moved a Resolution in conformity with that recommended by the First Report of the Committee on Railways of last Session—viz., that the following clause be inserted in all Railway Bills passing through this House:—

"And be it further Enacted, That nothing herein contained shall be deemed or construed to exempt the Railway by this or the said recited Acts authorised to be made from the provisions of any general Act relating to such Bills, or of any general Act relating to Railways, which may hereafter pass during the present or any future Session of Parliament."

In proposing this, he wished the Bills which passed this and all future Sessions should be placed in the same condition with the Railway Bills that passed last Session.

understood this was proposed as a Standing Order, and he had an objection to the patching up of the Standing Orders of the House.

thought that the Motion ought to be adjourned to a more convenient time.

thought a longer notice ought to have been given, and this subject discussed in a more full House. It might be postponed to this day week.

thought it ought to be adjourned.

was disposed to concur in the propriety of the proposition; but still the question ought to be adjourned.

concurred with others in thinking the Motion ought to be postponed.

moved, in pursuance of the Notice he had given, that after Monday, the 2nd of June next, Orders of the Day have precedence of Notices of Motion on Thursdays. Looking at the state of the Public Business before the House, and the fact that it had been usual in former years to agree to such a Motion at about the same period of the Session, he hoped the House would acquiesce in this proposal. It would not, he believed, interfere with any existing Notice. Last year, a similar Resolution had been in operation from the 3rd of June.

considered that a degree of hardship would be inflicted by the Motion on those hon. Members who, from the counting out of the House, or the House not being made, had been disappointed in bringing on Motions of which notice had been given. He had been so disappointed last night in regard to his Motion for a Committee to inquire into the operation of the Insolvency Act of last Session—a Motion of great importance to his constituents, and which he hoped the Government would yet enable him to bring under consideration.

said, the hon. Member could not be more disappointed than he was that the House was counted out yesterday. The hon. Member for Finsbury had made his statement, and it was most desirable that the Government should have an opportunity of replying to it. He could assure the hon. Member that it was not by the wish of the Government that the House was counted out, nor was any Member of the Government a party to that proceeding. There had been fewer instances this Session of the House being counted out, or of its failing to be made, than in any previous one—he believed in two instances only had there been any failure in making a House during the Session. With regard to the Motion of the hon. Member for Bristol, the Government had no wish to throw any impediment in its way.

hoped some opportunity would be afforded him of bringing forward his Motion. He did not wish to make a long speech, and should be quite satisfied if the Government would agree to appoint a Committee.

said, that a very great anxiety prevailed on the subject of the hon. Member's Motion, and he thought the nomination of a Committee was imperatively called for.

remarked that he had strong claims upon the right hon. Baronet, in regard to his Motion for inquiring into the peculiar burdens on land. If the Resolution now proposed were carried, it was probable that he would not have an opportunity of bringing forward that Motion during the present Session; and considering that he had on a previous evening, abstained from using his influence to cause a House to be made, he might almost say, at the personal request of the right hon. Baronet, but certainly in consequence of his appeal on the ground of great fatigue, he thought he had some claim to ask that facilities should be afforded him by the Government for bringing on his Motion.

thought when the House remembered the number of Government measures which were yet to be discussed—many of them measures of great importance—he might allude especially to the Scotch and Irish Banking Bills — they would concur with him that every facility should be afforded for proceeding with the Government business. It had been usual to give up the Thursdays to Orders of the Day, at about the same period in previous Sessions, and he hoped no objection would be made on the present occasion. With regard to the Motion of the hon. Member for Sheffield, he did not see how he could afford him any facilities for bringing it forward, as he was already under an engagement to one hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ewart), to afford him an opportunity for bringing under discussion his Motion as to the duties on butter and cheese. The noble Lord's (Lord John Russell's) Motion was also fixed for a night which was usually set apart for Government business; and, looking at the state of that business, and the advanced period of the Session, he hoped the House would acquiesce in the usual Motion he had submitted.

under the circumstances he had stated, thought he might fairly appeal to the fight hon. Baronet's courtesy, as well as to his sense of justice, to afford him facilities for bringing on his Motion.

felt grateful to the hon. Member for his courtesy; but he had not understood that he was under any obligation to him in this matter. He did not propose to take any of those days which were now set apart for notices of Motions for Government business, until Thursday the 7th of June; and before that time he hoped the hon. Member would have an opportunity of bringing forward his Motion on some Tuesday or Thursday.

said, there was not a chance, for the Notice Paper for each of those days was already filled.

said, as reference had been made to him, he might be permitted to state, that although the Government had certainly assisted in making a House on the previous night, he was not aware that they had made any very powerful efforts to keep it. It was true he had had an opportunity of saying a great deal, but he had not expressed the half of what he had intended to say. He would admit, that so far as form went he had been allowed to finish his speech; but he saw where the dial pointed—he saw it was approaching the fatal hour of seven—and feeling that it was expedient, that the right hon. Gentleman should have an opportunity of replying, he concluded, in the hope that that reply would be listened to, and be the means of keeping a House. It was most important that independent Members should have an opportunity of bringing forward those questions in which their constituents and the country felt an interest; but that would be impossible if the Government took from them the Thursday, while this mode of interrupting the business of the House was resorted to. Although not more than thirty Members were present when the right hon. Baronet (Sir James Graham) rose to speak on the previous evening, no attempt had been made by hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House to count the House out. It had been done by an hon. Gentleman on the opposite Benches; and perhaps that hon. Gentleman, the hon. Member for Northamptonshire, would now be good enough to state the grounds that had induced him to move that the House be counted. He and others felt, that the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) ought not to persist in his Motion; but if the right hon. Baronet would consent to withdraw the Medical Bill altogether, he would not say anything more on the subject. Looking at the Bill as it had been presented to them that morning, with the proposed Amendments, it was quite impossible for it to pass during the present Session, and he hoped if the right hon. Baronet intended to persist in his Motion, it would be at once withdrawn.

said, as the hon. Member opposite had made his name a striking part of his speech, he begged to say a few words in reply to the question he had put to him. Though he had received no intimation or suggestion from the right hon. Baronet or any Member of the Government on the preceding evening with regard to the counting out of the House, he had, during the speech of the hon. Gentleman, received repeated applications to make that Motion from hon. Gentlemen on the hon. Member's own side of the House. At one period of the hon. Gentleman's speech there were not more than a dozen Members present to listen to him; but he declined to interrupt the hon. Member, for, he said, the hon. Member for Finsbury always speaks well, and you will get more information by listening to him here than at the Reform Club. But he added that when the hon. Member had concluded his speech he intended to move that "the House be counted." Notwithstanding this courtesy the hon. Member now turned round upon him, and charged him with interrupting his Motion, though it was well known that if, depending on his friends, the hon. Member had been allowed to carry on his Motion to a division, the House would not—to use his own peculiar phraseology—have survived the operation.

was sorry to be compelled to interrupt for a short time the progress of the financial business of the country; and he certainly would not have done so, had he not felt bound to bring under the consideration of the House a case of great hardship, arising out of the operation of the laws for the protection of the Revenue, as they were called; but which might, perhaps, be more correctly described as laws for the oppression of individuals and the discouragement of commerce. He had not the least desire to find fault with the conduct of the department under whose cognizance such matters lay. It was extremely probable that the hardship of which he had to complain was to be ascribed rather to the state of the law, than to the conduct of any portion of the Executive. It might, then, be inquired why he brought the matter before the House at all. He could only say, that he did it simply in order that the rule under which such proceedings as he had to complain of occurred, might be thoroughly known and understood by the public, who might not run similar risks of pecuniary loss; and also, that the great inconvenience which such rules entail, might receive such a practical illustration as would conduce to an early alteration in the rules themselves. He would at once proceed to state briefly the grievance of which he had to complain. Mr. John Found was the owner of a ship called the Velocity. Having fallen into difficulties, he was compelled to mortgage it. The mortgagee being desirous of obtaining payment of the money he had advanced, Found was in danger of losing his means of livelihood, as well as those of a sister's family whom he maintained. Under these circumstances, a Mr. Seccombe induced his brother, a highly respectable person, Mr. John Seccombe by name, to advance the requisite sum to save Found from his difficulty. He (Mr. Trelawny) firmly believed that Mr. Seccombe took this step from motives of pure charity—to rescue an unfortunate and industrious person from impending ruin. The amount advanced was 234l. In the meanwhile, Found fell sick, and, finding it absolutely necessary to keep his ship in employment, he entrusted her for a time to his brother, Christopher Found. This person, unfortunately, was tempted to take in some brandy from a smuggler at sea, which was concealed under a cargo of coals. The result was, the seizure and sale of the vessel, and a consequent loss of considerable amount to a highly deserving and wholly innocent party. He was well aware he should be told, why did not people take more care? It would be said, was the Revenue to suffer because individuals advance their money on bad security? But to this it might be replied, is every person lending money on such security to sail in the ship, in order to exercise surveillance on the conduct of every sailor on board—to search every minute cranny, in order to see whether a roll of tobacco or a pint of spirits was concealed within it? Or, if this were absurd, is no property to be advanced on the security of ships? Were they to be, as it were, taken out of commerce? Were people to be discouraged from embarking money in the building of ships by the consideration that, in a case of temporary embarrassment, no money could be safely raised upon them? It had been the professed policy of this country to favour shipping. This had been the object of the navigation laws; and yet, in this instance, the very opposite was the effect. It is not merely of the direct effects of these revenue laws that complaint was made; but the indirect effects. Thus, the Corn laws, first, directly enhance the cost of the article, by excluding foreign corn; but, secondly, they enhance cost indirectly, by rendering the protected interest indolent, destitute of energy and resource. Thus, too, with the revenue laws. Not only was the cost of the commodities affected largely increased, but individuals were sadly oppressed; and the machinery of production unnecessarily hampered and restricted. In short, it came to this, that far more money was wasted by restricting commerce, than ever came into the coffers of the State. What was the annual charge for the purpose of preventing smuggling? In the Tobacco Duties Report, it was stated, that sixty-six cruisers were employed, and 6,174 men—enough men for five or six line of battle ships;—and all at a cost of 512,168l. a year. And yet it was also stated, that considerably above twenty millions of pounds of tobacco were annually smuggled, to the absolute ruin of the fair trader. He (Mr. Trelawny), in conclusion, could not help expressing his anxious hope that the Government would give this subject their earliest attention; if they could not find it consistent with their duty to give redress in the particular case of which complaint was made.

said, that he deemed it right to say a few words as to the facts of the case. In the month of October last, the vessel to which the hon. Member referred, the Velocity, was seized and brought into Plymouth harbour; the circumstance which led to that seizure was, that a quantity of contraband goods, namely, French brandy, was found concealed under the cargo of coals. Two custom-house officers, who were placed in charge of the vessel, were forcibly seized by the parties on board, and tied fast in the cabin, and the goods were landed in spite of them. The vessel under these circumstances was forfeited. It was true, that in this instance the petitioner, whose case the hon. Member had brought forward, was merely the mortgagee, and not the owner; and probably had no participation in the guilt of the transaction. The law recognised no distinction; and indeed if it did, it must be evident that the Revenue would be without adequate protection. He much regretted that an innocent individual should suffer; but in the present instance it could not be avoided without making a dangerous precedent.

in proposing the Motion of which he had given notice, to call the attention of the House to the present system of manning Her Majesty's Navy, and the difficulty that arises in procuring able seamen for the service, observed that the speech recently made by the hon. Member for Peebles-shire, that he had not formerly voted for the Maynooth grant because it was so small, had not created more surprise than the statement of the hon. and gallant Admiral opposite (Sir G. Cockburn), that he could man the Navy effectually, and with good and able sea men, to any amount at the present moment, were it necessary. In the course of his political life, there was one thing of which he was prouder than any other, and that was his conduct with regard to the Navy of this country. He had never allowed that subject to take the form in his mind of a mere party question. Whether sitting on the Government or the Opposition side of the House—whether in office or out of office—he had always stuck to the manning of the Navy as the most important feature connected with that service; and had contended that it was useless to build costly ships, and go to the expense of experimental squadrons, unless they provided for the ships, when built, being fully and ably manned. He could not, he thought, do better, in bringing the subject under the notice of the House, than to read some remarks from a leading public journal, in which he fully agreed. The writer said—

"The maintenance of our naval supremacy is intimately blended with our feelings of national pride, and with all our plans for the preservation of power; and perhaps no surer proof of want of patriotism could be evinced by any man, than in converting matters connected with the Navy into party questions. The Navy is strictly national; and it is the one branch of the Public Service for which John Bull never begrudges payment. It is, then, of the first importance that it be preserved in the best possible order."

He was free to admit that the hon. and gallant Officer opposite, and the Board of which he was a Member, deserved a meed of gratitude from the practical officers of the Navy for having, when they first came into office, done away with that absurd practice—that anomaly in the service—which had created two different complements for a British man of war, viz., a peace complement and a war complement. For that they had deserved and obtained the gratitude and good will of the whole Naval Service; not merely of the practical officers, but what was of more consequence, of the able seamen. But he was surprised to find, that having once decided that what had been understood as the peace complement should no longer exist—that having once put an end to the absurd distinction between a peace complement and a war complement, they should have reverted back to the old system. The hon. and gallant Admiral shook his head, as much as to say that he (Captain Berkeley) was mistaken on this point. He hoped it was so. When the Albion was fitted out under Captain Lockyer, her complement was supposed to be from 800 to 830 men. The hon. and gallant Officer, he admitted, had said that it was not intended that ships on the home station should have the full complement which they would have if sent to a foreign station; but that they should have a small complement, which should be filled up to the full amount as they were sent to sea. Well, the Albion, having been a short time on the home station, was sent to sea—to Lisbon—it was true that might not be called a foreign station, but she was sent out with 100 men less than the full complement—that was, she was sent out with a sort of betwixt-and-between complement, having more men than she would have had on a home station, and less than she should have had on a foreign. She was, however, destined for a particular service; and she went with this reduced complement of men to watch the French squadron in their operations off the Coast of Africa. It was true she was not called into action; but suppose she had — and it was by no means an improbable event to look forward to at that time—was it a fair position in which to place her officers and crew, to put her upon such a service with a complement 100 short of that which the Admiralty themselves acknowledged to be the proper one for a ship of her class? The hon. and gallant Officer (Sir G. Cockburn) said that ships of the same class, when employed by the late Government in the war with Syria, were sent to sea with only 690 men on board. The hon. and gallant Officer was here referring to the period when he (Captain Berkeley) had parted from his Friends in the Admiralty, because he differed with them upon this very subject—the insufficient manning of the ships. But when the hon. and gallant Officer came into office, it was generally understood that he meant to man the fleet properly and effectually. The distinction between peace and war complements was absurd and ridiculous; the proper complement was the thing required, and that should be for each ship in proportion to the number of her guns, and the weight of metal. That was the way in which the complement of every ship should be determined; and from it no alteration should be made while she was in commission, whether in peace or war. He wished to know why, after the Board of Admiralty had, after consultation with officers of every grade and all political opinions—after full consideration of all the circumstances—established upon the best and only principle a clue for arriving at the proper complement for a British man of war of every class, why the hon. and gallant Officer had afterwards gone back to a practice that had been condemned as absurd? They had heard much of right hon. Gentlemen opposite taking up the garments of the party they had succeeded; but he thought they would have done well if they had in this followed the example of the Whig Board of Admiralty, under Lord Minto; for no- thing showed a greater desire to do justice, and to consult the interests of the service, than the principle laid down by that Board—a principle approved of by Sir G. Seymour when out of office, but equally so when in office. He sent Sir G. Seymour the plan for manning the Navy upon the principle he had stated, viz., in proportion to the number of guns, and weight of metal of each ship; and Sir G. Seymour's reply was—

"I return your papers. I am confident no suggestions can be more useful than those made on improving the manning of our ships. I trust the Board will adopt them."

Shortly after this, Sir G. Seymour came into office; and from the conversation he then had with that gallant Officer, he found him as anxious to carry out that principle as he had been before. Now, he would take the case of Sir G. Seymour's ship—an 80 gun ship—she was to have the same number of men, he found, as an 84 gun ship. It was quite impossible, that under a proper system, an 80 gun ship and an 84 gun ship should have the same complement of men; either the one must have too many, or the other too few; and, in either case, there was a just ground of objection. Why, he asked, was a 90 and a 92 gun ship to have the same complement of men? If the one had two guns more than the other, why was she not to have the requisite additional number of men to work them? The arbitrary manner in which the Board of Admiralty had acted in manning the ships cut two ways—it was as wrong to overman a ship as to underman it. They were about to send to sea an experimental squadron; but it would not satisfy the purpose which they had in view if they sent it undermanned. In that case, good able seamen would not enter; as in half-manned ships a greater share of duty fell to the lot of such men than they would, under different circumstances, be subjected to. He entreated the House not to underrate the difficulty of manning ships. He had had some experience of that difficulty in 1836. He was in that year appointed to the Hercules, fitting out at Sheerness. The Asia was there also under orders for sea. Two or three ships were also fitting out at Portsmouth; in all about seven sail of the line. At the same time it was right to state that there were several well-manned ships in the Mediterranean. He, however, experienced great difficulty in getting sea- men for the Hercules. The captain of the Asia found a similar difficulty. The then Board of Admiralty ordered them to receive men from the coast-guard service. He remonstrated against such a system, for he found that men so supplied were frequently rated able seamen, when they had no pretensions to such a character. It would not do to say that the Navy was well manned, because the per centage of able seamen borne upon the ships' books was greater than it had been in Lord Nelson's time. The fact was, that when captains were appointed to ships, in their anxiety to please the Admiralty, to get their ships manned and to sea as soon as possible, they frequently took on board, and rated as able, men who were but very ordinary seamen. Men discharged from other ships with the rating of ordinary seamen, had frequently come to him and offered to join his ship, provided he would rate them as able seamen: this he had invariably refused to do. No man ought to be rated as an able seaman until he was able to do his duty efficiently in every part of a ship. The lack of able seamen was the great want of the Navy at present. To return, however, to his experience in manning the Hercules. On going out of Sheerness, after completing his complement, and with plenty of nominally able seamen on board, he found, when they came to be actually tested, that not more than half a dozen could be trusted to steer the ship, and that only seven were able to perform the duty of sounding. Upon his arrival at Lisbon, the station to which he was bound, he found that Sir W. Gage, the admiral commanding the squadron there, had received an order from the Admiralty to the effect that men should be allowed to volunteer from the Hercules to reinforce his ships. Now he (Captain Berkeley) knew that if he threw any difficulty in the way of the wishes of the Board of Admiralty, he would—and very properly—be visited with their displeasure, and probably lose his ship. Notwithstanding this, he wrote to Sir W. Gage, stating, that if among the men who might leave the Hercules, any of the able seamen on board should be included, he did not consider that, in the winter time, his ship would be safe in the chops of the Channel. Upon this Sir W. Gage came on board the Hercules, turned up and examined the crew, and, having completed his inspection, declared that he would not take one able seaman from the ship. The whole system of entering men from the coast guard and from rendezvous opened in seaport towns, would never answer. All sorts of persons were entered at these rendezvous without any proper inquiry. He remembered a story of a man coming to one of these rendezvous in 1836, and offering himself as a seaman. He was asked how long he had been at sea? He replied, twenty-two years. He was immediately put down as an able seaman, while, in fact, he was nothing more nor less than a discharged marine. He had talked of the difficulty of manning a ship in 1836. In 1840, when he was appointed to the Thunderer, he made great efforts to induce a due number of able seamen to join. The Vanguard was also preparing for sea in Portsmouth harbour. She, however, could get no men, and what was the reason? Why, they preferred joining the Thunderer, a Plymouth ship, in preference to the Vanguard. The captain of the latter vessel told him that he had frequently met able seamen in the streets, and asked them to join his ship. They replied they would not — they would enter for the Thunderer, because she was commanded by an officer who wished to make their work comparatively light, by making the complement of men as complete as possible. This was a specimen of the feeling of sailors with respect to undermanned ships. He would be allowed, however, to allude to one of the principal causes which now rendered the manning of ships more difficult than ever. In the first place, they had substituted machinery for manual labour—steam boats for vessels navigated by able seamen. Look at the Scotch smacks. Each of these vessels used to carry some twenty-five or thirty of the best seamen, accustomed to the severest of weather. Where were these smacks now? Let them remember the old sailing packets of Liverpool and Dover, plying to Ireland and France. They were all gone. So was a great part of the boatmen and wherrymen of Portsmouth and Plymouth. The same was the case with respect to the Thames watermen. During the war a great many able seamen were furnished by the Thames Watermen Company in return for the exemption they enjoyed from impressment. But a great proportion of the Thames boatmen were also gone. Thus, their great nurseries for seamen were being daily destroyed. This, of course, was no fault of the Admiralty; but the circumstances he had mentioned, as they accounted for the greater difficulty now felt in obtaining seamen, ought to impress upon them the necessity for adopting the best possible means of obtaining those men who were still left to them. Before proceeding further with his case, he might be allowed to revert to some circumstances connected with the views of the subject which he was endeavouring to impress, and which he had omitted to mention at an earlier part of his speech. In August, 1840, he commanded the Thunderer. The Mediterranean squadron, to which she belonged, was then liable from month to month to hostile collision with a French fleet. It was known to the House that the complements on board the Engtish squadron at the time were peace complements. Efforts were made, however, to put our ships into a more efficient condition. The first batch of men sent out consisted of 300 marines. They came in September; but the number was not more than sufficient to fill up the casualty vacancies. The next batch was composed of 600 men. They were received in January. Every exertion had been made, but these were all the fruits the Admiralty could obtain for their exertions. Out of the last 600 men, twenty were apportioned to the Thunderer: on mustering them, he found that the first six consisted of three pair of sawyers. The next man he inspected was one whose face he thought he knew, and who actually turned out to be a person who had, upon his (Captain Berkeley's) representation, been discharged from the Hercules, as utterly unfit for the service. Such a way of manning the Navy in the case of an emergency would never do. They must have a well-digested system of manning their ships, and, above all, they must not break faith with the seamen. They must not do as they had done by the seamen who were employed in China. They had taken a great mass of booty, which ought to have been their own property as prize money. He had no hesitation in saying that anything more calculated to prevent able seamen from entering the Navy had never occurred, than the conduct of Government towards the sailors of the Chinese expedition. Let the House recollect the feelings of sailors upon the point. A seaman would always prefer 10l. of prize money to 20l. of wages. He trusted that no such policy as that pursued with reference to the Chinese expedition would ever be repeated. Now, as to the mode which he would suggest under present circumstances for manning the Navy. He thought that the coast-guard service should be put under the control of the Admiralty, and that the men who might be entered into the Navy from that service should, at the expiration of the term for which they were engaged, be allowed to return to the stations from which they had been taken. Why should not the revenue service be placed under the control of the Admiralty, as a nursery for seamen? He could tell them. It was because it would injure the patronage held by the Treasury. We used formerly to have a great resource in the merchant service; but that resource was now done away with. Ships were now rigged in dock by the old Greenwich pensioners, and the seamen were not called on to perform the usual duties. When the ships came back from sea the men were discharged, and the ships were unrigged by the Greenwich pensioners. Instead of the Navy drawing its supply from the merchant service, the latter was supplied with men from the Navy, and for this reason, because the pay was better. He had, he thought, proved his case from 1836 to 1840; and he did not think there was anything in the present Board of Admiralty which, up to the year 1845, could induce the men of a better class, or in larger numbers, to join the service. He might be asked why he brought forward this discussion, as he concluded with no Motion. His answer was, that he was informed by several, amongst others by his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir C. Napier), that if he were to conclude with a Motion, he should be told by Ministers, "Leave such questions in the hands of the Executive; if the Government is not fit for its duties, you should bring forward a more decided Motion." He maintained, however, that such discussions as the present did a great deal of good; and not only that, but that they carried the point very often to which they related. He had brought forward a Motion, condemning the 10 gun brigs as unseaworthy. It was true there was a great majority against him, and that majority was swelled by the present Conservative Secretary of State for the Home Department; but though the right hon. Gentleman voted against him, he was the first, as a Whig First Lord of the Admiralty, to condemn those ships. No less than four of these brigs were about to be sent to the Coast of Africa. But the press took up the arguments which he had used; public opinion was found to be against them. The Shipwreck Committee took up the subject, and the Admiralty did not dare to send out those brigs as they intended. The termination of that debate fully justified the course which he look on the present occasion.

was surprised to hear the hon. and gallant Officer, who was usually so fair in his Motions, and to whom he always listened with much respect, begin his speech by saying, that he (Sir G. Cockburn) had asserted there was no difficulty in manning our fleet. Another gallant Officer on a former occasion said something to the like effect, which he had then immediately contradicted. So far from having made the declaration imputed to him, he had commenced his remarks by saying it was impossible to get the number of seamen wanted at a moment's notice; but there would be no difficulty in finding as many seamen as you chose to give bread and employment to, but no more. At the end of the war there was an enormous number of seamen paid off. These men had gone into foreign service, or found other employment at home. They were no longer available to the Navy. If the Navy was reduced to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000 men, in a few years those men could not be had, and this, in fact, was the substance of his argument. The number of seamen allowed by Parliament would always be kept up. They might educate 40,000 boys if they chose; but then if they found employment and bread for only 20,000 seamen, the first number would ultimately dwindle down to the latter. The number that maintenance was provided for would always be had, and would always be retained. It was, therefore, unfair to charge him with saying that the Navy could be manned momentarily, when we pleased, when his words were directly opposed to that assertion. The fact was, the Government had now obtained the number of men they wanted. They had manned all the ships, except the Queen, the Hibernia, and the Canopus, and those ships were but a few short; and thus they had been able to procure more seamen than under all circumstances they had been authorized to anticipate. The hon. and gallant Member (Captain Berkeley) complained that the men were not able seamen, and that when he went out to sea, his ship was very inefficiently manned. When he (Sir George Cockburn) commanded a ship, he always questioned the men before he "rated" them. [Captain Berkeley: The men were sent to me "rated," and that I complained of.] In that case he thought the hon. and gallant Officer ought to have written to the Admiralty on the subject; he ought to have questioned the men—and, if he found they were unable to steer or perform other requisite duties, he should at once have complained to the Admiralty. With respect to the manning of the ships now fitting out, the Superb had half her crew able, and the remainder ordinary seamen, having only six or eight landsmen. This and other vessels had received more seamen than under the existing difficulties Government had reason to expect. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Officer, that in sending ships abroad, they ought to be full manned; but that the complements of those ships at home might be on a reduced scale. Having ten sail of the line at home equipped, though not full manned, would be of much more advantage than if the ships were laid up in ordinary. In former times the complement of line of battle guard ships was 300 only. When in office before he had a resource which enabled him to man ships on an emergency. He could draw upon those men who were employed on shore against smugglers. When, therefore, it became necessary to send a fleet to Lisbon, though the ships of the line had their masts struck, yet by availing himself of the resource which he had referred to, he was enabled to have all the ships manned within forty-eight hours. If ships were laid up in ordinary, such a proceeding would not be practicable. It happened at present that Government were anxious to try the capabilities of certain ships constructed on different plans; and they were desirous of knowing which plan was the best. Therefore, for making such trials, and to exercise the officers and men at sea, he had availed himself of the assistance of the men of the ordinary, the seamen employed in the dockyards, and additional marines, which, added to the home complements, would render the ships sufficiently well manned to go to the mouth of the Channel for the purpose stated. The Admiral in command would know the extent to which the ships were manned, and would take measures accordingly. He had no doubt the gallant Officer would find that, generally speak- ing they were capable of doing the duty required of them. In war time, ships were frequently short of hands from sickness, and from having some of their men wounded or killed; and he considered the ships now going to cruise at the entrance of the Channel were as well manned as many of the ships were during the war. These ships when they returned, and were placed in our ports, with their home complements, would afford us the resource of ten sail of the line perfectly equipped, which could be speedily sent to sea; and no doubt Government would find men enough if the Legislature placed the means in the hands of the Admiralty. But there did not appear, at present, any necessity for incurring the expense of a greater vote of seamen to keep these ships full manned while on home duty. The hon. and gallant Member (Captain Berkeley) had complained of the inefficient condition of a ship he commanded, and had stated that, when at Lisbon, it would have been unsafe to part with any of his crew. That certainly must have been the case if the crew were of the description he represented, and if he had only twenty able seamen; but that was a very rare case. The hon. and gallant Member stated that men were anxious to join and remain in the ships he had commanded: he might have paid so much attention to the comforts of the ship's company as to become a favourite officer, and if so the men would be very unwilling to leave him; but he (Sir G. Cockburn) must deny the assertion that had been made that all our ships were now imperfectly manned. The Dublin came home the other day, and the captain told him the men had been four years abroad, and that it was impossible for any crew to have performed their duties better, or to have behaved better. The advantage of having the ships on foreign service well manned was, that the men were rendered most efficient seamen, and they were in a fit condition to meet an enemy. The men were taken out as ordinary seamen, and returned able seamen. And this was the way that the Navy would be able to get itself well manned. But, unless public affairs wore a very threatening aspect, he did not think that, in a time of peace, this country should be put to the expense of maintaining a larger fleet than was necessary for the protection of our commerce abroad. He believed that numbers of merchant seamen would enter the Royal Navy if they were allowed; in- deed, it had been necessary to issue an order to the men of war not to distress the merchantmen by taking their men. He did not know whether many hon. Members who were owners of merchant ships were present tonight; but he must say it had been found that many masters of merchantmen, and, he feared, many owners also, refused to take men into their service except through the agency of crimps. A seaman who had recently entered on board one of Her Majesty's ships at Portsmouth—the Superb or the Vindictive—stated that he was walking towards the Wapping end of the City, when he was asked by a crimp to enter on board a merchant ship. He refused; but afterwards went to the owner's office. He saw the owner, and said, he wished to be entered. The owner said, "Well, I will enter you;" and the master of the ship was in the office, and took the man from the owner's to the crimp's. The man was there entered; the crimp took his note for two months' wages, gave him a few shillings and some slops, and charged him a percentage for discount on his wages. The man had since entered a ship of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth, and there the master of the ship declared him to be in his debt to the extent of his advance given to the crimp, though the man had only received the few shillings he had mentioned. He might, add, that he was in possession of the names of all the parties connected with this affair. He considered it absolutely necessary, for the protection of seamen, that a stop should be put to such proceedings, which involved them in great distress. The Albion, the manning of which ship had been referred to, had been at first sent to sea with 750 men; the Rodney, of the same class, having been sent on service to the Mediterranean, by the former Board of Admiralty, with only 690: being only two deckers, they had only the lower deck for a sleeping place; yet when reference was made to the gallant Officer who commanded the Albion, it was found that there was no difficulty in providing accommodation for 830 men in the ships of that class. All calculations respecting the number of men were made upon a general principle, having reference to the number and weight of the guns. The second-rate ships were divided into two classes, and so likewise were the third and fourth, and also the fifth and sixth were divided into classes according to their sizes, and the number of their guns. Every one knew that the first-rate vessels were insufficiently manned during the last war. In the Victory, for example, at the battle of Trafalgar, it became necessary to bring the men from the lower to the upper deck on a call for boarders; and the fact was, that we had now 100 men less in the complements of our first-rate ships than either France or America. There were men enough, however, in the present establishment to perform every requisite duty in or out of action, and to make the ships perfectly efficient.

said, he was in duty bound to tell the House that it was impossible to do altogether without crimps. It was well known that seamen were necessarily in advance some two or three months as regarded the matter of wages, and without the assistance of crimps it would be impossible to keep them from deserting. On one occasion when he wanted some men, he was placed in communication with Captain Elliot, of the Sailors' Home, who undertook to provide him with the necessary complement of men; but he very speedily withdrew from that undertaking, declaring his inability to fulfil it; he was evidently wrong to give it up, but he found the task impossible, and, of course, application to the crimps became unavoidable. The gallant Commodore opposite shook his head; but it was impossible for any one to take a different course. Something was said about the deficiency in the number of seamen; but he must declare that he did not think the apprehensions upon this score were at all well founded. In the year 1814, the total number of seamen was 172,000, and at least two-thirds of that number were able seamen. Since 1814, the seamen had been increased to the extent of 42,000; and in the same proportion the number of able seamen had been increased; but in three or four years matters would be still better by reason of the change in the apprenticeship system. He could not let this opportunity pass of saying that the public were greatly indebted to the Board of Admiralty for the arrangements that they had made; and, further, he could not avoid adding, that the description and designations of our ships were of great importance; for if a British vessel of moderate size, denominated a 74, were to be beaten by a so-called American frigate, what would the world say? He, therefore, thought it a great improvement to have the smaller 74's cut down to 50 gun ships; and besides, we should look at the class of vessels which the French were now beginning to call corvettes. The real qualities and power of a vessel should be indicated by her designation.

said, that the crimping system had often been most unsparingly denounced by the highest authorities connected with the naval service of the country. Captain Elliot truly described it as a great evil to the seamen, and it certainly was one which the Legislature was bound to remedy. It was a grievous plundering of poor and simple-minded men. When a sailor landed he was usually seduced into some of the low boarding-houses, where every temptation to debauchery was presented to him; he was kept there till all his money was spent, and then he was turned forth to perish in the streets. The House really ought to adopt some measures calculated to remedy these evils. Perhaps it might be necessary to license the boarding-houses, and perhaps also to license the crimps. Of this he felt certain, that there were greater abuses arising from both classes of establishments.

said, he did not believe that the seamen had the real enjoyment of more than half their money.

said, it was a curious circumstance that on important questions respecting naval affairs there was a great discrepancy of opinion amongst officers who might be considered by the House to be the best authorities on the subject. Both his hon. and gallant Friends the Members for Gloucester and Marylebone, in his humble opinion, took a very ultra view of the question of manning ships of war; and so strongly had his hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester felt on the subject, that he had given up a lucrative and most honourable office in the conscientious discharge of his public duty, for which every good man must respect him; but one of his principal reasons for arguing the question against his gallant Friend was, that his speech was an unfair attack against the late Admiralty, and the popular cry of keeping ships of war fully manned had been swelled into a party cheer when the present Administration took office, implying, of course, that the Members of the late Board of Admiralty had failed in their duty. If that Board had possessed common prudence and foresight, they would have sent out 500 good seamen, or marines, to complete the war complement of the ships in the Mediterranean before the Syrian war: and then, in all human probability, the House would never have heard of the present Motion. But let him take them back to the days of real fighting, and forget Egyptians and Chinese. Let him remind the House what was the state of the Navy when England was fighting for her existence as a nation, and in what manner her ships were manned during a hot war. On the 24th December, 1796, Lord Nelson wrote to Lord St. Vincent—"You will, I am sure, forgive me for interesting myself for our friend Cockburn. He is now near ninety men short of his complement." Now, let the House recollect that this alluded to a frigate's ship's company, always in hard work, sleeping with one eye open. Lord Nelson thus concluded his letter:—"If you can, pray, Sir, procure some good men for Cockburn." Now, he (Captain Rous) appealed to that right hon. and gallant Officer (Sir G. Cockburn) whether, in his experience, from 1796 to 1815, he could not assure the House that ships of the line in particular were generally very short-handed. Lord Nelson talked of being nearly 100 men short of complement in the Agamemnon. From 1812 to 1814, he was a midshipman on board a very dashing frigate, the Bacchante, a ship carrying 42 guns, complement 300 men, but she never had on board above 280, of which 40 were French, Italians, and Germans, all the afterguard were foreigners, and the midshipmen used to stir them up in the Lingua Tuscana. The Bacchante sailed for America in 1814 with an extra war complement of 315 men; but now, in 1845, during a time of profound peace, the Fox, of 42 guns, a sister and a smaller ship, had a complement of 320; by this the House would naturally conclude that his gallant Friend the Member for Brighton was right when he said the seamen have degenerated, that they are not so broad across the shoulders or so long in the arms as they were in his younger days; and of course this would account for 320 men being considered requisite in time of peace, when 300 men in war time was an ample complement; but the real truth was that British seamen were as brave, as active, and intelligent as ever; but, unfortunately, the old captains were not the men they once were. The same impulse which made men of a certain age fancy that the women were not so handsome as they were formerly, influenced such elderly gentlemen, and his hon. and gallant Friend, to believe that British seamen had degenerated. The fact was, they were not so well calculated to command them as they were. Now, with respect to the manning of the ships, he had never expressed but one opinion—namely, that certain classes of Sir W. Symonds's ships, when the tonnage was augmented three-fifths, were undermanned, and no others; and that the late Admiralty exercised a wise discretion in so manning the rest of the Navy. In a frigate he once commanded, the present Admiralty had increased the complement from 275 to 360. In conclusion, he begged the House to recollect that the line of battle ships on the home station had, within a fraction, the same complement which they possessed in 1829. He rejoiced at it; for a line of battle ship was the worst vessel in the world to spoil young officers and seamen. Since that ever memorable trial cruise in November, he believed the ships of the line which were not paid off had never stirred from their moorings. Supposing the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair had sent a son as a midshipman on board the Albion, and twenty young landsmen from his own estate, to learn their duties as seamen, six months would have elapsed, and the ship had never yet been to sea. Would any person call a ship so circumstanced a school and a nursery for seamen? But the Admiralty had given all the ships on foreign stations an extra was complement: so much the worse, he thought. Nothing was so prejudicial to the health and comfort of a ship of war in a tropical climate and making long voyages, as her commander finding himself compelled to put the men on a short allowance of water, and crowding them between decks; nor was there anything so conducive to idleness and ill health. He, therefore, could not coincide in the opinions of his gallant Friend; and if he thought he had any chance of explaining the real fuels of the case to the House, he should propose that all ships on foreign stations be reduced 5 per cent. on their present complements, whereby the nation would be able to keep in commission, without any further expense, at least twenty additional cruisers. If the Navy was to be kept in an efficient state, no line of battle ships should be commissioned during peace except for flag officers; employ nothing larger than frigates, with active young officers, and England would then be ready for any emergency.

was greatly surprised at some of the hon. and gallant Officer's statements and arguments. The hon. and gallant Member had stated that the way to get good officers and seamen was to pay off the line of battle ships, and to put their crews into small frigates and brigs, taking care that those vessels were very sparingly manned. If such was now the opinion of the hon. and gallant Officer, as to the superior advantages to be derived from short complements, what must have been the feelings of the gallant Officer when, in command of his frigate in Cadiz bay, he was compelled to acknowledge his inability to perform certain manœuvres ordered by signal by the senior officer, from the circumstance of the absence from the ship of a single boat's crew only; such being the condition of his vessel as to numerical strength. [Captain Rous: This is the first time I ever heard of the circumstance.] The hon. Member for Gloucester sitting below was the senior officer alluded to, and would perhaps refresh the gallant Officer's memory on this subject. It would, however, appear that an opinion so properly expressed from the quarter-deck was not to be maintained and carried out on the floor of the House of Commons. [Captain Rous never had entertained the opinion ascribed to him.] What he complained of was, that a system which had been condemned by Lord St. Vincent was still continued by the Board of Admiralty. There was a vast distinction made between ships on foreign service and those on the home station, and that was extremely unjust both to the officers and men. There were, besides, many circumstances which tended to disgust the seamen, and to alienate them from the naval service. They objected, amongst other things, to the system pursued by the Admiralty of entering them for one ship, and then draughting them off to another. They objected also to being paid off at Ply- mouth when they were entered at Portsmouth. The system of entering them at the outports and of conveying them in small vessels to their destination, disgusted them, and disinclined them to the service. It would be far better if the Board of Admiralty was henceforward to enter the men only on board of the vessels in which they were intended to serve, and to pay them off in the port at which they entered; the Admiralty ought to take some measures to prevent seamen from being paid off at a distant port, from which they were often obliged to convey their chests and their outfits at a great expense and inconvenience. It was very much to be regretted that the merchants and shipowners were not sufficiently united amongst themselves to put an end to the system of crimps, and to man their ships without resorting to such means. The statements made by the hon. Member for Dartmouth would have a very injurious effect in this respect. The consequences of the system of entering the seamen for one ship and of employing them in another, were such as to deter the best men from entering at all. They often found themselves compelled to serve against their will in a class of vessels to which they entertained a great, and he was bound to say, a just abhorhence—he meant the 10 gun brigs. What was the opinion of the public with respect to those vessels? He would quote one fact to let the House see what was the general estimation in which they were held. At a Board of Admiralty held at Somerset House, at which Sir George Seymour, Captain Gordon, Mr. Corry, and Sir W. Symonds were present, several of those brigs was recently put up for sale by Dutch auction, the biddings beginning at 1,000l. and going gradually down to 500l., and still no purchasers; and yet, not withstanding they were so unpopular in the service that seamen would not enter for them, they found themselves placed on board them, by the system to which he had referred. The seamen knew very well that these brigs ought not to be kept in commission a single day, and yet they were forced to serve in them against their will. Notwithstanding, however, the circumstances to which he had adverted, the Navy was considered a very good service; and if the grievances of which the seamen complained were removed, it would be deemed by them to be far superior to the merchant service. The wages given by the Government were such as to compel the shipowners to advance their rates of pay to 3l. and 4l. a month. He wished to see the seamen always in so prosperous a condition; at the same time he could not help stating that it was principally owing to the disputes between the Admiralty and Lloyd's, that the seamen had profited. His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster had commented on some observations which he had formerly made with respect to the diminished size of the men serving on board Her Majesty's ships; and had argued as if he (Captain Pechell) had asserted that the entire race of seamen had dwindled down in stature and strength to a very low standard. Now, he meant to convey no such meaning as that which his hon. and gallant Friend had attributed to his words. What he had stated was, that owing to the time of year chosen for entering the men, the best seamen were already afloat in the merchant ships. The time for entering seamen for Her Majesty's service was May; whereas the men were engaged at an earlier period of the year by the merchants, and they were for the most part abroad in their vessels when the usual time for entering the seamen for the Navy arrived. Consequently it was not to be expected that the best and most athletic seamen would remain disengaged, or be at the service of the Government at the time. His complaint was, not that there were to be found such men as formerly used to man the Navy; but that, owing to the time of year when ships were generally commissioned, the strong and large-sized seamen were already engaged in the mercantile navy, and an inferior class of men alone remained for the Queen's service. There had been some complaints made with respect to the punishments enforced in the Navy; but he thought the system had been very much improved. He should, however, be glad to learn from the right hon. and gallant Officer opposite (Sir G. Cockburn), why it was that the Admiralty persisted in levying a penalty upon the class of pensioned seamen—or, in plain terms, why seamen who had earned their pensions by serving their full time in the Navy were not permitted to enjoy them whilst receiving their pay? [Sir G. Cockburn: The system referred to by the hon. and gallant Officer no longer exists.] Then it had been altered in consequence of the statements which he had made respecting it in that House. [Sir G. Cockburn: Quite the contrary.] He was glad, however, to find, from the right hon. and gallant Officer's statement, that there had been a change made in this respect. He did not anticipate much from the experimental squadron, though it was not impossible that it might be again wanted at Mogadore or Tangier; and perhaps the officers might again be told that they must not make any remarks or observations on the operations of our own or foreign squadrons, and that they were not to profit by the novel proceedings which they had witnessed. He hoped, however, that the views expressed by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gloucester would prevail, and that the Admiralty would man the ships in commission properly and efficiently. The right hon. and gallant Admiral had alleged as a reason why no more men could be had, the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had as usual interposed on financial grounds. So that it seemed the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Goulburn) was the great hindrance to the accomplishment of those efficient measures acknowledged to be necessary. If the fact were so, he would recommend the right hon. and gallant Officers opposite to retire. They might be perfectly certain that if they showed their sterns to the Admiralty, under such circumstances, it would be difficult to find persons who would take office, or who would accept appointments given up under such circumstances. He was convinced that if the Board of Admiralty would show a little independence, they would be listened to; and he was sure that his hon. Friends the Members for Coventry and Montrose would not object to any extra expense in order to procure a proper and efficient manning of the Navy. He much regretted that the Admiralty was treated as a subordinate body; but he did not see why they should submit to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If he was a great millstone round their necks, why didn't they throw him off, and appeal to this House? Something must be done to improve the condition of the seamen in the Navy; for he much feared that when sailors were most wanted they would be found to be in the service of Foreign Powers.

in explanation, observed that the shipowners as a body would, he was sure, be but too happy to destroy the crimp system, if the Government would only suggest some means by which it might be accomplished.

was glad that that discussion with regard to manning the Navy had taken place, for no more important subject could come under their consideration; but he did think that the gallant Officer the Member for Brighton employed himself in searching out the grievances of seamen, as if they were not at present properly attended to. With regard to the crimp system, he believed that they would never get rid of it until they educated the seaman and elevated his moral character; when that should be accomplished, the sailor himself, feeling his own moral worth, would cause the system to be abandoned. He had ever been an advocate for the efficient manning of the Navy, and he believed that the ships were properly manned at present. In conclusion, he would repeat what he had before stated in that House, that he should always be happy to promote the interests of the British sailor, and to elevate his moral character.

said, he had been with others accused of a propensity to find fault. Now he had never had the least wish to find fault with the present or any other Admiralty, unless there was ground for it. He knew very well that if he had gone on quietly and never found fault with anything, and never pointed out any of the errors to the Admiralty, he should have been in a better position than now. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Admiralty smiled, but so it was. If he had behaved himself better, he should now have been in command of an experimental squadron. The gallant Officer had expressed a wish that he should have such a command, and had asked him what ship he would like to have—and then, when another officer was appointed, what was the reason assigned? That he (Sir C. Napier) was too much of a party man. Now he disclaimed being a party man in anything relating to the Admiralty. He would much rather give his opinion to that Board quietly and in a private way, regarding errors that might be corrected; but the fact was, it was impossible to do anything for the good of the British Navy unless by agitation in the House of Commons. How had the condemnation of the 10 gun brigs been obtained? By agitation in the House of Commons. How had the ships at last been fully manned? By agitation in the House of Commons. There was no other means of obtaining reforms unless they were effected in that House, because Governments of all kinds were prone to stick to their own opinions, and it was difficult to get them to change their course, unless compelled by the force of public opinion. With respect to the manning of the Navy, he had understood the gallant Officer to say, that he was surprised they got men so fast as they did, and that ships were manned as well as they were in war time, and he had been supported in that assertion by a gallant Admiral near him. Now, he had been asked whether it were really possible that Sir G. Cockburn could have said in the House of Commons that the ships were now as well manned as in war time, and he had answered that he believed that what the gallant Officer had said was correctly reported in the papers. The other day he was at Portsmouth, and he had heard the opinions upon this subject expressed by the inferior officers; he had even heard those of the seamen themselves; and the general opinion he collected was, that the eight sail of the line were exceedingly ill manned. He could not conceive any reason why those officers and men should so state the case to him if it were not so; and, on the other hand, he could not conceive the gallant Officer stating that the ships were well manned if they were not so. But it was pretty well known that the Admiralty was not a place where truth could always get in. Officers were looking out for employment, and they had to please the gallant Admiral and different people, and things generally went suspiciously if any opinions were expressed adverse to the Board of Admiralty. He believed he was stating, without any exaggeration, the general feeling with respect to the manning of the ships; but he could not, of course, give the names of his authorities. There were good reasons against his so doing. When he had received information he had sometimes said to the party furnishing it—"May I mention your name as authority?" to which the answer was "For God's sake, don't; I give you the fact, but don't bring my name into question." He did not blame the Admiralty for not manning their ships better; it was not their fault—they were placed at the Board to do the best they could—but it was the fault of the Government of the day. When that Government came into office they found twenty-six ships of the line in commission, and they went to work and reduced them. In the first year they reduced them to twelve; in the second year to eight; and at the time we were in a difficulty with respect to our relations with France, we had but three sail of the line, and one fitting out to go to South America. The Government had since seen their error, and he was glad of it. Now that they had fitted out eight sail of the line, he hoped we should not see the day when seamen were sent adrift as they then were. The gallant Officer had expressed his surprise that they should get seamen so quickly. Why, the first ship was commissioned in January. All the months since then had elapsed and they were not gone yet. [Sir G. Cockburn: The ships are not ready.] No; if men had not been got to man them, how could they be ready? Then, there were ships commissioned the other day at Plymouth and other places, and after they had all been manned and stored, they were taken into dock again to have another look at their bottoms, at an expense of 500l. or 600l. a piece. Why had not those ships been put into dock and examined properly before being commissioned? There had, in fact, been sad bungling, and the country had been put to a great deal of expense by it. In the manning of the squadron he contended there should have been fewer marines and more seamen, and contended generally that the fleet ought to be properly manned so that it could be sent to any part of the world immediately, if the necessity for so doing arose, and he represented the difficulty the fleet would be placed in if a war should suddenly break out. With respect to the payment of the seamen, he contended that the finest men were underpaid, and that the best captains took every opportunity to give them increased advantages. With respect to the insufficient manning of the Albion, the gallant Officer had stated that she had been sent out to see if she would hold her complement of men. Why, the Albion was a larger ship than the Powerful or the Thunderer, and he had always understood that she was the largest 90 in the fleet, and broader than any. A youngster who had been only twenty-four hours at sea could have told the Admiralty that she could contain her complement of men. However, a stir was made in the matter, and now the Admiralty came down and told the House it had been ascertained that the Albion could stow her crew, and that it had been increased to 830 men. He was very glad to find that the Albion had at last got that number. He confessed he was surprised to hear an old shipowner like the hon. Member for Dartmouth tell the House of Commons that we had as good seamen now as ever we had. It was true, we had stokers on board the ships, and a sort of half and half fellows, who could pull ropes; but he wanted to know where were the old experienced hands who went aloft on the tops and yards in storm and darkness, exposed to the rain and cold? Where was that race of men? It was true they could order the engineer on board to back his engine, or make her go back or go round, and that was just what the Admiralty had been doing; they had been going back, and from bad to worse. The railroads had destroyed the coasting trade already, and the railroads would be the last finishing stroke to the British seamen. He could quote Lord Melville to show that we could not longer depend upon the merchant service for seamen, but must rear them within the Navy itself. These things were so clear and evident that he hoped the First Lord of the Treasury, to whom the people looked up for safety, would raise more ships, and trust the defence of the country entirely to her Navy. Although at the present moment the clouds on the horizon had not burst into a storm, this country had received a lesson. We had been on the point of war with France, and although we might have escaped the difficulty now, we ought never to leave the country in the state it then was, but have in readiness a Navy adequate to maintain the honour of the country. They were told that a great deal had been done for the improvement of seamen. He granted it. The men were better victualled and provisioned now than in former days. The slop system, too, had been rectified. Formerly, the men had no means of getting their slops with their own money, and were clothed in a manner that would have been disgraceful to the worst poor-house in the country. He thought that the supplying of slops ought not to be in the hands of the Government; but that when a ship was put in commission, the captain ought to have authority to open a contract for the supply of his crew. [The Chancellor of the Exchequer: That would never do.] The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that would never answer; but the right hon. Gentleman would excuse him if he differed from the right hon. Gentleman, and contended that it would answer remarkably well. A sample of the clothing to be supplied should be produced, the men should be measured for the clothes they were to wear, and thus they would be made more comfortable, and be better satisfied. The only reason why such a plan would not answer was, that a certain amount of patronage in giving a contract to somebody would be taken away; and it would not do for a person knowing nothing about sea affairs to tell him that an officer could not be entrusted with superintending the clothing of his own crew. He knew that at the present moment the men were not satisfied with their clothing; that they could buy better articles elsewhere, and that they would rather, if they had the money, go to a slopseller at Portsmouth for the articles they required than to the purser. Another point he wished to notice was connected with the manner in which the men received their wages. The men did not understand the present system of thirteen months in the year. Now, he would ask his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Somes), how he paid his seamen 2l. a month, twelve months in the year, or thirteen months in the year? [Mr. Somes: Twelve months.] Exactly. So a gentleman of great experience in all that related to seamen and ships told the House, the Government, and the Admiralty, that sailors did not understand what thirteen months in the year meant. He (Sir C. Napier) could not understand why the Government did not give up this ridiculous custom, for the continuance of which he could see no reason, unless in its antiquity. Sailors liked to reckon in round numbers, and he asked for them, therefore, 2l. a month, twelve months in the year, which would be only 1l. 15s. a year more than they now received, and the men would then be satisfied. That, however, was not all—there was not sufficient distinction between the seamen and the petty officers; the first class of these ought to get 4l. a month, and the second class 3l.; but if the Government would not go that length, why should they not receive 3l., and 2l. 10s. per month? Thus a better distinction would be drawn between the two classes, men would be stimulated to do their duty, and there would be more inducement to enter the service. Another point to which he wished to advert was the Sailor's Home, an institution established, to his immortal honour, by an individual, a captain in the service. What encouragement had that institution received? When the seaman came home he was surrounded by the sharks called crimps, the moment he landed; he was persuaded to go on shore to the house of one of these fellows; there he was made drunk, induced to spend his money, and then to run in debt, after which he was set up again by the crimp, taken on board ship, charged an enormous price for his necessaries, and then launched again without a sixpence in his pocket. He would tell the Government they must set to work to put down these crimps, and he had said as much before, when other people were in office, who were as bad as those who now filled it. ["Hear, hear."] Yes, he said so, for when he spoke of matters connected with the Admiralty, he cared not two straws who was in office. But the institution had received no encouragement. Men in office had never gone near it, and done nothing for it, unless, perhaps, sending their 1l. subscriptions. He had before tried to get a small grant for this Seaman's Home, to enable the managers to reduce the board from 12s. to 8s. a week, but in vain; and he now repeated not only that a small grant should be given, but that Government ought to establish Seamen's Homes in Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Sheerness, and every place where ships were paid off. The men would then know where to go with perfect safety. They could lock up their property and their money, and if they wanted to go out for a cruise, which of course they would after a long voyage, they could put 10s. or 12s. in their pocket, and start without being robbed and ruined by sharks. If the Government would do this, they would do good to the seaman, and improve his morals and character. He now wished to say a few words with respect to prize money; and he did not hesitate to assert that the conduct of the Government with respect to the China prize money was abominable. They required seamen to go out to China, not a healthy country; and when they had seized Canton, the Government took the whole of the Canton ransom. But that was not all. Worse was behind, for hundreds of vessels were captured by our seamen in China, and large sums of money paid for them; and instead of our seamen receiving the value of the guns captured, the whole of the money was returned. He had a statement, which showed that there was now in the possession of the East India Company 100,000l. produced by captured guns and stores, in addition to which many vessels had been captured. Why, seamen had been always accustomed to receive prize money. The idea of prize money had been handed down from father to son; there was not a boy in the service who did not look forward to his prize money, and yet the Government had taken all this money to themselves, and had given up the vessels that had been captured, in order that the Chinese might hand to the Government a sum of money to pay them for the expenses of the war. Seamen did not understand that that which they had been accustomed to consider as belonging to them should go into the Exchequer in such a fashion. It was a stupid policy, a penny-wise and pound-foolish system; and he was sorry that the Government, although they were in distress at the time, should have lent themselves to such a fraudulent malversation of the sailor's prize money. He would not now trouble the House further, but hoped that what he had said would not be without its effect in opening the eyes of the Government to the real state of the Navy.

said, he had always advocated the efficiency of the Navy, and if the Government were that night to state that our foreign relations required an increase of that branch of the Public Service, he should make no objection whatever to such increase. He wished the Government, however, would take measures to secure the services of the British seamen to the British flag. If those who were now serving other countries could be secured for this, we should have nothing to fear in the event of a war. It was not for him to venture an opinion how this was to be accomplished; but whether by an increase of wages, or other means, it would be the best possible economy that could be adopted, and he entreated the Government to direct their attention to the subject. As regarded the question of prize money, he agreed in what had been said by the hon. and gallant Officer; and, anxious as he was to save money to the country, he should be sorry to see those funds go into the Exchequer which, otherwise applied, might have the effect of securing the services of British seamen to the British flag.

wished to say one word in explanation. He had not, through the whole of his speech, uttered one syllable that might be construed into a proposition for imposing further expense on the country in one way or the other.

rose and said: I wish to make one or two observations on a subject to which I called the attention of the House on a former occasion—I mean the Slave Trade. I am induced to do this very much in consequence of the answer which the right hon. Baronet (Sir Robert Peel) gave to the statement I then made, and which answer, I think, was by no means satisfactory. I wish, however, in the first place to request the attention of the House to the annual Slave Trade Papers. This is about the time when the annual Returns are received from foreign stations, and I hope the Papers may be presented at an earlier period than they have been for some years past. Of recent years the Papers have been presented very late in the Session, and sufficient opportunity has not been afforded for giving the documents a deliberate perusal. I know that the right hon. Baronet may tell me that when I was in office the annual Papers were sometimes presented very late in the Session; but during those years we had many difficult and complicated affairs in hand which prevented me from looking over those Papers as early as I could have wished, and no such conferences or negotiations are now going on. Passing that by, I am sorry to say, with regard to the general subject, that the answer of the right hon. Baronet on a late occasion only went to confirm the opinion which I am afraid everything that has happened during the last three years has tended to create; namely, that with regard to the Slave Trade, Her Majesty's present Government have occupied themselves during the period they have been in office, not only in undoing much that had been accomplished by those who went before them, but actually in defeating some of the things which they had by some accident accomplished since they themselves had come into power. The two means by which all former Governments of this country have endeavoured to put down the Slave Trade have been, first, entering into Treaties with the Powers whose subjects carried on the Slave Trade, stipulating that such Powers should bind themselves to prohibit and prevent their subjects from engaging in the traffic; and, secondly, by forming Treaties by which the mutual Right of Search should be given. The first means tended to prevent the Slave Trade from being carried on in those countries where the slaves were sold and employed. The latter tended to give to the British Government the means of preventing the transport of slaves across the sea, if the Governments with whom the Treaties were made should evade or disregard the obligations they had entered into to prevent their subjects from slave trading. It was obvious to everybody that long-rooted habits could not at once be over-come by mere diplomatic engagements; the British Government could not, therefore, trust entirely to the efficacy of the Treaty engagements of Portugal, of Spain, or of Brazil, to put an end to the Slave Trade; hence the necessity of other means for suppressing that traffic. Now, what were the means in existence for putting an end to the Slave Trade at the time when the late Government came into office in 1830? Declarations against the Slave Trade had been obtained from most of the Powers of Europe at the Congresses of Vienna and Verona, of 1815 and 1822; but they were merely announcements of the principle that the traffic in slaves ought to be suppressed, and were unaccompanied by any provision of means for carrying those declarations into effect. There had been, however, Treaties concluded with Foreign Powers for the purpose of suppressing the Slave Trade, which gave British cruisers a Right of Search, calculated to enforce the obligations contracted by those Treaties. Before the year 1830, we had Treaties on these matters with twelve Powers. We had Treaties with Denmark and with the United States. These were entered into in 1814; the first in January, the last in December. These Treaties contained only general engagements. The Treaty with Denmark stipulated in general terms, that the King of Denmark should prohibit his subjects from taking any share in that trade; and the engagement of the United States was contained in the Tenth Article of the Treaty of Ghent, by which the United States bound themselves to use their best means to put an end to the Slave Trade; but neither of those Treaties contained any means for enforcing the fulfilment of their conditions. We had also a Treaty with Portugal, entered into in July 1817, but that Treaty gave England no power to enforce its observance south of the equator. We had likewise a Treaty with Spain, also entered into in 1817, but which was liable to the same objection as that with Portugal, giving no power to search vessels south of the equator. Again, there was a Treaty with the Netherlands, and with Sweden, and also with Brazil, more complete in their stipulations. There were also Treaties bearing on this subject with Algiers, with Tripoli, with Tunis, with Madagascar, and with the Imaun of Muscat—the Treaties with Tripoli and Tunis, had chiefly in view the abolition of the practice of making slaves of Christian prisoners. These Treaties, twelve in number, existed when the late Government came into office. Now, what did we do when we came into power? Why, we concluded no less than eighteen Treaties with different independent Powers in various parts of the world for the suppression of the Slave Trade. We entered into a Treaty with France; into additional stipulations with Denmark; we also concluded a Treaty with Sardinia; a further Treaty with Spain, with Sweden, and with the Netherlands. We made a Treaty, also, with the Hanse Towns, with Tuscany, with Naples, with Chile, with Venezuela, with Buenos Ayres, with Uruguay, with Haiti, with Muscat, with Bo- livia, with Texas, and with Mexico. From Portugal we were not able to procure an additional Treaty; although she was bound by her former engagements to conclude one; but we passed an Act of Parliament which gave us all the power which we were entitled to ask by Treaty. In all, we concluded eighteen Treaties; besides the Act of Parliament in regard to Portugal. The great object in these Treaties was to obtain the mutual Right of Search. We knew that unless all the Powers having flags upon the ocean joined in this arrangement, our endeavours would not be entirely successful. Our great object, therefore, was to enlist into this league every Power which had a flag upon the sea. I think I have shown that the late Government were not inattentive to their duty on this point. There were, besides, Treaties made with African chiefs, binding them to put an end to the Slave Trade in their respective territories on the African coast. Six Treaties were entered into with those chiefs in 1841, namely, with the chiefs of Timmanys, Bonny, Cartibar, Cameroons, Aboi, and Egarra. Besides this, we succeeded in obtaining the liberty of many British subjects who had been illegally detained in slavery, especially in Cuba, who had been either kidnapped from Sierra Leone, or having been taken by their former British owners from some British colony against law to Cuba, had been illegally sold there. We frequently urged the Governments of Spain and of Brazil to give real liberty to the negroes called emancipados, who had been pronounced free by the Mixed Commissions; but who were still retained in a state of slavery. And we also required those two Governments to concert with us measures for giving effect to their own laws issued in pursuance of their Treaties with Great Britain—laws by which every negro who, after a certain time long since gone by, had been landed in the territory either of Spain or of Brazil, was ipso facto free. That was the sum and substance of the steps which we took upon this subject while we were in office. Besides the Treaties which I have mentioned, we had negotiated and all but signed a Treaty by which the Five Great Powers of Europe were combined for the suppression of the Slave Trade—an object which at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was anxiously sought to be obtained even by large sa- crifices on the part of Great Britain. Now what has been done by the present Government since they came into office? Why, they have not concluded one single Treaty of their own with any Government. No; not one. They have signed two Treaties; but they were Treaties which they did not negotiate. The Treaty with Portugal was a mitigation of, and substitute for, the Act of Parliament which we had passed; and was, in fact, the very Treaty which we had proposed to Portugal, and her refusal to accept which, had been the groundwork of our Act of 1839. The Treaty between the Five Powers signed in December, 1841, had been negotiated by us; and I give them no credit for signing it, because the delay in signing it, arising solely from their not attaching due importance to the subject, was the real and original cause of the non-ratification of that Treaty by France. If they had signed the Treaty within a reasonable time after their coming into office in the beginning of September, 1841, the Treaty would have been ratified, because the period assigned for ratification would have expired before the Chamber of Deputies met; and those intrigues which finally prevented the ratification could not have been resorted to. That was the first backward step of Her Majesty's present Government. The consequence of that non-ratification was, that they failed to attain the accession of the kingdoms of Hanover, Belgium, and Greece to the general league against the Slave Trade; and thus these flags are still left open to the carrying on of that detestable traffic. I always said that such would be the consequence of the non-ratification by France The right hon. Baronet (Sir Robert Peel) admitted that it has been so. I asked the right hon. Gentleman why the accession of those three States to the Treaty which had been concluded with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had not been obtained; and he stated that after the refusal of France to ratify that Treaty, it was not thought expedient to ask the accession of those three other Powers. I do not see the conclusiveness of that argument. Does Her Majesty's Government assume, then, that the influence of France in Europe is so much greater than the influence of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia combined; that when those small Powers of the second order were asked to accede to a just and righteous engagement with them, the counter influence of France, wrongfully exerted to prevent the suppression of the detestable crime of making a traffic of human beings, is to be paramount to the moral influence of the other Four great Powers? That certainly would be an opinion by no means complimentary either to those Four great Powers, or to the three States to which the invitation should have been given. But even if that reasoning was just in regard to Belgium and Greece, why was it to be supposed that Hanover is to be so entirely absorbed and drawn into the vortex of France? Why should it be thought that to Hanover the invitation of the Four Powers would have been addressed in vain? I think Her Majesty's Government to blame for not having addressed that invitation to Hanover, and the other two States. It was their duty to have taken every step to gain the accession of every Power to the league. It would have shown a more becoming sense of what was due to the great cause of which I am speaking, if the Government had made the invitation, and have left the three States to give their reasons for not acceding to it. But if the course which the Government pursued be granted to be good, and if the refusal of France to ratify the Treaty was a good reason why you should abstain from attempting to get the accession of these three Powers to the League; then, on the other hand, it adds to the reasons which have led me to condemn the silence of Her Majesty's Government upon this breach of engagement on the part of the Government of France. We know on the best authority—for it was stated by the French Minister in the French Chambers—that his refusal to ratify a Treaty which he himself here, as Ambassador, had negotiated and settled, and which afterwards, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he had specifically instructed the Ambassador of France at this Court to sign, was not met by any remonstrance or complaint on the part of the British Government. Looking at the transaction merely as a matter of diplomatic precedent, it was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to have recorded a protest againt that refusal; and when it is seen that this refusal of France to ratify has had the effect of leaving three European flags open to the abuse of carrying on this nefarious traffic, it becomes a matter of still more serious concernment. This, then, is the result of the policy of the present Government with regard to the Slave Trade, as it concerns the European Powers. Then we come to the Ashburton Treaty, or capitulation, as it has been justly termed. By that Treaty Her Majesty's Government have let the United States out of the engagement contained in the stipulations of the Treaty of Ghent. The Treaty of Ghent stipulated that the two Governments of America and England should use their best endeavours to bring about the abolition of the Slave Trade. But by this Ashburton Treaty we accept, as a fulfilment of that engagement, an undertaking to send out five sloops of 16 guns each for the purpose of watching the Slave Trade along the whole coasts of Africa, Brazil, and the West Indies. Five such ships, it appears, are all that are to be sent by the United States upon the Slave Trade prevention service. Five sloops, of 16 guns each, are the whole force which is to be sent out to watch the abuse of the American flag along that immense line of coast; and this we accept as the "best endeavour" which the United States can make to co-operate with us for the entire abolition of the Slave Trade. That, surely, is not the best endeavour which the United States could make. It is difficult to conceive any endeavour at all which would not have been more effectual. This was bad enough; but there was another stipulation of the Treaty between England and America, by which the two parties bound themselves to make representations and remonstrances to the Governments of those countries which, by continuing to afford in their territories a market for slaves, held out inducements to others to pursue the crime of slave trading. Here, then, was something which Her Majesty's Government had to do, arising out of their own engagements. The former thing which they had to do, was to invite Belgium, Hanover, and Greece to accede to the Treaty with the Five European Powers. That was an obligation arising out of a Treaty which we had negotiated: they indeed signed our Treaty, but they declined to fulfil its obligation. Well, here was another backward step. The Treaty of Washington contained an engagement that the two parties to it should unite in making remonstrances and representations to the Powers of Brazil and Spain, on the subject of the Slave Trade, they being the Powers to whom the engagement referred. What did the right hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) state to me the other night? He stated that the British Secretary of State and the American Minister had had conferences upon the subject, and that they had at last come to the conclusion that it would be more agreeable to Brazil and to Spain that the representation should not be made jointly; that a joint representation might appear like dictation; that it would wound the national pride of the Governments to whom the representations were to be addressed; and therefore, they agreed to disregard that Article of the Treaty, and to make their representations separately. I never heard a reason which appeared to me to show so little earnestness in the matter to which it related. They determined not to make joint representations for fear of wounding the dignity and hurting the feelings of the Governments of Spain and Brazil! This of course meant that they were afraid of doing anything which might be disagreeable to the feelings of General Narvaez at Madrid, of General O'Donnel at the Havana, and of Senhor whoever he may be, who for the moment conducts the foreign affairs of Brazil. Here is a Government professing an anxious desire to suppress the Slave Trade, and yet abandoning the means resulting out of one of their own stipulations, because its exercise would not be agreeable to the slave-trading and Slave Trade-protecting and encouraging parties! Why, Sir, the value of the representation depended upon its being calculated to do what the right hon. Baronet calls wounding the feelings of the parties. The value of the representation depended upon its having somewhat of a dictatorial character; and in this respect the weight and force of the representation consisted in its being made jointly. Every one who knew the nature of international relations, and the effect of communications between Governments, must know that the representations made by two or more Governments jointly are very different from a representation made by one Government alone, or by two Governments separately. A joint representation is an indication of a unity of purpose, which may lead to unity of action between the two parties; whereas, separate representations indicate separate views which may by possibility never lead to combined action. It was the very circumstance of the weight which the joint representation would have carried with it that would have made it disagreeable to the Governments of Spain and of Brazil. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Robert Peel), that if the line of conduct to be pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the Slave Trade is to be regulated by a regard to the feelings of the Governments of the slave-trading countries—if their proceedings on these matters are to be guided by a consideration of what is agreeable to the Governments of Spain and Brazil, they might as well abstain from writing any more despatches, or taking any more steps for the abolition of the Slave Trade, and they may at once allow the slave traders to go on in their own way, and they may as well permit Spain and Brazil to go on as they like inviolating the Treaties they have entered into with us. Any representation henceforth made to obtain from them an effectual performance of their engagements will be represented by them as offensive to their dignity, and as an infringement upon what the Spanish call the "decorum" of independent nations. Here, again, the only forward step which the present Government had taken for the suppression of the Slave Trade, they themselves, upon consideration, have abandoned and retraced. Well, then, what have they done with regard to the liberation of British subjects from Cuba and Surinam? Why, they determined that they could not be justified in requiring the liberation of any British subject detained in slavery in Cuba or in Surinam, unless it could be shown that such British subject was born free, or had been actually in a British territory at the time the Emancipation Act was passed. Such a doctrine seems repugnant to every notion of common sense and common justice; but it is, moreover, a doctrine not borne out by their own acts. Notwithstanding, and in spite of this slavish doctrine, it appears that Her Majesty's Government have demanded and have obtained the liberation of some negroes which had been kidnapped from Jamaica. Their acts seem in this respect to have been better than their theory; and I trust this slavish doctrine of theirs will not be maintained. But we held a very different doctrine. I, on the 26th of August, 1841, addressed a despatch to Mr. Aston, the British Minister at Madrid, in which I stated—

"You will further state that it appears that there are many British subjects now held in slavery in Cuba, and as it is impossible that Her Majesty's Government can permit any British subjects, be their colour what it may, to be held in slavery in a foreign country, Her Majesty's Government claim and demand as a right from the Government of Spain, that all such persons shall be immediately released, and shall be placed on board the Romney, under the care of Mr. Turnbull, the superintendent of liberated Africans, in order to their being sent back to Jamaica, or such other British Colony as they may choose to go to. You will observe, that the fact that any such persons may happen to have been slaves in a British Colony at the time when they were taken from thence and carried to Cuba, can make no difference in the matter, because, in their removal from a British Colony as slaves was illegal, and because, they would now have been by law free if they had remained in a British Colony; and it cannot be admitted that their illegal removal to a Spanish island should deprive them of that liberty which the law of England has conferred upon them. You will add, that Her Majesty's Consul at the Havana has been instructed forthwith to take all the steps which may be necessary for finding out all the British subjects in Cuba who are thus illegally detained in bondage, and to apply to the Governor for the release of all persons whom he may discover to be so detained; and Her Majesty's Government request that the Government of Spain will immediately send the most positive orders to the Governor of Cuba to afford to Her Majesty's Consul every possible facility in pursuing his investigations; and to deliver over to him all persons who may appear to be British subjects, and to be so detained in bondage."

That was the opinion which I entertained upon this matter in 1841, and which I entertain still; and I think that Her Majesty's Government have acted very hastily, and without adequate consideration, in adopting the opinion that they ought not to claim the freedom of any British subject now held in bondage in any Spanish Colony, unless it can be shown that such British subject had been carried thither since the Emancipation Act, or was free previous to that Act, and that they have not shown that strong feeling in favour of the liberty of Her Majesty's subjects, by which the Government of this country ought always to be inspired. Then, with regard to the emancipados, I should be glad to see by the Slave Trade Papers now about to be laid before us, whether since the recall of General Valdez from Cuba, every success has attended our efforts to obtain real freedom for that wretched class of men. Then, with regard to another demand, which was made by us, that there should be a joint Commission to inquire into the cases of the negroes brought into Brazil and Cuba against the law of those two countries, and who are, therefore, by that law entitled to their freedom. With regard to that application, Her Majesty's present Government at once, on the first refusal given to them, intimated that they did not intend to press that demand. Now, I say, that even if they had been convinced that to have enforced the demand with respect to the negroes already so imported would have been attended with any internal convulsion which they did not wish to risk, which, however, I do not admit, still they ought to have made, and were entitled to have made, the demand prospectively, and to have insisted that such an investigation should for the future be established. The Government, then, have added nothing to the means which the Treaties, existing when they came into office, have given to this country to prevent the Slave Trade; but they have, by the various steps which they have taken, gone backwards instead of forward, and have diminished in a great degree the means which former Governments had obtained for the suppression of that trade. I suppose we shall very soon be informed what is the result of the negotiations which have been going on between the two Commissioners — one appointed by our Government, and the other by the Government of France. We are, as far as the public are able to make any conjecture upon the subject, led to believe that one result of the negotiation will be, the returning to one of those measures which the late Government adopted with the greatest success, and which the present Government, in its eager haste to undo every thing which their predecessors had done, had directed the Admiralty to forbid. We are told that the chief measure to be adopted for the suppression of the Slave Trade is the destruction of the baracoons and the blockade of the ports on the African coast. Now, is that the arrangement to be adopted? It will be rather curious if it is. I ask the question, because one thing which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs directed the Admiralty particularly to attend to was, not to attempt to blockade any of the ports or coasts of Africa. But should these be the means to be pursued, I shall not quarrel with Her Majesty's Government. I promise not to taunt them if they do adopt the system of blockading the coast, and of destroying the baracoons. I have no doubt that if these means are adopted with energy, they will produce very great and important effects. But, Sir, we have beard within the last few days that another event has taken place with regard to this matter, and that the Government of Brazil have intimated to Her Majesty's Government that the Treaty of 1826, as far as regards the mutual Right of Search, and the establishment of Mixed Commissions, is at an end. I should be anxious to hear from the right hon. Baronet whether that is so. If it be so, I think the Government cannot be at a loss for a good answer with which to meet any such declaration. Until I hear that the Brazilian Slave Trade is really abolished, in the only sense in which the Treaty of 1817 between Portugal and England can be reasonably construed — namely, that that traffic should not be merely prohibited, but should actually be put an end to, the assertion that the Treaty, and the Mixed Commissions, and the mutual Right of Search, are at an end, does not deserve serious refutation. But even if the Brazilian argument were good, and if the Mixed Commissions and the Right of Search, under the Treaty of 1826, were no longer in force, still the stipulation of that Treaty continues in force, by which the Government of Brazil bound itself to prevent and utterly to abolish the Slave Trade by its own subjects, and declared, that the carrying on of that Trade either directly or indirectly by any of its subjects, should be deemed and treated as piracy—and this, of course, not by their own Government only, but by either of the contracting parties—I say that that stipulation would be quite conclusive upon the point to which I have referred, even if the other argument which I hold to be bad were as good as it is inconclusive. But I must say, that if the Government of the United States and the Government of England had, according to the engagement of the Treaty of Washington, made strong and joint representations two years ago to the Government of the Brazils, on its flagrant violation of Treaties, and on the open pursuit of that traffic which the Brazilian law has stigmatized, and has threatened to punish, I cannot but think that such representations would have had considerable effect on the Brazilian Government, or at least would have placed our Government in a different position from that which they would now occupy, in case any necessity should arise for entering into a conflict with the Brazils upon this subject. I hold that we have a right by Treaty to exact from the Brazilian Government the suppression of the Brazilian Slave Trade. But only see what has been the course of the present Government in its communications with Brazil upon this subject. It really does seem to me, that if Her Majesty's Ministers had determined on doing every thing they could do which, under the appearance of being hostile to the Brazilian Slave Trade, would, in reality, have the effect of preventing the Brazilian Government from fulfilling its engagements upon that subject, they could not have adopted a course more ingeniously calculated for their purpose than that which they have pursued. One of the first things they did was to send out a mission to Rio Janeiro, for the purpose of entering into negotiations for the renewal of a commercial Treaty between the two countries; and, as I have been informed—and I have never heard it denied—the condition which our Minister was instructed to propose as a sine quâ non, in return for the future admission of Brazilian sugar into this country, was not that the Brazilian Government should more scrupulously perform their Treaty engagements with respect to the Slave Trade, but that they should pass some law with regard to the condition of slavery in the Brazils. It has been said that you might as well ask the country gentlemen of England to pass a law giving a free trade in corn; but that was but a weak mode of expressing the inconceivable absurdity of the proposal to which I have referred. Any one who has the least knowledge of the state of public feeling in the Brazils, must know that to send out a negotiator to propose such a condition as that, was to render the success of his mission morally and absolutely impossible. If we are to abstain from a joint representation with America to Brazil against the continuance of a crime which the law of Brazil itself has denounced, and which a solemn Treaty binds Brazil to put down—if delicacy towards the Brazilian Government is to prevent us from taking such a step, what chance was there of our succeeding, when we proposed a condition warranted by no Brazilian law and borne out by no Treaty, but was sure to be deemed an insult by the whole people of that country—which was an interference in their domestic and municipal affairs; an interference by which we were to call upon them not to enforce a law which they themselves had passed, but to pass a new law at variance with all their prejudices, all their habits, all their feelings, and, as they would think, all their interest? That proposal was never actually made; because the Brazilian Government, choosing probably to anticipate it, made beforehand a counter proposal, nearly as inadmissible by us; and the negotiation thus failed at the outset, and never got to the point at which our inadmissible proposal could have been made to the Government of the Brazils. But here we are, on the one hand, supporting a great domestic monopoly, and inflicting injury on our commerce, and privation on the people, by excluding Brazilian sugar, under the pretence that we are so anxious for the abolition of the Slave Trade, that we cannot bring ourselves to admit Brazilian sugar into our markets, unless the Brazilians will alter and qualify the state of slavery within their territory; while, on the other hand, we are so excessively scrupulous about giving the least offence to the Brazilian Government, that we will not make up our minds even to address a joint representation with the United States, urging that Government to execute its own laws, and to fulfil its own engagements, lest by taking that small step towards the suppression of the Slave Trade, we should hurt the feelings of the Cabinet of Rio Janeiro. I certainly cannot reconcile the profession, that this ex- clusion of Brazilian sugar is founded on an aversion to the Slave Trade, with the declaration that the reason why no step was taken in conjunction with the American Government, for the purpose of remonstrating with the Government of Brazil, however effectual such a step might have been, was, that such a joint remonstrance would have hurt the fine feelings of the Brazilian Government. Sir, I have stated, therefore, what the last Government did, and what the present Government has undone. What the present Government has done, has been all in the wrong way; they have not advanced one step towards the suppression of the traffic. What they are now about to do with France may be a step in the other direction; but if they agree to abandon the mutual Right of Search with France, I will just ask on what ground they will demand to continue it with any other country, not carrying on the Slave Trade? If they give it up in the case of other countries, just as much entitled to demand the concession as France, they will open wide fresh doors to Slave Trade, and the result will be that the crime will increase with fearful rapidity. I hope Her Majesty's Government may, upon further consideration, and on having their attention more drawn to the subject—to which, perhaps, they have not, from the pressure of other matters, given that full attention which it so justly deserves—I hope they may, in future, take a more lively interest in this matter than they seem to me as yet to have done. I am perfectly certain that if the British Government shows itself in earnest in the matter, and both willing and determined to employ all its means of political influence, and of physical coercion, with a steady and firm determination, it may succeed — not in entirely extinguishing the traffic—that I am afraid can never be done as long as the condition of slavery exists—but in bringing it into a very narrow compass compared with its present enormous extent. Sir, I stated to the right hon. Baronet a short time ago, that the Return presented of negroes landed since 1815, on the continent and islands of America, was exceedingly defective. I should be glad, if it were in the power of the Foreign Department to furnish a more correct Return, to be presented with the Slave Trade Papers. The time is now come when the annual Papers ought to be prepared; and I hope that they may be laid on the Table of the House—within such a period as to give everybody who may choose to attend to them an opportunity of making during the present Session any observations upon their contents which he may think to be necessary.^*

Sir, with respect to the period at which the Slave Trade Papers for the present year should be presented, I certainly have a confident hope that they will be presented at an earlier period than the noble Lord was in the habit of presenting them. I believe during the noble Lord's tenure of office they were very rarely presented before the concluding part of the Session, owing, no doubt, to the claims which the other duties of the office made on the noble Lord's time.

^* The following concluded Treaties were referred to by Lord Palmerston in his speech:—

BEFORE 1830.
Denmark (general art.)	January, 1814
United States (Ghent)	December, 1814
Portugal	January, 1815; July, 1817
Spain	August, 1814; September, 1817
Netherlands	May 1818
Additional Article (no slaves on board)	December, 1822
Additional Article (Equipment)	January, 1823
Sweden (with Equipment Article)	November, 1824
Brazil	November, 1826
Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis	April, 1816
Madagascar	October, 1817; October, 1820
Muscat	September, 1822

SINCE 1830.
France	November, 1831; March, 1833
Denmark	July, 1834
Sardinia	August, 1834
Spain	June, 1835
Sweden	June, 1835
Netherlands	February, 1837
Hans Towns	June, 1837
Tuscany	November, 1837
Naples	February, 1838
Chile	January, 1839
Venezuela	March, 1839
Buenos Ayres	May, 1839
Uruguay	July, 1839
Haiti, Muscat	December, 1839
Portugal (Act of Parliament)	1839
Bolivia	September, 1840
Texas	November, 1840
Mexico	February, 1841
18 Treaties.
1 Act of Parliament.

SINCE AUGUST, 1841.
Austria, Russia, Prussia	December, 1841
Portugal	July, 1842
United States	August, 1842

REMAIN NOW WITHOUT TREATIES.
Belgium	Hanover	New Granada
Greece	Oldenburgh	Peru

TREATIES WITH AFRICAN CHIEFS.
Timmanus	Feb. 1814	Cameroons	May, 1841
Bonny	April, 1841	Aboi	Aug., 1841
Cartibar	April, 1841	Egarra	Sept., 1841

I assure the noble Lord that the business of the Foreign Office has not diminished since he left, and if that excuse were to prevail, it would be valid on the present occasion. But although the business of the Foreign Office has not diminished, yet I hope the Slave Trade Papers will be presented at an early period; and it will then be seen from the perusal of those Papers whether the noble Lord's imputations on the present Government, of lukewarmness and indifference with regard to the continuance of the Slave Trade, is well founded or not. The noble Lord will then have an opportunity, if he thinks fit, of bringing forward any Motion criminating the Government—a better mode, I cannot help thinking, of testing the opinion of the House with respect to the conduct of the Government, than to make, as the noble Lord has so frequently done, speeches on the general subject, not leading to any issue. The noble Lord, on the present, as on several former occasions, has passed a very warm, and I am bound to say a merited eulogium on himself, on account of the efforts which he has made for the Suppression of the Slave Trade. I never denied his merit. I believe his labours have been most assiduous and successful for the suppression of that traffic. I give him full credit for his exertions; but he seems to think that his merits in this respect have not been sufficiently admitted by this House and the public, and so about once in every month he takes an opportunity of calling our attention to them. Two or three times in the course of every Session he reminds us of all the Treaties which he made with African princes, his Treaty with the Imaum of Muscat, and not only the original Treaty, but some addition to it, which was the means of conferring the greatest possible advantages on humanity and the civilized world in general. The noble Lord alluded to some points on which he knows I am precluded from entering, namely, the pending negotiations with France. The time must shortly arrive when the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government will be made known to the House, but in the meantime the noble Lord is aware that my lips are sealed. I am pretty confident the noble Lord expects that there is some arrangement about to be made with France which will be much more successful for the suppression of the Slave Trade than any now in force. He seems to think that by means of a blockade of the coast, and Treaties with the native powers on the coast, we shall be enabled consistently with the law of nations to destroy the baracoons; and that if such a course should be taken, the joint action of France and England in a vigorous attempt to suppress the Slave Trade would be most successful and effectual. This being the case, I am sorry to see the noble Lord attempt to spoil the effect of such a combination by a premature discussion. It is quite clear that the noble Lord anticipates the most beneficial effects from the pending negotiations. The noble Lord asks whether it is true that Brazil has notified to the British Government that she considers the subsidiary Convention, which was to be in force, I think, for fifteen years, for the suppression of the Slave Trade, at an end. The noble Lord has been rightly informed. The Brazilian Government has thought fit to signify that it does consider that Convention thus enduring for fifteen years after the year 1830 is at an end. The state of the case is this. Our original Treaty was with Portugal, Brazil being at that time a dependency of Portugal, and being bound in respect to the Slave Trade by the engagements entered into with us on the part of Portugal. In 1825, I think, the separation between Brazil and Portugal took place, and Brazil in 1826, on her separate account as an independent state, entered into an engagement with this country to the same effect as that previously existing with Portugal for the suppression of the Slave Trade. I think Brazil, within three years after the ratification of the Treaty, was bound to declare the suppression of the Slave Trade, that is to say, its suppression by law, not, I am afraid, its actual practical suppression. That brought us to the year 1830; and afterwards there was a Convention of, I think, rather doubtful import, as to whether or not after a lapse of fifteen years after that period of its suppression by law, Brazil had a right to declare the Subsidiary Convention at an end. If she had such a right, the period for the termination of the Subsidiary Convention arrived, I think, on the 13th of March last. It appears that she does consider herself at liberty to declare that Convention at an end; but, as the news only came by the last mail, the noble Lord will not expect from me a declaration of a positive opinion as to whether Brazil is justified in the course which she has thought proper to adopt. But whether she declares that Convention at an end or not, she is bound by engagements of permanent operation. Brazil and this country have a Convention, signed on the 23rd of November, 1826, which provides—

"That three years after the exchange of the ratifications it should not be lawful for the subjects of the Emperor of Brazil to be concerned in carrying on the African Slave Trade under any pretext, or in any manner whatever; and that the carrying on of such trade after that period by any person, a subject of Brazil, should be deemed and treated as piracy."

That is an engagement which is at present in force. I abstain on the present occasion from expressing any opinion as to the ability of Brazil to declare at an end the Convention which accords the appointment of a Mixed Commission. I have the satisfaction of knowing that there is that other Convention, which cannot be terminated by any act of Brazil, remaining in force, which declares the carrying on of the Slave Trade by a subject of Brazil to be an act of piracy; that is not merely a law of Brazil, but an engagement with the Government of this country, that such an act shall be considered an act of piracy. The noble Lord has referred to the answer which I gave him on a former night with respect to the operation of the Treaty which was signed by Five Great Powers of Europe, and which was ratified by four out of those Five Powers in 1840. I have only to state now what I stated then, that France having refused to ratify that Treaty, it became a matter of serious consideration whether it were politic to exercise the power which those who had ratified it undoubtedly had under the Treaty to invite the other maritime Powers of Europe, not being parties to the Treaty, to concur in the obligations of it. I will not on this occasion enter into the circumstances which induced France to refuse her ratification. The House will be aware what were the political circumstances, unconnected with any question of the Slave Trade, which induced her to adopt such a course. The noble Lord cannot be ignorant of the circumstances, counected, as they notoriously were, with the transactions which took place in the summer of 1840, with the Syrian campaign, and with the termination of that friendly alliance which previously existed between France and this country. I forbear to enter into the consideration of these circumstances. I forbear to discuss now who was the party, or with whom rests the blame of that termination. There cannot be a doubt, however, that political considerations connected with the Treaty of July, 1840, and the proceedings adopted by this country in reference to the Syrian campaign, were the real cause why France declined to ratify the Treaty. The noble Lord makes us responsible for the delay with respect to the signature. I assure the noble Lord that we are perfectly free from any such blame. We succeeded to power in August or September, 1841, and it was not through any negligence on our part that the signature of France was not attached to the Treaty. Circumstances occurred in the Chambers which prevented the ratification. If the noble Lord thought we laboured to obstruct the ratification of the Treaty, why did he not at the time make some Motion calling the attention of the House to the circumstances. The noble Lord says we made no remonstrance. We did every thing we could to impress on France the duty which she owed to the cause of humanity, to ratify, by her signature, the Treaty to which she had been a party. The question is, whether we were entitled to insist on its ratification? We certainly thought we were not, either by past usage or anything in the law of nations; and, not being entitled, it became, of course, a question in what manner we should direct any remonstrance against the act of a country which had thought fit to exercise a power to which we thought her entitled to resort. But, as to our passiveness and indifference, and our acquiescence in the refusal of France to ratify the Treaty, the noble Lord labours under a most erroneous impression. The Government of France did refuse to ratify the Treaty; it became the subject of eager debate in a popular assembly; and that assembly prevented the Executive Government, which was well inclined to the Treaty, from ratifying it. Placing a remonstance against it, and exercising that power which popular assemblies will occasionally exercise, they induced that Government to decline to ratify the Treaty which had been signed. France not having ratified the Treaty, it became a question for our consideration whether it would be politic to invite the three Powers contemplated by the Treaty—namely, Belgium, Hanover, and Greece, to concur in its engagements; the Slave Trade, in point of fact, being carried on on the Coast of Africa by none of these Powers, their flag never having been used to cover the traffic. I do not deny the advantage in point of moral impression of procuring their sanction to a reciprocal Right of Search; I think it of advantage that all the Powers of Europe should concur, even when the flags of those Powers may not be used for carrying on the Trade; I do not deny that a general protest against the Slave Trade would be of great public advantage. But we had to consider what would be the most desirable immediate practical course. It became a question, after the refusal of France to ratify the Treaty, whether or not a greater probability of advantage presented itself in an appeal to those Powers. We had to set against the advantages of that moral impression the disadvantages of the possible refusal on the other part to concur in our demand; and it was thought at the time inexpedient, after the example set by France, to call on Belgium, Hanover, and Greece, to concur in the engagements of the Treaty. But the noble Lord says, he always foresaw, after the example set by France, that great difficulty would be found in procuring the assent of these Powers; and that he was very much afraid that the refusal of France to ratify the Treaty, would not be confined to France. The noble Lord thinks that that part of the Treaty which enabled the concurring Powers to call on Belgium, Hanover, and Greece to acquiesce in its provisions, might be nullified by the refusal of France to ratify. Such was the noble Lord's impression, and he can, therefore, well estimate the motives of those who, after such refusal, thought it inexpedient to address themselves to those Powers. I am not prepared to say, that Hanover would not have acquiesced. The noble Lord says, "Why not appeal to Hanover?" But if Hanover had consented, and Belgium had declined, I still must think the advantage gained on one side would have been more than counterbalanced by the disadvantages on the other. The noble Lord has referred to the Treaty with Brazil. The noble Lord says, "You have done nothing yourselves, and you have undone what others had done." It is very easy for the noble Lord to make these charges; but I will refer to the Slave Trade Papers, already presented to the House, and to those which will shortly be presented; in those will be found the best evidence whether the present Government have been indifferent to the suppression of this infamous traffic. The noble Lord says, we have not even gained what was intended by the Treaty of Ghent, and talks about the eighty guns sent by the United States to the Coast of Africa, to suppress the Slave Trade. What did the noble Lord gain under the Treaty of Ghent? Did he get one gun sent by the United States to the African coast? I must assert, that we have procured a more active co-operation on the part of the United States for the suppression of the Slave Trade than the noble Lord was able to obtain, during his whole tenure of power, under that Treaty. The noble Lord talks of the unjust stipulations of the Treaty of Washington, which he again designates "a capitulation," when the very latest intelligence from the United States tells us that in that country they are applying to their own Government precisely the same terms. I assure the noble Lord that there are Palmerstons in the Congress of the United States who charge their Government with having made a capitulation, and state, that if certain documents had been produced two or three months ago, it would have been impossible for the Convention to have been signed. Therefore, I hope the noble Lord will no longer persist in so describing the agreement made by my noble Friend, which received the cordial sanction of the House, who, I hope, will not take the character of that most difficult and, as I think, successful negotiation from the noble Lord, who is evidently more mortified by that than by any other act of his successors, especially when the House recollects that my noble Friend, Lord Ashburton, had not only to effect that arrangement with the general Government of the United States, but that two of the States of that great country, Maine and Massachusetts, had the power, by withholding their assent, to interpose difficulties which it would have been almost impossible to overcome. Bearing this in mind, I cannot think that the great majority of this House will lightly estimate the wisdom and perseverance of my noble Friend, which led to the termination of differences which then threatened the continuance of amicable relations between the United States and this country. I should like to know what we lost by the arrangement. I should like to know whether or not, by removing the risk, which was then imminent, of an immediate hostile collision with the United States, the arrangement made by Lord Ashburton involved a sacrifice, on the part of this country, of her honour, or of anything permanent or valuable. But there was under that Treaty of Washington a power on the part of this country and the United States to make, jointly, representations to other Powers carrying on the Slave Trade. I stated to the noble Lord, that the mode of carrying into execution that engagement had been the subject of conference between my noble Friend, Lord Aberdeen, and Mr. Everett, the American Minister, immediately after the signature of the Treaty. I believe the impression of Mr Webster and Lord Ashburton, at the time of concluding the Treaty, was, that the representations to be made were not to be representations simultaneously and jointly made. The question was considered whether or not we were more likely to operate successfully by uniting in our representations to Brazil or to Spain; those representations being jointly made in the common name of the two countries, or whether we should not better secure our object by leaving each country to take its own course, urging its representations in the way each might think best. The noble Lord says we wished to spare the feelings of Brazil; but that was not our object. We wished to consider the mode by which we were most likely to effect the object contemplated, namely, to impede and annihilate the Slave Trade. If the noble Lord will look at the representations we made to Brazil, he will see that there was no desire on our part to spare the feelings of either Spain or Brazil—he will see the terms in which we address our remonstrance to both these countries. All that will appear in the Slave Trade Papers; and then all parties will be competent to judge whether there has been any desire to consult the feelings of parties who have been carrying on the Slave Trade in defiance of the existing Treaties. Sir, I believe also that the United States were actuated and influenced by no desire to consult the delicate feelings of Brazil. What I stated was this—that the two countries feared if their representations were made conjointly, they would be less effectual in inducing Brazil to observe these Treaties, than if they were made separately. I think if the noble Lord will refer to the representations of our Minister, and his denunciations of this traffic, his bringing under the notice of the Brazilian authorities their constant infraction of the Treaty, and the constant connivance of the subordinate authorities at the infraction of the Treaty, the noble Lord will see that this country has shown no disposition, but, on the contrary, has used the strongest language, and taken those steps which were best calculated to enforce on the Brazilian Government the moral and political duties which should induce it to adhere to these Treaties. Sir, these were the considerations that induced my noble Friend and the Minister of the United States to abstain from making, in the first place, a joint representation from the two countries. I believe I have replied to the principal observations of the noble Lord. He admits, that with respect to the emancipados, every representation that could be made has been made, so far as may be judged from the Papers. The noble Lord spoke of the representations that had been made to Spain for the appointment of a Mixed Commission in Cuba to put down the Slave Trade. I am surprised the noble Lord should impute to the present Government any indifference to the continuance of the Slave Trade. The noble Lord did make that representation; but at the time he did make it, I think he could not have expected that if that representation did not produce a moral effect in Spain, he had any legal power to enforce it. It might have been wise to do everything in our power to induce them to observe the obligations of the Treaty; but we were advised, in case Spain refused to appoint that Mixed Commission, that we had no power by any engagements entered into, or by the general law of nations, to compel them to appoint the Commission. I am certainly surprised to hear the noble Lord say that he differed from that opinion, which was enunciated by very high legal authority. I quite agree with him in the desire he has expressed to see the suppression of the Slave Trade; but where I differ from him is, that I do not believe that any assumption of authority by this country, which is not warranted by engagements, or by the law of nations, is the most effectual course that might be adopted for the suppression of the Slave Trade. We should make every effort, consistent either with actual engagements or the law of nations, to compel those countries which have engagements with us to observe those engagements; to induce other Powers which have not engagements—to induce them by persuasion, and by every motive which can influence them, to concur with us in a strong effort for the suppression of that trade. Sir, this has been our course; but the noble Lord advises, without reference to engagements, that we should assert our right to compel other Powers to suppress the Slave Trade. On that point I differ from him; and I doubt whether our difficulties, instead of being diminished, would not be increased, if we were to place ourselves decidedly in the wrong, even in enforcing the admitted rights of humanity. Sir, when these Papers are laid on the Table, the House will be able to judge whether the Government is justly liable to the charge which the noble Lord has advanced on various former occasions, and again repeated to-night. If they could be substantiated—if it could be shown that we are indifferent to the suppression of this monstrous evil, so degrading to civilized nations, I should deeply regret that Ministers had laid themselves open to just censure; and in such a case no condemnation could hardly be too severe to inflict on the Government of a country which has made such sacrifices for the suppression, not only of the Slave Trade, but for the abolition of slavery.

explained. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to suppose that he (Lord Palmerston) had argued that this country had a right to compel Spain to appoint a Mixed Commission. What he had argued was, that the Ministers should not have acquiesced in the refusal, but have made a counter proposal; nor did he argue that they should violate the law of nations, or do anything which the Treaties did not warrant. His argument was, to have Treaties with the parties, which, if carried faithfully into execution, would tend to suppress the Slave Trade.

contended that as that renowned statesman, M. Guizot, had constantly evinced the utmost desire to promote the happiness of mankind, no doubt he would take an early opportunity of doing all in his power to terminate the direful evil of slavery. A decided distinction ought to be made in our conduct to- wards States which had or had not joined in the hallowed cause.

moved that 129,092l. be granted for salaries and other expenses of the Admiralty Office.

complained that the Post Office was charged with the expenses of the packet service previously borne by the Admiralty, which caused an apparent loss of revenue under the penny postage system of 113,000l. It was an unfair mode of dealing with the case; and he desired to know whether, in future, the cost of the packet department should not be deducted from the Postage Returns. If it were, there would no doubt be an annual increasing revenue apparent in the Post Office.

said, that he had stated on a former occasion, that the revenue derived from the penny postage would be very small; but it was obvious that all the charges incident to the collection of the postage revenue should be deducted from the gross amount. It was thought better that the Admiralty should carry the mails; and consequently the expense transferred to that branch of the service. The Returns objected to by the hon. Member was intended to show the total expense and the balance. He had not, and did not mean to deny, that the Post-office revenue was an increasing revenue.

argued that the statement was no answer to his objection. The Return had created a false impression; and no doubt the object of it was to show that the penny postage system had failed.

said, that he had no notion the hon. Member meant to refer to a conversation which he had with a deputation two years ago; but certainly the hon. Member had wholly mistaken the communication which he had made on that occasion. That deputation had pressed on him the necessity of more frequent deliveries, and he did not, in answer, say that there ought to be no improvements; certainly, nothing was further from his intention than to draw any conclusion unfavourable to the penny postage. He had done all in his power to carry it into effect, as soon as Parliament had sanctioned it, and he should rejoice at its success; but when that deputation had said to him that the receipts of the Post Office amounted to 600,000l., he replied that they were quite mistaken, for that the net revenue was not above 110,000l.; and he pointed out to the deputation that they did not set against the receipts the expenses of the packets employed in conveying the letters: he had made it quite clear to the deputation that he was not instituting any comparison between the new and old systems. Rejoicing at the increase in the Post Office revenue, he must still contend that they could not ascertain the net revenue without deducting from the receipts all the charges incurred in the conveyance of the letters.

said, he would take advantage of the Navy Estimates being before the House to refer to the constitution of the Board of Admiralty. Its present form arose from his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Home Department having abolished the Navy Board; and since that change had taken place, he (Sir C. Napier) had repeatedly objected to the constitution of the Board of Admiralty as it now stood. It was his firm conviction that no good could be obtained through the Board while it remained constituted as at present. The responsibility was nominally thrown on the Lords of the Admiralty, each of whom took a different department of the service under his care: but every one knew what that responsibility consisted of. He had been always opposed to the system of having the Navy ruled by a civilian; but if it were to be so he would wish to know why the same system should not prevail in that department which existed under the Ordnance Board. They had the Clerk of the Ordnance, the Surveyor of the Ordnance, and the Storekeeper, all of whom were controlled, or at least, ought to be controlled by the Master General of the Ordnance. Now, they had a Surveyor of the Navy as well as a Surveyor of the Ordnance; an Accountant General of the Navy, whose office corresponded, he believed, with that of the Clerk of the Ordnance; they had also a Storekeeper General in each department of the Navy and the Ordnance; and what he wanted was, that the rule which was applied to the one class of officers should be extended to the other. He would wish to see the Lords of the Admiralty made really responsible. He would place one Lord as a Comptroller of the Dock Yards, and another as a Comptroller of the Medical Department. He did not wish to have them at all, but if they were to be continued, he was for making them responsible for the duties which they undertook to superintend. It was impossible for the right hon. and gallant Admiral at the head of the Board of Admiralty to perform all the duties that were imposed upon him. He had more duties to attend to than mortal man could get through, and the consequence was, that the work was badly done. ["Oh, oh."] He did not know what hon. Members meant by crying out "oh, oh." What he alleged was proved by the evidence of every day. He therefore trusted that the House would establish a more efficient control over the Navy Board than at present existed, and that the officers of that Board would be made responsible for the offices which they held.

objected to the Navy Department having the power of receiving as well as of expending funds, and said that the consequence was, that nearly seven millions of money escaped Parliamentary control. In his opinion, it should have no power as a board of outlay, except by direct Parliamentary grant.

said, the gallant Commodore had told them that the consequence of the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty was, that the work performed by it was very badly done; and an instance of the truth of that fact was afforded by the case which he now, pursuant to the notice given by him, brought before the consideration of the Committee. He alluded to the petition of the paymasters and pursers of the Royal Navy, which had been presented by him on the 2nd of April last, and which had been printed with the Votes. A Committee of eminent naval officers had recommended that their pay should be increased 1s. per day; but that recommendation had never been fully carried out, the additional shilling having been given to a part only; and the petitioners being of from thirty-one to thirty-six years standing, had found their juniors constantly put over their heads in this as in other respects. The Government had received large sums from the Pursers' Fund, which had never been accounted for, What had been done with this money? Where was it? The arrangement of the Board of Admiralty had worked badly, and why should they not now accede to the wish expressed by the Naval Commission in favour of a body of old and deserving officers? A second memorial had been addressed to the Admiralty by them—but they had received no answer, and they felt this neglect deeply. If the gallant Officer admitted the injustice, and had applied to the Treasury to obviate it, all blame would be removed from the Board of Admiralty, but then it must fall upon the Treasury. These officers only amounted to one hundred in number; and though the Government received 4,000l. a year from their profits, yet it refused to give them what they themselves had voluntarily surrendered to their more unfortunate brethren. The gallant Officer concluded by saying, that he would never leave the Chancellor of the Exchequer quiet until he had taken the case of these officers into his consideration, and had required an explanation from the right hon. and gallant Admiral at the head of the Board of Admiralty as to why the recommendation of the Navy Commissioners had not been carried into effect.

said, that in a very few words he would explain how this matter stood. He would place it in its true light. In 1814, these officers had been first put upon half-pay. In 1842, there were nearly 1,000 at 5s., 200 at 4s., and the remainder at 3s. They had then proposed that their profits should be reduced, and the Government of that day had accepted their proposal. In 1844, the bargain for an increase of 1s. a day was made, and they had for a time received that additional 1s. When, however, the Military and Naval Commission had sat, they had recommended that some of these officers should retire at the advanced pay of 8s. 6d., and that the remainder should have 7s. 6d. and 5s.; by which means by much the larger number would have a higher rate. The Treasury had then requested, as the condition of their consent, the Admiralty to revise the scale. By that revised scale, there were thirty pursers at 8s. 6d., seventy at 7s., and 320 at 5s.; so that a large majority had gained the benefit of the advance, and the Treasury had refused to give the advanced rate to the remainder. They had all to some extent benefited by the arrangement; and though he did not deny that there were some thirty or forty pursers surviving who had not received the advance, yet they had gained some benefit under the arrangement proposed by the Commission.

would be glad if the gallant Admiral could inform him when the retired list of captains would be placed on the Table.

replied, that he was unable to give an answer as to the period when it would be made public; but the list was now under the consideration of the Government.—Vote agreed to.

hoped that the Enlistment or Register Act would be amended. The Bill gave a bounty of 10l. to able seamen on entering on board a man of war, and on the issuing a proclamation in the declaration of war, a further bounty of 10l. was to be given; this he thought unnecessary.