Sir, this is a Bill to enable the Prussian Minister in England to provide for himself and his successors a permanent residence, in the same manner in which Hertford House is occupied by the French Ambassador—I wish it was so occupied at this moment—and Ashburnham House is occupied by the Russian Minister, and Chandos House by the Austrian Minister. I shall take this opportunity of referring to the name of an individual who has been recently dragged before another assembly. I did not think there was any place in Europe, and I can say with equal confidence in America—I did not think amongst civilised men there would be found any place in which such an individual would be made the subject of wanton, it not premeditated, insult. I feel that place was found where it could least have been expected, and without a desire to provoke a collision between the two assemblies, or even to—

wished to know from the right hon. Gentleman in the chair whether the observations of the hon. Baronet were in order?

did not know at present what bearing they had upon the Bill before the House.

My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding thinks I am out of order. It appears, therefore, that he has not yet read the title of the Bill. I apprehend that any Gentleman who will take the trouble to read that Bill will see that every observation I have hitherto addressed to the House is strictly in accordance with the subject of the Bill. The Bill is an Act authorising the purchase by the Prussian Minister in England of a residence for the use of the Prussian Legation; and further, the very name of the individual who now has the honour of filling that distinguished post is incorporated in the Bill. Therefore, I apprehend that the greatest stickler for the orders of the House will not accuse me again of violating the rules of the House when I call its attention, not only to the subject of the Bill, but to an individual whose name is incorporated in the measure. I repeat what I was stating at the time I was interrupted by my hon. Friend, that I do not desire to provoke a collision between any two assemblies, nor even between any two individuals; but I do maintain that it was a most extraordinary proceeding for a man at home in his own country, and in his own house, to attack one who was a stranger and a guest—that guest being, at the same time, the representative and, I may say, the friend of a Sovereign most closely allied to our own beloved Queen. I will not say that the Chevalier Bunsen is an inoffensive man, for it would be to degrade him almost to use such a phrase; but I will say that he is one of the most actively - kind and practically - benevolent men it has ever been my happiness to know; and, although I do not agree with his politics, nor in all respects with his ecclesiastical views, or his theological views, or his views on chronology, yet I know so well, and have so frequently enjoyed, the benefit of his large and varied acquire- ments, that I forget every point of difference when I find such a man attacked. I willingly bear in mind his kind, frank, liberal, and, a week ago, he would have allowed me to add his English character and manners; and when I see such a man dragged before another assembly in violation—I will not say of the rules of that assembly, for I leave that question utterly untouched—but in violation, I will say, of all the courtesies of life, and that in the presence of many of Her Majesty's Ministers, who allowed such an incident to pass without observation, and certainly without reproof—I believe I am not encroaching needlessly on the time of the House, when, in reference to one who has been so attacked in another place, I give to English Gentlemen an opportunity of expressing their sympathy. I beg the House will allow me to add, that the explanation which has been given elsewhere upon this subject adds another insult to the insult previously perpetrated. It has been pretended that the Chevalier Bunsen does not understand English. Why, he understands English and writes English at least as well as the individual who presumed to attack him. Having had an opportunity of making this statement, and having received, I venture to think, the general concurrence of the House in my views upon this subject—having, at least, received the almost universal concurrence of the House, I content myself with saying in reference to this Bill that I give to it my cordial support.

I wish to say a few words on the observations of the hon. Baronet—they are complete mis-statements; and I think he might have left the right hon. Assembly in which the circumstance occurred to right itself with the world at large on the subject. My noble Friend who has been supposed to have made the attack, states distinctly, that three several times speaking to the Gentleman whom the hon. Baronet has called his friend in plain simple courteous phrase, believing, as he says, that he was perfectly conversant with the English language, and with English courtesy, he said to him, "There are ladies who desire to sit down; you are in their place; they wish to sit down; will you permit them to do so?" To the astonishment of the noble Lord, that gentleman, the friend of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxford University, looked him in the face, and made him no answer. The request was made three several times; and at once I say to the House, knowing my noble Friend, as I can very well understand, was rather offended at such a reception, his observation on the fourth occasion was (and I beg to suggest to the hon. Gentleman how difficult and dangerous it is to make a statement of this kind, on which I am bound, in common fair play, to make an opposite statement)—"I will have you turned out." When, on the fourth occasion, he did not receive an answer to a courteous question, he then put in force the orders of the House.

I think it would not be well to refer further to what may have occurred with respect to the Chevalier Bunsen in the other House of Parliament. Whether the statement of my hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford is right, or the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite is right, I will not stop to inquire, or say a word on the subject; but as the question has been generally mooted, I will content myself with saying that the acquirements and reputation and learning of Chevalier Bunsen are such as to obtain for him the respect of every country. I regret that anything painful should have occurred to him, for he is entitled to the greatest respect not only for his diplomatic character as representative of the King of Prussia, the near ally of this country, but also for his personal character.

Bill, as amended, considered.

said, that in order to enable the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield to bring on his Motion that day, he was quite ready to postpone the Orders of the Day. Perhaps he might be allowed to add that there were two Amendments of which notice had been given. Of course the hon. Gentlemen who had given the notices would take whatever course they might think proper; but as the sole anxiety of the Government was that the question should be fully debated, and as the hon. and learned Member had raised a very fair and clear issue, perhaps it would be best that the Amendments should be withdrawn.

said, that as the matter was one in which Her Majesty's Government were peculiarly interested, he would consult their wishes by not pressing his Amendment.

said, he should reserve to himself the right of submitting his Amendment when the proper time came. Perhaps reasons for withdrawing it would arise in the course of discussion; and, if they did, he should exercise his discretion as he might deem best.

then rose and said: Sir, my duty towards the House commands me to explain to you why it is that I make this Motion. Sir, in my opinion, a Government like our own, when a large proportion of its administration has been condemned by one great branch of the Legislature, is unable either at home or abroad to maintain the interests of the country intact, to consult the great interests of the people of England, or to hold the reins of power with honour to themselves. If they were condemned by one portion of the Legislature, and the matter be left there unexplained, uninquired into, with no question asked, no opinion expressed, to foreign nations they would appear not a government; they would not be supposed to represent the feelings of England, and the interests of Englishmen in their hands would be undefended, and be crushed by the powers in the back-ground. But, Sir, when a portion of our Legislature has expressed an opinion so direct, so very plain, so utterly unambiguous, it becomes the duty of this House to ascertain what is the course to be pursued by the Government of the country, and to express their opinion with respect to the same point. Now, Sir, I am quite prepared to admit so far the proposition of the noble Lord that no Administration is called upon to resign upon a resolution of the House of Lords. I acknowledge that at once; but I must say that in a constitution like ours, in which we think it right to have a House of Lords, it is necessary that when the House of Lords have expressed their feelings and opinions, this House should step in and say what the people of England think upon the matter. If the noble Lord, after the resolution of the House of Lords, had determined to go on with the Administration; and if this House had permitted him to go on without any one suggesting a Motion to ascertain what was the opinion of this House—I say that in that case the noble Lord's Government would have been like a government which I have seen in my time: they would be dependent upon majorities, which were hardly majorities, upon an opinion which was hardly ascertained to be an opinion; they would be weak as regards this House; they would be almost impotent as regards the country at large; and they would be utterly impotent in reference to the government of the world. Therefore I think it is the duty of this House to express an opinion upon the same point as that on which the House of Lords has decided; and because I believe this, and because I believe also that the noble Lord himself would be the first to solicit an opinion on this occasion, I come forward and ask this House to express an opinion on the subject. And, Sir, with one personal observation, I will dismiss this part of what I have to address to the House. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire was pleased to speak of an arranged machinery. The insinuation, though couched in that allusive phraseology in which the hon. Member is so admirable an adept, was, nevertheless, very plain. But I beg to assure that hon. Gentleman that my course in this House has, from its commencement, been somewhat plain to all men's minds; that I, at least, have never shaped my course with reference to party interests or party disputes, and that no act of mine has been suggested by personal spite. I now, Sir, address myself to the question before the House. The House of Lords, in that mode which suits their peculiar habits, has, in as strong a way I think as is common in that House, in which there is more of that olden courtesy which used to govern the outsides of men than is usually seen here, adopted a resolution which forms a plain, simple condemnation of the foreign policy of the Government. I assume that in spite of this somewhat nisi prius like fashion in which the whole matter was conducted—in spite of small technicalities that would have made the fortune of a young man at sessions, or one who should have been investigating an affidavit before the Court of Queen's Bench—in spite of the mode in which the proposition was placed before the House of Lords, I assume that there has been a condemnation in general terms of the spirit and principle of the current foreign policy of the Government. With this feeling, Sir, I brought myself to the consideration of the subject which suggested the resolution which I shall lay before the House; and I will at once acknowledge that, in coming to the consideration of that question, my mind was inclined to arrive at a conclusion favourable to the noble Lord who is at the head of the Foreign Office of this country. I came to it with a mind inclined in his favour; though at the same time I say that it must not be supposed that mine is a blind approbation. For if any man in this House can make such a declaration, I certainly can say that I have often found fault with the noble Lord as sharply as most men in this House. I have often quarrelled with particular acts of the noble Lord; but I pay a compliment to the general principles which have, I believe, regulated his policy by coming forward on the present occasion to propose the resolution of which I have given notice. Sir, if I may illustrate this—I would say that on the second reading of a Bill in this House, we often say that we agree in its principles, but quarrel with many of its individual provisions. So I say on the policy of the noble Lord, that I concur in the principle which I shall immediately describe, though in many of the instances I have seen somewhat and much to condemn. Sir, I believe that the principles of the foreign policy of any Government affect two classes of things, those which regard individual rights and wrongs, and those which regard the general interest, the dignity, and honour of the country. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary will have an opportunity of correcting me if I misrepresent his policy; but I believe that as regards individual wrongs and rights with reference to foreign nations, the object of the noble Lord has been to extend the protection and shield of England to her wandering sons, who are carried by commerce, or by pleasure, or by necessity, to the various regions of the world—to extend over them, as much as the rules of civilised nations will permit, the great ægis of England's protection, that it may follow them wherever they go, into the despotism of Russia, or into the bleak countries of America—whether they be within the limits of ocean, or within the confines of any Power, great, insignificant, or almost helpless. That, Sir, I believe to be the great principle which has actuated the noble Lord in his conduct as respects individuals with regard to foreign nations. With regard to the interests of this country as a whole, I believe the object of his policy to have been, in the first place, to maintain the peace of the world—to maintain it not by truckling to despotism, but by teaching all foreign communities with whom we have any relations, that in so far as she is permitted to do so by the rules regulating internal communication, England brings the great moral force of her name to maintain constitu- tional government, not disorder—not to spread anarchy on the one hand, or despotism on the other, but to maintain peace by warning foreign Governments to make ready and proper and opportune concessions to the increasing enlightenment of the people; telling those people that so far as our physical power is concerned, it is not to be employed in coercing their rulers, but that in so far as the moral influence of this country and the opinions of its Government are concerned, the world shall know that we are friendly to all endeavours, wheresoever we may find them being made on the part of men, to vindicate for themselves the right of self-government. And if I could believe that an English House of Commons would come to a conclusion which would put a negative on that principle, then I should say we were not the people that the world had supposed us to be, from whom had emanated all that was glorious in the self-government of man. It is upon that principle, I believe, that the noble Lord has acted. Sir, I have a right to ask what is the antagonist principle. Can I not suppose that there might be a Minister in this country who, using the forms of constitutional government, should ever direct them to aid the despotisms of Europe? Can I not suppose the thing? And can I not also suppose—call it not despotism, but legitimacy—that there might be a Minister in this country who should so advance legitimacy as, under the softer expression, to bring in a much harder thing, and to make tyranny safe in Europe? Sir, I believe that this antagonistic principle is now within sight; I believe that the House of Commons is on the present occasion not merely called upon to decide the Ministerial existence of hon. Gentlemen opposite—[ The hon. and learned Member spoke from the Opposition side of the House ]—for as far as I am concerned, that is a matter of very little importance; I believe the question to be decided is, whether England is openly, frankly, and without hesitation, though amicably, to say, "We are friendly to every effort of man for self-government; we do not desire to assist any anarchical opposition to Government; we do not seek by physical force to thrust anything on any Government, but we do seek by that moral influence which is every day ruling Europe to favour the efforts of men who are rising up to govern themselves, and endeavouring to quench the tyranny of those who would crush these efforts to obtain what we con- sider amongst the first birthrights which nature has given us." I believe that to be the ruling principle of the noble Lord's policy. I am bound to say it is impossible, considering how long the noble Lord has been in the Councils of Her Majesty, to go through every individual act of his Ministerial policy. I therefore take large results; and, taking large results, what do I find? Let me compare, in a few words, the result of the policy which has been pursued by England from the year 1830 down to the present time, with the result of the policy which was pursued by her from 1790 to 1815. In 1789 broke out that grand result, for such it was, of the increasing enlightenment of Europe with respect to the despots of Europe—the first French Revolution. The whole result depended upon England. What were called the legitimate Governments of Europe banded together; and, unfortunately, England supported them. The consequence was seen, and may be read, in the most terrible conflict that the annals of mankind record—blood shed like water, wealth scattered with a prodigality of which no record of any other time presents a parallel. From 1789 to 1815 the great comity of nations was broken up; we were separated into enemies; relations of every kind depended upon force, and he who was mightiest in the field was alone regarded. Mankind were absolutely astounded with horror at the scene of destruction and the strife and confusion which followed. It was only by the striking down of that wonderful man whom the exigencies of France had raised up—the mighty Napoleon—that peace was brought back to mankind. In that fearful lesson we read a rule for our guidance in future. From 1815 there was a constant protest on the part of the whole body of the people; and at length, in 1830, the volcano burst, and the legitimate Bourbon family was again dispossessed. Sir, I feel it due to the great man who was then at the head of the Councils of England, to give him the great glory of having begun the new principles which have distinguished our foreign policy from that time to the present. The Duke of Wellington was at the head of the English Councils when that mighty conflict of the people of France commenced. A post did not pass by before he—well read as he was in the mighty contest that was proceeding, and fitted, by his knowledge and experience of civil affairs, by his position, by his capacity, and by all his powers, to say, "I have during my whole life, been reading a lesson of war and peace, and I assume to myself the responsibility of beginning a new foreign policy"—scarcely, I say, had a post passed by when the Duke of Wellington acknowledged the Government which the new revolution of France had established. From that time to the present, the same policy has been pursued. As was to be expected, that revolution created great excitement in Europe. Belgium followed, and Poland also. The feelings of the English people were differently expressed. Let other nations say what they will, we are far ahead of them all as regards our notions of constitutional government. Our battle was fought in 1640; and as, since that period we have had great experience, it was befitting that we should set before the world an example of a peaceful revolution. The people of England dispossessed the House of Lords of the power of making the House of Commons. The Government of France was carried by barricades; the revolution of England was effected through the forms of this House: the one was expressed by a change of dynasty; the other, by an Act of Parliament. But that revolution changed not merely the form of government, in as far as these peculiarities were concerned, it changed the Government itself. The noble Lord then became Foreign Secretary, and the first question submitted to his consideration was the revolution which had just broken out in the Netherlands; and I maintain that there is no portion of the noble Lord's political career that deserves higher commendation than the admirable foresight he exhibited in this matter. Had he followed the suggestions of many by whom he was surrounded—I do not speak of the great man, who is above all party considerations—I do not speak of him, but of those who, in this House or in the other, held principles antagonistic to those of the noble Lord on that subject—had he followed their advice, he would have opposed the separation of Holland and Belgium, and successfully opposed it. He might have done so, because the people of England are careless about foreign politics, and insulated in all their habits; but their Foreign Minister is all the more responsible, because they are so careless about foreign politics. It is a fact—I do not say I admire the apathy which would have permitted it—but it is a fact that the noble Lord might, if he had so pleased, on that occasion have prevented the separation of Holland from Belgium. If he had done so, I believe that universal war in Europe would have been the consequence; but of this I am certain, that if the year 1848 had seen Belgium under the dominion of Holland, the convulsions of that year would have at once rent asunder the unnatural alliance, and Belgium would have at once rushed into the arms of France, as her natural friend and ally. Then again should we have had the northern Powers coming down, and again would we have had enacted the scenes which deluged Europe with blood from 1790 to 1815. Therefore, I say, not looking at petty and insignificant charges, although I shall have to allude to them before I sit down, not wasting the time of this House in the examination of mere technicalities, but judging of the noble Lord by the broad and recognised principles of his policy, I take the case I have mentioned as a type of that policy, an instance upon which the policy and powers of England were brought to bear, and which, if they had not been so brought to bear, would have been a fruitful source of misery to the world. On a sudden this House is surprised by a resolution of the other House of Parliament; and I would ask the House to contemplate, along with me, the peculiar position of Europe at the time. There are three parties to these resolutions: Russia, which represents the despotism of Europe; France, which represents its levity—I had almost said—and the protectionist party in this country, who are opposed to the present Government on account of their commercial arrangements. Such is the alliance which has been formed to overwhelm the noble Lord. I find in Greece a monarch coming from Bavaria, a man educated at a small German court, and with all the feelings that such an education must create, and acting in everything under the instruction of Russia and Austria. I must confess that, with such a council, and such diplomacy, I feel somewhat degraded when I hear of the name of England being mixed up in any of these discussions. I want no representation for this country in the shape of an ambassador at foreign courts to protect our interests. Let rather the great name of England be our shield, and let our ships, and not our ambassadors, when necessary, vindicate our honour. But Athens has always been the focus of hot and busy intrigue. We have seen evinced their constant sympathy with Russian diplomacy, which always looks steadily at one point, and has the same end in view now as when Alexander proposed to Napoleon that Russia should have Constantinople for her portion of the spoil of the world. The same influences are now at work. Russia is the great inspiration, Austria being but her humble instrument and slave. And woe and shame to France, who, spite of all her glorious reminiscences, shrinks also into the form and character of a vassal of Russia. France, which once went against this northern Power, and almost overran her, and would have done so had it not been for the weather, has now suddenly forgotten the great guiding principles of her conduct, and thrown herself headlong at the feet of Russia. Why has she done this, and when does she choose her time? Why? Because at this moment the parties who form the Government of France wish to break through the constitution that created them, and, what is still more painful for me to mention, he who is the representative of an immortal name, as well as of a mighty people, makes paramount the consideration of his personal exigencies, and hopes by means of an insult to England to secure a dotation for himself. France, I say, wishes to get rid of universal suffrage, or rather the Government of France, which does not represent that great people—which does not represent French feeling—which is simply a body of men banded together for special ends and purposes. One set is working overhand and underhand for the purpose of restoring the legitimate monarch. Another set, under the semblance and name—the prostituted name—of order, is endeavouring to maintain their own individual ministerial existence; and these are the men who, aided by the worst of the bad, the wild anarchists, who in that country and in this promulgate their wretched ideas with respect to Government, have joined in this attempt to insult the greatness of England. Yes, the socialists and anarchists of France have lent their aid to the legitimists of that country, and both, taking advantage of the terrors of the middle classes, have tried to throw their great country at the feet of Russia. Well, Sir, at this time what occurs? The people of England are suddenly informed, through their Foreign Minister—having previously expected nothing and heard nothing, if I except blue books heaped upon blue books, and newspaper correspondence unreadable aud unread, they are suddenly informed that the fleet of Admiral Parker has been ordered to the Piræus. At once Englishmen erect their ears, and wish to know how it has occurred. People don't like the idea of it, they think there is something in it unusual and unheard of. The inquiry in every one's mouth is—was ever this done before? And then the slumbering power, which is always ready, although apparently slumbering, in another place—that power which is always ready to oppose anything like liberal government—which can give a majority against freedom whenever circumstances may make it expedient, suddenly interferes. They do not like prodigally to use their power. I have heard many threats, and often, I do not know how often, of the Ministry being left in a minority in the Lords; but the ordinary answer is, that the Ministry do not care about a defeat in the Lords. These things happen in consequence of the great ignorance and apathy of the people of England as respects foreign policy: but there was one very curious thing which I heard just before those occurrences took place, and I would ask this House seriously to bear it in mind. The people of Hungary had risen against the despotism of Austria. In a close but unfortunate conflict they had succumbed to the united power of Austria and Russia. The patriots—and I will presume to call them so—escaped; and to whom did they go for succour? To Turkey. With that bloodhound pertinacity which distinguishes every despot and every despotic Government, they were steadily followed by their enemies, and having arrived in Turkey they were demanded with an insolence which had never before been practised towards an independent nation. It was demanded of Turkey that she should deliver up those who had thrown themselves upon her for protection to those despots and tyrants who had flogged women, and tortured men in a manner which had been almost forgotten since the dark ages. But the noble Lord worthily represented England on that occasion, and said, "It shall not be." Our fleet—and glory be given also to France, for her fleet assisted us—our fleet told these two despotic Powers that such a violation of the rights of nations and of hospitality should not take place. The mere appearance of the fleet of England, as it approached the Dardanelles, stopped these wretches, and England vindicated the rights of nations simply by the appearance of one of her fleets surging into the Helles- pont. It was shortly after that circumstance that Count Nesselrode, writing to M. Brunow, said—

"It is painful that this should have occurred just as Admiral Parker has been to the Dardanelles on his very disagreeable mission."

Soon after the people of England woke up one morning, and heard that their fleet was in the celebrated Bay of Salamis. Now what is the charge brought against the noble Lord? They say, first, that his demands are unreasonable; next, that the amount claimed is insignificant; then, that the amount was exaggerated, and that the means adopted were imperious, hasty, uncalled for; and, lastly, it is averred that the time of demand is inopportune and improper. I shall be obliged if the House will permit me to examine these charges in some detail. I shall be as short as I possibly can, but must remember, that in attempting to be brief, I might only become obscure, and therefore I trust that if in my anxiety to make everything clear, I encroach upon the patience of the House, I shall receive its usual kind indulgence. In the first place, I ask, was there anything unusual in these claims, or contrary to the law and practice of nations? Let us try: I will first take France, and I will ask the House to make the distinction, if any, for me. There is, first, the simple question as regards the demands made on the Grecian nation. There is next the question of how the French people have acted in such circumstances. These two are different questions, and let us keep them separate. The law of nations, I take to be, accurately speaking, no law. It is a system of general morality in which the rules are of necessity vague, and depend rather on the discretion of the country than to be settled by any tribunal, for there is no tribunal competent. I do not know whether the hon. Member for the West Riding is here, but as he is the friend of international arbitration, he would soon see and acknowledge the difficulty I have named. We can only get then at the principle or rather the practice of this international law, by observing the usages of civilised nations as regards it, and I suppose that when I take the people of France, America, and England, I take the three nations who may be considered to be, as far as civilisation is concerned, at the head of the civilised world. Now I will begin with France. We are told that this sort of proceeding is altogether unknown, or was unknown until originated by the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary in the case of Greece. The cases in which the noble Lord interfered were five or six. There was the case of a man who was dispossessed of his land, the case of a man whose house was pulled down or turned inside out by the mob, the cases of the Navy of this country, insulted by the local authorities of Greece, and other instances of persons, subjects of this country, being cruelly tortured, flogged, and otherwise ill used. Now I believe it is very well known in this country, or at least it ought to be known, that in 1831 a French fleet appeared in the Tagus to insist on reparation for injuries done to French subjects during the reign of Dom Miguel. That may surprise some persons, but so it was. The poor unfortunate Portuguese said at once, "Oh, let us apply to England, let us ask her mediation." Her mediation was asked, granted, and offered to France, but refused by that Power. But what were the demands of France, because they form a striking and valuable lesson to Gentlemen who intend speaking on this subject without having given it any previous consideration, and also to certain Gentlemen in the Chamber of Deputies, who, without knowing what their own country has done in similar cases, have used language which were it not for the immeasurable superiority, the stern serenity, of the people of England, might be deemed insulting? But we are above such petty feelings. Soaring in our inapproachable greatness, we despise and disregard such attacks. The demands made by France, and consented to by poor Portugal, were what? They took ships, and threatened to bombard the town; indeed, they did shed blood. Their demands were, that a Frenchman, subjected to a severe imprisonment for a serious offence, should be liberated, and the sentence pronounced against him annulled by a special act; and that the judge should be dismissed. That was in times when we heard of "our dear Aberdeen," and when He was on the throne of France who had stepped in between the Monarchy and the Republic; and, having had the greatest opportunity that ever had been afforded of ruling for the benefit of mankind, had, through base personal feeling, lost and cast it all away! The demands of the French on that occasion were, further, that several French subjects should be indemnified; that a rule against arrest without a judicial decree should be observed; that the chief of police should be dismissed; and that all sentences on French subjects for political offences should be abrogated. This was one case. But again, it is urged that this affair in Greece was a petty affair. I think I can find as petty. In 1842 it appears that the French Government felt that injuries had been done to some French subjects at the small and insignificant port of San Salvador, amounting in the whole to 1,000 dollars. A French ship went in immediately, and the captain said, "If you do not pay, I will at once bombard the town." The people refused, the French Consul retired, got on board the French ship, and raised the demand at once to 2,000 dollars. The town was immediately blockaded, and the poor people were at last obliged to pay the money. There was another instance in which France had sought to obtain by force, redress for injuries inflicted on her citizens. In Mexico she once complained that some of her people had been maltreated. It appeared that a mob had pulled down a factory; and so mad were the French for revenge, that they would not listen to any proposal of mediation. They demanded instant and full payment, and because it was not immediately conceded, they proceeded to bombard the port of San Juan d'Ulloa. I could go on with many similar instances, but I will take one which meets the case of one of the objectors to the noble Lord's policy. It is said that we have degraded ourselves by attacking a weak nation. Here is a case of French magnanimity as regards minor Powers. In 1844 the Governor of Senegal fancied that he had received an injury from certain African chiefs, and he immediately sent a ship, took possession of two villages, and chastised the people into compliance with his demand. Now mark the curious mode of proceeding, and let us consider that with great nations a blockade is a declaration of war, and must of necessity be so; but in dealing with weak and comparatively powerless nations it is really a merciful and a useful mode of avoiding war to take the preliminary step of a blockade—not reprisals, be it observed, as has been too often but most erroneonsly stated. This, I say, in dealing with weak nations, is far better than declaring war, and thereby risking the peace of the world. Now, I will go on with my illustrations of the course taken by other nations, for they are really instructive lessons—and I will first take the United States of America. There we have a people of the same family as ourselves—there, in fact, we have our own blood, our own bone, our own institutions, and to a great extent our own feelings and habits. There we have a great maritime nation—a people as commercial as ourselves—a people anxious for peace, but jealous of the national honour, and careful of the rights and interests of her subjects. Now, I will take one or two curious instances of the course taken by that country under similar circumstances, some of them really instructive. It appears that in 1814, when, as is well known, America was at war with England, a privateer was fitted out in an American port, she was seen by an English brig of war, near the port of Fayal; this vessel chased the privateer, and took her under the walls of the fort of Fayal and set her on fire. Our brother over the water—our brother Jonathan, as America is generally called—presented his bill—but to whom? To England? No, she could not do that, for England was at war with her at the time—but she presented her bill to the Government of Portugal. But, says Portugal, what have we to do with it? The vessel was seized and burnt in spite of us. Exactly so, replies America, "that is just what we mean, it was done in spite of you, therefore pay us our bill." Up to this hour that bill has not been paid; but at this moment vessels of war are on their way from the other side of the Atlantic, and, for aught we know, are even now at the mouth of the Tagus blockading that river on this account. Well, this is the example which great and enlightened nations set us. Take another case. There was an American vessel called, I believe, the General Brooke. It appeared that certain persons who called themselves custom-house officers removed that vessel from one harbour to another, and the vessel was in consequence wrecked. A bill was sent in to the Portuguese Government, and this is another of the claims for which the American fleet is proceeding to blockade the Tagus. There is still another case to which I will refer. The House is aware that Murat was for some time King of Naples. True, he was called a usurper by the legitimists of Europe, but he was de facto sovereign for a time. While in that position he seized and applied to his own purposes certain American property. He was shortly afterwards expelled and shot. Well, the inevitable consequence, as far as America was concerned, followed—a bill was sent in. But, said the Neapolitan Government, Murat was a usurper, we have shot him. We can't help that, rejoins America, pay us our bill; and eventually, under the threat of sending an American fleet to Naples, the money was paid. How comes it that the sensitive feelings of English Gentlemen never found out these cases? France was allowed to go to Morocco and enforce her claims there without exciting the extreme sensibility of hon. Gentlemen, or rather noble Lords—and why? Because it did not suit them for party purposes to interfere at that time. I could go back to the history of our own country, and show similar examples. I could show that England has done the same thing over and over again, without complaint or objection. I have not stated half the cases I have before me of the United States or of France, but I may venture one or two as regards England. In 1831, at the time of the passing of the Reform Bill, with the House of Commons looking on, a British squadron was sent to Portugal to obtain satisfaction for injuries inflicted on British subjects during the time of Don Miguel, and on refusal hostilities were commenced, after which a settlement was obtained. And what took place in Greece? Simply this: For many years—and herein lies the misfortune and the difficulty of this case—for many years constant claims were arising, and complaints were being made, against the Government of Greece, by British subjects for injuries sustained by them; and in dealing with these claims the whole tone and manner of the Government of Greece requires to be known. Letters were written by our Ambassador setting forth these claims and complaints, which letters remained six months and some of them for two years unanswered and unnoticed. The complaints were reiterated, claim after claim was made; but no answer could be obtained. We forbore to take measures for enforcing satisfaction, knowing our own strength; but these successive demands remaining unanswered and unheeded, made us impatient. In one case thirteen years passed over without any attempt on the part of the Government of Greece to accord redress, and that the case of Mr. Finlay. Now, in regard to Mr. Finlay's case, the first thing I see in these papers is a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen, describing the claim as arising from a protocol entered into by Russia and France, which enabled Turkish proprietors to sell their lands in Greece, and under which protocol Mr. Finlay acquired the property. Now the law of Greece required that when private property was taken for public purposes there should be an ordonnance describing the land, and that the value should be assessed and paid before taking possession—two very proper conditions before taking forcible possession of land for public purposes, and which we, the Parliament, in effect apply in Railway Bills and other cases when we empower parties to take forcible possession of land. But what took place in the case of Mr. Finlay? His land was taken possession of without any ordonnance. He applies to the Greek Government to know how it was, and he is told that the land was not taken for public purposes, and that he might take possession of it himself if he chose. He proceeded to do so, but was told you have no business here, and was unceremoniously turned out. Then he wrote again, and said, "I find the property has been taken for public purposes." And by whom had it been taken? It had been taken not for national interests, not for the purposes of an arsenal, or a mole, a railway, or other great national work, or even for a poor-house, unless you can call the palace of King Otho a poorhouse—it was taken for the purpose of forming a garden wherein his Majesty might disport himself, at the expense of the subjects of this country; and for this they turned this British subject out of possession of his land, refusing all payment or compensation whatsoever. At length the man, having applied again and again in vain, and tired of importuning, did what he had a perfect right to do, and, reading the duty of the noble Lord as I read it, he applied to the Earl of Aberdeen to intercede with the Government of Greece to obtain for him payment of his land. Now the first thing the Earl of Aberdeen did, on receiving this application, was to acknowledge the justice of the claim; for he says, writing to Sir E. Lyons—

"It appears from Mr. Finlay's statement that you are already aware of the merits of his case, and that you have had some communication with the Greek Government thereupon. It is only necessary, therefore, that I should instruct you to follow up your representations in favour of Mr. Finlay's claim in such manner as you may deem best calculated to obtain that compensation to which Mr. Finlay may appear to be entitled."

Now what is the answer to this? The people of Athens, it would appear, inherit at least one quality for which their ancestors were distinguished. They are capital hands at a lawsuit. They know how to get out of a difficulty, or, at all events, to postpone payment, by availing themselves of the quirks and quibbles of the law. The reply was, "Why don't you try our legal tribunals?" Why, what was the use of that? Well, what did the poor man do? He said, "It is quite clear that I have no chance of redress but by dependence on my own Government. I came here to assist the Greeks in their efforts to obtain independence—I came to assist you against the Turks, and to do all I could for you—I bought the land under the guarantee of an English protocol, and now I demand my rights under English protection." But the Greek Government will now say, "We find great legal authorities of your own country quoted to sanction us in the refusal of your claims." And true it is that the great name of Lord Mansfield has been quoted to show that Mr. Finlay did wrong in appealing to his country: but I would ask those who made use of that great authority if they really read the case to which the opinion they quoted referred? I cannot believe that the noble Lord who brought forward that opinion, or any other man who read it, and quoted it as Lord Mansfield's, and as applicable to the present case, could have known the circumstances under which that opinion was given. That opinion was given, not by Lord Mansfield, but by Mr. Murray, one of the law officers of the Crown—not that I am about to do what has been done in another place, insult the law officers of the Crown, and my own brethren of the bar, by saying they would give an opinion any way; and I would suggest to the noble Lord who made that insinuation that he should judge of himself, not of others—but that opinion was given under these circumstances. A loan had been entered into by the Emperor of Germany—the Emperor Charles—whom Maria Theresa succeeded. The King of Prussia took Silesia, and it appeared that Silesia had been mortgaged as it were for that debt, and when the King of Prussia took it, by a treaty with Maria Theresa, he engaged to pay that debt. Afterwards certain injuries, as he supposed, were done to Prussia, by certain Prussian vessels being taken and brought in to our Admiralty, and which went through our Admiralty Courts for adjudication as prizes in the usual way. What was the course taken by the King of Prussia? He said, "I care not for these Admiralty Courts, I will assume for my own purpose that they are wrong, and I will confiscate this debt, be- cause certain Englishmen have done injury to the subjects of Prussia." And what was the answer made by Mr. Murray and Sir C. Leigh, the law officers of the Crown? The answer of Mr. Murray and the others was, "The injury has not been done, for the vessels have almost all been released, and have gone through the Admiralty, according to the usages of national law; almost all have been released, and those which have not there are some doubts about." But they went further and said: "Here is a case in which the national honour of the King is concerned; he has entered into an obligation to pay this debt, and the idea of confiscating that debt because certain other people may have done some injury to Prussian subjects, never before entered into the mind of any man who was at all acquainted with international law." But here the case is stronger still. Here the injury is done to the English subject by the Government of Greece. The party injured says, "I have no chance against you—the foreign Government who have injured me—you have no tribunal to which I can appeal with any chance of receiving justice: I will, therefore, appeal to the protection of my own Government, and to international law." There can be no doubt in this matter, as it appears to me—and I am quite sure the noble Lord who referred to the case I have just quoted could never have read the circumstances under which it arose; for if he had, he never would have adduced it as a parallel case to the present. Now, I will read some of the statements made by our Ambassador as to the manner in which his demands have been met. I find in a letter, dated Athens, August 7:—

"I have not yet received any answer from the Greek Government to my note of the 2nd of July, respecting Mr. Finlay's claims, and the claims of certain Ionian boatmen."

On August 20, he again writes—"I am still without any reply to my letter, &c." I now come to the other claims, and here I will only trouble the House with one letter. Sir E. Lyons, writing to M. Colocotroni, gives this clear and unambiguous statement. He says—

"With regard to that part of my note of the 24th October in which I had the honour to inform you that I had been instructed by Viscount Palmerston to call your attention to the other unsatisfied demands of Her Majesty's Government, and to request that they should be immediately settled, you say that if any of those demands have remained unanswered by your predecessors you wish that they may be pointed out to you, in order that you may give your immediate attention to them. In reply to your request I beg leave to observe that I have not had the honour to receive any answer to the note I addressed to you on the 7th October last—[and, mark, this is written on the 6th of December]—by desire of Viscount. Palmerston, reminding you that no answers had been returned to the demands of Her Majesty's Government, which were made in my notes to your predecessors of the 14th of March and 12th of April last, on the important subject of the fulfilment of treaty engagements respecting the Greek loan of 60,000,000 of francs. Nor has any answer been returned to the note which I addressed to M. Coletti on the 20th May, 1847, requiring, for the third time, in the name, and by desire, of Her Majesty's Government, that that of Greece should, without any further delay, make good the loss sustained by the masters of six Ionian boats who had been plundered at the custom-house at Salcina in October, 1846. Nor has any answer been returned to the note I addressed to M. Glarakis, on the 21st October, 1847, by desire of Viscount Palmerston, repeating the demand for compensation which I had already made on behalf of two Ionians who had been illegally arrested and cruelly flogged by the police authorities at Pyrgos, on the 15th of May, 1847, and on behalf also of two other Ionians who had been arrested and ill-used by the police at Patras, on the 30th of May, 1847, and stating, with regard to those demands, as well as to the others which had not been satisfied, that Her Majesty's Government earnestly hoped that the Greek Government would no longer delay complying with them; for the Greek Government ought to be aware that it must do so sooner or later, and that the only effect of further procrastination must be to render it the duty of Her Majesty's Government to increase, in proportion to such delay, the amount of compensation which it required for the injured parties, and adding that the Greek Government would act unwisely for its own interests if it misunderstood the forbearance which had been shown on these matters by Her Majesty's Government; and if it were to infer from that forbearance that the British Government was not determined to compel the Greek Government to accede to those demands, if it should not be induced to do so spontaneously by its own sense of justice and of right. Nor have I received the explanations promised by M. Glarakis, in his letter to me of the 7–19th February last, respecting the violent outrage commtted at Patras on an officer and boat's crew of Her Majesty's ship Fantome."

Now, I appeal to the House of Commons whether, after years of unanswered demands, there is in this letter anything unnecessarily stringent, anything uncourteous, in the proper sense of the term, or made more imperious than was called for to meet the exigencies of the case? To me it appears to be language in every way perfectly suited to the occasion; and if I were to seek for an example to compare it with, I would select that despatch of the Earl of Aberdeen's on the question of the Greek loan. The statement in that despatch, so far as the feelings of the Greek Government were concerned, was offensive and insulting—but not more so, I admit, than the subject demanded—and far more stringent, more curt, and more rough than the language of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I could go on, but the House is aware that all these papers, one after the other, consist of reiterated but ineffectual demands on the part of the English Government, and then at last comes a long explanation of the whole transaction, step by step, from the beginning, which Mr. Wyse thinks fit to make, showing that for thirteen years some of these claims had been pending, and that all of them were at last refused. I am aware that people are too ready to take advantage of the vulgar and wretched prejudice against the religion of the Jew; but, for my part, I think M. Pacifico might have aptly quoted the passage of our immortal bard. He might have said, "Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions?" If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why, revenge. It appears that you have only to say that a man is a Jew to excite a prejudice against his honesty, and to raise the suspicion that he is making an usurious demand. Now, let us see what the demand really is in this case. In those countries the House is aware there is a prejudice existing against the Jews, and among other means by which that prejudice is shown there is a habit on Easter Monday of burning in effigy one whom they think a fitting representative of the Jewish people—Judas. But let us see how these Christians deal with a rich Jew. A rich Jew comes to Athens, and they all at once find that he hath eyes and ears like themselves—he may be conciliated because he may be able to effect a loan for them. Baron Rothschild was at Athens—therefore Judas was not to be burned. Such was the deference paid to wealth when belonging to a rich Jew. Judas was not burned. But the uninstructed felt that they had been deprived of their holiday, much as the English boys would feel, I suppose, if you did not burn Guy Fawkes on the 5th of November, except that the boys here only set up a shout on such an occasion. These people, however, while the Christians of Athens were at church, headed by certain young noblemen, one of them the eldest son of the Minister of War, attack the House of this English subject, frighten and beat his family, destroy his whole pro- perty, throw everything they can out of the windows, and, in their spite and malice, throw oil over the richest furniture in the house. I read every letter on the subject, and I must say that, if I believe M. Pacifico wrote those letters, those letters prove him to be a man of education, one, I should say, of honourable feeling. I do not know him. I only judge of him by his letters; if any man knows anything of him to the contrary, let him express it. I judge by the letters. But I care not what he is. If he were poor and degraded as the poorest Jew that walks and buys and sells old clothes in London, he was born a British subject. He had a right to demand the protection of the English power. He was assailed in that which was to him as dear as to the richest amongst us. His family beaten—his children frightened—his married daughter made seriously ill by the terrible fright she experienced, having only just lain in! And I am to be told that they are only Jews! Why, it is a disgrace to this country such a reply. He asked reparation for that injury, and no answer is returned. He goes on. It was well known among the Greeks that no answer was returned. A second attack was made, and he tells the representative of England that he has been attacked a second time, and prays with almost piteous wailings the power of England to protect him; but he prays to God after the manner his fathers taught him, with as much honesty as you pray. Is there not something that ought to dignify even to ourselves the appeal of this man in his abject condition? Had he been the awful Baron Rothschild, don't you think that reparation would have been instantly demanded? Don't you think the despots would then say—"What! injure Mons. Rothschild, and not seek reparation for the injury!" And you would have well-turned periods in diplomatic papers, to tell the Greek Government that those injuries must not be permitted. But, because he was a poor Jew, his house and family are to be treated with insult, and all his demands set aside. Oh! but he has asked too much. Remember, the objection is not made to the amount. The objection is made to the principle; and do not let us run off upon the amount. Don't let us go on arguing about the amount with the introduction of an occasional joke turning on the French expression lit conjugal. That was a joke which raised a laugh, but it was a joke which could not be understood. I heard the joke and I heard the laugh. The joke was pointless in form as it was vulgar in sentiment. I took pains to ascertain what was likely to be the real state of the case on the value of the furniture, Going to an upholsterer's, I said, "You cannot judge of the value of this stock, but I ask you whether there is anything extravagant or extraordinary in the price; and if one were to turn round to his Peers, and say, 'Have any of your Lordships anything of the same value in your houses?' was there any ground for believing that the question could be answered in the negative?" The reply was, "There is nothing;" and he mentioned several who had given orders, which had been completed out of his shop, of a far more expensive kind. He said, "If you go to a particular drawing-room"—there is a delicacy in mentioning names, and I don't want to do that—"there you will see things of quadruple the value." Then, it is thought singular that M. Pacifico should have such articles of furniture in his possession. What is the explanation? They were not intended for this unfortunate man's own use. But why should we not say it? He had no contumely offered him in saying it—he was, in reality, a tradesman who had the hope of selling those articles of furniture to advantage, and of selling them to the very man who denied him redress. Now we all know—there is not a man in this House who does not know—enough of eastern habits, even from the stories of his childhood, to know that hiding wealth is one of the means of safety in those countries where there is no law, and that you render a man more anxious to hide the more he is oppressed. The man bought the property; it was destroyed. I care not what was the exaggeration. It is the principle for which I contend. But then it is said that he ought to have gone to the courts; that there was no right for him to go to his country, but that he ought to have gone to the courts. What is the plain truth? The very day on which the outrage took place, a complaint was made to the Government. Now, in those countries there is a public prosecutor. It was the business of the Government to investigate that matter. They did investigate it, and they declared that it did take place in the broad day on the Easter Sunday. People were known to be there by name; the whole of Athens knew it; and yet they declared that they could not find the criminals. Now, was not that a denial of justice, and was not this man fully justified in appealing to that which, though he be a Jew, is his natural protector—to the Government of England? I do hope, Sir, that the Government of England will be supported in this extensive view of the protection which England ought to afford to her wandering sons abroad. But I am told that there is a rule of international law which forbids such an appeal—that no one can expect to be better off in a foreign country than the subjects of that country. Now, I deny the whole principle. I deny it altogether, stated as it was, and clumsily guarded by this strange condition, namely, a constitutional Government. What is a constitutional Government? Depend upon it the Emperor of Russia would call his the most constitutional Government in Europe. Let an Englishman go to Russia. The Emperor of Russia's rule of law is, that what pleases him shall be law. What pleases the prince is the law. He may take one of his subjects, give him no account, no explanation, put him on a sledge, tie him neck and heels, and send him at once to Siberia. I appeal to the House of Commons—to both sides of the House—if an Englishman were treated thus, would you permit it? If not, where is your rule? It is good for nothing. The truth is, that the whole of this law is not in the proper sense a law. It introduces itself in each particular case according to circumstances, and is governed by exigencies, and the discretion of the persons connected with it. You will find that rule adopted by America, as well as England, and no American citizen would be supposed to be protected in Russia if he were taken by the neck and heels and sent to Siberia upon the mere ipse dixit of the Emperor. What is the rule in Russia? The Emperor of Russia's rule is, that what pleases him is law; according to the old rule of Justinian— quod placet principii —what pleases the Prince is law. Why, according to the reading of it the other day, in total ignorance of these facts, it is supposed that a person must of necessity go through the courts. That is not necessary. If you have reason to believe that what you deem justice cannot be thus done, by all the rules of what is called international law, you have a right to make an appeal to the Government at home. I have read to the House, both as regards France and the United States, cases in which such an appeal was made directly contrary to the rules of the coun- try in which they took place. Therefore, the rule laid down in another place is not the rule. And I say also, as regards this unfortunate man, M. Pacifico, notice had been given on the very day of his disaster. Now, what is the next objection? They say these are little isolated cases. Isolated cases! Are not all cases isolated in themselves, and was there not an accumulation of them here, one after another, until at last, so strong were they, that, not content with insulting a Jew, and attacking the house of a "canny Scot"—he hoped the House would not forget that expression—committed an act of violence against a member of the British Navy. What was that case? A young gentleman, the son of the Consul, is on board an English vessel. A boy, 12 years old, is shot, and while the father is on his way to his house, the whole boat's crew is seized upon. Oh! but it is said, can you believe that an English crew could be taken by four Greeks? Why, I suppose that four could have rowed the boat. A young boy—for he was nothing more—a midshipman was in command, and one of the sailors was wounded, and others were compelled to go into custody. Now, what occurred? First, a lie is told. They say it did not occur to the Fantome, but to the Spitfire, thereby broadly contradicting the honourable word of an honourable young man, and denying any right to make an explanation or apology. So soon as the real state of the case was discovered, the men were found to be innocent. What was the origin of that? The parties said that two English vessels entered the Grecian harbour with an intent to create an insurrection, and overturn the Government; aad, therefore, precautions were taken by the authorities to put the English into prison, saying that they had put on board persons who ran away from the island. The words of honour of the English were not accepted; but they were told that they spoken falsehoods. The English gentleman, who then represented the English nation, if he had not insisted on an immediate apology, would have been wholly unfit to represent this country. I will not go further into that case; I have done enough, because we are not to judge of these cases by the individual importance of any one of them. If you relax the law among nations half civilised—if you relax the law by which the people of this country are guarded when they are abroad, there will be no safety for English commerce. But, I am told mediation was offered; and now I suppose I shall be met by favourite phrases of the Peace Society. But, if anybody hopes to preserve peace by making all the world believe that nothing shall induce us to go to war, what must be the result? I shall never forget the lesson read me by the hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire on a very peculiar occasion—namely, at a peace meeting, where his warlike tendencies so broke out, that he begged pardon of the persons he was addressing, saying, "Though you have asked me to become a member of this society, do let me say a word in favour of a war for Hungary." I well understood the generous impulses of the hon. Gentleman—he, as I did, felt for the Hungarians, and he, had he been in that country, would have been amongst "the rebels," with a sword in his hand. I suppose we are going to look at this Greek affair as men of the world, and going to ask what mediation meant. I have quoted an instance where France was offered our mediation in 1841. That mediation was refused. We, very properly I think, stood out, making our demand through our Minister, and getting no redress did, at last, urged on by the necessity of the case, take strong measures. The Minister who did that acted under instructions. He had no power in himself to do so, but the man who had the power was the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mediation was offered, and well did the noble Lord refuse it, but the good offices of the French people he he accepted. What did they mean they would do? What did Baron Gros himself understand by it when he first went out? He understood that he was to endeavour to make the Greek Government yield to our demand. He was not to judge of the justice or injustice of our claims. There were many things of which we complained as regarded Greece. The affair of the Fantome was one, and the question of the Islands of Cervi and Sapienza was another. It was most distinctly understood, by the papers which passed between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Baron Gros, that these other complaints were to be left out of the case; and the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary himself was particularly marked and careful on that point. His instructions were complete and definite to his Minister. He said, "You must drop the consideration of the Fantome and the islands;" and it is clear, from the instruc- tions given to Mr. Wyse throughout, that these circumstances were taken out of the investigation. So far as regarded M. Drouyn de Lhuys, there was no misunderstanding on this point. So far as regarded Baron Gros, there was no misunderstanding about it; but while he was there he changed the character in which he appeared; he changed it, contrary to the well-understood principles of the case. The explanation given by him on his first meeting with Mr. Wyse, of the manner and principles with which he came out, clearly demonstrates that he knew full well what he was come to do. Staying there, he came from day to day to the office, and at last pretended to be a mediator, to see whether our demands were just or not. But here comes the question with regard to France. While the negotiations were going on between Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros, M. Drouyn de Lhuys says to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, "Don't you think we can settle this business?" The noble Lord assented. They set to work. They make an arrangement. That arrangement did not reach Greece before a more defined one was made by Mr. Wyse to the Grecian Government, for Baron Gros gave up his mediation. "I withdraw from it," said he, "I can do no more—I withdraw from it temporarily." But now comes the point. After Baron Gros had withdrawn from the mediation, or good offices, he received a letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The noble Lord wrote to Mr. Wyse, on April 19, informing him of the plan; but that did not reach Mr. Wyse so soon as a report got to Baron Gros of the conversation between the noble Lord and M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Baron Gros wrote to Mr. Wyse that he had heard of this conversation; and I do not know that the noble Lord has taken notice of it; but further on in the correspondence he will see that, on the 22nd of April, Baron Gros writes thus to Mr. Wyse:—

"A despatch, dated the 6th of this month, received by the last courier, contains word for word what follows. It appears, from the language held by Lord Palmerston to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that 'if the British Envoy should refuse to accept a compromise which you might judge reasonable, and to which the Greek Government had acceded, the affair must be referred to London, and that, until a definitive decision, all things should remain in suspense.'"

Now, on the 24th of April, Baron Gros writes to Mr. Wyse as follows:—

"I have just received an express, which gives me important news. Lord Palmerston requires some changes in my first draft of convention, which is very incomplete, I confess, but which has been in a singular degree improved as regards English views. But this is better than all. He has said to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 'If the arrangement proposed by M. Gros does not meet the concurrence of Mr. Wyse, the negotiation would remain open. Mr. Wyse would submit the proposals of the negotiator to the British Cabinet, and would wait for instructions. Measures of coercion would be resumed without fresh orders only in case M. Gros should declare that he renounces the part of mediator.'"

Mr. Wyse had, two days before, assumed that Baron Gros had renounced the office of mediator. In the mean time came the arrangement of the noble Lord. I must, therefore, say a word or two respecting the two plans of arrangement, and the sensibilities of the French people in regard to them. I believe that that of the noble Lord was the more favourable of the two to the Greek Government; but they are so much alike that I can scarcely perceive any difference between them. The difference I believe simply to be, that the noble Lord asked for a larger sum at once, and took no security, while Mr. Wyse asked for a smaller sum at once, and took security. That I believe to be the whole difference between them. The noble Lord asked naturally, was it worth while to disturb, for so slight a difference, the first arrangement proposed? and thereupon up starts the insulted French nation. But is it the French nation? Was there not a curious coincidence occurring at the time—a sort of diversion, by the Government, of the public mind from the real state of the question, for a political purpose? Was there no dread of an emeute at Paris, and a belief that, by talking of a war with England, they might prevent the chance of what they dreaded? Were they not going to infringe upon their own constitution? And was there not a slight wish to increase the dotation? I do not say it was the French people, but that body of conspirators who now hold in their hands the power of the French people, and who, ignorant of the name of constitutional government, confound the force of war with the putting down by the sword and bayonet, in the name of freedom. Freedom! It does not exist in France. There is no free discussion permitted there. One after another newspapers are put down; and, in order to oppress their own country, they would set the world in a flame, and risk the happiness of mankind. I believe the people of France are themselves, and, as a nation, beyond the reach of such petty artifices. I be- lieve they are opposed to these disgraceful performances. We know their unfortunate position. It cannot last. And before we talk of the terrors of war, let us look around the European world and ask where is the people who could safely go to war? Is it France? Is it Austria? and if so, where is Italy and Hungary? Could Russia go to war? The fact is, we are forbearing because we are so powerful. It is the weak who are always the most sensitive. Who is ever the most ready to fight in life? The man whose position is not determined in society. They who are the most powerful can best bear with opposition; can receive insult, and consider it not insult, but ascribe it to petulance if not to folly. I believe this a fair statement of the case of the noble Lord, and I have suggested enough to the House for a decision. I will only add one word more as to the form of that decision. I hope the House will not shrink from coming to a fair and proper vote upon the broad principle of the foreign policy of the Government. I trust my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose will not evade the difficulty by enabling hon. Gentlemen to ride off on the general policy of the Government. If their foreign policy does not get at the hands of this House a clear and defined unambiguous approval, they cannot remain where they are. There must be no cavil about the question at issue—no half measure of approval. There must be so broad, so clear, so strong, and so positive an approval that there will remain no doubt that they have maintained, and shall continue to have the power to maintain, the dignity of this country in the face of the world.

Motion made, and Question proposed—

"That the principles on which the Foreign Policy of Her Majesty's Government has been regulated, have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country; and, in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world."

seconded the Motion.

said, that having given notice of a Motion which he thought would have induced the House by a large majority to support the Government on the question submitted to them, and to remove the risk of what the noble Lord at the head of the Government stated to them on a former occasion, that the Government would resign if they had not the approbation of this House, he now found that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield had rested his appeal to the House—as he (Mr. Hume) had all along believed he intended to rest it—on the whole foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. He found also that the noble Lord at the head of the Government was anxious that the result of the present discussion should rest on that. He, for one, did not agree, he could not agree, with all that had been said by his hon. and learned Friend. He did expect, after the notice of Motion he had given, that he would be able to vindicate the whole foreign policy of the Government, commencing with 1830. But, instead of that, after commencing with the affairs of Belgium, he jumped away at once to the affairs of Greece. He was sorry that his hon. and learned Friend had adopted so much of the tu quoque argument, and had insisted that England might do what other States were in the habit of doing. He had thought that England stood so high that she did not need to take example from other States in doing that which was unjust in itself. He and others had, long before 1830, arraigned the foreign policy of this Government as calculated to lead to war; and he heard with the greatest pleasure the speech of Earl Grey in 1830, when he declared that the principles of his Government would be non-interference, economy, and reform; but he was sorry to say these principles had not been carried out. An appeal had, however, been made to him, and he would not now resist that appeal, lest it should be supposed that he had other views, and meant to injure Her Majesty's Government. The fact was, that he was anxious that Her Majesty's Ministers should retain their present position. He supported their home policy—aye, and their foreign policy, too, if they pleased; but he was most anxious that they should remain in office to carry out the measures which they had supported, and which he believed to be for the good of the country. On these grounds he would withdraw his Amendment, and he was only sorry that he found he did not understand those among whom he sat. He must, however, express his regret that anything should have passed in this House to create or to continue a feeling of animosity between France and this country, as an alliance between these States he considered essential to the peace of the world. He was sorry that a single expression should have passed, and he hoped that no more would pass, to increase that estrangement. He would only say further, he was sorry he had undertaken this unsatisfactory duty. It was pleasing to himself, but it was not pleasing to other parties with whom he acted. He never was ashamed of withdrawing when he found that by persevering he was not likely to effect the object he had in view, which was to secure for Her Majesty's Government the support of a large majority in the House, and therefore he would not press his Amendment.

said, that he assumed it to be after due deliberation that Her Majesty's Government had judged it proper to ask for the opinion of the House upon the original proposition of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield, instead of waiting for the modification of either his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, or of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Youghal. It was impossible, notwithstanding the general extent of the Motion now before the House, not to advert to the circumstances under which that Motion had been brought forward by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield. On Monday last a resolution was adopted elsewhere in these terms:—

"That while this House fully recognises the right and duty of the Government to secure to Her Majesty's subjects residing in foreign States the full protection of the laws of those States, it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the table by Her Majesty's command, that various claims against the Greek Government, doubtful in point of justice, or exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece, and calculated to endanger the continuance of our friendly relations with other Powers."

That resolution was said to have been carried by a majority far beyond the gloomiest anticipations of the Government, and it necessarily created in their minds an anxiety as to the course which it would be proper for them to pursue. For two days they had preserved a deep and impenetrable silence. At last his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield thought proper to put a question to the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown regarding the intentions of the Government in the critical circumstances which had occurred, and he elicited from the noble Lord the remarkable declaration which he had made in the House on Thursday last, when the noble Lord, after adverting to the terms of this resolution, stated that it was not the intention of the Government to depart from their course of foreign policy; that they had no intention whatsoever to bow to the decision of the other House; and that they certainly had not the least disposition to resign the reins of office into the hands of those who had carried that resolution. The noble Lord, then, in support of the course which the Government intended to adopt, took occasion to cite certain authorities which he conceived applied to the particular situation of the Government in reference to this question; and the noble Lord then told the House "that 140 years ago the House of Lords had passed a resolution and address, that it would not be consistent with the safety and the honour of this country to make any peace with France which should leave Spain and the Indies in the possession of any branch of the House of Bourbon;" and the noble Lord added that, notwithstanding that resolution and address were carried on a division in the House of Lords against the Government, a treaty was afterwards entered into with France by the Executive Government, by which Spain and the Indies were left in the possession of a member of the House of Bourbon. The noble Lord further said that no longer ago than the year 1833, the Duke of Wellington had brought forward a Motion in the House of Lords for an address to the Crown on the state of the foreign relations of this country with Portugal; that Earl Grey declared in his reply that if that resolution was carried he should consider it as a vote of censure, and a stigma upon the Government; that that resolution was carried—as it undoubtedly was by a majority of ten—that, notwithstanding that majority, the noble Earl then at the head of the Government had continued to pursue the same line of policy as before, and the noble Lord, then, as now, at the head of foreign affairs, had declared in the House that, notwithstanding that resolution of the House of Lords, he should continue, and not swerve from, the course of policy he had theretofore adopted. But the noble Lord, in citing those cases, had been—he (Sir F. Thesiger) had almost said, not very ingenuous—in his statement of the last resolution of the year 1833, because the noble Lord had forgotten to mention that four days after that resolution had been carried by a majority of ten only in the House of Lords, a habitual supporter of the Government—of course by arrangement with them—had brought forward in the House of Commons a Motion approving of the policy pursued by the Government towards Portugal, and that that Motion was carried by a majority of 263, there being only 98 Members who voted in the minority on that occasion. That was a very important circumstance to remember, when considering the present posture of affairs, to distinguish the position of the Government of that day from the course taken by the noble Lord on this occasion. The Government of that day appealed to the House of Commons from the decision of the House of Lords, and obtained the sanction of the former branch to the continuance of the same course of policy they had been adopting. The noble Lord was fond of citing precedents when they were in his favour, and he selected those parts which suited his purpose, rejecting the remainder. The noble Lord had adopted one part of the course pursued in the year 1833, by declining altogether to pursue a different course of policy to that which had been coudemned by the House of Lords, but at the same time he had not thought proper to adopt the other part of the precedent, and to come down to the House of Commons to ask explicitly for a reversal of the condemnation of the foreign policy as pronounced by the House of Lords; because, if the noble Lord had followed the whole precedent, as he was bound to do, and had brought such a Motion before the House, he might possibly have found that a question raised in the House of Commons on the general policy of this country with respect to the Greek nation would have been a very hazardous experiment. But the noble Lord had found it necessary that a question should be submitted to that House, in order, if possible, to obtain the expression of some opinion. And so his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield, in the difficulty and embarrassment in which the Government was placed, had stepped forward to its rescue. He would not say, with the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, that there had been an arranged or "obvious and offered machinery," by which the Motion had been submitted to the House in the very convenient form in which it had been conceived; but this much he would venture to say, that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield had purchased by his conduct a claim to the substantial gratitude of the Government.

rose to order. He thought that the observations of the hon. and learned Member were very invidious and unfair.

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had said nothing contrary to the order of the House.

When he had said that his hon. and learned Friend had determined to place himself in the gap, and to stand forth in support of the Government, by proposing such a resolution as that he had submitted to the House, he (Sir F. Thesiger) had some recollection of a debate which had taken place in the year 1843, in which his hon. and learned Friend had taken part, and there being in that debate no immediate and direct reference to the policy of the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs. In the debate in that year upon the Affghan war, his noble and learned Friend had thought proper to express himself in the following manner with reference to the noble Lord and his policy:—

"I may be unhappy, most unhappy; I may be singular, in having the impression upon my mind; but I cannot help fancying that the noble Viscount the Member for Tiverton, who so lately ruled the destinies of this country abroad, has had a most pernicious influence upon our foreign policy. I cannot help fancying that if the name of England has been brought into bad odour with the world, the most active instrument in the production of that mischief has been the noble Viscount. In fact, if I might upon so serious a matter bring forward an almost ludicrous illustration, I should say that the noble Lord was best typified by a late production of modern science, which is called the lucifer match. No sooner does he meet with an obstruction than a flame immediately bursts forth. He puts his hand upon America, and it required but one move to bring upon us a war that, in all its calamities, would have been equal to a civil war. It was only by a miracle that we were saved from a war with France. It was not owing to anything that the noble Lord did not do that we were not thrust into a war with Russia. We had an unnecessary war in Syria—we had an armed body in the Persian Gulf—Englishmen, and those under them, have swept the whole plains of India, from the banks of the Indus to the confines of the Hindoo Coosh, under the noble Lord's pernicious influence, bearing with them all the consternation and all the horrors of war. In short, extending his mischievous activity over the whole habitable world—from the western coasts of America to the eastern coast of China (where war absolutely raged)—wherever the English name is known, the hideous consequences of war have been expected to follow. Therefore, I say, that I do look with suspicion upon every argument and every fact that may be adduced by the noble Lord or those around him, in vindication of the mischievous activity which he has displayed in perplexing and distracting our foreign relations with the world at large."

That was in the year 1843. The noble Lord had since returned to power, and he (Sir F. Thesiger) must do the noble Lord the justice to say that he had returned entirely the same man. There was the most perfect consistency in the conduct of the noble Lord at the present time and at the time when he drew down such strong animadversion from his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield. There was the lucifer match at the Foreign Office again—there was the phaeton ready to set the world on fire. It therefore did appear extraordinary that his hon. and learned Friend, with those impressions, which it was to be assumed were sincere at that time, should have adopted the course he had taken on the present occasion, there having been observed since that time no alteration, as his hon. and learned Friend must admit, in the policy of the noble Lord. That such a resolution as that he had now proposed should have emanated from him, was one of the most extraordinary and inconceivable occurrences that could possibly be imagined. His hon. and learned Friend had undoubtedly not pursued the course which would have been the most convenient and proper one—he had not proposed a resolution confining the attention of the House to the Greek question, and calling upon the House for a reversal of the sentence of condemnation by the House of Lords of the Greek policy of the Government. His hon. and learned Friend had taken a much more prudent course. He had made his resolution so wide and extensive as to preclude the question of the policy of the Government as regarded Greece being considered specially, but at the same time had given to every one desirous to have an excuse for voting with the Government an ample range in which he might find some ground for the opinion he wished to express by his vote. But what did his hon. and learned Friend ask the House of Commons to do? He had said he wished the House to resolve "That the principles on which the Foreign Policy of Her Majesty's Government has been regulated, have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country." He confessed he thought that there was some ambiguity lurking under that general term "principles." He could not understand what his hon. and learned Friend meant by that word. He knew very well that all were agreed as to the abstract question of the principle that should regulate our intercourse with other nations; but he could not have thought that it was the intention of his hon. and learned Friend to confine his attention to that point. He had thought it was his intention to call upon the House to approve of the principles of the noble Lord, as carried out in this particular instance. There was also an expression in the resolution in which he thought there was some ambiguity; he meant that in which his hon. and learned Friend proposed the House should say that the principles which had regulated the foreign policy of the Government had been such as in times of unexampled difficulty had preserved "peace between England and the various nations of the world." What did he mean by "the world," and the "times of unexampled difficulty?" Did he mean that expression to apply to this country, or to foreign nations? He conceded to his hon. and learned Friend that there had been difficulties abroad; but with respect to our own country he was not conscious that it had been placed in any difficulty whatever by which credit could be gained by the noble Lord or the Government for having steered safely through. The storm of revolution had visited other lands, prostrating thrones, and shaking States to their very foundations, while we had been happily preserved from these calamities in a state of peace and security, and the only interpretation he could apply to this expression was, that, from the strong desire which the noble Lord had invariably manifested to interfere on every occasion with other nations, it had been a difficulty to the noble Lord to keep his hands off and not to interfere with those States in the troubled position in which they had been unhappily placed. But his hon. and learned Friend explained his Motion in the word principle as embodied in the resolution; and there was no doubt had distinctly called upon the House by his proposed resolution to choose deliberately and advisedly between two courses of policy—one, the policy which he (Sir F. Thesiger) should call the policy of order against the policy of change; and the ground which his hon. and learned Friend had particularly selected for the confidence of the House in the conduct of the noble Lord was this—that wherever nations had been disposed to a course of what he called self-government, they had never been without the assistance of the noble Lord, who had invariably been ready to interfere to forward the result at which they aimed. No one could have heard the speech of his hon. and learned Friend without observing the striking contrast exhibited in the opinion of his hon. and learned Friend concerning the foreign policy of the noble Lord, at the time when the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth was at the head of affairs, and at the present time. And he now had called upon the House to approve of the interferences of the noble Lord, and to justify the course he had adopted as being the best calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of the country, and to preserve peace between England and the world. Inasmuch as this was the choice presented to the House, let them approach it, and let them endeavour, if they could, to trace the policy of the noble Lord in the liberal acts of his administration with respect to the different Governments of Europe, and of the world; and then he would venture to say that so far from the policy of the noble Lord being calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country, and to preserve peace, there was no course of policy that ever had been pursued more likely to embroil us with all nations, or which had, he regretted to say, resulted in a deeper humiliation. It was quite impossible to consider this question apart from that theatre of the noble Lord's most recent exploits—the kingdom of Greece—in which he had pursued that course which his hon. and learned Friend had described as calculated to maintain the honour and dignity, and to preserve peace between England and the world. He proposed, in the consideration of this question, to confine himself to two or three prominent features, so as not to exhaust the House, and leave it to those who would follow him the opportunity of supplying any deficiencies he might leave in his speech. He would go, as rapidly as he could, over the ground, and put the House in possession of the facts upon which he rested. The House would recollect that his hon. and learned Friend had descanted upon the policy of other nations in cases which were foreign to the present question, and that it was not until almost the last part of his speech that he had condescended to advert to the case of Greece—that being the only part of the policy of the noble Lord for which his hon. and learned Friend had asked for the approbation of the House. In considering this question of Greece, let her position be remembered, guaranteed as she was by England, France, and Russia, who, as his hon. and learned Friend said, had soared from their illimitable grandeur to protect her. Greece was unquestionably a very humble Power indeed; and he apprehended that that very circumstance, considering the generosity we were always willing to attribute to ourselves, should have induced the noble Lord to abstain in his intercourse with that weak nation, from the threats, and the haughty and imperious language, and from the menaces, which he would not have ventured to use to any strong Power. There were certainly subjects of this country who had demands upon the Greek Government, in some degree, he admitted, founded on justice; but many of them most extravagantly and exorbitantly exaggerated. There was reason to complain of delay on the part of the Greek Government. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary had thought proper to insist upon the satisfaction of those demands in a tone and manner most ungenerous and most unbecoming, and to enforce those demands by a most enormous and overwhelming fleet; and when at last he had agreed to submit to the good offices of the French Government to effect an adjustment of these claims, the conduct of the noble Lord had led to so much suspicion of his good faith, that in the result the noble Lord, being humbled and compelled to submit to terms he had originally refused, had left an impression on the mind of the people of France which he believed would not speedily be effaced. Thus the noble Lord had done everything in his power to alienate from us one of the best, the closest, and most intimate of our allies. In order to make good these assertions, he would confine himself to the cases of Mr. Finlay, of M. Pacifico, and that of the six Ionian boats taken by the Greek brigands. In the first case, it appeared to him that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield had not prepared himself with the facts. Mr. Finlay was certainly a British subject. In 1830 he had purchased a small plot of land amounting to three quarters of an acre for the sum of 10 l., or 300 drachmas, from persons who had been compelled to give it up for other purposes. No doubt Mr. Finlay had realised a very good bargain. In 1836, a portion of that three quarters of an acre had been—unjustly, he admitted—seized upon and enclosed within the intended garden of the royal palace. At that time the Greek Government was virtually despotic; yet it was not correct to say, even under those unfavourable circumstances, that the Government utterly denied the right of Mr. Finlay to indemnity. The mere question between them was with regard to the amount of compensation. It appeared that the King of Greece then appointed a commission; that the commissioners, having examined the royal archives, came to the determination that the land of Mr. Finlay, and also the land of 100 other proprietors, which had been taken for the same purpose, ought not to be valued at more than half a drachma for a square yard. The other hundred proprietors agreed to accept these terms; but Mr. Finlay refused them, as he had a perfect right to do; and when it was considered that his claim for the land, for which he had paid 10 l., and of which a part only had been taken, amounted to 1,500 l., it must be admitted that the difference was sufficiently large to be worth a contest. But in 1843 a constitutional Government was appointed in Greece, and then Mr. Finlay's position became materially changed; for although up to that time all the tribunals of the country were not open to him, yet the House would find that from 1843, as he himself had admitted over and over again, he had a right which would have been recognised by those tribunals. He never ceased to solicit the good offices of our Government to compel the Greek Government to do him justice; and a council having been appointed, they reported that the claim of Mr. Finlay should be referred to arbitration. Mr. Finlay admitted, in one of his letters, that that was a fair and just mode of satisfying his claim, if equitably carried out. The question thus raised between the parties was not as to who should be the arbiters, but as to who should be the umpire, supposing the arbiters to disagree; and it being proposed, and fairly and justly proposed, that the umpire should be an indifferent person, the Greek Government, on the other hand, made what he admitted was a most unreasonable proposition, namely, that the umpire should be nominated by the president, and therefore would be one necessarily under the influence of the Government. The matter went on, and the first blue book was presented to the House in February, 1850; and his hon. and learned Friend would find, by a reference to that part of the report which referred to Mr. Finlay's claim, a letter from Mr. Wyse, dated 20th of August, 1849, being the last part of the blue book, and stating that he had not received any answer from the Greek Government to his note relating to the claims of M. Pacifico and Mr. Finlay. But he would pass by that, and come to the point whether the case of Mr. Finlay was one justifying the Government in interfering in the way they had, by hostile aggression, in order to obtain satisfaction; and notwithstanding the great authority of his hon. and learned Friend in international law, he (Sir F. Thesiger) would contend that it was not a case for hostile aggression. The Government might have interfered with good offices, and have offered mediation; but they had no right when there was no complaint but delay on the part of the Greek Government to go with an armed force and exact from the Greek Government a satisfaction of Mr. Finlay's claim. His hon. and learned Friend had denied, or rather had endeavoured to deny, the force of the opinion which had been expressed by Lord Mansfield; and he understood his hon. and learned Friend to say that there was, in fact, no system of international law now prevailing. Now he (Sir F. Thesiger) had always supposed that at this day all civilised nations had agreed to a certain code which regulated the intercourse between them—that there were certain principles as well known and as firmly established as the municipal law of each country itself could be; and he found that Vattel upon this very question had laid it down that nations ought not to interfere in cases of their subjects in foreign countries, or grant them protection except in cases where justice was refused, or where it was palpably evident that injustice had been done, or the law had been openly violated. Vattel says—

"The Prince, therefore, ought not to interfere in the causes of his subjects in foreign countries, and to grant them his protection, excepting in cases where justice is refused, or palpable and evident injustice done, or rules and forms openly violated, or, finally, an odious distinction made to the prejudice of his subjects, or of foreigners in general. The British Court established this maxim with great strength of evidence on occasion of the Prussian vessels seized and declared lawful prizes during the late war."

The same maxim had been established in the seizure of the Prussian vessels, and in that celebrated opinion, perfectly well known to his hon. and learned Friends, and which had been referred to already, which was signed by three other persons besides Lord Mansfield—an opinion which had attracted the admiration of the most famous philosophers and jurists, including Montesquieu, who had designated it une reponse sans replique. Lord Campbell, in his life of Lord Mansfield, in allusion to an opinion given by that eminent Judge on an analogous case, said, he, having often been engaged in drawing papers of a similar character, never regarded them without mixed feelings of admiration and despair—despair, that he never should be able to cope with such an argument as this. Lord Mansfield said—

"The law of nations, founded upon justice, equity, convenience, and reason, and confirmed by all usage, does not allow of reprisals, except in cases of violent injuries directed or supported by the State, or justice absolutely denied in re minime dubia by ordinary authority, and afterwards by the courts. Where the judges are left to give assistance according to their consciences, though their judgment should be erroneous, there would be no ground for reprisals; but in doubtful questions, different men think and judge differently; and all a foreigner can desire is that justice should be impartially administered to him, as it is to the subjects of the prince in whose courts the matter is tried."

[Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] His hon. and learned Friend cheered; but what was the fact? Mr. Finlay was not denied justice; but it was distinctly stated that he was procuring it before one of the competent tribunals of the country, and the question to be decided was, as to the character and amount of the compensation. Mr. Finlay had not exhausted all the means of obtaining justice which were offered by that country, and therefore a case had not arisen to call for the hostile attack of this country upon Greece. [Mr. COCKBURN: Hear, hear!] He had not done with this part of the question, and his hon. and learned Friend would find that he had cheered a little too soon. He (Sir F. Thesiger) complained with justice of the course adopted by the Government with regard to the papers which the noble Lord had thought proper to lay on the table of that House on the Greek question. By the papers in the blue book laid before Parliament on February 8, 1850, the Government would lead the House to believe that the question of Mr. Finlay's claim was at that time left in the same unsatisfactory state as was described by Mr. Wyse in the despatch dated the 20th of August, 1849. What would the House think when he told them, according to the papers recently laid on the table, that there was then in the possession of the Government a letter, which had been received so long ago as the 29th of October, 1849. This letter, which was written by Mr. Wyse to Viscount Palmerston, was dated the 18th of October, 1849, and announced that the claim of Mr. Finlay had been referred to arbitration in a manner which was satis- factory to both parties, and Mr. Finlay stated that he was prepared to be satisfied with the result. The letter of Mr. Wyse was dated the 18th of October, 1849, and was as follows:—

"My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of five further letters respecting Mr. Finlay's claim for indemnification for some land of his enclosed thirteen years ago in the garden of King Otho's Palace. Your Lordship will perceive that the Greek Government and Mr. Finlay have agreed to refer the case to arbitration, and that arbiters have been appointed by each party, upon an understanding that if these arbiters cannot agree, they stall appoint an umpire, and that whatever decision they shall come to shall be final."

He asked whether it was not the duty of the Government to lay this letter before the House without delay, instead of letting it believe that there was no prospect of obtaining a settlement of Mr. Finlay's claim. The House was left with imperfect means of forming a judgment in order that Mr. Finlay's claim might swell the catalogue of claims against the Greek Government, and thus justify an interference in that kingdom. He, therefore, was entitled to assume, as all parties were agreed as to the mode of settling the claims of Mr. Finlay, whatever might be the opinion of his hon. and learned Friend on the subject, that they had no right to interfere to prevent the settlement taking place between the parties. He repeated they were not justified in making this claim of Mr. Finlay, as they had never an excuse for resorting to force. He now came to the case of M. Pacifico. He trusted that it would not be supposed for one moment that he was one of that class of persons who had been referred to by his hon. and learned Friend, and whom he described as entertaining low and vulgar prejudices against persons in consequence of their religious opinions, and, above all, as regarded those who were of the same religion as M. Pacifico. The hon. and learned Gentleman also said that parties entertaining such prejudices would infer that in consequence of the religion of M. Pacifico, he would make an exorbitant claim; but he (Sir F. Thesiger) did not share in such an opinion. He would take the circumstances of the case itself as he found them, and would not regard the question as affecting this individual as a Jew or a Christian. From the statement of his case laid before the House, a more absurd, a more unfounded, and, in some respects, a more exaggerated claim, was never laid before Parliament. He admitted that a gross outrage was committed at the house of M. Pacifico at Athens, on Easter-day, 1847. His hon. and learned Friend was aware that it was customary on that day to burn a figure, and have a procession; but it happened at that time that Baron Rothschild was at Athens, and out of deference to the feelings of that gentleman it was determined that the usual ceremony should be dispensed with. By the adoption of this step on the part of the Greek authorities, Baron Rothschild was made the innocent cause of the injury done to M. Pacifico. Sir E. Lyons, in a despatch describing the proceedings which then took place, said that there were some brigands in the place who persuaded the mob that M. Pacifico was the cause of the prevention of the procession and other ceremonies, and induced the multitude to accompany them to the house of that person for objects of their own. From the papers on the table, it would appear that M. Pacifico had a house, well furnished, and a great deal of property in it. His hon. and learned Friend said there was a feeling on the part of certain persons to hide their wealth; but it certainly appeared to be a singular mode of hiding his riches, on the part of M. Pacifico, in filling his house with rich furniture. But M. Pacifico also had a large sum of money in his possession, according to the allegations in his claim. It appeared, however, that shortly before that time M. Pacifico lodged some plate at the Bank of Athens, on which he obtained a loan of 30 l. at a low interest, in order, as he said, that he might lend it out at exorbitant interest. If M. Pacifico was, as he described himself, a rich man, with a most valuable property in his possession, and having also in his house a large amount in drachmas, it was certainly singular on his part to pledge his plate. He (Sir F. Thesiger) should have thought that M. Pacifico would have found it would be a more convenient mode of transacting business, to have returned the advance which had been made to him by the Bank of Athens, and thus be enabled to have the full advantage of his own capital without paying interest for advances. It did not, however, appear to him to be a very likely circumstance that M. Pacifico was in possession of the drachmas which he alleged were in his house at the time of the outrage. Among other things connected with M. Pacifico, he said he had a claim on the Portuguese Government for upwards of 21,000 l., and that the documents which made out this claim had been carried off by the brigands with other plunder. Fortunately, however, when the brigands and other plunderers left his house, they did not take away with them a list, which will be found in the blue book, containing the heads of this claim. A mistake seems to have occurred in representing this matter elsewhere, from its having been supposed that the plunderers of M. Pacifico's house had left a precise inventory of the property, with the value affixed to each article. What they did leave appears to have been a list containing the heads of M. Pacifico's claims upon the Portuguese Government; and a protest signed by several parties referring to this claim was also dropped by the robbers. M. Pacifico, in consequence of these proceedings, claimed damages from the Greek Government for the loss of his property by the destruction of his house, and for the amount of money abstracted from it, of upwards of 4.000 l., and for the loss sustained by him by the destruction of the papers relative to his claim on the Portuguese Government, which was originally stated at 21,000 l. He now demanded for that amount and accumulated interest not less than 26,000 l. The question was, what would any reasonable man think of such a claim? The claim in respect of the destruction of his furniture and property he must call a most exorbitant demand; and the other he hardly knew how to describe, but he might state that the only voucher for which was a document showing that the Portuguese Government had utterly repudiated any such claim. Notwithstanding the want of foundation for this extraordinary demand of M. Pacifico — notwithstanding, any man of judgment and experience, looking at this statement, would be satisfied that the claim was greatly exaggerated in some respects, and in others that it was without foundation, the whole was represented as a just demand by the British Minister at Athens. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department adopted the claim of M. Pacifico as it was presented to him by the Minister at Athens, and ordered him to enforce on the Greek Government the payment of the whole of it, and also directed him, by an arbitrary proceeding of his own, to require the additional payment of 500 l. for the present injuries said to have been sustained by M. Pacifico. In the first place, was this a case for reprisals, or a case for an hostile aggression, or for a demand in that haughty and im- perious manner in which the noble Lord invariably instructed the British Ministers in minor States to make demands? He would ask whether this was a case in which the Government were justified in pursuing such a course as they had done, and which was not conformable to the law of nations. He contended this was a case for the tribunals of that country; and M. Pacifico himself recognised this when he appealed to the tribunals of the country to deal with the question. It appeared that an inquiry was instituted into this question by the Procureur General at Athens, and a council was assembled for the examination of six persons, who were said to be implicated in this transaction. The case was investigated at length before the council, and the result was, that that body expressed an opinion that there was no case to go before the assize court for trial; so that these six persons were discharged from custody. [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] His hon. and learned Friend, who was so fond of interrupting him with cheers, had better reserve what he had to say for his reply. His hon. and learned Friend must know that this was the regular tribunal of the country, and also that the proceeding was not an application for compensation for loss of property, but an application to enforce the criminal justice of the country by the punishment of the aggressors. He would venture to say that this was conclusive evidence that the tribunals of this country were open to M. Pacifico, not only for the punishment of those who plundered his house, but also for that compensation which the law would have afforded. The course which should have been pursued was, to have resorted, in the first place, to the tribunals of the country; and if justice was denied, there might have been some ground for the interference of the noble Lord. If it was clear that there was no chance of obtaining redress by these means, the noble Lord would have been quite right in requiring compensation. Suppose, in 1780, a riotous mob had broken into the house of a foreign Roman Catholic, and had plundered and destroyed the property in it—and no doubt many instances of the kind occurred at that time—would his hon. and learned Friend say that this was a case for the interference of the Government of the foreigner, to be enforced by an armed aggression? [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] Did his hon. and learned Friend by that cheer mean to say that he was prepared to de- fend such a proposition? If he was, he (Sir F. Thesiger) was prepared to join issue with him. He would venture to say that there never was a case in which such a mode of proceeding was allowed. His hon. and learned Friend held up the blue book in his hand as if it contained precedents and authorities for such a proceeding; but he (Sir F. Thesiger) never found, when such authorities were examined, that they agreed together. As for the case of M. Pacifico, it was not a case for intervention on the part of a Government alive to the interests of the country, until the fullest inquiry had been instituted into it. Nothing could justify any proceedings similar to those of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary until after the fullest inquiry, and the clearest conviction had been arrived at as to the justice of the claim. If there had been any inquiry they would have found that there had been most gross and absurd exaggeration resorted to in this claim. It would also be found that it was not until the period of the intervention of the French Government that there was any ground for supposing that M. Pacifico's claim should be made a subject of inquiry. He now came to the seizure of some Ionian boats at Salcina, which had been taken possession of and plundered by some armed men who were at that place. Sir E. Lyons, on receiving intelligence of this, lost no time in communicating the intelligence to the noble Lord. Shortly afterwards Sir E. Lyons received the following despatch from Viscount Palmerston:—

"The inclosures in your despatch (No. 87) relate to the plunder of six Ionian boats at Salcina, in the River Achelous. With reference to that subject, I have to instruct you to address a note to M. Coletti, stating that Her Majesty's Government expect and demand that the Greek Government will make full compensation to the Ionians for the losses and sufferings inflicted upon them by the Greek robbers and pirates who were allowed upon that occasion to take possession of the Custom-house at Salcina; and you will say that Her Majesty's Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands will be instructed to ascertain the amount to be claimed on behalf of the masters and crews of the six Ionian boats, and to send you an account thereof. You will also state to M. Coletti that Her Majesty's Government trust that when the account in question shall have been given in, His Excellency will, without any delay, cause the amount to be paid to you, in order that it may be remitted to Corfu."

M. Coletti, as would be seen in page 191 in the blue book, replied to this communication of the noble Lord; and he did not think his hon. and learned Friend could have taken a more accurate view of the transaction than was given by the Greek Minister:—

"The duty of the King's Government was to put down crime, and it has not neglected to do so. I think it superfluous, M. le Chevalier, to bring before your notice again the difficulties which are always opposed to effectually maintaining authority in the province of Acarnania; but no one is ignorant of attempts which have been made. Soldiers have fallen in encounters with the banditti; several of the latter have quite recently been killed. The pursuit is still continued, and, with the assistance of the Lord High Commissioner, I hope that the individual marked out as the principal author of the outrage committed at Salcina, the Ionian Tryphon, who has escaped from the prisons of Santa Maura, will at last fall into the hands of justice. Nothing will be neglected in order to obtain this result, which, I have much pleasure in hoping will be considered by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty as the fulfilment of the only obligation which the Government of His Hellenic Majesty can be held responsible for in this affair."

[Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] Did his hon. and learned Friend mean to say that because some brigands had plundered some Ionian boats, that the Greek Government was bound to make compensation to the persons plundered, and if it was refused, the claims should be enforced by an hostile force? [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] He was again surprised to hear his hon. and learned Friend express his assent to such a proposition. He had endeavoured to confine himself, in the remarks which he had made, to the conduct of the Government as regarded the three principal heads of the claims which were ordered to be enforced by the squadron under Sir W. Parker. The claim of Mr. Finlay might be put entirely aside for the present; but M. Pacifico had made out no case, and there was no ground for saying that the Greek Government should be called upon to make compensation, and which, if it was refused, should be forced by aggressive means. When, also, compensation was demanded, the claim was made in the most strong and overbearing language, and in terms such as were never used by the noble Lord unless in addressing small States. This was done in the most offensive manner, for the noble Lord had thought proper to order the British Minister at Athens to call upon the Minister of the Greek Government, and demand the concession of these claims within twenty-four hours, threatening them with a hostile blow if they refused to yield within that period. He had great pleasure in reading to the House the affecting and dignified answer made by M. Londos to this demand made by Mr. Wyse. The House would recollect that at the time this demand was made on M. Londos he had been only three weeks in office; and he was sure if the noble Lord was placed in a similar situation, he would have been glad to have asked time to plead. The letter of M. Londos was as follows:—

"Athens, Jan. 7–19, 1850.

"I have received the note which you did me the honour to write to me yesterday. It would be impossible for me to express to you the feelings with which it has been read by His Majesty the King of Greece and his Government. The whole nation will partake them. Greece is weak, Sir, and she did not expect that such blows would be aimed at her by a Government which she reckoned with equal pride and confidence among her benefactors. In the presence of a force like that which obeys your instructions, the Government of His Hellenic Majesty can only oppose its rights and a solemn protest of acts of hostility committed in profound peace, and which, without speaking of other interests of a higher order, are a violation in the highest degree of its dignity and independence. In this sad conjuncture, certain of the support of the Greek people, and of the sympathies of the whole world, the King of Greece and his Government await with sorrow, but without weakness, the end of the trials which, by order of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, you may still destine for them."

He (Sir F. Thesiger) thought that it was impossible for any one to conceive anything more calm and dignified than this reply of the Greek Minister to the threat offered to him on the part of the noble Lord. But no delay took place, and an overwhelming force was sent to Athens. No further delay was allowed after the peremptory demand made by Mr. Wyse. He was surprised to find that it had been stated by a noble Lord in another place that the circumstance of sending a large fleet to Greece to enforce these demands, was a compliment to the people of that country, for they could say that they yielded to a large fleet, but they had not been called upon to do so to a sloop-of-war. He thought it was a singular compliment for a large Power to send such a force against a weak State as to show that all resistance would be unavailing. This was a mode of showing to them their utter weakness, and certainly was a mode of compliment which could only have occurred to Her Majesty's Ministers. In the mode of enforcing the demand, a heavy blow was struck at the commerce of that country. The loss they had to sustain was heavier than the claims of M. Pacifico and all the other parties put together, setting aside the amount of the alleged claim for the destruction of papers connected with the demand on the Portuguese Go-

"Lord Palmerston agreed with me; only he told me that he would introduce into his note a paragraph for the purpose of well determining the nature of our intervention, which would be, not an arbitration, but a friendly mediation ( mediation officieuse ), an interposition of good offices. 'Something,' he said, 'like what you did in the affair of the sulphur of Sicily, and what we ourselves did in your difference with Mexico.'"

In whatever character it was that the French Government intervened, he thought it was clear that it was in perfect good faith on the part of that country, and with a sincere desire to promote a final and satisfactory adjustment of these matters. This could be shown in the most satisfactory manner in the despatch from General de la Hitte to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The General says—

"Whatever impression we may have received from the proceedings to which England has had recourse to enforce her claims, we ought to lay aside, as long as our mediation lasts, the painful sentiments which they have caused us. It is with perfect good faith that we have offered our good offices to the Cabinet of London. We sincerely desire an amicable arrangement, and, when a great Power is concerned, such an arrangement can only take place upon conditions which are not humiliating. It is enough to say that, without conceding to England anything which she cannot claim without injustice, it is requisite that the Greek Government should not refuse any satisfaction which equity may require or justify; and that it should give a certain latitude in considering what it ought to do in this respect."

On the 5th of March, Baron Gros arrived at Athens; on the 1st of March, Mr. Wyse, having received an intimation from the noble Lord of the intended intervention of the French Government, orders a suspension of coercive measures; but in the very first interview with Baron Gros, Mr. Wyse tells him that which certainly was not very satisfactory—that he was most distinctly to understand that Mr. Wyse had no instructions to go into any discussion as to the nature or amount of the claims, or any authority to make any concession or modification. That was not very satisfactory for a person who had been selected for the office of mediator, or to interpose good offices, or whatever terms the noble Lord might prefer to apply to it. But M. Gros proposed a convention by which the whole matter was to be arranged on certain terms. To this Mr. Wyse op-

"The case thus foreseen by Her Majesty's Government had in the meantime happened at Athens, though not precisely in the manner indicated by the words employed beforehand to describe it. Another settlement of the matters in dispute between Her Majesty's Government and the Greek Government had been made, but it had not been made by all three of the Ministers engaged in the negotiation. It had been made by direct communication between the Greek and the British Ministers, and was the result of a renewal of the action of the British squadron."

So that the noble Lord himself admitted that the circumstances under which the convention at Athens was to subsist in force had not occurred, and therefore the noble Lord, admitting that, must admit also that it was the convention entered into between himself and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which was to conclude the difference with the Greek Government. But the House must observe that in this convention there was no stipulation for protection against claims for indemnities for the losses sustained by the seizure of Greek vessels; and this was not wonderful when they came to consider the position in which the Government was placed towards France as respected this question. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after what had occurred with the noble Lord, feeling convinced that there had been a violation of the engagements made with him, communicated that impression to his own Government, who recalled their Ambassador from this capital on the 15th of May. So stood the question between France and the noble Lord; the noble Lord being accused in the face of the French nation of a breach of the engagement into which he had entered, and the French Minister having been withdrawn upon that account, and so the matter remained when this question was first brought under the attention of the House of Commons. The noble Lord was accused by M. Drouyn de Lhuys of not having adhered to the terms of that arrangement, which declared that the convention of London was to prevail, supposing that no other arrangement had been definitely agreed upon between the three Powers before its arrival at Athens; the noble Lord was insulted by the charges being made against him, and by the withdrawal of the French Minister expressly on that ground; and yet, at the present

"I have the honour of announcing to the Assembly that the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty consents, for the adjustment of the affairs of Greece, to return to the London treaty, by substituting for the clauses of the arrangement concluded at Athens on the 27th of April, which have not yet been executed, the corresponding stipulations of the convention agreed to in London on the 19th of April. Consequently, the President of the Republic gave the orders to declare to the Ambassador of Her Britannic Majesty that the French Government accepted that solution, so far as it was concerned. Gentlemen, what the French Cabinet has accepted on the 20th of June, is in substance what it had proposed to the English Cabinet on the 14th of May, previous to the recall of its Ambassador. The Government of the Republic hopes that it will be evident, for all that, from the first to the last act of that long negotiation, its conduct was only inspired by the sentiment of national dignity, by a spirit of conciliation, and a desire of maintaining general peace [loud applause on the right]."

So that the noble Lord, having stood out to the last, until he had driven us to the brink of a war, having submitted to the humiliation of being charged with a breach of his engagements, and having the Minister of France withdrawn, was compelled at last to submit to the terms of the convention he had before repudiated, and which now placed him in the same position in which he might have placed himself on the 14th of May, without the humbling scenes through which he had to pass since that time. Now the opinion which the French Government entertained on this subject he believed was shared by all the nations of Europe, and he thought the House would be disposed to adopt that opinion, which was thus expressed by General Lahitte, in one of the letters to be found in the papers laid before the French Chambers:—

"Be assured that if we have engaged in this difficult affair, it certainly was not because our dignity was flattered by having to discuss the bill of M. Pacifico, or that we found any immense advantage in making Greece pay rather less. No, we were prompted by other considerations. Sharing upon these matters the opinion of Russia, of Austria, of all the other Powers"—

"We thought, notwithstanding, that the nature of our relations with the English Government ought to determine us to assume another attitude, to hold another language; we stretch out a hand to them on purpose to bring them together; we do it in the interest of peace, in their own interest, and in that of our friendly relations with them."

He asked the House whether the transactions he had detailed were, as his hon. and learned Friend asked the House to declare, calculated to insure the peace of this country with other nations? He thought it would be discovered from those details that the noble Lord, so far from adopting a course which was calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country, had compromised and degraded it—and so far from pursuing measures calculated to preserve peace, had done everything he possibly could to embroil us with other nations. His hon. and learned Friend, adverting to some of the objections made to the terms in which the instructions of the noble Lord were conveyed to his Minister, and to the tone of that Minister to the King of Greece, observed that the Earl of Aberdeen had used just as strong language in despatches of his on the subject of the Greek loan; but his hon. and learned Friend overlooked the difference between the two cases. The Greek loan was secured by treaty, and by a guaranteed treaty; a violation of that treaty would have been a

said, that the opening of the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Abingdon but too well augured the course which he was about to take. He (Mr. Wood) came to the House, believing they were about to discuss a subjuct of great importance to the interests, the dignity, and the honour of the country —and he had no conception that the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield was to be met by arguments such as he had just listened to—arguments as to the exaggerated details of the claims of M. Pacifico, vulgar speculations as to the lasses of Mr. Finlay, and other arguments of the like description, every one of which he had heard before, or read before—but which had filled him with such ineffable disgust that he was grieved his hon. and learned Friend, whom he so much respected, should have sanctioned his approbation of them by adopting every one of them. It was, he repeated, a bad augury of the hon. and learned Gentleman's address that he had commenced it by a miserable insinuation against the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, to the effect that he had merited a substantial reward for the part he had taken. He took leave to tell the hon. and learned Gentleman who had made the insinuation, that the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had long ago earned his reward—a more substantial reward than any which the Ministers of the Crown or the country could bestow—the reward of the people of England, for having earned the reputation of an honest, an upright, and patriotic representative. There was no necessity, however, for him to speak in defence of the hon. and learned Member, who was very well qualified to defend himself. He only alluded to the attack which had been made upon him, as an augury of what might be expected to follow. The question which the House was invited on the present occasion to discuss, was one of grave and serious import. The resolution of another place had been determined not alone upon the merits of the dry question of the demands upon Greece, for the resolution had a general scope, and was founded upon this avowed principle, that it was desirable to announce to Europe that the Foreign Office was not England. That was the principle of the resolution; and he contended that it had been well and properly met by the counter resolution of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, who told them that the dignity and the honour of England had been upheld, and that peace had been preserved by the policy of Her Majesty's Government. He repeated that the present was a serious question to discuss. That other Assembly, august as it was, was capable, no doubt, from its own chivalrous feeling, of forming an estimate of what concerned honour. It thought that the honour of England was not in safe keeping—that the Commons of England had been regardless of it—and that it was not safe save in the custody of the House of Lords. Everything that had been done with reference to this subject had been done in the face of Parliament and of the country—every step that was taken was well known in that House; and whatever the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield might say with respect to the general negligence of England with respect to foreign affairs, it could not be held that in this case the charge could be borne out. The House of Lords had decided that it was the House of Commons which was to blame for not having taken any step to arrest this course of policy, and which had never been called upon to do so by any expression of opinion from hon. Members on the Opposition benches. It was true they had had occasionally a sprightly sally from the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, and a few querulous complaints from other hon. Members less distinguished; but no hon. Member had brought forward the question whether the honour of England had been tarnished or the peace of Europe emperilled by the foreign policy of the present Administration. If the sentence of the other place were right, the custody of the honour of England must for the future be confided to that House. The House of Commons had neglected it, and they announced to the whole of Europe that, as often as foreign countries had cause of complaint they would have to carry their appeals to the House of Lords, because the honour of England could not be confided to the keeping of the Commons. The result, however, of the policy of the Government was precisely the contrary, because the peace of Europe had been maintained, and, in his opinion, the honour and dignity of the country had been singularly upheld. If he were called upon to take issue upon the entire course of the policy of the Government with reference to foreign affairs, he could not ask a better issue; and so far from thinking that the Government had impaired the honour and dignity of the Crown, he was of opinion that they would have detracted from the one and lessened the other if they had hesitated to vindicate the rights of British subjects, which had been so long and so grievously violated in Greece. He believed, on the contrary, that if any shadow of blame were to attach to the Foreign Office, it was that it had not done in 1848 what it had done in 1850. Now let them consider what had caused the events which had taken place. Here they had a subject of Britain deprived violently of his property without any just cause. He remained for six years without having recourse to his own embassy, endeavouring to obtain redress, but utterly failing to gain the slightest reparation. Then, and then only, he obtained the aid of his own Government, receiving it, in the first instance, from the Earl of Aberdeen in 1842; and, because he persevered in his claim, they were to be told that his was "merely the case of a cannie Scotchman, who had made a good bargain, and wished to hold it." Then there was the case of another subject outraged by the plunder of his house in open daylight, and on a festival—his wife and daughter beaten, and his property plundered. And what was the answer to this outrage? Why, that the man was a Jew, and that he had exaggerated his claims. He was ashamed to hear that it was alleged against this man, who had no opportunity of defending himself, that he bore the same name with some one who would have been convicted of the crime of forgery if he had lived in this country, if he had not paid down a sum of money to stay the prosecution. Under such circumstances as these, was the House to reckon the panes of glass which were broken, or the candlesticks which were taken away from the house of M. Pacifico, when they had the fact before them that the house was plundered in the open daylight, and that redress was refused? And were they to say that they upheld the honour and the dignity of England, by permitting British subjects to be treated in this lawless and barbarous manner? But there was another case—that of Stellio Sumachi—which he was surprised no one had alluded to. This man, who was also a British subject, had been brutally tortured, indeed, subjected to a description of torture too horrible and degrading to detail, and so dreadful, that the poor man himself had paraphrased it by saying, "I was tortured in the Turkish fashion." With respect to this man, it was said that he was accused of burglary; but not a particle of evidence was adduced against him, and, after being kept in prison three months, he was released. He could prove that he had been brutally tortured. The law of Greece did not allow of torture, yet justice was entirely and completely refused to the unfortunate man who had been subjected to such revolting treatment. Was it, then, to be said that they were to allow a Scotchman to be robbed because he was "a cannie Scot?"—that they were to allow another subject to be outraged and plundered because he was a Jew, and had exaggerated his claims?—and that a third man was to be disgustingly tortured because he was accused of the crime of burglary, but without the production of a particle of evidence? They next came to another case, which amounted to a positive and direct insult, to that which was considered a most delicate point of national honour—an insult to an officer in the British Navy. The facts of this case were very few and very clear. An officer, the son of the British Vice-consul of the place, landed from a ship of war at the usual place of debarkation. After he had landed he was stopped by a party of armed soldiers, upon the ridiculous pretence that the boat in which he had arrived had gone to a suspicious vessel, and that he himself had gone to the house of a notorious Greek rebel. Notwithstanding this gross treatment, amounting, as it did, almost to an insult to the British flag, were we to be told that we were not to notice it, because the Power which inflicted the injury was a smaller one than ours, and not able to compete with us upon equal terms? These were the four cases in which we were told that we ought to forgive and forget, and, unmindful of the Powers in the background, pass over the insults, in order that the honour and dignity of England might be maintained. It appeared to him that those who had arrived at the resolution in the other House, must have had a very singular idea of what honour and dignity really were, or they must have been grossly misled. He believed that they had been egregiously misled, and that others were misled likewise. The fourth estate—the Times newspaper—had been under the same misapprehension for a long time. That valuable publication had said, over and over, among other mis-statements, that M. Pacifico was a hybrid Jew. This was the course taken by that journal in a long series of laboured articles against the noble Viscount at the head of the Foreign Office; and the minds of those who considered the question as it was thus presented to them, and who had not the patience to read the blue books, were prejudiced by the misrepresentations which were made on the subject. These prejudices were taken up by the advocates of the resolution proposed in the other House; and the result was, a total ignorance of the real circumstances of the case, and a disregard of the facts which the question really and truly turned upon, as detailed in the blue books and papers which had been presented to Parliament. If they took the case of Mr. Finlay, they would find that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had last spoken had very much mis-stated it. Mr. Finlay had purchased a piece of land for 300 or 400 drachmas, which was afterwards divided into two plots. One of them was seized upon by the Government, in order that a royal printing office might be established on it; and the other plot, lying convenient for the purpose, had been taken to form a garden for King Otho's palace. Both plots were thus taken away; and it was alleged by the Greek Government that it was done by virtue of a decree, passed in the year 1834 (but really in 1837), and that Mr. Finlay had given his consent to it. It was stated by M. Coletti that a commission was issued in the year 1837, to value the land thus taken away, and that the claims of other persons were satisfied, though no arrangement had been made with M. Pacifico. The statement given by Mr. Finlay was, that, in the year 1837, an arrangement was made by the commune of Athens, with reference to taking land for public purposes, and that it was agreed that all land to be so taken was to be staked out within six months. The land of Mr. Finlay was not staked out for eighteen months or two years, and consequently he supposed that it would not be required. When it was taken, however, he went and stated the circumstances to M. Zagrophus, who told him that, with respect to the land taken for the royal printing press, he ought to have compensation for it as it was required for public purposes, With regard to the other plot of land, he was told he might go and get it. Mr. Finlay replied that he could not get it as it had been annexed to the royal garden. He distinctly stated that Mr. Finlay invited the Greek Government to take his claim into consideration, on the ground that the land was not destined for any public purpose. Mr. Finlay said, "It was pleasant to be told to take any remedy against the Greek Government, after having been told in another place that the law did not permit it." He (Mr. P. Wood) agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Abingdon with regard to the law of nations. One of the rules laid down was, that you had a right to seek redress for your own subjects, either when you cannot have a remedy according to the law of the country, or when you can but are denied that remedy. Now, it appeared that Mr. Finlay had no remedy according to the law of the country. A commission had been appointed under a certain ordinance, and one hundred persons, whose cases had been inquired into, received compensation; but it should be recollected that those persons were Greek subjects. Mr. Finlay, however, should have had his case tried by a legal tribunal. It might be all very well for those Greek subjects to say they were contented. "They might have been contented," said Mr. Finlay, "but they were not paid." It was not until Mr. Finlay had made every remonstrance in his power that he took steps for calling the attention of the British Government to his claim. Sir E. Lyons, in one of his despatches, called attention to this fact. He said Mr. Finlay was deprived of a most valuable piece of ground in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, and, though the mild and gentlemanly measures he had taken to acquire compensation had been disregarded, he was still disposed to content himself with the highest price paid for the same quantity of land situated at the same distance from the palace. The Earl of Aberdeen did not say that the claim was opposed to the law of nations; on the contrary, he instructed Sir E. Lyons to take steps to see Mr. Finlay righted. He (Mr. P. Wood) had great satisfaction in finding that the Earl of Aberdeen, when he had no other grievances disturbing his imagination, had thus promptly recognised the justice of Mr. Finlay's claim. And yet from 1842 to 1848 there had been such miserable haggling and bargaining as mortal man never saw, without the appearance of any redress; and when he was told that this was the claim of a "cannie Scot," what ought they to think of the Sovereign who could every morning look out of the windows of his palace upon the piece of land for which he knew he had never paid, and which belonged to the subject of another State who had placed himself under his protection? Her Majesty's Government had been, if anything, too lenient in submitting for so long a time to the frauds and devices of this miserable and unhappy Government. The sum allotted to Mr. Finlay was about 1,066 l. Mr. Wyse said—

"I had ascertained that this is the sum which the arbiters appointed by the Greek Government and Mr. Finlay proposed to fix, had the Greek Government not prevented the arbitration from being brought to a conclusion within the legal period. This sum is rather larger than that which Mr. Finlay would have received, if the value had been calculated on the basis of the decision of the Greek tribunals In the similar case of Raphtopoulo, as proposed by Mr. Finlay three years ago."

Here was a case in which there was a clear denial of justice. Was Mr. Finlay to suffer all this, and no indignation to be expressed against the advisers of that unfortunate Sovereign, who permitted, under his very eyes, this detestable piece of iniquity? This unhappy Government had proposed that the matter should be left to the decision of two arbiters, appointed by the President of the Greek tribunals. What a nice chance of an honest decision such a tribunal would afford! The Greek judges were removable at the pleasure of the Crown; and it was proposed that a judge, removable at pleasure, should appoint the umpire. Mr. Finlay objected to the proposal as ridiculous, and the noble Viscount the Secretary for Foreign Affairs coincided in that opinion. An imputation had been thrown out that Her Majesty's Government had withheld despatches, furnished false extracts, and what not; and it was also imputed to the Government that in February last they laid before the House papers which did not inform it that this question was about to be determined. Now the facts were, that, after a delay of fourteen years, a delusive system of arbitration was wrung from the reluctant Greek Government. Finding, however, that the arbitrators had proved too honest for them, they delayed carrying out the decision until three months had elapsed; well, that period had expired about three months before the Piræus was blockaded. With respect to M. Pacifico's case, it was said that he had his remedy at law, and that he should have used it instead of running to the Foreign Office. Why, M. Pacifico did try the authorities. He went before the police; he pointed out the individuals who attacked his house, and named the general, and the sons of the general, in whose house the stolen property was to be found. The police said, "We have not got sufficient witnesses;" and having arrested some three or four persons, who, it was well known, had nothing whatever to do with the case, after some examination, dismissed them, and said, "We have nothing more to do with the inquiry." The case of M. Pacifico was that of a flagrant and patent outrage upon person and property. It was said that he too had his remedy in the ordinary courts of the country. But he had tried them; he went before the police; he pointed out some of the authors of the outrage, whom he had himself identified in the mob, and the houses where the stolen property might be found. But the police did not pursue their inquiries with regard to one of these individuals. They apprehended four or five persons who had nothing to do with the attack upon M. Pacifico's house, and that was all the redress he could get from the Greek police. He knew nothing personally of M. Pacifico; but he must be a man of considerable talent if he had drawn up his own papers, in which he had given an account of what had actually occurred. He answered paragraph by paragraph the statements of the Greek Minister. That Minister stated that he ought to have, in the first place, sought a remedy from the local authorities. He said distinctly—

"It has been proved that I did not immediately have recourse to the British legation. I first addressed myself to the laws of the country."

He then added that he assisted in the inquiry which was instituted with his own personal knowledge as much as he could, but observed—

"The information which I could furnish was necessarily very incomplete. Attacked by a furious populace—forced to conceal myself—obliged to go and implore an asylum in the palace of the British Minister—had I the power, or was it possible for me to distinguish the authors of the acts of violence and of the robberies which took place at my house? All that I could do I did; I mentioned the sons of General Zavellas in my representation to the King's advocate, and in my petition of June I pointed out the houses in which was some of the property stolen from my house; but it is precisely these sons of General Zavellas whom they have not proceeded against; and it is those very houses in which I proved the existence of the secreted goods that they refused to search judicially immediately after the crime had been perpetrated."

Then he added, that from his position as a Jew he could not act as a Greek citizen and introduce himself into those houses. Now, he (Mr. P. Wood) would ask the House this question—If Lord George Gordon had been one of the sons of the then Minister of the day, and if, in the outrage which he led, the house of a foreigner had been robbed and plundered, would the circumstance of that foreigner having been a Roman Catholic, even though he were able to say that he saw the son of the Minister leading the rioters, have been sufficient to justify the Government in saying they were unable to do him the justice he demanded?—that they had examined one or two witnesses, but, having done that, they were unable to do more in the case? If such a thing as this could possibly have occurred, would any Member of the House deny that it would have furnished a sufficient case for a foreign nation to take up against them? The whole case of M. Pacifico had been treated very lightly in another place; but, in his estimation, everything connected with it showed how thankful this country ought to be that they had at the head of foreign affairs a Minister like the noble Viscount, who took care that such outrages should not pass unchecked. Even if M. Pacifico had made the most extravagant demand ever made, that would not alter the nature of the attack made on his house. But then, said the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Abingdon, M. Pacifico ought to have redeemed his plate with the money which he had in his possession. Now, the fact was, that the money which he had in his possession was trust-money. He borrowed 80 l., and he had 230 l. belonging to the Synagogue; but surely they did not suggest that he ought to have redeemed his plate with that? Something had been said, he thought very ridiculously, about the wife and family of this gentleman not being witnesses. It was proved beyond a doubt, however, that they saw the furniture, and everything that he complained of losing, though they could not speak to the value. And, on the last point, he might appeal to an hon. Gentleman on the other side, who had written much upon such matters, whether it was not the custom of the Jews in the East to have richly furnished houses, which they secluded from the public gaze? Then, as to the Portuguese claims, they were told that they had been trumped up for the occasion. The fact was undoubted, however, that in 1845 M. Pacifico had urged claims on Portugal; Sir E. Lyons was able to speak to that fact, and it therefore could not have been got up merely to help out a subsequent case. Connected with the Portuguese claims there was a very strange circumstance that demanded the attention of the House. If they looked through the papers they would find the extraordinary course of negotiation that took place; and that, however right it might be to have the good offices of France on the occasion, certainly M. Pacifico was placed in extraordinary hands when he had a negotiator like Baron Gros to deal with. That Baron Gros, assuming the office of mediator, should have at once decided on refusing these claims on the evidence of the debtor that he did not owe the money, was one of the most marvellous circumstances in the case. It was, however, solely upon the statement of the Government of Portugal, made in two despatches, that they never owed him a farthing, and had always refused to pay, that Baron Gros came to his decision respecting these claims, and refused them. Then, with respect to Stellio Sumachi and his fellow-prisoners, they had been charged with committing a burglary, and tortured, by placing a heavy stone on their chest, and causing two or three persons to sit on it. Another method of torture, too horrible to mention, was also used. This poor man wrote a letter to the English Ambassador, complaining of the manner in which he had been treated—although it was afterwards made matter of accusation against him, that he never made any complaint of the treatment he had received. What did they do then? They instituted a mock inquiry before the Nomarch Ducas. Dr. Chrysantopulos was called in to give his opinion respecting the injuries done. This physician said he "found no organic change affected, and concluded there was no torture. On the chest there was no appearance of external injury. However, the prisoners, no doubt, felt some little pain in their chests; but they had been treated with"—the original words were " la grande sensibilité." It should have been translated, "treated with great tenderness." "There was no doubt," continued the physician, "that the prisoners felt some little pain on their chest being pressed, but it was difficult to decide the principal cause of pain. In other words, did the pain proceed from exterior injury—that is to say, from the application of the stone, &c., or from some other pathological cause, as, for example, rheumatism; or was it, lastly, the effect of their low trade as tinkers?" Was this case to be treated as a nisi prius case, as it had hitherto been treated? Here was a serious accusation made by two men, who pointed out to the police the parties who maltreated them. The examination that took place was secret. The accused and accusers were never confronted, and the only evidence adduced of which they had any account was that the injured persons had tender chests, which might have arisen from their previous trade as tinkers. But fortunately the case did not rest there. Ducas, the unfortunate Nomarch, was obliged to transmit this account, which he said would set all right. But that same Ducas told Mr. Wood, a gentleman whom he (Mr. P. Wood) did not know, but who was a vice-consul, that he said to the doctor that he was astonished at the certificate which he gave, and that the doctor replied, "What could I do? the police made me do it." But the case did not rest on the evidence of Mr. Wood alone; they had the evidence of Sir E. Lyons, who stated that Ducas had told him the same thing. Ducas at that time had resigned his office, and that appeared to account for his statement. It appeared that fresh demands were made for fresh inquiries; and the answer to those demands was, that it was not the custom to proceed twice against a person on a criminal charge. That answer was quite right if there had been a real examination and a fair trial; but to call all this mockery an inquiry was ridiculous. But, besides the testimony to which he had referred, they had the evidence of two men, who stated distinctly that they heard these unfortunate individuals say to the police, "How could you treat us so cruelly and barbarously?" and the police did not deny it, but said "We were ordered to do it." Now, he (Mr. P. Wood) would ask whether, upon the facts as he had briefly stated them, any human being could venture to say that it was not the bounden duty of our Foreign Minister to take care that these outrages should not be repeated? Redress, if any there was which could have been afforded to them, was refused, and that was enough. Was there a redress to be obtained from the tribunals of the country? If so, it was clearly and distinctly refused. Could any other course, then, have been taken but that which had been taken by the Government? Then, with reference to the Ionian States. So continual had been the acts of annoyance on the part of Greek subjects, that the Ionians stated that, unless Great Britain extended to them her protection, it would be impossible for them to carry on their trade. In such a case, was it not the right—the plain and bounden duty—of our Government to interfere? It was clearly proved that redress was refused; and, it was, besides, very remarkable that continued insults were offered by this miserable little Government in Greece to subjects of the Ionian Islands, because they were under the protection of this country. Another man was flogged without any cause whatever. Again, a man was arrested for putting up a flag, and was dragged through the streets as a prisoner, when, after all, no charge was proved against him. A memorial was presented, signed by forty Ionian subjects residing at Patras, in which they called upon the British Consul to protect them, saying that if they were not protected from these torturings and floggings, it would be impossible for the Ionians to remain at Patras. Under such circumstances it not only was right, but it was the plain and bounden duty of the British Government to interfere. With regard to the boats, that he confessed appeared to him to be the only doubtful part of the case. The case was this: A set of brigands—if indeed they were brigands—took possession of the Greek Custom-house, and decoyed a number of Ionian boats. It was a matter that ought to have been redressed, and that redress no doubt might have been rendered by the ordinary tribunals. But the House would recollect that this affair was coupled with all those other manifest cases of injustice. It was fairly to be inferred from that that it was a case in which it was utterly hopeless to obtain redress in the ordinary course. Nothing was done to punish those robbers. Either the Greek Government was too weak to correct that outrage, or, if strong enough, was unwilling to do it. But the last case he would refer to was that most gross outrage upon the boat's crew of Her Majesty's ship Fantome, at Patras. The plain statement was, that two persons were landed from the Fantome, one being the Consul's son, a youth of thirteen years of age, and the other the coxswain of the boat. These facts were explained by Mr. Wood and Captain Le Hardy to M. Rondopoulos, the Nomarch of Achaia; but what was the colouring which he put upon the transaction? He wrote thus to the Minister of the Interior:—

"This day at four o'clock in the afternoon arrived in the harbour of Patras, coming from Malta, the English steamer the Spitfire, the same whose boats received and took on board Merenditi and his accomplices. Her boat came on shore, her patent of health was sent in, and her commander then went to visit the British Consul. After having made some manœuvres in the harbour, which made us think that she was on the point of departure, the Spitfire, an hour later, cast anchor opposite the quarter 'la Tonnellerie' , where the families of the rebels Boulgaraki and E. R. Pettas reside. Nobody at first remarked how, after some manœuvres, the Spitfire had chosen this place for her anchorage, but, after a little while, this is what was observed:—At seven o'clock in the evening a boat's crew of the Spitfire landed in the abovementioned quarter, at some distance from the place where ships' boats ordinarily land, and then returned again to the steamer. I thought it advisable to address to the British Consul a letter, to request him to come to an understanding with the commander of the Spitfire, in order to prevent any misunderstanding or quarrel between the boats' crews and the guard on duty. I had hardly despatched this letter to the consul when a new incident occurred. The boat of the steamer, manned by ten sailors, came again on shore in the same quarter, exactly opposite the houses inhabited by the families of the abovementioned rebels, and put on shore two unknown persons, who, with haste, entered Boulgaraki's house."

A few days after there appeared a statement in the Moniteur Grec in which these particulars were persisted in. The Consul required the Nomarch to institute an inquiry into the facts; but he refused to do it. About a week afterwards, and when they knew that Captain Le Hardy, who was the only officer who knew the whole particulars of the matter, had left with his ship, the Greek authorities proposed to institute an inquiry. But what was the answer of the British Government? They said, "We have examined into the matter, and are perfectly satisfied, and shall take no further steps except that of making a demand on you for redress." He would ask the House whether British honour was in any degree compromised by demanding redress for the insult he had described? The conclusion of the case was this:—On the 6th of December, 1848, a letter was addressed by Sir E. Lyons to M. Colocrotoni, stating the whole of these aggravated cases—first, Mr. Finlay's case, with all the infamous delay attending it; next, M. Pacifico's case, and all its atrocity; then the case of torture; next, the case of the boat of the Fantome; and, after this enumeration, the letter concluded by demanding redress, and with this kind caution, "Don't presume upon our forbearance; don't infer from that forbearance that the British Government is not determined to compel the Greek Government to accede to these demands." What was the result? Why, that letter was not answered. In December, 1849, one year after that letter had remained unanswered, Mr. Wyse wrote to M. Londos, and after recapitulating the claims in the letter of the 6th of December, 1848, he said—

"I know you are now in office, and I wish to draw your attention to the unsatisfied demands made by my Government on behalf of aggrieved British and Ionian subjects. But you are aware of all the facts, because you were in the Cabinet when all the transactions took place."

And then Mr. Wyse repeated verbatim the letter of the 6th of December, 1848. Every thing had been done by Her Majesty's Government to induce the Greek Government to meet the demands that had been made upon them; but all was in vain. What more could have been done? He had heard only one answer to that question. It was said that England ought to have gone and told Russia and France what an unhappy position she was in. When the address was made which procured the adoption of the resolution in the other House, he was extremely struck with what seemed to him a total omission, even if the case had been fairly and manfully stated, instead of being put forth in the miserable and pettifogging manner in which it was. It was said and admitted by Lord Stanley, that it had been the case for some years past that the representatives of the three protecting Powers had been bent, not so much on securing the independence, and establishing the constitutional and newly-recognised Government of Greece, as on interfering with and caballing between themselves and the Greek Government for the maintenance of their own particular influence; one seeking to establish English influence, another French influence, and the third Russian influence. Now, that strong admission was made. Assuming it to be the fact (although, as far as regarded England, he was not prepared to admit it), what did the noble Lord tell them to do? He actually referred the British Minister to those two rival Governments—Russia and France—as mediators between England and Greece. The noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs was advised to say, "We cannot get redress from the Greek Government by our own diplomacy, and therefore we are to obtain it through the intervention of Russia and France." That would be one most remarkable mode of maintaining the dignity of England! He (Mr. P. Wood) wished to avoid all unpleasant observations with respect to other Powers. It was not he who accused them of caballing together, and endeavouring to establish an exclusive influence in Greece. That was the allegation of the opponents of Her Majesty's Government. But, having a public document before him—the letter of Count Nesselrode to Lord Palmerston—he confessed, for one, that, instead of being humiliated by that letter, taking the letter with the answer to it, he thought they had reason to feel great satisfaction with the triumphant nature of that answer. What was the letter? It was certainly a most extraordinary production. It seemed to have been penned in a fit of mortification at the British Government having taken the only manly course that was open to it. In that letter Count Nesselrode spoke of the "unimportant claims" of England on the Greek Government, and observed, that some of those claims had already been adjusted. Now, the only one that had been in anyway settled was Mr. Finlay's claim, which had been referred to arbitration. It proceeded to denounce the conduct of England "towards a weak and defenceless State," and then said, "We are certainly aware that England has claims on Greece." So that there was no surprise on Russia by these demands being made. "We remember," continued the letter, "that, in 1847, during the late administration of M. Coletti, the English Cabinet took measures against the Greek Government." Why, neither Russia nor France had any right to interfere or intermeddle in the matter. It was entirely a case of private redress sought by England from the Greek Government. It had nothing whatever to do with the territory of Greece, or with the guarantee of the independence of Greece. But Count Nesselrode said he knew it all; he was perfectly aware of the claims of England in 1847, and that she was going to take steps to carry those claims into effect. How, then, could he have experienced any surprise? His only surprise ought to have been, that England had not enforced her claims long before. But let us see what further this high-minded Nobleman had said, and what were the huckstering reasons for objecting to the course which had been pursued by England:—

"Independently," said Count Nesselrode, "of the goodwill which the two countries bear towards Greece, Russia and France have a material interest in maintaining her tranquillity. They have lent her money, and they cannot see with indifference that nation led to incur, on account of being obliged to adopt defensive measures, losses and expenses, which must render her less able than ever to meet her pecuniary obligations."

He could hardly believe himself, that this seriously turned upon such a letter. The only thing stated there, and which made an impression on persons who not had an opportunity of seeing the forbearance the English Government had shown, was, that the dignity of England had brought the affair into such a state. The hon. Member for West Surrey said, the other evening, and he (Mr. P. Wood) agreed with him, that when we quarrel with a weak State, it was like a quarrel between a giant and a dwarf, and that other States would say, "Well done, Dwarf;" but it could not be allowed, because another State was weak, that it should insult the English flag, and should do all that under the guardianship of Russia. The step which had been taken would be, he was confident, of immense value throughout the East. Those who knew anything of eastern nations knew that we suffered much from taking too humble a tone; those nations, so humbled and debased by their form of government, could not imagine that our moderation proceeded from anything but fear, and we knew from travellers that they were obliged to use words of violence to get the least attention from persons living under those Governments. Many travellers had told him, that since Lord Palmerston had been at the head of the Foreign Office, an Englishman could travel over every part of Syria and Asia with perfect freedom; and that that state of things was quite a contrast to what it was before. If the English Government, then, had submitted to these gross evasions of a justifiable claim, it would have been attributed to fear and dread. He trusted they had destroyed that delusion for ever; they had shown that England was firm, and though she forbore long, would insist on justice being done to all her subjects. The Government, too, had taken the mildest course—he supposed no one would have wished that we should have a little war with Greece—and the right course therefore was to put forth the power and strength which she believed we dare not exercise; and at last, after our letters had remained unanswered for years, and everybody but ourselves had perceived that the time was come when it was impossible for England to delay any longer to take the only step that could vindicate the honour and dignity of the country, and preserve peace. It was impossible for any person who did not feel the importance of this Motion on our foreign relations, to submit to the drudgery of going through the correspondence; but any one who would go through it would find it a very different thing from relating only to small claims, which was the only view that had hitherto been presented to the public. It was not for him to go through the whole of the noble Lord's policy. It was sufficient for him to say that for many years he had admired it. He did not know the noble Lord—he did not believe he had ever had the honour of exchanging a single word with him; but, looking to the year 1848, in which the peace of Europe was threatened—in a manner, indeed, of which few could recollect any former instance—and the way in which the noble Lord had preserved the peace of this country, and had tended to preserve the peace of Europe, and asking in vain for it to be shown where our honour or dignity was impaired, he should vote most cordially for the resolution of his hon. and learned, Friend the Member for Sheffield. He supposed it would be said that France had not interfered with Rome; that Russia had not interfered enough; that Prussia had not interfered. There was scarcely a nation in Europe that had not interfered except our own; and when we were challenged with interfering, and charged with disturbing the peace of Europe, he would say that our only interference had been by friendly mediation—that we desired to promote in every way the trade and peace of the different countries with which the noble Lord had any communication. [ Laughter. ] He could perfectly understand that that should be ridiculed by those who thought that the proper way to maintain the dignity and honour of our country, and to promote peace, was in all times to rank ourselves on the side of despotism. The hon. and learned Member for Abingdon had spoken of "the policy of order, and not of change," and had spoken of it as if he had said something antithetical. He (Mr. P. Wood) believed it would be found that change was the only mode of preserving order. Would any one suppose that order would be preserved long in those Governments which admitted of no change? He believed the desire and policy of this country was that every nation should be as free and as well governed as our own; but that we would never attempt to impose any form of government on the Sovereign or people of any country. We never attempted any Propaganda system. [ Cries of "Oh, oh!"] He repeated it, whenever our good offices were called for, or our advice asked, we had tendered it, and freely. But we had not supplied arms or money; and he thought it was an unfortunate mistake that the deputies from Hungary made in their struggle against the most decided act of; tyranny that ever existed, that they trusted rather to what had taken place at public meetings, where no person was responsible for what was said, than to the calm and rational exposition made by the Government. Every one would remember the day when the noble Lord said that Hungary was Austria's right arm, and that Austria would be inflicting a most fatal blow upon herself if ever she destroyed that country; but he said distinctly that Government would not take any step in interfering between Austria and those who were then her subjects; and if those Hungarians were deceived, they were not deceived by anything at the Foreign Office. He would say, also, that the affairs in the north of Italy appeared to him alone to justify the Motion; for, he would ask the House to consider what would have been the state of Europe if France, during the convulsions of Italy, had marched her army into the plains of Lombardy, and to say whether the Austrian Government had not much to thank the noble Lord for, as to the course he then took. That alone was a step that, at the most critical period, as the resolution said, not only maintained the honour and dignity of this country, but without which there might have been a war in Europe. The same course had been taken as to Denmark, and successfully; and he would ask whether, if it had not been taken, there would not have been a burst of war between Russia and the allied States of Germany. It was not for him to refer to what the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had said of the noble Lord on a former occasion—the hon. and learned Gentleman would answer that for himself; but he (Mr. P. Wood) thought all those things paltry and petty compared with the great question at issue. He would say nothing either of the consequences of an adverse vote to Ministers: as far as his personal feelings were concerned, he thought any change of Government would in a very short time lead to such a combination of circumstances in this country as would infallibly carry out those reforms which he was so anxious to see effected. If he could divest himself of the belief that the honour of the country was involved in the question, he would care little about the result of the Motion; but he trusted it would never go forth to Europe that we were indifferent to the interests of British subjects, whatever might be their religion or their rank in the social scale. The main argument in the present case was, that with regard to the one unfortunate individual, he was unworthy of attention because he was a Jew. He (Mr. P. Wood) trusted they would hear no more about the Jew, and that they would cease to bandy wretched personalities. Wherever they had a depressed people, long tyrannised over and misgoverned, moral principles would there be found weak. This had been the case with regard to the Jewish nation; but they were rapidly reviving from that in consequence of the liberal course pursued towards them by all the European Governments; and it was hoped that when Greece was liberated, she, too, would recover and take her place among the independent nations of the earth. But, unfortunately, at present, instead of finding frankness and readiness on her part, she had only made use of her weakness in order to give her that factitious strength to insult that State which had been her original protector. If her independence was to be maintained at all, it would not be by handing over our cause to Russia or France, but by teaching her an independent course of action—by showing her that England was long patient and forbearing, because she was powerful, and could afford to be so; but that the time must come when she could no longer forbear from obtaining redress for injuries, wherever her ægis of protection extended.

Let us, Sir, before the evening closes, at all events, get out of nisi prius. We have now had the advantage of listening for six hours to three Gentlemen of the long robe, and, excepting in the close of the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, we have not yet travelled out of the narrow circle of Greece. The hon. and learned Gentleman commenced his speech with an observation in which I entirely concur. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the gravity of the question we are now discussing, coupled with the attendant circumstances at the time it is discussed. I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that the question before the House touches nearly the dignity, the honour, and the interests of this country. I am dragged, Sir, into this discussion most reluctantly and unwillingly. On a question of this kind I think intentional absence would be cowardice; and silence, coupled with the opinions which I entertain and am about to express, is equally impossible. And yet, before I proceed to discuss this great question, will the House pardon me for a moment if I advert as shortly as I can to my own position? I have given to the Government which now presides over the destiny of this country for the last four years an independent and an honest support; because, in the state of parties, and, with reference to the general position of affairs, I thought it my duty so to do. And, giving them that support, I have not carped about trifles—I have not sought to disparage any portion of their conduct even where I might have differed with them; and I have exercised this forbearance upon public grounds. The hon. and learned Gentleman says he is not personally acquainted with the noble Viscount the Minister for Foreign Affairs of this country. My position in this respect is entirely different. I have known that noble Lord for many years. It was my good fortune for four years to be his colleague; and, during that period, I can truly say that I never acted with any person whose conduct appeared to me more honourable, more trustworthy, more faithful to his Colleagues, or with whom I constantly maintained more friendly relations. It was not, therefore, in reference at all to any difference with him on public affairs that I parted from the Government with which we were both connected. On the contrary, I am sure the noble Lord will say that he and I, from the offices we respectively held in the Government of Earl Grey, were forced into the most confidential and perpetual communication with reference to the great transactions in which we were together embarked. And since I left that Government, now many years ago, and have been thrown into opposition to the noble Lord, in public I have received from him every courtesy, and in private all that kindness which he extends to all his friends without reference to party. I am, therefore, anything but hostile either to the Government or to the noble Lord. And yet I must remember that we are invited to-night not to discuss the narrow question of Greece simply. It might have been possible to raise that question—to have propounded views in terms of contradiction to the resolution at which the House of Lords arrived. You might have said, "Our claims with respect to Greece are founded in undoubted justice, they are not exaggerated in amount, and the course which has been pursued by the Government with regard to them is not such as endangers our friendly relations with foreign Powers." That course was quite open for Her Majesty's Government to pursue; and it would have been exactly analogous to the precedent to which the noble Lord at the head of the Government referred, when, under the administration of Earl Grey, the Duke of Wellington carried a resolution in the House of Lords, recommending that the neutrality which His Majesty had recommended on a former occasion with respect to Portugal, should be observed by all his subjects. The question was carried against Earl Grey by a majority of ten. The very next day the question was asked, whether the Ministers of the Crown intended to make any change in their policy with respect to Portugal? "Not at all," was the answer; and Colonel Davis immediately gave notice of a Motion, the terms of which directly contradicted the Motion of the Duke of Wellington. It was confined strictly to that point. The substance of it was, "That the House extremely regretted that success had not attended the arms of Don Pedro in Portugal, and recommended that all measures should be taken by the Government that would be conducive to that end;" and I think this Motion was carried by a majority in this House of somewhere about 250. Now, that course would have been quite intelligible, and strictly in accordance with precedent; but now the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, not in concert, as he says, with the Government, exercising his discretion as an individual Member, has enlarged the field of discussion, and opened up a much wider question. What we are now debating is by no means confined to the narrow circle of Greece. The question propounded to us is this: "Do you on the whole approve of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the foreign relations of the country since their last accession to office?" Now I understand from the Government, that although this Motion is not brought forward at their suggestion, yet under the present circumstances in which they are placed, their desire is that issue should be joined upon that ground, and that the opinion of the House should be taken. It is therefore to that larger question that I mean to address myself; and if the House will extend to me its indulgence, although the theme is extensive, I shall endeavour as rapidly as I can to succinctly state my opinion with respect to some of the prominent points to which I shall call attention. I have already referred to my connexion in office, during Earl Grey's Administration, with the noble Viscount. Now, it cannot be supposed for one moment, by those who recollect the transactions with reference to foreign Powers in which the Government of Earl Grey was engaged, that I can be over chary with regard to the foreign relations of the country, or that I am disposed to limit within very strict rules the necessity for English interference in the pursuit of English interests with reference even to the internal affairs of foreign nations. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield has referred to one prominent transaction of that Administration—namely, the support given to Belgium, which had thrown off the yoke of Holland. I was a party, along with the noble Viscount, to the blockade of the ports of Holland, and to the expedition to Antwerp. I supported all the measures for the separation of Belgium and Holland, which was a direct departure from the treaty that had been entered into at Vienna. But I beg the House to understand that the noble Earl, whom we both served and looked up to with gratitude and deference, controlled that department of foreign affairs, and kept it very much under his own management; and let it be remembered how these political affairs were conducted. They were conducted with Prince Talleyrand as the representative of the Court of France, with Prince Lieven representing Russia, with Prince Esterhazy representing Austria, and with Baron Brunow representing the Court of Prussia at St. James's; and every step was taken deliberately, with the full and entire confidence of all the representatives of these great Powers. We interfered also with respect to Portugal, it appeared, very decisively, and to the extent not only of blockading the ports, but even of landing a portion of Her Majesty's forces, and we confirmed the dynasty of Don Pedro, and expelled Don Miguel. These were acts of strong and decided interference; but they were all so conducted as not to violate the opinions of our allies, and not to interrupt the most friendly intercourse with all the great Powers of Europe. Now, I would just observe, that my view of the danger, and the nature of the interference which, after Earl Grey ceased to be the head of the Government and Lord Melbourne's Administration, began—my view of the objections to the interference which the noble. Viscount then commenced, was pointed out with great perspicuity by one of his present Colleagues—I mean the present Earl Grey, in a debate which took place in this House when my right hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth was at the head of affairs. I will not trouble the House by reading many extracts; but still these words are so pointed, and, as I think, so prophetic, judging partly from the past, and also forecasting the future dangers of the interference in which the noble Viscount is disposed to indulge, and of which I shall have to show various instances during his administration for the last four years, that I should like to be permitted to read them to the House. Lord Howiek was speaking on the Address moved in answer to the Speech from the Throne on the 1st February, 1844. He said—

"Like the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, then at the head of the Government, he thought there was no greater curse to the world at large, and to the interests of civilisation and humanity, than the carrying on in every Court of Europe, and in every country in the world, a party struggle between what was called the English party and the French party. He abominated the whole system of such interference; and he would say that the more they abstained from giving advice to other countries as to the management of their internal affairs the better. And for this reason—the representative of England or of France, or of any other great nation, accredited to another country, with the most sincere desire for the welfare of that country, might, and no doubt would, give the best advice in his power; but that advice was not always taken, and little by little he would become exasperated at those who did not look upon him as an oracle, and would favour that party who were most impressed with his superior wisdom. The Ministers of France and of England might take opposite views of what was most conducive to the interests of Mexico or of Portugal; and, little by little, totally contrary to the wishes of their respective Governments, a sort of French and English party was created. A struggle for ascendancy between those parties resulted, and the unfortunate country where the system was carried on became the prey of factions which were occasioned, and of animosities which were embittered, by this kind of interference. He therefore joined with the right hon. Baronet in deprecating anything of the sort; and he had heard with much regret the expressions of his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, who, adverting to the present condition of Spain, had said that under that union of interests and that good understanding to which the right hon. Baronet had referred, and that union of interests which existed between France and England, the late Regent of Spain, to whom he paid a high and well-merited compliment, had fallen from power, and that a state of military despotism, if not anarchy, had succeeded. He joined in lamenting the unfortunate state of things now existing in Spain; but, while he did so, he rejoiced that the right hon. Baronet and the Government of the French King had abstained from taking any active part in preventing its continuance. He imputed blame to neither Government for what had occurred, and he only hoped that they might abstain, in like manner, from all interference for the future; and that they would leave the Spaniards to settle their own affairs for themselves, as the most likely means of restoring that country to the state of constitutional government and security of person and property which all must equally desire."

Now, Sir, I contend that the principles there laid down by Lord Howick are sound and most prudent. But now let us just contrast this language of Earl Grey with the conduct pursued by the noble Viscount almost immediately after his accession to power in 1846. This advice was pointed by Lord Howick with respect to Spain. Almost the first despatch written by the noble Viscount in 1846—I have it by me here—is a despatch dated the 19th of July, 1846, and addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer at Madrid—this despatch violates, as I think, all the leading principles contained in the advice to which I have already adverted as given by Earl Grey. I should be sorry to trouble the House by reading much of this despatch; but it must be observed that General Narvaez was then out of office in Spain; but for the system that had been established, General Narvaez was held as the responsible party by the noble Viscount. I will not read much, but still there are some expressions so strong, the interference is so direct with the whole scheme of government in Spain, that as specimens of the spirit which the noble Viscount has evinced from the first moment after he returned to the Foreign Office to conduct its affairs, and began a career of minute interferences with all the concerns of our allies, and more especially towards Spain, that I cannot do justice to the subject without reading a few passages. It will be remembered that the noble Viscount came into office about the middle of June, and this despatch was written on the 19th of July following. This is the way in which he talks of a great nation like Spain. He says—

"She has indeed a Parliament by law, but all freedom of election is overborne by force or by other means."

["Hear, hear!" from the Liberal Benches. ] This may be all very true; but is this the mode in which the Government of Spain should be addressed by the Minister of an ally in a time of profound peace, when friendly relations subsist between the two Powers. He also says—

"No sooner does her Parliament meet than on the first manifestation of opinion that is not in accordance with the views of the Executive, it is either prorogued or dissolved. There are, indeed, by law, tribunals for the trial of persons accused of offences and crimes; but numbers are imprisoned, and banished, and even executed, not only without being found guilty, but even with a trial. This system of violence and arbitrary power seems in some degree to have survived the fall of its author (Narvaez), and has not yet been abandoned entirely by the more moderate administration that succeeded him."

Then the noble Viscount proceeds to give advice to the Ministers. There was the comment on Narvaez, who was no longer in power, but was the Ambassador of Spain at the Court of France, and then came the advice to the succeeding Ministry who then ruled over the destinies of Spain:—

"It is greatly to be hoped that the present Ministry, or those who may succeed them, will lose no time in returning to the ways of the constitution and to obedience to the laws."

All this is, no doubt, most excellent advice; but the question with me is, is it possible to hold such language as this towards the Ministers of an independent Power, consistently with the permanence of your friendly relations with that Power? I say it is practically impossible, and the result will prove it. The despatch goes on:—

"Arbitrary violence like this must create open resistance, and while it is administered even by the strong hand and determined will of the individual who organised it (Narvaez). And when an attempt is made to continue it under a weaker and less daring direction (meaning the new Ministry), no great degree of sagacity was required to see that it must lead to outrage. For when the law is set at nought, in providing for life, liberty, and property, it is not surprising that the people should at length cease to respect it."

Now it is right that these principles should be observed by a Minister in his own sphere; but what will be the effect of preaching these lessons to the Governments of independent nations, owing no obedience to you, and not disposed perhaps to borrow your maxims? There is a caution at the end of this despatch that its contents are not to be too abruptly communicated to the Minister; but there is to be no reserve whatever with regard to stating this opinion of the noble Viscount and Her Majesty's Government. The substance of this despatch almost immediately transpires, and you find that Sir H. Bulwer writes to the noble Viscount on the 22nd of August, a despatch from Madrid, which concludes with this passage:—

"The French Government has not failed to turn its knowledge of the despatch of the 19th ult., which your Lordship addressed to me, to account, by representing it as a declaration of the hostility of the British Government to the present Government of Spain."

Now, whilst I am on the subject of Spain, I will just pass from 1846 to 1848, after that great convulsion which overthrew the French monarchy. The noble Viscount then addressed an admonition to the Government of Spain. At that time Narvaez had returned to power, and the admonition was addressed to Narvaez through. Sir H. Bulwer; and Sir H. Bulwer, so far from exercising any reserve as to his instructions, communicates the substance of this advice to the Queen Mother and the Minister. The despatch to which I allude is dated the 16th of March, and contained this recommendation, that Narvaez should enlarge the basis of his administration, and take some Liberals into office. Narvaez received this communication with the most extraordinary complacency. He told Sir H. Bulwer if he could persuade him that by making way for his rivals and opponents, he could advance the prosperity of his country, he was willing to surrender power, and follow the advice of the noble Viscount; but he came to the opposite conclusion. He did not make way for a political rival, but rather pursued the course which the noble Viscount is inclined to practise on the present occasion. He did not make way for an opponent; and the consequence was, that the opinions expressed by the British Government, which were taken so very smoothly and with such apparent complacency by Narvaez, led in a short time to an order for Sir H. Bulwer to leave the Court of Madrid. As I have mentioned the subject, I will just show you, what I think is a demonstration, that there is more objection to be taken to the unfortunate tone assumed by the noble Viscount, than to the course adopted in many cases by himself. I would refer to the very recent reconciliation that has taken place between the Court of Spain and the Court of St. James. The proudest nation in the world, which is without question the Spanish nation, made an advance to the British Government, after two years of interrupted relations. A sort of amende was made for the abrupt manner in which Sir H. Bulwer was expelled, and in the answer (personal exception having been taken, whether rightly or wrongly I will not now discuss, with reference to certain measures taken by Sir H. Bulwer, or some countenance shown by him to insurgents in arms against the Queen of Spain), the noble Viscount, while agreeing to a reconciliation, gratuit- ously makes this most extraordinay declaration. He says, "If Sir Henry Bulwer was not across the Atlantic, and employed at Washington, Sir Henry Bulwer is the Minister I would advise my Sovereign to send back to Spain." [ Cheers. ] Are these the lovers of peace who cheer? Are these the friends of the most amicable relations with all the great Powers of Europe? Do they believe this to be a conciliatory measure? Why, the selection of Sir H. Bulwer could produce no other event than the renewal of the most bitter animosity. But now I will just pause at the next nation that presents itself to my recollection. It is Portugal, where we have frequently interfered. Connected with these measures is a question as to their success. The object of the noble Viscount is a legitimate object, as far as is consistent with friendly relations with foreign countries, to support and promote the cause of civil liberty to the utmost extent. Has the noble Viscount been successful by the course he has adopted either in Spain or Portugal in promoting the cause of civil liberty, and placing in power the men most disposed to give effect to those principles? He has riveted Navaez in power in Spain; and in Portugal, where he interfered most actively, almost by force of arms, in favour of the Liberal party, the noble Viscount found that party universally opposed to the possession of power by one man, and that person was Costa Cabral. There is the semblance of a representative government in Portugal—I am afraid it is rather the semblance than the reality; and, since our active interference, if not in consequence of it, Costa Cabral is Minister of the Queen of Portugal, continues so still, and is likely to remain so. I will now refer to a period preceding the great events that occurred in Paris. In the autumn of 1848 there was a heaving perceptible throughout Europe that indicated the approach of the great earthquake that took place in 1848, and overthrew the dynasty of Louis Philippe. In no place was this so clearly indicated as in Switzerland. I was most anxious, with your permission, that I should address you before the noble Viscount was heard in this debate. I was most anxious he should have an opportunity of correcting any error into which I might fall, or rectifying any mistake which, from inaccuracy or accident, I might make; and I rejoice to have the opportunity of expressing fully my opinion in presence of the noble Viscount before he has spoken, that he may have ample opportunity of vindicating himself. To return to the affairs of Switzerland. Early in the autumn of that year (1847) a most fatal schism took place between two portions of the different States composing that great Republic. One of those divisions was termed the Sonderbund, or, as a term more intelligible, I would say the moderate republicans. The other party, which was the party at Berne, for brevity I will designate the red republican. ["No, no!"] I use the term merely for the sake of clearness, but I shall say then the moderate republicans and the ultra-republicans. The Minister of France, M. Bois le Compte, and Mr. Morier, the Minister of England, were acting in perfect accordance; and the administration of France, then under M. Guizot, was inclined to encourage the moderate republicans, and check the rapid advance and presumptuous measures of the ultra republicans. As I have said, the French and English Ministers were acting in perfect accordance up to the month of July; but at that period Mr. Morier was withdrawn, and Mr. Peel was left at Berne as Charge d'Affaires. At that time the Duke de Broglie was Ambassador from France in this country; and I am sure every one will agree with me when I say that he is a man of the most unimpeached honour, and strict integrity, and of the greatest public and private virtue. He represented to the noble Viscount at the head of the Foreign Department the dangers he saw as likely to arise from the state of affairs in Switzerland, and he suggested to the noble Viscount the possibility of the Court of St. James and the Court of France acting in concert with reference to its situation, and arresting the state of things that then existed. The noble Viscount, in the first instance, was not disposed to accede to the proposition; but after the lapse of some time a proposal came from the noble Viscount, through the Chevalier Bunsen, to the Duke de Broglie, that a note signed by all the Powers should be presented for the settlement of the question. France at once gladly acceded to the proposition; tha proposition was made by the Chevalier Bunsen on the 30th of October, and the draft of the note was presented to the noble Viscount by the Duke de Broglie on the 6th November. In the meantime the danger of a civil war in Switzerland was every day becoming more imminent. By a despatch which, I think, was written in the month of August by Mr. Peel, it will appear that he had made, by the direction of the noble Viscount, a friendly communication to the person who presided over the ultra republican party at Berne. The gentleman was extremely gratified by the communication, and asked for a copy of the letter of the noble Viscount which Mr. Peel had read; but he said he had not instructions, and without instructions declined to give it. Now, I am speaking of a publication which recently has been made in France resting upon despatches which are in the Foreign Office of France, from M. Bois le Compte. I said the specific draft of the note was tendered at the Foreign Office on the 6th of November by the Duke de Broglie. The noble Viscount kept the note to the 16th, without making any written communication upon it; on the 16th he suggested a certain alteration; this alteration had to be sent to Paris; it was sent there and finally adopted, but from the 16th to the 26th of November time was consumed in agreeing to the alteration in the note, and the note itself was not signed until the 26th of November. Now dates are important. Mr. Peel writes to the noble Viscount on the 22nd of November, from Berne, stating that General Dufaure had advanced from Berne in great force, on Lucerne, where the Sonderbund was assembled, and in such force that he expected a decisive action would take place. That letter from Mr. Peel was received on the 26th of November at the Foreign Office, the very day on which the note was signed. On the 27th you will find a paper respecting Switzerland, addressed to Sir Stratford Canning, in connection with the presentation of the note; and as to a certain contingency which the noble Viscount contemplated, there is this statement—"It is possible when you arrive at Berne you may find the Sonderbund dissolved by a complete victory gained over them by their antagonists; in that case you will not present the note." Now comes the matter that really does touch the honour of this country. The French Minister in Switzerland, in a despatch to M. Guizot, still in the archives of Paris, states that the English Minister admitted to him that in consequence of the private instructions of the noble Viscount, and of a communication which he conceived was in the spirit of the act, he had sent to General Dufaure a messenger from his own embassy, the chaplain, I believe, directing the General to lose no time, but make haste in his operations. [Viscount PALMERSTON: It is quite untrue.] I will say I was anxious to address the House before the noble Viscount addressed it. This statement has been current through Europe, and is not contradicted; and when we are discussing a question affecting the character of our foreign relations, it is right in the presence of the noble Viscount to state it, and give him an opportunity of denying it. He will not blame me for giving him the opportunity; but I must observe, if I mistake not, the confidence of the Government has not been withdrawn from Mr. Peel. Mr. Peel remained Charge d'Affaires after the transaction, and since the publication he is still in the employment of Her Majesty's Government. [Viscount PALMERSTON: He sent no such message.] The allegation of the noble Viscount is, that the Minister of France, and the Minister of Spain, who was present at the interview when it is said Mr. Peel made the admission, are in the opinion of the noble Viscount convicted of a mis-statement. Well, an opportunity is now given of explaining the matter; I have no knowledge of the subject but from the documents before me, and I assure the House that I have but truly stated the fact as set forth in the publication of M. D'Haussonville. We will pass from Switzerland to France. Now, Sir, I do not think it is necessary, in the present circumstances, that I should give a detailed opinion to the House on the mooted question of the Spanish marriages, or whether there was an infraction of the Treaty of Utrecht or no, or whether the course taken by the Government of France was in violation of the engagements they contracted with the English Government; but I must say this—that the misunderstanding which arose between M. Guizot and the noble Viscount in reference to that transaction, led to a personal quarrel (I have almost said) animosity on the part of the noble Viscount to that Minister, which pursued him to his fall. And it was not confined to misunderstanding and want of confidence; but, unless I am greatly mistaken, the English Ambassador, on the very eve of the great convulsion that overthrew Louis Philippe and his dynasty, was in most familiar and constant communication with the political opponents of M. Guizot, with those men who sought only to supplant an administration, but overthrew a monarchy and established a republic, which republic, established in consequence of their own measures, they seek now to modify and change. There will rest upon the conduct of the noble Viscount a heavy responsibility for the course he has pursued. [ Cheers. ] I certainly have not overstated the case in this particular. It will be to the last hour of the noble Viscount's life a matter of regret, that when he sought only to displace M. Guizot, he effected a change in a neighbouring State, the end of which is still uncertain: other generations will witness it; I hope they may not deplore it. I will proceed now to take up Italian affairs; and as we are discussing them, I will mention a matter which has never yet been explained—I mention it in the presence of the noble Viscount, to give him an opportunity of explaining it. In February, 1848, there was laid upon the tables of the Houses of Parliament a short correspondence with respect to Italian affairs that took place in the previous months of August and September, between himself and Prince Metternich. These were in August; and there was another despatch addressed by the noble Viscount to Lord Ponsonby, in the month of September, 1847. In the last despatch to Lord Ponsonby, he conveyed, in indirect terms, but in terms not to be misunderstood, a suspicion on the part of the noble Viscount that Austria was engaged in designs inconsistent with the independence of Piedmont. The noble Viscount says distinctly, the execution of any such attempt could not be regarded with indifference by Her Majesty's Ministers. This was laid on the tables of the two Houses of Parliament in February, and the last despatch was apparently without an answer. It was announced, therefore, to Italy, that the British Government saw reason to suspect Austria of designs on the independence of the Italian States; and the expectation was raised and the hope encouraged that reliance might be placed upon the assistance of England if any such attempt were made. There is no doubt that the noble Viscount received an answer to that despatch from Prince Metternich, containing a most solemn denial of any such intention, and stating that the policy of Austria in Italy was purely defensive; that they had no design on Piedmont, and were ready to enter into an arrangement to guarantee the independence of Piedmont. That was in October, and the noble Viscount, in the February following, submitted to the House the letter containing the accusation, but did not accompany it with Prince Metternich's answer. It was not until the month of August following, when Lord Brougham, in the other House of Parliament, moved for the production of the despatch, having a copy of it in his pocket, and not until then, was that despatch produced, it having then been dormant in the Foreign Office more than eight months. Austria has loudly complained of this conduct; and if there be no answer to that complaint, I must say it appears to me well-founded, and not consistent with the honour and character of the British nation for good faith and fair dealing. The effect of this despatch of the noble Viscount was, as might be expected, very exciting. Piedmont, so far from waiting for an attack, became the assailant. Then, after the events had passed, the question arises, did the noble Viscount and Her Majesty's Government do all in their power to restrain those attacks? The advice was of a very peculiar kind, not saying this is a violation of all your engagements to us, or a departure from the Vienna settlement, but simply a suggestion that Austria was too strong, and Piedmont was too weak, and probably she might fail in such a rencontre. Austria, at the moment the first onset was made, appealed to the noble Viscount and to Her Majesty's Government in the midst of its difficulties to mediate between her and Piedmont; but what was the sine quâ non on our part towards a friendly Power in the midst of difficulties? The noble Viscount insisted, as a condition precedent to an acceptance of the mediation, that Austria should not only abandon Lombardy but surrender Venice; and as Austria would not consent to the surrender of Venice, the noble Viscount declined to undertake the mediation. It is impossible to say what has been the effect of that act of the noble Viscount. My belief is, that the insurrection of Hungary was the consequence; and, what I regret as much as any man, the intervention of Russia, the interference of that country to crush the Hungarian insurrection having thus been rendered necessary. If it had not been for the extraordinary courage and constancy of General Radetzky, the consequences might have been more serious. What, then, has been the result of the noble Viscount's policy throughout Italy? Has the noble Viscount promoted the cause of Italian liberty by the course he has pursued? Piedmont was twice in one year at the mercy of the invading army of Austria. Rome is in possession of the French army. Lombardy is under the military rule of Austria. Venice was reconquered. And we cannot forget the daring exploits in Naples, which the noble Viscount was so anxious to uphold. What was the course pursued by the noble Viscount at Naples? At Naples there was the open interference of the English fleet. It was at the option of Her Majesty's Government to interfere with reference to the course to be pursued in Sicily — which island had a peculiar claim on our intervention. But in the interference which took place, the advice which was given was not, it is true, so far as words are concerned, quite so strong as in the case of Narvaez. The interference with his Neapolitan Majesty was not, however, confined to the shape of advice, but the British fleet was actually employed upon the coast of Sicily. But the Sicilian insurgents, when their efforts to assert their liberty were more or less successful, bethought them of tendering the crown of Sicily to the son of the King of Sardinia. But how was the crown of Sicily offered to the son of the King of Sardinia? The messenger entrusted with the offer was sent on board of a British man-of-war; and almost as soon as the post could convey the assurance from London to Turin, the assurance was given, that if the Duke of Genoa accepted the proffered crown, he would be recognised by England as the ally of this country. Affairs, however, took another turn. The King of Naples vindicated by force of arms his power against the Sicilian insurgents, who had been encouraged by us. They had relied upon our assistance—they had prolonged the contest in reliance upon that assistance—they were overcome, we left them to their fate—and a large body of these Sicilian refugees, flying to Malta in despair, were refused by the British Governor an asylum in that island. I shall now pass to another point upon which I am anxious to have the explanation of the noble Viscount the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I most distinctly, and in terms as strong as any which have been used by any hon. Gentleman, say, that the message sent by the Emperor of Russia, through an aid-de-camp, to the Grand Sultan, demanding the expulsion or surrender of the Turkish and Polish refugees, was a harsh course, contrary to engagements, and one which it became England to prevent as far as it was in her power to do so. The course taken by Her Majesty's Government in the first instance was not only, I think, unexceptionable, but right and highly honourable. They appealed to the generosity—to the good faith of the Emperor, in a despatch, firm in its tone, and yet conciliatory in its character; the very course which in the transactions of ordinary life it was prudent and right to adopt; and, after all, these public transactions are not, when honour is concerned, much to be distinguished from the transactions of private life—they appealed to the honour and generosity of an Emperor at the head of a great people, and of a powerful army and fleet. But it would not appear to me very decorous and prudent at the same time, when you have appealed to honour and generosity, to have taken any step which could be construed into menace. I say, therefore, that the order of the English fleet to proceed to the mouth of the Dardanelles, before the effect of the appeal to the Emperor had been ascertained, was improper in the highest degree. The order for the fleet to proceed to the mouth of the Dardanelles was, however, given. Now there is a transaction connected with this which is still more important. A treaty was in existence, the treaty of Unkiar' Skelessi, by which the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles were closed to the ships of naval powers, no vessel being allowed to pass without a special firman from the Sultan. Now the English fleet not only proceeded to the mouth of the Dardanelles, but Sir Stratford Canning called upon the admiral of the fleet actually to pass the Dardanelles and to go up to Constantinople; and, if I mistake not, obtained a firman from the Sultan for that purpose. But Admiral Parker, although he abstained from passing the Dardanelles, did not remain at anchorage outside the Dardanelles, but went within them. Reference has been made to this transaction by some hon. Gentlemen, who are rather disposed to be surprised at any expressions of anger on the part of the Minister of Russia at what he called the precipitate entrance within the Dardanelles of the fleet of Admiral Parker. Now, considering that such entrance was a violation of a positive treaty, I am not surprised at some such expression of opinion on the part of the Government of Russia. But before it could be known whether the appeal to the Emperor was successful or not—nay, more, before the letter making that appeal was presented, in consequence of an application from the Sultan himself, without the intervention of any foreign Power, the concession to the Porte had been made by Russia. When Russia heard that, accompanying the appeal made to him, there had been a hostile demonstration of the British fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles, the Emperor was naturally most indignant, and an excuse was made by the British Minister. Now, the question which really touches the honour of England is, was the excuse which was made, consistent with facts or not? The excuse which was made was, that the fleet was driven within the Dardanelles by stress of weather. Now there is a living witness, a Member of the House of Peers, who as a Peer, may upon his honour be believed in his place in Parliament, I mean Lord Hardwicke, who was in command of a line-of-battle ship upon that occasion, and he declares that so far from being driven within the Dardanelles by stress of weather, Admiral Parker weighed anchor, and upon a fine day, with a leading wind and in smooth water, entered the Dardanelles and cast anchor there. Now this is a matter touching intimately the honour of this country; and again I say I shall be happy to hear the explanation of the noble Viscount with respect to this matter. This brings me down to the affairs of Greece, when, after the entrance of the Dardanelles by Admiral Parker, his fleet proceeded to the Bay of Salamis. The proceedings which took place there have been dwelt upon so long that I shall not trouble the House at great length upon that particular point. I have already said that the tone assumed by the noble Viscount the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is—I can hardly use an expression less strong—sometimes so offensive that I am not surprised that hostile feelings should be generated even in the minds of many who are most desirous of continuing upon amicable relations with this country. But I hold in my hand a letter which purports to be written by the noble Viscount to M. Glarakis in the month of October, 1847. It was printed in a Greek paper, the French party as it was termed being in possession of power at Athens, the opposition party being in connection with the English Minister. This letter, which I am about to read, was pub- lished at Athens; it has never been contradicted, and certainly as a specimen of the tone of writing to an independent foreign Minister, even though it be the Greek Minister, if it he not contradicted, will go far in my opinion to account for all the unwillingness of the Greek Government to make any concessions to Her Majesty's Government. It will be observed that M. Glarakis had succeeded M. Coletti as Foreign Minister, who was supposed to have been under the influence of M. Piscatory. M. Piscatory was the French Envoy at Athens, and acted under the orders of M. Guizot, with whom the noble Viscount was outwardly on amicable terms, although I fear he acted towards him privately in a different spirit. These are the terms of the letter in question. The letter is dated October, 1847, and is as follows:—

"M. Glarakis will do well for the future to abstain from unjust accusations against Her Majesty's Government and its agents. He ought not to forget that those are not the means by which the relations of the British and Greek Governments can be placed upon a footing more satisfactory than they have hitherto been. As for General Grivas there is nothing in his former conduct or political opinions calculated to render him an object of importance on the part of the British Government; and if Her Majesty's Government viewed him with any sympathy, it is solely because he has been the victim of injustice and tyranny. The system followed for some time past by the Greek Government has been a system of illegality, of corruption, of violence, of injustice, and of tyranny, oppressive and disgusting to the Greek nation wherever the action of the Government of the country is felt."

I should have abstained from reading this letter had it not been that I was anxious to show the House in what manner the noble Viscount, in the last sentence, speaks of M. Coletti, who had preceded M. Glarakis, but who had recently died:—

"Her Majesty's Government will hope that this iniquitous system would cease with the life of the Minister who was generally considered as its author, because he was its chief instrument. But M. Glarakis declares that he means to persevere in the same system. It is evident that this system, so carried on, is supported by other influences equally hostile to the welfare of Greece, and contrary to the interests of her King."

[ Cheers. ] Do those hon. Members who cheer that passage, really think that this is language in which an English Minister should speak of the late first adviser of a foreign sovereign, with whom we seek to maintain friendly relations? The letter goes on to say that—

"It is, therefore, evident that M. Coletti was only an instrument, though a willing one, employed by those influences to carry on their dis- astrous policy. If the Greek Government desires to prevent insurrection, to maintain order and tranquillity, to encourage industry in the kingdom, it is not by arbitrary arrests, nor by illegal violence, nor by the ruin of whole provinces, like that which has recently taken place in Eubœa, that these results can be obtained."

[ Cheers. ] The hon. Members who cheer appear to think it quite natural that there should be some difficulty in keeping up amicable relations after a letter of the kind so addressed. After all, the kingdom of Greece—and the noble Viscount takes some credit for the interest he showed in the establishment of that kingdom—was until after the time of Mr. Canning, left as a feudal power attached to Turkey; and it was not till the Government of the Duke of Wellington—the Earl of Aberdeen being the Foreign Secretary—that the independence of Greece was established, and its feudal system abolished. So, also, until within the last four of five years, there existed in Greece no constitutional form of representative government; and it was during the Ministry of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, the Earl of Aberdeen being again Foreign Secretary, that representative government was first given to that country. Again, I hold that, after all, truth and plain dealing is the essence of English honour in the conduct of foreign affairs. I had always reason to believe, and I confidently believe that Greece was not innocent of covert interference in fomenting insurrection in the Ionian Islands. A more legitimate complaint against the Government of Greece could not be made, if well-founded by the British Government. If we had evidence to show that the Greek Government actually fomented the insurrections in the Ionian Islands, there would be no limit to the extent to which we might be justified in pushing our claims against the country. Sir H. Ward, however, in the first instance in his speech addressed to the senate, speaking of the insurrection in the Ionian Islands, prefers that charge against the Government of Greece in terms by no means ambiguous. This charge was met by an instant denial on the part of King Otho. Sir H. Ward, after that denial, again addresses his senate, and in the most unequivocal terms retracts the accusation. Well now, what was my amazement when in the papers presented to the French Chamber, in a despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated the 14th of March, a passage occurs in which complaint is made of the revival of this charge by the noble Viscount himself. M. Drouyn de Lhuys states in his despatch—

"Lord Palmerston replied that the English Government had other grounds of complaint against the Government of Greece, and that he could trace the hand of the Greek Cabinet in the agitation which had secretly excited the population of the Ionian Islands."

You have, therefore, the Governor of the Ionian Islands first on a solemn occasion making the accusation; you then have it denied most solemnly by the Ministers of King Otho; and, in consequence of that solemn abnegation, you have the retractation of the governor; and then six months after, the noble Viscount at the head of the Foreign Office, when stating his claim upon the Greek Government, revives the accusation, and presses it as a ground of complaint to the Ambassador of France. Again, I say, truth and plain dealing are essential qualities, if you are to maintain the honour of the English nation in her foreign relations. Now, I admit that with respect to the pecuniary claims of M. Pacifico, Mr. Finlay, and more especially the claims for some redress on account of the insult offered to the boat's crew of a British ship of war, much may be said in vindication of these claims; but I must say that these appear to me much the least important part of the transaction, as shown in these papers, yet it is the part on which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, with great address, principally dwelt: and he will forgive me for saying that in so doing he played the part of an advocate, rather than of a person engaged in deliberately discussing a great question of vast national importance: he dwelt much on the minor topics, but he passed very glibly through the most difficult part of his case—I mean that of the territorial claims for the islands of Cervi and Sapienza. I stated, in a letter, a copy of which is in the papers presented to us, that Mr. Wyse was directed to represent to the Greek Government, in answer to their able argument against our claim, that we held the justice of our demand to be indisputably proved. Now, with respect to this part of our claim, I do not think a more difficult or doubtful case could possibly exist. It is one which depends entirely upon the question whether, at the time of the treaty in 1797, when France conquered Venice, those islands really belonged to Venice or not. The whole case turns upon that matter of fact. What the Ionian State may have claimed, and what they may have as a matter of right asserted to be theirs, is nothing compared with the general treaty between Russia and the Porte; and when that transfer was made to the Ionian Islands, it was always with reference to the antecedent possession of Venice. It is therefore a question of very nice investigation, depending not only upon the meaning of the treaty, but also upon the investigation of the fact. It was by the merest accident, however, that the islands were not seized in October last. The order from the Foreign Office to the Admiralty, and from the Admiralty to Admiral Parker, consequent upon that order, to take possession of the two islands, are not given in the papers laid before the House; but there is a letter from Admiral Parker, dated October, acknowledging the receipt of instructions dated sometime in September. The order to seize the islands, however, was peremptory. A more hasty order, and a more ill-advised one, I think, never was given by any Government; and if it had been then executed it is quite plain that France and Russia would have had just ground to complain of a breach of treaty, and a casus belli would have arisen between the parties to the treaty. Admiral Parker was in no haste to execute the order; the seizure did not take place; and this country is deeply indebted to the prudence of Admiral Parker, who hesitated to carry such an order into effect even after his return from the Dardanelles to the Bay of Salamis. This brings me then to the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards the Government of France, with respect to these late transactions, and again I deeply regret the course which has been pursued in this respect. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has expressed an opinion that it was right to refuse the mediation of France, but right to accept her good offices. That is a matter of opinion; but I am bound to say that I think affairs had advanced so far, and we had asserted our rights with so high a hand, that to have accepted the mediation of France would have been hardly consistent with our independent position. I must add, however, that France having tendered the mediation which we rejected, to accept her good offices appears to me to have been the surest mode of leading to a misunderstanding on the subject. France asked to mediate with a view to a settlement; she made this offer deliberately, having formed an opinion on the merits of the case; the construction which she put on it, in her estimation, was the right one; and when her mediation was refused, the manner in which to exercise her good offices was certain to lead to disappointment to France in the settlement, and to mutual dissatisfaction. Now, I must say there are several circumstances attending the transaction which I do not approve of. After the convention of London had been signed, when from some misunderstanding at Athens another agreement had been extorted by force of arms, and when the English Government admitted that it was only by an accident that the intervention of London was not effectual—the natural and wise course would have been frankly and at once to have met the wishes of France, to have abandoned the convention wrung by force from the Greek Government, and to have given effect to the settlement yielded to France in London. I think it a great misfortune that the just expectation of France was not immediately satisfied in this respect. The course taken has been that of delay, and of attempts to obtain conditions, as it is said, less derogatory to the independence and dignity of England. But the transaction has ended in your acceptance at last of that which we might have obtained before the recall of the French Ambassador. Consequent upon that recall some negotiations took place at Athens; and, pending those negotiations, and to serve probably some purpose of debate in another place, a correspondence was produced charging Baron Gros with a breach of faith; again, another despatch was produced in two days after, addressed to the Marquess of Normanby, more or less explaining the mistake, withdrawing the charge of bad faith, but leaving the British Government open to the imputation of creating false impressions by the premature publication of imperfect documents. I am willing, however, to hope that our differences with France are accommodated. I wish I could add, that the settlement of this Greek affair has redounded to our honour and influence in Europe. Sir, something has been said with regard to Denmark, and the hon. and learned Gentleman who last sat down complimented the noble Viscount with respect to what he had done in that case. I confess, Sir, I cannot join in that compliment. It is two years since that difficult question arose. There are two guaranteeing—two co-guaranteeing — Powers, France and England. England has repudiated her guarantee; but France, as I understand, has not hesitated to accept it. We are told that our friendly relations with Prussia are not disturbed. Sir, I conceive the settlement of that question is indispensable in order to ensure a good understanding with Prussia. Every hour's delay increases the difficulty of that settlement, and every increase of difficulty in the way of settlement is more likely to lead to a misunderstanding with the Prussian Government. But, Sir, what has been the result of all this? The Austrian Ambassador has been withdrawn from London; the French Ambassador has been recalled; our relations with Prussia, on account of the non-conclusion of the arrangement with regard to Denmark, are insecure; and we have received notes from Count Nesselrode, on which the hon. and learned Member for Oxford commented with some severity, notes, which are not couched in very friendly terms. Somebody said the first note was withdrawn; in a second note, more conciliatory in its tone; but I think I have seen a third note published, which has the appearance of anything but a retractation. We have every reason to believe that the Russian Envoy at this Court, previous to the recall of the French Ambassador, remonstrated against the refusal of our Government to ratify the convention agreed upon in London. Sir, I have already said, that Narvaez is all-powerful in Spain; that Costa Cabral is all-powerful in Lisbon; that the French army is in occupation of Rome; and that the Pope is much estranged from friendly intercourse with this country. Then, I am asked, because the noble Viscount is not the Minister of Austria, or of Russia, or of France, but is the English Minister, par excellence —I am asked to come to a vote affirming absolutely that, under his guidance, the interests of England have been preserved in a manner most conducive to the honour of this country, and to the maintenance of amicable relations with foreign Powers. Sir, to this conclusion I cannot come. It is impossible for me, consistently with truth, and with my construction of the transactions which I have laid before the House, to give any such vote. I must give my negative to the resolution proposed by the hon. Member for Sheffield.

moved the adjournment of the debate.

Debate adjourned.

The House adjourned at One o'clock.