, on moving the Second Reading, said: As the House was good enough to allow me, at a very late hour of the night, some weeks ago, to bring in this Bill without any explanation, and as the Bill is one of considerable importance to the poor-law unions throughout the country, and in regard to the general administration of the poor-law, I think it would not be fair for me to allow the discussion on the second reading of the Bill to take its course without at the commencement attempting to discharge that duty which I ought to have undertaken when I brought in the Bill. I must begin by saying that it is no anxiety for legislation at this period of the Session that has induced me to bring in four Bills on the subject of the poor-law. I should have felt rather proud if, having devoted myself with due activity to my duties as the head of the poor-law department, I could have referred, at the close of the Session, to proofs that the existing laws were sufficient to carry out the objects of the Legislature for which that department was instituted. I should have thought it perfectly unjustifiable, with only half a year's experience in my present office, for me to have undertaken any large change, on speculative grounds, in the law which I had to administer; and I trust the House will believe that it is only under the pressure of an absolute and urgent necessity that I now call its attention to the subject which I am about more particularly to introduce, with an endeavour to secure its assent to a change of considerable importance. But the House will see, from the statement which I shall make, that it would be impossible for me, with any due regard to my duty, to avoid bringing this matter before Parliament. In the first place, a very important Act, passed last Session, expires in October next. It would be most unbecoming to allow that Act to expire by mere lapse of time without making any provision for those objects which that Act was unanimously passed last year to carry into effect. I am speaking of Mr. Bodkin's Bill in regard to the removal of the poor. The House will recollect that in the year 1846 a very important change was made in the law affecting the removal of the poor—a change which I think was founded on sound policy and with a due regard to the best interests of the poor. It is undeniable that the effect of that Bill has caused a very great shifting of the burdens on the ratepayers. It was contemplated at the time, and the Bill was passed with the intention of making the burden more equal. The effect of it was to cast the burden from one parish to another, so that the charge might fall on those who ought to bear it. At the same time, that increase of burden in some places was not borne very patiently, and last Session a feeling exhibited itself among a large number of Members against the operation of the Poor Removal Act. The matter was referred to the Committee of which I had the honour to be Chairman. We discussed the matter at considerable length. The opinion of the Committee was decidedly against interfering with the principle of that law; at the same time we admitted that there was justice in some of the complaints made against it. The Committee was generally sensible of the very heavy burden which had very suddenly been thrown on particular parishes, and could not forget that when the Legislature made that change it might have been a wiser course to have thrown the burden on a larger area than that of a parish; and as it was an instance of an entirely new burden, we considered that the Legislature should have guarded against creating a pressure upon particular localities. Under that impression a Member of that Committee, whose absence from this House I regret on many accounts, was induced, at the end of the Session, to introduce a Bill which was passed into a law, by which the charge for the persons made irremovable under the Act of 1846 was extended from the parish to the union, and made part of the common establishment charges of the union. Now, it is my intention to propose that the principle of that Act shall he continued, and that the irremoveable paupers shall henceforth, as they have been during the last year, be a charge, not upon the parish, but upon the whole union. Another subject of very great importance has been forced upon my attention since I have been in office. Almost every Gentleman must have heard the complaints that have been made throughout the whole country on the subject of vagrancy; so that I doubt not I shall find a ready acquiescence in the proposition that it is impossible to leave the law of vagrancy upon the footing on which it now stands. I have promised many hon. Gentlemen, whose forbearance towards me I now beg gratefully to acknowledge, that I would not allow the Session to pass without detailing to the House the whole scheme which I had prepared for the purpose of remedying this great evil. But perhaps the House will extend their indulgence to me a few days more, when I tell them that I have prepared a circular letter to the poor-law guardians, by which I hope some stop may be put to that evil. I repeat what I have formerly said, that I don't think it is an evil which can be remedied by an Act of Parliament. I do not think that the principle of relieving vagrancy, as far as it is laid down by law, can be altered for the better, or that its efficacy can be increased. I think that the law is strong enough. What, in my opinion, is wanted, is a different spirit in the administration of the law; and, above all, a different spirit on the part of those who are charged with the enforcement of the law. The whole system of vagrancy having become so intolerable an evil, and so great a scandal to the country, has been very much the result of an injudicious administration of the law for the last seven or eight years. I think no other exposition of the law could be given than that which was given seven or eight years ago. But, the law having been expounded in that way, it has unfortunately created a tendency to a great deal too much laxity in its administration. My opinion is, that while the general right of the vagrant to demand relief remains as it is, it is impossible to remedy the evil by any minor alteration of the law. But I do think that a great and sensible alteration in the extent of the evil may be made by a wiser and more discriminating course in the administration of the laws. It has been my object to induce the officers of the different unions to administer the law with proper spirit and discrimination—taking upon themselves the responsibility of refusing relief where undoubtedly it ought not to be given. I have assured them that if they will administer the law in a discriminating and honest spirit, I will take upon myself the responsibility of whatever they may do that shall tend to prevent the increase of so monstrous and formidable an evil. I will lay a copy of my circular letter before the House. There is one question respecting vagrancy which has been forced upon my attention from all parts of the country, and with respect to which it is necessary to make an alteration in the law—I refer to the incidental charge of vagrancy. That charge is now thrown upon the parish in which the vagrants apply for relief. In 99 cases out of 100 the applications are made in the single parish in which the workhouse is situated, or in which the relieving officer happens to live. I have received loud complaints against this portion of the working of the poor-law. The ratepayers on whom these applications are made say it is by no act of theirs that the workhouse happens to be in their parish; it is by the act of the union; neither is it by any act of theirs that the relieving officer has his residence in their parish; he is employed and appointed by the union. It generally happens that the relieving officer lives in the principal town or village of the union for general convenience, and yet the whole charge of vagrancy is thrown upon that one parish. I need not attempt to impress upon the House what an extraordinary expense this must entail upon that particular parish. It is astonishing the number of shifts that are resorted to by the different parishes to relieve themselves of these burdens, and to throw them upon their neighbours. All the arts and contrivances of a regular warfare are easily and speedily acquired and put in motion. In one town in the west of England it was found extremely inconvenient by one parish to have these applications made upon them by vagrants. The relieving officer resided in that parish. It was therefore arranged that he should be provided with a house rent-free. They got him a house, but it was on the other side of the street, and in a neighbouring parish. The relieving officer went to his new domicile, and he instantly transferred to the new parish the whole burden of the vagrants. This expense is a very severe charge upon the particular parish, and a very unjust charge. But there is another great evil, and that is that the whole administration of the poor-law is now in the hands of the board of guardians. It is they who appoint the officers and regulate the mode in which relief is to be given. But the board of guardians, as a board of guardians, has no interest in preventing vagrancy—it all falls on the parish. But the parish cannot appoint the officers, nor can they improve the present system that regulates vagrancy; the result therefore, has been very severe to individual parishes, particularly in the north of England, where the evil is very much felt, and where the ratepayers are willing to go to any expense to suppress vagrancy. But, with all their willingness, they have felt themselves unable to do it, because, at the union board, they have been outvoted by the guardians who represented parishes that are not at all interested in putting an end to vagrancy. I think, therefore, that upon these two grounds—first, the injustice of the burden, and, secondly, the necessity of imposing the administration of the law on the shoulders of those who alone have the power of putting down vagrancy—it is absolutely necessary that the charge of vagrancy should be made a union charge. The question then arises as to the mode of assessing that charge. The charge in each parish was made a part of the establishment charge. Now, hon. Gentlemen are aware of the mode in which the different parishes make their contributions to the establishment charge of the union. They are made without any reference to the amount of the rateable property in the parish, but entirely in reference to the average of its past expenditure. At the period of passing the new poor-law it was settled that the expenses of certain establishments should be borne by the different parishes of a union in common; and it was settled that those establishment charges should be contributed to in proportion to the expenditure on the poor and the sick in each parish, on the average of the three years immediately preceding the passing of the law. The average so taken is called the average of the parish. According to the proportion of that amount each parish contributes to the establishment charges of the union. Now, it does appear to me that to throw the charge of irremovable paupers and labourers into the calculation of these proportions, is quite contrary to the principles of justice. The principle upon which the establishment charges are placed on the averages is this—that when a workhouse was built and officers were appointed for the relief of the poor of a union, it was but fair that each parish of that union should contribute to the expense in proportion to the number of paupers which it brought as inmates of the workhouse, or which were subject to the care and superintendence of the officers. But the charges for irremovable paupers and for vagrants have nothing to do with the proportion of the pauperism of each parish. Suppose, for instance, parish A has been exceedingly well managed—its pauperism very small, and its average consequently very little—then suppose parish B to be ill-managed, or by some unfortunate circumstance its pauperism to be very great, its charge for relief very heavy, and its average very high, and consequently its contribution to the establishment charges twice or three times the amount of parish A. Now, all the relative rates imposed on account of the establishment charges on these two parishes are on a scale of strict justice. But when a heavy charge for vagrancy falls on a third parish—parish C—or when a heavy charge on account of persons who have become irremovable in parish C are thrown upon the union altogether, what equity is there then in this proportion of the establishment charges? It is fair to call upon me to contribute twice as much to those charges if my pauperism requires twice as much help from the establishments; but it is perfectly unfair to say that for that reason I am to be charged twice as much, because my parish has all the vagrancy of the three parishes—a matter with which I have nothing on earth to do. Upon the parish which is already heavily burdened, you place a double charge for the expenses of the union establishments; while the parish the burdens of which are comparatively light, you hardly charge at all. I have, accordingly, found that this part of the Bill has given rise to a good deal of complaint. But this point is so well stated in a paper which I have received from a gentleman whose merits are acknowledged by all who know him, and who, I believe, is well known to you, Sir—I mean Mr. Hawley, who was formerly a magistrate in Hampshire or Surrey, and who has been for some years a poor-law inspector in the north of England—that I cannot do better than read it to the House. That gentleman says—

"As the Act 10 and 11 Victoria, cap. 110, will expire on the 1st of October next, when the charge for the relief to the irremovable poor will be again thrown on the parishes of their residence, the Legislature, when that time arrives, would no doubt consider it expedient to renew its provisions, in the absence of any intention of introducing the Bill now under consideration. Of the justice and policy of that Act there can be no doubt—the dissatisfaction created by the retrospective effect of the 9th and 10th Victoria, cap. 66, created universal dissatisfaction in all the larger towns in the country, which was only allayed by distributing the burden which it bad imposed on individual parishes over the whole union, and fixing the charge on the establishment; the relief thus afforded to the parties most aggrieved has not, however, given general satisfaction, and the ratepayers in the largest and most pauperised parishes, where the averages have been increased by bad management and profuse expenditure, object that they are unfairly called upon to bear a disproportionate share of a charge for paupers belonging to parishes with which they have no connexion, and in a mode which inflicts a species of penalty for internal mismanagement by means of a foreign impost. It is, indeed, evident that the levying of contributions from the union fund, in such cases, upon the principle by which that fund is now created, is a grievous evil to the contributors, and some modification of the existing mode of raising it would probably have been demanded in the event of the revival of the Act above referred to in its present shape. The plan proposed by your Bill for the remedy of the evil appears calculated to give general satisfaction; and no method for creating a union fund for the payment of this charge, as well as for that for the relief of vagrants, can be better devised than that of an uniform union contribution, assessed, not in reference to past payments, but on the rateable value of every parish."

Upon those grounds I propose that a union fund, for the support of these vagrants, should he raised by equal contributions from the rateable property of the union. This change, which I think is absolutely called for by justice, with respect to vagrants, will establish for the first time a uniform union rate. It will be a great inconvenience if there are two principles of contribution to a common fund in the union—one on the principle of a uniform and equal rate of assessment, and the other upon the old system of averages. That, however, would not decide the question whether, upon a fair consideration of the subject, the establishment charges ought to be maintained upon their present footing? The next question to consider is, whether two kinds of union rating ought to be kept up—one upon an equal assessment of property; the other upon the old system of averages—or whether, once for all, all union charges should be put upon a uniform system. When the Poor Law Bill was passed it was impossible to frame the rating upon any other system than that adopted. To have done so would have been too great an interference with property, and would have cast upon the union the burdens which were caused solely by the mismanagement of particular parishes. But does justice require that the present system should be maintained after fifteen years' experience of union government? The question is very different, considered with regard to the period when the poor-law was introduced, and the present time. At the former period whatever evils and burdens existed, had grown up under parochial management; and it might fairly be said to different parishes, that undue burdens which might have accrued under their administration should not be thrown upon the general fund. But how stands the case now? The administration of the poor-law has been taken out of the hands of the parishes. The ratepayers and the parish officers have nothing to do with the administration of the law; it has been in the hands of the union officers; and now particular parishes can no longer be considered altogether responsible for the whole of the burdens which they may bring upon the union. Besides, the establishment charges are not of such a nature that they ought to be thrown upon particular parishes in proportion to their paupers respectively? They are of two kinds. The first is the expense of building the workhouse and maintaining it; the second is the salaries of the officers. The expense for the building of workhouses is for the most part at an end—the outlay is already made. Nevertheless, wherever there are the remains of such an outlay, I provide for it in the Bill by a section enacting that every parish shall pay its share of any debt still due for the building of a workhouse. As regards the second establishment charge, the salaries of officers, can it be maintained that the services of these officers are required in proportion to the pauperism existing in each parish? I think not. Take, for instance, the clerk to the guardians; his duties are with the guardians in respect to all the parishes alike, such as the general correspondence with the Poor Law Board, the attendance on meetings of boards of guardians, making out returns to Parliament—all these matters have reference to un-pauperised as well as pauperised parishes, and are services to the union generally, and not to particular parishes. Take another class of officers—the medical officers. Practically, what has medical relief in this country come to be? Can it be said to be a mere poor-law charge? I think not. I believe that the general system of the administration of medical relief has got very much to be a system of relief by parishes to the working classes of the country, and that it will not be found in many parishes that the honest and independent workman who has suffered from long and severe illness is able to pay for medical attendance out of his own means; on the contrary, generally he has to apply to the parish for medical relief. In that case this item of expense affects the unpauperised equally with the pauperised parishes. It seems, therefore, that the medical charge is one which ought not to be in proportion to the number of paupers in a parish. One charge, obviously parochial, is the salary of the master of the workhouse. Now, on what principle do Gentlemen regard the workhouse? As a test of pauperism? Do they think that a person seeking parish relief is deterred from it by going into the workhouse? It appears to me that an un-unpauperised parish derives more benefit from the existence of a workhouse than the pauperised parish itself. In fact, a line cannot be drawn as to the amount of services rendered by the different officers in the different parishes; and in fairness and policy the charge of their salaries ought to be borne by the union generally; every parish in the union and every ratepayer in each parish contributing, not according to the burdens upon each particular parish, but in proportion to property and the amount of means he had to bear the general burden with. This would be an important step towards putting an end to the system of averages, under which have grown up the most intolerable frauds. Unfortunately, in the administration of the poor-law, reduction in charges has not always been obtained by very legitimate means. Last Session a good deal was heard about an abuse which prevails widely over England, and is one of those intolerable grievances which, if allowed to go on, will bring the whole system of the relief of the poor about our ears. I allude to the system of clearing parishes, in cases in which one person is the proprietor of the whole, or nearly the whole, of a parish, and in which, instead of legitimate means being taken for the relief of the poor, or endeavours being made, by giving them employment or otherwise, to lessen the burden of paupers, the shorter and simpler method is adopted of shifting them to other places; and, by allowing cottages to fall down, or by pulling them down, to drive them into parishes where property is more divided. This evil has agitated the country, caused complaints against the whole system of the present law, and given rise to demands for changes so large and extensive as materially to interfere with the effectual administration of the law. Anything tending to this evil must be put a stop to. In truth, the whole system of averages is one of fraudulent squabbling. In some places the whole burden is sought to be shifted upon others. In other parishes they made private rates; two or three occupiers agreeing that they should support the paupers without letting them go into the workhouse, and levying private rates for that purpose. Under this system great frauds are perpetrated, and the averages unduly diminished. The Poor Law Commissioners have struggled against these frauds, by directing an assistant commissioner to take all these private rates into account. I have also discouraged them as much as possible, and I would rather put the law on a different footing altogether, than allow the evils to be remedied according to the equitable notions of any irresponsible gentlemen whose equity might degenerate into caprice. These are the grounds upon which I propose to make the third change contained in this Bill, and to place the establishment charges, as well as the other charges, on a common footing, and to raise a common union fund by a general union rate, apportioned on the property of the whole of the union. The difficulty with those who wished to establish this union rate had been the great want of uniformity in the present assessment of property to the poor-rate; and when the question was before started this was put forward as an insuperable objection. If property in one parish be assessed at a rack-rent, and property in another parish at only half its value, it is obvious that the one escapes its legitimate burden. [An Hon. MEMBER: That would be contrary to the Parochial Assessment Act.] But there are difficulties in the way of enforcing that Act, and in many instances it has not been acted upon. It would not be doing justice to ground the rate upon the parochial assessments. In the Bill I first brought in, I endeavoured to guard against this evil by allowing each union to form its own rate; and I did so under the impression, from all that had passed in the Committee, and all that I had heard from other quarters, that there was no other general contribution on which parochial property was fairly assessed. I have, however, made some inquiries as to whether the present assessment for the county rate might be made the basis of uniform union rating, and have received some information on the subject from the reports of inspectors whom I desired to inquire in what counties there had been a recent valuation made under the County Rates Act; in what counties such an one had been actually ordered, or was in progress; and whether a rate of such standing had been modified in such a manner as to give general satisfaction. I do not insist upon the positive accuracy of this information; but I find there are only four counties in England, and six in Wales, in which a proper county rate does not exist, or is not in process of being made. The English counties are Buckinghamshire, Shropshire, Suffolk, and Westmoreland. Of the first two I am not sure; and in fact the only county of which I am very sure is that unhappy and benighted county, Suffolk. But even there the straw was beginning to move, and the country gentlemen had discussed the subject at their quarter-sessions, and the effect of certain charges thrown upon the county rates had been to compel them to think of forming a new, just, and satisfactory valuation. My wish is to elicit from Gentlemen whether they can impugn the probability of the county rate being a satisfactory basis for the union rate. I propose by this Bill, as a general principle, that the union charges should be based upon the valuation of each parish in the union to the county rate; and I propose to establish an uniform union rate, upon which these three charges shall be thrown—establishment charges, vagrants, and irremovables. Questions of details will be more advantageously discussed in Committee; but I wish to call the attention of the House to the 5th Clause, concerning which there has been some excitement. I beg the House to observe that this clause is purely an exceptional one, which has been suggested as a means of putting an end to a mischievous doubt that existed as to the effect of the Poor Removal Act. The clause is merely declaratory, and explains the law as it now stands. It has been suggested, however, that it would have a particular effect in the case of Irish vagrants, which I do not contemplate. But if hon. Gentlemen will leave this clause entirely out of their consideration while discussing the Bill, I shall be prepared in Committee to meet objections to this particular clause, either by modification or the introduction of other clauses. The clause, however, is not necessarily involved in the principle of the Bill, which can be discussed without reference to it. But, besides this objection in detail, I anticipate a grave objection to the principle and object of the Bill. It will be said that this measure cannot be discussed without looking to the general question of substituting union rates for parish rates. It will be contended that I have admitted the principle of union rates; and, to quote language which has been used to me in private, that I have let in the small end of the wedge. But if sentiments such as that were to prevail in these days, we should be likely to bring all our old institutions about our ears. If the reasons I have stated justify the principle of union rating to the extent to which I propose to carry it, the House should not be deterred from doing what is right on a practical question by the fear that the principle might be carrried too far, and applied to cases to which it ought not to be applied. Those Gentlemen who resist the application of a good and just principle, fairly admissible in a particular case, because they dread ulterior consequences, are very likely to raise up a feeling in the community which will lead to that very principle being rashly and too hastily applied. When those who so much fear to let in the small end of the wedge succeed in resisting it, the result generally is that the wedge was often forced in butt-end foremost. By what I am about to say I fear that I shall lower myself in the opinion of many enlightended reformers in this country. [HABEAS CORPUS (IRELAND) SUSPENSION BILL.—The right hon. Gentleman was here interrupted by the Usher of the Black Rod, who summoned the House to the House of Lords, to hear the Royal Assent given to the above Bill. On the House returning, the right hon. Gentleman resumed.] I fear that after this short respite I must continue the humiliating confession which I was about to make when I was cut short by the Usher of the Black Rod. I should willingly avail myself of any opportunity to avoid making such a confession, but I fear I cannot. I fear, then, I shall lower myself in the opinion of many good practical reformers by admitting that I have not yet become a convert to the doctrine that it would be advisable to substitute union or any other system of chargeability upon a larger area for the old system of parochial chargeability. No doubt the opinions I had formed on this point were somewhat shaken at the period of the inquiry before the Committee on the Law of Settlement last year; but, great as some thought were the evils of the present system, I confess I was not prepared to encounter what I believe to be the great risk of substituting union for parochial chargeability to the poor. It appears to me to be of the greatest moment in the administration of the poor-law to render the condition of the poor in every part of England peculiarly a matter of interest, as well as a matter of feeling, to those who by property or by vicinity have influence over that condition of the poor; and I should be very loth to assist in any change which would at once deprive the proprietors and occupiers of estates in parishes of that interest they now have in upholding the condition of the poor. I admit all the evils so forcibly brought before the House by the evidence taken by the Committee on the Law of Settlement. I think the present law of settlement and power of removal of the poor involve great hardship; I trust that a long time will not elapse without Parliament relieving the poor from that great evil; and I feel confident that Parliament will be able to remove it. But, I still believe that that change, so bettering the condition of the poor, may be made without interference with the general principle that the charge of the resident poor should be thrown upon the particular parish in which they have resided for a length of time. But at the same time, whilst I approve of the principle of parochial rating, I do not mean to say that I can contend with a growing feeling against it, entertained by men of great practical good sense in this House and in the country most interested in a proper system of rating, who are friendly to an extension of the area of chargeability; I cannot struggle against such a feeling unless I could succeed in putting the law of parochial chargeability upon a just and satisfactory footing. It is not enough to say that we dislike union rating, or national rating, or any other mode of rating; we cannot disguise from ourselves that there is a general feeling amongst boards of guardians and through the country—except in the large towns, and in the open and populous parts of the Country—in favour of union rating; that there is a desire to remedy the evil of the present system, which is charged with so much injustice and cruelty, by extending the area of chargeability, and I think you cannot uphold the principle of parochial charge-ability unless you modify it so as to reach the evil, and satisfy the just claims of the country. I have thought it to be my duty to read every thing which appears in every country newspaper I can get hold of which has any relation to the general state of feeling with regard to the administration of the poor-law; and I have found that there is a very strong and prevalent feeling, and a general opinion throughout the country, that there is a great objection to the existing area of rating. There is a very wide opinion prevailing in favour of a union rating, and there is a growing opinion, I regret to say, in favour of what appears to me a dangerous and impracticable scheme, namely, a national rating. I admit that, upon abstract principles of justice, a national rate may be defended; but you cannot attempt to carry such a principle into effect without opening a door to serious evils; without doing one of two things—either you must allow every board of guardians to dip its hands into the pockets of the country, careless of the amount of charge, knowing that the Consolidated Fund would be able to pay; or you must do away with all local control over the funds, and let the national rate be administered by national administrators alone. I trust that these considerations will induce Parliament to resist a national rate. I cannot disguise from myself that there is a very great and popular agitation going on in the country for the purpose of inducing Parliament to adopt a national rating. I am sorry to say, that in many country gentlemen and farmers I have found a fatal tendency to favour a chargeability which I consider national. Upon these grounds, I propose to the House to adopt a modified system of union rating. I do not want to abandon the principle of parochial chargeability; but if you wish to uphold the principle, there should be the means of throwing the charge over as largo an area as the union, where, upon principles of justice and policy, the charge should be borne by all parts of the union. Another part of the Bill relates to extra-parochial places charged with the support of the poor. I cannot help thinking that abuses have arisen from this cause; and, at all events, it appears to be a matter of complaint throughout the country. In some of these extra-parochial places—such as cathedral closes and small farms—the number of paupers may be small; but where half a parish, as in Leicester, inhabited by knitters, is extra-parochial, a number of these men, when out of work, will walk over the boundary into the adjoining parish, which will be encumbered with them. I wish to make these extra-parochial places chargeable for their own poor, unless the ratepayers prefer to be joined to a parish. I trust the House will consent to the second reading of this Bill; and I think the principles of the Bill will receive the general assent of the country. I move that this Bill be read a second time.

was sure the House would share with him in the feelings of thankfulness they owed to the right hon. Gentleman for the clear and lucid manner in which he had gone through the whole of this difficult, complex, and intricate subject, and the frankness with which, it appeared to him, he had stated his views and that of the Government, upon a subject which was at once difficult, and interesting to all persons in the community. He could not, however, agree altogether in some of the principles which the right hon. Gentleman had laid down, and he would point out what seemed to him some inconsistency in those principles; but if he differed from the right hon. Gentleman in the result which he thought his measure had a tendency to produce, it was not from disrespect to his judgment. He (Mr. Henley) perfectly concurred with the right hon. Gentleman in thinking that a greater principle than the mere question of pecuniary interest was involved in this subject. If they looked to the proceedings of the last fourteen years they would perceive the effects of the parochial system, from which he had never been able to see any possible reason for departing, unless we adopted a national rate. He was a member of the Committee which sat last year with respect to this subject, and his views were based upon what he had heard in evidence before that Committee. The burden of the support of the poor was thrown upon some descriptions of property with an inequality which was very considerable, and showed the absolute necessity of a proper assessment. Why should not one description of property be as heavily taxed as another for the relief of the poor? It was, in his opinion, very difficult to say why a coal mine should be taxed, and a lead mine exempted. The right hon. Gentleman had attempted to generalise the question, but he had produced no argument to show that a wider area ought to be adopted with regard to assessment; and it therefore did not appear why a pauper, who resided in parish A, should be supported by parish B. This was a measure of a most important character, and one which could not possibly be remedied by tinkering and tampering constantly with it. The right hon. Gentleman, in dealing with extra-parochial property, had exemption in the inns of court. Why so? They had several servants to attend upon them, and provide for their luxuries; but those servants generally lived in other parishes, so that the mode of treating them approached pretty nearly to the clearance system. Upon what principle, then, was it that the right hon. Gentleman could exclude the inns of court, and heavily tax other possessors of property? He did not see any reason why one species of extra-parochial property should be treated differently from another. The old system had been objected to, and it had its faults; but the new system appeared to work well for some time, as "a new broom sweeps clean." However, it soon appeared, that when destitution of a certain description was complained of, and when numbers of destitute persons were found going about the country, and when the newspapers complaining of it made the circumstances more generally known, a different mode of treatment was adopted for town and country. A great increase of vagrancy had taken place after the passing of the Act, to which he had alluded. Now, vagrants deserved a very peculiar treatment in matters of legislation and police, for there were many causes in operation which would tend to cause the practice of vagrancy, and induce persons to adopt it as a profession; and, on the other hand, deserving and suffering persons might become vagrants under the pressure of distress. One class of vagrants learned at tramp-houses all the arrangements which regulated the workhouses, and they went out to beg with this feeling, that if they did not obtain money enough for the day, they had a refuge in the workhouse. Many of the cases of distress were simulated, but many were real, for there was unfortunately a great deal of real distress abroad. The worst feature in the simulated distress was, that it was the poor who suffered from it, for they were more disposed to relieve the distresses of the poor than the wealthy. They were near distress, and pitied it; whilst the wealthy, being better informed, were more cautious and chary in the disposal of their relief. The present system of relief by relieving officers had this defect in the rural districts, namely, that the officers had such distances to travel, that they frequently arrived at the place in the evening where the poor were awaiting relief, and being jaded and tired from their day's occupation, they did not pay sufficient attention to the claims of the applicants. He thought that the decision upon the applications for distress ought to be more a matter of police than at present. There was another very important subject which he would direct the attention of the authorities to, and that was the fact that the mode of instructing the officers of the workhouses in the discharge of their duties was not judicious. However feeling a man might be, he might become case-hardened by practice and custom, and the effects of that should be carefully guarded against. It was far easier to deal with cases one by one than when they were met with in large numbers. At present the vagrant could go from one workhouse to another; and he thought that the charge ought to be thrown on a larger area as regarded vagrants. He would furnish an example of his view in this respect. We stopped crime at the public expense, and though vagrancy was not crime, it was akin to it in its relation to public expenditure. If a man were to go from Liverpool to London, and on the way should require public relief, why should one parish afford that any more than another? Why should the relief not be afforded from a general public fund? There was one peculiarity about the centralised system, for it broke down the desire which the parishes formerly had to prevent expenditure; whereas formerly they felt how directly they suffered from the expenditure for the relief of the poor. It ought to be recollected that the present system had broken through a system which had been in force and operation for 300 years. He would remind the House again of the inequality of obliging a man with 100l. a year to pay 25l., whilst a man with a similar sum in the funds paid nothing to the poor-rates. Having by those establishments very considerably benefited the highly pauperised parishes, and having reduced their rates by twenty, thirty per cent, and in some cases even more than that, it was very hard to turn round and say—you shall be equally taxed for the maintenance of those establishments which you do not want with those who do want them. In his consideration that was an unjust principle. The right hon. Gentleman stated the case as if he were laying the tax for the first time; but he ought to have considered that these parishes have borne the expense of expensive establishments, which were of no service to them, and they had thus considerably reduced the rates in the highly pauperised districts. The right hon. Gentleman next referred to the workhouses. Gentlemen were accustomed to say that the workhouse afforded a great test and means of distinguishing between the industrious destitute and the idle vagrant. The poor-law guardians were in the habit of putting forward this doctrine; but let them take the case of an idle man, and they would find that the workhouse, so far from being a test, enabled him to defy them. Take the ordinary rate of wages, say 10s. a week, with a family of six persons, the whole amount of wages does not exceed, if it reaches, 20s., and that only if they are all employed. On this he is able to support the family; but if he goes into the workhouse, you cannot maintain him under 18s. a week. If he is put out of employment, he does not care—he will not stir himself to seek it in another place; off the fellow marches to the board of guardians; he is received as a destitute poor person; in he goes to the workhouse, the parish is put to the expense of 18s. a week until it is sick of it, and perhaps takes him out. Now, he begged the House to remember that these were not imaginary cases; he himself was aware of many such. The power of getting relief under this system afforded an absolute premium to the idle and the dissolute. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but any person acquainted with these matters would bear him out in the statements which he had made. He next came to the question of rating, which was no doubt one of immense difficulty. The conduct of the right hon. Gentleman clearly proved it to be such, for notwithstanding the great attention which every one was aware he bestowed upon the subject, although the Bill had only been a short time ago introduced to the House, yet nevertheless since its introduction the right hon. Gentleman had entirely altered his views upon the matter. Even as it now stood, as altered and amended, he was of opinion that the right hon. Gentleman had only partially escaped from the difficulties which surrounded him. The right hon. Gentleman admitted in argument that if he had persevered in his former proposition, that he would have subjected the unions to the expense of a re-rating; and he was so persuaded such would be the case, that he introduced an alteration. The right hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to apply a partial remedy, and that remedy was county rating. No one would deny that county rates are unequal. No one believes that they are equal. It is almost impossible to arrive at an equal rate over the whole county. He believed that if they were to make extensive inquiries among the ratepayers of a county, they would find that the good sense of the ratepayers, knowing the difficulty of the subject, had acquiesced in the rule, where they were aware that endeavours had been made to put the rating upon a footing of equality. It would be impossible to make it equal: when the surveyor had gone half way through the county, different circumstances would arise, and he would have to begin again. Again, different men formed different estimates of the value of property, and that was the reason of the inequality which prevailed in the system of parochial assessment. These are the difficulties which stand in your way, and you will be resting on an unsound basis if you think county rating is equal. The right hon. Gentleman has stated, that he will take county rating as his basis, save when the union ran into two counties; but he had not given the House any information as to the reasons upon which he arrived at that determination. The right hon. Gentleman should have stated to the House what number of unions did run into two counties. For all they knew to the contrary, the number of unions which did so formed the great proportion; he believed, however, that they were as one-fourth to the whole number. [Mr. BULLER: I believe that they are only one-tenth.] In the southern part of the county where he lived, there were four unions, and three out of the four ran into two counties. At all events, they ought to have been informed what proportion they bore to the others. He considered, in highly-pauperised parishes, where the duties of the officers were proportionally greater than in the others, the salaries of the medical staff, the relieving officers, and the clerks should be augmented. The right hon. Gentleman had made a very strong statement to the House upon what he called the clearance system; but he did not think the facts of the case warranted him. In his opinion, the real state of the case was, that no additional buildings had been erected to meet the wants of an increased population. But the House should remember that the clearance system involved the actual pulling down of dwelling-houses without building others for the accommodation of the increasing population. But the want of additional buildings to meet the exigency of the increase arose from the fact that sufficient accommodation already existed for those engaged upon the land; and they had it pretty substantially demonstrated that decreasing the population would not generally increase the wages of those so employed, as there were ordinarily a certain number of labourers permanently employed, whoso wages would not rise or fall, or be subject to such fluctuation. He thought, therefore, that the term was inadvertently used. He believed he had stated the real cause of the congregation of the poor to the larger towns, and be was certain that if they took the population returns, which gave the number of houses in the country, they would find that in the great majority of cases no decrease bad taken place. He wished also to say a few words respecting private rates and highway rates. He considered that some misunderstanding might arise if the matter were allowed to rest under the sweeping condemnation placed upon them by the right hon. Gentleman, when he was alluding to the fact of some of the poor being maintained by private and highway rates. In the part of England where he lived, a great deal of misery had been alleviated by the means of these rates, which had been thus so unscrupulously condemned. The House should recollect the very stringent nature of the orders of the poor-law guardians. Take the case, for instance, of a poor man, with a wife and four or five children, unable to get work. Under any circumstances his wages would have been, when in employment, eight or nine shillings, and in winter even lower than that. Some persons think that if these persons go into the poor-house, that they would be provided for; but inquiries had sufficiently demonstrated that if the poor were thus drafted off the land, the wages of those who remained would not be increased. The great number of persons who accept the relief afforded by the officer, which averages from 3s. to 3s. 6d., were condemned to sit at home, and almost starve upon it, while by the help of these rates the poor man was enabled to earn from 6s. to 7s., and thus was enabled to maintain himself in a state of comparative comfort. He did not think that the right hon. Gentleman contemplated this class of cases when he gave utterance to his sweeping denunciation. The House should not be inveigled by the soft persuasion of the right hon. Gentleman, that this was a little measure. Why, as sure as six and six make twelve, the principle of the Bill would be extended far beyond what might be now contemplated. The right hon. Gentleman might not be the person to extend it; but there were others who would be glad enough to avail themselves of it. Great alterations of the present kind should not be made bit by bit; if they were to be made, they ought to be considered as a whole, and treated as such. Of this he was sure, if there was one mode more than another by which they could shake confidence in the acts of that House, it would be by going on year after year shifting these burdens from one class to another, and thus interfering with the value of property in no slight degree. By this perpetual shifting and changing, they produced a soreness in men's minds, which at some time or another would drive them to make an organic change in order to get at the end of the chapter; and the end of the chapter would be the imposition of a national rate. The Removal Bill, introduced by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, was one of those by which he expected, in some sense, to equalise the burdens which pressed upon the agricultural interest; that was a measure, be it remembered, which the agricultural interest did not demand; on the contrary, they were averse from it; but the ink is scarcely dry which printed that Act of Parliament, before you come down to the House with an Act to undo all you have done before, and to inflict an additional burden upon the agricultural interest by making them sharers in that which heretofore had been borne in a larger proportion by the towns; and the Removal Bill, held out as an advantage to the agricultural interest, made the lever for depriving them of one, and for charging them with additional burdens. He had listened with great attention to the right hon. Gentleman; but he must confess that he did not see any good or sufficient reasons for the Bill. He did not see why the parishes which had been most relieved should throw off their shoulders the burdens rightfully laid on them, and burden those parishes by which they had been assisted. Nor did he see any reason why the Removal Bill, enacted for one purpose, should be made the lever for another; neither did he see any force in the reasons by which the right hon. Gentleman endeavoured to justify this shifting of burdens; or, dealing with the question of vagrancy, why it was not put under the provisions of some establishment competent to deal with it, and why they should not have a national charge for it, and treat it as all other crime was treated. They would never be able to draw a distinction between the vagrant and the really destitute poor, unless vagrancy was treated as an offence. These were the reasons why he could not consent to support the Bill. He thought it would be opening the doors for the entrance of future evils—breaking down the whole parochial system. He moved that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

wished to address an inquiry to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with regard to negotiations which were at present taking place, or had taken place, between Denmark and Germany, under the noble Lord's mediation. The House would recollect that he had brought the question of the hostilities between those Powers before the House in the month of May; and at a subsequent period the King of Denmark, with a view of terminating those hostilities, signed an armistice with great reluctance, as the terms of it were not very favourable to his crown and kingdom, and the signature of it was unsatisfactory to his subjects. But the king was influenced by feelings which would be appreciated in this country, and was especially anxious to terminate a conflict which was injurious to the commerce, not only of his own country, but particularly of England. The armistice having been signed under those circumstances by the King of Denmark, it was brought to Berlin, where it was signed and ratified by the King of Prussia, and he believed mainly through the auspices of the Crown of Sweden, and the activity and intelligence of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The House, then, would be surprised to learn that this armistice, thus signed and ratified, had been repudiated by the Prussian general; and after that sacrifice on the part of the King of Denmark he had the mortification of finding the armistice thrown in his face, and Europe had the mortification of learning that hostilities, so ruinous to commerce, were about to be recommenced. Now, he wished to ask the noble Lord whether he had any communication to make to the House on that almost unprecedented occurrence in diplomatic negotiations; whether he had received any communication from the Prussian Minister resident at the Court of St. James's explanatory of those circumstances; whether it were the fact that the King of Prussia, under the new constitution which at present prevailed in Germany—and which not even the King of Prussia himself seemed to understand—had informed Her Majesty's Government that he had no authority to sign and ratify that armistice; and whether he had informed Her Majesty that in consequence of his finding, to his astonishment, that he was deprived of those sovereign attributes, he intended to terminate any further diplomatic communications between his Court and the Cabinet of St. James's? Those were questions which he was sure the noble Lord would answer with all that fulness of detail which was called for by a subject so interesting to the public; and he trusted the noble Lord would be able to hold out a hope to the commercial interests of this country that there was a prospect of terminating the contest between Denmark and Germany in a manner which should be generally satisfactory to Europe, and advantageous to the interests of commerce.

had great pleasure in giving to the hon. Member and the House such explanation as was in his power to convey with regard to the very interesting and important matter to which his observations applied; and he trusted that the general result of his answer would be more encouraging, if not satisfactory, than perhaps the anticipations of the hon. Gentleman might have led the House to expect. The great difficulty which had arisen in those negotiations had sprung from the circumstance of there being so many different parties to be consulted, and in consequence of their being at a distance from each other, rather lengthened delays taking place in making the necessary communications preparatory to their assenting to an arrangement. What, in a few words, had taken place was, that Her Majesty's Government had proposed to the two parties—Germany and Denmark—articles of an armistice, which contained also the principles of the basis of a permanent settlement. As that appeared to the parties concerned to involve questions which might lead to lengthened discussions, the Prussian Government had sent an officer in their confidence to Malmöe to be in personal communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the King of Sweden, as a friendly mediator, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the King of Denmark; and they had arranged matters for an armistice, not including those principles of the basis of a permanent settlement which had been comprised in his (Lord Palmerston's) proposal. Those articles so agreed upon, but not signed, as the hon. Member supposed, by the organs of Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, had been approved by the Danish Government, and sent to Berlin, where objections having been taken to some of the details, modifications were thought requisite, and the Prussian officer had been sent back with the articles, and those modifications had been accepted. Undoubtedly it was reasonable to suppose that the articles of the armistice were thus finally concluded, and would be signed. But when the Prussian Government had sent orders to the general commanding in Schleswig to sign the armistice, in conjunction with the military commander of the Danish forces, that officer started a difficulty with regard to the position in which he conceived himself placed, both with reference to his own Government and to the government of the Confederation which had been recently constituted at Frankfort. He need not trouble the House by going into further details on the subject; but he might safely from communications which he had received that morning from Berlin, hold out a hope that those difficulties—which were difficulties in form rather than in substance—were likely to be got over; and, notwithstanding the delay which had taken place, he felt a confident hope that the armistice would be signed and concluded. There might be a question of certain modifications, but he trusted the two parties would come to an agreement in substance on the articles of the armistice. There would then remain the main question to be settled, and that main question Her Majesty's Government would still continue their good offices to arrange; and when hostilities should permanently cease he trusted the two parties would bring to the consideration of that further question that spirit of mutual conciliation without which no satisfactory arrangement could be attained.

inquired what steps had been taken to put an end to the abuses that have taken place in the several Vice-Admiralty Courts of the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, and New South Wales?

was not in a condition to give the hon. and gallant Gentleman any information on the subject of the fees and charges of the Vice Admiralty-Court of Sidney. With regard to the charges of the other courts, the subject had been fully investigated, and it had certainly been much easier to discover the existence of the evil of which the hon. and gallant Gentleman complained, than to devise a remedy for it. Among those who had been applied to to investigate this subject was Dr. Lushington. The fees, which were fixed by the Act of the 2nd William IV., cap. 51, were moderate; and if the charges had been limited to those fees, there would have been no ground for complaint. The judge received a fee of 1l. 10s. upon each case, the registrar a fee of 4l, and the other officers of the court fees amounting in the whole to 1l. 15s. But the dangerous part of the system was this, the judge had the power of awarding expenses to the agent of the captors; and the agent of the captors in return possessed the power of waiving all objections to the exaction of fees by the judge, and thus many fees were illegally exacted. The remedy proposed by Dr. was to allow the captors to have the right of having their agent's bill taxed by the registrar of the High Court of Admiralty.

asked the President of the Board of Trade, whether it was his intention to take any steps to prevent the overloading of the passenger steamboats plying on the Thames?

said, that by the provisions of the Steam Navigation Act all steamboat proprietors were directed to transmit to the Board of Trade every six months a report of the condition of their vessels; but this Act, although it inflicted a penalty on the proprietors of steam vessels navigating the sea for neglecting to make such a return, inflicted no penalty whatever on the proprietors of steamboats navigating rivers for such neglect. The Board of Trade took the only means in their power to prevent the occurrence of accidents, by writing to all the proprietors of the river steamboats, reminding them of the necessity of making such a return, and cautioning them that if they neglected to do so, and any accident should happen, they would probably be visited with severe punishment. He believed, however, that it would be his duty to ask the House to adopt some more stringent measure for the regulation of the river steamboats.

rose to move an Address, setting forth—

"That by an Order in Council, which his late Majesty was pleased to approve on the 15th day of December, 1831, Sir John Thomas Claridge, then Recorder of Prince of Wales's Island, was removed from the said office on account of an 'irritation between the Local Government and himself' which, in the opinion of the Lords of the Committee of Council, acting judicially in the case, was 'principally to be attributed' to the conduct of the said Local Government and of the Home Authorities:—Also setting forth that it further appeared to their Lordships in their investigation of the case, 'that no imputation rested on the capacity or integrity of Sir J. T. Claridge in the exercise of his judicial functions, so as to preclude his Majesty from employing him in his service in some other judicial situation; 'and praying that Her Majesty, graciously taking into consideration the expectations which the terms of the said Order in Council were calculated to create, may be pleased to direct that Sir J. T. Claridge may receive an appointment in Her Majesty's service of such a class as to Her Majesty shall seem meet."

He had moved for a copy of that Order in Council six days ago, but it had not yet been laid on the table of the House; however, it was accurately set forth in the terms of his Motion, and he might say that that Order in Council constituted his case. Sir John Thomas Claridge had, in the year 1825, been appointed to the recorder-ship of Prince of Wales's Island. Some years afterwards six charges had been made against him by the Court of Directors of the East India Company. Those charges had been referred to the Committee of the Privy Council, corresponding with what was now denominated the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and as only two of those charges had been persevered in, he should have only to deal with two of those charges. The first charge was, that Sir John Thomas Claridge had refused to execute the duties of his office until he should have obtained from the local government a guarantee for the payment of a certain amount of salary; and the other charge was that he had refused to proceed to Sincapore and Malacca for the trial of offenders unless the local government would pay his expenses. The Committee of Council decided that although Sir J. T. Claridge was not justified in the measures to which he had recourse to enforce the payment of his charges, or the expenses of his going his circuit, yet their Lordships were inclined to think that the local government was not justified in refusing to allow him his charges, and that it was the duty of the Court of Directors to provide for the payment of his expenses, and that Sir John Thomas Claridge had acted from a mistaken view of his duty. It appeared, therefore, that the local government were to blame as well as Sir J. T. Claridge. The Order in Council went on to state, that in consequence of the irritation which existed between the local government and Sir J. T. Claridge, it would be advisable that he should be removed, but that he had been guilty of no act which should incapacitate him from serving the Crown hereafter in a judicial capacity. Therefore he had been dismissed, not as a punishment, but on grounds of public policy and as a solution of a public dilemma. No imputation rested on his character; and from the wording of the Order in Council, an expectation had been raised in his mind that he should be employed again, which expectation had not been fulfilled. He did not bring forward this Motion as a party question, or as a charge against the right hon. Baronet opposite. There had been several Presidents of the Board of Control since these occurrences had taken place, all of whom had neglected the claims of Sir J. T. Claridge. He had brought forward this Motion entirely on public grounds. The independence of the Judges in England was secured by the fact of their holding their offices for life; but in the colonies they were liable to dismissal by the Government, and the only security they had for the independence of the colonial judges was the appeal to the Committee of the Privy Council, and the recommendation of that Committee should be always attended to. If they valued the independence of the colonial judges he besought them to agree to this address.

would not go further into the subject than the specific wording of the Motion required. He had no more to do with the case than the right hon. Gentleman himself. The appointment had taken place twenty years ago, and he had nothing to do with it, and had had nothing to do with the matter at all except having been so unfortunate as to have had a long and by no means agreeable correspondence with that gentleman. The whole accusation against him was, that he had not thought proper to recommend this gentleman for an Indian judgeship. [Mr. GLADSTONE: For any colonial judgeship.] He had no power to recommend him, except to an Indian judgeship. But he would ask the right hon. Gentleman how it happened that during the five years which the right hon. Gentleman had been in office, he had overlooked the claims and the merits of Sir J. T. Claridge? How came it that while the right hon. Gentleman held the office of Secretary for the Colonies he had never bestowed a judgeship on this gentleman? How came it that the injustice of this case had not burst upon the right hon. Gentleman until he (Sir John Hobhouse) had had the misfortune to become for the second time the correspondent of Sir J. T. Claridge? He considered that the proviso in the Order in Council on which the right hon. Gentleman had laid so much stress was somewhat extra-judicial. It, however, did not go the length of recommending him for employment, but it merely stated that he was not incapacitated from being employed. There was nothing whatever to impugn the character of Sir J. T. Claridge, who had been appointed by an able and excellent man, Mr. Charles Wynn; but neither was there anything that gave him any claim to any other appointment. He had nothing to say against the character of Sir J. T. Claridge, but he would rather not make him a judge. When the case was heard before the Privy Council, the Members of the Committee were Lord Brougham, Lord Goderich, and Mr. Charles Grant; and if they had entertained so decided an opinion as to the propriety of the reappointment of Sir J. T. Claridge, how came it that they had not reappointed him? Lord Brougham had conveyed extra-judicially to Sir J. T. Claridge that it had been the intention of the Committee in their decision to give a triumph to neither party. Shortly afterwards Sir J. T. Claridge had made a communication to Lord Brougham, to which he received no answer. He was not more fortunate in a second application; and the third time he received an answer that was by no means satisfactory. So little did Lord Brougham think himself called upon to do anything for the reinstatement of Sir J. T. Claridge, that when he applied for a silk gown, Lord Brougham thought it right to refuse even that small favour. Since the dismissal of Sir John Claridge, the office of President of the Board of Control had been held successively by Lord Glenelg, by himself (Sir J. C. Hobhouse), by Lord Ellenborough, by Lord Fitzgerald, by the Earl of Ripon (who had been a member of the Committee which had investigated the case); and then he again had the misfortune to be compelled to make the speech on this case which he was then addressing to the House. He could not see how the House of Commons could in anywise interfere in the case, and that seemed to be the real difficulty felt by the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman wanted the House of Commons to ask the Crown to give an appointment to Sir J. T. Claridge; had the right hon. Gentleman any precedent to show for such a case? He rather thought the right hon. Gentleman had not; on the contrary, he could recollect when a Motion had been made in that House on a former occasion to address the Crown to grant a pension to a gentleman, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth strongly opposed it, on the ground that it would be an interference with the Royal prerogative, and that it should be left to the responsibility of the Government. But, supposing that the House of Commons addressed the Crown on the case of Sir J. T. Claridge, and that the Crown gave him an appointment, who would be responsible in that case? It would not be the President of the Board of Control, or the Secretary for the Colonies, or the Prime Minister; for one and all these might urge that they could not do so consistently with their views of the public service, or that they had no appointments of the nature required in their gift. In that case the consequence would be that there would be no redress for the House of Commons. The House of Commons occasionally interfered to remove a man from a situation—to remove a Judge or a Minister—but never to appoint him. It would be manifestly unconstitutional, and the greatest danger to the public service might ensue from its interference with the judicial office. He hoped, therefore, that the House would not agree to the Motion. He wished it was in his power to come to some other conclusion on the subject, and to be able to say that Sir J. T. Claridge was the fittest person to be appointed as judge in India or elsewhere; but he could not give such an answer. He trusted, therefore, as no good could come of it, either to the House or to Sir J. T. Claridge, that the right hon. Gentleman would not press his Motion to a division. Motion withdrawn.

:^* Sir, in submitting to the consideration of the House the Motion of which I have given notice, I must entreat the indulgence of the House; for the nature and extent of the subject will compel me to trespass at some length upon its patience. My object is, in the first instance, to call the attention of the House to the amount of the colonial expenditure of the British empire; and in so doing, I shall endeavour to establish the following positions: 1st. That the colonial expenditure can be diminished without detriment to the interests of the empire. 2nd. That the system of colonial policy and government can be so amended, as to ensure more economical, and altogether better, government for the colonies. And, lastly, that by these reforms the resources of the colonies would be developed, they would become more useful, and their inhabitants more attached to the British empire. In speaking of colonies, I do not intend to include under that term the territories which are governed by the East India Company; but shall confine my remarks to those foreign possessions of the Crown which are under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office. Notwithstanding this limitation, the colonial empire of Great Britain contains between four and five millions of square miles—an area equal to the whole of Europe and British India added together. Of this vast space, about one million of square miles have been divided into forty different colonies, each with a separate government: four of them are in Europe, five in North America, fifteen in the West Indies, three in South America, five in Africa and its vicinity, three among the Asiatic islands, and five in Australia and New Zealand. The population of these colonies does not exceed 5,000,000: of

^*From a published Report.

this number about 2,500,000 are of European race; of whom about 500,000 are French, about 350,000 are Ionians and Maltese, a few are Dutch or Spaniards, and the remainder, amounting to about 1,600,000, are of English, Irish, or Scotch descent, Of the 2,500,000 inhabitants of the colonies who are not of European race, about 1,400,000 are Cingalese, and other inhabitants of Ceylon, and 1,100,000 are of African origin. In 1844 (the last complete return) the declared value of British produce and manufactures exported to the colonies, amounted to about 9,000,000l. sterling. The whole colonial expenditure of the British empire is about 8,000,000l. sterling a year; one half of which is defrayed by the colonies, and one half by Great Britain. That portion of the colonial expenditure which is defrayed by Great Britain, consists of military, naval, civil, and extraordinary expenditure. First, the net military expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies (including ordnance and commissariat expenditure) was returned to Parliament, for the year 1832, at 1,761,505l.; for the year 1835–36, at 2,030,059l., and for the year 1843–44 (the last return) at 2,556,919l. an increase between 1832 and 1843 of 795,414l., The present military expenditure is probably about the same as it was in 1843–44; for the military force in the colonies amounts at present to about 42,000 men (exclusive of artillery and engineers), or to about three-eighths of the whole military force of the British empire (exclusive of the army in India). For this amount of force we shall have to vote this year, first, in the Army Estimates for the pay, clothing, &c., of 42,000 men, and for the foreign staff, about 1,500,000l.; secondly, in the Ordnance Estimates for the pay of the artillery and engineers (which I will suppose to be the same as in 1843–44), for Ordnance establishments, barracks, fortifications, and stores in the colonies, about 550,0003/4.; and thirdly, in the Commissariat Estimates for commissariat services, provisions, forage, fuel, light, &c., in the cololonies, about 450,000l,. in all, about 2,500,000l, which will be the direct military expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies, for this year. To form a fair estimate of the whole military expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies, for one year, it would be necessary to add to this sum of 2,500,000l., a very considerable sum, on account of reliefs, military establishments at home, and other matters, which are in part required in order to keep up so large a military force in the colonies. It is evident, therefore, that I shall under-estimate the military expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies, when I set it down at only 2,500,000l. a year. Secondly, with regard to the naval expenditure by Great Britain on account of the colonies. At present we have about 235 ships in commission, with a complement not much short of 40,000 men. Of these ships, about 132, with a complement of about 25,000 men, are on foreign stations: some in the Mediterranean, some on the North American and West Indian station, some off the west coast of Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, others in the Chinese and Indian seas, or protecting our interests in New Zealand. Now, the House will remember that, in every debate that has taken place this year on the estimates, the extent of our colonial empire, and the new colonies which are springing up in Australia, New Zealand, and the Chinese and Indian seas, were among the chief causes assigned by the noble Lord the Member for the city of London, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, for the enormous amount of the naval force of Great Britain, and for the increase of that force, which has doubled both in magnitude and cost during the last thirteen or fourteen years. I may, therefore, without exaggeration, assume that at least one-third of the ships on foreign stations—that is, one-fifth of the ships in commission—or forty-five ships, with a complement of about 8,000 men, are maintained on account of the colonies. Now I infer from the estimates, and from the returns presented to the House, that these ships will cost the country annually, for wages and victuals of crews, wear and tear of vessels and stores, more than 700,000l. In addition to this sum, we shall have to vote this year, in the Navy Estimates, 65,000l. for naval establishments in the colonies, another 65,000l. for naval works and repairs in the colonies, and 181,000l. for freight and other matters connected with the conveyance of troops to the colonies. These sums, added together, will give a total of above 1,000,000l. sterling as the direct naval expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies for one year. To form a fair estimate of the whole naval expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies for one year, it will be necessary to add to this sum of 1,000,000l. sterling, a very considerable sum on account of reliefs, and of building new ships, likewise a portion of the cost of the naval establishments at home, and likewise a portion of the expense of the packet service to the colonies, which last item alone costs 418,000l. a year. It is evident, therefore, that I shall very much under-estimate the naval expenditure by Great Britain, on account of the colonies, when I set it down at only 1,000,000l. sterling a year, or at one-eighth of the whole naval expenditure of Great Britain. Thirdly, the civil expenditure by Great Britain on account of the colonies is chiefly defrayed by sums annually voted in the Miscellaneous Estimates, under the head of colonial services; some portion of it, however, is paid for under Acts of Parliament. It may be estimated this year at 300,000". It consists of numerous items, to some of which I shall have presently to refer. I will now only mention that we pay 27,000l. a year for the Colonial Office, 20,000l. a year for ecclesiastical establishments in the West Indies, between 11,000l. and 12,000l. a year for the clergy of North America, and that last year we divided the diocese of Australia into four bishoprics, erected a bishoprick at Cape Town, and conveyed the right rev. gentlemen who held these sees to the colonies, at the expense of this country. Lastly, under the head of extraordinary expenditure by Great Britain on account of the colonies, I put down such items as the insurrection in Canada, for which in the interval between 1838 and 1843, there were special grants to the amount of 2,096,000l.; as the Kafir war, on account of which there is a special grant this year of 1,100,000l., and for which we shall have probably to pay eight or nine hundred thousand pounds more; as the Maori war in New Zealand, which, at a low estimate, will cost half a million; as 214,000l. for the payment of the debts of South Australia, in 1842; as relief of sufferers by fire and other disasters in the colonies, for which we gave 50,000l. in 1846; as the risk of non-payment of loans, such as 236,000l. to the New Zealand Company, and 716,000l. to the West Indian planters; and innumerable other items. On the average of the last ten years, 200,000l. a year would have been wholly inadequate to cover the extraordinary expenditure by Great Britain on account of the colonies. I will put it down, however, at 200,000l. a year, and I will omit all mention of the sums paid for emancipating the negroes in the colonies, and the civil expenditure on account of our attempt to suppress the slave trade, which many persons would charge to the account of extraordinary colonial expenditure. If the four sums which I have just mentioned be added together, namely, 2,500,000l. for the Army, including ordnance and commissariat, 1,000,000l. for the Navy, 300,000l. for civil services, and 200,000l. for extraordinary expenses, the total direct expenditure by Great Britain on account of the colonies, would amount to at least four millions a year; and I am inclined to think that this is very much less than the actual annual cost of the colonies to Great Britain. Now, I beg the House to observe, that the declared value of British produce and manufactures exported to the colonies in the year 1844 was nine millions sterling, including the one million's worth of exports to Gibraltar, which are sent to Gibraltar to be smuggled into Spain. Therefore the expenditure of Great Britain on account of the colonies amounts to nine shillings in every pound's worth of its exports; or, in other words, for every pound's worth of goods that our merchants send to the colonies, the nation pays nine shillings; in fact, a large portion of our colonial trade consists of goods which are sent to defray the expenses of our establishments in the colonies. What are the advantages which we derive from our colonial possessions in return for this expenditure? Colonies are supposed to be useful either for political or commercial purposes, and with reference to these objects they should be divided into two classes, which should be considered separately; first, military stations, acquired chiefly for political purposes; secondly, colonies, properly so called, supposed to be of value chiefly for commercial objects. Our military stations are Heligoland, Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, Bermuda, the stations on the west coast of Africa, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope, the Mauritius, Hong-Kong, Labuan, and the Falkland Islands. What do these stations cost us; of what use are they to this country? They are called the outposts of the British empire, and they are supposed to be useful in periods of war, for purposes of aggression. But it appears to me that most of them are so far removed from the centre of the empire, that in time of war they would be sources of weakness and not of strength; for they would compel us, contrary to every sound principle of warfare, to scatter instead of concentrating our forces. Therefore, in the event of a really serious struggle, they would, like other outposts, in all probability, be abandoned to their fate. Moreover, it is evident that we can only retain possession of them as long as we have the dominion of the seas; but having the dominion of the seas, I cannot see why we should cover all of them with fortifications, and fill all of them with troops. I believe a wiser generation will hold wiser opinions with regard to the utility of these possessions. I will, however, for the present, suppose that some of them are of some use to the country, and proceed to tell the House what they cost us. First, Gibraltar and Malta: in 1843–4 the total expenditure incurred by Great Britain on account of these stations was 366,000l. About the same sum is expended upon them every year, for their garrisons consist of between five thousand and six thousand men (exclusive of artillery and engineers), and considerable sums are annually expended on building and repairing fortifications, naval works, &c. It is stated in the navy and ordnance estimates of this year, that the works now in progress in these two colonies will cost us 460,000l. I will not ask whether they are worth the price we pay for them. But I do question the utility of protecting the Ionian Islands with two thousand five hundred troops, at a cost to this country of about 130,000l. a year, which is somewhat more than the declared value of our exports to those islands in 1844. When England first became the protecting sovereign of the Ionian States, it was on the express condition that a portion at least of their military expense should he borne by the States; the sum to be paid was subsequently fixed at 35,5002. a year. In 1842 the Ionian States were 122,000l. in arrear; and I believe the arrears are still greater at present. We have spent large sums on military works at Corfu, and a grant of 12,873l. is to be proposed this year to complete some of these works. Therefore our military stations in the Mediterranean require about eight thousand troops, and they cost us at least half a million a year, exclusive of any portion of the expense of the fleet in the Mediterranean. That fleet, on the average of the last five years, has consisted of twenty-three ships, with a complement of 5,000 men, the expense of which, for wages, victuals, wear and tear, may be reckoned at half a million a year. The declared value of our exports to these stations is about 1,400,000l., of which nearly a million is a smuggling trade through Gibraltar into Spain. I next proceed to the Bermudas. Since the Peace we have expended there upwards of 600,000l. (exclusive of the cost of convict labour) on navy and ordnance works alone; and it is now estimated that to complete these works a further sum of 160,000l. will be required. At the Bermudas there is a garrison of one thousand two hundred men, at a cost (exclusive of the expense for convicts) of about 90,000l. a year. Now, what is the use of such costly establishments and fortifications on these worthless rocks? It is said that the Bermudas are useful as a means of aggression against the United States, and that we have garrisoned them and fortified them lest the United States should take possession of them. I believe the United States would not accept of them as a gift. They are chiefly used as a comfortable residence for the admiral on the North American station, for whom it is proposed to build a house at a cost of about 15,000l. I next proceed to St. Helena, which costs us in civil and military expenditure about 40,000l. a year, and to the colonies on the western coast of Africa, which in a similar manner cost us about 52,000l. a year. These colonies are not, strictly speaking, military stations, nor are they of much commercial importance; their main object is to impede the slave trade. The fleet which we had last year upon this station consisted of twenty-four ships, with 259 guns, and a complement of 2,781 men, and its cost was returned to Parliament for wages, victuals of crews, and wear and tear of ships, at 301,628l. a year. Besides these sums we generally expend about 80,000l. a year on other matters connected with what is called the suppression of the slave trade. Therefore, at least half a million a year is the direct expenditure by Great Britain in the vain attempt to put a stop to that traffic. It may not be proper to include all this under the head of colonial expenditure; but, nevertheless, I may be permitted to express my belief that it is a most useless expenditure, and to recommend Parliament to abandon it, together with the colony of Sierra Leone, and the other stations on the west coast of Africa, and thus to save the country an outlay of at least 450,000l. a year. I now arrive at the colony of the Cape of Good Hope (the area of which is considerably larger than that of the united kingdom). It may he looked upon as a commercial colony as well as a military station. As a commercial colony, it is not of much importance. In 1844, the declared value of our exports to it was only 458,000l., and our imports from it were 258,000l. The difference was made up by the military expenditure of Great Britain, which for 1843–4 amounted to 294,000l., or more than fifty per cent on our exports. In that year, the number of troops in the colony was 2,951 rank and file; last year, the number was at one time 5,470 rank and file. This increase was in consequence of the Kaffir war; and for the same reason the fleet on this station was increased to nine ships, with a complement of 1,700 men, which fleet must have cost this country at the rate of 170,000l. a year. For that war we have already paid 1,100,000l., and, in all probability, 800,000l. or 900,000l. more will be required to close the account. The House will not be astonished at this expenditure when it is informed, in the words of Sir Harry Smith, "that in the last bit of a brush with a Kafir chief called Sandhilli, 56,000l. were expended in waggon hire alone." One word with regard to that war, for it is a striking instance of the pranks that colonial governors can play, of the little control that the Secretary of State for the Colonies can exercise over them, and of the danger to which this country is perpetually exposed, under the present colonial system, of having vast sums of money expended upon a worthless colony. The Cape of Good Hope is the Algeria of England. The Kafir war which has just terminated was, I believe, the fourth in the last thirty years. The one which preceded it is said to have cost this country half a million sterling. All these wars have originated from nearly the same cause, namely, cattle stealing along a frontier of upwards of 700 miles. Sometimes the Kafirs stole, or were accused of stealing, the cattle of the colonists; the colonists retaliated; then they came to blows; blood was shed; the colonial government interfered; a large expenditure of public money ensued, to be paid for out of the imperial treasury. This was the case in the last war. With regard to the origin of that war, there is a great difference of opinion. Some persons, apparently with great reason, ascribe it to the discontinuance of the system of Sir B. D'Urban, and the adoption of the mistaken policy of the missionaries; and they maintain that the war was inevitable, and only too long delayed by attempts to conciliate the Kafirs. Other persons, with much show of reason, ascribe its origin and its ill success to the haste and indiscretion of the Governor, Sir P. Maitland. However this may be, the immediate cause of the war was this: a Kafir on the frontier stole an axe. He was arrested and sent off to prison. On the road a rescue was attempted; a conflict ensued; on the one side a Kafir, on the other side a Hottentot constable were slain, and the prisoner was rescued. Application was then made to certain Kafir chiefs to give up the offenders. They refused, on the grounds that the colonial authorities were not entitled by treaty to send a Kafir to prison for such a trifle as stealing an axe, and that the blood of the Hottentot had been paid for in the blood of the Kafir first killed; and they entreated the Governor not to be in haste with forces, but to have a talk about the matter and try to understand it. However, the Governor at once hastened to the frontier; by his orders Kafirland was invaded; but every arrangement was so ill made that our troops were repulsed; twice our baggage waggons were cut off; and the victorious Kafirs, in their turn, invaded the colony. For months Sir P. Maitland lived in the bush, enduring (according to his own account) unheard-of hardships, when he was very properly superseded. Great was the amazement and indignation of his successor, Sir Henry Pottinger, at the state of affairs which he discovered in the colony. He declares that he cannot give an "adequate idea of the confusion, unauthorised expense, and (as he believed) attendant peculation which had obtained." In that peculation it is rumoured that men of high station were implicated. Numerous instances of reckless expenditure are stated in Sir Henry's despatches. One of a settlement on the Kat River, where the few inhabitants were, on the plea of defending the frontier, receiving rations at the rate of 21,000l. a year. Another in the vicinity of a station called Block Drift, where rations had been regularly given to a number of Kafirs, who had been fighting against us. Sir Henry attempted to put a stop to these abuses; and the war seemed to be drawing to a close, when, unfortunately, fourteen goats were lost. They were tracked across the frontier into the territory of a Kafir chief; he was required to restore them, and to give up the supposed thief. Twelve of the goats were immediately sent back; but the chief denied all knowledge of the other two, and of the thief, if there were one. Sir Henry Pottinger was not satisfied. He ordered a secret expedition into Kafirland, to surprise the chief in question. The expedition, as usual, failed; the chief escaped; the troops retreated, after having killed a few Kafirs, and carried off some head of cattle; and the war was kindled afresh. Throughout, Sir Henry Pottinger was thwarted by a divided command; and the greater portion of his troops were unsuited for the service which they had to perform. For instance, old officers of the Peninsula, accustomed to regular warfare, were intent upon displaying their strategic skill in a contest with savages; heavy dragoons, mounted upon chargers, armed with rifles impossible to load on horseback; and English regiments, with their ordinary clothing and accoutrements, had, under the burning sun of Africa, to attack Kafirs skulking in a bush all but impenetrable to Europeans. In such a war, seven British regiments, with artillery and engineers, were not a match for half the number of naked savages armed with assegais. The war would never have been brought to a close, had it not been for the colonial corps, who, composed of Hottentots, led on by brave and energetic young English officers, followed the spoor of the Kafirs, captured their cattle, and hunted them down like wolves. By these means, Sir Henry Pottinger brought the war to a close just as he was succeeded by Sir II. Smith. Sir H. Smith, in addition to other marvellous feats, has made the Kafir chiefs kiss his foot, has proclaimed himself their only Inkosi Inkulu (great chief), and has added, on the north of the colony, some 40,000 square miles (about the size of England) of as barren a desert (to use the words of the surveyor general) as is to be found upon the earth's crust. Thus the loss of one axe and two goats on the frontier of the Cape of Good Hope has cost this country a couple of millions sterling. I attach no blame to Lord Grey or his predecessor on account of this war; it is clear from their despatches—I trust they will pardon me for saying it—that they were helpless and ignorant; and I believe Lord Grey was as much astonished as any man when he heard the amount of the bill to be paid. I warn the House, however, that, under the existing system, there is no reason whatever why, every four or five years, there should not be a similar war, with a similar bill to pay. For, with a frontier of about 700 miles in extent, causes of war with the neighbouring savages will perpetually recur. In the colony, such a war is most popular, and is wished for on account of the lavish expenditure of Great Britain; and every effort is made to prolong its duration. There is but one means of securing our purses for the future, namely, by withdrawing our troops from the frontier, and letting the colonists distinctly understand that they must defend themselves, and pay the cost of such defence. Then they will have the strongest motives to prevent the commencement and to hasten the termination of a Kafir war. In return for so doing, they should receive free institutions, and have complete control over their own expenditure. Then 1,000 troops would be a sufficient garrison for Cape Town; and in ordinary years, there might be a saving at the Cape, in military expenditure alone, to the amount of at least 200,000l. a year. If, however, public money be to be spent at the Cape of Good Hope, it would be better both for this country and for the colony that it should be spent on emigration. I believe that about 10l. a head is sufficient to defray the expense of sending emigrants to that colony. Now, the direct military expenditure by Great Britain on account of the colonies is at the rate of 60l. a year for each soldier in the colonies. Therefore, if we were to reduce our military force at the Cape by 1,500 men, and were to send there, in their stead, 9,000 emigrants a year, there would, in all probability, be a reduction in our expenditure on account of that colony; and the rapid increase of population would enable the colonists to guard their frontier effectually against the Kafirs. From the Cape of Good Hope I proceed to the Mauritius, which may likewise be looked upon, to a certain extent, as a commercial colony. The declared value of the exports to it of British produce was 285,000l. in 1844. The whole expenditure by Great Britain in 1843–44 on account of this colony was 92,000l. I should think that it costs somewhat more at present; for we have about 2,000 troops at the Mauritius, and we are going to improve the defences of the island, at the estimated cost of 150,000l. Where is the necessity for keeping this amount of military force at the Mauritius? Is it in order to keep down the planters? It is true, they are discontented and overburdened by taxation; but the best plan would be to bestow upon them free institutions, and to give them complete control over their expenditure; then 1,000 men—which was about the amount of the military force in that colony in 1826—would be an ample garrison. From the Mauritius I should proceed to Hong-Kong; but, first, I will stop for a moment at Ceylon. As Ceylon is neither a military station nor a colony properly so called, but is a subjugated territory of the same kind as our possessions in India, it appears to me that it would be better governed by the East India Company than by the Colonial Office, in which case we should have nothing to pay for the troops in that island. In 1843–4, the military expenditure by Great Britain amounted to 110,000l., in addition to a military expenditure by the colony of nearly 70,000l. At present, the military force in Ceylon consists of 4,000 troops, including colonial corps. Now, 110,000l. a year is a heavy price to pay for a colony, the declared value of our exports to which did not exceed 240,000l. in 1844. It is true, however, that the import trade from Ceylon, especially of coffee, is rapidly increasing in value. I now arrive at Hong-Kong. From the 1st of May, 1841, when we took possession of that island, up to the 30th September, 1846, we have expended upon it 314,000l., exclusive of the sums derived from the local revenue. I find in the Navy, Ordnance, Commissariat, and Miscellaneous Estimates for this year, that Hong-Kong appears under sixteen different heads, for sums amounting in all to 94,514l.; to which must be added the expense of paying, clothing, &c., of 1,200 troops, which must amount to at least 40,000l. a year. Therefore Hong-Kong bids fair to be a costly colony, as, indeed, it ought to be, when the salary of the Governor is 6,000l. a year. I should likewise observe, that to the account of Hong-Kong should be added a portion of the expense of the fleet in the Chinese and Indian seas, which consists at present of about twenty-five ships, with a complement of about 4,500 men, and which must cost at least 450,000l. a year. Therefore the total direct expenditure by Great Britain in the Chinese and Indian seas cannot be less than 600,000l. a year. As the East India Company has a fleet of its own to defend its own possessions, the greater portion of this expenditure is on account of the trade with China, which, on the average of the last four years, did not exceed 2,000,000l. a year in British produce and manufactures. Next, I have to inform the House that Labuan appears this year for the first time in our estimates, as yet only in the Miscellaneous Estimates, for the sum of 9,827l., 2,000l. of which is the salary of his Excellency the Rajah Brooke, of Sarawak, to whose dominions in Borneo we have this year appointed a consul at the salary of 500l. a year. Now, as in these matters the first step is all the difficulty, we may expect in a year or two to see Labuan, Sarawak, and perhaps in their train some half-dozen other Borneon principalities, holding conspicuous places in the Army, Navy, Ordnance, as well as Miscellaneous Estimates. Then we shall build barracks and fortifications, and garrison them with a few troops. The troops will create a demand for a small quantity of British produce and manufactures. To protect the trade thus arising, a ship or two of war will be stationed in the neighbourhood. Thus, in proportion to the increase of the public expenditure, will be the increase of the traffic, till at length we shall be informed that the British merchant is carrying a flourishing commerce with these settlements, at the usual cost to the nation of ten shillings in every pound sterling of her exports. This is the most approved Colonial Office fashion of colonising and creating a colonial trade—very different from the old English mode. I will now conclude the catalogue of the military stations with the Falkland Islands. On that dreary, desolate, and windy spot, where neither corn nor trees can grow, long wisely abandoned by us, we have, since 1841, expended upwards of 35,000l.; we have a civil establishment there at the cost of 5,000l. a year; a Governor who has erected barracks and other "necessary" buildings, well loop-holed for musketry; and being hard up for cash, he issued a paper currency, not, however, with the approbation of the Colonial Office. Thus it appears that our twelve military stations and Ceylon contain about 22,000 troops; and that portion of their civil and military expenditure which is defrayed by Great Britain amounts to at least 1,300,000l. a year, exclusive of extraordinary expenditure for Kafir wars, &c, which, on the average of the last ten years, may be put down at much more than 100,000l. a year. To these sums must he added a portion of the cost of the four large fleets which are stationed at or in the vicinity of the military stations, namely, on the Mediterranean, the African, the Cape, and the Chinese stations. These fleets consist at present of ninety-three ships, with a complement of 18,000 men, and must cost a million and a half a year for wages and victuals of crews, and wear and tear of vessels. What I propose to the House is this: to withdraw our military protection from the Ionian States; to dispense with our stations and fleet on the west coast of Africa; to reduce our establishments at the Cape and the Mauritius, and to bestow upon those colonies free institutions; to transfer Ceylon to the East India Company; to keep a sharp watch over the expenditure for Hong-Kong Labuan, and Sarawak; and to acknowledge the claim of Buenos Ayres to the Falkland Islands. Then 10,000 men, instead of 22,000, would be sufficient to garrison the military stations in the following manner; 6,000 for Malta and Gibraltar; 4,000 for Bermuda, the Cape, the Mauritius, and Hong-Kong. If this were done, there would be a reduction in military and naval expenditure to the amount of at least a million a year for the military stations alone. I now come to the colonies, properly so called, which have been planted in North America, the West Indies, and Australasia For what purposes, I ask, were colonies originally planted by England? What benefit does this country derive from he dominion over her colonies? Our ancestors would have answered these question in the following manner. They would have told us, how a little more than two centuries ago some of the inhabitants of this island, being uneasy at home, had migrated to America; they were prudent and energetic men, of the true Anglo-Saxon breed, which is best fitted to wage war with the savage and the forest; and being left alone, they flourished; and in the course of a few years, without costing one farthing to this country, they became a numerous and a thriving people. Then the shopkeepers and other traders of England wished to secure their custom, and, according to the notions of the day, they petitioned Parliament that the colonists should he confined to the English shop; first, for buying all the goods they wanted in Europe; secondly, for selling all such parts of their colonial produce as the English traders might find it convenient to buy. Parliament acceded to this request. Thence the old system of colonial monopoly, which was the sole end and aim of the dominion which England assumed over her colonies. To maintain that monopoly and that dominion, vast sums were expended, costly wars were waged, and huge military and naval establishments were kept up; but it was always supposed that the expense thus incurred was repaid by the benefits derived from the monopoly of the colonial trade. I will not attempt to strike the balance of past profit or loss. It is evident, however, that with the abandonment of colonial monopoly, the arguments in favour of colonial dominion, which were derived from that monopoly, must likewise he abandoned. Now, to monopoly free trade has succeeded, and the last relic of the colonial system, in the shape of the navigation laws, is about to perish. Our colonies are free to trade with whom they will, and in what manner they will. Therefore, they will only trade with us when they can do so more profitably with us than with other countries. Therefore, as far as trade is concerned, the colonies are become virtually independent States, except that they may not enact laws to restrain their inhabitants from buying from us, or selling to us, if it he for their interest so to do. It is evident, however, that if the colonies were independent States, they never would be so foolish as to prevent their inhabitants from selling to us; but it may he said that they might be so foolish as to prevent their inhabitants from buying from us. If this be all the mischief which, as far as trade is concerned, is to he apprehended from the colonies becoming independent States; then it follows that all the benefit which, as far as trade is concerned, we derive from the sums which we expend on colonial dominion, consists in the power which we thereby possess of averting the possibility of the colonies enacting hostile tariffs against our produce and manufactures. The amount of this benefit must evidently depend upon the value of our export trade to the colonies. Now, the declared value of the export of British produce and manufactures to the North American, West Indian, and Australasian colonies for the year 1844 (last complete return) was about 6,000,000l.; the direct expenditure by Great Britain, on account of those colonies, cannot be less than two millions sterling a year. I ask, is it worth our while to spend a couple of millions a year to guard against the possibility of a diminution in an export trade of 6,000,000l. a year? I put this question to any mercantile man: would it be worth his while to pay 6s. 8d. in the pound on the value of his goods, to secure that those goods shall freely compete with the goods of other nations in the markets of the North American, West Indian, and Australasian colonies? And if it be not worth his while, is it worth our while to pay it for him? This is undoubtedly a great and marvellous empire, in many respects unparalleled in history, but in no respect more marvellous than with reference to its colonies. Every other nation has attempted, in some shape or form, to draw tribute from its colonies; but England, on the contrary, has paid tribute to her colonies. She has created and maintained, at an enormous expense, an extensive colonial empire for the sole purpose of buying customers for her shop-keepers. This (as Adam Smith has justly observed) was the project, not of a nation of shopkeepers, but of a Government influenced by shopkeepers. It may be said that I have omitted to consider the value of the import trade from the colonies, which is equal to the value of the export trade; but no one fears that the colonies would, if they became independent States, refuse to sell to us; they would only be too happy so to do. We do not, therefore, require colonial dominion in order to buy from them; and in fact, we do not really require colonial dominion even to sell to them; for if we buy from them, it would be for their interest to receive payment in our produce and manufactures, if cheaper than those of other countries, and that interest would in the long run prevail. It does appear to me, therefore, to be a manifest absurdity to spend vast sums of money on colonial dominion for the purpose of securing free trade with the colonies. I now ask is this large colonial expenditure by Great Britain necessary in order to maintain the connexion between Great Britain and her colonies, which shall secure free trade between them, and the other benefits which I do believe Great Britain may derive from her colonies? I must be permitted to consider these questions separately with regard to each of the three great divisions of the colonies. In the North American colonies, the military force amounts to about 9,000 men. The military expenditure by Great Britain, for the year 1843–4, was 698,000l. The civil expenditure by Great Britain for the same year was 34,000l.; this sum included an annual charge of about 12,000l. for the North American clergy, and of about 15,000l. for the Indian department. The whole direct expenditure by Great Britain for that year was returned to Parliament at 736,691l. To this sum must be added a portion of the expense of the packet service, which costs 145,000l. a year; and a portion of the expense of the fleet on the North American and West Indian station, which, on the average of the last ten years, must have cost 300,000l. a year. When it is remembered that in addition to these sums, Parliament specially granted, in the interval between 1838 and 1843, 2,096,046l. on account of the insurrection in Canada; in 1846, 50,000l. to sufferers by fire at Quebec and St. John's; and in other years, smaller sums on account of Rideau Canal, canal communication in Canada; militia and volunteers in Canada, &c. &c, which in the interval between 1835 and 1847, amounted to 193,174l., it follows that the North American colonies have cost Great Britain at the rate of at least a million sterling a year during the last ten years, and at present they must cost at least 800,000l. a year. Now, on the average of the five years ending with 1844, the declared value of British produce and manufactures exported to the North American colonies was 2,600,000l. a year. Is it worth our while to pay 800,000l. a year, that is, 30 per cent on these exports, to guard against the possibility of some diminution in that trade? For what purpose do we keep 9,000 troops in North America? Is it to protect the colonists against the United States? But if they are loyal at heart they are strong enough to protect themselves; if they are disloyal, twice 9,000 men will not keep them down. But suppose they were to separate from us, and to form independent States, or even to join the United States, would they not become more profitable as colonies than they are at present? The United States of America are, in the strict signification of the word, still colonies of Great Britain, as Carthage was a colony of Tyre, and the cities of Ionia and Sicily were colonies of Greece; for the word colony does not necessarily imply dependency, but merely a community composed of persons who have removed from one country and settled in another, for the purpose of cultivating it. Now, our colonies (as I will term them) of the United States are in every point of view more useful to us than all our other colonies put together. In 1844, we exported to the United States produce and manufactures to the value of 8,000,000l.; an amount equal to the whole of our real export trade to all our colonial dominions, which we govern at a cost of 4,000,000l. a year; while the United States cost us for consular and diplomatic services not more than 15,000l. a year; and not one ship of war is required to protect our trade with the United States; in fact, a British ship of war is very rarely seen off the coasts of the United States. Again, more emigrants go directly from this country to the United States than to all our other colonies put together. In the last ten years, according to the returns of the Emigration Commissioners, 1,042,000 emigrants left this country, of which number 552,000 went directly to the United States; how many went indirectly through Canada, I cannot undertake to say. Last year 251,0000 persons emigrated from Great Britain to North America, 142,000 of whom went directly to the United States, the remaining 109,000 to the colonies. At present it is considered that colonies are chiefly useful as affording markets for our produce and outlets for our population. It is evident that in both these respects independent colonies are as useful as dependent ones. I do not, however, propose to abandon the North American colonies; but if we are compelled to choose between the alternative of the continuation of the present vast expenditure and that of abandoning these colonies, it is evident that the latter alternative would be the more profitable one in an economical point of view. But I maintain, that if we govern our North American colonies as we ought to govern them, follow out rigorously the principle of responsible government, and leave them to manage their own affairs, uncontrolled by the Colonial Office, we may with safety diminish our military force and expenditure, and they will willingly continue to be our fellow-subjects. In the West Indies the military force amounts to about six thousand men. In the year 1843–4, the military expenditure was 513,386l.; the civil expenditure was 74,462l. This civil expenditure consists of an annual charge of 20,300l. for ecclesiastical establishments, of about 18,000l. for the salaries of governors, and of about 35,000l. for the salaries of stipendiary magistrates. The total amount of the direct expenditure incurred by Great Britain, on account of these colonies, for 1843–4, has been returned at 593,834l., or within a trifle of what it was in 1835–6. But in order to form a fair estimate of the whole cost of these colonies, we should add to this direct expenditure a portion of the expense of the fleet on the North American and West Indian station, which fleet, as I have already stated, must cost the country at least 300,000l. a year; a portion, likewise, of the expense of the packet service to and from the West Indies, which is contracted for at 240,000l. a year; likewise something on account of the risk of the non-repayment of loans, such as 50,000l. this year, on account of the hurricane in Tobago; 166,000l. which the Colonial Office, somewhat usurping the ordinary functions of Parliament, promised, without consulting Parliament, to British Guiana and Trinidad in February last; and the 500,000l. with which the noble Lord the Member for the city of London has vainly hopped to appease the West Indian interest. How much of these loans will ever be repaid? And we must likewise add the cost of landing captured negroes free of charge in the West Indies; I have already mentioned the cost of capturing them. I am afraid, therefore, that our West Indian colonies will, in future, cost this country directly much more than 700,000l. a year, which is just one-fourth of the declared value of our annual exports to these colonies, on the average of five years, ending 1844. And that export trade is decreasing, and will decrease; for there can be no doubt that the value of West Indian property has greatly diminished. I will not trespass on the patience of the House by making any observations on the state of the West Indies, as that subject was so fully discussed a short time ago. I will merely remark, that some West Indian proprietors have said that we must either restore the value of their property, by protecting their sugar, or they will throw off our dominion. Now, if we must choose between these alternatives, there can be little doubt which would be the cheaper. For, if we were to abandon those colonies, there would be a direct saving of 700,000l. a year, and no protecting duty on sugar. In fact, if we were to make them a present of ten millions sterling, on condition of their becoming independent States, we should be gainers thereby to the amount of at least 350,000l. a year. Though I utterly disbelieve that the West Indian colonies can ever be of the slightest value to the country, as colonies, for their climate is quite unsuited to our race, and they will, in all probability, become negro islands, like Haiti; though they have been the most costly, the most worthless, and the worst managed of our colonies, a perpetual drain on the pockets of the people of England; yet I do not propose to abandon them, except at the express wish of the colonists. I should merely propose to reduce our military force to half its present amount, and to effect a saving of about 300,000l. a year. In the Australian colonies, including New Zealand, the number of troops must at present be about 5,000 men; and the military expenditure by Great Britain must amount to about 270,000l. a year. The civil expenditure by Great Britain for this year, according to the Miscellaneous Estimates, will be about 30,000l. a year. Therefore, the direct expenditure by Great Britain, on account of these colonies, must amount to at least 300,000l. a year, exclusive of such items as 14,402l. for the abandonment of Lord Stanley's colony of North Australia; 214,936l. which we first lent, and then gave, in consequence of Colonel Gawler's extravagances in South Australia; and I know not how much for the follies of Captains Hobson and Fitzroy in New Zealand, who involved us in a war with the natives, which is still going on. The bill has not yet been sent in. Will 500,000l. cover it? I am afraid not; for portions of three regiments are quartered in that colony; and there are three or four ships of war, with a complement of about eight hundred men, stationed off the coast. These ships must cost, for wages, provisions, wear and tear, &c, about 80,000l. a year. Now, the declared value of our exports to the Australian colonies, on the average of the five years ending 1844, was only 1,000,000l. a year; putting down our expenditure only at 300,000l. a year, that expenditure would amount to 30 per cent on the value of our exports. Now, it is certain that not one single soldier is required in Australia except to keep the convicts in order; nor would one soldier have been required in New Zealand had it not been for the preposterous mismanagement of that colony by the Colonial Office. Supposing, however that 2,000 men were required for the convict service in Van Diemen's Land, and 1,000 men for New Zealand, the military force in the Australian colonies might be reduced to 3,000 men. Thus, it appears that the military force in the North American, West Indian, and Australian colonies, amounts to about 20,000 men, and the direct expenditure by Great Britain, on account of these colonies, to about 2,000,000l. a year. I should propose to reduce that force to 10,000 men, whereof 4,000 men would be sufficient for North America, 3,000 for the West Indies, and 3,000 for Australia; and then, in my opinion, less than 1,000,000l. a year would suffice to defray the expenses of those colonies to Great Britain. Therefore, the whole reduction which I should propose at present to make in that portion of the colonial expenditure which is defrayed by Great Britain is 2,000,000l. a year. I should effect that saving partly by a reduction of 22,000 men in the military force in the colonies; partly by a reduction of the naval and civil expenditure on account of the colonies; and partly by removing the causes which have led to Canadian rebellions, Kafir and New Zealand wars, and the like. If this were accomplished, still, however, the colonies would continue to cost the large sum of 2,000,000l. a year; but I believe that a further reduction might ultimately be made on account of the commercial colonies; indeed, they might cost us next to nothing if we gave them complete control over their own affairs, on condition that they should pay their own expenses. The military stations, however, must always be a source of great expense; and if we retain them we must be content to pay dearly for our whistle. Before I leave this subject I must call the attention of the House to a Treasury Minute of 10th June last, in which my Lords of the Treasury complain of the delay in rendering, and especially in auditing, colonial accounts. My Lords instance those from Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Falkland Islands, Van Diemen's Land, and New South Wales; and the Commissariat accounts from China, the Cape of Good Hope, Van Diemen's Land, and New South Wales, to which I will add those from St. Lucia, South Australia, and Western Australia. My Lords state that these accounts are so much in arrear that they cannot admit the sufficiency of the reasons assigned for that delay. The delay has certainly been very extraordinary. I find that there are, at present, in the Audit Office the unaudited accounts of ton years from the Mauritius; of eight years from the Cape of Good Hope; of SIX years from Ceylon; and of four or five years from the other colonies to which I have referred. It is evident that, with such delay, it is impossible to exercise an effectual check over colonial expenditure. I shall now proceed to the consideration of that portion of the colonial expenditure of the British empire which is defrayed by the colonies themselves. A return has just been presented to the House of that expenditure for the last year, in which it could be made up. In most instances it is for the year 1845; it is not materially different from the returns for previous years; I may, therefore, without any considerable inaccuracy, assume that it represents the ordinary annual expenditure by the colonies, and especially for the year 1845. From that return, it appears that the total expenditure by all the colonies—excepting Ceylon, and the stations on the west coast of Africa, for reasons which I will presently state; and likewise the Ionian islands, from which there was no return—was about 3,350,000l. for the year 1845. The population of these colonies was about 3,400,000; therefore, the annual expenditure was at the rate of 19s. 8d. per head of the population. The rate of expenditure, however, varies considerably in different colonies, according to the form of local government. It is greater or less, according as the colonists have loss or more control over their own expenses. This is a most important fact, to which I wish to call the especial attention of the House. I have instituted a comparison between the rate of expenditure of those colonies which have, and those which have not, representative assemblies. From that comparison I have omitted Ceylon, because Ceylon is not a colony, properly so called, but belongs to the class of our Indian possessions; and it is evident that a rate of expenditure which might be considered trifling for a population composed chiefly of Europeans, might be excessive for a population of the Cingalese and Veddahs of Ceylon. I have likewise omitted the colonies on the west coast of Africa; for there is no account of their population on which any reliance cane placed; and the Ionian Islands have also been omitted, because, as I have already said, their expenditure has not been returned to Parliament in the return in question. With these omissions, I find that the rate of expenditure of the colonies with representative assemblies is less than one-half of the rate of the expenditure of the colonies without representative assemblies. The colonies, with representative assemblies, have a population of about 2,580,000, and their expenditure, in 1846, was 1,930,000l., or at the rate of 14s. 11d. per head of their population. On the other hand, the population of the colonies, without representative assemblies, was about 820,000, and their expenditure, in 1845, was 1,420,000l., or at the rate of 1l. 14s. a head of their population, or 18s. 7d. a head more than in the colonies with representative assemblies. I am convinced that this great increase of the rate of expenditure in the Crown colonies is mainly to be attributed to the want of self-government; for it is most apparent when the rate of expenditure, in each class of colonies, is examined and considered separately. The rate of expenditure is the lowest in the North American colonies, where there is the greatest amount of self-government; in fact, since the last insurrection in Canada, and the establishment of the doctrine of responsible government, Canada has become, in most respects, an independent State, except as far as the civil list is concerned, and except that it is now and then subjected to some mischievous and foolish interference on the part of the Colonial Office. Now, the expenditure of the North American colonies in 1845, was 1,134,000l., their population was 1,700,000; therefore the rate of expenditure was 13s. 1d. per head of the population, or 1s. 7d. less than the average rate of the colonies with representative assemblies. But it should be remarked, that of the 1,134,000l. expended in 1845 by the North American colonies, 500,000 was an extraordinary expenditure by Canada, on account of new works and buildings, a large portion of which was defrayed by a loan. If a portion of this loan be omitted, as it ought to he, from the annual expenditure, then the rate of expenditure by the North American colonies for the year 1845 would have been nearly the same as it was for the year 1842, when it amounted to about 9s. a head of the population. Though this rate of expenditure is low as compared to our other colonies, yet it is about 30 per cent higher than that of the United States for similar purposes. The difference mainly arises from the high scale of salaries paid to the higher functionaries in the North American colonies. Generally speaking, those functionaries receive from three to four times the amount of the salaries of similar functionaries in the United States. For instance, in the Canadas, with a population of 1,200,000, the Governor is paid 7,000l. a year; in the United States, the President has only 5,000l. a year, and no governor has more than 1,200l. a year; in the State of New York, with a population of 2,600,000, the Governor only receives 800l. a year. Again, the Chief Justices of Upper and Lower Canada are paid 1,500l. a year each, while the Chancellor and Chief Justices of the State of New York receive only 800l. a year each. The puisne Judges of Canada receive 1,000l. a year each; those of New York only 200l. a year each. The Governor of Nova Scotia is paid 3,500l. a year; the Governors of New Brunswick and Newfoundland are paid 3,000l. a year each. In Massachusetts, with a population much larger than that of the three last colonies added together, the salary of the Governor is only 500l. a year. In fact, the four North American colonies which I have just mentioned, pay 2,500l. a year more for the salaries of their four Governors, than the thirty States of the Union do for their thirty Governors. Now in the colonies the salaries are fixed by the various civil lists. These civil lists, being removed for a series of years from the control of the representative assemblies, are perpetual causes of quarrelling and discontent; and there is always a dispute going on between the Colonial Office and some colony or other on this subject, which frequently leads to the most unpleasant results. For instance, the dispute about-the civil list of Canada was one of the causes which ultimately led to the insurrection in that colony; and at present the Colonial Office is involved in a civil-list quarrel with British Guiana. In all these quarrels, the object of the Office is to keep up the pay of its functionaries; and the object of the colonists is a reduction of expenditure. There can be no doubt that the salaries of the higher functionaries in the colonies are excessive as compared to the standard of the United States, which is the usual standard of comparison in the colonies. For the salaries of the Governors of the thirty States of the Union amount in all to but 14,000l. a year; therefore the average is 460l. a year for the salary of each Governor. Now there are eighteen British colonies which pay for their own governors; their salaries amount in all to 72,000l. a year; therefore the average is 4,000l. a year for the salary of each of these Governors—or nearly nine times the rate of pay in the United States. In fact, nine out of the eighteen Governors in question receive as much as, or more than, the President of the United States. For instance, the Governors of Canada, the Mauritius, and Ceylon, receive 7,000l. a year each; the Governor of Jamaica has 6,500l. a year; and the Governors of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Isles, the Cape of Good Hope, and New South Wales, have 5,000l. a year each. I do not think this rate of pay is too high for noble Lords and other gentlemen of rank and connexion, when they undertake the duties of governors of the colonies; but if we are determined to employ such persons in the colonies, we ought to pay for them ourselves. On the other hand, if we insist upon the colonies paying their governors, it appears to me that, with the exception of the military stations, we should permit the colonies to elect their own governors and other functionaries, and to pay them what salaries they think fit. Such was, in olden times, the constitution of our colonies of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachussets. And the honour and distinction attached to the office of governor would induce the best men in the colonies to serve for moderate salaries. If, however, the colonists were to choose, in any particular case, a person unfit to be a governor, they would be the sufferers; they would have no one but themselves to blame: but, as I will presently show, it would be difficult for them to make a worse choice than the Colonial Office generally makes. To return to the question of the comparative rates of expenditure in those colonies which have, and those colonies which have not representative governments. In the West Indies the colonies with representative assemblies are Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands—with the exception of St Lucia—and the Bahamas. Their population is about 700,000; their expenditure in 1845 was 450,000l., or at the rate of 12s. 10d. per head of their population; the rate of Jamaica was 13s. Now, compare this rate with that of the West Indian colonies without representative assemblies, namely, St. Lucia, Honduras, Trinidad, and British Guiana—the Combined Court of which cannot with any propriety be termed a representative assembly—their population is about 190,000; their expenditure, exclusive of the cost of immigration, was 284,000l., or at the rate of 1l. 9s. a head, or more than twice as much as that of the West Indian colonies which have representative assemblies. The salaries of the higher functionaries in the West India colonies are all excessive, as compared with the standard of the United States. Twelve governors and lieutenant-governors receive 29,000l. a year, 16,000l. of which are paid by the colonists to five governors. As I have already observed, the Colonial Office is involved in a civil-list dispute with British Guiana. In consequence of the distressed condition of that colony, at the close of last year, the elective members of the Court of Policy proposed a reduction of 25 per cent upon all salaries above 700 dollars a year. The Colonial Office refused to accede to this proposal; and the Governor carried the estimates for the year in the Court of Policy by the exercise of his double vote. The Combined Court then refused to vote the supplies for the period required by the Governor. The Colonial Office has retaliated upon them for this conduct by stopping immigration to British Guiana, and by refusing the usual licenses to carry liberated negroes from Sierra Leone to that colony. This unexpected proceeding has occasioned considerable inconvenience and loss to various shipowners in this country, who complain that no reliance can be placed upon the Colonial Office with its perpetually shifting-regulations. The Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius have each of them about the same population, namely, 160,000, and being Crown colonies, their rate of expenditure is about the same as that of the Crown colonies of the West Indies, namely, 1l. 7s. a head; they are grievously taxed, especially the Mauritius. As I have already said, the Governor of the Mauritius has 7,000l. a year; and the Governor of the Cape has as much as the President of the United States. It may be said that the rate of expenditure is higher in the Crown colonies, because, generally speaking, those colonies are more thinly peopled than the colonies with representative assemblies. It is perfectly true, that, everything else being the same, the rate of expenditure in a thinly peopled territory will generally exceed that of a thickly peopled one. But the Crown colony of the Mauritius is four times as densely peopled as Jamaica, yet the rate of expenditure in Jamaica per head of the population, is loss than one-half what it is in the Mauritius. Again, the Crown colony of Malta is one of the most densely peopled spots on the face of the earth; yet the rate of expenditure is 16s. 6d. a head of the population, or twenty per cent more than that of the plantations in the West Indies; or nearly double the ordinary rate of expenditure in the thinly peopled North American colonies. Again, Malta is more than twice as thickly peopled as the Ionian States; but those States have a certain amount of self-government, and their rate of expenditure in 1840—the last return which I have been able to get at—was 14s. 3d. a head, or 2s. 3d. a head less than that of Malta. Ceylon is the only apparent exception to the rule, that the rate of expenditure of colonies governed by the Colonial Office is greater than that of the self-governed colonies. According to Sir Emerson Tennent the population of Ceylon in 1846 must have amounted to 1,500,000, and the expenditure in that year was 498,000l., or at the rate of 6s. 7d. a head of the population. It is true this rate of expenditure is lower than that of any other colony, yet I believe it will be found to be extravagant when the nature of the population is considered. For it ought to be compared with that of the territories governed by the East India Company, which are inhabited by an analogous population, but are locally governed by men carefully selected on account of their special aptitude. The population of those territories is said to be about 93,000,000, and the expenditure on the average of the five years ending 1844 was 20,000,000l. sterling, therefore at the rate of 4s. 3d. a head of the population, or one-third less than that of Ceylon. There can be no doubt that if Ceylon were transferred, as I propose, to the East India Company, it would be more economically governed than it is by the Colonial Office. Lastly, with regard to the Australian colonies. New South Wales is the only one which has a representative assembly of any kind. It commenced its existence in 1843, and immediately caused an extraordinary diminution in the expenditure. In 1841 the free population of New South Wales amounted to about 102,000, and the ordinary expenditure, exclusive of immigration, was 350,000l., or at the enormous rate of 32. 4s. a head of the population. In 1843 the Representative Assembly at once diminished the expenditure for the subsequent year by 60,000l.; and in 1846, when the free population amounted to 178,000, the expenditure was only 254,000l., or at the rate of 12. 8s. a head of the population. This extraordinary reduction in the rate of expenditure may be attributed, to a certain extent, to immigration; but the reduction in the positive amount of expenditure can he distinctly traced to the commencement of local self-government in 1843. Compare the rate of expenditure of New South Wales with that of the neighbouring colony of Van Diemen's Land, which has in vain petitioned for a representative assembly. In 1842 the free population of that colony amounted to 37,000, and on the average of the four years ending with 1844, the expenditure, exclusive of immigration, was 161,000l., or at the enormous rate of 42. 6s. a head. This rate of expenditure was not very different from that of the kindred colony of New South Wales prior to the establishment of representative government; but it was more than three times that of New South Wales after the establishment of representative government. It must, however, be acknowledged that the difference in the rate of expenditure of the two colonies may be attributed in part, though certainly not altogether, to the abolition of transportation to New South Wales, and to its continuance in its worst form to Van Diemen's Land. The House may remember the appalling description which was given last year of the loathsome moral state of the convict population of that colony and its dependency, Norfolk Island; of their hideous crimes; of their frightful diseases; and of their atrocious murders. It was shown that the unhappy state of that colony was brought about partly by the negligence of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Stanley—partly by the mismanagement of the then Governor of Van Diemen's Land, Sir Bardley Wilmott; and partly by the misconduct of the then Commandant of Norfolk Island, Major Childs. In consequence of these horrid disclosures, it was announced last year to the Governor of Van Diemen's Land, Sir W. Denison, that it was the intention of the Government that transportation should be discontinued altogether; and that announcement was received with great satisfaction in the colony. Unfortunately, it now appears that transportation is to be renewed to Van Diemen's Land, though in a mitigated form. The colonists will be bitterly disappointed and exasperated when they receive this information. At present they are discontented; for to meet the vast expenditure of the colony, taxes have been imposed which the judges have pronounced to be illegal; and one of the judges so deciding has been removed by the Governor, as the colonists believe, in consequence of his decision; a belief which, from the statements made to the House by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, appears to be unfounded. The colonists, however, will have every reason to be dissatisfied with the renewal of transportation, which will mar their prospects, and make them for ever the plague spot and reproach of Australasia. In the other Australian colonies which have not representative governments, I am unable to state with accuracy the rate of expenditure per head of the population. In South Australia, at one time, it exceeded 10l. a head per annum; and the colony became utterly bankrupt through the extravagance of its Governor, Colonel Gawler. We had to liquidate its debts, partly by a gift in 1842 to the amount of 214,236l., and by a loan of 85,000l. This loan will be repaid, because South Australia is becoming rich in consequence of the discovery of mines. With regard to these mines, it is said that the Colonial Office has created great dissatisfaction in this colony by reserving a royalty of one-fifteenth of their gross produce. The House is probably not aware that almost every year the Colonial Office makes some change in the management of the waste lands of the Australian colonies, which affects to a greater or less extent the value of all landed property in those colonies. For instance, with reference to minerals. Originally all minerals were reserved to the Crown, and only the surface of the soil was conveyed to the purchaser. In one instance, however, Lord Bathurst, when Secretary of State for the Colonies, gave all the coal in New South Wales to one company. In consequence of these reservations, no one had any interest in searching for or in discovering mines, therefore no mines were discovered, or, if discovered, they were carefully concealed. When, however, the noble Lord the Member for the city of London became Secretary of State for the Colonies, he, with his usual good sense, at once perceived the impolicy of such reservations, and under his rule all minerals were conveyed to the purchaser of the soil. Then mines were discovered, especially in South Australia; and then, to the astonishment of most persons, the Colonial Office determined upon reserving a royalty upon all future mines. [Mr. HAWES: No, no!] What! Do you mean to say that you have in no instance reserved a royalty? [Mr. HAWES: I mean to say that the late Colonial "Secretary, Lord Stanley, did it.] Well, it matters not who did it. The consequence is, that the previously discovered mines, which are nearer the coast, and therefore can he worked with less expense, will have to pay-nothing, whilst the subsequently discovered mines, which are further from the coast, and therefore more expensive to work, will have to pay a royalty of G| per cent on their gross produce. Such a measure is bad on economical grounds, and bad also in policy. For sound policy requires that this country should interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of its colonies, and, above all, as little as possible with their pockets. The policy of the noble Lord (the Member for the city of London) was the right and statesman-like one; sell your land to the colonists and have done with it. Seigneuries and royalties are relics of feudalism, wholly unsuited to colonies. Their establishment is another instance of the utter ignorance of men and things which the Colonial Office generally displays in its administration of the colonies; and, to crown the absurdity, the Emigration Commissioners report that these royalties arc, at present, not worth collecting in South Australia. Swan River, alias Western Australia, has a delicious climate, much good land, plenty of coal, and is well situated for commerce; it might have proved a flourishing colony by this time, but it was overlaid at its birth by the Colonial Office. Its expenditure exceeds its income, and we have to pay seven or eight thousand pounds a year for its civil government. Lastly, New Zealand. I do not know the rate of expenditure per head of the population in that colony. Its expenditure, however, far exceeds its income. We annually vote between twenty and thirty thousand pounds a year for its civil government; exclusive of the bill which we shall have to pay for Maori wars. In the course of the last two years we have voted that 236,000l. shall be lent to the New Zealand Company, which I hope will be repaid some day or other. In that colony, what with imbecile governors in the beginning, what with constitutions proclaimed and suspended, what with quarrels with the natives, what with missionaries and land sharks, there has been a state of the most extraordinary confusion; yet, I believe, through the indomitable energy of our race, New Zealand will ultimately become a flourishing colony, the Britain of the Southern Seas. The House may remember that in 1846 the Colonial Office imagined a nondescript constitution for New Zealand, and sent it off post haste to that colony. It was to divide New Zealand into two provinces, New Ulster and New Munster. Each was to have a representative assembly. When the constitution arrived, Governor Grey refused to bestow it on New Ulster, on the grounds that it would enable the British population to legislate for and tax the natives. Therefore, Governor Grey suspended the constitution of New Ulster till he could receive further instructions; but he expressed his opinions in very strong terms that the inhabitants of New Munster were fit for a constitution. When this intelligence reached the Colonial Office, Lord Grey immediately proposed to Parliament a Bill (which was passed about three or four months ago) to suspend the constitution of both provinces. Now I infer, from late accounts from the colonies, that New Munster has obtained its constitution; and perhaps its representatives will be assembled, and will be hard at work legislating, when orders will arrive from England to suspend their constitution and to dismiss them with ignominy. A curious farce is the history of the management of this colony by the Colonial Office. This same nondescript New Zealand constitution was sent by the Colonial Office to New South Wales for the colonists to inspect, and to see how they would like a similar one. They have rejected it with scorn and contempt. I am afraid, Sir, that the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, notwithstanding his very great abilities, will not be renowned in future history as either the Solon or Lycurgus of Australia. I think I have sufficiently established my position that, in every portion of the globe, the British colonies are more economically and better governed in proportion as they are self-governed. In North America the various States of the Union govern themselves twenty-five per cent cheaper than the Canadas do, which are, to a certain extent, under the control of the Colonial Office. In the West Indies, the Crown colonies, which are governed by the Colonial Office are twice as heavily taxed as the plantations; and in Australia, and in the Mediterranean, the same rule holds good. These facts justify the conclusion at which I now arrive, that the greater the amount of local self-government, and the less the Colonial Office interferes in the internal affairs of the colonies, the more economically and the better the colonies will be governed. In the course of the last ten years petitions complaining of Colonial Office government, and praying for representative government, have been presented from the Cape of Good Hope, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, Western Australia, South Australia, New Zealand, British Guiana, Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Malta. The prayer of only one of those petitions has been acceded to. New South Wales has obtained a mongrel form of representative government, which must soon be amended, though not in the fashion proposed by the Colonial Office. All the other petitions have been rejected. Now I do not assert that each of these colonies would derive the same amount of benefit from free institutions; but I am prepared to maintain that with representative government every one of them, not excepting the Mauritius, would have been more economically and better governed than they have been or are governed by the Colonial Office. In saying this I do not mean to speak with disrespect cither of past or present Secretaries of State for the Colonies; but there is no essential difference between them; the system is throughout the same, whoever may he the nominal chief. Of that system, however, I do intend to speak with disrespect; and I can quote in justification of my so doing some high authorities on this side of the House, who have carefully studied the subject. I mean my right hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. C. Buller), the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Ward), and the noble Earl at the head of the Colonial Office, before he became Secretary of State for the Colonies. As long as that system exists, the majority of the colonies must be ill governed, and their inhabitants discontented; for the Colonial Office undertakes to perform an impossible task. It undertakes the administration, civil, military, financial, judicial, and ecclesiastical, of some forty different communities, with various institutions, languages, laws, customs, wants, and interests. It undertakes to legislate more or less for all these colonies, and altogether for those which have no representative assemblies. It would be difficult enough to discharge all these functions in a single office, if all the colonies were close together and close to England; but they are scattered over the surface of the globe from the Arctic to the Antarctic Pole. To most of them several months must elapse, to some of them a whole year must elapse, before an answer to a letter can be received, before a petition can be complied with, or a grievance redressed. Therefore, orders which are issued from the Colonial Office in accordance with the last advices from a colony are, in innumerable instances, wholly unsuited to the state of the colony when the orders arrive; in some cases, questions which time has settled are reopened, forgotten disputes are revived, and the tardy interference of the Colonial Office is felt to be a curse even when a wrong is redressed. In other eases, the instructions of the Colonial Office are wisely disregarded by the governors, or rejected with derision by the colonial assemblies, who marvel at the crass ignorance of their transatlantic rulers. In addition to its other arduous functions, the Colonial Office is required to assist in the vain attempt to suppress the slave trade with Africa; and it has likewise the difficult task of administering a secondary punishment in a penal colony at the antipodes. Now, if it were possible for any mortal man to discharge the duties of such an office, it is evident that he ought to possess, not merely great mental powers, but a long and intimate acquaintance with the affairs of the different colonies; he should be brought up to the business, it should be the study of his life, and he should be appointed on account of his special aptitude to conduct such business. Is this the rule for selecting Secretaries of State for the Colonies? Nothing of the kind. They are generally chosen haphazard from the chiefs of the two great political parties in this or the other House of Parliament; and they retain their office, on the average, some eighteen months or so. During the last nine years there have been no less than six Colonial Secretaries—namely, Lord Glenelg, Lord Normanby, Lord John Russell, Lord Stanley, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Grey; all of them, I acknowledge, are men of great ability; all of them, I believe, most anxious to use their abilities for the benefit of their country and of the colonies; but I feel persuaded that one-third of them had little or no acquaintance with colonial affairs prior to their acceptance of office; just, therefore, as they were beginning to learn the wants and interests of the more important colonies, and to acquire the first rudiments of colonial lore, they were succeeded by some other statesman, who had to commence his lessons as Secretary of State for the Colonies, and to try his hand in the despotic and irresponsible government of some score or so of dependent States. In fact, the Colonial Government of this country is an ever-changing, frequently well-intentioned, but invariably weak and ignorant despotism. Its policy varies incessantly, swayed about by opposite influences; at one time directed, perhaps, by the West India body, the next instant by the Anti-Slavery Society, then by Canadian merchants, or by a New Zealand Company, or by a Missionary Society: it is everything by turns, and nothing long; Saint, Protectionist, Freetrader, in rapid succession; one day it orignates a project, the next day it abandons it, therefore all its schemes are abortions, and all its measures are unsuccessful; witness the economical condition of the West Indies, the frontier relations of the Cape of Good Hope, the immoral state of Van Diemen's Land, and the pseudo-systematic colonisation and revoked constitution of New Zealand. Such a government might suit serfs and other barbarians; but to men of our race, intelligent and energetic Englishmen, accustomed to freedom and to local self-government, it is one of the most hateful and odious governments that can well be imagined. It is difficult to express the deep-seated hatred and contempt which is felt for the Colonial Office by almost every dependency subject to its sway. If you doubt this fact, put the question to the West Indies and the Mauritius; put the same question to Van Diemen's Land, to New South Wales, to New Zealand, and your other Australian colonies; from all of them you will receive the same answer, and the same prayer to be freed from the control of the Colonial Office. Even the Canadas are not content, though they have responsible government; and though, in most respects, they are virtually independent of the Colonial Office, yet every now and then the Colonial Office contrives to produce irritation by stupid interference in some question of minor importance, such as the regulations of a banking bill, or the amount of a petty salary. Though the colonies have ample reason to complain of the manner in which their affairs are administered by the Colonial Office in this country, they have still greater reason to complain of the governors and other functionaries who are sent by the Colonial Office to the colonies; for, generally speaking, they are chosen, not on account of any special aptitude for, or knowledge of, the business they will have to perform, but for reasons foreign to the interest of the colonies. For instance, poor relations, or needy dependants of men having polical influence; officers in the Army or Navy who have been unsuccessful in their professions; briefless barristers; electioneering agents; importunate applicants for public employment, whose employment in this country public opinion would forbid; and at times, even discreditable partisans whom it is expedient to get rid of in the colonies; these are the materials out of which the Colonial Office has too frequently manufactured its governors and other functionaries. Therefore, in most cases they are signally unfit for the duties which they have to perform, and being wholly ignorant of the affairs of the colony to which they are appointed, they become the tools of one or other of the colonial factions; whence perpetual jealousies and never-ending feuds. The governors, the judges, and the other high functionaries, are generally on hostile terms. The governors remove the judges, the judges appeal to us for redress; every year a petition or two of this kind comes under the consideration of Parliament. To settle such questions the Colonial Office has just created a new tribunal, composed of an ex-Indian judge and railway commissioner, and of an ex-permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies; the one with little knowledge of colonial affairs, the other famed for years as the real head of the colonial system, and therefore reputed to be the evil genius of the colonies. It would be easy to cite instances which have occurred during the last ten years which would illustrate every one of these positions. I forbear, however, from mentioning names, as the facts are notorious to every one who has taken any interest in colonial affairs. It is no wonder that the colonies are discontented, and that they are badly and expensively governed. Is there any remedy for this state of things? I have traced the evil to its source in the colonial system of the Colonial Office. Can that system he amended? It appears to me that the Colonial Office, as an instrument for governing the colonies, must always be far inferior to any mode of self-government by the colonists. For it is evident that at least in ninety-nine cases out of every hundred, the colonists, the men on the spot, must he better judges of their own interests than honourable gentlemen far away in Downing-street can possibly be. It is evident, likewise, that (though the empire at large has a deep interest in the good and economical government of the colonies; though all of us here present are most sincerely desirous that the colonies should be contented and happy), yet we have other things to do besides studying colonial affairs and looking after the Colonial Office. Therefore, the Colonial Office is virtually irresponsible; it may play what pranks it pleases; it is only when we have to pay for a Canadian insurrection, or a Kafir war, that an outry is raised, and the Colonial Office is called to account, and then there is not above a score of us who know anything about the subject, even after a laborious study of the documents carefully prepared for the purpose by the Colonial Office. Remember, likewise, that implicit reliance cannot be placed on those documents. Some, for instance, are long didactic despatches, written for the sole purpose of being presented to Parliament, not intended to produce any specific results in the colonies; but full of well-turned periods, containing lofty sentiments and apparently statesman-like views, calculated to gain credit for the Office, and to satisfy the minds of honourable, ignorant, and confiding Members, who soon afterwards forget all about the matter. Again, as a collection of materials for enabling the House to form a judgment with regard to colonial affairs, those documents are not to be trusted, for, generally speaking, they are tainted with partiality, and necessarily so; because they are selected out of a vast mass, on account of their supposed importance—of that importance the Colonial Office is the sole and irresponsible judge—it determines without appeal what shall be produced and what shall be suppressed—in so doing, it must obey the unchanging laws of human nature, and attach greater importance to those documents which confirm its views, and less importance to those which are adverse to its opinions; the former, therefore, obtain its special care, and are sure to be produced; the latter are comparatively neglected, and liable to be forgotten and suppressed; the result is inevitable, namely, partial statements; instances of human fallibility, affording incontestable proofs of the impossibility under which this House labours of forming a correct judgment with regard to colonial affairs. For similar reasons the Colonial Office labours under a similar difficulty, because the statements made to it by the colonial authorities must frequently be of a partial character, and at times wholly untrustworthy; yet always months and sometimes whole years elapse before any explanation of those statements can be obtained. Therefore ignorance and irresponsibility are the characteristic defects of our present mode of governing the colonies. For these defects there is no remedy but local self-government. Hence I come to the conclusion, that we should delegate to the colonies all powers of local legislation and administration which are now possessed by the Colonial Office, with the reservation only of those powers the exercise of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the sovereignty of this country, or might be directly injurious to the interests of the whole empire. It appears to me that the powers that ought to be so reserved, are few in number, and could easily be defined. To determine them, it would be necessary merely to consider what are the benefits which this country may derive from the colonies, and what is requisite to secure the continuous enjoyment of those benefits. Colonies are useful either as affording markets for our produce, or outlets for our population. To prove their utility as markets, my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard, in his most able and admirable speech in 1843, on systematic colonisation, showed that the rate of consumption of British produce and manufactures, per head of the population, was very much greater in colonies than in other countries. Of the correctness of this position there can be no dobut. In 1844, Continental Europe, with a population of about 220,000,000 of inhabitants, did not consume more than 24,000,000l. worth of our produce and manufactures; whilst our colonies (including the United States), with a population not exceeding 25,000,000, consumed 16,000,000l., worth of our goods. Therefore, while the rate of consumption of our goods did not exceed 2s. 2d. a head in Continental Europe, it amounted to 8s. a head in the United States, 1l. 12s. a head in our other colonies. It must, however, be admitted, that a considerable portion of our trade with our subject colonies, consists of goods sent to defray the cost of our establishments there. Making, however, every fair deduction on that account, still it cannot be denied that they are excellent markets for our goods; it is very unfortunate, therefore, that they cost us so much as 16s. a head of their population, for government and defence, as that sum must absorb the greater portion of, if not all, the profit of our trade with those colonies. To show the utility of colonies as outlets for our population, I may refer to the reports of the Emigration Commissioners, from which it appears that in the course of the last twenty years 1,673,803 persons have emigrated from this country, of whom 825,564 went to the United States; 702,101 to the North American colonies, 127,188 to the Australian colonies, and 19,090 to other places. It would be interesting to know what has been the cost of this emigration, and how it has been defrayed. I cannot put it down at less than 20,000,000l, sterling, of which about 1,500,000l. were paid out of the proceeds of land sales in the Australian colonies. This emigration has varied considerably in amount from year to year; from the mini-mum of 26,092 persons in 1828, to the maximum of 258,270 persons last year. If averages of five years be taken, it appears to have gone on steadily increasing in amount; for on the average of the five years ending with 1832, it amounted to 60,000 persons a year; ending with 1837, to 66,000 persons a year; ending with 1842, to 86,000 persons a year; and ending with 1817, to 121,000 persons a year. Therefore, the habit of emigrating is confirmed, and becoming more powerful every day; and therefore colonies are becoming more useful as outlets for our population. Therefore, free trade with the colonies, and free access to the colonies, should, in my opinion, be the sole end and aim of the dominion which Great Britain still retains over her colonies. By keeping these two objects distinctly in view, by bestowing upon the colonies all powers of local legislation and administration which are not absolutely inconsistent with those objects and the sovereignty of this country, I believe that our colonial expenditure might be greatly diminished in amount, and that our colonial empire would flourish and be-come of incalculable utility to this country. I do not propose to abandon any portion of that empire. I only complain that it is of so little use to us; that it is a vast tract of fertile desert, which cost us 4,000,000l. sterling a year, and yet only contains a million and a half of our race. Would it not be possible to people this desert with active and thriving Englishmen? To cover it with communities composed of men with wants, habits, and feelings similar to our own, anxious to carry on with us a mutually beneficial trade? In this country, every trade, every profession, and every branch of industry are overstocked; in every quarter there is a fierce competition for employment. On the contrary, in the colonies, there is an equally fierce competition for labour of every kind. Now, is there any mode of bridging over the oceans that intervene, so that our colonies may be to the united kingdom, what the backwoods are to the United States? If such a plan could be devised, if it could be carried into execution, it might tend to solve the most difficult economical problems of England and of Ireland. To carry such a plan into execution, two things would be requisite. First, funds wherewith to convey the poorer classes to the colonies. How could such funds be obtained? The hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gateshead, and my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard, have, in their numerous and able speeches upon this subject, told us that sufficient funds could be obtained by the sale of waste lauds, according to the well-known plan of Mr. Wakefield. I hold the same opinion. I firmly believe that with continuous and systematic emigration, sufficient funds could be so obtained. But I will suppose, for the sake of argument, that they must be obtained, for the present, from some other source. Now, I ask the House to consider, first, that we spend four millions sterling a year in the colonies on Army, Navy, Ordnance, Commissariat, Kafir wars, Canadian rebellions, and the like; secondly, that for half four millions—the sum which I propose to save by a reduction of colonial expenditure—we might send annually to Australia 150,000 persons, and to Canada twice that number. I ask the House, at the expiration of ten or fifteen years, from which of these two modes of expending the public money would the nation derive the greater benefit? Our Army, Navy, and Ordnance cost us at present from six to seven millions sterling a year more than they did in 1835, when their force was ample for the defence of the empire. What have we to show in return for this enormous increase of expenditure? A Canadian insurrection suppressed, a Kafir war terminated, barren trophies in India, the gates of Somnauth, Hong-Kong, Labuan, and the Falkland Islands. What should we have had to show for it had only a portion of it been expended on colonisation? A third part of it—the two millions a year which I affirm can be spared from our colonial expenditure—would have been sufficient in ten years to double or triple the British population af our colonial empire. For instance, that sum would in ten years have conveyed a million and a half of our fellow-citizens to Australasia: where the climate is so peculiarly suited to our race, where abundance of food can easily be obtained; there, flourishing and contented, they would have been anxious to purchase our produce and manufactures: wealthy States, worthy of the British name, would have been generated, carrying on with us an enormous trade; self-governed they would have needed neither army nor navy to protect them, and would have gladly defrayed every local expense. That would have been a colonial empire to boast about. Again, the same sum of two millions sterling a year would, in ten years, have conveyed to North America some three millions; say, of Irishmen. With that sum I believe you might have created beyond the Atlantic a now and happy Ireland, so attractive to the Celtic race that they would have migrated in shoals from the old and unhappy Ireland, and thus, perhaps, have enabled you to solve that fearful problem, which neither Gagging Bills, nor Coercion Bills, nor Alien Bills, nor even a repeal of the Union, will ever solve. That, indeed, would have been a feat for a great statesman to acccomplish, and would have covered his name with immortal renown! I do grudge the four millions a year which we squander upon our colonies, when I consider what might be done with half that sum for the benefit of this country, and of the colonies, by means of systematic colonisation. But to colonise beneficially, it is necessary that the higher and richer, as well as the poorer classes; that the employers of labour as well as the employed; that all classes of society should migrate together, forming new communities, analogous to that of the Parent State. On such principles alone have successful colonies been founded in ancient or modern times. On such principles the colonies of Greece and of New England were founded. For instance, from the overcrowded cities of Greece the colonists departed under the guidance of their foremost men; they carried along with them the images of their heroes and their gods, whose common worship linked them for ever to their ancient home—arrived at their destination, they formed States after the model of the parent city; they flourished in wealth, excelled in all the arts of civilised life, extended the empire, and added to the renown of the Dorian or Ionian name. Not dissimilar in principle was the old English mode of colonising, except that our colonies, instead of commencing their existence as independent States, professed their allegiance to the mother country; but their charters gave them all the essential powers of self-government, and complete control over their internal affairs. They flourished rapidly, were most loyal, and sincerely attached to our empire, till we drove them into just rebellion by our now colonial system. Very different from these successful modes of colonising has been that of the Colonial Office. It has been either a shovelling out of paupers or a transportation of criminals, whereby some of the fairest portions of the British dominions have been converted into pest-houses of pauperism, or sinks of iniquity, polluting the earth with unheard-of diseases and unmentionable crimes. No gentleman, no man of birth or education, who knows anything about the matter, would ever think of emigrating to a colony, to be under the control of the Colonial Office. But if the colonies were properly planted, and self-governed according to the old fashion, then our kinsmen and friends, instead of overstocking the liberal professions, instead of overcrowding the Army and Navy, where no career is open for them, would seek their fortunes in the colonies and prosper. For we are by nature a colonising people. The same destiny that led our forefathers from their homes in the farthest east, still urges us onwards to occupy the uninhabited regions of the west and the south; and America, and Australia, and New Zealand, anxiously expect our arrival to convert their wastes into happy abodes of the Anglo-Saxon race. In making these observations, I wish merely to show, that if vast sums of money are to he expended on the colonies, they can he expended in a manner far more beneficial to the interests both of the colonies and of the rest of the empire than they have been hitherto expended. I do not, however, intend to propose to the House any plan of systematic colonisation, or any grant of public money for that purpose. My only objects, at present, are reduction of useless expenditure, and reform of had colonial government, which are things good in themselves without reference to any ulterior measures. But I will presume to express my belief that there is a great and noble career open for any statesman who, possessing the power, shall with firm and vigorous determination, curtail that expenditure, reform that system of government, and, at the same time, promote systematic colonisation. In what manner colonial expenditure can be curtailed without detriment to the interests of the empire, in what manner the system of colonial government can be amended for the benefit of the colonies, I have attempted to show; and in the hope that I have succeeded in proving that that expenditure ought to be curtailed, and that system of government ought to be amended, I take the liberty of moving the resolution:—

"That it is the opinion of this House that the Colonial Expenditure of the British Empire demands inquiry, with a view to its reduction; and that to accomplish this object, and to secure greater contentment and prosperity to the Colonists, they ought to be invested with large powers for the administration of their local affairs."

And if the Government will accede to this Motion, I give notice that next Session I shall follow up this subject by moving for a Committee of Inquiry.

rose with considerable diffidence to address the House, after a speech which had displayed such great ability and such extensive knowledge of the subject; but be rose with great confidence to second the Motion of the hon. Baronet. There was scarcely any opinion which the hon. Baronet had expressed in the course of his extended speech which be was not prepared to maintain and support. He agreed with the hon. Baronet that the large expenditure which this country undertook on account of its colonies was productive of very little beneficial result in its application. He believed, too, that this expenditure was sometimes admitted as a justification of the perpetual and mischievous meddling of the Colonial Office with the internal affairs of the colonies. The idea of colonial administration to which these evils were incident was a very miserable substitute for the policy which in former times regulated the relations between this country and the colonies; that policy was inexpensive, it was practically beneficial to the colonies, and did not require that those who administered it should be overwhelmed with an amount of business which no human capacity could properly execute. He was astonished that Earl Grey should have been led for one moment to support such a system as this. Did the system work well? The working was absolutely ridiculous. Look at the present feeling existing in the colonies in regard to their administration. It was said this was one of the ancient institutions of the country; that it was hallowed by long associations. The very reverse was the fact. Gentlemen were alive who remembered the time when no Colonial Office existed. It was not his intention to speak with disrespect of the noble Lord at the head of the Colonial Department; but to whatever individual the fault might be attributed, it was notorious that the working of the Colonial Office was in the highest degree unsatisfactory; and one of the most offensive features in the system arose from the fact of its perfect irresponsibility. There was a strange and mysterious agency always at work in the Colonial Office, with which nobody could cope, and which nobody could understand. A party of persons interested in one of the colonies paid a visit, in the character of a deputation, to the Secretary of State. They laid before him some colonial evil, and asked for redress. A remedy was proposed, and the parties took leave of the Minister, thankful for the kindness with which he had attended to their interest; and reported to their friends that nothing was more satisfactory than the interview they had had. They expected they were going to have their grievances redressed; but by and by, on the same evening perhaps, at some dinner party or ball room, some attaché of the Colonial Office made it apparent that all their expectations were idle—that the Colonial Office had no intention of carrying out the measures—and that in fact the deputation had only lost their time, and mistaken their errand. What could be more offensive than to find that these irregular communications—these backstairs announcements—were better founded than the solemn assurances of the Secretary of State? It was impossible that these sort of proceedings could often go forward without creating extensive and well-founded discontent; for this irregular influence was always exercised on the side of obstruction and bad feeling. His hon. Friend had called attention to the most flourishing colony of South Australia. That colony had the single advantage of costing this country nothing. The persons who founded that colony deserved every encouragement from the Colonial Office; but the whole encouragement they had received from the Colonial Office would afford an entertaining article in the columns of Punch. The colony of South Australia was formed in spite of the Colonial Office: it was now the most flourishing colony of the British Crown. The Colonial Office had an unlimited extent of fertile soil at their disposal; at home there was a people entirely disposed to colonisation, and gifted with qualities most calculated to succeed. There was a large amount of the working classes suffering from the circumstances of the times, and most anxious to obtain employment in distant dependencies. There was also any amount of capital which could be employed with safety. With such elements, wisely and judiciously combined, the most magnificent results might be expected. What were the results? The Colonial Office had made such use of these elements that they had rendered anything which deserved the name of colonisation almost impossible. He could appeal to the hon. Member for Liskeard, if in making this broad assertion he was not using the language of soberness and truth. Who were the parties who now proceeded to our colonies? Men of no character, adventurers and malcontents, and believers in El Dorado—men who did well in no country—formed the bulk of the present settlers, and it was out of materials such as these that you expected to produce great and flourishing colonies. There was at this moment a great desire amongst the working classes to emigrate to the colonies, and there were thousands of men in England pining for opportunities of distinction, willing to confront any trial, if it would only lead to a career of honourable enterprise—men inferior in no high quality to those colonists who laid the foundations of our colonial empire—men whose presence amongst the emigrants would be an incalculable blessing both to them and any settlement to which they might proceed, but who would not hear of the colonies on the terms on which they were now offered them. It used to be said that the bold Anglo-Saxon colonists brought their Lares and their Vates with them; but that was not exactly the fact, for they carried no such things with them. It was true they carried the Habeas Corpus Act and the Bill of Rights with them, and every colonist might go to church on a Sunday if in the colony in which he was placed he had a church to go to. The most peculiar characteristic, however, of the system of colonisation was, that we, who were a monarchical people, had spread persons of democratic principles over the globe. It had been remarked by Mr. Fox of the British, that there was no system but the British constitution under which a British subject could live with comfort; but he had not described the character of the colonies. He believed that the subject was of the greatest importance—that the destinies of this country were intimately connected with our future colonial policy; and he was firmly impressed with the conviction that more depended upon our colonial policy than ever depended upon the issue of a battle, or upon the approach of a revolution. British colonisation was one of the most important subjects which could engage the attention of Parliament, and therefore he had pleasure in seconding the Motion.

thought, whether he regarded the importance of the subject involved in this debate, upon which he entirely concurred with his hon. Friend who had just sat down—or whether he considered the magnitude of the subject, or the multiplicity of details which it involved—and admitting fully at the same time the propriety of discussing it; he must at the outset ask the House to extend to him its kindness and indulgence while he drew somewhat largely on its attention. Both his hon. Friend who supported the Motion, and the hon. Baronet who introduced it, had impugned not only the colonial policy of the present day, but the whole colonial policy of England. Reproaches, too, had been heaped upon the Colonial Office and his noble Friend now at the head of it—reproaches in which he begged humbly to take his share. [Mr. HUTT: If the hon. Gentleman alluded to him, he begged it to be distinctly understood that he cast no reproaches upon the noble Lord at the head of the Colonial Office.] He thought that what fell from his hon. Friend the Member for Southwark (Sir W. Molesworth), did cast not only reproach upon the colonial system, but upon those who had long and now administered it. Now, it was not for him to presume to defend all the errors and defects which might in past times have characterised our colonial system; but this he did say, that our colonial policy, taken as a whole, was the most successful and the most beneficial which the world had ever witnessed. He asked hon. Members who thought otherwise to point to any foreign colonial possessions either now or in past times where there had been the same success and the same progress. Let them point to any system of colonial government, ancient or modern, where free popular institutions had been so systematically established—where a free press and trial by jury were universally conceded—where personal liberty and political power were so fully enjoyed, so freely conferred, as in the colonial possessions of the British empire. This was the system of colonial government he defended. Both his hon. Friends had referred to and lauded what they were pleased to call "the old colonial system." Now, much as be had endeavoured to ascertain what that system was, he owned that the phrase referred to conveyed to his mind no very definite idea. He had heard it said that the old colonies of America were to be taken as a model by which we were to be guided in amending our colonial system. Now, he hardly knew one of those colonies which bad not been exposed to the direst vicissitudes and misfortunes and disasters, recurring, too, through long periods of time; and when hon. Gentlemen talked of colonies to be formed and founded, comprising every grade of society, he asked them to tell him when and where they found members of the aristocracy, and men of great eminence under the older colonial system, going out for the purposes of colonisation. They might be found going out for the purposes of gaining wealth, tempted by the possession of slave labour—they might find them going out simply from motives of gain—but certainly not for the purpose of colonisation in the sense in which we now understood the term. He believed there was not one colony of recent foundation to which we might not point as a triumphant contrast to the chequered progress of the old American colonies. Whether we looked to New Zealand, or South Australia, or Port Philip, or any other place where we had attempted to found a colony—everywhere the most marked success had attended our efforts, so much so, that it ought to encourage us to continue in the course which contrasted so beneficially with the older colonies to which reference had been made. Not one of the old American colonies had succeeded so rapidly, for instance, as South Australia—not one. He was, therefore, not disposed to recur to the old colonial system, as it was called, when he remembered that it comprehended both monopoly and slavery within its supposed elements of success—nor was be disposed to look with favour upon that system until he had ascertained more definitely from his hon. Friend what that system really was to which he referred. The hon. Member for Southwark had referred to the patronage of the Colonial Office. He thought he had beard him say, that none but needy adventurers, men with Parliamentary influence, were appointed to important positions in our colonies. His hon. Friend, he thought, might have recollected name after name of men who had held high office in the colonies, some even at the present moment, which would give the most decisive answer to this charge. He did not now speak of the exercise of patronage by his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Department—what he said applied to and included those who had preceded him. His hon. Friend might have recollected the names of many Governors of our colonies, which would show to the House that men of distinguished ability and the highest character had then, as now, been called to fill official positions. He might have recollected the name of Lord Metcalfe first in Jamaica, and subsequently in Canada; of Lord Elgin also, first in Jamaica, and afterwards in Canada, which he now so ably governed, in harmony with the feelings and wishes of the people; of Sir Harry Smith at the Cape of Good Hope; of Sir W. Colebrooke, now going out to Barbadoes—men all marked out by peculiar ability, and eminently fitted for their duties. It appeared to be necessary to remind the House of these appointments, since they were overlooked by his hon. Friends. They were now speaking not to England only, but to the colonies, and it was important to show that the appointments to high places in our distant possessions had not been made from the unworthy motives which had been assigned; but that men had been appointed whose ability had been proved by the success which had attended their administration. He might refer to more recent appointments—to Mr. More O'Ferrall, Governor of Malta. Was there any man could impugn that appointment? To Captain Grey, Governor of New Zealand. Was there any man could impugn that appointment? To Lord Harris at Trinidad, and to many others, which would equally show that the motives assigned had not influenced these appointments to the government of our colonies. His hon. Friend had said, that he was for conferring upon the colonies at once a large measure of self-government; but he understood him at the same time to say, that he was for abandoning none of our colonies. It followed, therefore, as a general rule, that all our colonies should be self-governed. Now, he admitted to a very large extent, that wherever a colony was found fitted for that form of government, the home authorities were bound to confer it; but when his hon. Friend looked over our colonial empire, he would find that that general maxim admitted of great and necessary qualification. Take, for instance, Canada, where self-government has been carried to the utmost point. Did his hon. Friend mean to say that he would apply the same form of government to the little island of Nevis? Take the Mauritius, which was excluded from self-government. That was a colony partaking of a military character as well as a colony; in which imperial interests had to be consulted, as well as the welfare of the colonist. Both could now be reconciled. But if a perfect system of self-government prevailed, imperial interests would clearly become subordinate, and in the upholding of these interests the colony was deeply interested. Then, again, where there were hostile races, or where Europeans were in a minority, would his hon. Friend give local self-government to a mere European minority, and thus, perhaps, place absolute power in their hands? It was here that the moderating influence of the Crown came in, and had been useful in maintaining a harmonious action between hostile races and between unequal numbers of different races; a result which, from obvious causes, could scarcely be expected from placing power without control in the hands of a European minority. Experience here was a safer guide than mere speculation. Our colonial possessions might be grouped in four classes. There was first our territorial possessions, over the surface of which we sought to diffuse our race, name, and language. They varied essentially one from another. Such were our North American and Australian colonies, New Zealand, and South Africa. Then there were the plantations, the great object of which was to supply tropical produce to this country. There were great anomalies and difficulties in the way of applying self-government to these islands, obvious to the most casual observer. Then there were our trading possessions, our great commercial depôts, such as Hong-Kong, Labuan, and our various possessions on the west coast of Africa. Those possessions were held for different purposes of policy and interest, and did not admit of one uniform system of government. Then there were the great military stations, but which he understood his hon. Friend did not mean to include in his sweeping policy. This general survey of the colonial possessions of the country showed the impossibility of subjecting them to any one system of government. The government must be varied with the variation of their necessities and peculiarities, which forbade, even if it were possible, the uniform application of one system through all our colonial possessions. He quite agreed with the hon. Baronet in thinking that local self-government ought to be the rule. He was not at all disposed to interfere with that as the general rule; and, whenever a colony or a community was fitted to receive that form of government, it ought to be the first duty of this country to confer that privilege upon it. He was prepared to show, that this had been the guiding principle of our colonial policy. Whilst he was glad to hear that his hon. Friend did not propose to abandon the colonies, it followed, whilst they were retained, that some form of home or central government must exist, whether, as now, by the responsible superintendence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or by a colonial commission as proposed by some high authorities. But a home or central authority must be retained in some form or shape very similar to that which at present existed. The hon. Member for Gateshead had talked of the despotic authority of the Colonial Office; and so did the hon. Member for Southwark. What did they mean? Despotic authority! Where was it exercised? The Colonial Minister was amenable to Parliament. The humble individual who now addressed the House was there to explain and defend, as far as he thought it could with justice he defended, the colonial policy of the country. The debates relating to the government of New Zealand could scarcely be forgotten. They were an answer to the charge of despotic authority. And equally so was the power of moving for papers which the House possessed. The debates upon the government of New Zealand, the full disclosure of every transaction in that colony, were equally an answer to the allegation that any secret influence existed—a charge rather made to give zest to speeches in that House, than founded upon fact. Such an imputation was calculated to injure the just authority of the Colonial Government; and he regretted that for a mere passing purpose such observations should be made. But he would now proceed to state how far the principles of self-government, or responsible government, had been recognised as part of that colonial policy which he defended. Would any one deny that Canada possessed the largest measure of self-government? She made her own laws with scarcely any interference; she imposed her own taxes; she expended their produce. She possessed the largest powers of self-government any colony ever possessed. Not only had she local self-government, but she had responsible government; and never had Canada enjoyed it so fully as since Lord Elgin had held the reins of government. He acted without reference to one party or the other; and the Ministry he appointed to conduct the affairs of the country was the Ministry in which the majority of the Assembly had confidence. Such was the principle of colonial government in Canada; and he must add, that Canada, when throughout Europe the greatest anxiety prevailed, and the greatest changes were taking place, was perfectly tranquil and contented with the Government she possessed. In Canada, no attempt had been made to create either excitement, or even advocate a change of government. On the contrary, the people relied on the Government they had, which was that of the majority of the Assembly; and in conformity, therefore, with the wishes of the majority of the people electing the members of that Assembly. Canada, then, presented a case in which responsible government had been carried to a practical and successful result. New Brunswick presented another instance. There a complete system of local self-government existed. He held in his hand an extract of a despatch which his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Department had addressed, in June, 1848, to the Governor of New Brunswick:—

"The principle on which, in my judgment, the Governor of a representative colony, such as New Brunswick, should act, is that of endeavouring to form such a council as he thinks will command the greatest confidence from the inhabitants and their representatives, and, when constructed, to give to it all fair support in carrying on the government of the province, while at the same time he should carefully abstain from committing himself to the interest of any one political party in such a manner as to place him under any difficulty in giving similar constitutional support to their opponents, if through any change in public opinion, a change of his council should become necessary."

Such were the principles on which his noble Friend had acted with respect to New Brunswick. The hon. Baronet seemed to think he had enunciated a new principle, which had never heretofore been acted on. In Nova Scotia, again, a change of Administration had taken place. The province was satisfied with the change; and the Administration was now conducted by the new Ministry, having the assent of the Assembly, and the Governor giving them his cordial support, according to the instructions of the noble Lord at the head of the Colonial Department. He would quote a passage from a despatch dated November 3, 1846, addressed to Sir John Harvey, the Governor of Nova Scotia, in which his noble Friend said—

"The object with which I recommend to you this course, is that of making it apparent that any transfer which may take place of political power from the hands of one party in the province to those of another, is the result, not of an act of yours, but of the wishes of the people themselves, as shown by the difficulty experienced by the retiring party in carrying on the government of the province according to the forms of the constitution."

Well, then, Nova Scotia also had a constitution, had local self-government. Generally, the North American possessions of this country enjoyed the large and full fruits of the British constitution. But the hon. Member for Southwark made some rather harsh observations on the Bill of his noble Friend for the government of New Zealand, overlooking altogether the liberal and constitutional character of that Bill. The hon. Member was not very accurate in what he said. That Bill, he was disposed to think, did confer a good constitution; in that Bill, for the first time, there was introduced this most important provision—a provision for a franchise to the native population. It was, he believed, the first time in the history of the colonies that the attempt had been made to introduce the natives to the exercise of political power; and there were many who would soon become qualified to exercise the privileges conferred. A more intelligent race did not exist—men more fitted to make good subjects of the Queen. With respect to Australia, his hon. Friend had said, the constitution had given great dissatisfaction in the colony: now no constitution had been proposed. How stood the fact? A despatch, not a Bill, had been sent out to elicit the opinions of the colonists. The object of his noble Friend was to place a general measure before the colonists. Their opinion was adverse to the scheme thus propounded—the Bill which Lord Grey intended to propose was at an end—and the future Bill which, in consequence, it might be his duty to propose—would be founded upon the existing constitution of New South Wales, with full power to amend it as the wants or wishes of the colony should suggest. That was surely not a measure indicating despotic authority, or a determination to govern the colonies without consulting them. Then it was said, the Cape ought to have representative government. What had been done? His hon. Friend had attempted to show that an indisposition existed on the part of the Government to grant a constitution and local self-government to the Cape. The fact was quite the. reverse. Among the papers printed and presented to the House was a despatch dated the 10th of December, 1841, from Sir G. Napier, then Governor of the Cape, to Lord Stan-Icy, recommending a representative government for the Cape. Lord Stanley replied in a despatch, in which he made many objections to the scheme, but expressed a hope they would be successfully met. But the noble Earl at the head of the Colonial Department, having had his attention called to the subject, addressed the Governor in a despatch dated the 2nd of November, 1846, as follows—

"I turn now to a totally different subject, on which I hope to receive the benefit of your advice and assistance so soon as the settlement of the affairs of Caffraria shall have left you leisure for the purpose. I advert to the applications which have been addressed to Her Majesty for the establishment of a representative form of government in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. Her Majesty's Government entertain the strongest prepossessions in favour of that system of colonial polity, and will be prompt to avail themselves of any opportunity of extending it to the British settlements in Southern Africa."

The House was aware that the progress of the Cape had been interrupted by the Kaffir war; and that the consequent state of the colony was unfavourable to the establishment or consideration of constitutional government. But peace had been restored; and to show that this great principle of our colonial government was not forgotten, he would now quote a passage from a despatch of Sir Harry Smith, dated December 10, 1847:—

"I propose to myself, with reference to your Lordship's despatch to me of the 10th of September last, to embrace in one general report the remodelling of the whole of this Government upon a comprehensive view, ever regarding popular representation as the true English form of government."

Thus the first thing Sir H. Smith did after the termination of the war was to turn his attention to the civil government of the colony; and they had his assurance that he would speedily make a report upon the civil government of the Cape upon a popular basis. Passing now from their territorial possessions, they came to their colonies in the West Indies—the plantations. Here a different state of things existed: there were small European communities, and a large coloured population. Whether in Trinidad, or the smaller islands, or in British Guiana, the observation applied to all. He asked his hon. Friend if he was prepared to confer upon these colonies local self-government? If so, one of two things must happen. They must either take precautions to secure a large and extended franchise for the coloured population, or they must prepare for the small European minority exercising a power over the coloured population without control—a power he doubted whether any one who was well acquainted with these colonies would wish to see thus exercised. He spoke advisedly when he said—and he was sure that every one acquainted with the legislation of the West Indies for the last ten or fifteen years would hear him out—that the tendency of that legislation had been to pass laws with reference to the labouring population which would have more or less placed them in a state of entire subserviency to their masters; and he believed the influence of the Crown had been most beneficially exercised in controlling, on the one hand, the power of the Council and the Assembly; and on the other in restraining the labouring population, and maintaining a harmonious action between those two portions of these communities. But then, it was said that colonies possessing representative assemblies conducted their affairs more economically than those governed by the Crown. Now, they had no returns sufficiently correct to form any sound judgment upon this point. He must state candidly that he had found the greatest difficulty in obtaining anything like an accurate account, whether of population or of finance, or the expenditure and cost of government in the West India colonies having representative assemblies. He must candidly state, that if there were any colonies with regard to which there existed difficulties in ascertaining these matters, they were our West India colonies. New Zealand, New South Wales, and Australia supplied statistical returns of the greatest accuracy; but this was not the case with the colonies he had referred to. And with regard to the calculations of his hon. Friend, especially those relating to New South Wales, it must be remembered that the rapid introduction of 40,000 or 50,000 emigrants would alter materially the cost of government, and affect the general result when the cost of government was measured by its comparative cost per head of the population. Without accurate information on these points, therefore, no results on which dependence could be placed could be obtained. He would refer to one instance. He held in his hand a return of the cost for one year of the government of British Guiana. The total cost, including military expenses, (which were 42,000l.,) was 313,000l. The mother country only contributed the amount required for military protection, stipendiary magistrates, &c.; and of the 270,000l. which was raised by the colony. 100,000l. was spent in immigration. [Mr. BARKLY: You mean dollars.] No. The accuracy of the amount was undoubted; 100,000l., not dollars, was spent in the importation of labourers; but his hon. Friend (Sir W. Molesworth) had not directed their attention to this point. [Sir W. MOLESWORTH specially excluded the expenses of immigration.] He did not so understand the statement of the hon. Baronet, and had therefore selected this colony as presenting a remarkable instance of the apparent cost of the government, whilst it included so large an amount for the importation of labour. Again, his hon. Friend had pointed out Hong-Kong as a settlement where great extravagance prevailed, and, as he understood him, he objected to the policy which led to its formation. Now, when he referred to the reports from Hong-Kong, he found strong proofs of the wisdom of those who founded it. Sir J. Davis, in a despatch dated the 13th of March, 1847, forwarded the third blue book of the colony, being for the year 1846, which showed that the income for that year had increased, from 22,000l. to 27,000l. in 1847; and further, that whilst the income had increased, the expenditure had diminished, the difference amounting to 6,375l. Thus, while the income was increasing, the expenditure was decreasing. Hong-Kong was an important station, and was maintained for the protection of our trade, and not for the sake of patronage; and it could only be upheld by the and of a naval and military force. But it was not fair to charge that expenditure upon the colony. Indeed he might here remark that if they had no colonies they would still be obliged to maintain a large fleet and a considerable force for the general protection of trade and commerce; so when the hon. Gentleman spoke of the packet service in connexion with our colonies, he must protest against the hon. Gentleman's inference, because it was clear that that service must be maintained, whether they had colonies or not. In the review which his hon. Friend had taken, he had but slightly noticed the island of Ceylon. Now, he was happy to tell the House that the fixed establishment in Ceylon had been recently placed under the review of the Council; and he was confident that in that island, as in other colonies, great reductions of expenditure might be and would be made. The tariff had been revised, and duties largely reduced already. He quite agreed with his hon. Friend, that it was their bounden duty to reduce the colonial expenditure in every case as far as was compatible with efficiency; and with regard to Ceylon, they had an earnest of this declaration by the Legislative Council having been called upon to review the cost of the fixed establishments, which had hitherto been withheld from their control. Many complaints had been made of the cost of the government of the Mauritius; but in September last, when there was a great probability of a commercial crisis in that colony, his noble Friend (Lord Grey), seeing the approach of difficulties, urged upon the colonial government the duty of reducing the expenditure, and, consequently, the taxation of the island. They had now received from the Governor a reply to these instructions, from which it appeared that there had been effected a reduction of taxation to the amount of 65,000l., including an immediate relief to the planters to the extent of 30,000l. a year, by taking off the stamp duty on the indentures of labourers; and relief to other classes to the extent of 20,000l. He had now shown, that as regarded self-government there was every disposition to establish it where the colonies were in a condition to receive it; and as regarded the expenditure, he had shown two marked instances, namely, Ceylon and the Mauritius, where taxation had been greatly reduced. He had proved that the Colonial Office had not been altogether idle in administering the affairs of the colonies. He would not detain the House to show the effect of our colonial policy; but it was important to state that our colonial trade was an increasing trade, whilst the cost of government was not increasing. The hon. Baronet had stated that for every pound sterling of exports 9s. were paid for the expenses of colonial government. If that were true the colonial system would indeed be indefensible on account of its extravagance; but he was confident that more accurate examination would show that it was incorrect. In 1845 the total value of British manufactures exported to the colonies was 15,100,000l., and that of the exports from the colonies was 13,400,000l. [Sir W. MOLESWORTH had referred only to our exports to the colonies; he never thought of introducing the value of colonial exports into the calculation.] He thought he was justified in taking both: if the cost of colonial government was to be thus tested, it should be proportioned to the whole capital employed; and not charged only on one portion of it; and looking at the case in that point of view, it would be seen that the cost of colonial government was far less than 9s. in the pound upon the value of imports and exports combined. Remarks had been made upon what was called the meddling policy of the Colonial Office; and the hon. Member for Gateshead had observed that South Australia would become a flourishing colony if the Colonial Office would but act wisely. [Mr. HUTT: I said if the Colonial Office would let it alone.] Let it alone! Why, if it had not been for the Colonial Office, the colony would have been bankrupt. South Australia had been essentially a pet colony with some gentlemen, and its management was assigned to amateurs. The result was, that they brought the colony to the verge of bankruptcy, and were obliged to come to the Colonial Office for a loan of 200,000l. Subsequently the government of the colony was transferred to the Colonial Office; and from that moment to the present it had been progressively in a flourishing condition. With reference to the royalties on mines which had been referred to in terms of complaint, he begged to inform the House, that the tax had been established by Lord Stanley, after the most careful consideration. But the system had this inequality—that it only applied to some of the mines, because in many cases these had been opened after the land was sold, with all the minerals beneath it. Well, representations had been made to his noble Friend on the subject. His own impression was that the tax was a fair one; but representations continued to be made, and almost the last act of Earl Grey was to remove those duties. Now, before hon. Gentlemen made sweeping assertions, some inquiries ought to have been instituted. [Sir W. MOLES-WORTH: When were the royalties removed?] Very recently. [Sir W. MOLESWORTH: Within the last three or four days?] No. The abolition had taken place sometime back, though only recently communicated to the colony. The progress of this and other colonies showed that the colonial policy of England had not been so unsuccessful as the hon. Baronet represented, in proof of which he might refer to the progress which Port Philip had made. In 1844 its revenue was 69,000l., in 1846 it was 96,000l.; in 1844 its imports amounted to 151,000l., in 1846 they reached 316,000l.; in 1844 its exports were 256,000l., in 1846 they amounted to 425,000l. As regarded South Australia, to which he had already referred, the result was equally gratifying, as the following comparative statement would prove:—

thought that the hon. Member the Under Secretary for the Colonies had been very successful in showing the improvement that had taken place within a recent period; and if the hon. Gentleman had confined himself to the recent administration of the colonies, he would have done very well. The hon. Gentleman, however, with more of chivalry than of prudence, went back through a long series of years defending all that had occurred. He thought also, that the hon. Gentleman would have been more prudent, as well as more generous, if he had not taunted the New Zealand Company with having received a loan. The hon. Gentleman ought not to have forgot-ten that it was admitted by all that the distresses of the company had been produced by the manner in which they had been thwarted by the Colonial Office until they were driven into a state of bankruptcy. The hon. Gentleman had alluded to the inconvenience which arose from the constant changes in the Colonial Office; but he had not proposed any remedy for that inconvenience. He thought that there should be a permanent board of commissioners or directors for the management of the Crown colonies, similar to that which had acted so well for the management of British India. The system under which the Indian empire was managed had been admitted not merely by Englishmen, but by foreigners, to have succeeded admirably; and why should not a similar system be extended to the colonies? For the last ten years there had been a change in the administration of the Colonial Office on an average once in every sixteen months, and the inconvenience thus produced was one of very considerable magnitude. The noble Lord had been, he believed, convinced, for many years past, of the advantage of giving representative governments to the colonies; but what answer was it for the hon. Gentleman to say that Earl Grey was now in correspondence with Sir Harry Smith about giving a representative government to the Cape, when he (Mr. Mangles) recollected that for twenty years past that colony had been petitioning for a representative form of government?