said, that one of the advantages of his addressing the House at so late a period of the discussion was, that he would be exempted from troubling them with a recapitulation of the facts of the case. They had been gone over with so much ability by others, and must be so completely fixed in the minds of hon. Gentlemen, that it would be quite unnecessary for him to refer to them except in the most incidental manner. Though he entirely disapproved of the foreign policy of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, and did not conceal that he dissented both from the arguments and the conclusions at which he had arrived the other night in his speech, yet he was ready to tender to him his sense of unbounded admiration of that speech, considered as an effort of Parliamentary and mental power. He had listened to his speech with close and untired attention, and he was anxious to offer to the House the result of some of those reflections that arose in his mind during its delivery. The noble Lord began by complaining that hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition side of the House coinciding in opinion with the noble Lord in another place, who moved the resolution condemnatory of the policy of Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, had not thought it their duty to propose a similar resolution in that House. The noble Lord considered that that should have been their course, and he censured them for not having done it. They certainly thought differently. They thought that two alternatives were presented for adoption by Her Majesty's Government. They considered, in the first place, that a great portion of the administration of the Government having been stamped by a vote of censure on the part of one branch of the Legislature, the Ministers would have felt it to be their duty to tender their resignation; or, secondly, they might have, adopted the alternative which was pursued in 1833, and have met the resolution of the House of Lords by a counter-resolution of the House of Commons, emanating either directly from themselves, or from some of their known supporters and friends. But it would appear that in all human affairs, and particularly in political affairs, there were always three courses open to acceptance. The Government chose the third course, which no hon. Member on the Opposition side ever anticipated—Her Majesty's Ministers adopted the alternative of doing nothing at all. They rested upon their oars, and it was left to an hon. and learned Member who was far from being habitually a supporter of the Government, and who had frequently expressed his disapprobation of their foreign policy, to propose a vote of confidence in them. But that resolution did not meet the resolution of the House of Lords. It evaded many of the principal points which the resolution of the House of Lords raised. If the House should adopt the resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman, it would not express any opinion upon one point which Her Majesty's Government had brought forward, and which both the hon. and learned Gentleman and the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary had pressed upon this House, namely, the degree and measure of obligation of the Government to afford protection to its subjects in foreign parts, without regard to the laws and tribunals of foreign countries. That most important question would, even though the resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman should be adopted, remain entirely undetermined by the House. The noble Lord, however, entered at great length into that question. It was the first point to which he addressed himself, and it was one of those subjects on which he was successful in eliciting the warmest and most enthusiastic cheers from Gentlemen who espoused his political opinions. The noble Lord pressed upon the consideration of the House the obligation and duty imposed on the Government to afford protection to British subjects in every nation of the world; and, as it appeared to him, they would constitute the British Government not merely a court of appeal, but a sort of court of premiere instance, totally setting aside the laws and tribunals of all foreign States. No doctrine could be more dangerous, or could more infallibly lead to collision with great States, or to aggressive movements on small ones. He would not advert to those exceptional cases which had been mentioned in the course of the debate, such as the law existing in China, or the law in operation in Charleston, where a British subject was liable to be apprehended and imprisoned on his entering that port. Such cases were entirely repugnant to the whole genius and spirit of the laws which regulated the communities of European nations. But it did not follow that, because there were those exceptional cases, the English Government were at liberty to set aside all the laws and tribunals of foreign States, when those laws and tribunals were in perfect harmony with the genius and spirit of the laws and institutions of all other civilised communities. By adopting such a course they would be violating the maxims of political and Christian morality. Did anybody suppose that if any State in the world were to come forward and demand of England that she should set aside her laws and tribunals, that she would submit to the dictation of such foreign Power? Then, it was equally unjust for England to attempt to trample upon the rights and privileges of other nations, however small and weak they might be. The noble Lord had favoured the House with a case exactly in point, and which entirely agreed with those pretensions which he would wish England to assume. The noble Lord said that a Roman held himself free from indignity when he could say, Civis Romanus Sum. It was true that the Roman citizen was free, but he was free in the midst of an enslaved world. The Roman was free, but his stride was the stride of a conqueror, and his foot was on the neck of all the subjugated nations of the earth. The Roman boasted of his single and solitary privileges; but it was the Englishman's boast that he was the freest amongst the free. An Englishman felt that he had rights to support, but he also felt that there were rights belonging to others which he was bound to respect. When, therefore, the noble Lord advanced in this manner the privileges of England as against the small but independent States of the world, and assumed the character of a Roman citizen for Englishmen, he was arrogating for this country the position of being the arbitrary mistress of an enslaved world. The great policy of the noble Lord had been to establish constitutional governments in the various continental States of Europe. But what said the Earl of Minto with regard to Italy? It was the opinion of that nobleman that Italy was unfit for a representative government, and that any reforms effected in those States should be merely administrative reforms. No doubt, constitutional government was a great blessing, but in certain states of society it was totally inapplicable. With respect to the cases of outrage committed by the Greek Government on British subjects, after considering the acts set forth in the blue book with reference to the injuries done to the Ionians, he was of opinion that full regard had been paid to English subjects and English rights. But he could not help asking how it happened that, in the case of Stellio Sumachi, no reclamation was made on the Greek Government? If that case were well founded, it formed the strongest case demanding redress. No doubt he was tortured by the arbitrary application of force; and the noble Lord, according to the law of nations, and upon every ground, would have had the fullest right to press his case upon the Government of Greece. Then, the noble Lord was extremely eloquent upon the subject of the attack on the boat's crew of the Fantome, and dwelt with great animation on the insult offered to our national honour, and to the national flag. But what were the facts? It appeared that a son of the Vice-Consul had been dining on board, and was afterwards landed by a boat from the Fantome on an undefended part of the coast. Two persons landed, and were arrested and carried to the guardhouse, but, upon an explanation being given, they were immediately released with great civility by the authorities. There were two points he should like to have cleared up in reference to this case. First, were there any general regulations with regard to the landing from boats from any ships on that part of the coast, and which this boat was at that moment transgressing; and, secondly, he should like to know whether there was any idea by the men when they made the arrest that the boat belonged to an English man-of-war at all? It appeared that the persons who lauded were not in uniform, and there was nothing to denote that they belonged to a British ship of war. The Greek soldiers might, therefore, have been perfectly blameless in arresting them. They might only have acted in strict obedience to their orders. In that case the Greek Government could not have acceded to our demands for their punishment without being guilty of meanness and injustice. There was another portion of the explanation of the noble Lord upon this branch of the question which inspired him (Sir J. Walsh) with the most unfeigned astonishment. It was quite certain that no one could read the papers connected with this transaction without seeing that a very ill-feeling did exist between the Consul, Mr. Macdonald, on the one side, and the authorities at Patras on the other. But what might have been the antecedent circumstances that might have created that state of things? The noble Lord told them there was a robber named Merenditi, who appeared to have been one of those brigand chiefs they had read of in the romances of their childhood, and so powerful that the Greek force was too weak or too little willing to oppose him, and that he obtained complete possession of Patras; but the noble Lord went on to tell them that the English Consul became the agent of an unworthy compromise with this robber—that the Consul was deputed and accepted the engagement to enter into a treaty with this Merenditi—it did not appear from the explanation of the noble Lord whether the Governor of Patras was or was not a party to it, but that Merenditi made his terms and effected the escape of himself and the brigands who formed his band under the flag of a British man-of-war—that these felons and robbers, and probably murderers and assassins, found a sanctuary on the deck of a British ship-of-war; and when the noble Lord spoke of the honour of the British flag, and was so acutely sensitive on that point, he (Sir J. Walsh) was surprised the noble Lord should not have visited with his reprobation an act calculated so deeply to tarnish it. As to the case of the boatmen of Salcina, the noble Lord seemed to insinuate that perhaps, after all, the custom-house officers were not overpowered by force, but were accomplices of the brigands. If such were the case, and it were established, then the noble Lord would have had a very fair case for applying to the Greek Government for redress; but as it was only an insinuation very indirectly thrown out, he (Sir J. Walsh) was entitled to assume that no proof existed of the truth of such hypothesis, and that the case was altogether altered; and he might say that the Greek Government had very excellent grounds of reason and justice on their side for saying it was the duty of Governments to protect personal property, but neither in the case of their own subjects, nor in that of foreigners, was it the practice of Governments; nor was it international law they should indemnify persons for losses they had sustained from robbery and spoliation they could not prevent. If the contrary were the case, he did not see why the Secretary of the Foreign Office, or of the Home Office, or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, might not be altogether inundated by applications from foreigners who had been robbed. A Frenchman, an Italian, or a Greek might, as he was walking up Cheapside, have his pocket picked of a gold watch, and the next day call upon the noble Lord or one of the right hon. Gentlemen for compensation. As to the case of Mr. Finlay, the noble Lord said it was very true that an arbitration had been agreed upon between Mr. Finlay and the Greek Government; but the course the latter adopted was so full of chicane and evasion, taking advantage of certain provisions of the Greek law, that the appeal would have been wholly inoperative. It was not a question with the House of Commons what value might or might not be attached to the documents which were not first submitted to the House, but what he complained of was, they had a distinct bearing on this question. On the 24th of February those papers were first of all submitted to the House, that brought up a controversy about Mr. Finlay's claim. Subsequently letters which detailed the facts and circumstances of the arbitration were found—letters which were in the possession of the Foreign Office; and what he complained of was a suppressio veri —that the Ministers, being fully cognisant of the facts, the noble Lord having these important documents in his possession, withheld them from the knowledge of the House of Commons, and that not until April, in consequence of circumstances adverted to by "our own correspondent" at Athens, did they find their tardy way to the table of the House of Commons. As to the much-vexed question of the claim of M. Pacifico, it had been already so much adverted to, that he should not trespass on the House by dwelling upon it at any length. All the other questions were of considerable importance, as involving points of international law and the principles of our relations with foreign countries, but the claim of M. Pacifico was the only one of importance, from its pecuniary amount; and, in fact, all the harsh preceedings, all the seizures of the Greek merchant vessels, all the interruption of the commerce of Greece, might be ascribed to that claim, and to that alone, for the seizure of any of the brigs of war, or whatever they were, would have amply satisfied all other claims. But it was that gigantic claim of M. Pacifico, so enormous in amount, and so objectionable in its nature, that was the foundation of the grave character these transactions had assumed. Now, when the noble Lord took upon himself to set aside a local treaty and to override the law of a particular State, he then put himself in the position of a judge in his own cause, and was bound to have satisfied himself, before preferring the charge, and founding upon it such a proceeding, of the justice of the claim in question. But, so far from doing so, it appeared from the blue books that the noble Lord, in the first instance, sending to Sir E. Lyons, said—

"Tell M. Pacifico to send in his bill, and ask from the Greek Government whatever he chooses to ask, and then leave the Greek Government to object to it, or not, as they please."

It appeared to him, that of all the claims in the blue books, the claim of M. Pacifico, upon the face of it, was the most monstrous and the most founded on imposition. He should be unwilling to revive discussion upon the dispute with France, which, as he supposed, was at an end; and he hoped that all the angry and jealous feelings which it had produced would soon die away; and if there was in this debate any one circumstance which he regretted more; than another, it was, that the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield should have; thought it necessary or consistent with his duty and with the interests of the peace of the world to have indulged in so violent a strain of sarcasm and invective against the head of the French Republic, for every one who was acquainted with the President knew that he was most favourably disposed to the British public; and yet the hon. Member did not hesitate to hold him up as being influenced, in the course of these transactions, by the meanest and most personal motives, by the desire of propitiating a certain number of votes in the Assembly. With respect to Russia, he thought that those Gentlemen who entertained great jealousy of the encroachments of that Power, ought to condemn the policy of the noble Lord; for the consequences of it must lead, in an immense degree, to the advance of the moral influence of Russia. In these transactions she had appeared as the champion of freedom and the independence of small States—she had appeared as the protector of the weak, as the opponent of the principles of arbitrary power, as applied to international relations; whilst England, on the contrary, with her great power and maritime superiority, had appeared as enforcing questionable demands, by resorting to an arbitrary use of force, and, as he contended, a gross abuse of it. If, indeed, there were any part of the subject which might fairly be considered as one that might have been submitted to the arbitration of some friendly Power, and in which they might have endeavoured to carry out the principles of the hon. Member for the West Riding, it was precisely that part which related to the islands of Cervi and Sapienza; for those islands could have no value except as a barren point of national honour. The noble Lord then proceeded from his Greek politics to follow the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon in his wide view of the noble Lord's continental policy. Now, it appeared there was directed against the political existence of the noble Lord the most formidable and incongruous combination that could possibly be. It existed from Lisbon to Archangel, including despotic Russia and republican France, and hon. Gentlemen on that (the Opposition) side of the House, who were generally supposed to be divided into two hostile camps. It might be that, even in that wide and general conspiracy, the hon. Gentlemen of the Manchester school of politics might be enlisted; and they had been assured by the hon. and gallant Member for Middlesex that even ladies formed part of the band of conspirators: he should have thought the noble Lord would at least have had amongst the ladies some in his favour. He thought the noble Lord was liable to the charge of political propagandism, and that he was strongly imbued with the Jesuitical maxim, that the end justified the means. He would refer to a statement made by the noble Lord at his last election at Tiverton, which appeared to him to give the true character of the noble Lord's foreign policy. The noble Lord said, speaking of Mehemet Ali—

"Now, how was it we did drive him out of Syria? Merely by giving a few muskets to the people of the country; by sending a few hundred marines on shore to aid them, and saying, 'Go it, my boys; if you want to get rid of Mehemet Ali, here we are to back you; if you intend to act, now's your time.' They took us at our word; they kicked him out neck and crop, and his army too; they hailed us as their deliverers."

The noble Lord, however, only half acted up to his professions; he "gave a few muskets," he set popular commotions and revolutions going, but he did not always act as backer on these occasions. It generally happened that he left those whom he had stirred up against their Governments to their fate. The noble Lord appeared to entertain the erroneous idea that, in encouraging the expansion of what were called liberal principles, he was fostering something analogous to our glorious system of English liberty. It unfortunately happened, however, that the noble Lord's interference merely paved the way for Jacobinism and anarchy which eventually led to reaction, and the result of his vaunted policy was, that instead of promoting liberty it rivetted absolute government. This, too, was not an accidental, but the necessary, result of the noble Lord's policy, which was framed and prosecuted in total ignorance of the state of society and temper and habits of the people to which it was applied. The noble Lord endeavoured to excuse the Earl of Minto's proceedings in Italy, by representing that the object of the noble Earl's mission was merely to recommend administrative reforms. But what construction would an excitable people like the Italians put on the Earl of Minto's presence amongst them? They did not want an English Lord to go into details respecting the administration of their affairs. That was a subject on which a foreigner was incompetent to form an opinion. The instant it was known that the Earl of Minto, the colleague of the great patron of revolutionary proceedings, was in Italy, the Italians were convinced that he had come amongst them for the purpose of effecting changes more important than administrative reforms. The Earl of Minto went through Italy, and disturbance followed in his train. At Rome the Earl of Minto put himself into communication with Cicerovacchio, a sort of Roman Santerre. What followed? The assassination of Rossi, the expulsion of the Pope, and the establishment of the Red Republic, which during its short career was stained by crimes of the deepest turpitude. At the present moment the bayonet was substituted at Rome for all the fine theories of constitutional government; and this was the usual result of the noble Lord's interference. The noble Lord failed to justify himself from the condemnation passed upon his conduct relative to the affairs of Sicily. England must ever look back with pain to the course of policy pursued by the noble Lord with respect to the Neapolitan States. The King of Naples, it was said, invited the Earl of Minto to give him advice, upon administrative reforms, of course. It appeared from the statement made by the noble Lord the other night, that the Earl of Minto assisted at the King of Naples' Council in drawing up the conditions which were to be offered to the Sicilians, and of which he became the bearer. To some extent, therefore, the Earl of Minto was responsible for those conditions. At all events, he was bound in honour, as the agent of the King of Naples and the bearer of his conditions to his subjects, to use all his influence to cause them to be accepted. News, however, arrived of the French revolution, and the Earl of Minto withdrew from the negotiation. It now became apparent that the English Government was secretly intriguing to dispossess the King of Naples of Sicily, and to erect it into an independent kingdom. The noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs wrote two letters, one to Lord Napier, and the other to Mr. Abercromby. In the latter, the noble Lord said that if the Duke of Genoa would accept the crown of Sicily, England would immediately acknowledge him. To Lord Napier the noble Lord wrote to the same effect, adding, that if he (Lord Napier) should deem it advisable to communicate the matter to the Sicilian Assembly, he was at liberty to do so. Lord Napier acted on his instructions; and the intelligence, communicated to the Sicilian Assembly, had the effect of inducing it to determine on placing Sicily under the sovereignty of the Duke of Genoa. These transactions were utterly irreconcilable with that character for honesty and plain dealing which it had been the pride of England to maintain. The noble Lord made a rather successful ad captandum appeal to his supporters in a passage of his speech in which he endeaveoured to make it appear that he had nothing to do with the overthrow of M. Guizot's Administration and the throne of Louis Philippe. Nevertheless, it was generally supposed throughout Europe that the noble Lord had a great deal to do with keeping up the Jacobinical and revolutionary spirit which led to that overthrow. Every part of Europe was kept in a state of excitement by the noble Lord's policy. Intrigues were going on in one quarter, threats were employed in another, and a general sense of uneasiness prevailed on account of the noble Lord's "musket" and "go-it-my-boys" policy. The noble Lord was even denied the gratification of knowing that his mischievous policy had been attended with success. France had recently mortified and humiliated the noble Lord; and, unfortunately, the humiliation extended to his country. About a month ago General Lahitte read from the French tribune a despatch which was almost an insult to England. General Lahitte had since communicated to the French Chamber that England had retracted, and granted all that she had refused, that the treaty of London had been adopted, and good relations been restored between the countries. If this House by its vote identified itself with the policy of the noble Lord, a policy generally regarded as the personal policy of the noble Lord, the consequence would be that those feelings of animosity and irritation which were not confined to Courts and Governments, to Ministers, ex-Ministers, or expectant Ministers, but extended to that large portion of the population who were attached to the principles of order, would be kept alive—that not only the noble Lord, but England, would be regarded as the patron and champion of revolution throughout the world—and that at no distant period this country would find it had to encounter no longer the tacit, but the active, hostility of almost the whole civilised world.

I feel satisfied that the apprehensions expressed by the hon. Baronet who has just sat down, will prove to be unfounded, and that under the policy pursued by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department, England will not be considered the universal patron of revolution, but that every Englishman resident abroad will feel that over him the broad shield of British protection is cast, so long as he does that which is right; and every foreign Government will feel that its proceedings are observed by a vigilant eye, which watches especially any attempt that may encroach on British independence, or interfere with the safety, honour, or happiness of our countrymen. Respecting the state of Greece, and the degree of protection that an Englishman might expect to obtain from the authorities in that kingdom—subjects to which the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken, and the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs have adverted—I would request the attention of the House to some private communications addressed to me from that country, to the unexaggerated character of which I would pledge myself, and which represent the condition of Greece. My correspondent writes in February, 1844—

"I must not forget to answer your questions about the state of Greece. For the moment the tide of revolution has been stayed. How long, will depend on the progress of events in Europe. You are no doubt aware that the great object of the authors of the late revolution was to get quit of the King, and appoint a president, as in the time of Capo d'Istrias. This scheme was defeated by the influence and exertions of General Church, when it was about to be carried into execution. But the writ remains, and with the majority of the nation the carrying it into execution is merely a question of time; the poor young king has no energy to break the turbulent spirit of the old chieftains and pallicars. Agriculture and commerce languish, the finances have hitherto been lavishly squandered and misused. It is hardly to be expected that the great Powers will advance a new loan; but if they will exert their powers to keep down revolt, and if Otho succeeds in forming a working Government out of constitutional elements, the country in time must take a start. It contains in itself all the materials for constituting a great and a powerful nation."

Writing in January, 1846, he says—

"Affairs in Greece are so bad that they can hardly be worse. It was discovered, about a fortnight ago, that the director of police, the right-hand man of Coletti, was the chief of a band of robbers. An immense quantity of plundered property, false keys and instruments for house-breaking, were discovered in his cellars. The whole country opposite to us is in the hands of banditti [this was written from the Ionian islands] which keeps us continually on the qui vive, as they occasionally attack and plunder the inhabitants of the small islands belonging to the Ionian States which lie near the Continent. Coletti has armed and taken into pay all the old pallicars, or guerilla chiefs who subsist by plundering the political opponents of the Minister. When these are cleared out, they will help themselves wherever they can find booty. They will then come to blows among themselves, which will break up the coalition and the Ministry of Coletti at the same time. Meanwhile the country is thrown back in civilisation half a century: unless England and her allies act in concert to deliver Greece from the clutches of her opponents, no stable or well-ordered Government will ever be established in the country. The good that might result from the liberty of the press is neutralised by its licentiousness. On the other hand, it must be allowed that schools are multiplying, the Scriptures freely circulated, and many good books printed and disseminated through the country. I enter so minutely into particulars, because I know you feel a great interest in the affairs of Greece."

In July, 1846, he writes—

"I do hope that the new Government (Lord John Russell's Administration) will interfere in some way to better the political condition of our obstinate neighbours of the kingdom of Greece. The whole country is in a state of indescribable anarchy. Misrule is at its height."

In February, 1847, he says—

"Your favourite kingdom of Greece is in a state fast verging to complete anarchy. The British authorities have been obliged to place the opposite coast in a state of blockade; and there has been some angry correspondence with Coletti on the subject of the outrages committed on the persons and property of Ionian subjects. The Government of unhappy Greece is in the hands of a set of unprincipled fellows, who think of nothing but how they may keep themselves in place and power. The energies and resources of the country are fast sinking."

Writing in October 20, 1848, he says—

"Greece, as a constitutional State, affords a striking instance of the truth of the old saying, Non progredi est regredi; nay, worse even, for from preying during so many years on her own vitals, she now attempts to prey on her neighbours, I mean her Government does. Some time before the death of the late Minister, Coletti, a secret association had been formed under his auspices for promoting and procuring the union under one sceptre of all the provinces in Europe anciently composing the Byzantine Empire. The Ionian islands, as a matter of course, fell within the scope of the Athenian's machinations. Their proceedings assumed all the characteristics of a conspiracy a tremendous oath bound (binds) the initiated to secrecy; and to a blind co-operation Cephalonia became the centre of the alternate operations. The existence of the conspiracy was rather suspected than known and recognised as a fact."

On January 16,1850, he wrote—

"Lord Palmerston's is the only policy calculated to extend the power or sustain the greatness of England. There is no shuffling, no truckling, no trimming about it. I wish his Lordship would take your old friends, the Greeks, in hand. ^{* *} While the Ottoman power stands, and Greece continues in her present unsettled unstable condition, the possession of the islands is of the greatest importance to us. ^{* * * *} In the hands of the Greeks the Ionian islands would become an asylum for pirates and for all sorts of banditti, and the navigation of the Adriatic would be no longer secure; so I trust you will vote for retaining the islands at all hazards. I observe that the Ionians themselves, and their advocates in the English press, with the most impudent effrontery, maintain that nothing has been done for them by the English. Do not listen to assertions of this sort. Everything has been done for them. ^{* * * *} When we got possession of the islands, thirty years since, they were in a worse state than were the Highlands of Scotland in 1715 or 1715. Without commerce, without roads, without any staple produce, the population half what it is at present, the people themselves serfs or banditti, their religion, now dominant, almost proscribed by their Venetian tyrants."

My last letter, Sir, reached me this very morning. It is dated June 12. My correspondent speaks of the blockade of the Greek coast and harbours. He says—

"Never was chastisement more justly merited. For the last ten years, the Greek Government has been systematically endeavouring to mine our power and influence in the Levant. This fact does not seem to be known or understood in England, where a factious and venal press has unchained all its fury against measures necessary for the maintenance of the honour and best interests of the country. Depend on it we are only at the beginning of the fray. Whether encouraged by other Powers or not, the Greeks are acting on an organised plan, which embraces both the political and ecclesiastical emancipation and aggrandisement of the race. Constantinople, is, of course, their first aim; but the possession of the patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria forms an essential part of their as they term ^{* * * *} They have contrived, no matter by what means, to make our rule over a limited population of 200,000 appear tyrannical, while we have in fact loaded them with benefits. ^{* * * *} The political horizon looks black all around; the tide of battle will roll towards the East; the mighty designs of Providence are fast approaching—it is consolatory to think that the interests of our empire are unmistakably entwined with those great purposes; so let the struggle commence when it will, God is with us and victory."

The extracts I have read to you, Sir, contain descriptions of the condition of the country, which I am confident are not exaggerated. And the noble Lord has told you what representations were reiterated during so many years, and communications made in vain to the Government of Greece. Is it for us now at length to abstain from resorting to those measures which it is manifest can alone effect redress for British subjects. The position of matters in Greece has been truly characterised by the noble Lord, who in another place proposed a resolution adverse to the policy of Her Majesty's Government; and by the right hon. Member for Ripon, when they described that kingdom as having been constantly the scene of intrigue, and pointed to its demoralised condition as allowing other countries more powerful than itself to attack the interests of Great Britain. With reference to the "good offices" of France, those who studied carefully the despatches of the French agent in Greece, would see that those "good offices" were not fairly carried out. Baron Gros prides himself on having reduced the pretensions of England. He appears rather desirous of affording to the Government of France a triumph, than of accomplishing the object for which he was appointed. It is but just, however, to say, that such was not the case with the French Ambassador in this country. It has been charged against our Government, that while this country has endeavoured to take advantage of a weak Power, we have truckled to a strong one; but an attentive perusal of the despatches will show how unfounded is such charge. The firmness exhibited in the communications made by Lord Bloomfield to Count Nesselrode, and by Lord Palmerston to Baron Brunow, have been such as befit the position of this country. They are marked by that plain manly simplicity that ought ever to characterise British diplomacy. Should the foreign policy of the present Government be set aside, it ought to be recollected into whose hands diplomatic affairs are likely to fall. Those who have been in the habit of watching the conduct of the different Foreign Ministers of this country, must have observed, that notwithstanding the many high and honourable and respectable qualities of the Earl of Aberdeen, some of his transactions in diplomacy have been attended with very unfortunate results. Will any hon. Member say, that our interference in Rio de la Plata has been anything but mischievous? Has it not materially affected the influence of this country in South America. Is it not true, that in consequence of the detention at Monte Video of some of Her Majesty's troops, a protracted war has been carried on in one of our colonies, which might have been checked in the very commencement if they had not been so detained. Sir, I rejoice in the boldness and generality of the Motion now before the House. It is not fitting that any man should be at the head of foreign affairs in this country who is not very cordially supported by the feeling of the House. Without the confidence of this House, a Foreign Minister cannot maintain the honour or promote the interests of this country, or afford to Englishmen residing abroad that protection to which they are entitled. I believe the speech of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department will be attended with one great result; not only will every Englishman abroad feel that the protection of this country extended to him, but every one connected with foreign States and with commerce, end interested in transactions abroad, will feel that this country must not at this time be exposed to the danger of losing the services of a Minister so eminently qualified to attend to her interests. Far from thinking that the course followed by the noble Lord had led to revolution, or that the noble Lord had fomented disturbances, I believe that the opposite was the case. The noble Lord had so little favour for republicanism, that in Sicily he preferred having a king to a republic. The House was called upon to affirm two great principles—that this country would not allow of dictation on the part of other Powers in the nomination of her Ministers, and that she would afford protection to subjects residing abroad. The expression of the noble Lord at the head of the Government that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was not the Minister of France, of Austria, or of Russia, but the Minister of England, embodied in a few words the character which ought to distinguish a British Foreign Minister. I feel that so long as by the blessing of Providence the health and life of the noble Lord are preserved, the interest and welfare of this country will be fearlessly and without compromise sustained.

said, the question at issue was not that which had been lately decided in another assembly. It was not, here, at least, a question relating to Greece I only. If, indeed, the proposition of the hon. and learned Member for Youghal had not been withdrawn, he could have better understood how certain speeches, occupying each about two hours' duration, had found a proper place. On the other hand, the hon. Member for Montrose, whose voracious appetite was so great as to swallow the entire animal, brought forward a proposition in which he digested the whole policy of the noble Lord, domestic as well as foreign. That proposition, too, was subsequently withdrawn, though the hon. Member was now, at all events, prepared to go the whole length of adopting the whole policy of the Government. The question at issue, however, was as to the foreign policy of the Government, and that only. If, indeed, it had been limited, as the hon. and learned Member for Youghal desired at one time to limit it, to the policy adopted by the noble Lord towards Greece, he (Sir R. H. Inglis) should have felt more difficulty in deciding upon his own vote. But we are now called upon, gratuitously, without the question being provoked by any other individual, to give the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield our confidence, in the first instance, while he carries forward a vote of confidence to the Government upon every part of their foreign policy. He (Sir R. H. Inglis) was not prepared to go that length with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. That confidence he might possibly have given in its limited application to Greece; but he could not extend it to the whole course of foreign policy pursued by the noble Lord. But, independently of that, there was another consideration which decided his vote upon the present occasion; and that was the terms on which the noble Lord at the head of the Government had been daring enough to rest the issue of this question. The noble Lord had told us that he did not intend to alter his course in consequence of any resolution in the Upper House of Parliament. But he went further than that; for he said that the privilege of controlling and advising the Government of the country rested with this, the Lower House of Parliament. While commenting upon this observation of the noble Lord, he remembered that in the important measure recently passed by the Government, granting a constitution to one of our greatest colonies, the principle of one chamber only was preferred. He was thinking, after such a statement as that he had referred to as being made by the First Minister of the Crown, that if it were a subject dependent upon the decision of the present Ministers, that they would not be disposed to declare themselves decidedly in favour of a double chamber in this their own country; because if the Upper House of Parliament be not entitled, upon such a subject as Greece, to give any opinion, he hardly knew upon what subject they would be entitled, according to the judgment of the noble Lord, to exercise any discretion whatever. If, indeed, noble Lords in the Upper House had interfered in respect to a Money Bill, we of course would be justified in interposing our high prerogative and constitutional privilege to such interference. But, upon a question of foreign policy, he could not but feel that the noble Members of the other House were entitled to exercise their functions equally as well as the House of Commons in a discussion upon the subject. But the noble Lord said, that if, in obedience to a majority of the House of Lords, the Government were to change their policy, that change would not be unaccompanied by great evils to the whole country; and, he emphatically added, to none would such a change be more injurious than to the noble Lords themselves. He (Sir R. H. Inglis) could not admire the discretion thus manifested by one who wields the power and influence of the Crown and a majority of this House, in direct opposition to the corresponding powers of the other branch of the Legislature. And how far those three Powers could act together in harmonious co-operation, while one branch of the Legislature was stigmatised in such a way by the First Minister of the Crown, he could not venture to state. But besides this collateral objection to the Motion, he had a direct objection to it. There were considerations distnctly connected with the foreign policy of the country which would justify him from withholding his confidence in the noble Lord on this occasion. In the earlier days of the Session—he believed it was in the very first week of it—he had asked the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs a quest on which struck him as being very important, but which the noble Lord had successfully evaded answering—namely, whether the operations carried on in the Bay of Salamis had or had not been communicated to the councils of the other Powers who were the co-guarantees with England in respect to the independence of Greece? The noble Lord answered every other point; but that one question, which, by the by, was also put to him by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (now the chief supporter of the Government), was utterly unnoticed by the noble Lord. But it now turns out that no such communications to these other Powers had been made; and the result might have been first a war with Russia, then with France, and perhaps a general European war. Then with respect to the two islands adjoining Greece. That, at least, was a question, whatever might be said of the claims of individual creditors, not exclusively British. It was a question in which three Powers had an equal interest. Yet in that it did not appear that any communications had been made, nor had any concurrent act been performed with the two other Powers. Again, the general policy of the noble Lord in respect to propagandists of political principles he could never support. He would ask the noble Lord if he had not first encouraged and afterwards discouraged the advocates of what were called liberal principles? But the noble Lord, while giving his moral support to those holding such principles in Sardinia and other places, had not extended the same protection to what he (Sir R. H. Inglis) regarded as certainly far more important—he alluded to the maintenance of the religious interests of Christian truth. In no one case, as well as he recollected, had the noble Lord made the profession of Christian faith, as maintained by Protestants, a portion of his duty in respect to any foreign Power. In the latest of his treaties with one of the New South American States, there was no provision for the free exercise of the Protestant religion. He knew that it had been left to the United States to contend successfully for the establishment of Christian worship in their intercourse with China. In respect to Sardinia and Tuscany, no such protection had been extended by the noble Lord. He apprehended that under the existing constitution of Tuscany every native Tuscan might at this moment become a Protestant; yet an English subject had been lately expelled from Tuscany on the ground that his opinions indicated "a tendency to proselytism." Supposing even that he had been successful in his endeavours to proselytise, yet the victims, as some persons might call them, of his exertions, would not have been disabled from holding any office civil or political. Yet, when he (Sir R. H. Inglis) found that such an individual had been expelled from the dominions of the Grand Duke, he would not say without remonstrance from our representative in Tuscany, but certainly without any support of such remonstrance from our Foreign Secretary, he could not think that the best interests of this country had been in this respect maintained. In Sardinia, nothing could justify the conduct of the noble Lord with respect to the late King of Sardinia. But the noble Lord said, we should recollect that the late King of Sardinia, after all, was nothing more than a man. This, of course, is a defence or palliation which he shares with every other offender. And when the King of Sardinia marched at the head of an army into Lombardy, instead of his being merely told that there was some danger that he himself would be defeated, a great deal more ought to have been said to him, in order to deter him from the unprovoked invasion of the territories of a Sovereign allied to him alike by blood and by treaty. There was, however, one circumstance in the foreign affairs of this country, and in the policy which guided them under the conduct of the noble Lord, upon which he could dwell with satisfaction—namely, that the noble Lord had never raised the hopes of Poland—that, shame, for shame it was, rested upon another Power, which having encouraged a gallant people to claim from a great empire the fulfilment of a solemn engagement to restore its independence, then abandoned and betrayed them at the moment when their support might have saved them. Although that negative merit belonged to the noble Lord, yet he, for one, could not admire the promulgation of those principles which the noble Lord made his pride and his glory. He stated no more of the noble Lord than the noble Lord stated of himself when he contended that it was the duty of England to propagate liberal principles. He had seen, as every one must have seen, as they went down from Charing-cross, the name of the noble Lord identified with "liberal principles;" and the names of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, placarded as connected with "despotism." The noble Lord the Prime Minister had but given utterance to that which was a clap-trap when he talked of the noble Lord as not being the Minister of Austria, or Russia, or Prussia, but the Minister of England. If the phrase meant anything it meant this, that it was necessary to sustain the noble Lord, because he, wherever he had influence, would be found to maintain what were called "liberal principles;" and that the House and the country should uphold Her Majesty's Ministers in their crusade in favour of liberal principles. He did not intend on this occasion to make one of those two hours' speeches of which they had had too many in that debate; but still he could not conclude, without adding a few words in reference to one part of the noble Lord's conduct, without referring with feelings of deep gratitude to the constant zeal and spirit which he had manifested in one most important point of foreign policy—he could not forget the efforts made by the noble Lord to abolish the slave trade, and to relieve the name of England from the disgrace of that foul blot. He felt that the noble Lord had always performed this portion of his duties cheerfully and effectively; but he at the same time could not be forgetful that the noble Lord formed part of an Administration which, whilst it destroyed the slave trade with one hand, endeavoured to build it up with another. He could not but feel that the slave system was encouraged when they encouraged the use of slave-grown sugar. This consideration alone, if there were none other, would withhold his support to a vote of unqualified praise upon the policy of the noble Lord. It would not be becoming in him to say anything of the unrivalled speech which had been made by the noble Lord—unexampled as he believed it to be in Parliamentary talent and power. He ventured so to speak of it, for, as he had heard it, in the midst of all its eloquence and all its self-defence, there was not to be found in it a single instance of personal bitterness or acrimony. It was, therefore, with much pain to himself, but with deep conviction that he was right, and still entertaining the opinion which he did of the great efforts of the noble Lord for the extinction of the slave trade, that still he must abstain from giving his assent to the proposition contained in the resolution of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, which gave unqualified support to the whole foreign policy of the Government.

Sir, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has stated it to be his wish to arrive at the opinion of this House on the point which had been decided in another place; but if that had been the object of the hon. and learned Gentleman, it would surely have been a plainer and more practical mode of doing so if he had confined his speech to the same ground and basis as that on which the question in that other place had been argued and disposed of. But he has thought fit to enlarge the area of the Motion submitted for our discussion. I do not, however, think that we have any reason to regret that he has taken that course, especially since the speech of the right hon. Baronet, the Member for Ripon, for which I am glad to find we are indebted to the extended Motion brought before us by the hon. and learned Member. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has not failed to take advantage of the opening made him to travel over the continent of Europe. It is not, however, my intention to follow the noble Lord in his unrivalled speech of the night before last; but I may be permitted to say that I think the reigning principle in the noble Lord's speech, over whatever country he travelled in its course, was this—that the object of Her Majesty's Government was the support of propagandism all over the world. It is, Sir, because I be- lieve that restless interference with the internal affairs of other countries to be injurious to those countries as well as to this, that I am wholly opposed to the principles enunciated in the speech of the noble Lord. I find that principle asserted with regard to the affairs of Portugal. The noble Lord said that the Government interfered there, and, with force of arms, expelled one aspirant to the Portuguese throne, and set up another. What I want to know, then, is this—if such is to be the principle that is to govern the foreign affairs of this country, and if the object be to force what may be considered constitutional government on other countries, what I want to know is, where is all this to stop? I wish to know whether, if such a principle is to be the rule, why America, or France, or Russia, have not each the same right to say that they think, in the one the republican, and in the other the absolute, form of government is the right one, and that they will therefore, by force of arms, impose it upon other countries? It was this same principle, too, that governed the Earl of; Minto in his roving commission to the States of Italy. There has been no answer in the noble Lord's able speech to the question that was put by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridport, who asked, the other evening, whether the Earl of Minto had not addressed a mob from a window in Rome with a republican cry. But the Earl of Minto, having sown the seeds of that revolution that occurred in Rome, proceeded on to Naples. An insurrection had already broken out in Sicily. The hon. Member for Bridport charged the noble Lord with having endeavoured to induce the Sicilians to elect the Duke of Genoa as their King; and the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, in reference to that charge, said that Lord Napier felt confident that the King of Naples had no chance whatever of recovering Sicily, and that the King himself had given up all idea of reconquering his rebellious subjects. I believe that the King had never entertained such an idea; but if he did, it would be owing to the presence of the English fleet in the Bay of Palermo, the admiral of which had threatened to fire upon the ships of the King of Naples if they ventured to bombard the town. While on this subject, the noble Lord said that "the offer of the throne of Sicily had never been accepted"—he did not say it had ever been made—"and that, in consequence of difficulties having arisen, the whole proposal led to no result." It led to no result undoubtedly, but that does not make the conduct of the Government the less objectionable. It is not so much the immediate result of the noble Lord's policy of which we complain, as the unsettling of the institutions of every State in Europe, and making every Government in Europe feel suspicion, distrust, and jealousy of England. With regard to the despatch supposed to have been suppressed, which Prince Metternich wrote with regard to the interference of Austria in Italy, the noble Lord did not deny the fact, because it was impossible to do so, but said he had reason to believe Prince Metternich was not sincere. On what grounds did the noble Lord make such an assertion? It is easy to give that as a reason for not laying that despatch on the table of the House; but whom will it satisfy? The noble Lord added that Count Colloredo had remained perfectly silent, and showed no discontent at the suppression of the despatch; but is that any sufficient reason to excuse the noble Lord for not giving to the House important information on a subject of vital importance? I now come to that subject which I conceive to be of the greatest importance to all—I allude to Greece, in respect to which the wounds which have been inflicted on the honour of this country are yet open and bleeding. I do not intend to weary the House by going over the details of the paltry and insignificant claims upon which the demands of our Government upon Greece were raised; but if any further argument beyond those already adduced by previous speakers were necessary to show the paltriness, the insignificance, and exaggeration of those demands, I would bring into court the evidence of Mr. Wyse himself, who, in a despatch written on the 20th of May, states that Baron Gros had described these claims as being " la risée de tout le monde. " Could anything be more unfortunate than the position of this Frenchman, keenly alive to a sense of the ridiculous as he seems to have been, on his arrival at Athens to enforce demands which he felt were the subject of the ridicule and laughter of the whole world? Supposing, however, these claims admissible, there is the further question, whether they were pressed forward in a fair and impartial manner. The two claims of which we have heard the most, are those of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico. With regard to the latter, it does not appear to me to have been submitted to the judicial tribunals of the country. The noble Lord said, in respect to the outrage committed upon M. Pacifico's house, that the mob were aided by the son of the Minister of War, a young man of 18 or 20, and that the injury was greatly aggravated by this circumstance. The House will be surprised to hear that the only son of the Minister of War at that time in Athens was a boy of 12 years old. And be it remembered that M. Pacifico swore before the magistrates that he could not identify one of those who gutted the house; and having sworn this oath, he contradicted himself afterwards, and said he saw the son of the Minister there. Great stress has been laid upon the claims of M. Pacifico upon the Portuguese Government; and the noble Lord said that the documents on which those claims were founded were destroyed. On the contrary, I am given to understand, on authority which cannot be doubted, that no documents were destroyed whatever, but simply a memorial written by M. Pacifico himself, and some copies, the originals being then, as they are now, deposited in the public archives of Athens. M. Pacifico, therefore, had not the shadow of a right to transfer his claims upon the Portuguese Government—which, by the way, that Government repudiated altogether — to the Greek Government. This is an important point, because it was upon this that those disagreements arose between Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros which led to all the divisions, the heats, and the animosities that had arisen between England and France. With regard to Mr. Finlay's claim, the noble Lord had entered into a long explanation, in the course of which he said that the arbitration had fallen to the ground previously to the 17th of June, when the twenty-four hours' notice was given. The fact is, on the contrary, that the arbitration was not finished at that time, nor until the day after; and, therefore, if the arbitrators had chosen to settle those claims the next day, they were perfectly competent to do so. But the noble Lord said that there were certain documents which the arbitrators had not yet had, and which the Greek Government refused to let them have, and that that was the reason they came to that decision. As in England, so at Athens, the plaintiff must take the first step; but the arbitrator of Mr. Finlay did not take that step, and, in fact, never appeared at all, and that was the true reason no arbitration was made. In one of his despatches, Mr. Wyse revealed the secret of this, when he said that Mr. Finlay himself had begged Mr. Wyse not to urge on the Government to settle his claim by arbitration. On the 13th of November, the French Government offered to mediate. The noble Lord found it impossible to refuse the offer; but did he accept it in that frank and cordial manner which was to have been expected? No, Sir, he said that if he accepted their mediation it should only be under the term of good offices, and he would not allow those good offices to infringe one jot upon the demands he had made, neither would he allow them to alter the amount. What it was Baron Gros was to settle, under those limitations, I am at a loss to conceive. It was an insult to the French nation to accept their mediation, and, at the same time, to insist upon such limitations. On the 9th of April the French Government proposed that the affair should be settled in London, and a sort of an agreement was come to. This new arrangement was to be forwarded to Athens; and a despatch of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary to the Marquess of Normanby is of considerable importance in acquiring a perfect understanding of this question. His Lordship first says—

"Moreover, on the 9th of April, it was agreed between us that Baron Gros, the French negotiator, should make to Mr. Wyse any reasonable proposition in regard to those matters which admitted of discussion; Mr. Wyse should not at once reject it, even if he did not himself think it entirely acceptable, but that he should send it home for decision, maintaining in the meanwhile the status quo as to the suspension of the action of the fleet and the detention of the Greek vessels."

A little further on I find the following paragraph:—

"As we had thus agreed upon a course which afforded a fair prospect of bringing the negotiations at Athens to a prompt termination by a convention to be sent out from hence, it obviously became necessary to write to Mr. Wyse to desire him to refer home for instructions as to any proposition which might be made to him by the Greek Government or by Baron Gros."

This exhibits a strange inconsistency as compared with the reasons given the other evening why he did not return instructions to Mr. Wyse; and, indeed, the two passages are inconsistent with each other. It is, however, obvious that neither in Athens nor in London was the French Government allowed to exercise that mediation and that authority to which it was so justly entitled. If these circumstances be doubtful, obscure, and uncertain, it will be admitted as clear and intelligible, that the moment the bases of the convention in London were signed, it was the imperative duty of the noble Lord to send information at once to Athens of the fact of that convention having been agreed to. The bases of that convention were signed on the 16th of April; but it was not until the 19th that the noble Lord wrote to Mr. Wyse. The noble Lord says that there was no steamer about to start, and that, therefore, he was obliged to wait. When the noble Lord was about to enforce these claims within twenty-four hours on the unfortunate Athenians, by blockading their port and by making reprisals, he had no difficulty in finding a whole fleet to despatch to the Bay of Salamis; but when the question is settled here by the mediation of the French Government, and when a message of peace is about to be sent—when the object is to do away with all the differences that had occurred—then the noble Lord could not find along the whole of the coast of England a single steamer to convey the gratifying and joyful intelligence to Athens. The House, I am sure, must have heard with regret the statement of the Prime Minister a few nights ago, that his noble Colleague was the Minister of England, and not the Minister of Austria and Russia. If that meant anything, it indicated that the interests of Russia and Austria were antagonistic to the interests of England. I hope that this is not the case. I can fancy nothing more dangerous to the peace of Europe than the suspicion of that antagonism. I am no friend to the cosmopolitan extravagances of the present day; but I think that there is a broad distinction between that policy which knows no fear, but, at the same time, is slow to incur the risk of war, and that system which is ever inculcating experiments with constitutions, and interfering in the internal affairs of every other nation. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield wishes the House to consent to a resolution which declares—

"That the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been regulated have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country; and in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world."

Some hon. Gentlemen were very indignant the other day when my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire spoke of the "machinery of Government" being at the service of the hon. and learned Member; but I think there is abundant evidence of some connexion between them, otherwise the hon. and learned Member would never have had the temerity to ask the House to come to such a resolution as this. The policy of the Government, so far from being of such a character as to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world, has been just the reverse. Is the fact so, or is it not? Has not Russia repeatedly had to send notes of remonstrance to our Government? Is it not a fact that, during the reign of the noble Lord at the Foreign Office, we have been for long periods without an Ambassador in France, in Austria, and in Spain? Is it not a fact that the Marquess of Normanby not long ago wrote a despatch, complaining of the results of this policy? Are these facts, or are they not? and if they be facts, is it possible for the House of Commons to adopt the resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman? I have always admired the courage, the talents, and, allow me to say, the patriotism of the noble Lord; but while I admit this, I think I am entitled to say, that the greater the talents and other qualities of the noble Lord, if misapplied and misdirected, the more imperative is the duty of the House of Commons to keep a watchful eye upon his policy. I am confident he is sincerely anxious to promote the interests of England and the dignity and honour of the Crown; and yet I must be permitted to doubt whether the best mode of securing those objects is, to insult every nation under the sun, to alienate all our allies, and to leave England almost without a friend on the Continent of Europe.

said: I will not trespass at length upon the patience of the House, for by this time every hon. Gentleman must have made up his mind with regard to the subject under consideration; and almost every argument has been uttered which can be used either for or against the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. By that Motion the hon. Gentleman calls upon the House carefully to consider the principles which have guided the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Ministers; he asks us to express our approbation of that policy as a whole; and he appeals to the House of Commons from the judgment which has been pronounced upon that policy by the other branch of the Legislature. We sit here, therefore, on the present occasion as a court of solemn appeal for the purpose either of confirming or reversing the judgment of the House of Peers. How ought we to act? We are at present clothed with the functions of judges; therefore we are bound by the obligations of judges. As the representatives of the British people we have to pronounce a solemn and deliberate verdict which will go forth to the whole world as the solemn and deliberate verdict of the British nation on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Ministers. The eyes of Europe are, therefore, fixed upon us, for it rarely happens that the British Parliament is called upon to pronounce a judgment on principles of foreign policy. The representatives of the British people have too much to attend to at home to be able to spare much attention for foreign affairs. Therefore, generally speaking, we permit the Government of the day to do as it likes in foreign matters; we exercise little or no control over our foreign policy, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is almost irresponsible. Of this fact the statesmen of Europe are well aware. They distinguish between the sentiments and conduct of the Government for the time being, and the sentiments and feelings of the British nation. They praise or blame the British Government for its foreign policy without affixing much praise or blame to the British people on account of that policy. All this will be changed by the vote of to-night. The result of that vote will be, in the eyes of the statesmen of Europe, either to identify the people of England with the Government in its foreign policy, or to separate the people of England from the Government with regard to that policy. If the Motion of the hon. Gentleman be carried, the sanction of the people of England will be given to the past policy of Her Majesty's Ministers in foreign affairs; the Government will be encouraged, in fact required, by the House of Commons to persevere in that policy, and the people of England will be pledged to support them in that policy, whatever may be the consequences. It is, therefore, difficult to exaggerate the importance of this vote. If, after a careful and impartial examination of the facts, we are deliberately of opinion that the judgment of the House of Lords is unsound and founded in error, we are perfectly entitled, as an independent branch of the Legislature, to dissent from that judgment, and are also bound, as representatives of the people, to reverse the decision of the House of Peers. On the other hand, if any hon. Members are of opinion that the judgment of the House of Lords is sound and founded on truth, and that the principles which have guided the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Ministers are not deserving of approbation, I ask, how can any of those Gentlemen, acting in the capacity of judges, with honour, vote to reverse the decision of the House of Lords, or, with honour, refuse to confirm that decision. Now, what are the principles of the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Ministers? They have been stated by the hon. and learned Gentleman, in his opening speech, subject to correction by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and the noble Lord, in his most able speech—one of the ablest speeches of modern times—appears to me to have substantially confirmed, in great detail, every statement of the hon. Gentleman. According to the hon. Gentleman, the principles of foreign policy affect two classes of cases: first, those which regard individual rights and wrongs. With regard to those cases, the hon. Gentleman declared that it is the principle of the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers to "extend the protection and shield of England to her wandering sons, who are carried by commerce, by pleasure, or by necessity, to the various regions of the world." The principle is a very vague one, and, according to the interpretation which has been put upon it in the course of the debate, it appears to me to be an unsound and dangerous one. For, according to the doctrine which has been laid down, whenever an Englishman has been unjustly deprived of his property in a foreign country, and cannot obtain what he considers to be full redress and compensation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be bound to interfere. For instance (as was justly observed by the hon. Member for Radnorshire) if an English traveller were to be robbed by Italian banditti, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be entitled to demand compensation for him, in the event of the Italian Government not being able to capture the banditti and restore the property of the traveller; and, consequently, it would follow, reciprocally, that if a foreigner were to have his pocket picked in London, the Government of that foreigner would be entitled to demand compensation from the British Government if the thief were not caught and the property restored. Again, it has been laid down in the case of Don Pacifico, that when a British subject is dissatisfied with the constitution of a foreign tribunal (for instance, on account of the mode in which the judges are appointed or removed) then the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be entitled to exercise original jurisdiction in all cases affecting the British subject in the foreign country; and also would be entitled to exercise appellate jurisdiction, if the British subject should be dissatisfied with any judgment which that foreign tribunal might pronounce with regard to him. These doctrines have been expressly maintained with regard to despotic countries; therefore, with regard to Austria and Russia. They have been applied to a constitutional Government in Greece; consequently they may be applied at pleasure to all the governments of the world, and in virtue of them the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would become the chief policeman and supreme judge of every country in all matters affecting British citizens. And, in fact, the noble Lord, in the conclusion of his speech, claimed for the British citizen in foreign countries all the rights and privileges which the Roman citizen claimed by the saving, Civis Romanus sum. Now let the noble Lord remember that when this was said, the Roman citizen was the master of the earth, and could and did trample upon mankind. To maintain pretensions as lofty and arrogant as those of Imperial Rome, what fleets, what armies, what immense expenditure, what burden of taxation would not be requisite? I ask financial reformers to answer. If these doctrines of the noble Lord are to be carried out, every European nation would be entitled to consider the visits of Englishmen as a nuisance, and to discourage those visits as much as possible. It appears to me that if a British subject think proper to wander wherever pleasure or profit may tempt him, the general rule should be that he must take the consequences of so doing; and the more despotically or the worse governed a country may be, the less entitled should the British citizen be to expect that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be at hand to protect him. For instance, if in such a country a British citizen choose to buy property, or to lend money to the State, he would buy the property cheaper, and lend the money at a higher rate of interest, than he would do in this country, because the security for his property and for the payment of his interest would be less. Why, then, should the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs interfere in his behalf to insure him against risk, and to enhance the value of his pro- perty? Next, with regard to the interference of this country in the local affairs of foreign nations, the noble Lord laid down precisely the same doctrines as the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has maintained, namely, that it was the duty of Her Majesty's Ministers (to use the words of the hon. and learned Gentleman) "to warn foreign Governments to make concessions to their people—to tell foreign nations that we are friendly to all individuals who are anxious for the right of self-government;" "that we are friendly to every effort that shall be made abroad to obtain self-government, and to crush tyranny and despotism." The noble Lord proved at much length that he had pursued this policy to a greater or a less degree with very little success in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Switzerland, Hungary, Piedmont, Lombardy, Rome, Naples, and Sicily. This policy the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield defended on the plea, that "from us had emanated all that is worth respecting in the government of men," and that "we soar in unapproachable greatness above the nations of the earth;" and with this defence of our foreign policy, the hon. Gentleman coupled the most lavish abuse of France, Austria, and Russia, with a sneer at the United States. I was sorry to hear such language from a Gentleman who is a distinguished representative of the people, and who, moreover, was moving a vote of confidence in the foreign policy of the Government. I must be permitted to tell that hon. and learned Gentleman, that nations who are really great do not boast of their greatness, but use modest language. I protest against the hon. and learned Gentleman's doctrines, which would make us the political pedagogues of the world, and would bind mankind to adopt our institutions as the best form of government for every nation of the earth. No one is more convinced than I am, that constitutional government and democratic institutions are the best forms of government for communities of our race in every part of the globe; because, by the education and I long experience of centuries we have acquired an aptitude for those institutions.; But I am not sufficiently acquainted with the wants, habits, and feelings of foreign nations to presume to assert that British institutions and British liberties are the only means by which foreign nations can be as well governed as Britain is. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that he only wished to propagate his faith by moral influences. The same language was used by the chiefs of the first French revolution. Now, it appears to me that the only moral influences which we are entitled to use, in order to convince foreign nations of the goodness of our institutions, would consist in making our institutions work well in this country, and in setting a good example which foreign nations might imitate if they think proper so to do. I object to the so-called moral influences which consist in instructing ambassadors to become the chiefs of foreign political parties, and to teach Ministers of foreign potentates the mode of governing their subjects. I object to sending envoys as wandering lecturers on the principles of constitutional government. An hon. Gentleman — I think it was the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield—said that nations, in respect of their relations to each other, should be looked upon as individuals—that is to say, that the relations between nations were analogous to those between men. I accept that analogy; it appears to me a good one. Therefore, I maintain that one nation has no more right to interfere with the local affairs of another nation, than one man has to interfere in the private affairs of another man. Now, there are certain persons who delight in interfering in the affairs of other persons, and are always offering unasked-for, and uncalled-for, advice. These persons are called officious meddlers; they are very disagreeable persons—hated as mischief-makers, and apt to sow discord in the bosom of families. Now, this is precisely our character among the nations of the earth in consequence of our foreign policy. We are looked upon as an officious, meddling nation, which, not content with managing its own affairs very well on the whole, must interfere with the affairs of other nations; and ours is the inevitable lot of the officious givers of uncalled-for advice; we are hated by all parties in all nations; the Liberals say that we first encouraged and then abandoned them; their opponents say we have stirred up the embers of discontent. It is doubtful whether we have always interfered on the truly Liberal side; but this is certain that the victory has always been to the party opposed to us; and that the way to be popular throughout Europe is to be at enmity with our Foreign Office. Therefore, in consequence of our foreign policy we are generally detested by the nations of Europe. If we determine to persevere in that policy, it is idle to talk of reducing our fleets, our armies, or our general expenditure. On the contrary, we ought to augment them all. A great portion of our present expenditure has been the consequence of our past foreign policy. Our interference in Syria led to an increase of our military and naval establishments, which increase cannot be reckoned to have cost less than 2,000,000 l. a year. How, then, will the financial reformers vote? I dissent entirely from the proposition contained in the Motion of the hon. Gentleman. But I have been told over and over again that myself and other hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, who condemn our foreign policy—and there are many such—that we ought to vote for the Motion of the hon. Gentleman, because if it be lost the present Government must resign; that if they do resign, there are no men belonging to the Liberal party of sufficient ability and talent to fill their places, and that the result would be a Tory and Protectionist Government; and it is affirmed that such a Government would pursue a course of policy which would lead to confusion, revolution, and the destruction of property. Hence it is inferred that to avert such a calamity, all Members on this side of the House who condemn the foreign policy of the Government are bound to sacrifice their convictions, and, on the plea that the means justify the end, to declare by their votes that to be true which in their consciences they believe to be false. Now, I do not believe that liberal principles and the institutions of this country require to he upheld by such means, which, if used in the ordinary relations of life, every man would pronounce to be dishonourable. Suppose the present Government were to resign, I should be sorry to see them out of office, for, so far as their domestic policy is concerned, I am a cordial supporter and a willing follower of Her Majesty's Ministers; and, even with regard to their foreign policy, no one more readily admits than I do the great talents and undoubted abilities which the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs displays on all occasions, and I firmly believe that he wishes to maintain the honour and renown of England and the peace of the world, though I utterly deny that the principles of his policy are well adapted to produce these results. Suppose, however, that the present Government were to resign, I do not believe that men cannot be found among the Liberal party qualified to take their places. But suppose the disagreeable alternative of the hon. Gentlemen opposite coming into power, I do not believe that they who have so large a stake in the property of this country—that the landed Gentlemen of England, under leaders with the abilities of Lord Stanley, and with the talents of my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, would pursue a course of policy which would lead to confusion, revolution, and destruction of property. But suppose the majority of the people of this country be in their favour, what right have we who proclaim the sovereignty of the people, to set aside the sovereignty of the people by voting against our consciences? But it is said there will be a dissolution. Why not? Most of us have voted for triennial Parliaments, and the three years have already expired. But it is said some of us will lose our seats. So much the better, for that assumption, if true, proves that we do not represent the people. These pleas and pretexts for voting against one's principles are well known to me. I first heard them immediately after the passing of the Reform Bill. Then the cry was, "If you let in Peel and the Tories, the Reform Bill will be repealed, and a revolution will follow." This cry induced many innocent Members to give votes of which they bitterly repented. Well, the right hon. Baronet came into office; no revolution followed; on the contrary, by his distinguished services and beneficial measures he has won well-merited renown, and I believe saved his country from a revolution. In conclusion, I repeat that I have firm faith in the institutions of this country, and that I do not believe that for the beneficial working of these institutions it is requisite that any of the representatives of the people should, even on this occasion, vote against their convictions. To affirm such a position appears to me the greatest calumny which can be uttered against representative and constitutional government. For us to act upon such a position would tend justly to cast a discredit upon representative institutions in the eyes of Europe, which the noble Lord, with all his ambassadors and wandering missionaries, would never wipe out. We owe it, therefore, to ourselves, to our constituents, and to the fair fame of our institutions, that, solemnly appealed to as we are on the present occasion, every one of us should vote for or against the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, according as we approve or disapprove of the proposition which it contains. For myself I have for many years disapproved of the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Ministers. I protested against it ten years ago; my convictions upon the subject are unchanged. I shall therefore, without hesitation, vote against the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, deeply regretting at the same time that I must act in opposition to political Friends, for whom I entertain as sincere an esteem and regard as I do for Her Majesty's Ministers collectively and individually.

said, that he gave credit to the hon. Baronet who had just resumed his seat for the sincerity of his reluctance to separate from his political friends, but he could not perceive the cogency of the arguments which had induced the hon. Baronet to take such a remarkable course. On the contrary, he believed that the hon. Baronet's speech was illogical and inconclusive, and that it afforded a curious instance of the inconsistencies into which a man was liable to be betrayed in endeavouring to develop a theory more brilliant than rational. The hon. Baronet now viewed with the greatest disfavour the idea of forcing on other countries constitutions for which those countries had not as yet manifested their aptitude, and yet there was no Member of that hon. House who had been more ardent in his anxiety to force upon the Australian colonies a constitution similar to that which prevailed in England. So true was it that the theory of to-day was not unfrequently at variance with the conclusions and actions of yesterday. It was curious to observe with what vehemence the foreign policy of the Ministers was now attacked by hon. Members who formerly either took no exception to it, or actually approved of it. The proceedings I of the hon. Baronet reminded him of an incident which occurred some years since. During the first siege of Acre, the Pacha, in proceeding to attack the Turkish troops in front, was surprised at the want of their usual alacrity manifested by his troops, and he at length found they had been attacked in their rear by a battalion of artillery in the service of Mehemet Ali. The hon. Baronet must not entertain any doubt as to the alacrity of those who had that night been attacked in the rear, for from his (Mr. Adair's) experience of Parliament, he believed that no policy of a Government was ever supported with more unanimity by a party than that which was the subject of discussion, and which had received the approval of everything liberal, both in that House and the country. He agreed in the opinion laid down by the hon. and learned Member for Oxford, that the law, in such cases of interference as had been brought before the House, must be fluctuating and uncertain, and various modifications must often be made in the application of any principle on the subject. With regard to the position of British subjects sojourning in foreign lands as to their individual rights and wrongs, he believed that, whatever diversity of opinion might exist on other branches of the question, this much at least would be conceded, that no subject of the British Crown, coming under the operation of foreign laws, ought to be in a worse position than he would have occupied under the laws of his own country. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department had never contended for more than this. He had never sought to stretch beyond this point the rights or privileges of British subjects travelling in other climes. It had been said that the noble Lord had meddled unjustifiably in the affairs of other countries; but the charge was wholly without foundation. No doubt "non-interference" was the best rule to observe in all practicable cases: but it was easy to conceive that circumstances might arise in which it would be impossible for a country holding the position of England to refrain altogether from interference. In bygone times, Queen Elizabeth was the exponent of the great principles of the Reformation in the Low Countries; and Cromwell vindicated the principles of the Revolution on the Alps. There were two points on which the noble Marquess who spoke last was mistaken as to matters of fact. The noble Marquess in the first place stated that neither Mr. Finlay nor the arbitrator who was named by him ever made any application to the Greek Government to be furnished with copies of the papers respecting that gentleman's claim for compensation. The noble Marquess was misinformed on this point, as applications had been made for that purpose. The noble Marquess also had not received accurate information as to the age of the son of M. Lavellas, the Minister of War at Athens, who was stated to have taken an active part in the disturbance of the house of M. Pacifico. The noble Marquess said that this person was only a boy of 12 years of age. Now he (Mr. Adair) was informed by those well acquainted with the circumstances of the case, that he was at least a boy of the age of 14 or 15. Hon. Gentlemen who were conversant with the development of the physical powers of the human race in that country, would be fully aware that a lad of the age of 14 or 15 was not like a schoolboy in this country, but would be well advanced towards manhood. Indeed, he had heard of a grandmother at the age of 25 at Athens itself. With respect to Baron Gros, he would do that gentleman the justice to say that he believed him to have entered on the negotiations, in the first instance, with a sincere desire to do justice to all parties; but, excellent though his intentions were, he had not sufficient strength of mind to resist the unrighteous influences which coiled and twined around the seat of Government at Athens. He constituted himself a judge, and would almost have become an advocate. This fact was evidenced with painful distinctness by the correspondence on the table; and by no circumstance was it more clearly established than by this, that he refused to submit to the Greek Government, on the part of the British, any proposition which did not quadrate with his own ideas of propriety. In acting thus he mistook the true purpose of his mission. In one of the despatches Mr. Wyse says that Baron Gros had adopted the determination to refuse to present to the Greek Government any papers of which he did not himself approve. Mr. Wyse then observes—

"I did my utmost to induce him to reconsider his determination, and at least not to break off his negotiation, but to submit to the Greek Government the terms I offered, if he were not prepared to recommend them, for I was informed that the Greek Goverment were most anxious to close the question, and had themselves expressed apprehension that Baron Gros would hesitate to propose to them terms submitted by me to him of which they had cognisance, and which they did not regard as too severe or onerous, and were consequently willing and anxious to accept. In fact, the Greek Government were seriously alarmed at the state of the country, and considered it a vital question for them to have their differences with Great Britain definitively settled."

He was as unwilling as any Member in that House to weary the House, and he certainly was not going into the whole of the questions connected with Greece, but he felt bound to direct attention to a few points. There was another point as to which he was entitled to call for the evi- dence, not of the negotiators themselves, but of the Greek Chambers. So soon as the claims of the British Government were made known, the Greek Ministry necessarily looked to their means of defence. Those means consisted in misrepresentation, suppression of documents, appeals to the support and encouragement of foreign Powers; but he did not find them appealing, as Ministers conscious that they were acting for the public good, would have appealed in the agony of the State, to the bold and resolute population which threw off the Turkish yoke, or to the Chambers. The project of indemnification which they proposed was not supported by the Chambers, nor did the population rally round them, as the population even of the wildest tribes of the earth rally round their chiefs when in danger. Not more than two addresses, in spite of official persuasions, arrived from the provinces. A public demonstration was attempted, but without success, and the anniversary of the King's arrival in Greece passed off with the usual apathy, the only " zetos " from the mob in front of the palace being those of boys and soldiers. But the Greek Ministers relied on the encouragement given them by the diplomatic agents of Russia and France. He regarded as one of the incidents of the negotiation most worthy of approval the dignified and temperate rebuke to the remonstrance of the Russian Government, which was administered by Lord Bloomfield, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Count Nesselrode complained, not because we had made the claims, but because we had not requested Russia to represent our claims to the Greek Court.

"I replied," wrote Lord Bloomfield, "that I could not suppose it was from a want of courtesy towards the Imperial Government that Her Majesty's Government had not communicated to them their intention to compel Greece to satisfy certain demands which we made on that country, and which we considered ourselves justified in requiring to be settled, but that I presumed, for I had no instructions on the subject, that it was not thought necessary to send a communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, because we were not in the habit of asking advice of other countries as to the mode in which we thought it proper to effect from time to time a settlement of the numberless private claims of Her Majesty's subjects on foreign Governments; and, further, it appeared to me that even if we had communicated our intentions, the Russian Government seemed already to have prejudged the case, and therefore would only have been found disposed to retard an arrangement respecting them rather than to have advanced our object."

Reverting to the subject of the conduct of the Greek Government, he would take leave to remind the House that the letters of our Minister at Athens were conclusive as to the universal feeling of reprobation with which their policy was regarded by the people at large. In a letter addressed by Mr. Wyse from Salamis Bay to the noble Lord, on the 27th of April, 1850, the following passages, which were quite satisfactory on the point, occurred:—

"In the Senate, Ministers were attacked with still greater vehemence. M. Adam Douca led, M. Londos replied; M. Psyllas followed in a set speech, and was supported by M. Papalexopulos, M. Mansolas, M. Manginas, and even M. Caracatzani. Ministers were plainly told that, having hitherto left the Senate in complete ignorance of their proceedings, it was impossible for the Senate to pronounce on what they did not know—on the conduct and propositions of Ministers; that M. Londos, who spoke for them, had no right to expect that he should be believed, after the deception he had practised on the Senate in the Cervi and Sapienza question; that he had always affirmed that these differences between Great Britain and Greece would terminate to the honour and glory of Greece; that as Ministers would have claimed and received the whole credit, had it so ended, it was only just that, should the contrary be the case, the whole shame and disgrace should fall upon them: that it was unconstitutional for the Senate to interfere in the acts of the Executive whilst in progress; but when completed, it was their constitutional right and duty to judge them. No one but M. Bulgaris spoke in favour of Ministers. At a late hour the Senate came to nearly the same decision as the Chamber of Deputies, namely, 'that the Ministry, being enlightened by what had just been said, do take such measures as shall appear most conducive to the interests of the country.' The Ministers left the Senate much disturbed at the issue of these proceedings. During the course of the debates various incidents occurred, which marked sufficiently the temper of the Assembly, and, it may be added, of the public. M. Londos himself is represented to have said in the Senate that England was a great and powerful nation, and had always shown herself the benefactress of Greece; to which it was replied that this was no new discovery, and ought to have been felt before; and as they, the Ministers, had conducted the affair up to this hour by themselves, they might continue to do so in the same way unto its close. The Cabinet Councils which preceded and followed the discussions in the Chambers were not less distracted. It is stated that, preceding the summoning of the Chambers, a decided opposition was observable. M. Balbi, Minister of Finance, in particular, signalised himself by strong representations of the necessity not only of terminating these difficulties, but of effecting a, thorough reconciliation with England. Without this, he considered all other measures incomplete. M. Balbi, at an early period, urged the same course; whether from regard for England or hostility to his Colleague, M. Londos, it is difficult to say. He has of late, on other grounds, proffered his resignation, and did not attend the Chambers with the other Ministers during the late debate. The effect of these proceedings has been very great. They show that the country is in direct opposition, on the question, to the diplomacy and the Government. They restore England to her just position here amongst the other Powers, and vindicate our proceedings in the face of the world against the calumnies which have been so liberally cast against them both here and elsewhere. Long since has the great mass of the community protested in our favour by their significant silence and uninterrupted good feeling, and considerate conduct towards us under severe trial; the press, with few and inconsiderable exceptions, has supported us, and the Legislature now has pronounced. This last expression of the public will, I consider, be decisive. It is impossible the conclusion of the question can now be deferred for many days."

Surely, if the Greek public so regarded the conduct of the Government, the noble Lord might be pardoned for also regarding it with some feeling of reprobation. It was because he (Mr. S. Adair) believed that the course pursued by the noble Lord was that which was required by a due regard for the honour and dignity of England, and not in consideration of any party alliance, that he was prepared to give his cordial support to the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. When he considered that, with the exception of three of the principal Powers of Europe, all the others had directly interfered since February, 1848, he could not but contrast the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers with that of other Powers. Did not the House remember, in the first instance, the extraordinary appearance of the troops of France under the walls of Rome, the advance of the Spaniards on that capital, and the circumstance of the Neapolitan troops being driven back to their own frontier? and had they not seen the advance of the Prussian and Russian troops? There were certain cases in which interference was justified by the necessity of each particular case. One of those cases was that in which Turkey had been lately placed, when, in the face of the most solemn treaties, the Sultan had been subjected to great indignity and contumely. Well it was for him and for the refugees whose extradition was insisted upon by Russia, that the fleet of Admiral Parker was descried in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean. It might be contended by some hon. Members, upon transcendental ground, that diplomacy was unnecessary, and that it only led to misunderstandings and litigation; but he thought that the experience of the past abundantly proved that diplomatic services were necessary for the protection of commerce and the common interest of nations. He (Mr. Adair) fully agreed with the hon. Members who had declared their conviction that not only our foreign relations but our domestic policy should be watched with the utmost carefulness, guided by the utmost discretion, and subordinated to the most exact observance of the laws of truth and justice. The whole world was now in transition from the old state of things to a new, and he firmly believed a better, state of civilisation; and it was natural that the eyes of all should be turned to England for an example which she ought to be able to follow. If, therefore, the conduct of Britain's Ministers should be at all times the object of solicitude to their country, more especially ought it to be so at this moment. Had they prostituted their influence to purposes of oppression and wrong, no calls of party should bind him to give his assent to the Motion; but it was because he did not conceive the policy of Government deserving of the reprobation with which it had been met, that he now stood forward to support it firmly and determinedly. He regarded their policy as especially entitled to the support of the House, on account of their great attention to everything that could protect or advance the commercial prosperity of England. The case of Venezuela afforded a remarkable instance of the necessity of such protection to Englishmen settled in foreign countries, as well as of the salutary effect produced by a judicious and resolute assertion of our rights. In that country a law existed by which a debtor, on obtaining the assent of a majority of his creditors, might postpone for an indefinite period the acquittal of his obligations; and to show how this law might be used or abused, there was one instance mentioned by the Consul General of Caraccas, in which a debtor had put off a settlement for fifty years. Under this unjust law, British subjects were exposed to a denial of their rights from those who had incurred obligations to them. Some might say that this was a case in which Britain should not have interfered, and that the laws of the country should bind those who resided in it. Such was not his opinion. In a case of such gross and exceeding wrong, any Government would have been exposed justly to the indignation of the country which hesitated to apply such means of redress as were adopted on that occasion. The just, firm, and temperate remonstrances addressed by the noble Lord to that Government, showed them that they could not find an excuse for wrongdoing or feebleness; and the Venezuelan Senate had agreed to make the indemnification that might be necessary in consequence of the operation of such a law. He assured the House, notwithstanding the opinion which hon. Gentlemen opposite might entertain upon the subject, that the present crisis was regarded by the commercial classes of the country with the most intense interest. He held in his hand a letter from a manufacturer in the country, addressed to an hon. Member of the House, which would sufficiently indicate the state of feeling of the class which he represented. It ran thus:—

"My dear Sir—We have read Bernal Osborne's speech twice over. It is a masterly performance, and he will have the thanks and sympathy of every lover of his country. We cannot realise the fears and apprehensions he shadows forth as to the free-traders. If any of them desert Palmerston in this instance, they will sink in public estimation, never to rise again. They will show they neither understand the views nor the feelings of the great mass of their supporters. We are grateful to the Minister who, despite of conspiracy at home and despotism abroad, has done what he could for his country's honour and the advancement of the world; and we freely forgive Lord John Russell's seven years of do-nothing-policy for the pluck he has exhibited on behalf of his Colleague. To refuse a cordial support to the Foreign Minister at this moment is madness. Abstract reasonings at a moment like this are beneath contempt; and if the free-traders act upon them and desert their duty, may God desert them in their hour of need!—I am, Sir, &c."

[ Cries of "Name, name!"] He was not at liberty to read the name, but he gave his word of honour that the letter was a bonâ fide one. With respect to the feelings of the middle classes, he believed it was quite as strong. A gentleman with whom he had held a conversation on the morning succeeding the last night's debate, had told him that he knew the middle classes well, belonging, as he did, to the movement party, and that if there was one point more than another upon which the nation would give its support to Ministers, it would be upon their foreign policy. He had himself received several letters, expressing great apprehension lest the result of the division would cause a dissolution of Parliament. He had taken the liberty to assure his correspondents that he himself had no fear of the result; but that if it should prove contrary to his expectations, hon. Gentlemen opposite would have most cause to fear. He assured those hon. Gentlemen that a dissolution of Parliament would not lead them to the bed of roses which they anticipated. If the result of the vote they were about to give, should be in accordance with that given elsewhere, it would be tantamount to saying that any subject of England, no matter in what part of the world he might be placed, might be liable to have the profits of his labour and enterprise snatched from him to swell the coffers of his rapacious debtor; and that, no matter what wrong he might be subjected to, his own Government would not redress his injuries. He would not be a party to any policy so dishonourable, and therefore his vote should be recorded in that majority which he confidently expected would be found to confirm the policy of the Government.

I must confess that the speech which we have just heard is one which I feel great difficulty in answering. The authorities that have been quoted are anonymous. The Gentleman who in that lucid letter explained his views upon the state of parties, and who described his alarm lest there should be some disaffection from among the ranks of the Liberal party with regard to the policy of the noble Lord the Foreign Minister, with great discretion and good sense abstained from adding his name to the document. The Gentleman, too, whose conversation the hon. Member quoted, must, I think, owe to him a debt of gratitude for exercising a similar discretion. With reference to the case which the hon. Gentleman puts forward, upon which he justifies his adhesion to the policy of the noble Viscount, its locality is in a region so distant that I must humbly confess my entire ignorance of the circumstances of the course which the Government pursued, and of anything more than the general results to which it conducted. Whether or not (for I could not clearly make it out) the hon. Gentleman quoted the case of Venezuela as an additional instance in which the noble Lord has acted with little forbearance and little temper towards a small State, or whether, upon the contrary, he adduced it as showing that the noble Lord there exercised great moderation, I am unable to say. I am unable to combat either view of the case; and therefore I must ask the hon. Gentleman's permission to come back to those more important matters with the history of which we are all far better acquainted. The noble Lord, in his speech the other night, a speech for which every one desired to do him a just homage, objected to the course taken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon, on the ground that, in reading a despatch upon which he founded some of his strictures, and on which he accused the noble Lord of interfering, in a manner unbecoming in its tone, in the domestic and political concerns of another country, the noble Lord objected that my right hon. Friend had not read the concluding passage of a despatch addressed to Mr. Bulwer, in 1846, and which, therefore, he read himself. I must do my right hon. Friend the justice to say that, without reading the whole despatch, he did imply that which the noble Lord thinks was misstated, namely, that this despatch was not communicated to the Minister, inasmuch as he stated that this despatch had transpired to the Spanish Government; and no wonder, for the noble Lord communicated the despatch to the French Government, and it was printed and published. At that time, General Narvaez was resident in Paris, holding a diplomatic appointment, and in that printed despatch it appears that the noble Lord, who tells us that in all cases he is animated by a desire to promote constitutional principles, and that he repudiates all personal feeling, in a sentence which does not appear in the Parliamentary edition of these papers, the noble Lord, who had no personal feeling against any Minister, and who would not allow himself to be animated by personal feelings against any man opposed to him—could find no other expression to apply to Narvaez than that of "reckless adventurer." Now, Sir, the speech of the hon. Gentleman tempts me to do that which I shall do in this case only, and in no other, and that is to make reference to a letter in the Greek papers. And here I must say I think the principal value to be placed upon the Greek papers is, as showing indications of the manner in which the foreign affairs are now conducted. The hon. Gentleman says the information of my noble Friend the Member for Stamford is incorrect. It is well known, the sons of Zavellas, who were accused of making a riot and attacking the daughters of Pacifico, were only twelve years old; but he says, "You must make allowance for the difference of climate, and for the precociousness which prevails in that country, because I have known an instance of a lady being a grandmother at twenty-five." [Mr. S. ADAIR said he had described the boys as between fourteen and fifteen.] Whether they were only twelve, or fourteen or fifteen, the boys were coming home from school, and playing with bows and arrows. They made a disturbance and behaved improperly, and doubtless received due chastisement from the pedagogue to whom their education had been very unsuccessfully intrusted. But it became a matter of great national importance. Now, during the whole of the negotiations and correspondence which passed upon what are called the Greek claims, the noble Lord showed a very great aversion to do that which he has himself told us was the proper course to pursue. The noble Lord does not appear to have recommended applications to the local tribunals. Either an action would not lie, or there were technical objections why the tribunals should not be approached by British subjects who had been injured; yet in this one instance, in which there was much less chance of success by going before them, the noble Lord had recommended prosecution. There was hardly any prospect of any very great success in case of such trivial assault. [Lord J. RUSSELL: There was the destruction of his house.] There was no destruction of the house; and the second case was the only instance which I can find where the noble Lord recommends recourse to the local tribunals. Why? Because he had then an opportunity of bringing before them the two sons of the Minister who had been opposed to him. The noble Lord had for a long time been on the worst terms with the Government of Greece. Where there was a possibility of obtaining a verdict, the noble Lord does not recommend application to the local tribunals; but in this instance, where there was an opportunity of bringing discredit upon Zavellas. Unlike Macduff, General Zavellas "had children," and the noble Lord thought he was able to expose them by bringing them into court. I beg pardon for having been tempted by what fell from the hon. Gentleman to diverge into these transactions, and I return to the topics raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon. The noble Lord having alluded, in the terms I have mentioned, to the despatch he addressed to Mr. Bulwer in 1846, made no similar reference to the despatch of 1848, and I think we may assume that when a debater of the power and ingenuity of the noble Lord allows an accusation brought against him to remain untouched, he has the best possible reasons for so doing. That despatch is an instance of the noble Lord's system of interference. Let us now see the results to which it led. Our Minister, acting upon his instructions, took so active and eager an interest in the domestic affairs of Spain, that, without referring to the circumstances, it ended in the expulsion of Mr. Bulwer from Madrid. Then, said the noble Lord—

"I am accused of having, in the reconciliation which has taken place between Spain and this country, shown a great want of courtesy and temper towards the Spanish Government."

I think the Spanish Government might have been justified in accepting the particular despatch in which the noble Lord expressed his regret that Mr. Bulwer was not at hand to be restored to his post at Madrid, for I think they can afford to be generous, and that they will not suffer in the contrast when their despatches are compared with those of the noble Lord. But the noble Lord went further, for he said—

"I will make confidants of the House, and tell them how that happened. I do not care to tell it, but that despatch was submitted to the Spanish Government in draft, and they approved of it before it became an authentic document."

That statement was received with loud cheers. But the noble Lord had made the House only his half-confidants; and I want to know whether he will tell us any more. Will he show us the other drafts submitted to the Spanish Government, from among which this particular one, after negotiation, was accepted as being the least offensive of them all? Again, passing from these considerations, the noble Lord, in his speech the other night, brought us to a consideration of the history of the events of 1847, in a country where I had the good fortune to be present during many stirring and exciting scenes. The House must remember perfectly the situation of Italy in the summer and autumn of 1847. There existed the greatest and the wildest discontent arising from misgovernment in some of the Italian States. Genoa was governed by the Jesuits. They filled every confidential post; the avenues to employment in every province were in their hands. They used their influence in a manner which did not tend to perpetuate or consolidate their power; and the people, seeing the ministers of religion engaged in carrying on the Government upon principles the very contrary to those of morality and justice, became enemies almost to religion itself. Tuscany had been governed by an excellent administration; her material resources greatly developed; the people generally were in- dustrious and contented, but still without any mixture of those free institutions to which by the character of her people, and by her traditions of liberty, she was entitled. The States of the Church were governed as the States of the Church have always been governed. At the time the first inquiries were made into the state of the Roman administration, the abuses discovered, both in the administration of justice and finance, were beyond all human belief. As far as concerned the administration of justice, it was a notorious fact, that many, not only political, but other persons charged as offenders, were confined for two and three years in gaol without trial; that in the prisons no authority was exercised over the subordinates charged with the administration of those prisons; that many were flogged at the discretion of the gaolers; that torture had been used; and that, after a man had been subjected to the basest and most humiliating treatment, he might in the end be dismissed and told there was no evidence against him. In the finances there was the greatest disorder and confusion. I recollect seeing myself the report of an examination into one branch of revenue which would have astonished my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was to the effect that in one small article of excise, so small that the total revenue it produced was only 300 crowns a year, the cost of the stationery was 700, and the salaries 4,000, a year. This was an instance of the way in which revenue extracted from a people suffering in great poverty was squandered in the most licentious manner. The accession of the Pope inspired throughout Italy the greatest hopes of reform. A benevolent man, anxious for administrative reforms, but who has played a part which he never intended to play, found himself, to use an expression of one of the liberal statesmen in Italy, "placed by a large party upon a pedestal so high that he could not get down from it without destruction to himself." He began his reign, as was well expressed in the letters of Mazzini, without the slightest intention of introducing any constitutional changes whatever: his object was to convert a bad despotism into a good despotism; his sole ambition to raise the States upon a level with that of Tuscany. But the long-slumbering discontent of every country in Italy was two powerful for his Holiness, and he soon found himself impelled into measures far more extensive than those he had originally contemplated. At that time no Englishman who watched the progress of Italian affairs could do otherwise than take the most lively interest in the prospects of the Italian people: whilst those whose classical education gave them perhaps a prejudice in favour of the literature of Italy naturally felt more than others great interest in the future of that city which had once been the political, and again the religious metropolis of the world, and which had twice given civilisation to the world. I have spoken of Sardinia, of Tuscany, and of Rome. I may include Naples in the list without making any exception in her favour. I confess then, that I watched with anxious hopeful gaze the proposal that better times were drawing near, and that the days of Italian regeneration were at hand. But there was a complication in Italian affairs which afforded an opportunity for the interference of the noble Lord, which interference, founded, as I think, on an entire misapprehension of the state of Italy, led to the most fatal results. In the north of Italy there was a large country governed by a nation who have held possession of it for centuries, though speaking a different language, between whom and the inhabitants their nationality as Italians interposed feelings of the greatest dislike. The greatest alarm was felt lest a collision should ensue between Austria and the other Italian States; but I think that, from the first, the documents show a complete misapprehension on that subject on the part of the agents of the noble Lord from whom he derived his information. The Liberal party, or rather the moderate party, used the name of Austria as a bugbear to keep the extreme section in order. Commit excesses, said they, and Austria will intervene. Proclaim a republic, Austria will invade you. But they were too sagacious to believe these statements. They knew well enough that Austria was too frightened to move, and that the last thing she would willingly do would be to add foreign difficulties to her internal disputes—that Austria held possession of Lombardy by the sword alone—that the utmost she hoped was to retain her possession, but that if attacked she would defend it. But that was not the opinion of Mr. Abercomby. Mr. Abercromby filled the noble Lord with constant apprehensions as to the intentions of Austria. He attributed to her not only the most sinister projects, but the most ubiquitous instigation of disturbances. There was a republican movement at Leghorn. It was got up by Austria. There was a reactionary plot at Rome. It was Austria. A long correspondence ensued, in which we continually find the suspicion that Austria had hostile intentions against other States, but Austria as continually denied it. Now, I was very anxious to hear what the noble Lord would say, in answer to the grave accusation against the honour of this country, which was adduced by the Ambassador of that country. That accusation was answered at the time in another place, in a manner very different from the explanation which the noble Lord gave of it the night before last. Mr. Abercromby made a statement that the Austrian Government had sent their Minister to demand an audience of the King of Sardinia for the purpose of presenting personally to him a note menacing Sardinia if she appointed civic guards on her territories. Or rather, I should say, it was the copy of a letter menacing Tuscany, if Tuscany formed a civic guard. That was to be communicated to the king, because Sardinia being coterminous with Austria, Austria considered herself equally in danger from such an armed force as Sardinia. That statement was made by Mr. Abercromby, and it was related with further details. It was said that etiquette at the Sardinian court would not allow a foreign ambassador to have an audience for the purpose; but that if the note were put into the hands of the Foreign Minister, it would be transmitted to the king. The noble Lord alluded to this very circumstance as a justification of his view that the professions of Austria were not to be believed. Yet will the House believe that the whole of this story turned out to be untrue. It was a gross fabrication palmed off upon Mr. Abercomby; and I must say that upon that ground I heard the statement of the noble Lord with the greatest surprise and regret. The noble Lord, observe, had written a despatch, imputing to Austria an intention to invade Sardinia and other States. Austria had as distinctly denied any such intention, in the strongest terms. She said that not only had she no intention to invade Sardinia, but that if Sardinia were attacked, she would be the first to assist her to repel the invaders. Now, the noble Lord, at a time when all Italy was disturbed—when an excited and anxious people were ready to break forth at any moment upon the slightest alarm which might lead them to think their privilege of liberty was about to be wrung from them—the noble Lord at that moment circulated these rumours about an intended invasion of the Italian States. He published and circulated it, not at the request of any Member of either House of Parliament, but "by command;" yet he did not lay upon the table at the same time the aswer of the Austrian Government distinctly denying the allegation! And not of the Austrian Government only, whom he supected, and who he thinks are not to be believed upon honour, but the distinct confession of the Sardinian Minister, who said, "I never heard of such a thing, and I do not believe it exists." This astonishing paper produced, as may well be expected, the greatest effect. The alarm of invasion had set every one arming. The civic guard were formed first of all under the impression of war between Austria and Sardinia. The Austrian Minister here—it was stated by Lord Brougham elsewhere—made a representation of having been unfairly dealt with. And we may search the blue books in vain for any despatch from Austria in answer to that which the noble Lord had circulated. The right hon. Baronet quoted a partion of this despatch—this despatch the noble Lord suppressed—and he suppressed it, not as stated by one of his Colleagues in the other House, from inadvertence. The noble Lord scorned to take advantage of that excuse, but he says—

"I purposely suppressed it, because I did not think that the professions of Austria were worthy of credence. I founded my disbelief of those professions upon the very facts of their having written a note to Count Solar de Marguerite."

Count Solar de la Marguerite, the Sardinian Minister, denies that such a note ever was written to or seen by him. Now, I want to know whether the House of Commons intend to recognise such a mode of transacting business between England and foreign nations? No private gentleman would dare so to act with his fellows. No man of honour would publish a letter accusing some other person of certain intentions and designs, and at the same time suppress a letter he had received completely denying the imputation. I must say, Sir, it is with shame that I see the foreign affairs of this country conducted in this attorney-like spirit. I do not think it is becoming to see documents suppressed, if they be inconvenient for the purpose which the noble Lord has in view at the time, or that they should be published making reflections on a friendly State, the truth of which is disproved by other documents not then produced. The hon. and learned Gentleman who moved the resolution was right in altering the terms of it, and leaving out the expression of "the honour of England being untarnished." I do not mean to bring any charge against the noble Lord personally. I have known the noble Lord, I believe, for as many years as I can count. I have invariably experienced from him the greatest kindness, and I have formed for his character the estimate which I have no doubt is universal in this House—that from the frankness and manliness of his bearing, he would be the last man to act in the private transactions of life in any other way than the most scrupulous man would approve. But diplomacy has a code of morals of its own, and in the conduct of public affairs the noble Lord is guided by the maxims and traditions of the diplomacy of the last century. With the altered state of circumstances in Europe he has not introduced, as I think he was bound to do, a more frank, straightforward, unreserved method of conducting public affairs, which increasing freedom of thought requires, and which is necessarily demanded from the increased publicity which free government requires to satisfy the representative assemblies of each country whose affairs are affected. At the time of which I have been speaking, the Earl of Minto arrived in Italy; and the Earl of Minto was naturally disposed to believe all the statements which he derived from his son-in-law, Mr. Abercromby. That information, I believe, originated in a misapprehension of the state of feeling in Italy, among a people who, let it be recollected, had had no political education, who had no practice in self-government, who had no habits of self-restraint, and whose passions were excited, and their hopes and aspirations ripe, at that moment. The effect of this emotion was greatly misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Italian nations. They looked upon the Earl of Minto as come to hasten the progress of constitutional freedom—not to originate it, because it was in progress—not to arrest it, because everybody knew he came to promote it. That opinion was caught up; and that which would, if left to itself, have terminated in the consolidation of free institutions, was converted into anarchy, which was crushed by military despotism. I think that those who, like the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, place their confidence in the Government upon the ground that they have assisted to support free opinions, and to establish free governments, would do well to look at the history of Italy during the last two years. At the time of which I have been speaking, every country had gained some great step towards constitutional freedom; there had been singularly little excess among the people, all things considered. If Rome was a country whose peculiar form of government made all progress very difficult, what was gained stood, perhaps on that very account, upon a more solid foundation; but the noble Lord's misunderstanding of the situation of those to whom he was sent, had the most fatal effect upon the progress of constitutional opinions. The noble Lord was not much versed in the Italian character. He was very partial to amendments adapted to the English form of government. The noble Viscount says that the Earl of Minto recommended no constitutional reforms, but only administrative reforms; but in Rome, as in other countries, it appears to me he was trying to recommend an amount of constitutional reform far from being advisable for the interests of the country. He was invited to come out upon a balcony, beneath which was a concourse of persons who welcomed him as one of the saviours of Italy. The noble Lord went out. The story is rather old now, but it will live for many years in Italy. I do not know whether the Earl of Minto is an Italian scholar, but he certainly could not have selected in the whole vocabulary of the language three more unfortunate words than those which he uttered, "Long live the independence of Italy!" ( Viva l'Independenza d'Italia! ) Now, "the independence of Italy," throughout the whole of the Peninsula, has but one meaning, and that is the expulsion of the "foreigner" from their soil—the expulsion of that foreigner whose continuance on that soil was, as the noble Lord said, guaranteed by treaty. Well, naturally these things, small and trivial as they were in themselves, yet, with a people so constituted as the Italians were, excited the wildest hopes, and encouraged the publication of the most extravagant theories. The noble Earl, in a despatch which he wrote to the noble Lord opposite, said that he had never heard of a party who were in favour of the amalgamation of all the States of Italy into one, or of a party who desired the expulsion of the foreigner. If so, I can only say that the noble Earl was entirely ignorant of that which was known to every schoolboy. The party to which I have alluded was a very powerful party. They held a great part of the bar, and almost all the universities; and the strength and countenance given, not by the Earl of Minto, but by the fact of his mission as interpreted by the people, to that party, did lead most materially to the terrible consequences which resulted. But the noble Earl went on. He proceeded to Naples at the invitation of the King. The noble Earl's journey to Naples originated in a curious manner; for the Earl of Minto says that a gentleman one day came to his hotel, and read a memorial, in which two facts were stated: one of them, that in 1812, England had guaranteed the independence of Sicily; and the other, that Sicily was remarkably ill governed. The noble Earl accordingly wrote him to ask whether he might not go and settle the affairs of Sicily. The Court of Naples at that time did not feel itself in a position to disregard the presence of a foreign nobleman holding high rank in the English Cabinet; and probably the King of Naples thought that the noble Earl would be a safer adviser than that young diplomatist, who, no doubt, by his talents and energy, will rise high in his profession some day, but who, penetrated by the instructions of the noble Lord opposite, was at that time leading the opposition at Naples with great skill and spirit. The noble Lord opposite, in answer to the Earl of Minto's application, sent him some instructions which were very simple, and from which I will only read one short extract:—

"I had yesterday a conversation with Prince Castelcicala, the Neapolitan Minister at this Court, who expressed a wish to know whether your Lordship was likely to go on to Naples. I told him that your Lordship's present instructions did not prescribe any visit to Naples; but that I would write to you immediately, to say that if the King of the Two Sicilies should, through Lord Napier, express any wish that your Lordship should visit Naples, you should immediately go thither, and should request an audience for the purpose of conveying to his Sicilian Majesty the strongest assurances of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain, and, if possible, draw still closer, the bonds of friendship which have so long united the Crowns of Great Britain and of the Two Sicilies."

On this amicable mission the Earl of Minto proceeded to Naples, where he found, not a despotic and arbitrary Government, but a Ministry formed of men who had distinguished themselves in the previous parts of their lives by an attachment to the cause of constitutional liberty. Sub- sequently the noble Earl went to Sicily for the purpose of inducing the Sicilians to accept the terms proposed. The rest of that history is but too well known. The manner in which this country, being in alliance with Naples, undertook the mission, and having failed in the first instance, took afterwards an exactly opposite course, is notorious. After having promised the King of Naples to insist upon terms which we thought just and fair, by which he would have been bound, but by which the other party would not have been bound, we then proceeded, when the Sicilians refused to treat on these terms, to enter into negotiations which had for their basis the severance of the Neapolitan Crown. At first, indeed, this was refused by the emissaries of the noble Lord; but the noble Lord found himself so driven on by circumstances that we at last treated for a repeal of the union between Sicily and Naples, and our fleet saluted the new flag of the Sicilian nation. So clear was our interference considered by the Sicilians, that the captain of one of our men-of-war was asked to sit for his picture to be placed in the town-hall among the heroes of the Sicilian revolution. Subsequently, as the House will recollect, English arms were found in the possession of the Sicilians, with the Tower mark upon them. [Viscount PALMERSTON: They were iron guns.] The noble Lord says they were iron guns. To have sent muskets would have been a breach of our treaty relations; but the noble Lord thought he might send iron guns without compromising this country. Well, we got deeper and deeper in the mire of these arrangements, till, step by step, the noble Lord arrived at the conclusion, that Sicily must be separated from Naples, and set up as an independent State—Sicily with a population not exceeding that of this town—the only question with him being whether that State should be a republic or a monarchy. We began by promoting constitutional reforms. We ended by promoting separate nationalities. The noble Lord decided in favour of a monarchy; and after having expressed his indignation at the treacherous conduct of Sardinia, he made his selection and determined to aggrandise the house of Savoy, by sending the Duke of Genoa to be head of that Sicilian State. The results of all this we know but too well. Those who, like myself, have long hoped to see constitutional and representative forms of government established in Italy, were doom- ed to be disappointed. From first to last it was obvious that the excitement produced by the interference of England must lead the people to the commission of excesses which would destroy all hopes of a consolidation of constitutional liberty. And so it happened. You who profess to be such ardent admirers of constitutional reforms, tell me what did you find in Sicily and at Rome but anarchy, from which they have only been relieved by the grinding oppression of military despotism? Is it on grounds like these that you would confer on the noble Lord the title of the friend of constitutional freedom? I will not enter into the subject of Greece. [ Cheers. ] I do not wonder, after the long debate which we have had on that part of the question, that the House would gladly be spared any observations from me upon it. I view the whole of that unhappy affair more as an indication of the general bearing of the noble Lord's policy, and the effect which it has on our foreign relations, than as deserving particular notice from me on its own account. The noble Lord has been congratulated on the success of his foreign policy. Is it a great success for this country to have brought France and Russia into closer political friendship and proximity by the course which we have taken in regard to Greece? We boasted last year that there would be one successful mediation in the case of Denmark; but since then we had almost repudiated our engagements, leaving France and Russia, the close amity between which I hold to be fatal to our interests, in a state of close political proximity, which cannot fail to be dangerous to the liberty and peace of Europe. I cannot say that any case has been made out of success on the part of the noble Lord. His speech, brilliant as it was, only showed how it was that the most skilful arrangements always ended in failure. I rejoice at the termination of the difference with France; but when we requested, as I see from the papers distributed two or three hours ago, to have a convention accepted, which but a very few days back we refused to accept, I must say I cannot see any great subject for boast in such success as that. Well, then, I ask the House to consider what have been the gross results of the noble Lord's policy. I do not impugn his conduct upon all occasions. I do not say that in the numerous negotiations in which he has been engaged, he has not conducted some of them to a happy issue. But I ask you to look at those countries in which the noble Lord has not interfered, at Prussia, now free, at Austria, now attempting to consolidate constitutional institutions, and then compare their condition with the condition of those countries which the noble Lord has cursed with his assistance. Do you approve of the condition of Sicily? Do you approve of the condition of Rome, held by the sword of the French, which, after having achieved its freedom, is now bound down under the yoke of an ignorant and fanatical priesthood? I wish you joy of these conquests of freedom in the countries which you have taken under your protection. It is true that men must not always be judged by the results of their labours; but constant failure surely cannot be a test of merit. The noble Lord said that the settlement of the Belgian question was effected, although there was a disagreement between the parties to the negotiation. Of course it was; but there may be difference without alienation; and I say, looking to the state of Europe and to the mode in which our negotiations have been carried on, as well as to the hatred which the noble Lord has generated of the British name, that something more than difference exists between us and the other nations of the Continent. I ask you, therefore, as representatives of British feeling, to mark your disapprobation. I ask the House then to reflect upon the mode in which these negotiations have been carried on, and the effect it has produced on our connexion with foreign nations. There is not one country with which we are at the present moment in terms of kind and cordial friendship. The noble Lord has said, "You ask for unanimity with all other Powers, and yet the settlement of the Belgian question was made without the assent of all the European Powers who were parties to the previous negotiations of 1815." Of course it was; no one would contend that the noble Lord could, or would require that he should, conduct the affairs of this country with the perfect and certain acquiescence of foreign Powers; but there may be differences without alienation, and variances of opinion without insult. I say that, looking at the state of Europe, and recollecting the mode in which these different negotiations have been carried on, bearing in mind how the people of other countries have been flattered by supposing that the success of their cause was guaranteed by the British name, considering the manner in which these peo- ple were first encouraged, and afterwards betrayed—how, while success appeared probable, they were backed on, and when failure was certain they were deserted—I do charge the present unparalleled condition of this country, in relation to other States, on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country. I ask you, therefore, as Members of a constitutional Government, and as Members representing British feelings, to mark with your reprobation that policy which not only by its sentiments and its objects, but also by its tone, has tended to lower the public character of this country, and to produce alienation from, and an aversion to, the Bristish people and the British name.

I feel it would be unnecessary, and almost unpardonable in me, if I were to occupy the attention of the House for any great length of time in a further vindication of the principles of that policy which has been pursued by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as the organ of Her Majesty's Government, of which he is so distinguished a Member. In the speech which my noble Friend addressed to the House at the close of the last night's debate—in that most lucid, able, comprehensive, and, I may add, most temperate speech, he stated and vindicated the principles upon which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been conducted, and by which it has been guided, and in which he met and refuted, one by one, the many charges and imputations which, from various quarters, and drawn from every possible source, have been made against him, for a great length of time. That speech has left little, if anything, to be added by those who follow him on the same side. When I allude to the temperate tone of that speech—a speech containing not one word which could give pain or offence; nay, not even to the bitterest opponent of the noble Lord, I must express my regret at some expressions which have fallen, I trust inadvertently, from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wilts. I regret, and I think on reflection the right hon. Gentleman will regret it himself, that he should have suffered himself to impute to my noble Friend a charge of having done that which was incompatible with honour and integrity, and which must be held disgraceful as between man and man. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman appeared himself to think that he had expressed himself in too unmeasured terms by the admission which was afterwards drawn from him, and in which he felt himself compelled to declare that he was glad to have the opportunity of expressing in the face of the House his entire accordance with the unanimous sense entertained by the House of the high honour and integrity of the noble Lord. The question before the House is not a mere question of minute detail, it is not a question concerning some immaterial and isolated act which my noble Friend may have committed in the long course of his official career; it is not a question of any particular despatch or of any particular phrase in any despatch which may have been scrutinised and criticised by hostile eyes. This is a question of principle. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield stated the issue truly when he said that the House was called on to decide whether the principles on which the foreign policy of this country is conducted, are such as, looking to that policy as a whole, to command the approval or merit the censure of the House. When I say that this is not a question of a particular despatch, I must for a moment notice two charges which have this evening been preferred against my noble Friend. The first is only a repetition of one made the other night—I allude to what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wilts terms the wilful suppression of a despatch from the Austrian Government—the other refers to the production of a despatch from Mr. Wyse, vindicating himself with the honest indignation of an Englishman against an unfounded charge reflecting on his official conduct. With respect to the first charge, that relating to the suppression of the Austrian despatch, the right hon. Gentleman seems to have forgotten what was stated by my noble Friend the other evening, namely, that if the production of that despatch had been deemed by the Austrian Government or by its representative in this country essential to its honour and character, it might have been asked for at any period during six months. With respect to Mr. Wyse's despatch, the right hon. Gentleman seems to be ignorant that General Lahitte, in a despatch addressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, distinctly stated—this at least is the generally received meaning of the words of the despatch, and the meaning was adopted by the public press in this country, and made matter of comment—that although Mr. Wyse knew that the bases of a convention were agreed upon between my noble Friend and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, he refused to delay his course of action until the arrival of the next steamer, which he was aware would bring him intelligence of the settlement of the question. The right hon. Gentleman complains of the production of the despatch which Mr. Wyse wrote in answer to the unfounded charge made against him; and the right hon. Gentleman seems to suppose that my noble Friend admitted the other night that the accusation had never been made against Mr. Wyse, because it was physically impossible the basis of the convention could have been known in Athens at the time. My noble Friend did not say that it was physically impossible the basis of the convention could have been known at Athens, and on that point I offer no opinion one way or another; but my noble Friend stated that Mr. Wyse was informed, from a source on which he thought he could confidently rely, that the basis of the convention had arrived and been communicated to Baron Gros, who had concealed it from him, and, writing under that impression he penned the despatch which has been laid before Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman is wrong in saying that when the despatch was laid upon the table, my noble Friend knew it to be impossible that Mr. Wyse's statement could be correct. Far from thinking that my noble Friend is censurable for publishing Mr. Wyse's despatch, under the circumstances, I am of opinion that he would have acted a shabby and mean part towards Mr. Wyse if he had not given to the world that gentleman's refutation of what he considered to be an unjust charge, injuriously affecting his character. To return from this topic, I repeat that the principles on which the Motion before the House is based were accurately stated by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, as principles of policy which affect two classes of cases: first, the individual rights belonging to, and the wrongs suffered by, British subjects; and, secondly, the general interests, dignity, and honour of the country. There may be many cases affecting the general interests, dignity, and honour of the country, and of great national importance also, which do not affect the rights of individuals; but the difficulty is, that questions affecting the rights of individual British subjects, do frequently become questions which affect the interests, honour, and dignity of the country, and cannot, therefore, be treated in the way in which the claims of British subjects in Greece have been treated in this and the other House of Parliament, but must be regarded with reference to the important, because national, principle involved in them. The real question at issue is, whether the present or any future Government of this country shall hereafter, in the assertion of the principle affecting the first class of cases, act in accordance with the limitation placed on the application of the principle which is involved in the resolution of the other House? or whether, on the other hand, it shall afford protection, in the widest sense, to every British subject, let his situation in life be what it may—let his religious creed be what it may—who, having suffered wrong in a foreign State, is unable, by the ordinary process of law, or the misgovernment of the country, to obtain redress. If the principle is to be limited, as it would be by the resolution of the House of Lords, there is an end of the confidence and trust British subjects now feel in the protection of their Government, which is the mainspring of British industry, and which is the security for the spread of British commerce throughout the world. I will not enter into the details of the Greek case, of which the House must be weary; but the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire is wrong in stating that only one appeal was made to a court of law in Greece. It was not until remonstrances were exhausted, and the Greek courts of law made the instruments, not of granting justice, but of delaying and denying it, that the British Government had recourse to its undoubted right of enforcing the satisfaction of claims which years of remonstrances had failed to procure the settlement of. I am surprised at the quarter from which the imputation on the Government proceeds. In the course of this debate repeated instances have been adduced, in which other countries have shown much less forbearance than England under somewhat similar circumstances. We have had described to us the means which France and the United States have taken to enforce claims upon other countries. It really appears as if the forbearance of England has been carried so far as to have led to the supposition that force would never be resorted to in order to obtain redress for her subjects, and that therefore the remonstrances of the British Government were disregarded. It is only in that way I can account for the surprise expressed at the conduct which Government has pursued with respect to Greece. I need not, however, refer to the conduct of foreign nations for precedents justificatory of the course taken by the Government. I am able to quote high authority in favour of that course, arising out of an analogous case which occurred not many years ago. In March 1840, Lord Lynd-hurst—and it is impossible to name him without expressing respect for the high authority that attaches to every thing which may fall from him, especially on a question of international law—brought under the notice of the House of Lords the wrongs which British merchants in Sicily had suffered from the acts of the Neapolitan Government, and urged the necessity of our Government seeking redress. Did Lord Lyndhurst deprecate resorting to force? No; he charged the Government with not being sufficiently active in enforcing the claims of its subjects. Lord Melbourne, in reply, admitted that we had an undoubted right to enforce justice; but said that, having sent a gentleman to investigate the case, he was unwilling to come to an open rupture with Naples as long as a chance remained of effecting our object by means of negotiation and remonstrance. Lord Lyndhurst's reply was pithy. He said, "that six ships of the line in the Bay of Naples would settle the business in a fortnight." The Government was not then reproached with being too active in asserting the rights of its subjects; it was not charged with being too ready to use the gigantic power of England against a weak State. On the contrary, the Government was taunted with being indifferent to the interests of British subjects, because it did not send a naval force to Naples to exact the amount due to them. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield asked, what is the antagonistic principle which, if you condemn that on which the Government has acted, you will substitute for it? That question has not been answered yet. You have quoted and misquoted despatches—you have displayed an ingenuity in perverting facts, but I have not heard from any one an intimation of the principle of conduct in foreign policy which is proposed to be substituted for that on which the Government has acted. True, I have heard it stated, in general terms, that my noble Friend is a propagandist—that he stirs up a seditious feeling in people against their Governments; but has he been guilty of any interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries—I mean with respect to the form of their governments? Can it be said that, since the revolution took place in France—a country in which we are deeply interested from its proximity to our own—my noble Friend has shown the slightest disposition to interfere with the form of government there established? [Mr. DISRAELI: Hear!] I suppose I am to infer from the cheer of the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire that he adopts the charge of propagandism preferred against my noble Friend. Then, I ask, which is the country with whose Government my noble Friend has interfered? I put aside the despatch with respect to Spain—I allude to an interference with the form of government established in any country. The right hon. Member for Ripon, by way, perhaps, of intimating that a difference of opinion exists amongst the Members of the Government with respect to its foreign policy, quoted an extract from a speech by Lord Howick, which the right hon. Baronet thinks contains a prospective condemnation of the policy of my noble Friend. The right hon. Baronet could not have thought the extract in question applicable to the policy which my noble Friend had up to that time pursued, because the right hon. Baronet bore honourable testimony to the integrity, ability, and other high qualities which he had perceived in my noble Friend whilst they acted together as Members of Earl Grey's Cabinet. I beg to recall to the right hon. Baronet's recollection—for we are told that a person's memory out of office is not as good as when he is in—the fierce political struggles which took place during the time he was my noble Friend's Colleague in Earl Grey's Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon has manfully declared his favourable opinion of my noble Friend's conduct at that period; but it was then, as now, condemned by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and my noble Friend's policy was attacked in the same spirit in which it is now assailed. Now, with regard to the extract from Lord Howick's speech, I really cannot see that it bears the construction which the right hon. Baronet endeavoured to put upon it. The right hon. Baronet said, it was the curse of a country to have an English Minister in it on the one hand, interfering with its affairs with the view of promoting what might be conceived to be English interests; and a French Minister on the other, interfering to advance what he assumed to be French interests. Intrigues of that kind, no doubt, lower the dignity of all par- ties concerned in them. That was, however, wholly distinct from the course of the Government. But is it to be maintained that the representatives of the British Government are to be precluded on all political subjects affecting Europe from expressing opinions and tendering advice to the Courts to which they are accredited? Circumstances may arise in which it is necessary, in the faithful discharge of their duty, that the representatives of this country should express a different opinion and tender different advice from the opinion expressed and the advice tendered from other quarters to the Courts to which they are accredited. Such may be the case with respect to the Spanish marriages. It is a case which one must deeply deplore. But is there the slightest proof that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government tended to encourage such a state of things in Europe as had been alleged? That policy which we have pursued, and which has been ably followed out by my noble Friend, has been, to speak plainly, the opinion of the British Government, reflecting, as I believe the Government does, the opinion of the great body of the people of this country, when there is an obligation, as in the cases of Spain and Greece, to give advice, or whenever that advice may be asked by some foreign Power which wanted guidance during circumstances of unexampled difficulty. These words, "unexampled difficulty," remind me of a reference made by the hon. and learned Member for Abingdon to the terms of the resolution. He, good innocent man, occupied with his briefs, and not extending his views far beyond Westminster-hall, exclaimed—"Circumstances of unexampled difficulty during the last three or four years! Why, who has heard of any? The noble Lord in Downing-street has not been surrounded by a tumultuary mob. Let all the rest of Europe take care of themselves, and let us take care of ourselves, shutting our eyes to what is going on around us." Is that the way in which the foreign affairs of the country are to be conducted? There may be cases which touch the interests, honour, and dignity of the country, in which we are bound to take part in proceedings in other countries in which we, with the rest of Europe, are deeply concerned, and, in addition, are absolutely bound by treaty to interfere in discussions and negotiations with respect to other parts of Europe. It is under circumstances of no ordinary dif- ficulty that my noble Friend has had to conduct the superintendence of the foreign affairs of this country. I gladly avail myself of the opportunity of avowing not only the feelings of personal regard which I cherish for my noble Friend, in common with all who have the pleasure of his friendship, not only my admiration of his untiring energy, his conspicuous ability, and the ceaseless vigilance with which he has conducted, under circumstances of "unexampled difficulty," the affairs of that office the duties of which he is called upon to discharge, but of avowing also my full and entire concurrence in the general principles which have regulated the policy of Her Majesty's Government, as carried into effect by my noble Friend. The policy of the Government with respect to foreign Powers, has been to interfere to the least possible extent, not to interfere in regard to the form of government, but to give, in certain cases, advice, in consequence of obligations previously incurred, or, where it has been asked, to give such advice as was most likely to establish tottering thrones, and to place them on a surer basis by promoting the principles of good constitutional government, which are equally calculated to serve as a safeguard against the encroachments of despotism on the one hand, and of anarchy on the other. I do not think any public man could have come out of the ordeal to which my noble Friend has been subjected, so unscathed. We have not only had every despatch out of our own Foreign Office, but the archives of other Foreign Offices have been ransacked for despatches, all of which have been criticised with minute severity—everything has been brought to bear against the conduct of affairs by my noble Friend: and I ask the House confidently whether every specific charge has not been satisfactorily and triumphantly refuted? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wiltshire says he will try the principles of my noble Friend's policy by the results; he alleges that it has been attended with a total want of success. After alluding in strong terms to the gross misgovernment which prevailed anterior to recent events in Italy, he imputed to the Government that the Earl of Minto by his conduct in Italy had prepared the way for results which every lover of contitutional liberty must deplore First, I deny the justice of the imputation on the Earl of Minto. The right hon. Gentleman had the advantage of being in Italy when these discussions took place; he had the advantage of information obtained on the spot as well as of personal observation. But I can assert, knowing as I do the purport of the despatches from the Earl of Minto, that they were very much in harmony with the opinion expresed by the right hon. Gentleman himself; and had the right hon. Gentleman been the representative of this country in Italy at the time, the course of policy he would have pursued would probably have been identical with that of the Earl of Minto. Was the revolution at Naples fomented by any agent of the British Government? Similar events occurred elsewhere in consequence of the spirit which had spread through Italy; but had there been the advice of the British Government, to which recourse might have been had through its representative, it is possible these events might not have occurred. Were Mr. Pitt and his Colleagues responsible, in consequence of the policy they adopted, for all the events which occurred from the first breaking out of the French revolutionary war? What are the results of the policy of Her Majesty's Government? A few years ago we heard predictions of imminent peril, an almost indispensable necessity was supposed to exist for a general European war. Has not peace been maintained? I don't say that there have not been conflicts in different parts of Europe; but have not the energies of the British Government been successfully directed to averting a general European war, the greatest calmity that could be inflicted on the world? The state of Europe is infinitely better than any reasonable man had cause to apprehend on the occurrence of the last French revolution. The peace of Europe has been maintained; and I trust I am not wrong in believing that the principles of constitutional government are making progress against despotic principles on the one hand, and anarchical on the other. Having passed through such a crisis, I do believe that there is more hope for the people and the Governments of Europe, owing to the causes 1 have indicated, than at any former period within the recollection of any of us. It is affirmed that it is the interest and duty of the Government to maintain friendly relations with Europe. That result may be purchased at too dear a price, and those friendly relations ought not to be maintained at the sacrifice of the individual rights of a British subject, and still less of the national interest and honour. I have stated generally the principles which have guided the Government—I have stated generally my concurrence in the principles which have guided the policy of my noble Friend. I must again remind the House, also, of what he said of this question—that it is not a narrow question with respect to a despatch, or a phrase in a despatch; the question was not confined to a question of the removal of one Minister from power, and the accession of another. That is a matter of subordinate importance. It is a question of great national interest and importance; and I trust the House, in giving the vote they are called upon to give in the present instance, will not take a course which shall lower the position which this country occupies among the other countries of the world. The question is one involving serious results; and I trust the House, aware that should the Government be censured there must be a total change of policy, will take heed how they impose on any future Government the obligation to adopt a policy fatal to the interests, the honour, and the character of this country. I trust the House will not lead other countries to believe that they may treat with indifference the claims of British subjects residing abroad, in the expectation that both Houses of Parliament will condemn a Minister, who, as representing the interests of this country, has thought it his duty to enforce those claims, and has successfully enforced them. I trust they will take these matters into their consideration, and that they will not lead foreign Governments and countries to conclude that we, whose ancestors established a free constitutional government and limited monarchy, are become indifferent to the principles of constitutional government, and have ceased to appreciate the value of institutions which are opposed to the predominance of all extreme views, as well as of principles the maintenance of which we have hitherto deemed essential to the the honour and character of the country.

Sir, if I might presume to offer a general observation on the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Home Secretary, who has just addressed the House, I should say that it consisted very much less of discussion upon the particular subjects on which the House will, at the close of the debate, have to deliver its solemn judgment, than of a somewhat vague enunciation of principles, clothed generally in an abstract form, most moderately and temperately expressed; and giving on the one hand very little occasion for dispute, but, on the other, helping us as little towards arriving at a practical conclusion. No one of us doubts that there are seasons when it is necessary to interfere in the concerns of other countries, or hesitates to profess in terms that the general rule should be to abstain from such interference. But these are mere generalities, and we must deal much more closely with the matter in hand if we desire to deal with it to advantage.

Sir, before I proceed to examine the merits of the question, I think it my duty to offer some remarks upon the position of the Government, and the constitutional doctrines which they have laid down in regard to it. A vote has been passed by another House of the Legislature, which directly impugns and censures the policy of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, with reference to his management of certain affairs in Greece. On the passing of that vote, the First Minister of the Crown makes no sign. When at length he is drawn forth from his silence by a question of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, then indeed he submits a statement to this House, and it is one which, in my view, calls for particular remark. "The Government," so said the noble Lord, "do not intend to alter their policy: they do not intend to resign their offices: they do not intend, with reference to the terms of the question put, to adopt any specific course whatever in regard to what has occurred. But at the same time," to this effect the noble Lord proceeded, "they do not dissemble that the vote of the House of Lords is an event of the gravest character; that it will have an influence on the conduct of foreign States; that it will impair the power which we ought to possess for the administration of the foreign affairs of this country." Sir, I, for one, must protest with all my might against the doctrine of the noble Lord. He is the First Minister of the Crown. He is the representative and the head of the great Whig party, with all its historical traditions; and he has come here to state that having been deprived, by a vote passed in another place, of a portion of the power with which a Government requires to be armed in order to conduct the public affairs for the advantage of the State, he and his colleagues intend to continue to be the servants of the Crown, but do not intend themselves to take any step for the recovery of the power which they have lost.

But the noble Lord had a pair of precedents for his course, and very briefly may they be disposed of. First, he finds that in the year 1710, the House of Lords passed a resolution to the effect that England ought not to be a party to any arrangement which should leave both Spain and France in the possession of the House of Bourbon; yet that this resolution was disregarded in the Peace of Utrecht. Is that a precedent at all? The House of Lords has not now been passing resolutions upon hypothetical cases, about matters which have not occurred. When Parliament does any such thing, it does what may, indeed, under peculiar circumstances be justified; but it steps beyond the discharge of its ordinary functions into a province not primarily its own. The House of Lords has not been attempting to fetter beforehand the free action of the Government by a premature judgment; it has not been arrogating to itself any function of the Crown, to which is assigned by the constitution the office of considering and adjusting by negotiation the terms of treaties, subject of course to the responsibility of its advisers; but that House, in the regular order, having taken into consideration the actual conduct of those advisers; as it appears in the papers presented by command of the Crown, has discharged a duty which constitutionally appertains to it in pronouncing a condemnation of that conduct.

And now what was the other precedent of the noble Lord? It was the case of Portugal in 1833. In 1833 you had a vote passed by the House of Lords, which I will assume to be equivalent, for the purposes of the argument, to the recent vote respecting Greece. It was passed on the 3rd of June. On the 6th of June the same question was to be considered, at the instance of a supporter of the Government, in the House of Commons; but so far were the Whigs of that day from thinking that the House of Lords had no concern in controlling the Executive, and that its vote might simply be overlooked, that Lord Ebrington rose in his place on the 4th of June, and thought it needful to take from the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs a specific assurance that the policy of the Administration would remain such as it had been until the House of Commons should (only two days later) have had an opportunity of giving its judgment upon the same question.

But what says the noble Lord now? Various efforts were made to induce Gentlemen, acting in opposition to the Government, to step in to their relief. The hon. and gallant Member for Middlesex made an appeal to the hon. Baronet the Member for Radnorshire; but unhappily without effect. And then the noble Lord himself suggested to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, that he might properly make a Motion on the subject. He, forsooth: and why was he to move? The purpose was, to reinstate the Government in its constitutional position, in the possession of the powers without which it ought not to be a Government. The purpose was, to question the vote of the House of Lords, and to neutralise and destroy its effect. Was this his affair? Sir, it is not for me to speak the sentiments of the hon. Member, but if on this occasion I may attempt to divine them, I really apprehend that he was not so ill satisfied with the vote of the House of Lords as to be desirous to disturb it: but you, who are dissatisfied with that vote, you who are the Ministers of the Crown, you who know that no Ministers should conduct the affairs of the country when stripped of the power which that vote has taken away from you,—it was for you, and not for him, to invite the judgment of this House in opposition to that decision in the House of Peers. However, you would not do so; and it was reserved to a Gentleman wholly independent of the Administration, to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, to make the attempt at extricating the Administration from its dilemma.

Well, Sir, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has interposed: and now let us mark the manner of his interposition. Has he proposed a vote contradictory to the vote of the House of Lords? Has he thought it prudent to raise the very same issue here that was raised there? No, Sir, he has shifted the issue; and no man shifts the issue, in the face of the enemy, without a motive. By so shifting it, he has given an indication of that which I plainly perceive, a very great unwillingness to meet the discussion upon the affairs of Greece. Is there any dispute about this unwillingness? Why then was it that, after the hon. and learned Member for Youghal had given notice of an addition to the Motion, of such a nature that it would have directed the debate to the precise issue raised in the House of Lords, he was urged and induced by the noble Lord at the head of the Government to abandon his intention? And again; with what benevolent view did the Member for Montrose conceive his Amendment? I invite the attention of the House to the words of that Amendment. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose proposed, and with perfect consistency and propriety as coming from him, words setting forth that "this House, taking into consideration the general policy of Her Majesty's Government, are of opinion that on the whole it is calculated to promote the best interests of the country." On the whole it is calculated. Those words, "on the whole," are, I apprehend, without example in a vote of Parliamentary confidence. Let me venture to put a construction upon them. I construe the words of the hon. Gentleman in this manner; that "on the whole" means "although I am not prepared to approve of the particular policy which the House of Lords has condemned." That was the meaning of the hon. Gentleman; and he felt, and showed the feeling, that it would not be expedient to meet the discussion fairly, boldly, and simply, upon the affairs of Greece. And why was this? I am sorry to perceive that I give so much dissatisfaction to some Gentlemen. The nature of the opinions I have to express forbids me to hope that it will be in my power to please them: but if my opinions themselves are such as can hardly fail to be unpalatable, I promise to do my best to avoid rendering them more so by the tone in which they will be expressed.

Sir, I think there was a very sufficient reason for the shifting of the issue. I will not deny that it was a fair and legitimate reason, but I think it was one which ought to be placed distinctly before the House, so that no man shall mistake it or forget it. There was and is a feeling in this House that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has amongst us sources of peculiar weakness, and also sources of peculiar strength. As to weakness, there exists a sentiment even among some part of the political adherents of the Administration—I will not discuss or attempt to define the extent of it, but I merely allege that it exists—a sentiment to the effect that the noble Lord, notwithstanding his distinguished abilities, is not altogether as prudent as he is able in the management of the foreign affairs of this country. Understand, I beg, that I am not presuming to describe what are your general sentiments; but even among a portion of those Gentlemen who sit opposite, there prevails an opinion, or a suspicion, that during the times when the administration of foreign affairs is in the hands of the noble Lord, the country is too commonly apt to be near the very verge of war. I admit, on the other hand, that the noble Lord possesses likewise in this House a source of strength that is peculiarly his own. There are in this House a class of Gentlemen professing to hold what are termed strong liberal opinions, with whom the noble Lord is in the utmost favour, because they believe that he uses energetically the influence of this country for the propagation of those opinions among the other nations of the world. It unfortunately happened, however, that in the case of Greece the noble Lord did not interfere on the side of liberty against despotism. The Government of that country is constitutional, and the interposition of the noble Lord has reference not to Greek affairs or institutions—at least on the surface it has no such reference, and we cannot tell what is beneath—but to certain real or presumed rights of British subjects resident in Greece. The case of Greece, therefore, so long as it stood alone, afforded no facilities for enlisting those sympathies of propagandism, to which I have referred, in favour of the noble Lord. On this account, I argue, it was judged wise to shift and to extend the issue; to introduce other subject matter, and so to draw off attention in some degree from the specialties of the case of Greece, and to fall back upon the general good character which the noble Lord enjoys in that particular quarter of the House, on account of the belief that his main study is to promote the progress of popular opinions throughout Europe.

At any rate, Sir, it has now come to this that we have before us two great divisions of the subject, each of them very distinct from the other; each of them large enough to fill a separate debate, and the two very difficult to examine adequately together. We have, first, the cluster of questions relating to the policy of the noble Lord in Greek affairs—questions quite apart from the conflict between despotism and freedom, and from the principle of intervention considered at large. In the case of Greece, it is evident that the noble Lord could not accurately be described as having meddled in the affairs of a foreign State; that is not the charge against him: he has, as matter of fact, been engaged—whether after a right or a wrong fashion it is for this House to determine—in giving what he calls protection to British subjects resident abroad. And there is no more important element in the whole range of the duties of a Foreign Minister, than rightly to bestow the care which is due to such persons. The first question raised for decision in the case of Greece is this—"Upon what rules and principles is the Foreign Minister of this country to proceed in securing the interests of British subjects domiciled in foreign States?" The second question, also involving most important principles, is this—"In what manner is the observance of engagements to co-guaranteeing Powers to be secured?" And we have, thirdly, the important question, a question which, if it be in strictness one of fact rather than of principle, is nevertheless one of the very first rank and moment, whether the conduct of the noble Lord, in respect to France, has been of a character well calculated to preserve the friendly relations between England and that Power, which are so essential to the wellbeing of Europe. And all these points we have to consider in the case of Greece, quite apart from the yet larger question, whether England is or is not to preserve the general policy condemned with emphasis and with justice by Earl Grey in the passage so appositely cited by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon.

And now, Sir, to clear my way as I proceed, and with reference to various precedents which have been alleged in this debate, I disclaim and repudiate altogether the trial of our conduct in Greece by a comparison with what other countries may have done on other occasions. At all events, I say, if we are to be guided by precedents, do not let them be either exclusively or mainly precedents of that class which exhibit the conduct of powerful States towards feeble ones, because I will venture to affirm that that is not a creditable chapter in the history of Europe; and any examples you may allege, drawn from that chapter, will do absolutely nothing towards securing in your favour the impartial judgment of posterity.

But I will say a word more particularly upon one precedent invoked by the right hon. Baronet who has just sat down, because it is taken from our own history. He cited the case of the sulphur claims urged by the British merchants in Sicily against the Sovereign of that country; and he remarked that Lord Lyndhurst had urged the Government to exact reparation in the case of those claims, as if that were a reason why any sort of exaction might be made for any sort of claim. But what is the use of perplexing and entangling a matter of this kind by the allegation of pretended precedents that are in truth totally irrelevant? The case of the sulphur claim was founded upon the construction of a treaty: that which Lord Lyndhurst did was, to assert what it appeared was the true construction of that treaty, and to require that effect should be given to it. That was a principle of unquestioned obligation; whereas in the case of Greece, you have proceeded wholly on vague and arbitrary notions of your own, with what bearing on treaties, and on the law of nations, I shall presently proceed to show.

Now, Sir, incoming to the consideration of the various claims against Greece, I must bear in mind how largely they have been discussed, both here and elsewhere; and I shall therefore be studious to put aside, with a very few words, all those cases which are not essential to the main issue.

First, I shall put aside the case of the Fantôme. I fully admit and assert, that it was the duty of the noble Lord to exact an apology in that case from the Government of Greece. But, on the other hand, I am convinced that we might have had that apology without resorting to reprisals, or to any employment of force. If you differ from me, I would observe that, before resorting to the use of force, it was the duty of the noble Lord to have put plainly and categorically his demand for such an apology; but this he has never done. There is a strange and inexplicable gap in the correspondence, reaching from a date soon after the event to that very 16th of January, when this subject was summarily revived in the list of final demands upon Greece, to be satisfied within twenty-four hours. Even had he made such a demand, and had it been refused, surely, with respect to such a question, we might have been content to leave the vindication of onr honour to the decision, by joint consent, of some friendly Power. My belief is, that it would not have been refused; but at any rate it was not upon this that the employment of force ultimately turned: we never had asked in plain terms for an apology, and Greece never had in reply refused one.

I shall also pass by the cases of certain Ionians, which I know not how to designate; perhaps they might properly be called the "twenty-pound cases." If I refrain from examining them in detail, it is only because the attention of Parliament has been largely exercised in this respect already, not because I think the proceedings in them have been defensible. On the contrary, I must not pass on without these general remarks. First, that the opinion of Baron Gros in these cases is evidently against you. In the case of the two Ionians at Patras he says, that "if he had to pronounce a judgment upon it"—that is, if he were arbiter—it would be "that that claim should not be prosecuted." The second of these two cases he manifestly considers ridiculous; and of the case of the boats plundered at Salcina he says, that our claim is inadmissible. But we are engaged, it seems, in protecting the interests of Ionian subjects. Well, if that is so, surely there is one body which beyond all others is entitled to be heard, and from which we may confidently expect approval and support. There is a Legislative Chamber in the Ionian Islands; and what language do they who represent in it the people of those islands hold with reference to our obliging care of their countrymen? I will not say that they go to the full length of making a positive complaint against the noble Lord. That indeed would have been rather a bold proceeding on their part. But they render you, as you shall see, little thanks indeed for mixing up Ionian claims in your controversy with Greece. I quote from the recent address presented by them to the High Commissioner of the Islands in answer to his speech. They state that "the Assembly cannot and ought not to pass over in silence the profound grief that the people of all the islands have felt at the differences which have occurred between Great Britain and the kingdom of Greece; and the more so, because among the grounds which have given occasion for those differences, it seems that the protection of Ionian interests is alleged." You can, I think, understand the meaning of that language. The Assembly ends with calling on the High Commissioner to give them official information on the subject.

Not wishing then, Sir, to detain the House with the examination of a mass of perplexed and contradictory details, I go to those larger cases which have occupied more of the public attention, and on which the main issue unquestionably depends.

I must allude, however, among these, to the astonishing case of Stellio Sumachi, because there is no one affair of them all which more strikingly illustrates the noble Lord's method of procedure in this most important department of his duties; and I ask the House, I ask the Members of the Government themselves, whether they are prepared to justify the manner in which the noble Lord conducted his treatment of that case. Stellio Sumachi, a man of no known character, and under accusation of theft, makes a complaint that he has been subjected to cruel torture. I say he was under a charge of theft—not as if this circumstance disentitled him to protection, but because it was a reason for the exercise of caution in accepting his statements. This complaint is adopted by the British Consul at Patras, and transmitted to the British Minister at Athens, Sir E. Lyons; adopted by him, and transmitted to the noble Lord. There is no sifting, no scrutiny, no resort to the tribunals in the first instance for redress. The appeal is at once made to the noble Lord; and the noble Lord, on the mere receipt of that ex-parte statement, without raising a question as to the trustworthiness of the person, without any reserve for what may remain to be said on the other side, without any inquiry as to remedy before the judicial tribunals—and I will dispute and overthrow every word that the right hon. Baronet who preceded me, stated on the subject of recourse to the legal tribunals of the country—having received the first intimation of the case on the 21st of August, 1846, on the 24th returns that most extraordinary reply which I could wish to read at length if it were not midnight; but I will simply recite the main allegations. He says that the British Government have learned with equal regret and surprise that this barbarous outrage and brutal torture have been inflicted by the Greek police; they had hoped that such practices "had ceased to digrace the Executive Government of Greece;" they cannot permit such things to be done with impunity; they demand that the police officers concerned shall be immediately dismissed; that adequate pecuniary compensation be made to Stellio Sumachi; and, lastly, that the compliance of the Greek Government with these "just and moderate demands" shall be reported to him by the next packet.

Now with regard to the matter of fact, whether this man was ever tortured or not, you may have formed a different opinion from that which Baron Gros formed; yet it is due to the Greek Government that you should know what opinion was formed by Baron Gros upon the spot, with full means of information, and in his impartial position. [ Cries of "Oh, oh!"] Yes, I say in his impartial position; and let me tell you that, if you have a due regard for the estimation in which you are to be held by the world at large, you cannot pursue a more shortsighted policy than first of all to invite—no, not to invite, but to accept—the good offices of a friendly Power, than to admit that that Power has selected a well-qualified person to be its organ in rendering those good offices, and at last, when you find that his judgment is against you, to meet with a sneer, as is now done by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Southampton, the acknowledgment of his impartiality. Hear then the judgment of Baron Gros. On the 5th of April, 1850, he writes to General La Hitte, that he cannot find any conclusive testimony as to the facts, and that in the doubt in which his inquiry leaves him, he would think it his duty to reject the claim. Now, as far as I am able to form a judgment, I think it probable that some personal injuries may have been unjustly and illegally inflicted on this individual. But that is not the question at issue, and has nothing to do with it. The question is this: do you recognise it as one of the principles of the foreign policy of Great Britain—"calculated," in the terms of the Motion, "to maintain the honour and dignity of this country," and "to preserve peace" with the nations of the world—that when an ex-parte complaint is made, proceeding from a man under accusation of theft, to the effect that he has been tortured contrary to law, you should, without examination as to the facts, and without inquiry as to the means of legal remedy, send to a Government allied with you, and protected by you, a peremptory demand for the dismissal of the officers charged, and the payment of compensation to the complainant, and for the announcement by the next packet that both have been done?

Well, Sir, having, as I have shown, begun in violence, the noble Lord, strangely enough, shifted to the ground of reason. The correspondence went on, and an investigation took place. The noble Lord thought, and, as it appears to me, with some justice, that the investigation was insufficient: and at length he came to do what he should have done at first. Having, on August 24, 1846, written to demand the dismissal of public functionaries, and the payment of compensation before the next packet, five months later, that is to say, on the 30th of January, 1847, he writes to Sir Edmund Lyons to require that all the circumstances of Sumachi's treatment shall be openly and impartially investigated at Patras. Nothing could be more reasonable in itself, than such a request. But what I complain of is this, that the noble Lord, instead of writing to demand examination of the case in August, 1846, and then requiring redress, if the investigation had been frustrated, in January, 1847, should have written at the very first moment a letter implying a conclusive judgment on the case, and conveying that judgment in the most violent and offensive terms, and should have been obliged in the following January to write a fresh despatch, admitting by clear implication that he had as yet had no materials for forming such a judgment, and requiring that such materials should be provided by a fresh examination.

And surely, Sir, it is by some notable and strange fatality that the noble Lord, when at length he has placed his case on a ground conformable to reason, cannot any longer keep up his interest in it, but must cease to act altogether. The agents of police, having been once criminally charged and acquitted, could not again be put upon their trial for the same offence: and after that announcement from the Greek Government, not another syllable appears in these papers with respect to Stellio Sumachi. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford, to whom, and still more to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Abingdon, we are much indebted for having applied their great acquirements and skill to the examination of these subjects, was most eloquent on the subject of the wrongs done to Stellio Sumachi. His feelings had been much harrowed by the account of these excruciating tortures, all of which he appeared implicitly to believe, and he argued with great earnestness that such a case afforded an ample justification for the strong measures adopted against the Greek Government and people. My hon. and learned Friend was evidently under the impression that redress had been demanded and obtained for Sumachi. No such thing, Sir. Why it was that his case did not appear along with others in the list presented in a peremptory manner last Janu- ary I cannot tell, but certain it is, that if we are to rely upon the papers which have been presented to us, no demand was then made on behalf of that person; his wrongs, which, if true, are most serious, remain to this hour without redress: if he was tortured, he has not even twenty pounds' worth of consolation, nor have the police officers charged with maltreating him been dismissed. If, therefore, the noble Lord considered this to be the case of an injured British subject, he has altogether betrayed his duty by failing to afford him protection. For this man, upon whose chest we are told that heavy stones were placed, and that officers of police jumped upon them, and upon whom other horrors not fit to be mentioned were (as it is said) inflicted—for this man, in whose case the noble Lord first made a violent and preposterous demand that was met with contempt, and next a moderate demand that led to nothing—the noble Lord has neither gained nor sought compensation; and I tell my learned Friend, who, I am sure, is as conscientious in his view of the case of Sumachi as he is known to be in all other matters, that, with his persuasion respecting the facts of it, he ought now to give his vote against the policy of the noble Lord for so gross a neglect and dereliction of his duty.

But, however, the case of Sumachi may illustrate the noble Lord's modes of proceeding, the measures ultimately adopted by him respecting Greece turn mainly on the cases of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico. I do not doubt that the House hears those names with alarm; and although there are a multitude of details in both their cases, which are highly instructive, and which ought to be thoroughly known, yet, at this hour, and this stage of the debate, I shall endeavour to keep the attention of the House, so far as it depends upon me, fastened only upon the principle that is involved in those cases.

There is an original vice in the noble Lord's manner of proceeding, which is made perfectly evident in Mr. Finlay's case; and I am not the less willing to attempt to exhibit it in that case, for the reason that Mr. Finlay is, as I believe, a man of undoubted respectability; or, further, for the reason that, whether he was or was not determined to have the best possible price for his land—a matter into which I do not consider that we are entitled to examine—his claim was in sub- stance a just one. And, moreover, I will admit that the proceedings of the Government of Greece in respect to it, considered in certain points of view, were vexatious, even if they were not shuffling. But the great question which I wish to ask, and which I now seek to test by means of these claims, is the question, upon what system and by what principle are the relations of British subjects, domiciled abroad, to the States in whose territories they are so domiciled, to be regulated? Are they to be regulated by an exceptional system? Are we to place them upon a ground that the subjects of other States are not allowed by the rules of international intercourse to occupy; or are they to be governed by the laws of the several countries within which they may reside?—always, of course, with the reserve of diplomatic intervention in case those laws should palpably fail to secure for them results conformable to general justice. Now, Sir, no words that I can use could exaggerate, or even adequately express, the immense importance of this question. The subject, indeed, of the restraints of international law may not at this moment be palatable to Gentlemen whom I see sitting yonder [ on the lower Ministerial benches ]; it may not easily harmonise with their sense of their mission to propagate liberal opinions through the world: but it is nevertheless essential, now that this question has been raised, that it should be thoroughly investigated; it is vital to every other country in which British subjects reside; it is vital to the British subjects thus residing abroad, that the whole world should know upon what terms they are henceforward to afford the rites of hospitable reception to such persons, and what price is to be paid for the benefits that their residence confers.

Now, Sir, as to the general principle which governs this question, there can in terms be little dispute. I have here the citations from Vattel, who is perfectly clear upon it; but I need not trouble the House with them, because I can appeal to an authority nearer hand. I may, indeed, in passing, direct attention to the strange assertion of the hon. Member for Cambridge. The hon. Gentleman has actually laid down this general proposition—that the subjects of any given country, resident in any other country, have an absolute right to the enjoyment there of at least as good laws as those by which they would have been governed at home. The hon. Gentleman, I suppose, has made up his mind to this conclusion after much consideration and a due inquiry into the principles of international law and their bearings on the case. Still I think it will be found that he will have the exclusive enjoyment of such an opinion. I pass on, therefore, to the doctrine of the noble Lord the Secretary of State, which is of a very different order. He used the following words to describe the proper form of remedy for injuries suffered by such persons:—"Where the law is applicable, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them. That is the opinion which our legal advisers have given in innumerable cases." He went on to explain that there were also cases in which there could be no legal, remedy and where another remedy should consequently be sought. I am sufficiently well pleased with the noble Lord's principle; and I shall take the liberty of testing his practice by it. So also my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford laid down the true principle with admirable clearness—I mean, as to the principle of law ruling the case, for I fear that I shall have to impugn his knowledge of the facts. I understand him to say, that if the law be found palpably deficient, a British subject may seek another remedy; but that he can have no other remedy whatever until he has exhausted all the means which the law affords him. That subject, of remedies over and above the laws of the country in which as a foreigner you reside, is one of the utmost delicacy; but I need not discuss it here. I contend, that in the cases before us, Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico did not exhaust, nor try to exhaust, the remedies which the law of Greece supplied. My hon. and learned Friend says, his general rule is not applicable to Mr. Finlay's case: while he was eloquent upon the necessity of our making ourselves acquainted with the papers by a careful perusal, he too plainly showed that his various avocations had not left him time for such a perusal. For my hon. and learned Friend actually assured the House that the Greek law was not applicable to the case of Mr. Finlay, and that the Government of Greece itself did not refer him to the tribunals. Now, Sir, on the contrary, there is not, I think, a single letter from the Greek Government in regard to Mr. Finlay's case, where they do not distinctly and pointedly intimate that the tribunals were open to him, and that to them he should have repaired. I will not trouble the House with reading the passages; but, in order that there may be no mistake, you shall have that which is the material point, namely, the references to them in the books which many Members have at hand. The first is cat p. 16 of the February Papers, dated February 19th, 1846. The second at p. 23, date November 4th, 1846. The third at p. 5 of the additional papers on this case, date August 30, 1848. And the fourth at p. 40 of the February Papers, date November 21, 1848. In every one of these places, the Greek Government pointed out, in language which I defy my learned Friend to mistake, that Mr. Finlay's proper recourse would have been to the tribunals. And so it would: for the Greek law, as I am informed, permits a private person to sue the sovereign: I believe through the medium of one of his officers. But did Mr. Finlay have recourse to the tribunals? ["Hear, hear!"] I understand your ironical cheers. You mean to say, "It was very well for the Government of Greece to refer him to the courts of law; but we do not believe he could really have gone there." Then I will show you that Mr. Finlay himself admitted that he might have gone there. ["No, no!"] If you deny it, I am afraid I must read from Mr. Finlay's own letter for the purpose: and you will see that he advances special reasons, not why he could not, but only why he should not, go before the tribunals. [An Hon. MEMBER: Hear, Hear!] Is the hon. and learned Gentleman, who was loud in expressing his dissent when I asserted that the tribunals were legally competent to try the case, is he now going to ride off upon the feeble and evasive pleas, that, although they may have been competent in point of jurisdiction, yet there were other reasons which rendered it inexpedient that Mr. Finlay should go before them? With those other reasons I will deal presently; but in the meantime I say, that whatever they may have been, if the tribunals were competent by law to try the case, then at all events, in order even to give you the basis of an ulterior claim in any other form, Mr. Finlay was absolutely bound to go before them. If the tribunals were open, and if Mr. Finlay would not plead before them, the case of the noble Lord against the Greek Government, so far as that gentleman is concerned, is unsound from the very bottom. If the tribunals were corrupt, it was his duty to go before them, and then to allege and show their corruption; if they were feeble, to show their weakness: if their jurisdiction would only cover part of his case, it was his duty to apply to them for that part, and then, in claiming diplomatic intervention, to show in what point they had fallen short. There may be, and no doubt there are, inconveniences and disadvantages in the operation of this principle; but it is the principle of the law of nations; and it is the only principle on which you can conduct with honour or with safety your charge over British subjects dispersed through all the States of the civilised world.

In his letter, dated September 4, 1848, Mr. Finlay says—

The second reason which Mr. Finlay assigns is this:—

And now we come to the third reason, Mr. Finlay's only ultimate reason, as he himself intimates, for not applying to the Greek tribunals. He says— England, and in Ireland, the Lord Chancellor, holds office during pleasure; and I ask you, would you permit a foreigner to demur to his jurisdiction upon such a plea? What, again, are foreigners to do in the colonies of this empire? Throughout their vast extent I suspect that, unless it be Canada, you will find scarcely a single exception to the rule that the judges hold office during pleasure. They are liable to be dismissed, often by the petty head of a small community, and subject to no other review than by an officer of State sitting in Downing-street, at a distance of five or ten or fifteen thousand miles. And what should we say, if a foreigner domiciled in the colonies were to refer to the diplomatic agent of his country for the prosecution of his legal rights, on the ground alleged by Mr. Finlay, that the judges are not appointed for life?

I conclude that this House will not be of opinion that there is to be one rule for the weak and another for the strong, and that, because Greece is a kingdom of small extent and resources, therefore we are to establish for resident Englishmen immunities as against her, which we should not claim from Russia, or from Austria, or from France, and which we never should concede, as against ourselves, to any Power upon earth.

And if this be so, then, after what has been stated, I fearlessly assert you cannot excuse your not having required a recourse to the courts of law before using force, in the case of Mr. Finlay, by the particular tenure of the judicial office as it exists in Greece.

But there may remain another plea. You may be inclined to say that the tribunals of Greece are practically so corrupt that these cases could not with propriety be taken before them. I reply, it is too late to put that plea: you have entirely precluded yourselves from employing it. My chief witness and authority is the Eleventh Article of the Treaty which you have concluded with Greece. Now recollect, I pray you, what is the position of the noble Lord. He has to prove that he is entitled to take the causes of British subjects domiciled in Greece out of the cognisance of the ordinary tribunals, to pass by those tribunals altogether, and to prosecute those causes by means of diplomatic intervention. But let us turn to the terms of this treaty, which define in a mode the most specific and distinct the footing on which the subjects of each country are to be placed, when residing in the other, with respect to the redress of their private wrongs. The article runs as follows:—

But again, what do others say, what does Mr. Finlay himself say, respecting the Greek tribunals? And here I pause for a moment to remark, that I am a little surprised at the extreme severity with which the institutions of the kingdom of Greece are criticised in this House. I should have hoped to find here some stronger sense of the difficulties which beset the way of a State struggling towards the enjoyment of freedom, something more approaching to sympathy with the people of Greece. Nor can I think the more highly of the political wisdom of a noble Lord opposite, the Member for Aylesbury, because he smiles with some derision when I refer to those institutions. But if you tell me that bribery is used to facilitate the movement of the wheels of State in Greece, where there is a representative constitution not yet seven years old, I must ask you how long it is since this House of Commons was tainted by bribery, and whether more than two or at the utmost three generations have elapsed since the wholesale employment of it was almost a recognised element in the government of the country?

But, Sir, though the tribunals of Greece, like those of many continental countries, may not be altogether free from stain, yet it is a gross error to suppose that they are radically corrupt; and it is right that she should have the benefit of the testimony which has been borne in their favour by no less a person that Mr. Finlay himself; in words, let me add, which seem to me to do him the unmost honour for his manly avowal. He says, in the letter from which I have been quoting—

But you shall have yet other evidences, the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons himself, who, in his despatch of the 24th of February, 1836, writes thus to the noble Lord: "The press is unshackled; the tribunals are completely independent."

I am assured, by what I consider excellent authority, that we underrate the civilisation of Greece, so far as that depends (and it must greatly depend) upon the regular and professional study of law. There is, I believe, a flourishing law school in the University of Athens: there is a regular system of judicature, a regular course of appeal through three courts; and the highest of these, the Areopagus, is one of which the judicial sentences have never been tainted by the breath of hostile accusation. If such be the tribunals of Greece, how far are they from showing that entire and palpable inability to do justice, which it would be absolutely essential for the vindication of the noble Lord to prove.

But there is another point of great importance with respect to Mr. Finlay, on which I must beg you to give me an answer. In October, 1849, arbitrators were appointed by mutual consent to settle the claim of Mr. Finlay. Why had not that arbitration been concluded before January? And why in January was it not allowed to proceed? You will tell me, perhaps, that it could not proceed in January because the law of Greece only allows a period of three months for arbitrations, and that period had expired. But Sir, I am informed by a gentleman of high respectability, holding a professorship in the University of Athens, that, although the fact does not appear in these papers, the Greek Government had offered, before the demand of Mr. Wyse, to waive its privilege of cutting off the arbitration, and to concede another term of three months for it. If this is not true, let it be contradicted. If it is true, as I believe, you had not the shadow of a right to resort to reprisals in order to enforce Mr. Finlay's claim. But again I ask emphatically, why was it that the arbitration had not before the month of January reached its close? On this point I complain very much of the indistinctness of the papers before us. I think Mr. Wyse says the want of progress was chiefly owing to the Greek Government: yet Mr. Finlay appears to me not to commit himself fully to that allegation. But however that may be, I beg the House to observe that Baron Gros, who is a man of character, and has acted as the representative of France, and whose word, I presume, will hardly be disputed on a matter of fact, states most distinctly that the reason why the arbitration had made no progress was this: that Mr. Finlay, who was the complaining party, and whose duty it was to make his case before the arbitrators, did not produce the necessary documents and proofs of his claim. The words of Baron Gros are to this effect:—

I come, however, now to the much more serious and much worse case of M. Pacifico. I shall again endeavour to avoid the vast mass of detail which this case comprises, because I hold that it must stand or fall by the principles applicable to the case of Mr. Finlay. Had you the power of repairing to the courts of law for the reparation of the injury which he had suffered? If you had, did you avail yourself of that power? Otherwise you had yourselves alone, in the main point, to blame, and had no right to employ diplomatic agency for an end which non constat but that the regular course of law could have attained.

M. Pacifico's principal claims were two. The first was for the sacking and plunder of his house: and that there may be no question as to my view of such proceedings, I at once declare that a detestable and execrable outrage was committed upon him. Any attempt to palliate that outrage I cannot make. Further, I freely and entirely admit to you that the character of M. Pacifico does not matter to us one straw when we are considering his title to protection or to compensation, and that we must proceed to vindicate it in precisely the same manner, whether he be the best man or the worst man in the world. But at the same time I differ altogether from those who say that we have nothing to do with his character in this matter as it stands. I wish with all my heart that I could have avoided it: I do not find it a very agreeable subject to rake into.

Then there is again the point of his religion. We are told by the supporters of the Motion, that M. Pacifico is reviled, and injustice done him, because he is a Jew: but I do not hear any of its opponents found themselves on his religion as a reason either for oppressing him or for mistrusting him. I say fearlessly, whatever may be the differences of opinion in this House as to the admission of Jews to political privilege, that no person could dare to stand up among us and allege his religion as a ground for mistrust or for the denial of justice, without drawing down upon himself, from all quarters of the House alike, universal scorn and indignation. But M. Pacifico himself has compelled us to consider rather narrowly the question of his character, because the whole of these enormous claims on his behalf—claims amounting to something like 30,000 l. or 31,000 l. out of a total of 32,000 l. or 33,000 l. —the whole of the allegations respecting them—which are of a nature, as I think, to strain to the uttermost the credulity of any man living—rest altogether on his personal credit. There may be one or two exceptions to such a remark, but they are so trivial and insignificant as to be little worth even this passing notice. It is not, with these trivial exceptions, upon the faith of documents, not upon the faith of independent testimony, but upon this person's individual word, that Sir Edmund Lyons accepted—as in every case indeed he accepted from others, and in my judgment deserves the serious disapprobation of this House for having so accepted—the allegations, wholesale as they were made, and transmitted them without distinction or inquiry to the noble Lord; upon which the noble Lord, adopting them in the same inconsiderate and partial spirit, endeavoured to force them wholesale on the Government of Greece, so that in effect the unsupported allegation of M. David Pacifico has been the prime and main mover of the operations of the British fleet against Greece.

Well then, Sir, we are bound to examine into the value of these allegations, as they are connected with the character of the party. And, first, I think it my duty to remark, that ten days ago a statement was made in terms the most distinct, before a full and distinguished concourse, and with the utmost notoriety, to the effect that a certain David Pacifico, of the same domicile, creed, and nation, with our David Pacifico, did forge a bill for 600 l.; and the identity of the party was at least suggested. Was not that statement, thus openly made, susceptible of contradiction? ["Oh, oh!"] Do those Gentlemen who cry "Oh!" mean to express their horror at the forgery of the bill—in which case I will cry "Oh!" along with them—or at the notice taken of it, in which case I cannot? Sir, I say it is a legitimate, and not only a legitimate, but a necessary matter for notice. I say this statement is a presumption, and, not having been denied, has become a strong presumption, though I do not say, even now, it is a demonstration, against M. Pacifico: and I say further, this is no question of holding a man innocent until he is found guilty—the people of Greece have been found guilty and mulcted on M. Pacifico's allegation, and he has received some hundred and forty thousand drachmas of their money, than which I take leave to say a greater iniquity has rarely been transacted under the face of the sun. If a man against whom there are primâ facie reasons for questioning his credit, comes before the Government of a State, and founds upon that credit enormous demands, to be enforced by military means against a friendly nation, I say it is your duty to dispose of those presumptions against him before you proceed to act upon his uncorroborated allegations. This charge then, it seems, has not been denied; and if there was power to deny it, the fact that it has not been denied appears quite inexplicable.

But, Sir, without resorting to a single hostile testimony, the very papers presented to us on behalf of M. Pacifico contain, in my judgment, too many presumptions of the same kind. And though his being a Jew is not a reason for debarring him from any of his just rights, yet neither is it a reason for exempting him from inquiry to which other persons would be subjected, irrespectively of their creed, under similar circumstances. Now, I ask the question, whether any one man in this House has read the celebrated inventory of M. Pacifico's furniture and effects, without finding that it bears on the very face of it all the proofs of gross, palpable, and wilful exaggeration? It is declared by Baron Gros, in language by no means too strong, to be a "deplorable exaggeration." It recites the great values of the articles of his furniture; and then the learned Member for Bath thinks that he has solved the difficulty by telling us that he has been to some upholsterer in London who said he could easily make a couch worth 170 l., or even more. This is rare simplicity. Yes! no doubt many a London upholsterer could make a couch worth 170 l., and could get him a chest of drawers worth 53 l., a carpet worth 60 l., a card-table worth 24 l., two mirrors worth 120 l., and a bed worth 150 l., and so forth: no doubt he could also purchase at shops in London of another class a china dinner-service worth 170 l., and two tea and coffee services worth 64 l. All these could be bought in London: you may find such articles in shops, and you may find some of them in private mansions, but then they are found inside the houses of men who outside those houses have 20,000 l., 50,000 l., or 100,000 l. of income by the year. Then again you find recited as having been in the house of M. Pacifico all these articles and many more besides of the same high relative values, and the very first thing which must occur to a reader of that catalogue, and strike him as utterly marvellous, is, that he had not only the finest furniture and finest clothes in his house, but had no other kind of clothes or furniture. There was not an ordinary article of either from the top to the bottom of his house. Everything in it was a specimen of the richest and the rarest of its kind. When I first heard this statement made in another place, I confess I thought it must have been a figure of rhetorical licence; and the House cannot now learn with more surprise than I did when I examined the document for myself, that the whole appliances and appointments of the mansion of Pacifico were characterised by this astonishing luxury. And yet this man, who thus surpassed nearly all subjects and equalled almost any prince, according to his own account, in many articles of luxury, who has 5,000 l. worth of clothes, jewels, and furniture, in his house, had not outside of it, except plate pledged to the Bank of Athens for 30 l., which he had not been able to redeem, one single farthing! The subject of M. Pacifico's claims may be a tedious one to the House, it has been so frequently under their notice; but I venture to express the opinion that the details of them, as they are contained in these volumes, would really afford no bad material for some ingenious writer of romance.

So, Sir, having his house crammed full of fine furniture, fine clothes, and fine jewels, M. Pacifico was in all other respects a pauper: but this is not all; it is plain that his furniture, as he has described it, was massive and solid in the highest degree. And yet we are told of its disappearing, its being broken to pieces and destroyed. It is not pretended that fire was used, but that a mob came into his house, and in an hour and a half, or, according to other places of the book, in three hours, destroyed these solid masses of mahogany. Why, Sir, they could not without fire thus have destroyed such articles, unless indeed they had eaten them. Sir, the whole statement bears on the very face of it outrageous fraud and falsehood. A man with this large mass of property in his house, carries on the trade of a moneylender upon a borrowed capital of 30 l., and when his furniture is destroyed declares that he has not an obolus wherewith to buy his bread. No such case ever existed.

But, besides allegations, there is, as I have said, some small documentary evidence produced by M. Pacifico. Let us vise this evidence to test his character. The documents to which I shall refer are two. Never, until long after the fact—after you had used force against Greece—after Baron Gros had arrived at Athens—but then, at length, in order to overcome the incredulity of Baron Gros, M. Pacifico was desirous to produce evidence as to the value of his furniture. Well, Sir, he produces, for one, a certain Signor Giacomo Capriles—evidently a man of high dignity, for, as he says of himself, "the Chevalier (Pacifico) had selected him to conduct his correspondence as his secretary, especially with the Minister at Lisbon;" that is to say, Sir, in plain but, I trust, not profane language, Signor Giacomo Capriles was a consul's clerk. But Signor Giacomo Capriles set forth, that while he moved in this sphere of dignity, he enjoyed opportunities of "becoming acquainted with the noble and splendid mode of life practised in the house" of M. Pacifico. You will, therefore, observe that this evidence bears out M. Pacifico's own representations. Before he was ruined by the Athenian mob, he was, by his own witness's testimony, practising a noble and splendid mode of life. Now, I turn to the second document; and I must observe, that the Chevalier Pacifico has done wisely and well to eschew the production of much documentary evidence, and to trust to copious assertion; for even in the few documents he has ventured to produce there is self-contradiction. At the time when the fleet of Sir William Parker commenced its operations against Greece, you had had but one real document before you—for I cannot dignify with that name certain copies of letters certified, as Baron Gros says, only by M. Pacifico himself—and this was a notarial protest which he had lodged in Athens against the Portuguese Government on the 4th of January, 1845, for not paying him 26,000 l . Now, in this document he himself speaks of his own condition and circumstances at the time to which the evidence of Capriles, cited already, referred; and what he says is this—by withholding payment of these claims" the Portuguese Government have left me in indigence in a foreign land!" So much for his veracity—for the trustworthiness of the man, upon whose unsupported allegations you have proceeded to violence against the Greek Government and people, and into whose character on that account, I say, it was both my right and my duty—and a nauseous and revolting duty it has been—to examine.

Well then, Sir, having this monstrous and wilful exaggeration in his hands, did M. Pacifico, or did he not, go before the tribunals, and exhaust the remedies afforded by the law, before betaking him to diplomatic aid? Sir, upon this point my hon. and learned friend the Member for Oxford, I must take leave to say, fell into serious error, for he entirely overlooked the distinction between the criminal justice of the country, which punishes offenders, and its civil justice, which gives redress to those who have suffered by the offence. M. Pacifico has indeed taken in some of us by his allegation that he went before the tribunals. It is true that he went, on the day of the riot, to the Procureur du Roi, and moved him to institute an inquiry; but this inquiry had reference exclusively to a criminal prosecution, which had nothing whatever to do with civil redress. Had this prosecution been pushed with the utmost vigilance and rigour, and every one of those rascals who sacked his house been well punished, as they deserved to be, for the outrage they had committed, that would not have mended M. Pacifico's furniture, nor relieved his beggary. He called in the Procureur du Roi just as in this country he might have called in the officer of police; but the officer of police could have done nothing towards replenishing his empty purse. But why did these criminal proceedings fail? It is alleged by M. Pacifico that the Greek authorities were unwilling to pursue the inquiry; and, I confess, I think it would have been more to their honour if they had prosecuted it with more vigour, notwithstanding the apprehensions which they might have entertained of any fresh outbreak of popular fanaticism. But, on the other hand, I find no evidence that M. Pacifico himself gave them the aid which he might have afforded. The main question, however, is, could he, and did he, betake himself to the courts of law for civil redress? Of those who attacked his house in a tumultuous assemblage, each one, I apprehend, was fully liable for the acts of the body. Now, Sir, I challenge contradiction, when I say that M. Pacifico took no step whatever to obtain civil redress. He gives his pretended reasons—he states that he saw a great number of persons, some of them soldiers of the gendarmerie; some of them belonging to families of wealth and station, particularly the sons of a Minister of State, who, as the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary tells us, were not children, but young men of eighteen or twenty; but a portion of them, as he alleges, were so poor that it would have been useless to proceed against them with a view to obtaining damages, and the rest were so rich and powerful that it would have been hopeless to expect a decision against them from the courts. But he does not deny that it was in his power to institute a suit against these rich persons, whom he alleges that he saw, before the tribunals. Why did he not do it? If he was poor and despised and a Jew, would he have had no aid from the British embassy? Could not the purse of this country have been freely opened if necessary, and the weight and influence of this country have been freely used in his behalf in the path and by the methods of law, to obtain for a man who had suffered under an execrable outrage some reasonable redress? No, Sir, there was a foregone determination not to call in the aid of the regular tribunals of the country. It was too notorious that all such complaints as these, be they what they might, and proceed they from whomsoever they might, were received without any scrutiny, as they arose, by the British Minister, transmitted by him bodily as they stood to the noble Lord, accepted in like manner by the noble Lord, and then returned in the form of official complaints and demands against the Government of Greece.

And I must beg the House to hear what were the sentiments—I think, in the main, the just and reasonable sentiments—of the Government of Greece, with respect, not merely to the detail, but to the principles of this case; for it is true that they objected in principle, not to the claim for redress, but to the lodgment of that claim against the State in the first instance. M. Colocotroni wrote in these terms on the 28th of July, 1848, to Sir Edmund Lyons:— think, most proper and reasonable reply; it is dated December 18, 1847:—

Now, Sir, I simply allege, quoting the authority of the noble Lord, as shown in his directions with regard to the mock affair of the 12th of October, that the same course ought to have been enjoined and enforced with regard to the real affair of the 4th of April; and I add, that if, in conducting the foreign policy of this country, we are to pay no regard to the laws and the tribunals of other nations, we have no title to expect that they shall pay any regard to ours.

Sir, as to the second main claim of M. Pacifico, that in respect of certain documents which, as he asserted, proved his demand upon Portugal, I cordially subscribe to the language of Baron Gros on the 19th of last March; it is not even of a nature to bear discussion. It is a claim for no less than 26,000 l., alleged to have been due for a great number of years, for some twenty years, more or less; with respect to which, as Baron Gros observes, this British subject had never once invoked the aid of the British Ambassador at Lisbon. We are told, indeed, that with a singular irregularity he had once asked Sir Edmund Lyons to write to Sir William Parker about these claims: Sir Edmund Lyons did it; but Sir William Parker, then in the Tagus, knew his duty better, and replied (we are told), that the time was not convenient for naming them. The noble Lord, indeed, on receiving the account of this monstrous demand, of which Sir Edmund Lyons, in his usual fashion, said, "I have every reason to believe that M. Pacifico's claim is just and proper," was a little staggered, and gently suggested that the claimant ought to produce some documents or testimony, or, at all events, to make a clear statement of particulars; but he remains contented with the trumpery reply, that the documents had been scattered by the war in Portugal, or destroyed in the pillage of his house. But Baron Gros makes this observation, and I submit that it is quite unanswerable:— use of force, when he relates his first interview with Baron Gros, and says of all the claims in common— l. or 7,000 l., the value of all the seizures made, as far as it can be estimated by an average founded on the valuation of those at Corfu, was for the forty-one vessels, without reckoning cargoes, about 82,000 l.

Sir, I assure the House that I turn from this subject with a relief and satisfaction as great as theirs.

I have thought it right in a case of this serious nature to make the charge against the noble Lord as clear, definite, and circumstantial as possible. I do not wish to insinuate anything; my desire is only to meet the noble Lord in open warfare; and if we, who are now in conflict with him, were capable of entertaining any different wish, I must say that the manner in which the noble Lord himself has fought his battle in this House, would have set us the example of the spirit and the temper in which we should proceed. I therefore thus sum up my complaints of the noble Lord in terms the most explicit: I affirm, first—and this I have illustrated particularly by the case of Stellio Sumachi—that your demands, even if they had been just, were urged in a tone and manner wholly unjustifiable. I affirm, secondly, that you urged as just, and that upon a State both feeble in itself, and specially entitled to your regard as one of its protecting Powers, demands which bore upon the very face of them the abundant proofs of fraud, falsehood, and absurdity. I affirm, lastly, that instead of trusting and trying the tribunals of the country, and employing diplomatic agency simply as a supplemental resource, you have interposed at once in the cases of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico the authority of foreign power, in contravention both of the particular stipulations of the treaty in force between this country and Greece, and of the general principles of the law of nations; and have thus set the mischievous example of abandoning the methods of law and order, in order to repair to those of force.

Sir, there is another wholly distinct question, with respect to the little islands of Cervi and Sapienza, which must not be passed by. It involves a matter of the highest importance, namely, the principles on which we are to proceed towards co-guaranteeing Powers in subjects falling within the scope of the guarantee.

Sir, I complain that there has been unbounded mystification in regard to Cervi and Sapienza. We claim them on the part of the Ionian Islands. Greece claims them as a portion of her territory, of which the integrity was guaranteed by England, France, and Russia jointly. We are not able to deny that the question of dominion over these islands is a territorial question to be settled by the three Powers, and ought not to be touched by any one of them before the others have heard of it. There is great debate upon the question whether the claim to these islands was one of those included within Mr. Wyse's note of the 16th of January. M. Londos asserted that it was so included; and, from evidence not contained in these papers, I think it possible that he may be right; but I pass that by. Mr. Wyse treats the assertion of M. Londos as a gross misrepresentation. He says everywhere that the case of Cervi and Sapienza was one entirely separate; and, in all the correspondence with Russia and with France on this subject, they are given to understand, or left to infer, that we had done no act which was at variance with their rights as co-guaranteeing Powers. But why all this debate about the note of the 16th of January? Suppose we are right in our doctrine about that note, what will the House of Commons think when they are told that these papers contain anterior and conclusive evidences of the wrong done by the noble Lord? The letter of orders to Sir William Parker, indeed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon observed, does not appear—I know not why—in these papers; but you will find in them a letter written by order of Earl Grey, from Mr. Elliot to Mr. Addington, as follows:—

Sir, in turning to the question of our relations with France, as they have been compromised by the Greek affairs, I must set out with saying, that, as it appears to me, we are under very great obligations to that country. First, for the offer of her mediation or good offices; and, secondly, for the spirit in which she proceeded to carry that offer into execution. For on the 16th of February, 1850, the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary thus stated to Mr. Wyse his opinion of Baron Gros:—"Baron Gros is a man of sense, and of a conciliatory disposition, and the choice seems to be a good one." You are, I think, further obliged to France for the great efforts she made to meet your wishes in the consideration of these claims; because I think it quite plain that if France had had to arbitrate, some 60,000 drachmas, or little over 2,000 l., would have been all that she could have awarded to us. Now, I do not think that the noble Lord has duly reciprocated these feelings on the part of France, or has done them justice in his own conduct. He did not, in my opinion, at any time keep Mr. Wyse properly informed as to the understanding on which it had been settled here that affairs should proceed at Athens. I will not dwell only upon the circumstances that the noble Lord could not find means for communicating to Mr. Wyse before the 17th of April what had been arranged between him and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th—though, from what we know of the noble Lord, I should have thought he could have compassed greater things than this; nor upon the circumstance that when the 17th arrived, he did not then think proper to make a communication. Even before the 9th of April, and long before it, he had arranged with the Ambassador of France that it should rest wholly with the French negotiator at Athens to fix the termination of his own intervention, and that, until he announced it, the action of the squadron should remain absolutely suspended. The noble Lord himself has told us that M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not misunderstand him; but when Baron Gros made known to Mr. Wyse that definition of his powers which had been transmitted to him on the authority of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Mr. Wyse was utterly at fault, and on the 15th of April he writes to the noble Lord:— Vauban, led to the final rupture, on which I will not dwell as to particulars; but I will state in passing that, with respect to the dispute about the communications at Athens upon the arrival of the Vauban, there is no charge (as I think) affecting the honour either of Mr. Wyse or of Baron Gros; and, resuming the main subject, I affirm that these limited communications to Mr. Wyse respecting the powers of Baron Gros give rise to the supposition, from which I think the noble Lord has yet to clear himself, that while he was negotiating at home with every profession and appearance of desiring an amicable settlement, he was not very unwilling that the matter should again go to the issue of force abroad.

But I pass to other matter, and I blame the noble Lord for having haggled with France upon the difference between the Convention of London and that of Athens, and for having attempted to evade acknowledging the extent of that difference. I think that the course he pursues in this part of the correspondence was quite unworthy of the courage which he shows in this House. In more than one despatch he struggles to make light of the differences between the two Conventions; says Her Majesty's Government have scarcely any reason for preferring either one of them in the abstract to the other, but suggests gently that the one—namely, that of Athens—has taken effect, and it seems, therefore, a pity to disturb it. Now, Sir, I will call upon the House to give marked attention to this difference, which the noble Lord treats as so trivial. It pertains chiefly to that old subject of the claims on Portugal. By the Convention of Athens, not only was there a deposit of no less than 150,000 drachmas, which of itself tended to produce an idea that there was some considerable body and substance in the claims (which idea might be very operative upon the judgment), but, what was still more important, a provision that the examination of the claims, and the decision of the amount, should be in the hands of the two Governments of England and Greece. Sir, we can all judge what that would mean in practice, while the recollections of January and April were yet fresh, and under the guns of Sir William Parker's squadron. It would mean that the claims should be settled by the preponderating influence of England. But very different is the Convention of London. First of all, it requires that M. Pacifico shall prove his loss, not, as you had contended, that the Greek Government should disprove it; secondly, there shall be no deposit. But the difference on which I rely is this: the investigation of the claims is to be conducted, not between strong England and weak Greece alone, but between strong England and weak Greece, with strong France, not to render good offices, reducible to nothing, but to arbitrate and determine between them. That is the difference of which the noble Lord has made so light—a difference of provisions reaching over a claim of 26,000 l., or some five-sixths of all he had demanded. And, Sir, I do not scruple to express the opinion that, under the arrangement as it now stands, the claims of M. Pacifico for his Portuguese documents are virtually dead, and that if he sold them by auction no man would be found to make a bid for them. But the French Government, unhappily, could not be brought to see the almost identity of the two Conventions: they pressed the noble Lord hard and closely upon that subject, and after various attempts at escape, he was compelled to submit, I will say, to the humiliation which he has brought upon himself, and not only upon himself, but upon his country, resorting to violence in the first instance, then failing to fulfil his understanding with France, and so permitting a second resort to violence to occur at Athens; and then being compelled by France, who, I must say, has justly vindicated her offended dignity to undo what his armament had done, and to accept the Convention of London even after that of Athens had been carried, so far as time permitted, into full effect.

But, Sir, it is not only with France that we have had to deal: what is the lesson that Count Nesselrode has read to us? The gentlemen of liberal polities, who have such favour to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, must surely, of all things, most desire, that England should not be humbled in the eyes of a foreign Power; they must surely also say, and I sympathise with them, "If we are to receive public lessons upon our conduct, let us receive them from those who have from infancy drunk the milk and breathed the breath of freedom like ourselves." Not such has been our fate under the unhappy auspices of the noble Lord. And now, Sir, I will read, at this late hour, and read, too, without apology. These grave and pregnant words of Count Nesselrode are words that may sting you while you hear them; but to them, at least, you will not listen, as you justly might to me, with indifference. On the 19th of February last, Count Nesselrode thus writes to the noble Lord— Interruption from conversation among some hon. Members. ] What, Sir, are there Gentlemen in this House who can pursue their idle chat, while words like these are sounding in their ears? If there are, I must tell them frankly, that I am little mortified at their withholding from myself the compliment of their attention. And now I will resume;—

And now, Sir, what compensation have we for this? Why, we had the compensation of hearing a great speech from the noble Lord; and, Sir, I, for one, assure the House that, as far as it goes, I do not undervalue that compensation. I respectfully assure the noble Lord, if he will permit me, that no man who sits in this House can be more sensible of the masterly character of that speech, alike remarkable as a physical and as an intellectual effort: no man, even of those who sit beside him, listened with keener admiration and delight, while, from the dusk of one day until the dawn of the next, the noble Lord defended his policy, and through the livelong summer's night the British House of Commons, crowded as it was, hung upon his lips.

But in what remains, in the endeavours to canvass the noble Lord's general conduct, I must be brief. I will not at this time follow the noble Lord into the discussion of all those particular instances of his policy on which he dwelt in reply to my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon, and which, I do not doubt, will be treated of by others who may follow me in the debate, and who are much more competent to discuss them. But there is plainly a great question of principle at issue between us, to which I cannot hesitate to advert. This is a matter in which mere words and mere definitions convey little meaning; but the idea which I have in my mind is that commonly expressed by the word non-interference or non-intervention. Such a word, apart from all cavils as to exact definition, does convey a principle, a temper, a course of policy, which is practically understood and practically approved by the people of England. Sir, so strong is this House, with a strength founded both in its nature as a representative body and in its general conduct, that it can sometimes even afford to deviate a little from the true line of action; its credit with the people may suffer some deduction, and yet remain in great vigour. You may, I say, afford the loss, but certain I am that you will incur such a loss, if you pass any vote which shall seem to disparage that principle and policy which shall be calculated to impress the people with the belief that you are infected with a mania and an itch for managing the affairs of other nations, and that you are not contented with your own weighty and honourable charge. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke last has put a question which I will answer. He says, if we are not satisfied with the rule of his noble Friend's proceedings, what is the antagonistic principle which we advance? I answer him in that one word to which I have referred: it is the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. I subscribe to those declarations of general maxims that fell from him; everything depends upon the tone and spirit of the man who has to act upon them. They are in themselves but vague abstractions: they acquire life, and weight, and vigour only as they take effect in administrative acts. Greatly as I respect in general the courage, the energy, the undoubted patriotism of the noble Lord, I accuse him of this, that his policy is marked and characterised by what I must call a spirit of interference. I hold that this is a fundamental fault: a fault not to be excused. The noble Lord tells us, indeed, that he does not go abroad to propagate extreme opinions in other countries; and that I do not for a moment doubt. I do not doubt he has the feeling—which must, indeed, be the feeling of every Englishman, and especially of every Secretary of State in England for Foreign Affairs—which has been the feeling, I am convinced, of the various distinguished persons who have held that office since the Peace—of the Earl of Aberdeen, of Mr. Canning, and of the Marquess of Londonderry likewise; I mean a sincere desire that when a legitimate opportunity creates itself, and makes it our duty, in conformity with the principles of public law, to exercise a British influence in the regulation of the internal affairs of other countries, that influence should be exercised in the spirit which we derive from our own free and stable form of government, and in the sense of extending to such countries, as far as they are able and desirous to receive them, institutions akin to those of which we know from experience the inestimable blessings. Upon this there can be no difference of opinion among us; no man who sits here can be the friend of absolute power any more than of licence and disorder. There can be no difference upon the proposition that, considering how the nations of Europe are associated together, and, in some sense, organised as a whole, such occasions will of necessity from time to time arise; but the difference among us arises upon this question: Are we, or are we not, to go abroad and make occasions for the propagation even of the political opinions which we consider to be sound? I say we are not. I complain of the noble Lord that he is disposed to make these occasions: nay, he boasts that he makes them. He refers back to his early policy in Spain and Portugal, and he says it was to us a matter of very small moment whether Portugal were ruled by Dom Miguel or Donna Maria; whether the Crown of Spain went to Don Carlos or to Donna Isabella; but then, he says, there were opportunities of propagating the political sentiments which we think sound, and therefore we did what otherwise it might not have been wise to do. This doctrine, Sir, of the noble Lord is, I admit, a most alluring doctrine. We are soothed and pleased with denunciations the most impartial alike of tyranny and of anarchy; and assured, I doubt not with truth, that the only part played by the noble Lord is that of the moderate reformer. Sir, I object to the propagandism even of moderate reform. In proportion as the representation is alluring, let us be on our guard. The noble Lord lays a snare for us, into which, as Englishmen, glorying in our country and its laws, we are but too likely to fall. We must remember that if we claim the right not only to accept, where they come spontaneously and by no act of ours, but to create and to catch at, opportunities for spreading in other countries the opinions of our own meridian, we must allow to every other nation, every other Government, a similar licence both of judgment and of action. What is to be the result? That if in every country the name of England is to be the symbol and the nucleus of a party, the name of France, of Russia, or of Austria, may and will be the same. And are you not, then, laying the foundation of a system hostile to the real interests of freedom, and destructive of the peace of the world?

Sir, we hear something in this debate of success as not being the true test of the excellence of public measures. And God forbid that I should say it is their true test, when you are in your own sphere, minding your own affairs. But when you think fit to go out of that sphere and to manage those of other people for them, then do I think success throws much light upon the examination of the question whether your intervention was wise and just. Interference in foreign countries, Sir, according to my mind, should be rare, deliberate, decisive in character, and effectual for its end. Success will usually show that you saw your way, and that the means you used were adapted and adequate to their purpose. Such, if I read them aright, were the acts done by Mr. Canning in the nature of intervention: they were few, and they were effectual — effectual whether when, in his own noble language, he "called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old," or when, founding himself on the obligations of public law, he despatched the troops of England to prevent the march of a Spanish force into Portugal. I do not find the same character in the interventions of the noble Lord opposite. I cannot look upon all that has taken place during the four years which are the subject-matter of this Motion, without seeing a rash desire, an habitual desire, of interference—a disposition to make the occasions of it, and, that which will always follow, a disposition, in making them, to look too slightly at the restraints imposed by the letter and spirit of the law of nations. I will confine myself to a single illustration. We have heard from the noble Lord what he has to say in vindication of his offer, or at least of his suggestion, of the Sicilian crown to the Duke of Genoa. Could any dispassionate hearer conceive his defence to be a good one? He took credit for this: that his offer to recognise the title was contingent upon the Duke of Genoa's obtaining positive possession of the crown of Sicily. Sir, I never heard of any royalty, of any government except two: either one de jure, or at the least one de facto. I cannot give the noble Lord much credit for not having recognised a title which, beyond all dispute, existed neither de jure nor de facto. Sir, I protest against these anticipations of occasion, on every ground both of policy and of justice. The general doctrine is that we are not entitled to recognise a Government, far less to suggest one, until we see it established, and have presumptive evidence that it springs from a national source. If we move without that evidence, and broach, some favourite scheme of our own, it becomes the sport and the shuttlecock of circumstances, and we become so along with it. I am the more willing to argue this principle in the instance of Naples, because the spirit of Neapolitan institutions is so far removed from that of our own, that the prejudices of every one who hears me must be unfavourable; and particularly must our sympathies be diverted from that Government, as respects the particular case of Sicily. The more we may be tempted to sympathise with Sicily, the less we admire Neapolitan institutions and usages of government, the more tenacious, as I contend, we should be of our duty to do them full justice—the more careful that we do not, because we differ from them, impair in their case the application of those great and sacred principles that govern and harmonise the intercourse between States, and from which you never can depart, without producing mischiefs by the violation of the rule, a thousandfold greater than any benefit you may promise yourself to achieve in the special instance. I say, therefore, that the noble Viscount, when he thus anticipated the dismemberment of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, pointing to that as likely to oceur which had not occurred, and which was not to occur, and in which he had no legitimate concern, did an act which breathed the spirit of hostility towards a friendly Power, an act at variance with duty, and an act ill adapted to advance the true interests of freedom in that or in any other country. And if, Sir, departing from the higher ground of duty and of justice, I must invoke considerations of prudence also, I say that we, the Parliament of this widely-extended empire, which has its innumerable limbs dispersed through the wide world from one of its extremities to the other, are not in a condition to deal lightly with those laws which prohibit allied nations from seeking to compass the dismemberment of one another. We might conceive a case. We might suppose that in the insurrection of Canada a portion of the province might for a time have been in possession of the insurgents: what view should we have taken of the conduct of a foreign Power which, while the contest was still doubtful, and before our gallant troops should have shown their inability to hold the soil they were defending for their sovereign and their country, had foreshown events as yet contingent, perhaps never to be realised, and had presumed to indicate to the people, who were still no more than insurgents, the choice of a particular head or a particular form of government?

Sir, I am well prepared, following the example of other and more distinguished men, to bear my share in the abuse which, I doubt not, may attend the part which we shall take on this occasion. I am prepared to hear it said that we are espousing the cause, as against England, of countries other than our own; that we cabal against the noble Lord because he is the protector of Englishmen domiciled abroad. Sir, I deny that he has truly protected Englishmen by the course he has pursued. I hold that no Minister in his place can really give to Englishmen resident in foreign lands either an effectual or a permanent protection, except by a careful observance of the principles that have been consecrated by the universal assent of mankind for governing the conduct of nation to nation. In vain do I you talk to us of a knot of foreign conspirators: the only knot of foreign conspirators against the noble Lord, is the combined opinion of civilised Europe. In vain you talk of the two kinds of revolutionists—the revolutionists who will have too much, reform for the noble Lord's taste, and the revolutionists who will have too little. These, he says, are the persons opposed to him and his moderate reforms, and all on grounds petty, paltry, narrow, and personal; but under his description there will, I fear, be found to fall nearly every party in nearly every country of Christendom.

Sir, great as is the influence and power of Britain, she cannot afford to follow, for any length of time, a self-isolating policy. It would be a contravention of the law of nature and of God, if it were possible for any single nation of Christendom to emancipate itself from the obligations which, bind all other nations, and to arrogate, in the face of mankind, a position of peculiar privilege. And now I will grapple with the noble Lord on the ground which he selected for himself, in the most triumphant portion of his speech, by his reference to those emphatic words, Civis Bomanus sum. He vaunted, amidst the cheers of his supporters, that under his administration an Englishman should be, throughout the world, what the citizen of Rome had been. What then, Sir, was a Roman citizen? He was the member of a privileged caste; he belonged to a conquering race, to a nation that held all others bound down by the strong arm of power. For him there was to be an exceptional system of law; for him principles were to be asserted, and by him rights were to be enjoyed, that were denied to the rest of the world. Is such, then, the view of the noble Lord, as to the relation that is to subsist between England and other countries? Does he make the claim for us, that we are to be uplifted upon a platform high above the standing-ground of all other nations? It is, indeed, too clear, not only from the expressions, but from the whole spirit of the speech of the noble Viscount, that too much of this notion is lurking in his mind; that he adopts in part that vain conception, that we, forsooth, have a mission to be the censors of vice and folly, of abuse and imperfection, among the other countries of the world; that we are to be the universal schoolmasters; and that all those who hesitate to recognise our office, can be governed only by prejudice or personal animosity, and should have the blind war of diplomacy forthwith declared against them. And certainly if the business of a Foreign Secretary properly were to carry on such diplomatic wars, all must admit that the noble Lord is a master in the discharge of his functions. What, Sir, ought a Foreign Secretary to be? Is he to be like some gallant knight at a tournament of old, pricking forth into the lists, armed at all points, confiding in his sinews and his skill, challenging all comers for the sake of honour, and having no other duty than to lay as many as possible of his adversaries sprawling in the dust? If such is the idea of a good Foreign Secretary, I, for one, would vote to the noble Lord his present appointment for his life. But, Sir, I do not understand the duty of a Secretary for Foreign Affairs to be of such a character. I understand it to be his duty to conciliate peace with dignity. I think it to be the very first of all his duties studiously to observe, and to exalt in honour among mankind, that great code of principles which is termed the law of nations, which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has found, indeed, to be very vague in their nature, and greatly dependent on the discretion of each particular country; but in which I find, on the contrary, a great and noble monument of human wisdom, founded on the combined dictates of reason and experience—a precious inheritance bequeathed to us by the generations that have gone before us, and a firm foundation on which we must take care to build whatever it may be our part to add to their acquisitions, if, indeed, we wish to maintain and to consolidate the brotherhood of nations, and to promote the peace and welfare of the world.

Sir, the English people, whom we are here to represent, are indeed a great and noble people; but it adds nothing to their greatness or their nobleness, that when we assemble in this place we should trumpet forth our virtues in elaborate panegyrics, and designate those who may not be wholly of our mind as a knot of foreign conspirators. When, indeed, I heard the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield glorifying us, together with the rest of the people of this country, and announcing that we soared in unapproachable greatness, and the like, I confess I felt that eulogies such as those savoured somewhat of bombast; and thought it much to the honour of this House that the praises thus vented seemed to fall so flat; that the cookery of the hon. and learned Gentleman was evidently seasoned beyond the capacity and relish of our palates, It is this insular temper, and this self-glorifying tendency, which the policy of the noble Lord, and the doctrines of his supporters, tend so much to, foment, and which has given to that policy the quarrelsome character that marks some of their speeches; for, indeed, it seems as if there lay upon the noble Lord an absolute necessity for quarrelling. No doubt it makes a difference, what may be the institutions of one country or another. If he can, he will quarrel with an absolute monarchy. If he cannot find an absolute monarchy for the purpose, he will quarrel with one which is limited. If he cannot find even that, yet, sooner than not quarrel at all, he will quarrel with a republic. He has lately shown us this in the case of France: he showed it once before in the case of America. The tenacious memory of the noble Lord reached back to transactions many years farther off than 1843: he referred to the foundation of the throne in Belgium, which was under Earl Grey's Government, and had nothing to do with the present Motion; but I am sorry it should not have retained what happened to him in 1843 respecting the Ashburton treaty, when this House, by its vote upon that treaty, read him a lesson of which he seems not to have reaped the benefit. The House of Commons at that time had the good sense to take a dispassionate view of a question depending between ourselves and a foreign country, and, rejecting the advice of the noble Lord, which must have led to a rupture between the two Powers, showed that it had no fear even of being thought afraid.

Sir, I say the policy of the noble Lord tends to encourage and confirm in us that which is our besetting fault and weakness, both as a nation and as individuals. Let an Englishman travel where he will as a private person, he is found in general to be upright, high-minded, brave, liberal, and true; but with all this, foreigners are too often sensible of something that galls them in his presence, and I apprehend it is because he has too great a tendency to self-esteem—too little disposition to regard the feelings, the habits, and the ideas of others. Sir, I find this characteristic too plainly legible in the policy of the noble Lord. I doubt not that use will be made of our present debate to work upon this peculiar weakness of the English mind. The people will be told that those who oppose the Motion are governed by personal motives, have no regard for public principle, no enlarged ideas of national policy. You will take your case before a favourable jury, and you think to gain your verdict; but, Sir, let the House of Commons be warned—let it warn itself—against all illusions. There is in this case also a course of appeal. There is an appeal, such as the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has made, from the one House of Parliament to the other. There is a further appeal from this House of Parliament to the people of England; but, lastly, there is also an appeal from the people of England to the general sentiment of the civilised world; and I, for my part, am of opinion that England will stand shorn of a chief part of her glory and her pride if she shall be found to have separated herself, through the policy she pursues abroad, from the moral supports which the general and fixed convictions of mankind afford—if the day shall come in which she may continue to excite the wonder and the fear of other nations, but in which she shall have no part in their affection and their regard.

No, Sir, let it not be so: let us recognise, and recognise with frankness, the equality of the weak with the strong; the principles of brotherhood among nations, and of their sacred independence. When we are asking for the maintenance of the rights which belong to our fellow-subjects resident in Greece, let us do as we would be done by, and let us pay all the respect to a feeble State, and to the infancy of free institutions, which we should desire and should exact from others towards their maturity and their strength. Let us refrain from all gratuitous and arbitrary meddling in the internal concerns of other States, even as we should resent the same interference if it were attempted to be practised towards ourselves. If the noble Lord has indeed acted on these principles, let the Government to which he belongs have your verdict in its favour; but if he has departed from them, as I contend, and as I humbly think and urge upon you that it has been too amply proved, then the House of Commons must not shrink from the performance of its duty, under whatever expectations of momentary obloquy or reproach, because we shall have done what is right; we shall enjoy the peace of our own consciences, and receive, whether a little sooner or a little later, the approval of the public voice, for having entered our solemn protest against a system of policy which we believe, nay, which we know, whatever may be its first aspect, must of necessity in its final results be unfavourable even to the security of British subjects resident abroad, which it professes so much to study—unfavorable to the dignity of the country, which the Motion of the hon. and learned Member asserts that it preserves—and equally unfavourable to that other great and sacred object which also it suggests to our recollection, the maintenance of peace with the nations of the world.

It is not to be supposed that I should have any hereditary antipathy to seeing a run made upon an individual Minister of a Whig Administration, in order to destroy its whole existence. I am not likely to feel any great reluctance at finding the remark of the hon. and gallant Member for Middlesex realised, that, "after all there is an avenger;" but notwithstanding all my political predilections, I do feel disgusted when I see, for the purpose of destoying an Administration, a run made upon an individual Minister, and, as of old, not the most ignoble amongst his Colleagues; not, I maintain, for any direlection of duty, but that the purposes of faction might be served, and because foreign whisperers have been at work. If I could pursue such a course, a course which I have execrated in times past, in similar circumstances, I should myself act like, be as bad as, a Whig; yet if I did, I might in my justification for inflicting another stab upon the noble Lord, say— There appears to be something very facetious in the way in which the First Lord of the Admiralty acted his part in the present transaction. When the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office applied for a fleet to be sent to the Bay of Salamis, the right hon. Baronet no doubt selected such ships as he considered best adapted for the service. Lovers are said to convey their sentiments to each other by the names of flowers; and the right hon. Baronet seems to have been anxious to convey the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government by the names of the ships; for we find he chose the Firebrand, the Dragon, the Spitfire, the Tartarus, the Bulldog, the Spiteful, the Frolic, and the Vengeance. If the right hon. Baronet had been required to send a bouquet of flowers to the King of Greece, he would have chosen the thistle, the stinging nettle, the nightshade, the crab, the prickly pear, and the gleditschia horrida.

This question has been argued under the name of a policy. Now the policy of the country has been to protect English residents abroad; to vote against this policy, is to vote, that in no case shall English residents abroad be protected by their own Government. When the opponents of Ministers, therefore, place the question on this basis, they place it upon one which is perfectly fatal to them; and in talking of overthrowing the Government upon the ground of the noble Lord's policy, and adopting a contrary policy, they make a declaration to the world that let the subjects of this country be treated as they may, the Foreign Minister must not protect them.

I now come to a question of greater importance. The hon. and learned Gentleman who brought forward this question (whether or not with the consent and approbation of Her Majesty's Ministers, I cannot say), has traced the historical pedigree of the Ministry back to the beginning of the French Revolution, and he has declared their policy now to be identical with that which it was in 1789. It is clear that the Greek Government has been encouraged secretly by the Russians, from the very commencement of the setting up the kingdom of Greece, to resist our claims, and to look with hostility upon everything done by the British Government. There is no doubt of the fact; and the noble Lord who gave us a detailed account of the first establishment of Greece into a separate kingdom, has declared that from that day there has been an unceasing contention between the principles of what he calls absolute and responsible government. But, can this be a matter of surprise, if as their learned advocate has declared, the Ministry is intimately connected with the principles of the revolution which broke out in 1789, and upon which it has continued to act, and is acting at the present day? The revolution in this country affords no parallel, because the remarkable and essential difference between us and France is this, that when we chose to alter our institutions, we never insisted that other nations should alter theirs also. When we cut off our king's head, we did not insist that all other nations should cut off their kings' heads also. But the peculiar characteristic of the revolution which broke out in 1789, is its spirit of propagandism. The character of nations, and of factions, like that of indviduals, is inherited as well as made: Fortes creantur fortibus, and the eagle that feeds on carrion and blood, cannot generate the dove that loves peace. What were the antecedents? Who were the political fathers of the present Administration? What is the character which they inherit? They are the men who patronised the French revolution, who apologised for the murder of the king, who palliated the rebellion in Ireland, who justified the mutiny of our fleet at the Nore, who participated in and abetted the propagandist spirit of those republican times, and many of them were members of the Corresponding Society. The present Whigs cannot be expected to be more scrupulous than their fathers; yet, singularly enough, the hon. and learned Gentleman boasted of our final successes against Napoleon, whilst the Whigs had opposed all the acts of the Government for the liberation of the Peninsula from the revolutionary armies of France, by the exertions of the Duke of Wellington.

The necessary consequence of this was, that when the Whigs came into office, they were regarded with univeral distrust; by every Power in Europe. For a time the wisdom of Earl Grey, who was well aware of this feeling towards them, by proceeding with great caution, restored some measure of confidence to the established Governments; but soon they brought forward the Reform Bill, which annihilated the power of the Crown in this country; and from that time foreign Governments have looked naturally with suspicion to everything that emanates from this; and then began to develop itself the propogandist spirit of their fathers, which proposed to carry their reforming principles and practice into every country in Europe. The conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to Switzerland, does not seem to be correctly understood by the House; nor has the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon accurately stated it, nor did the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary clearly explain it. The fact is this: the old constitution of Switzerland was a confederacy of independent cantons; each was sufficient to itself, and its internal arrangements were not to be meddled with by the rest. This constitution was guaranteed by the four Powers who were parties to the treaty of Vienna. Certain small cantons permitted the establishment of the Jesuits; whilst other cantons admitted some of the desperadoes who were labouring to revolutionise all Europe. The majority of the cantons, not liking the Jesuits, called unconstitutionally on the minority to expel the Jesuits, an interference in which they were not justified, and accordingly the minority refused to obey, and claimed assistance from the contracting Powers who had guaranteed the preservation of the constitution. Prussia, Austria, and Russia, however, were fully employed, and the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department took the part of the unconstitutional majority, which had raised an army under M. Ochsenbein to compel the submission of the constitutional minority. Here then was an uncalled-for interference, and a siding with revolution for the mere love of revolution, for there was nothing whatever to gain to ourselves.

The present Ministry was founded on agitation originally, and is supported by agitation now; and it is impossible that a Government which is the creature of agitation at home, can be the promoters of peace abroad. Amongst the chief supporters of the Government are the Manchester School, the heads of which have openly declared the ultimate object that they have in view. The hon. Member for Manchester declared lately at a public meeting— that the noble Lord has not sense enough for anything he pleases to undertake; but I must say, in reference to the course he pursues with foreign nations, Sin in tanto omnium metu solus non timet, eo magis refert me mihi atque vobis timere.

We are told that this is to be a vote of confidence in the Ministers. I confess I do not know what meaning to affix to that word. I have confidence in every man, and in every animal, according to his or its nature. I have confidence in a tailor to make a coat, but I have no confidence in him to make a pair of shoes. I have a confidence amounting to a perfect conviction that Her Majesty's Ministers will continue to act in the way in which they ever have acted. I have confidence that the party now dominant in this country, which, as I have said before, is striving to destroy everything in order to establish democracy—that party which has avowed that it wishes to destroy the House of Lords, and will only tolerate the Queen so long as she is a respectable individual—I have confidence that this party, which in my opinion ought to be extirpated like rats, will continue to be the party to whom the Ministers will look for support. I have confidence that the Administration which was founded on agitation, which gave to Ireland the parting charge to "Agitate, agitate, agitate!" will never be an Administration to promote tranquillity abroad. It is absurd to suppose that we can adopt agitation as a political principle at home, and make tranquillity the principle of our transactions abroad. The principle of the Government from first to last has been to keep up a system of political agitation; and the Ministers are only the stormy petrels, the harbingers of universal European convulsion. I have no doubt that they will so continue, and that nothing will stop them. But I deprecate any attempt to overturn the Government so long as the country is unconvinced of the delusiveness of the path which we are pursuing—a path which I am convinced can lead but to one result, which is the involving of all the countries in Europe in one scene of universal bloodshed. It was the Reform Bill which has produced the revolution that at the time was denied, but of which the hon. and learned Gentleman who opened the debate, and the other panegyrists of it, now boast with so much ostentation—it was this revolution which has made the policy of the Government such as it now is, and which has opened the career of that foreign policy which we are now called upon to judge. But although convinced of this, I will not consent on this account to serve the purposes of a faction by inflicting a wound upon the present Administration, because I cannot forget that Lord Stanley and the right hon. Member for Ripon are as deeply responsible for that Reform Bill as any others, and I will not consent to overthrow one set of men merely to uphold another equally culpable with themselves.

moved the adjournment of the debate.

Debate further adjourned till To-morrow.

The House adjourned at a quarter after Two o'clock.