wished to ask a question of the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Sharman Crawford). That hon. Gentleman some short time ago presented a petition to the House, purporting to be the petition of certain persons residing in the borough of Bridport, and which petition, in some of its terms, was of a very libellous tendency. The petition bore what purported to be the signature of several of his supporters in the borough. These signatures were disavowed by those whose names they bore, and he now wished to ask the hon. Member whether he could inform the House by what means those signatures were obtained, and who were the parties who promoted the petition?

said the hon. Member had been kind enough to inform him of his intention to put this question; and since the hon. Gentleman gave him that information, he (Mr. S. Crawford) had searched through every paper which was likely to indicate from what source he had received the petition, but he had been wholly unsuccessful, and he had no memorandum that would enable him to answer the hon. Gentleman's question. He only knew that the petition came to him, and that he presented it. He should be happy, if any fraudulent conduct had been practised, to lend his assistance to the hon. Member to discover the parties guilty of such practices.

said it was difficult to point out any particular mode.

was of opinion that this question involved a breach of privilege of the House.

said at present there was no question before the House.

was perfectly aware of that, and he had risen for the purpose of making it a question, because, as he understood the facts, there had been such an act practised as to constitute a breach of privilege. An hon. Member had alleged that a fraud had been committed in the concoction of a petition to the House; any hon. Member had therefore a right to investigate the charge, inasmuch as the whole efficacy of the right of petitioning would be destroyed altogether if it were to become the practice to manufacture petitions in one part of the kingdom, and then have them presented to the House as coming from another part. He did not know whether the hon. Member, whose confidence had been abused, intended to take any steps in the matter, but in his (Sir Robert Inglis's) opinion it was a subject deserving of further consideration.

also considered it a question of importance. The Committee on Public Petitions, of which he was a Member, had been placed in great difficulty in consequence of many petitions coming before them, the character of which, as to their being the real petitions of the parties purporting to have signed them, was very doubtful. A little before the recess there came before the Committee as many as eighty or ninety petitions in favour of the ten hours Bill. No Member's name was signed to those petitions; they were all written in the same handwriting, and he firmly believed that every single name signed to them was in one and the same handwriting. They all professed to be signed by the chairman of a meeting called for that purpose. He did not know whether the Committee had a right to report that such Petitions had not in reality been presented at all; but his impression was, that they were not genuine Petitions.

said a rule had been laid down by the House, and a circular was sent to the Members every year, requiring them to write their names on the Petitions presented by them. In his opinion, the Clerk at the Table should look at every Petition to see that the Member's name was there. Yes, he would assert that if 500 Petitions were presented at one time by one Member, the Clerk ought to take care to examine the signatures, otherwise there would be no security against fraudulent Petitions.

said, that the Resolution which the hon. Member referred to was sent round to every Member, cautioning them to sign their names to the Petitions, but unfortunately Members neglected to do this, and unless the House came to a Resolution that no Petition should be received unless signed by the Member presenting it, he knew not how the evil could be remedied.

really thought that the House ought to come to a Resolution, that no Petition should be received unless the Member's name was upon it, and then the hon. Member would be responsible. That was necessary to guard against an abuse which he considered to be a grave and serious breach of privilege. He had no objection to give notice for to-morrow for submitting a proposition of that kind to the House, though he thought the Government ought to bring it forward.

Matter dropped.

wished to ask the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Home Department, whether he could give the House any idea as to the period he would be able to introduce his long-expected Bill for Medical Reform. Many Friends of his (Mr. F. Maule) had looked forward to the Measure as one of great promise, and they were very anxious to have it before the House.

said, that to promise a good measure was an easy matter, but the performance was a more difficult affair. The House was aware that he had now already before them the Poor Law Bill, the Factory Bill, and the County Courts Bill —quite enough, he thought, at one time. However, he could state with respect to the Bill referred to by the right hon. Gentleman that he expected information of a practical nature on the bringing up of a Report of a Committee now sitting. He hoped by the 13th instant to be able to give notice when he should be able to introduce the Bill.

had a Petition to present, to which he wished to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for the Home Department. It was from a person of the name of Gregory, who had been indicted and convicted for the publication of a libel, and was now suffering under his sentence of imprisonment in the Gaol of Newgate. The petitioner stated that he was sentenced to an imprisonment of twelve months; that he was at first placed under such rules and discipline as protected him from suffering any hardship, but that he was now placed in a solitary cell; that he was allowed the use of a small table, with a single chair without a back; that he had no bed but a rope mattress on a narrow iron frame, with a horse cloth for his covering; that he was deprived of the use of a knife and fork, and was not allowed to read any books, and that the only drink allowed to him was water gruel. He wished to know whether the right hon. Baronet would tell him whether or not this person was subjected to these rules in consequence of any regulations which had been made by the head of the Home Department? whether the Gaol of Newgate was under the right hon. Gentleman's control? and, if so, whether the sort of punishment to which this petitioner was subjected, was with the cognizance, knowledge, and authority of the right hon. Gentleman?

said, the hon. and learned Gentleman having given him notice of his intention to present his petition, and having granted him an opportunity of seeing the prayer of it, he was in a condition to answer all these allegations. In the first place, he begged to state to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the Gaol of Newgate was under the immediate control and direction of the Lord Mayor and Corporation of the City of London, and that the rules enforced at that Gaol, had received the sanction of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and therefore, though not directly, yet indirectly, he was responsible for the punishment to which Mr. Gregory was subjected. He need hardly state to the House, that Mr. Gregory was convicted of a misdemeanor. The House was aware, that in. the year 1840, Parliament passed an Act, which divided misdemeanors into two classes, and enabled Judges to pass sentence upon a misdemeanant, and in the sentence to specify whether the misdemeanant should be subject to the punishment attached to the first class, or to the second class. Mr. Gregory made direct application to the Court, on passing sentence, that he should be classed in the first division, the punishment attached to the first division being much lighter than that attached to the second division. The Court deliberately refused that application, and he was undergoing his sentence, not as a misdemeanant of the first class, but of the second. As soon, however, as it was represented to him, that Mr. Gregory was suffering in his health, and had long been in an infirm state of health, he called the attention of the proper authorities to that fact, and in consequence of that proceeding, an alteration was made in his treatment. So far from his confinment being solitary, perhaps he had indulgences such as were never granted to any other person in his situation. He was placed in a room having a boarded floor, and was allowed a fire and various other accommodations never granted to other misdemeanants. His diet was under the direction of the medical officer, and by his special orders, an inspector had visited Mr. Gregory once a fortnight, and made Reports to the Home-Office, and so far from the health of Mr. Gregory having been impaired by his protracted confinement, he was better now than when he was first confined. Unless it should be represented to him that the protracted confinement of Mr. Gregory, under these circumstances, would be dangerous to his life, he should not be prepared to recommend any change.

Petition to lie on the Table.

wished to put a question to the Secretary for the Home Department relative to a case which had been brought before one of the Police Magistrates on Wednesday last. The facts as stated in the reports, were these:—A female, named Mary Brown, having left her home for the purpose of purchasing some necessaries, was accosted by a soldier in the street, who persisted in following her. Being alarmed, she ran back to her own house, but was pursued, her door broken open, and the soldier seized her, and threatened to murder her unless she yielded to his demands. After struggling for some time the woman was so overcome by her fears that she fainted, and she was found by a neighbour, who had been attracted by her cries, in a most dangerous condition, leaning half out of the window in a state of insensibility. These were the facts as given in evidence, and now came the point to which he wished to draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention. The charge was not denied, but the party who had committed the outrage pleaded in extenuation that he was drunk at the time; and the Magistrate in passing sentence, said, that in consideration of his being drunk, he should only fine him 10s. Now, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman if his attention had been brought to this case; and if so, whether the report of it which had appeared in the public papers were correct; and if it were correct, whether the right hon. Gentleman had felt it incumbent on him not to let the grounds on which that very lenient sentence was pronounced pass without some notice on his part, expressive of disapproval?

observed, that his attention had been drawn to the subject, and he had thought it most fair to the Magistrate to ask for his explanation. It appeared to be true that something had passed between the soldier and the complainant, and that the woman, alarmed, returned to her apartment, followed by the soldier, who broke open the door, and offered violence in the room: the woman screamed aloud, and her neighbours immediately entered, and the soldier instantly fled. According to the report in the police sheet, the charge before the Magistrate was for "assaulting Mary Brown, of No. 4, Peter-street, Westminster, breaking her door; damage, 1s.; drunk at the time." The Magistrate, on hearing the case, was satisfied that, the soldier being intoxicated at the time, some misapprehension had occurred. The door was extremely old, and made little resistance. The Magistrate might have convicted the offender of an aggravated assault if the whole case had been made out, but he did not think that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charge, and that the justice of the case would on the whole be met by a fine of 10s. With respect to what had been said of drunkenness being considered an excuse, the Magistrate gave the statement a full contradiction. He denied that he had considered the plea of drunkenness any excuse. He did not remember the precise expressions he had used, but they were of strong condemnation. It was a matter of nice discretion, but he was not prepared to say, that a fine of 10s. did fully meet the justice of the case. He admitted, however, that the explanation of Mr. Jardine (for that was the Magistrate's name) was frank and satisfactory, and he should be sorry that any stain should rest on that Gentleman's character.

hoped he might be permitted to express his satisfaction at the explanation which the right hon. Gentleman had been able to give him, and to add, that in putting this question, so as to elicit that explanation, he was sure he had done a public service; for all the newspapers had concurred in their reports, and in representing the Magistrate's conduct as reprehensible, from misunderstanding it; and he was sure he had done a service to Mr. Jardine himself by eliciting an explanation which had done him justice.

moved the Order of the Day for the House to resolve itself into a Committee on the Bank Charter Act.

said, that there was a matter of great importance for the consideration of the House, and he wished some period to be fixed for bringing it forward. He alluded to the extraordinary proceedings that had taken place with respect to the Governor General of India. He did not wish to raise any impediment with respect to the discussion which stood for to-night, but after what had taken place it was impossible that the matter could pass over without some explanation as to the course pursued by the Government, and as to the manner in which, for the future, India was to be governed. He perceived that his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose had a Motion for tomorrow evening on the subject, but it stood low in the list. He admitted, that it would be unfair on Government nights to interfere with the Orders of the Day; but still on a subject of such great importance as the government of the Indian possessions of this country, he trusted that hon. Members who had Notices for to-morrow night would allow the hon. Member for Montrose precedence. It was his opinion that some early day should be fixed when the Motion might be broughton.

said, that his name stood first in the Notice Paper for to-morrow with respect to the printing of a petition, complaining of the Magistrates of Shrews. bury, and his name stood last in the Paper with respect to the Motion as to the recall of the Governor General of India. Now, he had no objection, if it met with the approval of the House to take the last Motion first, and the first last.

would not take any objection to the course proposed to be pursued by the hon. Member. It was for hon. Members who had precedence to say whether they would give way or not.

stated, that he had a Motion which stood second in the Paper for to-morrow. He had no desire to put it off; but if it was the general wish of the House, he would not stand in the way of the hon. Member for Montrose.

Subject at an end.

^* rose, and addressing Mr. Greene, who was in the Chair, said—Sir, there are occasionally questions of such vast and manifest importance, and which prefer such a claim, I should rather say such a demand, on the attention of the House, that all rhetorical prefaces, dilating on their magnitude or enjoining the duty of patient consideration, are superfluous and impertinent. I shall, therefore, proceed at once to call the attention of this Committee to a matter which enters into every transaction of which money forms a part. There is no contract, public or private,—no engagement, national or individual, which is unaffected by it. The enterprises of commerce, the profits of trade, the arrangements made in all the domestic relations of society, the wages of labour, pecuniary transactions of the highest amount and of the lowest, the payment of the national debt, the provision for the national expenditure, the command which the coin of the smallest denomination has over the necessaries of life, are all affected by the decision to which we may come on that great question which I am about to submit to the consideration of the Committee. The circumstances under which the duty imposed on me arises are shortly these:—In the year 1833, an Act of Parliament passed which continued to the Bank of England certain privileges until the year 1855, and after the year 1855 until Parliament should determine to give one year's notice to the Bank of its determination to revise the charter. Before, however, the expiration of the full period of twenty-one years, before the arrival of that term of 1855, there was reserved to Parliament the power, after the lapse of ten years, by notice to be given to the Bank, of revising the charter and reconsidering this whole subject. That period will arrive in August next. After August next it will be competent to this House, by notice given through the Speaker, to intimate to the Bank that within six months next following this House will reconsider the charter of the Bank of England. If that opportunity be let pass, the charter of the Bank and all the privileges it confers will endure until the year 1855. In the present state of this country—in the present state of the currency—after the inquiries which have been instituted, after the degree to which public attention has been called to this subject, her Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to avail themselves of the opportunity thus given to them by law, and to consider the revision of the charter of the Bank. They are of opinion, that inquiry has been exhausted—that all the information which is essential to the formation of a satisfactory judgment has been collected, and that it is incumbent on the Ministers of the Crown to submit to the decision of Parliament the measures which in their opinion it may be fitting to adopt. Sir, I am perfectly satisfied that the Members of this House, rising superior to all party considerations, and to all private interests, will consider it their duty to apply their deliberate and impartial consideration to this great subject. I have that confidence in the House of Commons, from past experience of their superiority to mere party views and personal interests where matters of such paramount importance come under review, that I feel assured such will be the course they will pursue on this occasion. I ask you to-night for no decision. I would even deprecate the expression of opinion. I ask you to listen to the proposals I shall make—to hear the evidence and arguments by which they shall be supported —to read and consider the resolutions which I shall move, pro formâ and, after having deliberated maturely on the subject, hereafter to pronounce a cool and impartial judgment upon it. Sir, I am not shaken in the confidence I repose in the House by publications I have seen, inviting the attendance of Members on this occasion. I hold in my hand the resolutions adopted at a meeting of the General Committee of Private Country Bankers on the 17th April last. They are to this effect: "That the refusal of Government to give information on the subject of their measure concerning Banks and issue, naturally leads to the conclusion that it is their intention to propose some measure affecting country banks generally, and this meeting considers it most probable that it relates to the local circulation of the country." "That under these circumstances it is most desirable that the banks of issue, whether private or joint-stock banks, should unite to oppose any alteration in the local circulation of the country, or in the conditions on which it is now allowed by law; and that the several joint-stock banks and banks of issue throughout the United Kingdom be invited to co-operate with the private bankers in such opposition." The third Resolution is, "That all bankers be requested, as far as possible, to bring the question fully under the consideration of all Members of Parliament with whom they may be acquainted or connected, and endeavour to induce them to oppose any such alterations in the local circulation of the country." Sir, I complain not of these resolutions. I complain not, at least, that the Bankers have invited Members of Parliament to attend in their place and consider this subject; but I do hope that Members of Parliament will resist the subsequent appeal, and that they will not come here determined beforehand to oppose any alteration in the existing law which may be proposed for their consideration. Are you so satisfied with the existing state of things,—are you so convinced that it is utterly impossible in any particular to suggest alteration, that you will come prepared, before hearing the discussion on the subject, to offer, after previous concert and understanding, an insuperable obstacle to any amendment of the existing law? I know that to be impossible. I hold in my hand the proof of evils flowing from the present state of the law, which should make it impossible that any such previous compact and understanding, if entered into, could be fulfilled. My immediate proposition relates to Banking Concerns, and to the issue of Pro- missory Notes; but, considering that ten years have now elapsed since this subject was brought under consideration, I hope I shall be excused if I take a wider range than the immediate questions for decision might seem to justify, and if I advert at the outset to the great principles which govern, or ought to govern, the Measure of Value, and the Medium of Exchange. They lie, in truth, at the very foundation of our discussion. We cannot hope to agree on the Measure to be adopted with regard to Paper Currency, unless we are agreed on the principles which determine the value of that of which Paper is the representative, and on the nature of the obligation which is imposed upon the issuer of Promissory Notes. Now I fear there is not a general agreement on those fundamental principles—that there is still a very material difference of opinion as to the real nature and character of the Measure of Value in this country. My first question, therefore, is, what constitutes this Measure of Value? What is the signification of that word "a Pound," with which we are all familiar? What is the engagement to pay a "Pound?" Unless we are agreed on the answer to these questions, it is in vain we attempt to legislate on the subject. If a "Pound" is a mere visionary abstraction, a something which does not exist either in law or in practice, in that case one class of measures relating to Paper Currency may be adopted; but if the word " Pound," the common denomination of value, signifies something more than a mere fiction—if a "Pound" means a quantity of the precious metals of certain weight and certain fineness—if that be the definition of a "Pound," in that case another class of measures relating to Paper Currency will be requisite. Now, the whole foundation of the proposal I am about to make rests upon the assumption that according to practice, according to law, according to the ancient monetary policy of this country, that which is implied by the word "Pound" is a certain definite quantity of gold with a mark upon it to determine its weight and fineness, and that the engagement to pay a Pound means nothing, and can mean nothing else, than the promise to pay to the holder, when he demands it, that definite quantity of gold. What is the meaning of the "Pound" according to the ancient monetary policy of this country? The origin of the term was this:—In the reign of William the Conqueror a pound weight of silver was also the pound of account. The "Pound" represented both the weight of metal and the denomination of money. By subsequent debasements of the currency a great alteration was made, not in the name, but in the intrinsic value of the Pound sterling, and it was not until a late period of the reign of Queen Elizabeth that silver, being then the standard of value, received that determinate weight which it retained without variation, with constant refusals to debase the standard of silver, until the year 1816, when gold became the exclusive standard of value. The standard of silver was fixed about 1567; but in 1717, the value of the guinea was determined to be 21s., and for a certain period, both gold and silver constituted the mixed standard of value. In the year 1774, it being then enacted that no legal contract should be discharged in silver for any sum of more than 25l., gold became substantially the measure of value, and so it continued to be legally and practically until 1797, when that fatal measure for restricting cash payments by the Bank was passed, and parties were enabled to issue at their discretion Paper Money not convertible into coin at the will of the bearer. From 1797 to 1810 public attention was not much directed to this important subject; but in 1810 men of sagacity observed that the exchanges had been for a considerable period unfavourable to this country — more unfavourable than could be accounted for by the balance of trade or the monetary transactions of the country. A Committee was appointed to inquire into the subject, and opinions, not really novel, but at that time very startling, were enounced, to the effect that the "Pound" meant, in fact, nothing else than a definite quantity of the precious metals, and that those who promised to pay a Pound ought to pay that quantity. That theory was very much contested at the time. The House of Commons was not convinced by the arguments used in favour of it. The public mind, confused by the practice that had prevailed since the issue of inconvertible paper, would not admit the doctrine of a metallic standard. Those who contested it were, however, called upon to give their definition of the Pound Sterling, and it must be admitted that they responded to the call. They did not evade the question, as is now the practice, by writing long and unintelligible pamphlets, but, confident in their own theories, gave, in brief and compendious forms, their definitions of the standard of value. One writer said, "that a Pound might be defined to be a sense of value in reference to currency as compared with commodities." Another writer was dissatisfied with that definition, thinking the public had a right to something more definite and tangible, and that the meaning of "a reference to currency as compared with commodities," was not very obvious to enlightened minds. This writer said, "There is a standard and there is an unit which is the measure of value, and that unit is the interest of 33l. 6s. 8d. at 3 per cent., that being 1l., and being paid in a Bank-note as money of account." The last definition of the standard of value which I shall quote is this:—" The standard is neither gold nor silver, but it is something set up in the imagination, to be regulated by public opinion." Such were the absurdities into which ingenious men were betrayed, in the attempt to set up some other standard of value, more consistent with inconvertible paper than a metallic standard. It was supposed at that time that the doctrines propounded by the Bullion Committee were the visionary speculations of theorists, and were unknown in the former monetary history of this country. But that is not the case. Refer to every writer of eminence—to Mr. Locke, to Sir W. Petty, to any one who wrote before 1797, and who had not been familiar with inconvertible paper currency, and you will find they arrive at precisely the same conclusions with the Bullion Committee. Take the opinion of Mr. Harris, an officer of the Mint, and an eminent writer on the subject a century before the Bank Restriction Act:—

"In all countries (says Mr. Harris) there is established a certain standard both as to weight and fineness of the several species of those coins.

"In England, the silver monies are to contain 111 parts of fine silver, and 6 parts of alloy. That is, the pound troy with us contains 11 oz. 2 pennyweights of fine silver, and 18 pennyweights of alloy; and of a pound troy of this standard silver, our money pound contains 20/62parts, that is to say a pound of of this silver is coined into 62s. This standard has continued invariable ever since the 43rd Elizabeth."

"By the standard of money is always meant the quantity of pure or fine metal contained in a given sum. In England accounts are kept by the pound sterling, which is a certain quantity of fine silver appointed by law for a standard." (He was writing at a time when silver was the standard in England.) "All payments abroad are regulated by the course of exchange, and that is founded upon the intrinsic value, and not on the mere names of coins.

"We may break the public faith here, and curtail the long-established measure of property, but foreigners will make ample allowance for what we may do, and however we may rob 'and cheat one another, will secure themselves, and make an advantage of our discredit, by bringing the exchange against us beyond the part."

^✶ From a Corrected Report.

These are the true doctrines as to the measure of value, doctrines delivered one hundred years before the Report of the Bullion Committee was made, but in precise conformity with that Report. The truth of them is not, I fear, even now admitted. Publications daily issue from the press contesting it. Here is a volume published at Birmingham since the commencement of the present year, not the production, I presume, of a single author, for it professes to be written by Gemini. I have no wish to withhold justice from writers who give that proof of their sincerity, which is implied by the publication of an octavo volume. And I admit at once, that I do not believe this work could have proceeded from any other town in the Queen's dominions than Birmingham, and that the efforts of no single writer are equal to the production of so much nonsense. This volume collects and repeats all the old exploded fallacies on the subject of the standard of value and the currency. Its authors bewail the darkness of the age which adheres to a standard which was adopted in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and which they consider wholly unsuitable as a measure of value now, considering the extent of out commerce, and the increase of all pecuniary transactions in number and amount. They might with equal justice complain, that since travelling has been increased by the completion of railways, the foot measure is still adhered to. There is no better reason for making the sovereign pass for twenty-five shillings instead of twenty, than for making the foot consist of sixteen inches instead of twelve. They consider it absurd, that with the progress we have made in wealth and knowledge, we should still coin the ounce of gold into a sum represented by 3l. 17s. l0½d. "Coin the ounce of gold," say they, "into 5l, and we shall then have relief from our burthens, and encouragement to industry and trade." Now, let us consider what is meant by affixing to the ounce of gold a value, represented in coin by the sum of 3l. 17s. l0½d.? According to the regulations of the Mint, before the alteration of the silver coin in 1816, a pound weight of standard gold was coined into 44½ guineas; a pound weight of standard silver was coined into 62s.; and a guinea was made current for 21s. We are thus enabled to calculate the relative value of gold and silver according to the Mint regulations. The sum of 44½ guineas in gold, that is a pound of gold, was equivalent to 1,869 sixpences in silver, and the pound of silver being equal to 124 sixpences in coin, the value of gold was to that of silver, as 1,869 to 124, or as 15 9/124 to 1. The ounce of gold in coin was equivalent to the corresponding amount in silver, namely, the twelfth part of 1,869 sixpences, that is to say, to 155 sixpences and 9/12 of a shilling, or 3l. 17s. 10½d. There was, indeed, a small difference in the amount of alloy in a pound of coined gold and a pound of coined silver, for which it is necessary to make allowance, and that allowance being made, the relative value of pure gold to pure silver in the coins of the two metals was as 15 2859/13460 to 1. Silver has ceased to be a standard of value, and the silver coin being now a mere token, the former relative value of gold coin to silver coin is not now preserved. The above calculations explain our meaning when we say that the ounce of gold is coined into the sum of 3l. 17s. l0½d. These terms express the relation of gold and silver coin, according to the Mint regulations at the time that silver coin was made of standard silver. You may now enact, no doubt, that the ounce of gold shall be coined into 51. in money of account, that is to say, you may debase the standard to that extent. And what will be the effect of this? All debtors will no doubt gain by it. In the case of all unfulfilled contracts, he who has to receive payment will receive much less in point of real value than he stipulated for. The creditor will be defrauded—the debtor will have a corresponding advantage. But this will be the whole effect. No new transaction will be affected by your choosing to call an ounce of gold 5l. As Mr. Harris says, you may cheat each other at home, but foreign countries will adjust their dealings with you, not on account of the name to be given to your coin, but according to its real value. All new contracts at home will be regulated by the same principles. The real and not the nominal value of that which is made by law the medium of exchange, will regulate prices and all future contracts. Even the relative value of gold and silver will not be adjusted by your laws. You may insist on coining the ounce of gold into 51. instead of 3l. 17s. l0½d., that is to say, into 200 sixpences instead of, as at present, into 155 sixpences and fourpence halfpenny, but silver will disobey your law, and will insist on finding its own value in the market on principles which you cannot control. The Mint regulations do not, it is true, correctly express the present relative value of gold and silver in the bullion market. Silver is not worth 5s. 2d. an ounce, not more, I believe, than 5s. an ounce, and there would be an apparent present advantage to the debtor in taking silver rather than gold as the standard, since the relative value of gold to silver when standard-silver is 5s. per ounce, is as 15·575 to 1, instead of 15,285/1346 to 1. But there is reason to doubt whether those who wish for a relaxation of the standard, and who, for the purpose of benefiting the debtor, recommend either a joint standard of silver and gold, or the substitution of silver for gold as the standard, would attain their object were either of those Measures adopted. There is reason to believe, adverting particularly to the rapid increase of the annual supply of gold from mines within the dominions of the Emperor of Russia, that the value of gold in the general markets of the world is on the decrease, and that the interest of the debtor would not be permanently advanced by the abandonment of gold for silver as the standard of value in the country. But to revert to the errors of those who are the advocates of some measure of value other than the precious metals. They object to the selection of gold as the standard of value, because gold is an article of commerce,— because there is a demand for it as bullion, affecting, therefore, its value as coin, and disqualifying it to be the measure of value. Now, no one contends that there is or can be an absolutely fixed and invariable standard of value, No one de- nies that the value of gold, with reference to all commodities, excepting gold itself, may be subject to slight variations. But what other substance is not more subject to variations in value than the precious metals? What other substance possessing instrinsic value will not also be in demand as an article of commerce? It is because gold is an article of commerce, because there are no restrictions upon its export or its import, that you can at all times depend upon such a supply of gold for the purposes of coin as may be sufficient for the wants of this country. The precious metals are distributed among the various countries of the world in proportion to their respective necessities, by laws of certain though not very obvious operation, which, without our interference, will allot to our share all that we require. Some entertain the apprehension that we may be drained of all our gold in consequence of a demand for gold from foreign countries, either for the payment of their armies in time of war, or in consequence of sudden and unforeseen demand for foreign corn for our own internal consumption. It is supposed that gold, being an article in universal demand, and having at all times and in all places an ascertained value, is more subject to exportation than anything else. But the export of gold, whether coin or bullion, is governed by precisely the same laws by which the export of any other article is governed. Gold will not leave this country unless gold be dearer in some other country than it is in this. It will not leave this country, merely because it is gold, nor while there is any article of our produce or manufacture which can be exported in exchange for foreign produce with a more profitable return. If gold coin be in any country the common medium of exchange; or if the promissory notes, which perform in part the functions of gold coin, are at all times and under all circumstances of equal value with gold, and are instantly convertible into gold; there are causes in operation which, without any interference on our part, will confine within known and just limits the extent to which gold can be exported. There may no doubt be temporary pressure from the export of gold, even when it is confined within those limits; but none for which you may not provide, none to which you would not be subject, in a higher degree probably, were any other standard of value adopted in preference to gold. I have thus stated the grounds which justify the conclusion, that, according to the ancient monetary policy of the country, according to the law, according to the practice that prevailed at all times, excepting during the period of inconvertible paper currency, a certain quantity of the precious metals, definite in point of weight and fineness, has constituted, and ought to constitute, the measure of value. The minds of men, habituated during the Bank Restriction to a departure from that measure of value, were l0th to admit those great elementary truths which are at the foundation of the whole system of currency, paper credit, and foreign exchange. Ingenious writers have from time to time laboured to prove the unsoundness of these doctrines, to show that a metallic standard was neither practically nor theoretically the measure of value in this country, and have cited various facts apparently irreconcileable with the theory. But when all the circumstances attending each fact have been fully stated, they have been sufficient to account for the seeming contradiction. When Sir Isaac Newton had established the planetary system on the principle of gravitation and attraction, there were phenomena apparently at variance with the theory. But succeeding philosophers, starting from the point which in the progress of science had been reached by Sir Isaac Newton, applying his principles with improved means of investigating truth, solved the doubts which he had not been able to solve, and showed that the apparent contradictions, when all the disturbing influences were taken into account, became in fact new demonstrations of the soundness of the original theory. And the same result has followed, and will follow, in the case of objections which have been, and will continue to be, urged against the principle of the metallic standard. It must at the same time be admitted that it would be quite consistent with that principle to adopt some other measure of value than that which we have adopted. It would be consistent with that principle to select silver instead of gold as the standard,—to have a mixed standard of gold and silver, the relative values of the two metals being determined,—to dispense with gold coin altogether, and regulate the amount and value of paper currency by making it con- vertible only, according to the proposal of Mr. Ricardo, into gold bullion of a given minimum amount. I trust, however, this House will adhere to the present standard,—will resolve on the maintenance of a single standard, and of gold as that standard. All the great writers on this subject, Sir William Petty, Mr. Locke, Mr. Harris, and Lord Liverpool, have been decidedly in favour of a single, in preference to a double standard. Mr. Locke, indeed, was of opinion that silver ought to be the standard; but there appears good ground to doubt the soundness of that opinion; and there are, at any rate, the most cogent reasons, since gold has been for a long course of years the standard in this country, for the continued maintenance of it. They are well stated in the admirable Treatise on Coins, written by the first Lord Liverpool. In that treatise a system of coinage is recommended, which is in exact conformity, both in point of principle and detail, with the system which we have adopted. Lord Liverpool observes:—

"After full consideration of this extensive, abstruse, and intricate subject, I humbly offer to your Majesty, as the result of my opinion,

"First, That the coins of this Realm, which are to be the principal measure of property and instrument of commerce, should be made of one metal only.

"Secondly, That in this Kingdom the gold coins only have been for many years past, and are now, in the practice and opinion of the people, the principal measure of property and instrument of commerce.

"It has been shown that, in a country like Great Britain, so distinguished for its affluence and for the extent of its commercial connections, the gold coins are best adapted to be the principal measure of property; in this Kingdom, therefore, the gold coin is now the principal measure of property and standard coin, or, as it were, the sovereign archetype by which the weight and value of all other coins should be regulated.

"It is the measure of almost all contracts and bargains; and by it, as a measure, the price of all commodities bought and sold is adjusted and ascertained. For these reasons the gold coin should be made as perfect and kept as perfect as possible.

"Thirdly. It is evident, that where the function of the gold coins as a measure of property ceases, there that of the silver coins should begin; and that where the function of the silver coins, in this respect, ceases, there that of copper should begin: it is clear, therefore, that so far only these silver and copper coins should be made legal tender and no further, at least not in any great degree; and it follows that the coins, both of silver and copper, are subordinate, subservient, and merely representative coins; and must take their value with reference to the gold coins according to the rate which the sovereign sets upon each of them."

These are, in fact, the principles which regulate our present coinage. We have a single standard, and that standard gold,— the metal which was practically the standard for many years previously to the suspension of cash payment. The silver coin is a mere token, auxiliary and subordinate to the gold coin; the ounce of silver being now coined into 66s. instead of 62s., and silver coin not being a legal tender for any greater sum than 40s. By the abolition, in this part of the United Kingdom, of the promissory notes below 5l., you introduce the gold coin into general use for the purpose of effecting small payments; you enable the holder of the smallest note to demand payment in gold, and thus insure the maintenance of a very considerable quantity of gold as a part of the circulating medium. There is, no doubt, some expense in the maintenance of a metallic circulation, but none, in my opinion, sufficient to countervail the advantage of having gold coin generally distributed throughout the country, accessible to all, and the foundation of paper credit and currency. It is contended by some, that if you were to dispense with coin altogether, to adopt the principle of Mr. Ricardo's plan, and make bank notes not convertible into gold at the will of the holder, excepting when presented to the amount of a very considerable sum (300l. or 400l. for instance), and then convertible into bullion and not coin, you would provide a security against the effects of a panic connected with political causes, causing a sudden demand for gold. I very much doubt the policy of taking such precautions against such a contingency, and consider that the most effectual measure for promoting permanent confidence in the paper circulation of the country, is to require that the gold coin shall be in general use for small payments, and that the promissory note shall be of equal value with the coin which it professes to represent. I shall here close my observations on the measure of value and the coinage, and proceed to the more immediate subject for consideration, namely, the state of the paper circulation of the country, and the principles which ought to regulate it. I must state, at the outset, that in using the word money, I mean to designate by that word the coin of the Realm, and promissory notes payable to bearer on demand. In using the words paper currency, I mean only such promissory notes. I do not include in those terms bills of exchange, or drafts on bankers, or other forms of paper credit. I will not weary the House with a discussion as to the precise nature of deposits, and whether they constitute a part of the currency of the country. There is a material distinction, in my opinion, between the character of a promissory note payable to bearer on demand, and other forms of paper credit, and between the effects which they respectively produce upon the prices of commodities and upon the exchanges. The one answers all the purposes of money, passes from hand to hand without endorsement, without examination, if there be no suspicion of forgery: and it is in fact, what its designations imply it to be, currency or circulating medium. I do not deny that other forms of paper credit have some effects in common with Bank notes, that they all have a tendency to economise the use of metallic money, and have a common influence on the value of gold to the extent to which they dispense with the use of it, and thus leave a larger quantity available for the general purposes of the world than there would otherwise be. But I think experience shows that the paper currency, that is, the promissory notes payable to bearer on demand, stands in a certain relation to the gold coin and the foreign exchange in which other forms of paper credit do not stand. There are striking examples of this adduced in the Report of the Bullion Committee of 1810, in the case both of the Bank of England, and of the Irish and Scotch Banks. In the case of the Bank of England, shortly after its establishment there was a material depreciation of paper in consequence of its excessive issue. The notes of the Bank of England were at a discount of 17 per cent. There was no doubt as to the solvency of the Bank, for bank stock, on which 60 per cent. had been paid, was selling at 110 per cent. After trying various expedients, it was at length determined to reduce the amount of bank notes outstanding. The consequence was an immediate increase in the value of those which remained in circula- tion, the restoration of them to par, and a corresponding improvements the foreign exchanges. In the case of Ireland, in the year 1804 the exchange with England was very unfavourable. A Committee was appointed to consider the causes. It was denied by most of the witnesses from Ireland that they were at all connected with excessive issues of Irish notes. It was then stoutly maintained—and it was afterwards in 1810—that "notes issued only in proportion to the demand in exchange for good and convertible securities, payable at specific periods, could not tend to any excess in circulation, or to any depreciation." In the spring of 1804, the exchange of Ireland with England was so unfavourable that it required 118l. 10s. of the notes of the Bank of Ireland to purchase 100l. of the notes of the Bank of England. Between the year 1804 and the year 1806 the notes of the Bank of Ireland were reduced from 3,000,000l. to 2,410,000l., and the effect of this, taken in conjunction with an increase of the English circulation, was to restore the relative value of Irish paper and the exchange with England to par. In the same manner, an unfavourable state of the exchange between Scotland and England has been more than once corrected by a contraction of the paper circulation of Scotland. In all these cases the action has been upon that part of the paper credit of the country which has consisted of promissory notes payable to the bearer on demand. There has been no interference with other forms of paper credit, nor was it contended then, as it is now contended by some, that promissory notes are identical in their nature with bills of exchange, and with checks on bankers, and with deposits, and that they cannot be dealt with on any separate principle. There is a passage in the work to which I have before referred, the treatise of Lord Liverpool, which draws the just distinction between paper credit and paper currency, and exposes the fallacy of those who deprecate any attempt to regulate by law the paper currency, on the ground that it is not distinguishable in its nature from paper credit. Lord Liverpool observes—

"It has been a common artifice, practised by those who have written on paper currency, to confound paper credit with paper currency; and even the higher sorts of paper currency with the inferior sorts, such as immediately interfere with the use of the coins of the realm. Paper credit is not only highly convenient and beneficial, but is even absolutely necessary in carrying on the trade of a great commercial kingdom.

"Paper currency is a very undefined term, as used by speculative writers. To find arguments in its support, at least to the extent to which it is at present carried, they have been obliged to connect it with paper credit; so that the principles on which the use of paper credit is truly founded, may be brought in support of a great emission of paper currency. Paper currency, strictly speaking, consists only of bills or notes payable or convertible into cash on demand by the person who issued the same at the will of the holder."

That appears to me to be the true definition of paper currency, as distinguished from paper credit. It is the substitute for, and the immediate representative of coin, and with coin it constitutes "money." And if you will adhere to the standard of value, and will adopt such measures as shall ensure the uniform equivalency of Bank notes to coin, you may safely, in my opinion, leave untouched other forms of paper credit, and entrust the regulation and control of them to individual caution and discretion. There are some, however, who admit the validity of this distinction, and yet contend that no new legislative interference is required in the case of promissory notes. In their opinion the true principles which should govern the issue of such notes are, freedom of competition, and immediate convertibility into coin at the will of the holder. The combination of these principles will, in their opinion offord to the public a complete security against abuse of the privilege of issue. In support of that opinion they have, undoubtedly, the high authority of Adam Smith and of Ricardo. Both these eminent writers assume that immediate convertibility into coin is all that is requisite to prevent the excessive issue of paper. It is no impeachment of their sagacity, if, in the progress which this science, like all other sciences, is making, there be reason to doubt the soundness of any particular opinion which, they may have delivered. And it is our duty to disregard their authority, and to act on the conclusions of our own judgment, if either reason or experience convinces us that they are safer guides. It appears to me that we have, from reasoning, from experience, from the admissions made by the issuers of paper money, abundant ground for the conclusion, that, under a system of unlimited com- petition, although it be controlled by convertibility into coin, there is not an adequate security against the excessive issue of promissory notes. We should infer, certainly from reasoning, that free competition in the supply of any givnn article will probably ensure us the most abundant supply of that article at the cheapest rate. But we do not want an abundant supply of cheap promissory paper. We want only a certain quantity of paper, not, indeed, fixed and definite in nominal amount, but just such a quantity of paper, and that only, as shall be equivalent in point of value to the coin which it represents. If the paper be cheaper than the coin, it is an evil and not an advantage. That system, therefore, which provides a constant supply of paper equal in value to coin, and so varying in amount as to insure at all times immediate convertibility into coin, together with perfect confidence in the solvency of the issuers of paper, is the system which ought to be preferred. Now, unless the issuers of paper conform to certain principles, unless they vigilantly observe the causes which influence the influx or efflux of coin, and regulate their issues of paper accordingly, there is danger that the value of the paper will not correspond with the value of coin. The difference may not be immediately perceived,— nay, the first effect of undue issue, by increasing prices, may be to encourage further issues; and as each issuer, where there is unlimited competition, feels the inutility of individual efforts of contraction, the evil proceeds, until the disparity between gold and paper becomes manifest, confidence in the paper is shaken, and it becomes necessary to restore its value by sudden and violent reductions in its amount, spreading ruin among the issuers of paper, and deranging the whole monetary transactions of the country. If we admit the principle of a metallic standard, and admit that the paper currency ought to be regulated by immediate reference to the foreign exchanges,—that there ought to be early contractions of paper on the efflux of gold,—we might, I think, infer from reasoning, without the aid of experience, that an unlimited competition in respect to issue will not afford a security for the proper regulation of the paper currency. Let us now refer to the admissions made by those who are the advocates for unlimited competition. Several country bankers were examined by the Select Committee, and their evidence is important: it demonstrates the absence of that controlling check upon issue which ought to be applied, if the principles for which I contend are just. Mr. Hobhouse a banker, in the south-west of England, (a brother of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Nottingham,) who spoke with some authority from his having been Chairman of the Committee of Private Bankers, and their selected organ, was examined before the Committee. What account did he give of the issues of private bankers? He was asked—

"With a rise of prices, would there be an increased paper issue by country bankers?"

He answered—

"Yes, there will be an increase in the local circulation when prices rise. Gold is a commodity, of which there may be a glut as well as a scarcity; and I could never see any reason to be frightened at an export or drain of gold."

He was then asked—

"Ought not there to be a contraction of the circulation under such circumstances?"

He answers—

"Whether there ought or ought not, I cannot tell; but I am sure, that, in fact, there could not be. I am perfectly satisfied that it is quite impossible for these local currencies to be influenced by the price of gold or the foreign exchanges."

He is then asked—

"Does is not often happen that your circulation is increased in the beginning of a drain of gold?"

He answers—

"Yes; we do not pretend that our circulation is at all governed by it. It is governed by what I have stated already."

Another witness examined was Mr. Stuckey. He was asked this question—

Supposing it should be ultimately thought that it is desirable that the country circulation should have a general conformity to the state of the foreign exchanges; do you conceive that this could, in any way, be effected by the country bankers?"

He answers—

"I do not at present see how it could be accomplished; and I may take the liberty of going further in answer to that question, and saying that it appears to me that the country issues, as conducted in the West of England, have very little or nothing to do with foreign exchanges."

Now, the effect of this evidence is, to prove that country banks do not and cannot control their issues according to the state of the foreign exchanges. The amount of their issues is governed by prices, rather than by a reference to the exchange. When speculation is active, and prices rise, that is to say, at the very time at which a check may most probably be required on the increased issues of the country banks, their activity is stimulated. Just at the period when that warning is given, so far from the warning being attended to, there is increased action in the opposite direction. Prices are rising. The country bankers have no control over their currency. The increase of price compels increase of issue, and thus there is going on at the same time the reciprocal action of increased speculation, and an additional stimulus given to that speculation by increased issues. The first witness front whose evidence I quoted, when asked whether the circulation of country banks was governed, as that of the Bank of England was, by the state of the exchanges, fairly admitted that it was not. He was asked,

"Do you not mean that when a drain of gold was beginning, that was the time when frequently the circulation of the country banks was increased?"

The answer of Mr. Hobhouse, is—

"Yes; there is an increase at the beginning of a drain of gold, and the circulation is not governed by it."

The fact is, there is no sense of individual responsibility; each issuer says, and says naturally enough, "It is in vain for me, individually, to contract my issues, when others will not do the same. I shall suffer by doing so. My efforts will produce no effect on the aggregate, while some competitor will take that share of the circulation which I may withdraw." And thus, each refusing to make the individual sacrifice (which, indeed, is useless where only made individually,) the crisis comes,—there is a demand for gold which cannot be satisfied, and the end of all is, much individual suffering and many fortunes ruined, from the necessity of a sudden and violent effort to establish, by the contraction of issue, an equilibrium between gold and paper. Thus it appears to me that the conclusions of reason against unlimited competition of issue, are amply confirmed by the admission of the advocates for it. Are the lessons of experience at variance with the conclusions we are entitled to draw from reason and from evidence? What has been the result of unlimited competition in the United States? In the United States the paper circulation was supplied, not by private bankers, but by Joint-Stock Banks established on principles apparently the most satisfactory. There was every precaution taken against insolvency; unlimited responsibility of partners—excellent regulations for the publication and audit of accounts—immediate convertibility of paper into gold. If the principle of unlimited competition, controlled by such checks, be safe, why has it utterly failed in the United States? How can it be shown that the experiment was not fairly made in that country? Observe this fact. While there existed a central Bank (the United States Bank), standing in some such relation to the other Banks of the United States as the Bank of England stands to the Banks of the country, there was some degree (imperfect it is true) of control over the general issues of paper. But when the privileges of the Central Bank ceased, when the principle of free competition was left unchecked, then came, notwithstanding professed convertibility, immoderate issues of paper, extravagant speculation, and the natural consequences, suspension of cash payments and complete insolvency. Hence I conclude that reason, evidence, and experience combine to demonstrate the impolicy and danger of unlimited competition in the issue of paper. I have now stated—with respect to the measure of value, with respect to the coinage and currency—and with respect to promissory notes payable on demand—the broad and general principles which I think ought to regulate these three great elements of our monetary system. I have done on this occasion what I have done on others. I have stated, without the slightest compromise or concealment, the leading principles to which, in my opinion, our legislation in those matters ought to conform. I have now to state the extent to which I propose to carry out those principles. If I do not carry them out immediately to their full and entire extent, I may be told, as I have been told before, that very good principles have been laid down in the abstract, but that practically I shrink from their application. Nevertheless, the opi- nion which I have formerly expressed I still entertain—that it is of great importance that public men should acknowledge the great principles by which important measures should be regulated: and, in discussing a question of such magnitude as the present, I had rather it were said, "You fall short in the application of sound and admitted principles," than that "You have concealed or perverted those principles for the purpose of justifying your limited application of them." In addressing the House on this important subject, I have, in the first instance, stated principles which I deem to be correct, and which ought to be the rule and guide of our future legislation. I have now to consider, with the same unreservedness, how far the consideration due to special circumstances, to existing interests, to the usages and habits of the community, demands caution and limitation in the immediate application of those principles. All I can promise is, that I will propose no practical measure which is inconsistent with the principles which I have laid down, and which does not tend to their ultimate establishment. It is, however, most important that those who are responsible for the management of the affairs of a great country like this—seeing how easy it is, by unwise legislation, to create panic or introduce confusion into the monetary transactions of the country—it is most important that they should deal considerately with private interests: first, because justice requires it; and, secondly, because there is danger that the cause or progressive amendment and reform will be injured, if you cannot reconcile reform with a due regard to the welfare and happiness of individuals. In what mode then, admitting the principles I have announced to be correct, in what mode shall we best provide for the present application and ultimate establishment of them, with the least disturbance of existing interest? Some have contended, and I am not prepared to deny the position, that if we had a new state of society to deal with, the wisest plan would be, to claim for the State the exclusive privilege of the issue of promissory notes, as we have claimed for it the exclusive privilege of coinage. They consider that the state is entitled to the whole profits to be derived from that which is the representative of coin, and that if the State had the exclusive power of issuing paper, there would be estab- lished a controlling power which would insure, at far as possible, an equilibrium in the currency. At the game time there have been men, whose judgment is also entitled to weight, who have expressed a different opinion on this subject. This question was under the consideration of the House when Lord Althorp brought forward the Bank Charter Bill, in 1833. It had also been the subject of consideration in the Select Committee of 1832; and Lord Althorp, in moving the extension of the Bank Charter, discussed the policy of a single bank of issue to be constituted by and responsible to the Government. Having mentioned the name of Lord Althorp, I must, though I differ from that noble Lord in respect to politics, bear testimony to his integrity, and to the soundness of his judgment in all financial matters. No man who ever filled the office which the noble Lord then held is entitled to stand higher in public estimation as respects those qualifications for a public trust. On the occasion to which I have just referred, Lord Althorp said:—

"Another point for consideration is, whether the profits, which must necessarily be derived from the circulating medium of the country, should be possessed by Government, or should be allowed to remain in private hands? Now, Sir, the advantages, the only advantages, which I have been enabled to discover in a Government bank, as compared with a private company, are those which result from having responsible persons to manage the concern, the public deriving the benefit of it; but then, on the other hand, I think these advantages are much more than counterbalanced by the political evils which would inevitably result from placing this bank under the control of the Government. I think that the effect of the State having the complete control of the circulating medium in its own hands would be most mischievous. Under these circumstances, Sir, I certainly am prepared to propose the continuation of a single bank of issue in the metropolis, subject to the control of the publicity of their accounts. If we were now, for the first time, establishing a system of banking on which the country should proceed, I think this would be the most advisable mode of establishing a bank in the metropolis. But, Sir, this proposition has the additional advantage—and it is no mean one—that it will occasion the least change; because I certainly am of opinion that, unless some great advantages could be derived from a change in the monetary system of this country, nothing could be more ill-advised—nothing could be more useless, than to depart from it."

In the latter part of Lord Althorp's observations I entirely agree. The true policy in this country is to work, so far as it be possible, with the instruments you have ready for your hand—to avail yourselves of that advantage which they possess from having been in use, from being familiar from constituting a part of the habits and usages of society. They will probably work more smoothly than perfectly novel instruments of greater theoretical perfection. If we disturb that which is established, let us have some good practical reason for the change. It is now incumbent on me to detail and explain the practical measures which I propose for the regulation of the currency. I will state them consecutively, and without intermediate comment, in order that the House may be in full possession of the plan recommended by the Government. We think it of great importance to increase the controlling power of a single Bank of Issue. We think it the wisest course to select the Bank of England as that controlling and central body, rather than to appoint Commissioners acting under the authority of Parliament for the purpose of the issue of a Paper Currency. I therefore propose, with respect to the Bank of England, that it should continue in possession of its present privileges of Issue, but that there should be a complete separation of the business of banking from that of Issue; that there should be a department of Issue separate from the department of Banking, with separate officers and separate accounts. I propose that to the Issue department should be transferred the whole amount of bullion now in the possession of the Bank, and that the Issue of Bank Notes should hereafter take place on two foundations, and two foundations only:—first, on a definite amount of public securities; secondly, exclusively upon bullion. The action of the public will regulate the amount of that portion of the note circulation which is issued upon bullion. With respect to the banking business of the Bank, I propose that it should be governed on precisely the same principles as would regulate any other Body dealing with Bank of England notes. The fixed amount of securities on which I propose that the Bank of England should issue notes, is 14,000,000l., the whole of the remainder of the circulation to be issued exclusively on the foundation of bullion. I propose that there should be a complete periodical publication of the accounts of the Bank of England, both of the Banking and Issue Department. Objections were urged in 1833, to frequent publications of these accounts; but, in my opinion, those objections are without foundation. I have the strongest impression that nothing will more conduce to the credit of the Bank itself, and to the prevention of needless alarm, than the complete and immediate disclosure of its transactions. I would, therefore, propose to enact by law that there should be returned to the Government a weekly account of the issue of notes by the Bank of England, of the amount of bullion, of the amount of deposits, of securities, in short, a general summary of every transaction both in the Issue department and the Banking department of the Bank of England; and that the Government should forthwith publish unreservedly, and weekly, the account which they receive from the Bank. It is desirable, in order to make the whole plan more clearly understood, that I should now state the regulations we propose to establish with respect to other banking establishments, and afterwards, that I should revert to the subject of the Bank of England, and state the terms which we have made with the Bank, subject to the ratification of Parliament. Our general rule is, to draw a distinction between the privilege of Issue and the conduct of the ordinary banking business. We think they stand on an entirely different footing. We think that the privilege of Issue is one which may be fairly and justly controlled by the State, and that the banking business, as distinguished from Issue, is a matter in respect to which there cannot be too unlimited and unrestricted a competition. The principle of competition, though unsafe in our opinion when applied to Issue, ought, we think, to govern the business of banking. After the issue of paper currency has once taken place, it is then important that the public should be enabled to obtain the use of that issue on as favourable terms as possible. With regard to banks in England and Wales other than the Bank of England, we propose, that from this time, no new bank of issue should be constituted. I have stated that our object is to effect the change we contemplate, with as little detriment as possible to individual interests. We, therefore, do not propose to deprive existing banking establishments, which are now actually banks of issue, of the privilege they possess. We do not wish to raise that alarm which we fear would be excited if there should be any sudden extinction of the power of issue now possessed by these banking establishments. Leaving, therefore, to the existing banks, which are actually banks of issue, their privilege of issue, we subject them to the condition that they shall not exceed the existing amount of their Issue; this amount to be determined by the average Issue of each Bank for a definite preceding period, of two or three years, for instance. The Bank of England will thus be acquainted with the extent of the Issue from all other establishments. I know I am liable to be told that the Issues of these Banks may be much larger, under particular circumstances and at particular periods, than at others: but I have obtained Returns, of a confidential nature, from ten of the best conducted banks in the country, six of them being in agricultural, and four in manufacturing districts; and the amount of their variation of Issue is much less than might be imagined. If, however, there should at any time be a demand for an increased Issue, there would always be the ready means of supplying it; as the Banks may, by investing a portion of their capital in public securities, command a given amount of Bank of England Notes by the sale of such securities, and, with those Notes, may supply any occasional demand for increased local issues. While we thus restrain the issue of Promissory Notes, we intend to facilitate the Banking business. Many of the Joint-Stock Banking Companies have not at present the privilege of suing and being sued. There are two descriptions of Joint-Stock Banks; those constituted under the Act of 1826, and those established under the Act of 1833. The time has come when you must determine whether you will permit and encourage the system of Joint-Stock Banks, or extinguish it. If you determine to retain the system, then you ought to give the Banks every facility for the transaction of their business. The Joint-Stock Banks ask for the privilege of suing and being sued; but this privilege, if granted, is a privilege not only to them, but to the public, who will have readier means of procuring redress in case of wrong. Proceeding on the principles of facilitating Banking ope- rations, we propose to amend the existing law in other particulars. The place whence legal notice may be issued by Joint-Stock Banks, or where it may be served, is at present imperfectly defined. Again, the Joint-Stock Banks are bound by the acts of an unauthorized partner, it being the principle of partnerships that the acts of one bind the rest of the partners. But in the case of Joint-Stock Banks with a very large proprietary, there are no means of controlling the admission of individual partners. The purchase of shares constitutes a partner. We propose, therefore, to exempt the Company from liability on account of the unauthorized acts of a simple partner; still making the Company responsible for the unauthorized acts of a Director of the Bank. The appointment to be a Director implies choice, and the confidence of the elective body; and this distinction between liabilities for the acts of a Director, and that for a simple partner is therefore a just one. The chief complaint of the Joint-Stock Banks in London is, that they cannot accept Bills for a less date than six months. Other private Banking Establishments in London have an unlimited power of acceptance, but Joint-Stock Banks labour under the prohibition I have mentioned. This was insisted on by the Bank of England, when the last Charter was discussed, in order that the Joint-Stock Banks should not come into competition with that establishment and the London Private Banks, by being allowed the power of acceptance for a less date than six months. We propose to place the Joint-Stock Banks in London on a perfect equality in this respect, and to give them the power of accepting Bills of any amount and for any period. It is thought by some that this privilege might be so perverted as to give rise to a paper currency differing in form, but not in principle, from Promissory Notes. The power has been held by Private Banks from time immemorial, and it has not hitherto been accompanied by any abuse; and why should it be anticipated that Joint-Stock Banks would abuse a similar power, contrary to the intentions of the Legislature? But I give public notice, that, if the power should be abused,—if it should be attempted to circulate small Bills so accepted, within the limits reserved to the Bank,—I shall not hesitate to appeal to Parliament on the instant, for the purpose of correcting that evil. These, then, are the facilities we propose to extend to the Joint-Stock Banks. I will now mention the conditions or restrictions we propose to apply to all existing Banks. In the first place, we require of all such Banks, that there be a full and complete periodical publication of the names of all Partners and Directors. This is what the London and Westminster Bank voluntarily publishes. It is said, that the public have a great security against loss, in the fact, that each partner is liable to the extent of his whole fortune for the debts of the Bank to which he belongs. Very well. Let the public then know who the partners are. Let us know the transfers of shares that take place; let us determine how long the responsibility for the possession of shares will attach to a party; as we have the comfort of unlimited responsibility, give us the names of those who are our guarantees. There is another condition we have a right to insist upon. We are to continue to existing Banks the privilege of Issue. Let us know the amount of the Issues. We are going to demand from the Bank of England a weekly account of Issues, and any Bank exercising the privilege of Issue ought to make a similar publication. If a Bank objects to the condition of publication, it can absolve itself from it by issuing only Bank of England paper. It is said, that the weekly publication of issues will disclose secrets of which a rival may take advantage; that it will show "the weak point." Now I wish "the weak point" (if there be one) to be shown, and that the public may have the advantage of knowing it. It is said, erroneous inferences will be drawn from weekly publication; that the issues at one time will appear large, and at another comparatively small. But the frequency of publication will enlighten the public mind on these points, and will dispel the erroneous impressions to which ignorance or the attempt at concealment gives rise. Having required the publication of their Issues from all Banks to which the privilege of Issue is continued, I do not propose to carry further the demand for publicity. I do not wish to pry into the affairs of each Bank, and above all, I deprecate the taking of delusive securities against mismanagement and abuse. The public will hereafter know the names of the persons by whom Banking business is to be conducted, and the public must rely on their own caution and discretion as a security against being injured or defrauded. It has been frequently proposed to require from each bank a periodical publication of its liabilities, its assets, and the state of its transactions generally. But I have seen no form of account which would be at all satisfactory —no form of account which might not be rendered by a bank on the very verge of insolvency, if there were the intention to conceal a desperate state of affairs. The return for instance of "overdrawn accounts" might lead to very erroneous inferences as to the condition of a bank making such a return. A large amount of overdrawn accounts might in one case be indicative of gross mismanagement. It might in another case be perfectly compatible with the security of a bank, acting on the Scotch principle, and making advances at interest to customers in whom the bank had entire confidence. It has been proposed by some that the shares of Joint-Stock Banks should be prohibited below a certain minimum; that there should be no shares of amounts less than 100l. or 50l., or some fixed amount. But as, under the encouragement of the Legislature, banks have been established with 20l. and 10l. shares, and now exist, and, I believe, in many cases, have conducted their business satisfactorily, it would be harsh to insist on a sudden alteration in the amount of shares in the case of existing banks. Then, again, as to calling on all existing banks to invest a portion of their capital in Government securities, I have considered this maturely: but I see great difficulty in the way of forcing upon existing banks any compulsory arrangement of this nature, little prospect of any additional security from loss. As to future companies we have a right to make what regulations we please, and to adopt as to them what we may deem a better principle for their establishment. We pro-pose, then, that no new Joint-Stock Bank of deposit (of course it cannot be one of issue) shall be constituted except upon application to a department of the Government for this purpose; that there shall be a registration of the prospectus, a certain amount of paid-up capital, and a limitation as to the nominal amount of of each share. We propose also to require that the deed of settlement should be drawn up according to a prescribed form. The deeds at present are drawn up according to no fixed form, and there is great difficulty in ascertaining, by a reference to the deeds of settlement, from their complexity and want of uniformity, what are the powers and liabilities of banks, and what are the regulations under which they act. We expect that new banks will be constituted, conforming to the principles we thus establish; issuing, if they are Banks of Issue, the paper of the Bank of England, and by their conformity to those principles, establishing claims upon the public confidence. They may, no doubt, interfere with the business and profits of existing banks; but we exclude no existing bank from the power of adapting the new regulations to its own concerns, and we consider that species of interference which arises, not from vexatious intermeddling with the affairs of an existing bank, but from a purification and improvement of the system of Banking, to be perfectly legitimate. Having thug stated the proposed regulations as to the other banks, I now revert to the position of the Bank of England, and the relation in which it is to stand to the Government. I interrupted my statement as to the Bank, because I can make our proposed relations to the Bank more intelligible by having first described the regulations applicable to other Banking Establishments. I have stated that the issues of the Bank are to be upon bullion and upon a fixed amount of securities. We propose that 14,000,000l. should be that amount of securities. Seeing no advantage in a change, we propose to continue upon the present terms the existing loan of 11,000,000l. made by the Bank to the Government, at 3 per cent. This debt of the Government to the Bank is to be assigned as part of the security on which the issues of the Bank are to take place. There will then remain 3,000,000l. of additional securities, Exchequer bills or other securities, over which the Bank are to have entire control. We propose that the Bank should have a right, in case of necessity, to limit its issues upon that portion of the securities, viz. 3,000,000l. Circumstances might possibly arise in which the Bank might find it necessary to restrict its issues within the amount of 14,000,000l. In that case the Bank will have full power to diminish the 3,000,000l. of securities which are to be deposited in addition to the 11,000,000l. of debt assigned. I can hardly conceive a case in which it would be advisable to limit the issues to less than 11,000,000l. I have said that the Bank shall be restricted from issuing notes upon securities to any greater extent than 14,000,000l. This restriction applies, however, to ordinary circumstances and the present state of the affairs of the Bank. The case may occur in which it would be reasonable, and indeed might be necessary, that there should be an increase of the issues of the Bank upon securities. Suppose the country circulation to amount to 8,000,000l., and of this amount 2,000,000l. to be withdrawn, either in consequence of the failure of banks, or in consequence of agreements with the Bank of England to issue Bank of England paper—in that case, in order to supply the void, it may be necessary that the Bank should make an increased issue. A part of this issue may fairly be made upon securities. Our proposal is, that the profit to be derived from such an issue shall be placed to the account of the Government; and that no increased issue upon securities shall take place without a communication from the Bank to the Government, and without the express sanction of three Members of the Government: the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the President of the Board of Trade. We do not contemplate, and do not intend to provide for, an increased issue upon securities in any other case than to that which I have referred, namely, the supply of a void caused by the withdrawal of some considerable portion of the existing country circulation. Let me here advert to an Enactment which passed when the Bank Charter was last continued, which passes by the name of the Legal Tender Clause. It enabled other banks than the Bank of England to pay their notes in notes of the Bank of England, and thus relieved them from the obligation of paying in coin. I opposed this Clause at the time, considering it to be at variance with the principle of immediate convertibility. I do not now propose to repeal it, seeing that it has been in operation for several years, and that it may facilitate the substitution of Bank of England notes for the notes of other banks. It may serve to increase the controlling influence of the Bank, and to habituate the public to the use of its notes. The consequences either of the continuance or of the repeal of the Clause are probably less than is generally supposed. I will now detail the pecuniary engagements made with the Bank upon the part of Government. The Bank is to retain the privilege of issuing notes on securities to the amount of 14,000,000l. On an interest of 3 per cent., the gross gains of the Bank upon this total of issue would be 420,000l. In estimating the net profits, we must consider the deductions to be made. First, what is the cost of the issue? The Bank, for the sake of the public, conducts its issue on a liberal principle. It does not reissue notes; it provides the means of keeping every note issued within ten years; it gives therefore great facilities to the public in the detection of fraud or the tracing of transactions within that period. The total cost to the Bank, on an issue of 20,000,000l., has been estimated (by the Committee of 1833) at 117,000l., but I am inclined to estimate it at about 113,000l., which, taken from 420,000l., leaves 303,000l.? There is then to be deducted about 60,000l. composition with the Stamp Office, for the privilege of issuing notes. There is also about 24,000l. paid by the Bank to those bankers who undertake to issue Bank of England notes, receiving a commission of 1 per cent. The result is, after substracting these items, that there would be a net profit of 220,000l. derived from the issuing of notes. What is the sum we are to claim from the Bank for continued privileges? The Bank think we ought to make a material deduction from the sum fixed when the Charter was last renewed and paid at present, namely, 120,000l. But though in some respects we affect the peculiar privileges of the Bank, we give to the Bank increased control over the paper currency, and increased stability to their banking business. We have, therefore, insisted on an equal payment in future. We have, of course, had negotiations on the subject; and I must, in justice to the Gentlemen who have conducted it on the part of the Bank (the Governor and Deputy Governor), declare that I never saw men influenced by more disinterested or more public-spirited motives than they have evinced throughout our communications with them. They have reconciled their duties as managers of a great institution, bound to consult the interests of the proprietors, with en-lightened and comprehensive views of the public interests. I hope the House will feel that, in the Resolutions which I in- tend to propose, there is nothing to which the Bank and the country ought not to accede with readiness. Hitherto the Bank of England has been accustomed to pay to the Government a sum of 120,000l. I now propose that the Bank should, in addition to that sum, pay once for all 60,000l., being the amount of fixed annual composition for the issue of its notes, which will bring the entire amount to a sum of 180,000l., to be paid annually by the Bank. The net profit of the Bank, to be derived from the issue of notes, will probably not exceed the sum of 100,000l. The House will no doubt bear in mind that the public pay to the Bank an annual sum of 248,000l., under the provisions of certain Acts of Parliament, on account of the management, by the Bank, of the Public Debt. From this payment of 248,000l. will hereafter be deducted 180,000l., leaving the total payment of the public to the Bank, on the balance of the two accounts, a sum of 68,000l. As to the duration of the Charter, we propose that it should be renewed for a period of twenty-one years, with a power of revision by Parliament at the expiration of ten years. We propose, however, a departure from the arrangement made when the Charier was last renewed, in the following respects. Under the existing Charter, the power to revise accrues at the expiration of ten years; but, if the opportunity be not then taken advantage of, the Charter will endure without alteration for a further period of eleven years. We propose that at any time, after the lapse of ten years, there shall be the power of revision; that Parliament, for instance, may permit twelve or fifteen years to pass, and may then, should they think fit, revise the Charter of the Bank and its relation to the Government. Of Ireland and Scotland I have hitherto made no mention; I propose to reserve for separate legislation the state of the currency of each of those parts of the United Kingdom. The prohibition against the establishment of new Banks of Issue will extend to them. They, also, will be included in those enactments which will require the performance, for the future, of certain conditions preliminary to the formation of new Joint Stock Banks. But I have thought it more prudent to deal, in the first instance, with the issue of promissory notes in England and Wales; to establish certain principles for the regulation of that portion of the circulation; and to leave Ireland and Scotland for future legislation, in respect to their paper currency. That currency stands on a different footing in each country, from that in which it stands in this part of the United Kingdom; and the single measure I have to propose is so extensive, and affects such numerous and powerful interests, that I have been unwilling to encumber it with enactments requiring separate consideration, or to cloud the prospects of success by having to encounter too powerful a combination of opponents. It will be remembered that to banks in Ireland and Scotland the law permits the issue of notes of a less value than five pounds, and that in Scotland there is no single bank partaking of the character of the Bank of England. In Ireland there is the Bank of Ireland, with privileges somewhat similiar to the Bank of England; but, on the whole, the circumstances of the two countries are so far different, that I should be unwilling to propose any measure affecting the circulation either of Scotland or Ireland, without the opportunity of much more mature consideration than it has been in the power of the Government to give to this branch of the subject. Permit me, before I conclude, briefly to recapitulate the outlines of the plan recommended by Her Majesty's servants. It is proposed that the Bank of England shall continue in possession of its present privileges— that it shall retain the exclusive right of issue, within a district of which sixty-five miles from London as a centre is the radius. The private banks within that district, which now actually issue notes, will of course be permitted to continue their issues to the amount of the average of the last two years. Two Departments of the Bank will be constituted: one for the issue of notes, the other for the transaction of the ordinary business of banking. The bullion now in the possession of the Bank will be transferred to the Issue Department. The issue of notes will be restricted to an issue of 14,000,000l. upon securities—the remainder being issued upon bullion—and governed in amount by the fluctuations in the stock of bullion. If there be, under certain defined circumstances, an increase of the issues of securities, it can only take place with the knowledge and consent of the Government; and the profit derivable from such Issue will belong to the public. Bankers now actually enjoying the privilege of issue, will be allowed to continue their issues, provided the maximum in the case of each bank does not exceed the average of a certain prescribed period. A weekly publication of issues will be required from every Bank of Issue. The names of shareholders and partners in all banks will be registered and published. No new Bank of Issue can be hereafter formed, and no Joint-stock Company for banking purposes can be established, except after application to the Government and compliance with various regulations which will be hereafter submitted to the consideration of Parliament. I have now concluded the duty which I have to perform, and trust I have clearly explained to the House the principle and details of the plan which the Government proposes for the future regulation of the currency, and the grounds upon which it is founded. I ask for no vote to-night on the resolutions which I shall propose, pro formá, and, if I might give advice on such a subject, would recommend the postponement of discussion to a future day. To-morrow the correspondence which has taken place with the Bank, explaining more in detail our communications with the Bank, and the nature of the pecuniary arrangements between the Bank and the Government, will be laid upon the Table. The knowledge of that correspondence is important as a preliminary to full and satisfactory discussion on the merits of our proposal. Considering the part which I took in the year 1819 in terminating the system of inconvertible paper currency, and in re-establishing the ancient standard of value, it will no doubt be a source of great personal satisfaction to me, if I shall now succeed, after the lapse of a quarter of a century since those measures were adopted, in obtaining the assent of the House to proposals which are, in fact, the complement of them, and which are calculated to guarantee their permanence, and to facilitate their practical operation. But my gratification will be of a higher and purer nature than any connected with the satisfaction of personal feelings, if I may look forward to the mitigation or termination of evils, such as those which have at various times afflicted the country in consequence of rapid fluctuation in the amount and value of the medium of exchange. When I call to mind the danger to which the Bank of England has been exposed, the various effects of a sudden change from an overabundant to a contracted circulation, the reckless speculation of some of the Joint Stock Banks, the losses entailed on their shareholders, the insolvency of so many private banks, the miserable amount of the dividends which have in many cases been paid, the ruin inflicted on innocent creditors, the shock to public and private credit, then indeed I rejoice on public grounds in the hope, that the wisdom of Parliament will at length devise measures which shall inspire just confidence in the medium of exchange, shall put a check on improvident speculations, and shall ensure, so far as legislation can ensure, the just reward of industry, and the legitimate profit of commercial enterprise conducted with integrity and controlled by provident calculation. The right hon. Baronet concluded by moving—

"That it is expedient to continue to the Bank of England, for a time to be limited, certain of the privileges now by law vested in that Corporation, subject to such conditions as may be provided by any Act to be passed for that purpose."

wished to know if the Resolutions would be printed together with the Correspondence, so that the House might be enabled to see the whole plan?

—Yes.

asked whether the right hon. Baronet would produce a statement of the losses sustained by the public from the failure of Joint-Stock Banks?

said, that he had no objection to give the general result without giving the names.

begged to inquire what was the nature of the security upon which the Bank would make an issue to fill up a gap caused by meeting the demands of country banks?

said, if such an issue took place without any increase in the amount of securities, it would take place in a deposit of bullion, and there would be no necessity for opening an account between the Bank and Government in such a case.

wished to know if the right hon. Baronet could say whether it would be possible to give, in the returns relating to the Joint-Stock Banks, the number and amount of outstanding notes of each of these Banks at the time it failed?

thought it would be possible.

wished to know whether, supposing he wished to change a 5l. note, he should go to the Business department, or the department for Issue?

—Either.

asked whether any alteration were to be made in regard to Branch Banks.

said, it was not intended to interfere with the Banks at present in existence. It was excessively difficult to say what was the distance beyond which no Branch Banks should be established. If it should be thought desirable with respect to new Banks that no branches should be established beyond a distance of ten or twenty miles from the Central Bank nothing could be more easy than to adopt some such regulations with regard to them. With respect to their notes, he apprehended they were bound to pay in notes to the Bank of England.

wished to know if the notes of the country Banks would be received in payment of taxes?

—Decidedly not.

wished to know whether the weekly returns of the Branch Establishments would be made separately from those of the Bank of England?

thought the returns would be made simultaneously, but he would give the point his consideration.

presumed the returns would appear in the Gazette.

—Yes, either in the London Gazette, or some other official publication.

Resolution agreed to pro formâ.

"That it is expedient to continue to the Bank of England, for a time to be limited, certain of the privileges now by law vested in that Corporation, subject to such conditions as may be provided by any Act to be passed for for that purpose."

House resumed. Committee to sit again.

said, that he objected to any legislative interference in cases of accidents in Factories. The number of those accidents was small, and labour in Mills only should not be subject to such interference.

thought it was invidious to make accidents in Factories only the subject of special legislation.

said, that a great number of the accidents which occurred in Factories might be prevented by a little precaution; and he thought that there was, therefore, a justification for the interposition of the Legislature in those cases.

said, that out of 116,000 operatives engaged in Factories, there were on an average but 10 per annum who were fatally injured. That was sufficient evidence that great precaution had been exercised by the manufacturers; and with such a proof, not of neglect but of extraordinary caution, it would not become the House to mark out the Factory owners as the object of special legislation.

said, that the whole subject of those accidents had been under the consideration of a Committee, which after the fullest inquiry, had recommended the adoption of the rules then under discussion. It was only by an order of the Secretary of State that prosecutions in in cases of accidents could be instituted at the public expense; and he did not think, therefore, that that power was likely to be abused. Compensation might also be given in those cases in which the granting of it would be justified by the circumstances. It appeared to him that that was a very reasonable proposal.

said, that the Return of Accidents to which the hon. Member for Bolton had referred gave only the number of cases on which coroners' inquests had been held. Many other serious accidents must, however, hare also occurred.

said, that in the Factories there were but twenty-nine fatal accidents compared to eighty-five fatal accidents in coal-pits; and he thought it was not unreasonable to assume, that the number of small accidents varied in the same proportion.

Clause amended and agreed to.

On Clause twenty-nine, children may be employed in factories at eight years of age.

was understood to say that he considered the employment of children under the age of ten years in factory labour, cruel and impolitic, and he moved the omission of the Clause.

(who sat immediately behind the hon. Member for Oldham) said he hoped that, if the hon. Gentleman intended to divide the House on this subject, he would restate the arguments he had been urging in such a manner that he (Mr. Aglionby) might hear them; for though he sat so near the hon. Member he had scarcely heard a single word that had fallen from the hon. Member.

said, that in consequence of the alterations proposed by this Bill with regard to the limitation of the hours of labour, he had thought it right to introduce this Clause, allowing children above the age of eight years to be employed in factories. The Clause succeeding that now under consideration would effect an additional limitation of the hours of work with respect to children. No limitation at present existed as to the age of children engaged in silk manufactories; and a child five years of age might be employed in that description of work.

was convinced that the manufacturers would avail themselves of any permissive provisions in this Bill, and he saw no ground for allowing children to work in cotton mills at the age of eight years, when the House had, after full consideration, previously fixed the age of nine years as that under which no children should be employed.

expressed his intention to press his Amendment to a division.

The Committee divided on the question, that the Clause stand part of the Bill: —Ayes 137; Noes 40: Majority 97.

Clause agreed to.

On Clause thirty,

said, he believed that in some parts of the country this Clause would produce great difficulty and inconvenience, and would be far from advantageous either to the employers or the children. In the district with which he was connected, where the population was not collected together in masses, but scattered over the country, he apprehended it would operate most inconveniently; for in that district, owing to the distance the children had to travel before reaching the mills, they would scarcely be likely to undertake the trouble of the journey for the sake of a few hours' work. Mr. Sanders, in his last Report but one, entered very fully into this subject, and he admitted that in many parts of the country there would be great difficulty in carrying into operation the proposition contained in this Clause. Indeed, there was considerable difference of opinion among the inspectors as to this question. He begged to remind the House, that in many cases mills were worked by water power, and as the supply of water was uncertain, it would be impossible for them to work during specified hours. Under such a restriction as that proposed by this Clause they must frequently be prevented from working when they had a plentiful supply of water, which would produce most serious inconvenience. He hoped, therefore, under the circumstances, that the right hon. Baronet would pursue a course similar to that taken by a right hon. Gentleman opposite in 1841, and introduce a Clause enabling the Secretary of State to make some relaxation in the provisions of this Clause.

said, he hoped the right hon. Baronet would accede to the suggestion of the hon. Member. He thought this was the only way of making the Bill work fairly.

Clause agreed to.

On Clause thirty-two—women to be employed as young persons.

was not satisfied with the reasons that had been assigned for introducing the new principle of restricting the time for adult labour. He should therefore move the omission of the Clause.

said that if the Clause were passed as it then stood it would, he believed, have an effect far beyond what was intended.

The Committee divided on the question that the Clause stand part of the Bill.— Ayes 161; Noes 22: Majority 139.

Clause to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37—Regulations as to holidays.

in order to give an additional day to the holidays granted by the Bill, moved that the words "Good Friday, or Ascension Day," be substituted for the words "or Good Friday."

was willing to give an additional holiday, but objected to religious observances being mixed up with popular holidays.

thought that the holidays should rather be on political than religious anniversaries, and was, therefore, in favour of an additional holiday on the Queen's birthday.

said that the Clause gave effect to the existing laws, and he was not prepared to vote for an additional whole holiday.

said that if the working classes wished to have another holiday, they could easily obtain it from their employers.

The Committee divided on the question that the words—or Ascension Day be inserted.—Ayes 26; Noes 115: Majority 89.

Clause agreed to.

On Clause 45 power of distraining goods in factories where the occupier is convicted.

objected to the powers of distress under that Clause, so far as it gave power to seize the property of a third and innocent party. He moved as an Amendment to insert the words, "the property of such occupier."

The Committee divided on the question that the words be inserted.—Ayes 22; Noes 77: Majority 55.

Clause to stand part of the Bill.

Remaining Clauses agreed to. House resumed. Bill to be reported.

moved the following Resolutions:—

1. Resolved, That, in lieu and instead of the Duties of Customs now payable in respect of the Articles enumerated in the annexed Schedule, upon their Importation into the United Kingdom, there shall be raised, levied, collected, and paid, the rates of Duty spscified in the said Schedule; viz.—

2. Resolved, That the said Duties shall be subject to the additional Duty of 5l. per centum on the amounts thereof respectively imposed by the Acts 3 Vic, c. 17, and 5 and 6 Vic, c. 47, except with regard to Cordials and Liqueurs which shall be subject to the Duty of 4d. per gallon, also imposed by the Acts aforesaid.

3. Resolved, That the Duties now chargeable upon Flasks in which Olive Oil is imported, be repealed.

Resolutions agreed to. To be reported.

House resumed.

Adjourned at a quarter before two o'clock.