begged to lay on the Table of the House, the resolutions which it was his intention to propose after Easter, on the subject of education. The noble Lord then read the resolutions, as follow: —

"1. That in any bill for the promotion of education in Great Britain, by which a board shall be authorised to levy, or cause to be levied, parochial rates, for the erection and maintenance of schools, provision ought to be made for an adequate representation of the rate-payers of the parish in such board.

2.That the chairman of such board ought to be elected by the board itself.

3.That the Holy Scriptures, in the authorized version, should be taught in all schools established by any such board.

4.That special provision should be made for cases in which Roman Catholic parents may object to the instruction of their children in the Holy Scriptures in such schools.

5.That no other books of religious instruction should be used in such schools unless with the sanction of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the concurrence of the Committee of Privy Council for Education.

6.That, in order to prevent the disqualification of competent schoolmasters on religious grounds, the books of religious instruction, other than the Holy Bible, introduced into the schools, should be taught apart, by the clergyman of the parish, or some person appointed by him, to the children of parents who belong to the Established Church, or who may be desirous that their children should be so instructed.

7. That all children taught in such schools should have free liberty to resort to any Sunday school, or any place of religious worship which their parents may approve.

8. That any school connected with the National School Society, or the British and Foreign School Society, or any Protestant Dissenters' School, or any Roman Catholic School, which shall be found upon inspection to be efficiently conducted, should be entitled, by license from the Privy Council, to grant certificates of school attendance, for the purpose of employment in factories of children and young persons,

9. That, in the opinion of this House, the Committee of Privy Council for Education ought to be furnished with means to enable them to establish and maintain a sufficient number of training and model schools in Great Britain.

" 10. That the said committee ought likewise to be enabled to grant gratuities to deserving schoolmasters, and to afford such aid to schools established by voluntary contributions as may tend to the more complete instruction of the people in religious and secular knowledge, while at the same time the rights of conscience may be respected."

had not, of course, had as yet any opportunity of considering these resolutions, for he was not at all cognizant of them until that they bad been read by the noble Lord; but he would give them his best attention. He had every reason to hope and believe that this question would be most dispassionately considered. On the former occasion he had received the greatest assistance from the noble Lord and other hon. Members in promoting a calm and dispassionate discussion; and he trusted, that the House would act up to this principle throughout. Since the second reading of the measure he had received many deputations on the subject, and had heard objections to various parts of the bill. It had been the duty of himself and of his colleagues, a duty which they most readily fulfilled, to give their most calm and dispassionate consideration to the objections suggested. He was not prepared now to state exactly what modifications of the original proposal the Government was disposed to make; but thus far he was at liberty to mention to the House, that several points touched upon in the noble Lord's resolutions had formed the subject of deliberation by the Government; and he confidently hoped, that consistently with the principles announced by him on the second reading, it would be in his power to propose several modifications upon those points.

was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman should have misunderstood the notice which he gave. The resolutions of which he had given notice stood for to-morrow, and if he had brought them on it would have been necessary, according to the forms of the House, to state what his resolutions were. He bad stated that he did not intend to bring them on till after Easter, but that he would this day lay them on the Table. He had framed them in such a manner, and had deferred the consideration of them, to preserve that moderate and temperate tone in which this great subject had been begun, and in which, like the right hon. Baronet, he hoped, it would be continued. Considering the jealousy existing on this subject, he thought it better not to communicate his intentions to the Government or any of the Protestant dissenters.

wished to ask a question of the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with reference to the papers laid on the Table on the subject of the negotiations respecting the Washington Treaty. In a letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, dated the 7th of August, 1842, in answer to Mr. Webster's application with regard to the case of the Creole, his Lordship said —

" In the meantime, I engage that instructions shall be given to the governors of her Majesty's colonies at the southern borders of the United States to execute the laws duly, and that there shall be no officious interference with American vessels."

What he wished to ask of the noble Lord was, whether, in pursuance of the engagement thus entered into by Lord Ashburton, any instructions had been given to the governors of British colonies on the southern borders of the United States with reference to that particular point? He also wished to ask what was the general purport and nature of those instructions, supposing any to have been issued, and whether the noble Lord would have any objection to lay those instructions upon the Table of the House?

in answer to the question of the noble Lord, had to state that her Majesty's Government had not thought it necessary to issue any instructions subsequent to, or consequent on, that assurance on the part of Lord Ashburton to the American Secretary of State, to which the noble Lord bad referred. A short time before the correspondence in question, or almost simultaneously with it, her Majesty's Government had had under their deliberate consideration all the circumstances connected with the case of the Creole, out of which the correspondence had arisen; and the whole of that case, with the questions of law to which it bad given rise, had been submitted to the con- sideration of her Majesty's law officers. Their opinion with respect to a number of cases had been confidentially communicated to the Government, and transmitted by them to the governor of Bahamas both with regard to the course which had been hitherto pursued, and with regard to the course which should be pursued for the future. The governor of Bahamas had asked for further instructions with respect to a number of hypothetical cases; and respecting those cases also, instructions had been given previous to the communications between Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster. He need not, he hoped, say that those instructions maintained to the fullest extent the right of personal freedom on the part of every person within a British port, on board a vessel of whatever nation and under whatever circumstances; and that right the noble Lord might reply upon it would never be given up by her Majesty's present Government. But he had reason to hope and believe that the instructions sent out with regard to those hypothetical cases to which he had referred were of a nature substantially to comply with the request made on the part of Mr. Webster, and the assurance which had been given by Lord Ashburton. It had not, therefore been thought necessary to send out any fresh instructions. The opinions of the law-officers upon the legal points submitted to them had been confidentally communicated to the Government; am he did not think the noble Lord would consider it desirable that the Government should lay before the House conditional instructions upon hypothetical cases which might or might not arise.

said, that certain papers on this subject bad been laid on the Table of the House in 1839, exhibiting the views of the then Government in reference to it. He wished to see from the instructions whether, and to what extent, the present Government differed from the late Government in their view of the operation of British law in our colonies, in reference to slaves coming into those colonies, under whatever circumstances.

said, if he understood the question of the noble Lord right, it was, whether the instructions sent out by her Majesty's present Government, arising oat of the Creole, were different to the instructions sent out by the previous Go- vernment. He (Lord Stanley) had not those instructions before him; but to the best of his belief there was no deviation from the instructions issued by the late Government. The instructions were, that in case any complaint was made to the British governor, upon credible testimony, that any persons in a British port were detained against their will, it was the duty set forth, to afford such persons relief and protection.

rose to put a question to the right hon. Baronet at the head of her Majesty's Government. He begged to ask whether the Greek government had not refused to find means to pay the first instalment of the Greek loan which was now due, and whether England would cot, in that case, have to pay the interest of the loan? He also wished to ask whether if that government came here for another loan it would be granted?

said it was quite true that the Greek government had failed to pay the first half of the loan, as the hon. Gentleman had mentioned; and it was equally true that the interest must be paid by this country. He could assure the hon. Gentleman that if any application were made for a fresh loan, it would be declined.

would take that opportunity of calling the attention of her Majesty's Government to a matter which he thought deserved its serious attention. He held in his hand the papers which had been laid before the House accompanying the instructions issued to Lord AshBurton, and on which that noble Lord had negotiated the treaty of Washington. They contained all those documents which were thought to be necessary to illustrate the eighth article of that treaty. One of those documents was a report made to the United States government by two officers of the United States navy, who had been selected for the service on account of their being extremely welt acquainted with the nature and consequences of the African slave-trade. In that report those two officers, after stating their views of the course which they thought it would be desirable to be adapted by the two governments, went on to describe the slave-trade on the western coast of Africa. They afterwards referred to the slave-trade on the Eastern coast of Africa, and to his surprise he found the following remarks. Those gentlemen say, admitting that they have little personal knowledge of the details of the slave-trade on the Eastern coast,

"From the best information we can obtain, it seems that a large trade is carried on by Portuguese colonies, the Arab chiefs, and negro tribes. Their greatest markets are the Mahomedan countries bordering on the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the Portuguese East India colonies, Bombay, and perhaps other British possessions in the East Indies; this part of the trade is probably in the hands of Arab vessels."

The language contained in that report (the hon. member continued) which had been presented to the British public, and nothing having been said by the government which placed it before the country, there might be a suspicion that there was some ground for the allegations thus made. It should be remembered that those allegations were made by two commanders of the United States navy, who had been expressly appointed on account of their knowledge of the subject to report on the subject of the slave-trade on the coast of Africa; and they were contained in a report made to the United States government. They were made too in a report which was presented to that government, as the basis of its negotiations, and they were on this account of more importance than they appeared at first sight, and deserved to be brought under the notice of the English Parliament. For his own part, he believed the allegations to be totally Unfounded; and they appeared on the face of them to be ridiculous and absurd. At the same time they were consistent with the spirit which prevailed in the United States; and he found several proofs, in the writings by which the negotiations were carried on, of a willingness to entertain the worst suspicions of our motives and practices. The allegations were vague, but still he thought it was necessary that her Majesty's government should declare them to be unfounded, and should meet them with nothing less than an indignant refutation.

said, the House must recollect, with respect to the papers referred to by his hon. Friend, how they came to be laid on the Table of the House. The noble Lord opposite had asked for certain general papers connected with the late negotiations, and the noble Lord had asked for further correspondence. He had acceded to that motion for papers, and amongst the papers was the document referred to by his hon. Friend. It is a report which was laid before Congress, and he did not consider himself entitled, in laying the papers before the House, to exclude this, notwithstanding the observations which it contained reflecting- on our government. His hon. Friend must not, however, suppose that the practises there referred to really existed, or that there were any grounds for the observations, because no remarks had been made on the document on laying it on the Table of the House. He was glad however, of the opportunity which his hon. Friend had afforded him to correct the erroneous impressions which were likely to be made by the report. With respect to slavery continued in India in the territories under our control, there was no ground whatever for the suspicions. This was a subject which had occupied the attention of the late and the present government of India, both of which had considered what would be the best means of most effectively putting an end to slavery and the slave-trade. It was a subject to which Lord Auckland had devoted considerable attention, and he had endeavoured to put an end to slavery in all the territories of the East India Company. It was impossible to deny that a traffic in slaves did take place in some parts of India. In the territories of the Nizam, for example, there was a considerable traffic in slaves; there was some traffic in the Portuguese colonies; and there might be slaves introduced into British ports from neighbouring territories over which we had no control. Cases of that kind had occurred. In November, 1841, an agent of one of the Ameers of Scinde was brought to trial, at Bombay, for taking four Arab girls from Bombay to Scinde. As the offence was committed within our jurisdiction, he was tried and convicted, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Strong representations were made to the government to pardon him, but the government refused to attend to these representations, and the man was now suffering the execution of his sentence. To say, then, that the slave-trade was not put down by our laws was not the fact. In the preceding sessions, at Bombay, four persons were brought to trial for a similar offence (he meant the sessions of September, 1841), and were convicted and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The government, therefore, was endeavouring, by the application of British law, to correct the evil as fast as possible. There were thousands of Arabs, in several parts of India, who were in the capacity of slaves, though called the wives of those with whom they lived, and it was difficult to prevent by the utmost care and caution that species of slavery, and amongst those persons, a species of slave-trade. But the impression which that paragraph was calculated to make, that the slave-trade was continued in British India, was totally without foundation. As he had said before, this was a subject to which Lord Auckland had paid much attention, and he had entered into communication with the Portuguese settlements at Goa, and there was reason to believe that in consequence no slave-trade was now carried on there by the Portuguese. He had great satisfaction, too, in stating, that measures had been adopted to enforce the law, and, by a singular coincidence, on this very day he believed they would come into operation. They were intended to prevent all violent interference with the possessions of those who were called slaves, and for putting an end to the slave-trade in every part of India under our control, and to take care that slaves shall not pass out of our territories. By a regulation made in July, 1842, in all the ports on the coast within our jurisdiction, a vice-admiralty court had been established, to put in force the laws against the slave-trade, giving to the governors of our different territories in India the same power on the subject as the governers of the West-India colonies. This day, as he said, there would come into force in India an enactment of great importance concerning the status of slavery. It was but justice to say that this measure was mainly attributable to a suggestion of Lord Auckland, who deserved the greatest credit for the attention he had given to the subject, and he had been followed on this point by the present Governor-general of India. The House could not object to hear a few clauses of this enactment read. They were as follow:—

"Fort William Legislative Department, Jan. 6, 1843.

"The following draft of a proposed act was read in Council for the first time, January 6, 1843:—' An Act for declaring and amending the law regarding the condition of slavery within the territories of the East India Company.

"1. It is hereby enacted and declared that no public officer shall, in execution of, any decree or order of court, or for the enforcement of any demand of rent or revenue, sell, or cause to be sold, any person, or the right to the compulsory labour or services of any person, on the ground that such person is in a state of slavery.

" 2. And it is hereby declared and enacted, that no rights arising out of an alleged property in the person and services of another as a slave, shall be enforced by any civil or criminal court or magistrate, within the territories of the East India Company.

" 3. And it is hereby declared and enacted, that no person who may have acquired property by his own industry, or by the exercise of any art, calling, or profession, or by inheritance, assignment, gift, or bequest, shall be dispossessed of such property, or prevented from taking possession thereof, on the ground that such person, or that the person for whom the property may have been derived, was a slave.

"4. And it is hereby enacted, that any act which could be a penal offence, if done to a free man, shall be equally an offence if done to any person on the pretext of his being in a condition of slavery."

This enactment was of very great importance, and it appeared well calculated to arrest the progress of slavery, and check abuses, and when carried out in all parts of India under our control, or which we could influence, would go a long way to suppress slavery. The subject, he hardly need assure the House, had occupied continually the attention of her Majesty's Government for several years, and he could assure the House that the Government of India was sedulously engaged with it, and considered it of great and undoubted importance.

was understood to refer to that part of the report of the officers of the United States which described Bombay as the market of slaves, and to ask whether any slave ships now went to Bombay.

said, the words, "greatest markets, "were applied to Bom- bay, and, perhaps, other British possessions.

replied, that it might have occasionally happened that Arab vessels, bringing African boys, came to these ports, and transferred their cargoes to the natives without the interference of the British authorities, but the greatest efforts were made to prevent abuse.

believed the act quoted by the right hon. Baronet was not a new law. Several laws had been passed respecting the status of slavery, before the present law.

said, the present act was an act to declnre and amend the laws, and not a new law.

said, he understood there was some difficulty in the minds of the law officers as to the clause of which he had given notice, and he would therefore withdraw it.

pursuant to notice, moved the following clause:—

"And be it enacted, that in order to obviate all doubts as to the meaning of the words of the clear yearly value of not less than 10l.,' in the said recited act, every person shall be entitled to vote under the provisions of that act, in the election of any city or borough, as aforesaid, who shall be rated under the act, passed in the 6th and 7th years of the reign of Will. 4th, intitled, an Act to regulate Parochial Assessments,' upon the gross estimated rental of 10l.; and in cases of joint occupiers, upon the gross estimated rental of an amount which, when divided by the number of such occupiers, shall give a sum of not less than 10l. for each and every such occupier, provided that such person be otherwise qualified."

objected to the clause. If the bill introduced into that House by the hon. Member for Stroud, for establishing a uniformity of rating had been carried into effect, he should have no objection to the clause. But such was not the case. So far from there being a uniformity of rating, it was different in almost all the counties. The act was, in truth, a dead letter, and there was the utmost diversity of rating. The question under this aspect had already discussed on the motion of the hon. Member for Bradford, and he, therefore, must object to the clause.

said, he hoped the House would not reject the clause, though he was thankful the right hon. Baronet had thrown out enough in the course of his observations to induce revising barristers to act more in conformity with that opinion.

moved the following clause:—

"Be it enacted, that in case the vote of any person so protested against for personation shall have been received, and any other person shall afterwards tender his vote, in respect of the same qualification, stating, at the same time the name or names of the candidate or candidates for whom he tenders such vote, the returning-officer or his deputy shall enter on the poll-book every vote so tendered, distinguishing the same from the votes admitted and allowed at such election."

said, there was a difficulty on the subject, arising from differences of opinion as to the nature of the law and the power of the returning-officer. It was contended, on the one hand, that the returning-officer had no power to place the real voter on the poll, and, on the other, that he had. If the returning-officer had ascertained that he had received anerroneous, and the returning-officer befog satisfied of his error, should, on the real voter presenting himself, think it his duty to place that voter on the poll, then there was an occasion for the clause of his hon. Friend. In fact, the clause of his hon. Friend, were the law as he had stated, would not only not gain, but it Would defeat his hon. Friend's object. would place the personated voter in a worse condition than he would be in under the present law. That opinion as to the present state of the law was entertained by persons of high authority, but persons of equally high authority took a different view. They contended that a returning-officer having once carried a vote to account on the poll, had on power to recall that vote, and be could not place the real voter on the poll should be make his appearance after having placed on the poll the person who personated him. If that were the state of the law his hon. Friend's clause would be useful, and would enable the personated voter to prove that he had been personated. He would be entitled to tender his vote, and be enabled to recover his right. Under these different views of the law, he must leave the House to decide concerning his hon. Friend's clause

maintained that the qualification gave the right to vote, and if the qualification were exhausted, if the returning officer had registered a vote for a qualification, he could not register another vote. That was, according to his view, the present state of the law. There was no power to enable the returning officer to receive the vote of a voter who had been personated, and in his opinion the clause was clearly essential and ought to be introduced into the bill.

saw no objection whatever to the clause, and would support it.

took the same view of the law as his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Woodstock. When the returning-officer had once placed a person on the poll for one qualification, be had done his duty, and he could not place another person on the poll for that same qualification. He ought not to do so. There was then a difficulty in the case for which the clause of the hon. Member for Derby was meant to provide.

said there was nothing in the bill to authorize the returning officer to reject a vote tendered by a second person in the same name. The second person in such a case was more likely to be the true man, for it could hardly be attempted to personate a man who had already voted.

thought that no second vote could be polled in the same name. The prudent course would be to insert such a clause as was proposed.

wished to call the attention of the House for a few minutes to clauses 42, 48 58, 72, and 94, all being connected with the same matter, those /> clauses referred to the jurisdiction of that House with respect to matters connected with the right of voting, and their object was to transfer from the House that jurisdiction, and to give it to the revising barrister, subject to an appeal on questions of law. Those clauses introduced to the House a question of greater magnitude than had been before it for a considerable period. Looking to the history of the House of Commons, there was no contest more severe, and no triumph admitted to be of greater importance, than that which secured to the House what it was now proposed voluntarily to surrender. He behaved that the House owed if not its existence, its vital utility, to the jurisdiction and authority now proposed to be surrendered. He apprehended it was the duty of every statesman, in dealing with matters of such greet practical importance, to be governed mainly by experience—to look to what had been the evils to which the constitution had been exposed, and to mark the remedies which had from time to time been applied, and applied effectually, to those evils. It would be waste of time to occupy the House by going into any antiquarian details respecting the constitution of Parliament, but he thought it important to look back to the state in which it existed at the Revolution, and had continued ever since. Attempts were made to interfere with the return of Members to that House, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and more particularly in that of James 1st. In the year 1604 the famous protest was drawn up by Lord Coke, the first lawyer and statesman of the age, against the attempt of the Crown to interfere with the representative principle interest in the Commons of England. During the recess, the Lord Chancellor issued a writ for the return of a Member to the House. The House also issued a writ in the same case. Two Members were returned, and it became a question which Member had a right to sit. That House solemnly protested against the right of the Crown or the Chancellor to issue any writ except upon the motion of that House. A severe contest ensued. The House entered the protest of the journals. The king sent for the journals, and tore it out. That protest, however, remained on the record. He need not trouble the House by reading it; it would be in the recollection of every Member who had bestowed attention the subject, that it stated the vest emphatic language, that it was the inherent privilege of the House not only to cause writs to be issued for the return of Members, bat to regulate tat matters relating to their seats. The language could be more impressive, no assertion could be more distinct, than was employed on that occasion. The contest terminated by the House consenting for a time that both Members should retire, and that a new election should take place. Another writ was then issued, and from that hour to the present the right and control of the House over the elective franchise had never been disputed. It was true, that in the great case of Ashby and White, an attempt was made to raise the question regarding the right of voting in the form of action against the sheriff for refusing vote; but notwithstanding the contest led to the commitment of many persons, it was admitted on both sides, so even by the counsel advocating the cause, that with regard to seats in the House, the House had exclusive jurisdiction. It had been considered and treated by every reflective statesman and by every well-trained politician, as the corner stone of its authority and independence. In what custody could the guardianship of the elective franchise be so securely placed? Where could the constitution so safely deposit it as in that House-that House, which was responsible to the people; and which had, and ever ought to have a sympathy with the people in maintaining that franchise in full force, and in independent of any other authority whatsoever. They had now full power over that right—they were solemnly pledged to uphold it; and yet by this bill but it was proposed, and that too, with a precipitation that he confessed surprised him. It carried within it the seeds of an eventful change in the constitution which should put every Member on his guard to part with this power. They were about to surrender the decision of the right of voting—the power to judge of exercise of that right. And to surrender it to what? to a tribunal to which no hon. Member could conscientiously entrust it—they were about to deliver it over to a barrister of three years' standing. He could not believe till ocular evidence forced the belief upon him, that it could ever have been proposed, as was done by this bill, that the registration should be final—that it should be handed over to a barrister of three year' standing—and that his decision should be conclusive without appeal; save only that what were to be deemed questions of law, should be left to the Court of Common please, He looked to what were called questions of fact; and such questions might go very far in excluding most questions of law. The clauses, as they now stood, made the registration final: and the only appeal from the barrister was to be an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas on matters of law. He should rejoice, indeed, to find that the anxiety which he felt on this subject, was unfounded. He perceived that his hon. and learned Friend, the Solicitor-general, did not seem to participate in that anxiety, but he hoped his hon. and learned Friend would never consent to part with this jurisdiction. He should be happy to find that he was in error, but as he read the clause the registration was final, and justified the observation it had drawn from him. The 94th clause was rather long, but it began by reciting the former act, and it was as follows:—

"And whereas in and by the said first-recited act it is provided that upon petition to the House of Commons, complaining of an undue election or return of any Member or Members to serve in Parliament, any petitioner, or any person defending such election or return, shall be at liberty to impeach the correctness of the register of voters in force at the time of such election, by proving that, in consequence of the decision of the barrister who shall have revised the lists of voters from which such register shall have been formed, the name of any person who voted at such election was improperly inserted or retained in such register, or the name of any person who tendered his vote at such election improperly Omitted from such register; and the select committee appointed for the trial of such petition shall alter the poll taken at such election according to the truth of the case, and shall report their determination thereupon to the House, and the House shall thereupon carry such determination into effect, and the return shall be amended or the election declared void, as the case may be, and the register corrected accordingly, or such other order shall be made as to the House shall seem proper: And whereas doubts have arisen as to the true intent and meaning of the said enactment with respect to the power and authority of any such committee to inquire into the validity or invalidity of the vote of any person being on the register of voters in force at the time of such election j be it therefore declared and enacted, that it shall and may be lawful for any such committee to inquire into and decide upon the right to vote of any person who, being upon the register of voters in force at the time of such election, shall have voted in such election, or not being upon such register, shall have tendered his vote at such election, in case the name of such person shall have been specially retained upon such register, or inserted therein, or expunged or omitted there from, by the express decision of the revising barrister who shall have revised the lists of voters from which such register shall have been formed, or by the decision of the said court of appeal; and also that it shall and may be lawful for such committee to inquire into and decide upon the right to vote of any person who, being upon such register, shall have voted in such election, so far as the same may be disputed on the ground of legal incapacity at the time of his voting, under and by virtue of any statute now or hereafter to be in force, or on the ground of any other legal incapacity at the time of his voting, which may have arisen subsequently to the expiration of the time allowed for making out the list of voters from which the register of voters in force at the time of such election shall have been formed; but that, except in such cases or on such grounds as aforesaid, the register of voters in force at the time of such election shall be final and conclusive, to all intents and purposes, as to the right to vote in such election of every person who shall be upon such register."

He did not know whether he understood it, but he supposed that the election committees of that House were to have the same powers preserved to them which they had at present.

observed, that the words now objected to were introduced in consequence of reported decisions of committees of that House. It Was for the purpose of making the law uniform. Committees had decided that they would not inquire into the validity of a Vote Unless an objection had been taken before the barrister. If there had been no objection offered before the barrister, then the committees had determined to make no inquiry as to the validity of the vote. The object of the clause was to make that clear which before had been doubtful.

considered that it was otherwise. The register of the voters should be final and conclusive as to the rights of the electors, as it appeared on the register.

remarked, that was the case at present. He referred the hon. and learned Gentleman to the 60th section, and there it would be found that restriction was imposed, which was now complained of. The fact was, that it was the Reform Bill that determined that they could not examine into the validity of votes unless an objection to them had been taken and expressly decided upon by a revising barrister. Therefore, it was the Reform Bill that took from them this jurisdiction. If the barrister decided upon a vote objected to, they could inquire into the validity of that decision. The object of the clause was to make that clear and intelligible which had been before determined upon, that the register was to be final and conclusive upon a committee of that House, except in certain cases, when the vote had been objected to and expressly decided upon. That had been the law before; it was the law at present. The power of the House was parted with by the Reform Bill, and that power was not restored by the present bill.

conceived, that it went much further. The election committee of that House was a committee to be appealed to, and not one of original jurisdiction, and by this clause it was excluded from doing that which ought to be so left to it. That clause must be read in connection with the 42nd clause, to which he had already called their attention; and, as he conceived, that House should maintain that which they had already secured with great cost and hazard, and ought always to possess the power of determining finally upon the franchise, instead of being, as it was proposed, precluded as to matters of law by the opinion of courts of law. The period, too, at which this was attempted was most inauspicious. It was when they were engaged in the discussion of questions as to the jurisdiction of courts of law. It never had been denied that, to a very great extent Parliamentary law was distinct from the common law. He had always considered that committees of that House were too much trammelled, and bound down by the ordinary and technical rules which prevailed in courts of law. They Were now, however, not merely to introduce the practices of the courts of law, and permit them to interfere with Parliamentary tribunals, but they proposed to refer questions of law to the Court of Common Pleas. They had determined to leave questions of law—and these might include more than questions of law—to be decided by the technical rules of the courts. The mode of doing this, he considered, was one which ought not to be assented to. It was open to very serious objections —it was one assimilated to a class of cases against which complaints were the loudest, and the mode of proceeding regarded as most anomalous; he meant the session cases, wherein that was confirmed by one court, on which appeal was made on the case stated by another court. He appealed to every professional person, whether the law, as laid down upon these appeal cases, and thus carried from one court to another, was not precisely that law which had given the least satisfaction. There were introduced into these adjudications a conflict of decisions and as uncertainty which did not belong to any-other class of cases; and yet they proposed to do the same thing here. But it was to be only in certain cases, for it appeared it was to be left to the sic volo of a barrister of three years' standing whether that appeal should be given or refused. He referred to the clause, which provided—

" And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for any person who, under the provisions hereinbefore contained, shall have made any claim to have his name inserted in any list, or made any objection to any other person as not entitled to have his name inserted in any list, or whose name shall have been expunged from any list, and who in any such case shall be aggrieved by or dissatisfied with any decision of any revising barrister on any point of law material to the result of such case, either himself or by some person on his behalf, to give to the revising barrister in court, before the rising of the said court, on the same day on which such decision shall have been pronounced, a notice in writing that he is desirous to appeal, and in such notice shall shortly state the decision against which he desires to appeal; and the said barrister thereupon, if be thinks it reasonable and proper that such appeal should be entertained, shall state in writing the facts which according to his judgment shall have been established by the evidence in the case, and which shall be material to the matter in question."

He had always had a strong objection to the appointment of the barristers being made by the judges. A more objectionable principle he thought could not have been introduced. They were the very last body that should be open to the influence involved in patronage of this description. Nothing, he thought, could be more michievous as regarded the independence of the bar, or more destructive as respected the interests of the people, as connected with that independence, than that a large portion of the bar should be looking up to the judges for the advantages thus placed within their gift. This House, it was to be remembered, could not find fault with the conduct of the judges, without doing serious injury to the administration of justice. The House had acted, and properly acted, on that principle. They could not, then, deal with the judges as they did with other authorities; and the effect of bringing complaints against them in that House, as to their appointment, in any instance, of young barristers, wholly inadequate to the very responsible duties they were called upon to discharge, was a matter that was objectionable, in every point of view. It was a position in which the judges ought not to be placed. When he considered that there was to be a certain fixed scale of remuneration—that it was the same for one gentleman in the West Riding of York as for another who had the revision of a small borough, and that there was a very great advantage in a particular appointment, considering the remuneration for the labour, he found additional reasons for objecting to the system under which these appointments took place. It excluded, moreover, a considerable number of the bar. It gave to those who were the least experienced—to those whom they would not allow to argue their own cases, even the least important of them—it gave to them the power of deciding on the most important questions relating to the constitution of that House—and invested with this power, were also to decide whether an objection to their adjudications was reasonable and proper. He was not now to be told, that they were not to presume that the barristers would refuse any case that was reasonable and proper. He knew what was said of other tribunals, that the only case on which they would consent to hare an appeal would be a tolerably clear case—that judges were jealous of their jurisdiction being overlooked in a doubtful case. Then they were to leave, not questions of law, but questions that were reasonable and proper, to be determined by those barristers; and would thus surrender the rights of the people. The barrister was not to submit for appeal any questions but those that he might consider as reasonable and proper. What was the sense of this? What did they mean by it? Was it to depend upon what the barrister by his single opinion decided was so reasonable as to admit of no degree of doubt? He objected wholly to any such proposal. When he appealed on a bill of exceptions, it did not depend upon the judge who tried the cause to determine whether those exceptions were reasonable and proper. He believed that no writ of error would be granted at all, if it were to depend upon judges alone what was reasonable and what proper in the objections tendered to them. And yet they thus li- mited the right of the subject! "Reason" and "proper" were words of very indefinite meaning; they admitted of a construction so wide as to neutralize the clause altogether. But then Gentlemen might say that such points only were to be reserved as were material to the decision of the court. He begged of the House to remember that they were dealing with questions of law relating to the elective franchise—that the interpretation of some of those questions was exceedingly difficult, and that they were now to be no longer decided by the House, but transferred to gentlemen from whom they excluded the assistance of counsel altogether. They placed these young gentlemen with solicitors only to contend before them, and thus, too, without the assistance which even the judges would have—without that information which even the judges would require. They did not give, where the right of the subject was to be maintained, and the franchise to be upheld, that aid and protection which they would require for the smallest particle of property. They left the barrister without proper assistance, and then they permitted him to decide whether it were reasonable and proper to appeal against his decision, and what it was that it was reasonable and proper on which the appeal should be determined. In his own recollection he could state this to have happened: in settling a special case he proposed that a certain matter should be introduced as proved. The learned and eminent judge before whom the case was tried declined to put it in— he then said that he declined to sign the case. That learned judge, who was not more remarkable for his learning than his courtesy, kindly consented to make the addition that he proposed, and upon that very passage the case was decided in his favour. It was the great mining case in Cornwall. He said, then, that it was most unsafe to leave powers to a barrister which ought not to be left to a judge. An attorney might put in evidence—it was possible he might have taken advice upon doing so; he might prove certain facts, and require that such facts should be stated as proved in the appeal—and it was to be in the power of the barrister not to put that in, and for that they had no remedy. The case so stated might not contain enough for the decision of the court. Thus, they would not only withdraw from the proper and the constitutional tribunal the decisions with respect to the elective franchise, but they did it in the most crippled and infirm farm that it was possible to do it. But then he said, what was the occasion for this—what occasion had that House to surrender that protection which British subjects had a right to receive, with respect to the elective franchise? Formerly the House had decided questions of the franchise. These had been determined by the House itself. They had gone on improving their tribunal; and now, when they were in a better state than ever, they chose—voluntarily too—to surrender their rights. The bill brought in by the head of her Majesty's Government had been an improvement. They had heard of no decision since the last election, by their committees that could well be objected to. Had there not been a marked and great improvement in the tribunals of that House, and yet, with this before them, they ran from an evil that possibly might happen, to another and a certain evil, and one of much greater magnitude. Why abandon the right hon. Baronet's bill, when they attempted no further improvement in it? and he considered that it would admit of considerable improvement. In the first place, he objected to the franchise being decided in a court of law at all; but next, if they wanted to have it decided by law, still they would have that accomplished by election committees, If there were a vacant chief-judgeship, where would they go to supply the place? Surely not out of that House. Why then not make up by the legal knowledge that they had in that House? Or why not bring assistance in from Westminster-hall, instead of going there? Why not bring in assessors? Did they think they would have uniformity of decision? They would be disappointed. But if they went to courts of law, he objected to their going only to one court. He most distinctly objected to that proposition. When one class of cases was decided exclusively by one particular court, it was not satisfactory. Even in cases where there was not an appeal, the mere fact that other courts had to decide upon them, acted as a control, and ultimately are greater satisfaction to suitors. He distinctly objected to the confining the decisions in these cases to any one court; but he objected to giving them to any court. He would not part with this constitutional principle. The safety of the Home required that they should maintain the control over the elective franchise. It would be found to be no light evil to part with that power, and in the doing so, in the present instance, they could obtain no compensating good. Let them remember, that when once they parted with this power and control, it was gone, and forever. That House never had made a greater mistake than in passing the Grenville Act. It might have, by means of resolutions, done as well, and by its own authority have accomplished all that was of value in that act. They had still the power of amending the bill of Sir Robert Peel. They might have the advantage of the assistance of the best authorities in Westminster Hall, with the exception of the Beach; they might have the advice and best assistance of those who were in that House. He was sure that there was no Member who came to that House would flinch from any portion of that duty which attached to his situation. Their committees were in every way defective, they were capable of great improvement. The general complaints on the subject of the committees of that House he did not think fairly justified. There was a complaint as to the uncertainty of decisions, and of political bias; but he feared that under no transfer of authority could this complaint be wholly removed. As to diversity of judgment—as to uncertainty of opinion—they were incidental to every human tribunal. He submitted that the power ought to remain with the House. In no other hands could its exercise be so comprehensive, so constitutional, so complete. Even were any transfer of it meditated, it ought to be the subject of a separate and distinct bill. It ought to be most deliberately considered in a committee, when they would receive statements, and be convinced by proofs, that it was utterly impossible to gain the advantages which were expected by the proposed clause. Another consideration occurs. Who was to pay the expenses of the appeal of the voter, when there might be an uncertainty as to who was to be the candidate, how the elector might vote, or whether there was to be a contest at all? No provision was made for an appeal on matters of law. They let the rights of the electors be thus frittered away—the appeal was to be before an election, when no one had a specific purpose in maintaining the right that was disputed. Then, let it be supposed that it was expedient to hear the appeal, should the power be given to the barrister to determine what was the evidence, and what the facts, on which the rights of the parties should be conclud- ed? It was his opinion, that the Government bill ought to pass, without the appeal clauses. Courts of law, they ought to know, were not always favourable to popular rights. It was the decision of the Court of King's Bench, on the subject of corporations, that made the necessity for reform in those bodies to be felt, and that had advanced that question. They saw that, the tendency of those courts was not to extend popular rights, but to restrict them. If they wished to restrain the right of voting, then let them send these questions to the courts of law; but they could not do so without deserting their duty to their constituents, and this, too, when they had, as he conceived, abundant means within that House of upholding the franchise. The right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) had said, that if once they parted with their jurisdiction, they might shut the doors of that House. In this case, he thought that they ought to protect their constituents. He regretted that these clauses were sanctioned and supported by her Majesty's Government. They were, in his opinion, at variance with the constitutional rights of the House, and the real interests of the people. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving the omission of certain words in clause 42.

I labour under many disadvantages in rising to answer the very able speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman. In the first place, I am not at all prepared to enter upon the wide field of discussion opened by the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, who gave no notice of his intention to bring forward as a subject of discussion, the question which he has so fully debated. After the third reading of the bill, I was not prepared for the discussion of a principle so important. I entertain the greatest respect for the talents of the hon. and learned Gentleman—I feel the most unfeigned admiration for the boldness, integrity, and resolution with which, under all circumstances, and on all occasions, he defends the privileges of the House. If I thought the clauses in question involved any surrender of the rights and privileges of the House, so far from agreeing to them, I would give them my most hearty opposition; but I differ from the notion that the clauses involve any such surrender, and I must observe, that it appears to me, that the speech of the hon. Gentle- man was mainly founded on a misconception of one of these clauses, the 94th. It is clear from the course of the argument of the hon. and learned Member, that the hon. Gentleman, from inadvertence, put an erroneous construction on that clause, at the outset of his speech, and it is equally clear that the original misconception pervaded his argument to its close. Now, as I understand the 94th clause, it only sets forth in express terms, for the purpose of removing all doubt, that which is now the established usage, on the part of Parliamentary committees, in putting an interpretation on the 60th clause of the Reform Act. It does not extend one jot further, except in this single particular, that under the clause to which the hon. Gentleman referred, it is proposed to make the decision of a court of law final on the point of law submitted to its judgment, and binding upon committees of the House of Commons. The decisions of the Court of Common Pleas are to be strictly con-find to points of law, submitted as cases to their judgment. With this exception, the power of committees of the House of Commons is preserved intact and unaltered, exactly as it now stands under the 60th clause of the Reform Act. Now, the hon. and learned Gentleman has stated that the constituency of the United Kingdom has a deep interest in the question of registration, and as I understood him, that interest consists mainly in the principle which the clauses particularly under discussion, propose to alter, and to which alteration the hon. and learned Gentleman objects. The hon. Gentleman was not present on two former occasions when the measure was discussed, and when I heard the hon. and learned Gentleman allude to the constituency in general terms, I hoped that it was for the purpose of touching upon that point which I put to the noble Lord opposite upon a former occasion, with reference to the case of Ireland. The hon. and learned Gentleman stated, that he entertained great objections to placing a point of law affecting the qualifications of a voter under the jurisdiction of the judges of the land. Now, if I mistake not, the hon. Gentleman was himself one of the legal advisers of the late Government, when they introduced the bill to which I have alluded, with respect to the registration of voters in Ireland, and yet the hon. Gentleman now objects to give the power of appeal to English judges, which that bill allows to Irish judges. What is the state of the law in Ireland? It allows an appeal from the revising barristers to a single judge on circuit. The hon. and learned Gentleman was a party to that act, and yet he now tells us, that the present limited proposition, falling very far short of the enactment for Ireland, is a violation of constitutional principles. But the hon. Gentleman has gone still further upon this occasion—he has raised incidentally a question of very great importance, and as it appears to me has impugned the leading provisions of the Reform Act itself. The hon. and learned Gentleman has objected to the revising barristers being appointed by the judges. That was a tribunal appointed by the Reform Act. Now we have had various propositions for the amendment of the Reform Act, and various registration bills have been proposed; but in these bills no proposition was ever made for depriving the judges of the power of making the appointments in question. The last registration bill was introduced by Lord Campbell, at a time when the hon. and learned Gentleman was one of the legal advisers of the Government, and I am confident that in that bill no proposition was made for taking away the power of appointing revising barristers from the judges. The hon. and learned Gentleman has observed, that the clause gives the revising barrister power to authorise an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas only if he should think it "reasonable and proper," and the hon. Gentleman objects to these words. Now, I may remark, that if the revising barristers should not deem the case sufficient to justify an appeal, then all will remain in statu quo: the jurisdiction of Parliamentary committees is not touched; everything relating to disputes, both of law and matters of evidence, remains for the consideration of the committee just as the law reserves these points at present. But even if the case be referred on appeal to the judges, we have a far greater security, the appeal being strictly limited to a point of law, than we possess in Ireland, where the appeal of the judge is not so confined. I quite agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman, that it would be quite indefensible were I to rest the measure which I propose upon the characters of the judges now composing the Court of Common Pleas. I put the case upon no such ground. I quite concur with the hon. and learned Gentleman in the eulogium which he has passed upon the character of the Chief Justice and of the other judges of that court; but I repeat that I should not defend the measure, unless 1 was fully prepared for the contemplation of another state of things, and for the rule of judges of a very different character. But my reliance is upon judicial authority being exercised in the presence of the public and of an intelligent bar. The hon. and learned Gentle man has stated, that it is not expedient upon light grounds—frequently or in any manner derogatory to the character of the judges—to bring under the investigation of this House their proceedings in courts of law. But there could be no great abuse of the authority delegated to the judges by the bill before the House, which would not give rise to comments, and something; more than comments, within these walls. The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned an instance in which a learned and venerable judge adopted a suggestion made to him by the hon. and learned Gentleman with reference to the insertion of a particular plea. At first the judge hastily refused to accede to his suggestion, but on consideration, and at the earnest request of the hon. and learned Gentleman, he consented to the introduction of the plea. On the very plea which was thus inserted contrary to the wish of the judge in the first instance, judgment was given on the ground of the justice of the case. Now, it is impossible to state a case which appears to me to tend more to raise our confidence in the judges; and when I consider the power of public pinion, ad the influence of the presence of the bar, it confirms me in my opinion that the very limited power now proposed to be committed to the judges may be most; safely confided to their hands. Now, I must say, that the hon and learned Gentleman's prejudices, whenever the rights or privileges of this House are touched in the slightest degree, are so sensitive, that his excellent judgment is betrayed into a degree of captiousness. The hon. and learned Gentleman is quite alone in saying, that the passing of the Grenville Act was a misfortune and a detriment. I would remark to him, and to the noble Lord near him, who also entertains such high notions of the privileges of this House, that until the passing of the Grenville Act the House had no power of tak- ing evidence on oath—there was no power of declaring the opposition to a petition, or the pressing of a petition to be frivolous and vexatious—there was no power of awarding costs. All these important points have been guaranteed by the statute so much decried by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I deny that the bill before the House interferes with the jurisdiction of the tribunals constituted by the Grenville Act. All questions of fact are left to their decision as heretofore, and, as I had said before, only pure points of law are to be referred to the Court of Common Pleas. I am sorry, that on all the occasions on which the bill has been discussed, the hon. and learned Gentleman has been absent from his place. He is wrong in supposing that the clauses to which he objects were adopted hastily—on the contrary they have been fully considered. The original proposition brought forward by Government was different from that now before the House. The suggestion of the withdrawal of some parts of that measure, and the substitution of the proposed appellate tribunal in lieu of that at first proposed, emanated from the Opposition side of the House; and indeed I may say, that I am not aware of having ever seen, in a matter involving considerations of a party nature, such a general coincidence of opinion as was manifested by both sides of the House in favour of the clauses now objected to by the hon. and learned Gentleman. This assertion does not rest on any vague surmise. The clauses have already been submitted to a division, and carried by an overwhelming majority. With all my respect, therefore, for the honourable and learned Gentleman, I can yield neither to his authority nor his argument; and I feel the force of that argument less because I believe that it is completely founded on misconception of the nature of the clauses in dispute. I once more repeat, that they reserve to committees of the House intact and entire the jurisdiction which they now possess, and which they now exercise, save only the reservation of judgment on points of law when submitted on appeal lo the Court of Common Pleas. The hon. and learned Gentleman has stated that the clauses would be found in effect to be inoperative. I do not think so; the effect, I am satisfied, will be salutary. 1 entirely dissent from the hon. and learned Gentleman's views of their probable operation, and I believe that they contain no important surrender of the jurisdiction of the House of Commons. On points of law the opinions of the courts of law will be much safer and sounder than the opinions of the committees of the House. Indeed the hon. and learned Gentleman himself appeared to feel no great confidence—with all his fondness for the power of committees—in their decisions, where points of law were concerned. He proposed that after all they should call in the aid of lawyers—of assessors. Who, then, is to appoint them? The hon. and learned Gentleman said, that it was impossible we could get rid of political bias in cases of the nature in question. He said that judges were but men; and I reply that assessors are but men also, and that we should find them, moreover, frequently animated by political feeling. But when the hon. and learned Gentleman said that the House should nominate assessors, he must have meant the majority of the House; and I tell you that from the moment you should give the majority the power of appointing assessors—with all the hon. and learned Gentleman's jealousy of transferring judicial power, touching the rights of voting—he would soon come to prefer the Court of Common Pleas as an appellate tribunal to assessors animated by the political feelings of the majority of the House, and certainly chosen with a very strong party bias on the part of that majority. I have just heard somebody suggest on the opposite side of the House that the appointment of assessors should be left to the Speaker. My respect for you, Sir, is sincere and heartfelt, and nothing would grieve me more than to see you so situated; for, if I am sure of anything, I am certain of this, that if these invidious powers were entrusted to you, with all your firmness, and all your high integrity—although you would exercise them honestly and fearlessly—yet that, from the day on which you were called to wield them, the united and unanimous support of this House would fail you, and you would cease to enjoy the undivided confidence of all its Members, With the exercise of all those qualities which so adorn you, you would not only be unable to discharge your new duties to the satisfaction of all, but you would become the object of angry suspicion and would have cause even to lament the day when you were raised to the high honour of taking the chair.

could not allow what had been considered the rights of the House of Commons for several centuries—those rights on which the existence and power of the House of Commons had ere this depended in the most troublesome times—to be given up without again stating his reasons for dissenting from what would probably be the judgment of the House. He did not think that it was fair that these rights should be given up without further discussion, or that it was idle and impertinent to make some still further stand for the privileges of the House. The right hon. Baronet to-night, as well as on other occasions, had alluded to the proposition made during the time when the late Ministry was in power with respect to the Court of Appeal established in Ireland. The right hon. Baronet seemed to think, that that proposition was decisive against him (Lord John Russell), and that it was a great authority in favour of the measure which the right hon. Baronet now brought forward, a compliment which he appreciated and acknowledged. He thought at first, from what the right hon. Baronet stated, that he was wrong with reference to the last registration bill which had been introduced; but, upon referring to that measure, which had been brought in by Lord Morpeth, he found that it gave power to the judges appoint three barrister to be the court of appeal, and were to sit in Dublin, That had been the proposition of the late Government, as brought in by Lord Morpeth. But with respect to the Irish franchise, he found that it was in so vague and unsatisfactory a state, that he was deeply impressed with the necessity of adopting some remedy, and it was, therefore, proposed, in a bill brought forward by one of the law officers of the late Government, to leave to the judge of assize the decision of questions relating to the franchise. He could not say, that what had occurred in Ireland was to him a great inducement to invest the English judges with a similar power to that reposed in the Irish judges. He remembered, that on one case there were eleven judges who gave an opinion on a question affecting the franchise, and of the eleven, there were eight holding Tory principles, who gave an opinion in accordance with those principles, and three Whigs, who also gave an opinion in accordance with the advancement of Whig interests. It could not be denied, that there had been in Ireland a strong political bias among the judges; but was it desirable that they should see, in the Court of Common Pleas here, four judges give opinions, and knowing their respective politics be able to say that as were their politics, so would be their decisions. Was it a system of that kind which they wished to introduce? Even supposing the present proposition took away no powers from the House, would they like to see such consequences follow from its enactment? And yet they had held up Ireland as an example to the House, when it was seen from that example that the political feelings of judges conformed with their judicial decisions in favour of one legal view or other of the franchise. The right hon. Baronet had, on the last occasion on which the subject was discussed, brought forward another example, in order to show hon. Members they might leave the matters in dispute to the decision of the judges; and that example was, the fact that the Legislature had left the decision as to libel in the hands of the judges. But what had happened when that was left to them? They used to tell the jury that the only fact which they had to decide was the question of actual publication Whether the publication were innocent or guilty, the jury were not to decide. The judges told them that they had merely to say whether the publication had taken place, and having found that fact, that it was for the, the judges, to say whether the alleged libel were treasonable and seditious, or whether it were innocent. And what became of that law? Was Parliament satisfied with it? Did not Mr. Fox, with the consent of the House, when he was the leader of a small minority—did he not, seconded by Mr. Erskine, introduce a bill to change the law, because the liberty of the press was injured by it? Was it, then, on a model such as was furnished by the old libel law, that the right hon. Gentleman proposed that the House should act? The question had been decided at various times. On one occasion, all the legal Members of the House had taken one side, and the great majority of the House had taken the other, and in that case, to which his hon. and learned Friend had referred, the case of Ashley? White, some of the greatest legal authorities in the country, then Members of that House, argued that though the House itself could finally de- cide who should have the right of sitting in the House, yet with respect to the power of deciding who should have the right of voting, that the courts of law might exercise that authority as well as the House. And he believed it was argued by Mr. Cowper, afterwards Lord Chancellor, that two different courts might have jurisdiction in the same matter if not for the same object. He said, for instance, in the ecclesiastical courts, they might decide whether a marriage was good or not; and afterwards, when a question relative to the descent of property was raised in the same case, of course the courts of law would decide that. Though the question might be the same question, yet, as the ends were different, both courts might have jurisdiction in the matter. But, in spite of that argument, and many other able arguments, the House decided, by a very great majority, that both with respect to the right of voting and the right to a seat in this House, it was the sole and only judge. What was now proposed was, that with respect to all points of law which might be raised in a case on which there should be an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the decision of that Court should be binding on the committees of this House. They were told by the right bon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury, the last time this matter was discussed, that this measure would so clear up all the difficulties with respect to the law, that so little would remain to be discussed, that, in fact, no great power at all would be given to the Court of Common Pleas. Well, what did the House see to-night; There occurred a difficulty with respect to a question connected with the bill, when the Attorney and Solicitor-generals differed on a point of law, and the Attorney-general appealed to his hon. and learned Friend (Sir T. Wilde) and desired his opinion upon it. Could they expect, after this, when there was such difference of opinion before the bill passed as to what might be the law, that there would be no difficulty when the bill came into operation?—Could they expect that all would be clear when the bill came into operation, if even now the great law authorities in this House were undecided as to the interpretation of the law; But, in fact, sometimes the most difficult and unforeseen questions had come before the courts of law and been decided by them according to their view of the law, affect- ing most materially the privileges of the subject. His hon. and learned Friend mentioned the cases of corporations. Very difficult and nice questions of law decided by the judges had in these cases materially affected the subject's privileges. And he expected, if this bill came into operation, that they would find a very different state of the law prevail to what had hitherto prevailed as to the freehold franchise of 40s. He knew not what passed in the revising courts, but he had frequently seen such questions decided according to the old election law when very little evidence was required with respect to 40s. freeholds. It was taken upon the evidence of the party himself, corroborated by the land-tax books; general credence was given to the assertions of the voter, and the 40s. freehold was allowed to reside in him. But if these points were to be made nice questions of law, they might have cases to settle the right of a 40s. freeholder as intricate as Chancery suits. They might require the applicant to bring his titles. They might go into the question of how he had acquired them, and thus utterly defeat by such complex and tedious proceedings, one of the most valuable rights enjoyed by the people of this country. Various questions might arise. His hon. and learned Friend had adverted to the decision of revising barristers against the right of peers to vote at elections. Such a question as that might come before the Court of Common Pleas, and a decision in favour of the peer be pronounced. If that should happen, where was the remedy? This House would have entirely parted with the remedy, and with all the oft-asserted laws of the House they would have parted with the right of altering the decisions so made, and the decisions of the Court of Common Pleas would be conclusive. He must confess that he thought those questions might have been safely left to the election committees of the House. He had not seen anything, either in former or later times, to induce him to think that the right of voting for Members of Parliament should be left entirely to the decisions of a common-law court. Mr. Fox, in one of his speeches, he believed it was in introducing his Law of Libel bill, said, that there were two great securities for the liberties of the people of England—the one, their representation in the House of Commons, the other the trial by jury. Nowhere was one of these most important rights—the right of the electors to vote according to the interpretation by the House of Commons of the laws affecting its Members and their constituents, to be taken away; because the House was no longer to decide by means of a select committee on questions of franchise, nor were they to be intrusted to the judgment of a jury, but to the decisions of certain judges according to their sole and separate view of the law. They were thus parting with a great power for the loss of which they could have no compensation. An hon. Gentleman had said, and he believed that the feeling was pretty general in the House, that were the clauses to be agreed to, they would get rid of delay and expense. It might be so as respected Members of that House, and it might be convenient for them to get rid of much delay and expense; but they should remember that all popular rights under a free government were rights attended by delay and expense—were rights which could only be asserted and maintained, and defended at the cost of considerable delay and expense. If they wished to have a court for deciding these rights, resembling that of, common legal tribunals, acting according to forms of law, without regard to the spirit of a free constitution, they might thus get rid of some delay and expence, but they would sacrifice with it one of those means of keeping up the liberties of the people which their ancestors had maintained, and by dint of which they had made the House of Commons what it now is.

was sorry to trespass on the House, but he felt called upon to do so in consequence of what had fallen from the noble Lord and his hon. and learned Friend (Sir T. Wilde.) His hon. and learned Friend had spoken of this bill as being of equal importance to the Septennial Act, and the noble Lord said that this bill was an inroad upon the constitution, and that they were called upon to part with some of the jurisdiction of the House which their ancestors had struggled to maintain. Now, he trusted that both his hon. and learned Friend and the noble Lord would pardon him for saying, that it appeared to him, from what they had slated, that they did not understand the clause. He was sure that his hon. and learned Friend, when he rose to address the House, was under the impres- sion that the registration was to be final, subject only to an appeal to the judge; and his hon. and learned Friend seemed to think that the House was about to part with a great portion of its jurisdiction. Now let them see what, in reality, were the provisions of the bill. The noble Lord side that his right hon. Friend near him had referred to the case of the Irish registrations as if he wanted to derive and have a precedent furnished him by the noble Lord. Now he did not think that his right hon. Friend had referred to the case of the registration in Ireland for any such purpose. But his right hon. Friend had referred to it to show that the Legislature had sanctioned a similar principle, and that the Government, of which the noble Lord and his hon. and learned Friend opposite were Members, had introduced bills into that House for the purpose of carrying to a further extent the provisions of the Irish Registration Act, and so make the decision of the court of law final and conclusive, even against a committee of the House of Commons. They were told that they were now parting with their jurisdiction; but let them see what was the state of their jurisdiction at the time when those bills which had been referred to were introduced. By the Irish Registration Act, which existed prior to the Reform Bill, the assistant barrister registered the voters, and an appeal was given to the judge of assize both upon the law and upon the fact—sometimes with, and sometimes without, the intervention of a jury. The Irish Reform Bill afterwards passed, and what was the construction put upon that act by several election committees? The construction put upon it was this, that the provisions of the Reform Bill prevented a committee of that House from examining into the validity of any vote when once placed upon the Irish register. Now, when they heard of political decisions, it should be recollected that these decisions declaring the registry to be final, proceeded from those who belonged to what was called the Liberal party. Now that was the state of the law with respect to registration in Ireland, when the bill referred to was introduced into the House. The bill was introduced by the late Master of the Roils, Sir Michael O'Loughlin, for the purpose of clearing up doubts with respect to Irish registration, and declaring that the registry, after the appeal to the judge, should be final, and that any committee of the House of Commons should be precluded from examining into the registry. Now, these being the provisions of the bill introduced by the late Government, they were told by the noble Lord that they were now acting unconstitutionally, and that they were violating the principles of the constitution. But, under one of the sections of the Reform Act, a committee of the House of Commons, whatever might be their opinions as to the validity or want of validity of any vote, had not the power to take a vote off the register unless it had been objected to by the revising barrister. Supposing that a number of bad votes had been placed on the list by the overseer, and the revising barrister, who might not be of more than three years' standing, for there was no restriction in this respect under the Reform Act, had admitted those votes, and allowed them to remain upon the register—the committee of the House of Commons had no power to strike off these votes unless they had been objected to before the revising barrister. His hon. and learned Friend told him that he was about to surrender the privileges of that House, though the very same power had been parted with by the Reform Bill, by the Irish Registration Bill, and again by the bill subsequently introduced by the late Government, with a view of making the Irish Registration Bill more stringent; and yet, seeing all this, the noble Lord told them that they were about to part with that power which their ancestors had struggled to retain. Now this was the very argument which had been used against the Grenville Act, and his hon. and learned Friend said, that he considered the Grenville Act to have been an unfortunate act. But did his hon. and learned Friend recollect the scenes that had passed in the House before the Grenville Act had passed? Did the House recollect that every decision was given as a party vote; nay, that it was upon the decision upon a contested election that the vote was come to which had induced Sir R. Walpole to resign office? [Sir T. Wilde: I said that I regretted that the House had not proceeded by resolution.] Proceed by resolution ! Resolution of what kind did his hon. and learned Friend mean? Was it to mean this? Here was a contested election; a person was charged with bribery, with something that affected his honour. That was to be investigated. Give him then at least this safeguard—if witnesses were to be examined let him have them examined under the sanction of the law, and liable to an indictment for perjury if they swore falsely. But his hon. and learned Friend said, "Why don't you pass a resolution to examine them at the bar on oath?" Did his hon. and learned Friend mean to say, that the House of Commons had power to examine witnesses on oath? His hon. and learned Friend knew that it was essential to have the authority of the Legislature to oblige witnesses to be examined on oath, and to inflict upon them the penalty of perjury. And he knew also that it was necessary to have a legislative enactment to give costs against those who presented frivolous petitions. What resolution? Would they adopt a resolution according to the opinion of a majority of the House in one Session, which resolution, when the majority was the other way of thinking, might be rescinded? And so you might go on alternately exercising and receding from your power. Was that the course they would adopt? But the hon. and learned Gentleman stood alone; for he never heard of any one in modern times who said he regretted the passing of the Grenville Act. [Lord J. Russell: Lord Campbell had so expressed himself.] He was not before aware of that, and he did not think the noble Lord meant to say, that he agreed with that opinion. So that supposing the noble Lord to be correct, his testimony came to this—that the Attorney and Solicitor-general of the late Government were opposed to the Grenville Act, and no body else. He should assume then for a moment that the passing of the Grenville Act was not to be regretted. Then by that act they had parted with the privileges their ancestors struggled for, and given it to their committees. By the Reform Act they had materially limited the power of a committee of the House of Commons to review the registry; in Ireland they had left it a doubt whether a committee of the House of Commons had the power to inquire into any vote when once placed upon the register. By the clauses now under discussion, they did not seem to take from the committees any power over voters at all, or any right to inquire into disputed elections. It was not sought to take that jurisdiction from the House; but simply this, that haying provided a court of appeal for the decision of questions coming before revising barristers, they had constituted that court of precisely those persons who were most likely to give satisfactory decisions. His hon. and learned Friend (Sir T. Wilde) seemed to mistake the provisions of the act. All that was made final was the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in the individual case, and upon the particular point of law submitted to them. There was nothing else made final at all. His hon. and learned Friend said, he objected to the discretion given to the barrister to state the case to the court. The barrister might refuse to do so or not, as he thought fit. Supposing he did not, what was the consequence? They would present a petition to the House of Commons, to which everything was open, the law, the fact, and everything else. Nothing was changed or altered. The party aggrieved would not be without remedy; for if there were no appeal to the Common Pleas then he had it to a committee of this House. Then an objection was made to the method of appointing the revising barrister. But the plan proposed was as old as the Reform Bill, and should have been objected to when that measure was before Parliament. His hon. and learned Friend said, that from the remuneration provided they would be likely to select those least able to perform the duties. But if his noble Friend had looked into the bill he would see that the remuneration was higher than before. Their object was not to lessen the remuneration but to diminish the number, and he saw no reason why they should not be able to obtain as able assistance from revising barristers under this bill as under the Reform Bill. He would now come to some objections urged by the noble Lord, and which he was sorry had fallen from the noble Lord, because, coming from him, they would be likely to have great weight with the country. When the noble Lord said, that he distrusted the judges of the land—that he did not like to entrust them with the decisions of cases of this kind—he (the Solicitor-general) was sorry to hear such a declaration coining from the noble Lord, Did the noble Lord mean, when referring to the Judges in Ireland, and saying that one portion of them gave their decision in favour of one line of politics, and another in favour of another, that when these questions came before the Court of Common Pleas any political consideration would influence the judges of that court in their determinations. He could say this, and he was expressing the unanimous feeling of Westminster-hall and of the country, that every one would have perfect confidence in the decisions of that court. And he was sure the judges of that court would not allow the slightest feeling of political bias to influence their decision in any case that might come before them. Nor did he think that it could possibly arise. They would not have to decide upon the validity of a return at an election, and to say whether A or B was elected; but a case would be sent up from which neither the judge nor counsel would know how a particular decision would affect a political party. They would have to decide without any knowledge of the political bearings of the case. The noble Lord had referred to the law of libel. Now the cause of the alteration in the law of libel was, that the judges themselves, in consequence of an act that had passed, had taken upon themselves to say, that the question of libel was a question of law, and not of fact. They treated it as a question of law; and of course, their decision would be the right one. That was a question for them not a jury. The Legislature thought—and he (Sir W. Follett) did not say unwisely— that it was far better in political libels that the whole question should be submitted to the jury; but that very act of Parliament directed that the judge who tried the cause, should at the same time state his opinion, whether, in point of law, the matter complained of was a libel or not. But this alteration was introduced by the Legislature for the purpose of putting before the jury in a case of libel the same point submitted to juries in other cases—namely, a mixed question of law and fact. But did the noble Lord mean to say, because the Legislature passed that act, that therefore the tribunals for appeals now sought to be established ought not to exist? Where was the analogy between the two? Under the Reform Act difficult questions had arisen as to the franchise; and it had been shown that legal assistance ought to be obtained. Barristers had been appointed to revise the register of voters, and it was thought advisable that there should be an appeal against their decisions. It was at first proposed to create an Appellate Court, to be composed of three barristers, but when that proposition was submitted it seemed to be the unanimous opinion that that tribunal would not be as good, or as satisfactory, as a court of law, and therefore, his right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) had proposed to substitute the Court of Common Pleas as a Court of appeal. But they were told that in appointing this appeal to the Court of Law, they were violating the constitution, and abandoning the privileges of the House. He trusted that the House would feel that, in adopting this clause, they were not abandoning any privilege, nor committing any infringement of the constitution, but that they were carrying out that which it was their desire to carry out, namely, the establishment of a good, a perfect, and an effectual court of appeal from the revising Barristers' Court. They were called on to do no more than this, and he hoped they would be able to do that with effect.

said, the case was one of some difficulty, but be thought that it was likely that it would not be single cases, but classes of cases, that would be determined by the court of appeal, and as he thought the reference 10 the Court of Common Pleas would compel the revising barristers to act on some uniformity of principle, he should support the motion.

moved the second reading of the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill,

rose and said:^* Those who were present in the early part of the evening, and those only, can adequately understand the all but unanimous opposition which the bill now under consideration appeared at that time to encounter in the House. From every side petitions were presented against the measure: I may observe, that up to the 31st March inclusive, there had been eighty-two; and in this day's sitting, perhaps half as many more have been received—not from one section only of the House, but from all

^* From a corrected report.

indiscriminately. And there is this distinction in reference to the present measure, to which I cannot recollect a parallel in reference to any other; namely, that while there have been this number and variety of petitions against the bill, there has not been one—literally not one—petition in its favour. In the language, indeed, of (he petition from the Dean and Chapter of Norwich, which I myself presented a few days ago, those who agree on nothing else agree in condemning the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill. I wish my right hon. Friend (Sir James Graham) would consider this state of things. I respectfully urge him to spare, not his ordinary opponents, but the attached friends of his administration, from the necessity of resisting a measure of his Government; and to withdraw, before there be any actual collision between us, a proposition which so many of his own friends are compelled conscientiously to resist. I have already said that the opposition is general. I know that some object to the bill on one ground; some, on another; some, because the bill goes too far; some, because it does not go far enough. [Sir J. Graham: " Hear, hear."] I understand the cheer of my right hon. Friend; but I can assure him that, for my own part, I will never invoke the aid of any man except on my own principles. I will not attack the measure except on the grounds which I myself can maintain: but yet it must be obvious to my right hon. Friend, that if, without any compromise of my own opinions, I attack the bill on one side, I cannot be responsible for others attacking it in another way on another side. My own first objection to the measure is, that it is a change uncalled for by any necessity. It surely cannot be contended that change, without need, is in itself a good. Change in civil society is in fact an evil, except to remove a greater evil, or to insure a greater good. The disturbance of an existing institution requires these results in order to justify it. The proposed change effects the destruction of ancient institutions, and, at the same time, the ruin of individuals; while it also, indirectly yet necessarily, involves the hazard of injuring a very important branch of legal study and knowledge throughout the country. I am no advocate for the toleration of an abuse because it is ancient; but I say now, as I have always said, prove the abuse, and then reform it: prove the evil, and then remove it;—but prove, also, that the good which you seek will be greater to the community than the evil which it entails will be to individuals.^* Now, first, the proposed bill destroys about 380 ancient institutions. There are nearly 400 courts in England, which have existed, some, I believe, from the Conquest; all, for many centuries; and whatever may be said of the original introduction of the ecclesiastical law into England, or of the institution of these courts, or of the propriety of vesting in them a jurisdiction in matters testamentary the facts of the ancient standing of that law in England, of the courts to administer it, and of the matters administered, are all unquestioned. All of these courts, for one main function of their institution, the present bill destroys. It destroys them, without complaint on the one hand, without inquiry on the other. Yet, of the importance and fitness of inquiry, or, at least, of the propriety of the House receiving something like information on the subject at issue, before deciding it, those certainly must be persuaded, who moved for the reprinting of the famous Report of 1832 on the Ecclesiastical Courts. But if that report, contained in the big Blue Book which has been delivered this morning, be necessary to enlighten the House on the subject, the discussion ought now to be postponed: this large volume has not been ten hours in our hands; and a man can hardly yet handle its damp pages without the danger of rheumatism: if, on the contrary, the Blue Book be not necessary for the discussion of the measure, why was it ordered to be printed, at an expense which an hon. Member opposite (Mr. Hume), more easily than I, can calculate? In this volume, to which the framers of the present measure refer as their great authority, the destruction of about 380 courts was first projected. I am aware that, on this branch of the subject I shall not have the sym-

^* On this subject, I am happy to quote the forcible and just observation of Dr. Robert Philimore. (Study of the Civil and Canon Law, Lond. 1843, 8vo., p. 1.) "In our own age, the order of things seems reversed; every existing institution is called upon, in legal phrase, to show cause why it should not be destroyed the burthen of proof is shifted in a manner so contrary to common sense, equity, and reason, that those who defend what is established are required to demonstrate that it is not, instead of those who attack that it is, injurious to the public weal."

pathy of many, who, nevertheless, concur with me in opposing the bill, of which this is one of the results. But it appears to me to be in principle so objectionable, that I cannot consistently refrain from urging the evil of it. Some of these courts are royal peculiars; some are lay peculiars; some clerical peculiars. In these terms, and throughout the discussion., I shall not confine myself to technical language; it is not difficult to clothe (he whole question with professional phraseology; but in a deliberative body, like the present, it is better to use the common-sense language of daily life. To the subject of the royal and lay peculiars I will ask the attention of the House at a biter period; and to the subject of that mixed character of peculiar attached to the temple in London I will not presume to advert at all: I will rather leave it to its natural defenders, the learned body whose rights and independence this bill despatches by one summary phrase. I now advert to the case of the clerical peculiars, not so much with a view to show their fitness to retain possession of any jurisdiction in secular matters of ordinary society, such as wills, as with a view to show bow completely and how suddenly, by one single word, the present bill destroys some of the most ancient and established institutions of the ecclesiastical system of England. Take, for example, the Deanery of Salisbury. The Dean of Salisbury exercises a quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over eighty-two parishes—almost half as many as are contained in the diocese of Durban); almost quite as many as were contained in the diocese of Rochester ten years ago. I find this statement of the fact in one of the returns made to the House (No. 232. of 1828, p. 38.)

"The very rev. the Dean of Sarum, by an ancient constitution of the cathedral church, has exercised peculiar and exempt episcopal jurisdiction over eighty-two parishes; the dean having ordinary jurisdiction over the prebends of the Church (in which the prebendaries exercise archiadiaconal jurisdiction, having formerly resided on their prebends) and peculiar jurisdiction in other parishes; and, as ordinary, visiting triennially the prebends, in like manner as the bishop visits the archdeaconries; and visiting annually the other parishes in his peculiar and immediate jurisdiction, according to the ancient statutes of the Church, and the constant usage for above five centuries past, "

I take the statement from the return: but the date might have been placed much earlier—almost to the time of the first bishop who had his see in Salisbury, nearly 800 years ago. Is there any proof, is there the slightest allegation, of abuse on the part of the Dean of Salisbury? The actual dean and his immediate predecessors might, I believe challenge inquiry into their conduct. The present Dean visits and charges his clergy like a Bishop, and with great piety and discretion. Nor is this jurisdiction a novelty arising out of the Reformation. I beg the House to recollect that, by the lowest estimate of its antiquity, it has, on the contrary, existed for five centuries; for two centuries, 1 might almost say five, before the Reformation; for three centuries since. It is possible, though it may be feared not probable, that the bill, after all, does not contemplate the destruction of this jurisdiction without the shadow of a charge against the holder of it. But if it be not intended to destroy it, then it may be said, that the phraseology of the bill is singularly unhappy: and here I cannot but recollect the language of the Dean and Chapter of Norwich, to whose petition I have already adverted, and who, observing that by one form of words in the bill, all chapters and colleges, perhaps even the Universities, are made subject to the visitation of the nearest archdeacon, and being since told that such form of words was a mistake, and did not represent the mind and intentions of the framers of the bill, reply, that such a mistake, occurring in the first clause of the bill, deprives them of all confidence in those who so framed it. It is true that the obnoxious phrase occurs in other measures which, at different times, have been brought in by others, for the regulation or abolition of Ecclesiastical Courts: but this is no justification of its occurring here, if it have, as is believed, the meaning which the chapters affected by it have apprehended it to bear. The measure has by some been regarded as the attack of Doctors' Commons against all England. But I am happy to say, for the credit of Doctors' Commons, that all connected with its courts are not unanimous in favour of the bill. On the contrary, the ablest pamphlet which I have read on the subject, and which I respectfully recommend to my right hon. Friend (Sir James Graham), entitled, "Remarks on the Ecclesiastical Courts Bill," is, though anonymous, un- derstood to be written by a very able and acute practitioner in the London Courts. If, then, even Doctors' Commons be not unanimous in favour of the measure, is the change asked by the country? 1 have already referred to the number of petitions against the bill, and to the absence of any single petition for it. In the words of the petition from Carmarthen, presented by an hon. Member whom I see opposite (Mr. Morris), the existing system is to be destroyed "in the entire absence of any expression of dissatisfaction on the part of the public." What, then, recommends the measure? Why, it is "centralisation." Now that word—whatever charm it might once have possessed—has lost that charm in the eyes of the people of England. It is no longer in itself likely to be received as the justification of this or any other great change. Yet half, at least, of the reasoning in favour of the present bill rests on the benefit of "a central system." However inconsistent may be such reasoning on the part of those who in other matters are carrying justice to every man's door, yet, for the sake of argument, I will admit, for the moment, that it is desirable, that there should be one great central court, to which should be transferred all the business of the 380 courts which are to be abolished. May I, without throwing ridicule on the arguments of the friends of "centralisation," try it by this test? namely, will they erect the new court at Northampton, as the actual centre of England? No; their real object is to take all the business from the country, and bring it all to London: the real object is not centralisation, as such, but their own metropolis—not one court, but that one court in Doctors' Commons. I will not attempt to point out all the objections which exist to the present measure, in what it destroys, and in what it creates.

^*Charles Bowdler, Esq.: I am glad to tale the opportunity of stating here my entire conviction that my right hon. friend (Mr. Nicholl), who retired from Doctors' Commons when he accepted the office of Judge Advocate has, personally, no more pecuniary interest in the measure than I have; that his own right of patronage under it is not more extensive than mine; and that he has no more an unworthy motive in urging the bill than I have in opposing it. I say this, because to his measure, though certainly not to himself, I am on fuller consideration move and more opposed.

I feel that I am likely to need so much of the indulgence of the House on one grant division of the bill,—that which relates to the testamentary jurisdiction,—that I must leave to others the task of pointing out in detail the evils in other pacts of the bill. I select the question connected with testamentary jurisdiction as the more prominent ground of my objection, not because other matters which I find in this bill do not claim the highest attention on other grounds,—such, for instance, as the jurisdiction in causes matrimonial; such, also, as those which deprive the Church of its attribute of having any temporal sanctions in maintaining its discipline in any case; such as those which exclude from its cognizance altogether a whole class of questions which it has for centuries decided, and such as those which give an appeal from the decisions of a bishop, in matters purely ecclesiastical, to the Queen in Council, without providing that such council shall consist of members of the Church;—it is not from disregard to these subjects that I propose to pass from them to any other, but because I believe that the consolidation of all the business relating to "the wills" of England is, practically, the foundation of the whole proceeding. But, in passing, I would just notice one of the needless inconsistencies of the measure. Having by one clause destroyed at once all the peculiars, lay and clerical, of England, and having subjected chapters and colleges, and perhaps even the Universities, to the visitation of the nearest archdeacon, the bill proceeds, by another clause, to destroy the court of this very archdeacon. The Legislature by a late act gave increased functions to the archdeacon: he is still to remain the oculus episcapi,—he is still to visit; but in this function he is to be little more than a common informer, without the power of acting on the results of his visitation. But perhaps I may be told, as in the case of chapters being made subject to the archdeacon, that it is a mistake, and is not intended. All I can say is, that, on the face of the bill, the attentions which it effects, and which, I fear, are at all events intended, are alike extensive and impolitic; and therefore, if In one point I attribute to it a consequence not contemplated, enough of needless change still remains to justify my opposition. Again I say that I defend no abuse: but again I say, prove that an institution is an abuse before you destroy it. The present mode of legislation is rather working in the reckless spirit of savage life, which destroys a tree to get at the fruit, than in the wise spirit of statesmanship, which will always look first to a remedy, before it destroys. My complaint is, that, instead of remedying defects, this measure works a wholesale and indiscriminate destruction. There have been insulated instances of abuse stated; and enough has been made of "the will kept in a hat-box" in some small country registry; but there is little wisdom in making such rare cases the ground of so wide a measure of abolition. I will prove that this is the exception; the present practice in the country courts, as reported to this House, and as I myself have it in evidence, is very different. I will not, of course, trouble the House with details on all or even on many of the registries; but I will take a few, by the fairest of all rules of selection,—the letters of the alphabet. I will, therefore, look neither to the north nor to the south of England; still less to the Whig or the Tory; but I will take two letters of the alphabet, B and C, and only a few instances from each. First, Bedford, which I have myself indeed visited; the original wills are all kept in a room under the same roof with the church; and in another building, copies of all those wills, from 1600, are to be found, transcribed in folio volumes, with indexes as regular as those in Doctors' Commons. Then, Barnstaple: the wills are kept in a fire-proof room, built by the registrar, at his own expense; and copies are made and kept in folio books, as in Doctors' Commons; and the registrar, with whom I have been in communication, states, in reference to the court there, that there has not been one appeal from its decisions in seven years. At Bristol, I learn, on the authority of Mr. Clark, who has officiated there for forty-four years, that the poorer classes obtain, instantly, probate of the wills of their friends without the employment of proctors or solicitors, by going direct to his office. Would the proposed change be beneficial to them? Mr. Clark adds, that there have been only two appeals during his time, and in those the judgments of his court had been confirmed. No appeals have been made from our decisions in the last ten years—is, indeed, the return made continually from the greater number of the country court. William respect to the great proportion, in fact, there is very little business for decision, or for appeal. I have looked down whole pages of one of the returns to this House, and find one statement—no suits in this court for the last ten years. So far, therefore, as business is concerned, many of these minor courts might be abolished; but the same fact proves also, that they do no harm. But to return to my list. At Bodmin, as I see by a letter which I have received from Mr. Preston Wallis of that place, another advantage of the existing system is exemplified, which will be lost by the projected change and consequent transfer of all the original wills to London. He says:

"Within my own experience, I have known many instances of suits having been amicably settled by an inspection of the will of the deceased in the registry office; the parties have recognized their relative's handwriting, and been content. How is this to be effected at Exeter or in London? How are poor people to travel 100 or 300 miles to see and be satisfied?"

He takes these distances because the bill at all events carries the original documents to London, 300 miles; and then sends down copies to Exeter, 100 miles from some parts of Cornwall, and does not leave in that large county one single court of probate; whereas now, as Mr. Wallis states, half-yearly courts are held in each of its principal towns, and are so arranged that no party has to travel more than ten miles to prove a will. He adds:

"And when once the difficulty and improbability—of inspection by those interested in detecting frauds or forgeries—are known, it cannot be supposed that such practices will be less frequently resorted to."

To show the value to the great bulk of the people, of their existing privilege of superintending their own business personally and on the spot, Mr. Wallis, in the same letter, states, that, of the 308 wills proved on an average of ten years in his court, 243 were sworn to by the parties either at Bodmin or in his registry circuits, and no more than sixty-three were sworn to by commission. The importance of a party being able himself to see the original will in which he is interested is also illustrated in a letter which I have received

^* Vide Parliamentary Paper, No. 386 of 1838. In the first fifteen returns there is no one appeal.

from Mr. Davis, a venerable practitioner at Gloucester. This gentleman, who has the experience of nearly half a century, states:

" Nobody but those in the practice of it can tell how it appeases angry and litigant parties by taking them to the register office, and showing them the orignial document, the handwriting of the deceased, &c. &c. These are matters inherent in human nature, about which there is no arguing. At present, a will may be seen for a shilling. If deposited in the Commons, I will give you an idea of what the probable expense would be, by inclosing a skeleton of a probable bill.

, Sir, my hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford, baa made so direct an appeal to me, that it is impossible for me to delay replying to the remarks with which my hon. Friend has prefaced the amendment that has just been read. I can assure my hon. Friend that if this measure had been hastily prepared, or if I thought, that further deliberation might change my views upon the bill now under the consideration of the House, I would willingly yield to the suggestion for delay. But the bill has not been brought forward prematurely, nor without ample preparation on the part of her Majesty's Government, and I should only be guilty of deception, if I were to lead any one to believe it possible that I could change my views respecting this measure. Considering the view which nay hon. Friend takes of this measure, it is quite natural and consistent on his part to move that it be rejected, for he has stated to the House that he looks upon the bill as one that, if passed, would sever the connection between Church and State, would be a confiscation of valuable rights, and would be, on the part of the Archbishop of Canterbury, a surrender of privileges which he has no right to surrender. I feel bound to say, that I distinctly admit the truth of the statement made by my hon. Friend at the beginning of his speech, that I must be prepared for a very powerful opposition to this bill. I am aware, that many of the gentlemen with whom I am in the habit of acting, disapprove of the bill, and I am also aware, that among those to whom 1 am habitually opposed, there are likewise many from whom I must look for the most determined resistance to the measure. If I were not aware of the grounds of this opposition, I should only have to look at the volume I hold in my hand in order to ascertain them. When my right hon. Friend was at the head of the administration in 1835, an hon. and learned Gentleman, who previously as well as subsequently held the office of Attorney-general (Sir J. Campbell), who was then opposed to the Government, plainly told my hon. and learned Friend, the present Attorney-general and the then administration what would probably be the effect of a measure of this description, affirming that it would give umbrage to the country solicitors, a very powerful body, who would send in numerous petitions on this subject to the House, and would be able to induce many Members to vote against this salutary reform. Sir John Campbell then pointed out the difficulties which would attend a measure of this kind, and I now cite the opinion as a convincing proof that those difficulties have not been over-rated or misunderstood, but I, in the discharge of my public duty, being sincerely of opinion that this measure would be conducive to the public interest, and that it is not of a dangerous nature, as my hon. Friend who has just sat down believes it to be, have thought it my paramount duty, at all events, to submit the bill to the deliberation of Parliament. Anticipating the precarious support which this measure might receive en the opposition side, and aware also of the character of the opposition it would encounter out of doors, in the powerful quarters to which I have alluded, but believing firmly that it is wise in its policy, and would be conducive to the public good, I can not shrink from asking for the opinion of the House on its merits. My hon. Friend says this measure is not called for and asks from whom it emanates. Never has a measure, effecting a judicial change, been proposed to Parliament, which rested on a concurrence of higher authority than the bill under discussion. First of all, it has been submitted to a commission composed of the highest ecclesiastical and legal authorities; and the bill embodies, with a very slight exception, all the recommendations contained in the report of that commission. When I had the honour of being at the head of the Board of Admiralty, it was necessary to bring under the consideration of a committee of the House the constitution of the Admiralty Court, and, immediately connected with it, the administration of the civil tribunals of Doctors'-commons. A committee was appointed in 1833, to which the question of the Admiralty Court was referred, and an hon. Gentleman whom I see opposite (Mr. Jervis) served on that committee. I am sure the hon. Gentleman, although differing from me in many respects, will agree with me in thinking that the committee comprehended some of the highest authorities in the House. The late Sir J. Nicholl, the present Sir H. Jenner Fust, Dr. Lushing-ton, and Sir Nicholas Tindal were all examined before the committee, and all gave their evidence strongly and decidedly in favour of the principal changes recommended in the report. A bill, founded on that report, was introduced by the Government of my right hon. Friend in 1835, and a bill similar to that, and almost identical in its provisions, was subsequently introduced by the Government of Lord Melbourne, under the immediate auspices of Lord Cottenham, the late Lord Chancellor. That bill, so framed, was referred to a committee of the House of Lords, which went through all the enactments, and made a report in favour of the bill, almost with unanimity, and with certain modifications, not very material, one of which was the admission of an exception in favour of wills below a given amount. We have, therefore, the highest ecclesiastical authorities in favour of the measure, the highest judicial authorities in favour of it, the authority of two or three ex-Chancellors, and of the present Lord Chancellor of England, in its favour. That is my answer to the question of my hon. Friend—from whom does this bill emanate? My hon. Friend is strongly opposed to the abolition of 380 provincial tribunals. There may be some ground for objecting to the abolition of the diocesan courts, but it has been reserved for my hon. Friend to contend for the advantage of the dispersion through England of 380 tribunals, adjudicating on wills, claiming to be the separate depositaries of wills, and rendering necessary the doctrine of bona notabilia, which has been the source of more expensive litigation than any other part of ecclesiastical law. I can understand the argument in favour of preserving the diocesan courts, as contrasted with the concentration of the judicial authority in London, proposed by the present bill; but, till I heard the hon. Member for the University of Oxford, I had not supposed that a single Member would contend for the maintenance of 380 distinct local tribunals throughout the country. My hon. Friend asked whether there had been inquiry? I say, that the inquiry into this matter has been more full, more ably and competently conducted than in the case of any other-subject of the same importance. The committee recommended, that one court, sitting in London, should be the only court for probate of wills, granting administration, and exercising jurisdiction in the various other cases and matters enumerated, and that the judge or judges should be appointed by the Crown. Sir H. Jenner Fust, Dr. Lushington, and the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, were examined with respect to the comparative economy of probate taken out in the country, and probate taken out in London, and all declared it to be their opinion, that under proper regulations, which were pointed out by them, and are now embodied in the bill before the House, the cost of probate would not be greater in London than in the country. My hon. Friend charged me with something like inconsistency because I am an advocate for granting facilities for the recovery of small debts in the country, and the extension of county courts for that purpose, while I was defending a measure which would concentrate courts having jurisdiction in probate of wills and administration in London. There is nothing inconsistent in proposing to deal with sums of small amount by local jurisdiction, while large sums are left to be dealt with by the central authority. What is proposed with respect to debts is in exact conformity with what is proposed respecting probate. The local tribunal must from the necessity of the case, be an inferior tribunal, and it is only safe to entrust to the inferior jurisdiction command over property of small amount. My proposition is, that wills disposing of a large amount of property shall be tried before a superior tribunal, where they will have all the advantages of the attention of a judge of high station, who, through life, has been familiar with such causes. The hon. Gentleman has referred to the great advantage of having the wills deposited in the places where the trials are held. It is quite clear that London is the centre of litigation with respect to testamentary property of large value, and there must be great advantage in having in the metropolis a central register of wills. But is there no provision with respect to wills in the country? The bill provides that for wills under 300l. there shall be in each diocese a register, in which the original will shall be deposited; and with respect to wills beyond the value of 300l., though the original is to be registered in London, that there should be deposited in the diocesan register a copy of the will. It is calculated that expences will be immensely diminished under the proposed system. The right hon. Gentleman, the Judge Advocate-general, pointed out to the House, on asking leave to bring in the bill, that a large prospective saving would be effected, when the compensations granted by the measures should have fallen in. I am quite satisfied that ample justice will be done to all parties concerned by the compensations granted for the sinecure offices to be abolished, and that, when those compensations shall have ceased, there will be a large surplus available for any extension or improvement of the principles of the measure which it may be thought desirable hereafter to accomplish. Fears have been expressed with respect to fire, but I apprehend that no greater danger exists on that head in London than in York or Liverpool. Twice has York Minster been ravaged by fire, and I will venture to assert that for the last fifty years there have been more serious fires in Liverpool than in London. But these are ail minor points. I confess I think the time has arrived when it is desirable to take the sense of the House upon the principle of the measure. The principle of the measure is, the concentration, under a judge appointed by the Crown, of the supreme jurisdiction in matters testamentary and matrimonial. It may be possible that the opinion of the House is opposed to it, but I feel bound to ask for its decision, I understood my hon. Friend to say, it was desirable either that Government should withdraw this measure, or should adopt the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport, to refer the bill, after the second reading, to a select committee. I cannot consent to withdraw it, after the attention which the Government has bestowed on the details, after having formed a sincere opinion that the measure would be attended with benefit to the public, notwithstanding the injury which may be done to private interests. It is equally impossible for me to accede to the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Devonport. Great advantages might be anticipated from the right hon. Gentleman's assistance on a committee, but I think that the details of the measure have already been investigated by authorities of superior weight to those which could be collected by any committee that could be appointed. The ecclesiastical commissioners have recommended all the details of this measure, which are sanctioned also by the report of the Admiralty committee. I have also the authority of my right hon. and learned Friend the Judge Advocate, acting on behalf of the Government; also the authority of the right hon. Baronet now at the head of the Government, who, in 1835, brought forward a measure almost identical with the present. I also on the part of Lord Grey's Government, proposed a similar measure, and bestowed great pains on the report of that committee. Under the administration of Lord Melbourne, the then Attorney-general and Lord Cotton-ham undertook the same subject, and bestowed infinite labour upon it. I have then the opinion of three chancellors in favour of the measure, I have the opinion of the ecclesiastical commissioners in favour of it; I have the opinion of Attorney-generals on both sides of the House in favour of it; I have the report of a committee of the House of Lords in favour of it, I have the report of a committee of the House of Commons in favour of it. Upon principle, then, I cannot yield to the opposition to this bill, and the details of it rest upon the most minute investigation bestowed by the highest authority. With all deference, therefore, I must say, that if the House should think proper to reject this bill, I cannot offer any measure likely to be more acceptable in details. It is a question of principle to be decided upon by the House, and if it should be their pleasure to reject it, I shall deplore the decision. I shall believe that those reasons which I have already alluded to have been triumphant; and with pain I must come to the conclusion, that private interests have prevailed over public consideration; and that a measure, which in my conscience I believe to be sound and beneficial, has been defeated by a combination, such as I am unwilling to characterise.

repudiated the insinuation cast on the motives of the opponents of this measure by the right hon. Baronet, who, in his Opinion, would have done better had he refuted the arguments urged in opposition to it, and proved the advantages likely to follow from its enactment, instead of bringing forward the authority of committees over which he himself presided—[Sir J. Graham: no.] Of which, at least, the right hon. Baronet was a member. This was the first measure of the kind on which an opportunity had been afforded of full discussion. The principal objection to the measure was, that it transferred the whole of the contentious, and a great part of the lucrative non-contentious business from different parts of the country to London. When so much stress had been laid on the benefits which would accrue from the enactment of the measure, the House ought also to be made aware of the gross abuses to which it would be liable. The court would be incompetent to an effectual discharge of its duties, and would be utterly ineffective in securing uniformity. These objections had been pointed out in the real property-report, and in a petition from the London solicitors—men who could have no personal interest whatever in defeating such a measure—not being allowed to practise in the court, the business of which was restricted to thirty-four practitioners, as he believed, some of whom got 1,000 guineas premium with their articled clerks. There might be conflicting decisions; the Court of Chancery might decide one way and the Ecclesiastical Court another. With regard to the sanity of testators such conflicting decisions were not uncommon in the courts of common law and the ecclesiastical courts. He remembered a case in which this was flagrantly apparent. The case was "Tatham and Wright," in which a special jury found a testator insane with respect to his disposition of his real estate, whose will with regard to his personal property had been incontrovertibly established by the ecclesiastical courts. Nor was this to be wondered at, when in the one case the conclusion was arrived at by means of oral testimony, where the jury formed their judgment from the evidence and personal demeanour of the witness, and in the other the evidence was entirely composed of written depositions. An issue might be directed by the judge of the ecclesiastical court; but only after the expensive process of examining witnesses on paper had been gone through, in order to ascertain whether a doubtful point existed, which it was necessary to send to a jury. Such was the system which this bill designed to perpetuate; for it could not be called a reformation of Doctors' Commons. Why should not the poor man have justice brought to his door in testamentary matters, as well as in matters of civil rights? Why not establish an universal consistent system? The essence was too much neglected in conducting law reforms. The right hon. Baronet had failed to 'show the benefits which would be derived from the passing of this measure. Did he complain that ecclesiastical law was improperly administered in the country? Why not, then, send contentious cases when caveats had been entered to the superior tribunal in London, without depriving Suitors of the advantage of their local tribunals when no difference existed as to the testamentary disposition? But this was not the motive; the object was centralization. He could not understand upon what grounds a distinction was drawn between property above and under 300l. Was there greater difficulty in deciding one class of cases than the other? Was it hot, on the contrary, notorious that, in consequence of the want of technicality in the drawing up of wills bequeathing property of small value, much greater difficulty arose in adjudicating upon them than in the Case of large property where the instrument had been pro- party prepared by competent persons? It was, in short, establishing One law for the rich and another for the poor. But there were many other serious objections to the measure. In the first place the expense under the proposed system would be considerably augmented. His hon. Friend the Member lot the University of Oxford read an extractor the comparative charges in Chester and London. By this comparison it was proved the office fees for proving a will in London were from 15 to 20 per cent. more than in Chester, and it must of necessity be so. There was a practice in London, not prevailing elsewhere, of charging an extracting fee-that was, according to the amount of property sworn to, a fee in increased ratio to the length of the instrument. From a table he held in his hand it appeared that it many cases the charge in London was double the amount of that in Chester. It might be Said that if the fees charged were extravagant the judges had power, by the 34th clause, to alter and reduce them, but still the expense in London must necessarily be larger than in the country. The person in the country who had to prove a will in London must employ a proctor or attorney, who must send it to a London proctor, and thus two separate bills must be paid for proving the same will. This, it should be remembered, was not the case of solicitor and agent, for now, under an Act of Parliament respecting the division Of protts, a proctor would be struck off the roll if he were known to divide the profits; and consequently, in the case they Were considering, the expense must be doubled. The observation of his hon. friend on the effect of this was well worthy of the consideration of the House. The right hon. Baronet said these wills, in every case, were contested in Chancery. But in every case respecting disputed property, at present the assize town being the town where these registers were kept a man was sent to the register office, there to examine the will at the expense of a few shillings, while under the proposed system a person must come down front London to the assize town in charge of the will and of course, at much greater expense. Was that no objection, and did it Or not deserve attention when they were not professing to reform the whole system, but were merely abolishing local jurisdiction co increase the profits of the central system? He thought also the Chancellor of the Exchequer was interested in this measure, for with respect to stamps it could not fail to have a serious effect upon the revenue. It was already notorious that in the country no man would prove a will, unless compelled to do so, as, for instance, when obliged to establish his right to some disputed debt, and they might therefore depend upon it, that since hereafter the interest of the proctor would go along with that of his client, enough would be proved to recover the debt and no more. It should be remembered that by the proposed system they would leave but an inferior class of proctors. The practice now was for a solicitor who took Stamps for a large amount to give credit for them until the will was proved, but this would not be the case with the London proctor, who, although he did so now, would not do so under a totally different system. It appeared to him this measure would involve them in great difficulty, and for no object but to establish the favourite project of central registration. If this were so why, he would ask, should wills, if above a certain amount be registered in London? Why should not titles to property follow also? If this were not the object, why should the large wills be kept in town and the small ones in the country? Should he be told that it was for the facility of search? But he would tell the House that there was now a very easy means of search through the medium of the Stamp-office. He would advise hon. Gentlemen opposite to be on their guard, lest this system of registering wills in London might be the commencement of a plan for the general registration of title deeds as well. The right hon. Gentleman sneered at the notion of suitors wishing to inspect wills for themselves; but, judging from experience, he knew that suitors much desired to do it personally, and were not satisfied without it It was, therefore, of deep interest to the parties that they should have the power of doing so, and particularly since there were no countervailing advantages, or, at least, none that had been pointed out. He did not object to the abolition of the peculiars jurisdiction, nor to the alteration in the bonâ notabilia, which he conceived to be good; but by this measure the criminal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, courts, with respect to defamation, schism, brawling, smiting, and other offences, which they never heard of without an accompanying desire for its reformation, was left untouched. The bishop's courts, with all their obnoxious jurisdiction in respect to the offences of simony, heresy, schism, incest, adultery, and various offences enumerated in clause eighty seven, remained to be worked by the inferior class of proctors who would be left by the bill, or if that were not the case, the bill was drawn in such a clumsy way, that no man reading it could suppose it had any other intention. He wished also to call attention to the salaries proposed to be given under the new measure. The judge of the Arches Court now received a salary of 3,300l. without any retiring pension; but by this bill it was proposed to take from him all the prerogative jurisdiction, place in his hands the contentious jurisdiction, and to give him a salary of 4,500l., with a retiring pension of two-thirds of that amount. At present the judges possessed little patronage, but this bill would give them the appointment of registrars, clerks, surrogates, and other officers. He complained that the bill would increase the salaries of all the officers of the courts. The salary of the Queen's Advocate for instance, would be raised to 500l. a-year. Every one must admit that the learned Gentleman who held that office discharged his duties in a most efficient and satisfactory manner. He must say that he considered this feature of the measure most objectionable. This bill precluded country registrars from practising, but an exception was made with respect to London. A great advantage was thus given to the London registrars, for while they might practise as proctors, the registrars in the country would be compelled to give up their practice as proctors or solicitors, and there was no provision for affording them compensation. He considered that the bill did not contain any features to recommend it to the House. On all these grounds, believing the measure to be unsanctioned by competent authority, he should support the amendment of the hon. Baronet.

would support his hon. Friend the Member for Oxford in endeavouring to remove at one fell blow a Bill of that obnoxious character. If her Majesty's Government had made this an open question, many of the Members of the Government would not have supported the right hon. Baronet, the Home Secretary, on that occasion. When a similar bill was brought forward by Lord Camp-bell, the right hon. Gentleman below him exclaimed against the creation of patronage; and yet now, forsooth, they brought in a bill which gave to Doctors' Commons, who were rich enough and idle enough—increased fees, increased salaries, with an almost unheard of patronage. But he objected to the bill on other grounds; he objected to it on the ground that it took from large bodies their vested rights without a shadow of pretence in their conduct for so doing. It was no measure of reform: it was a measure of revolution. He would say, "Don't remove these Courts at all; but above all, don't remove them to that greedy Doctors' Commons." The bill seemed to him nothing better than a dirty Doctors' Commons job— and he called upon the House to join him in convincing the Government that the independence of the House would not suffer a measure of this obnoxious kind to be forced upon it.

said, if it were the pleasure of the House to continue the debate— [Loud cries of "No, no," "Adjourn," "Go on."] He wished to offer one or two observations to the House—but he did not wish to prolong the debate then against the sense of the House.

said, that, if the debate had been commenced at five, he should have pressed the question to a division that night; but as the debate was not begun until half past nine, he thought it only right to adjourn it.