established Church of the country, was virtually to separate that Church from the State. But there were other difficulties in the way, arising out of the multiplicity of sects in existence. It was quite impossible, he believed, to say how many sects there were. If this principle was admitted, this assistance must be given to any number, and any number of members might be employed; and this in itself would be extremely inconvenient.

thought it right to say a few words with respect to the introduction of this clause. The hon. Baronet, the Member for the University of Oxford, was right in saying that the clause was not contained in the original bill. It was moved when he (Lord John Russell) was not in his place, by the hon. Member for Knaresborough; it was supported by the noble Lord, the Member for North Lancashire (Lord Stanley) whom he did not now see present), and it was received with favour by the House. When he found the proposition had been thus supported and favourably received, although he had some doubts as to its propriety, he had stated, that seeing the opinion of the House was in its favour, he was willing to adopt a clause of this nature, always providing, that its terms should be such as to preserve that general superintendence of the chaplain which was necessary to the discipline of the prison. He thought that the clause in this respect answered the object the hon. Mover had in view, and in which he was ready to concur. The state of the law at present was, that if any prisoner asked the assistance of a minister not of the Church, that such minister should be admitted, and the practice was, he believed, uniformly agreeable to that law. Then it was said by hon. Members, that if such was the law, a minister should be paid for attending one prisoner as well as if he attended on fifty. To that proposition he could not agree, for though it might be very proper if there were fifty prisoners of one communion in a gaol, and that the minister of such communion gave up his time and passed a great part of every day in that prison, that he should have some remuneration for that constant devotion of his time; still, when he came only once a month, perhaps, to visit one prisoner, it would not be fit or necessary that any compensation should be given for so small and inconsiderable a service. Then the hon. Member for Droitwich (Mr. Pakington) objected to the words in the clause, "if they shall see fit." Now, it did seem to him (Lord John Russell) those words were necessary to render the clause free from that objection which he should otherwise entertain to it. The magistrates were obliged, as the hon. Member supposed, to appoint a minister to the gaol different to the chaplain of the Established Church; unless those words appeared, it would be otherwise a matter of absolute necessity with them to appoint such a person, and, on the other hand, it was desirable they should have this discretion, as in case they saw a minister interfering improperly with the duties of the chaplain, they could take advantage of the clause, and exercise the power and discretion vested in them by the Act of Parliament, On that head, therefore, he did not see the clause was liable to objection. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir R. Inglis) urged, that if the principle of this clause was carried to the extreme, it would be necessary to have ministers of every religion to regiments, to ships, and in almost every place; but the Legislature must look to practical effects. Soldiers were permitted to go to Roman Catholic chapels or Dissenting meeting-houses, because it could be done without inconvenience, but the privilege could not be extended to sailors, nor could ministers of every creed be sent on board ships, on account of the manifest inconvenience which would arise to the service. Hence it was necessary to make a difference both in practice and in legislation; And therefore he thought the committee might adopt a clause of this kind without saying they would adopt the principle in any other case.

observed, that though soldiers went to Roman Catholic or Dissenting chapels, they, nor the country, had not to pay the ministers. He was very sorry the noble Lord's doubts had been shaken on this question, for the very circumstance which recommended the, clause to the noble Lord—namely, that the appointment was left optional to the magistrates—afforded the very strongest objection to it. The operation of the clause would be strongly felt in Middlesex, Lancashire, and other large counties, and to show the consequences he would state what had occurred in the county of Middlesex. The circumstance he was about to mention showed, that the matter could not be left optional with the magistrates, but that the Legislature must determine whether or not Roman Catholic and other ministers must be paid or not. Not long since, an application was made at the quarter sessions on the part of some Roman Catholic ladies who wished to visit Coldbathfields prison; the majority of the magistrates not wishing to be responsible for the tracts those ladies might think fit to distribute, felt it their duty to resist the application, and the magistrates divided—fifteen for and thirty against the admission of those ladies. Upon that the question was supposed to have been settled, but the magistrate who had introduced again revived the subject; the magistrates again rejected it, and by a larger majority, because they stated, that the question was very likely to be brought under the consideration of Parliament, that they hoped it would not be left optional with the magistrates to decide one way or the other, and that the Legislature ought to determine, aye or no, whether these ministers ought to be paid. If that was not done, they stated, that the bench would be fighting the Catholic question every time they met. Determined as he was, not to leave the matter in doubt, he should certainly vote against the clause.

inquired, as the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell) was willing to apply the principle of this clause to prisons, why he hesitated to extend it to workhouses? He could assure the noble Lord, that the Dissenters did not look to this clause as any boon to them, and therefore he (Mr. Blackstone) believed it was in fact a clause to increase the power of the Romish Church. Neither did he believe the people of England were prepared to go along with the Government in that view, and on that ground solely he should resist the clause.

concurred in the belief expressed by the hon. Member, that the Dissenters had no wish themselves on the subject, first, because it was not consistent with their principles, that their clergy should receive payment from the state; and, next, because he believed there would never be found fifty Dissenters in any prison in England. At the same time he was very much disposed to give religious instruction to Roman Catholics hi prison in the way proposed, and when this was called a means of extending the power of the Roman Catholic Church, he must 'ask hon. Members whether they thought really their Church was so weak as to be in danger of being subverted by sending half-a-dozen Roman Catholic priests to attend prisoners in as many gaols? The proposition was most preposterous, and he thought he saw the hon. Member opposite smile at the absurdity of his own observations.

begged to remark, in the first place, that the words which had now been objected to were not in the clause he originally proposed, but had been inserted at the instigation of the noble Lord, the Member for North Lancashire. But the really serious question in the clause was this—look at the different prisons, and it would be seen, that the Roman Catholics in populous towns were of the lowest classes, and formed the largest number of prisoners. Those persons could not and would not receive the instruction the law now afforded them. The Legislature was now passing measures for the separate confinement of prisoners, and for other means of correcting criminals, and then, because there were large masses of criminals who would not avail themselves of the instruction of the Established Church, it was said, rather than provide them with the instruction they would accept, the Legislature would give them none, and thus deprive the whole community of the advantages of an attempt in that way to reform persons in confinement. This was a denial of justice to those individuals and to the country, Furthers it seemed strange to him that hon. Gentlemen opposite should think so lightly of their religion as to suppose, that because a few gaols were to be visited by the Roman Catholics, a blow was inflicted on the Established Church of the country. Hon. Members had spoken of a division on this clause; why, last year, after a long discussion, there had been a division, and the clause was carried by a large majority.

said, as the clause had been disclaimed by the noble Lord opposite, and also on the part of the Dissenters, he could not but think it was brought forward on behalf of the Roman Catholics. It was said, that this plan had been in operation in Ireland. The result there, however, did not induce him to look on the plan in a very favourable light. By this clause it was sought to make the magistrates do that which the Government were afraid to do themselves; they feared the responsibility, and sought to fix it on the magistrates of the country. The hon. Member (Mr. Langdale) had said, that the Catholics were the lowest class of the community. They well knew, that this class of the community did not seek the clergy of their persuasion; their clergy were obliged to seek out them; and were Members on the opposite side of the House prepared to tell him, that the Roman Catholic priests did not seek up the Members of their persuasion, but that it was necessary to provide clergy for the Roman Catholics in the prisons? The principle was not now acted upon, that the state was to maintain the established religion of the state; they had given up that principle. The Members of the Opposition had told those on the other side of the House, that there were persons destitute of religion within the walls of the gaols, and they now called on them to provide the religion of the state for them. It was not because he thought, that if the Roman Catholic priests were admitted into the walls of the gaols they would destroy the Church that he opposed this clause; for he did not believe if they separated all support of the state from the Church, that the Church would be in danger; but it was necessary for the safety of the state, that the Church should not be separated from the state. This attempt to introduce this clause was part of our great system; he saw it in operation not only in this country, not only in Ireland, but in Europe; it was part of a system, The Roman Catholics were a very powerful body, a very powerful political body, determined to work out their own ends. He saw this going on; he knew their power, and so far as he knew that power he believed, that when once it was established it was inconsistent with the civil and religious liberty of any country. On that ground he should vote against this clause.

said, if once they admitted the principle, that fifty persons assembled together in any gaol or other place of one religious persuasion should call upon the state to support their minister, fifty persons in any ship or society whatever might call upon the state to support their minister, of whatever religion they might be. It was the admission of this principle to which he, as a Protestant, could not submit. Fifty men of any religious denomination so circumstanced, be their principles ever so wild or contrary to Scripture, would be able to call on the Government to do that which would be disgraceful to a Protestant country.

thought this clause had some connexion with the minute of Council on education. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) had told them, that he would not have consented to this clause except it were always provided, that a general superintendence should be exercised by the chaplain of the gaol. He (Mr. Acland) had looked over the bill in vain for any such clause of superintendence It appeared to him, that the chaplain with his fifty persons under his charge would be in very much the same position as the Roman Catholic priest. On behalf of the established religion of the country, he did beg, that as the state professed to have an Established Church, it should not act in contravention of that profession. He would ask the noble Lord, what was that general superintendence which was given to the chaplains of the gaols? He had also to call the attention of the legal adviser of her Majesty to another question. He was rather anxious to ascertain from those learned in the law the meaning of the term "one and the same religion." He wanted to know what was the legal definition of the term "one and the same religion." Did it mean of the same denomination of religion, or did it include all denominations not being Roman Catholic, or all denominations not being of the Established Church? It was important for the House when a new principle was introduced to know to what extent it went. He should be glad to know what was the extent of the meaning of those terms?

moved, as an amend- ment, that the sheriffs of nine counties in which circuit courts are held should ex officio be members of the board.

opposed the amendment.

supported it.

objected to the Inspector-General of Prisons in Scotland being a member of the general board.

could not see what objection there was to it. The Inspector-general was the man likely to possess most information on the subject of prisons, and, as there were many Members of the Board who could not always attend, the attendance of the inspector would be more desirable.

said, that the remarks of the hon. Member would go more to prove the inefficiency of the board than the propriety of making the inspector a member of it. The inspector ought to be under the control of the board.

thought, that as the inspector was the servant of the board he would, by being made a member of it, be made a judge in his own case.

said, the inspector was responsible to the Government, as he had to report to it all circumstances connected with the state of prisons in Scotland. He would be an honorary member of the board, and should not influence its decisions. He thought that his being a member of the board would he a sort of guarantee that the board did its duty.

moved, as an amendment, that the words "inspectors of prisons" be omitted from the clause.

proposed an amendment, to the effect that no man should be a member of these local boards, unless he were a Commissioner of Supply and also a Justice of Peace.