In rising, Sir, to move that the House, at rising, do adjourn till Monday next, I think it right to make the House aware of an occurrence which I cannot speak of without the greatest regret. Her Majesty, yesterday, went to pay a visit to her uncle the Duke of Cambridge, and was returning in her carriage, and had just left the house of the Duke of Cambridge, when a person with a stick aimed a blow at Her Majesty, and struck her in the temple, causing Her Majesty to fall back in the carriage. Her Majesty soon recovered, and was enabled to return directly to Buckingham Palace. I had the honour of seeing Her Majesty a short time afterwards, and it is hardly necessary to inform the House that Her Majesty acted on this occasion with her usual fortitude and courage. I am very sorry to be obliged to add, that the person who made this brutal attack was a person in the dress of a gentleman, and who has held a commission in the Army. Whatever may be the legal character of the crime he has committed, of course it is my duty at present to abstain from speaking of it; and I am sure the feeling that was manifested last night of loyalty and attachment to Her Majesty will be universal throughout this country, and that our prayers will be all the more fervent for Her Majesty's safety, and that Her Majesty may enjoy a long life, and continue to act for the benefit of Her people.

felt himself called upon, in the discharge of his duty to his constituents, to take advantage of the Motion for the adjournment of the House to say a few words in support of the petition which had been presented by the hon. and gallant Member for Middlesex with reference to the proposed erection in Hyde Park. He should be sorry if it was supposed for one moment that he wished to throw any obstacle in the way of the exposition that was intended to take place. On the contrary, he regarded it as a conception which reflected the highest honour on the illustrious Personage with whom it originated; but he thought some other locality than Hyde Park would require to be selected if it was desired to conciliate the public feeling in its favour. There was strong excitement on the subject; and he felt himself called upon, from a regard to the interests of his constituents, to submit to the noble Lord that there was another locality equally convenient with Hyde Park, and one which the public would far more desire to see selected. He referred to Battersea-fields, a mile and a half from Hyde Park, where by Act of Parliament the Woods and Forests had power to construct a bridge, if found necessary for the accommodation of the public, and to form a park. This locality would admirably suit the purposes of the exhibition; and if it was arranged to take place there it would materially contribute to the formation of the new park, which he thought had been too long delayed. There was the strongest objection throughout the metropolis to the erection of buildings in Hyde Park, which was generally admitted to be one of the finest in the world. Such objections could not apply to Battersea, with respect to which he believed the hon. Member for East Surrey was able to give some useful information to the House.

did not rise to speak on the subject referred to by the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, In the remarks which he had just made, he had called the attention of the House away from a subject still more important, introduced to their notice feelingly and appropriately by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. When the noble Lord concluded, he (Mr. Herries) was under the impression that his Lordship was going to propose an address to Her Majesty expressive of the feelings of the House on the subject to which he had alluded. He had no doubt that the noble Lord was governed by precedent in the course he pursued: but at the same time he (Mr. Herries) could not refrain from stating that if it was the noble Lord's intention to carry to the foot of the Throne an expression of the sentiments of the House upon the shameful attack made upon Her Majesty's person, he would be most cordially responded to.

, in reply to the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman, had to state that he had fully considered this subject. On the last occasion on which an attack was made upon Her Majesty, it was thought better not to present any address to Her Majesty, as it would only have given to the circumstance an importance which it was not desirable to impart to it, and he thought the same course should be taken now. If he had been disposed to move an address, he certainly should have felt perfectly sure of the entire concurrence of the House.

rose together. The hon. Member for Montrose at length resumed his seat.

said, he apprehended the Speaker had done him the honour to call upon him last. The hon. Member for Montrose might have been called upon by the Speaker every hour of every day in the Session, but that did not give him a vested interest in the ear of the House, seeing he (Sir R. Inglis) had been called upon last, and therefore, according to all the rules of the House, he was in possession. He did not rise to speak on the subject, even of an address to Her Majesty, which had been alluded to, nor on the subject of the proposed building in Hyde Park, which he thought was most inopportunely introduced by the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster. But he wished to say that when that hon. and gallant Member rose after the noble Lord, his impression was, that he did so for the purpose of expressing in the name of the Army his sentiments with reference to what had occurred—that he rose to express his regret and surprise that one who had had the honour of bearing Her Majesty's commission should have committed an outrage so cowardly as to strike a woman, that woman a mother, and a mother in the presence of her children, and that that mother should be the Queen of England. He believed that in the bosom of every soldier, and, he hoped, in that of every civilian, there was the deepest feeling of shame and indignation at the commission of this outrage; and it was simply for the purpose of expressing what he believed to be the universal feeling of the House on the subject, that he had risen to address them.

did not think he had deserved the attack of the hon. Member for the University of Oxford, for he did not utter one word on the subject of Hyde Park until the Speaker put the question after the noble Lord sat down. With regard to the attack upon Her Majesty having been committed by a soldier, he did not believe that statement to be correct—he could not for a moment believe that the person could be a soldier.

considered that the obser- vations of the hon. Member for the University of Oxford were not called for. It had been his (Mr. Hume's) intention, if the hon. Baronet had not interposed, te have stated that he did not think there was any necessity for an address to the Throne on this occasion. He was confident that only one feeling of indignation would be felt from one end of the country to the other on the subject, and that an address from that House would only be annoying to Her Majesty. It would be well if the hon. Baronet would be a little more judicious, and a little more charitable in his feelings to others, and allow other people to have their opinions, although they might differ from his own. But the hon. Baronet would seem to monopolise all the spirit of loyalty to himself. ["Oh, oh!"] The House must allow him (Mr. Hume) to think so. With respect to the exhibition, no man was more anxious that it should succeed than he was. But what he wished the Government to consider was not so much the situation in which the building was proposed to be erected, as the manner in which the building was to be constructed. Instead of its being formed of solid walls and made a structure which would create alarm to everybody in the neighbourhood that it was intended to be a permanent building, he would propose that the erection should be a temporary building of wood and iron, and which there would be no difficulty in removing again.

said, with regard to the apprehension felt as to this building being intended to be a permanent building, he could assure his hon. Friend that there was no such intention. On the contrary, it was expressly stipulated in the contract for the construction of the building, that the whole should be carried away immediately after the exhibition. With regard to Hyde Park or any other place being selected as the site of the building, he would request the House to allow him to defer the expression of any opinion upon that subject until Monday. It was the intention of the Commissioners to meet to-morrow, for the express purpose of considering the whole question. He was not authorised to hold out to the House that the Commissioners would recommend that the site should be changed; but this he could state, that the whole question would be fully and fairly considered. He therefore hoped the House would withhold its judgment till Monday.

could not consent to withhold his judgment, or avoid speaking the opinions of his constituents on this subject. It was a pity the trees were cut down until the Commissioners had met. At least some public intimation ought to have been given before the trees were destroyed. As it was, they were cut down during the night. They were marked and cut down, just at daylight, before any one had any suspicion of the thing being about to be done. But the main question was as to the propriety of erecting so enormous a building in the park at all. Was the House aware of the nature of the building? The dome was to be as high as the Monument, and twice the diameter of St. Paul's. The walls that were to support the building were to be 60 feet high and 12 feet thick. The right hon. Gentleman had said that all this was to be carried away in a few months after the exhibition was over. After the experience he (Mr. Osborne) had had of an architect's promises, it would be difficult to make him believe that a building of such a magnitude would be removed in six months. He hoped, therefore, that the House would, in the first place, express a strong opinion against the building being erected in Hyde Park at all, but that, if it were to be erected there, then that it should only be constructed of wood and iron.

would just remind hon. Gentlemen that if there was to be a dome as high as the Monument, and twice the diameter of St. Paul's, there was no reasonable apprehension that the building would be erected before Monday next. The trees were irrecoverably gone, and the dome was yet to be built; he therefore hoped hon. Gentlemen would not proceed with the discussion any further, but allow the more important business of the House to be entered upon. He thought that course would be more decorous, and he was sure it would conduce more to the satisfactory settlement of the question.

knew as well as the right hon. Gentleman that the dome could not be erected between this and Monday, but what he was anxious to ask the Government was, that no determination should take place To-morrow that should be final and conclusive before the House had discussed the question on Monday. It was that which he was alarmed at. He was afraid that on Monday the House might be told that the Commissioners had discussed the question, and, after having fully considered it, had come to the conclusion that the building must be erected in Hyde Park, and therefore any further discussion of the subject by that House was wholly unnecessary. That was what he was anxious to guard against.

said, he had given notice of a question as to the legality of cutting down the trees, and which he should put on Monday to the hon. and learned Attorney General, and at the same time take the opportunity of expressing his opinion with regard to the exhibition, and also with regard to the site.

said, he should be in his place on Monday next, and would answer the question of the hon. and gallant Colonel.

asked whether the terms of the contract with the architect would make it compulsory on him to remove the building after the exhibition, or whether a discretionary power would be retained by the Commissioners for continuing the building, if they should think it necessary to do so?

had not had the opportunity of considering the terms of the contract, but on Monday next he would answer the question of the noble Lord.

said, that no subject had undergone move consideration than this on the part of Her Majesty's Government; and, after discussing the subject with the Commissioners, they came to an opinion that the best situation for the intended exhibition was Hyde Park; and in pursuance of that opinion they recommended Her Majesty to grant the site of Hyde Park for the building; but nothing further would be done on the subject before Monday, when the question would be again before the House; and he was not aware that anything had been so finally determined on that it could not be altered.

Subject dropped.

said: I think, Sir, as I was personally and pointedly alluded to in the course of the debate last night by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, that the House will not consider me presumptuous if I trespass for a short time upon its patience. I am anxious, Sir, in the first place, if the House will indulge me for a moment, to set myself right with that right hon. Gentleman. He was pleased, in the course of his observations to the House last night, to say that I had "sneered" at him. Now, I beg to assure the right hon. Gentleman and the House, that nothing on earth was further from my wishes or intentions than to show him the slightest disrespect or discourtesy. The right hon. Gentleman, with his accustomed talent, threw down the gauntlet on the floor of this House, and challenged a reply from any hon. Member to the facts which he stated, or to the principles of law which he then enunciated. I felt, Sir, at the time, as truly and as fully convinced as I ever was of anything in my life, that the right hon. Gentleman's facts were totally inaccurate, and that his law was utterly untenable. I ventured, therefore, to accept the challenge which he so threw out, and I meant by my cheer on that occasion—a mode which I believe to be a perfectly Parliamentary one of expressing that sentiment—to say that I was ready and anxious to accept the challenge of the right hon. Gentleman, and I am now prepared to answer him, although I am fully conscious of the vast difference of ability and disparity of power which exists between us; for the right hon. Gentleman, from his position, his high character, and, above all, his great abilities, is entitled to be treated with the utmost respect by every Member of this House. Having thus put myself right with the right hon. Gentleman, I must take the liberty of saying this, that in all my experience I never heard such a series of misrepresentations and misstatements as those which were made by the hon. Gentleman—[ Loud cheers, and cries of "Oh, oh!"]—and I will undertake to prove this assertion, step by step, and position by position—if the House will grant me its indulgence and forbearance. I feel, however, the great difficulty in which I am placed in entering upon this debate. If I go into the details of the case for the purpose of showing the fallacies, both in the statements and arguments of the right hon. Gentleman, I shall be told, by and by,—because I have the misfortune of belonging to a legal profession—that it was a nisi prius mode of conducting my argument. I think, however, that the manner in which the discussion of this subject has been conducted both in this House and in another place, has given us abundant evidence that it is not those only who practise in Westminster Hall, who are possessed of the power of arguing in nisi prius fashion. For of all the pettifogging proceedings which I have ever known during my experi- ence, this is the worst. It was so commenced elsewhere, and in the same spirit it has been conducted here. If hon. Gentlemen choose to introduce this subject to Parliament, and make a grave accusation against Her Majesty's Government, and then conduct it not upon the great principles of national policy and national honour, but by raising questions of minute details and technicalities, by grossly perverting facts and distorting evidence, and by an utter misrepresentation of what were the true principles that ought to govern this case, let them not be astonished if those who belong to the legal profession, whose habits are to criticise and investigate with logical strictness every species of evidence—to minutely analyse facts, as well as study the broad principles of municipal and national law—stung to the quick by the manifest injustice of this proceeding, should rush into the discussion; and, above all, let not the charge come from them that the men having those acquirements are treating the subject in a nisi prius spirit. I am now speaking for the interest of my profession; and I must say that I never heard an observation more ungracious, or made in worse taste, than that which fell from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon (Sir J. Graham), following as it did the admirable speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Oxford; than which a more masterly analysis of facts, and a more convincing speech, in point of argument and of law, I never heard. It certainly never was surpassed in this House, or in any other place. It altogether demolished the whole case brought against the Government in all that respected Greece. And yet the right hon. Baronet, because he found he was unable to grapple with the arguments of my hon. and learned Friend, nor even tried to do it, said, "Oh, it is not fair to deal with this great question upon such narrow ground, or with reference to the case of Greece alone—it is all founded upon blue books—a pack of rubbish—mere nisi prius —let us come to that which is the great issue to be decided by the House—the foreign policy of the Government." Now, that certainly strikes me as being a very odd position for the right hon. Baronet to take, when it is considered that the verdict which has been passed by the other House of Parliament against Her Majesty's Government, and in consequence of which verdict they are required to resign office, proceeded entirely not upon the question of the general foreign policy of the Government, but exclusively and distinctly upon the line of conduct pursued by them in respect to Greece. The right hon. Baronet then went into the whole of the foreign policy of the country, leaving out of view the whole of the Greek case. The right hon. Baronet was followed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wiltshire, and he followed exactly in the same track, threw the Greek question overboard, and took his stand upon the foreign policy of the Government. Then came the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, whom, I suppose, we are now to consider as the representative of Lord Stanley in this House — "Gladstone vice Disraeli am I to say, resigned or superseded?" There are, therefore, two cases before the House: the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon and the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire come forward and take up the question of the whole foreign policy of the Government; while the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, arguing his case upon the nisi prius style, takes his stand upon the Greek question only. Which of these two different positions is the House to consider? Is it that of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, or that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford? It is a matter of perfect indifference to me. I am prepared to go into both. But I must say this, that I do not think, if you sever in your cases for the prosecution—if the hon. Gentlemen will allow me to use so technical a phrase—and shift the ground of your accusation from one point to the other, I claim as a right that we may be fairly heard upon both. And do not tell us when we meet you on the Greek case, that it is all mere nisi prius, but allow us to show you what the facts are, and what the nature of your arguments, and I will undertake to say that we will demolish your whole case, nor leave you a leg to stand upon. Sir, the case is thus, divided into two parts: the interference of the Government in Greece, and the policy of the Government with respect to the rest of Europe. Now, as I am following the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford in the debate, I must first deal with his case. Her Majesty's Government have, it appears, interfered in the affairs of Greece for the purpose of redressing certain wrongs sustained by the sub- jects of this empire; and the point in dispute is, whether they were justified in the course which they took upon that occasion. Now, as it is impossible to dispute that in this instance the subjects of Her Majesty have sustained wrong—a fact which no one has attempted to deny—they were most unquestionably entitled to redress from the Government of the country in which they happened to be at the time they sustained such wrong; but if the laws of that country where these wrongs were perpetrated, afforded no means of redress, they became unquestionably entitled to redress from the Government of that country, and if the Government would not redress those wrongs, it was not only the right but the bounden duty of the Government of this country to interfere on behalf of its subjects, and to obtain redress for the wrongs which they had suffered. I take it to be a fundamental principle in the policy of all nations, that it is the right and duty of a State to protect its subjects against injuries sustained at the hands of other States, or subjects of such States. This has been the principle upon which nations have acted in all ages. The noble Lord who addressed the House the other night referred to the great principle that the Roman State never allowed a Roman citizen to be injured. But what said the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford to that? He said that it was because Rome exercised a universal dominion over the world; because it considered a Roman citizen as superior to the subjects of all other States, and by its universal supremacy and power was enabled to tyrannise over other countries, and obtain redress for the wrongs sustained by its citizens even in cases where they were not entitled to such redress. I dissent from that position altogether. I say that it was not after the Roman empire had become established, and had obtained its supremacy over the whole world, that that position was first taken up by the Roman State. It was a principle upon I which it acted from the very earliest ages of the empire; and therefore it was that the great orator was entitled triumphantly 5 to exclaim, with all the noble pride and triumph of a Roman, " Quot bella majores nostri suscepti erint, quot cives Romani injuriâ affecti sunt, navicularii retenti, mercatores spoliati, esse dicerentur." It was not only before they had established universal dominion over the world that they adopted this principle, but it was at a period in their history when they had to fight their battles for empire with other States upon almost equal terms, that they invariably asserted that first right and duty of a State to protect its citizens, and to obtain redress for their wrongs, when they sustained any at the hands of other States. That course, I take it, was not unknown to this country either in one of the most glorious periods of its history. What is it that, in spite of all the dark shades that rest upon his character, has made the memory of Cromwell illustrious? What, but that he would suffer no Englishman to be injured by any State or Potentate, no matter how great? But, after all, can the proposition be denied that the Government of a country is bound to obtain redress for, and to afford protection to its citizens when injured? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford did not dispute that position; but he qualified it by saying, that British subjects living in foreign States, and sustaining any wrong there, either from the Government of the country, or any of the subjects of that State, are bound to have recourse to the tribunals of the country for redress, and if redress could be obtained from such tribunals, they are not to call upon the country of which they are the subjects to interfere. I cheerfully assent to that proposition, and I will undertake to make it perfectly manifest that in neither of the cases which have led to the interference of this country was there the slightest or most remote probability—looking to the law of Greece, and the condition of its tribunals—that any English subject, however injured, could succeed in obtaining redress from the tribunals of that country. Now I will take, in the first place, the case of Mr. Finlay. I do not intend to cite blue books upon this subject; the whole matter is capable of being placed before the House in a very short and succinct form. Mr. Finlay, it appears, was the proprietor of some land at Athens. That gentleman, with some other inhabitants at Athens, was anxious, when King Otho was in possession of the actual sovereignty of Greece, to induce the King to fix the seat of Government at Athens; and accordingly Mr. Finlay, with those other inhabitants, presented a memorial to the Government of Greece, proposing to give or sell the land which belonged to them to the Government, upon certain terms, in order that it might be made applicable for the establishment of the necessary public buildings in Athens, with the view of inducing the Government to fix itself there. But they coupled their offer of the land with these conditions, that the land to be taken should be scheduled and set out within six months from the time of taking possession of it. When the Government came to Athens, the land of many of the individuals, which had been thus offered to the Government, was taken. Mr. Finlay's land, however, was not so taken. The land taken by the Greek Government of the other individuals was paid for according to a price which the parties had agreed upon; and it is easy to understand that the inhabitants of a city like Athens, possessing property, and being desirous of bringing the Government to Athens, should be perfectly willing to dispose of a portion of their land at a lower rate, if, by so doing, they could attain their object, as the existence of the Government to Athens would have the effect of enhancing the value of the remainder of their property. Mr. Finlay's land was not, however, taken upon this ground; it was taken some time after, by the arbitrary command of the King, without law or ordinance, or without anything whatever which could give a sanction to such a proceeding—nothing, except the arbitrary and absolute will of the Sovereign. That is a matter of fact upon which I defy any man to dispute. That being done, what was the consequence? Mr. Finlay's land was taken and converted into the palace garden of the King. Mr. Finlay applied for compensation in 1836; and according to the statement of Sir Edmund Lyons—who, I apprehend, notwithstanding the insinuations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, is in every way worthy of credit—the proceedings of Mr. Finlay towards the Greek Government were characterised by the most gentlemanly moderation and forbearance; yet for six long years (until 1842), Mr. Finlay continued, from time to time, to put forward, kindly and temperately, his demand for compensation, but could not get a single farthing. Do not tell me that the delay arose from any dispute as to the amount of compensation which should be given to that gentleman. He could not obtain even the slightest answer to his communications. But in 1842, when this injustice became too grievous to be patiently borne any longer, Mr. Finlay addressed the noble Lord who was at the head of foreign affairs of this country—not the present noble Lord, but the Earl of Aberdeen—who instructed Sir Edmund Lyons to apply to the Greek Government, and to enforce by all means in his power the legitimate demands of Mr. Finlay. What was the result? After a great deal of difficulty and delay, the King of Greece proposed to issue a commission to inquire into the claims of Mr. Finlay. But of whom was it proposed that the commission should consist? Of M. Glarakis and M. Manitaki, the Minister of the Interior. One of those persons was a most remarkable character; and Sir Edward Codrington, speaking of him in a public despatch, said that he was a man who had made himself notorious by fostering and encouraging pirates. The other was a mere creature of the King, and would have acted, if appointed, on the part of the King. Mr. Finlay, therefore, objected to this commission. Further communications took place, and no redress could be obtained. This was in 1845. Now, a commission thus constituted, Mr. Finlay was justified in repudiating. He said, very truly, "It is not an impartial tribunal; I can place no confidence in it; I will have nothing to do with it, but will appeal to the Government at home." He did so, and the present noble Lord, then at the head of Foreign Affairs, having inquired into the matter, a despatch was sent to Sir Edmund Lyons, instructing him to enforce the claim of Mr. Finlay. The King proposed another commission, which was appointed; and in the end, after all these years of evasion, shuffling, quirks, and chicanery of every description, it was agreed to refer the matter to arbitration. At first the Greek Government had the assurance to propose that it should have the nomination of the umpire; but, being shamed out of this extravagant proposal, a proper umpire was appointed. What was the next trick they resorted to? Why, they delayed the production of the necessary documents beyond the period of three months, within which period, by the law of Greece, an arbitration must be concluded, or it falls to the ground. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) has stated that the delay had originated with Mr. Finlay; but this is not so: the blue book proves directly the contrary. It was the Government who asked for the delay. Now, was this fair of the right hon. Gentleman? Talk of nisi prius, indeed! At least lawyers held this at nisi prius —that though they might use sophistry to induce a jury or a court to adopt their conclusions, it was a sacred duty not to mis-state facts. Well, then, Mr. Finlay could get no redress; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford says, he might have gone to the tribunals of the country. The tribunals of the country, indeed! They say, "a little learning is a dangerous thing;" but this is equally the case when applied to law. The right hon. Gentleman possesses every quality which would have made a most brilliant advocate. He has eloquence unlimited, subtlety unrivalled, casuistry unexampled; all he wants is a little knowledge of law. If he had not been a great statesman, he would have been a great lawyer, if he would only have condescended to put on the wig and gown, and acquire a little knowledge of the very first principles of law. I would advise him, if he would accept of my humble advice, to confine himself to that science of which he is so great a master—politics, and not to meddle with law. The right hon. Gentleman is ignorant of the fundamental principle of law — that a subject cannot sue the Sovereign. That is the rule in every country, with the exception of this. And why is it not the law in England? Simply, because, by the established usage and magnanimous practice of this country, the Sovereign, upon the petition of a subject complaining of a wrong sustained from the Crown, refers it to the first law officer of the Crown, and indorses upon the petition the important and solemn words, "Let right be done." And upon that the Sovereign condescends to submit Herself to an equality with Her subjects before the throne of law, and allows justice to be adminstered between Her and the meanest of Her subjects by the ordinary tribunals of the land. And, thank God! that we have tribunals, and that we have judges, who would administer the law between the Sovereign and Her subjects with as much impartiality, with as even a hand, and with as unbiassed a mind, as between any two ordinary persons. But is that the case in Greece? No! If the right hon. Gentleman had read these documents—and I will do him the justice, or rather the charity, to believe that he had only superficially looked at them—he would have found out what was the actual state of the law in Greece. I will tell you what Mr. Finlay wrote upon the subject; and the letter was forwarded to the Greek Government by Sir Edmund Lyons, and they could not contradict it. Mr. Finlay said this—and this is the only document that I shall read from the blue books:—

"I solicit your attention to the reasons which render M. Coletti's reference to the Greek courts of law at variance with the principles of justice. My land was seized for the profit of the civil list, without any preliminary form, at a time when the Greek Government was virtually despotic. Repeated acts of oppression at last caused the revolution of the 3d (15th) September, 1843. That revolution, however, kindly allowed a veil to cover the unconstitutional acts of the preceding years of the monarchy. Now, my demand for indemnity is really no claim on the regular administration of the Greek Government, but is directed against the civil list, to obtain redress for an arbitrary exercise of the royal prerogative, at a period when the constitution of Greece was in abeyance, and when it was impossible, as M. Coletti is aware, to bring any action against the crown before the courts of law. The state of things is now changed in Greece; and, under the present constitution of the country, the civil list cannot act except by agents, who would become individually responsible for infractions of the rights of property, and might be personally sued before the existing courts of law for any illegalities they might commit. This was not the case when I was deprived of my property; and the Bavarian officers who acted as the agents of the civil list were not only free from responsibility at the time, but they have long ago returned to Bavaria."

[Mr. GLADSTONE: What is the date of that?] It is dated May 25, 1846, at the time the Earl of Aberdeen was in office. Now, that letter was sent by Sir Edmund Lyons to Coletti, the Minister of Greece, and no answer was ever returned to the important allegations which it contained. I ask, then, had the right hon. Gentleman read that letter or not? If he had, why did he not state it to the House? If he had not read it, how can he reconcile it to himself, with that sense of justice which he, upon all occasions, so loudly professes, to condemn Her Majesty's Ministers, and to denounce the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, without having first made himself master of the actual facts? [ Cheers. ] I understand that cheer, and it can only proceed from some hon. Member who is dead to all considerations of justice, who may think, perhaps, that anything is fair against a political enemy, and that they may lower and traduce a Minister like the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, in the estimation of the country, by distorting facts and perverting evidence. But, I ask, what becomes of the position that Mr. Finlay could have appealed to the tribunals of the country against the King of Greece? The King of Greece is utterly irresponsible, not only politically but civilly, to any of his subjects, and you can only seek redress, if you have sustained any injury, against the officers of State. In this case, however, the officers of State were not responsible, because this matter had occurred before the constitution by which alone even they became responsible, and were called into power. With respect, therefore, to the claim of Mr. Finlay, I think that case is pretty well disposed of. I now come to M. Pacifico; and I rejoice that we shall be able to discuss that case on its merits, and not on the ground of M. Pacifico being a Jew or an usurer, or, as it was ungenerously suggested behind his back, and when he could not defend himself a delinquent who had committed an act of forgery. All these questions are utterly beside the one at issue. And here, Sir, let me say, that I never felt stronger indignation than when I read the observations as to who and what M. Pacifico was and is, which have been repeated over and over again in that portion of the press devoted to the interests of Russian despotism, and which have been spoken over and over again by certain noble Lords who come forward either for their own behoof, or that of continental tyrants. According to these authorities, M. Pacifico is a species of Jew broker—a Jew usurer—a Jew trafficker—a hybrid Jew. And then, Sir, forsooth, we are told in the same breath as that in which such phrases are employed, that they are not used to prejudice the individual to whom they are applied. For what purpose, then, I ask, are they used? Why, Sir, even at nisi prius we should not stoop to such shabby artifices as these. Even lawyers would not resort to such mean and dirty arts as these; they would not think themselves justified in saying that, on a man sustaining a civil wrong and demanding justice, the question was to be tried by his character; yet that has been done again and again to prejudice this case. However, the right hon. Gentleman, in taking the place of those who had carried on this accusation against the Government elsewhere, thought it necessary to protect himself from being supposed to take any part in such acts as these. But the right hon. Gentleman has pursued the course followed elsewhere, of making the most of the abused extravagance of M. Pacifico's demand. But I will show the House that the amount of compensation claimed has nothing to do with the question, and for this simple reason—it never was a matter of dispute with the Greek Government at all. The objection which the Greek Government took was to the principle of the demand, not to its amount. The dispute never advanced so far as to have anything to do with the amount. As for the wrongs inflicted on M. Pacifico, I need not dwell upon them. They are known to all the world. The man was outraged in his person, in his family, and in his property. The question, then, is this—was he entitled to redress? He may be a Jew—a broker—a usurer—a hybrid Jew — he may have committed an act of forgery. It is possible—although God forbid that I should believe such a charge against any man without the opportunity of answering it!—he may have been a forger: it did not lie in the mouth of the Portuguese Government to say so after having appointed him consul, first at Morocco, and then at Athens; but for all that he was injured, and therefore entitled to redress. Now what are the known facts as to his position? He had been living at Athens for many years in comfort and respectability—a substantial citizen, carrying on his business with the Greek people. Well, he was grievously injured. The right hon. Gentleman said, he ought to have gone before the Greek tribunals. What tribunals? He did go before one. He tried to proceed in a criminal court—with what success we know. A crime had been committed in the broad daylight—at noon—in the midst of Athens. The perpetrators were seen and well known. They were denounced to the police, and the police, in reply, contended that there was no evidence to fix their identity, and so let them loose again. So much for the honour and honesty of Greek tribunals. But the right hon. Gentleman says, why did he not go before a civil tribunal? Why did he not sue the rioters for damages? Good God! Is it possible that the right hon, Gentleman can be in earnest? Does he really consider us so weak, so gullible, as to be likely to swallow an obvious, a palpable, a gross absurdity, such as that? What! seek for compensation in damages from a mob—from a rabble of brigands, vagabonds, and ruffians in rags and tatters, who wrecked his house and stole his furniture? Is he to proceed for damages against such a horde as this? Let me ask the House—let me ask the right hon. Gentleman this question: suppose that in some time of trouble and popular excitement a mob were to sack his house, as the mob sacked M. Pacifico's, would he bring an action against each and every member of that mob? We have had instances of such riots taking place, I think. Nottingham Castle was destroyed. It belonged to the Duke of Newcastle. Did he prosecute the mob for damages? The Marquess of Londonderry's house in St. James's-square was attacked, and damaged. Did he prosecute the mob for damages? The palace of the bishop at Bristol was burnt down, and property to a great extent destroyed. Did he prosecute the mob for damages? No; you don't proceed against paupers. There is nothing to be got out of them. Observe the difference between Greece and this country. England, with wiser legislation, proceeding on the principle that for injuries done in times of tumult, it was idle to leave the people to a remedy by civil action against the parties committing them, provided this wise regulation, that in the case of such injuries the local community, the hundred, should be responsible for the property which has been demolished. If, however, the property fall under a certain category for which the hundred is not liable, the Government is nevertheless bound to make the loss good; so that no owner of property need suffer from the lawless violence of mobs, which it is the business of the Executive to keep in order. If, then, this state of things had existed in Athens—if M. Pacifico could have claimed redress from the Greek tribunals, he was no doubt bound to go there. But I say he could not. It is idle to assert that he could. The right hon. Gentleman tells us that there are courts of law in Greece, that there is a regular bar there always ready to undertake the case of anybody applying to them. Is there? Stop a minute. M. Pacifico having been attacked a second time, and having made his complaint, the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office instructed Sir Edmund Lyons to institute a prosecution against the parties who had committed the outrage. What was the result? The offending parties had actually been apprehended, when M. Pacifico was told that he could not get a lawyer to bring his case on, and that such was the strict compulsion under which the courts were kept, that they did not dare to put themselves in opposition to the will of the Prime Minister of the country. But, says the right hon. Gentleman, the judges at Athens administer justice impartially and fairly. There is a court called the Areopagus, and its judges are perfectly free to act according to the dictates of their conscience. Let me tell the right hon. Gentleman that he never laboured under a more complete mistake. The constitution undoubtedly provides that the judges shall not be dismissed at the king's pleasure; but they are so dismissed every day. And not only that; but the Greek Government have established this system—and it showed their Greek subtlety, as they have a number of courts of equal jurisdiction and authority—they transplant the judges from one to the other, as the purposes of each case may seem to require. When a particular case which the Government is interested in bringing to a particular decision occurs in a court, why then they transplant the judge on whom they can depend into that court. Let me cite an instance. An action was brought by M. Piscatori, the French Ambassador at Athens, against the editor of a newspaper published there, the Athena. This was in 1846. M. Piscatori was, of course, all-powerful with the Government. Well, the sentence was against the editor: two of the judges pronounced for his acquittal—three for his condemnation. One of the former, called, I believe, Disachi, was summarily dismissed, in the following curt terms:—"The King has been pleased to remove you from the bench." Well, the editor appealed to the court of the Areopagus, and on the eve of his case coming on, two of his judges who were to be were suddenly dismissed, without any reason whatever being assigned. I have these facts from authority upon which I can implicitly rely, and for their exact truth I pledge myself to the House. Again: there was a president of the court of the Areopagus, called Cleonares. He was dismissed upon the instant, without any reason assigned, but for causes of which no one who has listened to what I stated, can for a moment doubt. And after this you tell me that the Greek tribunals are pure. "Oh, but," says the right hon. Gentleman, "I produce Sir Edmund Lyons to prove my case. He says that the press is free, and the tribunals are fair and independent." True, Sir Edmund Lyons says so; but when? Sir, the reference to Sir Edmund Lyons shows that there are other texts besides those of Scripture which the—which certain persons can quote for their own purposes. The despatch in question was written in 1836, and under what circumstances? King Otho having been advised by his father, as young gentlemen who have lived too fast and extravagantly sometimes are, to go and travel, and look out for a wife—of course, a rich one—obeyed the paternal injunction, and left his kingdom under the charge of Count Armansperg, who took advantage of the absence of his royal master to set matters a little to rights. Well, he began by reforming the tribunals, by making them independent. He set the press free—he established provincial councils, so as to give the people some sort of means of expressing their opinions on public matters—in short, he set the kingdom so far to rights, hoping, of course, that upon the return of his royal master he would reap the reward of his merits in a rich overflow of regal favours. Notice, however, of what Count Armansperg had been doing had, it seems, been conveyed to King Otho, who straightway returned in alarm, and before the boat which conveyed him from the ship touched the soil of Greece, Count Armansperg was ignominiously dismissed. Arbitrary dominion resumed its tyrannic rule—injustice, oppression, and wrong were re-established in their old supremacy; and such is the system which has ruled supreme in Greece ever since. Well, to proceed. The right hon. Gentleman dwelt last night on the case of the man Sumachi, who was tortured; and he set out by saying that he did not believe Sumachi's statement, and that Sir Edmund Lyons was just the man ready to receive and record any unauthenticated case bearing against the Greek Government. Sir, I say, on the contrary, that Sir Edmund Lyons is a man who, after eight or nine years' service as Minister of Athens, received, as a token of his Sovereign's approbation, the Grand Cross of the Bath; and I hope that a gentleman who has been thus specially and highly honoured, is at least entitled to have his official assertions believed, at all events until the contrary shall have been shown. But is this case of Sumachi a single instance? No. Torture has over and over again been applied in Greece. I have here a pamphlet recently published upon that country—a pamphlet, the claims of which to perfect credibility and high consideration are vouched for when I say that it displays upon its front the respected and respectable name of Mr. Alexander Baillie Cochrane. Now, I will tell you what that Gentleman says on the subject of Greece:—

"One word regarding the municipalities of Greece, which were even respected by the Turks and to the confirmation of whose privileges the representatives of the three Powers attached the greatest importance in 1828. These rights, under the present administration, are only used as instruments of vexation, oppression, and persecution. In one year, contrary to the spirit of the constitution, 87 municipal officers have been superseded, and any persons elected by the people are immediately rejected, unless they consent to become the mere tools of the Government. It were idle to cite instances, for M. Coletti does not deny the fact, but contents himself with the very plausible declaration that this tyrannical power is never exercised except for the advantage of the people. We must assume that M. Coletti is under the impression that brigandage is another element of good government, for the following documents are but a very small portion of the evidence in my possession. A petition presented from Patras a few weeks since, and authenticated by all the leading inhabitants, states—'The members of the family Dimeoi, arrested by the Mirarque (the Government officer), were subjected to the torture for three days, and all their effects sold. Dimetri Nicalocupulo, accused of an insignificant robbery three years ago, was put to the torture, and expired soon after.' This unhappy man was denounced to the Mirarque as having stolen a cow three years since; the Mirarque ordered an ordeal by torture, the gendarmes bound him hand and foot, threw him down, and placed enormous stones on his breast and stomach, and then jumped upon them. In the last extremity, and in the hope of saving his life, he pleaded guilty, but it was too late; when the stones were removed he died; his young wife, who was on the eve of her confinement, was carried to the grave a few days afterwards. I translate parts of the petition from Messenia, but the tortures practised on the women will not bear description—in these cases the atrocity of the crime is the security of the criminal. 'Sire—Fifty citizens, dragged without excuse from the bosom of their families, and thrown into a damp and loathsome dungeon, deploring their loss of liberty, that last worldly blessing, cast themselves on your mercy. Sire, the tortures we have undergone are unheard of and horrible; some of us suspended by the feet; others, with their legs and arms bound, are laid upon the ground, and blocks of stone placed on their chests, their flesh torn and limbs mutilated. A robbery had been committed in our village in the month of October; on the 22nd of November, D. Soulis, lieutenant des garde frontieres, at the head of a detachment of soldiers, and without any instructions from the magistrates, desired them to seize eighty of us, and throw us into a cellar of a house of a priest named Papajanopulos. Not obtaining any information, notwithstanding all the violence, some were released, and others conducted to their respective houses, where the most horrible tortures were inflicted upon us during the nights of the 22nd and 23rd; then, not having succeeded in making us admit ourselves guilty, we were taken to a lonely spot named Divari, thrown down, bound and gagged, with enormous stones heaped upon us; when we lay at the point of death the stones were removed, and we were set at liberty. These horrors, Sire, had a far different object to the discovery of a theft; for some time past the garde fron- tieres have endeavoured to push us to acts of despair. But we, Sire, throw ourselves upon your Majesty's protection, imploring in tears and affliction the punishment of those persons who have so outraged humanity. We supplicate your Majesty to condescend to take efficacious measures to put a termination to those miseries which oppress your people, by excluding from the public service those persons who, instead of executing the laws, only substitute fearful tortures; and all these crimes are committed in the name of your Majesty.' At Lamia, on the 26th November last, two gendarmes and three soldiers entered the village of Daitza, where they took and imprisoned the authorities, and then having entered the cottages belonging to two men, Agrosloti Galatopoulo and Christo Tagana, seized the women, whom they treated with a brutality too horrible to describe, and then pillaged the house. It will be observed that these are outrages committed by officers and men in authority, and the instances might be multiplied tenfold, but it is hopeless to convey any adequate notion of the general disorganisation of the country, and the reader must imagine it after being informed that the Government actually amnestises the brigands; and not this alone, but the captains of banditti are empowered to delegate their authority to those employed under their command. I add one of the certificates:—'I, the undersigned, certify upon my conscience that the bearer of this note served under my orders in all my acts of brigandage that I committed, and that he always distinguished himself by his zeal. (Signed) KIAFFA'—this 'Kiaffa' being a notorious brigand. I admit that M. Coletti has this advantage, that these facts are hardly credible; but when M. Daniopoulo asserted in the Chamber that M. Coletti had amnestised no less than fifteen captains of banditti, whose names were alone sufficient to inspire terror, why did not M. Coletti, for the credit of European civilisation, make some attempt to refute these terrible accusations? M. Coletti's policy is to discredit the constitution."

These, then, are the men whom Her Majesty's Ministers are accused of not having treated with sufficient delicacy, courtesy, and respect. Torture, I repeat, is commonly applied in Greece. I can prove innumerable instances of it. One is so disgusting I cannot mention; and yet I ought to mention it—I will mention it. I feel that it ought be told; that we may at least know what these people, of whom so much has been said, really are. How do they torture women? They attach cats to their naked persons, and then flog the animals, that in their furious struggles they may lacerate the flesh to which they are tied. Another species of torture is this—a man is tied hands, feet, and head together, and in this position flung upon the ground and bastinadoed. And still, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman is right—perfectly right—in saying that all such atrocities are forbidden by the constitution of Greece. But what is the value of that constitution? I say, Sir, not so much as that of the paper on which it is written. It has been set aside—violated—outraged in every respect and in every way. It exists but in name; while oppression and corruption reign in unmitigated horror in its room. And now, Sir, I dismiss the right hon. Gentleman and his Greek argument. I trust I have given him and them satisfactory answers. Transcendent as are the abilities of the right hon. Gentleman, I believe that even his talents will not support a case when truth is in the other scale. That truth, if it does not prevail here, will prevail elsewhere. The country is beginning to appreciate what is the truth in this question. The country will fully appreciate, too, the motives which induce you, after four years of silence, now at length to come forward to attack the noble Lord at the head of the foreign affairs of this country. But, whatever may be the result here, I tell you that the people of England will only rally the more heartily around that Government which stands pledged to extend the safeguard of its power to all its subjects, in whatever land their business may have led them, and which is also able and willing, if on any occasion it may be too late to interfere for the purposes of protection—at all events to stand forward and to demand for them reparation and redress. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon asks why the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has carried his resolution beyond the limits of the Greek question, to which the resolution of the House of Lords was confined? I will tell him. The verdict in the other House was certainly taken in the case of Greece. This he asserts; this I admit. But will anybody tell me that had the verdict been taken on the subject of Greece alone, it must not have been, after the facts which I have mentioned, in favour of the Government? There is the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford insinuates that the resolution was purposely so framed as to avoid the issue on the Greek question. He says, you did not venture to take the debate simply upon Greece; you deemed it safer to enlarge the issue. I ask—I put it to the House—do you believe, after what you have heard, that the Government could have met with any other fate than a triumphant acquittal had the charges against them been confined solely to Greece? But I will tell you why—as I conceive—the hon. and learned Gentleman who brought for- ward this Motion chose to mate it embrace more in its terms than the resolution of the House of Lords technically and strictly involved; and I think I can also state the reason why the Government deprecated anything like a limitation of the present debate to the terms of the resolution already voted in another place. It is quite true that you framed your indictment in the House of Lords so as to limit it to Greece. But you conducted the discussion not with reference only to Greece, but to the whole foreign policy of the Government; and so, when you obtained your sentence upon one count of the indictment, you boasted to the whole world that that which was condemned was not merely limited to the resolution upon Greek affairs, but was in fact and in truth the whole foreign policy of the Government. Then, Sir, it was that the hon. and learned Gentleman said, I will frame my resolution so as to embrace the whole subject; there shall be no mistake about it; the verdict of the House of Commons shall be a full, an ample, and a decisive one. Well, then, having gone so far, let us take the whole policy of the noble Lord. But first, mark this — you brought forward that question only where it was not competent for the noble Lord himself to appear and reply. Oh! you know the power of his intellect—you know that he thoroughly understood all the facts you were mis-stating. It was here and in the noble Lord's presence that your accusations should have been made. But no, you remained silent, and allowed the matter to be brought on in quite a different way, and from quite a different quarter. Long have you sat there, and long have your tongues been tied, for reasons of course best known to yourselves. You say that the interests of the country have been injured—that peace has been jeopardised—that the dignity of England has been compromised, and her honour tarnished. Is this true?—and have you sat there in silence suffering such things to proceed? Nay, more, have you not actually supported the Administration which you say has produced these results? Why did you not come forward ere now? Did you not owe it to the country, to the House, to yourselves as statesmen, to come forward and say; "It is true that we are supporting you in your domestic policy, but we warn you that as to your foreign policy, that we can't support, and that a day will come when we must and will bring you to an account. Be wise in time. We are your friends—your friends in private as well as in public." Why, I say, did you not act thus? There are not wanting opportunities. Hon. Gentlemen, who have been the open and fair and manly enemies of the Government, and whom I respect, have more than once brought this question forward. The hon. Member for Dorsetshire, on more than one occasion, introduced the subject of Spain; another hon. Gentleman brought forward the question of Neapolitan and Sicilian politics. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, with that eloquent sarcasm of which he is so perfect a master, has made many pungent and amusing observations on the foreign policy of Government. The matter, therefore, did not sleep. Surely, then, it was incumbent on you to raise a warning voice for the good of your friends. Well may the noble Lord exclaim, "God save me from my friends! I can save myself from my enemies." As for the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, I do not know his motto, but I can furnish him with one, perfectly appropriate and perfectly at his service—"I bide my time." But what, after all, I beg to ask, is the gist of the complaints made against the noble Lord? Why, it is that he has been too fond of interfering in the concerns of other countries. Has he? Just let me hear your charges more specifically put. You have proclaimed, you have trumpeted them all over the world—you have put them into the newspapers until one is sick of seeing the same everlasting subject in the columns of the Times. Upon these charges the peal is continually rung—intervention—interference—getting the country into scrapes—involving us in war—and so forth. [ Cheers. ] Yes, very good; but pray when has it all happened? As the Scotch lawyers say—be pleased to condescend to particulars. But, no; no particulars seem to be forthcoming; only the right hon. Baronet opposite is there, eager to excuse his quondam friend and ancient colleague, of course with deep regret—oh, of course, with the utmost reluctance—oh, of course, but still animated by a stern sense of duty—burning with a pure, and noble, and exalted flame of patriotism, which can yield to no consideration of friendship or regard—here he is irresistibly impelled to come forward with the dismal list of accusations in his hand. Sir, these accusations branch into five or six distinct charges. Two of these involve, not the foreign policy of the Government, but the personal honour of the noble Lord. I must own I did not see any of that reluctance, any of that deep pain and sorrow, which the right hon. Gentleman professed to feel on the occasion. There was the same bland smile which ordinarily enlightens and enlivens his countenance; though it certainly was ironed out the other day by the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Middlesex. The right hon. Gentleman lays his charges on the authority of some French scribbler. The noble Lord has answered these two charges; and now, is there a single man in this House who has the slightest doubt or distrust of the noble Lord's word? I will not condescend for a single moment to break a lance with the right hon. Gentleman on these two charges, and I come to the questions of foreign policy. Now, what are these charges? They are three: they relate to Spain, to the disputes between Naples and Sicily, and to the disputes between Austria and Lombardy. In dealing with the question of foreign policy, you must, first, look at the circumstances under which the transactions took place. It was said by a noble Lord in another place, with a complacency which was quite amusing, "Four years ago you were on terms of amity and friendly regard with all the nations of the Continent, and now you have lost the amity and regard of them all." Yes; but does the noble Lord forget that four years ago Europe was in a state of profound tranquillity and repose? Does he forget that, during the period in which the noble Lord has had the direction of the foreign affairs of this country, Europe has been placed in a position altogether new, difficult, and trying? Does he forget the difficulties that have since occurred? Europe agitated and convulsed from one extremity to another, thrones subverted and tottering to their fall, the people everywhere excited, roused, agitated, and the question everywhere raised, whether there should be republican anarchy on the one hand, or absolutism on the other. What was the course which the noble Lord pursued? Where circumstances compelled him to interfere, or where he was invited to interpose his good offices, what was the course which the noble Lord pursued? He steered a middle course—he endeavoured to induce absolute monarchs to make timely and judicious concessions to their people—he endeavoured to induce the excited and irritated people, driven and goaded into rebellion by a long course of despotism and tyranny—he en- deavoured to induce the people to listen to the dictates of reason and moderation; and had he succeeded, the condition of Europe would have been infinitely preferable to what it now is. But the honour is not the less to the noble Lord; and his merit in the eyes of his country and of the world ought not to be the less because, unfortunately, his counsels were not followed. But I come to particular charges. It is said the noble Lord interfered in the affairs of Spain. What were the circumstances of his interference? A revolution had just occurred in France—a republic had been established; the flame spread everywhere; it crossed the Alps; it spread through Italy; it entered Germany—Austria and Prussia felt its influence; everywhere revolution stalked abroad, and subverted existing institutions. What was more natural than to expect that Spain would also be subject to its influence? Could any man reasonably expect that that country, which for half a century had been the hotbed of revolution and insurrection, should escape? True, it did not so turn out; but there was not the less reason to expect it. I appeal to every man present, and by his answer I will be bound—did he not expect that Spain would be involved in the general vortex of revolution—that the throne would be subverted, and that a republic would be established? Under these circumstances what did the noble Lord do? He wrote a despatch to our Minister in Spain, telling him that if an opportunity should occur—he well knowing the dissatisfaction and discontent which existed there in consequence of the subversion of the constitution—he wrote to our Minister to say, if an opportunity should offer, you ought to suggest to the Spanish Government the wisdom and the prudence of making timely concessions. Well, it so happened, after our Minister had received that despatch, that, instead of adopting such principles, or acting upon them, on the contrary, the stern and resolute Narvaez determined to suppress the popular movement, even at the risk of imperilling the Crown and the Throne of his Sovereign. Our Minister thus found himself placed in a difficult position; and though it was not intended that he should show the despatch to the Spanish Government, but to communicate its contents according to the usual forms of diplomatic courtesy—yet, being anxious to produce a great, and profound, and immediate impression, he determined to show the despatch of the noble Lord to Narvaez. The Government of Spain took umbrage at the form of this communication. The hon. Member for Montrose, whom I do not now see in his place—no doubt this is a sore subject for him; but it is the more important for him, because I understand he means to vote against the Government to-night—the hon. Member for Montrose got up in the House and justified the policy of the Government. He said that the Government were justified in interfering; that the Government of Spain had been guilty of the basest ingratitude—for it was never to be forgotten that we had thus far a right to interfere in their domestic concerns that we had been instrumental in placing the Sovereign upon the throne—that we had done so for the purpose of securing to Spain the blessings of constitutional government—a purpose which was notoriously frustrated; that Spain was, besides, deeply indebted both to this country and to the subjects of this country; and that therefore, in regard both for the interests of Spain and for our own interests, we were justified in interfering. And let the House attend to this remarkable circumstance, that till the despatch was communicated to the Foreign Minister of Spain, the Foreign Minister was in the habit of seeking the counsel and advice of Sir Henry Bulwer; and so long as these counsels were agreeable to his own inclination, he took no umbrage; but so soon as the advice went against his stomach, he said, I'll trouble you no more for advice—I shall seek my counsellors elsewhere. All this occurred two years ago, but it is now raked up by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, though Lord Stanley, in the House of Peers, never uttered a syllable of remonstrance. Aye, Sir, your friends always find out your faults more readily than your enemies. I shall now go to Sicily. What is the case of Sicily? Sicily enjoyed for centuries institutions as free as our own. She had a Parliament consisting of two chambers. Her Parliament enacted laws, imposed taxes, and acted in all respects like the Parliament of this country. This state of things continued down to 1811, and the consequence was, that when the rest of Italy, and the King of Naples dominions—Naples itself included—fell off from their monarch, and joined in the French revolution, Sicily remained true and loyal to her King; and you all know that a British army was established in Sicily, and formed one of the main points of communication with the Mediter- ranean. In 1811, the King of Naples got into hot water with his subjects by attempting to enforce taxes upon them without their own consent, whereupon the Sicilians rose, the English Government then interfered, and a negotiation took place, which was conducted by Lord William Bentinck, on the one hand, and the King of Naples on the other; and the result of that negotiation was that the terms of a constitution were agreed to and adopted by the King of Naples and his people. I say that England morally guaranteed that constitution. That is denied, I know; and if you speak of a legal guarantee, I agree with you. I have now before me the memorandum of Lord Castlereagh, which was written in 1814, before the British army quitted Sicily. He says that Sicily called upon England to interfere to ensure for her the benefits of a free and liberal constitution—that England became the "protectress and supporter"—these were the words—the protectress and supporter of the constitution of Sicily; and upon the strength of our having done so, the Sicilian Parliament voted 7,000 men to join our army, and they fought in our ranks in Spain. What happened afterwards? The Holy Alliance, at the Congress of Vienna, disposed of the kingdoms of the world as if they were so many farms, and their inhabitants sheep and oxen. Among other things, they said that the King of Naples was to be established and recognised as the king of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies; on which said the King of Naples, "Oh, then, it follows that the independence of Sicily is gone—her constitution is at an end—Sicily merges into Naples; and as Naples is under an arbitrary Government, ergo, Sicily ought to be under an arbitrary Government too." So things remained till the Sicilians rose, after years of unjust exactions and tyrannical government. They rose in revolution, and prevailed for a time against the King. They desired at first to establish a republic. The King found that he could make no head against them; he appealed to the English Government, and asked for their intervention. Now, I call the attention of the House to this—the King of Naples asked the Government of England to interfere between him and his subjects, and bring them to terms of moderation and reason. Was it wrong in the English Government to comply with this request? We had morally guaranteed the liberties of Sicily. They had been robbed, shamefully robbed, of their liberties. Here was an opportunity to see justice done to both parties, and to endeavour to restore to the people of Sicily those institutions of which they had been so iniquitously deprived. The King invites the Earl of Minto to come to his assistance. I ask if the Government were not justified in allowing him to do so? The hon. Baronet the Member for Southwark—in a speech as remarkable as any one I ever heard in this House as coming from a liberal Member—the hon. Baronet said that he would judge of States as he would of individuals; and that there was no character more hateful than a man who was always meddling in his neighbours' affairs. But, Sir, there is another character more hateful still—the man who wraps himself up in the narrow circle of his own selfishness—who looks after nothing but his own narrow interests—who will not interfere for the reconciliation of friends—who will not bestir himself to preserve peace—who will not interpose with his good offices—the man who says, "I look only to my own narrow interests, don't hurt me and I won't hurt you—I don't desire to benefit my species—I don't care a rush for the benefit of my fellow men." That certainly was not the principle on which we acted. Oh, but, say hon. Gentlemen, you were willing to recognise the Duke of Genoa. The noble Lord has given you a sufficient reason for that. The people of Sicily declined all further connexion with the King of Naples—they had had quite enough of his treachery and tyranny, and they determined to set up a republic, and at all events to establish a Government of their own. What said our Government? If you will have no more to do with Naples, at all events, don't set up a republic—you may do much better than that—you had better try a monarch of your own. Well, said they, if we elect the Duke of Genoa, will you recognise him? Yes, when he is king de facto. Now I ask, with such facts as these—and I challenge contradiction—has the intervention of Her Majesty's Government in Sicily been such as to entitle it to the abuse that has been heaped upon it, or does it justify you in saying that it has compromised the interests or the dignity of the country? There is yet another case, and that exhausts the charges against the noble Lord. The noble Lord interfered in the affairs of Piedmont and Austria. But at whose solicitation? The Emperor of Austria sent an envoy to this country, asking the intervention of the noble Lord on certain terms proposed by the Austrian Government; and though the noble Lord was willing to adopt them, he states that he did not believe, in the present state of men's minds in Italy, there was the slightest chance of obtaining an agreement to them. The negotiation went off, and there ended the intervention. It went no farther. Oh, but, says the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, it ought to have gone farther. If it had gone farther—if you had stopped the King of Piedmont—if you had interfered on the right side—for there is the gravamen of the charge: it is not that you interfered, but that you interfered in favour of constitutional liberty—if, said a noble Lord in another place, if you had interfered to stop the King of Sardinia from marching into Lombardy, Austria would have had no difficulty in putting down the insurrection there—then the victorious troops would have had no difficulty in marching eastward, and putting down the insurrection in Hungary, and thus the intervention of Russia would not have been required. But have you no sympathies for the Italian people? Can you not recall the eminent greatness and glory of the people—their mediæval splendour—their renown in arts and arms, and all those imperishable monuments of human greatness which they have reared? Do these things not touch your hearts? Have you no sympathy for the people—if they, who for so many years have been degraded under the leaden rule of Austria, thought that at last the day of their regeneration had arrived, and the establishment of that nationality which in their dreams they had pictured as rivalling the glories of ancient times—have you no sympathy for these men? Do you prefer that Radetzky with his Teutonic hordes should pillage their houses, and drive the best and noblest of their sons to those horrible dungeons, those carceri du rissimé, which have already filled Europe with horror, and turn that which was wont to be the garden of the world into a desolate wilderness and a desert? Are your sympathies with Austria against Hungary—that noble people who possessed a constitution as ancient as your own—whose nationality was secured to them by treaty upon treaty—who raised Austria at a time when that State was almost prostrate under a combination of the Powers that sought the dis- memberment of the empire, but who are now sought to be absolutely merged in the Austrian empire, and to become a subordinate portion of the Austrian people? They said, "We have our own laws and constitution—we have sworn to preserve them inviolate—we have before drawn our swords for you in the time of national peril—we must now draw them in our own defence." This was the people whom Austria attempted to put down; but she had no power to put down that gallant population. But there did at last occur the intervention of the barbarous hordes of Russia; and your sympathies are for the butcheries of Haynau—for his military executions—for his scourging of women; your sympathies are for these things, because you say that order is restored. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Abingdon fancies in his ingenuity that he can change things by changing names, but he is marvellously mistaken. Tyranny, absolutism, despotism, do not change their character because you call them order. Liberty, freedom, constitutional rights, do not change their character because you call them republicanism. No, Sir, these things will not deceive the people of England. The cause is the cause of civilisation and humanity all over the world. The question is, whether you will have absolutism on the one hand, or constitutional government and freedom on the other; and don't flatter yourselves, because for a time a despotic Government has prevailed—because order, as you call it, is restored in Europe—because the spirit of Hungarian liberty has been extinguished in the blood of the best and noblest of her sons—don't fancy that such a state of things is to last. There is not a drop of the blood that has been spilt that does not call to Heaven for vengeance. The generation that is to come, whose fathers have been gibbetted, and whose mothers have been scourged, they will yet revenge these atrocities. And you who complain of interference—you who complain that Her Majesty's Government has interfered in this case and in that?—what do you say to the intervention of Russia—what do you say to the intervention of France? Who extinguished the liberties and constitutional rights of Hungary?—Russia. Who restored the old, worn-out, and effete Government of the Pope and his conclave of cardinals at Rome?—France. What right have Russia and France to take umbrage at the noble Lord because he has inter- fered in favour of constitutional liberty, while they interfered in favour of arbitrary power? I have now disposed of these three instances of intervention, and I say, after all the abuse that has been heaped on the noble Lord on account of them, they come to nothing. They have not imperilled the peace and prosperity of the country. Where has there been the slightest chance of war, except from the recent misunderstanding with regard to Greece?—and that is all moonshine. That was not a case of intervention. The noble Lord was then protecting the rights of British subjects. In every instance of intervention, the noble Lord interfered only by giving counsel and advice; and that advice was excellent. Where has he endangered the peace of England and of Europe? Why, we remained at peace even when Russia interfered in Hungary; and I tell hon. Gentlemen opposite that if we had had the spirit of our fathers, and if we had not been crippled by the weight of a debt entailed upon us by our predecessors, I don't believe that this country would have stood a silent spectatress of the intervention of Russia. Be that as it may, I say that the policy of the noble Lord has nowhere led to the consequences which you hold out. I come back to the point from which I started, and it is this: you cry out against the intervention of the noble Lord, and say that it has been upon the wrong side; what then are we to expect if the policy of the Government should be changed? Are we henceforth to look smilingly and encouragingly on while the despotic Powers of the Continent carry out their designs to extinguish liberty, satisfied in return that our Foreign Secretary is treated with the expressions of fond endearment, and called "that dear Minister?" Let me ask you, is the doctrine that England should take a high position among the nations of the Continent—is that doctrine new? Do you forget the policy of Mr. Canning, when in 1820 the fabric which the Sovereigns of Europe had erected on the suppression of European liberty began to show that it contained the elements and seeds of its own destruction? When in Spain the gallant Riego, whom they afterwards took and hanged on a gibbet so high that he could not from it address the people, but whose name still lives in the memory of every patriotic Spaniard—when Riego stood forth and called upon the people to assert their right to the constitution of 1812—when the flame spread—when all Europe threatened to become involved in the conflagration—when the Neapolitans actually rose in insurrection—what did the allied Sovereigns do? They first interfered and put down the constitution which had been established in Naples. We had at that time at the head of our Government a noble Lord who was not remarkable for his fondness for constitutional liberty—who was as "dear" to foreign despots as the Earl of Aberdeen himself—yet even he could not stand silently by while this intervention of arbitrary power was put forth against the liberties of the people, and he issued that celebrated circular, in which he remonstrated and protested against the intervention of the allied Sovereigns. There was afterwards assembled the Congress of Verona, at which the allied Sovereigns determined to interfere in the case of Spain—to put down constitutional liberty there, as they had put it down at Naples. What did Mr. Canning do? He was a Member of a Tory Government, and he sent as Ambassador to the Congress no less illustrious a person than the Duke of Wellington. What did Mr. Canning do? He protested and remonstrated against interference in the case of Spain; and the consequence was, that the sovereigns held their hands. It is true, he said, that England will not so far interfere in the affairs of the Continent as to go to war on that account; but, so far as remonstrance and the expression of opinion goes, she, regarding the principle of constitutional liberty embodied in her own constitution to be one of the first and greatest blessings that could befall a country, she would desire to uphold and extend it to all the rest of the nations of the world. It is known that France sent her troops, and overcame the constitutional Government established in Spain, and hanged Riego, as I before remarked, on a lofty gibbet. But when it was proposed to go farther than this, and to interfere in the war that was then raging between Spain and her insurgent provinces in South America, Mr. Canning came forward, and said, "No, you shall not. England won't stand by and see this done. So far as European polities are concerned, we won't wage war against you; though we tell you frankly our opinion. But if you attempt to interfere with the Spanish provinces, as you have interfered in Spain, rather than consent to it we will go to war." That, I say, is a precedent for this case. The policy of the noble Lord, so far as European politics are concerned, is based upon the principles adopted by Mr. Canning. It is a policy which the Parliament and the people of England have repeatedly sanctioned and approved; and I trust I do not flatter the noble Lord when I say, that the mantle of that distinguished Statesman has fallen well and gracefully upon him, not only as regards the foreign policy of that great Minister, but I must add, while the accents of his voice are yet ringing in our ears, and find an echo in our hearts — I must add, that he has also inherited that illustrious Statesman's matchless eloquence. I have now gone over these various cases, and I protest I cannot see on what it is that you found the charge of undue interference. I admit that to those hon. Gentlemen who consider that peace is the great end and aim of existence, and that to peace all else is to be sacrificed—who hold that man was created by Heaven for the sole purpose of producing, and manufacturing, and consuming cotton—who recognise no nobler aspirations, no impulses of humanity—I admit to them, that peace is of the greatest importance to this country—not merely peace between this country and foreign. Governments, but peace between foreign Governments and the people who are subjected to those Governments. I admit to them that peace is essential to the development of our industry, and to the progress of our manufactures. But I tell those men that every revolution and struggle in Europe is fatal to our interests, and I tell them that as matters now are, such things will frequently occur. Mark my words, unless the relations between the governors and the governed be placed on a more satisfactory basis, you may secure peace for the day, as men have before now bought peace at the price of their independence; but that is an unsafe and an uncertain condition of things. You had far better obtain peace, based and founded on principles which are likely to endure; otherwise you only put off the evil day. You may execute the leaders, and imprison their followers. You may decimate by military executions—it matters not. The time will come when the struggle will be renewed and renewed, over and over again, till freedom is at last secured. It would be far better to settle it at once, and to settle it as it can only be settled, by inducing arbitrary monarchs to act righteously by their subjects—by inducing the people to accept the counsels of mediation and peace. In that middle path the noble Lord has walked. He has endeavoured—to use the eloquent language of Mr. Canning—to stay the plague on both sides. If he has not succeeded, so much the worse for Europe—so much the more pity for the condition of the world, but we ought not the less do justice to his exertions. I cannot sit down without adverting to ulterior considerations. I must look beyond the question of the day. We are now called upon to pass a censure upon the Government, which is to drive them from the helm of affairs. What is to follow? The resolution deals with the past; the state of things to which it refers has ceased to exist. There is no disturbance in Europe—there is no agitation. You have suppressed for the present all disorder and disorganization — every thing is quiet — there is no necessity for attacking the Government on any present charge of intervention. Before you claim my vote in favour of censuring the Government, let me know what are to be the consequences of that vote—who is to take the government of the country if Her Majesty's Ministers are dispossessed of office? Which of you are prepared to do so? I take the liberty of addressing myself in the first place to the right hon. Gentleman opposite. You have supported the Government now for four years, on the ground that their domestic policy is essential to the prosperity of that commercial policy which you introduced, and which the Government have carried out. Well, you are now about to dispossess Her Majesty's Ministers. What are you prepared to do? As on other occasions, you may take one of three courses. You may yourselves assume the government of the country, or you may leave it to those hon. Gentlemen in whose opinions you have not always, and certainly not recently, concurred; or, as a third course, you may have a combination between yourselves and them. Are you prepared to adopt the first? I ask the two right hon. Baronets, one of whom has, I may say, opened the accusation against the noble Lord with as much special pleading, and as much nisi prius argument, as ever I heard—who has come forward on this occasion from a simple sense of duty which will no longer allow him to be silent, though he has been still for four years. I address myself to another right hon. Baronet, for whom I have always entertained, and unless he should now take a course which I hope he will not, for whom I shall continue to entertain, the most profound respect and admiration, for his high talents, for his vast abilities, his statesmanlike views, and, above all, for the great courage which he has displayed in maintaining his sense of right in defiance of the strongest temptations. I ask those two right hon. Baronets whether they are prepared to take the government of the country? If so, where is your staff? Where are your elements of power? Not in this House. When you consented to be seduced by the Delilah of free trade—when you were seduced by the Delilah of free trade, the Samson of Conservatism was shorn of his strength. Well, I don't suppose you are quite prepared to go to the country. If you do, you will be worse off than you are now, take my word for it. I don't suppose, then, that you will take the Government yourselves. For you can't suppose that hon. Gentlemen, the Members of the Protectionist party, who have been for four years fighting a manly, straightforward, and gallant battle against the Government, and have only been defeated over and over again by your support of that Government—you can't believe that they have been taking all these pains merely to let you walk in and take the place of the present Ministry. No, no, they are not so weak as all that. If they were, addressing them as agriculturists, I might well say—

"Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra boves."

Or if they are prepared to follow like sheep in the flock of which the right hon. Baronet opposite is the shepherd, we might be excused for saying to them—

"Sic vos non vobis vellera fertis oves."

Or bearing in mind a favourite quotation of the hon. and gallant Member for Lincoln—"ubi mel, ibi apes;"—so again—

"Sic vos non vobis mellificatis apes."

No, they are not so weak as all that. But what next? Are the Gentlemen of the Protectionist party to form a Government, and are you prepared to turn out Her Majesty's Ministers in order to bring them in? You have gone on for four years supporting the Goverment, and are you prepared now to oust them from office, to let in those who are sworn to subvert what you assert to be essential for the best interests of the empire? I cannot suppose that you will follow that course. Then there is a third course, which is that of a combination: and it is to that I alluded when I adverted to the possibility of a thing occurring that would make me blush for the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth; and I will not believe it—it cannot be that a statesman who has been bearded in this House by the leaders of that party—a statesman on whom their calumny, and contempt, and scorn have been heaped in language which I own I have again and again burned with indignation to hear addressed to him—I cannot suppose that he, for the sake of office, would prostitute his great name and his great honour, by a union with the party by whom he has been thus treated? It is a thing impossible! [An Hon. MEMBER: We won't have him.] I will suppose that he is no longer anxious for office. I will suppose that the consular dignity which he has so well won—the high station he holds in this House and elsewhere—the great things he has achieved—are enough to satisfy the ambition of any man; and power can add nothing to the greatness of such a man as he is. But then, I would ask, is it possible that some of those who have hitherto reposed under the shadow of his wing, are to leave the parent nest and venture forth to unite themselves with hon. Gentlemen opposite? If so, the country will understand why it is you come forward now to attack and condemn the policy of the Government. But that is not enough. We, whom you call upon by our votes to aid you in dispossessing the Government of power, are entitled to ask what are the terms and conditions of that unholy alliance? Now if there is to be a compromise—and I cannot believe that you will be so reckless, so inconsiderate in the duty you owe to your Sovereign as to drive the Government from office by an abstract vote on its past policy, unless you are prepared to see some Government established that is able to conduct the councils of the Sovereign—if there is to be alliance between you which I shall suppose to be the case until I hear to the contrary, I am entitled to call upon you to speak out plainly in the matter. It is no idle, no vulgar or impertinent curiosity that dictates the demand, but as a representative of the people who are interested in the government of the country, I am bound to stand forward and ask you to be candid. What are to be the terms and conditions of this alliance? I will tell you what I believe, judging from your conduct on the present occasion—I believe that the candour of the transaction will be here [ the Protectionist benches ], and not there. I cannot believe that the Gentlemen who represent the Protectionist party, and who have fought a manly fight in this House and elsewhere for principles which they believe to be just, but which I have ever conscientiously opposed—who have proclaimed again and again that they meant to take their stand upon those principles; who have agitated the empire from one end to the other in favour of these principles, I cannot believe that they are prepared now to abandon them. I believe, therefore, that the union will involve a compromise of, or deviation from, principle on your part. If it is not so, then I call upon you to speak out. Is there such an alliance agreed upon? If so, what are its terms and conditions? Are we to have a fixed duty or a sliding scale? Give us an answer—for once be frank and fair with us. Give us an answer: what are to be the terms and conditions—what are we, the Parliament—what are the people of England to expect? We have a right to fairness and frankness on such an occasion. Sir, until I know how that is to be, I, for one, will not, and I trust the independent Members of this House will not, lend themselves to what I can't help calling a very pitiful and mean conspiracy against the Foreign Minister of this country. Not that I fear it, for the combination which exist throughout Europe is not a combination of the people of Europe; and when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford says we are a by-word and a scorn among nations, and that "Englishman" is a hated name, he says what is utterly incorrect. He identifies, as I understood him—for that is a necessity of his position—he identifies a nation with its arbitrary rulers. I tell him that the nations, that is, the people of Europe, do not dislike the English, but, on the contrary, our policy for the last few years has endeared us to them. They know the difficulties of our position, they make all allowance for the Government, they know it cannot interfere by force of arms, but they know that constitutional liberty in every quarter of the world has the sympathy of the minds and hearts of the British people, and they know that the Government exhibits the faithful echo of these sympathies. We have now arrived at a most momentous epoch in the history of this country—aye, and of the world. We are called upon to take our choice between two great antagonistic principles. Is the foreign policy of this country to be the foreign policy which the noble Lord and the Government have pursued—that middle policy between absolutism and republicanism, encouraging constitutional governments, but not interfering to establish them by military force; using only our moral influence, and taking the proud position which England is entitled to assume as the head of the constitutional nations of the world? The arbitrary rulers of foreign nations may endeavour to destroy Her Majesty's Government; but rest assured of this—when the nations of the Continent have at length succeeded in establishing constitutional governments, and in securing free institutions for themselves, and when their voices can speak out, they will look back gratefully to the sympathy we have shown them in their time of suffering and distress; and the influence which we shall maintain amongst them will be commensurate with that sympathy. The epoch on which we stand is not less momentous as regards the domestic concerns of this country; for the question we are now called upon to decide is, whether the Government shall yield the reins of power to a party who are bent on reversing the present commercial policy of the empire. I believe the policy which Her Majesty's Government have hitherto carried on to be essential to the prosperity of our commerce—essential to the great manufacturing interests of the country, to the welfare of the State, and, above all, essential to secure a steady and abundant supply of the food which shall preserve the famishing millions. I believe, then, Sir, that if I were to oppose the resolution of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, I would be betraying the best interests of the people of this realm, and the best interests of the nations of Europe—that I would be retarding the progress of civilisation and the welfare of humanity, and betraying the best interests of mankind; I shall therefore most cheerfully and unhesitatingly vote in favour of the resolution.

Sir, The hon. and learned Gentleman who has just spoken has thought fit to accuse me of suppressing an important fact. The hon. and learned Gentleman has shown that Mr. Finlay had asserted that the courts of law in Greece could not give him redress, and the hon. and learned Gentleman has charged me with suppressing the truth, because I had not referred to the passage. Now I was perfectly aware of that passage. I was aware that in the earlier periods of the controversy Mr. Finlay asserted that he could not obtain redress; but the passage which I quoted was written two years and a half later than the date of the passage referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman. Mr. Finlay began by asserting that the courts of law could not afford him redress; and he ended by asserting, or rather by admitting, two years and a half afterwards, that the courts were competent to try the question as to the value of the land of which he was dispossessed.

said, that the hon. and learned Member for Southampton had made two charges against hon. Gentlemen on his (Mr. Walpole's) side of the House: the first, that the question had been argued as a nisi prius question; and the other, that they had occasionally shifted their ground, at one time discussing the general policy of the Government, and, at another, confining themselves to the Greek part of the case. With regard to the first charge, he could not help thinking that the hon. and learned Member, in his attempt to answer the magnificent speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, had not altogether forgotten his own nisi prius practice. And with regard to the second charge, by which it was insinuated that they had, more or less, mistaken or misunderstood the policy of Government, it was clear to him, however that might be, that there could be no mistake as to the tendency of that policy, if it were to be judged by the speech of the hon. and learned Member. He (Mr. Walpole) would meet the supporters of the Motion upon the two points which the hon. and learned Member justly said that Motion involved—the first relating to the particular occurrences which had taken place in Greece, and the second relating to that general policy by which our intercourse with Foreign Powers had been conducted and carried on; and he thought he could show that in respect to neither was the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government calculated to "maintain the honour and dignity of the country," or to "promote peace between England and the other nations of the world." With respect to the Greek question, which was really a question of a twofold character, partly applying to national claims, and partly to those that were more strictly personal, he observed that the hon. and learned Gentleman had carefully avoided one point—namely, the national part of the question, the claim upon the islands of Sapienza and Cervi. Now this and the personal claims must be kept quite distinct. The former depended upon, and must be determined by, the obligation to terms of international treaties; and the latter by the maxims of international law. With regard to the former, it was to be observed that the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary actually sent out instructions to the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands to take forcible possession of Sapienza and Cervi, without the consent of France and Russia, the two other guaranteeing Powers; and yet we were under distinct engagement that no force belonging to one of those Powers should be allowed to enter the new Greek State without the concurrence of the other two. By doing this, therefore, the noble Lord had jeopardised the peace of Europe, and compromised the honour of this country. He would concur with the noble Lord in saying that those islands were part of the Ionian States, if the noble Lord could make good his assertion that they originally formed part of the Republic of Venice; but that was, in fact, the whole gist of the question; and, while that was undecided, his sending a fleet was contrary to existing treaties, and the honour of this country was materially affected by it. With regard to the personal claims, he contended that they depended upon the maxims of international law. And what were those maxims? He would not argue the case as an advocate, but state what he believed those maxims to be. But before he did so, perhaps the noble Lord would here permit him to correct an error into which the noble Lord had fallen. He had charged a noble Lord in another place with imputing to the Queen's Advocate that he had written an opinion contrary to his own, merely to support the views of the Government. This was not so: what that noble Lord had really said, was merely this—that it was necessary to know the nature of the case upon which the opinion of the Queen's Advocate was founded, before they could know what value to put upon that opinion. He would now revert to the question before them, and state what he believed to be the maxims of international law, upon which the question must necessarily be determined; and, according to them, it might be generally laid down, that reprisals; were allowable under no circumstances which did not amount to a denial of justice. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield seemed to treat the maxims of international law as if they were a something so vague and undefined as only to be determined by the arbitrary rule which different nations might put upon them. The principles, however, of international law were as well known as the principles of common law or the principles of equity; and the difficulty was not so much in understanding the principles as in noting the exceptions by which they, like all other laws, must obviously be modified. The general principle was simply this, as he had already stated—namely, that one State may issue reprisals for enforcing claims or obtaining compensation for individual wrongs, when justice was denied or refused by another. What, then, was a denial of justice? Justice might be denied in three ways: either by refusing to hear the party's complaint, or by studied and unwarrantable delays, which are equivalent to a refusal, or by a decision evidently and obviously partial and unjust. He would not quote the authorities, although he had them there; but those were the principles laid down by Vattel, and confirmed by all the jurists. The general inference to be drawn from them was, then, that reprisals were allowable in all cases where justice is refused by the act of the State ratifying and confirming the acts of individuals; but they were not allowable where justice has only not been done because the individual complaining of wrong has neglected to use the ordinary means of obtaining and enforcing it. Apply these maxims, and then let them see whether these claims were of such a nature as to justify the reprisals which had been made. In his opinion, the case of the Fantome, and that of the plunder of the Ionians, were cases in which reprisals might properly have been allowed, for the acts complained of were the acts, not of private individuals, but of the officers of Government. But those might be laid aside altogether, because, in point of fact, the reprisals, for which a fleet was sent to the Bay of Salamis, related solely to the cases of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico. Upon those two cases, everything depended. Now, according to all the rules laid down by the jurists, reprisals, in his opinion, were not justifiable in the case of Mr. Finlay, for this plain reason, that, although the previous long delay which had Taken place might be considered as amounting to a denial of justice, his claims were confessedly under consideration, and they were referred to arbitration in October, 1849. From that moment, therefore, all right to our Government to interfere by an armed force expired, and the ultima ratio ought not to have been called in, unless it was mentioned that the arbitration had failed. Neither, in his opinion, did the case of M. Pacifico justify an appeal to arms, because, as he could show, those claims had not been attempted to be enforced by M. Pacifico himself, and the noble Lord had not endeavoured to ascertain the fact beforehand whether every other mode of satisfying those claims but an appeal to arms had been attempted. He would prove not only that justice was never denied to M. Pacifico, but that the Government had never taken the trouble to inquire to what extent those claims had been pressed. Observe the dates; the injury was done on the 4th of April, 1847. On the 10th of May, the courts in Greece, which had been appealed to, had determined that for the present there was no case. On July 19, 1847, the noble Lord sent out a despatch to Sir Edmund Lyons, in which he required a statement of the nature of the claims of M. Pacifico, and properly requiring "satisfactory proofs of it." On the 8th of October, 1847, M. Pacifico wrote a most extraordinary letter to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, inviting the noble Lord to become his champion and take up his cause. He then says, with adroit flattery—

"A strong hand, a firm will, are necessary to compel the Greek Government to perform a duty of equity and justice. That strong hand can only be yours, my Lord; that firm will, my just rights ead me to hope will be yours likewise."

That letter, he was afraid, had induced the noble Lord to take up the case without inquiry; for on the 30th of October, 1847, he wrote to Sir Edmund Lyons, not requiring satisfactory proofs, but boldly saying and at once deciding—

"With reference to this latter request of M. Pacifico, I have to instruct you to make an immediate demand upon the Greek Government for the payment of the sum due to M. Pacifico, for the ground taken for the royal garden; and you will at the same time inform the Greek Government that Her Majesty's Government will, as soon as possible, fix the amount which they intend to demand as compensation for the sufferings sustained by M. Pacifico."

Thus the noble Lord had never required that the claim should be one established by the tribunals of the country, or by a proper investigation; but he took upon himself at once to say that the British Government would fix on the amount intended to be demanded for M. Pacifico, as a compensation for his sufferings, without inquiry. It had been said by the noble Lord that M. Pacifico had had no opportunity afforded him of obtaining redress from the Greek Government; but was that M. Pacifico's own view of the case? No; he said he would not apply for redress to the Greek tribunals, as he preferred the tutelary authority of the noble Lord, by an appeal to which he doubtless thought he could obtain a greater amount of compensation than that which would be awarded to him on evidence and proof. For, on January 24, 1848, M. Pacifico winds up his arguments in answer to M. Glarakis' despatch as follows:—

"I should then be very ill-advised in running the risks, more than uncertain, of a series of expensive proceedings, while I have a legal right to claim from the Greek Government equitable compensation for the wrongs which the Greek people have done me, and which the Greek Government has permitted, and while these just rights can be brought forward in evidence, and maintained by the tutelar authority of my Government, namely, by the British Legation."

Nobody could read these facts and attend to these dates without arriving at the conclusion that M. Pacifico never did apply, and never intended to apply, to the civil tribunals of the country, when for anything which appears he might have obtained justice; and also that the noble Lord never took the pains to inquire whether justice had been refused before be sent a fleet to the Bay of Salamis to demand reparation. He had therefore established that, according to the maxims of international law, reprisals were unjustifiable in either case for the personal claims of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico; and with reference to the national part of the question, it was clear, on the ground of international justice, that the noble Lord ought first to have applied to France and Russia. If this were the case, assuredly hon. Members could come but to one conclusion with regard to the Motion before the House, namely, that the course pursued by the noble Lord had materially endangered, if not the peace of Europe, at least the friendly intercourse between us and other nations. With respect to the general principles by which the foreign policy of this country was conducted, he thought the noble Lord was as little entitled to the approbation of the House as he was for what he had done in respect to his reprisals in the Bay of Salamis. If the principles of the noble Lord were not those of propagandism, they were certainly, to quote the words of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, principles which took advantage of every circumstance, and made for itself opportunities to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign countries. But if such principles were really to guide our policy in future, he had no hesitation in saying that they would lead to perpetual confusion and disquietude; for if we had the right which the noble Lord claimed for himself, we must expect that other countries would also claim a similar right with reference to the views which they entertained. If we interfered for the purpose of establishing liberal institutions in other countries, because we thought they would be beneficial to them, why should not Russia, Austria, France, or America, interfere in a similar manner in other countries to enforce their notions of freedom and government? What jealousies and distrust necessarily would arise on every side, if such a course were generally adopted? Amicable intercourse, which now subsisted between nations, would be destroyed, and the progress of civilisation would be thrown back or retarded. Yet those were the principles of the present Government; and all the arguments of the noble Lord, powerful as they were, in applying those principles, must fall to the ground, if the foundation upon which that argument rested was shown to be unsound. The foundation of that argument, however, was evidently unsound, for it claimed for the Foreign Minister a right to interfere to enforce his own notions of government in other countries. But that, once admitted, would create at once so much disturbance in every other country, it would destroy so entirely the mutual confidence which ought to subsist between different nations, that if it were adopted, they could not hope the peace of the world would be preserved. In the course of the debate, the principles promoted by the noble Lord and those of other Foreign Ministers had been compared. It was the fashion to say that the Minister who immediately preceded him was in favour of absolute government, while that of the noble Lord was in favour of liberal institutions. But he thought the former had this advantage, namely, that, while he maintained peace with the more liberal Governments, he secured the friendship of the less liberal Governments—he remained at peace with all, instead of only retaining the friendship of some—whereas the noble Lord who now held the office of Foreign Secretary, was regarded with distrust even by the most liberal Governments, and with open dislike by the others. They must, however, not only judge of the policy of the noble Lord by the tendency his principles naturally had, but by their actual results; and here he challenged the comparison which had been instituted between the policy of the late Foreign Minister and the policy of the noble Lord. The policy of the Earl of Aberdeen had been admirably drawn by the masterly hand of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, when he quitted office in 1846. The right hon. Baronet had truly said that—

"The Earl of Aberdeen dared to keep in view the moral obligation of the Christian Minister of a Christian country to maintain peace wherever he could, and to avoid on all occasions the risk of war."

But admitting this, and admitting the force of the moral obligation, he told the House with perfect truth, that "no Minister was less inclined to sacrifice the interests and dignity of this country." Acting on that policy, the Earl of Aberdeen might well have his policy advantageously compared with that of the noble Lord opposite. It was singular enough—and he would rest the issue upon that one point—that the two policies might be well tested by reference to two quadrennial periods in which respectively the two Ministers were in power. The Earl of Aberdeen came into office in 1842, and quitted it in 1846. The noble Lord opposite came into office in 1846, and he was still in office in 1850, Now, compare these two periods. When the Earl of Aberdeen came into office in 1842, everything in Europe was more or less disturbed. England was viewed by some nations with dislike, and by more with distrust. The bonds of friendship which united us with France had been nearly broken asunder by the expedition to Syria. In Asia, we had sustained the most fatal reverses. In America, there were difficulties which threatened a rupture in respect to the boundary between Canada and the United States. It was on this troubled and perilous sea that the Earl of Aberdeen embarked in 1842. Four years passed over our heads, and what had happened? The bonds which united France and England were riveted again more strongly than ever; in America, the differences respecting the boundary question were equitably adjusted; in Asia, our great reverses had been more than vindicated in the defiles of Affghanistan and upon the banks of the Sutlej. Such was the first quadrennial period, and when we consider it and see at the same time that we were at perfect peace with all the nations of the world, the policy of the Earl of Aberdeen might well challenge the admiration of the House and of the country. Now, what followed? When the Earl of Aberdeen was succeeded by the noble Lord, we then commenced the second quadrennial period, which is now just terminating. Could the noble Lord say that the line of the horizon was now as clear and as bright as then? Could the noble Lord say that we were now at perfect peace with all the Powers of Europe? Could the noble Lord say that our amicable relations were anything like so strong as they were in 1846? To the former of the two periods we could revert with pride and look back with pleasure to alliances renewed, to friendships restored, to disasters overcome, to disgraces wiped away, to fresh glories and new honours, and triumphant achievements, and, what he thought more important than all, to the perfect amity, peace, and goodwill which necessarily flowed from the calm, enlightened, and dignified policy of noninterference. In the latter of those periods, bright as was the prospect with which it commenced, we must trace the history of that fatal policy, which intermeddles with everything, and settles nothing—we could read it in the summary dismissal of our Minister from Madrid—in the sudden withdrawal of the Austrian Ambassador from the Court of St. James's—in the deep humiliation of the King of Sardinia, whose treacherous ambition, he was afraid he must say, had been aided and abetted by the noble Lord, against a friend, a kinsman, and an ally—he might read it likewise in the mission of the Earl of Minto, whose course through Italy he could liken to nothing but the fabulous influence of the dim eclipse, which shed over the nations through which he travelled, disastrous twilight, while with fear of change it perplexed the rulers of them—we must further trace it in the degradation of the Pope, whose imprudent vanity as the patron and partisan of liberal institutions we fostered and encouraged, until they reacted most fatally on himself—in short, we must read it in disappointed Italy—in offended Russia—in estranged Austria—in alienated Germany—in the averted looks with which our former most valued allies now regard us—and, to sum up all in one brief sentence, we might mark it everywhere in the partial hatred, in the general disquietude, in the universal distrust with which our policy was now received by every nation upon earth. With this conscientious estimate of the policy of the noble Lord, he could not vote for any Motion which affirmed that a policy like that which he had described could conduce to the honour and dignity of England, or was calculated to preserve the peace of the world.

said, that, but for the accidental circumstance of his being the Seconder of the Motion, he should not have presumed to have taken part in a debate which, in his own experience, was certainly the most full, the most striking, and the most able on both sides of the question. As, however, he had given some little attention to the subject, and was aided by having had ocular demonstration of many of the events before the House, he would confine himself especially to those points. It had struck him, and he was sure it had struck others, that the chief characteristic of the noble Lord's speech was not its singular lucidity of expression, nor even the noble and generous sentiments which had found so enthusiastic an echo in the House, but the plain and sensible statement of facts which it contained, and the ample refutation it presented to all the suppositions, suspicions, and accusations which had been brought against him. He also thought, in common with others, that it was a subject of regret that the explanations contained in it came so late, and he could not help thinking that if the representative of the Foreign Office was more in the habit of communicating with the House on those subjects, and letting them, as it were, a little more into his confidence, it would not be possible to raise such a structure of suspicion and injustice as that with which the noble Lord had now to contend. He had no complaint to make against those hon. Members who had brought forward charges with such an array of suspicion; but he did complain of those hon. Members who, after the refutation of the noble Lord, and the detail of facts which he had given, continued to heap up accusations and to cast suspicions. He hoped the House would not hear anything further of certain circumstances which had been brought forward. He hoped they would hear no more of the reasons which were assigned for the expedition of the Earl of Minto, and for the appearance of the British fleet in the Dardanelles; but, above all, he trusted that the grave accusation which he regretted to hear coming from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, that the noble Lord had contributed in any way whatever, by thought or action, to the deplorable events of the late French revolution, would never again be heard. The hon. and learned Member for Midhurst, who spoke last, had dwelt upon the want of success of the noble Lord, and of the general failure of his policy; but it was by no means just or reasonable to fix upon the events of one moment, and appeal to their issue as determining the failure or the success of a given policy. As well might hon. Gentlemen opposite fix upon the Greek question as upon any other which had presented itself during the last four years in which they were silent. Amid the greatest enterprises and achievements of public men in the history of the world, there never have been any which have totally been free from the imputation of failure. This might be said of the great interferer, Elizabeth, who had established the Protestant religion, when the massacre of St. Bartholomew took place. The same might be said of William of Nassau, at the hour of his death; and the same might have been said of Mr. Pitt in more modern times, on the occasion of the battle of Austerlitz, who had died in the belief that he had failed. He (Mr. Milnes) did not believe that the policy of the noble Lord had failed. If his policy throughout had shown itself to be based upon wisdom and prudence, they had no right to use the argument against him of want of success; neither could the argument be maintained that the noble Lord was unpopular. It was very much the habit of gentlemen travelling abroad to take their opinions from the society into which they were accidentally thrown. At the present time the aristocratic party on the Continent, those who were in favour of absolute government, were very much disgusted at the failure of their efforts, and it was only natural that they should think ill of the noble Lord. Nor were those persons to blame who had rushed into rebellion and violence, if they disliked the noble Lord when the natural consequences of their imprudence descended upon them. The noble Lord had neither encouraged these people nor betrayed them. He repeated that the real estimate of the public opinion upon the Continent was not to be gleaned from the casual conversations of particular coteries, nor from the misrepresentations which might appear in public prints devoted to the interests of party. He thought hon. Gentlemen would agree with him that, acting as the noble Lord had done throughout the whole of the disturbances which had taken place in neighbouring States, he had taken the worst possible course to gain popularity—that of being perfectly moderate between two extremes. If he had advocated either republicanism or absolutism, he would have had ardent admirers in various parts of Europe. But this he had not done. It had been said that the great fault of the noble Lord was his constant interference in the affairs of other nations; but he (Mr. Milnes) owned it struck him that the noble Lord would be more amenable to the accusation if he had interfered more, and thrown the balance of public opinion in this country into the hesitating scales of the world. It might be said that, if he had not arrested the French army in its passage to Rome, his interference would have been wise; and it might have been said that, if he had not interfered, the Austrians would have vacated Italy, and the Italians would have been independent. Or it might have been said, when Russia interfered in Hungary, that, if we had sent a fleet to blockade the Russian ports, that intervention would never have taken place. If they examined into the conduct of the noble Lord, they would find that the fallacy about his interference would fall to the ground. What had been his conduct toward those Powers of Europe, which we might consider as established ill a firm form of government? In those countries where absolute government was not a fiction but a reality, was it found that the noble Lord had ever attempted to incite any nation whatever to make a change in their form of government? But, when we came to countries where absolute forms of government had failed of themselves—where despotism was not destroyed but worn out—where the king could not reign, not because of rebellion and anarchy, but because the affection and loyalty of his people had left him—in those countries, no doubt, the noble Lord might be said in some degree to have interfered. But had he interfered alone? Was it not in concert with the great Powers of Europe? In Belgium, in Portugal, in Spain, and in Greece— countries which had risen into constitutional States under the auspices of England—no doubt the noble Lord had interfered; but he had done so to give the people those vents which we were led to believe were, in free countries, the safety valves to protect them from revolutions. This brought him to the consideration of our claims upon Greece. And here it occurred to him that hon. Gentlemen who had censured the conduct of the noble Lord in remonstrating with the Greek Government were not altogether familiar with the condition of that Government, or of the institutions of the country. He had been in Greece, and he thought he was to some extent acquainted with its constitution and forms of government. It had been his good fortune to have received the utmost hospitality from the party who represented English interests in Greece. He believed that in our relations with that country we had acted with a certain acerbity and persistance which might have been avoided. It was, however, very difficult for those who had assisted in the establishment of constitutional governments to leave them alone as substantial realities, and to declare that they would have nothing more to say to them. The truth was, that these countries, not being in the habit of constitutional government, were constantly applying for assistance and advice to those who had assisted in its establishment, and therefore it became a matter of extreme difficulty for a Foreign Minister to steer a course in which he was not either the leader or the opponent of a party. This was often the case, and it was almost impossible for the Foreign Minister of England to avoid exercising an enormous amount of influence, one way or the other. On the whole, he believed that the interference of England of late years had been exercised with great discretion and moderation. It had been exercised in Spain and Greece, where he had witnessed its effects, always for the advancement of constitutional liberty. He contended that the position of England in the Mediterranean was a defensive and not an offensive one, because, if we were to maintain our protectorate or our possessions there, we could not allow Greece or Spain to fall into the hands of a dominant Power. In defending the policy of the noble Lord from the accusations which had been made against it, he felt that he was addressing that small portion of the House who approved of the insular policy of the coun- try, for he could not think that those who supported the Government of which the Earl of Aberdeen was a Member, which interfered quite as much as that of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, could now come forward and blame him for the manner in which he had acted in constitutional countries. He confessed that he could not find in the administration of the affairs of the Foreign Office by the Earl of Aberdeen that difference, as compared with the administration of his noble Friend, which hon. Gentlemen opposite appeared to see. He denied that there was anything different in the policy of the noble Lord, which ought to induce hon. Gentlemen opposite to risk the peace of the country, and the dignity of their fellow-subjects, for the purpose of turning the noble Lord out of office. It was true that, since the Earl of Aberdeen had quitted office, they had heard demonstrations from him which appeared so contradictory to his former policy, that it was difficult to imagine how opposition could alter the tone of so great a man. The Earl of Aberdeen had recognised the French revolution of 1830 as early as the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs had recognised that of 1848; but since 1848 the Earl of Aberdeen had blamed the policy of the noble Lord with reference to the Republic, and had constantly been sneering at that great country. He owned he was left to the conviction that, in this important crisis of affairs, the question at issue was, whether England would adopt the constitutional principle throughout Europe, or join that combination of absolute power which at this moment threatened to overthrow all the good which had been effected. If they were now to prevent the development of free constitutions, they would have to announce to the world that the onward march of improvement was stayed. They would have to tell Prussia that she should halt in the good cause she had begun; and if they let the Government of France believe it was the wish of the people of England to keep public opinion down by a display of military force, they would establish over the whole of Europe a great present evil, and prepare for France one of the most frightful destinies in the history of nations. Were there not countries at this moment whose cruelty and arbitrary exercise of power was heaping up retribution at no distant day; and was not despotic power making an attempt to destroy all that had been gained in the contest for freedom? Was this, then, a moment to throw the moral weight of England in the scale of despotism against that of freedom? He believed the English people did not take that view of the question. If the chance of the division that night brought about a change of Government, and if that change of Government was preceded or followed by an appeal to the people of the country, before whom the facts of the case were put, he was confident that the temperate, calm, and moderate support which the noble Lord had given to free constitutions all over the world would meet with their cordial approval. He believed, if the people were told that it was this country of Greece—which England had called into existence, and for which she was now paying 240,000 l. a year—that had treated British subjects with scorn and contumely, they would not find fault with the policy of the noble Lord. He believed that considerable misapprehension prevailed with reference to the constitution and legal tribunals of Greece. Those tribunals were gradually becoming as good as any in the world. If the case of Mr. Finlay and that of M. Pacifico had occurred twenty years ago, they would have been tried in the Consular Court of the Ottoman empire, according to our laws and customs, and the matter would have been disposed of long since; but in a new country of free institutions it was different, because it was expected that the claims of British subjects would be considered by the tribunals of the country such as they were, and that the same justice would be awarded to a foreigner as to a native. But it was said that we were treating a weak country differently to a strong one; but Greece had acted in a way in which no strong country would or could act. If the case of the insult to the Fantome had occurred in a strong country, such as Russia or France, the Government of the country would have hastened to make an apology. Could it be supposed, that if the property of an English subject had been taken or destroyed in the possessions of any of the German princes, reparation would not have been made? If the same thing had occurred in the kingdom of Bavaria, there would not have been any difference with the English Government; or if a French merchant's house were attacked in this country in an anti-Maynooth row, and proof were given of injustice inflicted, would any one suppose that the House of Commons would have hesitated to make reparation for the outrage? If we erred at all in our foreign policy, would it not be much better to err on the side of excessive generosity? If this case were placed before the people of England, and if it were said to them, "Do you mean to ratify the resolution of the House of Lords, while the French, German, and American merchant is able to appeal to his country against injustice and wrong?" he was sure the unanimous voice of the people would affirm that policy which was consistent with the law of nations, and reconcilable with the dictates of moderation and justice. He believed that, by negativing the Motion, they would leave the English merchant and the English traveller unprotected and subjected to outrages in all parts of the world. If the House should come to any such resolution, still he was convinced that the English people at large would entertain a different opinion, and that the question would again have to be debated in a very different temper and under less favourable circumstances than at present. Look at what happened in the case of Mr. Pritchard, and the solemnity of manner with which the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth came down to defend him. On that occasion, the right hon. Gentleman said, "We will not leave the defenders and propagators of our faith unprotected." He (Mr. M. Milnes) believed that, if the House negatived the Motion, great injury would be inflicted on the people of England. They would not, however, by any such decision, alter the law of nations, which was founded on the necessity of things, and not on any fantastical notions or logical subtleties. He would appeal to hon. Gentlemen opposite whether they might not find some more appropriate occasion to express their differences of opinion from the Government, and some worthier object to attack than his noble Friend. It was now four years since the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth had retired from office, and he (Mr. M. Milnes) could not say with what admiration he had observed the constant and unfactious support which the right hon. Gentleman and his followers had during that period given to the Queen's Government. They had supported the Government, not only because that on many points they agreed with them; but because they would not allow mere personal matters to disturb Her Majesty's Ministers in conducting the affairs of the country. He regretted now that on a mere personal question, and one having no reference to our national greatness, they had come forward to create embarrassment. Surely hon. Gentlemen opposite must have observed that their mode of reasoning was email—that they had treated the question in detail, and left to them (the Government supporters) the duty of vindicating great principles. If, therefore, on this day—the anniversary of the right hon. Baronet's retirement from office—a new opposition was organised, it would detract greatly from the character and influence of himself and his supporters. Such an opposition, implicating, as it did, not only the character of a great statesman, but the honour and power of the British nation, would greatly retard those objects which they all had at heart, namely, the progress of civilisation and constitutional liberty over the whole of Europe.

I have heard from several Gentlemen around me, some of whom I do not think extremely democratic, whom I have by no means found always supporting extreme liberalism, very intolerant expressions towards those who do not take the same view with themselves in relation to the Government on this occasion. I will ask those hon. Gentlemen, do they think me an ally of Russia or of Austria? Do they think I have shown less sympathy for the Hungarians or Italians than they have—that I have less fervent cosmopolitan sympathies than they? If, then, they admit me to be as liberal as themselves, surely they may allow me the freedom of taking the view my conscience dictates in a matter which has nothing on earth to do with questions of constitutionalism or despotism.

As I understand it, the first thing before us is the conduct of our Government in Greece, though the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has widened that question, by the wording of his resolution, so as to cover the whole foreign policy of the Government. But as to the conduct of our Government in Greece, why, if this subject had been set before us in February, or even in March, within a few weeks after we had heard that fifteen British vessels of war had assembled in the Bay of Salamis to blockade the coast of a friendly Power, there would scarcely have been any difficulty in approaching the subject in a calm and dispassionate way, apart from all the extraneous matter with which it has been now encumbered. Really, when those who oppose this Motion are off-hand charged with plot, conspiracy, and cabal, I am tempted to ask whether there has not been some little plot, conspiracy, and cabal to get up an artificial excitement in the country on this subject? Yes, I have seen placards and circulars; I am not speaking without knowledge. However, the question is, what was the conduct of our Government in relation to the affairs of Greece? I have not brought my blue books down with me, and I shall not read a single line to you; but, as there is much mystification on the subject, and as I wish to deal fairly with all, I will state the case in a few words, so that no one may take exception to it.

In the first place, Mr. Finlay, a Scotch gentleman, settles in Greece more than twenty years ago, taking up his residence at Athens, not as a merchant, not to promote British commerce in that quarter of the world, but as a denizen of Greece. He purchases land in Athens, and the neighbourhood; I have walked over the land, and I saw the much discussed palace, just as it was rising from this land. He bought land on speculation, not only in Athens, but in the neighbourhood. Mr. Finlay thus became interested in the prosperity of Athens. The Court of Greece and its Government were at this time established at Nauplia; it was desired by the proprietors and inhabitants of Athens that the Governvernment should resume its ancient and classic seat, by removing to Athens. The landed proprietors of Athens deeply interested in again making it the metropolis of Greece, instead of allowing it to remain what it was, little better than a village of huts, all signed an engagement with the commune or municipality of Athens, to furnish land for erecting public buildings upon, the price fixed being equivalent to about 3¼ d. to 3½ d. per square yard.

I do not intend to go through all the correspondence on the subject of Mr. Finlay's claim; I merely want to bring the matter to the point on which you must all agree. Mr. Finlay was one of more than 100 persons who thus sold land to the Greek Government; that is admitted by all parties in the correspondence. Among those proprietors who sold their land for palaces and public buildings were several foreigners, and among these foreigners were two whom Sir E. Lyons, in his first letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, speaks of as fellow-sufferers with Mr. Finlay, Mr. Hill, the agent of the Episcopalian Society of America, and the Russian Consul General. These are facts that nobody denies. I do not desire to go into any controversy, but simply to draw the attention of the House and of the country to the fact that all the other proprietors of these lands, without exception, agreed to the terms, and accepted the terms, that were offered by the commissioners appointed by the municipality for that purpose. ["No!"] Does the hon. and learned Member for Southampton, with his blue book before him, mean to say that the fact is not stated in that blue book as I have given it? [Mr. COCKBURN: No!] Why, it is stated there expressly. ["No!"] Will the hon. and learned Member tell me that Mr. Hill and the Russian Consul General did not accept the money, or that they did not stand in the same position with Mr. Finlay? I know Mr. Hill; it is an honour to any one to be acquainted with him; for, as it is well stated by Sir E. Lyons, in that first letter to which I have referred, there is no one to whom the rising generation of Greeks is more indebted than to Mr. Hill and his family. Now, the fact to which I wish particularly to draw your attention is this, that Mr. Finlay repeatedly refused to accept from the Greek Government the same price for his land as was eagerly accepted by Mr. Hill, and the Russian Consul for theirs; a long controversy ensued, and the result was the approach of our ships of war to the Bay of Salamis. I have not stated anything so far that any one can deny. Now, we come to M. Pacifico. M. Pacifico has his house outrageously attacked by a mob: that no one can deny; his furniture is destroyed; he sends in his bill to the Government, and, with that bill in our hands, our ships of war enter the Piræus. I blushed with indignation when I read the inventory of M. Pacifico's furniture. It is no matter of surprise that hon. Members have deprecated any allusion to the details of that bill, as if nearly the whole of this question was not a question of details. ["No, no!"] Why, with the exception of the apology required for the insult to the Fantome, all the rest is a matter of money. ["No!"] I beg pardon; I say all the rest is a matter of money, and your exclamations only show how you are acting in this case upon blind passion and party spirit.

M. Pacifico sends in his bill to the Government; he charges for a bedstead 150 l.; for the sheets 30 l.; for the pillowcase 10 l.; for two coverlids 25 l. This inventory is so deeply disgraceful to all concerned in it, that, first, you tried to evade the question, by saying the case was not one for details, and then you turned round and said that M. Pacifico brought all this furniture to Athens, to sell it to the King of Greece. But if we go into the bill for the personal apparel, the every-day wearing apparel of M. Pacifico and his family, we find there just the same sort of thing; it is all in unison with the 15 l. bedstead. Why, there is a gold watch with appendages put down at 50 l. for one of the items. And all this rich furniture and costly wearing apparel was claimed by a man who the next month declared himself ruined and destitute, and himself and family dependent on alms for their daily bread!

When I first read the account, I thought the whole thing was a mistake, and that, in writing out the bill, pounds sterling had been put down instead of drachmas, for I am pretty sure that in every case, drachmas instead of pounds would have much more nearly represented the real value of the articles. Next comes the case of the plunder of the six Ionian boats at Salcina, and their demand for 235 l. —for I will not enter into details; then the case of the four Ionians, who charged the Greek authorities with having outraged them, and thumb-screwed them, two at Patras, and two at Pyrgos; the Greek authorities controvert the statement of our Consul upon this subject, and the correspondence altogether puzzles us as to who is right and who wrong: but the noble Lord, nothing doubting, settles the matter in a few lines by ordering that the four complainants shall be paid 20 l. each by the Greek Government.

Then comes the Fantome case. A British ship-of-war is lying off Patras; a boat goes on shore at nine o'clock at night, when it is dark; the coxswain lands, not at the usual place of disembarkation, but on the beach; on his return he is taken into custody by two officials, and, along with a midshipman and a boat's crew, conveyed to the station, in default of not giving a satisfactory account of himself, the Greeks, bear you in mind, not speaking one word of English, nor the Englishmen one word of Greek. Now, suppose a Frenchman landing in the same way from a boat, by night, near Brighton, not at the ordinary landing place, but on the beach, and observed by preventive officers, neither party understanding one word of the other's language, and mutual explanation being consequently impossible. Why, the blockademen would at once put the landing party down for a French smuggler, and would take him into custody, and convey him to the station, where an interpreter being procured, the explanation required would be supplied, and the arrested person be dismissed with all proper apology. This was precisely what was done to the midshipman. As soon as an interpreter was found, and it was ascertained who the Englishman was, he was at once liberated, and respectfully conveyed to his ship.

There you have the statement of all our grievances against Greece. I will not go into the merits of them; say the Greeks were wrong, or we were wrong, just as you please; but admit they were wrong, and what I want to know is, whether the wrong was not one that might have been readily settled by other means than by sending fifteen ships of war into the Bay of Salamis? I know I take a very vulgar, mercenary view of the matter, but I re- peat my question—Was there no other way to settle this question than by this immense array of force? It is quite evident that the only reason why this entire matter was not settled before was the bad spirit that existed between our representative and the Government of Greece. I do not speak disparagingly of Sir Edmund Lyons; any other functionary, under the same circumstances, could scarcely have been so long there, any more than at Madrid, or elsewhere, without getting mixed up with the local politics in the same way that Sir Edmund Lyons was. That was the reason why it was found that for six or nine months letters addressed by Sir E. Lyons to the Greek Government remained unanswered, and why there had been no adjustment of these petty differences until it was necessary to send fifteen ships of war to Athens.

Now, is there not something wrong at the bottom of this, and something that requires to be mended? Is it worth while to have an Ambassador there with 5,000 l. a year embroiling you with the Government, and begetting bad blood and animosity? Why, I would rather have no one but a Consul at the Piræus, whose duty it should be to look after your commerce, and who should be told "Never to go to Athens at all, for if you mix yourself up with political matters, somebody else shall be appointed in your place." If you would do this, you would avoid the absurdity of having to employ fifteen vessels of war to collect a debt of 6,000 l. But everybody said that something else was meant besides obtaining redress for injuries to British subjects in Greece. It is said that the noble Viscount intended this demonstration at Athens as a menace to Russia. But how does this answer its purpose as a demonstration against Russia? The moment the Court of Russia hear of the demonstration, I find that they send a remonstrance against the Government of this country—a remonstrance couched in language I never expected to hear from a semi-barbarous country like Russia to this: read, I ask you, the extraordinary language used by Count Nesselrode to Lord Palmerston, and then read the answer of the latter, and see how different is the tone adopted by him to a country which is powerful, compared with that he makes use of to one that is weak. Well, then, I ask again what was the advantage of this demonstration, when the only result of it is a hectoring epistle from Count Nesselrode, to which the noble Viscount sent a very meek and lamb-like reply?

One reason why I abhor the policy of injustice and aggression—for I call it injustice and aggression to send ships of war against a weak country to enforce disputed claims which might have been amicably settled—is, that you place yourselves in such a position that you are obliged to submit to language like this from the Russian Court. And why are you obliged to submit to it? Because you are committing an injustice, and conscious you do so; for otherwise, so far from this country being in a condition to be menaced by by Russia, such are the advantages you possess in your great wealth, and your maritime commerce, in the knowledge and use of mechanical science, and in the advanced state of the arts over Russia, that if you behaved with dignity to small States, she would not venture even to look at you disparagingly, far less to use such language towards you. I have asked why was not this affair settled by other means than by ships of war?

I now come to a part of the policy and conduct of the Foreign Office altogether irreconcilable to the notions of those hon. Gentlemen who did me the honour last year, to the number of eighty, of voting for my Motion in favour of international arbitration. I beg you to take a survey of my hon. Friends here, and ask, if you have not a consciousness of how they at least ought to vote on this question? The Motion I brought forward last year was to the effect, that in all disputes with other countries which you could not settle by amicable means, you should resort to arbitration. It is quite clear, it is said, that the noble Viscount could not resort to arbitration. My charge against him is, that he did resort to arbitration after having made use in the first place of fifteen ships of war. No sooner was this demonstration known than an envoy arrives from France with tenders of mediation. And now I must say, I have read, with feelings nearly akin to contempt for diplomacy, the accounts of what took place between the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office and M. Drouyn de Lhuys—I have read the French accounts, and the accounts in the blue books, and I have felt the most sovereign contempt for diplomacy. M. Drouyn de Lhuys came over in the most loyal spirit, as I believe, to offer to settle this beggarly affair of a few thousand pounds with Greece. He told the noble Lord frankly, as a proof of his sincerity, and the noble Lord has repeated it in a letter to the Marquess of Normanby, that it would be useful to the French Government to be allowed to settle it, or, to use a common American phrase, that it would give them "political capital" in France. How did the noble Lord receive the approaches of M. Drouyn de Lhuys? Was it in the way that a man of business, accustomed to the management of affairs, would have done? Did he say, "We are much obliged to you; this affair of a few thousands has been a long time standing over, take it and settle it, and we shall be very much obliged to the Government of France?" Would not that have been the rational and reasonable way of meeting him? Instead of this, what does the noble Viscount say? He higgles with M. Drouyn de Lhuys over the different words to be used—over "good offices," "mediation," and "arbitration." I declare that both in French and English it fairly puzzles one to make anything out of it, but it appears, by the accounts, that the noble Lord insists he won't take "arbitration"—it must be "good offices." M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in the French account of what took place, given by him to General Lahitte, describes himself to have entreated the noble Lord to extend a little the powers of the negotiators—to yield to an arbitration. But no; the noble Viscount was determined to have what he demanded; and all he would require of France was to persuade Greece to give what he asked. Baron Gros went out to Athens crippled by these conditions, but he set to work at once with Mr. Wyse. I think it is evident Baron Gros had the most earnest desire to settle the matter. Indeed, his character as a diplomatist was largely connected with his success in arranging it, and he went to work evidently disposed to surmount every possible difficulty; but, when he came to the case of M. Pacifico, and heard from all he conversed with in Athens the real facts of the case—when he discovered it was a barefaced attempt at swindling, he gave up the effort to effect an arrangement in despair.

What was going on at the very same time in London? At this very same moment commence the "good offices" between the noble Lord and M. Drouyn de Lhuys. So he has two negotiations going, one at Athens and the other at London, and all to settle this paltry affair of a few thou- sand pounds. It ended as might be expected—a little delay on the part of a courier — some mistake or delay in not putting a letter into the letter bag in time for the night's post, and the whole affair was broken off in Athens before they in London could know what was doing. The negotiations were thrown aside—our ships were ordered to do their worst—Greece submitted—and you got your money. What follows? The French Government, irritated by your conduct, withdraws its Minister—and now comes the quarrel I have with the noble Lord.

Now comes my case against him for not accepting arbitration in the first instance. Actually, after your ships of war had extorted the money from Greece, and a large part of it was already placed in the bank, the noble Viscount consented, in the most humiliating way—for I consider the communications received from the Marquess of Normanby most humiliating—to accept what he had before refused, and you have now returned to this state, that by France withdrawing its Ambassador you are obliged to do away all you have done by means of your fifteen ships of war; and you have agreed to substitute the convention of London for the terms you obtained by your fleet at Athens. Yes; have you not agreed to give up the money lodged in the bank for payment? What do you call that? Your ships of war extort money from the Government of Greece; the French Government tells you "Give that money back; you must take the terms of the convention of London." We yield, and so the matter ends. But no, it is not yet ended. And here is my complaint against the noble Lord. It seems as if the system at the Foreign Office is calculated to breed and perpetuate quarrels. First, you submit to rebuke from Russia, and next you are humiliated before France—the two countries some of our very knowing people say we intended to terrify by our demonstration against Greece; but the question is not yet settled. There are three arbitrators appointed to settle the question of M. Pacifico's claim against the Court of Lisbon. As my hon. Friends near me, who voted for my Motion, will see, they have been obliged to resort to my plan of arbitration, after all the display of force. I cannot imagine a more complete triumph of the principle I advocated last year than the details of this proceeding. ["Oh, oh!"] Why here are hon. Gentlemen behind me groaning. I am not surprised at it, they must be groaning at the thought of their own inconsistency. For what are we called on to vote? That this matter has been most ably, justly, and dexterously managed. But I do not think it is finished at all.

It is said that there is some cause of quarrel with Russia, on account of vessels seized in the Levant and in the Greek ports, and M. Brunow has given us notice he may have reclamations to make for the value of the property which fell into our hands, and for the loss we occasioned, and I should not be surprised if you had another blue book very soon, containing correspondence with respect to seizures of Russian ships; and all this has arisen because the Foreign Office would not two months earlier submit the whole of this pettifogging business to arbitration. France would have been proud to be your arbitrator; you refused her. Then came the convention, and last comes an arbitration on the whole matter; only you submit on the most humiliating terms to conditions you had before refused.

Now let us take in two sums what the actual result has been, in so far as we have gone, in obtaining what we demanded. Our whole claim on the Greek Government was 33,000 l. The whole amount we have actually received is 6,400 l.; so that as we stand at present we appear before the nations of the world as having made a demand for 33,000 l., and as having, up to the present moment, received only 6,400 l.; and that will show, in the face of the world, what the extent of your injustice was in comparison with the justice of your claims. In my opinion, this is three times as much as you were entitled to; and, looking to the claims of M. Pacifico, and to the opinions of Baron Gros respecting them, I declare to you most solemnly my firm belief, that if the people of England understood the merits of this question, and if they had read, as I have done, the contents of the blue books and of the inventory—such is the opinion I have of the generosity and justice of my countrymen, that in spite of the galvanic effort to make this a party question, they would be so disgusted that they would raise a subscription to pay back the Greek Government the money it has given you. In the next place, besides a vote of approbation on account of this Greek affair, we are asked to identify ourselves with the foreign policy of the Government since their accession to office. Now, I should be the most inconsistent being on the face of the earth, if I gave such a vote. Not many years ago I had to denounce at a public meeting I called in Manchester, the conduct of the noble Lord in the case of Syria, and I remember afterwards denouncing his proceedings in Portugal also. I moved in this House for a return of any vessels of war belonging to us which were at the time lying in the Tagus in consequence of that business. I protested, too, at a public meeting, and before a most enthusiastic audience, on the noble Lord's conduct in the affairs of Sicily, and I am now called on to vote my approbation of the proceedings of the Foreign Office during the existence of the present Administration. Why, I say, if I did so, and gave that vote, I think my mouth ought to be closed on any question of economy, retrenchment, or possibility of reducing our establishments, for ever, because I am quite sure, if this system is to continue, and if you are to send fifteen ships of war to collect debts of 6,400 l., you not only cannot reduce your warlike establishments, but you have not establishments enough.

There has been a great deal said during the debate about the principle of non-intervention; but this is a principle which I thought was acknowledged and admitted by all parties. Hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House have never, since the time of the Reform Bill, thought of anything so absurd as obtaining popularity by the peculiar characteristic of being the meddlers in the affairs of other countries. I cannot say there is as much wisdom on this side of the House, for there seems to me a disposition here to take merit to the party, because it has for its principle to interfere in the affairs of other nations. That was not the doctrine of Earl Grey. I remember the speech of the noble Lord in 1830. Nothing electrified the country more than that exposition of his principles. He spoke of the wars—of Mr. Pitt and of his successors—of the 800,000,000 l. of expenditure incurred in those wars, and he pledged himself to the country that peace, non-intervention, and retrenchment should be the watchwords of the Whig party. Now, I ask the country fairly to decide whether the tone and language of the speakers on this side of the House, on this night, and in the course of this debate, have been in harmony and unison with that sentiment of Lord Grey? Why, what has been the language of the hon. and learned Member for Southampton, and for which he has been cheered to the echo? One half the Treasury benches were left empty, while hon. Members ran one after another, tumbling over each other in their haste, to shake hands with the hon. and learned Member. Well, what did the hon. and learned Member say? I pass over his sneer against the men of peace and men of cotton, because we must allow gentlemen of the long robe some latitude when they forget the arena in which they are displaying their powers; but what would Earl Grey have said to the doctrine of the hon. and learned Gentleman, that we have no prospect of peace with the countries of Europe till they have adopted constitutional Governments? What sort of constitutional Governments? Is it our own? Why, even if they came so far as this, and suppose they adopt our form of government, might not hon. Members in the Assembly at Washington get up and say, "We will have no peace till we make the world republican?" The hon. and learned Gentleman seems to have set out with the doctrine that we ought to interfere with the forms of government of the nations of Europe; and, judging from the noble Lord's speech, I must say he appears to be no unwilling pupil in that school of policy. If the House of Commons votes its approbation of such sentiments, and the noble Lord acts on them, I think the Foreign Office will have undertaken the reform and constitutionalising of every country on the face of the earth. But do you think the people of this country, when they get cool, will see the wisdom of carrying out such a course? I claim for myself as much sympathy for foreigners struggling for liberty as any one in this House; but it is not true, as the hon. and learned Member for Bath said, that I ever attended a public meeting, and said I was in favour of going to war, and that I made an exception from my general principles in favour of Hungary.

Will the hon. Member allow me to state what I did say? It was this—that the hon. Member, having made a speech in unison with the feelings of the meeting, made an apology to them because he was about to add a few words as to the war in Hungary; that he had been peaceful in everything else, but that he was warlike there.

I am glad the hon. and learned Gentleman has stated this, and that I misunderstand him, as it may prevent my being misunderstood in future. I never in public advocated interference with the Governments of foreign countries, even in cases where my feelings were most strongly interested in anything relating to their domestic affairs or concerns. [ Cries of "The Russian Loan!"] When I see that principle violated by others, as in the case of the Russian invasion of Hungary—and when I see a portion of the press of this civilised nation hounding on that semi-barbarous empire, then, believing that this is almost the only country where there is a free platform, and where it cannot be corrupted, as a portion of the press may have been, I shall denounce it, as I denounced the Government of Russia. But it is a matter of very small importance what my individual opinion may be when you come to the question, whether the Government of this country shall become the propagandist of their opinions in foreign countries. I maintain they have no right to communicate, except through the Government of other countries, and that whether it be a republic, a despotism, or a monarchy, I hold they have no right to interfere. Mark the effect of your own principle if you take the opposite ground. If you claim the right of intervention in your Government, you must tolerate it in other nations also. With what face could you get up and denounce the Emperor of Russia for invading Hungary after the doctrine advocated by the hon. and learned Member to-night, had been adopted by this country? I say, if you want to benefit nations struggling for their freedom, establish as one of the maxims of international law the principle of non-intervention. If you want to give a guarantee for peace, and, as I believe, the surest guarantee for progress and freedom, lay down this principle and act on it—that no foreign State has a right by force to interfere with the domestic concerns of another State, even to confer what you conceive to be a benefit upon it, against its own consent. What will you say respecting the conduct of the noble Lord in the case of Switzerland? He joined there in an intervention, though the great majority of the Protestant cantons protested against it.

But I come back to the principle. Do you want to benefit the Hungarians? I will tell you the sentiments of the leading Hungarians. I have seen them all, and I must say that, much as I admired them during their noble struggle, what I have seen of them in adversity has entitled them to still greater respect, for I never saw men endure adversity with more manly fortitude and dignified self-respect. They have avoided all expressions of sympathy from public meetings, and (loathing the idea of being dependent on the charity of others) have sought, by emigration to America and elsewhere, an opportunity of subsisting by the labour of their own hands. These men say, "We don't ask you to help us, or to come to our assistance. Establish such a principle as shall provide we shall not be interfered with by others." And what do the Italians say? They don't want the English to interfere with them or to help them. "Leave us to ourselves," say they. "Establish the principle that we shall not be interfered with by foreigners." [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] I will answer the hon. and learned Gentleman's cheer. He seems to ask, how will you keep out Austria from Italy, and Russia from Hungary? Why, by setting a good example ourselves, and then, if necessary, by protesting against the violation of the principle by others. I will give him an illustration of what I mean. Does he remember when Kossuth took refuge in Turkey, and Austria and the Emperor of Russia demanded him back? I beg him to understand that that illustrious refugee was not saved by any intervention of the Foreign Secretary. Has it not been admitted that the Emperor of Russia gave up his claim before the courier arrived from England? What was it then that liberated them? It was the universal outburst of public opinion and public indignation in Western Europe. And why had public opinion this power? Because this demand for the extradition of political offenders was a violation of the law of nations, which declares that persons who have committed political offences in one State shall find a sanctuary in another, and ought not to be delivered up. But then the great Powers invariably obey this law themselves, and respect the neutrality of even their weakest neighbours; and hence the moral power which public opinion exercised when it protested against the demand of Russia and Austria. If our Government were always to act upon the principle of non-intervention, we should see the law of nations declaring itself as clearly against the invasion of a foreign country as it has spoken out against the extradition of political refugees. Let us begin and set the example to other nations of non-intervention. I have no doubt that our example and protest would influence the Governments of Austria and Russia; but what possible moral influence can this country have with those States when the Government goes abroad to interfere with the domestic affairs of other countries? It is said, however, that the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary goes abroad as the champion of liberalism and constitutionalism. But I cannot fall into this delusion. I cannot trace this battle that we are taught to believe is going on under the noble Viscount's auspices between liberalism and despotism abroad. I do not think that the noble Lord is more democratic than his colleagues, or than the right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Tamworth. I believe the noble Lord is of an active turn of mind—that he likes these protocols and conventions—and that the smaller the subject the better it suits his taste. I do not find that the noble Lord has taken up any great question of constitutional freedom abroad. Did he ever protest against the invasion of Hungary by Russia? He made a speech against Austria, I remember, on one occasion, but he did not breathe a syllable against Russia. The only allusion he made to Russia was in the nature of an apology, uttered in a sense that seemed to justify the part taken by Russia rather than otherwise. Then it is said that in Italy the noble Lord endeavours to establish constitutional government, and representative institutions. I always thought there was great exaggeration upon this subject; but the noble Foreign Secretary has himself dispelled the illusion, for he has frankly told us in his speech that he sent the Earl of Minto to the different courts of Italy, not to recommend parliaments or representative assemblies, but merely to advise the Governments to adopt administrative reforms. But that was not what the Italian people wanted. They wanted security for their liberties by constitutional reforms, and the adoption of a representative system; and that was what the noble Lord did not recommend should be given to them.

I believe the progress of freedom depends more upon the maintenance of peace, the spread of commerce, and the diffusion of education, than upon the labours of cabinets and foreign offices. And if you prevent those perturbations which have recently taken place abroad in consequence of your foreign policy, and if you will leave other nations in greater tranquillity, those ideas of freedom will continue to progress, and you need not trouble yourself about them. On this side of the House some persons have been menaced with very terrible consequences, if they do not vote for this resolution. I can only say that I, like many other hon. Members, sit commonly here and in Committee-rooms of this House for twelve hours in the course of the day. Allow two or three hours a day for the transaction of necessary business at home, and that is not play, but hard work. But why should we undergo this labour unless to advocate those opinions and convictions which we believe to be true and just? If I have one conviction stronger than another, it is in favour of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic concerns of other nations. That principle is involved in this Motion; and upon it, for fifteen years, my opinion has been again and again recorded. I have never seen reason to change that opinion, but, on the contrary, every thing confirms me in my conviction of its truth. If I remain in this seat, I will try to promote the triumph of that principle; and happy should I be to be able to hasten in the slightest degree the advent of the day when the intercourse of nations will exhibit the same benign changes as have taken place in the intercourse of individuals. In private life we no longer find it necessary to carry arms for our protection, as did our forefathers. There has been the discontinuance of the practice of duelling; and something should be done to carry the same spirit into the intercourse of nations. In domestic life physical correction is giving way to moral influence. In schools and in lunatic asylums, this principle is successfully adopted; and even the training of the lower animals is found to be better done by kindness than coercion. Can't you adopt this principle in the intercourse of nations? Whoever brings forward such measures shall have my support; and, if it should happen, as the hon. Member has threatened me, that the consequences of my vote shall be the loss of my seat in this House, then I say, that next to the satisfaction of having contributed to the advance of one's convictions is, in my opinion, the consciousness of having sacrificed something for them.

Mr. Speaker, however extended in point of duration the debate has been, and however exhausted the topics that have been introduced into the discussion, I think the House will admit that I should not be acting in conformity with a sense of duty if I abstained from assigning the grounds on which my vote will be given. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Southampton has demanded a full explanation of the circumstances under which that vote will be given. Sir, he shall have that explanation. I have no reserve. The hon. and learned Member has stated that there is a dishonourable conspiracy formed against Her Majesty's Government. Sir, a more unfounded charge never was preferred. He presumes that there has been some base compromise between Gentlemen sitting on this side of the House, but holding different opinions upon matters of vital interest. He is wholly mistaken. There has been no such compromise. He talks of there being three courses to pursue; he tells us there are three combinations by which office may be obtained. He says, "I demand to know which of these three courses you contemplate." Now, is it not possible for the hon. and learned Gentleman to suppose that there may be a fourth? Is it not possible for him to speculate upon the possibility that men in this House may intend to give their votes without reference to political combinations? Does he exclude the possibility of that fourth course of action, which arises from a conscientious conviction as to the truth? Is that excluded from his contemplation? May it not be possible that men cannot subscribe to a resolution which asserts that a certain course has been best calculated to preserve peace and to support the honour and dignity of this country? Is it not possible that, without reference to party or personal interests, men may decline to affirm a resolution which deals with principles of greater importance to the welfare of this country for good or for evil than have ever been under the consideration of the House? Sir, I will not forget, and I need not remind the House, that I have given, or attempted to give, to Her Majesty's Government my support—I will say my cordial support—during the last four years. In utter oblivion of the circumstances under which they succeeded to power, I have felt it my duty to give them, not an ostentatious, but, because it was not ostentatious, a not the less effective support. I have not the honour and advantage of possessing their personal friendship; I have never been in political connexion with them. I have held no communication with them during the last four years which may not be had by any Member of this House, who may be the most independent and the most unconnected with their policy. I have given them my support, because I cordially approved of the policy which they carried into domestic affairs. I think that their policy in domestic affairs has been a liberal and conservative policy. I have agreed with them, and I repeat it now, with respect to the principle of commercial freedom. So far from a base compromise having taken place between myself and the Gentlemen who sit near me, and whose confidence I have had the misfortune to forfeit, every day that passes convinces me more and more that upon the cordial adoption of, and the unequivocal adhesion to, those principles of commercial policy, the peace and true interests of this country depend. I have said enough, I hope, to prove to the hon. and learned Member, that for myself, as I know, and for others, as I believe, there has been none of that base compromise that he supposes has dictated our unanimity upon this occasion. I feel as grateful to Her Majesty's Government as one public man can feel to others for the maintenance of those principles which regulate the monetary affairs of this country. I concur with them as to their Irish policy. I have not forgotten the declaration I made with respect to Ireland on the day upon which I quitted office, and I retain the opinion which I then expressed, that your true policy towards Ireland is to maintain civil equality as the privilege of all Her Majesty's subjects, and not to permit religious differences of opinion to constitute a disqualification for the favour of the Crown. It is because I concur with them as to the general principles of their policy that I, agreeing with them in their commercial legislation, and agreeing with them, as I have said, in the general outlines of their policy (I do not speak of the particular opinions which they may entertain, but only of the legislative measures produced by them with reference to the internal circumstances of the country), have been able, speaking generally, to give to their measures my support. I laugh to scorn the imputation that I have some connexion with foreign conspirators. I believe of others, and I know of myself, that I repudiate any dictation from any person who is not immediately connected with the interests of my own country. I utterly disbelieve the existence of any such conspiracy. With respect to the combination of political opponents, of course in the conduct of party there must be concert and combination in the interest and movements of party. I speak not of this concert with the slightest disrespect; but I may say for myself, as the hon. and learned Member demands the full truth, that so little have I been a party to any such combination, that I never saw the resolution submitted by the noble Lord in the other House, and voted by the Lords, until I read it in the newspapers. I knew as little of the concoction, and was concerned as little with the proposal of this resolution, as the noble Lord against whom it was directed. I do not labour, therefore, under any influence which can prevent me from giving a fair and dispassionate consideration to the resolution proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. It is said, however, that after four years' patient endurance—after four years' neutrality and silence—I and others have come forward to condemn the conduct of the Government. Sir, I have come forward with no condemnation of the Government. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield demands from me to acquiesce in a declaration of positive approbation; and not only that, but he demands from me the assertion of principles, the consideration of which is tenfold more important than the saving of a Ministry can be. Sir, there have been—and I will not forget it on this occasion—there have been occasions on which I have supported the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. I supported it with respect to Portugal. I did not concur in the vote of censure with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Spain, because I thought it would be unjust to Sir Henry Bulwer, and would be too severe a visitation for any offence which Her Majesty's Government and the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary had committed. But I took the occasion of expressing my regret that the tone assumed by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs towards Spain was not calculated to conciliate the goodwill of the people of that country. Sir, the most important point in the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government I concurred in. I agreed with them in the recognition of the French Republic, and as to the policy of recognising the Government which appeared to be most conformable to the will of the French people. I go further, and say that I think such a recognition ought I not to be a cold reluctant acquiescence in an unavoidable necessity. I believe that, without reference to the constitution of the Government, the true policy is to maintain friendly relations with that great people on the other side of the Channel— to cultivate a good understanding with them—to show a disposition to place confidence in them. And it is because I concur in that policy—because I am favourable to the cultivation of a good understanding with France, that I now ask you, the Government, to give an account of your French relations, and to tell me how it is that such a correspondence has taken place as that which is laid upon the table of the House; and why it is that you have had these altercations with the people of France, who have shown a disposition to place in you a cordial and unlimited confidence. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield moves a resolution, the effect of which is to express approbation of the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been conducted, and to approve of their past administration. The hon. and learned Gentleman, however, has admitted some latitude in expressing that approval. He has omitted from this resolution the word "best," and has confined himself to the simple affirmation that they have conducted foreign affairs in such a way as to conduce to the honour and dignity of the country. I must say that I very much dislike professions of political faith. I very much dislike subscribing to certain articles which are laid down in order to cover a censure passed in the other House of Parliament. I am called upon to subscribe to the principles which have regulated the foreign diplomacy of Her Majesty's Government. Is it too much to ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to define, before he asks me to subscribe those articles, what they really are? Are they non-intervention? Are they the positive assertion of claims brought forward against a weak Government, and the employment of language not held towards the strong and powerful? Are these the principles which the hon. and learned Gentleman asks us to agree to? or does he say, "Subscribe to the articles which I have framed, and I will leave you to collect from the past, and from certain principles that have been enforced, what those principles are of which I ask your approval?" But that is a very vague and unsatisfactory definition of the articles of political faith which I am called upon to subscribe. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not confine his range of observation to recent political history. He went from 1789 to 1815, and then took the period from 1815 to 1830. In 1830 he said there dawned upon us the certain commencement of a happier era in our foreign policy; and this happier period was the recognition of the dynasty of Orleans on the throne of France. But my noble Friend the Earl of Aberdeen was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at that time. We announced in the Speech from the Throne that the elder branch of the House of Bourbon had ceased to reign, and, seeing that the new sovereignty met with the general concurrence of the French people, we gave the new Sovereign a cordial recognition, and attempted as far as was in our power to lay the foundations of lasting peace. But the period chosen by the hon. and learned Gentleman extends to 1830; and is that a period from which I am to collect what the principles are I am called upon to approve? I apprehend not. I apprehend it would be no answer to the vote of the House of Lords to pass a panegyric on the principles that characterised the foreign policy of this country twenty years ago. I am asked to express approbation of the foreign policy of the present Government, as distinguished from the policy of its predecessors. [Lord J. RUSSELL: It is not necessary.] Well, then, how will you get over the censure of the House of Lords? I thought it possible to place another construction on the Motion of the hon. and learned Member; but the declaration of the noble Lord at the head of the Goverment removed all doubts from my mind. It was the noble Lord who said, upon the first night on which reference was made in this House to the answer of the House of Lords, that his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would not be the Minister of Austria, would not be the Minister of Russia, and would not be the Minister of France, but would be the Minister of England. What was the meaning of that declaration? The noble Lord has too much prudence and discretion to point a sarcasm against three of the greatest Powers of Europe; but he could afford to be very liberal with such weapons when directed against his predecessors. My construction of that passage was, that the noble Lord meant to contrast the conduct of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton with the conduct of the Earl of Aberdeen, and that which he solicited from me by my vote of this night was a decided reflection on the policy of the Earl of Aberdeen—upon the policy for which I myself was responsible. I have been connected with my noble Friend the Earl of Aberdeen during the whole period for which he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; I was connected with him at the period when we announced that we recognised the house of Orleans, and that we were determined to maintain the most friendly relations with France. I remained connected with him until July, 1846, when, in surrendering power at the feet of a majority of this House, I announced the termination of the only difference that remained with the United States, by the adjustment of the affair of Oregon. I do not look back upon my connexion with my noble Friend with any other feelings than those of cordial satisfaction. I believe there never existed a Minister less disposed to make a sacrifice either of the honour or the interests of this country, or more sincerely disposed to maintain not only peace, but the most friendly relations with every country with which England had intercourse. I never understood that this House had disapproved of the policy of my noble Friend. I never understood this House to convey any intimation that it thought that, in the attempt to maintain peace, he showed a disposition to sacrifice either the honour or the interests of England. I do recollect that the maintenance of peace was often most difficult—that we had to soothe an excited state of the public mind in France; and I must say that it was the good fortune of England, of France, and of the world, that at that critical period of our history this country was not involved in war on account of the most stupid and frivolous cause of war that ever existed, namely, the expulsion of Mr. Pritchard from Tahiti. Perhaps the House will recollect that a great party in France took its name from Mr. Pritchard, and that at last the name of Pritchardites or Pritchardists was assigned to a large party which supported the absurd war cry of France at that time; and I will do justice to a fallen Minister, M. Guizot, to declare my belief that it was mainly owing to his courage, to his resolution, to his determination to resist the war cry in France, that we were enabled to avert the calamities of war. Well, Sir, we had difficulties to contend with in maintaining the course we pursued. We were charged by the noble Lord opposite with making Ashburton capitulations. We were told that we were yielding to all those great Powers with which we came in contact; but the result was, that the House of Commons did not share in the apprehensions of the noble Lord, and our policy met with your most cordial approbation. I may say that, separated as I am from those with whom I had once the good fortune to act, that separation has not made me forgetful of the generous and cordial support which the foreign policy of my noble Friend obtained from others. In justice to ourselves—in justice to the party with whom I then acted—in justice to this House, I could not with honour acquiesce in any covert reflection on the policy of my noble Friend—the policy of peace, consistent with our maintenance of the honour of the country. The resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman embraces two objects—the protection of the Government, and the declaration of the public principles he calls upon you to affirm—namely, that the course pursued by the Government is one calculated to maintain the dignity and honour of England. I wish I could give it my support. It would be more agreeable to my private feelings. It would be more in consistency with my disposition to support Her Majesty's Government if I could do so; but to speak of that particular affair which led to the vote of the House of Lords, the conduct of Government in reference to the Greek affair, I cannot, consistently with my conscientious convictions, declare that I think the course which the Government has pursued is the course best calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country, or to maintain peace with foreign nations. Now, I take a somewhat peculiar view of that case. I am no partisan of Greece or the Greek Government. I am disgusted with their evasions and their delays. I have had experience of them. I know how impossible it was to procure from them redress or even satisfaction. I have had occasion—at least my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) had occasion, to express to them our deep dissatisfaction with that course which they pursued. The noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs read a letter which was addressed by my noble Friend to the Government of Greece, and he made much of that letter, and contrasted it with his own; but we were perfectly authorised in making that communication to the Greek Government, because we had the misfortune to stand in the position of a creditor; of a creditor who received no money, and could get no satisfaction. We were entitled to an annual payment along with two other Powers. Our remonstrances were addressed in vain to the debtor. When we saw the Government of that country removing from office men of the highest character, and appointing others subject to grievous imputations, I think that a creditor thus deprived of his money, or the prospect of obtaining it, was justified in holding pretty strong language, of warning and remonstrance to those who were making appointments which still more clouded the prospects of any ultimate settlement. The noble Lord read that letter with great emphasis, and contrasted it with a letter he had written to our Minister at Madrid. He said, "See the course you have pursued; you have absolutely addressed a ommunication to be made directly to the Sovereign, whereas I, more cautious, more conciliatory, addressed my letter to the Minister of England residing at Madrid." In the letter of the noble Lord I find him state that—

"Her Majesty's Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of independent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Ministers on these matters."

And then the noble Lord said—and it was received with general acclamations—"Contrast my conduct with that of the Earl of Aberdeen, who directs his remonstrances directly to the Sovereign, whereas I would not approach even the Minister with the language of remonstrance." Then he charged my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon with having suppressed a passage of this letter that would have borne testimony to the great merits of the noble Lord. I am disposed to blame my right hon. Friend for suppressing that passage, because it contains this instruction to the Minister:—

"Though you will of course take care to express on no occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I have thus explained to you, and although you will be careful not to express those sentiments in any manner or upon any occasion so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not conceal from any of those persons who may have the power of remedying the existing evil, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the British Government."

Now, I confess, for the purpose of avoiding embarrassment, I would rather make such communications direct to the Minister or the Sovereign of another country, than tell the Ambassador to withhold certain things from them, but to have no scruple whatever in communicating the views of the British Government to those who are in direct opposition to the Sovereign or Minister. Spain had been divided into two parties—the despotic party and the constitutional party. The views of the British Government were to be communicated to that party who the noble Lord believed had the power of remedying the existing evils under which Spain suffered, but were to be withheld from the Ministers and the Sovereign. But I was speaking of the Government of Greece. I will admit you had just claims upon Greece; I will admit that the birth or religion of M. Paeifico constitutes no reason why he should not have the same title to indemnity as the highest noble, or a British subject of the highest rank. I admit that the meanness of his residence is not to be cited as a reason for withholding from him commiseration or redress; but I conceive there was an obvious mode of settling his claims without offending France, and without provoking a rebuke from Russia. My belief is that, without any compromise of your own dignity, you might have got the whole money you demanded, and avoided the difficulties in which you have involved yourselves with those Powers. With regard to Russia, you had just asserted the authority of England by remonstrating with her for attempting to expel the refugees from Turkey. She acquiesced in your demands; and, with regard to France, you had all but the certainty of obtaining her cordial sympathy and good feeling. There never was a period in which it was more the interest of this country to conciliate the good feeling of Russia and France. France was weak, and the prey of intestine divisions; you could have made concessions to her then without incurring any suspicion of weakness on your part; and depend upon it that conciliatory conduct towards France in the hour of her weakness, arising from intestine divisions, would have been rewarded with her permanent gratitude in the day of her strength. I can quite understand how you could have addressed France and Russia in such terms as these: "We have claims upon Greece—you are co-guaranteeing Powers; the law of nations would enable us to proceed at once to obtain summary redress; but we will not send fifteen sail of the line to threaten Greece with the interruption of her commerce till we have invoked your good offices, and attempted to settle these claims of ours by arbitration." Why not have said, "There may be limits to delay; your friendly arbitration may fail; we are determined not to abandon our claims—insults have been offered, for which we must demand an apology; but we have pecuniary claims, that we will not insist upon by force, till we have applied for your good offices?" You may quote instances in which the United States have attacked Portugal, and in which France has sent fleets to Naples; but the policy of England should be to set the example of a different course of action, so far as you can set it without the compromise of your own honour. I admit you may have had the right. It is possible that you had authority to enforce your demand by the law of nations, without referring them to the consideration of any other Power; but, if every country will have recourse to force to obtain its rights, there is no guarantee for the peace of Europe for a single day. I do not deny your right; but I say that every consideration of policy in the peculiar circumstances in which you stood with regard to France and Russia—Russia having acquiesced in your demands for the withdrawal of her requisition for the expulsion of the Hungarian refugees from Turkey, and France having shown every disposition to confide in you and act cordially with you, there was every motive at that time why you should have exerted every effort to settle the matter through their good offices before you resorted to force. You did not object to the good offices of France—you accepted them when they were tendered—but why not invite them? Why not ask the good offices of France to assist in the adjustment of the affair? My belief is that you would have effected that adjustment, have gained the goodwill of Russia and of France, and have avoided giving offence to Greece; above all you would have avoided those rebukes which were administered to you by Russia and France, and which I cannot read without pain; and having read which, I cannot vote for a resolution which declares that the course which you have pursued in your foreign policy is calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country. I don't blame you for your ultimate concessions to France, or for your not having resisted the demand made of you by France, but don't ask me to concur in a vote of positive approbation of the course you have pursued. But I do blame you for your conduct towards France after you had accepted their good offices. I see no reason whatsoever for the course you pursued; and I think it was easy to foresee that it would involve you in the difficulty in which it did. I read the letters of M. Drouyn de Lhuys and General Lahitte, I and I never saw letters containing more positive evidence of what were the real wishes and intentions of France in tendering to you her "good offices." There is something touching in the appeal which that great Power made to you. She reproaches you for having resorted to force, and says to you, "You have alarmed every other country in Europe by sending fifteen sail of the line to the Piræus to insist upon these demands. Accept our good offices; by your doing so, you will assist us in our internal affairs." Now, what is the Motion? What did the hon. and learned Gentleman tell us, in language which I wish he had forborne to use? He said that France had become a vassal of Russia? Is that true? If he makes that assertion, how can he demand of me an acquiescence in his Motion? Who has made France a vassal of Russia? Has England contributed to it by her refusal of the "good offices" of France? Has England contributed to it by her refusal in the first instance to accept the convention? When M. Drouyn de Lhuys opened to you the prospect of your being able to settle the Greek question in London—when the Foreign Minister in this country, the representative of France, told you that you might obviate all this delay in Athens by settling the question here, why did you not send immediate information to Mr. Wyse, not that the basis of the convention was settled, but that there was a prospect of an amicable arrangement? That communication by M. Drouyn de Lhuys was made so early as the 9th of April, but the noble Lord says that he had no opportunity of writing to Mr. Wyse until the 19th. It is true the basis of the convention was not settled until the 15th of April, but the moment there appeared a prospect of effecting an amicable arrangement in London, you ought not to have considered expense, but having a vessel at your command, you ought instantly to have sent to Greece, and informed Mr. Wyse, knowing that under certain contingencies he was at that time authorised to employ force—what were your prospects of coming to an amicable settlement of the affair in this country, and to have advised him to abstain from resorting to force. Will the noble Lord tell me why he neglected this? The noble Lord says, that although he might have a steamboat at Dover and at Folkestone, yet the French had a vessel at Marseilles, and the French Government could despatch their vessel on the 12th; but how could he despatch one from Dover or Folkestone, so as to reach Athens at the same time? But why did not the noble Lord communicate with the French Government, and say, "If it is your intention to represent to your agent at Athens that there is a prospect of an amicable arrangement of the claims of England on Greece being effected in London, perhaps you will permit me to avail myself of the same opportunity of making a similar communication to my agent?" Why did the Vauban sail from Marseilles without a communication from the noble Lord similar in purport to that made by the French Government? But the noble Lord did not do it, and forcible means were resorted to. What was the consequence? You heard from the Marquess of Normanby the feeling of despair which the French Government experienced the moment they heard of it. At that moment, when you got that letter from the Marquess of Normanby, and were made aware of what were the feelings of the French Government, why did you not frankly and honestly say to the French Government, "Here has been a mistake, a misunderstanding, an unintentional delay; and to convince you that we had no intention to give you offence, we voluntarily offer to adopt at once the original convention?" Was not that the obvious way of preventing any ill effects arising from this misapprehension, and of giving consolation to the wounded honour of France, founded perhaps on her just suspicion of your intentions? Why did you not at once yourselves tender the London convention in the place of the Greek convention? You were asked to do it; it was the demand made of you; you refused; but you were ultimately obliged to do it. A communication was made by General Lahitte to the French Chamber, in which he said—

"That which I insisted on on the 20th May—that which preceded the withdrawal of the representative of France from the Court of England, that in substance I have obtained, and France has accepted the proposal of Lord Palmerston."

That was a painful communication for an Englishman to read. It might have been prevented by a frank offer to France to accept that which France offered in the first instance, and which you then refused, but subsequently conceded. I think you were right in making the concession subsequently. I blame you not for having made that concession, rather than interrupt the cordial good understanding between the two countries; but don't ask me to vote that the course you have taken is consistent with the dignity and honour of England. I do ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government and the noble Secretary of State if this had happened to the Earl of Aberdeen and myself—if we had received this letter from Russia—if we had seen the French Minister withdrawn from this Court, because we would not accede to a convention which we subsequently accepted—I ask whether if under these circumstances a vote had been proposed to the House, declaring that the course we had taken was most consistent with the dignity and honour of England—could those two noble Lords have remained on their seats until I had myself, also, made that proposal to them? Well, I am not willing to provoke any censure, but I do really feel that it is utterly impossible, with any regard for the truth, to express any positive approbation of your policy, and declare that the course you have been taking is consistent with the maintenance of the honour and dignity of this country. When I see your present position with Austria, with France, and with Prussia, and when I see also the many questions that remain unsettled with the States in the north of Europe, and when, on the other hand, I know the positive advantage that it is to this country that you should be on the most friendly footing with all those Powers, how can I vote that the course you have been taking is the best calculated to preserve peace? Peace, no doubt, there is. There is no disturbance; therefore, if the words in the resolution have any meaning at all, they must mean that your policy is calculated to maintain those amicable relations which ought to exist between the great Powers of Europe for their separate and individual advantage. If you appeal to diplomacy, let me in the first place ask what is this diplomacy? It is a costly engine for maintaining peace. It is a remarkable instrument used by civilised nations for the purpose of preventing war. Unless it be used to appease the angry passions of individual men, to check the feelings that rise out of national resentments—unless it be used for that purpose it is an instrument not only costly but mischievous. If, then, your application of diplomacy be to fester every wound, to provoke instead of sooth- ing resentments, to place a Minister in every Court of Europe for the purpose, not of preventing quarrels, or of adjusting quarrels, but for the purpose of continuing an angry correspondence, and for the purpose of promoting what is supposed to be an English interest; of keeping up conflicts with the representatives of other Powers, then I say, that not only is the expenditure upon this costly instrument thrown away, but this great engine, used by civilised society for the purpose of maintaining peace, is perverted into a cause of hostility and war. I have so little disposition—and I say it with truth, for the feelings which have actuated me for the last four years remained unabated—I have so little disposition, I say, for entering into any angry or hostile controversy, that I shall make no reference whatever to many of the topics which were introduced into that most able and most temperate speech, which made us proud of the man who delivered it, and in which he vindicated with becoming spirit, and with an ability worthy of his name and place, that course of conduct which he had pursued. I now come to that portion of this discussion which is a thousand times of more importance than a question as to the existence of a particular Government. I now approach the consideration of the principle which the hon. and learned Gentleman who brought forward this resolution proposes to be recognised and assented to by the House. The interests of a Government are small in comparison with the consideration of the principles laid down by the hon. and learned Gentleman. The hon. and learned Member for Southampton says this Motion has reference to Greece merely. No such thing. Is this a Motion to declare that whether the Government be right or wrong in this individual instance, their conduct under great difficulties has been in respect to Greece not deserving of censure? Is that the Motion? No. But you ask me to affirm and to subscribe to certain vague and indefinite principles, an explanation of which I can only collect from the speech of their able propounder. I entreat the consideration of the noble Lord to the declaration and opinion which I am called upon to affirm. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield says there shall be no mistake as to the purport and import of my vote. It is not a resolution simply of approval of the policy of the noble Lord; but it is a resolution, the intention and meaning of which is this—"We are to tell the people of all foreign countries with whom we have any relations, that our power, so far as it is physically concerned, is not to be employed to coerce their rulers; but that, in so far as the moral influence of this country and of its Government is concerned, the world shall know that we are friendly wheresoever we find a large endeavour, on the part of any body of men, to vindicate to themselves the right of self-government." The intention of this Motion is, that the House of Commons shall declare openly, plainly, and without ambiguity, "We are for self-government. We are to say to the nations of the world, "We are favourable to those efforts of man by which he endeavours to raise himself in the scale of nations, and, by his own enlightenment and a confidence in his own powers, to govern himself and resist that tyranny which, under the name of legitimacy, has ever sought to crush him in all those powers which we, as Englishmen, consider to be the very birthright that nature has given us." There shall be no mistake, says the hon. and learned Gentleman, as to my intentions. This declaration shall be made "openly, plainly, and without ambiguity." I am asked what is the antagonistic principle? I have been challenged over and over again to declare it. I will declare it. The principle for which I contend is antagonistic to that which has been propounded by the hon. and learned Gentleman; it is the principle for which every statesman of eminence in this country for the last 50 years has contended—namely, non-interference with the domestic affairs of other countries, without some clear and undeniable necessity arising from circumstances affecting the interests of your own country. That is the antagonistic principle for which I contend. I say this, that the hon. and learned Gentleman is calling upon me to affirm that principle which was contended against by Mr. Fox when it was employed in favour of arbitrary government; which was resisted by Mr. Canning, and resisted by Lord Castlereagh at the Congress of Verona, when the combined Sovereigns attempted by force to check the progress of constitutional government. Now this is a matter of so grave an importance, and so far removed from those other matters which are incidentally and collaterally connected with the question, that I entreat the attention of the House. I affirm that the principle for which you contend is the principle which was asserted by the Convention of France on the 19th of November, 1792. It is the principle which was afterward abandoned by the same Convention on the 13th of April, 1793, because France found it utterly impossible to adhere to it consistently with the maintenance of peace. For a certain period after the treaty of Pilnitz, after the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, which was founded on the same principle, the assertion, namely, of the right to interfere with the domestic affairs of another country—[Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear, hear!] Oh! I do not admit that it is right to interfere in favour of depotism and not of liberty, but I say the declarations of Austria and Prussia on the invasion of France were hostile to republican institutions—they demanded that France should restore her legitimate Sovereign. We were enabled to remain at peace with France for a certain period. We declared our willingness to maintain peace with France. On the 12th of May, 1792, M. Chauvelin informed Lord Granville that—

"France rejects all ideas of aggrandisement. She will preserve her limits, her liberty, her constitution, her inalienable right of reforming herself, whenever she many think proper; she will never consent that, under any relation, foreign Powers should attempt to dictate, or even dare to nourish a hope of dictating laws to her. But this very pride, so natural and so just, is a sure pledge to all Powers from whom she shall have received no provocation, not only of her constantly pacific disposition, but also of the respect which the French well know how to show at all times for the laws, the customs, and all the forms of government of different nations. The King, indeed, wishes it to be known that he would publicly and severely disavow all those of his agents at foreign courts in peace with France who should dare to depart an instant from that respect, either by fomenting or favouring insurrections against established order, or by interfering in any manner whatever in the interior policy of such States, under pretence of proselytism, which, exercised in the dominions of friendly Powers, would be a real violation of the law of nations."

That was the declaration of France after the revolution of 1789, the declaration which France made to England on the 12th May, 1792, and on which Mr. Pitt relied as the ground for maintaining neutrality and even friendly relations with the new Government; but on the 19th of November, 1792, France took a different course. What is the hon. and learned Gentleman's resolution—that which the House of Commons are to proclaim? That—

"We are favourable to those efforts of man by which he endeavours to raise himself in the nations, and, by his own enlightenment and a confidence in his own powers, to govern himself, and resist that tyranny which, under the name of legitimacy, has ever sought to crush him in all those powers which we as Englishmen consider to be the very birthright that nature has given us."

What was the declaration of the Convention of 1792?—

"The National Convention declare, in the name of the French nation, that they will grant fraternity and assistance to all those people who wish to procure liberty, and they charge the executive powers to send orders to their generals to give assistance to such people as have suffered, or are now suffering in the cause of liberty."

The National Convention on the 13th of April, 1793, seeing the universal indignation excited by that proclamation, declared in the name of the French people—

"That it will not intermeddle, qu'elle ne s'immis cera pas, in any manner in the government of other countries, but that it will rather bury itself under its own ruins than suffer any other Power to intermeddle in the interior administration of the Republic, or influence the form of constitution which France wishes to establish for herself."

They withdrew the objectionable declaration of the 19th of November because they found it excited against the French Government the indignation of all independent nations. It was upon this principle that Mr. Fox denounced the declaration of the Duke of Brunswick. Mr. Fox quoted Vattel; he said he found Vattel out of favour, but he valued all those writers who had collected together the experience of ages; and it was upon the principle laid down by Vattel of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries that he denounced as iniquitous the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick. Then, what are we to declare? That we will relinquish the principle of non-interference, and declare in favour of the principle of self-government—that we will declare in favour of that people that "resist, under the name of legitimacy, that tyranny which has ever sought to crush him in all those powers which we, as Englishmen, consider to be the very birthright that nature has given us?" It is a most serious undertaking on the part of this House. If you do claim that right, you must give a correlative right to other Powers. Self-government! Who shall construe what is the basis of self-government? We are living in the neighbourhood of a great republic—a republic which may be prosperous; which may calculate its power—which maintains the doctrine that legitimacy is inconsistent with self-government; that monarchy is inconsistent with self-government. If I claim the right to introduce my notion of self-government into an independent nation, can I deny the right of France to introduce its notion of self-government into countries opposed to republican institutions? Recollect our manifold relations with other countries in every quarter of the globe. Recollect our position in North America. Recollect our monarchical colonies, in close contact with republicanism. American notions of self-government differ from ours. American notions of self-government probably go to the extent that there ought to be universal suffrage, and that all classes should have the right to exercise a voice in the government of their country. If I impose my notions of monarchical institutions of government on despotic countries, what right have I to remonstrate against the United States for introducing into the monarchical colonies of Great Britain in their immediate neighbourhood their republican notions of what is self-government? We are, as I said before, in the immediate neighbourhood of a great republic. Does self-government extend beyond Europe? Does this right of self-government extend beyond it? We govern millions of people in India; are we to admit the right of other Powers to inculcate the right of self-government among them? Which is the wisest policy—to attempt to interfere with the institutions and measures of other countries not bordering on our own, out of an abstract love for constitutional government—or to hold that doctrine maintained by Mr. Fox, Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Mr. Canning, and Lord Castlereagh, that the true policy of this country is non-intervention in the affairs of others? Is it politic for us to go to China and attempt to intermix with our commercial notions our notions of self-government? or are these principles confined to certain quarters of the globe?—are they limited to Europe? Can we limit them because it is convenient? or shall we instruct Dr. Bowring to read to the Chinese people at Canton lectures on political economy—there is legitimacy there—there is not much of self-government—there is a learned professor, an enlightened political philosopher, the representative of this country; shall we invite him to instruct the people of China in their duties towards themselves—to insist on self-government? or, is it wise to live at peace with China and to make allowance for those peculiar institutions under which the people live, and with which we have no concern? I believe the latter to be by far the wiser course, the least likely to involve us in trouble and embarrassment—the best calculated to enable us to promote peace, to make commerce prosperous, and to prevent nations with whom we have commercial and international relations from entertaining jealousies of us. That I believe to be the best policy, as far as England is concerned. It is also my firm belief that you will not advance the cause of constitutional government by attempting to dictate to other nations. If you do, your intentions will be mistaken—you will rouse feelings upon which you do not calculate—you will invite opposition to Government; and beware that the time does not arrive when, frightened by your own interference, you withdraw your countenance from those whom you have excited, and leave upon their minds the bitter recollection that you have betrayed them. If you succeed, I doubt whether or no the institutions that take root under your patronage will be lasting. Constitutional liberty will be best worked out by those who aspire to freedom by their own efforts. You will only overload it by your help, by your principle of interference, against which I remonstrate—against which I enter my protest—to which I to-night will be no party. You are departing from the established policy of England—you are involving yourselves in difficulties the extent of which you can hardly conceive—you are bestowing no aid on the cause of constitutional freedom, but are encouraging its advocates to look to you for aid, instead of those efforts which can alone establish it, and upon the successful exertion of which alone it can be useful. For all these reasons I give my dissent, my reluctant dissent, from the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman. I am determined to take, upon this occasion, the course which I have taken upon every other. I will not evade the difficulty by silence or absence—I will state the grounds upon which I protest against the resolution—the carrying of which, I believe, will give a false impression with respect to the dignity and honour of this country, and will establish a principle which you cannot carry into execution without imminent danger to the best interests of the country.

Before I proceed, Sir, to make any observations on the resolution now before the House, I must take notice of an insinuation made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Uni- versity of Oxford, that we were unwilling to meet this question, and that we unfairly proposed to the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire that he should bring forward a resolution in conformity with the resolution of the House of Lords. That the position was to us, undoubtedly, one of no little difficulty, I have not denied, and do not deny. That the action of Government as regards foreign Powers, with that resolution of the House of Lords remaining on its journals, and with no opinion expressed by this House, would have been fettered and crippled, I admit; but it appeared to me—and nothing that I have heard has convinced me to the contrary—that when a resolution of censure was brought forward in Parliament by a great party, commanding it would appear a majority in one House of Parliament, and having at all times very considerable numbers in the other House of Parliament—it would have been right, according to all principles of justice and fairness, to have brought forward that resolution, not only in the House where the Foreign Minister was absent, but also in that in which he was present; and I must say that such is the course I should have expected from the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire on this occasion, because during the period in which he has been the leader of the party to which he belongs—since the lamented death of Lord George Bentinck—I have always found in him a fair opponent, ready to take issue on great questions of public interest, not seeking by any evasion or any subterfuge to obtain any undue advantage. It might also be inferred from the tenderness with which the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford treated this point, that the course which has been pursued has been rather of his advising than recommended by the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire. Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman seemed to throw the shield of his protection over the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire whilst justifying the propriety of the course which has been pursued. I again say that I think it is not a fair course; and if the right hon. Gentleman is in future to conduct the debates in this House on behalf of the great party opposite, I am afraid we must not expect the same fairness and justice from him as we have experienced from the hon. Member for Buckinghamshire during the time he has been their leader. Be that, however, as it may, I think the right hon. Gentleman could hardly expect that I or any of my colleagues would move either a vote of confidence or censure with respect to the foreign policy of the Government. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield felt the difficulty in which the country was placed by the resolution of the House of Lords, and came forward with a proposition of his own. He is an independent Member of the House, more independent, perhaps, of the Government than Colonel Davies was in 1833, when he moved a resolution with respect to Portugal. I accept the proposition of the hon. and learned Member—I accept his declaration as to his policy—not as to ours—not as to the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government since they have had the conduct of affairs. The Motion declares—

"That the principles on which the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government has been regulated, have been such as were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this country; and, in times of unexampled difficulty, to preserve peace between England and the various nations of the world."

There is no dogma laid down—no declaration of the opinions which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield may entertain; but a plain declaration that the principles which have guided the Queen's Government are such as have tended to uphold the honour of the country and to maintain peace. It therefore appears to me that the latter part of the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth was entirely unsuited to the question before us; because whatever may be the opinions of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield—be they right or be they wrong—he has not placed before this House a resolution embodying those opinions, but one which refers to the known and practical course adopted by the Government during the four years of its existence. There is a despatch in which the principles that have regulated the foreign policy of the Government are laid down, and it will be seen that they are very different from those to which the right hon. Member for Tamworth referred as being opposed to those enunciated by Mr. Fox, Mr. Canning, Lord Castlereagh, and other eminent statesmen. In that despatch my noble Friend says—

"The Austrian Government has recently asked, and has received the assent of the Government of Great Britain to the principle that the several States into which Italy is divided are entitled to maintain and defend their independence; and that this independence ought to be respected and to be held inviolate by all the other Powers of Europe: and Her Majesty's Government, in expressing their assent to this indisputable proposition, couple with it another which they conceive to be equally undeniable; that every independent sovereign has a right to make within his own dominions such reforms and improvements as he may judge conducive to the welfare of the people whom he governs; and that no other Government can be entitled to forbid or to restrain such an exercise of one of the proper attributes of independent sovereignty; and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that the Cabinet of Vienna must be ready to acknowledge so plain a political truth."

These are the principles on which the policy of Government is founded; and why, then, should the right hon. Baronet have gone about seeking for reasons—searching far and wide for reasons to oppose the resolution, and finding them in some doctrines which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield advanced in the course of his speech? The right hon. Baronet did not favour us with many other reasons for opposing the resolution, and I think they are not entitled to more weight than the one to which I have just alluded. The right. hon. Baronet says it is a reflection on the preceding Government to declare that the present Government has upheld the honour of the country and maintained peace. That, again, appears to me to be a very far-fetched notion, and one which is not warranted by the resolution, or by anything which has been advanced in discussion. During the existence of the right hon. Baronet's Administration, I never either proposed or concurred in any vote to cast censure on, or express an adverse opinion of, the foreign policy of his Government; and if any one had asked me my opinion of the manner in which the Earl of Aberdeen conducted the foreign policy of the country, though I might have objected to some of his particular acts, and thought them, perhaps, not well considered with reference to some particular interests of the country, yet believing the whole course of his foreign policy was such as tended to maintain the honour of the country and preserve peace, I should not have hesitated to express that opinion, and indeed I have often declared it in private to those who spoke to me on the subject. If you will seek for a reflection upon the Earl of Aberdeen, it is not for his conduct whilst in office; but I must say, that although as Minister of the Crown he maintained the honour of the country, and with the intelligence of a statesman watched over and preserved peace, yet, during the time the present Ministry has been in office, his Lordship, prompted as I believe by foreigners and other persons with whom he has been in communication, has, from time to time, uttered the most unfounded imputations and made the most unjust attacks upon the Government. I maintain, then, that whilst the resolution before us conveys no reflection on the late Government, it certainly does imply that there is no wish on the part of this House, that the foreign policy of this country should be directed principally for the benefit of foreign nations, instead of mainly for our own. This is so obvious a course of policy, that it may appear hardly to require any lengthened debate to prove its necessity, or any solemn sanction of this House to affirm it; but it appears to me that there has lately exhibited itself in this country a tendency to depreciate English objects, and to give credence to communications which come from I know not where, but from foreign Powers—sometimes the most incredible stories — sometimes diplomatic transactions which ought to be kept secret—and all these communications insinuate charges against the Government, which have a most unfortunate effect—if not on public opinion generally in this country, yet on the opinions of many who are in the habit of taking part in the public transactions of this country. I think the Greek papers before the House furnish manifest proof of the correctness of my statement. In the first place, although I fear to incur the censure of the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford, for indulging in praise of the English character, yet I must; say, that it is characteristic of the people of this country to be great lovers of the truth, and in that respect they are superior to nearly all the nations of the world. Yet if we listen to what has been said in this House and elsewhere, relative to these transactions, we find that every English witness is disparaged and discredited who gives evidence in favour of the Government of his own country. Sir Edmund Lyons is a man distinguished in two professions, of the highest honour and great ability; but we are told that he is ready to adopt every idle story, and pass it without examination, and that therefore no credit can be given to his representations. Then, because a lieutenant of the Navy is naturally indignant at the falsehoods uttered with respect to an outrage upon the service to which he belongs, he is laughed at and ridiculed for what are called his warlike propensities. If an English Consul denounces the falsehood of a Nomarch, or some other Greek officer, who asserts that some men were not thumb-screwed, when they were marched openly through the streets subjected to that torture, and seen by all the inhabitants of the place, the British Vice-Consul's statement is derided, and the Greek officer's statement obtains ready credence. I confess I feel somewhat indignant at such conduct. With whatever other faults Englishmen may be chargeable, if they pay little respect to the laws and usages of other nations; if they sometimes act in an overbearing and insulting manner to some nations they think inferior to ours in many of our national qualities—yet they always bear about them the distinguishing mark of a love of truth. There is no occasion in which this is not perceptible. In our criminal trials, as compared with those of other countries, we perceive how much greater is the tendency and readiness to tell the truth. If that be the case, are the British Houses of Parliament to found resolutions on the presumption that every Greek is to be believed, and every Englishman to be disbelieved? The statement of Mr. Finlay, a man of the highest respectability, as to the circumstances which prevented the arbitration in his case from being carried into effect, was discredited; and the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford relies on the representations of Baron Gros, who derived his statement at second-hand from a M. Privelegio. Baron Gros indorses the statement of this Greek, and the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford says, "I care not what Mr. Finlay may state, I have Baron Gros's authority against him." I don't want, now that the House has been sated with the subject, to go into the particular claims—I mean the claims of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico; but with respect to the assertion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford, that Mr. Finlay changed his mind from 1846 to 1848, I think that in the very letter which the right hon. Gentleman quoted there is an assertion exactly similar to that Mr. Finlay made in 1846—namely, that he would not have justice from the Greek tribunals, because as it was the presumption before the Greek tribunals that the King would be in lawful possession of his land, it was impossible they could give him any compensation for the arbitrary seizure of that land; and that sentence of Mr. Finlay's occurs between two sentences which the right hon. Gentleman read, but most unfortunately he overlooked that particular sentence. Here is the statement:—

"With reference to my now carrying my claim before the Greek tribunals, M. Colocotroni is aware that any action I can bring must pass over the arbitrary seizure of my property. The Greek tribunals are compelled to adopt the fiction that the King lawfully held possession of my property for the King can do no wrong."

["Hear, hear!" and a cry of "Go on!" from the Opposition benches. ] I will go on. I must say that this is a more than usual case of unfair quotation. I remember seeing Members of this House not unfrequently—wishing to make out their own case—read to a certain point, and not read what others thought not so favourable to that case. But the right hon. Gentleman went beyond this, because he read a paragraph at the beginning and a paragraph at the end. [An Hon. MEMBER: Read the whole.] As a wish is expressed to hear the whole, I shall proceed:—

"They must suppose with M. Colocotroni, that my expropriation was not a case of injustice. M. Colocotroni knows that the expense and delay attendant on bringing a case before the courts of law between a foreigner and the Crown for damages, where the wrong was inflicted prior to the revolution of 1843, is tantamount to a denial of justice for the present."

The right hon. Gentleman fixed on the words at the beginning of the sentence, talked of expense and delay, and said, fairly enough, if that were the only argument, if expense and delay were to be considered by you as a denial of justice, they were common to other countries with Greece. But that is not Mr. Finlay's statement. His statement is, that there is expense and delay with reference to cases which had occured before the revolution of 1843; and Mr. Finlay's case was this—I advert to it as the right hon. Gentleman rather invites me to go into that case — that in 1836 or 1837, the King being entirely arbitrary and despotic, his land was seized. He was told it was to be of some use for the erection of a palace for the King, and applied to have fair payment for that land. Did they tell him to go before the tribunals and claim it? Nothing of the kind. They said, "We have not taken your land; you are perfectly mistaken. We don't want your land. It is still yours." He went to visit his land; he found that he could not get upon it; that it was used by workmen for the purposes of the royal palace; and he was actually excluded. Having gone on in this way for some time he at last writes a letter to the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs in this country. The right hon. Member for the University of Oxford said, this was not the case for the law of nations, but a case for the ordinary tribunals, and therefore that it ought not to have been discussed between the two Governments. But the right hon. Gentleman left out one fact—namely, that that appeal was made, not to my noble Friend, but to the Earl of Aberdeen, then at the head of Foreign Affairs, who, at the time, or a little before, was a Colleague of the right hon. Gentleman. The Earl of Aberdeen, instead of saying to Mr. Finlay, "Take your place before the tribunals," said to Sir Edmund Lyons, "Use your good offices to obtain redress for Mr. Finlay." As regarded the question of making this a subject for diplomatic interference, negotiation, and remonstrance—that was the act of the Earl of Aberdeen, and not of my noble Friend, and that was another circumstance which was omitted by the right hon. Gentleman. In no way does Mr. Finlay obtain any redress. The arbitrary and despotic power of the King was conclusive against his obtaining a fair price for his land. At length a revolution takes place, and about ten years after the land was taken, Mr. Finlay is told he might now go before the tribunals:—

"If you had told me that in 1837 or 1838," he says, "and the King had allowed the question to be fairly tried, I should have gladly resorted to that commission. But to tell me now, in 1848, when the case will be attended with expenses and delay such as will prevent me from obtaining justice, is in fact only a mockery of my claim."

And then the right hon. Gentleman quotes that as an alteration in Mr. Finlay's opinion. Without entering on the claims of M. Pacifico, I must say that I think the way in which this question has been brought forward in order to procure a censure of the present Government, is one, the justice of which, as the hon. and learned Member for Southampton remarked, would hardly be allowed in a court of law. The first question with respect to all these claims, it appears to me, is, has this man suffered grievous injury and wrong? The second question is, can he obtain from the ordinary course of justice in the country in which he is resident a remedy for that wrong? These are the two important questions; and if you look at M. Pacifico's claim with reference to those questions, I think you will find in the first place, that his wrong was a very griev- ous one; and in the next place, that he did not procure redress from the ordinary courts of justice. But hon. Gentlemen and noble Lords who have brought forward this matter, leave these two points entirely out of sight, and go to a third point, no doubt important, but quite incidental, and put the question—Is this claim fair or exaggerated in amount? M. Pacifico may have made a claim exaggerated in amount. I am not going to argue that with you. But, although he did, if in the first place he has suffered grievous wrong, and in the second place cannot obtain redress, by a principle of the law of nations he was entitled to redress through the intervention of his own Government. With respect to the extent of claims my noble Friend says, when he first heard of the claim, he desired that an account should be got of the loss, and such an account having been received, that reasonable compensation should be asked. That was the amount of the noble Lord's instructions to the British Minister at Athens. With respect to these claims, let me state that much as these claims have been denied, much as we have been told—but not by the right hon. Baronet who spoke last; I must do him the justice to say he took no such ground—much as the justice of these claims has been denied, yet I do assert that it is in conformity with the usage of this nation and of all other civilised nations of Europe and of the world, to ask for remedy and redress from Government to Government in such instances. With respect to the United States of America, I find since 1830 that there have been no less than sixteen cases in which redress has been asked for with reference to injury inflicted on their own subjects. With respect to France, every one knows that the strongest measures have been taken because French subjects had been injured. And there was but lately a claim on the part of France on account of the property of French subjects destroyed at Naples, not by the Government, not with the willing assent of the Government, but destroyed during a riot which the Government were unable to suppress; and compensation was granted. An hon. Member asked me a question yesterday with respect to our claims on Naples, and it so happens that there has arrived, within a day or two, a despatch giving an account of the state of those claims. We have made a request to the Court of Naples to have an indemnity for certain British residents at Messina, whose goods were destroyed in the bom- bardment of that place. The Neapolitan Minister of Foreign Affairs said, he was quite willing to agree to the principle which had been laid down, I suppose by the Queen's Advocate, he says by the Crown lawyers of Great Britain, namely—

"That compensation should be awarded for the loss of such property as was destroyed without sufficient necessity, whether wantonly, designedly, or by pillage."

But it so happened that there were other representatives besides that of England at the conference. There were the Ministers of Prussia, France, and Austria. What do they say?—

"The Ministers of France and of Prussia said, that they could not adopt this principle without reservation. They said that the property of foreigners placed in the warehouses of a free port had always been considered to be under the guarantee of the Government to whose protection it was confided; and the compensation granted by the Belgian and Bavarian Governments for the destruction of property lodged in free ports at Antwerp and on the Rhine proved clearly that such a principle was generally recognized by European Powers."

It appears, then, that the principle we proceeded upon was not only not extravagant, was not only not pushed beyond the usual law of nations, but within its range. And—

"Count Walewski also cited a case which occurred in Paris during the insurrection of the 23rd of June, 1848, when indemnity was claimed by the Neapolitan, and conceded by the French Government for losses suffered by a Neapolitan subject upon that occasion."

It thus appears when a claim was made for losses suffered at Paris, that the French Government, as a Government that knows the law of nations and willing to do justice to foreigners, conceded that claim; and if the French Government had not vainly imagined that these claims might be made the source of war between other European nations—if they had listened only to the law of nations and to the justice of the claim, I am satisfied that twenty-four hours would have been amply sufficient for conceding the claims. And when we come to put forward those claims, one of which was met by evasions and procrastinations of every kind for fourteen years, and the least of them for more than two years, it is not too much to say if great evils occurred in consequence of those demands, they arose, not from any fault of Her Majesty's Government, but because, acting according to the law of nations, we were met by a Government which wished to add to all these unfair delays the fur- ther injury of refusing our claims, in the hope that other Foreign Powers might support them in that course. What if we should submit to such a proceeding? What if we should fall into what appears to be the meaning of the resolution of the House of Lords, saying, "We will abide by what any Powers tell us is the protection of the laws in their own country?" What if we should entirely abandon the principle which the Foreign Secretary of State for this country from time immemorial has asserted, and say, "We will no longer act according to the principle which we have hitherto acted upon?" What would be the consequence? The French Minister would claim compensation for injuries on behalf of his country. The Government would grant that claim. The Prussian Minister would claim compensation for natives of Prussia. The Prussian Minister would obtain it. But when it came to the British Minister, it would be said, "No. Your British subject is not protected. He must have recourse to the laws of the country where he is resident. Let him make what he can of an appeal to its tribunals. Let him go from one Court to another. But the English Parliament have decided that while French, American, Austrian, and Prussian subjects shall all obtain the protection of the law of nations and of the justice of the case, no Englishman shall have that boon." Sir, that is one of the reasons, therefore, why I ask the House to assent to the resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, because I think if that resolution is carried, that those foreign nations who might be encouraged by the resolution of the House of Lords to refuse all just claims, will see that it is not the opinion of the House of Commons of England that protection is to be refused to British subjects abroad. Sir, a much wider question has been raised by this resolution. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon was the first, and he has been followed by others in discussing the whole foreign policy of my noble Friend. Now, Sir, the allusion made by the right hon. Gentleman to the time when he was in office with my noble Friend, and to what took place with regard to Antwerp when it was besieged, and the Dutch ports were blockaded and an embargo laid on Dutch commerce, has induced me to look back to the debates of that time, and there I find that in another place the Earl of Aberdeen is represented to have stated that the Fo- reign Secretary of that day, who was no other than the Foreign Secretary of this day, was animated by vanity or some feeling of that sort, and that he was sure Earl Grey, who was then at the head of the Government, did not partake in my noble Friend's views. He observed, as Gentlemen have observed in the debate, and with respect to which the right hon. Baronet has been already set right, that three of the great Powers of Europe were separated from us—that neither Austria, Russia, nor Prussia approved of the violent means we had taken to compel the King of Holland to sign a treaty of peace; and he called upon Earl Grey to discountenance and to disavow such a course of policy. Earl Grey made the answer upon that occasion which every one would have expected from him—that he entirely approved of the conduct of my noble Friend in the office of foreign affairs—that every step that had been taken had met his sanction, and that he and the rest of his colleagues were responsible for the course that had been adopted. Sir, I say that same thing at the present day, that we stand here responsible for the policy with regard to our foreign affairs; and we state it against the same imputation, now seventeen years old, which was made against the conduct of my noble Friend, Sir, with regard to the transactions that have taken place—most important they have been since our accession to power. The first which I think was alluded to was the Spanish marriages. My noble Friend has made a statement upon that point, and I do not believe any more than he that the Spanish marriages were the cause of the downfal of the French monarchy; but I do believe, and it is stated by various French authorities, that that preference of the interests of the dynasty to the interests of the nation, did tend in some degree to weaken the hold of the able Monarch who then ruled over France. And, Sir, I regret, for my part, seeing that the consequence that followed from the attempt of Louis XIV. to place one of his family on the throne of Spain, was a long and bloody war, and seeing that the consequence of the attempt of another Sovereign of France—the Emperor Napoleon—to place one of his brothers on the throne of Spain, was the continuance of that war; seeing, I say, these grave consequences of such events, I certainly regret that when that subject of the marriage of the Spanish Princess to a son of Louis Philippe was first mentioned to the Earl of Aberdeen, he had not the foresight and firmness to say, "Though that marriage may be contracted, it is one that may produce very great evils to Europe, and the first consequence will be the loss of the friendship of this country." If that course had been taken by the noble Lord, that marriage would never have been further considered, and it would not have been one of the elements of discord in France at this time. But seeing that that was not done, that the matter was already proceded with, and that it was clear that the French Government were intent upon it, it was very soon apparent that the conditions which had been voluntarily annexed to the marriage of the Infanta would not be adhered to, and that was a material additional cause for the estrangement of the two countries. Sir, there were other internal matters to which I need not allude, that were main causes of the downfal of that Monarchy; but I think that the House must agree when the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Abingdon talks about there being no circumstances of unexampled difficulty, that though perhaps not unexampled, yet circumstances of immense difficutly occurred when a monarchy was overthrown, and a Republic was placed in its stead, that republic being led by men, some of whom held up the example of the Girondins, and some that of the Jacobins of 1790. Sir, we had this difficulty, that it was the descriptive characteristic of the Girondins to show hatred and animosity, and that it was the descriptive characteristic of the Jacobins to propose and to carry into effect by that most terrible means a propagandist war. We could not be insensible to the danger, that men who professed to admire those principles, would be likely to adopt a similar course of policy. But we had a warning before us. It must be admitted that the conduct which was pursued in 1792, which was intended to preserve peace, had failed in so doing, and had failed, as I believe, because the communications between England and the great Powers of the Continent did not extend to France, but omitted her altogether. At a late period of the war, in 1797, I think, Mr. Fox said that if what had been then communicated to Russia had been commmunicated to France, he should have had nothing to say on the subject. So small, apparently small, is the difference between two great men in cases of this nature. Sir, with that warning before us, we thought the best course we could pursue was to show every friendly disposition to France, to maintain our adherence to existing treaties, but with that adherence to show ourselves as ready to consort on political affairs with Republican as with Monarchical France. You have seen that gradually those men who then took the lead have been replaced by others whose views are not so extreme, and whose conduct is less likely to be at variance with those existing arrangements which were established by the peace of 1815. I say this, therefore, that our friendly conduct towards France—our readiness to consort with France upon any subject of European importance — thus showing her that she was in no danger of any foreign invasion in which England should participate, has been a great element in the peace of Europe, and an element in times and circumstances which bore, at least, some resemblance to those which led to the most bloody and costly war upon record. I say, therefore, Sir, when you come to hear one Gentleman after another—one picking up a single phrase in a despatch, another telling us of some explanations from a balcony, and another adverting to some circumstance equally trivial—I say that I do not pretend to defend every one of those particular circumstances, or the tone of each particular note; but I tell you that we have been in circumstances of great difficulty; that we have preserved that peace which our ancestors thought themselves constrained to abandon; and I ask you to judge us by the principles we have professed, by the principles to which we adhere, by the results which have ensued; and not by trifling circumstances which now in holiday time, when the danger has greatly passed, Gentlemen may pick out of the newspapers. Sir, one of the most difficult topics, and I must say that it was one on which we no doubt had to pursue a course that now cannot be exempt from fair criticism, was with respect to Naples and Sicily. The advice which the Earl of Minto, under the instructions of my noble Friend, had given to the princes of Italy whom he saw, was, as the hon. Member for the West Riding very fairly says, to make administrative reforms, to endeavour to introduce purity into their tribunals, a good administration of the law and finances, and thus to prepare the way for representative constitutions, but not to introduce such constitutions by force. The King of Naples took an opposite course— he refused everything. One day, after everything had been refused—the most temperate reforms even—there was a tumult in the streets, and the King of Naples came forth, granted a constitution, and every favour that was asked on the part of the people. This has been narrated, along with other circumstances of great importance, by an author of the name of Parini, who in a book lately published gives a history of the circumstances of Rome. The effect of giving that representative constitution, together with the revolution of France immediately following, was to excite a flame in all Italy for the adoption of similar constitutions. A little previous to the French revolution, but a little after the grant of that constitution by the King of Naples, the Earl of Minto was invited by the King to go to Naples in order to assist him in his negotiations. The Earl of Minto had repeatedly written, private letters indeed, both to my noble Friend and myself, stating that he was desirous to come home from Rome, and not to go to Naples. He considered it, however, his duty to go to Naples, where he was then employed day and night in consultation with the King and his Ministers, in order to frame propositions which, as he thought, would preserve the crown on the head of the King of the Two Sicilies, and at the same time would be sufficient to satisfy the subjects. They succeeded in framing what was deemed to them satisfactory, and the Earl of Minto obtained the consent of the King to break them to Sicily. News of the French Revolution arrived at the same time, and the conditions which had been previously promulgated by the Neapolitan Government themselves were refused without some further alteration. That alteration was sent to the Earl of Minto by the King, with an account of what had taken place being at once refused, and the Earl of Minto returned to Naples; but so far from his being supposed at that time to excite a revolution in Italy, the rumour in Naples was that his house was about to be attacked because he had advised the King to adhere to existing treaties, and not to send troops to attack the Austrian possessions. But those conditions in Sicily having entirely failed, the Sicilians then thought themselves able to set up an independent Government, and the question for them to decide was whether they should make it a monarchy or a republic. Now, in ordinary circumstances I quite admit, and it is very easy for hon. Gentlemen to say so, that the King had a right certainly to claim the allegiance of his subjects; that he had a right to endeavour to induce them again to submission, and that foreign nations ought not to interfere until a sufficient time has elapsed to show that that country has entirely established its independence. But, Sir, those were not ordinary circumstances, all Italy being inflamed, agitated, and excited by the spectacle of a French revolution, which had spread all over Europe, and was creating dissension and confusion in the various capitals of Europe. The question for us to consider then was, whether the spectacle of a democratic republic set up in France might not spread over the whole of Italy, and France and Italy form united democratic republics, dangerous to the peace of Europe, and dangerous to the peace which connects those countries with England. We thought that these were extraordinary circumstances, and that it might be permitted us to go out of the ordinary path in regard to them, and to say that if the Duke of Genoa were chosen king, we would be ready to acknowledge him. I admit that that was not the usual course; but again I say that the circumstances were extraordinary, and we were desirous, according to the best of our judgment, to prevent the extraordinary events which had taken place in France from being repeated in Sicily, and of preserving among the people the forms of a settled Government, and the elements of authority. We took what we judged to be the best course, and we adopted it upon our own responsibility. I cannot say that the course of events justified either our foresight, or that of the King of the Two Sicilies, in thinking that the Sicilians would establish their independence, because events took another course. If, however, they had established their independence, I think you would have been glad now that they had not furnished to Italy the spectacle of a democratic republic. But I say that, in asking you to pass a judgment upon those things, I do not ask your approbation of all the particular steps, but I ask you to show forbearance—some consideration for the circumstances of extraordinary difficulty—and to give us credit at least for not having attempted propagandism of any sort, in endeavouring, if possible, to provide the elements of authority and liberty in those countries of Europe in which we had any influence. Well, Sir, there is another question which has been touched upon, and touched upon, I think, with the same unfairness which has marked the comments upon our conduct in other cases—I mean an interference with respect to the demand of the Hungarian refugees. It has been objected that the fleet under Sir William Parker entered within the outer castle of the Dardanelles, and, in contradiction of the subsequent explanation of my noble Friend, it has been stated, on the authority of a captain of the fleet, that it was not driven there by stress of weather. I think Sir William Parker is a person who may be believed upon his own statement; and his statement is—the phrase perhaps is not strictly accurate—but he states that the anchorage outside the castles is an unsafe ancorage when the weather is tempestuous, and that, as the Turkish authorities and Sir Stratford Canning, our own Ambassador, thought he might proceed within the inner bay, and that the fleet would be safer there than in the outer bay, he had thought it proper to adopt the suggestion. I believe that statement is strictly accurate; and I think it is proved by this, that my noble Friend, not agreeing, as far as I remember, in the opinion of Sir Stratford Canning, that it was in accordance with the treaty respecting the passage of the Dardanelles that the fleet should not anchor in the inner bay, orders were immediately given to Sir William Parker to go back to Besica bay, which he accordingly did, and, a gale having soon afterwards sprung up, the result was that two line-of-battle ships dragged their anchors. That is a proof, I think, that it was not a safe anchorage. It is, therefore, mere quibbling to say that stress of weather was not an apposite phrase to use because it happened to be a fine day when they entered the Dardanelles. They went there, as I have said, for more secure anchorage during tempestuous weather. I beg to pass now to the question which was the cause of the expedition of Sir William Parker to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. The Hungarian refugees had been demanded—not their expulsion, as the right hon. Gentleman says, but that they should be surrendered and given up. This demand was made by two powerful neighbours—the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of Austria. The Sultan took alarm. He asked the English and French Ambassadors if he might expect support from their respective countries. Both replied that he might count upon that. I know not what the French Ambassador wrote to his own Government, but our Ambassador—as able a man as ever filled a diplomatic post—said that the resolution of the Turks to maintain their independence for the future, after several previous infractions of that independence since their power had become reduced, would mainly depend upon the answer given by this country to his appeal. The answer we gave was this:—

"We will make a friendly representation to the Emperor of Russia, but, at the same time, we will give instant orders that, in case the Emperors of Russia and Austria should persist in their demands, the Sultan shall have the assistance of a powerful English fleet."

Why, Sir, the Emperor of Russia behaved, I think, not in a manner which was humiliating, as it is said we behaved when we agreed to conditions different from the former proposals, but in a manner which I consider to have been highly wise and magnanimous. Upon the representation of the Sultan, he entirely altered his former decision, and abandoned his demand at once. He made a proposal perfectly fair and reasonable, and withdrew altogether the proposal for the surrender of the refugees. But it was not improbable that the Emperor of Russia, with such power as he possesses, should feel that this power would diminish in public opinion if, having made a peremptory demand, he should recede from that demand. We took the risk of a refusal, and we determined to send a fleet. The hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire, echoing a hundred others, says that we are not afraid to attempt the coercion of a weak nation; but that when we have to deal with a strong Power, then we soon take a humble tone, and entirely weaken our language. Well, I think that the act to which I have just referred was a good deal stronger than any language of my noble Friend. The readiness to support the independence of Turkey—to support it at any cost—and to save Europe from the degrading spectacle of seeing refugees given up to punishment by a Power in whose territory they have taken refuge—I say that that act was a good deal stronger than any answer my noble Friend has written, or than the note which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford admires because he thinks it tends to humiliate the Government. When I am saying this, don't let me be mistaken in any way—although I think my language ought to prevent the error—as asserting that the sending of a French and English fleet to support the Sultan was the cause of the change in the counsels of the Emperor of Russia. I give him the highest credit for having, upon receiving the representation made by the Sultan, desisted from a demand which at the time he probably thought was indiscreetly and unfairly made. I give him every credit for that act. I only say that, if his decision had been otherwise, we were ready to encounter the peril of that decision; and that the weight of the two Powers would not have deterred us from interfering in a just cause, and in behalf of an object connected at once with the safety of individuals and the independence of one of the Powers of Europe. Well, then, we had those demands to make upon Greece. Our fleet was in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and, instead of going to Malta, it proceeded at once to Salamis Bay. Great importance has been attached to the fact of our sending so large a fleet; but the circumstance is very simple. If we had sent a fleet from Naples on purpose, probably a smaller force would have been deemed sufficient; but, being already under the command of Sir William Parker, there was no inconvenience and no fault committed in desiring Sir William Parker to go with that fleet to the Bay of Salamis, and, if it was necessary at length to resort to measures of reprisal and coercion, to show a force far more than sufficient to enforce our demands. I beg to say also, that if the event of making those demands had been fairly considered by the Foreign Ministers in Athens at the time, little difficulty would have been encountered on that subject. In the course of the last ten years—sometimes under the Earl of Aberdeen and sometimes under my noble Friend—many cases have happened in which the denial of justice by the republics of South America has been followed by redress. I have one here now before me, in which the Earl of Aberdeen proceeded to reprisals, in the case of two merchants whose claims had not been attended to. My belief is, that if the Foreign Ministers at Athens had acted in the friendly manner towards England in which English Ministers and Consuls have often acted towards other Powers of Europe in similar circumstances, the whole affair might have been settled in a few hours, and Europe would not have beheld the spectacle it did. I have stated already that we thought it our duty no longer to permit those insults to continue. Insults I call them, because it is not merely that the replies to our demands were insufficient, but if any one will look through the blue books, and consult the letters of Sir Edmund Lyons, he will find, with reference to the outrage on the 4th of April, Sir Edmund Lyons saying, that his letters to the Greek Government calling for redress in April, May, and October, were all left unanswered; and, considering that every now and then the Greek Government have expressed their gratitude to England, as one of the founders of the kingdom of Greece, I think that even on the ground of the common courtesy which nations pay to one another, they ought at least to have answered our Ambassador's letters. That they did not do so looks very like as if an insult must have been intended. My right hon. Friend who spoke last, without finding much to complain of in our demands, says, that when we accepted the good offices of France, we might have brought the affair to a more speedy conclusion. I will not dispute with the right hon. Gentleman whether our conduct in every point was right with respect to those claims. I think it is not very difficult, when a matter has some time passed, to say that some little alteration in the course we pursued would have been better and might have led to a speedier conclusion. I remember an instance:—An injury was inflicted upon a person named Pritchard—a subject of this country holding an official situation under the Government of the Queen. The right hon. Gentleman was asked with respect to that case, and he gave an answer which struck me as an answer becoming the spirit of an English Minister. The negotiation lingered for some time. For my part, so far as I was concerned, I stated that I was quite ready to leave the whole matter to the discretion of the Government, and that I was ready to support any agreement on the subject which should exhihit the same spirit as his answer; but when, some time afterwards, I asked a French statesman what was the cause of the delay in the settlement of the case, seeing that it was clear the French were in the wrong, and that reparation was undoubtedly due to us, I was told that the language of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons was so exceedingly haughty, and had given such offence to the French Government, that it was not possible at once to come to a conclusion on the subject. I then saw that the speech I had ad- mired for the spirit it displayed, would have been more discreet if it had been more guarded, and that we should have come more speedily to an arrangement with the French Government. I made this criticism upon the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman then, saying at the same time that it was quite natural that he should have given the answer he did give. But with respect to these affairs, if we showed a willingness to accept the good offices of France, which we did accept—if we showed a willingness in the end to concur with them in an arrangement which, although it might not seem perfectly reasonable to us, was more satisfactory to them—I think the House will see that there is not only no danger of the interruption of peace, but that there is, on the contrary, just as much prospect of the re-establishment of intimate relations with France now as there was in 1845, at the time of the unfortunata affair of Mr. Pritchard. The right hon. Gentleman, and other hon Members who have preceded him, have spoken of the general maxims and policy by which we have been guided. I have no hesitation in saying that I think the great majority of this House are agreed upon the general principle they would wish to be adopted—not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations. Not to interfere is undoubtedly the rule, but it is not always very strictly observed, even by persons so abhorrent to interference in the affairs of other nations as the Government which preceded us. I find, in a paper laid before the House, a despatch from the Earl of Aberdeen with respect to the Greek loan. No doubt, the English Government had a right to require payment of the interest of that loan, and even, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite asserted, to take forcible possession of a portion of the revenues of Greece to defray it; though I think he would not easily do that without much more difficulty than we have had in enforcing the claims of Mr. Finlay and M. Pacifico. But, in asking for the payment of this interest, after stating most strongly that Great Britain was determined to speak "a language which can no longer be misunderstood or set at nought," the Earl of Aberdeen says—

"It will be your duty to declare at the same time, that we shall not cease to urge and require the introduction of a system of rigid economy in the different branches of the service of the State, and especially in that of the War Department, which is still altogether disproportioned to the real wants of the State."

Here is such an opinion as the hon. Member for the West Riding might give at Bradford with respect to our own army estimates. The Earl of Aberdeen further says—

"You will inform the Greek Government that we shall still continue to insist on the necessity of administrative reform and a reduction of the armed force. The expenses of the War Department continue to absorb one-third of the revenues of the State. Brigandage has increased. The guaranteeing Powers are justified in viewing this state of things as the evidence of a vicious administration, which must be remedied by prompt measures of improvement. Wherever disorders prevail, the finances of the State must suffer. But the dilapidation of the Greek finances throws an undue burden upon the guaranteeing Powers. This Great Britain, as one of those Powers, cannot, and will not, longer allow."

That is justifiable language; but surely I shall not be told that it is not a comment upon the internal economy of Greece. When you tell they must reduce their armed force, that their War Department is much too expensive, that their whole administration is vicious, I think you are hardly entitled to come and read lectures to my noble Friend because you have found some fault with a despatch to Sir Henry Bulwer with respect to the conduct of Spain, which was not only under great obligation to us, but was also considerably in our debt for advances made to that State. Then these questions, though noninterference is the rule, must be decided in each particular case according to the necessities of the case. From the time of the Revolution—a revolution itself begun and supported by a Dutch army—down to the suppression of the rebellion of 1715, which was effected by the aid of Dutch regiments, and from 1715 to the present time, there have been few years without the interference of some Power or another in the internal affairs of other States, grounded upon some presumed necessity. I suppose it will not be said, after the examples I have quoted as occurring in our own country, that all interference is to be at once condemned. But then we are told, and I think the hon. Member for the West Riding laid down this new maxim, that not interfering ourselves we are not to permit other Powers to interfere. [Mr. COBDEN intimated his dissent.] I certainly thought the argument of the hon. Gentleman was entirely in that direction; and in case any one else should lay down such a maxim, as the hon. Gentleman has not done so, I must say that a maxim more fruitful in war could not be adopted. Why, when the Allied Powers at Verona thought it absolutely necessary for them to interfere at Naples, we should have had a war with those Powers, and when they again interfered in Spain, another war would have been the consequence to prevent that interference. I think, therefore, that in adopting non-interference as the rule, we should guard ourselves against laying down any such absolute maxim as would prevent this State from interfering in a case where absolute necessity for interference might exist. My noble Friend quoted the case of Portugal. Soon afterwards occurred the case of Spain, and that interference was suggested by an eminent statesman, Prince Talleyrand, then Ambassador at this Court, who felt that the success of the Carlists in Spain would be dangerous to the house of Orleans in France. It is for statesmen on different occasions to judge of the dangers which threaten their countries. Holding, then, that we cannot lay down any absolute rule of noninterference, I will only say that when interference is absolutely necessary, and in cases where influence without interference may be used, our interference in such cases of necessity, or our influence when it can be exercised, should be applied to the promotion of that temperate liberty in which both liberty and order consist. I can see no harm, but much the contrary, likely to result from such a course; for, without preaching any propagandism, we say it is our desire to see institutions, whether they are called monarchical or republican, which combine the elements of authority and of freedom. Such institutions exist in this country; such institutions exist in the United States of America. They are institutions that tend to promote the happiness of mankind. But they have a more important influence. They tend to promote the independence of nations. A nation that has a free Government, in which the representatives of the people are called upon to consider the public interests, is far less likely to be subjugated, or to submit to the influence of a foreign Power, than a nation where a Court by its own despotic will rules the destiny of the people. It is for the interest of England that the independence of nations should be supported, and the general balance of power maintained. I say also that besides the general interest of mankind, it is our particular interest with regard to Europe that freedom should be extended. I myself rejoice that after all the trouble, confusion, and bloodshed of the year 1848, two Powers, both of considerable importance — one from its magnitude, the other from its position—Prussia and Sardinia, have been placed in a way to establish permanent representative institutions. I am not afraid to say that I rejoice at that result. I am not ashamed to say that I should be glad if other nations could safely, when they are prepared for such institutions, follow such examples. Our best influence, after all, is to be obtained by affording an example of order and of liberty to others. But, Sir, at the same time, it is a great advantage that it should be understood in Europe that we take part with neither of the extreme parties which now divide it; that while we abhor the crimes which produced the assassination of Rossi and Latour, we also disapprove of those acts which deprived nations of ancient rights, and have given their best blood to be shed upon the scaffold. I think it is of great use to Europe and the world that the Government of this country should be understood to approve of neither of these extremes — neither of the wildness of democracy, nor of the iron rule of despotism. I say that these extremes produce and succeed to each other; that the absolute tyrant leads to the unbridled demagogue, and the unbridled demagogue, in his turn, leads to the iron rule of the tyrant. I wish to see neither of these kinds or forms of government prevail; and I beg this House to be aware lest, in censuring a Government which has held that middle course—which has detested the excesses of despotism and the excesses of license, they should be thought to declare themselves in favour of one of these parties—of which, I need not say. It will be understood that neither the other House of Parliament nor this is disposed to approve of the excesses of democracy; but if you, by your votes, put a negative upon this resolution, if you inspire joy in the hearts of all the lovers of despotism, and all the haters of liberty throughout Europe, you will be inflicting a great public evil, which will not be compensated, as you may suppose, by the more firm establishment of authority, of law, and of tranquillity. On the contrary, if those who, by working so strenuously and so courageously in the cause of order in Europe have gained the superior influence, if they act with moderation, if they gradually lay the foundation of freedom, and proceed to erect a superstructure upon it, they may hope to maintain order and tranquillity. But depend upon it, that any attempt to suppress opinion, now that the men of Europe have been so much instructed in political doctrines, any endeavour to throw them back into silence, to refuse them political rights altogether, would not end in the establishment of despotism, but, in the present state of men's minds, it would end, if not in the establishment, at least in the temporary rule of a wild democracy. Let the House beware, then, how they countenance opinions of that kind. This cannot be denied, that the overthrow of the foreign policy of the present Government would be hailed as a triumph by all those who, up to 1848, thought their only security consisted in silencing the press, in forbidding free instruction, and in shutting out free institutions. All those men would rejoice if they were told that the present Government was removed. There are other considerations, upon which I shall hardly venture to dwell, but which were touched upon in that most able and eloquent speech of the hon. and learned Member for Southampton. Although the rumours may not have reached the ears of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tamworth, and although I believe that those who contemplate at all infringing upon the commercial policy which he has laid down would consider him the last person to be admitted to power, yet the rumours are very rife that there has been a way discovered—a mode which has been as yet imparted only to a few, by which those dissensions which since 1846 have been so marked may at once cease, and harmony be re-established. I cannot well believe that such should be the case. I cannot believe that Gentlemen who have followed the right hon. Gentleman in that course which he pursued in 1846 would now abandon those principles, or lead the people to suppose that there was any danger of a reversion to our former policy. I cannot believe, on the other hand, that those who have so loudly declared their adherence to the principle of protection to native industry, would now on a sudden abandon that principle, and give cause of bearing in their own persons the invectives and the reproaches which fell upon the right hon. Baronet and those who followed him in 1846. For then, indeed, instead of that inspiriting example which was held out to the farmers of England, that the day would come when the cry would issue from the lips of their leader, "Up, guards, and at them!"—we should have a totally different military manœuvre; instead of the victory of Waterloo, we should have the capitulation of Ulm; instead of the glory of Wellington, we should see the disgrace and degradation of Mack. I cannot believe that those who have so loudly proclaimed to the farmers their adherence to such maxims will now desert them; they have too lately and too loudly avowed those principles now to be enabled to tamper with or to compromise them. But this I know, that with respect to ourselves, we have endeavoured to carry on the government of this country, both with regard to its domestic and its foreign relations, in times of great danger, in such a manner as that there should not be any disturbance of the tranquillity, of the peace, of the progress of industry in this country, and at the same time to propose from time to time such improvements as it seemed to us might be safely adopted. In that course we have received, I fully admit, the cordial and constant support of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Tamworth. He no doubt, on considering the course we had adopted, found that that course was consonant to what he believes to be the true interests of the country; but, nevertheless, I feel an obligation to him for the manner in which he has given that support, giving it freely, giving it frankly, and at the same time never attempting to show that it was by his support that the majority of this House were induced to uphold the measures of the Government. If the right hon. Gentleman—if the right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon, think fit to withdraw that support, they must be aware of the difficulties that may follow, of the perils to which they expose a policy of which they have been the supporters and the approvers, of a great part of which they are themselves the authors. That is a consideration, not for us, but for themselves. All I can say is, that if in the course of four years we have been following principles of foreign policy which were inconsistent with the honour and dignity of the country, and which wantonly endangered peace with foreign Powers, whatever domestic policy such a Government might pursue, the sooner it is displaced the better for the interests of the country. I cannot conceive that a Government should be allowed to continue, which, although this House is late in discovering it, is yet discovered to have been for four years sacri- ficing the honour and endangering the peace of the country. I am persuaded, for my own part, that we have done neither the one nor the other. I feel, on the contrary, that we have been able successfully to contend with great dangers. I feel that at this moment there is no circumstance which threatens the peace that connects this country with other Powers of Europe. On many subjects we are in constant and intimate communication with those Powers. Russia, for instance, has been mentioned as holding an unfriendly station; but there is no week passes that my noble Friend is not in communication with Russia with respect to points of policy on most important subjects, on which the two Powers are fully agreed. Let not any man, therefore, be misled by the notion which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford stated last night, that while my noble Friend was Foreign Secretary, this country was constantly on the brink of war. Why, that would be indeed a strange conclusion to come to, seeing that in the thirty-five years of peace we have so happily enjoyed, for upwards of fourteen of them the foreign affairs of this country have been under the peculiar administration of my noble Friend. If such has been the case, I think it is a presumption that there has been, however it may be denied, a foreign cabal at work, which has endeavoured to impose upon the public of England false statements, which for the sake of its own ends has raised unfounded suspicions with respect to the foreign policy of England, and which endeavours to overturn that foreign policy, partly out of a wish to see a Government more favourable to views of absolute power on the Continent, and partly out of a wish to diminish the power and reputation of England. But those who frame these designs forget two things. They forget that, however it might be avoided by the opponents of my noble Friend—however they might try to shirk and evade the contest, a day might come when my noble Friend himself would be able, in his own masterly language, and with his own command of a knowledge of all the circumstances that have taken place, in this House to make his triumphant defence. Happy indeed would it have been for the opponents and the enemies of my noble Friend and of the Government, had they been able by transferring the scene of battle to another quarter to put an end entirely to this controversy, without my noble Friend having once been heard upon the subject. How many unfounded statements, how many rumours invented for the purposes of calumny might still have lived, might still have been in existence, had my noble Friend not had an opportunity of addressing this House. That is one circumstance which the enemies of the foreign policy of this Government had not counted upon. It was an opportunity they were not anxious to court, and I believe most desirous to avoid, but they were not able to avoid it; my noble Friend has been heard in his defence. There is another circumstance I think they had not counted upon, which is, that although the people of England are generally very indifferent and often ill-informed upon foreign affairs, to which they do not pay any constant attention, there might come a day when, roused by the prevalence of views clearly indicated by foreign interests, they might arouse themselves, and awake and give their attention to this subject, and say, "Is it true that the honour of England has been stained, that peace with Europe has been endangered, while the noble Lord has had the conduct of the foreign policy? and if it is not true, is it our business as the people of England to allow such an unfair pursuit to end in his defeat?" This, as I have said, was not reckoned upon; this, I believe, is taking place. For my own part, by the verdict of this House and the verdict of the people of England, I shall be ready to abide, fully convinced that we have consulted the honour of the country, and during most difficult times have preserved to you the blessings of peace.

It is with unfeigned reluctance that I rise to address the House at this hour (two o'clock). I trust the House will consider it, on my part, not an act of presumption, but of necessity. But considering all the circumstances of the case, and the direct appeal made to me by the First Minister, I cannot but feel that I should be wanting, not only in self-respect, but in duty to those Gentlemen with whom I have the honour and satisfaction to act in political connexion, were I to give a silent vote on this occasion. I promise the House that I will not forget the hour, but I must trust not only to their indulgence but their generosity, and that they will not forget that the occasion is great and peculiar. In the extreme desire of Her Majesty's Ministers to be censured, they have found great fault with me, that I have not become their censurer. The noble Lord the First Minister has said that it devolved on me, as an act of constitutional duty, to propose, in consequence of the vote in the House of Lords, a similar vote for the adoption of the House of Commons, and not to have left it to an independent Member of the House, who sympathises with the policy of the Government, to propose a vote of confidence in that policy. And then the noble Lord, with singular inconsistency, refers to a precedent in 1833, when the House of Lords also came to a vote of censure of the foreign policy of the Whig Government of that day; and when Colonel Davies, a gentleman, the noble Lord assures us, as independent as the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, consequently proposed a vote of confidence in the Government. As far then as precedents go, as quoted by the noble Lord, it would seem I was quite warranted in leaving the task to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. There are, however, other precedents and more recent ones. Since I myself have had the honour of a seat in this House, I can remember the House of Lords arriving at a vote of great gravity on the government of Ireland, and which the Ministry of the day accepted as tantamount to a vote of want of confidence in their administration. Well, was it the leader of the Opposition—an opposition the most powerful that ever existed in this country—presided over by a personage not less distinguished than the Member for Tamworth, who on that occasion was expected or invited to come forward and propose a vote similar to that which the Lords had adopted? Not at all. The vote proposed in the Commons was a vote of confidence in the Government to counterpoise the vote of censure in the Lords. And who proposed it? Not even an independent Member of Parliament. It was proposed by the leading Minister in this House—and that Minister was the noble Lord himself. A debate of five days ensued, and the Government was confirmed in the exercise of their authority by a triumphant majority of 22! Before I touch on the resolution immediately before us, I would make one observation on the remark of the First Minister with respect to Lord Aberdeen. The noble Lord says that Lord Aberdeen has been in the habit in his place in Parliament of making the most unauthorised statements with respect to the conduct of the Government in the management of our foreign affairs. This is a very grave accusation, and it would have been as well, I think, if the noble Lord had deigned to substantiate it by some reference to details. In their total absence, though I have no political connexion with Lord Aberdeen, I feel bound to say that I have always read the speeches of that distinguished statesman with the due attention they merit; and that during the four years to which the observation of the noble Lord applies, I can recall no one statement of Lord Aberdeen as to our foreign affairs that was not fully justified by preceding facts; and, I might add, no judgment which subsequent events have not fully warranted. The noble Lord talks of certain rumours—of certain rumours which he supposes may not have reached the ear of the Member for Tamworth. I scarcely apprehend the particular rumours to which he refers, but in a country like this political rumours are always rife. Very recently, for example, only just before the opening of the Session, there was a very prevalent rumour that the noble Lord was going to impose an 8 s. duty on the importation of foreign corn. Perhaps that rumour may not have reached the noble Lord's ear. And yet it was one that was very credited even by many of his friends and followers. The learned Member for Sheffield, in introducing his resolution, complained of some alleged language of mine that would seem to intimate that he was not unwilling to become the useful instrument of the Government in the stop he was taking. He imputed to me the expression "arranged machinery" in relation to himself and the Government. I did not correct him at the time, because I would not interrupt him at such a moment on a mere personal point; but the expression has been repeated in the course of a protracted debate, and therefore I may be permitted to assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that he was quite in error in his impression. All I did say was, addressing myself to the noble Lord, that if he were not himself disposed to ask a distinct vote from the House, he might at least avail himself of the obvious and offered machinery presented by the notice of the learned Gentleman—perhaps not a phrase remarkable for its felicity, but surely not one calculated to ruffle even the most irritable temperament. The resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman, however, though not proposed in collusion with the Government, has been sanctioned and adopted by them; and in now commenting upon it, I regard it as put for- ward with all the official authority of the Treasury bench. That resolution was occasioned by one adopted by the House of Lords, which proclaimed the principle that it is the right and the duty of the Government of this country to secure to Her Majesty's subjects in foreign States the full protection of the laws of those States. The Secretary of State, when he rose the other night, flatly denied the truth of this proposition. I was for the moment lost in amazement at his audacity, but the cheer which followed his repudiation had scarcely subsided, when the noble Lord dispelled my astonishment by entering into an argument which fully admitted the principle which he had challenged. The Secretary of State denied the proposition, because it did not go far enough; but if it did not go far enough, so far as it did go, it was nevertheless true. The question is, did the House of Lords recognise no other right and duty in our Government with respect to the security of our fellow subjects in foreign States, than the one they thought it expedient to assert? Did they mean to limit the rights and duties of our Government, instead of establishing them? Certainly not; the House of Lords laid down no rule that if the laws of foreign States were not sufficient for the protection of British subjects, other means of redress were not to be resorted to. The noble Lord, however, would seem to have assumed quite a converse position. He maintained that it was the duty of our Government to secure to British subjects in foreign States full protection, without any reference at all to the laws of those States. In other words, a British subject in Greece, for example, was to look for redress for any grievance, not to the local tribunals in the first instance, but in the first instance and absolutely, to the British admiral on the nearest station, or to the British Minister in Downing-street. Now, I want to know in what position would this country be placed with regard to foreign Powers, if this principle were really acted on? I will again take the instance of the country, our relations with which are immediately under our consideration. Greece is a country abounding in British subjects who are not Britons. Act on the principle asserted by the Government, and the Greeks of Ionia, the various populations of Malta, the Spaniards and Jews of Gibraltar, a teeming and scheming race, not distinguished by the highest morality, pursuing avocations in which the law frequently interferes or ought to inter- fere, would, whenever it had, or fancied it had, a claim, or grievance, bring it at once not before the tribunal of the country, but before the nearest military or naval officer in Her Majesty's service, or before Downing-street, or before the English Parliament. The independence of Greece would, under such circumstances, indeed, be a mockery. The Secretary of State alleges the character of the Greek people, and the circumstances of their social state, as sufficient reasons for his principle: the Greek tribunals are corrupt; the population is savage and rapacious; there is no justice in a land of bandits. But if this be so, it might be a very good argument against recognising the independence of Greece, but not of violating its independence. We have to deal with a country which we have declared to be independent; which consequently possesses all the rights and owes all the responsibilities of independence, and we cannot, à priori, declare that the tribunals of such a country are incompetent to redress the wrongs of our countrymen who may be dwelling in it. Her Majesty's subjects so situate must take the consequences of their locality, and before they call for the supplementary aid of the law of nations to redress their wrongs, they must have exhausted the assistance which the municipal law of the land in which they choose to live provides them. And here, Sir, perhaps I may be permitted to express my surprise, that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, an Englishman, and not only an Englishman but an English lawyer, should have spoken in terms so slightingly of the law of nations, as if instead of being a code matured by the wisdom and experience of ages, it was, as he would have us believe, only a bundle of medley maxims got together by chance and expediency. I think when the hon. and learned Member recalls the names of Lord Mansfield, of Sir William Scott, of Sir William Grant; when he recalls the great transatlantic name of Judge Story; when he remembers how the practice of war was humanised by the decrees of Lord Stowell, that they were quoted and referred to by foreign nations even in times of warfare—he will scarcely feel justified in the opinions which he expressed of a code which has so materially advanced the civilisation of Europe. Sir, it is said that the House of Lords itself qualified the principle on which it condemned the foreign policy of the Government. I find no such qualifi- cation recorded. But were it so, I could not give my adhesion to such qualification. I cannot agree that the principle which the House of Lords laid down applies only to countries in which constitutional governments prevail. It is a principle; an absolute principle of law; and applies to all countries. But if in some countries it happens not to be practical, that does not prove that the principle is to be superseded by violence, but only that it is to be sustained by means equally legal. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield asks how a British subject is to obtain relief under a despotic government. He takes the instance of Russia, and says, that the Emperor might banish an English suitor, as he might one of his own subjects, to Siberia. The answer to the hon. and learned Member is, that in that case the law of nations steps in to assist the municipal law that is deficient, and that the remedy of the suffering foreigner is secured by treaty. Take the case not only of an absolute government, but of an oriental despotism; take the case of Turkey. We have carried on commercial relations with Turkey longer perhaps than with any other existing country. Have we secured the interests and vindicated the rights of our fellow-subjects by sending into every harbour of the Levant, on every mercantile squabble, a considerable fleet? Not at all. But distrusting the municipal law, we called into action the law of nations; we entered into conventions, popularly styled capitulations, with the Porte; we provided that when suits occurred between two British subjects in the dominion of Turkey, they should be decided by the British Consul: that if the suit occurred between a native and a British subject, the British Ambassador or Consul should jointly preside at the tribunal. Why, at this moment, had we not made Greece an independent State, the provisions of these treaties would have still applied to Greece as an ancient portion of the Ottoman empire. Why have we not taken care to continue these provisions to independent Greece? Why have we not secured for British subjects in Greece what we have secured, and secured for centuries, for British subjects in Turkey? Why have we not established in Greece what we established two centuries ago in Portugal—a Judge Conservator for British subjects? These are the means by which, if the local and municipal law is clearly deficient, the law of nations, in the authentic form of treaties, steps in to supply what is wanting, and to prevent those appeals to force, and those rude and barbarous appliances which, it seems, are the fashion of this age of progress. One word as to the Greek claims: the House need not be alarmed: the names of Finlay and Pacifico shall not again escape me. Admitting the validity of these claims, which my argument will permit, I hardly think that the House will deny that, on the whole, these claims were, to a certain degree, doubtful in their character and exaggerated in their amount. If they were not, they certainly differed from any other claims that ever were urged. But, admitting their general validity, I know of twenty public claims, just as good, and much more considerable. I have on my table, at this moment, the claims of British merchants sorely aggrieved by the non-payment of money advanced by them to pay the dividends due on a loan of a South American State, and which this firm, once eminent, the late house of Reid, Irving, and Co. had never even negotiated. Now I do not say that Government should send sixteen ships of the line to enforce that claim, but I should like to know on what plea they would refuse to do it? Again, there were the claims of the English workmen banished from France, and properly alluded to by my noble Friend the Member for Colchester. Theirs was a very hard case. They were banished with arrears of wages unpaid. Had any demand been made on France on their account—of the capital of which they were thus deprived? Again, there were the Portendic claims with which, no doubt, many hon. Gentlemen were familiar. The Secretary of State himself had encouraged British merchants to enterprises in a country from which they had been ruinously expelled by a foreign Power. During the seven years that the noble Lord was in office, did he obtain any satisfaction for these victims of his policy? Well, Sir, remembering all these circumstances, I am not surprised that there are persons who are of opinion that these very inferior claims recently so energetically enforced were a pretext, and were not the real cause for the appearance of a British fleet, larger than the one which fought the battle of the Nile, in the waters of Athens. The Secretary of State has complained that the attack on his policy has been made, both abroad and at home, a personal attack. I can assure the noble Lord he shall have no cause to make this complaint of me. I have, before this, taken the opportunity of expressing my disapprobation of a mode which has only of recent date entered into our discussion, and that is of visiting on the head of a department the consequences of a policy for which the whole Cabinet is responsible. That mode is not only one highly unconstitutional, but grossly insulting to the colleagues of the Secretary of State, and more particularly to the First Minister, who, not having any department himself, was influenced probably in not taking any, in order that he might control all departments alike. If there be any colleagues of the Secretary of State who disapprove of his policy, in my opinion they are infinitely more blame-able than himself. His policy may be erroneous, but it is at least one which he believes expedient; but they are responsible for a policy which they condemn. Many Gentlemen, who have addressed us in the course of this debate, have referred to the feelings of fervent friendship which they entertain to the Secretary of State. Whether it were the inspiration of their theme—Greece, that famous land, famous for nothing so much as for the intensity of its friendships—whatever may be the cause, I cannot help feeling that these effusions are not conveniently introduced into parliamentary discussion, and that if there be any one of so effeminate a turn of mind, that on account of private friendship he cannot perform a public duty, by giving a vote which may bring a Minister into a difficulty, the best thing for a person of such nervous susceptibility, would be to accept the Chiltern Hundreds. But to come to the resolution of the Member for Sheffield. The first and natural inquiry is, what are the principles which that resolution so much lauds, and on which are founded the foreign policy of the present Government. The hon. and learned Gentleman had no doubt intended to be particularly explicit, but having deplored the ignorance of the people of England of foreign affairs, I am bound to say, that the hon. and learned Gentleman is no exception to his own observation. Dismissing the first principle, that it is the duty of every Government to protect its subjects in every clime as self-evident; the great principle of this policy, according to the resolution is, I conceive, the support of the cause of self-government and constitutional liberty. That might not be a very prudent, but all would admit it was a very captivating principle. Liberty against despotism; the cause of constitutional government against arbitrary rule—every one felt, though he might, on reflection, doubt the beneficial results of such a policy, there was something inspiriting and ennobling in its character. It would seem, however, from the observations of hon. Gentlemen opposite, that the consequences of this development of self-government in foreign parts have hitherto proved not very felicitous. The Member for Sheffield informs us, that self-government, in its most unlimited form, namely, universal suffrage, in one of the most civilised countries of Europe, has produced an assembly, which has produced a government who, according to the hon. Gentleman, are a gang of conspirators. Then it was said by the gallant Member for Middlesex, that it was altogether a great mistake to have given a constitutional government to Greece, for that country was quite unfitted for such a blessing; while the Secretary of State had been obliged to blockade or bombard the liberal Government of Portugal. But is it quite clear that the principle pursued by Her Majesty's Government in the conduct of our foreign affairs has been the principle so boldly announced, and so unsparingly lauded, by the Member for Sheffield? Is it true that their foreign policy has aimed and aspired at the development of self-government, and the encouragement of constitutional liberty, throughout the world? I propose to ascertain this. The present Government acceded to office in the middle of the year 1846. They were soon busily occupied in the Peninsula; equally active at Madrid and at Lisbon. But in favour of self-government? On behalf of constitutional liberty? Not at all. In favour of a royal marriage; on behalf of a dynastic interest. In both instances the purposes were purely dynastic. And so far from their policy having any relation to their alleged great principle, they were acting in direct violation of it—seeking to effect a royal marriage at Madrid, by putting them selves at the head of the Liberal party, and consolidating a dynasty at Lisbon at the same time, by blockading and bombarding the Liberal party. The Spanish match caused an estrangement from France, and the consequences of that estrangement furnishes the key note of the whole foreign policy of our Government. France, remembering her position in 1840, and alarmed lest she should again find herself in a state of isolation, sought a cordial understanding with another great Power—Austria. The maintenance of a good understanding with France is the cardinal point of the foreign policy of this country. No one denies it. We all admit it. But in the event, however to be lamented, of France having to look to another Power for that cordial understanding, which England should supply, surely there is no Power with whom we should witness her cherish feelings of political sympathy with less jealousy than with Austria. The friendly relations between France and Austria, however, were not viewed with satisfaction by our Government. Our Government, from that moment, seized every occasion to check the influence of these two countries; and the year 1847 afforded them two opportunities of doing so. Switzerland offered the first, and Italy the second. Is there any one who pretends that the interference of our Government in these two countries was an interference in favour of constitutional government? Why the First Minister, who has just addressed us, has taken great pains, and this, too, not the first occasion he has taken for that purpose, to assure us that the mission of Lord Minto was scrupulously confined to a recommendation of merely administrative reforms. What, then, becomes of that patronage of constitutional freedom on the Continent, which we are told is the characteristic of the present Government? It does not appear to have been their characteristic in Italy in 1847. Then and there, we learn from the highest authority, they were only administrative reformers. Were they more liberal in Switzerland? The Secretary of State has triumphantly vindicated himself from all supposed sympathy with Red Republicans, of which we have heard so much for so long a time. And he might well do it; for I may be permitted to remind the House, that during all this year of 1847, Her Majesty's Government, in their foreign policy, were cherishing a cordial understanding with Russia, and smiling, with more than complacency, on the legitimate pretender to the Spanish throne. Well, now, I have examined the foreign policy of the Government for nearly a moiety of the period during which they have held the reins of power; and I ask the House thus far, where is the evidence that it has been a policy promoted by the alleged principle of encouraging the self-government and constitutional spirit of Europe, or whether it has been prompted by any other consideration than the attainment of the varying object which the Government might deem desirable and expedient? Sir, there was no doubt, a very great uneasiness in parts of Europe in 1847. An appreciation of its consequences would hardly be attained without a due comprehension of its cause. Was it produced by the natural disquiet and restlessness of populations existing under Governments, whose forms and spirit they had alike outlived, or was it the result of the combinations of those secret societies, which for nearly three quarters of a century, have watched the casual discontents of Europe, and taking advantage, for example, of the continued diminution in the means of subsistence of the people, by a series of bad harvests, such as we have recently experienced, have seized and fomented the opportunity to further those social changes to which they are devoted. According to the opinion of the most eminent of modern statesmen, the latter was the cause. Scrutinised by the characteristic serenity of his intelligence, the smouldering disturbance of 1847 was not the voice of the people; and in more than one despatch upon our table, Prince Metternich warned our Government that the menaced disturbance was not, as it had been heretofore, of a political, but of a social, and, as it is termed, communistic character, and aimed at the reconstruction of society, and not at the modification of political institutions. Her Majesty's Ministers, Sir, were not of the opinion, it seems, of Prince Metternich, and treated his warnings with something like contempt; yet the distinction he drew was not unimportant. Where a revolution is the consequence of a nation being deprived of its just rights, or where they are debarred from those rights for which they have gradually become qualified without the recognition of their rulers, no doubt scenes of bloodshed, violence, and destruction may occur, long years very often, when the progress of civilisation is not only arrested, but even a reaction of barbarism is threatened; but in the end great principles triumph, and after all the sacrifices, it is found that society has been ameliorated, and though the generation has suffered, the nation has advanced. On the other hand, when the movement is the factitious offspring of occult confederations, we generally find that force eventually vindicates the principles of order; the multitude has never been generally enlisted in behalf of measures which their conviction did not prompt or originate; and it usually occurs, as the consequence of such movements, that the grievances alleged as the cause of the insurrection are aggravated, and that society falls back, instead of advancing, from the unjustified or premature disturbance. Now, Sir, when the French revolution occurred, at the commencement of 1848, the problem was to be solved, whether it was an event caused by the popular passions of a community desiring great political changes adapted to their altered condition, or the result of the intrigues of secret societies. It was clear that on a right appreciation of the circumstances, the success or the failure of the English policy depended. The instant the crash occurred, Her Majesty's Government resumed the French alliance. They take great credit to themselves for this. I don't wish to be captious, especially at half past two o'clock in the morning; but I may be permitted to remind Her Majesty's Ministers, that they allowed four months to elapse before they recognised the Republic; and they were, therefore, scarcely authorised to remind the House of the extraordinary promptitude with which they acknowledged the new form of Government in France. The great consequences of the French revolution were the dismemberment of the dominions of three Powers, with whom England had long been upon terms of cordial understanding and ancient alliance. Austria was deprived of Lombardy; the King of the two Sicilies became the King of Naples only; and the King of Denmark lost his Scandinavian duchies. The secret societies of Germany invaded Schleswig-Holstein, as the secret societies of Italy had invaded Sicily and the provinces of Austria. Now, in every instance these dismemberments had injured a great English interest. It was a great English interest that the north of Italy should belong to Austria, and that, in the possession of a first-rate military power, Lombardy, in conjunction with Sardinia, should afford a barrier to France; it was a first-rate English interest that Sicily should belong to Naples, and not to a country which commanded the shores of the Mediterranean; it was a first-rate English interest that the Sound should be in the possession of Denmark, and that the ports of the Baltic, and the mouths of the Elbe, should belong to that Power. Well, with all these great interests at stake, Her Majesty's Govern- ment came to a decision, that it was utterly impossible that Austria could ever regain Lombardy; that the King of Naples could again become the King of Sicily; or that the King of Denmark could retain the ports of the Baltic and the mouths of the Elbe. And thus these three great English, interests were at once given up by an English Government. The Government might have been sincere, though they were quite wrong. But under any circumstances, is this a policy entitled to a vote of the House, declaring that it tended to the honour and dignity of the country? I do not understand how it can tend to the honour and dignity of a country, that its affairs should be conducted by men, who, instead of grappling with the difficulties before them, only utter a cry of despair. Let me recall to the recollection of the House, though with the brevity which the occasion demands, the manner in which Her Majesty's Ministers have dealt with the circumstances placed before them. Austria in her agony, with all her provinces dismembered, sends a Minister to England—a Minister hastily accredited, if accredited at all, by an Administration which lasted only a few weeks—to offer in her despair to relinquish Lombardy. It is not enough, replied Her Majesty's Ministers; you must not only relinquish Lombardy, you must give up Venetia. But, instead of giving up Venetia, she reconquers Lombardy. Austria is in possession of both; but is she indebted for this either to the prescient sagacity or the animating counsels of one who ought, in her peril and affliction, to have been her faithful ally? Take the instance of the King of the Two Sicilies; is it denied that, while we were maintaining intimate diplomatic relations with that Sovereign—while we had at his court an Envoy in frequent and friendly conference with him, Her Majesty's Ministers simultaneously, and in secret, were entertaining propositions which not only, without his approbation, but absolutely without his knowledge, would have deprived him of one of his crowns? No Member of the Government has denied this proceeding. Well, is it one that tends to maintain the honour and dignity of this country? Yet the resolution we are called upon to vote, asserts it does. I come to Denmark. We have been accused, on this side of the House, of not having called its attention, during the existence of the present Administration, to the state of our foreign rela- tions. My conscience acquits me in this respect, but especially with reference to Denmark. It is more than two years ago, since, foreseeing the evils that would ensue—the inevitable blockade of the Baltic—so detrimental to our manufactures and commerce, that must occur from the illegal invasion of the Scandinavian duchies belonging to Denmark by Germany, that I felt it my duty to solicit the consideration of the House to the state of affairs in those countries. The right of England to interfere was obvious. We had guaranteed the possession of these duchies to Denmark. But our right was not only obvious, our means of vindicating it were not difficult. The guarantee was not single. We had a powerful colleague in the engagement. France was similarly bound, and faithful to its traditionary policy of always supporting the independence of Denmark, France, under any form of government, would have been prepared, and prompt to fulfil its office. General Cavaignac was then at the head of the Government of France; but in the midst of revolution and domestic struggles, France never for a moment hesitated in expressing her readiness to redeem her pledge, and uphold her established policy. How did Her Majesty's Ministers act? They did not repudiate their guarantee, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon said the other night. That might have been justifiable; for the repudiation of a guarantee may be founded on a point of law. No; they shuffled and tried to evade the guarantee, which they did not dare to abjure. And with France, prepared to enforce the rights of Denmark, which she had engaged for more than a century to maintain, and with the other great Power of Europe, Russia, not a party to the guarantee, but ready to act as if she were equally bound by the same treaty, nothing was done to assist Denmark to a termination of her troubles, because England stood aloof; and why? Why, by standing aloof from the fulfilment of an engagement which the concurrence and sympathy of France and Russia rendered so easy to perform, why did England occasion those blockades of the Baltic of which the commercial classes of this country have uttered so many complaints? Because, forsooth, the intelligence and energies of Her Majesty's Ministers were concentrated on one great object—the creation of a German empire! Convinced that the empire of Austria could no longer be upheld, or, not wishing to up- hold it, their hopes were centred in an empire of the north, to which every petty interest was to be subordinate. And where was that German empire now? Was the failure of that project a reason for the House passing a vote of confidence in the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government? The German empire was a German romance; as wild and monstrous! But Her Majesty's Ministers devoted themselves to that great object. ["No!"] "No!" I will show they did—I will show what they did. With Austria, Naples, Denmark, in the desperate state I have described, Her Majesty's Ministers, instead of consoling and comforting them, instead of imparting hope or trying to inspire them with renovated energy, hit upon a plan to extricate themselves from their difficulties, to settle Europe, and to find some compensation for the weakened power of those three considerable allies, and that was to form new political combinations. They determined upon an European Congress. The scheme was colossal; no doubt they expected to rival the glories of Westphalia and Vienna—that they would mature a settlement that would regulate centuries—and that the name of the Secretary of State would descend to posterity with that of a Richelieu and a Castlereagh. The Congress was to be held at Brussels. An experienced diplomatist was sent out to represent England, versed in many missions, a Member of the Privy Council, and highly decorated; but when Sir Henry Ellis arrived at Brussels, in order to consolidate the German empire by the dismemberment of the Austrian, not a single European envoy joined him. He lingered on for some months, without the representative of a single Power meeting him, and all that resulted from the great Congress of Brussels was his Excellency's bill of expenses, which the financial reformers may find in the civil contingencies. Well, was that a proceeding which tended to maintain the honour and dignity of the country? Is the Congress of Brussels an incident which should inspire us to vote our confidence in the prudence, sagacity, and success of Her Majesty's Government? Ought the House to sanction the proposed vote on account of this great exploit? Well, then, what are we to think of the justice of the panegyric of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield on Her Majesty's Ministers, for their advocacy of the principle of self-government, and their promotion of constitu- tional liberty? I ask the House, have Her Majesty's Ministers really done this? I have shown you that during a moiety of their administration, during the years 1846 and 1847, they were occupied in dynastic arrangements in the Peninsula, and carrying on their general policy by the aid of a cordial understanding with Russia. And what was their policy of 1848? They pursued at that time a most incoherent line. They had to deal with circumstances to which they were not equal. They were wrong in every judgment they formed, and failed in every combination they attempted. And yet the House is asked to vote confidence in them, and to declare that their want of judgment with respect to the Austrian empire, with respect to Denmark, with respect to Sicily, together with their project of an European Congress at Brussels, are all incidents calculated to uphold the character of this country, and tending to maintain its dignity and honour. But though they have thus unequivocally and universally failed, the House is called upon by the hon. and learned Gentleman to remember and to declare that the policy of the Government, in trying circumstances, had succeeded in preserving peace among the nations of the world. Now, Sir, this is a point on which, if the hour had permitted, I should like to have entered into detail. But I feel it is impossible. I wish I might, or could. I have the despatches here. I was prepared to meet the Secretary of State fairly and completely on this point; but the hour, and the naturally exhausted state of the House, forbid it. I must, therefore, enter into no details, but I will not refrain from stating the conclusions at which I have arrived. They are very contrary to those of the hon. and learned Gentleman. Had the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers a tendency to preserve peace? Did it preserve peace? I think it quite clear that had it not been for the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers, there would have been no war in Europe at all. I form my opinion on the admissions of the Secretary of State himself. I will not refer to the despatches of Prince Metternich, or their warning voice; but I assert that if the Secretary of State, as the organ of the Government, had made proper representations, and taken proper steps, the King of Sardinia would never have made war upon Austria. The Secretary of State said, that it was quite out of their power to prevent Sardinia attacking Austria. Did the Government try? Did the Secretary of State protest against that invasion? Did he do that which he did in the case of Cracow? He did not. When that infamous act was committed by the King of Sardinia, did Her Majesty's Ministers recall Her Majesty's representative from his court? Nothing of the kind. Let it be remembered that Sardinia was always in our power. The King possessed Genoa only by the treaties which this country signed and sanctioned at Vienna. The very title-deeds of Sardinia were in the pockets of the Secretary of State. The conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers in not preventing that invasion was the real cause of the war. The Secretary of State maintained that had peace been preserved in Italy, the insurrection of Hungary would probably have ensued, and that the resources of Austria were not materially reduced in that country by the affairs of Lombardy. Yet it appears by official documents recently published, that the Italian troubles caused 120,000 men to be draughted from Hungary, and the other kingdoms of the empire, to Italy; and these troops, picked troops by the bye, would otherwise have been employed in Hungary. I think, therefore, it is quite evident that the Sardinian invasion led to the Hungarian insurrection, and ultimately to that interference of Russia, to be ever deprecated. But if their policy occasioned war, did war assist their policy? Did it attain or advance their objects? Quite the reverse. Look at Sicily and the condition of its population. There, the very Government which they denounced has been confirmed and established by their policy. And as for that Russia, of which they had heard so many fears, Her Majesty's Ministers had the satisfaction of finding that after all these extraordinary proceedings which proved that the recent events in Europe had been occasioned, as Prince Metternich said, not by populations who wanted institutions, but by secret societies who sought plunder; order and authority had been established in the most rigid manner by the colossal power and iron volition of the Russian empire. It had, indeed, been admitted by their advocates that all the proceedings of the Government had failed, but then they claimed our confidence for their good intentions. It might be a good thing that our Government should be animated by constitutional sympathies in the management of our foreign transactions; but surely it would be mon- strous for Parliament to vote confidence in a Government merely on account of its sentiments, and not on account of a policy which had aimed at and obtained results of great general importance. I must not at this hour touch on the affairs of France and Turkey. With respect to them I must trust to the recollection of the House to fill up the picture. I will only ask, whether the retreat from the Dardanelles, or the harangue of General la Hitte, be incidents and procedures which tend to the maintenance of our honour and our dignity? There is, however, one consequence of our foreign policy during the present Administration which must be touched on. Two years ago, the Secretary of State felt himself bound to send his passports to the Spanish Minister, who quitted London in twenty-four hours: the year after that the Austrian Ambassador disappeared; and a little while ago, the town was startled by the sudden flight of the French Ambassador; while, much about the same time, it was officially announced, that the Russian Minister had taken the only means at hand to signify, that the Government of this country no longer possessed the cordial feelings of that great Power. Now are these circumstances which tend to the dignity and honour of a country? Is there any instance on record of a Government so situated—four foreign Ministers of the highest class having abruptly quitted them—coming forward and asking the confidence of the House of Commons in their foreign policy? I remember a passage in an Italian author, which, I cannot help fancying, is very apposite to the present state of our affairs. It is in Guiccardini, speaking of Venice at the end of the 15th century. He remarks on the unprecedented prosperity of the republic at that time. There were more sequins in its treasury, than there are sovereigns now in the Bank of England; its commerce was more extensive, relatively to the existing population of the world, than even that commerce whose progress is commemorated in those flattering returns of the Board of Trade, which every month are placed upon our table; it held the Orient in fee as we now hold India, and all the rich mercantile islands of the Mediterranean were hers, as the rich mercantile islands of the Atlantic now belong to England. With an aristocracy, of which some of the leading houses traced their descent from the Consular families of Rome, the Venetian might indeed, say, Civis Ro - manus sum, with rather more justice, perhaps, than a Finlay or a Pacifico. Above all, at that period the naval power of Venice was supreme. Yet amid all this unprecedented prosperity, the historian observes, that, great as was the power, and flourishing the condition of the grand republic, there was apparent at this time a singular estrangement between the Government of Venice and all foreign countries. That estrangement, observes the historian, was to be ascribed, partly to the jealousy and envy of these Powers at the prosperity of the great commercial aristocracy; but partly to the haughty tone which Venice for sometime had been accustomed to assume towards them. What was the consequence? Until that moment, in the struggles of Europe, the power of the King of Spain and the Emperor of Germany had been balanced against each by the state craft of Venice—in the same manner, as under her influence, the power of the Pope had checked the ambition of France; but in consequence of the diplomatic isolation of Venice, it so happened that on the same day, at the same hour, and in the same city, the representatives of all those great Powers, who had never before agreed upon any other question, met and signed the treaty of Cambray; the sole object of which was to cut the wings of this highflying republic of Venice, to terminate the intolerable career of the great commercial aristocracy which had offended them by its wealth, and insulted them by its arrogance. I need not remind the House of what were the consequences of the League of Cambray. They were not to be measured by the loss of that fatal battle which immediately ensued. But all historians agree, that, from that day, the star of Venice paled. Is there no lesson for England in this record of the past? If France ehrank from isolation in 1840, when our policy had created an estrangement between that country and England; if France, with her great resources and her daring spirit, shrank from isolation with terror, what is there in our position, that should make us feel, that in the present state of the world, and of the relations existing between nations, England alone can pursue an unsympathising path? For my part, I believe, that if the policy of the Government which we are now called on to approve be persisted in—this will occur: the great Powers of the world, I care not what may be their form of government, republican, monarchical, or imperial—as had hap- pened at Cambray—on the same day and perhaps at the same hour, will present to the Secretary of State an ultimatum which even the patrons and professors of peace societies, may find it difficult to digest. The House of Lords, in the exercise of a solemn duty, have expressed their opinion of a policy which they believe will lead to such terrible results. Was there anything in the manner in which that decision was accomplished, which should disqualify it for the confidence and respect of the House of Commons? I have heard, indeed, that decision described as the manœuvre of a foreign faction; but when I look to the influences which carried that decision, I do not find the influence of foreign conspirators, but of individuals who for that object had worked together, although they did not work together for any other; I find that decision carried too by the painful suffrage, and painful absence, no doubt also, of many friends and supporters in old days of the Government. I know not what may be the numerical result of the division that is now about to be taken here; but I feel persuaded that it will virtually announce to Europe and to another hemisphere, that the Parliament of England is resolved that, in future, her policy shall be conducted with a due regard to the rights of nations.

Sir, after the protracted debate, I shall only notice the prophecy with which the hon. Gentleman has concluded his speech—a prophecy which was, no doubt, intended to overawe and damp our spirits. I know not what the effect of that prophecy may be; but this I am bold to say, that the prophecy is not an English one; that it is not suggested by an English spirit; and that it would never have been thought of by one who had the heart to dare the danger he anticipated. If I believed that the House of Commons could be daunted by that prophecy, and would sanction the principles by which it was declared, then I should fear that we had given the nations of the world reasons to believe that by combining they might crush us.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 310; Noes 264:

The House adjourned at Four o'clock till Monday next.