wished to ask a question of the right hon. President of the Board of Trade. He had seen in the ordinary channels of communication a statement, that certain proceedings had taken place in the House of Representatives in the United States, of deep importance to the trade and manufactures of this country. It was stated that on the 25th of February last an hon. Member in the House of Representatives, on the discussion of a Bill then before it, proposed an amendment, imposing an additional duty on all kinds of iron, and various other manufactures, and imposing certain duties on certain articles that before were entirely exempt from duty, and that that amendment was carried by a majority of 127 to 54. A friend of his, writing from Philadelphia on the 10th of March, said he was informed there was likely to be a party compromise, which would secure for the iron and coal of that country a much greater protection than that which they already enjoyed, and which was at present 30 per cent; but that as to cotton manufactures nothing was at present arranged, Manchester having outbid those who were engaged in cotton manufactures in that country. On this alleged Manchester proceeding it would not be proper that he should now say anything. He wished, therefore, to ask the right hon. Gentleman if the Government had received any information, and if they would lay it before the House, of the nature and extent of increase in the protective duties proposed to be levied on the import into the United States of all kinds of iron, and on various other articles of British produce and manufacture now exempt from duty?

replied that, having had notice of the question, he had made it his duty to inquire whether any report had been received from Sir Henry Bulwer, our Minister at Washington, and he found that no despatch had been received from him since the date of these transactions; but he had seen in the newspapers an account of the proceedings to which the hon. Gentleman's question referred, and he had no reason to doubt the correctness of that statement. The proposed alteration of the tariff, however, had not passed into a law by the Legislature of the United States. It had passed only one branch of the Legislature—namely, the House of Representatives, and had not passed the Senate.

MR. Speaker, I rise to put a question, with a view to prevent, if I can, in the future discussion of the Ecclesiastical Titles Assumption Bill, that asperity of language which we all must regret to have already heard. The question is as follows, and I trust the reply will show the House the exact position in which it stauds with reference to debate: "Whether it be competent to the House to reconsider the Resolution at present in force as to the freedom of debate, and to amend it in cases where language is insulting collectively to individuals as well as personally, as was the case in the Papal Aggression debate on Thursday last?"

Hon. Members are aware that the rule of the House with regard to freedom of debate is part of the unwritten law of the House, and that it is a privilege which it is most important to preserve inviolate. At the same time it must be acknowledged that there are restraints which are not imposed by the actual rules of the House. Those restraints are founded upon the good feeling and courtesy of hon. Members, which ought to prevent, as much as possible, any Member from wounding the feelings, and especially the religious feelings, of other Members of the House. But I beg to state that in all cases of this description it is quite competent for the House to pronounce an opinion at the time upon the words spoken. For if any hon. Members are not satisfied with the decision of the Chair, it is competent not, for one hon. Member, but for the House, to call upon the Speaker to desire the words to be taken down; and then the sense of the House may be taken upon them. I entertain however, the greatest confidence that hon. Members, feeling the importance, as well for the satisfactory discussion of all important subjects, as for the preservation of the dignity of the House, that those restraints to which I have alluded should be observed, and, knowing that they cannot be enforced by any of the orders of the House, will see the greater necessity of not disregarding them.

begged to move for a Select Committee, to inquire into the question of the existing steam communications between England and India. He believed that he had no reason to expect opposition to his Motion from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer. However, from information which he had received, he was given to understand that the proposed Committee would he objectionable to some, on the ground that they did not think the present was the moment for inquiry; whilst others doubted whether a Parliamentary Committee was the proper tribunal to consider the question; and others thought the consequence of such a Committee would be to postpone the communication which it was desired to establish between Australia and this country to an indefinite period. There was one objection which might have been raised, and which, if it had, would have prevented him from pressing the House to grant a Committee. If he had been informed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it was the intention of Government to enter into an inquiry upon this question, he should have been content to leave it in his hands; for he felt that there was nothing more objectionable than for Parliament to interfere with these questions, which more properly belonged to the Executive Government; and he should be the last to desire to take the responsibility from the department to which it properly belonged. But he trusted he should be able to show that there were peculiar grounds why this Committee should be granted, and that some public advantage might be gained by agreeing to his proposition. He felt sure any Gentleman whose attention had been turned to the evidence given before the Contract Packet Service Committee, would have arrived at the same conclusion to which he had come, namely, that nothing was more unsatisfactory than the mode in which these arrangements were carried out. Here was a service where the expenditure of upwards of a million of money was involved, and the responsibility could not be placed upon any single party. In any questions where the colonial interest was affected, there were no less than four departments by which inquiry could be instituted. First, there was the Colonial Department, then there was the Treasury, then the Post Office, and lastly, the Admiralty. In any question where the India interests were affected, there were two other departments in lieu of the Colonial Office. Some reform ought to take place in that respect. There was another reason why he should move for this Committee, namely, that on the first of January, 1853, the contract now existing between the Peninsular and Oriental Company would expire, and the arrangement by which the second route of communication was carried on between the Indian and British Government would cease in the following year. Before any alteration in those arrangements could be made, it was important that sufficient time should be given for those parties who might be disposed to come forward with tenders. Another reason for asking for a Committee was, that, seeing the long period during which the subject of steam communication with Australia had been discussed, he saw little hope of any definite arrangement being come to. But the main ground upon which he asked for the Committee was a discussion which had taken place at the close of the last Session between his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the hon. Member for Honiton, relative to a tender which had been forwarded by the Peninsular and Oriental Company, proposing to undertake the communication between Sydney and Singapore. That contract was supported on the ground of the commercial advantages which were expected to be derived from it; but owing to difficulties which had been thrown in its way by the Indian Government, it had not been found practicable to carry it into effect. There was an impression upon the public mind, that in consequence of the objections which were made by the Government of India, the public were deprived of the advantages which were likely to arise from that contract. His hon. Friend the Member for Honiton repudiated that charge, and in doing so moved for certain documents which had been laid upon the table of the House. A Report had also been laid before the House on the proceedings of the Select Committee on the Contract Packet Service, over which the hon. Member for Oxfordshire presided. In that Report there was this passage:—

"Your Committee recommend great caution either in renewing the existing, or in forming new I arrangements. They suggest that if it be decided to renew the existing contracts, the most strict and searching inquiry should be instituted, by some responsible department of the Government, into the cost of the execution, into the manner in which the service has been performed, and into the profits resulting from the several transactions to the companies by which they have been respectively carried on; and if it should be decided to put up the several contracts to public tender, the most ample notice, and most full particulars, of the terms and conditions of the service required should be given to the public, as being the means most likely to secure a real and true competition by responsible parties."

That, Committee, it was true, pointed to some responsible department of the Government; but he had yet to learn that it was the intention of the Government to carry out that suggestion of the Committee. He thought it was the duty of the House to see that the inquiry proposed by the Committee should take place. If they allowed the present state of things to go on much longer, it might be found more difficult to effect those arrangements which should be thought desirable, and might perpetuate a monopoly of the Indian steam communication. In bringing that question before the House, he was acting on public grounds; he had no acquaintance with any of those companies which were interested in it, and he had no hostility whatever to that great company by which the line was at present carried on, namely, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Packet Company. On the contrary, he thought the public were deeply indebted to that company for the energy and ability it had displayed in carrying on the communication at a time when the profits were smaller than at present, and he rejoiced that the undertaking now yielded a large remuneration. He would state to the House those arrangements which were now in operation, some of the difficulties which had arisen at various times, some of the complaints that had been made against the mode in which the service was at present conducted, and the points into which he thought it would be the duty of the proposed Committee to inquire. The notice which he had placed on the table had two distinct objects: the first was to inquire into the question of the existing steam communications between England and India, and to report whether any improvements might be made in the conduct of those communications previous to the grant of a further contract to any company proposing to carry on that line. The second object was to consider the subject of steam communication, having for its object a line or lines connecting England, India, and Australia, and to report to the House the most fitting mode in which such communication may be effected, with due care to economy, and with advantage to the public interests. The importance of the first point to which he alluded, it was not necessary to dilate upon. The fact of a more rapid communication having been established between England and India was one of both commercial and political importance, and had added materially to the comfort and convenience of those who in the pursuit of their respective employments were obliged to go to India themselves, or who had relatives settled in that country. It was one of the most striking features in that march of knowledge by which the last quarter of a century marked the history of the world. In the year 1835 the necessity as well as the importance of a more rapid communication between England and India was generally admitted by the public. The Indian Government, in communication with Her Majesty's Government at home, undertook to carry on the steam communication between England and India. The better to understand the mode in which this communication was effected, he would bisect the route, taking the Isthmus of Suez as the point of division. In the year 1835 Her Majesty's Government, to conjuuction with the Government of India, opened a line of communication between this country and Bombay. That part of the voyage westward of Alexandria was performed by the vessels appointed by Her Majesty's Government, and the portion that lay between Suez and Bombay was performed by the Indian Navy. The Government of that day, viewing the question as an imperial one, and seeing the large expense that was incurred, agreed to contribute 50,000l. to that undertaking. This arrangement lasted up to the year 1841, when for the first time that great company, known by the name of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Packet Company, appeared to the eastward of the Isthmus; of Suez, and established a line of communication between Calcutta and Suez, with a branch from Alexandria to Southampton for carrying passengers as well as for trade. The Indian Government felt how important this new line was to the commerce of India, and they contributed 20,000l. per annum to the undertaking—the postal communication still remaining in the hands of the English Government, and the Indian Government jointly. This arrangement lasted up to the year 1845, when the whole question came under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. It was in 1845, under the Earl of Ripon, that the whole question was gone into, and was most laboriously discussed. The conclusion arrived at was that a bi-monthly line of communication should be established between England and India, one line being carried on conjointly by Her Majesty's Government and the East India Company, the other to be carried on wholly by the Pen- insular and Oriental Company. The arrangements relative to the first line of communication, namely, the joint one, were as follows, and are those now in force:—The mails leave England on the 7th of each month, and proceed viâ Marseilles to Alexandria; they reach Suez on the 20th of the same month; they are then forwarded to Bombay, and from Bombay to their different destinations. The second line of communication was that which was carried on by the Peninsular and Oriental Company. The arrangements with them were as follows:—They agreed to open a monthly line of communication between England, India, and China, their vessels to sail from Southampton on the 20th of each month, touching at Gibraltar and Malta. The mails arrive at Suez oil the 7th of the following month, and from thence the vessels of the company are despatched to Ceylon, Madras, and Calcutta, and thence to Singapore and China. The contract for opening this line of communication was a sum of 160,000l. per annum, and the Government taking the same view of the subject as the former Government, agreed to contribute as its share towards the undertaking, the sum of 90,000l. per annum,; requiring the Indian Government to contribute the other portion, namely, 70,000l. These arrangements were to last for seven years, and they will expire on the 1st of January, 1853. The whole cost to the public of these lines of communication amounted to a sum of 265,000l., of which 125,000l. was paid by the Indian revenue, and 140,000l. by the Treasury at home. He should add, that when these arrangements were made, Her Majesty's Government agreed to retain the postage in their own hands. The contract with the Peninsular and Oriental Company would shortly cease; and the question which now arose was, what course ought to be pursued in reference to future communication, He thought it most important to view this question as a whole question, and as one that affected in an equal degree the interests of India and Australia, as well as of England. In 1849 tenders were called for by the Admiralty with the view of opening a line of communication between this country and Australia. The Peninsular and Oriental Company sent in their tender agreeing to open a communication between Sydney and Singapore for 105,000l., on the condition that the line between Bombay and Suez, now worked by the Indian navy, should be abandoned to them. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer approved of this scheme, and considered that it was an economical arrangement; but the Indian Government opposed it, on the ground that it would create a monopoly of eastern communication in the hands of the Peninsular and Oriental Company; that its adoption would cripple all future arrangements of the communication; that it would be, in point of fact, not an economical but an additional and costly arrangement; and that it would injuriously affect the efficiency of the Indian navy. Now, the House would, he thought, concur with the Indian Government in the opinion that to create any monopoly in our great eastern communication, would be very highly mischievous and inexpedient, and, at all events, if no competition presented itself, which might be impossible in an undertaking of such magnitude, the rules and regulations laid down for the direction and control of the company intrusted with the communication ought to be of the most stringent character. Ever since these arrangements had been before the public, the Peninsular and Oriental Company had always put forward their pretensions to the line between Suez and Bombay being placed in their hands when the subject should come again under consideration; and, at the time the arrangement itself was made, a letter was sent by the secretary of the company to the shareholders, which exhibited the principle upon which the company had acted in forming the arrangement. The letter was in these terms:—

"In proposing to undertake such an extensive range of mail communication at so diminished a rate of remuneration, the directors desire me to observe that they do not expect that the new service, even with all its advantages of combination for commercial purposes, will be, of itself, adequately remunerative; but they are led to hope that, with the benefits the company's already established lines may receive from it, they may be enabled to derive such a profit on the whole of the company's operations as may yield a moderate dividend to the proprietors of the company's capital."

He did not at all wonder that the Indian Government should manifest a jealousy of the Peninsular and Oriental Company in this matter. The increased cost anticipated, and the decreased efficiency of the Indian navy, were of course questions of Indian finance and Indian policy; but there could be no question that, as a general fact, the services performed by the Indian navy were very great. The services per- formed by that navy on the coasts of India, Arabia, Persia, and China, were very considerable. With the extensive seaboard of India, along the entire length of which the Governor General had communications to carry on, it was most important that he should have a squadron at his disposal, and that the men who composed it should have confidence in the Government, and should be accustomed to the naval service of India. So long as the custom obtained of giving the Governor General no power or control over Her Majesty's squadron in the Indian seas, so long this navy must be maintained. Whether this particular service might not be performed at least as well in smaller vessels than those now employed, was a question into which he would not then enter. He could not do better, in explanation of the views which had induced the Earl of Ripon to continue the service for the time in the hands of the Indian Government, than quote the words of the Earl of Ripon himself on the occasion:—

"The objections of the court seem mainly to apply to the proposal for transferring to private contractors the service of the mail in the line between Suez and Bombay. I therefore hasten to state that one portion of the conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government have come is to leave that service at present in the hands of the East India Company. In coming to this determination they have been influenced, not only by a regard to the efficiency of the Indian Navy, but by the consideration that in case of any accidental failure on the part of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the East India Company's Navy will still be available in the same manner as Her Majesty's ships occasionally employed in Europe, as a contingent remedy for any casualties occurring to the mail contractors."

As to the mode in which the communication was now conducted, he had received within the last few days a number of complaints from merchants connected with the Indian trade, representing the inconveniences to which passengers were subjected, the obstacles in the way of regular and speedy transmission, and the want of sufficient means for transport of goods. He would read to the House a letter he had that morning received from the Chamber of Commerce of Bengal, representing the irregularity of the mails—

"Showing the difference of a fortnight between the date on which the mail arrived, compared with the receipt in another; and it is unnecessary for us to dwell upon the great inconvenience and loss which this uncertainty of the mail's arrival must occasion to those concerned in mercantile operations, for, although the Bombay express does in the majority of cases outrun your steam- ers, the former brings little besides the public news, in addition to one or two private letters to each mercantile firm."

It might be urged, no doubt, by his right hon. Friend opposite, that the Government had nothing whatever to do with the commercial wants of India in reference to this question, and that all they had to consider was what would be the most ready mode for the conveyance of Her Majesty's mails. He thought, however, it must be undeniable that the plan which should be found best for the commerce of India should, if possible, be adapted to the one best fitted for postal communication. The next point to which the attention of the Committee should, in his opinion, be directed, was the subject of steam communication, having for its object a line or lines connecting England, India, and Australia; and to report to the House the most fitting mode in which such communication might be effected, with due care to economy, and with advantage to the public interests. Now, he regretted to find that he differed from some hon. Gentlemen as to the best mode of obtaining the object which they all had in view. Looking at the delay, however, that had already taken place, and the many difficulties in the way, he could not but think that the Report of a Committee of the nature he proposed would point out the most ready means, and would, in fact, be the best method of effecting the object he had in view. He would not yield to any hon. Gentleman in his regard for the interests of the Australian colonies. When it was considered that there were in that country nearly half a million of British subjects, that they were purchasers to a large extent of our manufactured goods, and that many of them were bound to us by ties of kindred and blood, their importance could not for a moment be denied. But there was one great want which Australia, in common with all other colonies, experienced, and that was the want of capital. The capitalist would not invest his money, however advantageous might be the prospect, if for four months he was to be kept in total ignorance of what had become of it; and the only way in which advantage was to be gained by the colony would be by the establishment of steam communication. During the last eight years the question of steam communication with Australia had been at various times before the public, and various routes had been proposed. The first was one opening up a line of commu- nication between the western coast of the Isthmus of Panama and Australia by way of the Galapagos, Tahiti, and New Zealand, by which the journey would be performed in about sixty-four days. Many advantages had been alleged in favour of that route; but there were at the same time many disadvantages. One of the greatest, which he thought almost insurmountable, was, that no arrangement had been made as to the mode in which the Isthmus of Panama was to be crossed. A second route was viâ Singapore to Sydney. The importance of this route could not be overrated, because it gave a direct communication between the Australian colonies and India and China. With reference to this route, in connexion with the question of capital, perhaps the House was not aware that there went annually from India a body of men anxious to seek a more genial clime, men who had laid by a certain fortune obtained in the military and civil service of their country; and many of whom, he believed, if there were a greater communication between India and Australia, would be found ready to embark and become settlers in that country. This view was borne out by the following brief extract from a Sydney paper of this year:—

"Many of our influential settlers are gentlemen who have paid our colony a visit, and, liking the climate and country, have sold out and become permanent residents."

He thought that was a consideration which rendered this route deserving of the utmost attention. The third line which had been proposed was that viâ the Cape of Good Hope to Sydney. Many objections had been raised to that route, such as the distance that a steamer would have to traverse without touching land; but he was given to understand that the experiment of the screw steamer Bosphorus had succeeded, and that therefore that objection was removed. These were the three lines of communication before the public, and which he thought worthy of the consideration of the Committee. He regretted that in his views upon this subject he differed from some hon. Gentlemen who were interested in it; and he regretted if, owing to the appointment of the Committee, the Australian colonies should be debarred for even four months longer from enjoying the advantage of steam communication; but he should regret much more if through entering into a hasty and ill-devised contract, injury should be done to the whole of our eastern communications. He could not consent to look at this question as affecting the particular interests of either India, Australia, or England, individually. It must be viewed as a question affecting all three countries together. He felt strongly that there could be nothing more important for our colonial interests than that wise and judicious arrangement should be entered into for rapid and general intercommunication with every part of the empire; and he thought that upon such a subject the appointment of a few practical men empowered to take evidence would afford great information to the public, while the Government would thereby be much aided in the conclusions at which it should arrive. He trusted he had said nothing that showed any disposition to prejudge the matter; and, in conclusion, he would state that his only motive for bringing the question forward was, because he thought that it was one of importance and interest to the public, and that the appointment of a Committee might be productive of useful effects.

seconded the Motion.

said, he rose to propose an Amendment, the effect of which would he to oblige the Committee first to take into consideration the Australian part of the question, and afterwards the Indian portion of the subject. His noble Friend had, with his usual ability, made out a most excellent case for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the first branch of his subject; but he thought that, as far as the Australian branch was concerned, his noble Friend had not been so successful. The questions of steam communication with India and Australia had little to do with each other—one had been for some time established, the other was yet in embryo, and, as he thought, had been most cruelly delayed by the remissness of Her Majesty's Government. His noble Friend should therefore beware, lest, by proposing this Committee, he should be depriving for some further period of time our Australian colonies of the long-desired benefits of steam communication. That question had long attracted the attention of the country and of the Government, and owing to the delay that had taken place, he (Lord Naas) had felt it to be his duty, last year, to move the adoption of an address to Her Majesty on the subject. The House was led to believe, by the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that no time would be lost in perfecting that great scheme; but what, up to this time, had been the result? They were now half through another Session—seven or eight months had elapsed—and the Australian colonies were still as far off the completion of the undertaking as they were when they first took up the matter in 1844. He would shortly state to the House the steps that bad been taken on the subject. In the year 1844, shortly after representative institutions had been given to New South Wales, the Legislative Council of Sydney passed strong resolutions on the subject of steam communication. In 1846 they appointed a Committee of the Council to consider it, and the Committee drew up a report recommending that 6,000l. should be voted by the Legislative Council for a communication between Sydney and Singapore, and also proposed the adoption of memorials to Her Majesty, praying for the establishment of that line. In 1847 the question was much agitated in this country; public meetings were held, and deputations waited upon different officers of the Government respecting it. In 1848 the contract entered into for three years with the owners of the sailing packets which had been employed in carrying the mails to Australia, expired. Up to that time there had been a tolerably regular monthly mode of communication between this country and the Australian colonies; and even that system was esteemed a great advantage by the colonies. But on the 4th of February in that year that contract expired; and the Government declined to renew it, being in hopes that a contract with some steam company would speedily be effected, establishing a superior mode of communication. From that day—the 4th of February, 1848—there had been no regular communication whatever with the Australian colonies; and the usual inconveniences arising from interrupted communications with this country had been acutely felt by the colonists. They had been obliged to pay a much higher price for the transmission of newspapers, periodicals, reviews, and Parliamentary papers, than any other co- lony enjoying proper communications. The Government having advertised for tenders, among the tenders sent in was an offer from a company not now in existence—the Indian and Australian Steam Packet Company—to perform the service for 26,000l.; and that offer was accepted. When this company had completed the contract, it was proved that it had not one shilling of capital subscribed; and yet such a company was allowed to keep the question entirely in its hands for nearly sis months, and to keep every bonâ fide competitor out of the market. The state of the company was this, that so far from being able to put down a single steamer, or even the keel of a single steamer, it came under the operation of the Winding-up Act, and was entombed with many other companies of the same sort. It was clear that Government had not exercised sufficient supervision in giving so important a contract in that manner into the hands of a bubble company. In 1848, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a despatch to Sir Charles FitzRoy, the Governor of Australia, held out hopes to the colonists that the communication would be immedictely established; and they also had the assistant secretary to the Treasury writing that the Lords' Commissioners of that department were of opinion that so important a communication should not be allowed to depend solely on a question of expense, and that it should be established at all hazards. In 1849, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Packet Company offered to perform the service between Singapore and Sydney for nothing, provided they got the sum paid partly by the East India Company and partly by the Government for the service between Bombay and Suez. The course taken by the hon. Gentleman opposite, the Member for Orkney, on this point, he thought was a very fair one. 115,000l. being the previous cost of the service, the offer of the Peninsular and Oriental Company was for 105,000l., and it was proposed that 75,000l. of that sum should be furnished by the Government, and the remaining 30,000l. by the East India Company; but the East India Company declined to enter into the arrangement. So ended the year 1849; he did not wish to make any reflections on, the East India Company for their conduct in this matter, he regretted the decision that the hon. Company had come to. It was quite certain that in point of law they had a perfect right to act as they did, and no one could object to their so doing, as they acted for what they considered the interests of the great country committed to their care; but in the autumn of 1850, shortly after he had submitted his Motion of last year to the House, notifications were issued by the Admiralty for the third time, calling for tenders for this service; and the result was, that a tender was now before the Government, which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not think satisfactory. He (Lord Naas) had been informed that that tender from the Peninsular and Oriental Company wa an offer to perform the service between Singapore and Sydney, provided the usual rate of postage of one shilling on each letter going from this country to Sydney was allowed to them; and he understood that the right hon. Gentleman thought the tender now before the Government for performing the service for the amount of postage of letters alone, and free of expense to the Treasury, was unsatisfactory. Now all that he (Lord Naas) wished to do by the Amendment he had to propose, was merely that the Australian part of the noble Viscount's Motion should be gone into first, and should be reported upon as a totally and an entirely separate question. Within the last two months, he understood a contract had been entered into with a company to carry the mails to the Cape for 30,000l., and a similar contract had been entered into with regard to Brazil. He therefore thought that the Australian colonies should at least be placed on an equality with countries of inferior importance, and that the Government should not allow of such inexcusable delay. The colonists of Australia now almost despaired of ever obtaining the necessary communication from their own Government; and the interminable delays had, he understood, induced certain parties among the colonists to appeal to the Government of the United States of America to put on steamers between Panama and Sydney. He thought there were very grave objections to such a course—a course to which he had been no party, but he merely mentioned the circumstance to show the feeling prevailing in the colonies; and he feared that if the House now refused to agree to his Amendment, and would not urge on the Committee the necessity of reporting speedily with regard to the communication with Australia, the colonists would be led to think, after the number of years that the subject had been neglected, that their friends in this country had forgotten them, and that there must be some agency in this country—something going on behind the scenes—calculated to deprive them of the benefits of this communication. The line between this country and Australia was yet open, and had not been given to any one; on the other hand, the contract between the Government and the East India Company had yet two years to run before it expired. He hoped, therefore, that the House would accede to his very moderate request, merely to transpose the wording of the noble Viscount's Motion, so that the Committee should consider the Australian branch of the question first, and should report first on that branch which might be acted upon at once, before they entered upon the consideration of that portion of their inquiry which (however soon they might report upon it) could not be acted upon for more than two years.

seconded the Amendment.

said, that he had already altered the original shape of his Motion, and he considered that he had framed it so as to embrace the object of the noble Lord the Member for Kildare.

hoped the noble Lord would not press his Amendment, as it was not very desirable as a general principle to tie the hands of a Committee, but rather to leave it to exercise its own discretion as to the order of its proceedings. No doubt there was great force in the noble Lord's observations as to the urgency, in point of time, of the Australian part of the question; but it would be better to allow the Committee, at its first meeting, to ascertain what witnesses are ready to be first examined, and what pre- parations were to be made as to the various parts of their inquiry; because if they tied their hands to enter into one part of the subject before another, very possibly the result would be no advantage to that particular part; and a positive disadvantage to the other portion.

said, the noble Viscount had expressed himself anxious to bring before the Committee the various lines between England and Australia, and likewise India and Australia, so as not to exclude any line which might be proposed by the Goverment, or be suggested by any company to connect England with Australia, either by way of Panama, the Cape, or otherwise. Now, from experience of a former Committee, he was afraid that the terms of the Motion might restrain the Chairman of the Committee from entering into the question of any future contract which might be made, and that the Committee would feel themselves bound by the terms of the Motion carried by the House from considering any other contract which might be entertained. If the previous Committee had not felt itself hampered in that manner, perhaps there would have been no necessity for the Committee now asked for by the noble Viscount.

regretted exceedingly that the Committee should be moved for at all, because, if agreed to, the whole question of the communication with Australia would remain entombed there until the end of the Session. He thought that the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Kildare ought to have been agreed to at once, and that the Australian colonies should not be reduced to the necessity of appealing to the United States to afford them a direct steam communication. He had no doubt, when he saw the fleet of ships that the Americans had within the last few months sent into the Pacific, that they would be perfectly competent to undertake the office; but he felt certain that the delay upon the part of the British Government, which must necessarily arise before the Report of the Committee could be made and acted upon, would be such as to create the greatest discontent in the colonies. He hoped the Government and the House would at once adopt measures for establishing direct steam communication with the colonies.

trusted the House would adopt the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford not to tie the Committee up to a particular course, but to leave the Committee to pursue their own line of proceeding. The Committee would be desirous of giving the advantage of communication to all the colonies as speedily and as efficiently as possible; and the noble Lord the Member for Kildare, he had no doubt, would have the full opportunity of impressing his own views upon the Committee,

felt much difficulty in addressing the House on a subject in which his personal interests were, or might be supposed to be, concerned. As a director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, however, he felt it his duty to allude to some statements of the noble Viscount who had moved for the Committee. The noble Viscount was kind enough to say that he had no feelings of hostility towards the company; but he had made an ex parte statement which would tend very materially to injure the property of the shareholders. The noble Viscount had read a letter from the Chamber of Commerce of Bengal, in which they gave a very dreadful account of irregularities alleged to have occurred; but he begged to say that that letter had been entirely contradicted. He could show them letters from two persons who had made a voyage in the same ship, and who had been treated in precisely the same manner, one of whom condemned the arrangements of the vessel, while the other was extremely laudatory of them.

said, it seemed to him, considering that on the whole they were all agreed on this question, that they had occupied more time than was necessary to obtain an object with which nobody in the world differed, because nobody denied the extreme importance of steam communication with the Australian colonies, and the importance that it should be established as speedily as possible. He had told the noble Viscount that he thought inquiries before a Committee might be beneficial in putting the House and the Government in possession of information, and in enabling the Government to do that which it had yet been unable to do. The importance of the subject he had never denied, and it had always been his endeavour, as far as possible, and as rapidly as possible, to carry out a steam navigation to our Australian colonies. But he could not allow the statement to pass unnoticed that it was his duty to provide the requisite communication, totally regardless of the expense. What he felt bound to do was to obtain the best communication he could as cheap as he could. The noble Viscount had said the object might have been effected with a positive saving; but he could not have acceded to the offer that had been made while the Government was bound by an existing contract. The Government had advertised for tenders for the performance of part of the service; and it was quite true that he had not thought any tender that had been sent in was such as the Government could accept. With regard to the terms of the Motion, he did not think the slightest advantage would arise from the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Kildare, because, of course, it would be in the option of the Committee to take any part of the subject which it thought most important before any other. Besides, his conviction was, that everybody who knew anything of the subject, was aware that it was perfectly impossible to establish a separate communication for Australia, without taking into consideration the communication between this country and other parts. If the colonies should be able to set up a communication between Sydney and Singapore and other places, that would be all very well; but what we must consider was a communication between this country and Australia. First, then, the Amendment of the noble Lord was unnecessary; and next, if the Committee were to be fixed by it, it would paralyse all their efforts, and render their inquiries of no possible advantage. He did not think the noble Viscount's own Motion would fully carry out the object they all had at heart. Its terms omitted a point of very great importance to the Australian colonies—namely, a communication between them and China. He thought he could suggest words, if the noble Viscount would allow him, that would embrace all that was wanted. As the hon. Member for Montrose said he did not wish to restrict the inquiry at all, yet he hoped they would not wander from their main object, and bury it under the Committee, but that they would obtain the information to enable the Government to effect what was beneficial for India, for the colonies, and for all the interests concerned. What he proposed to substitute was, to inquire into the existing steam communication between India and China, the possibility of effecting improvements therein, and the best mode of establishing steam communication with the Australian Colonies.

was much obliged to his right hon. Friend for suggesting that alteration in the terms of his Motion. That suggestion would carry out his object better than his own proposition. He could assure the noble Lord the Member for Kildare that no one felt more strongly than he did the importance of speedily establishing steam communication with the Australian Colonies; but he must say he thought it would be very improper to fetter the discretion of the Committee by prescribing a specific course to regulate the order of its inquiries.

took it that the real object was that the Committee should be free to go into the whole case in the widest possible manner. They did not propose ending merely in a blue book, but in satisfying all the colonies and the commercial communities interested, and in having that object effected as quickly as possible. It was desirable, as the Committee was to be appointed, that it should; be universally understood on the part of the public that the order of reference should include the question as to the route by Panama, and the route to unite the Australian colonies with China. The terms of the Motion should be enlarged, so as to embrace the colony of the Mauritius, and all the other places which it was desirable to connect in the communication which was to go by Australia.

understood that when they took the line to Australia by the Cape, they would of course include all the intervening colonies.

said, he bad so drawn the terms of the Motion—"the best mode of establishing steam communication with the Australian Colonies"—that it would include the route by Panama, and all the other points involved in the question.

said, that at present the letters leaving Liverpool in the evening were divided at Birmingham into London and west country letters, which arrived precisely at the same hour at Southampton and Plymouth. Supposing a vessel sailing that afternoon from Southampton to touch at Plymouth or Falmouth, there would be a gain of a whole day from the north western parts of the island. Again, letters leaving London, at eight or nine at night, arrived at Plymouth at six in the morning, within an hour or two of the time that the steamer leaving South- ampton at three in the afternoon passed within twenty or thirty miles of Plymouth. The correspondence of the west of England was subject to another disadvantage: letters posted at Plymouth at six in the evening, and travelling to London to go by the Peninsular and Oriental mail, arrived the next afternoon at Southampton, and would again pass the meridian of Plymouth within thirty miles of the place, thirty-six hours after leaving it. This was a question of no small importance, and he hoped it would form part of the consideration of the Committee. Since the question was last decided by the Admiralty, nearly 100 additional miles of railway had been formed in that direction, making a difference of six or seven hours in the transit between Plymouth and London.

was afraid that it would be impossible for the Committee to undertake inquiries of that kind in addition to their more immediate duties. They would overload the Committee, and lead to infinite delay.

said, the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated that there was no use in discussing this Motion and the Amendment, because they were all agreed upon the necessity for some inquiry. He (MR. Adderley) said, however, that they were not all agreed as to what needed inquiry, or how the inquiry should be conducted. Far from it. They might all be agreed that it was important and useful to this country and the colonies that a Committee should be appointed on the large question of steam communication with all the world; but what they were not all agreed upon was as to the need of inquiry about Australia. He would ask the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer why Australia should be included in this inquiry at all; and if he could not tell why Australia should be included, it would be still more difficult for him to tell why Australia should be put at the fag-end of a perfect encyclopædia of the whole eastern world. Nobody asked for this Committee with regard to Australia—nobody wanted it but the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, to get himself out of a scrape. Australia did not want it—it repudiated it, because the question of Australian communication was understood and settled already. Who had asked for Australian inquiry? Not the noble Viscount the Member for King's Lynn; it was tacked on to his inquiry without any desire on his part, but merely because of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's irresolution, who had made up his mind years ago, and had entered fully into the question, and knew everything about it, and did not require any more information. The right hon. Gentleman had stated long ago that he had made up his mind on the question, and yet he called for fresh inquiry; and what was his object? It was because he had been impeded by the East India Company, and he feared to carry out in face of that Company his own views, and, therefore, ha wished to bolster them up by the help of this Committee. He would ask whether Australia was to be put in the appendix of a long investigation into Indian affairs? The colony would know who had done it—the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and knowing that he had made up his mind what was the best communication between Australia and this country, and that he could not point to a single advantage to be gained by this Committee with regard to these colonies, they would ask him at least to state some reason why he did not act at once? Earl Grey, the Secretary for the Colonies, bad got all the information, and made up his mind also three years ago, for he then asked the Legislative Council of Sydney to make an offer towards the undertaking; and was it possible that the Secretary of State could have called upon the Legislative Council of Sydney to vote 6.000l. three years ago for an object which he bad not yet made up his mind to carry out? What would be thought of such premature and illusory instructions out there, or what hope was there, with these delays without any assignable reason, of ever arriving at a practical decision? The right hon. Gentleman had drawn up in the midst of the debate afresh form for the Motion of the noble Viscount the Member for King's Lynn. It might be much betters—it had made it more capacious—it had extended the question to China, and a thousand other places; but still Australia was put in the appendix. That was the point to which he could not agree; and that was the grievance remedied in the noble Lord the Member for Kildare's Amendment. Why had the noble Lord been asked to withdraw his Amendment? Why it would be worse now for Australia than it was at first, because now they were to have an interminable inquiry, and Australia was to be put at the end of it. He would advise, and he hoped the noble Lord would not withdraw his Amendment till be dis- tinctly understood from the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn that he would allow the Committee to place Australia first in their inquiry on communications; and not only that, but that he would consent to report on that branch first; because all they were asked to do with relation to communication with Astralia was only to sit in incubation on the information already collected by the right hon. Gentleman, and bring it to light. It could not require many hours for that; three days would suffice to go through a preliminary inquiry merely as an act of compliance with the right hon. Gentleman's wishes, that they should bring to light the decision he had had in his breast for some time past. He was speaking utterly disinterestedly on this question; he had not the slightest interest in any of the companies concerned—he had not even an interest in Australia itself. But as everybody allowed the enormous importance of that communication, and as the colonies were getting irritated because they wanted postal facilities, the great instrument of modern civilisation, and were still behind all the rest of the world with regard to it, these incessant delays were almost enough to justify any amount of indignation, and acts of resentment on the part of the colonists; and unless the Australian colonies were to go first in the inquiry, and to be the subject of a preliminary report, and to be clear from a question that was unnecessarily obstructed, he would advise the noble Lord not to withdraw his Amendment. He (MR. Adderley) would thank the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer to answer the question he had put to him—what on earth a Committee could do in the way of inquiry to put him in possession of further facts, or of any information that could alter his decision as to steam communication with Australia, or which was the best of the tenders already made to him?

said, that though he was as anxious as any one to extend the benefits of steam communication, he entirely disagreed with the hon. Gentleman who had last spoken. It was utterly impossible to do justice to the Australian colonies themselves without a full inquiry, owing to the difficulties of carrying out the communication in an efficient way. He knew that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was most anxious last year to carry it out as a distinct question; but the conduct of the East India Company having thrown obstacles in the way of that arrangement, it became necessary to consider the question as a whole. Three routes had been suggested—Panama, Singapore, and the Cape; but there was a fourth, which appeared to have been altogether forgotten, from Singapore down to Swan River. That route was not advocated by the Sydney people; but there was no doubt that, in a short time, they would be satisfied that route was the best for themselves and the whole of the colony. The hon. Member for North Staffordshire had not done the light hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer justice; and he had also overlooked the fact, that it was utterly impossible that this question of steam communication could be arranged on a perfect and permanent basis without the fullest possible inquiry.

said, he could make no promise that the case of Australia should be first taken into special consideration, and reported upon separately by the Committee. He thought the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been very unfairly attacked; and when the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Staffordshire said, that his Motion had been framed by the right hon. Gentleman, he must say he had had no communication whatever on the subject with the right hon. Gentleman till within the last three or four days.

was most desirous that the branch of the subject connected with Australia should have been allowed to engage the first inquiries of the Committee; but as such a course appeared to be considered unusual, he would withdraw his Amendment.

thought the words of the resolution exceedingly wide; and he feared that justice would not be done to Australia by an inquiry that bid fair to be very protracted. Would the Government feel justified in suspending its measures merely because the Committee was sitting?

thought they were fighting with a shadow instead of a substance. He trusted there was no intention to refuse to consider the want of communication with Australia at as early a period as possible. He approved of making the proposed inquiry an enlarged one, as the best mode of carrying out what had so long been anxiously desired. He hoped that New Zealand would not be for- gotten in the investigations of the Committee.

said, New Zealand was included in the route by Panama.

said, he wished that the hon. Member for North Staffordshire had made his attack before he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had spoken. With the appointment of this Committee he had had nothing to do; the Motion was that of the noble Viscount the Member for King's Lynn. What he had distinctly stated was, that it was perfectly impossible to consider the question of Australian communication except in connexion with some other. He had never concealed his own opinion as to what was the best mode of effecting that communication; but it did not rest with him to carry it out. He hoped the information elicited by the Committee would be such as to induce other parties to concur in his views. The hon. Gentleman opposite, the Member for Harwich, being a Member of the East India Company, was in a position to do more for promoting that communication than he could.

said, it was perfectly competent for the Government to establish this communication if they chose. They had already expended 100,000l. in carrying out steam communication with places of much less importance than Australia. Would the Government take into consideration the propriety of establishing a temporary line of steam communication, either by Her Majesty's vessels or in some other way, pending the inquiry of the Committee, or at all events until the termination of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's charter in 1853. The Dutch Government had a communication between Batavia, Java, and Singapore, by means of Government vessels.

said, the question was about being referred to a Committee, which would consider most of these points; and, if they confined their attention to the main questions, they would be occupied but a very short time.

said, he would move as an Amendment, the addition of the words "and New Zealand." He did not wish the thing to be left at all loose.

thought the general words were for the best. If they began to specify this or that place, other hon. Gentleman would want others added—the Feejee Islands, perhaps.

was also in favour of the most general words possible.

rose, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the differential duties levied on British ships in the ports of Spain. Having first presented a petition on the subject from merchants and shipowners of London, the hon. Member was proceeding to explain his views upon the question, when he was interrupted by

, who said, that with a view to save the hon. Gentleman trouble, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman in the chair, whether it would not be necessary that they should go into Committee of the whole House, to consider the provisions of the two Acts referred to in this Motion?

said, that that depended on whether the hon. Member for Orkney intended to conclude with a Motion for leave to bring in a Bill. If he did, then the suggestion of the hon. Member for Montrose was a correct one; if not, it would not be necessary.

wished also to ask another question, as to a point of order in connection with this subject. The hon. Mover, he said, wished to increase duties; but if so, ought he not, in accordance with the rules of the House, to be in a position to say that he had the assent of the Ministers of the Crown to the introduction of the Motion—that was, provided he was going to proceed by an Address to the Crown?

said, if the hon. Member meant to propose increased taxation, that should be done in a Committee of the whole House, but it was not necessary that he should have the recommendation of the Crown; but for an increase of the estimates it was necessary to have that recommendation.

then proceeded with his argument, contending that the subject was one of very considerable national importance. Differential duties, he might state at the outset, were not duties imposed for the purpose of revenue, but to secure a monopoly of the carrying trade to the ships of the country imposing such duties, and consisted of higher rates of duty levied on goods when imported or exported in foreign ships, than when imported in the ships of such country, with the object of excluding foreign ships from participating in its carrying trade. Spain had carried this exclusive policy to a much greater extent than any other country in the world; and while we have been relaxing our navigation laws in favour of her shipping, she has been proceeding in a directly opposite course in regard to our shipping, until at last her differential duties had driven British shipping to a large extent out of the trade with Spain and her dependencies. Not only the shipowners, but the merchants connected with Spain, had for many years felt this aggressive and obstructive policy of Spain towards British navigation and trade to be a serious grievance, for the removal of which they had a right to call for the interposition of the British Government. Numerous representations to that effect had been from time to time made to the Government, but without effect, and they considered that the time had arrived when Spain ought to be made to feel that she can no longer be permitted to pursue this hostile course of policy with impunity. He would, by a statement of some facts, contrast, somewhat in detail, the treatment of British vessels in Spanish ports with the treatment of Spanish vessels in British ports, as stated in the petition he had presented. From the year 1824, when the relaxation in our navigation laws, made by the late MR. Huskisson, took effect, Spanish vessels had been admitted to import goods from Spain into the ports of this kingdom, on the same terms in respect to the duties on such goods as British vessels; and since the 1st January, 1850, under the provisions of the last Navigation Act, the whole carrying trade of the world with this country bad been thrown open to Spanish vessels on precisely the same terms as to British vessels. But what had been the conduct of Spain towards British vessels during this long period? Why, she had imposed such heavy additional duties on goods imported into Spain or the Spanish colonies in British vessels, although such goods might be the produce of the united kingdom, as almost to prohibit the employment of British vessels in the trade with Spain. The hon. Member then read extracts from the last Spanish tariff, and stated from it a few items of these differential duties. Salt dried fish, an article of large import into Spain, and chiefly from Newfoundland and other British fisheries, if imported into Spain in a British vessel, paid about 3l. 5s. per ton duty more than if imported in a Spanish vessel. Cinnamon and cloves, about 10l. additional duty. Pepper, tobacco, linen and cotton goods, were charged with equally high duties. And, as a general rule, the tariff imposed about one-third increase on the ordinary rates of duty, if the goods were imported in a British ship. These additional rates of duty operated as an almost entire exclusion of British shipping from carrying such goods to Spain, because were a British shipowner to offer to carry the goods even for nothing, the additional duties which the merchant exporting them would have to pay in Spain made it more advantageous for him to hire a Spanish ship even at an enormously high rate of freight, rather than send his goods in a British ship freight free. An instance of the operation of these duties might be now seen in the port of London, where, of twenty-three vessels loading for various ports of Spain, nineteen wore Spanish, and only four were British. If they went to the important colonies of Spain, such as Cuba and the Philippines, the same exclusive system prevailed in equal if not greater force. If a British ship imported goods into Ha-vannah, they had to pay from 24 to 30 per cent of duties; whereas, if the same goods were imported in a Spanish vessel, they only paid from 17 to 21 per cent, being a difference of from 7 to 9 per cent ad valorem in favour of the Spanish vessel. Again, on exportation, if sugar or other produce of Cuba was exported in a British vessel, it paid 6¼d. per cent duty; but if exported in a Spanish vessel, it paid only 4½ per cent, or, if destined for a Spanish port, only 2½ per cent. The tonnage duty, also, on a British ship at Havannah was a dollar and a half, equal to 6s. 6d. sterling; whereas, on a Spanish vessel, it was only five reals, equal to 2s. 6d. per ton, giving an advantage of 4s. per ton to the Spanish ship over the British ship. At Manilla a similar system prevailed. The duty levied there on goods imported in a British vessel was 14 per cent ad valorem, and on a Spanish vessel only 7 per cent, British vessels being shut out from the trade with this important place by the imposition of a double duty. He would now proceed to show to the House some of the effects of this restrictive policy on the part of Spain on the shipping and trading interests of this country. And, first, with regard to the trade between the united kingdom and Spain. The current rates of interest at present, from London to Bilboa, was about 2l. per ton by a Spanish vessel. By a British vessel it was only 1l., or half that which the Spanish vessel obtained; and, even at that rate, British vessels were seldom employed, and only for the conveyance of goods of low value, and subject to low rates of duty. To Cadiz and Malaga the freight by Spanish vessels was about 45s. the ton; by a British vessel only 15s., or about one-third of the rate of freight obtained by Spanish vessels. But the effect of this restrictive policy of Spain was perhaps nowhere to be seen in such force as in the important fishing trade between Newfoundland and Spain. That trade was formerly carried on entirely in British fast-sailing vessels, constructed expressly for the purpose. In consequence of the high differential duties, they had now been driven out of it, and the trade was now carried on almost exclusively in Spanish vessels. He had a list of the cargoes of cod fish exported from Newfoundland direct to Spanish ports during the last fishing season. Out of 70 cargoes so despatched, 69 were sent in Spanish ships, and only one in a British ship. The trade with Cuba, in spite of the restrictions to which he had alluded, employed about 200 sail of British vessels annually, because Spain, even with all her efforts to monopolise the carrying trade for her own vessels, cannot supply shipping nearly sufficient for the wants of the trade. But were British vessels placed on an equal footing to compete with those of Spain, he had no doubt the number of British vessels in the trade with Cuba would soon be more than doubled. With regard to Manilla, he had seen a letter from a shipowner, stating that he, the shipowner, had a fine first-class ship loading at Liverpool for Manilla, and that there was a Spanish vessel, described as a very inferior one to the British ship, also loading at Liverpool for the same destination. Now, the British shipowner went on to state that it was with great difficulty he could obtain cargo for his vessel, although he was offering to receive goods at so low a freight as from 15s. to 25s. the ton, while the Spanish ship, his competitor, was loading fast at rates of freight of from 80s. to 100s. the ton. To remedy, as far as possible, the injury to the trade by this system, goods for Manilla are now generally sent in British ships to our free port of Singapore, where they are obliged to be landed and reshipped in Spanish ships to Manilla, the Spanish ships generally charging more than double the rate of freight for carrying the goods from Singapore to Manilla, being only 1,300 miles, than the British vessels charge for carrying them from England to Singapore, a distance of 8,000 miles, being six times the distance from Singapore to Manilla. Such were some of the effects of the restrictive policy of Spain on the British shipping interest. He would now proceed to state some instances of its operation in obstructing the natural course of international commerce. He would first refer to documents which he had recently received from Alicant, namely, a copy of a memorial from British merchants resident at that port, to the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a list of arrivals, sailings, and sales of cargoes of fish at that port. The hon. Member here read extracts from the memorial, complaining in strong terms that the Spanish tariff had not only excluded British shipping from the trade with Spain, but was fast destroying the trade itself, by compelling them to employ the inferior shipping and mariners of Spain at greatly higher rates of freight than British ships could be had for, together with the high rate of duty imposed on British-cured fish by the last tariff, that of 1849. That the sale of fish imported into the port of Alicant to the consignment of the memorialists had averaged about 5,000 tons annually, but that in consequence of the measures of the Spanish Government alluded to—and particularly to the increased differential duties imposed by the tariff of 1849—they had only been able to sell one small cargo of 100 tons by a British vessel, and that at a heavy loss, while about 2,000 tons were imported in Spanish vessels and sold. By a trade list from Alicant, he found that, while this one solitary cargo was imported in a British ship, 43 sail of British ships which called at that port with cargoes of fish for sale, were compelled to proceed on to the Italian and other ports in the Mediterranean, not being able to dispose of a single cargo at Alicant. These British merchants prayed urgently that the British Government would adopt measures to compel the Spanish Government to a more just course of policy, expressing their conviction that no other means would be effectual. He would now refer to an extract from the annual report of the Board of Fisheries in Scotland, which stated that the trade in Scottish-cured cod and ling fish to Spain had been greatly checked by the high duties in Spain, but more particularly by the differential duties in favour of Spanish ships, such ships being very difficult to procure, and only at very high rates of freight. This report stated also an instance where a cargo of fish which had been shipped in a British vessel was obliged to be landed again and warehoused, in order to wait the arrival of a Spanish vessel. But he could state many instances within his own experience of the injurious consequences to trade of this policy of Spain; but, not to weary the House with details, he would only advert to two. He recollected once despatching two vessels on the same day from London to Bilboa; the one was a Spanish vessel, the other a British one. The Spaniard had obtained a cargo and a good freight; but the British vessel, in consequence of the differential duties, could not obtain any cargo, and was compelled to proceed in ballast, being chartered to bring a return cargo of wool. When the Spaniard had got as far as off Ramsgate, not liking the look of the weather, he put into Ramsgate harbour to wait for its bettering. The British ship pushed on, reached Bilboa, loaded her cargo of wool, and actually arrived with it in the London Dock, while the Spaniard was still lying weather-bound in Ramsgate harbour. Some years since, being then connected with a fishing establishment in these northern islands of Scotland which he had the honour to represent in that House, he received an order from a Spanish merchant in Bilboa to send him a cargo of dried fish. The differential duties in Spain compelled him to employ a Spanish vessel to carry the cargo to Bilboa, and the freight, together with additional premium of insurance, made the cost of transit nearly four times as much as it would have been by a British vessel. But this was not the worst of it: the mas- ter and crew of the Spanish vessel gave an illustration of the skill and energy which the Spanish protective system had created in her mariners. They were three months and some days in effecting their passage from the Shetland Islands to Bilboa, although nothing particular had occurred to their vessel—about the time that one of the first-class British ships requires to make a passage to India. Now, the fish being so long kept in a perhaps not over-tight vessel, arrived, as might have been expected, in a damaged state, and being, besides, too late for the proper season, his (MR. Anderson's) correspondent lost a very considerable sum by the speculation. He determined to have no more to do with Shetland fish in Spanish vessels, and thus the poor Shetland fishermen had one of the best outlets for the produce of their industry seriously checked. He could multiply instances of the injurious operation of these differential duties on British shipping and commerce; but he believed that the House would admit that he had sufficiently established a case against Spain of aggression in these important British interests, which ought no longer to be tolerated, and an effectual remedy, he submitted, was in the hands of the Executive Government. The Act for repealing the navigation laws empowered the Queen to lay countervailing duties in the ports of this kingdom on the ships of such foreign countries as might levy higher rates of duty on British ships. He could see no reason why this power should not be exercised towards the ships of Spain. That Power had gone far beyond any other in her restrictive, he might say aggressive, policy. She had violated every commercial treaty she had entered into with this country. Article 38 of the treaty signed at Madrid, in 16G7, stated—

"People and subjects of King of Great Britain and King of Spain shall have and enjoy in the respective lands, seas, ports, havens, roads, and territories, of the one or the other, and in all places whatsoever, the same privileges, securities, liberties, and immunities, whether they concern their persons or trade, with all the beneficial clauses and circumstances, which have been granted, or shall be hereafter granted, by either of the said Kings, to the Most Christian King, the States General of the United Provinces, the Hans Towns, or any other Kingdom or State whatsoever, in as full, ample, and beneficial manner as if the same were particularly mentioned in this treaty."

This was confirmed by the 9th article of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and particularly as to—

"All duties, impositions, or customs whatsoever, relating to persons, goods, and merchandises, ships, freight, seamen, navigation, and commerce, as subjects of France or any other foreign nation."

It was confirmed also by 2nd article of the Treaty of Commerce of 1713. The 4th article of the Treaty of Commerce of Madrid, 1715, stated that—

"The said subjects (British) shall not anywhere pay higher or other duties than those which his Catholic Majesty's subjects pay in the same place."

The 5th article of the same treaty eon-firmed the 38th article of 1667; and the Treaty of Peace, dated—"Madrid, Aug., 1814," confirmed all treaties previous to 1796. We had patiently submitted to the injustice of Spain for twenty-seven years, and we could not, therefore, now be accused of precipitation in seeking redress. That course, it must be borne in mind, rested on an entirely different principle to any attempt to coerce a foreign Power to alter duties, however high they might be, imposed for mere purposes of revenue. And if Spain levied an import duty of 100 to 150 per cent on the produce of our fisheries, and on articles of extensive consumption among her people, we had no more right to compel her to alter these duties than the Chinese Emperor had to compel us to alter our enormous duty of 300 to 400 per cent on the chief produce of his country, and on an article of extensive consumption among our people—tea. That we had a right to resist the fiscal warfare carried on by Spain against our mercantile marine, by a wisely defensive measure, he thought there could scarcely be a doubt. Perhaps the only question to be raised was, would it be effectual? Might it not provoke Spain to impose still higher differential duties in favour of her own shipping, to the still greater obstruction of trade? He would state a fact which he considered would set that question at rest. He would refer to the course adopted by the United States of America. Under a fundamental law of the States (as most hon. Members were, no doubt, aware) foreign ships in American ports were treated exactly in the same manner that American ships were treated in foreign ports. Under this law Spanish ships had been for many years past subjected to countervailing additional duties in all the ports of the United States. Spain had never ventured to increase hey differential duties as against the United States, and the effect of the American policy had been to exclude almost entirely Spanish vessels from the ports of America; as a confirmation of the fact, he would state that he had examined some American shipping lists, and he found that at the port of New York, between which and the Spanish islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, particularly, there was an extensive trade, out of an annual average arrival of nearly 2,500 sail of vessels of all countries, the number of Spanish Vessels was only two. He had little doubt that a similar result would soon follow the adoption by our Government of the measure he recommended, which could scarcely fail to compel Spain to alter her policy. He wished to state, in conclusion, that, as a British shipowner, he was willing to run the race of competition with the world. He had given his humble support to the repeal of the navigation laws, and, although he had voted for that repeal against the opinion of some of his friends connected with the shipping trade, he did not repent that vote. But he did expect fair play, and that he should not have unfair obstructions placed in his way.

, in seconding the Motion, said, that he could confirm all that had been said by the hon. Mover with respect to the unfair operation of the differential duties imposed by Spain. About two years ago, Spain made an alteration in her tariff, principally, it was said, with a view of lessening the duties on articles of consumption. The duty on salt fish imported in Spanish vessels was, however, slightly increased, while the duty on salt fish imported in British vessels was very largely increased; in one instance, while the increase as to fish imported in Spanish vessels was 17 per cent, the increase as to importations in British vessels was 37 per cent. Now, that was one of the main ar- tides of commerce with Spain. Then there had been a distinct infraction both of the spirit and letter of our treaties with Spain by the preference which she gave to France over us. France had the privilege of carrying from one port of Spain to another, while we had not; although in every commercial treaty between Great Britain and Spain it had been provided that the subjects of Great Britain should enjoy equal privileges in the Spanish ports with those of France. It might, perhaps, be said that there were certain treaties that stood in the way of the resolution now proposed; it might be said that we had had some differences with respect to the "most favoured nation" clauses in these treaties; but for the last two centuries we had been making treaties of commerce, friendship, and peace with Spain; and on one point after another Spain had been disregarding them, and therefore when we had adopted a new commercial system, he submitted to his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether it would not be better to throw over all treaties with Spain. Let it be a tabula rasâ, and in future deal with Spain as she dealt with us. There was one objection that might be made to this Resolution, that it appeared as if they were seeking to maintain an influence by protection. He thought, however, that this was entirely an exceptional ease. There was no nation in the world that had shown the same disregard of justice that Spain had done. Now he thought they must fight each nation with its own weapons, and if Spain was resolved not to come to a fair understanding with England without being forced to it, it might be our duty to force her to it. The question was whether, situated as the Spanish Government now were, we were likely to obtain anything like equity or justice from them without forcing them to it. He was sure that the course advocated by his hon. Friend, who had proposed the Resolution, would be very influential with them. If they found that we forbid Spanish ships bringing their sugars from the Havannah, and their fruits from Malaga, except on payment of heavy duties, we should soon have Spain more clamorous to be put on an equal footing with England than we had been to lie put on an equal footing with Spain; and on that ground, and believing that the Resolution would be effectual to the end proposed, he should give it his cordial support.

said, that both his hon. Friends had very accurately stated the facts of the case. The question might be divided into two distinct portions. Spain was at present levying, and had for a long period levied, differential duties of a] very onerous description on goods exported from, or imported into, her harbours in foreign as discriminated from Spanish bottoms. It should, however, be admitted that in the year 1849, Spain had decreased the amount of those differential duties on the greater portion of commodities. These duties had amounted previously to that year to about 33 per cent, and had then been reduced to about 20 per cent. The levying of these differential duties was the first ground of complaint we had against Spain. Our second ground of complaint was of a totally different description. It was that Spain, in certain respects, treated the shipowners of this country not only less favourably than her own subjects, but less favourably than the shipowners of other foreign nations, and more especially those of France. His hon. Friend the Member for Orkney had truly said that we had entered into repeated treaties with Spain, some of them of ancient date, which laid down in express language the obligation that she should deal towards us on the terms of the most favoured nation. Now we certainly had a right to complain of the conduct of Spain in contravening that stipulation. Under the second head of complaint to which his hon. Friend had adverted, lie believed that the most important item consisted in the fact, that higher harbour dues were levied in the ports of Spain on British vessels than on French vessels. Complaints had some time ago been made to the Spanish Government upon that subject, and that Government had professed its willingness to set the matter right. But, in point of fact, the only way in which that could be done consistently with the law of this country would be by the Spanish Government entering into a convention with us, upon which an Order in Council might be issued empowering the Lords of the Treasury to repay the duties on Spanish vessels entering our harbours. The Spanish Government professed itself willing to adopt the proposed principle, but stated that they did not wish to proceed by way of a Convention, which might fetter their independent action. They said that if we were to adopt the practice in question without any convention, they would imitate our example. Now it appeared to him that was an unfriendly mode of proceeding, and a mere quibble and pretext to evade a compliance with a just and reasonable demand. His noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had very recently renewed his remonstrances with the Spanish Government upon that subject, and he (Mr. Labouchere) had every reason to hope that these remonstrances would prove effectual. But if that hope should not be realised, it appeared to him that the best course which Her Majesty's Government could pursue would be to come down to that House and ask for powers to effect that arrangement for mutual concessions on the part of Spain and of England, without the necessity of any previous Convention. With regard to the greater question, namely, the manner in which Spain treated not only English vessels, but also all other foreign vessels, he should observe that no one could feel more strongly than he did the great injury which it inflicted on the trade and commerce of this country. But he felt convinced that any person who had listened to the statement of his hon. Friend who had introduced that Motion, must see that it was against Spain herself that that restrictive policy operated most prejudicially. His hon. Friend had told them that the Spanish mercantile marine, which that policy had been meant to foster, was reduced to a most helpless and inefficient condition. Now, he should say, that that was no great encouragement to this country to revert to anything like a restrictive system, with a view of protecting our shipping interest. He should also remind hon. Gentlemen that that burden on our commerce had been of long standing, and had not dated from the repeal of our Navigation Laws; and neither had it been greatly aggravated by that measure. It was quite true that by the repeal of the Navigation Laws we had thrown open what had been called the general carrying trade of the world to Spain, as well as to other foreign nations. But he believed that no one would contend that we had any reason to look upon Spain as a formidable competitor in that trade. On the contrary, it was a remarkable fact that no nation which had adopted the protective and restrictive system of navigation was to be feared in that great branch of commerce. Which were the nations that enjoyed the largest share of the carrying trade of the world, and that possessed the greatest mercantile navies? Why, they were the United States, the Baltic Powers, and England—the countries, in fact, that had shown the least disposition to dread the competition of foreigners. But he did not on that account say that it would not be most desirable for this country to obtain a repeal of the differential duties to which his hon. Friend had called their attention, these duties inflicted peculiar injury on the constituents of his hon. Friend in the Shetland and Orkney Islands, by narrowing their markets. He was also well aware of the prejudicial effect which they produced in the Newfoundland trade. It was certainly a legitimate and proper object for the Government and Parliament of this country to induce Spain, if possible, to alter these discriminating duties. All he would say on that occasion was that that question had not been lost sight of by his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and by Her Majesty's Government. They were at the present moment in active correspondence with the Spanish Government Upon the subject. The diplomatic negotiations with respect to it had not yet been brought to a close; and he trusted that the House would not then interfere in the matter by coming to any vote upon a point which, in his opinion, it would be better to leave in the hands of Her Majesty's Ministers. If the House should do them the honour of believing that they were disposed to act on the subject in the manner they might deem most conducive to these interests which they were all anxious to promote, he hoped that the House would not adopt the proposed Resolution. He believed that the debate which was then taking place, and the expression of feeling in the British House of Commons that the trade between Great Britain and Spain ought to be conducted on a more just and liberal ay stem, would not be lost on the Spanish Government. It was not, therefore, with any doubt of the importance of that subject, and still less with any disposition not to promote the objects which the hon. Gentleman had in view, that he ventured to express a hope that the House would not think it necessary to come to any formal vote upon that occasion.

said, it appeared to him that that case might be met by a clause in the existing Navigation Act. That Act gave Her Majesty in Council a retaliatory power against these foreign countries which did not reciprocate our mode of dealing with the shipping in- terest. It was well known that our policy had not been reciprocated by Spain, and that English vessels trading with Spain did not enjoy the same advantages which were enjoyed by Spanish vessels trading with this country, since the repeal of the Navigation Laws. If the Act were allowed to remain inoperative in that instance, then he said that such an example might work very prejudicially; for what security could they have that other countries would not imitate the conduct of Spain? They all knew that the Dutch Government also imposed, in certain instances, differential duties, to tin disadvantage of the British shipowner. In the island of Java, British vessels landing cargoes were subjected to double the amount of the duties imposed on Dutch vessels. Remonstrances in such cases might be all very well; but when remonstrances were carried beyond a given point, they became totally worthless. In his opinion the time had arrived when some decided course of action ought to be taken with regard to Spain. He would not then enter into any general discussion on the subject of the Navigation Laws, or the justice and expediency of the late repeal of these laws. They would have other opportunities of considering that important question. But he certainly thought that the proposal made by the hon. Member for Orkney ought at least to engage the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government: and he hoped that without any decided vote of the House upon the subject, they would adopt such measures as might prove to Spain and the rest of the commercial world that England expected to have a reciprocity of action in her commercial intercoms with other nations.

said, no country in Europe owed so much to England as did Spain; and lie saw with regret the very little gratitude which her Government entertained towards this country. As the best means of exposing that ingratitude, he would wish to see the correspondence that had taken place, and the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to obtain that reciprocity. He would like to see the correspondence for this reason, that nations, like individuals, often yielded to shame what they refused to justice. He did not wish it to be understood, however, that lie was an advocate for retaliation, ft was a question rather for the Spanish Government and the Spanish people, whether they were acting wisely in imposing a higher rate of duty on goods imported in British vessels. They had already one instance of the folly of retaliation in the ease of the sulphur duty. They were unquestionably treated unfairly by the Government in Naples in regard to the sulphur duties, but when in retaliation they charged a duty of 4l. per ton on olive oil instead of 2l., they only punished themselves. He thought they had been treated with the deepest ingratitude by Spain; but he thought they should put up with that ingratitude rather than have recourse to retaliation, which could only injure the people of this country, who had a right to have things as cheaply as they could be got. He regretted to say that the American Government also was running wild in the same manner, for they were levying duties to the amount of 100 per cent on certain articles, thus doubling the price to their own people. What could be more preposterous than to compel a man to pay 30 dollars for a coat which lie might obtain for 15? though an enlightened nation, the Americans were in this respect acting in complete ignorance of their real interests. As he did not consider what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the beard of Trade to be satisfactory, he hoped the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would state what steps he had taken with regard to Spain.

said, he hoped his hon. Friend the Member for Orkney, after having heard the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the beard of Trade would not press his Motion to a division. The Hon. Gentleman opposite, the Member for Westmoreland, thought that retaliation was a good policy. But though retaliation were a good policy—which he did not admit—was the time come for retaliating on Spain? Let them remember what a struggle they had in this country to carry a free-trade policy—that the alteration in their own Navigation Laws had taken effect but twelve months ago—and they would then probably make a greater allowance for foreign nations, and give them more time to come to the same conclusion as they had themselves come to. He would consider it a most precipitate and improper preceding if the Government of this country were to adopt a policy of retaliation against Spain under the existing relations between the two countries. The right hon. Gentleman informed them that Spain had made many reductions in her tariff, to the extent of 33 per cent.

said, that what he had stated was, that the discriminating duties on goods brought into Spain in foreign vessels, which were, as he understood, 33 per cent, had been reduced to 20 per cent when the tariff was altered in 1849.

said, it would, in his opinion, be most unfortunate if, after having abolished the Navigation Laws, they were to withhold from Spain these privileges which they gave to all other nations. This would be to imitate what took place under the old Navigation Laws, which gave certain advantages to all other countries by allowing them to send goods in their own ships to the British colonies. But they withheld these advantages from Spain for twenty years, for in April, 1828, an Order in Council was issued, declaring "that vessels belonging to Spain were not to be allowed to carry on any direct trade between Spain and the British possessions abroad." What, might be expected, as the effect of their withholding from Spain in particular for twenty years, privileges which they gave to the rest of the world? Why, this, at least—that it was no reason to make Spain less restrictive, or more liberal towards this country—and it was only by adopting and carrying out a liberal policy, that Spain could be expected to move in the direction of free trade. Having been in the Shetland Isles last autumn, lie received certain information there which made him doubt whether the constituency of his hon. Friend approved of the proposition made by him on the present occasion. And for this reason—the constituents of his hon. Friend found it difficult to get a market for their fish in the ports of Spain, although there was a great demand for fish there, in consequence of the high differential duty on British vessels, and they felt this to be a great evil and hardship. But if, in addition to this differential duty on British ships arriving in the ports of Spain, there was to be also a differential duty on Spanish ships here, the consequence would be that they could not take their fish into the ports of Spain, either in British ships or Spanish ships, except under a high duty. As they were probably not far from a general election, he doubted whether this was a popular Motion for his hon. Friend to make. He hoped his hon. Friend was not in earnest in bringing forward this proposition, and that he did so rather with a view to get the Spanish differential duty removed, than with a view of inducing the Government to reverse their policy. He hoped the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary would state what had been done by the Government of this country, and that he would assure them that in all his communications to foreign Governments he declared that England would always regulate her policy in reference to the people of this country, and would not make her commercial policy contingent on the views of foreign countries.

said, he quite agreed with his right hon. Friend the President of the beard of Trade that the question which had been brought forward by the hon. Member for Orkney was one of very considerable importance to a large portion of this community. He also quite agreed that we had good cause of complaint against the Spanish Government for the course they had pursued—a complaint which, however, applied more to a long course of prejudice with respect to commercial matters than to any recent disposition on the part of Spain to pursue an unfriendly course towards this country. Indeed, as his right hon. Friend the President of the beard of Trade had stated latterly the Spanish Government had been rather relaxing than increasing the restrictions of their tariff. It was well known that Spain and Portugal were very far behind most other countries in regard to the principles of their commercial policy. But the Spaniards were beginning to move. They must not be expected to move more quickly than the captain of the merchantman who had been alluded to. They would not move on the first change of wind. They might not move until the wind had blown steadily for several days from the same quarter. But he hoped they would not delay so long as that Spanish captain they had heard of, who lay in Ramsgate harbour looking at the weathercock while the English merchantman went to Bilboa and came back. The Spanish Government at present kept 20,000 men, a strong and useful part of the population, employed as custom-house officers, while an equal number were engaged as smugglers in defeating the labours of the custom-house officers, and these 40,000 men were employed in preventing revenue from coming into the Spanish Treasury. He trusted the Spanish Government would begin to pursue a course more advantageous to the interests of Spain, and at the some more conducive to the interests of these countries who had commerce with Spain. He could assure the House that this was not only the impression upon his mind, but that it was very forcibly felt by the Government of Portugal. For when the Spanish Government began to alter their tariff, the Portuguese Government were apprehensive of losing a portion of revenue derived from importations into that country. The Portuguese Government were aware that a largo portion of the foreign manufactured goods consumed in Spain paid duty in Portugal, and were smuggled, duty free, into Spain, and this was a most profitable proceeding for Portugal. Thus the Portuguese Government appeared likely to lose a very large portion of revenue. However, the Spanish Government persevered, and he trusted the result would be, not only that the Spanish Government would lower their tariff, but that the Portuguese Government would, as was reasonable, so far lower their tariff as to recover the pull they bad before enjoyed upon the Spanish custom-house. At all events, the Spaniards were looking in the right direction. Her Majesty's Government had been and were still urging the Spanish Government upon the particular point to which the hon. Gentleman who proposed the Resolution had directed their attention. The House would probably expect him to comply with the request of the hon. Member for Montrose, by detailing all the arguments Her Majesty's Government had used during the negotiations, and the replies of the Spanish Government. No doubt, his own portion of this correspondence would be found to be an instructive lesson in political economy; but, on the other hand, he could not say that it would be very instructive to learn the reasons they assigned for not complying with the requests of Her Majesty's Government. The Government were urging the Spanish Government in the manner and to the extent he had described; and he should regret if the hon. Member for Orkney pressed this Motion to a division, because he thought that any expression of opinion or resolution of the House of Commons to effect this object would be prejudicial to the intention the hon. Member had in view in the present state of the relations between the two Powers. There was, in the first place, a discriminating duty of 20 per cent upon the goods of all nations brought into Spain; and, with regard to this differential duty, we stood upon the footing of the most fa- voured, or rather, he ought to say, the most unfavoured, nation. But there was another matter of less importance, but where the grievance was greater, namely, in the preference given to French vessels over English vessels in Spanish ports. The only question between the two Governments was as to the method of doing what was necessary; and, when both parties were agreed upon an object, they would not be long in agreeing to the particular mode of doing it. He trusted the hon. Mover of this Resolution would be satisfied with the effect which this discussion would have upon the Spanish Government, convincing them, as it would, that the Parliament of this country perceived that the grievance was a real one, and that, on the other hand, we were disposed to meet them in the most liberal manner with regard to our commercial arrangements with that country.

said, the noble Viscount had made a very amusing speech, but a great part of it was far wide of the very narrow question the hon. Member for Orkney had brought forward for their consideration. They had enacted a proviso for the purpose of protecting British interests, and he called upon them to enforce it, Spain being of all other nations the one they had the best right to enforce it against, for they had been subjected to a long course of injury from that nation. That was the nation that had turned out their Ambassador in a summary way, and inflicted upon them the greatest insult that had been inflicted upon them in all their history; that was the nation that had repudiated their debt, and not only injured them, but added insult to the injury by the manner in which the chief Minister of the Crown proposed to satisfy the creditors, he said the payment of the debt was a matter of inclination on their part, and if they did not take one-half of it they would get none. He was by no means satisfied with the assurance of the noble Viscount that he had the matter under consideration, especially as he had not condescended to give them so much as an outline of the negotiations. He would certainly resist the withdrawal of the Motion. If the proviso was worth anything, and was ever to be exercised, now was the time. He had listened with satisfaction to the account given by the right hon. President of the beard of Trade of the competition between the Spanish and English vessels. It was certainly a great triumph to our vessels, masters, and seamen; and afforded a refutation to the aspersions cast on them during the debates on the Navigation Bill. He thought this was a very proper Motion, affecting as it did the interest of their shipping and the honour of their country; for he thought both had been outraged by the conduct of the Court of Spain, which had treated them for a long series of years with contumely and insult. The proper mode of redress was not by a more discussion in that House. He doubted whether the Spaniards took the trouble of reading the newspapers; the proper way was, to give them a Vote of the House, and an Order in Council by the Queen, and then they would understand their language, hut not until then. He, therefore, should give this Motion his support, and would not consent to its withdrawal.

thought they were much indebted to the hon. Gentleman who had brought forward this Motion. When they had opened their ports to the commerce of all foreign countries, and when they had not received reciprocal advantages, it should be known that the House of Commons was not asleep on the subject. He trusted that no Gentleman would speak on this question with any other motive but to obtain that right course of policy from the Court of Spain, which it was the object of this Motion. He made that remark, in consequence of the observations of the hon. Member for Dorsetshire, but he gave him entire credit for taking no step with regard to the debate, except that which would conduce to the object in view, namely, to obtain freedom for British ships in the ports of Spain. The question before the House was not that they should express their indignation at the want of reciprocity on the part of Spain. The Motion if carried would do this—it would take the matter out of the hands of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, and place it in their own hands. The question was, whether they were more likely to carry their object by encouraging the noble Lord, and by strengthening the hands of the noble Lord in doing the duty they had intrusted him with, or by taking the matter into their own hands? The question was, whether having, in the last Session of Parliament but one, placed in the hands of the Executive Government a certain power, and the Government having now come forward and told them they were doing their utmost in the matter, they would step in and take the weapons out of their hands, and say they could use them more effectually. The hon. Member for Dorsetshire had introduced other matters with respect to Spain, which he (Mr. Cardwell) thought should not have been mixed up in this question. They were anxious to get a reciprocal system of navigation with Spain, and the best thing they could do was not to trouble their heads about some ancient grudge with that country. The noble Lord had told them that the Government was engaged in doing what was required to the utmost of their power; and he (Mr. Cardwell) hoped that by expressing their opinion, and giving vent to their indignation, they would strengthen his hands. It would be unfortunate if it should go to the Court of Spain that they had a divided opinion on this question, or one that was not unanimous. It should go forth to the Court of Spain that the Government is determined, and the House of Commons unanimous, on the question.

would support the Motion. The question was whether the British shipowner was to he left to suffer an intolerable grievance. Pie taxed the right hon. Member for Manchester with indifference to the interests of the shipowner, who could not enter any port he pleased, like the right hon. Member in his yacht. If the proviso in the Navigation Act was anything more than a tub to the whale, let it be acted on.

did not think it was ever contemplated that by a clause in an Act of Parliament they could change the whole commercial policy of any country. The Spanish Government did not mean to insult them by the establishment of these differential duties, but it was their policy to propose differential duties as between Spanish ships and the ships of all foreign countries. Suppose they retaliated on the Spanish Government, did they think it would stop there? It would not, but, on the contrary, the Spanish Government would go on retaliating against them until the annual export of British manufactures to Spain was entirely done away with. His right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester was perfectly right in the advice he had given to the hon. Gentleman by whom this Motion was brought forward; for how could the condition of the inhabitants of the Orkney and Shetland Isles be benefited by levying a tax upon their fish? The hon. Gentleman was going to tax their own fish for the benefit of his constituents; but when the matter came to be explained to them, they would not (as suggested by his right hon. Friend) altogether admire the plan of retaliation by which their fish would he taxed. He thought it would be just as well if the hon. Gentleman would listen to the advice he had received, before he pressed his Motion; and lot him consider whether the resolution might not be taken in a different view from that in which lie brought it forward.

would ask hon. Members how it was that the Bill repealing the Navigation Laws was got through the House? He believed it was carried very much on the faith reposed by hon. Members in the assertion of the Government, that they would be ready if foreign nations did not act with reciprocity towards this country, to give effect to that clause. The House ought to consider what would be the effect on the shipowners of this country when they found that that provision about which so much parade had been made had been ineffectual. He would give the House some statistics with respect to the trade between Spain and this country in the year preceding the repeal of the Navigation Laws and the year following that repeal. In the year ending 5th Jan., 1850, the vessels that entered inwards from Spain were 117, and their tonnage was 17,842. That was the year preceding the repeal of the Navigation Laws. In the year succeeding the repeal, the number of ships that entered inwards from Spain had increased from 117 to 150 and the tonnage had increased from 17,842 to 23,742. It had been stated in the course of the debate, that out of 23 vessels clearing outwards from London to Spain, 19 belonged to the Spanish nation. The House had also been told that the trade between Newfoundland and Spain was altogether monopolised by the Spanish nation. Then he would ask was that clause in the Act repealing the Navigation Laws introduced by the Government in good faith, or not? If it was introduced in good faith, he would ask if there was any case in which it could be carried into effect more stringent and more palpable than the case now before the House?

said, his constituents were very deeply interested in this question, their trade with Newfoundland having been seriously injured; but after hearing this debate, he was quite content that the question should be left in the hands of the the noble Lord the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

said, he could not understand the consistency of the hon. Member for Bridport, if he did not support the Government in enforcing the provisions of an Act which be was instrumental in passing. With reference to an observation that bad fallen from the hon. Member for Montrose, that the Americans had had the worst of the bargain since the repeal of the Navigation Laws, he (Mr. Newdegate) was prepared to maintain that the result of the repeal, so far as concerned England and the United States, showed that the Americans had had much the best of the bargain. Was not the House aware that America bad proposed a tariff of additional duties on foreign manufactures, and that it was only defeated in the Senate by a factious system of delay? He contended that no country in the world could dictate the commercial policy of the world. They might sacrifice their manufactures and their shipping, hut it was not the will of Providence that all nations should be governed by one system, but, like families, each nation should consult its own interests, and do that which it considered best for its own prosperity.

wished, before the House came to a division, to say a few words respecting the form and substance of this Motion. With respect to the general question of the Navigation Laws, whenever the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire chose to enter into that subject, lie would find that the result of a more liberal system of policy bad been favourable not only to the Americans, but to the commerce of every nation in the world. There were exceptions; but these exceptions were very few, and did not include any of the great maritime Powers. With regard to the advantages that America might have derived from the repeal of the Navigation Laws, he believed that this country had derived greater advantages still, and he was sure he was not at all sorry if the United States of America had derived advantage from the change. It was to be desired that both countries should derive advantage from the repeal of these laws. An hon. Member had said, in the course of the debate, that the House could no longer listen to trifling negotiations. If that were so, the proper course would be to call, against the opinion of the Government, for all the despatches on this subject, all the treaties between Spain and this country, and then the House would form its own opinion upon the whole ques- tion. But to come to a conclusion without knowing really what the representations were that had been made, or what the answers were that had been given, or what was the state of the case between the two countries, would be a course so imprudent for the House of Commons to take, that they could hardly take it with any consistency. If this Resolution were adopted, there might be circumstances which would prevent its being carried into effect, for the Committee might expose themselves to the inability of the Crown to comply with the request of the House.

replied: With regard to the Motion, he said, that he regretted to find from the observations of his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose, and his right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, that, notwithstanding his (Mr. Anderson's) explanation of the difference in principle between an endeavour to obtain free and fair competition for our merchant shipping, and to remove obstructions to international commerce—an endeavour perfectly consistent, as he considered, with the principles of free trade—they persisted in confounding it with the levying of retaliatory duties on foreign produce, because foreign countries might levy high duties on our produce. He maintained that the proposition which he had brought forward rested on a totally different principle. It was calculated to promote the freedom of trade by free and fair competition. He would never for an instant be so absurd as to propose, that because Spain, for instance, thought proper to levy a duty of from 100 to 150 per cent on the produce of our fisheries, as he had already stated, we should therefore put a duty of 100 to 150 per cent on her wool, and thus obstruct and enhance the cost of our manufacturing industry. His object was to cheapen the cost and improve the means of maritime transit, and to show that we could do so without detriment to any other British interest.

Sir, I rise for the purpose of bringing before the House a most important subject, for leave to bring in a Bill for the better Administration of Justice in the Court of Chancery. If the proposal I have to make solely concerned the administration of justice, I certainly should have been disposed to ask those who are more familiar with the proceedings in our courts of justice, to undertake the task on which I now propose to enter. But feeling that the office of Lord Chancellor, and all that is connected with his functions, deeply affect the whole of the government and legislation of this country, I have undertaken this task myself, thinking it better that the whole views of the Government on this important subject should be stated to the House, than that our view should be solely confined to the present distribution of offices and functions in the Court of Chancery. In bringing this question before the House, I should first state the changes that have been made during and since 1812, when the Bill appointing a Vice-Chancellor was passed by Parliament. In 1811 it was found that the duties which were then performed by Lord Eldon were of so laborious a nature that, notwithstanding the known industry and learning of that eminent Judge, it was considered to be impossible that he could perform all his duties in the Court of Chancery, together with those ditties which belonged to him as the Supreme Judge of the House of Lords as a court of appeal. Lord Redesdale accordingly moved for the appointment of a Committee of the House of Lords on this subject, which resulted in the Bill to which I have referred. It is stated by Mr. Twiss, in the Life of Lord Eldon, that at that time the arrears in the Court of Chancery amounted to 276 causes, and that at the then rate of despatch it would require a period of twelve or thirteen years for the disposal of them, to say nothing of the further arrears which would have accumulated in the meantime. It was therefore decided that a new Judge should be appointed, under the title of Vice-Chancellor, to perform part of the duties of the Lord Chancellor. It was said at that time, and by no less eminent a man than Sir S. Romilly, that the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor was not necessary, and that the business then before the Court of Chancery was not much greater in amount than that which bad been before that Court in the time of Lord Hardwicke. Lord Cottenham, who made a statement on a subsequent occasion, said that Sir Samuel Romilly had been mistaken in that respect, and he showed by a return how much greater was the amount of business in the Court of Chancery then than it had been in the time of Lord Hardwicke; yet I rather think that there was very great foundation for the statement made by Sir Samuel Romilly, for I find in the report of what was stated by Lord Cottenham, that while he said, that from 1761 to 1765 the causes set down were on the average 411, and that they had increased from 1831 to 1835, taking an average of years, to 1,283, being more than three times as many; yet he states at the same time, that the causes set down from 1810 to 1812 were, on an average, no more than 540. [3 Hansard, xxxiii. 402.] It would, therefore, appear that there had been an enormous increase on the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, and that there was at the time of the appointment a very great number of causes then waiting to be heard in the Court of Chancery. But I imagine the fact to have been that the delays which prevailed at that time in the Court of Chancery, and the inadequacy of the judicial strength of the Court, were the causes of many matters being withheld, which would have come before the Court if there had been a prospect of an early settlement of them, and in that way injustice was done to the suitors who would otherwise have appeared in court. Now, whilst from 1810 to 1812 the average number of causes set, down was 540, from 1823 to 1825 the average number was 945, and from 1833 to 1835 it was 1,301. It is evident, therefore, that the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor led to a very great increase in the business of the Court of Chancery, and that causes which would probably never have appeared there were brought into that Court in consequence of that appointment. I think it is nearly the same thing whether the number of causes brought into the Court cannot be decided owing to the arrear of business, or whether causes are not brought in from despair of being able to obtain a hearing for them. In either case there is a great evil to the subject, for there is a denial of that justice which it is the business of the State to see is done. Lord Cottenham stated at the same time that there was a very great increase in the number of peti- tions, and that they had increased from 1,487, the average of 1821 to 1823, to 2,817 in 1832 to 1835. On looking to some later returns which I have procured, from 1841 to 1851, I find that in the year ending November, 1843, the number of petitions were 2,715, nearly the number stated for 1833; but in 1849 they were 3,984, and, in 1850 they were 3,724, showing an enormous increase—an increase, however, I do not believe more than commensurate with the increase of other business before that Court. Upon looking at another return—I do not do-sire to go into the details—but, looking at the total amount of the matters brought into the Court of Chancery under the various heads familiar to all who belong to the learned profession, I find that in 1842 the total number of these matters was 7,325; in 1843, 6,873; in 1844, 7,639; the average being 7,279. In 1848, the number was 8,332; in 1849, 8,697; in 1850, 8,356; being an average of 8,456. There was thus an increase in these few years from 7,279, the average in 1844, to 8,456, the average in 1850, showing in another way that there has been a great increase in the business of the Court of Chancery. Sir, upon looking through the returns in detail, I find (as I could easily show, but that it would delay the House unnecessarily) that in the year 1848 the Court of Chancery seems to have been fully adequate to its functions, though the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the three Vice-Chancellors appear to have been fully employed; and at the same time I find that the number of causes left for hearing at the end of the term were not more than would probably be disposed of in the next term, and not more than had been so disposed of in several successive years. But in looking through the returns for the years 1849 and 1850, we may observe how essential it is that the Court of Chancery not only should have an adequate number of Judges, but that the Judges should be in a state of health and strength adequate to the performance of all their functions. For I find that in Easter term, 1849, until Trinity term, 1850, Lord Cottenham, being unable to attend in the Court of Chancery from illness, immediately a considerable arrear arose, and the number of causes waiting to be heard was very considerably increased. However I will now refer to the quantity of business there was before the different Courts of Chancery on the first day of Michaelmas term, 1850, and the first day of Hilary term, 1851. At that time there were only two Vice-Chancellors, the operation of the Act which was passed for the appointment of two additional Vice-Chancellors having provided that upon the resignation of the junior Vice-Chancellor no other person should be appointed. I find that on the first day of Michaelmas term the total number of appeals, motions, petitions, demurrers, pleas, exceptions, and causes before the Lord Chancellor, was 80; before the Master of the Rolls, 90; before "Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce, 392; before Vice-Chancellor Lord Cranworth, 173: total, 735. At the commencement of Hilary term, 1851, there were before the Lord Chancellor, 106; the Master of the Rolls, 135; Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce, 532; Lord Cranworth, 242: total, 1,016. This accumulation of business has been partly owing, no doubt, to certain Acts of Parliament lately passed, especially that as to the winding-up of railway companies; and this is a temporary accumulation which, when the judicial strength is increased by the appointment of another Vice-Chancellor, according to a Bill now before the House, which meets with general approbation, will be greatly diminished. It is not, therefore, to that subject I wish to call the attention of the House; but I thought it desirable that the House should see what has been generally the progress of judicial business in the Court of Chancery, that they may judge a little of the very great importance of any change made in that court. Sir, the progress of society and the complicated state of property in this country have led more and more to bring-within the control of that court a great amount of property, and many most intricate causes, so that it is of the utmost importance to the whole nation that there should be justice administered in that important court. I now come, Sir, to notice the nature of the office of Lord Chancellor, who is at the head of this great court, and has other most important duties to perform. The Lord Chancellor is, in the first place, at the head of the Court of Chancery; and although it now seldoms happens that he hears original Motions, yet the daily business of the Court of Chancery is under his superintendence, and the appeals and hearings from the other Judges are brought before him for rehearing. He likewise is the Judge who presides in the House of Lords when that House sits as the great Court of Appeal. He has also various administrative functions belonging to him, which are specially attached to the Great Seal, He is a Member of the Cabinet likewise, and as such is consulted on all political questions that come before the Government, but more especially these which have relation either to the constitution, to the amendment of the law, or to the enforcement of the law when there arises any question upon its enforcement, lie has other functions. He is, for instance, the adviser of the Royal Family in cases of doubt and difficulty involving their interests. His position is very high in consequence of all these functions. Now, Sir, I think it is right to state both the advantages and the disadvantages which appear to arise from this union of functions in the Lord Chancellor. In the first place, I think it is a great advantage that the Government of the country should have the aid and the authority, in matters of law and general policy, of a person who has risen by his talents at the bar to a place of the greatest eminence, and whose opinion upon matters of law must be of great weight—and who adding to that the authority attached to his high office, must be of the greatest advantage to the Executive Government of the country. It appears to me, if possible, of still greater importance that the person holding the office of Lord Chancellor should preside in the House of Lords, and that he should there be the ultimate Judge of Appeals, so that thereby the House of Lords should have this security—that being the great Court of Appeal in this country, they have to preside over their decisions a man as to whose great capacity and authority there cannot be any doubt. There is a further advantage in this constitution of the office of Lord Chancellor. It is an office which has been always reckoned the great prize of the profession; and thereby, while the Chancellor sits at the head of the House of Lords to declare, in the name of that House, their judgments to the country—it is something to say, that it is an eminence which is to be reached by talent from the humblest station, by men who, having devoted their labours in the early part of their lives to the study of the profession of the law, have stood to such advantage amongst their competitors, that it may truly be said of them, that, by their talents and their abilities, they have earned their eminent position. It is one of the many institutions of this country, by which that which is the most aristocratic body in this country is connected with these who, having no original advantage of birth, and no original advantages of fortune, have attained by their merits to the eminence they enjoy. Now, I will state shortly what I consider some of the disadvantages attending this union of offices. The chief disadvantage, I think, is, that these functions are so weighty; that the attendance in the Court of Chancery to give judgment on matters of the highest importance is of itself so great a labour to the mind and body of that functionary, with the task of presiding in the House of Lords, and the attention that must necessarily be paid to great questions of State which come before the Cabinet—these functions are so many and so weighty, that it seems scarcely possible that any one man should be found adequate to perform the whole. Another disadvantage is, that, according' to the constitution, while the Executive Government of the day have the advantage of the advice and assistance of the Lord Chancellor, he must be one whose general political opinions agree with theirs; and, therefore, when a change of Government happens, the country loses the benefit of his accumulated experience, and the weight of his decision in the Court of Chancery. These considerations, Sir, placed before the country, and weighed by men of various minds and dispositions, have, from time to time, produced plans by which it appeared to them, that the great advantages I have mentioned might be secured in another way, and that the disadvantages might be obviated by some different arrangement of our machinery in the Court of Chancery, in the House of Lords, or in the administration of justice. The first plan which I shall mention which has been proposed for this purpose comes forward propounded with all the ability and clearness of statement which peculiarly belongs to its framer, Lord Lang-dale. He proposes that there shall be a permanent Judge in the Court of Chancery, not changing with the Administration of the day. He likewise proposes that there shall be a Lord President sitting in the House of Lords, who shall likewise be a permanent Judge. And he proposes, further, that there shall be an officer called the Keeper of the Great Seal, or Minister of Justice, who shall belong to the Administration of the day, and whose whole care and attention shall be directed to the correcting and advising on such changes of law as the Government or individual Members may from time to time propose. Now, Sir, it appears to me that, however plausible such a proposition may be, and however it may agree with our views of theoretical separation between the political and judicial function, I cannot think that, in practice, such a plan would be likely to be beneficial. First, I cannot think that this separation of the political and judicial functions is, in itself, a well-founded or an important objection. It is well founded (though there are precedents to the contrary), and that, notwithstanding these precedents of Lord Mansfield and Lord Ellenborough, as to Judges who preside in criminal jurisprudence; but with regard to the Judge who presides over courts which relate to the disposition of property, I cannot well conceive cases likely to arise in practice to sway the opinion of the Judges. In the course of the debates on this subject, in 1836, it was observed on this point, I think, by Lord Abinger, that, among the decisions looked to with respect, were these of a Judge whose freedom on political subjects no one will doubt—Judge Jeffries. Lord Abinger stated, that, notwithstanding his reputation as a politician, his decisions as to matters of property have always been regarded with respect by the profession. Without, however, referring to such extreme cases as Lord Chancellor Jeffries, from the time of the Revolution there have been many eminent men in the highest seats, and in great authority, deciding cases of property, many of them very warm politicians—and none of them more decided a politician than Lord Hardwicke—yet, notwithstanding their political feelings, I cannot find one of whom it is said that he decided cases in the Court of Chancery with reference to the politics of the parties interested. Therefore, if there is really no reason why a political Chancellor should not decide questions of property, and if, in fact, we have found that, from the Revolution there has been no practical evil in the union of the offices, I think it is a proposition which, however plausible, we had better disregard. I then come, Sir, to the practical inconvenience of the plans thus proposed. The Lord Chancellor would be appointed to a permanent office, and no doubt would discharge his duties with ability and impartiality, and, as the presiding Judge in the House of Lords, would probably have great weight in the body. But when we come to that which I have stated as so useful and so advantageous, namely, that there should be a person of great authority assisting the deliberations of the Government, and taking part in these deliberations in the House of Lords which concern amendments of the law, or any constitutional question, I think the plan would fail. First, in order to obtain a person of first-rate eminence at the bar to take a station so precarious as that of becoming the mere political adviser of the Administration of the day, we should be obliged to give a very high salary and high retiring allowance; and I cannot but perceive, that there would be very soon (even if the House of Commons were disposed, in the first instance, to grant that salary) complaints on that score; and it would be said, "Why should a person whose functions are after all merely political, and who is nothing more than the political adviser of the Government, have a much greater salary and retiring allowance than are allotted to any other political Member of the Administration?" and I do not think that such a large salary and allowance could be maintained. Then, if that were so, you would soon find that the offices of Lord Chancellor, of Lord President of the House of Lords, and of the three great Judges presiding in the Common Law Courts, would be more sought after than this precarious station of Lord Keeper or Minister of Justice; and you would, in fact, be liable to have a man inferior to these who were sitting in these high judicial stations appointed to this office; and when he was the adviser of the Government we should he liable to have the decisions of the Government, taken by his advice, overthrown by the superior weight and authority of these men, more eminent at the bar. If, then, that be so, I do not see why this large provision should be made, nor why the Home Secretary, sitting in this House, should not be competent to perform all the duties which it is supposed could be performed by the so called Minister of Justice. As to one duty which it is supposed would be performed by the Minister of Justice, from my experience I should say that no such officer is required to perform the duty—I mean the duty of superintending Bills, seeing that their language was consistent, &c, and that no error has crept into our legislation. I should say that, as the legislation of the country must be settled by both Houses of Parliament, one of which is a numerous body, and the other is not only numerous but sent here by popular election—those Bills which are passed must not only be of such a nature as to satisfy the acute minds of the legal profession, but convey the sense and meaning of the two Houses of Parliament. And with respect to the "advantage" which it is said would be derived from the language in which Acts were passed, I think that great lawyers who have even most intelligent views as to the amendment of the law, when they come to carry their views into effect, do not carry them into effect much better or so well as these who have devoted their whole time to the framing of laws, and who have been practically engaged in the work of preparing Bills afterwards passed. In short, I believe that the Minister of Justice would probably, instead of drawing the Bills himself, trust to such men us the gentleman who assisted me in the Reform Bill (Mr. Gregson), or the gentleman who so ably assists my right hon. Friend (Mr. Coulson)—such men as have paid constant attention to the drawing of Bills. I should be afraid, therefore, that if this plan were adopted you would be parting with that which has been a great advantage to the country, and which you have had ever since the Revolution—the having acting in your Executive Government, and at the same time presiding in the House of Lords, a man of most eminent legal authority, taken from these who have had greatest success at the bar. I think that the Executive Government would sink in weight, and that your judicial system would likewise decline, and that you would obtain no equivalent advantage. I cannot, therefore, recommend to the House to adopt that plan (however ably recommended) of a division of the Chancellorship into three offices. There is another plan which has been much considered, and which does not go to the length of that which I have stated, but is at the same time a considerable alteration. I mean the plan of having a permanent Judge in the Court of Chancery, and separating the Lord Chancellor altogether from any duties in the Court of Chancery, but preserving him in the office, and, with the title of Lord Chancellor, making him Appellate Judge in the House of Lords. I think that plan has great advantages over the one I have just mentioned. It preserves to the Executive Government a person of great authority and weight in legal matters. At the same time, I must say, that on consulting the debate which took place upon the subject, and referring to the statements of Lord Lyudhurst and the authorities he quotes, Sir S. Romilly, Lord Redesdale, and others, I think that there is a very general and nearly unanimous opinion in the profession, that the Judge who sits merely in a Court of Appeal would not have that weight and authority, and would not be so capable of acting as a Judge as one who sat in constant practice in the Courts with large ordinary jurisdiction. I find this opinion stated over and over again in the debates of 1836; and I find Sir S. Romilly quoted thus:—

"If of the three Judges who are to preside in equity two have the law kept constantly in their mind by regular attendance in Court, and the third only refreshes his memory by looking back into text-books and precedents, just so as to enable him to decide a dozen or two of causes in the year which might be brought before him upon appeal—it is obvious that this effect must be produced—that the appeal will be from a Judge having perfect mastery of the law, to one who has but an imperfect recollection of it."

I find, Sir, that the House decided by 94 to 29 against the Bill; showing that the House of Lords were entirely adverse to the adoption of that plan. There have been other schemes deserving of attention, as that of Sir Edward Sugden, whose plan was an immediate Court of Appeal, to consist of the several Judges, as the Vice-Chancellors. One objection to that plan appears fatal to it—that by depriving the several Courts of Chancery of their heads to form this Court of Appeal, the action of these courts would be paralysed—much of the time they should give to causes in their own courts would be consumed in the Court of Appeal, and their strength greatly diminished. At the same time, there is a statement of Sir E. Sugden, which was made before a Committee of the other House on Official Salaries, and which is well worthy of attention, because giving his own experience. He was then presiding in the Court of Chancery in Ireland—and no man over sat there with a greater reputation or with greater reason (from learning, ability, and practice) to repose confidence in his own conclusions and decisions; he was asked—

"But still the Lord Chancellor of Ireland has not so laborious an office as the Lord Chancellor of England?—The answer was—'Certainly not; but the Chancellorship of Ireland is quite sufficient to occupy any man's energies and time. The public is not aware of the pressure which there is upon a single judge sitting alone in court. If a man forms one of four, the division of responsibility, and the assistance mutually given, and the satisfaction which a man feels in finding that his opinion is agreed in by others, leave him without any doubt or pressure upon his mind. But I consider that the office of a single judge is one of the most painful that it is possible for any man to fill, however competent he may feel himself. He has to decide upon matters of immense weight in point of law, and of great importance in point of property, with no assistance, nobody that he can turn to, not a person in the world to whom he can speak upon the subject. He has to decide all upon his own responsibility. I consider, therefore, that the wear and tear upon the mind of a man, however great a lawyer he may be, who is conscientiously doing his duty, is very great indeed in the office of a single judge.'"

Sir E. Sugden subsequently partly qualified this opinion, but only partly, observing that in relation to the inferior Judges, as the Vice-Chancellors, they had at least the satisfaction of feeling, that if they should be wrong, their error could be corrected on appeal, which is not the case with a Judge whose decision is final. Now, Sir, I have heard from other quarters that there is an opinion, which has gained great strength of late, that it is desirable that the decisions in the Court of Chancery should not be the decision of a single Judge, but the decision of more than one Judge, and that this additional Judge should come for the hearing into the Chancellor's Court. And I think this view is strengthened to the House, if they agree with me, that it is desirable not to make an alteration of that practice by which an eminent man at the bar or the bench is taken at once into the Court of Chancery, there to preside. It would be a great loss to the Government and the public, if you were to lay down a rule that no man who has not practised in the Court of Chancery should attain the office of Lord Chancellor, and that thus eminent men, who at the Common Law bar have risen to the highest reputation, should be excluded from the attainment of the highest eminence of all. Now, the Bill I have to propose goes first upon the foundation that it is desirable to have more than one Judge sitting in the Lord Chancellor's Court; and further, upon this further foundation, that while the union of functions I have referred to remains, and the consequent necessity for the Chancellor's attending to political subjects, and the wear and tear of body and mind being such as Sir Edward Sugden describes, it is desirable that the Chancellor should have a greater portion of time than he now possesses, which he may afford to the consideration of these matters. It has been my fortune to be connected with Lord Cottenham in the administration of affairs, and I believe no man ever gave greater satisfaction by the attention he paid to the business of the Court over which he presided, and the clear judgment he brought to hear upon it—an attention shown not only in Court, but at his own house, where I have often found him late at night occupied in study, and where he has been engaged until two or three o'clock in the morning, considering authorities or precedents. But the great attention which he thus bestowed on the judicial questions rendered him less able to give the time others would desire to political and administrative questions. I think, therefore, that it would be desirable that the Lord Chancellor should be enabled to have some relief from attendance in the Court of Chancery, and that it should not be necessary for him to enter into questions of minute detail—the language and phraseology of Bills—but that he should be able to give sufficient time and attention to the consideration of all measures which may affect the administration of the law, or which may tend to alter, in any respect, the institutions of the country. Now, what I shall venture to propose, is, that there should be established a court, which should be called the Supreme Court of Chancery, or the Lord Chancellor's Court, whichever name may be determined upon, and in that Court should sit the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and one of the Judges of the Courts of Common Law, to be summoned from time to time as occasion may require. I am informed—at least in the present state of business before the Common Law Courts—it is the opinion of the present Lord Chancellor that it will not be difficult to obtain the assistance of one of the Common Law Judges for the performance of these duties. I propose, therefore, that there should be three Judges in this Supreme Court—the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and one of the Judges of the Common Law Courts—and that any two of them should have the power of hearing in the Court of Chancery all causes heard therein, and, in the absence of the Lord Chancellor, that the two remaining Judges should be possessed of all the powers and authorities exercised by him. It is part of the measure which I propose, that appeals in bankruptcy, now exclusively adjudicated upon by the Lord Chancellor, should be referred to this Supreme Court, and that the Lord Chancellor alone shall not exercise these powers with which he is entrusted, but that he shall always exercise them only as a member of the Supreme Court. By these provisions the Lord Chancellor would be enabled, and indeed required to attend to the business of the Court of Chancery. All the minute details would be heard by his associates, and he would not be so entirely absorbed by his duties as to prevent him giving that attention which his other high and important duties demanded. In the same way, matters of lunacy should be heard and decided upon by this Supreme Court. An arrangement should be made with the Judges, by which one of their number could give his attendance in the mode required. With regard to the salaries in future to be paid, it will be recollected by the House that the Committee on Salaries proposed last year that if there were any division in the office of Lord Chancellor, the salary should be reduced to 8,000l. a year. The Government have taken this suggestion into their consideration, and it is cur opinion that that is a greater reduction than ought to be made in so high an office. We think also that the pension to be paid to the Lord Chancellor on retirement from office ought not to be diminished. It is desirable, when the situation depends on the chances and changes of political affairs, that such a retiring allowance should be made as would induce men already in the enjoyment of high position to accept an office of so much importance to the country. We, therefore, propose that the salary of the Lord Chancellor shall be 10,000l. per annum, and that the retiring allowance be the same as it at present is, namely, 5,000l., a year. There is another detail in connexion with the office of Lord Chancellor, which I have some difficulty in mentioning, because, as First Lord of the Treasury, I may appear to have some personal interest in it. It is well known that there is at present a great deal of ecclesiastical patronage vested in the Lord Chancellor. It was originally vested in him, because the persons who acted in the Chancery offices were clerks in orders, and giving them benefices was a mode of rewarding their exertions. The arrangement belongs evidently to the time when the Lord Chancellor was himself an ecclesiastic. The patronage to which I refer is disposed of not by reference to the Crown, not by taking the Sovereign's idea sure, but is disposed of by the Lord Chancellor at his own uncontrolled discretion. On the other hand, it has been proposed by the Commission appointed last year, that the whole of these benefices should be sold, and the proceeds appropriated to the purpose of increasing the means of spiritual instruction. The Government, in taking that proposal into their consideration, were adverse to it. In the first place, it is not desirable to part with a great public trust, by selling the property attached to it to whoever should offer the highest price for it; and, in the second place, I do not think that such a separation of a great part of the Church from the State is desirable. What I propose, therefore, is, that this patronage be in future vested in the Crown, and that the Minister of the Crown take the pleasure of the Sovereign with regard to the dispensing of it, in the same way as the ecclesiastical patronage vested in the Crown is now disposed of. I have stated now the general principles of the Bill which I have the honour to propose. But I should mislead the House if I gave it to be supposed that I was now carrying into effect all the proposals which the Government and the Lord Chancellor will have to make for the improvement of the administration of justice. In Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne at the commencement of the present Session, it it was said—

"The administration of Justice in the several Departments of Law and Equity will, no doubt receive the serious Attention of Parliament; and I feel confident that the measures which may he submitted with a view of improving that Administration, will he discussed with that mature Deliberation which important Changes in the highest Courts of Judicature in the Kingdom imperatively demand."

Now, Sir, one of the changes which can and has been made, as any one will have seen who has consulted the public newspapers of the day, is, the reduction and abolition of many of the fees which are now paid in proceedings in the Court of Chancery. I am persuaded that nothing can be more desirable than that suitors should be I enabled to obtain justice without a very great expense, which must deter men from the I pursuit of their just claims. I have heard it said by some, that it was desirable that the avenues to justice should not be too open, for if justice were made too cheap; litigation would be sure to increase. If it is desirable to discourage litigation, this is not the way to effect that object. If a person comes with a frivolous complaint, or frivolous accusation, let him pay the penalty of that proceeding by the cost which will be imposed upon him. But to say that a man shall pay a particular amount of money before he can obtain justice in a fair complaint, that I hold to be inconsistent with the principle of justice, and the principle which in this country regulates the administration of justice. And when you say that by such a course you would discourage litigation, I think even in that point of view the greatest error would be committed. It evidently would be so, if you take the position of the person on whom the penalty might have to be inflicted. A man of 20,000l.. a year, to indulge his spite on some person, his enemy, would have no hesitation in spending 1,000l.. in litigation; but take another man, who has really a wrong done him, and he may be unable to spend 100l. to obtain justice. Thus while the rich man would be at liberty to satisfy his vindictive spirit of litigation, the poor man would be debarred from obtaining what was his right. The making of justice cheap, therefore, as far as it can be done, I hold to be one of the clearest duties of the State; and I think that we cannot in this respect err in reducing and abolishing as many fees now payable in legal proceedings as may be possible. There are other measures in contemplation for the purpose of effecting which there have been two Commissions appointed—one to inquire into the proceedings of the Common Law Courts, and another into all the proceedings in the Court of Chancery. I am persuaded, without mentioning any particular measure, that the result of these Commissions will be very much to prevent delays, these constant transfers of causes from one Court to another, and these tedious proceedings which have hitherto embarrassed the Courts of Justice. I believe that the Commissioners are devoting their attention to get rid, as far as possible, of these technicalities and forms which do not touch the real substance or merits of the case. I believe that if we proceed in this course, very much good will be done, and I am sure that there is no subject which more deserves the attention of Parliament. This I can assure the House, that however difficult the question may be, the Government will continue to pay the, most earnest attention to it, convinced not only that it is their duty to pay this attention, but if there is any right which the people of this country are entitled to, it is, that they should have justice not only impartially and fairly administered, as I believe it is, but administered at as little cost to the suitor as the case will allow. With these opinions upon the subject, and asking pardon for having detained them so long, I move, Sir, for leave to bring in this Bill.

said, that at that late hour, and on a subject of so much importance as that introduced by the noble Lord, and with a Bill which proposed materially to alter, and was intended to improve, the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery, it would be unpardonable in him to trespass on the time of the House, particularly on a measure so perfectly new, with many observations. He merely rose to say that the noble Lord, in that part of his speech which related to the office of Lord Chancellor and the administration of justice in the Court of Chancery, and the various measures which heretofore had been proposed with the view of improving the administration of justice in that court, had expressed himself with sentiments so just, with a view so clear and so accurate of the duties of that great office, that although he (Mr. Stuart) highly disapproved of the latter part of the speech, and, so far as he could judge at the moment, of the measure proposed, he could not withhold his admiration of the opinions enunciated by the noble Lord on the general subject. He regretted deeply that so humble an individual as himself—one who had no other claim to the notice of the House than that of being the senior member of the Chancery bar present—should be the first person to rise to make an observation on the noble Lord's speech. He regretted that no statesman on that bench, and with whom he usually acted, was present to state his views on this question—a question important to laymen ten thousand times more than it was to the legal profession. The views of the members of the bar were, in his opinion, of considerable importance; but the importance of their duties depended entirely, and beyond all power of estimate, on the authority and qualifications of the Judge before whom they appeared on behalf of others to solicit justice. He did not presume to form this opinion from anything said by the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), who expressed just views on that part of the measure to which he (Mr. Stuart) was alluding. Concurring in the views of the noble Lord with respect to the first part of his speech, he now proceeded to notice a few points on which he differed from the noble Lord. To him the proposal was entirely new; and the noble Lord could not have taken the stop of pro posing such a Bill without, of course, consulting the law officers of the Crown. It was in the hope of eliciting the views of these learned Gentlemen, that lie (Mr. Stuart) ventured to throw out one or two considerations regarding the measure. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) being of opinion that the office of Lord Chancellor as a judicial and political office should be preserved, proposed by the intended measure to give to the Lord Chancellor, sitting in the Court of Chancery, some further judicial assistance sitting in the Supreme Court—not in the court of ultimate appeal—for although the Lord Chancellor sat as a Judge of Appeal in the Chancery Court, yet from him there was an appeal to the House of Lords. The proposal was to give to the Lord High Chancellor sitting in the Court of Chancery the assistance of two Judges, not two Judges whom he might solicit to assist him on occasions of importance, but, as he (Mr. Stuart) understood, the Lord Chancellor was to have permanently and constantly associated with him the Master of the Rolls and a Common Law Judge, with one or the other of whom he must be associated, and both of whom, its the absence of the Lord Chancellor, might discharge the duties of that high office. This was a very novel proposal; for at present, as the Court of Chancery was constituted, the Lord Chancellor was in the habit, when cases requiring it occurred, of calling other Judges to his assistance. The Lord Chancellor had at present the power of calling to his assistance the Master of the Rolls, and of requesting the co-operation of a Common I Law Judge, when matters of intricacy or importance required it. The principle of the noble Lord was, that the Lord Chancellor never could be considered competent to transact the business of his court without the assistance of these assessors Consider the effect of this. The noble Lord had said, and most truly, that the judicial strength of the Court of Chancery was inadequate for the performance of the business of the Court; that was, they had at present, or ought to have, the Master of the Rolls sitting in his own Court, two Vice-Chancellors sitting in their Courts, and the Lord Chancellor in the Supreme Court, and all these were not sufficient to get through the business. The first effect of this measure would be to shut the court of the Master of the Rolls upon every day the Lord Chancellor sat. This was a serious objection. A Bill had been before the House for a very surprising length of time for the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor to supply the place of Vice-Chancellor Wigram. But even were that Judge appointed, he (Mr. Stuart) could not see that the Master of the Rolls had any time to spare from the business of his own Court. He knew that he had none. The learned Judge who had just retired from the office of the Master of the Rolls had been in the habit of sitting as a Privy Councillor, and abstracting that time from the Rolls Court which ought to have been entirely devoted to it. What had been the consequence? Why, there had been not only a great arrear of business in that court, but suitors bad become so dissatisfied that they did not resort to the Rolls Court, and even with the diminished business the arrears had been very large. He complained that the Master of the Rolls, with all the emoluments of that great office paid for discharging the duties of the office, and the office having its own peculiar duties and responsibilities, should be withdrawn from his own court, and called upon to give assistance to the Lord Chancellor, while suitors wore clamouring for justice at the doors of his own court. There was another proceeding of the Government to which he took great exception—it was this. Last summer, when Vice-Chancellor Wigram, who was a Judge of exemplary diligence, had been disabled by bad health from attending his duties, suitors had been unable to obtain orders in his court, and a large arrear of business was the consequence—the Government actually took the Master of the Rolls, and the Vice-Chancellor of England, while he bad health to do it, as Commissioners, to sit with another learned Judge in the Court of Chancery, to administer the duties of the Lord Chancellor. By this proceeding the suitors had been placed in a situation alike grievous to them, and disgraceful to the Government, for the effect of it was that the doors of two of the inferior courts were shut to the suitors, It might be said that there existed peculiar reasons for such a course; hut he should like to hear any reasons which would be of a satisfactory character, and sufficient to satisfy the public. All this had been done at a season of the year when the pressure of business was greatest, and when withdrawing the Vice-Chancellor of England, who did the greatest amount of the business of court, was a grievous injury to the suitors. He could not name that excellent and most useful Judge, the late Vice-Chancellor of England, without expressing his sense of the gratitude due to his memory, for his eminent public services during the twenty-four years which he had filled that high office, discharging an unexampled amount of business to the great benefit of the suitors. The effect of the conduct of Government in appointing last summer a Commission constituted of the inferior Judges in Chancery to transact the duties of the Lord Chancellor, had been not only injurious to the public, but had placed the Bar and he (Mr. Stuart) himself in a most disagreeable position. He had been beset with complaints of his clients; he had represented the state of matters to the Government as one not creditable to them, and highly injurious to the public; but he at last obtained the redress which was so urgently required. He noticed this because a noble and learned Lord had published a pamphlet on the subject, in which he (Mr. Stuart) and other Members of the Chancery bar who had pressed the Government to put an end to the Commission, had been charged with mercenary motives—with being actuated with a desire to serve their own purposes. That state of things of which they had complained has been put an end to. A Lord Chancellor has been appointed, and the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) has made up his mind on the importance of not separating the political from the judicial functions of the Lord Chancellor. He agreed with the noble Lord upon the wisdom of not separating these functions. But with regard to an argument used in favour of such a separation, he thought it whimsical at this time of day that it should be conceived possible that any man holding the high office of Lord Chancellor, in the face of the public and the bar of England, could dare to pronounce a judgment affecting property which should be biased from any political opinions. As to the duties being too much to be performed by any one man, because they were political as well as judicial, recent experience proved that there was no pretence for this suggestion when a competent person held the office. From 1836 to 1841, the office was held by one who performed all the duties of Lord Chancellor, without any complaint of an excess of these duties. That noble and learned Lord (Lord Cottenham) never invoked the assistance now promised to his successor; and he knew, had he required it, that he could have commanded it without the assistance of Parliament. He (Mr. Stuart) knew that Lord Cottenham used to sit up until two or three in the morning; and the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) had urged that bestowing so much time on legal investigation was hardly consistent with the duties which the Lord Chancellor was expected to perform in attending Cabinet Councils. He (Mr. Stuart) knew not what symptoms of fatigue Lord Cottenham might have exhibited at the Cabinet, but no man showed less fatigue, even at the rising of his Court, than did Lord Cottenham during the period he had mentioned, and while he was in the vigour of health. But the noble Lord's scheme suggested to-night seemed rather a scheme to increase the anxiety and labour of the Lord Chancellor. He (Mr. Stuart) could not understand how the duty of a Judge in pronouncing his opinion on difficult cases could he a divided labour. The great excellency of the judgments of the Court of Chancery was their being pronounced by a single Judge. They had had experience of the other course of proceeding. They had had the experience of two Commissions—the one of last summer, and the other in 1835, the year preceding that in which the noble Lord at the head of the Government had had the sagacity and firmness to appoint Lord Cottenham. Lord Cottenham, while only a Commissioner, had been assisted by the Vice-Chancellor of England and the Master of the Rolls. Which were the better judgments of Lord Cottenham—when he was fettered by two assessors, or when he sat as Lord Chancellor alone? He (Mr. Stuart) knew that there was no measure of comparison between the two. All the important judgments, when he sat alone, when he studied alone, and alone pronounced these judgments, were admirable models of judicial eloquence and sound law. Why a constant assessorship, when the Lord Chancellor had it in his power to obtain assistance whenever he required it? Lord Eldon was in the habit sometimes of sending for this kind of assistance. Lord Eldon once directed a case for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench; he obtained the opinion; he was dissatisfied, and directed another case for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas; he ob- tained that, and was dissatisfied with that also. He invoked the assistance of two assessors, and asked the Chief of each of these Common Law Courts to sit with him and reconsider the whole matter. They stated the reasons for the opinions they had formed; and then Lord Eldon delivered a memorable judgment, satisfying both the assessors that they were mistaken, and stultifying their previous opinions. This showed that it was a mere incumbrance to saddle the Lord Chancellor constantly with two assessors. But the noble Lord went further, and proposed that the judicial business should be transacted without any Lord Chancellor at all. Could anything be more inconsistent than the provisions of this Bill? If the office was so important, how absurd to make an arrangement of that kind! He (Mr. Stuart) did not say the objections could not be answered, but the Bill came before the House as a new measure; it deserved the greatest consideration, and such consideration he hoped the House would have, the opportunity of devoting to it. As to the ecclesiastical patronage now vested in the Lord Chancellor being transferred to the Prime Minister as now proposed by the noble Lord, it was highly objectionable. Candidates for Church preferment would, if the Bill passed, have to resort to the Government Secretary; it was to be made a Government matter. For his own part, valuing as he did the character of the Church of England, he would rather see the Lord Chancellor, who was deemed to be the keeper of the Royal conscience, exercise the choice and responsibility of Church patronage, than it should be placed at the disposal of the First Minister of the Crown, to be disposed of, he would not say on base considerations, hut he thought they might fairly infer on conditions which ought to be far removed from those which should influence the gift of livings and benefices in the Church of England.

said, if he wished to treat the measure in a spirit of opposition to the Government, he should rather choose to address the House on the second reading, especially at that late hour of the night; but feeling, as he did, most deeply the importance and difficulty, and wishing, if possible, rather to assist any Government in dealing with, such a question, than to offer any obstructions in the attempt to overcome these difficulties, he was quite sure the House would give him credit for a sincere desire to con- sider the measure which the noble Lord had introduced with a view to make it as perfect as possible. He did not think it was a measure which would give satisfaction either to the profession, to the suitors, or to the public. The object of the Bill was to obtain a better administration of justice in the Court of Chancery. What was proposed? To relieve the Lord Chancellor from the necessity of paying close attention to the details of the judicial business, it gives him the assistance of the Master of the Rolls, and a Judge withdrawn from one of the Common Law Courts. Observe how it would operate, if the alteration were effected. If the Lord Chancellor was relieved from giving close and constant attention to the judicial business, and the highest business of the Court of Chancery, the inevitable consequence must follow, that the Master of the Rolls being the only Equity Judge, must virtually take the place of the Lord Chancellor; in that respect, what became of the Rolls? It seemed little less than the abolition of the Rolls, because he could not conceive that the Master of the Rolls could be continually giving his attention to the business of appeals, which ought to be transacted every day—he could not understand how the Master of the Rolls could be giving daily attention to the Lord Chancellor's Court, without a total suppression of the Rolls Court as a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. And even if it were considered that the suppression of the Rolls Court would not be the consequence, it was obvious that constant interference with the business of the Court must take place. The noble Lord had stated that Sir Edward Sugden had suggested that one or more of the Judges of the Courts of Chancery should assist the Lord Chancellor in hearing appeals. To that the same objection applied—that it was drawing these Judges from their own courts, and preventing the business in those Courts being transacted. No doubt it would be better to withdraw one Judge than two; but it was quite clear the objection was the same, whatever the extent in which they interfered, to any diminution of the judicial force of the Court of Chancery, at a time and under circumstances when it was necessary to increase it. His lion, and learned Friend (Mr. Stuart) had referred to the attendance of the Master of the Rolls in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He hoped no one would understand that his hon. and learned Friend had intended the slightest reflection on the Master of the Rolls. He (Mr. Palmer) was sure such was not his meaning, and he was quite sure at all times, and especially now, his hon. and learned Friend would regret if anything should he said which could produce anything of a painful feeling. All the profession agreed that there never was a more conscientious or more laborious Judge of the Court of Chancery than that noble Lord, and certainly his attendance in the Judicial Committee was given not only on request, but because it was considered that one of the Judges of the Court of Chancery should attend. If that were necessary then, he did not see why it was not necessary now. But the Master of the Rolls could not attend the Judical Committee and the Lord Chancellor's Court also. That assistance to the Judical Committee must be withdrawn, if they only gave an equivalent amount from the Rolls to the Chancery Court. But the sittings of the Lord Chancellor were much more constant; and, therefore, a far more equivalent in the amount of assistance was required in the Court of Chancery. He could confirm the hon. Member for Newark, that the unavoidable interference in the Rolls Court was very much felt, and that it was a matter of very serious consequence to disturb the regular administration of justice in any of the Courts. Not only did it make the Court comparatively inefficient, but there was one other effect which ought to be extremely guarded against. It held out opportunity for a bad species of litigation, in which persons whose interest was delay, hung over their neighbours unfounded and unjust demands, with a view of driving them into a compromise. The noble Lord had expressly stated that in the business of that Court there had been a continual tendency to increase, requiring an increase of judicial force. The effect of the loss of one Vice-Chancellor had been severely felt, and business had accumulated. He was quite sure that there would be full employment, not only for an additional Vice-Chancellor, but for the Master of the Rolls, as a Judge in the first instance. Lord Cottenham, before going out of office, issued certain orders, which enabled causes to be brought to the stage of "appearing" in a simple and short way, without the expense of the old system of pleading. The effect was, that a vast number of cases of that kind came in for hearing; they would now be ready to be heard and disposed of, and the more the administration of justice was facilitated and simplified, the more certain it was that the public would come into Court, and a fuller judicial force would be required to attend to the business of the Courts. It was with great humility that he begged to suggest a remedy, hut he could not help thinking that the difficulty was where it ought not to be—not in the mind or disposition of the noble Lord, but in an apprehension that the country would not pay the necessary expense of duly administering justice. Because, if there had been no such fear, Government would have said, "If the Lord Chancellor wants assistance, let him have it. Take the best man you can get." There were five Judges in the Court of Queen's Bench, five in the Common Pleas, and five in the Exchequer, while in the Chancery Courts there were only five altogether. Why not get two more from the bench or from the Courts? He believed the country would find that it was more judicious economy to provide this assistance without interfering with the existing Courts. But if the country would not find the money, and if the money must be found, he thought that by consolidating the Court of Bankruptcy with the Chancery Court (of which it was originally a branch), and by revising the system of administration by Commissioners of Bankruptcy, and in the Masters' Offices, they might probably be able to throw all the Accountants' business of the Courts of Chancery and Bankruptcy together, and to withdraw from these Courts either Masters or Commissioners to the necessary extent to provide a fund, out of which might be paid one or two additional Judges of the Court of Chancery. Some system such as that would be desirable; but no good reason could (he thought) be given for seeking to save to the country the paltry sum of 10,000L—paltry in respect of the advantages to be gained—at a time when the public most required an efficient and expeditious administration of justice in the Court of Chancery. As to the assistance to be derived from Judges of the Courts of Law, if their business was only transacted in London, it might be considered that there was too large a judicial force. But for the purposes of the circuits it was necessary to keep it up; and it would not be found to be the universal opinion that we had more Judges than were required. Then one of the best Judges would have to be withdrawn from the Courts of Common Law to sit in the Chancery Court. That Judge could not be brought to relieve the Master of the Rolls, because it was necessary at all times that there should be in the Courts of Chancery a Judge thoroughly acquainted with Chancery practice. He did not disparage the value of Common Law in Chancery Courts; on the contrary, in the instances of late Chancellors, they had felt that the union of the knowledge of the two systems was of great importance; and although it was indispensable to have a sound knowledge of equity law, it was of the highest value that that should be in conjunction with and tempered by sound experience in Common Law. He did not submit these remarks in any spirit of hostility, but from a desire to aid the Government, as far as he could, in so important a duty as that of improving the administration of justice in Courts of Chancery.

said, that the subject was of great importance. He subscribed to every sentiment which fell from the noble Lord, and could only express his regret that the Government should feel itself crippled by that which his hon. and learned Friend had very properly designated a false economy. He regretted that the Government should be influenced by a false feeling of economy, which was, in fact, the real great impediment to an efficient reform of the Court of Chancery—a feeling for which he believed the House itself was mainly responsible, he said it was a most glaring inconsistency that there should be no less than fifteen Judges to administer the Common Law of the land—a number not at all greater than was necessary—and that the whole business of the Court of Chancery—a business which was increasing, whilst that at Common Law was decreasing—should be administered only by five Judges. Whilst the Government adhered to this principle of false economy, it was idle to talk of effecting any useful reforms in the Court of Chancery. He fully concurred in the statement of his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. R. Palmer) that it would be most inexpedient to take away one Common Law Judge to assist the Lord Chancellor. If that were done, how could the business of the circuits be provided for? Persons of less dignity than a Judge, Sergeant, or Queen's Counsel, would have to sit, or during the whole time of the circuits the Lord Chancellor would be deprived of the assistance of the Judge whose aid it was now proposed he should receive; and he did not think that would be a satisfactory arrangement. There was one other point to which he wished to ad- vert. No alteration was to be made in the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords. It had always been held to be an evil that there should he an appeal from the same Judge sitting in the Court of Chancery to the same Judge sitting in the House of Lords. The present measure would introduce a greater absurdity. A case would he heard and decided by the Lord Chancellor sitting with the Master of the Rolls and a Common Law Judge, and then there would be an appeal to the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, sitting alone. The appeal, therefore, would be from a stronger to a weaker court. With respect to appeals from Scotland, although he admitted that the eminent persons who filled the office of Lord Chancellor sometimes made themselves masters of Scotch law, yet under the present system they could not be certain that the Lord Chancellor would be present to hear Scotch appeals. It so happened last year that the decision of a great number of these appeals depended entirely upon the voluntary exertions of a noble and learned Lord (Lord Brougham), who was not bound by any compulsion to give his attendance in the House of Lords. The country had the benefit of the valuable services of that noble and learned Lord, who, from his early education, was well acquainted with Scotch law; but it might so happen that these Scotch appeals might be brought before a single Judge, who had no knowledge of the Scotch law. He agreed with his hon. and learned Friends in their anxiety to see passed some measure for the improvement of the Court of Chancery, and he had thrown out these observations with that view.

said, he agreed with his hon. and learned Friends that this was not the proper occasion to express any decided opinion as to the merits of this Bill. He agreed with the noble Lord in the opinion which he had expressed, that it was not desirable that there should be a permanent Judge in the Court of Chancery as a Judge of Appeal, because the powers entrusted to such a Judge were too great to be placed in the hands of any individual, however eminent he might be. He thought that there ought to be more than one Judge sitting in that Court. He must say, however, that he could not approve of this scheme, because he thought it might have the effect of closing the Court of the Master of the Rolls as a court in the first instance. He must object to any delay in the ordinary proceeding of the business in Chancery, He knew one case in which the costs, occasioned by mere delays, amounted to 1,000l.. in one year, not arising from any fees, hut because a decision was required before the estate could be administered at all. He objected to the measure, because, he repeated, it would have the effect of closing the Court of the Master of the Rolls, and he did not think there would be sufficient force in the Courts of Chancery to enable the suits to be determined within a reasonable time.

I can only say that I am much obliged to the lion, and learned Gentlemen who have been so good as to take a part in this discussion. I am convinced that the objections which they have mentioned are intended in a friendly spirit, and I can only say that they shall he carefully considered. I omitted to state one point, namely, that there are officers under the Lord Chancellor with respect to whom a considerable reform may be effected by consolidating their duties, still preserving for the Lord Chancellor a sufficient number of officers to give him assistance in some of his most important duties. The Lord Chancellor will give every attention to this matter with regard to the appellate jurisdiction. I can only say that I made no proposition on that subject, because I think it is one which had better be left to the discretion of the House of Lords.

said, he wished to ask whether one of the Common Law Judges would be permanently selected?

One will be summoned from time to time.

said, that the public wished to see the abolition of fees in the Court of Chancery, and the payment by salaries substituted.

said, that one of the objects of the Bill was to carry into effect the recommendations of the Committee on Salaries in the Court of Chancery, and to effect consolidation, which would diminish expense. With reference to the main subject of the Bill, no doubt various opportunities would arise, during the discussion upon it, which would enable them to put it into such a state as to meet the wishes of both sides of the House.

said: The Motion I have to propose is that the retiring pension of the office to be created under this Bill shall be an annuity not exceeding 3,000l., and not 3,500l. as proposed in the Bill. The Committee on Official Salaries last year did not report on this office, but state, p. 7, paragraph 4, "that it was understood it was an office that was not to renewed." Under the Bill the salary is 5,000l. per annum; the retiring pension is 3,500l. per annum. On some unintelligible principle of finance the salary is fixed on the suitors' fund, the pension on the Consolidated Fund. I contend that the retiring pension of 3,500l., that is, 7–10ths of the salary, exceeds in proportion all other classes of pensions whatever. In no other department is there anything like it. Search the diplomatic, the civil, the military, and even the judicial services, and, with the exception of this one class, there is hardly a pension that exceeds 2,000l. per annum. The highest services—whether diplomatic, civil, or military—are repaid by pensions from 800l. to 2,000l. per annum. In the military service there is one great exception, but that is for services unparalleled, which, consequently, confirms the rule. Take the diplomatic service (2nd and 3rd Wm. c. 116)—first-class, 1,750l.; second-class, 1,300l.; third-class, 900l.; fourth-class, 700l. I am not aware that the most eminent services as a statesman would obtain a higher pension than 2,000l. per annum; and in all departments of the State, Excise, Customs, or such as are placed on the Consolidated Fund, it is rare to find any retiring pension beyond 2,000l. Now as to pensions for judicial services. It is true that ex-Lord Chancellors receive retiring pensions of 5,000l. per annum, or something about one-third of the salary. The Irish ex-Chancellors receive only 3,692l., and in the time of Lord Eldon the retiring pension was 4,000l. per annum. But what is the history of the class of retiring pensions that include the Puisne Judges and the Vice-Chancellors. Up to 1813 the retiring pension of this class was 2,000l. per annum. In 1813 it was increased to 2,600l., and in 1825, the salaries of the Puisne Judges having been raised to 5,500l.—a year commencing with alleged prosperity, but ending in a disastrous panic—the retiring pension was raised to 3,500l. But what was the proposition of the Government of that day? First, that the retiring pension should be only 2,300l.; then adding the 500l. taken off the salary, which was proposed to be 6,000l., which made the retiring pension 2,800l; but finally, after a faint and coy resistance to the legal opposition of that day, the Government gave way, and the retiring pension was fixed at 3,500l. Mr. Secretary Peel, however, had announced previously the principle on which such pensions should be enacted—viz., in a fixed proportion to the salary. Adopt that principle, and look cither to the pensions of the highest officers of the law, or any other class of officers in the law, and a retiring pension of 3,500l., or seven-tenths of the salary, cannot be maintained. But in 1832 the salaries of all Puisne Judges since 1828 were reduced from 5,500l. to 5,000l. per annum. Reduce the retiring pensions in the same proportion, or one-eleventh, you arrive nearly at the proposition for which I contend—viz., a retiring pension of 3,000l. per annum. The Amendment I wish to propose is so moderate and so just that I trust the hon. and learned Attorney General will have no difficulty in adopting it.

dissented from the views of the hon. Baronet, for several reasons. In the first place, when settling the salary of a Judge, and his retiring pension, they should inquire what was the sum which would secure the efficient discharge of the duties of the office. No gentleman, he ventured to say, had accepted the office of Vice-Chancellor without a very great diminution of income, and in some cases to a larger amount than the House would think probable if he named it. He thought the amount of salary at present given to the Vice-Chancellors was no more than sufficient to secure high judicial ability. Indeed it was said, and he believed truly, that there were instances in which the highest judicial services had been lost to the country because of the lowness of the sum fixed as salary. The reason why they obtained Judges at the cost of reduction of their incomes was mainly by reason of the certainty and security against calamity which was afforded by the retiring allowance. If that allowance were diminished or taken away, they would either be obliged to pay higher salaries, or, what would be a great injury to the public, they would lose the service of persons the most efficient to discharge judicial duties. Another con- sideration was, that Judges should retain their offices no longer than they were capable efficiently to perform their duties; and if a great difference were made between the salary and the pension, there would be a great temptation to remain on the bench after the powers of the mind were enfeebled by age and infirmity. But he would call the attention of the House to what had really happened. The first Vice-Chancellor was Sir Thomas Plumer, who died Master of the Rolls in 1825, after ten years' service, without a retiring allowance. The next was Sir John Leech, who died in 1833 Master of the Rolls, without a retiring allowance, after sixteen years' service. The next was Sir Launcelot Shadwell, who died in 1850 on the bench, after twenty-two years' service, and of course he had no retiring allowance. If he had addressed the House a year ago, he could have said that there was no instance on record, in the experience of thirty-five years, in which a retiring allowance had been made; but the unexpected calamity which had befallen one of the most efficient and conscientious Judges that ever sat upon the bench, Sir James Wigram, had rendered him unable to remain, or he would undoubtedly have preferred continuing to devote himself to the service of his country than retiring in idleness. This was the first instance which had ever yet occurred of a retiring pension; and the only way, and the cheaper way, to obtain first-rate efficiency was, he believed, to give a good retiring pension. It would have been easy for the Government to acquire a little popularity by agreeing to this reduction; but believing it a matter of vital importance to the public interest, he must call upon the House to reject the Amendment of the hon. Baronet.

objected to proceed- ing at that late hour (a quarter past one) with a Bill consisting of near 160 clauses, and which would alter the whole practice and procedure of the Civil Bill Courts in Ireland. He should like to have an explanation of the Bill from the hon. and learned Irish Attorney General before being asked to consent to the second reading; but instead of doing so, the hon. and learned Gentleman had not said a single word, except to move the second reading of the Bill. He begged to move that the House do now adjourn.

denied that the hon. Gentleman the Member for the city of Dublin spoke the sentiments of the Irish people in opposing the second reading of this Bill, which was one for the better administration of justice in Ireland. The House ought at once to agree to the second reading, and amend what was defective when the Bill came before them in Committee. He would be no party to the factious opposition shown by some Members to every measure brought forward, whether for the benefit of the country or not, because it came from those who happened at present not to act in accordance with the opinions of certain individuals who assumed to themselves the character of being the only real Irish representatives. He protested against the conduct of those individuals, and would tell them that, as an Irishman, he was prepared to support every measure brought forward by Government that he thought would be for the benefit of Ireland.

opposed proceeding with a Bill to consolidate fifty Acts of Parliament, that contained 158 clauses, and extended over 100 pages, at that hour in the morning.

said, that the Bill was brought in in pursuance of a pledge which he gave to the hon. Member for Cork last Session but one, and of an intimation which the right hon. the Home Secretary gave to a deputation of Irish Members who waited upon him last year to press this subject upon the attention of the Government. If the principle of the Bill was opposed, there was no wish on the part of his right hon. Friend to press the second reading at that time.

thought that the course pursued by his hon. Friend the Member for the city of Dublin was misunderstood by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for Ireland. He (Mr. Keogh) did not understand any of these hon. Members alluded to had objected to the principle of the Bill, nor did he understand them to insinuate that there was anything like a party principle involved in the present question. He could not imagine anything of a party discussion in it. They did not oppose the principle of the Bill, but it was one of such magnitude and importance as claimed at least from the first law-officers of the Crown for Ireland some statement as to what the principle of the measure was. The opinion entertained by the majority of the Irish Members was this—that measures of this kind should not be introduced by the law officers for Ireland without some explanation as to the grounds upon which they were founded. And they also objected to these measures being handed over from the law officers in Ireland to the law officers in England, who had quite sufficient business of their own to occupy them. The Irish Members did not think that such a system should be continued, nor that the business of the Irish law department should be carried on at one or two o'clock in the morning.

said, he thought he had a right to complain of the manner in which he had been dealt with in this discussion. When he introduced the Bill, he stated that its object was, in the first place, to consolidate and codify fifty Acts of Parliament that had existed for nearly a century; he explained these parts of the Bill that were new; his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk was present, and made some observations on the Bill, and his impression was, that all the Irish Members were in perfect possession of the contents of the Bill. He was disposed not to propose the second reading that evening, but he was pressed to do so; then when hon. Members opposite objected, he offered to postpone it, but that did not appear to suit them, and so he again proposed it. In fact it was not on the Bill, but upon him (Mr. Hatchell) that they wished to express their opinion. He asked the assembled Commons of England—English Gentlemen and Irish Gentlemen—whether this was a course of conduct that ought to be pursued, This course of conduct must and, as far as he was concerned, would be resisted if repeated. It was admitted that the principle of the Bill was unquestionable; he was, however, quite prepared to postpone the second reading for the present. [Cries of "Go on!"]

said, that what the Irish Members complained of was the habitually late hour at which Irish legislation was brought on in that House.

hoped his hon. Friends would consent to the second reading, in order that the Bill might be referred to a Select Committee.

said, the House was sometimes occupied with discussions on which there was really a difference of opinion, but it was very hard indeed they should be kept up so late (half-past one) when there seemed to be no difference of opinion whatever. His right hon. Friend first said he was ready to postpone the Bill. That course was objected to, and his right hon. Friend was met with cries of "Go on, go on!" and yet when he was proceeding with the Bill, he was told he ought not to bring it on at so late an hour. It did seem most unreasonable that hon. Gentlemen would not accept the liberal offer of his right hon. Friend, and consent to the postponement.