called the attention of the House to the Croal contract, and complained that Mr. Croal had himself departed from his first contract, which superseded Mr. Purcell, and therefore the whole contract ought to be re-opened and left to fair competition. He declared that Lord Lowther's proceedings were not characterised by that straightforward dealing which he might expect from that noble Lord. On the contrary, he thought the noble Lord's conduct partook of the nature of juggling. He had understood, both from Lord Lowther and other Members of the Government, that if Mr. Croat were not ready with his new coaches, Mr. Croal should lose the contract. That understanding was not carried out; and though Mr. Croat had put old coaches on the road, the noble Lord had not fulfilled his implied promises. This was what he complained of. Mr. Croal had received permission to keep old coaches on the by-roads for three months. The three months were elapsed, and the old coaches were not removed; Mr. Croal might now set the Government at defiance, for there was no power in the law to enforce his contract, land the old coaches were to be kept on the road, endangering the lives of her Majesty's subjects. But if this contract were not enforced, there was no reason whatever why any contract should be, or could be enforced. There had been most unjustifiable truckling on the part of the Government to Mr. Croal. The worst part of the matter was, the partiality evinced, which might operate most extensively and unfavourably on the feelings of the Irish. The hon. Member entered into a long history of the transaction, and quoted a great number of details to prove that Mr. Croal had not completed his contract, and that Mr. Parcell had been most unjustly dealt with, while a great injustice had been done to the public by providing imperfect carriages. He would leave at present the House to decide between Lord Lowther, Mr. Parcell, and the public.

said, that he never heard so much said on so small a foundation. The Government had only one object in view, that of making the best terms for the public. If every disappointed candidate for a contract were to have such eloquent advocates as the hon. Gentleman to bring his case before the House, the Government must give up contracts altogether, for it would lead to a waste of time quite unbearable. The Post-office had done in this case as it was bound to do, accepted the lowest terms which were offered, which were one-third lower than Mr. Purcell's offer. He admitted that some accident, such as the illness of a person in the Post-office department, had prevented all the terms of the contract from being fulfilled. It was not a violation of the contract, however, to keep these coaches on the road, as the hon. Gentleman contended; it was only necessary that the coaches supplied should be supplied agreeably to the pattern, and should be fit for the service. The case was the same in all contracts; and if the contracter did not fulfil the terms the contract was not dissolved, but the parties were prosecuted for the penalties they had incurred by not fulfilling the contract. The hon. Gentleman's representation of Lord Lowther's conduct was most unfair, particularly as Lord Lowther and he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had endeavoured to promote a beneficial arrangement between Mr. Purcell and Mr. Croal. The delay of which the hon. Gentleman complained was, in fact, caused by a hope, on the part of Lord Lowther, that these two parties would enter into a mutual arrangement. With respect to the coaches supplied, the proper officers had fully approved of them. Mr. Purcell himself, in 1837, when he entered into the contract, had kept old coaches on the road, and had the Ministers deprived Mr. Croal of a similar advantage the Government would have been liable to Just reprehension. He totally denied that any national feeling had operated in the case, and declared that the only duty of the Government was to take the most beneficial terms which were offered for the public, which it had done. He warned Gentlemen who approved of the contract system, how they encouraged individuals to bring complaints before that House, because the terms they offered were not accepted.

said, that the complaint was that the contract had been abused, which the right hon. Gentleman had not answered. He approved of the principle of entering into contracts, but in this case the terms of the contract had been violated. The economy talked o twas erroneous, for the Government would gain 2,000l. a-year by the coaches, and would lose 5,000l. a-year by horsing them.

said, that Mr. Purcell having served the public well, should have had at least fair play, but he had not had fair play. The impression in Ireland was that the contract had not been fairly given, and that Mr. Purcell had lost the contract less by his terms being not so favourable as those of Mr. Croal, than by the mode of conducting the contract. The Order of the Day was read, and the House went into committee on the Affidavits, &c., (Scotland and Ireland) bill, which passed through the committee with amendments.

asked whether the bill was to be limited to two years, and whether it were resolved to call out only 10,000 men. The proceedings on this bill were altogether unusual. In 1819 an estimate was laid on the Table when a similar measure was proposed. If there were only 10,000 men to be employed for six months, the right hon. Gentleman should make an estimate of the amount required, and lay it on the Table. He wished to know the number of men who were to be called out, and how long the bill was to remain in force.

could not make an estimate, as the hon. Gentleman wished. The expense would be wholly contingent on the number of men actually employed. The pensioners might not be called out at all, or only a few for two months, and therfore it was impossible for him to lay any estimate on the Table. The practice was, to lay an account of the whole expenses before the House after they had been incurred. He should be sorry if he were not able to realise the expectations he had held out last night, of only employing 10,000 men; and he must say that he had great objections to limiting the number of men to be employed. At the same time, after what had passed, he should not object to state in the bill that the number of pensioners enrolled should not exceed 10,000. He could not make that concession last night, in, consequence of the tone, the offensive tone, of hon. Members. When his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department came, he could answer the hon. Member's question as to the duration of the bill, as that was in his department.

asked whether it were intended to call out the pensioners and drill them? The right hon. Gentleman opposite had no reason to complain of the tone on that side, which was consistent with discussion; the right hon. Gentleman should complain of the tone when the bill was brought in, which caused the opposition it had met with. The bill had caused great alarm, and it would cause still more alarm when it was better known. He wished to ask, however, whether it were intended to insult the people by calling out these 10,000 pensioners to be drilled before their faces when they were perfectly quiet?

said, it was not the intention to call out the pensioners for eight days' drill. Nor could he say for how many days they would be called out. It was possible they might be called out for four days before the next meeting of Parliament. If they were called out for four days, at the expense of 2s. 6d. per day, he thought the House could not complain of that sum to provide a force ready to put down any disturbance. As to meeting this expense, he had to say that in 1842 a sum of 10,000l. was granted, to provide for certain contingencies. Of that sum only 4,000l, had been expended. He therefore had no need to come to Parliament for any additional grant till next year. The clothing of these men would be supplied by the Ordnance department, and the Ordnance estimates would be brought before the House in a regular course. If the whole of the men were called out, he did not expect that the cost would be more than 12s. a head; but not expecting the whole to be called out, he thought about 7s. a head on the whole number might cover all the expense.

not having been present at the discussion last evening, and not being of the opinion of several Gentlemen who spoke on that occasion, wished to state his views of this bill. It was said to be unconstitutional, but he could conscientiously bear witness that he believed the right hon. Gentleman who pro- posed it had no design to invade the Constitution. He could say that he had none, and between two and three years ago, when he was in office, he had discussed a plan and prepared a measure very like the present bill. He believed that the bill now proposed by the right hon. Gentleman was like the bill he proposed then, and he was bound to say that the Government was perfectly justified in proposing the measure. He saw that the Government had a mass of power at its command, which could be made available in cases of exigency. He had reason, however, to think that the pensioners, when called into service without being under the restraint of military discipline, might be mischievous. They could be made effective as a military body, and under military regulations, while they would be most inefficient as a police. He believed that by this measure the Government might call out 10,000 efficient soldiers, while before it had the power of calling out 70,000 bad special constables. He had no fear that the army would be used to subvert liberty. The constitutional checks to the employment of such a force were so great, that for nearly two centuries and a half, ever since the restoration of Charles the 2nd, there had been no single instance of the military force being able to overbear the civil power. Those checks were amply sufficient to guard the public against the employment of the retired soldier in the preservation of the public peace, and from that no bad consequences were to be apprehended. It would be the cheapest force and the best that could be resorted to. In cases of disorders and disturbances, dangerous to peace and property, they must look to and rely upon some force or other, and this body of men were the least liable to public obloquy; it was decidedly the most efficient and the most economical. And on those precicis, when he was in office, he had prepared such a plan as that now proposed, uninfluenced, as he could assure the House, by any such motives as he understood had been attributed to the Government in the course of the debate of the previous evening. Then, it was asked, were they prepared to join in placing additional powers in the hands of Government, while they refused any concession to the wishes of the people? He had voted for every measure of political and of commercial reform that had been proposed by every party in that House for years past; he had voted for the motion of the hon. Member for Wolver-hampton, but he never could admit that because any particular measure of reform was not carried out by the Government, he could refuse that Government the powers necessary to preserve the public peace. Was it the meaning of Gentlemen on that (the Opposition) side of the House, that if Government were to concede what they thought a good Corn-law, they would be at liberty to employ troops and to put the people to the sword when there was no necessity for it? Then was it intended that because Government would not agree to a good Corn-law, they were to refuse to grant them the instruments necessary to maintain public order? Were they, as a mode of coercing the Government into adopting a good policy, to grant the people a latitude for riot? This proposition was utterly untenable. If the powers asked for could be safely confided to the Government, he would vote for them though they had a bad commercial system; and if those powers were not necessary, and it was not safe to confide in them, he would vote against the proposal, though they had the best commercial system in the world. If it was necessary for the preservation of public order, he would vote for it, though they had a still worse Corn-law than the present one.

said the right hon. Gentleman, not being in his place last night, had received a false impression of what had taken place. There were no persons more desirous of lending their assistance for the preservation of the public peace than the Gentlemen on his side of the House, or more ready to put down riot. But they believed the character of the bill was unconstitutional. It was giving an additional quantity of despotic power to the Government, and they naturally felt disappointed that such powers should be asked for at this period of the Session. They had resisted the bill as far as they were able, but himself and his friends would not be disposed to oppose its further progress, provided the Government would consent to limit the operation of the act to two years. Last night there had been shown some disposition to meet them on this point.

expressed his obligations to the right hon. Member for Edinburgh for his frank avowal of his sentiments, though generally opposed to her Majesty's Government, and his concurrence in the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman. It was indispensably necessary that property and the public peace should be protected against organized plunderers. In the course of last year it was undeniable that property was menaced, and even destroyed in open day, in Staffordshire. It was then the general impression, and experience proved it to be correct, that the ordinary civil power of the country was insufficient to preserve the public peace and to give security to property; and the demands for the assistance of some other force were numerous. He stated last night that no additional power was conferred on the Government by this bill, for it was perfectly competent for them as the law stood to call out these pensioners, to arm them, and to employ them in any way that should be most conducive to the public good, but they conceived that in the employment of these men, without the strong checks of strict military discipline, it would not be expedient to trust them with arms in their hands in aid of the civil force, and that the civil rights of the people were far more endangered by that course than by the measure proposed by the Government. If the measure were defensible at all, it was defensible not only as a temporary expedient, but as a permanent measure. His experience of the working of the special constable system had led him to propose the present bill, and he thought it should be made permanent. The pensioners were now liable to be called out and embodied as veteran battalions, or called out in aid of the civil power as special constables, and being so called out, without military control or discipline, they might be armed. Now, the adoption of the first course, as had been stated on the previous evening by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, would be attended with much inconvenience by bringing the force to a central point instead of making it generally available; and with regard to the second course, the experience of the special constable system would not induce him to propose it. The result of his experience therefore, induced him to propose the measure in its present shape, and the grounds upon which he proposed it were those he had stated. He proposed it as a permanent measure, and he could not assent to the proposition to limit the operation of the bill for two years. His right hon. Friend, the Secretary of War had announced his intention to limit the number of men that were to be enrolled, but he could not consent to the limitation as to time. The provision for the expense of the measure would be annually brought before the House in the estimates, and would be thus placed, in the most constitutional manner, under the control and check of the House. It was sound in principle, and a safe addition to the power of the executive, for the proper exercise of which the executive would be responsible. Looking at all the circumstances of the case—looking at the concession already made—looking at the advantages of having the measure permanent—and looking at the periodical manner in which its consequences would necessarily come under the consideration of the House, he could not consent to limiting the bill to a number of years.

was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman was departing from the principle that the expense of a military force should be proposed annually to Parliament. The bill was adding a permanent force of 10,000 men to the military power of the Government. There was no occasion for the right hon. Baronet to compliment the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh, for that right hon. Gentleman and his friends were never found contending for the cause of liberty, but were ever ready to support the Government against the people. He expected, though the limitation of the bill was now 10,000 men, that next year the whole force of 75,000 would be called out. He considered such a course of proceeding as the present was most dangerous to the Queen and the country. He deplored it as a total departure from the constitution. If the right hon. Gentleman had admitted a limitation to the bill as to time, he would not oppose it, but as that was not the case he meant to oppose it, and he hoped his Friends would oppose it to the utmost of their power.

said, it was objected to this bill that it was opposed to constitutional principle; now the constitutional principle was, that the soldiers were enlisted for life, and were at all times liable to be called upon to serve, though the estimates were voted annually; and though in this case the bill was permanent, the supplies for the force which would be enrolled under it would be voted annually, there was therefore no constitutional difference between the construction of this force and the construction of the standing army. The bill was brought forward as a constitutional measure and upon constitutional principles, to aid the Government in putting down outrage and in preserving the public peace; and for his own part he could see no reason for the factious opposition with which it was met by the Opposition. He trusted the Government would adhere to the bill, and if Gentlemen opposite persevered in this species of vexatious opposition to a measure which was necessary for the protection of life and property, he was quite sure their conduct would be viewed with feelings of disgust by the people of this country, who would rally round the Government, and support them in their endeavour to conduct the administration of affairs in compliance with the principles of the constitution. The Government had another course. If hon. Gentlemen opposite dared to obstruct her Majesty's servants in their endeavour to carry on the legislative business of the country, let the Government resign, and the country would soon show whether it would submit to be governed by hon. Gentlemen opposite.

dared the Ministers to resign. The gallant officer forgot that the Government could not maintain a single soldier without the annual assent of the House; but these pensioners were already and permanently paid. So much for the ignorance of the hon. Gentleman. If he were not allowed to speak, he would beg leave to move that the House do adjourn. They did not come there to be driven away by the high words of the gallant Officer. The course which he expected to be pursued had been entirely changed with regard to the bill since last night, probably on account of the support given it the right, hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh.

, interrupting the hon. Member, said the hon. Member had clearly no right to address the House on this to this question, having already addressed it, and sat down. The hon. Member had spoke since the order of the day was moved.

moved that the House do adjourn.

had no desire to offer any factious opposition to the Government, and he thought, after what had passed, if the right hon. Gentleman would consent to limit the duration of the bill to two years, there need be no further difficulty on the subject. He thought that a fair compromise.

thought the right hon. Member was right in refusing to comply with the request to limit the duration of the bill. He hoped the Government would consent to no such proposition. He conceived that if the bill were to be limited, there would not be sufficient time to drill the men to make them serviceable. If the bill were only to be continued for two years, there would not be time to make the force effective. The yeomanry were not limited as to time, and why should they lay more restriction on that force than on the yeomanry?

was surprised that the hon. Member for Middlesex should speak of a factious opposition, for if he was not mistaken, there was a time when the hon. Member sat on the Opposition side of the House, and the hon. Member, or his friends at least, were extremely factious in their opposition. As to the disgust created by the opposition to the bill, he believed all the large constituencies would view their conduct with approbation. The power asked for was the power of refusing with impunity, any measures of improvement the state of the people might require. He felt that the power asked for was only necessary, because the Government had refused to do justice to the people. The limitation of the bill to two years would not impair its efficiency. If at the end of two years it was still found necessary, Parliament would, as on all similar occasions, continue it. But once such measures were made permanent, it required twenty times the exertion to get rid of them again. They got to be matters of course, and he believed they should be abandoning their duties to their constituents, if they did not take every means the forms of the House afforded to defeat this measure. He owed no allegiance to those on the opposite side of the House; and to his own conscience and to his constituents alone should he look for approbation.

had predicted last night that if the Government conceded anything they would not disarm opposition. What now said the hon. Members? The hon. Member for Montrose said that he would move the adjournment of the House, and stop the business. Formerly the right hon. Member for Edinburgh was quite a favourite of hon. Gentlemen opposite, but now they spoke slightingly of him, and were more his enemies than his friends. He thought the course of that right hon. Gentlemen highly honourable to him, though he probably might repent of it. The right hon. Gentleman had learned a little more precaution. He wished the Ministers should concede nothing. Firmness in Ministers was the greatest virtue. Let them stick to their guns, and they would be sure of success.

did not know why the bill might not be limited to one Session. The hon. Member for Yorkshire stated that it would require time to drill the men, but the gallant officer who brought in the bill said that these pensioners would require no drilling. No reason whatever had been assigned for the bill. The Government said that the exigencies of the present time required the bill. Well, take it, then, for the present time. Did the right hon. Gentleman assume the character of prophet, and tell them that the discontent would be permanent? Did they mean to make it so? What sort of character, then, did they give their own Government? There was more in this bill than met the eye, and till that were stated—till some constitutional reason were given for the bill—he should join his hon. Friends in giving it the utmost opposition in his power.

moved, that the next order of the day be read. They were invited last night to state their objections to the measure, and they stated them under the expectation.

decided that the hon. Member was out of order. The House had decided that it would not adjourn, and would have the order of the day read, and the hon. Member had no right to address the House till the order of the day was read.

persisted that he was in order. But the Speaker reiterating that the hon. Member had already spoken on the question before the House, the hon. Member sat down.

said, that he was now in order, and he would proceed to state what he should before have said had he been allowed. He was surprised at the hon. Members on the other side interrupting him, and he then rose to move that the House should go into a committee that day three months. There was great inconsistency amongst the advocates of the bill. bill. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman, when he introduced the bill, had not said one word about the disturbances last year; but now the right hon. Baronet the Home Secretary spoke of the disturbances last year, and wished to make the bill permanent. The right hon. Baronet had put it entirely on a new footing, and made him dislike the bill more than ever. Last night when the division was 92 to 16, he was inclined to say that he would not oppose the bill any further, and, therefore, he had proposed that it should be limited as to time, and that a limitation should be made as to the number of men to be enrolled. But now matters were changed, and the bill was to be made permanent. He did not know why it should not be subject to revision, as it was an experimental bill. They had limited the Irish Arms Bill, they had limited the Coalwhippers Bill, why should they not limit this, which was only an experimental bill? The income-tax had been limited to three years, because the Government knew that the people would not bear it if it were not limited, and why, he again asked, should not this bill be limited? He had said that if the right hon. Baronet would put down the yeomanry he should be disposed to agree to the bill. He quite agreed with the right hon. Baronet that the employment of the yeomanry, by which the rancorous feelings of different classes were nourished, was much to be deprecated, and he should prefer at all times relying on the military to calling out the yeomanry. If yeomanry were to be put down, and the measure subjected to a periodical revision, he should not object to it. The Government ought to have brought in the bill earlier. The number of pensioners was 73,103, and though they might not all be able to serve, this bill would give a power to the Government to enroll between 30,000 and 40,000 pensioners. It was no recommendation to him to find that this bill had the authority of the whigs, but though it had been prepared by them it had not been brought into the House. It was, therefore, no authority at all that it had been discussed in the Whig cabinet and never been allowed to see daylight in Parliament. The bill was not just to the pensioners. If it only summoned those who were willing to serve he should have less objection to it. But it was compulsory on the pensioners; and those men who were scattered in the most remote parts of the empire, might be suddenly, called on to serve, by a bill brought in at the close of the Session, and passed with out much discussion. It was true the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War stated that those should not be called out who might find it very inconvenient to serve, and that would mitigate in some degree the compulsory part of the bill; but still he contended, out of justice to the pensioners, that such a bill should not be brought in at the close of the Session. He appealed to the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Government not to hurry forward the bill, The hon. Member concluded by moving that the House do resolve itself into a committee three months hence.

said, notwithstanding the vehement declamation of the hon. Member for Montrose, it was pretty clear that his own opinions were strongly in favour of the bill. He thought the hon. Member was the last man in the world to make ill considered concessions to his opponents, and when he said he thought this kind of force was greatly preferable to many others of which the Government had full power of availing itself, when he said these soldiers would be efficient instruments of preserving the public peace, when he said if the Government would give its assurance to the House that it would not call out the yeomanry, he would then waive his objections to the permanent character of the bill, and be prepared to support it—when he heard the hon. Member say this, he could not think that the hon. Member believed the bill to be either dangerous or unconstitutional. A great number of the objections now brought against this bill had been brought against the establishment of the new police force in 1829. He was told that it was an unconstitutional measure, that it did away with the ancient conservators of the public peace, who were submitted to the parochial authorities, and paid by those who had the control of the parochial funds: it was said that it was the beginning of a series of encroachments on the constitution of the country, under the name of establishing a metropolitan police. Perhaps the hon. Member for Coventry was of that opinion still; but he did not apprehend that the hon. Member had found his freedom of speech or action much restricted, though he had to announce to him the perhaps startling fact that there were in the metropolis between 3,000 and 4,000 organized policemen; and if the deliberate opinion of the inhabitants were asked, he believed they would say they felt greater security for both their property and their persons since the establishment of a body that showed the utmost deference for the law, and against whom there was no proof that any person had been by their means impeded in the exercise of any right which the constitution gave them. He must remind the House that nothing could be more dangerous than to resort to the use of privileges which would establish the preponderance, not of the opinion of the majority, but of the minority of that House. That power was given for the protection of the minority against a tyrannical majority: but that power the present abuse of these privileges would tend to impair. He reminded the opposition that the Government had conceded to them their time of going into committee, and remarked on the distinction between enrolling and calling out the pensioners. The conduct of the Government did not give the slightest justification for the exercise of the powers of opposition, granted for the protection of the minority. The Government did not consider this as a measure of coercion, nor one that gave them any new powers. They had at present a great unwieldy instrument at their command, which they might employ without restriction, for they could call out the whole of the pensioners, and they came down to the House of Commons to ask Parliament to regulate the exercise of that power, and to impose restrictions on the power they already possessed. They might call out the force without applying to Parliament; but if they did so, they would get a body of men less efficient for the preservation of the public peace, while it was more dangerous to the civil liberty of the subject. The Government objected to the restriction to two years, because they did not consider it a sufficient time to make a fair experiment of the efficacy of the force. It was proposed at first to limit the metropolitan police to three years; but if a force was to be organized at present, let it be put into an efficient state, and able to perform the trust reposed in it. He thought the Government had some claim to the confidence of the House. The country was last year in a state of great excitement, and in many parts of the country there were very imperfect provisions made for the preservation of the public peace. The attacks of those who were confederated together were not made on the property of the rich, but against the freedom of action of the poor, who were compelled to leave their work when they were contented with their wages. The Government at that time restored tranquillity. They did not demand any new powers from the Legislature; they asked no new powers at the present moment. They had a great and ill-regulated power at their disposal, and they thought it their duty to come to Parliament, and ask Parliament to apply some regulations to it. He denied that the measure was one of coercion. They might call into activity, without inconvenience, the services of those whose service they had a right to require, and they might decline the voluntary aid of those whose services they thought it better to dispense with; but here was an available force, under the control of the magistrates, for the maintenance of the public peace, and all they asked the House was, to enable them to apply that force. That some additional power was necessary, was plain, from the fact stated last night by the hon. Member for Ashton-under-Lyne, that in that neighbourhood there were 10,000 men out of employment, and only five persons to preserve the peace. He repeated that the Government only asked the House to regulate the power, the Government already possessed.

said the right hon. Baronet had shown no reason for the measure; the only argument he advanced against its limitation was, that two years were not long enough for the trying the experiment. Not ten thousand men only, but twice that number might be raised in half that time, and these men did not require training at all, as they were told by the Secretary at War. He had as much respect for the opinion of the majority as any man, and there might be occasions when it would be vexatious for a small majority to interfere. But these privileges were given to be used at some time or other, or why were they given at all? The House was called on in the last week of the Session, when most of the Members had left London, when no notice of such a measure had been given, when there had been no time for any expression of public opinion with regard to it, to pass this bill, when the Government itself said it already possessed all the power the bill professed to give it, and that it even imposed restrictions upon that power. The statement of the right hon. Baronet was not enough to satisfy the House, and they were justified in resisting it.

had entertained last night a sanguine hope that the Government was ready to make some concession with regard to this bill and its duration. Some allusion had been made to the tone adopted last, night by Members on this side of the House towards the right hon. the Secretary at War; he did not hear anything of the kind; but was there not something offensive in the tone of the hon. and gallant Member for Middlesex? He "dared" the opposition to persist in opposing the bill; he never heard that "dare" was a parliamentary word, to be applied to any Member, or section of Members. He did dare, and would dare, to oppose it. The hon. and gallant Gentleman advised the Government if the Opposition persisted in "daring," to resign. He did not think the advice was very likely to be taken. He did not think either of the right hon. Baronets were likely to resign; but if that opposition was likely to have that result, that was a premium to them to obstruct the bill. He did not think that the right hon. Baronet, the Paymaster of the Forces, was likely to resign. There he sits, in happy indifference to all that is going on around him, which one would think had something to do with his department, leaving all his battles to be fought by the two right hon. Baronets. If their obstruction would produce such a happy result as the resignation of a ministry so unpopular as the present one, he believed they should have even all the Whig army up to town to join in it. There was only one thing wanted to complete the unpopularity of the present bill, and that it had obtained—it was now announced that it was a Whig measure. It came, it seemed, from the portfolio of the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, the late Secretary at War. If it had been kept back so long, let it be kept back a little longer; let it be delayed for six months, and be introduced when it could be discussed. Why was there such indecent haste with it? The right hon. Baronet, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, had called the working people organised plunderers. [Sir J. Graham: That was in allusion to the outrages of last year.] He denied that the charge could apply to the workingmen. When Manchester was in possession of what they called the mob for three days, not so much as a pane of glass was broken. In the speech from the throne, Ministers came down with canting, hypocritical compliments to the conduct of the working classes, and on the fortitude with which they bore their sufferings, and then at the end of a long Session they came forward to call them "organised plunderers," and applied to Parliament for a measure of coercion, unaccompanied by any measures of relief. Why, was not this a measure of coercion? If the putting into motion 600,000 ball cartridge and 10,000 bayonets were not means of coercion, he did not know what was. The right hon. Member for Edinburgh was very indignant against those who opposed the bill, and described them as giving a latitude to riot. They did no such thing. He remembered at the time of the passing of the Reform Bill that the right hon. Gentleman was not then so averse from giving a latitude to riot. He remembered speeches in which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen spoke of the fires of Bristol and the black flag at Glasgow, and then the right hon. Gentleman was not averse from recommending submission to the wishes of the people. In 1830, too, when the whole country was roused and almost in a state of revolt, the right hon. Gentleman was silent. He wished to know why they should now increase the standing army? His hon. Friend, the Member for Montrose, had been misrepresented, for his hon. Friend had only expressed a readiness to support the bill on condition that the yeomanry was superseded. The hon. Member concluded by declaring that it was plain that the object of the Government was to govern the people by brute force, and refuse them all reasonable concessions.

hoped that, after what had been said, the hon. Member for Montrose would not press his motion to a division.

said, if the force were so good as the right hon. Gentleman described it, why should he be afraid to come before the House and renew the act every year? Of late years the standing army had been increased 10,000 men; but it never was an argument that you must continue that force a considerable time in order to make these men soldiers. The Legislature had been going on, step by step, infringing on the liberties of the people, and all this was made necessary by extortion and taxation to maintain the aristocracy in superfluity and luxury. This was the cause why the Government was becoming wholly military. In 1792 the whole naval and military force of the empire was only 45,000 men, and the expense not above 4,000,000l. Now there were 240,000 effective men, and they cost 16,000,000l. at least. This was the progress of misgovernment. If military power was depended on—if exaction were continued, at last the string would break, and then woe to those who had practised oppression on the people. Those who follow out the course which now required the increase of the military force would, in the end, be the greatest sufferers.

said, that the minority of that House had power given to them to obstruct measures under certain circumstances, in opposition to measures supported by a majority. This was a case of the kind. The bill ought not to have been brought in at that period of the Session, and it ought not now to be enforced. They ought to wait till it was known what the public would think of such a measure. Supposed that they had pursued this course on the education scheme, and the majority had backed the ministers in carrying that bill through, would not the education scheme have become a law before the people had time to consider? If the country understood this bill he was sure the country would oppose it as they had opposed the Education Bill. Where, he asked, were the Members of the great northern constituencies, and of the manufacturing towns? Where were the Members for Manchester? ["They are absent."] Where was the Member for Glasgow? ["Here."] Yes, but the other Members of the great manufacturing constituencies were not present. He asked hon. Gentlemen who represented, perhaps, rural constituencies, and who had remained to make up the majority, whether it were customary to bring in bills of this kind at the end of the Session, and whether it were not customary to give notice of them? No notice whatever had been given of this bill. The Government knew that the House always thinned at the end of August; they knew what the state of the House would be; yet they had given no notice of their intention to bring in such a measure, and these Members had no reason to suppose that such a bill was contemplated. He was not amenable to the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, and he hoped in future he would not speak in his name. He agreed with the hon. Member for Finsbury, that it was no recommendation of the measure, that it was concocted by the Whigs.

moved, that the House do adjourn till five O'clock.

, considering that this was the day on which motions had precedence, consented to resume the committee in the evening.

had understood last night that the Government had consented to limit the bill, and if that were done his hon. Friends, he understood, would not oppose it. He hoped before the next meeting of the House, the Government would be ready to come into such an arrangement.

hoped the Government would adhere to its determination. The Gentleman opposite only wanted to bully the Government. If Government gave way, he would not support the Ministers, humble as he was.

begged to ask the Attorney-General a question on a subject of considerable importance with respect to the recreations of the working-classes. It appeared that some young men were on a Sunday evening recently, after the hours of divine service, about five or six o'clock, amusing themselves playing at cricket on a common, called Burley Common, in the country of Berks, and were taken up, brought before a magistrate, and condemned to pay a penalty which, with the costs, amounted to fifteen shillings each. They asked for time to raise the money, but were told they must go to gaol immediately unless the money was paid forthwith. They were earning only seven or eight shillings a week, and were unable to pay the fines, but some charitable persons advanced the money for

^* These two names were not in the minority on the first division. Mr. M. Forster voted in that minority.

them and they were set at large. The question which he wished to ask his hon. and learned Friend was whether it was illegal for poor people to play at cricket or any other manly game on Sunday after the hours of divine service, and if that were the case, whether it was legal for the rich to have their horses and carriages, and other enjoyments at the same time?

said he would answer that part of the question which referred to the state of the law. Certainly at present it was by statute provided that persons should not go out of their own parish for the purpose mentioned. His noble Friend had not stated whether in this instance the parties had been in their own parish or not. If they were in their own parish he apprehended they were not violating the law, but otherwise he believed they came within the meaning of the statute relating to persons assembling out of their own parish for purposes not justified by the law. The rest of the question it was unnecessary for him to answer.

rose and said—Sir, I owe some explanation for bringing the subject of colonization before the House at so late a period of the Session, as to render it impossible for me to attain such practical results as I once hoped to secure even now. It is not wholly my fault. Immediately after the discussion of my motion of last April, I felt that the unexpectedly favourable reception which the House gave to the general views which I then laid before it, and the interest which the public generally evinced on the subject of colonization, rendered it incumbent on me to supply what had been remarked on in the debate, what was generally remarked on in the country as the defective point of my statement—namely, the want of some detailed plan for securing to the country the beneficial application of sound principles of colonization. I did, in consequence, even before the Easter recess, give notice of a motion for leave to bring in a bill, which I should have brought in, had not a severe illness, and a very protracted recovery, put it out of my power to devote myself to a task requiring for its accomplishment at least all the energy which I possess. I deeply regret that the delay, thus occasioned, has compelled me to postpone that motion till it is impossi- ble for Parliament to pass any measure during the present Session. For certainly nothing has occurred since my motion of April, to shake my conviction of the pressing and great necessity under which this country labours, of having recourse to extensive and systematic colonization as a remedy for the exigencies of its position. I then based by motion on a survey of the great and acknowledge difficulties of our social condition. I had to describe a grievous temporary aggravation of permanent evils in the condition of the country; and I am sorry to say that I see nothing to justify me in believing that any remedy has been found for the permanent causes of distress, nor even that we can flatter ourselves with a belief in any substantial alleviation of our temporary suffering. Whatever improvement, as yet but temporary, may have taken place in some departments of trade and manufactures, others labour under a severer depression at present than they did in the earlier part of the year. Recent events have forced us to pay great attention to the condition of the Irish people; and while just stress has been laid on the political causes which affect the tranquility of that country, we have been forced to admit the existence of an immense amount of material suffering, and to trace its origin to bad social arrangements. In another part of the United Kingdom, open and wide-spread turbulence have compelled us to look a little into the material condition of the people: and however some superficial inquirers may be content to take extortionate tolls as a sufficient explanation of the Rebecca riots, none but superficial inquirers can fail to see that so daring, organized, and universal violation of the laws betokens a general uneasiness, the cause of a general disaffection. Since I addressed you in April, time and fortune, instead of removing our ills and our anxieties, have thickened the gloom that hangs around us, while discussion and inquiry have gone on spreading over the community a knowledge of the suffering that exists, and the alarm that its existence must engender in every thinking mind. In the mean time, what has the Legislature done? Look back at the blank annals of the present Session, and what has been done? What substantial good has been effected? Nay, what foundation of future good has been laid? What promise of better things have been held out? You are closing this Session without a single mentionable measure, without even a hope of relief, and your answer to the cry of unmitigated distress is, that the suffering people are to expect no good from the wisdom of their rulers. It is now too late completely to repair this evil; and as Parliament is to rest from its labours whether its work be done or not, we must face for some time the consequences of our inaction. All that we can now do, is to give the public some ground for hoping that another year our labours will not be perfectly barren. And though it is customary in this House to dwell very strongly on the danger of exciting hopes which can not be realised, it seems to me that in the present state of things with the suffering now pressing on the people, with the political doctrines now current among them, there is far greater danger from our raising no hopes at all in their minds, and leaving them in perfect despair of any good from their rulers. I did at one time hope that the Session might have terminated otherwise. Some hopes were, I confess, excited by something that passed in the debate on the motion of my firm Friend the Member for Limerick. My noble Friend the Member for Sunderland, in the course of that most statesmanlike speech which he delivered on that occasion, dwelt on extensive and systematic emigration as a prominent and primary remedy for the social evils of Ireland; and I was glad to find that the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Government, in noticing the various suggestions of my noble Friend, did not dispose of this with a declaration either of hostility or of doubt, but treated it as one of which he felt the practical value, and to which he was prepared to give due consideration; and though this favourable intimation has as yet produced no visible result, in the shape either of actual measures or even of definite promise, I trust that we may regard the favourable language of the right hon. Baronet as not wholly unmeaning; and that we may conclude that he is disposed during the recess to give this great subject that careful consideration of which he has declared it to be worthy. A full consideration of the subject has induced me to abstain for the present from bringing the general subject of colonization before the House. Whenever I do so I shall have to invite your attention to no simple development of some single and striking expedient, by the sole efficiency of which every difficulty may be certainly and easily surmounted. We have already advanced beyond this. The general principles of sound colonization are known and admitted by all; and we are now come to that stage, in which colonization, like all other great practical benefits, has to be perfected by that patient labour, by that minute attention to detail, by that consistent, systematic, concentrated assiduity, by which alone great schemes are brought to be realities, and the merit of public usefulness is won. It would require on the part of the House a really laborious attention to many and complicated causes that produce the utter inadequacy of our present system of colonization, and to many and complicated suggestions of apparently small changes, which would, I believe, result in a very great improvement. It would be useless to attempt this now. I feel that this is not the period, at which I can expect to win such attention, even from those whose good dispositions I have so fully experienced; and I feel, moreover, that even were I to succeed in making such an impression, its effect would pass away before the occasion for carrying my views into practical effect shall really arrive. I must, therefore, postpone till the beginning of next Session any attempt to bring before the House, any general plan for the improvement of our system of colonization. There is, however, one portion of the subject to which, for particular reasons, I feel it necessary not to allow the Session to close without adverting, and on which I must now give an outline of the plans, which I have hopes that during the recess the most effectual steps may be taken for testing its soundness; and (if the result of the test be satisfactory) of promoting its adoption. In all previous discussions of practical plans for making the waste lands of our colonies available for purposes of colonization, we have been in the habit of putting British North America wholly out of consideration, on the ground that in all the most important of our possessions, there we have placed the waste lands out of our control, by giving them up, in common with all the other sources of the revenue of the Crown, to the provincial legislatures. I have myself treated the question, as it regards these colonies, in this manner, merely because, feeling that the course to be adopted with regard to them must be different from that which should be applied to those colonies in which our power of legislation is wholly unrestricted, I judged it most convenient, while discussing general principles, not to divert attention to an exceptionable case. But I must own, I should regard any practical scheme of colonization as most defective and unsatisfactory which proposed to leave British North America entirely out of the field of colonization. These colonies have one obvious and great advantage, as every one must be aware, over ail other portions of our empire, in their greater nearness to the mother country. The emigrant, who can avail himself of steam, could, with ease, be at the westernmost point of Canada, in about a fortnight. Even the poorest, though compelled to resort to the slowest means of communication, need not provide for more than a six weeks' sea voyage, and might count on reaching the same distance in two months. The nature of our Canadian trade renders the outward voyage peculiarly cheap in proportion even to its length. And though the unoccupied regions of our American dominions present no such vast field for the future extension of our race as are offered by the wide regions of our Australian, and, perhaps, of our African quarters of the globe—though they promise no such vast variety of produce of such value—though they fill our imaginations with no such certain, though distant, prospects of boundless empire—they offer us an immense space more than any other available for the immediate wants of this and many succeeding generations. Millions might live and thrive on a vast extent of rich land, in which climate, soil, and water, unite in favouring the easy production of food, whether for the consumption of the people or for exportation to other countries; and to and from which the most capacious harbours, and the most abundant facilities for internal communication afford the amplest means of access and of carriage. I find the late Lord Sydenham, the best of practical judges of such matters, expatiating in enthusiastic terms on the natural capabilities of the country. Speaking (I use his own words) of

"The great district, nearly as large as Ireland, placed between the three lakes—Erie, Ontario, and Huron," (he goes on to say)—" You can conceive nothing finer; the most magnificent soil in the world—four feet of vegetable mould—a climate certainly the best in North America—the greater part of it admirably watered. In the word, there is land enough, and capabilities enough for some millions of people, and for one of the finest provinces in the world."

Of another tract of great extent, the eastern townships of Lower Canada, he speaks in almost equal terms of praise, rating it below the western district of Upper Canada only in the advantage of natural means of communication by water; and other regions, of which he did not speak, are equally inviting. In all these portions of our possessions, there is room enough to establish in plenty, at least half the present dense population of the British islands, and it would certainly be a lamentable, though for the advocate of colonization, were he compelled to abandon this noble field, placed so peculiarly within our reach, as one which was never to be rendered available to us by the application of vigorous efforts, and a sound system. I do not deny that the cession of the land revenues has placed some difficulties in the way of our applying a sounder system of colonization to Canada. I shall limit my present motion, and the practical suggestions which I have to make, to Canada, because it will simplify my task to speak now of that particular colony which I know best; more especially, when it happens to be placed in circumstances so very similar to those of its neighbours, and to be also so much the most influential of the whole group of colonies, that there can be no fear but that a good example set there would speedily be followed in the others. I say, then, that the difficulties created by the cessions of the Crown lands of Canada do not seem to be insuperable. For we have not, it must be recollected, by any means parted with our control over the lands, but only over the proceeds of the sales. The Crown still retains the entire management of the lands. I will not say that I think very lightly of the wisdom of the arrangement, by which the management of such a property is placed in the hands of one party and the proceeds are to be expended by another. But it has this advantage, that at any rate we have not entirely divested ourselves of all authority in the matter. We have a voice still, though to render our efforts available for the purpose of colonization, we require the co-operation of others, who alone can direct the proceeds of the land sales to a useful distribution. All we have to do is to get that oo-operation; and I must say that had there been no cession of the revenues in question I think we must equally have done this; for in dealing with such a province as that of Canada, I should have been very loth to impose on it any plan which its Legislature had not considered, to which that Legislature had not given the benefit of amendments suggested by experience, and which it had not ratified by its sanction. I rely most cordially on its co-operation in any well-considered scheme, for if emigration be needful to us, colonization is the first necessity of British North America, and of such necessity the colonial Legislature is at least as well aware as we are. The plan by which I would propose to promote colonization to Canada, though proceeding on the same principles as that which should be applied to Australia, New Zealand, and other colonies, would differ from it considerably in detail. The difference between the present position of Canada and that of those colonies renders it necessary that in the two cases very different means should be taken to attain the same end. We have one very great advantage in dealing with Canada, and that is the comparative cheapness and facility of emigration thither. But, on the other hand, we have a class of difficulties to contend with there, which, though not unknown, though not otherwise than very formidable in every one, even of our newest colonies, exist there in gigantic dimensions. These are the difficulties created by former mismanagement, by that perversion of the ends, and exhaustion of the means of colonization, which has naturally been the result of long perseverence in the oldest of our extensive colonies in a system of colonization founded on no principles at all, and conducted with langour, caprice, and a total recklessness of public interests. Those Gentlemen who either have read or will take the trouble to read the documents, which contain the most authentic information on the subject, will see that it is almost impossible to exaggerate the mischief of that mismanagement, or the condemnation which it deserves. I refer more especially to the report on "Public Lands and Emigration," which is contained in Appendix (B.) to Lord Durham's Report; and which, though it bears my sig- nature, I have from the moment of its publication acknowledged to be the work of Mr. Wakefield. The representations of past evils, which are contained in that report, are condensed into a more popular and striking form in that part of Lord Durham's general report, which is headed "Disposal of Public Lands—Emigration." Every statement in both the larger and the more condensed of these views, is fully borne out by the mass of evidence given in Appendix B, and though Lord Durham's report, and its accompanying documents have now been more than four years before the public, and have been exposed to the criticism of the numerous and powerful bodies, whose misconduct it exposed without measure, and who, consequently, had and have shown the strongest disposition to discredit all its statements, I may fearlessly assert, that not the slightest shock has been given to the entire accuracy of its representations. I may rely therefore with confidence on the absolutely unimpeached accuracy of the statements contained in these documents, prepared as they were with the greatest labour, and publicly given to the world under the highest official authority, and under the deepest sense of the responsibility attaching to every word uttered on so solemn an occasion. I will not now trouble the House with describing the various forms in which the mismanagement of the public lands of Canada affected their disposal. Where ignorance, carelessness, and jobbery ran riot, unchecked through every department, there was not a stage in the process in which some abuse or another did not interfere to mar all public objects, and check all private enterprises. I will remark that it will greatly tend to clear Gentlemen's views on this subject, if they will cast their eyes over the details of the various abuses described in the reports and evidence to which I have referred. They will see how from first to last, the entire system proceeded on no principles at all; how one system prevailed in one colony, and exactly the reverse in its neighbour; how the system of to-day was changed on the morrow to one of the most contrary nature; and how, without formal change, it was violated from day to day by the caprice of the governor or his subordinates. They will see with what perverse ingenuity it was contrived, that while the most undue facilities were given for the acquisition of large masses of land by persons who could make no good use of it, every obstacle was placed in the way of the purchaser who was really to be a settler; what trouble, expense, and delay preceded his choice of the spot, and, again, what incalculable trouble, expense, and delay were interposed by the carelessness and extortion of the Government offices before a title could be got to the land selected and purchased. They will also see how worthless that title was rendered by the blunders of the surveys; how whole townships were laid down with wrongly drawn lines; how, owing to these blunders, it was a frequent occurrence, for one purchaser to find that he had got a section containing a fourth more, another, less lucks, one a fourth less than he had paid for: how sometimes the hopeless set-after carrying his family, and goods, and implements, and stock, over long miles of almost impassable road, to the spot numbered out in his grant, found that it was included in another man's estate, or that it comprised nothing but a portion of a lake, or even that it existed nowhere save on the surveyor-general's map. I invite your attention to these facts, partly, because, I wish you to understand what ample cause existed for the deplorable results, which have prevented the colonization of Canada, and partly, because, in entering on a new career of colonization, it is good that you should divest your minds of all superstitious reverence for the practical authority of those officials, whose blunders and frauds engendered—whose apathy and ignorance sanctioned—and whose presumptuous obstinacy defended—these execrable practices. I may now pass over these topics, because many of these abuses have been partially corrected, and may by very simple specific means be entirely renewed; and because I wish to fix your attention on the one great mischief, which is the result of these and other faults, namely, the reckless profusion of grants which has taken the wild lands of Canada out of the hands of the public and placed them in the nominal possession of a few proprietors, who can neither use them themselves, nor render them subservient to the promotion of any great public purpose, or general plan. This is the main difficulty which meets us in the outset of any attempt to colonise Canada. The country is still unsettled, but not unappropriated; the lands are wild, but the Go- vernment cannot use them. In its bad its property was jobbed away. Some was granted to governors, some to executive councillors, some to the dependents of men in power; a large portion was assigned to form a provision of the most objectionable kind for the clergy and a still larger portion was allotted to other classes of persons who were considered to have claims on the Government, which were satisfied by grants of land instead of pensions. The result was, that at the period of Lord Durham's report, out of 17,000,000 of acres comprised within the surveyed districts of Upper Canada, the whole had been alienated, except about 700,000 acres, which are said to be inferior in position or quality. In Lower Canada, about 1,500,000 acres are left ungranted, out of more than 6,000,000, which are contained in the surveyed townships. These instances are not of so glaring a nature as that of Prince Edward's Island, the whole of which being about 1,500,000 acres of excellent land, were literally granted away in one day in London to absentee proprietors, whose heirs still keep them, and prevent their being turned to any useful account, But the evil in Canada is practically as great as it can be. You may fairly say, that the whole of the surveyed land has been alienated; and is now the property either of large absentee proprietors, who, with the exception of the Canada and other companies, and a very few private individuals, do nothing for the settlement of them, or of very poor persons, who have got almost for nothing, tracts, which they have neither capital nor labour to cultivate. The low price for which land could be got, has tempted every settler to become a proprietor; almost every man is a proprietor of more than he can use, and is either a rich absentee without the disposition, or a needy settler, without the means of hiring labour. These are the inevitable results of giving undue facilities to the acquisition of land. Lord Durham, in the part of his report to which I have referred, has described the tendency of such a system as evinced by the present state of Canada, I need not now go through the painful description which he has given of the backward and unimproving condition of the country. The deplorable truth is too sufficiently proved by a single circumstance instanced by him, and which, in spite of the recent distress pervading the United days States, is stated still to be the fact by Mr. Buckingham, one of the most recent travellers in America. I mean the universally and greatly superior value of land on the American, over that of the British side of the frontier line. Indeed, a great part of the land in our colonies is practically valueless, even at that very low price. Mr. Stayner, the Deputy-Postmaster-General, one of the largest proprietors of wild land in Lower Canada, gave this evidence before the commission appointed by Lipid Durham:—

"Twenty years ago, or thereabout, I purchased wild land, at what was then considered a low price, in the natural hope, that it would be gradually increasing in value; and that, whenever I might choose to sell, it would be at such a profit as would afford me a fair return for the use of the money employed; so far, however, from realising this expectation, I now find, after the lapse of so many years, when the accumulated interest upon the money invested has increased the cost of the land 150 per cent.—I say, I find, that I could not, if compelled to sell this land, obtain more for it than it originally cost me."

Several witnesses are stated to have asserted that it is impossible to obtain money on mortgage of wild land, because the system of granting Crown lands has rendered the value so uncertain. Such was the effect of this profuse disposal of Crown lands in checking the progress of the colony. It has scattered the population over a wide extent of country, in little farms separated by vast tracts of unsettled land in the possession of absentee proprietors, and unconnected by roads either with each other or with markets. The settler can raise food for himself, but can with difficulty sell, and, therefore, is not much tempted to raise a surplus produce. He has no motive, and no means for employing labour; but tilling with his own hands, and those of his family just enough of his land to support themselves and keeping every body else off the remainder of his property, he goes on just raising from year to year enough for the consumption of the year, without making any progress in comfort or in civilization. And thus you have the greater part of Upper Canada, and the townships, cultivated in scattered patches by small proprietors, who neither accumulate nor improve. The effect of this system on the large proprietors may be judged from the descriptions which I have previously quoted. No one would rent their land while he could get land from the Crown almost for nothing; and few of them had the disposition or the ability to take vigorous measures and expend sufficient capital to bring the estate into cultivation. The result is that described by Mr. Stayner, in the passage of his evidence which I quoted before, that these great estates are absolutely valueless, producing no rent, unsaleable at a profit, very often without absolute loss, and not available for the purpose of raising money on mortgage. On the other hand, see its inevitable effects on emigration. The emigrant, who arrived in the colony with means to buy and clear a farm, sometimes settled on it, and after long years of hardship, arrived at the state of rude and mere competence which I have described. Even of this class a great number were tempted to go on into the States, whither great facilities of acquiring land, a greater choice of situation, and every chance of a more civilized existence, and a more improving lot invited them. But the labourer who arrived in Canada with nothing but his labour, found hardly any means of employment, save what the towns afforded or what might be got on public works. The farmers of the colony created but a small demand for labour. The consequence was that the greater portion of the mere labouring class landed in Canada merely to go on into the United States, where certain employment at high wages was to be had. Lord Durham's report states as the result of a comparison of calculations made by very competent persons, that during the eight years preceding, at least one half of the emigrants from Great Britain to Canada had re-emigrated into the United States. It has been stated that this emigration through Canada to the States is now stopped; indeed, we have been told that as many as 6,000 British emigrants had emigrated during the course of last year from the States into Canada; and it seems to be inferred that the process of emigration between Canada and the United States is now completely reversed. I have no doubt that the fact is correctly stated, and when you recollect that just in that very year the great public works in the state of New York ceased simultaneously with the commencement of great public works in Canada, no one can wonder that as many as 6,000 of the Irish labourers and their families formerly congregated about the Erie canal and other works, transferred themselves across the frontier in search of employment. But I think it would be too much to infer from this that the old accustomed emigration of artizans and agriculturists through Canada to the Far West has entirely ceased, or does not go on as much as usual. The only inference to be drawn from the altered state of things last year is, that the providing employment for the labourer on public works, in Canada, and the opening up the country for settlement, have a great tendency to keep the emigrants in our territory. Indeed, when last the question was before the House, we were warned that the real danger to Canada was to be apprehended from too great a supply of labour being poured in; and we were told that Canada was riot the place for persons to go to who have nothing but their labour to depend upon, but that it was well suited for persons of some small means. I should be very loth to come to the same conclusion. Neither for the relief of the mother country, nor the settlement of Canada, can I believe that an emigration entirely or mainly consisting of persons of small means would be sufficient. There is no doubt absolutely a large class of persons in this country, who possess small means, and at the same time the disposition and the ability to contend with the hardship of the life of a settler in the backwoods of Canada. But comparatively a small proportion of those in this country who can labour possess such means; and if you rely merely on an emigration of that class, you will never afford sufficient relief to the labouring population of this country, and you will never give the due impulse to the prosperity of Canada. When I consider the great proximity of Canada, and the comparative cheapness of the passage to it, I cannot but consider it as after all affording the readiest outlet for the surplus capital and labour. I cannot contentedly tell the suffering thousands who are annually resorting to Canada at their own cost, and the many thousands more who desire to do so, that the relief which they seek is not to be found so easily; for that Canada is not available to the poor emigrants from Great Britain, and still more from Ireland, who has nothing but his labour to carry abroad with him. It is our duty, it seems to me, to render Canada available to our people, and our people available to Canada. And in order to do that we must in Canada, as in our other colonies, endeavour to get over the great impediment to colonization, by securing the simultaneous emigration of capital and labour; we must tempt the capitalist to embark his money in the improvement of Canada, by ensuring him labour for the cultivation of his property, and we must invite the labourer thither by holding out to him the certainty of being employed by others, until he shall have accumulated sufficient means for becoming a thriving proprietor. This we can only do by applying to Canada the principles on which our colonization should be conducted elsewhere. There, as elsewhere, the placing a sufficient price on waste lands must furnish the means of colonization, while it would serve the yet more important purpose of concentrating the population, which your former system seemed devised with a view of scattering as widely as possible. But here in the outset the difficulty meets us that almost the whole waste land of Canada is at the present moment appropriated; but the Government has no power to make it available for any sound system of colonization; and that the greater part of the proprietors not only cannot be induced to adopt the best system, but do not even use their land at all. It would be useless, as I before said, to attempt to try any better system on the comparatively small portion of surveyed, or even on the large extent of unsurveyed waste lands, which still remain in the Crown; because every right step taken with respect to them will be neutralized by the bad system allowed with respect to the land of individuals. It is quite obvious that while a large extent of property is allowed to lie uncultivated in the possession of individuals, the improvement of a colony is hopeless. The experience of every colony has proved this. The public feeling of every colony has determined that no respect for private property must allow it to become a public nuisance; and the legislation of every colony contains some device or another for preventing the mischief. The two most common plans have been a law of escheat, whereby property, of which a certain proportion had not been reclaimed after a certain period, becomes forfeited to the Crown; and a wild land tax, which in one form or another is generally adopted even in the United States, and in some of our present colonies. My report to Lord Durham recommended the imposition of a wild land tax, which was to be payable in land, and which would inevitably have had the effect, in course of time, of bringing almost the whole of the wild lands into the possession of the Crown. I have not the slightest misgiving as to the correctness of the reasoning by which this proposal was supported. But I am inclined to think that a much more speedy process for getting the wild lands into the possession of the Government is wanted in the present state of things, than any which could be effected by a wild land tax, unless you mean it to be a measure of summary confiscation. Put on a wild land tax such as that proposed in my report of 2d. an acre; the present absentee proprietors will be unable to pay it in money, and their lands will gradually become the property of the Government. But the process will not have effect for a great many years. It will be a long time even before the amount of land thus acquired by the Crown will produce any sensible effect on the land market; and the application of a sound system to the Crown lands will be still further thwarted by the immense quantity of land which the proprietors will throw into the market at low prices, under the alarm of losing it altogether. Nevertheless, unless the nuisance of this immense amount of wild lands be removed in some milder way, the proprietors may make up their minds to being loaded with a very heavy tax on them. If the provincial legislature does not impose one, the district councils, which have now by law the power, will be sure to do so with very little scruple. In the eastern towns, by an ordinance which was disallowed, it is true, but which did not the less show the disposition of the council of that district, that body I understand imposed on the British North American Company one simple rate, of so enormous an amount as by itself to be equivalent to direct confiscation. In the French districts the disposition would be quite the same; only luckily, from the unpopularity of the mode in which the municipal law was passed by the authority of special council, the French districts councils have hitherto taken the line of making no use at all of their powers. But the danger is that the powers of local taxation vested in these bodies will ere long be used, and without measure, against the wild lands. I think, therefore, that some precaution should be taken to secure the rights of the existing proprietors, even while our main object is that of securing the settlement of the wild lands. A plan for this object has been suggested, of which I will briefly state the outline, for the purpose of its being fully considered both here and in Canada. The Government might at once determine to take into its own hands the whole of the wild lands in Canada, compensating the proprietors for the present value of them. For this purpose a general valuation of all the appropriated wild lands of the province would be the first step necessary; a process, doubtless, requiring some time and expense, but nothing like what the mention of a general valuation suggests to us in this country. For it would be wrong, as it would be impossible, in Canada to fix a special value on each acre. The value of an estate there is mainly determined by considerations of position and general character, which apply to vast extents of territory, and every valuation, therefore, must be framed on a large scale. The present value of all those lands might easily be ascertained; for though if all brought into market now they would probably not sell at all, still there is in every district of Canada a price which it is calculated that a purchaser wishing to buy any particular lot, would give for it, and below which the proprietors would generally entertain no offer of purchase. This would be the value, but it should be provided, as I think is just in all cases of compulsory appropriation for public purposes, that the compensation should always equal any sum actually paid for the land by the present proprietor. The value might be as much higher as the valuers might think that altered circumstances had rendered just; but the price actually paid by the existing proprietor should always be the minimum of the value placed on his estate. The proportional interest of each proprietor of wild lands being thus ascertained, I do not propose that the Government, on taking the land, should compensate him by an actual payment of the estimated purchase money. For recollect what the actual value of the land to those proprietors is. It is totally unproductive; it brings no rent; no money can be raised on it, even by way of mortgage. It has a kind of fancied value in the market; but even this value is a deferred one. At the present rate of settlement the proprietor cannot count on getting anything from his land for many long years. In taking the wild land, therefore, we may fairly say that the Government takes that which brings in no present income, and cannot at present be sold. If the Government, in taking the land, ensures to the proprietor a payment of its value at as early a period as he would get it in, if left in his own possession, he is no loser: if the Government having got possession of his wilderness, can, by means of a sound and vigorous system of colonization, sell the land faster than he could, he is a gainer. I should propose, therefore, to pay the proprietor by debentures in a land stock, of which the total amount should consist of as many pounds as there would be in the total estimated value of the property resumed; and of which each proprietor's share should be of the amount at which his own lands were estimated. On these debentures I would pay no interest, because I see no justice in a claim for interest where the property taken brings in no income. But as the Government sold the land, it should pay each purchaser a dividend, until the whole stock was paid off. Thus, suppose there to be 14,000,000 of acres of surveyed and appropriated but wild land in Upper Canada; and that the value of this were to be taken at 4,000,000l.—I have really no reason for fixing this value, but take it quite arbitrarily, because I must take some number—I would create a stock of 4,000,000. Suppose one proprietor has 10,000 acres valued at 1l. a-piece; another also 10,000 acres estimated at 2s. a-piece. The first should have 10,000l. of the stock, the latter 1,000l. Neither should receive interest; but, supposing 100,000l. to be got in the year by land sales, over end above prior charges on the proceeds, I would apply this sum to pay off the stock, which I should thus reduce 2½ per cent., and the first proprietor would get 250l. and the latter 25l. If the land sales produced an applicable fund of 1,000,000l., a quarter of the whole stock would be paid off, and the first proprietor, would get 2,500l., and the second 250l. My argument to recommend this to the proprietors would be very simple. I should say to them, that by this arrangement they would get as much as they can ever expect under the present system to get for their estates; that in the hands of the Government, vigorously employing itself to give a value to those lands by a sound system of disposing of them, and by a large measure of colonization, the whole price would be much sooner got than it could be realized by the absentee proprietors; and that whereas they now get no annual return, each proprietor would, in proportion to the Government sales, and without any exertion on his own part, get an annual instalment of greater or less amount. I should further remind them, that, at any rate, by this arrangement they would secure themselves the original purchase money of their land, and something more, if the present value was greater than the original cost; and that if things are left as they are, they will infallibly, according to the general practice of North America and the received notions of public justice current there, be subjected to a wild land tax, imposed either by general or by municipal authority, which more or less rapidly takes their estates from them without any compensation at all. The arrangement, therefore, is one which must be advantageous to them. The advantage to the public would be, that the Government would thus get the whole of the granted wild lands into its hands; and might establish a plan for giving an increased value to them and its other lands by a sound system of disposing of them, subject to no obstruction from private competition, and by applying the surplus proceeds to promote extensive colonization. I would do this by reverting to the precise recommendations of my report to Lord Durham. I did not, or rather Mr. Wakefield did not, therein, by any means insist on applying the proceeds of the land-sales to defraying the passage of emigrants. I am rather surprised to find Lord Sydenham, in one of the letters recently published, arguing against the application of Mr. Wakefield's views to the colonization of Canada, on the ground that it is not to be effected by selling land at a high price, in order to get the means of carrying out emigrants. In that report, which contains Mr. Wakefield's own deliberate application of his principles to Canada, it is not proposed to set a high price on land; nor is it proposed to apply the proceeds in the first place to emigration. The means are varied to attain the great end of colonization. In new colonies, especially in those of Australia, the great difficulty of colonization is the carrying out the emigrant to the colony; and this is the expense which it is of most urgent necessity to defray by the proceeds of your land sales. The people will not, cannot get out without; and the getting them to the colony is the first necessity. But with respect to Canada the case is exactly the reverse. There, as we see, the means of getting across the ocean are within the reach of a vast number of the poorest of the population, not only of Great Britain but also of Ireland. Without any aid except that which friends, which parishes, and which liberal landlords have been in the habit of giving, a vast influx of labourers and their families has taken place. I should propose that, in the first place, at least we should leave emigration to be carried on independent of the Government; and I should suggest, as my report does, that the primary object, to which the proceeds of the land-sales should be devoted, should be the opening up the interior of the country by roads, bridges, and other public works, so as to render it accessible; and to the building churches, schools, and other public buildings, which should render it really habitable by a civilized community. By the great public works now in progress, we shall establish those great lines of communication which are destined to make Montreal and Quebec the out ports of the vast country which lies on both sides of the great lakes. But, at present, this will be effected by facilitating communication with the far west of the United States, and the transmission of its produce through Canada. If you wish to render the great mass of our own territory available for feeding this main stream, and making it the highway for bringing into the market Canadian produce raised by our own people, the system of communications must be completed by extending to each separate portion of the province its own system of minor internal communications, and rendering each not only accessible, but habitable. For really the great obstacle to the settlement of capitalists, great or small, in Canada is the desolation and discomfort of the life that awaits them. Tempted by the prospect of getting a large quantity of land, they embark their fortunes in a purchase; they find that their lot is cast in a wilderness, and that their life is to be one of solitude and hardship; they are cut off from their kind, and can neither enjoy life nor lay the foundation of wealth; even the observances of a common worship are often denied them, and they see their children grow up without the possibility of educating them. The single settler who finds himself in this position can do nothing to remedy it; but a Government, that really took up colonization in earnest and on system, would provide against such monstrous evils by a few roads, a few churches, and a few schools, which would, at a small expense, provide in every district for the comfort of large numbers. It would lay open various districts by roads made before hand; and concentrate settlements round churches, schools, and markets previously established. These provisions for the comfort and well-being of a civilized community would tempt the capitalist to resort to what would then be no desert; and they would enable you to plant your labourers in districts already prepared for settlement. The construction of such works would in another way facilitate the emigration of poor labourers, by affording them a certain means of getting employment on their arrival in the colony. Government, if conducting the whole operation on a combined plan, would do right in employing emigrants in preference to other persons on their works; and would direct them thither on their arrival. As the labours of these men opened up the country, capitalists would be induced to purchase and settle, and would employ another portion of the labouring emigrants. These labourers, either in the public or in private employment, would be sure, in course of time, to accumulate sufficient savings out of their wages, to enable them to purchase and stock small farms; they would then not only make way for a fresh supply of labouring emigrants, but would create a fresh demand for labour. This is the sure result of a sound system of colonization; the more labour and capital that are supplied to a colony, the larger is the field laid open for additional capital and labour; and the means of employing both go on continually augmenting in geometrical progression, while there remains any waste lands to be reclaimed. Of course, it cannot be supposed that I mean any extensive improvement of the country to be effected, merely by the actual produce of the land sales of the first years of applying this system. I contemplate, as was proposed in my report, anticipating that produce by a loan. The payment of the interest, and then of the principal of the interest, and then of the principal of that loan, would be the first charges on the purchase-money of the land. But I should propose that this House should guarantee the payment of the interest; and this, not because I believe that it would ever be called upon actually to pay, but because such a guarantee would admit of the money being raised at a very low rate of interest. Sir, even if this country should actually have to take the debt upon itself, and pay the interest for ever, I would not scruple, considering the object to be attained, to propose our taking the burthen upon ourselves. Suppose that a loan of two millions should be raised at 4 per cent., which would amount to an annual charge of 75.000l., and that by means of the system thus established we could, as I feel very confident we should, double the present annual amount of emigration to Canada, who would refuse to pay 75.000l. a-year, in order to enable 40,000 more of our countrymen to emigrate every year? It would be carrying on emigration at the rate, after all, of only 2l. a head. And if these 40,000 emigrants were landed in Canada, and, from paupers fed by our bounty, became customers demanding and paying for our goods, the cost incurred on their account would be paid over and over again by the mere addition to our revenue which would result from the increase in our trade which they must create. But I lay this down merely as a position, which I should not scruple to defend, if driven to it. I have not the slightest fear of the produce of the land sales proving insufficient for the discharge of every claim upon it. It is a question whether the Government, by taking the waste lands of the province into its hands, by disposing of them on an uniform and sound principle, and by rendering them accessible and habitable by means of the expenditure of a loan raised on the security of future land sales, would so augment the value of its lands as to obtain from the sale of them the means of repaying the original purchase-money without interest, and the necessary loan with interest. It is impossible to make any calculations near enough to the truth ever to render it worth our while to discuss them hypothetically. It is impossible ever to approximate to the actual value of the wild lands, for which stock would have to be created. What loan would be requisite, at what times, and how much at a time it would have to be raised; and, consequently, what annual amount of interest would be payable each year; and, on the other hand, what amount of lands would be sold every year, and at what price: all these are points, of which some kind of estimate must be given in order to found any calculation of the results, and of which I see no ground for giving any plausible estimate. I will not, therefore, Sir, give any estimate, after the usual fashion of projectors, by gravely working out with arithmetical accuracy, the most precise results from perfectly hypothetical premises. I would rather trust to very general reasoning for leading us to general conclusions. Imagine to yourselves the contrast between a property situated in the midst of the forest, without a passable road to connect it with your neighbours or with your market during half the year; and then the same property, with no change made in its condition but that of a village near it, and good roads connecting it with the neighbouring properties and town; and tell me whether you think it would be at all extravagant to say, that the property would be tripled in value by that single change? Nay, as I am sure that your imaginations will give you but a feeble conception of the importance of more roads to the Canadian settler, I would beg you to look to an extract given in the 85th page of Lord Durham's "Report," from the evidence of the chief agent for emigrants in Upper Canada, who states that in 1834 he himself met a settler from the township of Warwick, who was returning from a grist mill at. Westminster, about forty-five miles distant from his home, whither he had been compelled to carry thirteen bushels of wheat to get them ground.—

"He had a yoke of oxen and a horse attached to his waggon; had been absent nine days, and did not expect to reach home till the following evening. Light as his load was, he assured me that he had to unload wholly or in part several times; and that after driving his waggon through the swamps, to pick out a road through the woods, where the swamps and gallies were fordable, and to carry the bags on his back, and to replace them in the waggon."

The witness then goes on to calculate that it would have been cheaper to send the wheat from Toronto across the Atlantic to be ground at Liverpool and brought back, than it must have been to get it thus ground. Neighbours, a mill in the next village, and a decent road, would have enabled this poor man to do in an hour what it cost him, his horse, and his oxen, ten days to do for thirteen bushels of wheat. This is, no doubt, an extreme case; but it is but an extreme case of a great class of difficulties, destroying the comfort of the settlers, and obstructing the settlement of Canada. It is but a sample of the mischief resulting from the want of roads. Judge then for yourselves, what increased value mere roads would give to the lands of Canada. Is it extravagant to count on that increase, and on the impulse given to the settlement of the colony and to the sale of your land, being such as to insure your paying off the entire debt contracted both for the acquisition and for the improvement of the lands in a few years? But even if it could be supposed that the sale of these lands alone would not suffice, more than suffice, to repay the debt, recollect that the Crown has, in addition to all their surveyed lands, a vast reserve of unsurveyed territory of its own—valueless, it is true, until the surveyed lands be settled, but to which their mere settlement would give a value, and which would always furnish a large additional security for any debt contracted for the improvement of the colony. You have indeed an ample property which would well repay any outlay that might now be required to render it available to your people. All that is needed is the mere will to turn it to account, and method and some system in doing so. As to the machinery for carrying the plan into operation, my report to Lord Durham suggested a commission. I will not now, however, enter into this question further than to say that, as in any scheme of colonization you have to further the interest of two parties, of the mother country and of the colony, it is necessary that the machinery for the purpose should consist partly of an establishment here, and partly of an establishment in the colony. The establishment in the colony it would be better to leave to the experience of the Colonial Legislature to suggest. The additions which it would be necessary to make to the existing commission in this country, for the purpose of enabling it to superintend the administration of the system in Canada, may be left to be considered when the constitution of our present emigrant department comes altogether before the House. For I will take this opportunity of saying, that I think the first requisite for a good system of colonization is to have what Mr. Carlyle calls an effective emigration service; and the first practical step, which I would propose to take next Session, would be to put the present land emigration commission on a footing proportioned to the magnitude and importance of the task assigned to it. As for the details, by which the Canadian scheme would have to be carried out, these also had better be left to the Colonial Legislature and Executive to suggest, There will be not a little difficulty in devising and carrying out such a scheme; and there will be no little risk of its being thwarted by blundering, and still more by jobbing. Of course there will. What good did ever Government undertake to do for the people that cost no pains and was attended with no risk of failure or even of mischief? If we are to be scared from every enterprise of public good by the aspect of difficulty and risk, we must give up every duty of Government. The only question here with respect to every other suggestion of public improvement is whether the object be worth the pains taking necessary for mastering difficulties and preventing jobbing. The object here is to render the nearest of our colonies productive to our people of all the various benefits which sound and extensive colonization may be made to produce. It is, in fact, nothing else than the recolonization of Canada. This is surely worth an effort, and the means which I propose are surely worth that consideration which I am confident they will meet with in the colony, and worth all that which I ask from the Government; namely, that during the recess they will co-operate with the Legislature of Canada in devising a plan for the effectual colonization of that great province. Here, Sir, I should close my present remarks, were it not for the necessity of not omitting from my suggestion of Canadian colonization some reference to the wants and interests of the French portion of the population of Canada. It seems to me that no plan of colonization from Canada can be complete that does not include some provision for enabling the French population to extend itself beyond the limits of its present territory. By the plan adopted on the original occupation of the Canadas the French laws and institutions were confined to the existing seigneuries, and all the rest of the whole province was formed into townships in which the law of England was established. The growth of the French Canadian population since the period of the conquest has been the most rapid ever witnessed in any race not recruited by emigration. In less than eighty years they had multiplied sevenfold. Though the unoccupied land of the seigneuries was sufficient for the reception of a great addition to the original population, such an increase as this exceeded its capabilities. It is but too well ascertained that the increase of produce has not kept pace with the increase of population. The lands which formerly supplied not only the consumption of Canada, but also a large export of grain, are now worn out. Complaints of distress, says Lord Durham's report, are constant, and the deterioration of the condition of a great part of the population admitted on all hands. In fact, Lower Canada exhibits but too many of those signs of the pressure of population in a restricted field of employment, from which we are accustomed to regard the New World as exempted. That the population has not spread out and cleared the surrounding forest is attributable to no want of inclination or energy on their own part. But the French Canadian wishes to carry his own laws and institutions with him: he will not move save under the guidance of his priest. This our law prevented his doing; for the instant that he passed the limits of the seigneuries no provision was made for his church; and he was subjected to a strange code of laws which he regarded with aversion. Many attempts were made to pass these barriers. When I was in Canada a project was mooted, though in no practical shape, for settling the upper valley of the Sangueray and the country round Lake of St. John's, which had been surveyed by orders of the Assembly, and found to possess advantages of soil that rendered it more productive and habitable than a considerable portion of the country more to the southward. It was useless during the war for us to entertain any proposal for extending the domain of the French law and race, nor has anything been done for this purpose since the restoration of constitutional government. But surely now it would be right to take this up once more, and if the French race has outgrown the limits which, not natural but merely legislative landmarks assigned to it, surely it is our business to provide for such an extension of their institutions as is necessary for enabling them to live and multiply in comfort. Thus much, while we are making provision for the extension of our own race in Canada, and for relieving ourselves from the pressure of population—thus much at least we are bound to do to guard these, the ancient European occupants of Canada, from the evil of being pent up in a restricted angle of what was once their undivided patrimony. I must say that I think we owe the French Canadians much consideration—much for long obedience and affectionate loyalty—much for all the mischiefs brought on them by an insurrection which, if precipitated by their own misconduct, had its foundation in our continued obstinate and gross misgovernment—and much for their ready and sincere return to better feelings on the first exhibition of an intention to govern them with fairness and kindness. This, indeed, has astonished those who even most highly estimated the gentleness and simplicity of their character. The only passage in Lord Durham's report, which subsequent events have at all shown to be founded in error, is that in which he deplores the impossibility of ever reconciling the existing generation of French Canadians to the British Government. The mistake shows that highly as he has rated the amiable qualities of that people, he underrated their forgiving disposition, and that he has also underrated the efficacy of those great measures of conciliation which he recommended, and by carrying which into effect, Sir Charles Bagot has for ever endeared his memory to the people of Canada. I will now trouble you no longer at present. The general subject of the means of rendering our colonies at large available to our people by a systematic colonization, I shall bring before this House at an early period of next Session unless indeed the general feeling in the country, and their own sense of the necessity of availing themselves of every remedy for the increasing distress of the country, shall induce her Majesty's Government to anticipate me by themselves proposing practical measures, which they can frame with so much more chance of success. At present I shall content myself with laying these views before you, and moving an address for a copy of the act passed by the province of Canada in the 5th year of her Majesty, intituled" An Act for the disposal of public lands."

regretted that his noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies was not present on this occasion; but he believed that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down was aware that the noble Lord's absence was occasioned by no disrespect for himself, or of the subject which he had so ably brought before the House. Of course, in the absence of his noble Friend, he could not meet, with any decided expressions of opinion, the plan which the hon. and learned Gentleman had proposed in the course of his speech. There were one or two points, however, in the hon. Gentleman's speech upon which he felt it necessary to make a few brief observations. He could assure the hon. Gentleman at the outset, that it was not from any want of will, but from want of powers, that more had not been done by her Majesty's Government in the cause of emigration. In consequence of one observation, however, which had fallen from the hon. and learned Gentleman, he wished to guard himself against assenting to the proposition that the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Government was pledged to consider any measure of this kind. With respect to the sale of lands in Canada, he would not defend the system which was pursued in this matter, but he thought that the motive imputed by the hon. and learned Gentleman to those engaged in these transactions had in some degree been coloured by his ready powers of caricature. He must certainly protest against the sweeping condemnation of the land commission in which the hon. and learned Gentleman had indulged upon the subject of Prince Edward's Island, although he thought that the hon. and learned Gentleman had been a little misled. In justice to the proprietors of that island, he felt bound to say that from all the information which he had on the subject, he thought that so far from their having any wish to prevent improvement, the greatest pains had been taken by them in furtherance of such improvements; indeed, if he had been aware, that a subject of such importance was about to have been brought before the House, he could have brought down documents which would have proved that the increase of productiveness and of the progress of general improvement in the island had been very remarkable. Undoubtedly there was some misunderstandings existing between landlord and tenant, which arose believed from the fact that the inhabitants of that place had but a very imperfect notion of the law relating to landlord and tenant. With regard to the comparison which the hon. and learned Gentleman had made between the state of Canada and of the United States, and the opinion which he had cited from Mr. Buckingham on the subject;—he could not at the moment go into details on the subject; particularly as to the price of land, but could only say that he would cite the authority of Mr. Murray, a gentleman who had recently travelled in that part of the world, which was decidedly in favour of Canada. With respect to the re-emigration which the hon. and learned Gentleman described as taking place from Canada to the United States, he believed that he could satisfactorily explain the state of the case upon that point. The fact was that in consequence of the cheapness of passage by Canada that route was taken by great numbers of persons; and thus many people crossed the frontiers of Canada, not for the purpose of remaining there, but on their way to other parts. This explained the apparent difference between the number of persons who went from the United States to Canada, and that of those who went from Canada to the United States. Temporary circumstances also accounted to a very considerable extent for these differences. For instance, some years back there was a great deal of speculation, and a great number of public works going on in the United States, and the consequence was that a great number of persons went there from Canada for the purpose of seeking employment. Now, however, the case was reversed; the preponderance of public works was in favour of Canada, and this led, for the moment, to a great influx of hands from the United States. In short, he believed, that the preponderance of emigration between the United Sates and Canada was now in favour of the latter. At the same time, however, it must not be at all supposed that at the present moment Canada offered that ready and advantageous field for labour which seemed generally to be supposed. He held in his hand two returns, one of which arrived by the previous mail, and the other by the mail which arrived last night. The first of these, dated the 17th of June, contained a report from the commissioners of emigration; who stated that—

"They regretted to learn, by accounts from the west, that the demand for labour at present was very slack—that several people, unable to find employment, had gone to their homes, and that many more would do so but that they had not the means."

The report which he had received today, and which was dated Quebec, 1st of July, stated that—

"Employment was very scarce; that wages were very low, only 2s. a-day, whilst many hands were to be got at 1s. 8d. or 1s. 10d. The price of farming stock was so low that they could not pay higher wages. It, was therefore, considered fortunate that there had been a decrease of emigration during the last year."

The report added that—

"Carpenters, tailors, shoemakers, and handicraftsmen of all denominations found equal difficulty in obtaining employment."

He thought it important that these statements should get abroad, as much misapprehension had existed upon the subject. The falling off in emigration of late years was very remarkable. In 1842 the number of emigrants was 35,000, whilst in 1843 it was 13,500. The hon. and learned Gentleman had referred to the complaint against the wild land tax, and proposed to do away with it by imposing another tax in its stead. With respect to the tax itself, however, he would observe that the proceeds of it were employed on public works of utility, and that the amount of it was not exorbitant, it being limited to 1½d. an acre in Upper Canada; and though in some cases it had been pressed rather severely, he did not think such an amount of hardship had resulted from it as the hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to describe. With respect to the plan proposed by the hon. Gentleman for the purchase of lands from private individuals by the Crown, for which payment was to be made by a species of scrip, such a plan must not originate with this House but with the legislature of Canada. His hon. and learned Friend referring to the question of emigration to Canada, though he had refused to touch upon the most important point—the means of promoting it. He had said that Sir C. Bagot had only given effect to Lord Durham's recommendations. But it should be remembered that Lord Durham's recom- mendation was to denationalize the French Canadians. He should only state in conclusion, that her Majesty's Government were by no means indisposed to entertain any practicable proposal for promoting emigration by means of the sale of the lands of Canada. Amongst the blue books which his hon. and learned Friend referred to, he had omitted one which was presented on the 29th of May, in which there was a despatch of Sir C. Metcalf, stating that the land and emigration commissioners had recommeded that a portion of the proceeds of the lands should be devoted to the introduction of emigrants. It was true, that the same book stated, as a matter of fact, that the Legislature did not entertain the proposion; but the notice of the subject showed that there was every disposition on the part of the Government to give effect to practical recommendations to attain the object the hon. and learned Gentleman had in view.

The assurance given on the part of the Government was all he expected, namely, that they would turn their attention to the practicability of co-operating with the legislature of Canada, with the view of making the lands available for the purposes of emigration. He knew very well that nothing could be done unless the colonial legislature were a principal party in effecting that purpose. He owed an apology to the House for having brought this subject on in the absence of the noble Lord the Secretary of the Colonies, who he knew was unable to attend from unavoidable causes. He could not but say before he sat down, that there was one remark of his hon. Friend which he thought might have been better omitted. His hon. Friend said that Lord Durham proposed to denationalize the French Canadians. Lord Durham proposed no such thing. He proposed to silence the empty and absurd pretensions of nationality advanced by some injudicious friends of the French Canadians; but he said that the real way to do it was to have such an union of the provinces as would prevent the French from ruling by the force of a mere majority, and at the same time reconcile them to our Government by securing to them the advantages of a representative and responsible Government. He was convinced that what had occurred in Canada would have been most satisfactory to Lord Durham had he lived. He was perfectly willing to say, however, that honour was due to Sir Charles Bagot for carrying into effect the main recommendation of the report of Lord Durham, and establishing a representative Government with an executive in harmony with the majority.

trusted the hon. and learned Gentleman would furnish his recommendations in writing, as by so doing it would facilitate their consideration.

expressed his surprise that so important a question should not have attracted a larger House. There were millions of capital in this country that could not find employment, and abroad we had millions of acres requiring cultivation. He asked why, if corn were not allowed to be brought to this country, the people should not be enabled to go where they might get corn? He thought no time should be lost in adopting an extensive system of colonization. He was sure that if it were not for the repudiation system adopted in America, the surplus capital of this country would have gone there before this.

, in rising to bring forward the motion of which he had given notice, said, that he was quite alive to the disadvantage under which he rose to address the House at the present period of the Session. Questions of foreign policy were generally considered uninteresting, but he could assure the House that on the present question he would confine himself within the narrowest limits. With this assurance he might perhaps he allowed to avail himself of the indulgence of the House whilst he showed the grounds and reasons on which he called upon them to adopt the motion with which he intended to conclude. The question was really a more important one than many people might be inclined to consider. He need not renal to the memory of hon. Gentlemen the circumstances which led to the present condition of the affairs of Greece. They would all be well aware that Greece had failed to pay her portion of the loan entered into with the three powers. He would read an extract from Count Nessolrode's despatch to M. Catacany;—

"In a communication made by the Greek government to the three powers, the Greek government stated—1. That they were unable to pay the interest of the loan due March 1. 2. It proposed, by means of another loan, to be contracted under the guarantee of the three powers, to pay the interest and sinking fund of the old loans. Count Nesselrode, in the first place, quoted the twelfth article of the treaty of London, May 7, 1832, which declares that the interest of the money due to the three powers was to precede all other payments whatever. As to the present amount due, the Russian government have determined on paying the interest, and have authorised the advance to be made, and M. Catacany is desired positively to inform the Greek government that the emperor will require the advance to be repaid on or before the 1st of June next. As for the future, he continued, the most grave consideration belongs to the official avowal which the Athenian Cabinet makes of its inviolability, and this avowal will compel the three powers to concert the adoption of some efficacious means to avert the ruin and total bankruptcy of a nation, which declares it can no longer fulfil the terms of the first article of the treaty of London. The Greek government should not deceive itself as to the importance of this declaration. I have already observed that it comprehends the future interests of the new state; it refers, therefore, not alone to pecuniary interests, but to far greater political interests, of which the three powers partake the responsibility, and they are most anxious not to abandon to chance a creation which they have bound themselves to protect."

The question was one which had long been considered by the Emperor. It had also been discussed in the French Chambers in 1841, and M. Guizot had expressed a very decided opinion with regard to it. M. Guizot said that—

"The state of Greece demanded the most serious consideration of his Majesty's government; it appeared to us essentially bad; the interior condition of the country was endangered, alike by the weakness of the public administration and the conflict of national prejudices. At home, vices of a different description occasioned great alarm; the administration appeared powerless—destitute of energy—incapable not only of ameliorating the social condition of the people, but even of exercising power."

And in consequence of this, M. Piscatory was sent to Greece on a special mission. He had quoted these extracts to show the House that the subject had been brought to the attention of the other Governments, and as an excuse for himself for now calling to it the attention of the British Government. The House was aware under what circumstances King Otho had taken the Crown of Greece. The sovereignty of that country had been offered to the present King of the Bel- gians—then Prince Leopold; but for certain reasons it had been declined by him. He had heard it stated, that many doubts existed with regard to those reasons, but he found the reasons distinctly set forth in a despatch to the representatives of the allied Courts. It was to the effect that, with a due regard to his own honour, he could never consent to become merely the delegate of other powers, to hold Greece in subjection, and that as he saw, with the deepest regret, all chance of independent power annihilated, he must, at the last moment, decline the sovereignty of a country so situated. With the circumstances under which King Otho had gone to Greece, certain privileges had been granted to her people—the right of a representative Government, and the control of her finances. Not only in 1830 had that privilege been confirmed, but in 1828 at the first meeting of the representatives. the same privileges had been provided for, The article 4, of project of Convention in 1832, referred to the protest of February 3, 1830. In the first article it was declared—

"That Greece shall form an independent state, and enjoy all the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, which attach to complete independence."

The despatch of the representatives of Poros, December 1828, was as follows:—

"In proposing the establishment of an hereditary monarchy, they are far from pretending that we Greeks ought not to participate in the legislative power, for even while under the Turkish rule they elected their own municipal magistrates; for eight years the representative principle has predominated amongst them, in their different organizations, and in a manner associated with their new existence. The representatives think it would be both unjust and dangerous to deprive them of it, but it may be expected that by combining this principle with that of hereditary succession to the supreme power the desires of the Greeks would be amply fulfilled."

He would now quote the opinions of the noble Lord, the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs on this point. In 1830, Lord John Russell said, putting a question to the right hon. Baronet:—

"Some points require explanation; the first regards the form of Government which is intended to be established in Greece, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will have no objection to renew his declaration, that his Majesty's Government has no intention to prevent the Greeks governing themselves according to their wishes, wants, and views: no course is likely to be effectual in establishing a permanent government except by consulting the feelings of the people who are to be ruled by it."

The right hon. Baronet stated in answer:—

"I can assure the noble Lord that in the arrangements, the basis of which has been laid by the allies, no attempt has been made to dictate despotic monarchy to Greece; I can also venture to disclaim, certainly on the part of my own Government, and I believe on the part of France and Russia, any wish to interfere with the formation of such institutions as are best calculated to secure the liberty, and promote the happiness of Greece. I join with the noble Lord heartily in the wish which he expresses that the Greeks of the present day may recover from the torpor of long slavery and be enabled to emulate the glory of their predecessors, while at the same time they enjoy all the advantages to be derived from the establishment of those institutions which are calculated to ensure the possession of civil and religious liberty."

The noble Viscount opposite had, in 1836, expressed similar opinions. Lord Palmerston said,—

"I can assure the committee that nothing can be more contrary to the truth than that the Government of Greece is arbitrary and tyrannical, [here the noble Lord was mistaken], conducted on tyrannous and barbarous principles, and supported by barbarian troops. It is true, that no national assembly has yet been convoked, but a man must be blind to the natural character of the Greeks, as well as to the geographical distribution of that country, if he thinks that Greece can be governed without a representative assembly—it is an indispensable addition to the kingly government. It is a great mistake to suppose that Greece is not in possession of the basis of freedom; the only thing wanting to place it in the same situation as England herself, is to put the finishing stroke to the work which has been already done, to add to the institutions which have been already formed a general representation of the state; but this is a thing which must follow, and not precede, other arrangements. I am convinced, however, Greece will at length have one; it is as much the wish of his Majesty's Government, as it is of Greece itself."

The hon. Member who was now entering the House (Dr. Bowring), had said also,—

"He could not consent to any loan for the support of the present Government, a more unpopular than which it never entered into the human imagination to conceive, and which he had been assured by hundreds of Greeks was utterly unsuited to the character and habits of the people."

King Otho had himself, also, in rather pompous and inflated language, promised to maintain the privileges which had been held out by the contracting powers to her people. He said in his address on assuming the sovereignty—

"Called amongst you by the confidence of the high contracting powers, to whose protection you owe the termination of this disastrous war—called amongst you by your free suffrages, I mount the throne of Greece to fulfil the engagements which I contracted in accepting the Crown, Let the ægis of the law protect your persons and properties against licence and arbitrary Government. May you, by firmly-rooted institutions, adapted alike to the state and the wishes of the nation, prove the benefit of true liberty, which can only exist under the empire of laws. Such is the glorious but difficult task which is imposed upon me. In mounting the throne of Greece, I give you the assurance to maintain your religion faithfully,—to protect your laws—to administer justice impartially—to preserve by the aid of God your rights and liberties intact."

The King of Bavaria had said that it was impossible for his son to enter into Greece without the consent of her people; and yet the right hon. Baronet, and every one must agree with him, that King Otho had not entered with the consent of the Greek people. The money of the country was sent to Bavaria, and the people were obliged to pay stamp duty, even on a petition to be presented to the king. The national domains were offered for sale and alienation, and the Grand Crosses were disposed of thus:—Seventy-two Grand Crosses—fourteen Bavarians, three Greeks, and the rest among the three Powers. Fifty-five Grand Commanders—eight Bavarians, seven Greeks, and the rest among the three Powers. Seventy-five Commanders—of which, twenty Greeks. Two hundred and twenty-three Gold Crosses—sixty-one Greeks. In that the Greeks were treated with no fairness, and the whole country was in an utterly miserable state, particularly the interior, to a much greater extent than under the Turks. He admitted that the noble Viscount opposite had done all he could for Greece, but the Government of this country was bound to see the guarantee from Bavaria fulfilled. Certain conditions had been entered into, and those ought to have been strictly adhered to, and that fine country saved the misery under which its people were now suffering. Sir, (the hon. Member concluded) throughout I have most carefully alluded any allusion to classical enormities, although they might not have been out ef place, and, although the right hon. Baronet and the noble Viscount are the last who would disregard them; but still, considering this question in its most matter-of-fact point of view, something must be conceded to the spirit of the Government. Why, the right hon. Baronet will remember, that it was with the view of preserving Delphi and Thermopylæ to Greece that the boundaries the Morea and Cyclades to the gulphs of Voto and Arta. Sir, I say that these considerations form no motive for political action." For when we are called upon to legislate," to quote the language of the greatest orator of antiquity, in speaking of Greece," when we are called upon to legislate for a country which not only possesses refinement itself but has communicated it to others, certes we ought to render the humanity we have received." Nor does it shame me to declare, when I speak of those subjects, which we cannot be accused of neglecting and despising, that all we have acquired has been transmitted to us by those arts and sciences which are the monuments and memorials of Greece. Wherefore, besides that common faith which is due to all men, we are especially appealed to by every consideration of feeling to bestow it in this country. But, Sir, I would appeal to this House by higher considerations than classical associations and political interests—by arguments which would be unanswerable when opposed to these considerations, and which even these cannot enforce. I appeal to you by your national faith and national honour; by pure principles of right and wrong, which are immutable. Do not tell me that Greece interest you not—that her fate can little affect you. She did interest you in 1827, when you signed the treaty of London—she did interest you in 1832, when you sent a Bavarian prince to sway her destinies—she did interest you when you sent your fleets to Navarino, and your protocols to Constantinople. And, although it be admitted that her happiness and welfare cannot affect your power, yet will you, by permitting a continued violation of these treaties, suffer the greatest of all injuries—a loss of your character for con- sistency and integrity among nations? The hon. Member moved

"An Address for certain papers which relate to our diplomatic intercourse with the kingdom of Greece; among others, for copies of those protocols which are supposed to have been signed since 1833, when the last was communicated to Parliament; also, copies of any instructions transmitted to our minister at Athens, in consequence of those meetings of the representatives of the three Powers, at which, from any particular cause, no protocol was signed; also, copies of those communications from Sir Edmund Lyons which convey any information relating to the financial state of Greece."

seconded the motion. He condemned the policy which had been pursued towards Greece, and said that every Greek he had communicated with during his travels was of opinion that our interference in the concerns of that country had been productive of nothing but evil; and that was his opinion also. The Greeks ought to have been allowed to choose a king from amongst themselves, and instead of which the three Powers had sent them a sovereign whose sole object seemed to be the degradation of the people he was appointed to rule over?

thought it was unwise to employ harsh language towards a sovereign who had been placed and was retained on his throne by the three great Powers of Europe. If some of the censures which had been directed against King Otho had been applied to the Regency which governed Greece, before he assumed the unlimited sovereignty of the country, it would have been more justifiable; for that body, after governing Greece for years, left it without having done any of the things which they ought to have done.

Having had so great a share, officially, in the transactions Greece, it would be impossible for me to remain altogether silent during this discussion. I wish to state, in the first place, that as respects all transactions in which the late Government were concerned, I have not the least objection to the productions of any papers which may throw light upon them; subject, of course, to the discretion which the present advisers of the Crown may exercise with regard to documents in their possession, with the details of which they must be cognizant. Speaking generally, I am of opinion that no public inconvenience could arise from the production of papers in continuation of those which have already been presented to Parliament on the subject of Greece, that is to say, of protocols and other correspondence. The hon. Member for Bolton (Dr. Bowring) has stated very broadly that he thinks himself, and that all the Greeks with whom he has conversed, also think, that the interposition of England and the other allied powers, however benevolent their intentions, has, as regards Greece, been attended with nothing but evil. I venture to suggest to the hon. Member, that when a people begin to complain openly of the inconvenience which they suffer from the measures of a Government, it is a proof that they have made some progress in political and civil liberty. The Greeks would not have ventured to make such complaints when they were the inhabitants of a Turkish province. If the hon. Member recollects anything of the course of events in the history of the country of which we are speaking, it is impossible that he can seriously entertain the opinion to which he has given utterance. What was the state of things in Greece when England, France, and Russia interfered? Civil war had been raging in Greece from the year 1820 to 1826, a war which desolated and devastated the whole face of the Morea, a war which was assuming the character of actual extermination, for it is well known to every body, that the Turkish commander and Ibrahim Pacha had conceived and were about to execute the plan of utterly depopulating the whole of the Morea, of carrying off that portion of the population which might not be put to death, and transporting them as slaves to Africa, and of repeopling the country by a colony brought from Egypt. In that state of things, when all Europe was shocked at the transactions which for so many years had been going on, England, France, Russia, interposed—first, with their good offices, in order to obtain a pacification between the Sultan and the Greeks: and secondly, when friendly interposition proved unavailing, they resorted to stronger measures in order to put an end to so devastating a war. If the three powers had done nothing else than this, so far from any one being entitled to assert that their interference had been productive of evil, every impartial man must admit that they effected a good work, which had been attended with great benefit. But not content with that, England, France, and Russia, ultimately obtained from the Porte the separation of Greece from the dominions of the Sultan, and erected it into an independent state. By this measure the three powers obtained for the Greeks not only all the privileges which they could have enjoyed as loyal and favoured subjects of Turkey (and which some few of them did enjoy before the revolution): but all the advantages which belong to subjects of an independent power. It is, then, quite a misrepresentation of history, to assert that nothing has been gained for Greece by the interposition to which this country was a party. I am quite ready to admit that the result has not, in all respects, justified the sanguine expectations which this country formed. I however, am not at all inclined to speak despairingly of the future prospects of Greece. Nothing is more remarkable in the history of the human race than this fact, that the inhabitants of particular portions of the earth appear to retain for long periods of time their peculiar character, varying only according to the circumstances under which they happen to be placed. The Greeks of the present day retain many of the high intellectual qualities which led the former inhabitants of their country to the pitch of civilization which they attained. The character of the old Greeks varied according to the circumstances in which they were placed, and the same nations which rose to the highest eminence of renown and glory at a period when it was in the free enjoyment of political and civil liberty liberty, under the sway of the Romans assumed so degraded a character as to make it difficult to recognize in it the state which had formerly excited the admiration of the world. I think, therefore, that the hon. Member for Bolton ought not despair because the Greeks do not at the present moment exhibit all the qualities which they are capable of developing under a more ample enjoyment of political and civil liberty. It is said that the three powers made a bad choice of a king for Greece, and the hon. Member who has brought forward this question contends that, in this matter, the powers acted without sufficient authority from the Greek nation. I can only say that the three powers believed that the delegation which they received from the Greek government, authorizing them to choose a sovereign for Greece, was a sufficient expression of the national will on that point. We might, as has been urged, have chosen for the king of Greece some distinguished member of a German royal family—some man eminent for his military capacity. I can assure the hon. Member that those points did not escape the observations of those who had to make the choice; but we wanted to find a sovereign for a people who, it was intended, should have a free constitution; and we did think, whether right or wrong—I think rightly—that we were likely to find a Sovereign who would live in harmony with the people he was to rule over, by selecting, not a member of any royal family connected with the arbitrary governments of the continent, but prince connected with a popular representative Government; and we also thought that a person young in years would be more likely to identify himself with the habits and inclinations of the people, than a person of formed habits and character. We thought that the son of the king of Bavaria combined, in his own person, all the necessary qualifications for the office and accordingly he was chosen king of Greece. With respect to regency, also, I think it did not deserve censure cast upon it by the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Milnes). So far from having done nothing for Greece, the regency left the country in possession of many useful institutions, and if they had added to them a system of national representation, I think they would have done all that any body of men, possessing the government of that country could have accomplished. What was the condition of Greece when the regency surrendered up their authority? The hon. Member wishes the House to believe that the regency did nothing for the Greeks, and that under their sway the country was almost in the same condition as it was whilst under the dominion of Turkey. He forgets that under the regency Greece had a free press. [Mr. Hume:"It has been put down."] I have not risen for the purpose of defending what has recently been done. I am speaking in answer to the hon. Member's charge against the regency. I say that the regency gave Greece a free press, known laws, pendent tribunals of justice, municipal corporations, provincial assemblies, every thing, in short, which forms the foundation of civil liberty, except—and I allow that the exception is important—a national assembly. Did the three powers overlook the importance of a national assembly for Greece? There was a pledge on the part of the three powers that a constitution should be given to Greece. and that pledge was repeated by the minister of the King of Bavaria, Baron Gisè, acting as guardian of the monarch's minor son, when appointed King of Greece. The letter of Baron Gisè, containing the pledge, is in the Foreign Office, and I hope it will be amongst the papers which the Government will produce. As regards the three powers, their intention on the subject of a constitution is evidenced by this passage in a proclamation which they addressed to the Greeks:—

"Hellènes! Livrez vous à ces sentiments avec confiance, entourez votre nouveau Souverain de votre reconnaissance et de votre affection. Sujets fidèles! Rallies vous autour de son trône; aidez le avec un juste dévouement dans la tâche de donner â Petat une constitution definitive, et de lui assurer le double bienfait de la paix au dehors, de la tranquilité, du règne de loix, et de l'ordre au dedans."

"Greeks, abandon yourselves confidently to these feelings: encompass your Sovereign with your gratitude and affection. Faithful subjects rally around his throne; aid him with true devotion in giving to the state a definitive constitution, and ensure him the double benefit of peace abroad, and tranquility and the reign of law and order at home:

If no constitution has been given to the Greeks, it is not because no expectation of that kind was held out by the three powers; but it is, I must say, in violation of promises to which this country and the King of Bavaria, on the part of his son, were parties. As far as this country was concerned the late Government was not wanting in endeavours to induce the Sovereign of Greece to fulfil that promise. We certainly did not receive in our endeavours that support from the other two powers who were parties to the conference and to the proclamation to which I have referred which we had a right to expect; and it must be obvious that when only one power out of three was urging the King of Greece to do that which he himself or his advisers were not disposed to do, our efforts were not likely to be attended with great success. The hon. Member for Bridport read a passage from a speech which I delivered on a former occasion, and in which I denied that the government of Greece was in any way tyrannical. I must say that, whatever I may have thought at the time when I made that speech, the information which came officially under my observation, when I was in office, respecting the conduct of persons acting under the authority of the Greek government, satisfied me that they had been guilty of a great abuse of power and had committed acts of great cruelty. We urged upon the Greek government the necessity of making inquiry into the circumstances to which I have alluded, with the view of preventing the recurrence of such conduct, and I believe that our representations were attended with success; but of course I cannot speak with any degree of authority respecting what has occurred during the last two years. I can only repeat, that representative constitution is what the Greeks were entitled to expect; and I hope that, not withstanding the delays which have hitherto taken place, it is a consummation we shall soon have the happiness of witnessing. I am firmly convinced that, if a system of Government were established which would allow of the free discussion of events, of the free expression of opinion, and of free inquiry into grievances, it would redound infinitely to the comfort of the King of Greece, and to the happiness, contentment, and welfare of his kingdom. A matter was touched upon in this House on a former occasion, which is intimately connected with the want of a representation in Greece, and in which this country is directly interested, I mean the payment of the interest on that part of the loan to Greece which England guaranteed. When the late Government consented to make good to King Otho the same engagement into which their predecessors had entered towards King Leopold, and which, I believe, was essentially necessary for the launching of the Greek state, we took security which appeared to us to be sufficient to prevent any burthen falling on this country. We made a stipulation, which is contained in the 6th article of the treaty, which I will now read to the House:—

"The Sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, of such intalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three courts; the first, revenues of the state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek treasury shall be devoted, first of all to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three courts shall have been completely secured for the current year. The diplomatic representatives of the three courts in Greece shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last-mentioned stipulations."

That stipulation, I am sorry to say, has not been fulfilled. Up to the period when the late Government left office that portion of the loan which we guaranteed had not been raised; neither, I believe, had the other two portions. The Greek government was at that time oppressed with expenses of a temporary nature; and it always held out the expectation, that those would, in a short time, be diminished; whilst, on the other hand, the income of the country would be increased so as to furnish the means of paying the interest of the loan out of the annual revenues. Budgets were proposed, but we doubted them. They were not prospective, but retrospective, having reference only to the year that had elapsed. We were always assured, that these budgets had been reviewed by the council of state, and, that reliance might be placed on their accuracy. Now, if there had existed in Greece a popular representative assembly, this kind of proceeding could not have gone on, for such an assembly would have minutely examined the budgets, and detected the errors which are now admitted to exist in some of them. In an answer which the Greek government gave the other day to a representation of the Russian government, it is stated, that during the last few years, the revenues of Greece have much increased, whilst her expenses have diminished, and certainly, if there was an approximation to truth in the budgets which the Greek government gave us, there ought now to be a surplus applicable to the payment of the interest of the loan. I have no doubt, that the present Administration has continued, as we did, to urge the Greek government to fulfil the conditions of the loan, as regards the payment of interest. There is no disguising the fact, that there has been an undue expenditure of money in Greece. This may be owing to the want of that control which a more perfect constitution would have afforded to the king, maintaining a greater number of Bavarian officers and civil servants than appears to be necessary, to keeping up too large an army, or too great a number of ships; but whatever the cause may be, there is no disguising the fact, that the Greek revenue has been improvidently squandered, and but for that, that it would have been sufficient to pay the interest of the loan. In ordinary circumstances, the English Government would have no right to ask a single question respecting these matters; but as we are guarantees for a loan for which we have taken security, we have a right to insist that greater thrift shall be observed by the Greek government. No doubt her Majesty's Ministers are employing the means at their disposal, in conjunction with France and Russia, to induce the king of Greece to fulfil his engagements; and I trust, that the advisers of that sovereign will counsel him to comply with the just representations of the three powers. I also hope, that her Majesty's Ministers will urge strongly upon the king of Greece the necessity of his giving a constitution to his people, in redemption of the pledge given by the three powers in 1832, and repeated by Baron Gise, his father's counsellor; and then I am sure the hon. Member for Bolton, in all his future travels, will be unable to find any Greeks who would not say that the condition in which we have placed them is not happiness itself, compared with that in which we found them when we first interfered in their behalf.

I think it is impossible for any inhabitant of a country in which civilization has made progress to profess indifference for the fate of Greece—a country to which we owe all civilization and attainments which are not connected with the Christian dispensation. Independently, however, of those considerations, Greece must always be an object of interest. From her geographical position, the internal tranquillity of Greece must necessarily exercise an important influence on the general tranquillity of Europe. The English Government has, moreover, contracted special pecuniary engagements with Greece by becoming responsible for her debts. My hon. Friend the Member for Ponte fract has stated, that the opinions expressed in this House, will not fail to exercise a peculiar effect in Greece; that the proceedings of the British Parliament are looked up to by the Greek people with anxiety; and that the Greek Government, as well as the Greek people, are peculiarly sensible to the judgments expressed respecting them by those nations to whom they are accustomed to look up with respect. As far as the Government is concerned, I hope that they will not manifest an undue sensitiveness; and if they are so strongly alive, as my hon. Friend says, to the opinions expressed respecting them by the other politicians of Europe, I hope that the opinions expressed in the British House of Commons—dictated, certainly, by no unfriendly feeling—will not fail to produce upon the Greek Government that effect which—we wish that Greece should honourably fulfil her enagements. I must say, that, if English exhortations had been apt to produce that effect, art ample opportunity has been given; for I am bound to say, that the excellent English representative now in Greece, a man animated by the most sincere wish to promote the welfare and the prosperity of the country in which he resides, has not failed of late years, repeatedly to warn the Greek Government of the consequences to which an unthrifty expenditure must ultimately and infallibly lead. As to the motion before the House, there is one part to which I have no objection, namely, that part which relates to the production of the protocols agreed to since 1833, when the last that has been submitted to Parliament, was signed. There are six or seven which have been signed since then, and I can have no objection to their production. With respect to the negotiations now pending as to the obligations of Greece, the noble Lord expressed a hope that some progress had been made in impressing on the Greek Government the necessity of fulfilling their engagements, entered into by the three powers. I believe I am in the position to satisfy the expectations of the noble Lord, by assuring him that efforts have been made by all the three powers with that view, The noble Lord justly says, that, by the treaty concluded by the Greek Government with the three powers, Greece bound herself to appropriate a part of the available revenue of the country to the payment of the interest on the loan guaranteed by the three powers; but the noble Lord admitted, at the same time, that that part of the treaty had never been practically put into force, and the noble Lord even stated that the interest on the first part of the loan was paid by the Greek government out of a subsequent instalment of that loan. The result of such a course was easy to foresee. The Greek government soon found itself unable to fulfil its engagements, and the creditors of Greece applied to the three powers that had become guarantees that those engagements should be fulfilled. England, France, and Russia, have in consequence been obliged to satisfy those creditors. The three powers recently met in conference, and informed the Greek government that it was impossible for them to concur in the continuance of a state of things that transferred to the three powers the task of making good engagements, which it was the duty of Greece herself to discharge. I have every reason to believe that a convention accepted by Greece has been signed, renewing the obligations into which Greece originally entered, and requiring the application of specific branches of the revenue, first to repay to us what we have already paid, and secondly, to afford us security for a more regular payment in future of the interest on the loan. These transactions have not yet been brought to a close. The latest documents referring to them are of so recent a date as the 11th of August, but the papers referring to the present negotiations, it is not at present in my power to produce. When, however, the negotiations have been concluded, the whole of the particulars shall be as freely communicated as those papers to the production of which I have already given my consent. The three powers, in the mean time, have not been unmindful of other engagements, besides those of a pecuniary character, into which the Greek government had entered. Russia, France, and this country, acting in concert, have remonstrated with the Greek government on the necessity of introducing effectual reforms into the administration of Greece. They have made strong representations, like wise, on other matters connected with the necessity of giving satisfaction to the just wishes of the people. I must abstain at present from any more direct allusion to this subject, but I can assure the House that many points alluded to by the noble Lord, and by the hon. Gentleman who originated this motion, have not been overlooked in the recent negotiations that have taken place between the three powers and Greece. The production of the other papers moved for by the hon. Gentleman would be likely to interfere with the negotiations now going on, and under these circumstances, I hope the hon. Gentleman will be satisfied with the papers which I have ex- pressed myself ready to produce. I concur in the sentiment expressed that we ought now less to revert to the past, than to consider what may best secure the future progress and prosperity of a people, of whose ultimate fortunes we certainly ought not to despair. We must recollect the despotism of centuries to which they had been subjected; and if on being rescued from that despotism, they should not at once manifest those capacities for the arts of Government which are familiar to the inhabitants of more favoured countries, we ought to consider the circumstances from which that incapacity for the arts of Government may be supposed to have arisen. Some personal remarks have been made respecting the King of Greece. That King, it must not be forgotten, is the sovereign of the country, and I should much regret it, if any harsh language were to be employed respecting him in this House. He came to the throne when he was extremely young, and when he had had no experience of the duties of Government. A more intimate knowledge of the feelings of the Greek people, of their jealousy of foreign rule and interference, aided by the friendly suggestions of the powers who have every right to consider themselves the protectors of Greece, will, I trust, induce him to listen to those suggestions, and by so doing promote the welfare and happiness of his people, and of his own dynasty.

said, there was one point of the noble Lord's speech to which he could not accede. He denied, that the Greek people had ever been consulted as to the choice of their sovereign, for he could not admit that the miserable assembly at Argos could be looked on as representing the Greek nation. The truth was, they had never been consulted at all on a point of such vital interest to them. With respect to the terms of the motion, he was quite ready to concur with the proposal of the right hon. Baronet; and with respect to the King of Greece, should he persist in his present course, he hoped that the three powers would feel it to be their duty to interfere, and to use stronger language than any that had yet been addressed to him.

I rise, pursuant to notice, to move for the production of papers connected with Servia. Events have lately occurred in that country of no little importance to the rest of Europe. In the negotiations connected with those events, the British Government has taken a part, and the part taken in them by so great a power cannot fail to exercise a material influence on the result. The British constitution vests in the advisers of the Crown the fullest and most discretionary power in their diplomatic transactions with foreign powers. That discretionary power, however, is exercised, subject to the revision of Parliament; but in order that this revision may take place, it is necessary that Parliament should be informed of the course which the Government may have adopted, or of the grounds on which that course has been pursued. In the present instance, Parliament is very much in the dark as to the course which her Majesty's Government have pursued, so far as the events of Servia are concerned, and therefore we can have no knowledge of the grounds on which that course has been pursued. I did, at a former period of the Session, endeavour to obtain the production of papers, calculated to throw some light upon those transactions—not indeed papers containing that full information which those I now intend to move for would afford, but still papers which would supply the ground work for further inquiry. Some of those papers were granted—the rest were withheld—and those which were granted proved the propriety or necessity for the production of those which were withheld. Those papers which were granted were treaties made between Russia and the Porte, and firmans, which were declared an integral part of those treaties. The papers withheld were documents calculated partially to show what had been the course of events, and in what respect those events had been conformable with the stipulations contained in those treaties. I should, on several accounts, have preferred that her Majesty's Government should of their own accord have given those papers rather than it should have become my duty to move for them in this House. Her Majesty's Government in other matters have justified themselves for what they have refused to do by the example of their predecessors. I wish that on the present occasion they had followed that example. Whatever may be said for or against our foreign policy, it must be ad- mitted that there have been few Governments that have afforded more full information respecting all important transactions in which we were concerned. We did so on the occasion of our negotiations with Belgium, with Greece, with the United States, with Naples, with those which we carried on with Russia respecting the affairs of Persia and Affghanistan, and with China, we afforded Parliament the fullest information as to the course we pursued in all those important transactions. The papers connected with the negotiations with Russia on the affairs of Persia and Affghanistan were a case very much in point with the present, and I wish the production of them had formed a precedent on this question. Before those papers were produced an intimation had been made in that House of an intention to bring the matter to which they had reference under discussion; but after they had been produced they were found so full, and I am happy to say so satisfactory, that no Member of Parliament felt it his duty, either in that or in the other House, to moot the subject by motion. Now it is quite impossible (though from what I have heard I do not think it probable) that if her Majesty's Government had, with regard to the affairs of Servia, followed the example which the late Administration had set them with regard to the affairs of Russia with Persia and Affghanistan, a result similar might have followed, and it might not have become my duty, or that of any other Member, to have said anything in Parliament on this subject. If that result had followed, it would have been more satisfactory to me. In the first place, as a British subject and as one of the representatives of the British people, I should have been glad to have found that in a transaction of some importance to Europe the conduct of the British Government had been such as to deserve the approbation of the country. Again, as a Member of the late Administration, I should have been better pleased not to have had to originate the discussion; because it is a discussion in which he should be compelled to criticise and find fault with the conduct of a friendly ally—I mean the government of Russia. I wish to think and to speak well of that Government. In a crisis of great European difficulty, at a time when the peace of Europe was threatened by the state of things that arose out of the conflict be- tween the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, Russia addressed herself to Great Britain, and sent a minister of great ability over to this country, charged to offer to England the unreserved confidence of Russia, and to ask for the confidence of England in return. Many circumstances connected with that overture were calculated to command the confidence which the minister of Russia was charged to ask for. There had been a misunderstanding between the two governments, and many things had happened that might have led the Russian government to doubt whether a full concordance was likely to take place between England and Russia. We accepted the overture as frankly and unreservedly as it was made, and I believe I can say that the whole of our conduct fully bore out the confidence that Russia placed in us, while, on the other hand, the steadiness and good faith of Russia fully merited the confidence which we placed in her. It is, therefore, with great regret that I originate a discussion which may impose on me the duty of criticising the recent conduct of Russia. The circumstances to which my motion relates are shortly these: Servia, as everybody knows, is a Christian province belonging to the Turkish empire. The Servians are as completely subjects of the Sultan as any other people living under the Turkish rule. But the Servians enjoy some peculiar privileges, partly obtained by occasional resistance to the Turkish governors, and partly by treaties concluded between Russia and the Porte. Among other privileges, the Servians enjoy that of choosing their own prince, besides which, the Sultan pledges himself not to intefere in the internal administration of the country. The history of Servia is marked with serious insurrections and revolts, not differing much from those presented to us by the history of the other provinces of the Turkish empire. It is not that the Government of Constantinople has exercised a tyrannical control over the remote provinces. It is not the distant Emperor they have feared so much as his officers, who were ever near to them. The Pacha's first object after his appointment to the command of a province, is to extort from the people the money by which he had purchased his promotion. The unruly Janizaries carried outrage and violence into every house, and the collectors of the revenue in enforcing the con- tributions of the people, often cut off the nose and ears of their victims in mere wantonness. It was things like these that led to the revolts of the Servians, and in the course of those revolts the Servians applied to Russia. for assistance. When she was at peace with Turkey, Russia advised the Servians to go to Constantinople, and promised the friendly intercession of her ambassadors; and when at war, Russia made the grievances of the Servians, the subject of treaties at the close of the war. It was thus, that the treaty of Bucharest was made to stipulate for the privileges of the Servians. The engagements thus entered into, were broken, and again renewed by a subsequent treaty; were again broken and again renewed by the treaty of Adrianople. According to the stipulations of these treaties, the Servians were to have the free choice of their own prince, and the Sultan bound himself not to interfere with the internal administration of the province. Czerney George, the first chief of the Servians, was never acknowledged by the Porte. Prince Milosch followed, and not only was he invested with the chief authority, but the right was conceded to him of transmitting his authority to his descendants. His authority, moreover, was fully acknowledged by the Sultan. Prince Milosch, in 1835, gave to the Servians a very full constitution. It was a voluminous document, consisting of 120 articles, and was drawn up by "Davidovitch," under the promptings of young Servia, Prince Milosch, I believe, had not much to do with it; for all the early years of his life had been spent in scenes of turbulence and civil war; his education had been neglected, and at the time when he was raised to the rank of a prince, he had not, as he himself acknowledged, fully mastered the art of writing. When this constitution, however, came into operation, he found it extremely inconvenient, and soon put it aside. As might have been expected under such circumstances, the Servians became discontented, and complained, and in 1839 the Porte gave the Servians a modified constitution, contained in one of the firmans now on the Table of the House. Milosch was very much discontented with this, and abdicated his authority as prince. The Servians, in virtue of the principle of hereditary succession, called his son to power. This son soon afterwards died, and the Servians then conferred the au- thority on Prince Michael, the second son of Milosch. During the reign of Prince Michael the Servians were still discontented, and in the month of September they at last broke out into open insurrection, whereupon Michael followed the example of his father, and likewise abdicated and retired from the country. No other Member of the family could now be called on to succeed, and the Servians elected as their prince one Cara George-witch, a son of Czerny George. The Sultan sanctioned the choice, and sent the proper instrument for the confirmation of Cara George witch. Everything seemed settled. The Servians were satisfied, and the Sultan had confirmed the election of the new prince. But Russia was not satisfied: she objected to what she considered the revolutionary proceedings by which the abdication of Prince Michael had been brought about, and she objected to the election on the ground that it had been brought about by proceedings of the same violent character. Russia urged these objections on the Sultan, and demanded, first, that the election of Prince George witch should be annulled as the result of violence; secondly, that a new election should take place by an assembly of the Servian nation; and, thirdly, that Wutschitch and Petroniewich, two popular leaders, who had long held a prominent position in the country, and had figured in the events connected with the abdication and election, should he recalled from Servia and punished for the part they had taken in the revolutionary proceedings there. As the public has been informed, the Turkish government demurred, and contended that these demands were not founded on any right that Russia enjoyed by virtue of any treaty. Turkey contended that all Russia had a right to demand was, that the Servians should exercise a free choice in the election of their prince. This right Turkey further contended the Servians had exercised, and moreover, Turkey said that she had bound herself by treaty not to interfere in the internal affairs of Servia, which she would be doing if she were to act in conformity with the demands now made. These representations of the Sultan were of no avail. Russia persisted in her demand, and left the Porte only one alternative, submission, or an immediate rupture of all friendly relations. The Sultan knew, by bitter experience, that in any single handed struggle, Russia was by far the stronger. But he knew also that in July, 1840, there had been concluded between the five great powers of Europe a treaty, in the preamble of which it was said, that they had no other object in signing it than a desire to manifest their respect for the inviolate rights of the Sultan. The Sultan, therefore, thinking these demands of Russia a violation of his rights, naturally thought of addressing himself to the other four powers, parties to that treaty. What did those four powers do? And first, of the British Government. I speak only from general report; but the papers I move for, if granted, will show how these matters stand. The public and the world have been led to believe, that the British ambassador at Constantinople was of opinion, that the Sultan was right, and that the Government of England ought to afford him its countenance and support in the view he took of his rights. It is believed, also, that such was the advice the British ambassador gave to his Government; but if he did, in what condition did that advice find the Government? Why, it found them, on this matter, in the same condition in which they have too often been found with respect to many other matters, both foreign and domestic. It found the British Government without any opinion of its own on the subject. Now, this at least I am not stating on public report, because I have heard it with my own ears, not indeed in this House, but in another place, from a person justly considered to speak on that subject with the authority of the Government. I heard it myself stated, that the British Government did on that occasion, on being applied to by the Porte on those Servian affairs, that which in the opinion of the person to whom I allude was the only thing which a British Government endowed with common sense and prudence would have done on such an occasion—they inquired what the Government of Austria had done, and determined that whatever that might be, they would do the same. Now I venture humbly to think, that that was a course not wise, and not worthy of the Government of this country. I think that on every matter on which Great Britain has an interest, be it great or small, Great Britain is entitled to have an opinion, and I think that a British Government, which on any matter in which British interests are more or less involved, chooses to delegate its right of opinion to other Governments, and pledges itself to follow the line of action selected by other governments, any Ministry which does that abdicates its functions, and does not do its duty to the country. On such a matter, supposing even that the interests of England were precisely the same as those of any other foreign power, neither more nor less, and precisely in the same direction, still, I say, that to subject yourselves to the guidance of another state is not wise and not becoming. But we may be told that this foreign government, whatever it may be, must be the best judge of its own interests, and if they think such a course consistent with their interests, these being the same as ours, it must be consistent with ours also. But what is more common, whether with individuals, Governments, or nations, than that mankind should mistake their own interests? And, therefore, by placing our decision in the hands of another party, we forego that right which we are entitled to exercise, to judge of our own interests. Moreover, a Government responsible to Parliament and the public for their administration of national affairs, is not, I think, entitled to decline deciding for itself, or to place itself at the command of any other Government. Though Austria has an interest as well as we in the maintenance of the independence of the Turkish empire, and though I admit, as was stated by the person whom I heard on that occasion, that her interest is even greater and more direct than ours, from the geographical position of that empire, yet she has other interests which may come into contact with ours, and point out a policy entirely different from our own. She is one of the greatest powers of Europe, greater, perhaps, than those who have seen her act on several occasions may believe her to be, and would be greater still if her energies and resources were fully developed. But she is all frontier, and we know that in states bordering each other much inconvenience may be inflicted and annoyance produced, by influences and causes to which remote countries would be entirely strangers. And therefore, though it be true that Austria may have as 'great or a greater interest than we have in maintaining the inviolability of the authority of the Sultan, yet it may so happen that Russia, in her communications with Austria, may be able to appeal to other nearer and more valued interests of Austria, for the sake of which that power may (and rightly, too, with a view to its own general advantage), be inclined to sacrifice that more remote interest of Turkey. But that is the interest which she has in common with us; and therefore, by placing ourselves at her disposal, we run the risk of sacrificing British interests for the sake of one with which we have no direct concern. I say that course was not fair or useful even towards Austria herself. I will first state what the course was which the Government took. Austria, I am informed, in the outset, took the same view as was taken by the British ambassador at Constantinople—that the Sultan had pursued a wise and proper course, and ought to be supported in that course. But there speedily came a very strong and urgent representation from Petersburgh to Vienna, and soon after that representation arrived, the Austrian Government changed its view, and instead of being disposed to support the Sultan against the demands of Russia, determined to advise that sovereign to yield to the demands of Russia. Now, I say, that we weakened the Austrian Government on that occasion, because if the English Government had adopted the view taken by its ambassador at Constantinople—I assume him to have taken that view which it is generally said he took, and which was also at first adopted by Austria—when the Russian Government endeavoured to make Austria change her views, she would have replied, "Surely the views we have taken cannot be unreasonable; it was assumed by the British Government, which we know from declarations in the British Parliament to be an intimate alliance and friendship with the Government of Russia, and which from community of interests would not take a view at variance with ours. Go to London and try to persuade the British Cabinet to take a different view of the matter, and if you do, we will not say we shall not be persuaded to reconsider our views." In that case that would have given powerful support to the Austrian Government, but we are told that we had given Austria full power to act for us. I am quite sure that will not be denied, because if it were not so, it is quite impossible that the Austrian ambassador could have had an interview with the Secretary of State here, without discovering what was the course which the British Government proposed to take. Russia, then, had cause for doubly increased urgency of remonstrance with Austria, for she said, "By holding this course you do us double injury. You give to the Sultan that support which your own influence at Constantinople enables you to lend, while that which arises from the influence of England is exercised in the same manner as yours; therefore, you are doubly responsible for the mischievous policy to which you at present adhere." The course we pursued, then, so far from being any support to Austria, was, in effect, the same as that of a man who should give to a traveller liable to attack the whole of his property in addition to that which belonged to himself, and thereby invite a double portion of vehemence in the attack. Austria, having changed her opinion, instructed her Minister at Constantinople to advise the Sultan to yield to the demands of Russia. The English ambassador, having no other instructions except to do what his Austrian colleague might do, backed that advice; and Prussia, of course, backed the representations of these three Powers. There remained the Government of France. I have been informed that the French Government, in the beginning of the affair, took the same view of the matter as was taken by the British ambassador at Constantinople, and, in the first instance, by the Austrian Government at Vienna. France thought that those demands of Russia were unreasonable, and that she ought not to insist on their being complied with. But when she found England, Austria, and Prussia advising compliance with the demands of Russia, what was it likely that she would do? France, only two years before, at great inconvenience, and at much sacrifice of her own feelings, had separated herself from those four powers, specifically on the Turkish question, because she did not choose to join in the measures these powers thought necessary for the maintenance of the Turkish empire. Was it likely that she on this occasion should change places with those powers, and having one year separated herself from them because she would not join in the measures calculated to support the independence of the Sultan, she should now again separate herself from them, because she would not allow of measures calculated to impair that independence? Of course that was not to be expected, and France accordingly consented to join her advice to the other three, or she remained passive and gave no advice at all. I believe it is generally supposed that she did join with the other three in recommending submission. In that state of things, the Sultan being on the one hand urged by the demands of a great and powerful neighbour, and on the other hand abandoned by all those allies from whom he might have expected at least friendly offices and diplomatic assistance, had no alternative except unconditional submission. He therefore consented to annul the election of Prince George, and order another election by a General Assembly of the Servians to he convened for that purpose, and to recall the two popular leaders, Wutschitch and Petroniewich, to Constantinople, to answer for their conduct. He went even a step further, and possibly, in compliance with a fresh demand addressed to him, appointed a Russian general, Baron Lieven, to be his commissioner, conjointly with a Turkish officer, to the Servians, and see that the terms of the arrangement he had prescribed were faithfully carried out, which was exceedingly humiliating. They went to Servia, and what happened? First, Prince George declined to abdicate, and gave very good reasons for not doing so. If he abdicated, there would probably have been no Government at all, but a period of anarchy; and it was especially necessary he should carry on the administration of affairs, at least until the General Assembly met. They met, and protested against the recall of Wutschitch and Petroniewich. They said these men were popular leaders, in whom they had confidence, and it was intimated that if they were sent away, the Assembly would do nothing. They declared they would not consider the election of Prince George as null and void, and that, in their opinion, it had been duly and properly made, representing the will of the Servian nation; and they refused to do anything but confirm it. I have been led to believe that this result was, on the whole, considered satisfactory by Baron Lieven and the Turkish commissioners. It showed that which, under the circumstances, was all the Turkish Government could require, that Prince George was the free choice of the Servian nation. We have been publicly informed that the Russian Govern- ment was not contented with the result. They were at first dissatisfied by this process of election, but they have at length agreed to make no further objections on that point, although they still insisted on this, that the two popular leaders should be recalled to Constantinople, and undergo some censure or punishment for their proceedings; and it was stated only two days ago in the newspapers, that by some arrangement or other those two men had left Servia, and even on that point, the wishes of the Russian Government had been fully met. I want papers to show what has really been the course of these transactions, and what have been the language and the conduct held by the British Government in reference to these affairs. I want to know, and I think Parliament has a right to know, whether the British Government has acted up to the words of the preamble to the treaty, I have just quoted, and maintained to their best the inviolability of the sovereign rights of the Porte; or whether, for any reason or motive they have consented to become a party to proceedings utterly at variance with that inviolability. I hope I shall not be told that Russia has a treaty with the Porte, and that she has a right to put what construction she pleases on its terms. I know that assertion has been made; I hope we shall not hear it tonight, for I must say, an assertion more preposterous, or more contrary to common sense and justice, it would be difficult to conceive. I say at variance with common sense, because it leads to no conclusion. If Russia be at liberty to put her own construction on a treaty into which she has entered, the same must hold good as a general maxim; what is good for one power, must be good for all; if one state can do that, another is equally entitled to exercise the same right. If that be so, the matter ends exactly where it began; the two parties have equal and conflicting rights, which must be decided either by an appeal to arms, or by the interposition of mediating powers. When I am told then that Russia has a right to put its own construction on its own treaty, I reply that the sentence has no practical meaning whatever, unless it is meant to be asserted that she has some right to put a construction on a treaty, which must be acquiesced in and adopted by every other nation. That is a sort of doctrine which no Ministers will venture to propose in this House with respect to any country in the world, and therefore that cannot be the meaning. Do not tell me of a treaty between Russia and the Porte. These treaties are now on the Table, and we have as perfect a right as any other power to judge of them, and decide as to what will be a fair interpretation of them; and I, for my part, must declare that there is not a word in any of them which gives Russia the shadow of a ground for the demands she has set up. Neither, I hope, shall we be told, that these Servian affairs were attended with revolutionary proceedings, and that Russia had a right to require that such proceedings in a neighbouring state should be put down and punished. That, we know, is a doctrine held by the great powers of the continent, who contend that if there are disturbances in any province of a neighbouring state adjoining their own frontier, they have a right, as a matter of self-defence, and to prevent the disaffection from spreading, to call on the Government of the country to put it down, or failing in that, to enter and suppress it themselves. But Servia is not conterminous with any portion of Russia. The distance between the nearest point of Servia and the frontiers of the Russian empire is not less than 300 miles; as great a distance as from the frontiers of Poland to the capitals of Berlin and Vienna, or from the extreme frontier of Russian Poland to the frontier of the western German states—Hanover and Bavaria. There can be, therefore, no pretence set up on this ground. I trust I shall not be told that Russia had a right to require these transactions to be set aside on the ground that they were invalid, as having been of an insurrectionary nature. The Sultan had acquiesced in them; he was alone the judge how far it was proper and fit for him to acquiesce in a proceeding more or less revolutionary; and the Sovereign of the country having acquiesced, no other power, I contend, had a right to interfere. Perhaps I may told that this result was obtained by improper means, and that large sums of money were sent by the new Servian government to be distributed among persons of influence, on condition of their obtaining the sanction of the Sultan. Perhaps that may have been the case, and what then? That would be a very grave offence in England; but is it the first time that influence has been purchased in Turkey by means of this kind? I think that till a very late day, even if the practice do not still exist, all great appointments and provincial commands have been conferred by the Turkish government from motives of that kind, and that the payments made a part of the acknowledged and legitimate emoluments of persons in authority. But be that as it may, it appears to me that the Russian government, having no right to interfere in the affairs of Servia by treaty, had no more right to complain of the election of Cara George witsch, because he was elected by pecuniary means, than it would have to complain of any election being carried here by the same means. I say that Russia is not in Servia, that which she is in Moldavia and Wallachia—a protecting power. The only rights she has granted to her in respect of Servia are, to see that the Sultan fulfils towards the Servians the engagements into which he has entered with Russia, to leave to the Servians the free choice of their chief, and not to interfere in their internal administration. If that be the case, I say that the Sultan, having been compelled to submit to her demands, has sustained a material violation of his independent rights as a sovereign; and I maintain that the sovereign of the Turkish empire cannot sustain a violation of his independent rights, without the balance of power in Europe being affected thereby. Perhaps I shall be told that his doctrine about the balance of power in Europe is an exploded and antiquated doctrine; and that the way in which I insist upon it is only part and parcel of the restless and meddling system of interference with affairs beyond seas, which, according to some Gentlemen opposite, was the prevailing fault of her Majesty's late Government. If any man holds that opinion, I can only assure him, he may be very fit—

"Fidenarum, Gabiorumque esse potestas, Et de mensurâ jus dicere, vasa minora Frangere—"

but I think he is unfit to hold high office in a great nation. If the preservation of the balance of power in Europe be not an object deserving the attention of a great statesman, I should like to know why Parliament annually records its opinion to that effect, by granting to the Crown the power of keeping a standing army; one of the purposes of which is declared to be the preservation of the balance of power in Europe—a declaration, not of to-day or yesterday, but one which has come down to us since the time of William 3rd. Shall I be told by her Majesty's Ministers that since Parliament gives an army for this among other objects, they think they would be ill requiting the bounty of Parliament if they employed any other means than force for this purpose? Shall I be told that Government have a noble disdain of those measures of diplomacy, a timely employment of which may prevent any impairment of the balance of power, and thus render an appeal to arms unnecessary. Shall I be told that Government prefer to let things take their course, waiting till the evil has grown to a respectable magnitude, and then preparing to meet the shock on our own shores? Those who have not had sagacity to foresee dangers at a distance, are not likely to have courage enough to meet them when they are near; and those who have not possessed energy to make the efforts necessary to avert dangers when remote, cannot be supposed to be gifted with the boldness to face those dangers when they are at hand. If you want to conduct the vessel of the State safely to its haven, you must be looking constantly to the landmarks, always working at the wheel, perpetually meeting and resisting those thwarting impulses which are continually tending to drive you from your course; and the pilot who would lash the helm fast amidship, and set with his bands before him, determined to do nothing until he had brought his ship in the midst of breakers, would be an unsafe guide. The same principle, the do-nothing, think-nothing principle, on which Government seem determined to proceed with respect to all our affairs, seems to me not less fatal. I think that the sovereign of the Turkish empire has been obliged to submit to an infringement of his national power: that the independent power of the Sultan is essential to the balance of power in Europe; and I think it is a most narrow and mistaken policy which leads a Government, for the sake of temporary and momentary convenience, to submit to things which in their inevitable tendency are calculated to bring it into greater difficulties for the future. I think, therefore, that on the present subject the conduct of her Majesty's Government has not been such as it became them, as responsible advisers of the Crown to pursue. I call for those papers to show what that conduct has really been, and no one will have greater satisfaction than myself, if the papers, when produced, shall refute the charges I have brought, or if the right hon. Baronet, by detailed explanation, should prove to the House, that there is no just ground for impugning the conduct of the Government. The noble Lord concluded by moving for

"Copies or extracts of all communications which have passed between the British Government and the British ambassadors at Vienna, Paris, Petersburg, and Constantinople, and the British consul-general in Servia, in regard to the transactions connected with the late changes in the government of Servia."

I cannot help expressing great regret that the noble Lord should have considered it his duty to call the attention of the House to the particular subject, on which he has now addressed them. The noble Lord must be aware, from his long experience in diplomatic affairs, that as these transactions are not yet brought to a close, and as communications in respect to them are still pending, it would be utterly incompatible with my duty as a Minister of the Crown to undertake at the present time to detail the communications which have passed between the British Government and the British ambassadors at Vienna, Paris, Petersburg, and Constatinople, and the consul-general at Servia, connected with the late changes in the government of Servia. The noble Lord has stated that the four great powers of Europe are parties to a treaty which recites that it is necessary for the peace of Europe that the independence of Turkey shall be maintained. So far as that treaty is concerned, the four powers are in common accordance, and have common relations. But with respect to Servia, the four powers do not stand in the same relation. This country has contracted no special obligations, and stands in no peculiar relations to Servia. That is not the case with Russia, which, with respect to Servia and the Porte, has special engagements. Events in Servia which may be indifferent to us, are not indiffent to Russia. The Servian people have claims on Russia which they have not on us. There exists between the Porte and Russia certain treaties stipulating for the fulfilment of certain engagements, under which the parties come to each other. The noble Lord said the right of Russia in Servia was not the same as in Moldavia and Wallachia. That is perfectly true; but still it is impossible to argue that Russia has not special and peculiar rights with respect to the relations between Servia and Turkey. There have been laid on the Table of the House treaties which gave to Russia the right of qualified interference in the affairs of Servia. The first of these is that of Bucharest, in which the Porte undertakes to grant a pardon and general amnesty to the Servians, and they shall not be disquieted on account of past transactions. At a subsequent period, the engagements which the Porte had contracted with respect to the Servian nation not having been fulfilled, and Turkey being required by Russia to fulfil them, she entered into new engagements for that purpose. In 1826 the Porte concluded with Russia the treaty of Akerman, admitting that the conditions stipulated for in the treaty of Bucharest had not been fulfilled, and entering into new obligations that the engagements respecting the Servian peoshould be fulfilled. The Porte, in that new treaty, engaged to Russia that it would settle with the Servian deputies the measures necessary to secure those advantages which were at once the due reward and the pledge of a continuance of that fidelity of which the nation had given proofs to the Ottoman throne. Here, then, is a second proof that the relation in which Turkey stood to Russia and to the Servian nation was an exclusive and peculiar one. By a document which was called a separate instrument, but which had all the force and validity of a treaty, the Servians were guaranteed the choice of their chiefs, freedom in their religion, and independence in the administration of their internal affairs. And, observe, this was a treaty, not between Servia and Turkey, but between Turkey and Russia, acting for the protection of Servia, and requiring of the Porte a certain line of policy with respect to the Servian people. In that treaty the Porte stipulated that the Servians should have the free choice of their chiefs, and independence in their internal administration. These engagements were not fulfilled, and subsequent ones were entered into, under the treaty of Adrianople, Russia having only interfered and required the fulfilment of the engagements of the Porte with respect to the Servian nation. Again Turkey stipulated that the Servians should elect their chiefs themselves, and administer their internal affairs by their own authority. Here was for the third time a stipulation entered into, not with Servia, but with Russia, in favour of Servia. That, then, I consider a conclusive proof that Russia, one of the four powers, stands in a peculiar relation to the Porte and to Servia—relations in which none of the other powers, parties to the general treaty, stood to either of them. It cannot be denied that the stipulations were not strictly adhered to by the Porte. It has been said that the Servian people conferred upon the family of Prince Milosch the right of hereditary succession. I apprehend that was done, not by the Serivans, but by the Porte, and that it was inconsistent with the engagement of the three treaties of Bucharest, of Akerman, and of Adrianople. It stipulated that the Servians should have the free choice of their chiefs, because to stipulate that they should have the choice of their chiefs, and then for another party to make the succession hereditary in one family, is manifestly a violation of the stipulation by which freedom of choice was guaranteed. In the month of August, 1842, the chief of the family in respect of whom the hereditary succession was guaranteed by Turkey, was deposed, and the election of a new chief proceeded with, conducted upon no regular form, and, possibly, as the noble Lord has said, influenced by corruption. The noble Lord says that Russia had no more right to interfere with respect to the corrupt election of a Servian chief than with respect to a corrupt election to the House of Commons. Sir, I must protest against that doctrine. Can it be maintained, when Russia, acting on behalf of the Servian people, stipulates with Turkey that their choice shall be free, and that the Porte shall not interfere in their internal affairs, if a chief is deposed in consequence of the corrupt application of money, or the prostitution of power, if there is an interference in the internal affairs of Servia, can it be maintained that Russia has no right to protest against such abuse of money and such interference in the domestic administration of her affairs? And yet that is the broad principle which the noble Lord maintains. I think it also impossible to maintain the principle which the noble Lord considers some may be disposed to contend for—that Russia or any other nation can have the absolute and unlimited power to construe treaties as she pleases. No nation can absolutely, and subject to no qualification, construe treaties in a sense opposed to equity and justice; but, I apprehend that when great powers have treaties with foreign states they do claim the right—subject to the control of public opinion and subject to the interposition of others, if the propositions they advance are against the law of nations or the principles of equity—they do claim the right, in the first instance, of declaring the view which they take of the provisions of such treaties. In the case of our own treaty with Brazil, we did claim the right of deciding whether the treaty expired in 1842 or 1844. We consulted no other power; and I apprehend we should have resisted it as an unwarrantable interference on the part of other powers, if they had told us that we should construe the treaty, and that they had the right to interfere to define the period at which it expired? Russia, then, having her treaties, considered it her right to protest against what had taken place in Servia. She alleged that the Servians, having a right to the free choice of their chiefs, the election ought to be determined according to certain principles and certain forms, that the election in November, 1842, was not in conformity with the stipulations of the treaty into which Russia had entered with Turkey in favour of Servia, and that she had a right to protest against it; and she did require from the Porte that the election of 1842 should be set aside, and certain parties to that election compelled to resign. The noble Lord says it was treachery of England to defer to Russia as to the construction of the treaty, and not to encourage the Porte in resisting the demands of Russia. The noble Lord assumes that all that England did was to place her discretion under the control of Austria. I consider that the noble Lord is totally misinformed on the subject; but this I think no man will deny; that before England undertook to lend her countenance and support to Turkey in resisting the construction put by Russia on the three treaties, it was the right and it was the duty of England to consider well the course taken by other powers which had as direct an interest in Servia as England had. The noble Lord says, that Austria is one of the most powerful military countries in Europe: that her energies are greater than they are supposed to be; that she appears to remain passive, relying upon her strength; but that if that force should be called forth in a just cause, it would be found to be greater than it is thought. Well, here is this great military power, having an interest in maintaining peace on her own frontiers and in the adjacent provinces, and whose course must have a material weight and influence upon the decision of other countries. When England undertakes to inform the Porte that Russia is wrong and Turkey right—that Russia has no right to place a construction upon the treaties, and undertakes to encourage Turkey to resist Russia, she ought first to well weigh the consequences of such resistance. What the noble Lord means by the moral countenance and support to be given to Turkey, is neither more nor less than this, resist the demand, and in that resistance you shall have the support of England. To tell Turkey that Russia is guilty of an infraction of the treaties, to tell her to resist in the cause of Servia, means nothing more nor less than this, "If in your resistance you should not succeed, and you are threatened by Russia with hostilities, you may rely not merely upon the moral, but the physical support of England, and that support we promise you." Before entering into such engagements you should consider well the extent of the support upon which you could rely. You should consider well—for you are at perfect liberty to do so—whether the object to be gained is one which so closely and intimately affects the interest of England, that war upon such a ground is justifiable. If we are to act upon the principles for which the noble Lord appears to contend, I venture to say that opportunities for war will present themselves more frequently than the noble Lord probably anticipates. If you undertake to promise moral countenance and support in every direction, one of two things must necessarily happen—either, having made these promises of support, you will, in case of necessity, recede from them; or, if you act upon higher and more chivalrous principles, and fulfil your implied engagements, there will be no end to the hostilities with which the country will have to contend, and in which she will still be involved. But I apprehend that the noble Lord has not himself always acted upon this principle. I apprehend that, retaining the opinions he has avowed as to moral right, he did on many occasions consider whether he had the physical power to sustain his views. The noble Lord has said this evening that Greece, in consequence of engagements entered into with us, has a right to demand from her government free institutions—that in consequence of engagements to which England was a party, Greece has a right to expect a constitutional form of government. In his opinion that was an engagement which this country is bound to fulfil; but he said that two other powers, France and Russia were parties to the engagement, and as he could not procure their co-operation and assistance, he was unwilling that England should singly fulfil the engagement for which she was responsible. I think I have heard the noble Lord declare in this House that the free town of Cracow had a right to expect the residence of an English consul. In the face of this House and of Europe the noble Lord declared, not only that we had a right to send a consul, but that that right ought to be and should be exercised, and a consul should be sent. There was not only the conviction of the right, but a declaration that it should be exercised. The noble Lord did not however, adhere to that determination. He subsequently stated, and I think not unwisely nor imprudently, that finding on the part of Austria and Prussia objections to the recognition of a consul, which he had not anticipated, he had weighed the consequences of exposing the right against the necessity of departing from his public declaration; yet painful as it was to him to recede from his professed intention, he was not prepared to risk all the consequences of enforcing what he had declared to be right. The noble Lord stated, I think correctly, that there are limits to the exercise of what we may abstractedly consider to be right. Every prudent man will compare the consequences of different courses of action. He will compare the probability of success with the disadvantage that must arise from want of general concert and co-operation, and he will maturely and calmly weigh these considerations before he enters into engagements that are to be binding upon the honour of the country. At least, in not encouraging Turkey to resist the demands of Russia, we have taken a course in unison with that of other great powers. Not making our decision dependent upon that of Austria, but acknowledging Austria to be, of all the great powers, the most intimately concerned in the affairs of Servia, her views, although not binding upon this country, did enter as an important element in the ground of our decision; for to encourage Turkey in respect to Servia, in opposition to Russia and Austria, would be an act of imprudence, for the consequences of which a Government would, I think, be justly responsible. And were the views of other countries at variance with ours? What was the view taken by France? The noble Lord accounts for the conduct of France, with regard to Servia, on the ground of France having acted apart from the other powers in the case of Syria. I think France would claim a right of independent action. I do not think she would be influenced by the consideration supposed by the noble Lord. I think the recollection of what has passed would lead her to take her own course with regard to Servia, if she thought her honour or her essential interests required it. So far from past events inducing France to abstain from maintaining Turkish independence, I apprehend they would have formed an incentive to France to engage in separate mode of action in the affairs of Servia. But I think the noble Lord is misinformed as to France having ever been inclined to tender different advice to Turkey from that which was given by England. The course taken by the two countries was governed by the same principles, and was practically in all respects the same; and from the commencement of these proceedings to the close, the cooperation of France and this country has been intimate and complete. I am now speaking on the supposition that the construction put by Russia on the treaties was at variance with the true and just one. I have shown that she had these treaties, that she had not the power to construe them according to her own tyrannical will, and subject to no responsibility; but, like other powers, she had a right, in the first instance, to state what her construction was, and that construction being placed upon them, it was the duty of England, being referred to by Turkey, before she gave advice to resist it, well to consider the consequence of that advice, and the degree of concert and co-operation that was to be expected in case Turkey should fail to prevail upon Russia to withdraw her pretensions. I am saying this on the supposition of Russia putting forward a claim that was not justified; but before England undertook to vindicate the rights of Turkey in the province of Servia, it became her well to consider the nature of the transactions that had recently taken place there—it was right she should consider whether or no the deposition of one prince and the election of another was the universal act of a free people, intolerant of despotism, seeking for liberty, and proclaiming with one voice, their wish to govern themselves by their own authority. I cannot agree with the noble Lord that if corruption took place, if bribery were practised in the deposition of the ruling prince, that was an immaterial consideration when we were considering whether we should ally ourselves with the Servian people; and therefore I hold that we were bound, not only to consider our ability to support Turkey, but also to consider the character of the cause to which we should thus ally ourselves. As to the character of the events which occurred in Servia, our information of course was derived from the diplomatic agent who represented this country in that province. That gentleman was not appointed by the present Government. The diplomatic agent or consul, a gentleman of considerable ability, of strong prepossessions in favour of popular institutions, was selected by the noble Lord and received, I believe, special marks of his confidence, and immediately before the noble Lord's departure from office, the gentleman in question received the appointment of consul resident at Semlin. From that gentleman the information of the British Government was derived, as to the character of the events that took place in Servia. I told the noble Lord, that I had no objection to present the information which we had received on facts and occurrences in Servia, and I afterwards hesitated simply from a fear of prejudicing the interests of some who had taken a prominent part in those transactions, whose names were freely mentioned, and who appeared to be objects of suspicion, and to whom I thought it would be hardly fair to expose them to the consequences of personally referring to them. As I before said, I am sorry the noble Lord forces me to make reference to this general information, but the charges which he has made against the Government, leave me no alternative but to refer to it, but of course I shall studiously avoid any reference to names or particular cases. I shall only state the general information we received with respect to the change of government which took place in Servia at the latter end of the last year. Observe, the Servian people had a right to the choice of their own chiefs, and to expect from Turkey no interference in that selection. The change of Government took place in 1842. Speaking of the state of Servia, immediately after the deposition of the family of Prince Milosch, and the substitution of the present prince, who was then re-elected, the diplomatic agent, in a letter dated the 9th of September, said—

"It is quite a reign of terror: the prisons of Belgrade are crowded with political prisoners, and Semlin is filled with refugees in consequence of the late change."

On the 15th of September we were told, that—

"The recent election of a Prince was a mock election by the suffrages of successful rebels; that the treachery and corruption which had influenced the election were equally flagrant."

On the 2nd of November we were informed of that to which I have adverted already, namely—

"The frightful condition of Servia under the new rulers; and I can assure your Excellency (this letter was addressed to Sir Stratford Canning) that the system of terror is hardly within Christian imagination. I now owe it to truth to make a further emphatic declaration, that the late changes in Servia were not brought about by the wishes of the nation; that the wealth, worth, and intelligence of Servia are against the present condition of affairs, and that the districts are almost to a man in favour of Prince Ghika. The better description of people, and even the laborious, labour under well-founded apprehension of torture and death."

I will not refer to the distinct cases of torture here alluded to, as I hope there has been some mistake. I only wish to show, from the Consul's letters, what is the general state of the country. This gentleman, with full opportunity of personal inquiry, four months after, on the 4th of February in the present year, not under the first excitement, or subject to error from, misinformation, or shocked by the excesses, perhaps, inseparable from great revolutions in Government, but writing, in February, 1843, from Semlin states—

"That the number of fugitives is still increasing. Within the last week more than 100 have escaped to Austria. They represent that the oppression in Servia is so unsupportable, that they preferred abandoning home and property to suffering under such a system any longer."

This was the information which we received with respect to the mode in which the change of Government was, by a system of bribery and corruption; and the consequences have been such as I have mentioned. That is the information we have received from a channel upon which we can depend—the official agent selected by the noble Lord, whom we found in charge of British interests in that quarter. With respect to the events that occurred in Servia, combine these facts with what I before stated—that Austria was at least indisposed to interfere—that we were disposed to counsel Turkey to acquiesce in the demands of Russia—that Prussia did not take a different view from that of England—and that France was disposed to counsel concurrence—combining these facts with the information which we received as to the sort of interference which led to the change of Government, and the consequences of that change, in promoting contentment and happiness amongst the Servian people, have I not vindicated the Government against the charge that this country ought, on its own single responsibility, to have encouraged Turkey to resist the demands of Russia, and to have promised that moral countenance and support which implies physical countenance and support in case the moral influence should prove inefficient? What was the demand of Russia? I am not here to vindicate Russia, I am not the representative of Russia in this House; but the demand of Russia upon Turkey was to this effect:—"This election has been irregular, it has not been conducted in proper form, it has been brought about by Turkish authority, by means of corruption. I have a right to interfere for the rights of the Servian people. I have a right to demand that the election of their chiefs shall be conducted according to certain forms. What I require is, that there shall be a free election." Russia did not demand that Prince Milosch should be reinstated—she did not demand that the prince who has been recently, and, as she said, irregularly elected should be excluded. Russia only required a new election by the Servian people, and Russia was prepared to abide by the result of that fresh appeal to the Servian people. That appeal has been made; the decision made at the first election has been confirmed, and I trust that Russia will abide by her own declaration; and the new election being in favour of the prince who was said to have been irregularly elected in the first instance, I trust that Russia will be prepared to respect the decision of properly constituted Servian authorities. There cannot be a question but the second decision corresponded with the first, and it is only a fair inference that the choice now made is in conformity with the general wishes of the Servian people. I understood that Turkey did assure Russia that other conditions of the treaties should be fulfilled. I do not understand whether those conditions have been complied with. The transaction is incomplete, the communications are pending. I have laboured under great disadvantage in consequence of the communications and accounts of the events being incomplete. I cannot consider myself justified, consistently with my duty to the Crown and the public, in laying on the Table the various communications with foreign powers which the noble Lord has called for; but I trust I have given such an explanation as will be considered to entitle me to call for the confidence of the House to that extent that the Government shall not be compelled to disclose communications, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interests.

said, that he was somewhat surprised that the right hon. Gentleman had laid so much stress on the information contained in the despatches of our consul at Serulin, since the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had in another place announced that this very consul must not be looked upon in any way as an authority. Nor was that very surprising This same consul had informed her Majesty's Government, that the Prince of Servia was an infatuated youth—placed on the throne by the intrigues and corruption of other persons, not by his own energy, but by the influence of his own character and in spite of the wishes of the people. It turned out that the infatuated youth was a man of mature years, more than forty years of age, one who had received a finished education at the Military College at Odessa, and who possessed abilities that could avail themselves of this advantage. The re-election of this Prince was a complete answer to the consul's charges of corruption and undue means. He was the free choice of a free people whom that consul had stigmatised in his despatches as barbarous, but who might more justly be characterised as heroic. It might, indeed, be an answer to the noble Lord for the right hon. Gentleman to urge, that the statements on which the right hon. Gentleman relied, came from a consul of that noble Lord's appointing; but it was no answer to the House, and, certainly, of all Members, it was least an answer to him (Mr. Disraeli). For it might be in the recollection of the House, that on a recent occasion he had felt it his duty to call the attention of the House to the character of our consular establishment. On that occasion it had not been his object to enter into any personal details, his objection to the establishment being against the principle on which it was founded, which assumed a difference which he maintained did not exist between commercial and political interests. In illustration, however, of the fallacy of that principle, he had thought it necessary to refer to one or two recent appointments in this department, and, among others, he had particularly called the attention of the House to the appointment of the consul in question. He had mentioned, then, that this Gentleman had been recalled by the late Government from the post he then occupied for alleged misconduct; that he had not succeeded in clearing himself, to the satisfaction of the Government, from those charges; that the noble Lord opposite had refused to again employ him; and that, finally, in the very agonies of the expiring administration, he had by some influence which it was not then necessary to analyse, succeeded in being appointed to a post which he (Mr. Disraeli) then warned the House would before long become a place of great importance to this country. He asked the House whether what had since occurred had not justified his apprehensions. This consul had been called upon to act, and his conduct has been of a very ambiguous, not to say suspicious, character. He furnished information to his chief which has since been discovered to have been of a very deceptive nature, and that chief has publicly dis- owned him as an authority. And yet they find the right hon. Gentleman to-night, vindicating his Government by some miserable extracts from the malicious correspondence of this very functionary! Why were they to believe on the authority of this consul, that the Servian chiefs were bribed, when on every other point he is acknowledged to be mistaken and to have misled? And if bribed in the first instance, how comes it that on the second, they confirm their choice? But were they to believe that the conduct of these transactions had been left entirely to this consul? Is that the answer of the right hon. Gentleman to the motion of the noble Lord? Were there no other despatches from no other persons? On this head the right hon. Gentleman was silent. The only extracts he read were from the despatches of the functionary who had been discredited. He confessed he could scarcely credit his ears when he heard the right hon. Gentleman to-night with regard to these strange proceedings, again referring for vindication to the treaties of Bucharest, and Akerman, and Adrianople. He remembered, some time since, to have made an enquiry of the right hon. Gentleman with respect to this interference of Russia in Servia, an enquiry couched, he believed, in Parliamentary language, and made with all that respect which he felt for the right hon. Gentleman, and to which the right hon. Gentleman replied, with all that explicitness of which he was a master, and all that courtesy which he reserved only for his supporters. The right hon. Gentleman had, then, also, referred them to the treaties of Bucharest, Akerman, and Adrianople, as offering the ground on which this interference was justifiable—and considering that there was not a single clause, nay, not a single expression, in any of those treaties on the subject,—the reference was remarkable. The right hon. Gentleman, however, to-night had laid down another principle for the conduct of England on this head and it was this: that it is our policy in these respects to pursue the same line adopted by the cabinet of Vienna. It was the cabinet of Vienna to which they were to look as to an oracle. Yet, in 1828, when an English Government, of which the right hon. Baronet, not the chief, was, at least, an eminent Member, in which the office of Foreign Secretary was filled by the same individual who now occupied the post, when that Government in 1828 was ap- pealed to by Austria to interfere under similar circumstances, and for a similar purpose, was there the same superstitious following of the Cabinet of Vienna? Did they adopt the same line as the Cabinet of Vienna then? And yet the necessity of acting with Austria, and the authority of our Servian Consul, formed the only answer which the right hon. Gentleman had made to the comprehensive speech of the noble Lord! But the real question at issue was not to be disposed of by quotations from a consular despatch or intimation of the policy of a foreign Cabinet. What was that question? The real question was this, whether England would maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, and whether that independence and integrity were endangered by the late conduct of the British Ministry? That was the question as it was understood out of doors; as it was understood throughout Europe; and as some day it would be understood in that House. If ever the crisis arrived that had been so long threatened, he hoped the policy of the Government would be vindicated in a different manner to that which they had witnessed that night. If the existence of that ancient empire were at stake, he trusted they might be favoured with opinions more worthy of a statesman in a public assembly than such as could be called out of a consular despatch. He hoped, too, that their policy might prove somewhat more profound than the mere following of the councils of Austria, when she advised them to do nothing, and of not following Austria when she advised them to do something; for that seemed the policy now laid down by her Majesty's Government. But then it seemed that the right hon. Gentleman had a precedent for his vindication; an instance to justify a submission to events which might nevertheless be politically injurious and diplomatically unjust. There was, according to the right hon. Gentleman, the case of the Consul at Cracow. Always a Consul! And it was by such miserable instances that they were to regulate their policy when the fate of a great empire was at stake. The question now before them, involved a great country in the Danube, and affecting the various empires contiguous to the Danube, it involved the independence of Turkey, and we are not hound to interfere or to interest ourselves according to the right hon. Gentleman, because we had once declined to enforce the ap- pointment of a Consul, which we had a right by treaties to insist upon. He believed, that the independence of Turkey never could be maintained by considerations so limited, and views so minute as they had been favored with that night. Now he (Mr. D'Israeli) wished to guard himself from being supposed to entertain those fanatical opinions respecting designs of Russia which were said to be prevalent in some quarters. He believed the designs of Russia to be none other than those that were perfectly legitimate, and pursued by means equally unimpeachable. He saw much to respect in Russia and in her conduct. He respected her nationality, he respected her intelligence, he respected her power. We, too, had nationality and power, but we were deficient in that intelligence, and especially with respect to the east, for which Russia was eminent. That intelligence was founded on an absolute knowledge of the subject. He thought that the great question of foreign policy was more simple than statesmen were inclined to admit it to be. To understand it, they must look at the map. There they might observe, that the two strongest positions were in the possession of the two weakest powers. Geographically they are almost the same. A straight of the ocean enters into an inland sea surrounded by illimitable forests; at once an emporium and an arsenal. Such were the Sound and the Dardanelles. As long as then the two strongest positions in the world were in the position of the two weakest powers, the present disposition of power might be maintained. But when one of them came into the possession of a first-rate state, then the balance of power would be disturbed to its centre, and if both fell under the same authority, then universal empire would be threatened. The noble Lord opposite knew full well that in expressing this opinion, he was not indulging in the mere speculations of political visionaries. The secret records of our Foreign Office, if he were not mistaken, would afford ample evidence, that there were views entertained by the greatest of practical statesmen. This then was the real position in which England with respect to this question found herself. Was it possible that there could be a weaker power than Sweden? Yes, there was Turkey. Was it possible that there could be a weaker power than Turkey? Yes, there was Sweden. With the Sound and the Dardanelles in the possession of these two powers, they were safe. Yet they could not deny that Russia was approaching these two points, gradually, but regularly; sometimes even rapidly. In one year she had advanced nearer than three hundred miles to one of these positions. What then ought to be their policy? To maintain Turkey in that state by their diplomatic action, that she might be able to hold independently the Dardanelles. That however could never be the case, if the policy of her Majesty's Government with respect to Servia, (but he hoped in no other case,) was to be pursued. It was useless for them to pretend to disguise from themselves the state of Turkey. Turkey was prostrate; but not so much from natural decline, as from having been, as it were, stabbed in the back. It was the diplomacy of Europe during the last twenty years that had reduced Turkey to her present fallen state—not the decline of her resources. They were still unequalled. She had still the finest climate and the most fertile soil, and she was free from that evil which oppressed this and all other countries; she had no national debt. On what ground was the widely diffused assumption raised, that the regeneration of Turkey was hopeless? She had lost, according to some, her finest provinces? Be it so. So had England, little more than half a century back; more disgracefully, more disastrously. In 1780, it was thought, that the sun of England too, was set, because her American provinces had achieved their independence. Was Greece more indispensable to Turkey, than America to England? He did not think so. Turkey before this had been a very powerful state without Greece. Was the state of Turkey hopeless, because her armies had been defeated and her fleets destroyed? What state in Christendom would lay that down as an indisputable inference? or because her capital had been occupied by a foreign foe? Would that principle pass current at Paris, or Berlin, or Vienna, or even in the metropolis of Russia? Why this was a calamity that had befallen every state in Europe except England? But some there were, perhaps, who might reply; all this may be true as far as it goes, but the hopelessness of which regeneration exists in the fact of the inferior numbers of its Moslemin population. Why, the Moslemin population of the Turkish empire bore a greater proportion to its general population, than the German population of the Austrian empire bore to its general population. Austria, he main- tained, must have fallen long ago, if Austria had been treated like Turkey. He imputed no blame to Russia for this conduct; in the situation of. Russia their conduct would probably be the same. It was a fixed, deep policy, founded on ample knowledge; it was opposed by an uncertain, superficial policy, founded in ignorance. The House had now been sitting seven months, and this was almost the only debate that had occurred on their foreign policy. He must confess that it had elicited declarations from the right hon. Gentleman which filled him with sorrow, and he could not but hope that some Member of the Cabinet would rise and give them more joyful tidings. He could not but remind the House how often they were told that it would be better for them not to interfere in the foreign policy of the empire; and especially that since the House had been reformed, it would be much better for them to confine themselves to the consideration of their domestic interests. Now, what he asked, had been the result of this devotion to the consideration of internal affairs? Had the condition of the people been improved? Had the country prospered? Had the Treasury been more abundantly supplied? At this time last year, on the eve of prorogation, one county was in insurrection; now they heard of several. A principality, at least, was in outbreak, and a kingdom was menaced by a rebellion. Were they then to say, "Let Russia act as she likes. What is Servia to us? Let us disregard the wars it may entail, the ultimate waste of treasure and of blood it may occasion. We have devoted our energies to trade. See how it is flourishing! We have secured the civil rights and material progress of the people. Lancashire is content; Wales in profound peace; Ireland loyal. "Was this the language they were to use." He repeated that their policy with respect to the East, made them at this moment the laughing-stock of Europe; and as to their domestic situation, was there any one who could deny, that, in returning to their counties, they would not meet dissatisfaction and distress? This was the thirteenth session of their reformed Parliament; and again he asked them, what had they achieved by their devotion to domestic politics, from which they had promised themselves so much?

was perfectly willing to rest the question on the ground it was placed on by the hon. Member for Shrews- bury—viz., the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He had heard with great regret, that the right hon. Baronet had not seized the opportunity of that motion to condemn the assumption of power over Servia by the Russian government. When the right hon. Gentleman drew an analogy between the protectorate exercised over Servia and other provinces by the Ottoman empire, he might have remembered that there were other cases of protectorateship beyond those which he had cited. France asserted a supremacy over the Christian populations of the East, as Russia did over Servia, and yet they never heard of the French government interfering in the domestic policy of the populations for which she was interested. The doctrine of qualified interference, to which the right hon. Gentleman had referred, he considered as exceedingly dangerous. He was glad to think that a check was to be put upon the policy of Russia, and that that check would come powerfully from England, when the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, understood that he had been misinformed as to the election of Prince Alexander George, and what were the real feelings of the Servians; but perhaps it was too late to set about asserting the rights of the Servian people. In this respect he considered they were indebted to the interference of the Foreign Secretary.

believed, that both the late and the present Government had been exceedingly ill-informed as to the state of affairs in Servia, and it was not, therefore astonishing that mistakes had been committed. Russia took advantage of our want of information, and allied herself with the popular side in Servia. Until our consular establishments were altogether reformed, Government would always be liable to be misled, and sometimes betrayed, by the imperfect information they received with regard to foreign affairs.

was glad to hear the explanation that had been given by her Majesty's Government. He could not expect expressions of a very bold character from the Government, considering the negotiations they had to carry on with foreign powers; nor until the transactions commented on have been finally concluded. There were some points which he had heard from them with particular satisfaction. He did not consider that the attacks made by Gentlemen sitting behind, on her Majesty's Government in that House were becoming. He did not think that it was seemly on the part of younger Members of that House, to rise up behind her Majesty's Ministers whom they pretended to support, and not only express a difference of opinion, but to heap the grossest terms of contumely and opprobrium on those whom they affected to support. He entertained not only this opinion himself, but he knew that it was also entertained by a large number of Members of that House, who agreed with him in thinking that such language as had been used that night by the hon. Member for Shrewsbury, and on other occasions by other hon. Members, was not seemly coming from gentlemen who pretended to support her Majesty's Government. With respect to the taunts that fell from the noble Viscount, as to not furnishing information, or showing more activity with respect to Servia, he must say that he wished the noble Lord had done as much with regard to Poland as the present Government had indirectly done with regard to Servia. For the ten years he was in office as Foreign Secretary, no one could have acted with more caution in giving explanations, or could abstain with more care than the noble Lord from giving information on all points connected with foreign matters then under attention. The noble Lord certainly talked of Belgium and China, and of other places; but he never would, until matters were closed, place the papers connected with the negotiations in these quarters on the Table of the House. He had often also been asked for explanations with regard to what was going on in Poland, but the noble Lord constantly refused to furnish any information. He wished that he could have seen some of that moral support given to Poland which the noble Lord complained had not been given to Servia, for if they had, he believed Poland would have been in a very different situation from what it now was.

was not aware of having used any gross terms of contumely to the right hon. Baronet or any of his colleagues. Certainly he had not intended to have used any personal terms of reproach, nor did he believe that he had. Perhaps the noble Viscount would mention the expressions he alluded to.

could not at the mo- ment refer to the exact words to which he alluded, but he would appeal to the House whether the hon. Member had not resorted to a string of the grossest terms and stigmas against the right hon. Baronet and the present Government. Perhaps the expression grossest contumely was too strong, but still he thought he was justified at the moment in using it.

observed, that the remarkable circumstance of the case was, that the noble Lord could not repeat one of these gross terms of contumely which he stated had been used. He trusted that at any rate the noble Lord would state what he alluded to.

said, that the expression to which he more particularly referred was the term disgraceful conduct, as applied to her Majesty's Ministers, which he considered to be a term of gross contumely as coming from one who affected to support the Government.

thought that the speech of the hon. Member for Shrewsbury was character by sound sense, and that the hon. Gentleman was perfectly right in condemning that constant meddling foreign policy which had so long been suffered to go on. As for the censure which the noble Lord had passed on young Members expressing their opinions in that House in an independent manner, he must say that it was altogether uncalled for and unjustifiable. He conceived the hon. Member for Shrewsbury, or any other, was as fully entitled to express their opinions as the noble Lord. He thought also, that thanks were due to that hon. Gentleman for haying brought under the notice of the House, on more than one occasion, the lamentable defects of our consular department, and that it would have been well if many of his suggestions had been previously attended to. He thought that the attack of the noble Lord on the hon. Gentleman was most undeserving, and the right bon. Gentleman, so far from censuring him, ought to thank him for the information which he had given to the House. He could not agree with the noble Lord in censuring the right hon. Baronet for his conduct in this matter, for he had long thought that this country had too long interfered with the affairs of foreign countries, and had left home matters untouched. He conceived that it rather behoved the noble Lord to vindicate his own character, for constant interference with the affairs of foreign countries, which he hoped that he would do at some time or other, instead of indulging there in censuring the present Government for not following his example.

did not rise to discuss this subject, but rather in consequence of the charge which had been made by the noble Lord the Member for Liverpool, against certain young Members, sitting on that (the Ministerial) side of the House. [Viscount Sandon had only referred to the speech of the hon. Member for Shrewsbury.] He willingly admitted that he knew nothing of this subject except by hearsay, unless he had some hereditary information. But he thought, although he was only acquainted with the rudiments of the question, he had no difficulty in convicting the noble Lord of the most gross ignorance; but, perhaps, that was not a Parliamentary expression, although gross contumely might be; and the gross ignorance of which he accused the noble Lord, in speaking of this question was with reference to the protection of Russia. The noble Lord spoke as if that protection were acknowledged, and as if it had not been continually and often protested against by the noble Lord opposite. He would appeal upon that question to any Gentleman who knew anything of the relations of the Ottoman Porte, and Austria, Russia, and France. He would merely add, that if he had ventured to attack on many occasions the do-nothing policy of this Government, which had been so signally exposed by the noble Lord, his attacks had been directed against that policy, and not against the Ministers.

said, that as an independent Member of that House he thought the attack of the noble Lord very unfair and unjust towards the hon. Member for Shrewsbury, for undoubtedly the noble Lord had no right to read that kind of lesson to the hon. Gentleman, for he had listened most attentively to the speech of the hon. Gentleman, and he had not heard anything to sanction the words used by the noble Lord as to the hon. Gentleman having said anything that could be construed into gross contumely and insult towards the right hon. baronet. He was sure, that if the hon. Gentleman had done so, the Speaker would have felt it his duty to have interposed. If hon. Gentlemen on the other (the Ministerial) side of the House would not speak out—if they were to be chained by the Treasury Benches—he could only say that he for one was very sorry for it. He was not shackled by party, and he could not help thinking that the hon. Gentlemen the Member for Shrewsbury had been perfectly right in speaking independently, and delivering his sentiments to the House and the country. Upon the motion itself he would only say, he believed that Russia was acting most arbitrarily towards Servia, and he should give his independent vote—not pledged as a party man—to the motion now before the House.

said, that as an impartial spectator, if he were allowed to express an opinion, he must say that there was nothing in the speech of the hon. Member for Shrewsbury, that, in his opinion, was calculated to call forth the very great warmth of remark that fell from the noble Lord. It did not appear to him that there was anything un-parliamentary in what the hon. Gentleman said; and he had, before then, heard parties who generally supported the Government, but sometimes differing in opinion from the Government, express their opinions as strongly as the hon. Gentleman had done without any indication on the part of the Government that those attacks were un-parliamentary. The right hon. Gentleman began by stating that Russia had treated with the Porte, and appeared to think that he had omitted to take that circumstance into consideration. His argument, however, was that she had treated with the Porte, undoubtedly as to Servia, and therefore, stood in reference to Turkey and its provincial powers in a different manner front the other powers who signed the treaty of the Dardanelles, the stipulations of which appeared to confer the rights she claimed to exercise. The right hon. Baronet said that very considerable Powers did claim of themselves to put their own interpretation upon treaties with other Powers, without previous consultation with any other Powers. He never meant to say the contrary of that. He was quite ready to admit that very great Powers would interpret their own treaties; but his argument was, that if Powers did in exercise of that right put upon a treaty with another Power a construction which that treaty did not justly bear out, other Powers were equally entitled to come with a friendly representation to that Power, and state their reasons why they thought her interpretation wrong, and to push their reasoning as far as the importance of the case would lead them to think expedient. Undoubtedly the British Government, when the late Government had the conduct of affairs, would not have considered it showed any want of respect to them, or any interference with their just independence, if, as for instance in the case of the treaty of Brazil, Russia and France had said, "We think you put an overstrained construction upon that treaty, and allow us to state our reasons for that opinion." They would have been perfectly ready to enter with any other Power which they had thought was entitled so to do into the consideration of the matter, and if they showed to the satisfaction of the Government that their construction was not borne out, they would have been prepared to admit what they should then have thought the justice of the case. With regard to the hereditary right, the right hon. Gentleman fancied that the hereditary right did not exist in Prince Milosch until the grant by firman, in 1830. But on enquiry, he would find that it was confirmed by the Servians before that, in 1817, afterwards in 1826, and again in 1827; and even after the war was terminated by the peace of Adrianople, the Sultan gave a confirmation of that hereditary right. The right hon Gentleman had also mistaken the drift of another argument which he had used, which was, not that this Government ought nakedly and simply to have advised the Porte to resist, but that this country ought to have united herself with Austria, and that if Austria was in the first place convinced that the demands of Russia were not justified, and France was prepared to support that, England ought to have united herself with those two Powers; and his argument was further, that if those three Powers had gone, not to Turkey, but to Russia, and stated, fairly and fully their reasons, and endeavoured to convince Russia that her demands were not founded upon a just interpretation of the treaty, he could not help thinking that those representations must have had a very material effect upon the demands of the Russian Government. But he must firmly protest against the argument used upon that occasion, not for the first time, but often resorted to in that House, namely, that the Government was never to express an opinion to any other Power in the world in dissent of the course that Power was about to pursue, unless the Government were prepared immediately to go to war it, support of their opinion. But it had been justly observed, what was the meaning of diplomatic relations if there were no medium between amicable representations and war? War was a great evil, no doubt, but it was as great, if not a greater, evil to all the other countries of Europe; and if England were indisposed to go to war without an overruling necessity, it should not be supposed that continental states were of so fiery a character as to be ready to plunge into all the horrors of war on behalf of pretensions which had no foundation. It was by timely representations that war was to be prevented: and if from a foolish and unfounded feat of the immediate approach of that which could only be the ultimate result, we were to allow wrongs to be multiplied, and our rights to be trampled on, our apathy would only raise up for us greater difficulties than those from which we shrank; while by timely and friendly interposition we might have prevented great evils, we should find ourselves insensibly involved in the gulf whence we were desirous of preserving ourselves. Russia was too great a power to be affronted by a representation, if ever she was indisposed to regard it; and if our representation were founded in reason and justice, it would be sure to have the greatest weight. The right hon. Baronet was right in saying that the late Government had given due weight to prudential considerations; as was the case of the Cracow consulship—of which, the risk appearing greater than the benefit, it was relinquished. But in the case of Servia, great was the object to be accomplished, and the House had yet to learn that which had been avoided. The same considerations of prudence had undoubtedly occurred in the cases of Greece and of Poland, as to which latter case the Government of Lord Grey had certainly felt that Russia was acting in violation of the treaty of Vienna, but Austria, Prussia, and Russia were agreed on the question; and what means had we of enforcing our demands except by a war, in which we might or might not have had the co-operation of France—a course which no man could think would have been expedient? However, the late Government had enforced its views by representations and remonstrances, which had not been attended to; and, under those circumstances it was, that further interference had been relinquished. If the right hon. Baronet had said that the Government had taken a similar course in Servia, his case would have beeen stronger; but it did not appear that the Government had used their influence with Russia on the question, but that they had been deterred by apprehensions of war. He could not avoid saying a word on what had been represented of the means of information possessed by Governments in this country. He knew not what might be in the power of the present Government; but he could say as to the preceding Administration, that no Government in Europe was better informed of what was passing in every part of the world; and he had the means of comparing the information thus acquired with that possessed by other Governments; and though he could conceive that the Consul-general of Servia, when recently arrived at his post, might have been misled, the Government at home should have made allowances for inexperience, and have availed themselves of the means they had in their power of correcting possible errors, by comparing the information they received with that received by foreign friendly Governments. Of course, when the right hon. Baronet declared that the transactions in question were not yet closed, and that it would be inconvenient to the public interests to produce the papers asked for, he should not divide the House, although he could not help observing that the Government to which he belonged had produced papers on some occasions before the transactions to which they related had closed; as in the case of Belgium. But he would never deny to a servant of the Crown the right of refusing papers on his own responsibility; and, though, perhaps, he might demand the production of those of which the right hon. Baronet had read extracts, he would wave the privilege, as they had not put the case fairly before the House. He would not, therefore, press his motion; but at the same time he would not withdraw it.

said, that the late period of the Session, and the little chance of getting this measure through Parliament, reluctantly compelled him to announce that he intended to withdraw it. At the same time, as all his past experience had confirmed his views with respect to the management of houses of correction, he might announce that he should certainly re-introduce the measure next session.

, expressed his regret at hearing the right hon. Baronet's determination, and the more especially after his declaration that his views respecting the measure were confirmed by his experience. He must say that he did not think he had been quite fairly treated on this subject. He had withdrawn his motion respecting Knutsford goal on the assurance that this bill should be brought forward, and that they would have an opportunity of discussing the whole question of goal management in connexion with it. They were in no worse condition with respect to this measure than they were with respect to the Chelsea Pensioners' Bill, and yet they pressed the coercive and abandoned this—the remedial measure. Why was this? Because, forsooth, some five or six magistrates—they were only five or six—objected to this measure as an interference with their "prerogative." If the Government attended to their objections regarding this bill, why not attend to his regarding the other? He repeated that he was not fairly treated; and he should certainly raise his voice still louder upon this subject had he not some confidence in the right hon. Baronet, who with respect to prisons had pursued a course which was highly honourable to his public character, and which afforded him (Mr. T. Duncombe) some hope that the objects of this bill would yet be carried out, and consequently some consolation for its present abandonment.