The House is aware, that at the close of the last Session the House sustained a great loss by the death of Mr. Rickman, who was an officer of the House for thirty-eight years, and sat as a clerk at the table during twenty-six years. I have received this morning a letter from his son, in which he states, that his lamented father had collected a number of papers relating to the privileges, practice, and precedents of Parliament, and that he is desirous of placing them at the disposal of the House.

said, he thought the House should express their sense of the great services of the late Mr. Rickman. As, however, there were not many Members then present, he should take the liberty of giving notice, that he would bring forward a resolution on the subject to-morrow.

said, that as he had not received a satisfactory answer from the noble Lord, to the question addressed to him on a former occasion, he hoped the noble Lord would now give him one. The question he had to put was, whether her Majesty's Government was aware of a letter addressed to T. M. Ray, Esq., dated Buckingham Palace, Jan. 20, 1841, and signed G. E. Anson, containing the sincere thanks of Prince Albert to the Loyal National Repeal Association of Ireland, for their address to his Royal Highness on the birth of a princess.

said, that since the hon. Gentleman had asked the former question, he had seen the letter alluded to in a newspaper, but he had not thought it necessary to make any inquiry on the subject.

begged leave to ask the noble Lord, whether he had received any more recent despatches from the Levant which would enable him to stale whether the treaty made by Commodore Napier, or by Admiral Stopford, with Mehemet Ali, had been yet carried into effect? Also, whether Syria had been yet evacuated by the troops of the Pacha, and the authority of the Sultan re established in that country?

said, all the information he could give was, that Commodore Napier had entered into a convention with Mehemet Ali, which the commodore had not authority to conclude, and which Admiral Stopford disapproved of, and therefore was not carried into effect. The submission of Mehemet Ali had been made in consequence of instructions sent by Admiral Stopford through Captain Fanshawe, and accepted by the Sultan, who had in consequence appointed commissioners to proceed to Alexandria and inform Mehemet, that the Sultan conceded to him the government of Egypt, and would make his authority hereditary. As for the evacuation of Syria, arrangements were making by which Ibrahim and his troops would be permitted to quit that country without molestation. The evacuation was not yet complete. Mehemet Ali had proved his readiness to fulfil his engagements, so far as to have given orders for the Turkish fleet to be rapidly refitted and made ready to sail from Alexandria.

asked, had this last step been done at the suggestion of the Four Powers?

— Yes, in consequence of the suggestion of the Four Powers.

rose to move for leave to bring in a bill for facilitating the Administration of Justice. In executing his task he would, he said, occupy but a small portion of time, because the measure he was about to ask leave to introduce had already been before the House, and was not likely to meet with serious opposition. This measure would be followed by others to improve the law, — for the appointing of localudges,— for the reformation of the ecclesiastical courts,— for amending the law with respect to bankrupts and insolvents, by bringing them under one jurisdiction, and for abolishing the Court of Review, which was, on all hands, admitted not to have answered the expectations originally formed respecting it. The present measure related merely to the administration of the law in the Courts of Equity— a branch of the law which was of very great importance, on account of the immense mass of property, real and personal, brought under its jurisdiction, and in the administration of which great delay was experienced, notwithstanding the high character and unwearied assiduity of the judges who presided in the Equity Courts. The great cause of this delay was the increased business thrown into those courts from the greatly increased population of the country, and from its still more increased wealth. With the enormous mass of property brought under the administration of the Equity Courts, it was impossible, with the present judicial establishments, to get through the business. There had been hardly any addition to the judicial establishments of the country since the reign of Edward 1st, though the property to be administered had gone on constantly and rapidly increasing. He might mention that the funds in the Court of Chancery in 1802, amounted to 19,000,000l.; in 1812, to 28,000,000l.; and in 1839, to 41,000,000l. The Acts of Parliament which had been passed of late years respecting railways had very much contributed to increase the business of the Equity Courts, and the consequence was, that there were frequent and just complaints of the slow administration of justice to equity suitors. The arrears in the Court of Chancery were very great, amounting at present to between 1,200 and 1,300 causes. Between the time of a cause being set down for hearing, and it being heard, a period of not less than three years elapsed, and upon an average it was five years from the date of the beginning of a cause to its being first brought before the judge. When a cause was heard it might not be definitively disposed of, but would come on again for further directions, and this might happen repeatedly before the cause was finally determined. Between these hearings, there was a cycle of three years. The consequence of this procrastination was, great distress to individuals. Another evil, also,' resulting from such a state of things was the encouragement to fraud. Persons having property entrusted to them frequently set the law at defiance, presuming upon the inability of individuals to brave the expenses and anxieties of a Chancery suit. Compromises on unequal terms were matters of daily occurrence. The enormous amount of extra costs, arising from delays, constituted in itself a great grievance. Upon a moderate calculation, the term fees and other expenses, arising from delays, amounted to not less than 40,000l. per annum. It was, by some, ignorantly supposed that all this delay was advantageous to solicitors. No such thing; they were often the greatest sufferers, having to remain for years without reimbursement of the money they were obliged to expend. This being the case, what was to be done? Some alteration must be made. He first turned his attention to the Court of Exchequer. That was one of the tribunals by which the equity law was administered. That court, however, exercised double functions— those of common law and equity. Its common law decisions were sometimes less satisfactory, from the absence of the Chief Baron, and as an equity court it had fallen into disrepute, notwithstanding the eminence of the judges who usually presided in it. One cause of this was, that the judge who sat in the Exchequer was obliged to attend the circuits, and the court, consequently, was closed from July to November. If an injunction were granted previously, there were no means of getting it dissolved during that period. Another evil consisted in there being no appeal from an interlocutory order of that court except to the House of Lords. For these reasons, he entirely concurred with those who framed the bill he was about to introduce in thinking that the equitable jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court ought to be abolished. This, to be sure, might be avoided by appointing another judge in that court, who would confine himself entirely to the equity business, and from whose decisions there should be an appeal to the Lord Chancellor. This, however, would only be appointing another Vice-Chancellor, under a different name. The first object, then; of the present bill was to abolish the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer. The next question to be considered was, what addition should be made to the judicial power of the Court of Chancery. If the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer were abolished, it would be necessary to provide a substitute for it. Even during the existence of the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, it had been considered necessary to increase the judicial power of the Court of Chancery. In 1828, Lord Lyndhurst introduced a bill in the House of Lords, which passed through that Assembly, and was brought down to the Commons, to appoint an additional Vice-chancellor. It was a matter for regret that that measure did not pass the House of Commons. The public mind, however, was not then prepared for such a proposition, and it was only by degrees that it had become prepared to entertain it. If one judge was necessary then, two new judges could not be considered too many, when the equity department of the Court of Exchequer were abolished. No apprehension need be entertained, that new business would not be found for the additional judges. The House would be surprised to hear, that for sums under a 100l., no one ever thought of going into equity. In courts of common law, the case was entirely different. His learned Friends, who were present, would bear him out in his statement, that in three-fourths of the causes tried at common law the damages were under 100l. No one but a madman would now go into equity to recover a debt of 100l. If there were at present a demand against a fraudulent executor, or partner, or any other person, against whom there was no remedy at common law, unless the amount were more than 100l., the practice of the Court of Chancery amounted to an entire denial of justice to the parties aggrieved. Indeed, under the bill introduced at the close of last Session, he was sure that great improvements in the masters' offices and other departments in Chancery would be made; and he was sure that in all cases of a fiduciary nature, a remedy would be afforded as satisfactory as that now given by the courts of common law; but this could not be effected without a considerable addition to the judicial strength, as he had already stated. On those grounds, he believed there would be no opposition to the appointment of two new Vice-Chancellors as proposed by the present bill. He might, perhaps, be blamed for not proposing a more extensive measure, particularly as the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Ripon, had given notice of a bill for improving the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords and the judicial Committee of the Privy Council; but he thought it right to keep clear of all debateable ground, and he trusted that those measures would not be allowed to impede the present bill, which he desired should proceed with as little delay as possible. In 1835, the Government, with which he was connected, brought forward a measure which proposed that a chief judge should be created in Chancery, who should not be removeable with the Government, and that the attention of the Lord Chancellor should be confined to appeals and writs of error in the House of Lords, and in the Privy Council. That measure, however, did not meet with the approbation of the other House, and he was afraid that if the right hon. Member for Ripon proposed any such plan it would not be received with favour. The bill which he was now about to introduce would be a large instalment of legal reform, and as it would be sent back to the Lords in the same state in which it had been brought down from that House, there was no reason to doubt that it would receive the approbation of that Assembly. The bill would abolish the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, and appoint two new Vice-Chancellors. At a subsequent stage, it would be necessary to introduce clauses respecting salaries and compensations. That was a subject which had better be reserved for the committee, and with the leave of the House he would abstain from entering upon it at the present time. It might, however, be satisfactory to the House to know that neither for salaries nor compensations would it be necessary to impose any burthen upon the country. There were funds belonging to the Courts of Exchequer and Chancery amply sufficient to defray all reasonable salaries, and all the compensations which would be necessary. He concluded by moving for leave to introduce "a Bill for facilitating the Administration of Justice."

had first a few words to say respecting the proposition of the noble Lord, which was expected by the House last year. If it had come on last year, it was his intention to endeavour to have it postponed; but the noble Lord showed his judgment in holding over the bill until now, although he had done so because he saw there was no chance of its passing last year without opposition. His right hon. and learned Friend seemed to think there ought to be no opposition to this motion for the appointment of two new judges; but he must inform the House that this proposition for two new judges involved a proposition for two new courts. They deceived themselves if they supposed that the two new judges would be added to the old court. Each judge must have a separate court, a separate bar, a separate suite of officers, and a separate place must be built. If there be a greater evil than a want of a proper judicial power to meet the exigiencies of a country it would be found in the existence of a greater number of courts of justice than the business of the country required. There could be no greater evil than the creation of courts of judicature which were really not wanted in a country. The hon. and learned Gentleman's proposition was, that one of the judges whom he proposed to appoint should be only temporary— that at a certain period his office should cease, and that the court should, in fact, no longer remain an effective court. But he would beg leave to ask the hon. and learned Gentleman had he reflected upon the great inconvenience of such a court of justice? If they created a new court of justice, they would also create a great body of lawyers to attend that court, and they would soon find that the supply would be fully equal to the demand. He would be found at all times ready to go to the whole extent of supporting any increase of judicial power which the hon. and learned Member might propose, if the necessity for such increase had been clearly proved, however averse he might be, and though much he deprecated the creation of new courts. If a case of necessity could be proved to his satisfaction, he would never stand in opposition to it. But he felt so strongly the evils arising from the introduction of a court of justice not permanently wanted, that he felt himself bound to express his strong dissent from the proposition. The hon. and learned Gentleman had, he thought, made out but a very imperfect case to warrant such a measure as he had demanded. The returns moved for, and which the whole House would have in a day or two, would show that his hon. and learned Friend had greatly mistaken the circumstances attending the existing state of the law and the administration of justice in this country. That hon. and learned Gentleman had informed the House that there were arrears amounting to 1,200 or 1,300 cases at present waiting for judicial inquiry, but he begged leave to say, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had about doubled the actual number. The fact was this, that there were not one-half that number of cases in arrear. The hon. and learned Gentleman had also stated that there was very little chance of any case being at present decided within the term of three years from the time it was set down. Now he begged leave to inform that House that the Master of the Rolls had been for some time hearing and adjudicating upon cases, none of which had been set down before Easter Term 1840, which of course reduced the period from three years to six months. He of course acquitted the hon. and learned Member of any intention to mislead the House, but that hon. and learned Gentleman was altogether mistaken when he founded his proposal upon the statement with which he had favoured the House. He was not there to deny that great delay existed in the present judicial institutions of the country, but that delay was unavoidable under the existing state of things. It was hopeless, therefore, to expect that with their present number of judicial officers, they would have judges who would attend more punctually to their business. It was impossible judges could do more than they have done, and he thought it was but fair to assume that what the present judges were not able to accomplish, no other judges would be able to effect. His hon. and learned Friend had informed the House that in 1829, when he was then an officer of the crown under the administration of the Duke of Wellington, a bill had been proposed for the establishment of a new judge, which proved the necessity that then existed for an additional judge. He admitted, of course, having been the advocate of such a measure then, but he thought that there was no greater necessity now than at that time, and he therefore could not see what case his hon. and learned Friend had made out for two additional judges being appointed. If that proposition had been assented to in 1829, and such an addition been then granted, there would not have been now any complaint made upon the great accumulation of business which it was admitted had at present increased. The hon. and learned Gentleman had also said that the Court of Review had not answered the expectations which had been entertained of it, and therefore he proposed that it should be abolished. With regard to this Court, he recollected being on the opposition side of the House when it was proposed to be created, and he thought it his duty to give it his most strenuous opposition, as he was then, as he is now, clearly of opinion that such a court would be useless and unnecessary. The question was this. He was of opinion that in 1830 an additional judge should be elected, and accordingly he submitted a proposition to that effect to the House. He was now of the same opinion, but if it could be shown to him and the House that there were two additional judges necessary, he would cheerfully acquiesce in the views of his hon. and learned Friend. He was as desirous as any man that the judicial institutions of the country should be in such a condition as to answer the exigencies of the times, but if he admitted the necessity for an addition to the judicial power of the country, he saw no reason why there should be two appointed. If, however, it were proved that two judges were necessary, why then let there be an increase of two. Notwithstanding his strong opposition to the creation of the Court of Review, and his efforts to prove the utter impossibility of such a court being a benefit to the country, that court was established and four judges were appointed to preside in it. It was since found to be most useless and ineffectual, for nine-tenths of the business had been struck out of it, never to rise again; the consequence of which was, that this court had been since found of no use whatever. Then the hon. and learned Gentleman, in arguing in favour of the election of two more judges, said that there were a great many compromises now to what there had been before, and, consequently, if his proposal were agreed to, there would then be no necessity for compromise, and therefore there would be more causes to hear. Now, he would take it upon himself to assert that, with regard to the proceedings of the Court of Chancery generally, the hon. and learned Gentleman had committed a mistake in assuming that compromises to anything like the extent which he had stated had taken place. The practice of the court was to take the number of bills which were filed first, then they reckoned the number of cases set down for hearing, and finding that perhaps many have been withdrawn, it was supposed that in these there were compromises. There was no foundation for such a statement. He felt that he was perfectly competent to state the general circumstances connected with the hearing of causes in the Court of Chancery, and he had no hesitation in asserting that nothing was more rare than a compromise in that court after the bill was filed, unless for the best of all good reasons namely, the want of merits,—the case might not be a promising one. The practice in that court was carried on thus. A bill was filed, which was met by a demurrer or plea, which was a complete answer to it. Another large class of causes were cases of injunction, and that was done by motion, and when those turned out successful or otherwise, in the great majority of cases there was nothing more heard of them, and there was consequently an end of them. There was another large class of cases which this House was not aware of. Cases of this nature, where the general object of a man about to sue another was not to know whether he had a good right to take law proceedings or not, but having made up his mind to go to law, he was fully determined to carry his intentions into effect. His friends might perhaps endeavour to persuade him to desist, but having once got law into his head he answers them, "I will go to law, because I think I ought to do so, and go I will." Nothing could prevent such a person from indulging his fancy, and he accordingly consults his counsel, who informs him that he has no case to bring into a court, and that he would assuredly be beaten; but what does such a person say in reply, "That may be all very true, but I tell you that the defendant, my opponent, has certain papers in his possession, which he has admitted, and these will prove my case, so that I am certain that if I file a bill against him he will prove my case." But his counsel would say to him, "Don't be deluded by such an idea, for if you file your bill an answer will be immediately put in to it, which would destroy all your hopes." This person, notwithstanding all this good advice, files his bill, the answer is put in, and he is compelled to suffer a dismissal with costs. This was a description of a large class of cases which never came to a hearing. His impression was, that any great additional number of judges would not aid to the doing away of these causes of complaint. It appeared that in'1839, down to Michaelmas Term 1840, the Lord Chancellor had heard seventy-nine bills, original cases, and twenty-two exceptions, which made altogether 101 original matters heard by the Lord Chancellor within this period. He had also heard during that time 130 appeals, making altogether 231 cases. In the Vice-Chancellor's Court, within the same period, there were, including short causes, motions, &c, about 439 cases heard. With regard to short causes great misapprehension existed, many persons supposed that they were not adverse ones, but all these short causes were generally adverse cases. They were styled short causes, because the pleadings connected with them were not of great length. Now, in those causes the judges were called upon to decide objections, which frequently involved the most important points of law, without the assistance which the bar generally afforded them. Since the long vacation up to Hilary Term which ended yesterday, a great portion of the arrears had been disposed of. The Lord Chancellor had heard 160 original causes, and twenty-two short causes, with a great number of appeals, &c.; the Vice-Chancellor had heard 190 short causes, &c, and the Master of the Rolls had heard within the same time twenty-four original causes and twenty-seven short causes, and further directions, &c. He was happy to see that there were very few judgments indeed: and he might say, that all the appeals before the Lord Chancellor had been heard. He did not suppose that there were more than 100 cases in arrear in the Rolls' Court, and he had no doubt that the whole would be heard by Easter Term, if they appointed an additional judge. Indeed he anticipated that there would be no arrear of business by the end of Easter Term. In the Lord Chancellor's Court and the Vice Chancellor's Court there was an arrear of only about 395 cases. So that instead of so large a number as 1,300 or 1,400 cases having accumulated, as the hon. and learned Gentleman had stated, there were only about 550 cases, including causes, &c. He was then fully persuaded that the appointment of one more additional judge would very soon get through this arrear of business, for they had the Lord Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Master of the Rolls hearing original causes. They would have three judges sitting to hear those causes, and a portion of the Lord Chancellor's time would be dedicated to the new business. He had then formed the opinion that the arrears would be soon cleared up. He had indeed heard, from a very competent authority to speak upon such a subject, that such had been the frequency of railway motions in these courts, that the whole time of one court of equity had been constantly occupied in hearing them. Now, as to the arrear of causes unheard in those courts, he was satisfied there was some mistake or misunderstanding for he had been positively assured by the Vice-Chancellor, that there really was no arrear of causes in the Vice-Chancellor's Court, and that all motions in that court, all petitions had been heard; and there was not even any judgments in arrear. A great deal of time, too, had been taken up in business not likely to employ much time in future— namely, in charity cases, including foundation schools, and endowed institutions, which, in consequence of the passing of the Municipal Corporations Reform Bill, had been under the consideration of the court continually for some time past, and had occupied much of the attention of courts of equity. He thought he could safely assume that the business in arrear in these courts did not amount to one-half of what the hon. and learned Attorney-General had assumed it to be. He had, in consequence of this reduction in the estimate of cases in arrear by the hon. the Attorney-General, come to the conclusion that one additional judge would be fully competent to the proposed duty, instead of two such judges as proposed by this bill. However, as the Government had so framed their bill that there should be two judges, they no doubt would persevere in that part of their plan, and he should take the measure as he found it. In the state of doubt the House as yet was as to the propriety of there being one judge or two, he should remind them that it would be better not to be over zealous in their legislating upon this subject, and do too much. He believed it was Dean Swift who once said to his cook, "Take away that beef and do it a little less— it is too much done." Of course she answered that she was not able. "Then," said he, "should not that teach you to do the meat a little less at first, because you could do it a little more." Now, might not that, however homely, be applied to the subject of these courts. So he would apprise the House that it would be easy if they found one judge not sufficient to do the business in arrear to add another; but if they appointed two they must be prepared to incur the whole expense of two courts. — whether two were necessary or not. The double appointment would prove injurious to the profession, and the administration of justice in the country, if they were to have a court with all its officers and necessary expenditure, but without causes— a bar attached to the court without briefs, and solicitors without business. Unless he should at a future stage of the proceedings hear this proposition supported upon grounds more satisfactory and convincing he should feel it to be his duty to move an amendment in committee upon the bill, limiting the appointment to a single additional judge instead of two; and though open to conviction he would say that the hon. the Attorney-General must clearly make out his case before he could acquiesce in the plan for appointing two new judges, and as a consequence, two new courts. Now, as to the constitution of the additional court of equity, and the judges appointed to preside in it, he would just remark that the creation of a new equity court, and the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor to preside over it, had been occasioned by a very general complaint against the procrastination of business at that time in the existing equity courts, and as it was admitted there was much to be done, by the judge who was an eminent Chancery barrister, a salary was annexed to the situation of 6,000l. a-year. Considering this judge was to sit in judgment upon causes of great importance, and take upon himself the duties of the Lord Chancellor, so far it was only proper he should have a high salary proportioned to the dignity of his station in the profession. He had heard that it was intended by the provisions of this bill to reduce the salary of this efficient judge to 2,000l. a year. Now he must say that the duties of this judge were so heavy and onerous, that it would not be worth any competent equity barrister's while, to retain the seal on the reduced salary. He should, therefore, strongly recommend, that the salary should not be lowered. If the appointment of a new judge took place, he should also say give such judge a salary fully adequate to the sacrifice he must make in respect to income, and fully proportionate to the duties of the station he would have to fill; and if the appointment were made, as it ought to be made, out of that class of barristers who were equity lawyers, competent to the task, he was satisfied the proposed salary was, taking it at 5,000l. or 6,000l. a-year, not too great. There was another part of the measure to which he entertained a serious objection; it was to that part which proposed that these two judges should be dependent as judges upon the Lord Chancellor. This, he thought, would be extremely injudicious. Each judge, whether there were two new judges or one, ought to be altogether independent, in his court, of the Lord Chancellor. The trust already reposed in that great officer of the Crown, was the highest that ever had, he believed, been confided to an individual. The Lord Chancellor had, at present, the power to alter and remodel everything in the management of his court, to reform anything he conceived to be an abuse, and make new regulations from time to time if he thought necessary. Of the extent of his patronage hardly any one in that House could be ignorant. The House should recollect that the course with this great functionary was to send a great many cases to be examined in the offices of the masters of the Court of Chancery. Now, what must be the effect in those offices of crowding them with additional business from the newly-created courts, as must be the case should the two judges in equity proposed by this bill be appointed? In his opinion, those offices would be quite blocked up, and great injury would be done to the administration of justice throughout the country. It was now the imperative duty of the House, with the assistance of those competent to give advice on the subject, to reform the constitution of the masters in Chancery, and the offices over which the masters presided. They displayed, it must be admitted, a want of energy and alacrity in the discharge of their duty, which might be attributed, in a good degree, to their being withdrawn from the public eye. He confessed he should hold the appointment of additional judges in equity as altogether valueless, unless the master's offices, without loss of time, were reformed and improved; and he trusted these small courts, would, like others, be open, not in theory, but in practice, to the inspection and presence of the public. At present the de- lays in these departments often amounted to an entire and absolute denial of justice. To render the equity jurisdiction complete, it was then, in his opinion, necessary— first, that these offices should be remodelled and improved; and, secondly, the constitution of the courts of equity should be so improved, that the business of appeals should not be materially increased, notwithstanding the addition proposed to the number of equity courts. The lower courts must be improved, but the higher courts must be improved also. Nothing was the subject of greater complaints than the composition of our Courts of Appeal, but if that part of the system were now open to objection, how much greater would be the objection, when they were going to create two new courts of appeal? The composition of the House of Lords as a Court of Appeal was a great anomaly. It owed its establishment to a train of unforeseen circumstances; its jurisdiction was denied in late times by that House, in the strongest terms, and to the extent of committing persons who sought its protection; and though it was ultimately established, they were content to leave their authority in the state they found it. What could be more absurd than that the decrees of a judge who was competent to the performance of his task, should be reversed by a body of Peers, who were entirely ignorant of every matter relating to the administration of the law? Had this practically been the case, the glaring absurdity of the practice would have rendered it intolerable: but the great body of the Peers acquiesced in the decision of the Lord Chancellor; and he was, in fact, the sole judge of appeals in the House of Lords. Was it not, therefore, a most alarming circumstance, that the whole of the appeal business of the empire, might by some of the changes to which that high office was constantly liable, be made dependent on the judgment of a person who might be utterly unable to form a judgment upon the different cases, not because he was deficient in knowledge of the law, not because he was not endowed with the highest qualities which could adorn such a functionary, but solely because he had been accustomed to direct his attention to a different branch of legal inquiry and practice from that of the equity courts, and therefore his mind was unprepared to enter upon a consideration of such subjects. The House of Lords certainly had the power to call in the common law judges, but only to obtain their advice in cases of difficulty. But no assistance could be required from the equity judges unless they were Peers, and as such had a right to be present. All appeals, then, from the Court of Chancery must be appeals to the Lord Chancellor himself. This, of itself, was a most alarming fact. If a judge in the court below was called on to re-hear a cause, as that cause would not be carried to another tribunal he might change his opinion without any impugning of his judgment, as other circumstances might have been brought to his knowledge; but in a case of appeal from his judgment to a superior court, unless it was a case of some obvious slip, it would be contrary to human nature, to expect that he should reverse his own decision. His authority being impugned before his Peers, he had every motive and every feeling to affirm his own decision. He was, in fact, to all intents and purposes, a party in the cause. If a judge had a pecuniary interest in a cause, he was not permitted to sit in judgment on it; and whilst character and high station were of any value— whilst self-love was an actuating motive in the human breast, the Lord Chancellor, sitting as the Judge of Appeal in the House of Lords would have a much stronger motive than any pecuniary one could possibly be to affirm his own decision. The ancient Grecian had appealed from Philip drunk to Philip sober; but appeals from the Court of Chancery to the House of Lords, were appeals from Philip sober to Philip drunk— appeals from a judge uninfluenced by any motive, with all his passions slumbering, to the same judge, actuated by the strongest possible motives, the passion of self-love, to support his own previous judgment. Such a system could not long be allowed to continue, and he knew, that no one deprecated it more than the present Lord Chancellor himself. The reason why he went so much into detail upon this branch of the subject was, that he might show the House what the general feeling of the country was with respect to the system now in force, and which could not continue much longer, but must inevitably be reformed; and so strongly was the necessity for this reform felt, that no professional man would conscientiously recommend an appeal to be carried to the House of Lords from the Lord Chancellor's decision, if it appeared at all probable that the same individual would preside in the House of Lords at the moment when such appeal should come on for hearing. He had, on a former oc- casion, when dwelling upon this topic, repeatedly told the House that it was hopeless to expect so much from human nature, as that a judge would pronounce in the court of appeal a decree in the very teeth of his own decision in the lower court, or to suppose that any additional arguments, however convincing, could have the effect of making him willing to reverse his own judgment. In fact, the situation of such a judge was so painful and so anomalous, that every functionary would sedulously seek to be relieved from all possibility of being placed in a similar one. But he was aware it might be urged against this mode of viewing the subject, that there were other persons sitting in the House of Lords, who, from their having formerly held the office of Lord Chancellor, were consequently well qualified to assist in judging appeals, and even to counteract any undue bias which might be betrayed by the Lord Chancellor in favour of his own decrees. He, however, could assure the House that as far as his own opinion was concerned, founded upon experience, he thought that nothing was so dangerous to the interests of justice as that persons sitting in the House of Lords, in their capacity as Peers, in their ordinary garb, divested of all the attributes and responsibilities of legal functionaries, should interfere actively in the decision of appeals. A person so circumstanced could never be considered to act under any responsibility as to the mode in which he exercised this most important office. He was not like a regular judge, clothed in all the authority of his office; it was not an act of duty that such persons performed, for no such duty was imposed upon them, and there was nothing he so much objected to as such a mode of deciding an appeal, although there would probably be no man whom he would be more desirous to accept as judge in his suit, if the same individual were to pronounce his decision in the regular exercise of his functions. He would remind the House also of the arrears of judgments in appeal cases in the House of Lords, as shown by the returns which he had moved for during two preceding Sessions of Parliament. At the end of 1839 there was an arrear of seventeen cases which had been duly heard before the House, and which were waiting for judgment, and at the end of the previous Session there were sixteen similar cases. Last year there had been an arrear of forty-two cases, all of which had been disposed of except three. This system was highly disadvantageous to the suitor, and it arose solely from the complicated nature of the Chancellor's duties. The proposition which he had to make for the purpose of obviating these evils was a very simple one. He did not consider it was right to leave all the heavy business of hearing and deciding on the appeals to the House of Lords upon the shoulders of the Lord Chancellor. Nor, as he had already intimated, did he consider it right that an appeal from the decision of the Lord Chancellor should be judged by the same individual, sitting in his capacity as president of the High Court of Appeals in the Upper House. Such a proceeding amounted, in his opinion, to a denial of justice. It was not his desire to add to or diminish from the influence of the House of Peers. Looking at that House politically as well as in its judicial capacity, he was not disposed to do any thing by which either could be impaired. He looked upon its exercise of the highest judicial functions in the realm to be essential to the maintenance of its dignity. But he was prepared to give the Lord Chancellor the highest order of assistance that it was possible to give. He would not disturb the present jurisdiction of the House; he would leave it as at present; but he would appoint two equity judges, giving them the same name as was conferred upon similar persons in the bill proposed by Lord Langdale, or he would style them the Lords' Assistants to the House of Lords, in cases of appeals. If such functionaries should be Peers, they would of course have a voice in the decision of the cases, but if they were not Peers they should have no voices, but at all times sit there as judges, give their opinions and act as such, and of course in all cases possess the weight and authority of that high office. Such an addition to the judicial establishment of the House of Lords as that which he proposed would at once have the effect of doing away with all the anomalies at present complained of; and he conceived the decisions of the Upper House would greatly increase in weight and authority. He would, moreover, add to the power at present enjoyed by the House of Lords, of calling in the common law judges to aid them in their deliberations, by giving that House the faculty of calling in the equity judges also; nor did he suppose that such a power would be objected to by the House of Commons. It could not be forgotten that many attempts had been made to improve the pre- sent system, and that some had emanated from the House of Peers itself, but even that House had as yet been unable to adopt any plan that had been proposed, He, in the year 1830, had himself proposed a plan for the creation of what he had called a Court of Equity Exchequer, to be composed of the Lord Chancellor, a new judge to be appointed, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Lord Chief Baron; but that plan was not persisted in. In the year 1833 Lord Brougham laid on the Table of the other House of Parliament a bill to appoint a chief judge in equity, and to reserve to the Lord Chancellor all his political functions, his judicial character in the House of Lords, and all his legal patronage. That bill was not approved of, and consequently dropped. In 1835, Lord Brougham brought forward a new plan more objectionable than its predecessor, by which it was proposed to refer all matters of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In 1839, the question was fully debated in the House of Lords, when the plans submitted by the present Lord Chancellor and Master of the Rolls came under consideration. The Lord Chancellor's plan was like that of 1833, which had been proposed by Lord Brougham, with the further provision that the new chief judge in equity should be the permanent president of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. That plan had, however, not been approved of by the House of Lords, and was rejected. In the plan of Lord Langdale he could not entirely concur, although he had the greatest respect for the authority and opinions of that noble and learned Judge. All these plans, therefore, having in some measure failed, he would now submit to the House the remainder of his proposals. His plan would add nothing to the House of Lords, nor would it take anything away. He would take away no part of the jurisdiction of the House of Lords, nor would he add to it; but he would endeavour, as far as it was in his power, to amend and improve it. The remaining part of his plan had reference to the Privy Council, which, as at present constituted, was liable to the most serious objection. In that body there was no fixed judges, the time of its sittings was uncertain, and no one could be sure of the same judges sitting to hear the whole of an appeal. He deprecated delay as much as any one in the administration of justice, but he equally deprecated too hasty a decision; and the Privy Council, as it stood at present, might, perhaps, be liable to that objection. There was no court which had to decide upon' more important or more varied questions, embracing every sort of law. Questions in the Judicial Committee had to be decided by the civil law of this country, by the Dutch law, the Spanish law, by the laws of the East, by the old Norman law, and by the different laws existing in our various colonies; yet, in that court, where such important, varied, and complicated questions had to be tried and decided, there was no fixed judge, no head of the court, nor were there any fixed hours of sitting. Even when the judges could attend it was impossible to know beforehand when they were to sit, and the consequence too often was, that no cases were ready or in a state to be brought on. When a case was ready they had often to send to Westminster-hall to beg the attendance of a judge to make a court, and much delay and disappointment was the result. During last year there were only eighteen days of sitting, while the appeals to be tried were of the greatest importance, involving property to a very large amount. In short, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as at present constituted, sat in a manner which was disapproved of by the whole bar. Taking this view of the matter, he proposed, in order to have a regular court in the Privy Council, and an appointed head, as well as regular and fixed sittings, that the two judges whom he proposed as assistants to the Lord Chancellor should, when they were net occupied in the House of Lords, sit in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and, if that plan were adopted, there would be sufficient time to decide on all the appeals which came before them. He would further propose, when those judges sat alone, and when any difference of opinion on any point arose between them, that the matter in dispute should stand over to be heard and decided by the Lord Chancellor. Such was the outline of the bill which he proposed to ask leave to introduce, not in opposition to the bill of his hon. and learned Friend, but in addition to that part of it which provided for the appointment of two additional judges. He had only one other observation to make. If the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were to be made really available for the administration of justice, it was necessary that the proceedings should be differently conducted from the manner in which they were conducted at present. He thought it was necessary in the House of Lords to remove the clerks from the table, so as to have the judge immediately before the bar, and without anything to interrupt his view of those who were pleading before him. In the Judicial Committee the judges ought also to be in the face of the bar, and he thought a long table ought to be used instead of a round one. These, no doubt, were minor matters, but he was inclined to think that there was more importance to be attached to the form of a court than most persons were willing to allow. He should offer no I factious opposition to the bill proposed by his hon. and learned Friend, but, on the contrary, he should give him all the assistance in his power. When his hon. and learned Friend obtained leave to bring in his bill, he (Sir E. Sugden) should then move for leave to introduce his bill, so as to have both bills before the House at once, and so as to enable hon. Members to decide upon their merits.

said, he would draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, to the evidence which had some time ago been laid before that House, with respect to the business of the Court of Chancery. By that it appeared, that out of 1,068 causes instituted in that court, 300 only had been set down for hearing, and out of those 300, only 180 had been actually heard in one year. What would the right hon. Baronet say about the disposition of the other 120 causes then remaining? It could hardly be contended for but that some of those, nay, the greater number of these, were causes of compromise. Thus, the right of the client was turned often into a right of reversion, and not a right of possession. He contended, that these 120 causes alone would be quite sufficient for a single additional judge to dispose of in each term. There was at that moment a large arrear of causes in the Court of Chancery. Under all the circumstances, he thought there had been established sufficient grounds for the appointment of an additional judge. The right hon. Gentleman opposite himself had stated that the arrear of causes at present in the Rolls Court alone amounted to 455. He thought it might even be estimated at 500, and that that would be nearer the mark. He would ask his right hon. and learned Friend what had been the standing of that arrear? They had been told the arrears of the Rolls' Court, but not that of the Vice-Chancellor's Court. His right hon. and learned Friend might have told them that the arrears of causes were standing over in the Vice-Chancellor's Court for three or four years. Was he then to be told that they were to have only one judge? When his right hon. and learned Friend, in 1830, had himself proposed to increase the number of judges, the business was not so heavy as now. He did not now think of lbs transfer of the business of the Court of Exchequer to the Court of Chancery. His right hon. Friend admitted that the present judges were overworked; that they could not do more than they were doing; yet his plan would have the effect of throwing; additional business into the Court of Chancery. Now, one of the great evils in that court of which he had to complain was the great delay which took place in it. If the judges were pressed upon in the manner which his right hon. and learned Friend said, they should have some way of getting rid of the great quantity of business thrown upon them, and how did they do that but by referring to the masters many things which they ought to decide themselves, and thus in a manner creating a number of new judges themselves. There was another great evil arising out of this want of sufficient judicial power to which he should allude, and that was, that the judges were often obliged to give their decisions in such a hasty manner, that the registrars could not take down their judgments with sufficient correctness, and the consequence of this was, that motions had frequently to be made in the court to rectify any inaccuracy that might occur. Then there was always an increasing number of motions and applications to be made, arising out of the very causes before the court. Money was to be drawn out, or it was to be lodged in court; or parties were dying, or marriage settlements were required to be made, bankruptcies or insolvencies were taking place; and all these created expense and additional delay. Now, when all these things were taken into fair consideration, it was impossible for any one to contend that two additional judges were not necessary. It had been said, that the arrear of business was decreasing at present,— that it was not, in fact, as great as it had been last Trinity Term. Now that decrease in the arrears arose from the fact, that the Lord Chancellor had been enabled to hear original causes since and during last Michaelmas Term; but he would venture to assert, that his Lordship would not be able to hear an original cause until next Trinity Term, and so the arrear must be as great, if not greater, next Trinity Term than it was last. The Vice-Chancellor had only been able to hear forty-seven causes during the year, in consequence of the great number of motions which had come before him. The immense number of railways proposed to be made of late years had been one great cause of an immense number of motions, in junctions, and several other proceedings in the Court of Chancery, and he was told that a great number more of railway bills were likely to be brought in during the present Session, which would, of course, increase considerably the business in the court. If they looked back to the historical authorities, and examined into the demand for judicial power which existed so far back as the time of Lord Hardwicke, it would seem that one judge and a half, if he might say so, or even two judges, were occupied by the business of the court then fully. Both the Master of the Rolls and the Lord Chancellor had been fully occupied in hearing original causes. In their time the average number of petitions in the year had been about 400, and the number of original causes 370. At present there were, in every year, about 2,700 petitions. If it was necessary to have one judge and a half, or two judges, then he had no hesitation whatever in saying, that they ought to have four judges now. His right hon. Friend complained of the number of judgments left in arrear by the present Lord Chancellor, notwithstanding his great labour, and his assiduous exertions. He complained that the Lord Chancellor had left in arrear sixteen judgments in the House of Lords, and twenty-three in the Court of Chancery. But how would the right hon. Gentleman remedy the evil? By separating the onerous duties at present attaching to the office of Lord Chancellor? No; he would retain the political character, and the judicial functions combined in one person, but proposed to give the Lord Chancellor two assistants in the House of Lords, who were to be present when he was able so to abstract himself from the Court of Chancery, and from his political duties, as to attend as a judge in appeal. The duties would never be efficiently performed until two regular assist- ants were given in the Court of Chancery, and the political functions of the Lord Chancellor were separated from his judicial duties. Would his right hon. Friend bring forward that plan, or would he support it in the House? If not, his proposition would in no way remedy the evil. His right hon. Friend had very properly remarked upon the inutility of appeals from the Lord Chancellor in the Court of Chancery to the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords; but he would remind his right hon. Friend ofacase—"Wright v; Atkins"—in which the Lord Chancellor had changed his opinion upon having assistance there. Now what he recommended was, that the assistance in the Court of Chancery should be regular and permanent, not casual; without that nothing effectual could be done either for the suitor or the court. These were the observations which he thought it his duty to submit to the House on the present occasion, reserving to himself full power of moving at a future time any amendments upon his right hon. Friend's proposition, as he should think proper to submit, and giving full support to the bill of his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, which he thought necessary, whether his right hon. Friend's bill passed or not.

, in reply, said, that the vast number of causes in arrear was of much less importance than the period which elapsed between the setting down and the hearing of a cause; with respect to which, the accuracy of his statement could not be controverted. It was satisfactorily proved, before the Lords' Committee last Session of Parliament, that by increasing this period the arrear of causes would be diminished instead of being increased, from people in despair abstaining from filing bills, and from deaths, insolvencies, and compromises before a hearing could take place. Extend the period to fifty years, and you would have no arrear at all, as there would then be a universal, as there is now a partial, denial of justice. He maintained the necessity of two new judges, and thought it not improbable that the exigencies of justice might soon require a greater number. It had not been disputed that in the numerous cases of an equitable demand under 100l., there is no practical remedy, and it was not pretended that such a reproach was permanently to be affixed to the administration of justice in this country. Railway controversies instead of being at an end, as was supposed by his right hon. and learned Friend, he believed were only beginning. With respect to the hearing of appeals in the House of Lords, he had probably had more experience than any other man at the bar, and he must say, that the system though liable to theoretical objections, upon the whole had worked well, and had given satisfaction to the public. He had pleaded in the House of Lords often before Lord Eldon, Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Brougham, and Lord Cottenham, and with the assistance they commanded, he must say, that their decisions, whether affirming or reversing, left no just cause of complaint to the suitors. Whether in case of reversal or affirmance, reasons were uniformly given, showing that the presiding judge had minutely attended to the case, and the arguments on both sides. He was bound to say, that the judicial functions of the House of Lords had been satisfactorily exercised. He admitted, that something must soon be done to improve the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The voluntary principle did not answer for a court of justice, and instead of sending round Westminster Hall (often in vain), to solicit the attendance of judges at the Privy Council, a judge or judges must be appointed, whose principal duty it would be to attend there at stated periods. He was much afraid, however, that the Lords assistants of his right hon. and learned Friend, would never take places either in the House of Lords or in the Privy Council. At the same time, he should offer no opposition to the bringing in of the bill, and should be glad to lend his assistance in furthering the laudable object which it had in view.

said, it might be for the convenience of the House, that he should state, that he was not about to ask Members to express any opinion which would be binding upon them in future stages of the question which he rose to bring forward. It had been pressed upon him by many Gentlemen, that it was desirable that the measure should be explained to the House with the substance of the resolution he meant to propose, for some days before they were called upon to decide upon it, and he willingly acceded to a course so proper in itself. It was his intention, therefore, then to make a statement of the grounds upon which, on the part of the Government, he, was prepared to recommend an alteration of the duties affecting a portion of the produce of our colonial possessions, and then to move— not that the House should go into a committee to agree to a resolution, which would bind them in future, but "that the House should on Monday next resolve itself into a select committee, to consider so much of the said Acts regulating the duties on rum." The object of the measure which he should propose for consideration was extremely simple— it was to equalise the duty on rum, whether the produce of our West-India Colonies, or of our possessions in India, and to obviate the anomaly, that whereas the law allowed sugar from our West-India colonies and sugar from the East to be introduced at an equal rate of duty, yet it placed a differential duty upon rum, although rum and sugar were equally the produce of the cane. His object was, to allow rum as well as sugar to be introduced from our East-Indian possessions at the same duty as that from the West Indies, and he thought the proposition in itself so just and reasonable, that our eastern possessions should be under no disadvantage compared with any other portion of the British dominions as to the produce of the sugar cane, which was the great staple article of their cultivation, that the whole burden of proof lay upon those who would resist a measure which was prima facie so just and reasonable. He would remind the House, that early in the last Session of Parliament a petition was presented, which both on account of the quarter from which it proceeded and the question of which it treated, was entitled to the greatest attention— he meant the petition from the Directors of the East-India Company, not only in their own name, but in that of the great empire whose interests were so closely connected with theirs, complaining of the injustice to which they considered that great empire subject, compared with other colonial possessions of her Majesty. On that occasion although he could not recommend to the House the adoption of the resolutions proposed by the chairman of the board of directors, and although there were some things which he thought required investigation, yet in the principle propounded — the right of India to be treated as favourably as our other colonial possessions-he was ready to give his unqualified assent; and when the hon. Gentleman said, that inquiry would be best conducted by referring the petition to a committee of the House, he said, that he should not offer any opposition on the part of the Government, but that he should consider it his duty to look into the petitions, and whatever he could with propriety recommend to the house he should be happy to do. In redemption of that pledge he brought forward this proposal. The duty now operated to the exclusion of East-India rum from the markets of this country—this was one of the points most prominently put forward by those who represented the East-India interests, and it was one of the subjects referred to committees of the Commons and the Lords. The committee of the Lords had alone as yet reported; and although in some particulars he was not supported in his present proposition by that report, yet so far as the principle was concerned he was completely supported; for the Lords, in their report, stated, that they considered it proper, on general principles, that rum from the East Indies should be placed on the same footing as rum from the West, but that there was something in the existing state of transition in the West-Indian colonies which would render it harsh to admit East-India produce on an equal footing at the present moment. ["Hear, hear!"] He could assure the hon. Gentleman who cheered him, that he had given the utmost consideration to that point; for it was not enough to lay down general principles, but we should consider the time and mode of applying them, and examine whether there was any degree of suffering any peculiar hardship— in any portion of our dominions, which required that they should not be pressed at the present moment. If he were not satisfied, not only that his proposition was just and equitable in itself on all true principles of commerce and of colonial policy, but that it would not have the effect on the West-Indian colonies which was apprehended— if he were not prepared to prove, that there never was anything in the world so exaggerated as the fears of those who had advocated the West-Indian interests before the Commons and the Lords, on this question, and to prove, that if the House agreed with him on the principle, that the measure ought lo be carried into effect, there was nothing in the present circumstances of the trade in ram, or in the present state of the West Indies, to prevent its being done, but, on the contrary, that the present moment was a very proper opportunity for doing it he (Mr. Labouchere) would not advocate it. Of course, the question of rum was very much mixed up with the question of sugar. If the effect of equalising the duties on rum would be to facilitate the produce of sugar in the East Indies, and to send it in greater quantities to the British market, there was no one who had paid any attention to the state of the sugar market for the last year, to the high price of the article, the loss to the revenue, and the very great privations endured by many on account of that high price, but must admit it to be the duty of that House to adopt any measure which would enlarge the supply of sugar— not from slave-growing states or foreign nations, but the produce of free labour, whether in the east or the west. He said, therefore, that if the argument with which he was to be opposed was, that he was giving an additional stimulus to the production of sugar in our East-Indian possessions, and thereby doing an injury to the West-India Colonies, he was confident, that the House would not listen to that argument, but would agree with him, that it would be most desirable to facilitate and increase the supply from the East Indies. But he confessed he could not believe, that such would be the result to any great extent. He wished he could believe, that the success of this proposition would be the augmentation to any large amount of the quantity of sugar produced in our East-Indian possessions. He could not think it would be so, but he mentioned it to show that any argument against his proposition must be founded, not on any general view of the principles of trade, but upon the ground that there were some special circumstances which would render it injurious to the West-Indian colonies to admit East-Indian sugar at the same rate of duty. It had been said that the rum would not be received from the West Indies, in the same manner as sugar was now received. Of course, in order to that it must be proved that there must be some sudden and great falling-off in the produce of rum in the West Indies, if his bill should be carried— that the market in this country would be suddenly affected injuriously to the West-India liquors. If the House would bear with him, he should be able to lay before it facts connected with the rum trade and the British market, to show how futile was this apprehension. There was this material difference between the supply of sugar and that of rum at this moment. It was well known that the supply of sugar, which was now admitted from the East and West Indies, was still very inadequate to the ordinary wants of this country. The consequence of course was, that the price of sugar in this country, thus admitted, was much higher than the price of sugar abroad. There was a great difference in the price between a pound of sugar admitted for consumption in this country, paying duty, and a pound of sugar from Cuba or the Brazils, coming into this country, and which must be re-exported elsewhere. Nominally, the West Indies enjoy the same monopoly in sugar as in rum ["No."] The hon. Member would see from the facts he should lay before the House that it was so. The East and West Indies between them were not able to send as much sugar to Great Britain as the market would consume; whilst the West Indies alone were able to send into this country a very considerably larger quantity of rum than the market here was able to take off. What was the consequence? Why, that the surplus was exported to the markets abroad, in the north of Germany and elsewhere. What followed from that? Of course, the price of rum, even in the English market, was governed by the price the surplus fetched in the third market, where the West-Indian rum had to contend with foreign rum. The House would see that sugar in bond varied much in price, whether it was or was not admissible for consumption in this country. But in rum in bond there was no such difference; or, if a difference, one of a very trifling kind; and East-Indian rum could be sold in bond without paying duty, at the same price as rum from the West Indies which was in bond, at the option of being exported abroad. In the last navy contract there were 100,000 gallons of rum, 50,000 of which were from the West and 50,000 from the East Indies; and it was got at precisely the same price. He mentioned this to show that there need be no apprehensions if the duties on East and West India produce were equalised. It had also been stated, that the immediate result would be a falling-off in the price of West-India produce, and an injury to the West Indies. But he could not see that that would be the case; on the contrary, he contended that what was at present a merely nominal advantage, might become a real advantage. It might be asked, if it were no loss to the West Indies, how could it be a gain to the East Indies? He admitted the importance of this argument; but, at the same time, it generally happened with those restrictions, that the inconvenience, on the one hand, was greater than the convenience on the other. There was one mode, for instance— the present rate of duties had operated unfavourably to the East Indies— he meant with regard to the finer qualities of rum. The rum that was exported from this country was almost entirely of a coarser description, and the finer qualities, chiefly produced in Jamaica, had a monopoly in the English market, and consequently, at present, there was no temptation to the East Indies to produce finer. If they would equalize the duties on East and West India rum, they would offer an inducement to the East-Indian cultivator to improve his article. This being a work of time, no one could say that it would produce injurious effects to the West Indies, and no one could say but that the East Indies were entitled to it as well as the West Indies. What he was particularly anxious to call hon. Gentlemen's attention to was, that some reasonable proof should be given that the change he was asking them to make would inflict a sudden and serious blow on the West Indies. He thought the House ought to require that proof. It ought not to be upon vain apprehensions or mere allegations that the House should be prepared to refuse that which no man could deny was, upon principle, a measure of justice to the East Indies. They ought to be assured that these were well-grounded apprehensions, on the part of the colonists, in reference to a measure which, on all general principles, was just and fair towards the East Indies; for he could not help observing, that any one who had attended to the evidence before the Houses of Parliament would see with how much heat, on both sides, the question had been discussed, and especially with what eagerness it had been urged by the East Indians. They were told that it was much felt in India, that it was a question of feeling, that there was a general idea, not only among the English population in the East Indies, but also among the native population, that in our commercial regulations we went out of our way to inflict injury and disadvantage on the East Indies. When he talked of public opinion as connected, with the East Indies, he was sure no one acquainted with the subject would say it was an improper expression, for there was an increased feeling and intelligence among the inhabitants of that country, which enabled them to discuss questions of this kind; and the House ought to see that there was a good and solid reason for refusing a boon of this description, urged upon them as it was by those who were best able to speak upon it, the court of directors in this country — they ought to see that they were going on a broad and solid foundation, in refusing an application of the kind. He would now read to the House a statement of figures, which would put hon. Members in possession of the fact that there was rum imported from the West Indies alone more than sufficient to supply the British market, and that a large surplus was annually exported to foreign countries, where it had to compete with rum from other countries, by which means the monopoly price in England was entirely destroyed. The right hon. Member quoted the following—

STATEMENT OF THE QUANTITIES OF RUM IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM, DISTINGUISHING THE IMPORTS FROM THE BRITISH WEST INDIES; ALSO OF THE QUANTITIES ON WHICH DUTY WAS PAID, AND WHICH WERE RE-EXPORTED, DURING EACH YEAR, FROM 1833 TO 1839:—
Years.	Imported.		Paid Duty.	Re-exported
	Total from all Places.	From the Brit. W. Ind.
	Galls.	Galls.	Galls.	Galls.
1833	5,146,877	5,109,975	3,492,133	1,834,206
1834	5,158,489	5,112,399	3,345,177	1,642,282
1835	5,540,170	5,453,317	3,416,966	1,678,374
1836	4,993,942	4,868,168	3,324,749	1,279,845
1837	4,613,095	4,418,350	3,184,255	1,174,273
1838	4,912,227	4,641,212	3,135,651	1,134,436
1839	5,477,669	4,021,821	2,830,263	1,155,753

Besides this, there was a quantity of rum delivered for the use of the navy, and for ships stores during the same years as follows:—

	West India.	East India.	Total.
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.
1833	800,850		800,850
1834	790,398		790,398
1835	672,661		672,661
1836	815,928		815,928
1837	707,746		707,746
1838	690,492	3,978	694,470
1839	634,470	87,998	722,468

The point he wished to establish was, that throughout the whole course of these years there never had been a year in which there had not been a much larger quantity of rum brought from the West Indies alone than could be consumed in the English market. The consequence was, that a large surplus was annually re-exported to other countries, chiefly to the north of Germany, where it met with rum from the East Indies, Cuba, and the Brazils, and was obliged to compete with it in the markets there. If his argument was correct, he was at a loss to understand upon what the assertion of the West-India colonists rested, that if there were an equalization of duties upon the East and West India rum at this moment it would cause a serious loss, and that the present state of the home market for West-India rum would be altogether altered. He now came to a part of the subject which he believed had excited the apprehensions of many, who were nevertheless perfectly satisfied to admit rum which was actually brought from the East Indies, upon equal duties, and who clearly saw the inconsistency and absurdity of saying to the East-India colonists— "We will admit your sugar to come into competition with ours in the home market, but we will not admit your rum." But, said they, although we are quite willing to take East-India rum, we must be quite sure that it is real East-India rum. What we are afraid of is, that cheap spirit made from rice, and other kinds of spirits flavoured with rum, will be introduced into this country under the cover of imported East-India rum, to the injury of the West-India interest. Persons have also endeavoured to make it appear that it would be injurious to the revenue and to the distillers of this country to admit East-India rum; for the Gentlemen who represent the West-India interest have been vigilant in getting auxiliaries, and they endeavoured to persuade the English distillers that their interests are involved in this question. A more idle bugbear never was attempted to be set up than this pretence, that rice spirit would come into this country. In the first place, he begged to say, that the bill he proposed to lay before the House was not a bill to authorise the introduction of all spirits generally from the East Indies, but only rum made from sugar grown there. And it was his intention, if the House should at a future evening adopt the resolution he should submit to them, to propose that no rum should be admitted into this country except a certificate were obtained from the importation department of the East-India Company, that it was pure rum made from the sugar cane. The chief commissioner of the customs had told him, that he should feel just as much confidence in a certificate from the officer of the East-India Company, as he should from the Custom-house. Therefore, if any hon. Gentleman was prepared to say, that the certificate would not be worth anything, it must be admitted, that he (Mr. Labouchere) had taken sufficient pains to be satisfied that it would afford the protection required. Besides, it should be borne in mind, that foreign spirit must pay 9s. duty on being imported into this country. It was not very likely that our distillers or agriculturists would be greatly injured by a foreign spirit to be brought in here that was to pay 9s. duty, which was afterwards to be made to imitate a spirit that paid a less duty. He had not received the slightest representation, nor had his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, from the distillers of this country, to induce either him or his right hon., Friend to believe that there was the least fear of that happening which Gentlemen had endeavoured to persuade the committee would result if they admitted rum, the produce of the East Indies, into this country upon equal terms with the rum of the West Indies— namely, that it would be the means of our being deluged with cheap spirits converted into a species of rum, such spirits having to pay a duty of 9s., and the importation of it to be certified as being bona fide rum, and not an inferior spirit. He might further observe, that the strict regulations which were adopted by the revenue officers to prevent the importation of any such spirit would operate as an additional precaution. As it was not intended by hon. Gentlemen on the other side to discuss this question to-night, he did not feel it necessary to make any further observations. All that he was anxious to do was to state generally the grounds upon which he made this proposition: a proposition which he sincerely believed, unless some strong reason were assigned, and some proof given on the part of the West-India interest, that its adoption would inflict a fatal blow upon them, ought, upon the ordinary principles of justice, and of sound commercial policy, to be assented to by the House. The burden of proof against its adoption, most certainly rested with those who opposed it. As he was not aware of what the nature of that proof could be, he must delay any further observations until he had heard from the hon. Gentleman who more especially advocated the West-India interest, the grounds why they were adverse to the alteration proposed. He could assure them, that if he felt he was, by the course he was now taking, inflicting an injury upon the West-India colonists, no one would be more unwilling to bring it forward than he was, but he was now anxious, that the House should adopt it, seeing, as he did, that there was growing in the East Indies a feeling of discontent with this country, which he must admit, looking at past legislation, was not wholly without ground. He was satisfied there was a public opinion forming itself even among the native population of that country, which, if they cultivated and did justice to, would prove a strong link between it and the British nation: but which, if neglected and despised, would assuredly lead to the most disastrous results. His firm conviction was, that they should cordially, voluntarily, and at once, without waiting for solicitations or petitions from any quarter, show that whatever they could do with justice to the other great interests of the empire, to reduce any inequalities and redress any grievances they might perceive to exist, as affecting the interests and well-being of the Indian population under British sway, it was their pleasure and their delight to accomplish. It was not because there were not so many Gentlemen sitting in that House connected with the East Indies as were connected with other parts of the British empire, that, therefore, that House would so far desert its duty, as not to take as deep an interest in all that concerned the feelings of the inhabitants of the East Indies, as it would in the interests of any other of the British dominions. It was on this account infinitely more than on account of the real value of the present question itself, that he should feel extremely sorry to see the House turn a deaf ear to a proposal which, he was satisfied, without inflicting any injury whatever on the West-India colonists, would give great satisfaction to our fellow subjects in the East. There were other questions connected with the petitions to which he had adverted, upon which there might be other opportunities, in the course of the Session for him to express his opinion. Some demands had been made by the East Indies, which manifestly involved questions of revenue, he meant the duty upon spices and silks and so forth; but he did not feel that this would be the proper moment to express any opinion upon such topics. There was one subject, however, which, as it could not be brought before the House as a legislative measure, depending, as it did, upon the exercise of the Queen's prerogative, he might, perhaps be permitted to take this opportunity briefly to advert to it. The directors of the East-India Company, feeling that the trade between the East Indies and the great colonies of Ceylon and Australia, was checked, and almost destroyed, by the discriminating duties imposed upon the produce of the East Indies and the produce and manufactures of Great Britain and other British dependencies, had called for redress, those duties operating prejudicially to the East Indies. The question was brought before the Committee of the House of Lords, and that Committee had recommended that these duties should at once be equalized. He must say, that if ever a real grievance were brought under the notice of Parliament, this was one. Was it to be tolerated, that the trade of the East Indies, with some of the nearest British colonies, such as Ceylon and Australia, was to be destroyed by this narrow and jealous policy of the mother country? Was so valuable a trade to be crushed by a system having no just foundation? Was it not a measure of the most obvious policy and justice, both as it regarded Ceylon and Australia, as well as the East Indies, that this state of things should be put an end to? He was therefore, happy to be able to state that it was the intention of her Majesty's Government, by an Order in Council, to do away with these discriminating duties, and to place the duty upon British produce and manufactures and the duty upon East-India produce and manufactures on the same footing. The only cause of delay in issuing this order, had been the necessity of making some alterations in the system existing in Ceylon. As soon as the duties imposed in Ceylon were regulated, her Majesty's Government were perfectly willing to concede that the markets of Ceylon and Australia should be thrown open to the produce of the East Indies, just as they were open to the produce of Great Britain and her other dependencies. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving, that the House should, on Monday next, resolve itself into a Committee, to consider so much of the Customs Duties Act (3 and 4 Will. 4) as relates to the duties on rum and rum shrub, the produce of any British possession and within the limits of the East-India Company's charter.

would not go into this subject at any length, partly because his right hon. Friend had deprecated discussion on that occasion, and partly because there was a question pending before the House that evening which might possibly disincline many hon. Members from giving that attention to a commercial subject, which it was so well qualified to command. But he must express his regret at the mode of supporting his motion which had been adopted by the right hon. Gentleman. He thought it quite unnecessary upon a measure founded on the strictest justice to argue the question as one which might possibly affect the West-Indian body, or weaken a monopoly which -had been so long maintained. The question was one of justice, it was not to be narrowed and circumscribed into a West-Indian question, or a question of any monopoly whatever. He also regretted, that the hon. Gentleman had not made his motion more extensive, and taken in a greater range of commerce. The report to which the right hon. Gentleman had alluded, opened to him a wider field than the one over which he had expatiated. There was the question of extending the commerce in sugar, which now came almost exclusively from Bengal, then was the question of allowing produce growers, in many of our East Indian possessions, to be placed on the same level with the produce of Bengal. The Mysore, too, ought to be placed upon the same footing. Those questions might all have been referred to. He would, however, reserve any further observations which he might have to make upon this subject, until the second reading of the bill. For the present he would content himself with deprecating the course of narrowing this into a mere West-Indian question, and entreating the House, when the subject came again before them, to make the measure of relief as large and comprehensive as the case required. The subject was one of vast importance, not only to the East Indies, but to Great Britain herself, and to the commerce which bound the two countries together.

had been taken by surprise by the motion. The report of the House of Lords was laid on the table last Session, and yet not a syllable had proceeded from the committee of the House of Commons in derogation of the opinion which the House of Lords had expressed. It was impossible for the public to imagine that the first subject to which the petition of the East-India Company had reference, was that which the committee of the House of Lords had declared to be, and which it was expedient at the time to adopt, He said, that those extensive interests which were concerned in the agitation of this question, interests more extensive than those which the right hon. Gentleman had adverted to, must betaken by surprise, and he preferred waiting the time when some substantive step was to be taken. All he would say, on the present occasion, was this, that it was at the present moment of the greatest possible importance— important as affecting the feelings of the inhabitants of the East Indies — important as affecting the interests of the West-Indian colonies, and important as being calculated to affect the great work which was there being carried into effect. At present they were embarked in the discussion of this question, in the absence of that complete preparation on the part of those who were disposed to join in it which he thought absolutely essential.

said, that if the right hon. Gentleman was surprised at what had been brought forward, he was taken by surprise, not because the proposition was so extensive and vast, but because it was so trifling. As far as it went he perfectly accorded with the measure, but it was only one act of justice when many were required. Not only the interests of India but the best resources of England had been injured by the restrictions which had been suffered to remain so long upon commerce. The vast powers of India to promote commerce, and to increase wealth, we by our legislation had actually limited and prevented. India had not had fair play, on the contrary, she had been cramped and confined in the exercise of those ample powers which she naturally possessed for the extension of her commerce. The revenue of India had consequently suffered to so great a degree, that it was scarcely able to meet its increased expenditure. If England had been benefited, it might be some excuse for this state of things, but England had herself been a loser by these restrictions He had therefore expected, that the right hon. Gentleman would have brought forward a much more extensive measure than was before the House. The right hon. Gentleman would find as much opposition to this paltry and trifling amendment as if he had brought the whole question before the House. The time was come when all legislation in relation to our commerce must be reconsidered. He would only at present enter his protest against this paltry way of dealing with the subject, and he hoped that the Government would think it right to adopt a larger measure, more suitable to the requirements of the country, and to the present state of India.

would not have risen, had it not been to remove an impression which the observations of the right hon. Member for Cambridge were calculated to produce. He had adverted to the report of the committee of the House of Lords, and had stated that the report of the committee of the House of Commons abstained from expressing an opinion coinciding with the Lords. Such a statement might induce the House to suppose, that the committee of the House of Commons had taken into consideration the subject matter of the report, and had determined to make no report, because they were unable to coincide with the Lords. He begged to inform the House, that the subject matter of the report was never once discussed in the committee. The committee was converted into a regular West-Indian committee, and when he argued the question of the report, he was met by this observation,—"How can you report? You have not heard half the evidence. We have witnesses on every subject—witnesses from every West-India island." He was helpless. Therefore the committee unfortunately arose without making a report, because, up to the latest hour, they were so assailed by witnesses, that it was in vain to make a report. He would make one other observation as to the extent of the measure. As far as he was able to comprehend the feelings of those connected with the West Indies, he was bound to say, that the bill would be hailed with pleasure, and received with the deepest gratitude. A more extensive measure might have been, and he hoped would ere long be introduced, but the great and crying grievance, as affecting India, and the consumer, was the question of rum.

expressed his hope, that those Gentlemen who thought this a good measure, although it did not go far enough, still would support Ministers in this good measure. They would bear in mind the difficulties with which Ministers had to contend— the opposition of a formidable and intelligent body. He must remind them, that they had gone further in practice than the House of Lords had recommended, although not in principle, as his hon. Friend very properly explained. As far as the principle went, they recommended this change, and they said in their report, which was drawn with considerable care und dexterity, that the only objection which they made to the change was, that the West Indies were in a state of transition, which induced them not to recommend an immediate alteration. When the discussion should come on every one connected with the East Indies would be prepared to show that this argument would not apply, for there was also a transit ion going on in the East Indies. As to Ceylon and Australia, Ministers would be prepared to recommend, by an order in council, that the alteration should be made. Considering all the difficulties with which they had had to contend, they had not forgotten their duty. The House of Commons would show, that they were thinking, not of the West Indies or the East Indies, but of what they owed to the community at large; the time was past and gone by when any of the old fallacies would have an effect on the House.

said, that he was not going to infringe what seemed to be the tacit agreement, nor to discuss anything which would lead to contention, but on Monday next he would call the attention of the committee to the subject of preventing East-India rum being slave produce, and also to the gross neglect of the East-India Company in following up the Act of Parliament, and in violation of that act, not producing rules and regulations for the mitigation of slavery. On general grounds he, of course, approved of the Govern meat measure.

said, that the right hon. Gentleman proposed to put East-India articles on a footing with West-India articles, to which, of course, he supposed nobody would object, but did he propose to put the produce of the West Indies on the same footing as the produce of the East Indies, in those colonies in which an advantage was given to the produce of the East Indies over those of the West Indies?

was understood to say, "Certainly, if the right hon. Gentleman referred to Canada."

quite agreed with the bon. Member for Dublin as to the absolute necessity of excluding from the equalisation any produce which might be the produce of slave land. Not only did he concur in that opinion, but he must say, that he went further; because, attached as he was to the great principles of the motion of his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, yet he thought they could not, either with justice to the West Indies, or with due regard to the great principles laid down in that House from time to time, allow the East-Indian produce to be placed upon the same footing with the produce of the West Indies, unless the whole system of slavery existing in the East Indies were altogether extinguished. It was not extinguished— it was not extirpated— it continued to flourish, not only as a domestic system of slavery, but by the import of slaves up to that very hour. In 1833 his noble Friend Lord Glenelg, when he brought in the bill respecting the Company's charter, introduced a clause putting an end to all slavery in the East Indies, and that clause passed the House, he believed, without a single dissentient. Nor was it then hastily or rashly determined upon; the most eminent men connected with the subject were consulted, and the noble Lord was informed that it would be perfectly safe, therefore the clause was carried. It was true that the Lords threw it out, but they did not do so upon principle, they wanted to have further evidence on the subject. It was his intention to ask the right hon. President of the Board of Control to produce all the papers on the subject in order to know what steps the company had taken to carry out the intentions of that House, or whether they had done anything after obtaining a full knowledge of the proceedings of that House. He thought the House would never consent to allow, in the face of all its most solemn declarations upon the subject of slavery — it never would allow those principles to be set at nought in our Eastern dominions. He would say, put the East Indies on the same footing with the West Indies in respect to slavery— let slavery be extirpated, and he would go farther than his right hon. Friend, and say, give justice to the East Indies not only in the articles of sugar and of rum, but in every other production. Fie would move for some papers, and on them he would be prepared to ground a motion for the total abolition of slavery.

stated, that the hon. Member for Beverley had assigned, as a reason why the committee had made no report, the apprehension of a still further mass of West-India evidence. Now, according to his recollection, it arose from the lateness of the Session, and a number of home manufacturers, alive to British industry, being anxious to be heard; and it was a singular fact, that in the list of evidence on which the Lords' report was founded, not one witness connected with those interests appeared to have been examined. Still, however, he had no fear but that due protection would be afforded to them in the conflict going on betwixt East and West India points at issue.

said, in bringing forward the present motion, I feel myself relieved from the necessity of trespassing on the time and attention of the House at any length, because the subject is not only not new, but I am afraid somewhat too familiar both within and without these walls, and because I cannot believe that the House will in the present Session refuse me permission to introduce a bill founded upon the same principle, and following very much the same provisions as that which, without division, I was allowed to introduce last year; which obtained the support of a majority on the second reading, which was much discussed in its various stages, and which I am almost warranted in saying, but for the lapse of time and delay, would at this moment have been the law of the land. I shall therefore very briefly remind the House of the main provisions of the measure by which I sought to correct certain abuses. It is not necessary for me now to argue them, because they have been admitted on all hands— because all parties of all political opinions considered it impossible that the registration laws, as regards Ireland, should remain as they are. There exists a universal and unanimous belief and conviction, that the abuses stated over and over again to have arisen out of the registration laws in Ireland, are great and notorious; in fact, that they have become so intolerable, that remedy and regulation are indispensable. The first point to which the provisions of the bill of last Session, which in a great measure obtained the sanction of the House, were directed, was to abolish altogether certificates as evidence of the right of voting. It was considered, that the system of certificates was itself a fertile source of abuse, and of the main evils connected with registration. I proposed in lieu of it no new and untried plan, but to transfer to Ireland the mode adopted in England, by making the right of voting depend upon an annual registration. The lists, we know, are here made out by certain specified officers, and they are revised by barristers, and having been so revised are taken as evidence beyond dispute of the right of the individual claiming. I then proposed to introduce into Ireland another portion of the English system. It was, as in English counties, that any person seeking to obtain the elective franchise should give a certain notice— neither longer nor shorter than in England, and with the same degree of publicity. The simple reason for this was, that objectors, if they thought fit, might come forward to resist the demand of any party claiming to be registered. I sought also, that the registration should not, as now, be confined to what are called quarter-session towns, nor carried on at quarter-sessions, but that the registration should be annual, as with us, and not form a portion of the business of the quarter-sessions. It was not to be carried on before the barristers who now preside in those courts, but was to form the business of a separate circuit. I did not intend to alter the authority, but to change the time, and to afford greater facilities to all parties, by including in the circuits, not only quarter-session towns, but others, and certain assigned districts, according to the discretion of the barristers. But there was also another portion of the bill I brought forward. Conceding, as I am willing to do, to the assistant barristers of Ireland, all competence to discharge their duties, I felt it utterly impossible that the decision of any one individual, however learned and conscientious, ought to be final in determining the right of an individual to exercise the elective franchise. What was the remedy I suggested? The assistant barrister now places on the register the name of any person having the right to vote; and supposing he has been in error, the sole remedy now is most inconvenient, expensive, uncertain— that universally deprecated remedy, a Committee of the House of Commons, and then only in case of a petition after a contested election. I believe, that on every side it was considered desirable to withdraw this highly objectionable remedy. But if you withdraw this, the only existing appeal, it follows almost as a matter of course that you must substitute some other more proper, more impartial, more learned and more certain tribunal by which a remedy can be immediately applied, which would not be costly, and which would not compel the parties to wait until the occurrence of a contested election. I take it to be universally admitted, that some appeal from the assistant-barristers ought to exist. I found a provision in the law, that in case of rejection, the party rejected might go before a judge of assize; and when this question was discussed last year, many arguments were used, to some of which I was not insensible, with reference to the inconvenience and expense to parties in going before a judge of assize. With a view to these arguments, I anxiously endeavoured to find some court equally learned, equally impartial, equally free from suspicion, which at the same time would afford a cheaper remedy; but I confess that my search was vain. I have heard no suggestion of any court to be substituted for that of the judge of assize, which combined advantages to an equal extent, and free from as many inconveniences. Therefore I still propose that the appeal should be to the judge of assize; but that that appeal, instead of being one-sided only in cases of rejection, should be extended also to cases of admission. But in taking this course, I am anxious to afford some protection against vexatious appeals; and I know of no other mode of giving protection but by enabling the judge of assize to use his discretion in imposing limited costs in the event of an appeal on either side being found vexatious and void of any solid foundation. A serious objection was taken, that a person claiming the franchise ought not to be saddled with costs; but I confess I could see no valid ground for that objection. The two parties, the claimant and the objector, are both discharging a public duty: one insists upon his title to the franchise, and the other comes forward on behalf of the public to prevent a legitimate claimant of that right from being deprived of his right. I see no reason why one side should be favoured more than the other, and I feel it necessary that the check arising from costs should be applied equally to the claimant and to the objector. But I was struck with one point, which, however, had not escaped my notice when I originally introduced the bill. It was alleged that it was extremely hard that a person who had obtained the sanction of the assistant barrister for his right to vote, should afterwards be subject to costs, because he affirmed the decision of the barrister. The answer which occurred to my mind was, that costs were only to be awarded by the judge when it appeared that the case was frivolous and vexatious. No judge would give costs against a claimant or an objector, if he came forward not only with a plausible, but a substantial ground for overthrowing or affirming the previous decision; but that there may be no difficulty on the subject, I am perfectly prepared, in the bill I wish to introduce, to place some limitation on the subject of costs, and that limitation is, that the party who comes forward to support the decision of the court below shall not be liable to costs in an appeal to the judge of assize. If that alteration seems to remove any ground for complaining of hardship, I shall be very ready to introduce such a provision. We must remember that we do not now stand on precisely the same footing as last year, and I must be permitted to direct the attention of the House to a society formed since the conclusion of the Session. It includes among its members a great number of names of persons for whom I entertain a sincere respect, and for some of whom I feel strong regard. I find among them Lord Charlemont, Lord Gosford, (the noble Mover of the Address on the first day of our meeting), the hon. Member for Armagh, Lord Clements, Mr. Sharman Crawford, and many other gentlemen, of whom I can only speak with respect. That society was formed for the purpose of entering into the details of the registration question, for the purpose of sifting it to the bottom, establishing grounds of objection, if they could be found, to my bill, and of supporting the views of Government on the subject. I speak of the Liberal Association of Ulster, warm friends of the present Ministers, while at the same time they deprecate the agitation of the question of the repeal of the union. Where I differ from them I wish to speak of their opinions with all respect, and where I agree with them I hope I may consider them valuable supporters. I am not to be told that these are men who are extremely illi- beral— that they profess strong Tory doctrines, because having given some of their names, the House will be aware that such is not the fact. They state in their report that they are in favour of an indefinite extension of the franchise—that they are for vote by ballot, and for shortening the duration of Parliaments; therefore, on points on which I have the good fortune of their concurrence, it cannot be urged as a ground of objection that they are in favour of an illiberal policy. What, then, are the points on which we concur, and what those upon which we differ? Here let me observe that I am anxious to avoid all irritating topics — that I am most desirous of excluding angry feelings from the discussion of this question, but I am desirous also of showing and proving that on the main grounds which were last year made the foundation of imputation and personal acrimony against me, I have, without exception, the concurrence of the Liberal Association of Ulster. My first proposal was to abolish certificates, and the Liberal Association of Ulster express their decided conviction that certificates ought to be abolished. I proposed that the registration should be superintended by the assistant-barristers, and they recommend that precisely that course should be adopted. I proposed that in all cases of claim notice should be given, and notice having been given, that the party should, by himself or by other evidence, substantiate his right to vote. The Liberal Association of Ulster prefers the system pursued in English counties requiring public notice to be given; that body also prefers that the claimant, before he is placed on the register, should appear, and, by his own or other evidence, establish his claim to exercise the franchise. I shall take the liberty of quoting one or two paragraphs from the report of the committee of the Liberal Association of Ulster, because they are strong in favour of the plan I recommend. It was prepared with much care and diligence, and it was read to the general committee on the 19th and 20th of November, 1840, Lord Gosford in the chair. The whole subject is there considered in detail, and the report was printed as recommended by the committee. I think no point was more attacked last year than that of the double appeal to the judges, and on this subject what state the committee of the Liberal Association of Ulster? The committee stated that they considered it objectionable in the first instance that there should be no means of appeal, except to a Committee of the House of Commons. They could not approve of the English system, which gave no redress either to the claimant, or the objector, against the erroneous opinions of the revising barrister, nor would they approve of the Irish system which confined the right of appeal to the rejected claimant. They, therefore, recommended the formation of a court of appeal, and that a right of appeal upon points of law (matters of fact being determined) should be conferred both on the claimant and on the objector; and further, that the court of appeal should be so constituted that the appellants should have costs at the discretion of the court. Here, then, are three of the main provisions of my bill approved of. The Ulster Association consider it desirable to avoid the necessity of a reference to a Committee of the House of Commons. They agree that no amendment will be perfect unless an appeal tribunal be constituted, and if we do constitute an appeal tribunal, they state that it will be only just that the appeal should lie both ways, and they say that the Irish system is objectionable, because the right of appeal is given only one way, and that the English system is objectionable, because it gives the right neither one way nor the other I have thus enumerated the points on which I agree with this committee out of the House. We agree upon the abolition of certificates— we agree upon the construction of the court of registry before the assistant-barrister— we agree that there should be an appeal from the decisions of the revising barrister to an appeal tribunal, and that the appeal should lie both ways as a matter of course. We have, then, to all these main points of my bill the assent of the Liberal Association of the province of Ulster. What are the points in which we differ? I have endeavoured to show how much our ground of difference has been narrowed in the present Session. I hope that these differences are a fair matter for calm and temperate discussion, and I trust that they will not cause the imputation to be thrown upon me that I am secretly and coverely destroying the franchise, when I am only desirous of providing a fair and efficient system of registration. The first point of difference between us is, whether the registration should be annual, as it is in England; or quarterly, as it is in Ireland. Upon this point, I confess that I have no hesitation in saying that I have formed a strong opinion that an annual registration is more desirable, and I therefore propose that the registration should be annual and not quarterly. I do not now wish to argue these objections: I only wish to point out what are the topics which are most likely to be discussed. This point, however, was discussed last year. I do not now stand here as the representative of my own opinion alone upon the question— a majority of the House of Commons during the last year upon a division affirmed the opinion, that annual registration was preferable to quarterly. Now, with regard to the form in which the notices of claim should be given; very much has been said on this point. I have carefully looked over the form, and I have endeavoured, as far as I could, consistently with the ends of justice, to simplify it. But I must absolutely require, that certain particulars should be produced, if upon these particulars is to rest the right of a person to be registered, or of an objecter to insist on the removal. Then, as to costs; it is proposed by the Ulster Association, that, in all cases costs should be given wherever the decision is in favour of the party claiming the franchise; it is not limited to objections that may be merely frivolous or vexatious, but it an objection fail, however well-founded it may have been thought by the objector, and from whatever cause it may have failed, it is to be the imperative duty of the magistrate to give the claimant pecuniary costs; not because the objection is frivolous or vexatious, but because it turns out that the objector has formed an erroneous opinion of the law. At the same time, however frivolous or unfounded the claim may be, the claimant may give notice to be registered either at one registration, or at a dozen; however frivolous or ridiculous the claim may he, the claimant is not to be visited with any of the costs to which he has put the objector, who has been obliged to appear over and over again to prove the same case, although the same objector is to be saddled with costs, if he fail, upon any single occasion, to sustain his proofs. Now, I proposed last year that in either case— and my opinion remains unchanged— the claimant or the objector may be fined in costs, not exceeding in the whole 5l., or not exceeding the amount that either party may be actually put to, if less than that sum, if in the opinion of the judge either party shall have given a frivolous or vexatious claim or objection. That provision, I confess, appears to me to be more fair than the proposal of the Ulster Association. There is another important point to which, as it was raised last year, and as it caused a division, I wish to draw the attention of the House, particularly as in regard to this, as upon all others, I am anxious to meet the views and the wishes of the House. The right hon. Gentleman, the Attorney-general for Ireland (Mr. Pigot) upon the very first clause of the bill, moved to insert certain words, by way of an amendment to the clause. The first clause declared, that from and after the first day of November, 1841, no person should have the right of voting for any place unless registered according to the provisions of the bill. By the bill, persons holding certificates under the present law were not to be called upon again to appear and substantiate their right, but they might be objected to. The learned Gentleman, the Attorney-general, thought that the object of this provision, the protection of the existing voter, should be carried to a greater extent; perhaps he meant to extend it to all persons who should at any time obtain a place upon the register, for he moved to insert these words, that—

"In making the register of votes for any county, city, town, or borough, under the provisions of this Act, the name of every person who, when such register shall be made, shall be registered as a voter for such county, city, town, or borough, shall be placed and retained upon such register, so long as his right of voting as such registered elector would continue under the present law, unless he shall have lost his qualification since he was so registered, or unless he shall have been personally disqualified as such voter or have died; or unless his registry was effected by fraudulent Personation."

This amendment was carried by a majority, certainly not a large majority, of 296 to 289. As on the one hand I have come forward to maintain the views of the majority of the House, when they agree with myself, so I am ready, as far as I can do so consistently with the duty which I feel, to bow to the sense of the House, even though expressed by no largo majority, when it is opposed to my own wishes and my own views; but to the extent of what I conceive to be the object of this amendment I cannot concede. By the terms that a party shall be free from objection during the time that he would be entitled under the present law, I know not whether it were the intention of the learned Gentleman, that all parties who should have obtained certificates under the law as it now stands, shall be entitled to vote during the eight years for which the certificates shall have been granted, or whether it were his intention to carry the protection still further, and say, that no one who shall be hereafter registered shall be objected to except in case of some disqualification arising subsequently to the registration. So far as the first provision goes, I can see a good ground for the distinction, that those who have been registered under the law as it now stands, shall have a right to vote for the eight years of their certificates. I am prepared to admit the apparent hardship of subjecting them to re-examination, although at the same time we confer upon them the right for life, unless they shall be rejected on objection; but if the learned gentleman goes so far as to say, that the voter when once registered shall not be liable to be removed for any disqualification which may have existed at the time of registration, but which may not have been urged in the first instance, I cannot conceive why, because upon a had foundation, a party has rested a fraudulent vote, and has been once placed upon the register, he should be immoveable. The evils of the present system would be aggravated, for be would remain on the register for the term of his natural life, not because he had ever proved that he had possessed the right to vote, or that it might not be objected that he never had the right, but because, if he were objected to, he might turn round upon the objector, and answer, "True it is that I possess no right to vote, and that I never did, but I defy you to prove that the circumstances have altered since I first registered; you ought to have raised the objection when I was first put on I do not deny, nay I concede to you, that I had no right then, I have no right now, but, nevertheless, I defy you to strike me off." That is not an extreme case. I am informed, that it has occurred in Scotland, where the system recommended for Ireland is in existence, where I am informed parties are on the register without a foot of land in the country—who, as all the world know, have not now a foot of land in the country —who, as all the world know, never had a foot of land in the country; and, as they never had any qualification, there could be no change of circumstances since they were registered, so they are now entitled to vote. It is very easy to say, "Yes, but we call upon the voter to prove his claim in the first instance;" one story is good, till another is told. If the person claims in a county where parties are not very closely balanced, or in which there has not been any contest, we all know that the register is not very closely watched; and that, when there is a prospect of a contest, the parties find that there are numbers of bad votes on the register, the wonder is how they ever got there; but the wonder will be still greater if the Legislature, in its wisdom, shall assist in their retention. All these bad votes will be swept away if the right of objection shall be annual as it is in England. I do not mean to give the right of objection even to the same extent that it is in England, for I propose, for the protection of the voter who is once on the register, that he shall remain so for life, unless some other party shall prove, not only a primâ facie case, but an absolute disqualification to the party registered being upon the register, and that the objector not establishing his proof, and appearing to have given his notice frivolously, shall be liable to costs. To this extent I am perfectly willing to give protection to the voter; but I cannot carry the protection so far as to say that under no circumstances shall he be liable to objection, unless for matters that have arisen since his registration. Still I am willing to bow to the decision of the House as expressed on the motion of the right hon. Gentleman, if it be interpreted as applying only to persons who, under the existing law, have obtained certificates, having a right to vote for eight years; and with his limitation, I am willing that these parties should remain on the register for the term their certificates now have to run, provided that at the expiration of that term they shall again come forward in the same manner as new voters to be re-registered. I hope, therefore, that I have been able to show that the grounds of our differences are narrowed to the forms of the notice of objection and of claim, to the question whether the registration shall be annual or quarterly—the House has already decided in favour of its being annual; and to the question whether the voter shall be protected against all future investigation of his original title, and whether the objector shall be liable to costs under all circumstances of failure. On another point I shall be enabled, without any sacrifice of principle, to remove an objection which has been made to my bill —I allude to the notice of objection to be given to the party. In my notice, I have followed the English plan; I have copied the notice from the English bill. The words simply are,

"Take notice that I object to your name being retained on the register of voters for the county of—,"

That is the English law at the present moment; but in what I now propose I do not take this general notice of objection to a party who has, in the first instance, established his right to vote: I think, then, that the party objecting should state on the face of his notice the nature of the objection, that the party who shall appear to defend his right, if he shall think fit so to do, may be enabled to know the ground on which he will be assailed. I believe that the noble Lord, the Secretary for the Colonies, in an English bill which he introduced last Session, to a certain extent proposed that the grounds of objection should be specified in the notice, the exact form may be subject for discussion; but the principle of giving the specific grounds of objections, I am prepared to admit. And now, Sir, I have literally stated all the differences between me and the Liberal Association. I adhere to the judges of assize as the tribunal to which the appeal should go; but if any hon. Gentleman will show me any tribunal equally impartial, equally able, and less expensive, that tribunal I shall be ready to take; but knowing of none such, I have taken that which found existing, to which by the law there was an appeal in one case, and which I have extended to both claim and objection; and a tribunal to which it will be recollected Mr. Justice Perrin, then Mr. Perrin, did in this House propose that a double appeal should be given. To another point, it is necessary that I should take this opportunity of adverting, not because it is in the bill, but because it forms no part of the bill. The hon. and learned Gentleman, the Member for Dublin, has given notice that, in case I should not declare his intention to introduce a clause to define the franchise, he will divide the House on the motion for leave to bring in my bill. Now, Sir, I have understood that before I came into the House, the hon. and learned Gentleman withdrew that notice, and stated that he would offer no objection to the introduction of the bill, but that he would move the adjournment of the discussion to a future day. I wish, therefore, to state distinctly, that it is not my intention to introduce into this bill any clause defining the parliamentary franchise in Ireland. I stated in the House last year that I was aware of the difficulties and of the inconveniences which have arisen in consequence of the doubts thrown upon the franchise; but I stated also that I was aware of the difficulties I should have to encounter if I added the question of the franchise to a subject which is already sufficiently difficult in itself— the question of the registration; and after the fullest consideration, I am still of the opinion that if I wish to carry this bill, or if I wish to carry any bill, I must separate the two subjects. In the course of the last Session the propriety and the prudence of that determination received the approval of the Members of her Majesty's Government themselves, who introduced not one bill embracing both, but brought forward one bill to amend the registration, but reserved the franchise discussion for the consideration of the House in a separate bill. I have not only the authority of the learned Gentleman and of her Majesty's Government, but also of the House itself, for not mixing the registration with the franchise. The matter was introduced, it was argued, it was decided by the House of Commons itself in the last Session, on the motion of the hon. Member for Dublin himself, that it be an instruction to the committee, and that they have the power of defining the right of voting. After discussion, and on a division, the House agreed with me. Of her Majesty's Ministers, the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies, the noble Lord the Secretary for Ireland, the Attorney-general, and many of her Majesty's Government voting with me, affirming the prudence of the course I had adopted, of not introducing the franchise question into a bill for registration. The number voting in favour of the instruction was 162, and the number declaring that it was inexpedient that the two questions should be mixed being 311, leaving a majority of nearly two to one in favour of the declaration that it is inexpedient to mix the two. I am far from being unaware of the inconveniences and difficulties arising from the decisions of the judges upon the franchise of late years. I regret those difficulties as much as any hon. Member; I regret that the small number of dissentient judges should not have considered themselves, consistently with their oaths, bound by the opinion of a majority of the judges upon a matter that had been fully considered; but with regard to those inconveniences, and to the decisions of the judges — not meaning to impute any but the most conscientious motives to the minority for adhering to their opinion consistently with their oaths— I am convinced that in the present state of the House, and in the present state of parties, if I were to introduce a clause defining the franchise, I should be absolutely and entirely debarred, not only from passing this bill, but any bill, in this or any future Session. If I were to introduce a clause defining the franchise as I believe to be right, I could not proceed: and I am sure that if hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House were to introduce into a bill for registration defining the franchise in any other way than in accordance with that which has hitherto been construed as the law, they would equally fail. I confess, therefore, that I do flinch from the difficulty of dealing with the question of the franchise; for if I did, I might be compelled to postpone a measure already sufficiently surrounded with difficulty. I should but introduce an infinity of additional argument. The Session would pass away as the last did, by the mere efflux of time it would end. I should leave the evils irremediable and unremedied; the abuses of the present system would continue for another year, although they have been admitted in their full extent by all sides of the House, and by men of every shade of political opinion. I, adhering, then, to my first opinion, shall be most willing to discuss the provisions of this bill in the most friendly temper and spirit; I shall respect the arguments of such as may seek to controvert me by argument; I shall readily bow to the decision of the House, if it be not adverse to any great principle of my measure; and, with this declaration, I conclude by moving for leave to bring in a bill to amend the laws relating to the registration of voters in Ireland.

My noble Friend has shown that he is so much enamoured of the subject to which he devoted so large a portion of his energy in the last Session of Parliament, that he has not been enabled to resist the temptation, although her Majesty's Ministers have given notice, in the very first week of the Session, of their intention to being forward a bill upon this subject, yet my noble Friend is so enamoured of his success, and so pleased with the reception which his project obtained in the last Session— so delighted with the majorities he obtained — so charmed with carrying twelve clauses in the course of four months, that determined not to be forestalled this year, he rejoices in the pleasure of having the first word. I am not disposed, Sir, to dispute with him that priority. The extremely temperate and moderate observations with which he has introduced his motion, would not tempt me to do so, and I hone that I should not fail in courtesy towards any Member in this House, and certainly not towards the noble Lord. Considering then that the bill of last Session undoubtedly obtained possession of the House, that it met with what even the noble Lord himself would deem unexpected success, that it drew overflowing Houses, and brought down overwhelming plaudits, I am not now disposed to oppose the motion of the noble Lord for leave to bring in this bill; and I have no doubt that the noble Lord, and that those who support him, will be disposed to make the same concession to me when I shall, on Thursday, move for leave to bring in the measure of the Government. Believing, that I shall then have the fullest opportunity of explaining the views of her Majesty's Government on the subject of registration in Ireland, I do not consider it necessary upon the present occasion to enter into any observations upon that subject. There are only two things arising out of the speech of the noble Lord which I will mention for the sake of obviating any misunderstanding. From the statement of the noble Lord I collect, that although he admits of some alterations and amendments, the main features of his present bill are the same as in the bill of last year. He includes the provision, that the voter should be annually called upon to prove his right to be upon the register, and also the appeal to a judge of assize, both ways, from the decision of the assistant barrister; and he fortifies himself by a coincidence of opinion which he discovers in these particulars with the Liberal Association of Ulster, from the report of whose proceedings, the noble Lord has largely quoted. But I imagine, that upon a closer examination, it will appear, that between the opinions of the noble Lord, and the recorded sentiments of the Ulster Association, there will be by no means found that similarity of view upon which the noble Lord relies. The Association of Ulster do not recommend an appeal both ways, upon matters of fact, as well as upon matters of law; and, above all, they do not recommend a double appeal, without a clear definition of the franchise. If it should so happen that the noble Lord is prepared to take the recommendations of the association of Ulster, there will be less ground of difficulty and dispute between us than we might have been led to suppose. The one other point I wish to observe, is, that in conformity with the notice which I gave in the early part of the evening, I shall, in the measure which I shall propose on Thursday, ask the House to concur in a bill to determine the qualification as well as the mode of registering the voter, and I hope, that upon that occasion, I shall have it in my power to show to the I House, and to show to the noble Lord, in perfect consistency with what I have al-i ways said and done before upon this branch of the subject, that we cannot expect any alteration to be satisfactorily complete, not even that which the noble Lord has recommended, and especially not the appointment of any new appellate tribunal, without, in the first instance, defining the franchise. Having slated thus much by way of precaution, and reserving to myself and to my colleagues the fullest right to object to and oppose the noble Lord's measure, I shall not now divide against leave being given to bring in his bill.

I am in no way bound by any compromise between my noble Friend and the noble Lord. I stand here belonging to no party upon this question. I stand here representing the people of Ireland. I think that the House and the country ought to be somewhat surprised that the noble Lord, in a prepared speech which he had delivered, to make out the strongest case for himself, in order to gain what he said was his end—the prevention of the multiplication of fraudulent voters in Ireland—that was the noble Lord's object —yet that the noble Lord who alleged this has not given the House any evidence, has not adduced any instance, of the wholesale multiplication of votes. The noble Lord did not give any statistics of Irish counties; he did not say that in a county having only 100,000 inhabitants there were 2.5,000 voters, or 10,000, or 4,000; he did not contrast the overwhelming number of the Irish people who are entitled to the franchise, with the aggregate number of voters; that would have been the way fairly to investigate the subject. The county of Cork for instance has 713,000 inhabitants; there has been a multiplicity of fraudulent voters put upon the register. How many are there? There are 713,000 inhabitants, there are 3,800 voters. The utmost number that can vote is 3,800. Does the noble Lord grudge 3,800 voters to 713,000 inhabitants? Is that his plan? Is this his enormous multiplication of fraudulent votes? Oh, remedy it. Yes, there is an overwhelming amount; there must be fraud; there must be "villainous perjury" that was the word the noble Lord used last year. [No, no!] Perhaps the noble Lord did not say so. The report is not to be believed, then; somebody else said so for him. What is meant by interrupting me? I had beastly bellowings last year— are they to be renewed now? I was proceeding to show what is the state of the registration. The aggregate population of Wales is 710,000; Wales has upwards of 30,000 voters. The population of Cork is larger than Wales, Cork has not more than 3,800 voters, and that is the system of registration that is to be closely watched over. Make the comparison. Tell me after that, whether there is a union, between the two countries. I'll not mock you by asking. I call the attention of the House to what has been the noble Lord's sole care by day, sole thought by night; it ends in a miserable abortion. He has completely swindled the people of Ireland out of their votes by the kind of franchise he gave, because it was he who gave it. The mode of registration in Ireland is complained of. To be sure it is. Was not he the author of it? He resisted me when I asked to have the English system introduced. His plan has worked badly. Why? Because we want a definition of the franchise. The moment you define the franchise, that moment you take away two-thirds of the difficulty. Too few now are admitted to that franchise. I shall have an opportunity, and I will go through the counties, and will show the contraction since 1832–33. There were then not registered in Ireland 5 per cent, of the male adult population; in England there were registered 20 per cent. The registry in England has since increased 10 per cent. When we have the returns from Ireland, and they ought to have been sooner produced, they will give a diminution of 20 per cent. Probably, as has been suggested to me by a Friend near me, of 30 per cent. Under such circumstances, the noble Lord presses forward with a dexterity that is more conspicuous for its cunning than its fairness. The noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies, gave notice of a bill to amend the English system of registration, which would have been brought on yesterday, except for the accident of their being no House. The noble Lord the Secretary for Ireland has given notice of a bill to amend the registration in Ireland. That stands in the notice paper for to-morrow. The noble Lord had some gentlemen lurching for him, and the moment they saw the probability of those bills being brought forward, they anticipated them. Why not have given the House and the country fair play, in seeing what the measures were which were to be proposed by the Ministers of the Crown? That would not answer the purpose of the noble Lord. He had his pocket pistol— the report of the proceedings of the Ulster Association, which he used in favour of his own measure. How little did that association know that they were to be met with a total want of candour? They offered suggestions, which I do not think were well considered, and the noble Lord being inimical to the extension of the franchise, threw over the points in reference to the amelioration, as he called it, of the franchise, and met their candour with the full extent of his dexterity. I think that the inhabitants of Ulster did not know the noble Lord quite so well as the inhabitants of other parts of Ireland do, or they would not have enabled him to take advantage of their simplicity. I think it was highly improper to have brought forward the motion in the manner in which it has been placed before the House. We are entitled to have the Government measure fairly before the House, but the noble Lord obstructs the fair consideration of that proposition by the introduction of his bill. For my own part, if I am at all displeased, or feel sorry for any view of the case, it is for the multitudinous attendance on the other side of the House to night. I congratulate the noble Lord on the enthusiasm of his followers, for so he called their attachment last Session. [Cheers.] I am glad that I promoted that shout, because it will mark still better to the people of Ireland how little they have to expect. They must rely on themselves and their own exertions, and every act and every exertion to lessen their franchise is a new argument to show that the connection between the two countries is not founded in justice. I think the House should pause, and should not allow the noble Lord to bring in his bill until that of the Government has been laid upon the Table; and I protest against the vexation produced by the measure of the noble Lord, and demand of the House that if we are to be bound by the union, they will give us the full benefit of it. I say, let them not give us the worst part only of the English registration, but give it to us as it is; and, whether for good or for bad, I am ready to stand by the English system, considering that the union is a binding measure, and that we are entitled under it to English rights and English liberties. I say, do not suffer the noble Lord's vexatious legislation to affect one part of the country and not another. Again I ask, why he does not bring in a bill for amending the system of registration in England? Is not that complained of; and is it not nearer home? Oh! no; the object of the noble Lord is not to amend the registration, but to give a blow to the liberties of Ireland. I am determined to meet him foot to loot, and I move that this debate be adjourned until after the 4th instant.

thought that the amendment proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Dublin was fully justified by the course which had been taken by the noble Lord, because he deemed that course to be factious. As a matter of prudence, however, he recommended the hon. and learned Member not to press his motion to a division. Seeing the array of hon. Members opposite, he thought it would answer no useful purpose to divide the House, and he besides deemed it of the highest importance that a question of this magnitude and consequence should be discussed with as much calmness as possible.

said, I confess that my objections to the measure of the noble Lord of last year have been very little diminished by the statement which he has made upon the subject of his measure of the present Session. It seems to me that, with the exception of some particulars, the main features of the bill are the same, and that they will produce the same calamitous consequences which it appeared to me would result from the bill of last year. I must own, although the noble Lord stated the case very fairly, and I do not mean to impute to him anything but a desire to reform the abuses of Irish registration— it is certainly somewhat singular, considering the abuses which exist in the mode of registration and of voting, and the practice of elections, in England, Scotland and Ireland, and upon one of which in Scotland the noble Lord dwelt in the course of his speech this evening, that he should pass by and neglect all these, and that it should be the abuses which exist in Ireland alone, which should have called for his especial attention, and should make him so anxious, at the very first moment of the Session, to bring a measure before the House. I must say also, that although there may be many abuses in the system of registration in Ireland, although I cannot deny the statements which have been made as well on this as on the other side of the House, yet that I do view with considerable jealousy and alarm a measure to reform those abuses, which acts entirely by way of restriction. It is to be remembered that the bill of 1829, brought in as a counterpoise to the Roman Catholic claims, was in itself a restrictive measure of disqualification; and it is to be recollected that the noble Lord in 1832, with a view to remedying the existing abuses, brought in a bill granting such additional franchise as he thought necessary, but not altering the restrictions of 1829. And now, after those two measures, comes again a measure of restriction, narrowing the franchise originally granted fifty years ago to the whole people of Ireland. Now, it may or may not be quite proper to make this restriction upon the franchise, and to introduce a bill for the purpose; but it certainly behaves the House to look most narrowly into the provisions of the bill, and so ascertain the general effect of them when taken together. I remember my noble Friend, the late Lord Durham, in discussing some of the restrictions on the franchise of England, which he thought too numerous, and apt to be vexatious, said, by way of illustration, "You may say that every 10l. householder shall have a vote, but you may also say that he shall only have such vote on condition of his being able to construe the first book of Homer." This is merely an illustration of the manner in which you may limit what at first would appear a large and liberal measure, and it equally applies to the present question. Now the noble Lord who has introduced this measure proposes to retain the franchise as it exists according to law, but he also proposes that that franchise shall be ultimately determined by a court of law. The ordinary practice, however, of courts of law, according to ray observation (and I say this without wishing to impute to the judges any political bias or partiality), but the ordinary practice and tendency of courts of law, and of the highest and most learned amongst them, is generally to restrict the franchise by technical definitions and distinctions which exist either by the common law or the statute law. Thus, with regard to the largest words and those of the most extended meaning in our charters, such as the words "community," "burgesses," and, as is the case of the "community" of the city of Bath, their meaning has been restricted in the course of time to mean the elective rights of some twelve or thirteen people only. Now, if we are to part with all control in this matter— to pass a bill with the consent of the other House of Parliament, and which can never be repealed without the consent of that House— by which the whole franchise is in future to be denned and settled by the judgments of a court of law, and upon the doctrine of settling the law according to the opinion of a majority of the judges, I can very well imagine that in a short time that, franchise would be further limited, until it came to be enjoyed by a very small number of persons. It is very well to say, when a man is not legally entitled to vote, because he has not the estate which the law requires he should have in order to entitle him to vote, and when he has, therefore, been fraudulently placed on the register, that you should provide, by legislative and statutory enactments, that he should no longer continue to hold such a vote; but you should also take care that in raising up a barrier against the fraudulent voter, that you do not also at the same time raise up one against the real and honest voter. Now there is many a voter in Ireland, not happening to be dependent upon or connected with any strong, wealthy, or powerful landlord, but having his own independent property, who. on reading the acts of 1829 and 1832, conceives himself to have a vote, and goes to the assistant barrister, who allows his claim. He is however, appealed against, and he is then put to considerable expense in going before the judge of assize, who may happen to be one of those judges whose opinion is favourable to the nature of the qualification on which his claim is based. So far all would be well. But next year the same process is repeated, and the assistant-barrister may, on this second occasion, still entertain his claim and allow him his vote. On being appealed against this time, however, he may find at the assize-town a judge whose opinion is that he has no vote, and after considerable loss he finds himself deprived of the power of voting. What is the effect of these facts upon others? The neighbours of the voter in question, when they gee that a man well known to have suffi- cient properly to entitle him to vote has been caused much trouble and loss of time, and put to considerable expense, by being sent before three or perhaps six, seven, or eight judges, whose decisions have only led to the loss of his vote, his time, his money, and his trouble. These neighbours, although their votes might be excellent in law, and exactly the description of votes which you designed by your law to protect, would become discouraged, and abstain altogether from enforcing their claims. This, I fear, would be the effect of some of the provisions of the noble Lord's bill, and although I do not say that certain cases of fraud do not exist which ought to be corrected, yet I say that you effect nothing by that bill which you might not equally well effect by more simple machinery; and that if you do mean to settle the whole question, I believe it will be impossible to settle it thoroughly, and, above all, to do justice to the people of Ireland, unless you take into your consideration the question of the franchise. Now is it not a great evil that there should be a Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas establishing the franchise according to one view of the law, and a Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer establishing it according to another? And when the noble Lord, entirely pretermitting the case of England and Scotland, has given his whole attention to Ireland, is it too much to ask that he should, in some other bill, if not in this, but especially after what we heard last Session from the hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Lucas), who so strongly stated the evils of which I now complain; is it too much, I say, to ask the noble Lord to include the subject of the franchise in his consideration of the question? The noble Lord said last year, that the two questions might very well be separated. I agree with him that it may be a very right course to pursue; it was the course we ourselves pursued last year. But what I say is that you ought not to assume that you are remedying all evils, that you are doing all that is required to be done; whereas the only thing you are doing is to set up a very complex and incomplete system of registration, which will only narrow the franchise to those only who feel the power of a protector who are prepared, as dependents and connections, to go before the registration courts, assured that their costs will be paid, and which will leave no franchise for those who are prudent enough to take care not to ruin their families for the sake of attaining that which you will have made as difficult of attainment as if they had no claim on the representation of Ireland whatsoever. With regard to the immediate question before the House, I think the noble Lord is quite justified in the course he has taken to-night. If he chose to bring the measure forward, he had a perfect right, according to the forms of Parliament, to give notice of his intention. After the sanction which the House gave to the general principle of the bill last year, I do not think there is any parliamentary ground for opposing his bringing it in, and I shall therefore vote for the motion of the noble Lord, and against any motion in opposition to it.

wished to say a few words merely in reference to the observation which the noble Lord (Russell) had made respecting himself. He certainly did state last year, and was ready to state again, that he did think it was desirable for all parties in Ireland, that the truth of the franchise in that country should be placed on some more satisfactory basis than the mere oath of the voter. But if the noble Lord imagined that he had intended to express an opinion that his noble Friend would have acted more justly if he had coupled the question of the franchise with this bill, be distinctly disavowed such an opinion. He had never said so; and he certainly was of opinion that, if the noble Lord had done so, he would have opened a Pandora's box, from which discord would have spread on all sides, and at the bottom of which not even hope would have been found to remain. He could, indeed, have taken no course which would have produced so much confusion. It was true his name had appeared to a bill respecting the franchise, in conjunction with t hose of Sir D. Norreys and Sir Rober Ferguson; but, though he did not complain of its having been placed there, his name was added to that bill when he had left town. Indeed, one of those hon. Gentlemen, in writing to acquaint him with the fact of his name having been annexed to the bill, had jocurly told him that it was a forgery.

said, that the noble Lord took great credit to himself for agreeing so much, with reference to the provisions of his bill, with the Ulster Association. He begged to inform the noble Lord, however, that the origin of that association was the noble Lord's bill itself — an origin not founded, too, in any agreement with that bill, but in opposition to it. He must say that he considered it somewhat disingenuous on the part of the noble Lord to claim this agreement with the opinions of the Ulster Association. A report of that association showed that its opinions, especially with reference lo the right of appeal as given in the noble Lord's bill were opposed to his. The association contended that they would grant a right of appeal as to matters of law, but not as to matters of fact; and they were particular in staling, with respect to the question of the franchise, that it should depend on a more simple and uniform test than at present. With regard to these and some other points, the noble Lord was, then, not quite correct as to the opinions of the Ulster Association. By the way, he could not refrain, before he sat down, from congratulating the noble Lord on his new love for associations. He could assure him, however, that the Ulster Liberal Association was decidedly opposed to the noble Lord and his bill.