appeared at the bar, and said that the committee appointed to examine the journals of the House of Lords had done so, and had found that the Rating of Stock in Trade Bill, sent up from this House, had been read a first and second time by their Lordships, and that the report of their Lordships' committee on the bill was ordered to be brought up on that day six months.

said, he hoped the House, as this was a matter of great importance, would allow him to introduce a new bill and pass it as rapidly as possible. He understood that one question, and that a principal one, upon which this bill had been lost in the House of Lords, was the question as to the liability which was taken away by this bill. That was a point upon which he need not give an opinion. All he would say was, that his hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-General, was clearly of opinion that the liability, as regarded all occupiers, was neither varied nor changed. It was, however, supposed that occupiers would be exempted from liability under the words which exempted, or at least were intended to exempt, inhabitants only. He had been also told, that there was great objection in the other House to pass this as a permanent act, several noble Lords thinking that the question ought to be again considered in the next session. That certainly was not his opinion. It was essential, however, to pass a bill in the present session, and he would, therefore, propose to introduce a hill, and, if possible, pass it through the whole of the stages that day, so that it might be considered in the House of Lords to-morrow. The noble Lord concluded by moving for leave to bring in a bill.

rose cordially to second the motion. There could be no doubt that it was essential that a bill of this sort should be passed; at the same time he owed to himself, and to the question of law, to state that he was of the clearest and most confident opinion that the objections taken to the bill in the House of Lords were altogether unfounded. There was not the smallest pretence for saying that the bill would have the operation apprehended. The only object of the bill was to prevent persons who were inhabitants from being rated for stock in trade. In every other capacity, and as regarded every other species of property, they remained rateable as before. There appeared to exist a dread that leasehold property would be exempted from rating. If the bill had been liable to such a construction, he would have been very much to blame, because he had no doubt that leasehold property chiefly contributed to the rate for the relief of the poor. He begged, however, to say, that it was utterly impossible that such a construction could be put on the bill. After the report made by the hon. Members who had examined the journals of the House of Lords, it was absolutely necessary that something should be done; for if not—if the question were left in its present state, no rate could be made for the poor in any parish in the kingdom. Under the circumstances, the course which his noble Friend proposed was the best that could be pursued. The House had agreed to the bill in all its stages, with very little objection to some of the details—not so much as to prevent him from hoping that the bill would be allowed to pass through all its stages this evening.

had an amendment to propose, but first he would explain to the noble Lord how this matter stood. Yesterday he stated to the House that in consequence of the vindictive conduct of certain parties at Chelmsford, as shown at a meeting of the churchwardens and others, with the rector in the chair, it was clear that the House could not trust those parties with any discretionary power as regarded the bill before the House. It appeared that at a meeting on Monday last, certain resolutions were passed by the parishioners of Chelmsford, the last of which was as follows:—

"That as regards the proceedings against John Thorogood, which have been hitherto carried on by the churchwardens of Chelmsford, on their own judgment and responsibility, the thanks of this meeting are eminently due to them for the judicious, straightforward, and uncompromising course which they have hitherto pursued; and that, in the opinion of this meeting, they will best serve the interests of the Established Church generally, as they will assuredly of this parish in particular, by persevering in the same course of firmness and consistency, until they have recovered the rate due from John Thorogood, and received the costs occasioned by his obstinacy, trickery, and self-will."

That charitable resolution was put from the chair, and adopted by a majority of the meeting assembled within the walls of that sacred edifice, which John Thorogood not using, did not think proper to contribute to the repairs of. Some parties not satisfied with the show of hands, demanded a poll, the result of which for the first day was, that 168 voted for keeping Mr. Thorogood in prison, and 130 for his discharge. He had little doubt but that the friends of the churchwardens and of persecution would succeed. After coming to such a resolution, and after seeing that resolution confirmed by the petition presented to the House, praying the House not to give its consent to any bill for the release of Mr. Thorogood, although he had suffered nineteen months' imprisonment, until he should have paid the rate and costs, it was quite clear that these parties would not carry out the humane object which the noble Lord had in view in introducing this bill, a bill, the principle of which had been sanctioned by the House without a division, and yet these men set themselves in opposition to the express wish of the House, and, if possible, to an act of Parliament. He therefore said, they ought not to be trusted with any discretionary power, and he wished the House to adopt such an amendment as would take that discretionary power away from them, and leave a discretion with the judge of the Ecclesiastical Court to say whether the prisoner should be released or not. It was stated yesterday, by his right hon. and learned Friend (Dr. Lushington) that this would be giving too great power to any judge, to release prisoners from contempt. This was a difficulty easily obviated by confining the operation of the bill to the cases of persons committed for the non-payment of church-rates; and for that purpose he would move to insert in the second line of the bill the words "in cases of subtraction of church-rates." This would only give power to the judge to discharge a prisoner who was imprisoned for a small sum like this, of 5s. 6d. He proposed, moreover, to leave out the proviso by which no order was to be made by the judge, without the consent of the party or parties in the suit. He wished to leave that proviso out, because it was quite clear that this power would be much better vested in the court, than in persons actuated by such vindictive and intolerant motives as the inhabitants of Chelmsford. It was the judge of the Ecclesiastical Court against whom the offence had been committed. The churchwardens of Chelmsford had, in point of fact, nothing to do with the contempt that had been committed. It rested between Mr. Thorogood and the court, and the judge of that court was the person who was best able to say whether Mr. Thorogood had been sufficiently punished for the offence he had committed. If this had been a case of debt for 5s. 6d., the individual would not have been incarcerated more than seven days, but for 5s. 6d. due to the church, it appeared that a man was to be kept in prison for life. The church was the proper tribunal to say whether this offence had been sufficiently punished or not, and he trusted, considering that Mr. Thorogood had now been imprisoned for nineteen months, that the Church would consider that he had been sufficiently punished. The warrant upon which Mr. Thorogood was committed, merely stated, that he was guilty of contumacy, in refusing to appear to the citation served upon him. The prisoner's making satisfaction for the contempt of court had nothing to do with the payment of costs. Costs were not mentioned in the warrant. He would not, therefore, give those inhabitants of Chelmsford, who had shown so vindictive and malevolent a feeling, a voice upon the subject. He would move, in the first place, to insert words to confine the operation of the bill to cases of the subtraction of church-rates, and subsequently he would move, that the proviso to which he had referred be expunged.

said, he must consider the proposition of the hon. Gentleman with reference to what he proposed subsequently to introduce into the bill, and to decide whether or not the whole proposition ought to be adopted. The hon. Gentleman proposed that the bill, instead Of being general, should have reference solely to cases of contempt for non-payment of church-rates. This pro- bably would do away with the objection which he understood had been taken yesterday, and which was of a most serious kind, viz. with regard to any party refusing to appear upon questions of the greatest importance, affecting the various relations of life with which the court would have to deal, the danger of giving to the judge an absolute power of freeing such party at once from the consequences of his refusal. Looking, however, at the amendment with regard to church-rates solely, he must say he did not think it expedient to adopt it. The amendment proposed would give to the judge of the Ecclesiastical Court an absolute dominion over all cases of this kind. The judge would have it in his power to refuse to discharge a prisoner, or after a party had been in prison a single day for contempt, he would have it in his power at once, without the consent of the party suing, to discharge the prisoner. Suppose the judge did not think it consistent with his duty so to discharge a prisoner, then they would be placing upon the judge the whole odium of the refusal; for if they gave the judge an absolute power, it would remain for him to say whether or not the party should be discharged. They had had the case of Mr. Thorogood, and as matters stood then, he thought that case would not find a great many imitators; but supposing any party should so refuse church-rates, and when summoned before the magistrates should contest the validity of the rate, and when summoned to appear before the Ecclesiastical Court, should refuse to appear, and should consequently be committed for contempt, such a person would be imprisoned solely at the discretion of the judge. Now there might be a great many parties who would imitate such conduct, and would bring such a pressure to bear upon the judge, as to be enabled entirely to defeat the law by means of this amendment of the hon. Gentleman. Parties would not pay church-rates, but would contest the validity of the rate, would then refuse to appear, and the judge would be ultimately compelled, from the great number of persons imprisoned, to discharge them. He submitted, therefore, that giving this extreme and absolute power to a judge, without control,, to discharge a party who refused to pay or appear, and that after even one single day's imprisonment, would be a most inexpedient change of the law. The amend- ment would either enable a judge to do that which it was not fit he should do, or feeling that it was not fit, it would be placing upon him a responsibility that ought not to be imposed upon him—the responsibility of entirely dispensing with the enactments of the law, and obedience to the measures taken for the enforcement of the law.

said, that the people of Chelmsford, and the churchwardens, had great reason to complain of the feelings of vindictiveness and severity that had been attributed to them. The churchwardens were bound to enforce the rate, in vindication of the law of the country. In doing this they had been put to heavy expenses, and now all they required was, that the rate, together with the costs to which they had been put, should be paid. He believed that the churchwardens and inhabitants of Chelmsford would be very happy if Mr. Thorogood were released from prison, provided the law were complied with.

said, that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had complained that his hon. Friend had attributed to those gentlemen of Chelmsford, whom the hon. Gentleman defended, great severity in the course they had pursued with reference to Mr. John Thorogood. Yes, the hon. Gentleman said, and by his cheer confirmed the statement, that these Chelmsford gentlemen would be most happy if Mr. Thorogood were to be released to-morrow. But their happiness did not go to the extent of remitting the 5s. 6d. and the costs that had been incurred. Their happiness fell quite short of that. They would be most happy if Mr. Thorogood paid the rate and the costs—if in fact he gave them every thing they sought for. They knew that Mr. Thorogood entertained conscientious scruples against paying this rate; or whether they knew this or not, they knew at least, that he was conscientiously determined not to pay this rate, and that he was conscientiously determined not to pay the costs, and therefore their happiness would never be completed, because, sooner than pay this rate and costs, Mr. Thorogood would die in Chelsmford Gaol; and then, forsooth, these gentlemen expected to be exempted from having anything like severity attributed to them. He did think, that the hon. Member would find very few people, however much they might differ from Mr. Thorogood as to the course he had pursued, that would give to the authorities of Chelmsford credit for an extreme anxiety to show mercy, and for an extreme propriety in constituting that which would give them happiness. Never before had an opinion so unanimously prevailed as that Mr. Thorogood had suffered long enough, that the 5s. 6d. rate had been amply paid for by his imprisonment; that the costs, even if they should amount to 100l. had been amply paid for by the length of that imprisonment; and then for those persons to talk of their happiness if he should be released to-morrow, and of their not being influenced by any feeling of severity, and of their praying to be exempted from all charge of harshness in a case like this, when they had done everything which the most severe interpretation of the law enabled them to do, seemed to him rather too much for the public, and he hoped also for that House.

said, that it was absurd to talk of conscience in a ease of this sort. If Mr. Thorogood had been actuated by conscientious motives, he had nothing to do but go before the magistrates, and, like the Quakers, allow his goods to be distrained. He did no such thing. He went before the magistrates and gave notice, that he would dispute the validity of the rate, and the magistrates, supposing that he did bonâ fide intend to dispute the validity of the rate, discharged him. It was nothing short of a fraud on the part of this person to deprive the parish of a summary remedy for the recovery of the rate, and to put them to a more expensive process. The churchwardens had been harassed for a great length of time, and now all that they wanted was, that the rate and their costs should be paid. He could not consent to the amendment.

would not press the first portion of his amendment, but would persevere in the amendment for striking out the proviso.

said, that as he admitted, that there would probably be some difficulty in effecting the release of John Thorogood under this bill, and as he had stated his reasons for not agreeing to the amendment of the hon. Member for Finsbury, he should propose the insertion of words calculated to meet the case. As it might require some consideration, however, he should first move, that they be printed. The words were:—

"Provided always, that in cases of sub- traction of Church rate in amount not exceeding 5l., where the party in contempt has suffered imprisonment for twelve months and upwards, the consent of the other parties shall not be considered necessary to enable the judge to discharge such party."

The object was, to give a prisoner the benefit of the exercise of the powers of a judge after twelve months' imprisonment, and if it met the views of the House he would move it at once.

rose to move:—

"That an humble address he presented to her Majesty, that she will be graciously pleased to direct that a commission may be issued to inquire into the allegations contained in the petition of Mr. Feargus O'Connor, presented to this House on the 1st day of June last, and into what has been and now is his treatment in York Castle; also to inquire into what has been and now is the treatment of prisoners confined under sentences for writing and publishing seditious libels, or for uttering seditious words, or for attending seditious meetings, in the gaols or houses of correction of York, Wakefield, Northallerton, and Beverley."

He assured the House that he had no intention whatever to throw any imputation on any individual, his only object was, that inquiry should be made into the circumstances, with a view to the proper elucidation of the grounds of complaint. He thought that he should be able to make out a prima facie case of hardship quite sufficient to justify him in the course which he had adopted, and that he should also be able to show that a commission was the best and most satisfactory mode of obtaining that satisfaction and information to which the country was entitled. He would proceed first to the second part of his motion. The case of York Castle would include the complaint of Mr. Feargus O'Connor, and the other places named had been selected, because, being in the same county, it was probable that the same regulations prevailed in their gaols, and also because strong cases of hardship had been made out in petitions presented to the House from persons confined in them. Mr. Joseph Crabtree was confined in Wakefield gaol, and a petition had been presented to the House from him on the 30th of June. That petition set forth many circumstances showing the greatest hardship to have been employed towards the prisoner, which in themselves formed a ground fully sufficient to entitle him to succeed in his motion. All he asked for was, that an inquiry might be made by competent persons, in order that the result might be known to the House. The hon. Member then proceeded to read extracts from the petition, at considerable length, which, he contended, stated the petitioner to have been subjected to a degree of indignity and hardship which he thought was unfitting his condition. The hon. Member also referred to the petition of Richard White, a prisoner for similar offences, and of a prisoner who was confined in Northallerton gaol, who had been subjected to hard labour. The latter petition had not been printed, and he could not vouch for the accuracy of the allegations contained in it, but if it were that the prisoner was put to hard labour, he contended that a case for inquiry had been made out. He thought that the hon. and learned Attorney-general would confirm the opinion which he expressed when he said, that hard labour was not such a punishment as was contemplated in such cases. He had had the honour of sitting as chairman of the committee upon the subject of the Affirmation Bill, and the hon. and learned Attorney-general had made use of an expression upon this subject of which he had taken the liberty of making a note. He said, "Hard labour ought never to be imposed, because it is an infamous punishment, unless it be for an infamous offence." This case was not infamous, and if the parties were subjected to hard labour it was improper. He called upon the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary for the Home Department to satisfy the House whether hard labour was part of the sentence pronounced. If it were a part of the sentence, it was an erroneous sentence; if it were not, the punishment had been improperly inflicted, and he claimed that an inquiry should be made. With regard to the first part of his motion, regarding Mr. F. O'Connor, he founded it on the petition presented by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Reading. Mr. O'Connor alleged a series of hardships and grievances, which at the time excited very strong sympathy; and he begged to ask whether, if these statements were true, such punishments had not been inflicted as should never have been employed? It was matter of public notoriety that some relaxation had been made—an admission of the necessity of taking that course. Mr. O'Connor in his petition stated,—

"That, in consequence of the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, your petitioner was consigned to the custody of the governor of York Castle, on Tuesday the 19th day of May, at ten o'clock at night. That your petitioner was first deprived of his money and a few newspapers, and, after being examined by a physician, was conducted to a stone cell, seven and a half feet long and four feet ten inches wide, about eight feet high, the door up to petitioner's chin, and only wide enough to admit petitioner sideways. An iron bedstead, not near the width of petitioner, a thin flock bed, not so long as petitioner, and the usual number of blankets, with a horse rug for a counterpane, were then shown to petitioner, which, with a black pot, composed the furniture, &c."

On former occasions some of the facts stated in the petition were denied, and it was alleged that he had voluntarily imposed upon himself those hardships, of which he complained. Mr. O'Connor, however, assured him, that that of which he complained was strictly in accordance with the rules of the prison. That very contradiction was a reason for inquiry. It was also stated in the petition that Mr. Clarkson, the professional adviser of Mr. O'Connor, had presented a petition complaining of his not having been allowed to visit Mr. O'Connor. He denied that he had ever admitted that he was not the professional adviser of Mr. O'Connor, or that he wished to see him as a private friend only. Up to the month of June last he was still refused admittance to his client, though since that period he had been allowed to see him. He thought that some explanation of this refusal to admit Mr. Clarkson was due from the hon. Under-Secretary. Government had sent a responsible officer (Mr. Crawford) down to inquire, but his instructions were verbal only, and there was no record whatever of his investigation. He thought that such a course on the part of the Home-office was, to say the least of it, not salutary, and that he was entitled to call for a commission to inquire into the state of the discipline in the prisons in question. He thought that the House could not have before it a question of greater importance, or one of deeper interest to the masses of the population, and respecting which they had so repeatedly petitioned the House. The demand which he made for inquiry was supported by precedents, and it had been allowed at periods not remarkable for the liberality of the Government: and he had shown a primâ facie case of hardship. In conclusion, he called upon the House to grant him what he required, and he should leave it until the inquiry was completed, or to a future period to found a substantive motion on the subject. The hon. Member concluded by making his motion for an address, which we gave at the early part of his speech.

did not feel that it would be convenient to revive the whole of the discussions which took place on previous occasions on this subject, and what had now been stated by the hon. and learned Gentleman respecting Mr. Feargus O'Connor was substantially the same as had been stated on former occasions, when the House decided by a very large majority against such a motion. The present motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman was founded on the allegations made by Mr. Feargus O'Connor as to his treatment; immediately on complaint being made to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, he directed that the treatment of Mr. F. O'Connor should be altered, and he did not understand that the hon. and learned Gentleman found fault, unless with respect to some of the phrases used on the subject, with the treatment now experienced by that person. The question was, whether or not the justices of Yorkshire had complied with these directions; an inspector of prisons was on the spot at the time, and he was directed to investigate the subject; and on his doing so, he stated that he was satisfied that the directions of the Secretary of State had been complied with, and that the magistrates did not enforce the prison regulations against Mr. Feargus O'Connor. If the House was disposed to think that those who had the regulation of the prison had altered or suppressed the facts of the case, there might be ground for further inquiry; but it should be recollected that if this were discovered it would be instantly followed with the dismissal of the parties: they had then the declarations of Mr. F. O'Connor, but he did not think that they were so much to be relied on, or ought to be considered such sound or good authority as that which he referred to. With regard to these cases generally, he thought that a great deal of sympathy was felt towards those persons who were found guilty of libels at particular moments of excitement, and growing out of strong fervour or feeling occasioned by the collision of parties, or other similar causes, and this not merely in the minds of those who had attended to the subject, but in the mind of those who had administered the law; but he confessed that he did not think that any such sympathy was called for in the case of those who, by means of pamphlets or newspapers, or by speeches, indulged in language far beyond the bounds of propriety, and which tended to bring the Sovereign and the law and the authorities into contempt, and which held up individuals to public attack, and which thus, either by writing or speech, induced persons to violate the law. He recollected that on this subject a distinguished friend of his made some striking observations in 1819, when the Six Acts, as they were termed, were before Parliament. He alluded to the late Sir James Mackintosh, who drew the broad distinction between the two classes of libellers in so much more striking language than he could use, that he would read some of his late Friend's observations to the House. The noble Lord quoted, at considerable length, from Sir James Mackintosh's speech on Dec. 23, 1819; and for the passage, see Hansard, vol. 41, pp. 1132–1133. Sir James Mackintosh also proposed an amendment for the purpose of carrying these opinions into effect, which was thus worded, namely, to leave out all these words,

"Tending to bring into hatred or contempt the person of his Majesty, his heirs, or successors, or the Regent, or the Government and constitution, as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or to excite his Majesty's subjects to attempt the alteration of any matter in Church or State, as by law established, otherwise than by lawful means;"

And to insert these words in their room,

"Or any seditious libel tending to excite his Majesty's subjects to do any act which, if done, would by the existing law be treason or felony; or any libel in which it shall be affirmed or maintained that his Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, in Parliament assembled, has not, or ought not to have full power and authority to make laws binding on his Majesty's subjects in all cases whatsoever."

He thought that this was a clear distinction, and that it would have been expedient and just to adopt the amendment as proposed by Sir James Mackintosh. He thought, that by the adoption of some such words as these they might easily draw a distinction. If he was called upon to refer to particular cases illustrative of his opinion, he would say that one of the least blameable cases of the first kind of political libel, and which evidently grew out of the extreme fervour and excitement of the moment, was that of Sir Francis Burdett; another case, very similar, was that of Gilbert Wakefield, and there were others of the same kind which he could mention. Now, he did not think that his hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general, ever instituted proceedings against any of this class of libels; nor had he received any instructions from the Government to prosecute in any such case. He believed, that no proceedings of the kind had been carried on since the Government of the Duke of Wellington, when the Attorney-general felt called upon to proceed against certain newspapers for using language of certainly a very intemperate and violent nature, at a period of great political excitement. But with reference to the second species of libel, by which attempts were made to excite persons either by speeches or by writings to rebel or to act against the law, or to overthrow the law, or to commit acts of violence against individuals, and this by persons who wished to get some pecuniary advantages for themselves out of such proceedings— against such persons he thought that it was the duty of the Government to direct prosecutions to be instituted. He thought also, that although sympathy or commisseration might be extended to the former classes of offenders, it would be very ill to feel or manifest any thing of the kind towards the latter. He did not hesitate to say also, that he thought that Mr. F. O'Connor's was one of the worst cases of the latter description of libel; for that person was the proprietor of a newspaper by which he made a very considerable profit, and which had an extensive circulation in Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and other manufacturing districts, and in which there were constant attacks on the law and the institutions of the country, so as to lead to the endangering the peace of the country. He thought, that with regard to persons of this class, all that the Secretary of State could be called upon to do in case of their conviction and their being sentenced, was to take care that they were not exposed to any unnecessary or extreme hardships. At the same time, however, it was not to be allowed that this person, or any other of the same class, was to have all the honours of martyrdom without any of the sufferings of the martyr. If that were to be the case, it would be only giving a premium to others to follow their example, and to imitate them in violating the law, and thus lead to the greatest confusion in the country. Before he sat down, he wished to advert to one or two of the points alluded to by the hon. and learned Gentleman in reference to the case of Mr. O'Connor. The House had heard many complaints of the hardships inflicted on Mr. O'Connor, in putting him in a room in company with felons. He said, that the facts of the case were these: it so happened, that at the time that Mr. O'Connor was committed to York Castle, there were no prisoners on that side of the gaol in which misdemeanants were confined. On his being conducted to that side of the prison he complained of being placed in solitary confinement, and he was asked by the keeper of the prison whether he would prefer being placed in a room with some felons who had been convicted of offences of a less heinous character to continuing where he was, and Mr. O'Connor at once stated his desire to be removed there. One of the strongest complaints made by Mr. Feargus O'Connor was his being placed in the society of felons, and it certainly had made some impression on the public; but the fact of the case was exactly as he had stated, and that Mr. O'Connor was placed in their society at his own desire. The hon. and learned Gentleman said, that the treatment of these prisoners for political offences should be similar to that of debtors; he contended, however, that there was no ground for any such analogy, and he could not conceive why such a change should be made in the treatment of a person guilty of a misdemeanour of a very bad character. If they sent down a commission to inquire into all these grounds of complaint, the report would inevitably be, that the several sentences were carried into effect according to the decision of the judges. If the hon. and learned Member and the House were of opinion that in these cases of sedition the persons found guilty should be treated with peculiar mildness, he could only say that it would be for the Legislature to make a change to this effect, which must be done by an act of Parliament; but the appointment of a commission could only have the result of seeing whether the sentences had been carried into effect, and whether the magistrates adhered to the instructions of the Secretary of State. He could assure the hon. Gent, that neither the Government nor himself would be deterred by either petitions or motions, from proceeding against persons instigating others to a breach of the law, or from adopting those steps which they believed were essential to the peace of the country.

could not help complaining of the language which the noble Lord had thought proper to use in reference to the persons who were the subject-matter of the present motion, in charging them with urging others to the violation of the law, and to acts of violence and rapine. He did not think that there was anything in their conduct which would justify the use of such expressions on the part of the noble Lord. What he complained of was, not that prosecutions had been instituted, but that the sentences had been carried out in a way in which the judges did not intend they should be, and which the law did not justify. As for the inspector of prisons, Mr. Crawford, visiting York Castle, in conformity with the instructions of the Home-office, they had been told that that gentleman had taken no examinations or depositions, and had made no written report. Now, he believed that the statement of Mr. Feargus O'Connor was to be relied on in this point, who declared that depositions had been taken, and had been signed at York Castle. With respect to the motion, he regretted that his hon. Friend had not extended it to all gaols in which persons were under confinement for political offences. The motion would not then be confined to York Castle and Wakefield House of Correction, but would extend to Oakham, Warwick, Knutsford, Chester, Lancaster, Monmouth, and other places. The House was hardly aware of the number of persons suffering in the various prisons at the present moment, for offences of a political nature. Now he was anxious that an inquiry, if one was instituted, should be extended to every case of the kind. On this subject he had that day presented a petition from a man of the name of Martin, who was now confined for a political offence in Northallerton gaol. This petitioner, William Martin, had been sentenced for sedition to twelve months' imprisonment in the Northallerton house of correction, and to be bound over to keep the peace for three years. On his being taken to the house of correction he was put to hard labour, and for a certain period was placed on the treadmill. This was clearly illegal, and contrary to the sentence passed on him; for on his conviction, and being sentenced, he asked the judge who tried him whether he was to be sentenced to hard labour. The judge replied, that the law did not authorise him to sentence a person to hard labour convicted of the offence of which this person had been found guilty. Notwithstanding this, he was placed on the treadmill for several days, and therefore, if the statement of the prisoner was true as to the language of the judge who tried him, there could be no doubt of the illegality of his treatment. This man did not ask the House to curtail his punishment, but he requested that he might be treated as others convicted of similar offences, and that he might be sent back to York Castle. The noble Lord had declared that the case of Mr. Feargus O'Connor was one of the worst cases of the kind. Why, then, should Mr. Martin's treatment in gaol be so much worse than that of Mr. O'Connor? He thought, however, that one part of the treatment of Mr. Feargus O'Connor was absolutely disgraceful, namely, the opening and reading his private letters before they were handed to him. If they wished to prevent his communicating anything they objected to, let either the chaplain or gaoler, or other officer of the prison whose duty it was to do so, read that gentleman's letters before he was allowed to send them away; but there could be no possible necessity to violate confidence to such an extent as to open the letters sent to him. With reference to the case of Vincent, he felt bound to thank the Government for the mitigation that had been made in the treatment of that person, and of Shellard, and of two or three others now in confinement for political offences. He believed that if a commission was appointed, it would be found that upwards of 200 persons were confined in different gaols on charges of a political nature, and that the treatment they experienced varied considerably. He hoped that on reflection the noble Lord would agree to the motion of his hon. Friend.

had hoped the hon. Member below him, the Under-Secretary for the Home Department, would have communicated to the House what he knew upon the subject; but the hon. Gentleman seemed to rely upon the argument and statement of the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies, who had now retired from the House. He was very glad his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cockermouth had brought forward the motion; he returned that hon. and learned Gentleman his thanks for the perseverance in the matter, and for the resolution he had shown, that this question should not remain unmooted in this House, or that the public should continue ignorant of these atrocities. But, important as the question was, it was not now being discussed before the representatives of the people, but before the benches which those representatives ought to occupy. He knew not what explanation hon. Members would give of their conduct in the matter on the hustings, but he trusted that a faithful account not only of the present state of the House, but also of the arguments which had been urged, would be presented to the public. Why, if the Government would not pledge itself to an inquiry into these matters, did it refuse to grant a commission. He thought a commission would expose acts of atrocity which the country would condemn, and even the House would not approve. Had there been, he begged to ask, any refutation of the allegations contained in the petitions which had been presented? It was said, that Mr. Crawford, the inspector was satisfied that the allegations in the petition of Mr. Feargus O'Connor were untrue; but where was the evidence of Mr. Crawford's satisfaction on that point? The Government had been entreated over and over again to produce Mr. Crawford's report, and at one time it was said that his report had been orally communicated, and at another time the answer given was, that if a report in writing had been made, there was nothing in it. Over and over again the informations or depositions upon which Mr. Crawford had formed his opinions had been sought from the Government, and in every instance the attempt to obtain either the one or the other had wholly failed. This was not treating the House and the country either fairly or justly, and the course pursued in the matter was calculated to bring the House to the lowest possible degree of public odium. If the allegations contained in the petitions of the various political prisoners who had addressed the House were untrue, they themselves would be the parties who would suffer for their falsehood; but his belief was, that those allegations would, on inquiry, turn out to be well-founded, and in that belief he was confirmed by the fact that the Government did not dare to grant such an inquiry as would expose the atrocities which had been committed. If they did not shrink from inquiry, why should they refuse a commission? Let the House bear in mind some of the allegations. What was the statement of Crabtree? Why, he had told the House that he was obliged to keep his face in one position. Did the hon. Member below him (Mr. F. Maule) sanction this infamous treatment of political offenders? The hon. and learned Member for Cockermouth had most ably and adroitly laid before the House what had taken place in the year 1812, when those in office were Tories—a party condemned by those who now held office for their political prosecutions of the Liberals. But it appeared that even then, in a corrupt and atrocious boroughmongering House of Commons, a motion similar to the present was succesful. There was now a reformed House of Parliament, in which it was said the opinions of the people were faithfully reflected; and yet now, when a motion was made by a friend of the people, what was the answer given to it by the noble Lord, the leader of the House? Why, precisely the same answer as had been given at the former period by Lord Castlereagh. In short, the noble Lord appeared as the Castlereagh of the present day. This was but too true; for the noble Lord had, in resisting the present motion, employed the selfsame argument as had been used by Lord Castlereagh in 1812. Did her Majesty's Government suppose the people would respect such conduct on the part of professed reformers? Was this to be the course of reform, that out of office they should support liberal principles, and in office condemn liberal principles? Was this such honesty of heart and of intention as would win the affections of the people of England? On the contrary, would not the people rather condemn such conduct, and do right in visiting it with their severest condemnation? He had expected that, on a former occasion, the Administration would have said, and said truly, "We have been deceived; we had expected that the magistrates had pursued a different course, and we do not approve of political offenders being subjected to this severity of punishment; we discredit the statements which have been made, and we will at once institute an inquiry, in order, if possible, to ascertain whether an efficient remedy may not be applied." Instead of this, the noble Lord, the Secretary for the Colonies, had quoted the language of Sir James Mackintosh, supplied him by an hon. and learned Gentleman on the opposite benches, who held the opinions now which Lord Castlereagh entertained in 1812. The hon. and learned Gentleman must rejoice that the noble Lord had fallen into the trap so ingeniously laid for him. But the noble Lord had divided political offenders into two classes, and had called upon the House to look with clemency upon language used in the heat of argument by such men as Sir F. Burdett in 1819. Now, Sir F. Burdett was a man of education and of large property, and in his opinion it was upon the educated man, upon the man of property, whose influence and example were calculated to have a great effect on the community, that the severity of the law should fall, rather than upon the uninstructed and untutored. He would exhibit no leniency to such men as Sir F. Burdett, but he would extend it to individuals like William Lovett and John Collins. And how had those two men been treated in Warwick gaol? Why, for the first six months, except during a short time while they were in the infirmary, they were denied the use of animal food. Looking to that case, he was of opinion that the inquiry ought not to be confined to that of Mr. Feargus O'Connor, but that the commission should issue to inquire into the manner in which political offenders were treated in all the gaols of the United Kingdom, and, therefore, he trusted his hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Cocker-mouth, would withdraw the first portion of his motion, and amend the second part of it in such a manner as to include the cases of all political offenders. Would the Government object to such an amendment? It would be better that they should do so, for the question would otherwise come to a division, and in that case, though the commission might be lost, the Government would lose the House. The course which the Government had thought fit to pursue in this matter was deeply to be regretted and deplored. The hon. Member below him (Mr. F. Maule) was of a sanguine temperament and an excitable constitution; he might be one day out of office, and in a year or two find himself in such a place as Warwick gaol. The hon. Member was not very mild in his expressions towards his political opponents; he gave free currency, and he admired him for it, to his thoughts and views with respect to those whom he believed to be the enemies of his country, and thus he might bring himself under their prosecution. Now, in that case, he begged to ask the hon. Member how he would like to be put on the treadmill, or be obliged to keep his fine face in one position for eight hours at a time in order that the people might admire it. Such treatment as these political offenders had experienced was a disgrace to a country which boasted of its civilization. If the Government was ready to take upon itself the odium of this proceeding, let them; he, for one, at least would take especial care that no part of it should fall on him. Nay, if he were in the Administration, nothing should induce him to continue there, if his colleagues would persist in a course which must bring disgrace upon any Government professing liberal principles.

could not help observing, that he thought the speech just delivered by the hon. Member for Finsbury was much better adapted for the marquee in which Lovett and Collins had dined the other day, than for the occasion when this important question was discussed. The speech of the hon. Member had so much of the serio-comic vein, that the hon. and learned Member for Cockermouth could scarcely thank his hon. Friend for his support on this occasion. The hon. and learned Member who had brought forward this motion had said, that the issuing of a commission was the proper mode of proceeding. He was sorry to differ from him. He had quoted the case of Thomas Holden, brought forward by Sir Samuel Romilly in the year 1812. Now, Holden was confined for a simple debt, and while in prison had been subjected to all sorts of most infamous treatment. At that period the transactions in the management of gaols were but little known to the Executive Government, and he could well imagine, that in 1812 the House of Commons consented to an inquiry into the circumstances of that case and into the government of that particular gaol. But his hon. and learned Friend might have brought forward a case much more analogous to the present—that of Mr. Hunt, confined in Ilchester gaol in the year 1819. But in that case the complaint was against the gaoler, whose conduct was described to be of so tyrannical a nature as to unfit him to remain at the head of that gaol. These circumstances were strongly put to Mr. Goulburn, then the Under-Secretary for the Home Department, who moved an amendment, the effect of which was the issuing of a commission of inquiry, and the result of that commission was, that the gaoler was held to be unworthy to retain his situation. There, then, was an inquiry into a specific complaint; but in the present case the House was asked to consent to issue a commission to inquire into the management of all gaols in which political offenders were confined. Now, the first case which had been brought under the notice of the House was that of Joseph Crabtree, who, by the hon. Member for Finsbury had presented a petition. He had taken some pains to inquire into that case, and he found that Crabtree was a very peculiar sort of person, and that he not only petitioned the House of Commons, seeking for remedies for the treatment he received in the gaol in which he was confined, but that he also had addressed the Home-office offering to make disclosures and discoveries as to the con duct of his brother Chartists. In his petition Crabtree stated, that he had been afflicted with a disease of the liver for the last six years, and that he suffered also from a pulmonary complaint, which, with imprisonment, would be likely to prove fatal. The Home-office had inquired into that statement, and he had the authority of the surgeon of Wakefield gaol, of whose conduct he had never heard any complaint, for saying that Crabtree was not suffering from any serious disease of the liver or from any organic affection of the lungs, and that, though delicate, he had no complaint of a serious character as tending to shorten life. He next complained of being kept in close confinement, and being prevented from walking about. In answer to this, the gaoler stated, that he was only prevented walking about after he was locked up at 8 o'clock at night, and that rule was established to prevent prisoners in the adjoining cells from being disturbed. With regard to the statement as to his being obliged to hold up his head, and prevented from speaking or making any motion or sign to other prisoners, it was a most exaggerated statement of the discipline of this gaol—a discipline known as the silent system. Whether that system was right or wrong was not the present question, but under it, it was true that Crabtree could not speak or communicate by any means with the neighbouring prisoners with whom he was confined during the day. That system was sanctioned by the law, and had been productive of great good where great numbers of prisoners were confined together. As to the allegation that he had been cut off from communication with his family, and that he was not allowed to write, the visiting justices stated that Crabtree had had frequent visits from his friends, and had enjoyed all necessary correspondence with his wife upon domestic affairs. As to his diet he had been allowed an addition of a pint of milk daily, besides other indulgences. In May last he wrote to the Home-office, offering to give information as to the Chartists, but the offer was not attended to, because it was felt information ought not to be received from an individual who was himself in the custody of the law. So much, then, for the case of Crabtree. The hon. Gentleman, who frequently became very inaudible, was understood to say, that with respect to William Martin, if his case were rightly stated, there must be something wrong; but, for his own part, he had had no previous knowledge with respect to it. As regarded the case of Mr. O'Connor, it had already been admitted that his treatment at York Castle had, for the first two days of his imprisonment, been unnecessarily severe, but the moment the Secretary of State was made aware of it, measures were promptly taken that similar cause for complaint should no longer exist. Mr. O'Connor subsequently denied that the instructions given by the Secretary of State upon this point had been carried into effect, but on inquiry made, the Government had been assured, by a communication from the visiting governors, that those instructions had been acted on. The complaint being reiterated, a person was sent down by Government to York Castle to make inquiry into the matter. Captain Williams, the inspector of the northern districts—not being in the way, the task devolved upon Mr. Craw ford. Mr. O'Connor complained of the cursory manner in which the inquiry before Mr. Crawford was conducted, which, he said, was cut short in the details. Now the inquiry extended over an entire day, the 9th of June last; and Mr. Crawford, when asked respecting the investigation, said, that the whole of the allegations contained in Mr. O'Connor's petition had been inquired into most fully. When the visiting magistrates had all but one left. Mr. O'Connor proposed that the investigation should be continued the following day, not confining the inquiry to that alone which had occurred at York Castle. The magistrate, who was the only one present, consented, but the other magistrates on the next day objected, on the ground of the proposition for introducing extraneous matter. Since that period Mr. O'Connor had received all the indulgences which an imprisonment in the Castle would permit. He had a good airy day room, as well as a similar one for a sleeping apartment. He was allowed to select his food, and permitted to see his friends as well as his legal advisers, Messrs. Clarkson and Turner. Mr. Clarkson, applied to be admitted to him on the 22nd of May. The magistrates, having some doubts on the point, wrote to the Secretary of State for instructions, and an answer was returned on the 25th, directing both that his legal and medical advisers should be allowed access to the prisoner. Mr. Turner, the other legal adviser, applied for the same permission directly to the Secretary of State on the 25th of May, to which application that gentleman received an answer in the affirmative on the 26th, the visiting magistrates having been written to to that effect at the same time. Thus, then, it would be seen that no blame could attach to the Executive Government as far as regarded the access of Mr. O'Connor's legal and medical advisers. There was, indeed, one privation to which Mr. O'Connor had been subjected, and however unpopular the avowal might make him, he must say, that he concurred both in thinking that Mr. O'Connor was justly subjected to that privation, and that it was one which ought to be continued. It was this—that whilst Mr. O'Connor was enduring the punishment of a crime of which he had been convicted by a jury of his countrymen, and for which he had been sentenced by a judge of the land, he ought not to be permitted to conduct the journal called the0 Northern Star. The expression of such an opinion, and the adoption of such a course required, he admitted strong grounds of justification, but he also thought that it would not be denied that those grounds existed on the present occasion, for if hon. Gentlemen would look to that paper, they would admit that it was well calculated to work the public mind into the same state of dangerous effervescence which was exhibited last summer. If, whilst Mr. O'Connor was free, he could excite to so much danger, the chances of evil would be increased tenfold if he were allowed to conduct the journal whilst in confinement. With respect to the close eye which was kept upon Mr. O'Connor's correspondence, a communication from the governor of the gaol would show its necessity. When the person who attended Mr. O'Connor in prison, Edward Whitworth, was about to be discharged, he was closely searched, with a view to discover whether he had any papers on his person, but none were discovered. He took with him a small looking-glass, given to him by Mr. O'Connor, in which it was not supposed any papers could be secreted, and which was, therefore, allowed to pass; yet Mr. O'Connor afterwards boasted that there were several sheets of closely written paper concealed between the glass and the wooden panel at the back. Under these circumstances, it was not to be wondered at that Mr. O'Connor's correspondence was closely scrutinized. He now considered that he had touched upon most of the points which had been alluded to. Before he closed his observations he must express his regret that those who had taken up the view of the hon. and learned Member for Cockermouth persisted in the use of the general expression "political offences," when the danger which attended them had not yet passed away, and which, though at present out of sight, might be, perhaps, but slumbering. He hoped, however, that this might not be the case, and that the public mind was returning to a better condition. The House should not, however, shut its eyes to the tendency which existed amongst the humbler classes, owing in a great degree to the fact, that wages were not what they ought to be. Though that tendency did not now exhibit itself in the same way in which it had lately done, still the dangerous views which had been entertained and expressed should not be hastily forgotten. It was true, that the persons who were confined for those offences had been, for the most part, the victims of others, who had deluded them. Some of the leaders, too, had suffered punishment, and he did not, and would not believe, that any persons in that House sympathised in the crime for which they had suffered, notwithstanding the exaggerated statements which had been made respecting them, and the contrast which had been drawn between former times and the present. For his own part, whilst the gaols were so well inspected, he would not suffer himself to be led away by the notion that these petitions were correct representations. He, however, would say with respect to the different systems of regulations in the various prisons, he would have no objection to see them placed under the control of a central board, as in Scotland.

wished to say a few words before the Speaker left the Chair. He regretted, that the other bill which had been sent down from the House of Lords had not passed into a law during the present Session. But from the lateness of the period, and the opposition therefore it had been thought more expedient to withdraw that bill, in order to introduce it at the commencement of next Session; he believed, that the bill now before the House would not meet with opposition from any quarter, not even from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon, who had thrown out such an alarming threat respecting the other bill. The object of this bill was to give to the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-chancellor, the power of making rules and regulations in the practice of the Court of Chancery. He believed, that the Court of Chancery, the bar, and the solicitors, were almost unanimously of opinion, that such a length of time as now interposed between the setting down and the hearing of a cause was an enormous evil, which drove parties to an unequal compromise, and was in many instances a denial of justice. The only remedy for that evil was to add to the number of judges. This bill empowered the Lord Chancellor to do that which otherwise could only be done by an Act of Parliament, namely, make different arrangements for conducting the business of the equity courts. There were many things connected with the offices of the court which it would be desirable to correct, simplify, and improve. These, however, were matters of regulation, which he thought would be much better left to the judges, as those of the common law had been left, than made the subject of legislative enactment in detail. To enable the judges in equity to make those regulations was the object of this bill. He sincerely hoped, that it was only the precursor of still greater and more extensive improvements.

spoke to the following effect.^* —I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-general, in regretting that the bill to which he has alluded, did not pass into law. I entirely agree with him, that few measures of greater importance to the public interests have ever been sent down to this House from the House of Lords. But I confess, that the speech of my hon. and learned Friend would have been more satisfactory to me, if, instead of confining himself to expressions of regret at the failure of that measure, he had explained the cause of it, and had told the House and the country what is hitherto a profound secret—a mystery apparently unknown even to the Ministers in the other House of Parliament—how it has happened, that a measure of such vast importance, so often promised, so long delayed—reaching this House, after so many years of hope deferred, has at length been so unceremoniously, and as it should seem, so causelessly abandoned. Is the Government ignorant of the difficulties which had been surmounted in the other House;

^* From a corrected Report, published by Stevens and Norton.

what sacrifices of personal and political feeling had been made to carry it; what exertions had been made by a most distinguished individual, possessing great influence there, to remove obstacles which nothing else could have overcome? I believe Lord Lyndhurst recommended the select committee for the very purpose of laying before Parliament a body of evidence which should convince all men of the necessity of abolishing the Equity branch of the Exchequer, and giving additional judicial power to the Court of Chancery—and after a most complete body of testimony had been produced — after, by means of it, opposition had been silenced—when no serious difficulties any longer remained, her Majesty's Ministers in this House, apparently in mere wantonness, threw up the bill. Surely some explanation is demanded why Ministers suffered themselves to be scared from a measure which they themselves admit to have been so important, by a mere shadow of opposition—a mere threat of a speech, not against the bill, but on matters connected with it, by my right hon. colleague. My right hon. colleague was perfectly consistent in his course. He had never expressed himself as being hostile to the bill itself—but he was of opinion that improvements in the appellate jurisdiction were as important as those provided by the late bill, or more so—he thought that measures for both objects ought to be connected together, and he entertained so little confidence in her Majesty's Ministers, that he thought if the additional judges were once granted, the necessary improvement in the appellate courts would never be accomplished. But the Government, of course, do not share these opinions—they consider that the two measures are entirely distinct and independent, and that the appointment of the additional judges, and the abolition of the Equity branch of the Court of Exchequer, will facilitate rather than impede other desirable alterations. Why, then, I ask again, was this bill thrown aside? Is a measure unworthy of the support of the Government, if it has only the recommendation of being of the utmost importance to the well-being of the people? Sir, I cannot think that the House ought to permit this bill to be recommitted without a much stricter examination of its objects and effect, of the evils which require correction, of the evils which it will leave untouched, and of those for which it will provide a remedy, than my hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general, has deemed to be necessary. It seems to me important to go into this detail, in order that this House and the public may form a correct opinion of what they have a right to expect from those to whom these extensive powers are proposed to be confided, so that those who are to exercise these powers, and those over whom they are to be exercised, may alike know, that the eyes of the people are upon them, and that a strict account will be required of the employment of powers so extensive. While this consideration will operate to exclude all bias of fear or favour in the discharge of his important trust, the hands of the Lord Chancellor will be strengthened by the conviction, that in dealing fearlessly with gross abuses, wherever they may be found, he may count upon the support of the House of Commons, and the concurrent opinion of all men of all parties in it. It is unnecessary to remark, that the two great evils of the Court of Chancery are expense and delay. Delay, indeed, is itself expense, with the addition of a thousand ills besides. But these evils have so commonly been treated as a mere topic of popular declamation—as a convenient ground of attack against a minister—that the real nature and causes of the evils, and the means by which they may be removed or alleviated, have scarcely ever, in this House, been investigated. But however dry or uninteresting the detail may be, there is no other mode of discussing usefully the best remedy for evils, which are felt by all to be of overwhelming magnitude; which all men, of all parties, are equally interested in correcting, and if they understood them, would, I believe, be equally anxious to correct. Sir, for this purpose it is necessary to distinguish between the delay and expense which arise from the want of sufficient judicial power in the courts, and those evils of the same kind which arise from other causes. The former class, the bill now before the House will leave entirely undiminished; the latter, by means of this measure, may be removed or lightened. I rejoice, Sir, to see that the hon. Member for Kilkenny is in the House, though I fear I must encroach upon his province, and point attention to abuses, which, though some of them appear upon returns which he has procured, seem to have somehow or other escaped his observation. I trust, Sir, that the hon. Gentleman's powers of vision are not dimmed by years, though they certainly have not exhibited the same lynx-like acuteness in the detection of abuses since his friends have come into office, which they displayed in the time of his opponents. Sir, it appears from the evidence taken by the House of Lords, that the average arrear of causes in the Court of Chancery is about 700, and that allowing twelve months for bringing a cause into a state for hearing, two years more are wasted before it can be heard. Perhaps most causes are heard twice; many, several times before they are finally disposed of. If any accounts are to be taken, or any inquiries made, the causes are at the first hearing referred to one of the masters of the Court, and after he has made his report, are again set down for hearing before the judge, and undergo another delay of two years. Though the expense attending this delay is the least of the evils which arise from it, even the expense well deserves attention. It is not merely that during this period, term fees are paid in each of the four terms in each year to all the clerks in court and solicitors employed, but occasions for applications by motion and petition are continually arising, and changes are constantly taking place which give rise to new suits. If a birth, or death, or sometimes if a marriage takes place, if a man makes an assignment or a mortgage of property, becomes lunatic, bankrupt, or insolvent, if any change or transmission of interest occurs, a new suit is the consequence. A most respectable and able solicitor, Mr. Field, who has devoted great time and attention to the subject, was examined before the Select Committee of the House of Lords, and he has also published a pamphlet on the offices and practice of Chancery, which deserves to be studied by all who take an interest in the subject. He has made a calculation of the expense arising from the delay in hearing in the Vice Chancellor's Court alone. The arrear there, at that time, was 515 causes, and he computes it at 20,000l. per annum, so that taking the average arrears in the three Courts at 700, nearly 30,000l. must be thrown away in each year, in pure loss, without the slightest advantage to any human being; and the suitors to this extent are taxed, not to secure to them any advantage, but to purchase heart-breaking anxiety, distress and ruin; and four or five years of this expense are thus inflicted on the suitors through mere deficiency of judicial power! Another of the modes in which this delay operates to defeat justice is in compelling parties to compromise their suits from inability to bring them to a decision. It appears from the evidence of Mr. Field, that out of 1366 adverse causes, not much more than 300 are set down to be heard, and less than 200 are actually heard—the rest are compromised or abandoned. It may be thought that a settlement by way of compromise may be no evil, but the contrary, and so it is when the compromise is fair. But observe how the delay affects the terms of compromise—I have a claim for 1000l. which can be recovered only in Chancery. The debtor knows that I cannot possibly obtain a decree in less than three years, that he may probably be able to delay the original hearing much longer; that if it depends upon an account to be taken, however simple, he can withhold payment for more than twice that time, and an unascertained balance carries no interest. He knows, therefore, that it is worth my while to take half my just demand, rather than to wait for eight or nine years it may be, and recover the whole amount at the expense of extra costs, which I may have to pay, to an amount perhaps equal to the difference. He offers me therefore, as a fair compromise, in lieu of a present value to which I am entitled, the value of a reversionary interest, and if I am wise I shall accept it. But the delay not only occasions the resistance to just demands, it sometimes prevents the abandonment of claims which are unjust. A man files a bill in which he finds that he must ultimately be defeated, and be charged with the costs of the suit; but he knows that the death of either party may save him from the payment, because a suit cannot be revived for costs alone, and he therefore protracts the suit by all possible means, and takes the chance of one party or the other dying in the long course of years through which he can extend the litigation. So it fares with causes actually instituted; but the greatest evil is the utter exclusion from relief of all parties, whose demands are not of large amount, or who are too poor to bear the expense of such protracted litigation. It is stated in the petition of the solicitors, which I had the honour to present this evening, that practically there is no remedy in the Court of Chancery if the sum to be recovered is less than 1000l.; that it is better for a smaller sum to submit to the loss rather than to incur the risk and expense of prosecuting the claim. Now let the House observe to what a vast number of cases a court of equity alone can afford relief. If you have a legacy to recover, a trustee to call to account, a partnership difference to adjust, a mercantile account to investigate, in all these cases, and a multitude of others, a court of law can give no redress, or no adequate redress; and yet to all but wealthy suitors the doors of a court of equity are closed. For the poor man, in all those cases in England, there is no justice. The extent, the enormous extent, of this mischief appears from contrasting on the one hand the number of bills filed in Lord Hardwicke's time, with those filed now; and on the other, the amount of the property under the care of the court in Lord Hardwicke's time and now. In 1750, the earliest year at which I have the returns, the number of bills filed was 1744; in 1839, it was 1750. Now, let it be recollected how prodigious has been the increase in population, in wealth, in commerce, in the complication, variety, and intricacy of transactions, out of which questions upon rights of property arise, during the last century; and still, there has been scarcely any increase in the number of suitors. Yet, so far from the arm of the Lord Chancellor having been shortened during this period, this court has gone on from year to year accommodating itself to the exigencies of society, and gradually extending its authority till it has absorbed within its jurisdiction nearly all the property in the kingdom. There is no considerable landed estate, which is not subject to trusts which courts of equity only can control. There is no personal estate in the disposition of which, on the death of the owner, difficulties arise, which can be administered except through this medium; and yet, the number of bills filed, is scarcely increased. How is it possible to account for this, except on the hypothesis that the enormous expense and delay of the court exclude all small suitors from justice. The different nature of the causes now and in Lord Hardwicke's time, may be judged of from the amount of the funds standing in the name of the Accountant-general at the two periods. In 1750, it was 1,665,160l. 18s. 4d. It is now above forty-one millions. And this is the personal property alone. The real property is perhaps much larger. There is in this court, complete justice for the rich—for the poor, there is none at all. Now, I ask, is this a state of things which ought to be permitted to continue for one single hour? Is a Government justified in permitting its continuance, merely to escape from a night's debate in the House of Commons? I put the question to those Members who think that matters, which affect the well-being of the people, ought to be of some account with their representatives, and that the due administration of justice is essential to that well-being. I ask them, whether these things, however inferior in importance to party questions, are not still of some moment, and whether, after devoting six months of eager debate to what interests ourselves, we ought not to allow as many hours to what interests the people? I put the question to those Ministers who told us in the King's Speech of 1836, that "the speedy and satisfactory administration of justice is the first and most sacred duty of the Sovereign." I repeat, that the country has a right to know the true reason why a measure, which was calculated to put an end to such grievances, was thrown overboard by the Ministers, as it at present appears, in mere indolence or caprice. Sir, it has been said, that the appointment of two additional judges would not have remedied all these evils, and unquestionably it would not; but the rejected measure contained also the provisions embodied in this bill, which are probably of still greater importance than the appointment of additional judges, or the alteration in the Court of Exchequer. Yet these, but for the energy of Lord Brougham, would have been equally lost to the country. I will venture, with the permission of the House, to offer some observations on the evils which appear to me to exist in the Court of Chancery, and to be capable of correction without the appointment of additional judges, or any alteration in the Court of Exchequer; in order that the House may judge how far the bill now before us is adequate to remove these evils, or how far it may be necessary for the House to arm the com- mittee with additional power to make it adequate to the purpose. To begin with that branch of the profession to which I myself belong, I think that much, both of expense and time, may be saved by some alteration in the practice with respect to counsel. At present, except orders of course, many of which perhaps might be dispensed with altogether, no order can be obtained from the court, though all parties consent to it, without the intervention of counsel. The consent orders thus obtained, are extremely numerous; more than half the petitions are of this character, and a considerable proportion of the motions. Now, it is not merely the expense of the fees to counsel which the client has to pay, but each counsel must have a brief, and when the parties are numerous, the costs become extremely heavy. Indeed the expense is much the same, whether the application is consented to or opposed, unless in case of opposition, there is a dispute about facts. Now it does appear to me, that in very many, if not in all of these cases, the appearance of counsel is unnecessary, and that the expense of their briefs and fees might be saved. I can see no objection to the order being made by the judge upon a petition addressed to him with the consent of the parties certified by their solicitors, upon whose instructions counsel, if they appear, must entirely rely. The necessary affidavits might be sent with the petition, and if, in any particular case, the judge thought it necessary, the attendance of the agents might be required. Another alteration in the rules with respect to counsel might also, as it appears to me, be adopted with advantage, and with great saving to the suitors both of time and money. On a trial in a court of law, only one counsel addresses the jury. In the argument of a point of law on a special case, only one counsel addresses the judges. In the privy council, the ultimate court of appeal from some of the domestic and all the colonial tribunals, where mixed cases of law and fact of the utmost complication and difficulty are decided, only two counsel are heard to the same point. In the House of Lords, the ultimate court of appeal from all other tribunals, including the Court of Chancery, the same rule is adopted, however numerous the parties may be. But in the inferior court, in the Court of Chancery itself, there is no limit to the number of counsel. Each party may be heard by his own counsel to each point, and he may be heard by as many as he thinks fit to retain. It sometimes happens that seven or eight gentlemen employed for different parties, address the court in succession on the same topics; and as no two probably have heard what has been said by those who have gone before them, the same facts, and the same arguments and authorities, are repeated again and again, exhausting alike the patience of the judge, and his time which belongs to the public. I can see no reason why this practice should continue; or why the same rule which is found useful in the superior courts, should not be adopted in the inferior. These may perhaps be thought trifling matters, but there are other improvements in the practice of the court by which far greater good may be effected. There are cases in which, singular as it may appear, by straining to an excess a principle, which is at the root of all justice, the most serious injustice is actually done. If there be one principle in the administration of law which would seem to require no qualification, it is the rule that no man's interest shall be affected without his being heard. And yet, as this rule is acted upon, it is the most fruitful perhaps, of all sources of expense and delay—of needless expense and delay. If a landed estate is to be dealt with in the Court of Chancery, all persons who have an interest in it must be brought into court before it can be touched. Now these persons are often extremely numerous. Take the most familiar case. A gentleman of landed property devises it by his will to trustees—he charges it with the payment of portions to his younger children, and legacies and annuities to his friends and servants, and subject to these encumbrances he gives it in trust for his eldest and other sons in succession, and their issue. There is no question about the sufficiency of the estate to satisfy all the charges a hundred times told, yet if the trusts of this will are to be executed by the Court of Chancery, all these persons, trustees, and cestui qui trusts, children, friends, and servants, must all be parties to the suit. But it not improbably happens that the children's portions are also in settlement, and if so, the trustees of their settlements, and the parties interested under them, husbands, wives, and children, must equally be parties. Nor is this all; if during the pen- dency of the suit any of these innumerable parties die, or children taking an interest are born, additional bills of revivor and supplement are necessary, till at last the record is so encumbered that any effectual progress in the suit becomes almost impracticable. Each party may employ a separate solicitor and counsel, and costs are accumulated to an extent which no moderate estate can bear. Now what is the cause assigned for this most ruinous practice? Why a principle in theory unimpeachable, that the interests of all these parties may be affected by the decision, and therefore they ought all to be heard. It is said, that the court cannot tell that the estate is more than sufficient to pay the charges, and that therefore a legatee of 20l. must be present at taking all the accounts in the master's office, by which the fund subject to his demand, and the amount of the charges upon that fund are to be ascertained, and that if a question arises on the construction of the will, he has the same right to be heard in defence of the fund on which his 20l. is charged as the owner of the estate itself subject to the charge, though the estate may be worth 20,000l. a-year. Yet it is very obvious that the legatee of 20l. might safely trust the defence of the estate to its owner, who cannot protect the 20,000l. a-year without protecting at the same time the 20l., and that the only real consequence of the rule to the favoured legatee is, that his whole 20l., and much more, is absorbed in the extra costs of the suit, which he has to pay. But what makes this rule the more unreasonable, is, that if the estate be held by a legal and not an equitable title (a distinction hardly intelligible to any persons but lawyers), and the question is tried at law, none of these parties can interfere; the title is defended by the party in possession, or asserted by the party claiming the possession, and they, and they alone, can be heard. Nay, in the Court of Chancery, if instead of real estate the property happens to be personalty, a totally different rule prevails. If a personal estate of a man who dies worth a million, if administered, the executors are considered sufficiently to represent the interests of all parties, creditors, legatees, and annuitants, and yet precisely the same argument might be used with respect to the doubt as to the sufficiency of the fund, and the interest of every legatee to see that the accounts of the estate are properly taken in the master's office, which, with respect to land, is thought to require the presence of all these different parties. Nay, if the land, instead of being held in fee simple, is held for 1000 years, then it is personal estate, and is sufficiently represented by the executor. Now, under wills the same person is most commonly both trustee and executor. Whatever be the amount of the property —however enormous—if it be leasehold, one defendant is sufficient, if there be an acre of freehold a hundred other parties become necessary. Surely, there is no sense nor convenience in acting upon rules so opposite, in cases substantially the same; and I can see no sufficient reason why the trustee in such cases should not be deemed to represent the real estate, as completely as the executor represents the personalty. In cases where there is no trustee, some other arrangement would be necessary; but in all cases of this description, I have little doubt that a most important reduction may be made in the number of parties, and that the expense and delay of such suits may be diminished to a very small part of its present amount. The same principle—the apprehension of affecting the interest of parties in their absence—has introduced another, and, perhaps, still more crying evil, the endless multiplication of useless references to the master. The rule upon this subject is unfortunately applied indifferently both to real and personal property. A legacy is given to a class—for instance to the children of John Thompson—John Thompson and his wife are before the court, and say we have six children, neither more nor less. The six children are present, and say here we are, all brothers and sisters, and we have no other brothers and sisters. The executor or trustee is present, and says I have known the family all my life, there are six children, neither more nor less. A witness, or half-a-dozen witnesses, swear to the same thing—but all in vain. The judge is incredulous—he says, I must have this matter inquired into by the master; and forthwith the cause is despatched to Southampton Buildings. Here the point being one about which there is neither doubt nor dispute, about which all parties are agreed except the judge—the inquiry occupies a comparatively short time—perhaps not above twelve months—particularly if the parties are fortunate enough, to get into the office of my hon. and learned Friend opposite, the Member for Galway. The master having looked into the evidence which was before the court, and probably none other, is, of course, satisfied that John Thompson has six children, and no more; and upon his report the court is satisfied also. But the cause is to be set down again in the paper, and must wait its turn, and at the end of another two years, if fortunately no change happens in the interval to John Thompson's family, his six children obtain their rights; having waited three years, and paid the expense of an inquiry and a double hearing, without the slightest advantage to anybody. This practice of referring matters to the master without sufficient cause, is carried to a most mischievous extent in a multitude of other cases, and has strong recommendations to a judge, who is more desirous of the credit of dispatching business than scrupulous about the mode in which it is disposed of. A cause is got rid of for the day, it disappears out of the paper; it counts amongst the "causes heard and otherwise disposed of," and swells the return of business done by the court. But it is a most false credit, acquired, not by dispatching business, but delaying it; by denying justice, instead of administering it. The rules, however, having been established, no individual judge, however much he may feel the grievance, considers himself at liberty to depart from them. Sir, by alterations on these points—by reducing the number of counsel, the number of parties, and the number of references to the master—I venture to think that most important savings may be made, both of time and of costs, and yet these are but a few of the instances in which the practice of the court, may, in my humble opinion, be usefully reformed. But having trespassed so long on the attention of the House with these details, and having still to trouble them with matters connected with the officers of the court of still more importance, I dare not dwell longer on a subject so technical as this. With respect to the officers of the court, some returns have very recently been laid before the House—which often asked for, but long withheld, have at length been obtained by the perseverance of the hon. and learned Member for Cockermouth. The return which I hold in my hand bears the name of Mr. Aglionby. These returns, I confess, have filled me with astonishment, and, I think, will occasion some surprise to the House. There are certain ancient officers of the court called Six Clerks, who formerly acted as solicitors, and by whom, in that character, all the business of the court was transacted. To assist them in performing these duties, they had a certain number of sworn clerks, once sixty, now, I believe, reduced to twenty-five. They were, in truth, the only solicitors recognized by the courts, and, accordingly, to this hour, every party in a cause in Chancery is obliged to appoint one of the sworn clerks as his clerk in court, or nominally as his agent, to represent him through the progress of the suit. But so entirely is the real office of these gentlemen, both six clerks and sworn clerks, changed, that their duties now consist, as far as I can discover, of what I am about to describe to the House. The duty of the six clerks consists in signing their names on the records—the bills and answers, pleas and demurrers which are filed. If a six clerk is for the plaintiff, he signs his name on the bill—if for the defendant, on the answer—but as the form is purely useless, and serves no purpose of authentication, or any other, it is thought unnecessary for more than one six clerk to attend the office at a time; and whoever is in attendance signs all the records for all the plaintiffs and all the defendants, signing his own name for the party for whom he is nominally concerned, and the name of one of the other six clerks (per procuration, as it would be termed in mercantile phrase), for the opponent party. For this useless ceremony, it appears that these gentlemen received, during the last year, in the shape of fees alone (in addition to other emoluments, to which I shall afterwards advert), a net sum of 1,122l. 10s. each. Such being the duties of the six clerks, the proper duties of the sworn clerks would seem to be still less.

"Si minus esse potest quam quod nihil esse videmus,"

As far as I can understand the matter, the only duty which the sworn clerks have to perform as properly belonging to their office, is to receive and transmit to the solicitors all notices from time to time given in the course of a cause. If a solicitor and his opponent reside in the same street at Mile-end, the simple course would seem to be, to serve the notice at Mile-end but this the court does not allow. The notice must be sent up from Mile-end to the clerk in court, in Chancery-lane, in order that the clerk in court may return it in due course of post, to the solicitor at Mile-end. And for duties such as these, with the addition of one to which I will advert, not properly belonging to their office, what does the House suppose is the gross amount of fees received by these officers, and paid by the unfortunate suitors? The return of the last year makes the amount no less than 59,967l. 6s. 9d. Of this sum,8,205l. 4s. 6d. is stated to be accounted for to the six clerks, and to constitute the amount of fees paid to them, to which I have already alluded. The remainder, after deducting 363l. 15s. 1d. staled to be paid "to the bag-bearer and others," is retained by the sworn clerks. Now how are these fees constituted? The statement of these details will show at once the enormity and iniquity of the tax which is thus levied on the suitor. The sum of 27,197l. 11s. 3d. appears to arise from copy money—from the charges for copying all the bills, answers, &c. which are filed, those copies being the only copies which the court will recognize. Now the actual expense of making copies was computed some years ago, on occasion of certain alterations which were made in the masters' offices. It was then thought that 1½d. a folio was a fair charge to be allowed, and it appears from the masters' returns, also laid before the House during the present Session, that out of this sum the masters' clerks make a clear profit, varying from 300l. to between 600l. and 700l. a year. It must, therefore, be considered, to say the least of it, a liberal allowance, But what is charged for the same thing in the six clerks' office? Not 1½d. but 10d. a folio; 10d. for every folio of ninety words, which may be copied for 1½d. and leave a large profit! Of this sum of 10d., I believe 3d. is paid to the six clerk, and out of the 7d. the clerk in court pays the actual expense of making the copy, which, I suppose, is about 1d. and the rest appears to be all profit. Another source of the enormous income of this office consists of term fees. These, in the last year, were in number 42,999. The amount in money is not stated, but, I believe, the fees are 6s. 8d. each, and if so, they would give a sum of 14,333l. These sums, as far as I can learn, are not paid for any duty, real or nominal, but become due to the clerk in court, in each of the four terms in the year in which any step is taken in the cause. In addition to this, term fees (I believe of much larger amount) become due in each term to the solicitors, and I request the House to observe how strongly this tells upon the expenses arising out of the years of delay, which are at present occasioned to the suitor by the want of judges to hear the arrear of causes. I rejoice to see that the noble Lord, the Secretary of the Colonies has returned to the House. He will have an opportunity of judging, from this instance alone, of the enormous evil inflicted on the public by the rejection of the late bill, and I persuade myself that he has returned to the House in order to disclose to us a secret, at present, as it should seem, not revealed even to his colleagues, but reserved, I trust, for this House, why, when such evils were to be remedied, and the remedy was offered, he refused the benefit of it to the people. I have no disposition to offer any compliment to the noble Lord, but I must say that I regret that he left the Home Office before this question arose. I believe that he has a real desire to improve the institutions of the country, and I cannot think that if he had known the real state of the case, he would have incurred the responsibility of rejecting the late bill. The remaining item in this astounding return, is 8,994l. 10s. received for taxation of costs. Now this business, I believe, is actually done, and the amount fairly earned. But the whimsical part of the case is, that the only duty which the clerks in court really perform, is that which ought to be, and to appearance actually is, performed by the masters. It is to them, as my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Galway, will satisfy the House, that all bills of costs are referred for taxation. It is by them that on all their reports, the costs appear to have been actually taxed, so that of the vast amount received by these officers, about 9,000l. a-year appears to be paid for doing the business of other people, and the rest for doing nothing or next to nothing. Now, I beg not to be understood as casting the slightest imputation or reflection upon any of these gentlemen, either six clerks or sworn clerks; they are not open to any; they only do nothing, because they have nothing to do; they have very excellent places, which they are quite right to keep, as long as the Legislature will allow it, and they act in no other manner than any Gentleman in this House would act in the same circumstances. But is this system one which should be endured? We have heard complaints of sinecures—of pensions. The hon. Member for Kilkenny, has often descanted upon them. Has he looked at these returns? Has he observed the sums which individuals in this office receive for duties such as I have described? —gentlemen highly respectable undoubtedly, but with no claim of any sort or kind on the profession or the public. The gross amount of one gentleman's return, I perceive, is, for the last year, 8,130l. 8s. 6d.; of another 9,645l. 6s. 8d.; of a third, 10,879l. 3s. 10d. This last return, after paying every expense, would leave, as I calculate it, a clear sinecure of above 7,000l. per annum—more than the salary of any Cabinet Minister! half as much again as the pension of a Lord Chancellor. Yet, as if in this office the Legislature took a pride in augmenting sinecures instead of reducing them, observe what has happened with respect to the six clerks. In 1832, some alteration being made in their fees by the establishment of a bankruptcy court, they obtained, as compensation allowed under the act from the Lords of the Treasury, 52l. per annum each for life. But in 1833 another act was passed for abolishing fines and recoveries, and substituting in their stead deeds enrolled in Chancery. This act, it appears, put into the pocket of each six clerk, by means of fees paid for doing nothing, a considerable addition to their incomes arising from fees on enrolments; the amount of the addition does not appear. The total amount of fees paid to each six clerk for enrolments in the last year was 527l. 10s., and in the preceding year545l. and yet they are receiving compensation for a loss to the extent of 52l. while their income has been thus most improperly, and, I believe, on the part of the Legislature, most unintentionally, increased. It does seem to me, that the whole of these offices, with their enormous profits, ought to be altogether swept away, making, of course, to the fortunate holders, a fair compensation. I now come to an office of a different description, which, I confess, I approach with reluctance—I mean the Masters' Office. I have the honour to be personally acquainted, more or less, with all those gentlemen, and with many of them, am fortunate enough to be on terms of friendship and intimacy. Speaking of them generally, I sincerely believe that more amiable, or honourable, or conscientious men do not exist, and several of them are very excellent lawyers; and yet it is impossible to deny, that it is against their office more than any other that the opinion of the profession is directed. According to that opinion—

Umbrarum hic locus est—somni noctisque spooræ.

The system appears to be contrived to damp all energy. Which of the ordinary motives to exertion is left to operate on the minds of the masters? Secluded in the recesses of their dark chambers— exempt from the control or inspection of the judges—relieved from the competition of the bar—independent of the opinion of the solicitors, and their proceedings totally unknown to the public—acquiring no credit by diligence or ability—incurring; neither loss nor censure by indolence or inattention—with nothing to hope and nothing to fear—can any men be placed in circumstances so unfavourable to exertion? Can it be expected that they should themselves perform the irksome duty of unremitting attention to subjects the most unattractive, or rigidly discharge the duty, perhaps still more irksome, of stimulating and compelling to constant activity the parties who attend them—the solicitors and their clerks—all affected, more or less, by the genius loci? This control over the practitioners before them, is perhaps more material than any thing else in order to prevent the delays in the office. I know not whether, under the present system, the masters possess the power of control—certainly it is not exercised. The course of proceeding is described by Mr. Field, who very fairly attributes to his own brethren, the solicitors and their clerks, the principal share of the blame. He tells us, that they attend the master or his clerk (who really does the greater part of the business), when they have nothing else to do; that any excuse is sufficient for neglecting to attend a warrant; that it is considered a want of courtesy for a solicitor to insist upon any thing like strictness in such matters; that three or four warrants are often taken out before any one is attended, the clerks settle it amongst themselves, and the master does not interfere. What is the effect of this? Why, that which might be done in an hour, occupies weeks, and the business of weeks is protracted through years. It appears from the same authority (Mr. Field's pamphlet) that warrants can only be obtained at an interval of several days —that there are only about 180 days in each year on which warrants are made returnable, and that a warrant is generally an appointment for half an hour only. Let any merchant or man of business consider how soon a long and intricate account, extending through a series of years, is likely to be settled by such a course of proceeding, by the devotion to it of half an hour or an hour at a time at intervals of days—weeks—months; when, probably, at each succeeding meeting, what passed at the last is forgotten, or denied, or disputed. It is rather to be wondered at, that, with such a system, accounts are ever taken—difficult inquiries as to facts ever answered—than that matters of this kind only emerge after a lapse of years, from the offices in which they have so long slumbered, and that many of them sleep there the sleep of death, and never emerge at all. In the absence of all other control over the masters, the Legislature has provided that they shall make returns to the Lord Chancellor of the days of their attendance at their offices, and the number of hours of each day's attendance. These returns, as I understand it, are made out from a register kept by their clerks, in which are entered the days of their attendance, and the earliest and latest warrant on each day which is attended before them. I say nothing of the delicacy of this mode of dealing with gentlemen in quasi judicial situations, or of the position in which it may place them with regard to the clerks in their office. But it is obviously quite inefficient for its purpose. The master may be absent from his office during the whole interval between the first warrant and the last; the return leaves it quite uncertain whether the master is in his chambers or in the public office—or, if in chambers, how he is employed there. I hold in my hand an abstract of these returns for the last two years, which has been laid before the House during the present Session. There appears to be a great difference between the degree of labour which the different masters devote to the performance of their duties, at least, if it is to be measured by their hours of attendance. The lowest return for the year 1839, is "176 days, and the average number of hours per day, nearly three and three quarters." The highest return, that of my hon. and learned Friend opposite, the Member for Galway, is "211 days, and six and a quarter hours on an average per day," rather more than double the other. Now, without detracting from the credit due to my hon. and learned Friend, I cannot help thinking, that the superiority of his attendance may, perhaps, in some degree be attributed to his having a seat here; and it is a counterpoise to considerable inconveniences which have sometimes appeared to me to attend the sitting of Masters in Chancery in this House. No man would like to face in the House of Commons a very unsatisfactory return. But is a system, a fit one to be maintained, which places the diligent and the indolent in precisely the same situation, and leaves it entirely at the discretion of the individual, without check or control, to devote just as much, or just as little time and attention as he pleases to his duties, even though his office should be choked with business? But, Sir, I have no hesitation in saying, that in my opinion, much more time ought to be given to the public by these offices than is allowed by the present arrangements. They ought to be kept open many more days. Instead of closing whenever the court is closed, and sometimes sooner; they ought, in my opinion, to open sooner, and close later. The time which may be employed in court by a judge in equity, furnishes no criterion at all of that which may fairly be required from a master in chambers. It is said, that the average attendance of the masters is about five hours, and that some of them attend as many days at chambers as the Master of the Rolls and the Vice Chancellor sit in court. Supposing that to be so, still there is no sort of comparison between the labours of the judges and the masters. The whole time of the judge, during his sitting, is bestowed entirely upon his business. His attention can never be diverted or relaxed for an instant, and the fatigue of this unremitting application of the faculties for five hours a day, is said to be as much as almost any mind can, for a continuance, undergo. The judge's labours, so far from terminating with his sitting in court, often become then only more severe. Questions are constantly pending before him for decision on the most complicated and difficult subjects both of fact and of law—questions often of enormous value in point of property, upon which the wealth or ruin of families depends, attended with the most painful sense of responsibility to the judge, and requiring the utmost exertion of all his diligence and mental powers to enable him to arrive at a correct determination. In order to do his duty properly, he may, perhaps, be obliged to bestow as much time upon a case out of court as in it. But the master's duties are of a totally different character; the far greater part consist of matters which require no mental effort at all—involve no doubt or difficulty—so much, indeed, is this the case, that a large proportion of the reports is, I believe, prepared by the master's clerks. I cannot see why the public should not expect from the masters the same exertions which the class from whom they are usually taken—the equity draftsmen— are compelled to make to secure the same income. I know something of Chancery drawing, and I will engage to say that no man can make by it 2,500l. a-year, without a very different expenditure of time and labour from that which is described in any of these returns. The early closing of their offices is of the utmost inconvenience to the suitors. The Court of Chancery is about to rise next Saturday—I must take the liberty of saying, in my humble opinion, a great deal too early, considering the mass of pressing business which will be left undisposed of; —but even of those orders which will be made many will remain inoperative, because they involve references to the master in order to give them effect; and the masters will cease to attend their offices as soon as the court rises, or sooner. It does appear to me that nothing can ever be done effectually to expedite the business of the Court of Chancery, till a complete alteration is made in the whole system of the masters' offices. It should seem, that in former times the obstruction was rather in the offices than in the court itself. We know that as early as the time of Swift and Pope the delays and expenses of this court were the subject of satire. Gulliver, I think, tells us that amongst other subjects on which he was examined by the King of Brobdignag, his majesty made inquiry about the Court of Chancery. "Now," says Gulliver, "I happened to be particularly well qualified to give his majesty information upon this point, ray father having been totally ruined by a suit, in which, after twenty years litigation, he had obtained a decree in his favour with costs." Yet at this time there was no great delay in the judges of the court, few causes appear to have been then in arrear, and the delay must have been elsewhere. Sir, I should be sorry that the present masters, for whom I entertain sincere respect, should take amiss what I have felt it my duty to say of their offices. I make no complaint of them personally, but of the system,—for which they are not responsible; and I trust they will feel that it is only by a full exposure of the evils of that system, that we can hope to see such improvements made in it as will make the offices themselves infinitely more useful to the public, and, therefore, at the same time more honourable, and I doubt not more agreeable to the holders. Sure I am, that until this is done, the masters will never occupy in public opinion the station which they would then fairly claim. Sure I am, that unless the most searching inquiry is made into the existing evils in the present system of the Court of Chancery, in whatever quarter they may be found, that scandal and opprobrium will never be removed from the court, which all connected with it must be anxious to shake off. In the long statement with which I have troubled the House, I have pointed out some of those matters which, I apprehend, may require correction, and which by this bill as it stands, or as on recommitment it may be made, the Lord Chancellor will be empowered to correct. Whether any additional judicial power should be given by it, I leave to the consideration of those who have the charge of it. To introducing into the present bill any alteration in the Court of Exchequer, or any provision for a permanent new judge, I, for one, under existing circumstances should object. However desirable those measures may be in themselves, they could not, in my opinion, after what has passed, be properly proposed again during the present Session. But without any such alteration, I think infinite good may be done by this bill. The powers to be given to the Lord Chancellor will be necessarily most extensive—all but legislative— and I trust they will be as fairly exercised as they are liberally bestowed. The responsibility will be commensurate with the powers. Their exercise will be watched by the House with constitutional jealousy, but by me, at least, without apprehension or suspicion. The Lord Chancellor will have the assistance of most able and zealous coadjutors, and the support of public opinion. However strongly opposed to him as a politician, I have never refused to bear my humble testimony to his merits as a judge; and I have no hesitation in saying, that if he applies to the discharge of the duties to be confided to him by this Bill, the same temper and firmness, the same ability and knowledge of his subject which he exhibits in his judicial capacity, he will establish a juster, and, therefore, a more lasting claim to the respect and gratitude of his countrymen, than it has been in the power of any Judge, within living memory, to acquire. He will remove all the abuses which this Bill will place within his reach, and he will leave to his colleagues in this House, who abandoned the larger measure, and to this House which has sanctioned the abandonment, the shame of continuing those grievances which that larger measure alone could have redressed.

expressed his admiration of the knowledge of the subject displayed by the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down, and the judicious and skilful manner in which he had dealt with his materials. He had always been impressed with a deep sense of the difficulty of effecting any reform in the Court of Chancery. He had always considered that subject the peculiar domain of the gentlemen who practised there, and who were so much engaged in the defence of the whole system, that any attempt at its reformation would be hopeless. Any person attempting to introduce a measure of Chancery reform, might be a year or two years engaged in the task, and if at length he proposed his remedies in that House, he might be convicted of gross ignorance on some part of the subject by some learned gentlemen who had devoted his whole life to the practice of the court. It was, therefore, with double pleasure that he had heard the hon. and learned Gentleman, whose standing in the Court of Chancery was exceedingly high —no man stood higher—stating in their full enormity the abuses which existed in it. Whatever might be the hon. and learned Gentleman's opinion with regard to the abandonment of the bill, he could not help feeling very grateful to him for the exposition which he had made to the House. With respect to that bill, which he had last week stated his intention to withdraw, he was not aware that the appointment of the two additional judges contemplated in it would put an end to the existing sinecures of the six clerks, and the other iniquities to which the hon. and learned Gentleman had alluded. That bill proposed no direct remedy upon this subject. What was the history of this bill? It was introduced in the Lords early in the session. On the 7th of April its second reading was adjourned sine die. Their Lordships then appointed a committee, which sat for a considerable time; and on the 16th of July the bill was read a third time, and sent down to that House. It was a bill affecting a court with respect to which there were various opinions, which was connected with the highest court in the realm—the Court of Appeals in the other House, and with the high office of Lord Chancellor, partaking of a political as well as a judicial character. On the 16th of July it came down to the House of Commons. Many Members, thinking that the chief business of the session was then over, were preparing to leave town; others had left it previously. Having thus occupied the Lords from the month of April to the middle of July, if, notwithstanding, it were the unanimous opinion of the House of Commons that a remedy should be immediately applied, he should cordially support his hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general, who was ready to proceed with the bill. But that was not the case. A right hon. Gentleman fully qualified to discuss all the intricacies and difficulties of the subject (Sir E. Sugden) had immediately asked whether the bill would be proceeded with, and upon receiving an answer in the affirmative, gave notice of a motion that "it was the duty of the House, in the first place, to provide for the more satisfactory administration of justice in the House of Lords and Privy Council." In this motion the right hon. Gentleman would no doubt have received a very extensive support, and had the motion been successful, it would have at once put an end to the bill. His (Lord J. Russell's) reply to the right hon. Gentleman was, that there being many other bills of importance to send up to the Lords, he could not pro- ceed with it before the 30th of July. The right hon. Gentleman then stated, that if the bill came on for discussion, he should think himself justified in taking advantage of all the forms of the House to prevent it from passing into a law. He said, that he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not take that course, on which the right hon. Gentleman intimated that he would. If under such circumstances he had proceeded, he must have postponed several other important bills, and it would probably have been finally passed with great difficulty. The question of compensation to the officers of the Court of Exchequer was a question to be considered and dealt with on its own merits. In reference to the remarks which the hon. Gentleman had made on the subject of the withdrawal of the bill, he begged to say that the reproach had hitherto been, that they had hurried over the public business at the end of the session, and introduced bills at too late a period. But the reproach was now the other way. Whatever blame might be thrown on the Government, he hailed with pleasure this symptom of an anxiety for reforms on the other side, and whenever they felt anxious to manifest their desire to promote reforms they would not find him backward in assisting them. He did not think it advisable at present to do more than say, that the present bill empowered the Lord Chancellor to amend the regulations of his court. An excellent opportunity would thus be afforded next session of appointing additional judges with the advantage of an improved system. He would not disguise his opinion that he thought the present constitution of the Court of Chancery most unsatisfactory. It was impossible that the public could be satisfied, so long as this court was without judges constantly bound to attend. According to the present arrangement, counsel were engaged, and all other expenses incurred, but the judge, having some engagement elsewhere, did not come to the court, and the parties were involved in all these expenses and loss of time for no other reason than that no one was bound to come. When this was the case with regard to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, that the sitting of the judge was a matter of mere chance and caprice, he certainly thought that it, was a discreditable, if not a disgraceful, state of the great courts of this empire, With regard to the bill intro- duced by the Lord Chancellor, three or' four years since, for disconnecting the civil and political functions of the Lord Chancellor, and for the appointment of a permanent judge, considering the immense importance of the functions of the Court of Chancery, the immense benefit which it rendered to persons possessing property throughout this kingdom, the vast control which it exercised over the monied interests of the country, it did appear to him to be the common sense of the subject that there should be, as in the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas, a permanent judge at its head. Let them take into consideration the high personal character of the present Lord Chancellor, and remember how, by the vole upon the Jamaica question last year, they might have lost his high legal and judicial qualities for no reason whatever but the fact of a political change. He should say the same thing of a person of opposite politics; and he begged to ask, whether this was not a misfortune, and a fault in the constitution. They had had an unfortunate example in the case of Lord Hardwicke, a very great judge, perfectly able to deal with all legal questions, but on political questions, opposed to the colleagues with whom he acted, and continually labouring to thwart and overthrow them. That was a misfortune to the politics of the country. It was plain that they could not satisfactorily combine these two characters. They must have either a straightforward, unflinching man, or one who would go between both political parties, and thus strive to maintain his position as the highest legal functionary in connection with two or three successive Governments. He considered this to be a fault both legally and politically. The remedy for it he would not then enter into, for it was a question of the greatest difficulty. To deprive the Administration of an individual of the highest legal authority, who would give to it the weight of his authority, was in itself a great mischief; but to get rid of that mischief was, he repeated, a matter of great difficulty, and when this question came to be debated, was one which could not be overlooked. He had, therefore, come to this conclusion—that, though he was glad that the House of Lords had at last agreed to apply a remey to some of the evils of the Court of Chancery, he had still greater reason to be glad that the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite had pointed out other considerations, which must make Parliament determined to carry still further its reforms on this subject, He therefore thought, that he had not acted wrongly in proposing that the former bill on this subject should be relinquished now, in order to be introduced in a more extensive shape in the next Session of Parliament. In that shape, he would introduce the subject at the earliest period next Session; and he thought that then the House would have an opportunity, of which it ought to avail itself, to consider seriously all the questions connected with it. If the hon. and learned Gentleman's Colleague (Sir E. Sugden) would then move for a committee of inquiry, though he had resisted such inquiry this Session from a persuasion that it was merely proposed as a measure of delay, he would not object to it, considering, as he did, that it was intimately connected with matters which required the immediate consideration of Parliament.

said, that in the whole course of his Parliamentary experience, he had never heard two speeches which had given him greater satisfaction than the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, and the speech of the noble Lord. He should have been glad had this bill been carried during the present Session, but he considered, that the pledge of the noble Lord, that he would carry it in the next Session, was eminently satisfactory. He hoped, that the noble Lord would redeem that pledge, and let the public have the benefit as soon as possible of the reforms which he had promised. He was still of the same opinion which he had declared in the committee, namely, that the office of the six clerks ought to be abolished, and he was sorry that he had not had sufficient weight with the noble Lord to get that proposition carried into effect.

said,^* considering the situation I have the honour of holding, I trust the House will, even at this late hour of the night, and this late period of the Session, bear with me for a very short time. We must all regret, that the opportunity was not afforded to my hon. and learned Friend of delivering the speech he has just made, upon going into com-

^* From a corrected report.

mittee upon the bill that has been withdrawn, a more fitting occasion than the present upon going into committee on a bill giving us only an instalment of those benefits intended by the Lord Chancellor, and the other House of Parliament, to be conferred on the suitors and the public at large. I concur in every regret expressed by my hon. and learned Friend at the withdrawal of that bill, I concur in everything he has said respecting its great importance and unquestionable utility, I concur in every thing he has so well and so eloquently said respecting the mischievous effects of the great and unpardonable delays in the Court of Chancery, and of the great and extended misery and ruin produced by those delays, I entirely agree with him, that the judicial power is greatly insufficient, and with him I can only account, by these delays and their mischievous consequences, for the no great increase (if any) of the number of bills yearly filed since the time of Lord Hardwicke, notwithstanding the great increase of the population, the immense increase of the national wealth, the large addition to the national debt, the great creation of leasehold and other personal property, all of which must be administered by means of trusts, the creation and great varieties of different sorts of property in the same land, and the greater complication and intricacy which must ensue there from. But when my hon. and learned Friend throws the whole blame of the withdrawing of the bill on Ministers, I differ from him; I think they are to blame, and greatly to blame, but not wholly, I think my right hon. Friend, the late Lord Chancellor of Ireland, must come in for a share of the blame arising from the withdrawal of the bill. For, what is the history of this matter? The bill was read a second time in the House of Lords on the 11th of May, it did not come down to this House until the 16th of July. I do not mean to say, that the intermediate time was unprofitably spent, on the contrary, during that interval, the most satisfactory, the most convincing evidence has been put upon record establishing the great want of judicial power. It was read a first time on the 16th of July, and the second reading was fixed by the noble Lord, the Secretary for the Colonies on the 20th, and on that day my hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-general, was about to propose the second reading to the House, thinking that no opposition would be offered, and that as the urgency of the case had dissipated all party feelings in the other House, so here also the same feeling would be permitted to prevail, and that the bill would pass through its stages with perfect unanimity, until he was stopped by the threatened opposition of my right hon. Friend, whereupon the second reading was fixed for the Monday following. On the Friday, however, my right hon. Friend asked the noble Lord when, with certainty, the bill would be read a second time, on which occasion the noble Lord stated, that he had intended that it should have been read a second time on the day before, or, at all events, on the Monday following, until he found it was to be opposed, that being so, and as it was a bill of great importance, and would take up much time in discussion, and as the bill had passed the Lords, it would be better to proceed on Monday with the bills that were to go up to the House of Lords, and to take the Administration of Justice Bill on the Thursday, when it would come on early in the evening. When my right hon. Friend declared, that he would feel himself bound to give the bill every opposition that the regulations and forms of the House would entitle or enable him to give, I confess I did not expect such a declaration from my right hon. Friend, and feeling the greatest interest in the passing of the measure, I was at such declaration greatly grieved, for what was my impression, and the impression of the noble Lord, but that my right hon. Friend, taking a lesson out of the book of my hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Dubliu, and following his example, and the plan adopted by him last year respecting the Bank of Ireland Charter Bill, would follow the same course, and, by frequent adjournments, prevent the passing of the bill? The noble Lord had a right to act on that impression, but where the noble Lord is to blame, is, first, that he did not at all events try the question with my right hon. Friend, and secondly, when he was told by my right hon. Friend, that although he expressed himself otherwise, and too strongly, yet that he never meant to oppose the bill substantially, but to make the measure more perfect, the noble Lord ought then to have proceeded with the bill, and not have persisted in its withdrawal; no valid reason can be offered for his not so doing, and when he talks of the difficulties respecting the compensation clauses, it appears to me that he much exaggerates these difficulties. In reference to one individual in particular, however averse I might be, under the circumstances, to give compensation, if at the same time I could secure the passing of the bill thereby, and was told so by the noble Lord, and thereby prevent the heart-burnings and misery of six or nine months' longer delay to the unfortunate suitors, I would give that price without hesitation, and glad, I am confident, the poor suitors would be to contribute for that object. The noble Lord gave us no option, but withdrew the bill. Where my right hon. Friend is to blame, and much to blame, is, in not informing the noble Lord in time of his change of intention, or that his original object and meaning was not understood. And I think he was much to blame in making the reformation and alteration in the Apellate Court a sine qua non to the passing of the bill then before the House. It was an independent measure, and was necessary to be passed with or without reform in the appellate jurisdiction. Reform and alter your Appellate Courts, still that measure must have passed. Pass that measure, and you would not interfere with or retard the reformation in the Appellate Courts; so far from so doing, you would render the passing of such a measure more strongly and more loudly called for. When I say my right hon. Friend is to be blamed, I would be doing him the greatest injustice if I did not add, that his ultimate object, although ill-timed, was most praiseworthy, and his motives were the most pure; his anxiety to have a good Court of Appeal induced him so to act, but in supporting the bill that has been unfortunately withdrawn, he might have taken the opportunity of insisting upon the other more extensive and called-for reforms, as my hon. and learned Friend opposite has done this evening. I rejoice to find the case of the appellate jurisdiction in such able hands as those of my right hon. Friend. I rejoice to find that cause supported by such high authority, and that the plan which, perhaps rashly for a man in my then situation, a mere humble advocate at the bar, I submitted to this House in 1834, does not very much differ from that proposed by my right hon. Friend. As for myself, my opinion is unchanged, that the extensive evils of the Court of Chancery and Appellate Court, will never be effectually remedied until you separate the political character of the Lord Chancellor from his judicial,—until you separate his duties as Speaker and Judge of Appeals in the House of Lords, from his duties as Chief Judge of the Court of Chancery. The onerous and multifarious duties of the Lord Chancellor are such, that no one man can perform them with credit to himself or satisfaction to the public. The present possessor of the Great Seal feels this so much, although for years we have not had a Lord Chancellor that has given greater satisfaction, yet he lost no time in preparing a measure whereby he separated those duties,—I mean the duties as Judge of the Appellate Court and Speaker of the House of Lords from his duties in the Court of Chancery. The Lords refused their assent to that measure. If my right hon. Friend were present, I would take the liberty of asking him what expectation he had of their agreeing to his proposition now. I confess I am at a loss to discover upon what grounds it was the Lords refused their assent to that measure, particularly when I find a Committee of their own House reported, in 1823, that "There is now a manifest impossibility that any person holding the Great Seal can find the time which is required for the business of the Court of Chancery and the House of Lords, and all the other great and arduous duties of his high office;" and the more particularly when we consider the duties of the Lord Chancellor. He is a Cabinet Minister, and must attend Cabinet Councils; he is a Privy Councillor, and is bound to attend the Privy Council on all great occasions; he has to give his advice to the Secretary of the Home Department; he is Speaker of the House of Lords; he is a Judge of Appeals in that House; he has to attend the proceedings in all peerage cases; he has to peruse all patents and treaties signed by the queen; he has the care of idiots and lunatics; he has the disposition of Church patronage, and the appointment and superintendence of the magistracy. In addition to all this, he has to preside as chief judge in the Court of Chancery. Is it possible for any human being to get through all these grave and multifarious labours efficiently? Can any one man in the present state of things discharge all these duties? Separate, therefore, these duties; lessen these labours. With every argument adduced by my hon. and learned Friend in support of the withdrawn bill I entirely concur. It would be not only a waste of time, but it would be wrong in me to attempt to say anything at this moment in addition to what he has so ably said. I also pass by what he has said respecting the hearing of counsel, respecting parties, and the difference made between real and personal estate in this respect, the form of pleading, the constant recourse to references to the masters; 1st, because I very much concur with him in these remarks, and, 2ndly, because I think they are subjects much better to be submitted to the Lord Chancellor or a commission than to this House. In respect of the six clerks, the reduction to the number of two is already provided for by that important and excellent measure of Lord Brougham's, passed in 1833. I fully, however, concur with my hon. and learned Friend in the absurdity of an oversight in another Act of Parliament passed in the same year, I mean the Fines and Recoveries Act, whereby the income of these offices is very greatly increased; and what makes the absurdity greater, is, that the duty to be performed (not a very arduous duty I admit) is performed by the masters or commissioners, but nothing, or nearly nothing, is done by the six clerks. It is clear that the law, in this respect, should be altered. Neither was Lord Brougham unmindful of the sixty clerks; I believe I may say it was his intention to have introduced a measure respecting them. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend, that such offices may be dispensed with, due and adequate compensation being given to the present holders. I do not see why there should be a different mode of service of notices and orders in suits in equity from that in actions at law; but that is not the opinion of many. The late Lord Redesdale, a great legal authority, thought the maintenance of these officers essential to the good working of causes. My hon. and learned Friend says, that these officers are only occupied in the taxation of costs, and which, strictly speaking, ought to be performed by the masters. He is perfectly correct in that remark, and the sooner the taxation of costs is transferred to proper and efficient taxing officers the better. Now, as to the observations which my hon. and learned Friend has thought proper to make respecting the masters, and which has been the cause of my addressing the House on this occasion. He complains of the delays in the masters' offices; if he had made a little more inquiry—if he had not entirely forgotten what must have occurred to himself whilst practising at the outer bar—if he had consulted a little more diligently the book on which he so much relies for his facts, I mean the pamphlet of Mr. Field, he would have found that the delay is not imputable to the masters, but to the solicitors; and this is the evidence of a solicitor himself. And when I say the blame is imputable to the solicitors, let me not be understood as finding fault with them indiscriminately. In many cases, they are waiting for instructions from their clients in the country; in others, they are waiting to see the issue of a proposed compromise or arrangement; in others, perhaps, stopped for want of funds, money not being furnished by their clients. And let me here correct a very common error, that delays are advantageous to solicitors. I believe they are most detrimental, not only by the prevention of a greater influx of business, but by means of solicitors being kept out of their money; for I believe, in many chancery suits, a solicitor will be better paid by his having money laid out at 51. per cent, interest. Delays are frequently caused also by the non-attendance of barristers. There is scarcely an attendance by a barrister that is strictly given on the first appointment; but are the barristers to blame? No such thing; they are detained in court, or by appointments with other masters; and I state these things, first, to show that the delays are not to be imputed to the masters, and next, to show that indulgence must occasionally be given by the masters to both barristers and solicitors. My hon. and learned Friend complains of the manner in which causes are proceeded with before the masters, of the secresy of the sittings, of the number of days they attend, and of the hours they attend. I entirely concur with him that continuity of proceeding is most desirable, but it is not always attainable, partly owing to the nature of the cause itself (for in the midst of a cause it may be necessary to let it stand over for other evidence), and partly owing to the engagements of solicitors. If the whole day should be occupied with the hearing of a cause, great injury may arise in other cases, but, when attainable, I agree that it is most desirable, A remarkable instance of this sort occurred last year in my office. In the Bury St. Edmund's case, well known to my hon. and learned Friend, a decree was pronounced by the Master of the Rolls, directing, among other things, an account to be taken of the charity estates; it so happened that there were seventy or eighty different charities all vested in the corporation of that town, or some portion of the corporation, and who were the accounting parties, and therefore seventy or eighty different accounts were to be taken; the parties, upon my requiring such accounts to be taken, despairing that it would be possible, within any reasonable time, to get through such a mass, first endeavoured to put such a construction on the decree as would not render it necessary to take an account farther back than the execution of a deed in 1810; but finding my view of the case confirmed by the Master of the Rolls, they threw up their hands in dismay. My answer was, "Do as I desire you during the vacation" (it was about this time last year); "come to me in November; I will give a whole week, and six hours each day of that week."— They attended in November; they proceeded for two days, six hours each day, and the matter was gone through in the middle of the third day. If proceeded with in the ordinary way of warrants, the taking of the different seventy or eighty accounts would have taken a year or more; so far in favour of continuity of proceedings. But see what has happened. After the taking of these accounts, it was necessary that a survey should be had of all the charity estates, which I ordered to be taken; from that day to this I have seen nothing of the parties, except in an interlocutory matter, the appointment of trustees.—Can this delay be imputable to the master? I have no doubt that, upon being questioned, the solicitor will have some plausible reason for the delay. There is no master in the buildings who is not perfectly alive to the advantages of continuity of proceeding, and who, as far as in him lies, does not carry into effect such continuity; but, until directed by a higher and competent authority—until the master is directed not to proceed with a cause until he finishes the preceding one, he cannot, he ought not, to do more than he does at present. Of the propriety, of the fitness, of the justice of such an order, much, I think, may be said. It requires grave and serious consideration; much, very much, in my opinion, ought and must be left to the management of the master. Then, as to the secresy of the sittings; surely my hon. and learned Friend must know (as the fact is) that our sittings are not secret; they are open to the public, and as much open as the courts themselves. I admit they are not as accessible, and the matters transacted there do not in general attract public attention; but that is not the fault of the masters. The master sits at a table, and the parties are around him stating their cases as practical men rather than orators; but if it should be thought beneficial that a change should be made in this respect, that the master's room should be made more accessible to the public, that the forms of the court should be more adopted, I can vouch for the masters that they will interpose no difficulty nor make any objections. I, however, very much doubt the expediency of such a measure; I very much doubt its utility, and I have great fears of this mischief arising from it, that solicitors and their clerks, instead of getting through their business as they do now practically and to the purpose, will then become makers of speeches, and address themselves more to the audience than to the master, if audience they should have; and even without an audience, the very forms of a court will induce them to imitate the addresses and statements of the barristers. Mr. Field himself, from whose book my hon. and learned Friend has so much borrowed, (good authority, I fully admit, on this point,) the great advocate for this alteration in the masters' sittings, winds up all his observations on this point by saying, that, "after all, perhaps the business is much better gone through and disposed of than if the forms of a court were more used;" but to satisfy the call made by the public, and which my hon. and learned Friend seems to have taken up, let trial be made. I only hope that the masters and the suitors will not thereby be deprived of the excellent method in which business is now transacted by solicitors and their clerks. And here I must observe the great satisfaction I have felt, ever since I have sat as master, at the manner in which business is generally conducted and carried on by them. Now, as to the hours of business; my hon. and learned Friend has referred to one particular return made under peculiar circumstances; he ought to have stated the general average, and which appears to be nearly five hours a day to each master. I have the authority of the Colleague of my hon. and learned Friend, that no judge ought to be called upon, with advantage to the public, to sit beyond five hours in the day; but my hon. and learned Friend says, that the time of the judge is much occupied out of court in preparing for court; he must know that the master is also so occupied; there is no day passes that I am not occupied from one hour to two hours at least out of office-hours in reading my papers for the next day and looking at points of law. And then, in respect of the number of days, I agree with my hon. and learned Friend, that the master should sit every day the court sits; but I do not see what use their sitting at other times would answer. And my hon. and learned Friend may be assured, that if they continued their sittings until Christmas next, there would then be the same bustle and hurry as there is generally at this time of the year; and surely my hon. and learned Friend ought to know, that the masters, after the last seal, have no power whatever of compelling attendances upon warrants. I think the practice most absurd and mischievous. I have, with the other masters, adopted every means we could to put a stop to such a practice. I have suggested in the proper quarter that an alteration should be made, and I have no doubt it will be made. As to the hours, it is well known that solicitors cannot, except under very pressing circumstances, attend upon the masters, but from eleven to four o'clock. They are occupied in the earlier hours in the morning in reading their letters, and making arrangements for the day; and in later hours they are again occupied with letters for the post, and preparing for the next day. But my hon. and learned Friend says, that there is a great pressure and arrear, and delay of business; that there is an actual choaking up in our offices: all I can say, is, that I know there is no such arrear or delay or choaking up in my office, and that I am not aware and I do not believe that there is any such in any other office. I know that, by the time my office closes, there will not be a single matter left undisposed of or unfinished where the solicitors would attend to it. Mr. Field, himself, admits, that with the master himself there is no delay. And whilst my hon. and learned Friend undervalues the services of the masters, he ought to reflect, that, whilst there is more substantial business done in our courts of equity in the course of the year than in all the other courts at Westminster Hall, two thirds of that business are transacted in the masters' offices. As to the romantic allusion of my hon. and learned Friend, of the masters reading the newspaper or a novel, he could hardly be serious; and I feel confident he intended it merely as a figure of speech, as a flourish which an orator can hardly ever avoid where it falls in his way. If a warrant should not be attended, if an interval should arise between the attendance on warrants, the master has plenty of occupation in reading over and preparing his reports, and in signing them. For my hon. and learned Friend is grealy mistaken when he says, their reports are prepared by the chief clerk and not by the masters themselves; true it is, that the statement and technical part is so prepared; but I will speak for myself, and, in so doing, may also for all the other masters, that there is no master who does not prepare or settle his own finding, and peruse the whole of the report. It is not, I conceive, the duty of the master to do more, but that of the chief clerk; and the master's time must be, and is much better occupied in other and more difficult matters. And now, as to attendances and their enforcement; I wish the masters had more power; but how that is to be effected with safety or utility is a matter of grave consideration. Whom will you mulct with costs, or punish for non-attendance? Not the suitor, for he may be perfectly innocent; the solicitor,—will you gain your point thereby? My hon. and learned Friend says, and so does Mr. Field (a solicitor himself), that solicitors will not attend sometimes, out of courtesy to each other; will they not extend that courtesy as to costs, and keep a regular account between each other for non-attendance, and set off one against the other? All this, as I have already said, requires consideration, and much, very much, depends upon proper management, and the master's seizing the proper moment to compel attendances and continuity of warrants. My hon. and learned Friend then says, referring no doubt, to the nature of our sittings, that the masters have nothing to hope, nothing to fear, nothing to influence their conduct. Nothing to fear ! Will he not allow something for conscientious feelings, and a sense of duty? Will he not give some credit to men of education, men who have at the bar obtained considerable business and acquired high station? If such credit cannot be given to men who now perform the office of masters; if a sense of duty be not sufficient to influence them, they ought never, in my opinion, to have been appointed to that high situation: for let my hon. and learned Friend consider it as he will, let him compare the duties of the masters and their salaries, and measure them with the labour and remuneration of a draftsman at the bar, the office of master must always be considered one of the most important of judicial appointments. As for the observation respecting the influence which my sitting in Parliament has upon my conduct, I think it might have been spared. I do not think the Bar or the public would judge of me so harshly, and to the Bar and public I appeal. My hon. and learned Friend next says, we are independent of the Lord Chancellor. Except as to our appointments, not more so than we were; and I should be sorry we were. My hon. and learned Friend says, that under the former practice, the Lord Chancellor might have sent or not, as he thought proper, reference to the Masters; and as their emoluments then depended upon fees, and not salary, the Masters were then entirely dependent upon the Lord Chancellor. But does my hon. and learned Friend mean to say, that the Lord Chancellor ever did exclude a Master from his share of references, or that he ought to do so? If circumstances should arise to justify such exclusion, surely the same circumstances would and ought, to cause the removal altogether of such Master. I think the change of remuneration from fees to salary a change for the better; it is one of those salutary reforms for which we are indebted to Lord Brougham; and equally beneficial, as it appears tome, is the change of appointment from the Lord Chancellor to the Prime Minister; for thereby you render the whole Cabinet responsible for the appointment, whilst at the same time you secure the approval of the Lord Chancellor; for it cannot be supposed that the Prime Minister would ever appoint any one that was not approved of by the Lord Chancellor. If ever a Minister should do so, I do not hesitate to say, that he would greatly fail in his duty to the public, and act contrary to the intention of the framers of the Act and the Legislature, which I have no doubt was to place the appointment of the masters in the same situation and on the same footing as that of the other judges. When my hon. and learned Friend says the masters have nothing to hope, does he forget the promotion and advancement of masters Thompson and Alexander to the high judicial situation of chief Baron? My hon. and learned Friend and the House may be assured, that they will not find more ardent or zealous supporters or coadjutors in the cause of reform of the Court and the Masters' offices than the masters themselves. I beg pardon for having so long trespassed on the kindness and attention of the House; I feel that I have been desultory and tedious, but my excuse must be, that I was not aware that my hon. and learned Friend was about to make any observations respecting the masters, which have been the occasion of my rising at all; or that he was going to do anything more than complain of the withdrawal of the bill. With him, before I sit down, I must again express my regret at that withdrawal: but though that bill has been withdrawn, great good has been attained; great advance has been made this Session; the most irresistible evidence has been placed upon record; unanimity has been secured; emulation between parties has been created. Lord Lyndhurst, always a reformer of the abuses of the court, has become a convert to and zealous supporter of the appointment of two more judges, and the increase of the judicial power. I must here take this opportunity of expressing with others our sense of obligation to his Lordship. My hon. and learned Friend has joined our ranks as a reformer; he is most welcome even at this eleventh hour; and he has by his speech of this evening rendered the cause the most important services, which I am ready to acknowledge, although I complain of his observations respecting the masters, which I consider unmerited and uncalled for, and were by me most unexpected. My right hon. Friend, his colleague, has declared himself favourable to, nay, he has insisted upon, still greater and more extensive reforms. The noble Lord, the Secretary for the Colonies, has expressed an opinion, that next Session, not only should the bill, now un- happily withdrawn, pass, but there ought to be an investigation respecting the Apellate Court, independently of the question of the supply of judicial power. All this must inspire us with hope and well grounded assurance that ere long the Court of Chancery and the Appellate Court will be put on such a footing as to secure to the suitor a satisfactory administration of justice, without delay and disappointment. What a triumph to those who have been long exerting themselves in the good cause, to the present Master of the Rolls, and others, amongst whom, I trust, I may rank myself as an humble but constant and ardent labourer in and out of Parliament.

wished to ask whether this clause would empower the Chancellor and judges to make orders dispensing with bills and answers, or at least with answers in common suits, for payment of debts and legacies, and other simple cases.

There is a subsequent clause authorising the Lord Chancellor and the judges generally to make rules and orders as to the form and mode of proceeding to obtain relief, and to alter, control, and regulate the business of the several offices of the court. Under these powers the judges might, as he conceived, in such cases, if they should think it expedient, dispense with bills and answers altogether, and substitute a petition, or some simple mode of proceeding.

stated, that he doubted whether the judges would act upon this part of the bill, and that part which authorised them to direct payment into the "Suitors' Fee Fund" of the copy money now received by any of the officers for their own use, inasmuch as this could not be done effectually without very largely interfering with the emoluments of the six clerks and clerks in court; he wished to know how this was.

stated, that to meet this difficulty, he had prepared a clause for allowing compensation to the officers whose emoluments might be affected under this act, which he would propose when this bill was gone through.

proposed the addition of his clause for compensation "to the officers who might be affected by the provisions of the act." He staled, that he conceived that the bill would be ineffectual without it, inasmuch as the operation of the act, if properly and effectually carried out, would deprive the six clerks and clerks in court of a large proportion of their fees, and it was impossible to expect that the judges would do this unless some means were afforded to the officers for obtaining a fair compensation.

stated, that the clause proposed would, in his opinion, be a very useful one. He understood that several of the clerks in court had paid large sums of money for their places: He thought it therefore, reasonable that such a clause should be added.

agreed that this was a very necessary clause, and would facilitate the carrying out the bill in a complete and effectual manner.