seeing the right hon. the Secretary for the Colonies in his place, begged his attention to some observations he felt compelled to make on a subject in which he was personally and deeply interested, and which personal considerations—as not being a supporter of the present Government he was anxious not to do anything that would wear the appearance of unkindness or ill-will—had induced him hitherto to refrain from pressing. But really affairs in Jamaica were now looking so awfully ruinous, and prospects so mournfully distressing, that he, as a West India proprietor, did not know what to do. He held in his hand a letter from his agent, dated the 13th of May, relating to the distress existing in that island, in consequence of the deficient supply of labour, the results of which he would beg leave shortly to state to the House. He would not enter into any topics of party difference, nor any disputed grounds of policy, but would address himself simply to this one point—that point which was of the greatest magnitude to the Colonies—the want of labour and of men. The successive and calamitous dispensations of Providence—the ravages of the cholera last year, and of the small-pox this year, bade fair to deprive the colonists of the legitimate stock of labour to which they were entitled. He did not like to allude to this subject, or to matters of personal consideration; but, knowing the circumstances, he thought it better, by the statement of a few facts within his own knowledge, to confirm the truth of the representations which he felt it his duty to press on the consideration of the House, and the consideration, the efficient consideration, of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. Last year he was himself deprived, on his property in the north of the island of Jamaica, of 120 labourers out of the stock he had, by the cholera. That number actually perished by that dreadful visitation; and they were, as his agent informed him, the most efficient labourers in the district—and again this year the labourers were quite decimated by the small-pox, and his agent was now obliged to look on 14 or 15 bands as the whole supply of adult labour for the estate, the remainder being made up of children from 9 to 14 years of age, who were much more expensive and far less effective; and the agent added, in his communication, that he was now training up a gang of children which, with a few coolies, was all he had to depend upon for the future supply of labour; but he was consoled in some measure for being compelled to have recourse to the labour of children by the consideration that they were being trained up to habits of useful industry. Such was the state of things now going on, not only in his (Mr. Bernal's) immediate district in the north, but in all other parts of the island, and in others of the colonies; and unless they had some strong auxiliary support—he did not mean in the way of money—but by way of some efficient and ready remedial measures from the Home Government for the supply of labour, he could not see what help Jamaica had to look for, or from whence assistance was to be obtained in this her most calamitous and unfortunate situation; and he dared not shut his eyes to the possible issue—the risk and the danger that threatened. He wished not to cast the slightest disloyal tincture into his observations, but he did feel that the situation of our West Indian Islands was such that unless some remedy were introduced, a crisis was imminent. He made no charge against the present Ministry, as being the cause of the evils with which these colonies were afflicted; but the last and the previous Ministries he did accuse of great neglect in not foreseeing what must happen from the policy they adopted, and providing the necessary precautions for guarding against those very evils which had resulted. Either our Colonies were of use to us, or they were not; and if not, there should still be some feeling of kindly relationship for "auld langsyne" which should induce us to pay attention to the horrible complaints which reached this country from the West Indies by every monthly packet. He was not saying one word about the price of labour; they all knew that labour in Jamaica was excessively dear, and the fact he would state would show it: his agent informed him that he had paid since the 31st of January to the 13th of May, 1,000l. for farm labour on his (Mr. Bernal's) account, without taking into account salaries, ordinary agricultural expenses, and taxes. It was evident such a state of things could not last. He was quite aware, and they must all be aware, that there must be a halt soon; and, condensing his observations into the smallest compass, and without wishing to tinge them with one angry word, he would now ask his right hon. Friend whether he was prepared, on the part of the Government, to consider or initiate measures, or whether he felt himself in a condition to accept or confirm, or to combine in any efforts that might be thought of by others, for assisting the Island of Jamaica and our other colonies similarly situated, by providing for them an immediate and sufficient supply of labour?

I was not in the least aware of the intention of my hon. Friend to make these observations upon this painful and deeply interesting subject. If I had known that he intended to call the attention of the House to the subject, I would have made myself better prepared with regard to details than I can possibly be under these circumstances—and would have made my answer more satisfactory. The subject being brought forward in an unexpected manner, I think my hon. Friend will feel that all I can do is to meet his observations by a general answer. But I must assure him, and assure the House, that I do not think there is any man in this House more painfully alive than I am to this distressed and exhausted condition of these colonies. My hon. Friend, I am sure, will not fail to recollect that this is a subject to which I had given attention long before I came into office; and my attention has been painfully kept alive by the representations I have constantly received since I have been in office; and at a very recent date I have had interviews with a body of delegates, gentlemen whom my hon. Friend well knows, who are now in this country in order to represent the state particularly of Jamaica; and both from those gentlemen and from private persons, owners of estates, I have constantly received the most painful representations of the distress existing in Jamaica, with explanation also of the particular causes of that distress to which my hon. Friend has adverted. So far as the dreadful ravages of the cholera and the present difficulties arising from smallpox are concerned, I am sure he will admit that these are visitations of Providence, and that as such, while they excite our sympathy and make us more anxious to afford relief if we can, they do not in any way touch the legislation or the policy of this country. But I have never shrunk from stating my opinion that, irrespective of these visitations of Providence, the great distress of our West India Colonies must be traced in a large degree to the policy that was adopted by this country in 1846. When we first came into office, it became, of course, a grave question for the consideration of the Government whe- ther, under the peculiar circumstances of the present Session, we were justified in addressing ourselves to the consideration of that policy. My hon. Friend will remember, that on one of the very first days—I believe on the first day on which we took our seats in this House as a Government—it became my duty to explain the intentions of Her Majesty's Ministers; and that I then said that upon a careful consideration of the whole subject, we did not think we should be justified, under the peculiar circumstances of this Session, and looking to the position of the Government, in making the state of the West Indian Colonies, painful and bad as it is, an exception from the general rule which we bad laid down for our conduct. But, though the alteration of the sugar duties, either by checking the descent of the foreign duty, or by lowering the duty upon colonial produce, is one subject which has of course been strongly pressed upon the consideration of Her Majesty's Ministers, and is a question to which we must hereafter address our serious consideration, my hon. Friend is aware that that is by no means the only remedy which has been pointed out, and he has himself in his observations this morning adverted to other subjects, which may be well taken into consideration. I hope, as far as I am concerned, my hon. Friend will bear in mind the overwhelming duties I have had to discharge. During the period that I have been in office, there have been the extraordinary state of affairs at the Cape of Good Hope, which necessarily engrosses a large portion of my attention—the Government and Constitution of New Zealand—the unprecedented addition to the labours of the Colonial Office, caused by the discoveries of gold in Australia—the question of railways in the North American Provinces; and, considering all this accumulation of heavy duties, I hope my hon. Friend will not think that I have been negligent or at all forgetful of the interest I have ever expressed in West Indian affairs, if up to this moment I have not been able to take any active steps upon the subject. To show him that I am not forgetful of the state of these colonies, I beg to say that three or four days ago I communicated with one of the senior clerks in the West Indian department of the Colonial Office, and told him that as soon as ever the immediate pressure of colonial business should be relaxed—as soon as I might have more leisure than the present state of business in this House affords me—I wished him to prepare all the necessary papers, that I might, without loss of time, direct my attention to two important subjects—the supply of labour, and the present state of the labour laws in these colonies. I have given directions already to have all the necessary information in preparation for me upon those two subjects; so that, whatever may be the ultimate policy of the Government with regard to the sugar duties, at all events I as Secretary of State for the Colonies, may not lose a day beyond what I can possibly avoid in directing my anxious attention to the question whether I may be able to afford to those Colonies any relief upon these two subjects.

said, he was glad to observe that there was a reduction in this Vote as compared with previous years, and he hoped that they might look forward to a further and a considerable reduction next year. The charge of 600?. for the Bishop of New Zealand, and 590l. for chaplains and schools, he must, however, object to, on the ground that the people of this country ought not to be taxed for providing bisheps and clergy for New Zealand, or any other Colony, and added, that unless a pledge were given that these items should not appear again, he should divide the Committee against them.

said, he was decidedly averse to giving any distinct pledge; but, seeing the reduction already made in the Vote, and that next year it would be further reduced, it was hoped, to 5,000l., and that after that time probably no grant at all would be required on account of New Zealand, he would suggest that it would be hardly reasonable to divide against the amount now proposed.

said, that after the gratifying statement of the right hon. Gentleman, considering that the Vote was now reduced to 10,000l., and would be only 5,000l., after which no grant would be required, he would not press his Amendment.

said, he did not know how many of these islands there were, but seeing that the total number of inhabitants was about twenty-six, he thought the amount proposed was excessive. He admitted that the position of these islands would be an important one in the event of a war, and that it was necessary, therefore, to retain them; but he would suggest whether, by combining offices, it might not be done at less cost. He hoped to have an assurance from the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary that some considerable reduction would be made in this Vote in future years.

could not say that he was in a position to give any such assurance; but he would beg to call the hon. Gentleman's attention to the fact, that more than half the amount now asked for was for a debt due to the Admiralty for provisions and supplies landed at the islands.

said, that this Vote related to a subject which had not been for some time past very popular with the country; but for his own part he had always supported the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) in endeavouring to secure the efficiency of the squadron on the coast of Africa. That noble Lord having left office, it was desirable to know whether the same active system was to be kept up as in his time. The only fault he (Sir G. Pechell) had to find during that noble Lord's tenure of office was, that vessels were sent out which were inefficient and unable to cope with the slavers, and had not the slightest chance of coming up with one in a chace. He considered that more encouragement was due to those engaged in such a service, and that more efficient vessels should be placed on the station.

said, he could assure the hon. and gallant Member that the present Board of Admiralty paid the strictest attention to the subject of the description of vessels proper to be sent upon the service referred to. With regard to the encouragement of the officers engaged in this service, no one could be more alive than himself to their risk and danger; the, service in that quarter had unhappily been fatal to one who ought to be mentioned with special commendation—Commander Forbes. It was impossible to give any distinct pledge as to personal promotion, but the subject was one which was never lost sight of on the arrival of despatches from that coast, or in any arrangements made with a view to the suppression of the slave trade. Any supposition among foreign Powers that the retirement of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) from the Foreign Office was meant on the part of England to denote that there was any hesitation, any indifference, as to the great question of the slave trade, was entirely unfounded. The Board of Admiralty still maintained their determination that the squadron should be kept in an efficient state, so as to repress the slave trade. All that had reached them since they came into office, had been on the whole of a satisfactory character; and he trusted that the Committee and the hon. and gallant Member would find that efficient vessels were employed; that due attention was paid to the promotion of officers in this service; and that the determination of the country to put down the nefarious traffic was supported as vigorously by this Board as by the former.

said, he should be glad to know whether the same support was received from the United States and France as when the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) was in office? It was understood that America had withdrawn one vessel, and although we had received some very valuable assistance from America, it was well known nothing could be more unfortunate to an officer in that service than to bring a slave prize either into New York or Boston.

said, the reports, on the whole, from Commodore Bruce were satisfactory in that respect.

said, he must find fault with the scale of promotion of the officers engaged in the affair at Lagos, which he attributed to the accounts arriving just as the late Board were quitting office. He would refer more particularly to the large number of killed and wounded in proportion to the force engaged, to the gallant conduct displayed, and the sustained nature of the effort, and would suggest whether there might not be room here and there for further promotion.

said, the promotions underwent the most deliberate and the most liberal consideration. Whatever was the number of killed and wounded in comparison to the number engaged, he was convinced in no naval action on record had a more liberal promotion been given than in the affair at Lagos.

said, the present Government had not found any marks of the haste which the hon. and gallant Member (Sir G. Pechell) alleged. There were marks of the greatest attention in every case which had occurred under the late Government, whether on the eve of their leaving office or previously.

begged to explain that he did not charge the late Board of Admiralty with haste in the general management of naval affairs, but merely used the word in connexion with the news arriving just as the Admiralty were leaving office. He disclaimed having been requested by any individual to mention the subject. Upon gathering the facts of the case from the despatches and other sources, it struck him that two or three cases had escaped that notice which in justice they ought to have received.

said, it gave him great pleasure to hear from the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty that it was their intention to keep up the slave squadron. If that squadron were kept up in the present state of efficiency, he had very little doubt that, in a few years, the slave trade would be entirely suppressed.

thought very nearly the same amount of force would be demanded by the Liverpool merchants for the protection of trade on the coast of Africa if the attempts to suppress the slave trade were abandoned. The vessels engaged in the slave trade would become pirates, and our ships would be obliged to lie inside instead of outside the ports, which of itself would be a great disadvantage.

said, the expense was 750,000l. a year, exclusive of the expenses under the head of non-effective services of the country.

said, he objected to several of the items. They paid 750l, a year to the Consul at St. Petersburg, where they had an Ambassador and other highly-paid officials who could perform all the services that were required of a Consul. Then there was 1,000l. for the Consul at Warsaw, where he could have scarcely anything to do. The Consul at Boulogne received 400?. a year, besides fees for the ganting of passports. The Consul General for Austria received 1,000l. per annum, which was much too high, considering the limited extent of their commercial relations with the Austrian Empire. He was glad to find that their trade with Turkey was increasing, but he considered that there was nothing to justify the keeping up of thirty-four Consular establishments, many of which were in the interior of the country. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) had last year abolished the office of Consul General at Tripoli, by which 1,600l. a year was saved to the country. He perceived that the Consul Generals in South America were more highly paid than others. The Consul at Lima had 2,000l. a year. He should like to hear why they were so much more highly paid than the European Consuls.

said, that he was not in a position to answer all the questions which had been put to him by the hon. Gentleman. The reason why the South American Consul Generals wore more highly paid than those in Europe was that in the majority of the South American States there was no resident Minister, and consequently that various diplomatic duties devolved on the Consular Agent. It was especially desirable that, Government should have responsible persons who could keep them regularly informed of the course of public events in those remote countries, with which there was so little private communication. The salary to the Consul General at Tripoli had been taken into consideration, and reduced in amount no longer ago than last year. As to the Consul at Boulogne, since the reduction of the price of Foreign Office passports to 7s. 6d., he believed there had been a vast increase in the number issued, and in consequence a corresponding diminution in the number of consular passports, which would reduce the fees to a very small amount. With regard to the general expenditure under this head, it had only increased 2,000l. over last year, and for that increase the present Government were not responsible; but he could assure the Committee that the whole question of Consular Expenditure should be minutely inquired into.

said, he considered that Government might make more use of these Consuls. When the difficult question arose with respect to the Channel fisheries, it was suggested that three Com- missioners should be appointed by England to meet three Commissioners appointed by France, and they were told probably one would be a captain in the Navy, another an admiral, and the third a diplomatist; but the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton found an intelligent gentleman acting as our Consul at Brest, upon a salary of 300l. a year, to whom he entrusted the matter; in twelve months the treaty was concluded, and all the arrangements, except in one case, were highly satisfactory to all parties. That was a striking instance of the saving of expense by employing Consuls.

would admit that the noble Lord's (Lord Stanley's) statement was satisfactory, though he could not see why the Consul General at Lima was to have more than any other Consul General in any other part in the world. He wished to know why the Consul at Warsaw had such an unusually large salary as 1,000l. a year, when we had, besides, a very expensive diplomatic establishment in Russia.

could not explain why the Consul at Warsaw received that sum, but the Committee would remember that the remuneration of these officials must depend a great deal upon a variety of circumstances—on the nature of the localities where they were sent to reside, on the expense of living there, as compared with other places, the quantity of business done, the amount of fees, if any, appertaining to the office, and the degree of responsibility attendant upon the duties which had to be performed. The only rule that could be laid down was, that the sum fixed should be the lowest for which the services of a well-qualified person could. be procured; and that was a rule which, in each instance, could only be tested by experience. It was, therefore, very difficult to say, offhand, why one Consul received more than another. The general duties, too, of British Consuls were well known to the Committee. He believed they were invaluable in affording information to the Government; they often performed diplomatic services; they attended to the claims of commercial men, and not only protected the property, but, as in a very recent instance, were often called upon to protect the lives of British subjects abroad.

said, that there was included in this Vote a sum of 6,000l., being a moiety of expenditure on account of chapels, chaplains, and burial- grounds. He wished to hear from the noble Lord an explanation of this item.

said, the practice of Government in this matter had been to help those who helped themselves. Where-ever there was a small English community resident in any place to which a Consul was appointed, and who were willing to pay half the expenses of supporting a chaplain, it had been the general practice of the Government to pay the other half, subject to certain regulations which had been laid down.

said, if the noble Lord (Viscount Duncan) who had spoken with regard to the consular establishment at Warsaw had ever visited that city, he would know that it was one of the most expensive capitals in Europe. He would also have learnt that this country had no better agent in the world than Colonel Duplat, and that the diplomatic business which that gentleman had to transact was of the greatest importance.

wished to know whether, in the event of any new appointments, the former salaries would be given as a matter of course, or whether the Government would pay regard to the nature of the duties to be performed?

said, he was not aware of any rule binding the Government to continue the old salary when they filled up a vacancy. The matter was, he believed, invariably left to their discretion. All he could say for the present Government was, that in any such case of a vacancy being filled up, they would consider whether a diminution of expenditure was possible, and make all such reductions as could be effected consistently with a due regard to the efficient performance of a very important part of the public service.

said, he considered that he had reason to complain that the salary of the Consul at Buenos Ayres was proposed to be raised from 800l. to 1,500l., the title being changed from "Consul" to "Consul General."

said, that in the altertion, instead of an increase, there had on the whole been a considerable reduction of expense. It was true that the increase of salary referred to had taken place, but that was in consequence of the diplomatic agent formerly resident at Buenos Ayres having been withdrawn, by which a saving had been effected which more than counterbalanced the augmented salary of the Consul General.

objected to the expense of the establishment at Hong-Kong. The same individual received 3,000l. a year as Governor, and 3,000l. a year as Superintendent of trade. The secretary and registrar had 1,500l. a year, the assistant keeper of records 470l. a year; and there were three other assistants, the fourth receiving 270l. a year. The trade of Hong-Kong was contemptibly small in comparison with that of Canton, and yet, as Superintendent of it, the Governor received 3,000l. a year, while our Consul at Canton had only 1,800l. The whole charge for Hong-Kong was 7,399l., for Canton 4,629l. Such a state of things was monstrous.

said, the apparent increase in the cost of the establishment at Hong-Kong was nominal, and not real, 3,000l. having been transferred from the Colonial to the Foreign department. There was, in fact, a reduction of about 400l. The hon. Gentleman had forgotten that the establishment at Canton was subordinate to that at Hong-Kong; and though he agreed with him that the trade of Hong-Kong was not comparable to that of Canton, yet he must observe that the Governor of the former had supervision of the whole, and that it was not fair to compare his salary with that of an officer who was actually serving under him.

said, what he complained of was, that the Governor of Hong-Kong received 3,000l. as Superintendent of Trade, in addition to 3,000l. paid to him as Governor, while the Consul at Canton received only 1,800l.

said, he thought this Vote should be postponed until after the discussion of the Motion of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) with regard to the Consular establishments generally. The Committee would remember that a division took place on this very item last year. A promise was then given that the matter should be reconsidered this year; and he hoped the present Government would consider whether it was really necessary that the Governor of Hong-Kong should have 6,000l. a year for performing the duties of his two offices.

said, if the hon. Member for Montrose had requested the postponement of the Vote, the Government would most probably have conceded his wish. The question, however, of the emoluments of the Consul at Hong-Kong was not raised by this Vote, which had reference only to the Superintendence of Trade.

would suggest that the Vote should be allowed to pass, with the understanding that the whole amount of salary to be paid to the Governor should be debated when the question of the cost of Consular Establishments generally came under consideration.

said, it might in that ease be said that, having refused to give the party concerned 3,000l. as Superintendent of Trade, they could not refuse to give him the same amount as Governor.

would consent that the Vote should be passed on the understanding stated, and that no such argument as that just mentioned by the hon. Member for Ashton should be used on behalf of the Government.

said, he still must contend that all the duties ought to be performed for 3,000l. a year.

said, he thought that the exceptions taken by Gentlemen 'sitting at home at ease "to the salary of this or that Consul would come with much better effect and with a much better grace from merchants who had establishments on the spot. They might depend upon it that if a Consul did not do his duty, they would soon have plenty of complaints against him. They would never get good and efficient men to represent them abroad unless they paid them fairly. It was all very well to talk of the expense of Hong-Kong; but the climate of Hong-Kong was the most deadly one in the world to European constitutions, not excepting the coast of Africa, and it was besides a very expensive place to live at. The Chinese, too, were a most difficult people to deal with, and they could not have an efficient man to live there unless they paid him as they ought to do. As a sailor who had been in different parts of the world, he maintained that no money was better laid out than that which was paid to secure efficient, able, and honest Consuls. Why, at that moment, there were three revolutions in Central America; and without proper Consuls, how could the liberties and lives of British subjects be otherwise than in danger?

said, however deadly the climate of Hong-Kong might he, it was clear that 6,000l. a year would not keep the Governor alive. As he observed last year, sailors and soldiers were obliged to serve in this deadly climate, and, he might add, that the subordinates of the establishment were as much exposed to it as the Governor, without being nearly so well paid.

said, it was impossible to obtain the services of persons so readily, or so cheaply, for an unhealthy climate as for a healthy one. As regarded the case of soldiers, the Committee were aware that soldiers in India received a much higher pay than soldiers at home.

said, he was glad to hear such sound principles laid down by Members of Her Majesty's Government. He recollected a period when they joined hon. Members behind him in an attack on salaries and emoluments—and the effect of such conduct was, he believed, to injure very much the public service.

said, he would agree to the Vote on the understanding that the total amount of Consular salaries was to form the subject of discussion thereafter.

said, some of the items appeared to him to require explanation. He found that out of about thirty Embassies there were but just six which enjoyed the luxury of an allowance for chaplains and chapels; and it was some of the richest Embassies that were thus privileged. There was 300l. for Constantinople, and there were various amounts for Madrid, Oporto, Denmark, Sardinia, and Greece; and what was most remarkable was, that it appeared not to have been considered whether a particular country were Protestant or Roman Catholic. He should move to reduce the vote by 1,000l., the amount proposed to be granted for chaplains, &c.

said, that he had already stated that the rule was to pay one-half the salary of a chaplain where the British residents paid the other half; or in some exceptional cases, such as Constantinople, where the British population were few in number, to appoint a chaplain to the Embassy.

said, that the explanation given by the noble Lord was not satisfactory, because in some Roman Catholic cities, like Lisbon, where there was a very large and wealthy English population, the expense of a chaplain was paid out of the public funds.

believed, that but for the chapel attached to the Embassy at Constantinople, English Protestants in that city would have no place for public worship.

said, that neither in Vienna nor in Turin were the English residents numerous, and yet no chaplain was provided for the Embassies at those places.

said, he wished to call the attention of the Government to the subject of our mission to Tuscany. He was not going to enter into Mr. Mather's question, but he wished to state that he had been informed by a gentleman of the highest respectability who was in Florence at the time of the assault on Mr. Mather, that great dissatisfaction was felt by the residents at Florence with regard to the mode in which the business of the mission at that place was conducted. This gentleman stated that our Charge d' Affaires at Florence had no place of business to which British subjects might resort, and that if he desired to see either the chief of the mission (Mr. Scarlett), or any one connected with it, it was necessary for him to go to Mr. Scarlett's country residence, which was at so great a distance from Florence as to render a vehicle necessary, and involve much expense and the loss of at least half a day.

could not at that moment give any opinion as to the statement of the noble Lord. All he could say was, that the matter would be inquired into. It was of the utmost importance that British subjects resident in any city abroad should have constant and immediate access to their Ministers.

said, that he could, from his own experience, concur in the remarks of his noble Friend. He had himself been put to considerable inconvenience at Turin by having to wait several days before he could obtain a renewal of his passport, from the want of some better system than that which existed at our Embassy there. He believed that a notice had been given by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that would prevent the recurrence of such complaints as those referred to.

said, that a circular had recently been issued by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, which would render it impossible for Her Majesty's subjects in future to suffer any inconvenience on the subject of passports. That circular required that somebody should always be in attendance at every mission, to provide for the passport service. With regard to the statement made by the noble Lord (Lord D. Stuart), he would remind the Committee that one of the most distinguished members of the diplomacy of this country had very recently arrived at Florence, as Minister from this country.

said, he wished to call attention to the return which had been laid on the table on this subject, from which it appeared that the whole amount for compensation and retired allowances in all the public offices on the 31st December, 1851, was 687,581l. It appeared to him that that was an enormous sum to pay for superannuations and allowances, and the more so as he understood that the half pay in the Military and Naval Establishments were not included in that amount. There were also certain discrepancies between the Votes and the Estimates, which he supposed had arisen from these allowances being stopped on their way to the Treasury. There had been, too, of late, a great increase of retiring allowances in the department of Woods and Forests, some of which required looking into. He would mention an instance in which two brothers, one forty-five and the other forty-three years of age, had large retiring allowances, after being in the public service respectively twenty-seven and twenty-seven and a half years; and thus, as in a vast number of other cases, it was shown that they had entered the public service at a very early age, and left it as superannuated when in the very prime of life. He observed also with regret that the sums payable for those superannuations were increasing from year to year, and he looked upon that as a serious public grievance.

said, he was aware that there was no branch of the public service which more required watching than this; and he could state that his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury would give the utmost attention to it. There was an increase in the Vote, chiefly owing to the transfer of items formerly paid from the the Woods and Forests revenue, and the payment of compensation allowances on the abolition of offices at the Mint; but there was also the ordinary and legitimate increase by the addition of gentlemen who had earned their superannuation.

said, he was glad to perceive that the ages of the parties receiving these allowances were at present usually given in the public returns. But he regretted that that practice was not universally observed, and that the ages of the retiring clerks in the Mint were not published. Now, he happened himself to know that some of those gentlemen were still in the prime of life. It appeared, too, that some of the retiring clerks in the Woods and Forests, who were to receive large pensions, were persons between forty and fifty years of age, while they were succeeded by young nephews or other near relatives. He looked upon that as a very gross abuse.

observed that the present Government had not admitted these, nor indeed more than one retirement, at the Woods and Forests.

thought that where offices were abolished, as at the Mint, the gentlemen should be employed in other departments.

said, that when he had been connected with the Government the practice had been adopted of making as much use as possible of the old clerks before younger men were appointed in their places. He should say that the appearance of the present list was anything but satisfactory.

said, that he saw in daily and nightly attendance in that House hon. Members who were much more advanced in years than nineteen out of twenty of the persons who were stated to have retired from our public offices from infirmity and old age. These allowances were full of abuses. There was one case, for instance, of a messenger to the First Lord of the Treasury retiring on account of ill health, on 360l. a year, who had received that sum for sixteen years. He did not complain of the payment of liberal salaries to the clerks in those offices, but he complained that many of them were very highly paid for doing little or nothing.

said, he must enter his earnest protest against the practice of granting retiring allowances to men in the very prime of life. He believed there was no portion of the public service in which so many reductions of expenditure might be advantageously and properly effected as in the Votes then under their consideration.

said, that a difficulty existed in dealing with the clerkships in the Office of the Woods and Forests. According to the practice which prevailed in that office, young men who entered it as copying clerks were entitled to he afterwards promoted by seniority. Now, under that arrangement, persons were raised from the subordinate offices for which they had first been engaged, to positions in which a superior order of talent, was required, and for which they were not always found competent. The result was, that it became necessary that they should be superseded in order that they might make way for more efficient substitutes. In his opinion, it was desirable that copying clerks should not hare a right to be promoted by seniority to higher offices, and if that right did not exist, a considerable sum might be saved in retiring allowances.

wished to know whether this grant was made for ecclesiastical purposes? If it was, he would oppose it.

said, that the clergy in receipt of these pensions were refugees, and it was only in that character they received assistance.

said, he objected to an item; "The Bishop of Chester, for tipends to two preachers in Lancashire, 92l. 16s." He did not understand the richest county in England coming before the public for such a miserable sum. He was quite sure it was high time it was done away with, and unless he had a very satisfactory assurance that it would not appear again in the Estimates, he should certainly divide the Committee upon it.

said, the item was one of an important list of items the omission of which he intended to press. But he wished to know whether the sum of 700l. to the poor French Refugee Clergy was paid to them as refugees or as Roman Catholic priests?

replied that the allowances to the French refugees were made many years ago, some as far back as the time of the first French Revolution; and he believed they were made to them, not as clergy, but as French refugees.

said, it did not appear from the Estimates who these clergymen were, or why they received these allowances. He could not understand why, now that order was restored in France, and the blessings of a despotic Government, they should persist in living in a heretic and infidel country like England. If the item was in the slightest degree of an ecclesiastical character, it came within the range of his objections to all such Votes. There was another item of 89l. 9s., "The Bishop of Sodor and Man—to be distributed among the incumbents and schoolmasters of the Isle of Man," which he wished to hear explained. Upon the item of 92l. 16s. for two preachers in Lancashire, he could give the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) some information. That sum was placed at the disposal of the Bishop of Chester, to pay two preachers against Popish recusants, at a time when the Crown took a great deal of trouble about Popish recusancy. It had now become a sinecure, as there were no Popish recusants to preach against; but whether it was the sinecure of the Bishop of Chester or not, he could not say. He should certainly object to the Vote, and divide the Committee upon it; but he should be very glad to hear—for the credit of the Bishop of Chester, for the credit of Parliament, and for the credit of the Crown—that some other duties had been found to which the sum had been applied. He should also object to another item in this Estimate, of 400l. To "the College of St. David's, Lampeter, in aid of the expenditure of the College, the net income of the livings annexed to the College, for the maintenance thereof, not at present exceeding 400l. in the year, and the expenditure considerably exceeding 950?." It was a remarkable fact, that the same statement had been made ever since the year 1828, when the grant was first voted. The expenditure was the same, the deficiency was the same, the assets were the same, and the sum required was the same. The history of the case was not only the history of a disgraceful job, but of a fraud—a fraud of which it was impossible to acquit the gentlemen who came before the public in connexion with it. Formerly, in Wales, there were a number of grammar schools, at which the young men who afterwards became clergymen of the Established Church received their education, and, for various reasons, it was thought desirable to supersede those grammar schools by a College. Great efforts were made in the collection of funds for the purpose, throughout the whole of the Principality; and in 1827 the College was built and endowed, it might be truly said, out of the widow's mite. It was opened in 1828, and, by an Act of Parliament, George IV. placed at the disposal of the College the advowsons of six livings. In 1828, the authorities of the College came to Parliament for a grant of 400l.; for, although the six livings would have been ample to maintain the College, they were then occupied, and the revenue was insufficient for the purpose. Accordingly, Parliament granted the 400l., with the express stipulation that that sum should be reduced as the livings fell in, and entirely cease when the income of the College equalled the expenditure. Every one of the livings had fallen in; but whilst all livings throughout England and Wales had vastly increased since the Tithe Commutation Act, these six livings had diminished in point of revenue. It was admitted that four of the livings produced respectively 170l., 140l., 110l., and 130l., or 550l. in all; and then with the bare statement—for accounts were refused—that the expenditure was more than 950l., the authorities of the College came to Parliament, like fraudulent beggars, for the 400l. He was not using the words by way of invective; it was a fraud if the real amount of income was concealed, in order to obtain the annual sum of 400l. from Parliament. One of the largest of the two remaining livings was bestowed on the Rev. Henry Williams, who never held any official position in the College; and the other living, that of St. Peter's, Carmarthen, was given to Archdeacon Bevan, a non-resident member of the Board. When the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. J. Williams) moved for a return on this subject, it was consented to provisionally by Ministers, who sent down to the heads of the College to know whether they would make out the return. They expressed their readiness to make the return in a form which was perfectly useless. As the leading Members of that House were averse to inquiry, and the Session was drawing to a close, his hon. Friend was obliged to forego any further explanation. Formerly the memorials for the grant sent to the Treasury were drawn in the name of the Principal of the College; but the responsibility of the statement, or misstatement, was now divided between the Principal, the Vice-Principal, the Tutor, and the Visitor. These annual memorials certified that the revenues of the benefices annexed to the College did not exceed 550l., and that the expenditure greatly exceeded that sum, and requested the usual grant. Upon that the item was set down in the Estimates without a syllable of explanation. He (Mr. C. Anstey) hoped Her Majesty's Ministers would not suppose he was reproaching them. He knew they occupied the post of a provisional Government, and this was one of the unpleasant inheritances from their predecessors. In the year 1828 the bishop certified that one of the livings had fallen in, so as to become a source of income to the College, and he estimated it at 370l. In the following year the second living fell in, which the same bishop estimated at 300l. a year; but when he came to state them together, he made the aggregate amount of the two, 400l. Two years afterwards lie reduced the aggregate amount of the two livings from 400l. a year to 370l. In 183l another living fell in, and three benefices, worth by the Calendar at least 800l. a year, were set down at 450l. In March, 1843, the present bishop countersigned the certificate that all the livings were under 500l. a year; and again the expenditure exceeded the amount by 450l, In the face of every other living throughout England and Wales being increased in value, these livings had unfortunately become depreciated in value at least cent per cent as fast as they fell in, and further diminished since the passing of the Tithe Commutation Act—a case which did not occur in any other living throughout England. He did not believe one syllable of these statements. He believed that it would be found on inquiry that the endowments of the College had been added to largely by private bounty, and that the receipts of the property, if duly administered, counted by thousands and not by hundreds. But the accounts which would show it were not presented; they were to this day refused; and the question was, whether they ought not to refuse a farthing more until they knew the truth. He should be sorry to do anything to check education in Wales—it was his wish to promote education; but he believed they would promote it by stopping this grant, which had a most mischievous effect, begetting a spirit of idleness, un-thrift, and dishonesty in the management of the College. So far from the Welsh language being taught there, he understood the students lost the use of that portion of the Welsh language which they possessed previous to their entering the College. Many of the themes in the Welsh language sent to the bishop by the candidates for ordination were returned as most wretched performances; and in many cases the compositions which were approved were contributed by dissenting ministers, who were paid by the candidates of the Church of England to qualify them, in that way, to teach and instruct the people of Wales in their own language. He was also informed that the sermons which were preached by the clergy in the Welsh language, were composed by dissenting ministers, because the clergy were incompetent to do so themselves. Such being the effect of the system pursued in St. David's College, Lampeter, he felt the Committee ought to renounce being parties to profligate expenditure and wasteful management, and he should move that the Vote be reduced by 1,800l.

said, he thought the hon. and learned Member opposed this small sum to the College of St. David's with a bad grace, when thousands upon thousands had been granted for the education of the priests of his (Mr. C. Anstey's) peculiar faith. The College was established to enable persons of the middle classes in Wales to receive a sound classical education. The Principal was a gentleman who had taken the highest classical honours at Oxford. The Vice-Principal was a gentleman of high literary attainments. The Bishop of St. David's was the Visitor; and those three persons must combine to carry on this fraud. Of course he (Mr. Morris) was not prepared to meet the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman; but he submitted to the Committee it was most improbable a man in so dignified a station as the Bishop of St. David's would lend himself to so atrocious a misrepresentation.

said, some of clergy who were educated at this College were ornaments to the Welsh Church, and most popular with the people, and better preachers could not be heard. He was astonished at the assertion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, which he begged to deny, that they were a set of idle, ignorant men, paying for sermons composed by other people. Instead of a vague and general charge, he should have given a particular instance, and then it could easily have been met. It was most inconvenient that charges should be brought forward without notice. [Mr. ANSTEY: I have given notice.] He (Mr. Davies) denied, in toto, that the authorities of the College had refused to make returns. The return asked for was of such a character it was impossible to give it; but the authorities had always expressed their readiness to make any reasonable return if they had the power of doing it. With regard to the statement that the accounts were "cooked," he was unable to make any answer; but they had a sufficient guarantee in the character of those who presided over the College. The College had done a great deal of good in improving the character of the clergy; and the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. J. Williams) was so convinced of its advantages, that his only objection upon a previous occasion was as to the smallness of the sum proposed to be voted.

said, the College was founded in 1827, for the avowed purpose of qualifying young men for the office of clergymen of the Established Church in Wales. It was built by private subscriptions, and by a grant from Parliament of 6,000?. A Royal Charter was given, and by Act of Parliament of George IV. six livings were appointed for its maintenance. From the year 1826, 400l. a year had been given by Parliament, making up a sum of upwards of 10,000l. for its support, exclusive of 6,000l. for the building. No return had ever been made from that time to this. There were constant complaints of want of money, and large sums had been given by benevolent individuals, who were ignorant of the means at the disposal of the College. He did not object to the grant if accounts were rendered; he should wish to make it 1,000l. instead of 400l., and in no country would it be of more use for the purposes of education than in Wales. He could contradict the statement of the hon. and learned Member (Mr. C. Anstey), that the young men were unable to preach in their own language. Some of the most eminent clergymen in Wales were educated at this College. He knew six or seven young men who had studied there, and they would reflect credit on any other College in the Kingdom. The last living fell in in 1842, and was given to the Rev. Henry Williams, who never had been and was not now connected with the College. The other five livings were respectively valued at 200l., 244l., 257l., 329l., 258l., and 176l., making a total of 1,364l. a year. He hoped, nevertheless, the hon. and learned Member for Youghal would not divide the Committee; but if the Amendment were pressed, he (Mr. J. Williams) should vote with him.

said, as Member for Cardigan he thought it very singular that he had never heard of these abuses, which if they existed, must have reached his ears.

said, perhaps the Committee were not aware that in the time of Henry VIII. all the rectorial tithes, especially of South Wales, were taken away from the Church, and given to laymen, to a College at Oxford, and in other ways diverted from the Church. The consequence was that the livings of the Church in Wales were always known as the poorest in the Kingdom, not on account of the country being poor, because if the Church in Wales had her due she would be as rich as any other part of the Church of England, and perfectly able to maintain herself. The greatest benefit had been conferred on the Church in Wales by the establishment of this College, and by the superior system of education pursued, which had elevated the character of the Welsh clergy. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. C. Anstey) had denounced the heads of the College as fraudulent beggars. He (Mr. W. Williams) was not surprised as such an observation. The hon. and lerned Gentleman had denounced almost everything in any way connected with Protestantism. But, knowing the present Bishop of St. David's, and the Principal and Vice-Principal of the College, he would undertake to say more upright and more honest men were not to be found; and he would challenge the character of those gentlemen with the character of any persons connected with the hon. and learned Member's Church, beginning with the Pope, and concluding with the hon. and learned Member himself. The hon. and learned Member last year did not say a word against a vote of 600l. for the repairs of the College of Maynooth, nor did he urge any objection to a vote of 4,000l. or 5,000l. to the University of London, when he heard that Roman Catholics received the advantage of it. He wished to see this grant altogether abandoned, that the College of St. David's might be under no obligations to any one; but he trusted the Committee, after voting sums for Oxford and Cambridge, and for the Scotch and Irish Universities, would not on this occasion refuse this sum of 400l.

said, that the advantages diffused by means of those educated at St. David's were such that he only wished the grant were not so small.

hoped the hon. and learned Member would not insist on dividing; if he did, he should move that the Chairman report progress, and ask leave to sit again.

said, he had on former occasions expressed his opinion unfavourably to voting money for Roman Catholic purposes, and if the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) was present when the 600l. for the repairs of Maynooth was discussed, he must have voted upon his (Mr. C. Anstey's) Motion to disallow it. He objected to all grants; and when the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. J. Williams) talked of the good and sound education at this College, let him remember what his namesake the Archdeacon of Cardigan said—namely, that he conscientiously believed the institution at Lampeter had been a blight and a curse upon the Principality; that it was not deficient, but corrupt, in its educational operation. He (Mr. C. Anstey) would insist on dividing the Committee on the Question,

explained that he had not defended the system of education, but merely said the young men could preach in the Welsh language.

said, that in the City Article of the Times of the 3rd of June the following paragraph appeared:—

"It is a curious fact, illustrative of the way in which the official business of the Government is sometimes performed, that a check drawn by the Poor Law Board, and signed by Sir John Trollope (President), and Lord Courtenay (Secretary), was dishonoured to-day at the Bank of England. Its amount was 149l., and the answer given to Messrs. Glyn and Co., by whom it was presented, was 'Not sufficient effects.'"

He thought that for the credit of the Poor Law Board some explanation should he given on this subject, and he begged to ask the right hon. President of the Board whether the statement in the Times was correct?

said, he should have no great difficulty in explaining the matter to which the noble Lord referred. The circumstance arose from mere inadvertence on the part of the accountant who transacted the monetary business of the Poor Law Board. The accounts of the auditors would be sent in very soon, and money had been voted by the House in the course of the Session; but the accountant had, by some oversight, omitted to make the usual application to the Treasury to transfer the amount to the account of the Poor Law Board. This was an error which he (Sir J. Trollope) would take good care should not happen again, for the check he had put upon the mode of paying the accounts rendered its recurrence impossible. He must say, however, that the officer who transacted the business of this department was a very old and valuable servant of the public, having been in the public service for about eighteen years without ever making a similar mistake; and he (Sir J. Trollope) really thought it was hardly worth while to trouble the House with such a subject. At all events he believed the House would agree with him that it was not a matter which called for the censure of that House upon Her Majesty's Government.

wished to ask the Colonial Secretary whether the letter addressed to him on May 1, by the Hon. Mr. Hincks, and which was published in the Times of May 31, was authentic; and, if it was, whether he was able to give to the House any information or explanation of the circumstances under which it was written?

I can assure the hon. Baronet who has put this question to me, that so far from having any objection to answer it, I feel greatly indebted to him for having afforded me an opportunity of giving the explanation he has requested. The letter to which the hon. Baronet has adverted, is founded entirely upon a mistake. I have no knowledge how that letter found its way into the public prints; and I must say I think I have reason to express at least surprise that such a letter, forming part of a series of correspondence, should have been inserted in the newspapers of this country without any of the documents that preceded or followed it. The natural result of the insertion of such a letter in the papers, without any explanation of what preceded or followed it, has been, that most erroneous inferences have been drawn, and that very wrong impressions have gained currency with regard to the circumstances which preceded and followed the writing of that letter. It appears to me that the complaints against the conduct of the Government are three in number. The first complaint is, that the deputation which came over to this country from Canada on the subject of the proposed railway, were left for seven weeks without any answer. It is next complained that when an answer was given, it was not communicated officially to the gentlemen who formed the deputation to this country, but was obtained by them through a private channel. The third complaint is, that the gentlemen who came here as a deputation from the Provinces of Canada and New Brunswick were not treated with that consideration and confidence to which their position in their own country entitled them. Now, if the House will favour me with their indulgence for a very few moments, I think I shall be able to show how far these complaints are well founded. With regard to the first complaint, that the gentlemen forming the deputation were left for seven weeks without an answer from the Government, I must beg permission to refer to dates. Mr. Hincks arrived in this country, as a delegate from Canada on this subject about the 16th of March. Directly after his arrival, I had several interviews with him relative to the proposed railways, and in those interviews he communicated to me the views of the Province of Canada. He also stated to me that he was one of a deputation of three gentlemen, and that the arrival of Mr. Chandler, from New Brunswick, and of Mr. Howe, from Nova Scotia, might be expected by the next packet. Under these circumstances, I considered—and I think the House will deem I was justified in considering—that the negotiation was not to be proceeded with until the deputation was complete; especially as Mr. Chandler and Mr. Howe were to bring with them from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia the Act that had been passed upon this subject by the Legislatures of those Colonies. I made frequent inquiries from time to time whether those gentlemen had arrived, and I was told that they had not yet reached England, but that they might be expected by the next packet. So things went on until the 20th of April, on which day Mr. Chandler called at the Colonial Office. I believe he had arrived some few days before, but I did not know it. Mr. Howe, however, had not arrived, and I ought here to mention that the two Acts of the Colonies did not arrive till the 28th of April. On the 26th of April a letter was written by Mr. Hincks to the noble Earl at the head of the Government, requesting an interview for himself and Mr. Chandler upon this subject. I think I can show the House how little the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) was disposed to underrate the importance of this deputation, by reading to them the memorandum in the handwriting of the noble Earl at the back of Mr. Hincks's letter. It is—

"Give him an early appointment. This matter is one of very great importance, but I should wish, if possible, to see, together with Mr. Hincks, the representatives in this matter of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia."

The noble Earl's Secretary made an appointment for the 30th of April, the first day on which he was able to see these gentlemen; and on that day the noble Earl received Mr. Hincks and Mr. Chandler; and at the request of my noble Friend I was present. At that interview the whole subject was talked over, and on the very next morning, the 1st of May, Mr. Hincks wrote the letter to which the hon. Baronet has referred, and in the early part of that letter Mr. Hincks says, alluding to the interview of the previous day—

"I left his Lordship in the confident hope that I should receive an early communication of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government."

Mr. Hincks then goes on to say, that the arrival of Mr. Howe could have no effect on the question of route—the only one raised by Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Howe had not then arrived, and he did not come; and this letter of Mr. Hincks, of the 1st of May, was the first intimation I received that the two other Members of the deputation considered the presence of Mr. Howe unimportant to the negotiation. I immediately proceeded to act upon that intimation, and at the Cabinet Council held on the following Saturday the 8th of May—the matter having previously, of course. formed the subject of conversation among the Government—the whole question was formally brought before the Cabinet, was fully discussed, and was finally decided. I hope the statement I have made will prove that there was no pretext whatever for saying that the deputation was left without an answer from any fault of Her Majesty's Government. It has been complained that after the Cabinet had decided the question, no communication was made to the Gentlemen forming the deputation, but that they learned the decision of the Government incidentally through a private source. Now, owing to the great pressure of business—and I trust the House will make allowance for the enormous pressure of business that did occur in the office to which I have the honour to be attached—several days elapsed after the Cabinet Council arrived at their decision before I was at leisure to prepare a despatch on the subject. In consequence of that delay, and of subsequent delays after the despatch was draughted, the despatch was not finally written for sending until the 20th of May. I should say that Mr. Hincks had previously intimated his intention not to leave England until the 27th of May, and he did not go until a much later period. On the 20th of May the despatch was sent to the Governors of the three colonies of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia; and on the same day, by my directions, official copies of that despatch were communicated to Mr. Hincks and Mr. Chandler. In the meantime I had made no communication, public or private, upon this subject to any party; and if either of these Gentlemen had indirectly ascertained the decision of the Government, I cannot say how they got the information. It certainly was not through any act of mine. I hope I have answered the second allegation. I now come to the third subject, of complaint—that these gentlemen were not treated with the consideration to which their position entitled them. I should be extremely Sony if it should be thought that the Government were for a moment open to such an imputation. On the arrival of Mr. Hincks, I had several interviews with him, and I extended to him that courtesy and hospitality which I thought were due to his distinguished station in his own Province. I have been told that I ought to have resented his letter. There certainly are expressions in that letter which have the appearance of having been written under some feelings of irritation—expressions which I think are not borne out by the facts—expressions which I read with regret, and which I cannot help thinking Mr. Hincks must regret having used. But, Sir, I must say that, looking to the fact that the greater part of these letters were written in a tone perfectly respectful, I have no hesitation in avowing to the House my feeling, that if unconsciously and unintentionally, under the pressure of business, which really is sometimes almost overwhelming, I had—I am sure I am not aware that I had—been guilty of any omission towards these gentlemen, I thought it more consistent with my duty to the Queen, with my own office, and with the friendly relations which I hope will always subsist between the great colony of Canada and the mother country, that I should continue to act in the same spirit of courtesy as before, rather than go out of my way and take offence, or make any quarrel on the subject. That was the spirit in which I am disposed to act towards these gentlemen; but I would ask the House to recollect that Mr. Hincks was not the only person concerned. It would not be correct to draw any distinction between Mr. Chandler and Mr. Hincks; but Mr. Chandler has written no petulant letter. He is a gentleman distinguished by great ability, a man of high character, and one who, like Mr. Hincks, has, by the power of his own talent raised himself to the highest position in the colony. I most readily admit that these gentlemen were entitled to every consideration in this country at the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and my opinion is that they received it. I continued, to the close of their stay in this country, the same hospitality, the same courtesy, with which our intercourse commenced, and I had reason to believe they were deeply impressed by the gracious and spontaneous condescension they received at the hands of Her Majesty. At the close of their stay they called at the Colonial Office to take leave, and we parted on the most friendly terms, and certainly I had no reason to believe there was any offence taken on their part. I hope I have said enough to show that the allegation of delay on the part of the Government is unfounded, and that we were willing to treat these gentlemen with every due consideration. In offering this explanation, I have not touched on the policy of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the decision at which they arrived. The hon. Member's question did not refer to that decision, and I am sure the House will feel that the occasion of answering a question is not the proper moment of referring to such a subject. The answer given to these gentlemen was given on the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government; and whenever the proper moment arrives, I shall be prepared to vindicate my share in it.

rose to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the despatches just arrived from the Cape announced the passing of the constitution ordinances, including the alterations of the franchise against which the Attorney General protested; what information had been received relating to the rumoured advance of Praetorius against the Zoolus; and whether treaties were actually entered into with the Caffre chiefs for the termination of the war? The papers and letters just received were full of the importance of the expressions of Lord Derby last year, when he said in the debate on the Cape in the House of Lords—

"I might have hesitated as to the introduction of so large a measure of representative government as is contemplated in the plan disclosed by these papers. But I say that, inasmuch as the question has been raised, and has been raised upon such high authority, and has obtained the sanction of so large a portion of the colonists, and the sanction of the Grown, I say that any risk is to be encountered, and I will not bate one jot of the extent of free institutions proposed to be conferred upon the colony, however much I may look with anxious apprehension to the working of these institutions—at all events in the first place."—[3 Hansard, cxviii. 717.]

He wished, also, to know if Government intended to carry out their legislation on the subject this Session?

said, that the question of which the hon. Member had given notice embraced three points, to which he had added a fourth, and, in replying, he (Sir J. Pakington) would take them seriatim. As the hon. Member had given notice of the question on Saturday, he presumed the hon. Member referred to the accounts which came over a week ago with Sir Harry Smith, and he might not be aware that a mail had arrived this morning. By the mail of a week ago he (Sir J. Pakington) had received a despatch from General Cathcart, stating that he had thought it to be his duty to pass the constitution ordinances with the alterations made by the Council; and, by the mail of this morning, he had received the ordinances themselves. As to the second question, he was very happy to be able to state that the rumoured advances of Prsetorius against the Zoolus not only remained without foundation, but that by the mail this morning he had received the agreeable information that a convention had been agreed to between Prsetorius and Her Majesty's Commissioners, and that peaceful relations had been established. As to the third question, whether treaties were entered into with the Kaffir chiefs, he regretted to say he had no information that they were; and he was afraid, from the despatches received from General Cathcart, there was no reason to believe there would be. With respect to the fourth question. he did not know till a week ago that the ordinances had been sanctioned by the new Governor, and, as the ordinances had only arrived this morning at the Colonial Office, he thought the hon. Member would admit it would be extremely premature for him to attempt to state now what were the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. on this subject.

asked of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Lord Stanley) whether any communications had been received by Her Majesty's Govern merit respecting a recent Conference between the representatives of the great Powers of Europe, with reference to the claims of Prussia upon Neufchatel; and, secondly, if the noble Lord knew if there would be any objection to lay the papers on the table of the House?

In answer to the question of the noble Lord, I have to state that a conference has been held, and a protocol signed by the representatives of the five Great European Powers, in reference to the rights of Prussia over Neuf chatel. The existence of such rights, and their recognition by the Treaty of Vienna, cannot be disputed; and I must observe that it is not the least important feature of this transaction, that in it the territorial settlement of Europe, as arranged in that treaty, has, for the first time, been recognised by France under her present ruler. I may add, that no communication will, for the present, be addressed in consequence of the protocol in question, to the Government of Switzerland. With regard to the papers, I am afraid it will he impossible to lay them upon the table.

Mr. Speaker, I promised to state to-day to the House the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the business that is before the House, with the view of expediting its despatch. It was my intention originally to have selected this day to express those views. I thought that as soon after the holydays as prac- ticable it would be desirable that we should come to some conclusion on this subject; but why I fixed on this day was that I thought the House would be indisposed to have the explanation of the views of Government made on the day of meeting, and that it would be more convenient, instead of taking the fag-end of the week, to select the first Monday after we assembled for business for that purpose. But if it had not been my intention to fix on this day, it would not have been possible for me to avoid the performance of this duty after the memorable appeal made by a right hon. Baronet the Member for Ripon (Sir James Graham) on the reassembling of the House. That right hon. Gentleman is one who necessarily and justly exercises a very great influence over the opinion of this House; and, though indeed he is listened to with great respect upon all subjects, on none is his opinion more regarded than on the conduct of public business. The statement of that right hon. Gentleman was calculated very much to arrest public attention,, and to produce a very considerable effect upon the House, especially among those not very familiar with the details of the subjects upon which the right hon. Gentleman spoke. Certainly, he conveyed an impression to the House and to the country that the state of public business was extremely unsatisfactory; that there was a vast accumulation of business, with a very slender prospect of its being disposed of, and that if the termination of the present Session, which seems now pretty-well agreed on, and which we are all anticipating, occurs at the time expected, there would be no possibility of dealing with the accumulation of business before the House, all of which, as the right hon. Gentleman very truly stated, was of a highly important and pressing character. The right hon. Gentleman said, on that occasion, that he felt deeply on the subject; that he viewed the present state of business with great apprehension; and that it was with no ordinary feelings of apprehension and upon no ordinary subject that he spoke—because it was not the mere reputation of this particular House which was at stake, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman—though the reputation of even this House, I think, must be dear to him—but (if I am not misrepresenting him) he went so far as to say that he really feared that if we did not take care we should bring representative government itself into dis- repute. And, that there may be no mistake on the matter, I will quote the words which the right hon. Gentleman stated: what he feared was—

"This assembly, which has been the great landmark of representative government and the great example of representative assemblies throughout the world, will be brought into disrepute;"

—because we should appear to the world to be unable to transact the public business. Now, Sir, it would be—it must be—a most serious state of affairs which could warrant such words from such a man. The right hon. Gentleman did not confine himself on that occasion—listened to as he was with becoming attention by the House,—to a mere general expression of the apprehensions under which he was suffering. He went into very great detail on the subject; he took a minute review of the state of the business before the House; he called the attention of the House to the various subjects before them, grouping the several Bills on all important matters in that clear and perspicuous manner which he always commands; and he laid down the data from which he drew the inference he communicated to us; and which, in his opinion, warranted the apprehensions he felt. Indeed, I read in a very great authority on the day following that it was evidently an herculean task to deal with the business before the House of Commons; and that even to form a catalogue of it, or to enumerate it in detail, required the colossal power of intellect for which we are all willing to give the right hon. Gentleman credit. Under these circumstances, I felt an unusual responsibility placed upon me in the position in which I stand, and for which I am every day more aware I am little qualified. I felt it was a terrible responsibility to incur, that under the guidance which I had been able to give to the business of the House, by the advice of my Colleagues, and assisted by the kindness of hon. Members on both sides of the House, I had brought public business not only to a standstill, but even to a perilous and disgraceful position. Well, Sir, under that feeling I have examined with all the assiduity the circumstances of the case required, the state of public business before us. Peeling that I am responsible for its general position, I have endeavoured to see if I could in some degree escape from the consequences of neglect of duty, or from the results of that incapacity with which, though the right hon. Gentleman was courteous enough not to charge me, he must have felt I was liable to be accused of. Under the challenge and appeal of the right hon. Gentleman, I will examine very briefly the business now before us, and the prospects I have ventured to form of the ultimate fate of all the Bills to which he referred. I will follow the order taken by the right hon. Gentleman, because it is now familiar to the House, and I do not think that any suggestion of mine would make it more clear. On the evening referred to, the right hon. Gentleman very particularly and very justly impressed on the House the importance of the Bills for legal reform which are before us—Bills probably inferior in importance to no business before the House, and which some may lament should have been brought forward under the circumstances in which the present House of Commons now meets. The right hon. Gentleman, on Thursday, called the attention of the House to three of these Bills: 1st, to the Common Law Procedure Amendment Bill; secondly, to the Equitable Jurisdiction Bill; and, thirdly, to the Bill for the Abolition of Masters in Chancery. The right hon. Gentleman said, to use his own phrase, and to pursue his own terse and expressive language, "Not one step has yet been taken in this House with regard to any one of these three Bills beyond their introduction." He expressed a hope on Thursday that I would on Monday be able to give some information on this subject; and I have now the pleasure of reminding the right hon. Gentleman that as to the Common Law Procedure Bill, the Equitable Jurisdiction Bill, and the Bill for the Abolition of Masters' Office in Chancery, with respect to which not one step had been taken, very important steps have been taken in the interval, and all three have been read a second time. But there were two other measures of legal reform beside those three to which the right hon. Gentleman first referred—the Suitors in Chancery Relief Bill, and the Bill respecting alterations in the Law of Wills. As the right hon. Gentleman—so great an authority upon all subjects, but on the subject of legal reform the very highest in this House—said on Thursday, it was impossible to exaggerate the magnitude, difficulty, and importance of those questions. Well, on this present Monday, I have the pleasure of informing the right hon. Gentleman that those two Bills, the magnitude, difficulty, and importance of which, to use his own language, could not be exaggerated, have entirely passed through this House. So much for these important Bills on legal reform: two of them having entirely passed the House of Commons, three of them having been read a second time, and no material opposition being anticipated to their progress, I think Her Majesty's Government are not arrogant or presumptuous in assuming that these five important measures for the reform of the law will pass the Legislature and become law without at all interfering with that termination of Parliament which is now so rife in every one's mouth. Well, the right hon. Gentleman then proceeded, with all the clearness which characterises his mature statements, to another important group of Bills which were still on the table—those which he described as Colonial Bills. On Thursday last, calling on me on Monday to give an account of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, with that influence with became his position, he reminded the House of the New Zealand Bill, the importance of which was only equalled by the number of its clauses, and said that he expected that on Monday some idea would be given by Government what their intentions were with respect to that important Bill. Sir, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that this is a Bill of the utmost importance, and I should deplore the circumstance that this Bill, which attempts to establish a right principle of Colonial Administration, under happy auspices, should be defeated by any occurrence connected with the abrupt termination of Parliament. But, Sir, what is the bulletin of Monday night upon this subject—that night upon which I was called upon to state exactly the intentions of Government with regard to public business. The New Zealand Bill has not only got into Committee, but has nearly got through Committee. In fact I may say, that out of more than 80 clauses, 72 have been disposed of; and, with the exception of some which refer to what may be almost called a private and a local subject, the great questions connected with this Bill, which is to give a new constitution to an interesting colony—the great questions are all settled in this House; and it is hardly possible to conceive that the state in which the New Zealand Bill is now found can at all justify Her Majesty's Government in relinquishing the hope of speedily passing this Bill through the House. Then, there is another colonial measure, also re- ferred to by the right hon. Gentleman—the Hereditary Casual Revenues Bill, which, to use the language of the right hon. Gentleman, is a measure of "primary importance." Now, perhaps, the House will allow me to remind them of the nature of this Bill. The Law Officers of the Crown have expressed to Her Majesty's Government their doubts, and more than doubts, whether those branches of casual revenue, which have now assumed very great importance in the auriferous colonies of Australia, might not be, by the strict letter of the law, applicable to the Consolidated Fund, instead of being applied, as Her Majesty's Government wish, to the benefit of the colony from which they spring. No one can doubt but that this is an object to attain which will not excite any very great party feeling, or receive an}' very great opposition; and when I mention that the Bill which is to confer this highly beneficial and advantageous privilege upon the colonies is composed of only two clauses, it is not a very presumptuous expectation on the part of Her Majesty's Government to hope that they may be as successful with it as they have hitherto been in that foremost Bill with regard to colonial legislation relating to New Zealand. There are two other Government Bills which the right hon. Gentleman referred to as connected with the Colonies, and really, except that the word "bishop" does appear in the titles of these Bills—and I know how unfortunate that word sometimes is in exciting debate in this House, and in calling forth the irregular energy of the hon. and learned Member for Youghal—I should hardly suppose that there will be any opposition to these two Bills. One of them, the Bishopric of Quebec Bill, is in fact only to take care that in a diocese already divided, one of the bishops should not retain the whole of the episcopal property, but should divide it with his brother bishop; and I should hardly think that this measure would be opposed, more especially as it consists only of two clauses, and has already passed the other House of Parliament. I think, therefore, it is not rash to suppose that even that Bill may soon pass into a law without at all procrastinating the conclusion of the Session. There is a fourth Bill, called the Colonial Bishops' Bill, and that is a measure which is also of very small dimensions, its only object being to relieve the Indian bishops from the disability which, in the case of the other colonial bishops, does not exist, for the latter are not prevented from officiating in the dioceses of other bishops, as the Indian bishops are. It is therefore a Bill essentially just in its provisions. It is one which I cannot say is of that urgent nature which, generally speaking, all the Bills are which Her Majesty's Government have brought forward, but it is a Bill of a very important character, very slight in its dimensions, and not calculated to produce any controversy; therefore I shall give it a chance of obtaining the sanction of the House. I have now gone through two of the most important groups of projected legislation to which the right hon. Gentleman referred; but the colossal catalogue was not limited to these two groups. The next subject to which the right hon. Gentleman alluded for those proofs of the unsatisfactory state of public business which he adduced, refers to the department which is presided over by my noble Friend the President of the Board of Works. There are three Bills on the table of the House which have been placed there by my noble Friend. The first of these is the Intramural Interment Bill—a Bill which, I believe, has the concurrence of a great majority in this House, and which it is the public wish, as well as the wish of the majority of this House, should pass into law. I am not prepared, I confess, to renounce the hope, not only of passing that Bill, but of passing it quickly, and with but slight opposition. There is also another Bill, the Metropolitan Water Bill; but remember, that that Bill has already been referred to a Select Committee, and it comes down, therefore, to the House with the advantage of the criticism of that Select Committee, and the approbation of a tribunal to which the House always looks with great respect; and therefore I think I am warranted in believing that it can be passed without postponing the termination of the Session. There is another Bill laid upon the table of the House by my noble Friend (Lord J. Manners)-the Metropolis Buildings Bill; and, as there seems such a keen desire to resist legislation on the part of the right hon. Gentleman, from the fear that we may he overwhelmed with it, and, as it is necessary, in order to give hon. Members an opportunity of making any observations in reply, that I should conclude with some Motion, I am prepared to move, at the proper time, that the Order of the Day for the Second Reading of that Bill should be discharged. I have now gone through three of the great divisions which the right hon. Gentleman brought to our notice. All our measures of legal reform are fast arriving at that safe harbour to which I believe they are destined; all our Colonial Bills have also made very great progress since the Thursday when the attention of the country and of the House was called to the unprecedented position of Parliamentary business; and of the two Bills which are under the charge of my noble Friend the President of the Board of Works, one of them has been referred to a Select Committee, which, as I before said, will tend to make its progress through the House more rapid, and the other has received out of doors and in the House such a degree of favour that I cannot doubt it will in due time pass into a law. Sir, there were, however, other circumstances in the state of public business on which the right hon. Gentleman dilated in terms of impressive solemnity, and which seemed to produce a considerable effect at the moment upon the feelings of the House. The right hon. Gentleman called the attention of the House of Commons particularly, on Thursday, to the state of the Committee of Supply. With something of the art of the rhetorician, he reminded the House that hitherto the expeditious way in which the Committee of Supply had been carried on, the promptitude with which we had passed our Estimates, had been, as we are always too willing to acknowledge, the consequence of the continued forbearance of the House; but the right hon. Gentleman gave the House to understand that even now the remaining Estimates amounted to millions, in respect to which we were to pass through a different ordeal. On Thursday night he called the attention of the House and of the country to the important fact that there were still 200 Votes in supply which had not been passed, and that those 200 Votes were to be met with 42 recorded negatives of one hon. Member. That, Sir, was the dreadful prospect for the Government at the end of the week, and that was one of the evidences of the incapacity of Her Majesty's Ministry to conduct the business of the House of Commons. It will perhaps be some satisfaction to the right hon. Gentleman to know that, Monday having come, I, the great criminal, appearing to give that account which the "unprecedented" state of Parliamentary business was said to call for, can at least urge some plea of extenuating circumstances; since now, on Monday, instead of 200 Votes in Supply remaining to be passed, there are, I believe, only 19; and with regard to those 19 Votes, I cannot help thinking that, even with the determined spirit of the hon. Member for Youghal (Mr. C. Anstey) the hon. and learned Member may yet find other opportunities enough for the exercise of his indefatigable powers; and that, perhaps, when we go into Committee of Supply again with those 19 Votes we may experience even from him some little tender touch of remorse. There were some miscellaneous Bills also mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman. There was the Navy Pay Bill. I have endeavoured to form some opinion whether that measure can be passed; but I cannot gather that there is any opposition to it, and when the statement is made with respect to it by the Secretary to the Admiralty, I indulge in the hope that that Bill too will pass. There is also the Patent-Law Amendment Bill; but I may remind the House that that Bill has already passed the House of Lords, and that we have referred it to a Select Committee; there, as I have before remarked was the case with Bills so referred, it will receive a revision which will enable it to command much more readily the general agreement of the House. I cannot think that I am yet called upon to say that these two laws, which I believe will be advantageous to the country, should be renounced. Now, Sir, there are some other Bills, and one rather large head, to which the right hon. Gentleman also referred. There are two Bills with regard to Ireland. There is, first, the Valuation of Land Bill; I hear from all sides that this is a good measure, Why, then, should we give it up? I cannot say that I am prepared to give it up, when we have had only one division upon this measure, and when the numbers, I think, were 80 to 4 in favour of the Bill; and, believing that this is a Bill which is very much to the advantage of the people of Ireland, I certainty think the House will concur in thinking it should pass. There is another Bill connected with Ireland—the White-boy Acts Consolidation Bill. I am anxious at this moment that no Bill should pass, that we should proceed with no Bill which is likely, I won't say to waste, but to occupy the time of the House, unless it is of urgent necessity; and, as I agree with those who think that a Bill for the purpose of consolidation can scarcely come under this head, I am prepared not to press it forward. Then there were the Continuance Bills, which is the last class of measures to which I shall refer. The Poor Law Board Act, which is a Continuance Bill, now stands for a third reading; and then there is the Encumbered Estates Act. That is a Bill which must be continued, and I cannot anticipate that any hon. Gentleman in this House can wish that that Bill should not pass. There remains another Bill, which relates to a matter to which the right hon. Gentleman said the late Government attached the greatest importance, and which must be renewed—I mean the Prevention of Crime and Outrage Act in Ireland. We have had from some hon. Gentlemen opposite some hints as to the opposition which is to be extended to the renewal of the Crime and Outrage Act. Sir, whatever opposition is offered to the Bill, so long as it respects Parliamentary usages, and is conducted in that courteous spirit which I believe will always distinguish this House, that opposition in a case of imminent necessity I must be prepared to meet. It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Act for Preventing Crime and Outrage in Ireland should be renewed; and inasmuch as that Act consists of only one clause, giving hon. Gentlemen opposite credit for as energetic patriotism as any body of men possess, even should they put in practice all the resources of their rhetoric, even if they should avail themselves of all the opportunities with which the constitutional forms of this House provide them, I cannot believe they will be able to defeat a measure so necessary to the peace, the tranquillity, and the prosperity of their country. With very great respect, therefore, for the opinions held by those hon. Gentlemen, we shall attempt to continue that Act; and I tell them I am prepared for their opposition, which however, I am sure will be conducted according to the spirit and practice of this House. I have now gone through the whole of the colossal catalogue of the right hon. Gentleman, and I ask the House fairly to decide, is it their opinion that the state of public business, that the state of business in the House of Commons, is so unsatisfactory as was alleged on Thursday night? I declare, Sir, that when I examine the Government measures that have not passed, with the most anxious desire to ask the House to support nothing which I do not conceive to be of the first necessity—with the most anxious desire that the labours of this Parliament should not be prolonged—I do not find myself justified, with the exception of the slight and most insignificant instance to which I have referred, in recommending the withdrawal of any of these Bills. They appear to me to be necessary, and they appear to me also to be in a most satisfactory state of progress, so that all of them may be passed consistently with that termination of the Session which we all of us anticipate. Sir, I claim no credit to the Government for this state of the public business, and I say that most unfeignedly. It is a state of the public business, in my opinion, satisfactory; but it is due, and due only, to the good sense and the good temper of the House of Commons. And, Sir, when I heard the highest authority dilate upon the present state of business, and say, with all the weight attaching to his name in the senate of his country, that if we did not take care we should bring representative government itself into disrepute, and that it would appear that we could not transact the business of the country, I say that I have drawn from the Session which is now closing a very different conclusion and a very opposite moral. I would rather adduce what has been done in this House, and the manner in which it has been done—I would rather adduce it as evidence in favour of representative government, in favour, at least, of the mode in which representative government is carried on in this country, than bring it forward as an argument which should lead us to believe that the reputation of representative government is in danger. Sir, I will not dilate upon the fact that we have been enabled already to pass through the House of Commons 37 Government measures, 20 of which have already become law; but when I recall to the House the circumstances of the Session, that a change of Government took place, and when I remind the House of the party feelings which under such circumstances naturally revive, of the great delay of business which from such circumstances must necessarily occur, the fact that I and my Colleagues only on the 15th of March were enabled to resume our seats in this House, I think it tells very much (as I said before) for the good sense and the good temper of the House of Commons that we have been permitted by their aid to carry nearly to a conclusion so many important measures, and yet not to have postponed that important appeal to the people on which we are all agreed. Sir, I remember some years ago, when I sat on the other side of the House, under the guidance and advice of that distinguished man Lord George Ben- tinck, and when I took a part in public affairs which I was not, but for the too great indulgence of my friends, scarcely justified to assume, it became my duty to sum up the results of the longest Session that I believe the House of Commons has ever yet experienced—a Session of more than ten continuous months, concluding in the month of September, 1848. There were at that time the same charges made as to the inefficiency of the House of Commons. At that time we were told that the accumulation of business was intolerable, and that it was proved in a manner which every one ought to view with alarm that a representative government could no longer deal with the affairs of a great community. Sir, it was my duty then, after a careful analysis of all the Motions and all the measures of that remarkable Session—it was my duty then to vindicate the conduct and character of the House of Commons. It was my duty also to endeavour to prove that which I gave my reasons for believing—that it was to the weakness of the Ministry, and not to the inefficieney of the House, that this lamentable state of affairs was owing. In the present instance, Sir, I do not think it necessary for me to ascribe the present state of public business either to the weakness of the Ministry, or to the inefficiency of the House of Commons, because I maintain that the condition of public business at such a period, and after a Session so broken up and disturbed, never was more satisfactory. I said that I claim no credit for the Ministry for this result; but I can say this most sincerely for them—that we have endeavoured by sedulous attention to the business which we had to discharge—to merit the generous support which we have received from the House of Commons, even from our opponents.

said: Before entering on the discussion of this Bill, I beg for a very few moments to refer to the charge of inconsistency which it has been attempted to affix on those who having voted for the introduction of the Local Militia Bill of my noble Friend the Member for the City of London, have found it their duty to vote not against the introduction, but against the second reading of the General Militia Bill. Sir, with regard to this Militia measure, there are four parties. There are those who are opposed to all Militia Bills, or to all additional means of national defence. They, most consistently, have opposed both Bills. Secondly, there are those who may lean to a local or to a general Militia Bill, but who, willing to entertain the general consideration of our defences—being desirous of seeing some additional military force organised—have consistently enough supported the entertainment of both measures, hoping that they might be altered in Committee according to their several views; and it is now for them to decide whether the present Bill in its amended shape answers their expectations of national defence. There is a third party, who have considered a Local Militia Bill to be founded on principles "so essentially vicious and false," that they have been compelled to adopt the very unusual course of practically refusing to allow a Government to lay upon the table of this House their measures for the defence of the country. This party consisted mainly of hon. Gentlemen opposite; of almost every Member of the Cabinet; indeed of almost every Member of the present Government having seats in this House. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke and voted on the occasion; so also, the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, the introducer of this measure. There is a fourth party, who have supported a Local Militia measure, considering it capable of popular organisation, but who, looking upon a general Militia measure in a time of peace as mischievous and oppressive, have opposed its second reading. Now, Sir, the same broad distinction of "vicious principles;"—"very essential difference"—I quote the words as stated in February—between the two systems, which may justify the very unusual procedure of the present Government in having practically resisted even the introduction of the Local Militia Bill of their predecessors, must at least, stand in equal stead those members and supporters of the late Government who in May and June oppose, as they in February opposed, the principle of a general Militia Bill. Sir, I am almost ashamed of having occupied these few moments with a deduction so plain and self-evident; but such a ready, and, if I may so say, so unfair a use of this charge of inconsistency, was made in the early stage of this discussion by those very persons—by the Colonial Secretary for instance—who thereby laid themselves most bare to the counter charge, that I, who, for one, do value a character for rational consistency, have ventured to occupy the time of the House with these few unvarnished facts. And now, without one word of comment or recrimination, I proceed to the business before us. That consists, first, in a very brief survey of the grounds alleged for the present measure; secondly, of the substitutes or alternatives that have been suggested for it; thirdly, of the results to be expected from the measure itself; and, fourthly, the consequences that might result from its rejection. The general grounds may he soon despatched. They were originally laid upon the urgency of some vague imminent danger—more than half denied by words, but more than half implied by inuendo—and upon the Ministerial assertion that we could not bring into the field, after denuding our arsenals, our depots, and our capital, 25,000 men. Both of these pleas have vanished under the hammer of discussion. The vague imminent peril, never strongly asserted, has been utterly abandoned, both in word and in deed. I say emphatically "in deed." For the Government has refused the offers that were made to them by the Amendments of 50 and 90 days' drill, which would have rendered their militiamen to a certain extent effective; whereas the present measure only proposes to form a force that will hardly be collected before Christmas; that will not then have half its numbers; and those numbers then not even versed in the mysteries of the goose step. These are admissions that you contemplate no urgency, no proximate call, for the application of your force. Then the 25,000 men have been shown to be 65,000, including 5,000 marines on shore. Attempts indeed were made during the discussion to exclude the marines ashore from all consideration, upon the singular plea that in the event of an invasion they would be wanted on board of our ships. But if the enemy were once landed, common prudence would counsel the disembarking of whatever marines were already afloat, rather than sending the 5,000 ashore far away from the scene of action. If London were menaced by an hostile army in Kent, it would be a sorry manoeuivre to embark our marines at Woolwich for the augmentation of a fleet off Cherbourg that had already let an enemy slip by. But it is to be remembered that the Ministerial plan made no reservation for necessary garrisons and all the long array of abatements by which the analytical ingenuity of some right hon. Gentlemen left us with almost no army at all. The Ministerial statement expressly excluded these garrisons,&c—I will read it, if you like—leaving their defence, with that of the metropolis, and the Queen's palaces, to pensioners and police. True, it excluded Ireland also. But no one during the debate has seriously endeavoured to sustain so invidious and insulting, so repealing an exclusion. Ireland is as much part and parcel of this country, as much bound to defend and be defended, as Yorkshire, Middlesex, or Scotland. At the time of the disturbances in the manufacturing districts in 1841, Ireland supplied regiments to Lancashire; and, still more, if those districts were invaded, would she lend her helping hand. Of course it is impossible to foresee under what peculiar circumstances an invasion or an attack on this country might take place; one cannot say how Ireland or Scotland or Yorkshire might then stand; but as a general rule we are bound to assume that they would all equally and mutually defend one another. The exclusion of all consideration of the troops in Ireland seems to me to involve a flat insult to the loyalty of that country. We are bound to consider our troops in Scotland, England, and Ireland, as our home troops; and while the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, without misgiving, left our arsenals, our manufacturing districts, London, and Her Majesty's palaces, to the protection of pensioners and police, he surely might have remembered that like pensioners reside and are enrolled also in Ireland, which has the further defence not of unarmed policemen, but of 12,000 admirably-constituted and well-armed constabulary, and which render the regular forces of Ireland greatly more available than those of England. Undoubtedly the disposability of these troops offers a wide field for speculation, as well as for grave consideration; but it has been made needlessly wide by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen travelling out of its precincts—by arguing as if we had to guard against a vast and comprehensive scheme of invasion, which would necessarily demand such a long and extensive preparation as could not fail to give us time and warning enough to make corresponding preparations for defence. Then, undoubtedly, some such dispositions of our forces and garrisons as have been sketched, would be necessary; but such an invasion as that is palpably not the subject under consideration. Therefore, all the right hon. Secretary's phantom garrisons of 10,000 men in one direction—men here, and 5,000 men there, are beside the present question, and serve only to mystify and mislead. It is not against a comprehensive invasion, with long trains of battering artillery, that we are called upon to arm. It is against a sudden and vigorous assault, when at the unexpected outbreak of a war we might find ourselves in a state of laxity or weakness; and when once the assault was made, it would be an act of folly or of cowardice to shut up two-thirds of our regulars in garrison. It is from the heedless or wilful confounding of these two very distinct modes of attack and defence—a comprehensive invasion or a sudden assault—that the seeming contradictory statements of our forces have arisen. These discussions, then, have cleared the question: all urgency has been abandoned; Ireland is reunited to us, and instead of a bare handful of 25,000 men, we find we may safely rely on from 65,000 to 70,000 regular cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers, and marines; together with a reserve of some 50,000 pensioners, dockyard battalions, &c. which render these troops more disposable, and of which I shall presently speak. Yet still Her Majesty's Ministers say our forces are insufficient, and they ask for such reinforcements as may render them more formidable and more fully disposable. This request has been heard with respect and attention. It may suit the purposes of those who seek to cry down all reasonable discussion respecting a measure branching out, as this does, into so many civil and financial, as well as military considerations, to assert that all those who do not support it are recklessly leaving this country open to danger and insult. Sir, the only reply that one can condescend to make to such imputations, is a mere short recapitulation of the additional or substitutional means of defence that have been submitted. In the first place, there has been offered to you a local militia resembling more nearly the old constitutional force of the country, than your English general militia. That you flatly refused. Many propositions from both sides of the House have called upon you to encourage and organise the voluntary spirit of the country—to patronise rifle artillery, and light infantry, as well as your present mounted yeomanry volunteers. To this you have turned a deaf ear. In accordance with the principle that has trained and organised our dockyard bat talions, you have been requested to extend the numbers of your police, and to train them, and other local forces, to the use of arms and military exercises. This, also, you have not heeded. Yet allow me to say that these suggestions offer means quite as comprehensive, more national, more cheap, more spontaneous, more effective, and a more ready at hand organisation than that which is now before us. Yet still I admit they are but subsidiary means. The gallant Gentleman the Member for Westminster has pointed out to you, and others who followed him have shown, how you might withdraw from several of your colonies a considerable amount of artillery and infantry, and thereby increase your home forces at no additional expense. Almost every military officer—I believe I may say every military officer—who has spoken in this debate, has avowed or admitted that an increase to your regular forces of 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 men would be infinitely preferable to your proposed militia; and there are very few reflecting civilians who have not concurred in this opinion. But nearly all have also intimated a fear that the additional charge to the country for supporting such an increase to the Army, would become so irksome that it would be almost hopeless permanently to maintain it, combined as it would be with the just jealousy that exists in this country against a large standing Army. But, Sir, there are other obvious, simple, and beneficial means by which an equivalent to these 10,000 or 20,000 regular troops might be obtained at little or no real permanent cost to the country, and which, when once obtained, could not, by any economical fit, be dismissed and done away with. You would be secure of them for the next twenty years, and might annually replenish vacancies, and increase their numbers. I beg pardon of the House for saying so; but it seems to me almost infatuation, when seeking to strengthen your military power, that instead of looking to your vigorous, well-disciplined, and easily-recruited Army for its supply, you should weakly, mischievously, extravagantly turn right round about and think of hiring by the piecework a multitude of armed labourers and artisans to do that—it might be the most critical duty that can fall to man, but with which they are necessarily, totally, and entirely unacquainted, and in which you yourselves declare you will not afford them sufficient time and occasion for instruction. Why, Sir, if the danger be as real as it is stated to be, such conduct is near akin to that madness which we are told is inflicted on persons or communities marked for ruin. If you really want an additional military force, why will you not seek it where it is most quickly and best to be found—in your Army? Why will you not have an army of reserve; or, rather, why will you not extend and consolidate your present army of reserve? for you already have one. Your retiring pensioner system and pensioner battalions constitute an army of reserve, which requires only a little expanding and remodelling to render highly effective. You know that, by your existing regulations, after twenty-one or twenty-four years' service, as the case may be, your well-conducted soldier is entitled to a pension of 1s. a day, subject to being enrolled and called out, as he now is, for occasional or emergent service. The slightest reflection will tell you that half this pension for half this period of service would scarcely add to the public charge; and it is notorious that if such an offer of 6d. a day for ten or twelve years' service, were made to men of good character, with like conditions of reserved service, it would gladly be accepted. It is known that there are from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the Army who have served above ten years. But estimating for the present only from those at home, or in our less distant colonies, and who have served from ten to fifteen years, you might forthwith select and form into reserve battalions some 10,000 of these best soldiers, ranging from twenty-eight to thirty-five years of age. This would be a substantial commencement of a reserve force. The gap in the standing Army would forthwith be filled up by recruits, and each successive year would yield its supply of ten or twelve years' service men to fill up vacancies and increase the numbers of this efficient army of reserve. And the only answer to this plain proposition is, that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War says, "Oh, you would be robbing the Army of its best soldiers." Sir, there is either danger to be apprehended from a foreign assault, or there is not. If there be not, then the whole of the present measure falls to the ground—it has not a leg to stand upon. But if there he danger, then I stand here to learn how the experienced soldier of good character, who, by virtue of that experience and good character, is retained at home in an army of reserve, ready, at four-and-twenty hours' warning, to come forth in his country's defence in the crisis of her greatest danger, can, by any process of reasoning, be said to be stolen from the Army. Why, Sir, he is retained in the Army for the most precious, the most important service that mortal man can render—the defence of his native soil. By his small retiring pension he is effectually retained in the Army for all emergencies, while having honourably fulfilled his twelve years' active service, he is restored to civil life, with a retaining compensation. It is thus that the reward for past services becomes also the guarantee for the finding and the fitness of the instrument of future contingent service. This is, therefore, no robbery of the Army, but the very best means of extending and multiplying its powers and resources. It is making a small army render in peace the service of a large one, and that by the humane and provident means of the pensioner system. A moment's reflection must tell not only every soldier, but every civilian, that the true way to obtain a really efficient reserve or latent military force in a country, is to pass a certain amount of its population, more or less rapidly, through the ranks of the active Army; and that the best way to reward good conduct in that Army, and to secure the finding of the reserve men, is to give them small retiring and retaining pensions. With our redundant and martial population, and with the greatly amended and amending treatment of our soldiers, there is no difficulty in finding recruits. But with the expectation of a small pension after twelve years' service, the Army would probably become so popular that that most desirable object—making dismissal a punishment instead of a boon, would be attained, Still, while many would be glad to marry, and retire thus early on the smaller pension to their early homes and avocations, others, with an acquired affection for a soldier's life, would continue on for their full twenty-one years' service, and its maximum pension. There would thus still be retained in all regiments a considerable number of old and experienced soldiers—a great advantage I fully admit, and enhanced by the fact of this being voluntary; whereas now, all are constrained to continue to serve their full time, in default of which they forfeit all claims to any pension whatever. But, by establishing the two periods of service, and the two pensions, the double advantage would be gained of having a body of willing young men for your army of reserve, and a body of willing old soldiers for your standing Army. Some regulations would be necessary for the rate of pay if called out for any service longer than that of mere drill. It is clearly just that while the soldier's pension is thus treated as a retaining fee, no officer should be allowed to retire on half-pay, under a specified age, without also being attached to the army of reserve. But these are mere questions of detail. That on which I wish to fix attention is, that by this system of half service and half pension we might within this year, and without difficulty or permanently increased expense, obtain 10,000 or 12,000 excellent soldiers of from thirty to thirty-two years of age; and further, that we might thus in a few years augment our reserve force to almost any amount—to the amount of one-half or two-thirds of our whole standing Army. After fifty years of age the men might receive a small additional pension, and be enrolled for ten years longer in garrison battalions, never to be called out except in cases of urgency. Some 10,000 of the more ablebodied of our already enrolled pensioners who are under fifty should be drafted into the army of reserve, and those between fifty and sixty would pass into the garrison battalions. Thus the name of pensioner, which carries with it the impression of something worn out, would cease. Let not hon. Gentlemen think that I am exaggerating when I rate the reserve force so highly. Our Army now consists of 140,000 to 150,000 men of all ranks: if these be renewed every twelfth year (or, making allowance for those soldiers who may choose to serve out their twenty-one years), we may say every fifteenth year, then it is clear that 140,000 or 150,000 must pass through our ranks during that time. But if a deduction of one-half of these be made for deaths, disabilities, and discharges, there will still remain for those twelve years some 70,000 or 80,000 between the ages of twenty and forty-five, available for an army of reserve, and which, mark you, would cost barely any- thing more than the mere fifty shillings per annum for accoutrements and enrolling. Now I beg to ask among the most fervent admirers of the measure before the House, whether these 80,000 prime soldiers, costing less than 200,000l. a year, would not be twenty times more valuable in every respect than your 80,000 militiamen, costing at least 300,000l. a year? But as this army of reserve would be composed entirely of prime solders, it would probably not be necessary to drill them every year, and they might therefore he divided into two corps, to be drilled alternate years, whereby their cost would be considerably reduced, and the 80,000 army of reserve would not cost half of the expense of your 80,000 militiamen. And here I might leave the case. I might ask which you will have—80,000 prime soldiers for 150,000l. a year, or 80,000 no soldiers at all for double the money? That is the question. Have I exaggerated? Have I misstated? Can you pick a hole in my argument? Perhaps you may say, "True, but we want our men for defensive operations now; and you have shown us only how we may have them twelve or fifteen years hence." In the first place, you have not got your 80,000 militiamen yet—I doubt whether you will ever get them, and if you do, that you will maintain them. You may succeed this year with your bounty, and the novelty of the thing; but next year, when the main pull comes, you will be obliged to have recourse to your ballot—to apply the screw, when its head will fly off. At all events you say you will he satisfied with 30,000 or 40,000 this year. Now I have shown you that you may have 10,000 or 12,000 prime soldiers from your standing Army for an army of reserve, as soon as, or sooner, than you can get out and drill your militiamen. But by offering a small pension as a condition of enrolment to already discharged soldiers of good character, and of ten years and upwards service, you might speedily enrol some 4,000 or 5,000 of the good soldiers of this class who are scattered about the country. You may add to these 10,000 or 12,000 of the most ablebodied of your first-class pensioners under fifty years of ago, always at hand, and thus at once place your reserve force at 25,000 soldiers, with whom not one of you can venture to compare the 30,000 or 40,000 undrilled bounty-men. Next year, and each successive year, would bring 6,000 or 8,000 ten years' service men to the ranks of this army of reserve; and as its numbers rose, you would despatch volunteer battalions of it to some of your more important colonies, who would gladly receive and bear the enrolling and other charges of these most valuable military colonists, while you at home would retain a useful control over them by the payment of their pensions. I speak not from hypothesis, but from fact, for this has already occurred in Australia, the Cape, and your North American Colonies. The gradual increase of your army of reserve would thus enable you to withdraw some of your active troops from those colonies, and so lead to a safe reduction of your standing Army. This is an obvious and important recommendation of my scheme, but of which yours is utterly devoid. But independent of these general reasons for operating on your Army for the creation of a reserve force, you must remember that in 1847 you passed the Ten Years' Service Act; and it is highly expedient, if not absolutely necessary, that you should soon take efficient steps for retaining the services, either in the regular Army, or in an army of reserve, of these series of men whose terms of enrolment will commence expiring in 1857, 1888, &c. All these reasons, then, press upon you for organising an army of reserve from your Army—it lies under your hand waiting for development—it is capable of enormous expansion and varied application, and at little or no cost—-and would be ready to start into action at a moment's call. These, then, are some of the substitutes or alternatives which we offer you; but instead of this you say, let us revert to our old constitutional force of a general militia, which you tell us is a step in the right direction. 1s it so, and is your proposed measure a revival of the old national militia system? That was essentially local in its organisation: the men and officers were of the county or shire; they were only temporarily embodied even during war, and were exercised within their own shires; their duties were essentially local: all extra-provincial or general service in other parts of the kingdom were exceptional. The progress of the late war forced on various modifications, which, before its close, changed the character of the militia into that of a second or home army. The consequence was, that in 1808 its former place was actually filled up by the local militia, which was then organised out of the volunteers which 1793 and 1804 called forth; and thus the local militia, which embodied all ranks around their own homes, is the lineal representative of the old militia force of the country. But your militia scheme, taking up the altered general militia of the war, now seeks to effect still further changes, and is about to lay the basis for a permanent home army. It is to be distinct from and totally disconnected in its formation from the regular Army, This is an innovation of which the country should be aware, and should have time to guard against. It was hardly perceptible at first, but its features have crept out under discussion. All local interests and distinctions are abandoned or overridden. The special quotas for the counties are given up; the county or local qualifications are made personal, or surrendered to half-pay officers. County drills may be changed to district or general drills; in fact, little remains but the mere name and inefficiency of militia, and that too, we are told, is to be revived next year. Now let us ascertain what will be the efficiency of this new domestic Home-Office army, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has told us will be cheap, popular, and effective. There are two means of aiding a regular army in case of invasion: first, by reinforcements of regular troops; secondly, by the subordinate co-operation of irregular or half-formed troops, gathered from a general volunteering, a local militia, or other imperfect organisation of a population hitherto unaccustomed to arms. Both these resources are highly useful—both necessary; but they are essentially distinct. The one immediately joins and gives strength to an army, and affords time for the organisation and discipline of the other. Now, one of my principal objections to the present measure is, that it neutralises and confounds these two essential resources, which are valuable mainly by being kept distinct. Your ballot and your bounty will paralyse, degrade, and interfere with the volunteering and patriotic principle of the one; and your broken and imperfect organisation can never reach the military requirements of the other. You assert that it will be an army of reserve. I fear that it will be like the rest of your measures—no better than a miserable compromise. For what are the requirements of an army of reserve, capable of aid- ing us in the event of a sudden invasion? What are those requirements? First, that its men and officers should be essentially soldiers, capable of instantly entering on garrison and field duties as seconds to the regular Army; secondly, that they should certainly be found, and easily be assembled; thirdly, that the force should be permanently sustained, and therefore popular and cheap in its working; fourthly, that it should be allied with, and in harmonious feeling with the Army. Now, Sir, without encumbering the argument with any minor considerations, I ask whether these are not the obvious and essential requirements of a force which should aid our Army in the repulse of the sudden and desperate assault of a disciplined enemy? Now, let us apply these tests to the reserve force you propose: would the men and officers be in harmony with the Army? What would they have in common? Nothing but their red coats, and the irritating fact of having received a much higher bounty for infinitely less hard and less long service. Is it likely to be permanent? Ask your present militia system, that has been a dead or unenforced piece of parchment for thirty years, costing the country more than three millions for no one semblance of service, I will not say rendered, but renderable, during all that long period. Is it likely to be popular with the ballot stamped and rivetted upon it, being, as you admit, its very backbone, and without which you tell us it could not exist? What say the 1,370 petitions against, and one only for it? But, unpopular and inoperative, will the 300,000l. annual expense stand the shock of the economic votes of the next Parliament? Will this convulsive act of a Provisional Government in a dying Parliament be respected? Your measure, therefore, stands little chance of permanence. But will your men be certainly found and easily collected? What hold have you on them? If you could draw your general militia, as you might have drawn your local militia, from a localised resident population, such fulfilment would probably have taken place; but you have inserted a clause admitting quotas from proximate or distant counties. This, in combination with your bounty and substitute money, will obviously attract the unsettled vagrant class; and, without any harsh disparagement of the general mass composing this class, it is obvious that the temptation of poverty, their unsettled habits of life, and faci- lities for evasion and concealment, will cause numbers every year to disappear from your muster-roll. The absurd checks which you have proposed and withdrawn, show plainly that you fear this; while the obvious but necessary feebleness show clearly how unavailing they will be. Let those who have declaimed so lustily upon the fidelity with which your militiamen will return to their annual drilling, explain the necessity for the stern precautions which are taken in your Army and Navy against the desertion of those who come from this very class which will feed your militia. And how will it feed it, if it feed it at all? Why, plainly, its voracious grasp of 80,000 men in two years will be satisfied only at the cost of the necessary recruiting supply of your Army, your Navy, and marines. Your checks on evasion are mere cobwebs. You have no other valid security for the forthcoming of your militiaman to his annual drill, than the offer of some 20s. annual bounty, in addition to 1s. a day pay—offering, in fact, lower wages, including his incidental expenses, than even a Dorsetshire labourer now gets, and yet which you dream will tempt men from employment in a remote part of the kingdom. If this be your sole slender expedient for coaxing your vagrant militiaman to his drill, what security have you, during the forty-nine weeks' intervals of his drills, for knowing where to find him? None whatever. Thus, then, you offer a most slender security for the annual reappearance of your men, and no security at all of speedily finding and assembling them on emergencies. But when, following Mrs. Glasse's advice, you have first caught your man, and dressed him, will he in truth be a soldier? When will he be a soldier? Never. Every one in this House, either directly or indirectly, has declared so. Never; that is, not until you give him such a course of drilling and acting in concert with other troops. as by your Bill, and the very condition of the force, you cannot possibly bestow, What has your Chancellor of the Exchequer said on this subject? He told you on the 6th May, taking the common-sense view of the question, it was madness or misrepresentation to assert that those militiamen would cope with the legions of Algiers or of the Caucasus. True enough, too true; for it is precisely just such legions as those that they would have to contend with; and yet we are told by the leader, in this House, of the Government, proposing this measure—that it was madness or misrepresentation to assert that they could do so. Will the Chancellor of the Exchequer say the same of your regular Army, and of the reserved force of regulars propose to append to them? Will he not say rather, and think it foul scorn to imagine for a moment, that such a force would not be, as it has ever been, competent to meet successfully any legions, come they from the north, south, east, or west, that might be brought against them? By these tests then, and by your leader's own surrender of the case, I ask you to weigh the two measures. On the one hand, you may have at almost no additional expense, and with no interference with civil rights, a force that may commence at 20,000 or 28,000 men, and may expand to 70,000 or 100,000 men, all capable, in concert with your active Army, of meeting any known troops in the world; and, on the other hand, you may collect at considerable expense, by a bounty injurious to the recruiting of our Army, and at considerable interference with civil rights, a force commencing at 30,000 or 40,000, and which by the menace or the infliction of the ballot—that is, by conscription—you, or some reckless Ministry, may augment to double or treble that number, but over which you can have little or no hold, and which your Chancellor of the Exchequer tells you will be of no real use whatever. Of what avail, then, is your measure? Why, the same right hon. Gentleman tells you his 80,000 militiamen would render your regular Army more freely disposable. What a monstrous, cumbrous, and irksome machinery for how simple an end—an end, too, already accomplished! Are we to tempt or to drag 80,000 or even 120,000 untrained or half-and-half trained agricultural labourers and town artisans from their homes and their occupations, their ploughs and their looms, to attempt, behind walls and houses and ramparts, to do very imperfectly that which 30,000 or 40,000 already trained dockyard and reserved battalions can now do much more effectually, and whose number, if need be, could be greatly and cheaply increased by the occasional training of the police, and other local and responsible forces? The right hon. Member for Manchester has well and most truly said, that if an attack really took place, every soldier and every policeman would be available, for the people of every town and hamlet would take their places and do their duty. It is monstrous, therefore, to ask the country to undergo all the expense and vexation of a general arming for the sake of superseding our infinitely preferable and already established dockyard and garrison battalions. If your militia is to be of any use in supplying the supposed gap in our defences by the asserted smallness of our Army, it must be fit suddenly to join and aid that Army in repulsing a desperate and disciplined enemy. If it be not fit for that, it is fit for nothing that cannot be done by a given number of men, at a tithe of the cost and care. But, confessedly, it will not be fit for such service. Your own leader says, it would be absurd to expect it should cope on any short warning with an invader. That word "short" involves the whole question, for, manifestly, if it be not ready in a short time, it will not be ready in sufficient time. I ask the House, therefore, whether we are taking, as has been alleged, a step in the right direction, by authorising the creation of an irksome expensive force, admitted beforehand to be inadequate to the service required? Is it not our duty to postpone the consideration of these defensive measures, that we are told will be no defence at all?—what will be the mischief, what the consequences? It is better to do something, anything—no matter what—than nothing. Let us beware, lest by hurrying into the wrong, we thereby indispose the country from hereafter adopting the right, course. It is now universally admitted that there is no ostensible cause whatever for urgency. The debate and discussion have, though in some respects painful, done much good: they have thrown light on the question, they have cleared away many delusions, false alarms, and false expectations, and suggested many valuable resources. We begin to see how we stand; for though we may have been amused, if not instructed, by the poetical invention by a Member of Her Majesty's Government of a net of French railways connecting the Mediterranean and the Channel, and on which soldiers and sailors, if not three-deckers, were to be wafted, as by a magician's wand, from Algiers and Toulon to Cherbourg and Brest; and, though we may have stared at the stupendous arch with which, with no compliment to our Navy, we were told steam had bridged the British Channel; and though we may have been bewildered with the ingenious dissolving views, by which our home forces narrowly escaped being reduced to minus quantity: yet through all these and other mists and feints of debating ingenuity, there has stood out largely, plainly, and in-controvertibly proved by official documents, and by indisputable Parliamentary Estimates, the one decisive fact—no matter how disposed or disposable—that we actually have at this very moment nearly 70,000 regular troops, cavalry, infantry, artillery, and marines ashore, within the three Kingdoms; that behind these regulars, and capable of setting them free for an emergency, we have of dockyard battalions and first and second class pensioners a garrison force of nearly 40,000; that, independent of these 100,000 men, there are yeomanry, armed and amiable constabulary amongst a thronging and valiant population, all girded in and fenced by a Navy that has never been baffled or discomfited, and which the Prime Minister told you, on his accession to office, was in the highest state of organisation, and which the responsible authorities in this House have admitted to be easily reinforceable by the 1,300 mercantile steamers of our various home ports, all capable of bearing guns, and fed from a mercantile marine, counting 230,000 sailors. Behind these forces we may sleep in peace, reject this Bill, and meditate upon a better. I have no intention to blame Her Majesty's Government for having brought their measure forward in such a hurry: no special blame attaches to them, for they could not well avoid it. They were compelled by political circumstances, new to office, surrounded by innumerable difficulties, and on the eve of a dissolution. As yet only provisional in their existence, with no time for information, counsel, or reflection, it would have been a miracle if they had brought forward a good and efficient measure: they themselves admit that it is only a half measure, an experiment, and that it must be revised in the new Parliament. I repeat, therefore, that in condemning and opposing this Bill, I attach no blame to the Government for its inefficiency. Why will they therefore force it on a reluctant House, and remonstrating country? They may fancy it a nice point of party tactics; but the case is far different with the various independent Members and independent sections into which this House is divided. They who consider that our national defences are incomplete, and require revision, are bound to pause at the last stage, and to ask themselves whether this measure will really add to those defences; whether it will not rather obstruct better measures. Others have gone into this inquiry with a frank and candid spirit, but with little or no previous information, and with no official documents or data on which to rely and deliberate. I ask them, have they risen from this discussion with any appetite for this Bill? I believe no one in dividual member has during all these protracted debates attempted to point out the efficiency and peculiar applicability of the present measure to the end proposed There have been retorts and rejoinders, disquisitions upon peace and war, upon the desirableness of increasing our regular Army and our Navy, and upon the amount and disposability of our forces; but not one word has been uttered to show how the services of these proposed militiamen would be available in the hour of sudden danger, On the contrary, almost every speaker in support of the measure has indirectly condemned it by declaring how much preferable would be an augmentation, even a small augmentation, of our Army and Navy. Sir, they have been shown how they may have a reinforcement of almost any amount of regular troops in an army of reserve, at almost no cost, and with no danger of disbandment. Let hon. Gentlemen who are anxious that something should be done, be satisfied that this question of our national defences has been brought so prominently before the country and the world, that it cannot rest where it is, but is sure of being resumed and solved in the next Parliament. The only consideration now is how it should be best accomplished. Before we blindly rush upon a remedy, why should there not be appointed during the summer a commission of our most eminent military, naval, and official men? Is it not desirable that the various requirements and political and financial bearings of this great question, should be calmly and thoroughly sifted? There are many deep subjects for their grave consideration. The present is at best a mere one-sided, isolated measure; but from the combined deliberations of an adequate commission, we might with justice expect to learn whether a broader basis might not be formed, by an extensive application of the system of reserve forces, for the development and maintenance of our naval and military establishments; whether the appliances of modern art and science, more especially in respect to locomotion, might not be more broadly extended to them; and whether such development and more extensive application of science between the two services might not effect their more intimate co-operation and multiplied strength, more especially in defensive operations; whether advantage should not be taken of the electric telegraph, and of the great junctions of our railways, and more intimate connexions with the coast, and of our arsenals and military stations. These professional subjects might be directed by sound, political, financial, and diplomatic considerations. Would not the measure of a Government prepared during a recess, and resulting from a patient study of the collected information and deliberate report of such a Commission, carry more weight, and be likely to conduce infinitely more to the permanent and sound defence of this country, than the necessarily harsh and undigested measure now before us? There can be no doubt of it. Why, then, are we to take this plunge in the dark? Why such haste to fetter our future proceedings? Let us, therefore, postpone the measure. It will be no triumph to any Opposition, no real defeat of the Government, to defer it to a more fitting time and tribunal—from a dying to a living Parliament—from a provisional to an established Government. We all know the number and remarkable unanimity of public petitions against this measure. This under any circumstances ought to have much weight; but now, when we are on the very brink of a dissolution—of returning to our constituents the powers with which they have clothed us—is it decent, is it becoming, to slam our half-unhinged doors in their faces, and tell them we will legislate in their very despite? For these reasons, and because I sincerely desire a wise revision and adjustment of our national defences, I ask you to pause and give time for calmer deliberation, for a constitutional appeal to your country's opinion, and for the collected information and confidential counsel of your most eminent public men. You may refuse this; you may disregard time, circumstance, and counsel, and you may carry your Bill; but if you do, I fear that while it may delude with a false show of vigour, it will in no degree add to our substantial defences, and after a few years of vexation, expense, and inefficiency, will fall into the disuse and contempt of its predecessor—that old deerepid general Militia Bill which you will thus mischievously revive. I am ashamed of having detained the House so long when there are so many here much more capable of discussing this question; but I will now gladly give place to them by moving that this Bill be read a third time this day three months.

Sir, it is a singular fact, that upwards of two centuries ago a Motion was made in the House of Commons (in 1642), much resembling the present. It was moved in the Long Parliament to this effect: "That this House should consider the condition of the Militia of the kingdom, that such force or army could be drawn together for the defence of the kingdom if it should be invaded;" which was opposed by Mr. Hyde, who said, "There never yet appeared any defect in power, and we might reasonably expect the same security in future." Now, therefore, it appears that even 200 years ago, the same apprehension of invasion existed: in fact, this dread of invasion seems to have been a sort of monomania in the English people for several centuries. The real question seems to be, Does greater danger now exist of our being invaded since the use of steamboats and railways than formerly? The answer is, that no doubt exists that the embarkation of troops, and the assembling of them at any given spot, is more easy now than formerly; it is also apparent that steam vessels can convey troops with greater celerity and certainty than when sailing vessels were in use: so far, therefore, facilities are given to an aggressive power. At the same time, however, greater facilities for defence are found in the country attacked, if possessed of similar means for defence, particularly if they have a superior naval force. The defensive squadron can always meet its opponents; and whatever part of the coast is threatened with disembarkation by foreign troops, can in a few hours be defended by all the disposable military force within 100 miles of the spot. It appears, therefore, that in the present day, the means of defence are increased in a greater proportion than the means of attack. It has, I believe, been stated by the highest military authority in this country that the nation possessed of railway communication may save half its military force, so that 10,000 men will answer the purpose of double that number, by the celerity of their reaching any given spot when required. It does not appear to me that the militia force would be of much service in case of a sudden invasion. Let us suppose that 40,000 men were embarked at Cherbourg, and, as it is asserted, they might (which, however, I deem impossible) be landed in, say, three or four days on the English coast, of what use would the militia be, if not ready and embodied for service? Look at the time required to embody these 80,000 men, to call the officers and men together, to give them their arms, clothing, and accoutrements: by the time all this was done, the invading force, if not opposed by other means, might march over England. If, therefore, your militia is not organised, it is useless on a sudden emergency; if organised and ready, you are keeping 80,000 men at an immense expense, and probably for no purpose whatever. There appears to me to exist a great inconsistency in the Executive Government. Volunteer rifle corps, composed of persons who have a stake in the community, and are therefore attached to our institutions, who would form a very powerful and efficient force, are discouraged, and prevented from forming themselves into either companies or regiments, and yet you are anxious to give power and to teach the use of arms to 80,000 men who have nothing to lose, and who are probably, in great part, persons of idle and often of dissolute habits. One would think the revolution of 1830, in France, and the subsequent one of 1848, would show you the danger of teaching the use of arms to a set of men whose poverty whispers they have nothing to lose, and whose love of money tells them they have much to gain by any convulsion. Entertaining, as I do, a perfect conviction that you are incurring a great and useless expense in the formation of a militia, in time of profound peace; that you are thereby encouraging in the community idle and dissolute habits, injurious to the morality of the people; that this Bill is decidedly not a popular measure in the country; that no possible harm could arise if you postponed the consideration of it to a new Parliament—I shall vote against the measure. If you are sincere in your apprehensions of an invasion, and are anxious for means of defence, increase your Army or your naval forces to a certain extent; particularly depend on the latter, which has for centuries defended you from all foreign attacks, and will, I trust and fervently hope, keep you safe from all external danger for centuries to come.

said, he thought that this measure was very unpopular; but if the safety of the country required such a measure, its unpopularity was no argument against it. Looking at the course that had been pursued by different Governments with regard to the question of a militia—by the Government of Sir Robert Peel—by the Government of the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord John Russell), who actually brought forward a proposition similar in its effect though differing in its details—and by the present Government; and when the responsible Executive declared that such a measure was necessary—he did not feel justified as a Member of the Legislature in rejecting the measure which Her Majesty's Ministers pressed upon the House for the purpose. He was not, however, satisfied with the Bill, as he thought it was not sufficient for the purposes for which it was intended. If there were any alternative proposition, he should vote in favour of that alternative; but he was unable to vote against the only measure that had been laid before the House. On these grounds he should think it his duty to support the third reading. He did not think the regular forces of the country were sufficient for any emergency which might arise. He regretted that the Government had not yielded to the wishes of the country, and struck out the clauses relating to the ballot; and it was his intention to vote for the omission of those clauses; but at present he should give a reluctant vote in favour of the third reading of the Bill.

could distinctly state that public opinion out of doors was against the Bill; and he could not but wonder at the hardihood of Her Majesty's Ministers in going to the country after passing a measure so unpopular. He would assure that House that out of doors no fear of an invasion existed. He would take, as an instance, London; and the proof of his assertion would be found in the fact that the funds were, above par, and that at this moment enormous sums were being transmitted to France for investment, as he could state on authority, in the public works of that country. Never, did he believe, was there a period in history in which France was more desirous of being at peace with this country than the present. The President well knew that nothing would so endanger the stability of his power as a rupture with England; and the policy of the other three great Powers had, especially since the death of Prince Schwarzenberg, been a policy of peace and of compact defence, not against the French President, but against the eventualities of another revolution. In such a state of things, he thought a more impolitic measure had never been introduced into the House. He would maintain that the whole press of this country was opposed to the Bill, although not opposed to an efficient measure for our national defence. In place of this Bill, he would advise an addition to our marine force, which would be a hundred times more efficient than a force composed of bad soldiers and worse citizens. It would be impossible to bring the Bill into operation for a considerable time after the meeting of the next Parliament; and therefore he would call on the Government to abandon the present measure, and to mature a plan which could be fairly considered next Session. Entertaining these opinions, he would vote for the Amendment.

intended to vote against the third reading; and would press upon the House to reject the Bill, on the grounds that it was ineffectual, and was open to the most grave objections. He was willing to admit that the Government had some excuse in the public clamour and in the act of their predecessors; and that they had, in their difficulty, endeavoured to make their Bill as unobjectionable as they could; but that was only a reason why, looking at this Bill, he thought that no measure of the kind ought to be brought forward. In the first place, it was not based on the true principle of a militia. It was based rather on the principle of a regular force than on that of a militia. The measure of the noble Lord the Member for London was based more on the principle of a militia; but he should also have opposed that measure, although, for reasons quite distinct from those which induced him to vote against this Bill. He would admit that there was some argument for increasing our means of defence, in the improvement of modern science, and in the increased facilities of transit; he did not believe that there was any hostile feeling to us on the part of France; and if such feeling did exist, this measure was so inefficient to meet it, that it was a mere waste of money. His objection to that part of the Bill which related to the voluntary system, and raising men by means of bounties, was, that it was a plan for raising a regular force in a most uneconomical and inefficient manner. The effect of the measure would be to render all Militia Bills for ever unpopular with the country. The Bill would give no satisfaction to the country; it would prove offensive to the feelings of the community, and its existence would only throw greater difficulties in the way of producing a really efficient measure in time of need. With respect to the compulsory clauses, he thought a plan could not have been suggested more likely to render unpopular the idea of service in the militia. There was great injustice in the clauses relating to the ballot; as the wealthiest classes, for instance, the House of Peers and the Members of the Universities, were exempted from their operation. He should, therefore, give his determined opposition to the Bill.

said, the strong and paramount objection to this measure in his opinion was, that, though introduced by the Government, it bore upon it the stamp of insufficiency. If the Government could show that further defences were required for the safety of the country let them come forward and make out their case, and the House would afford ample means for them. If an accession to the Army were required, it would be granted, and that would be a course worthy of the country. He would add to the artillery—a branch which he believed would be the great arm in modern warfare. For himself, he believed that some means of defence might be necessary. He was satisfied, considering the advance which science had made of late years, and its application to military purposes, that any future war that might arise would be of such a gigantic character as to throw all past wars into the shade; and really when he heard of such a ridiculous measure as the present being devised to meet the possibility of such, he was reminded of the old lady in the farce, who, on having an insult offered to her, exclaimed—"I would advise you to take care, I have two cousins who are colonels in the militia." He objected to this measure further, that it was not worthy of the times in which they lived. Adam Smith had, in considering the question of national defences, expressed a decided hostility to the militia, which he said Was only the resource of barbarous countries, and that the more civilised men be- came, the less capable were they either of attack or defence by a militia. Since the time of Adam Smith the nation had become more civilised, and the principle of division of labour had been carried to a still greater extent, so that his objection applied now in still greater force. He also objected to the Bill because it contained within itself two other Acts—the 42nd of Geo. III. and the Mutiny Act—by which two obnoxious provisions were thrust upon the Militia—the flogging of the men, and their being billeted upon licensed victuallers. Another reason for opposing the Bill was, that the opinion of military foreigners was against such a means of defence. In the foreign correspondence of the newspapers the other day, the opinion of both Austrian and Russian Generals was cited against the efficiency of a militia force as a means of protection. But he need not go abroad for the opinions of foreign military men—there was not a military authority in this country that he had conversed with, from Sir Howard Douglas to authorities sitting on the other side of the House, who did not confess that in their secret opinion this was an idle measure, and that it would realise the description which Dryden gave of the militia in his day:—

"The country rings around with loud alarms,

And now in fields the rude militia swarms,

Mouths without hands maintained at vast expense,

In peace a charge, in war a weak defence.

Stout once a month they march a blustering band,

And ever, but in times of need, at hand.

This was the morn when issuing on the guard,

Drawn up in rank and file they stood prepared

Of securing arms to make a short essay,

Then hasten to be drunk—the business of the day."

Conceiving, therefore, that this measure would be only the semblance, and not the reality of a defence, he should cordially vote against its third reading.

supported the Bill, which he was the more inclined to do after the explanations which from time to time had been tendered from the Ministerial benches, and especially from the Home Secretary, as to the precautions that were to be adopted with regard to the force. He thought that the Bill would be useful as a means of training the population to arms, which was one of the most satisfactory measures of national defence that could be adopted. He trusted that every care would be taken to enforce such regulations as would prevent the admission of persons of bad character into the force But, in addition to the militia, other considerations had been suggested, which he thought were well worthy of the attention of Government. Among these he thought the suggestion of a small increase to the Army was one of great importance—particularly an addition to the rifle corps, which was a force that required some time to train, while in the time of danger it was most efficient. He would also remark that along the whole of the southern coast an efficient means of protection had been provided during the last war in the erection of Martello towers, and he thought that those towers should be now put in a state of defence, their batteries manned with swivel guns, and housed over, while a few chosen men were appointed to occupy them. This might be done at a very small expense. Then he would recommend that more attention should be paid to our marine. He was surprised to see the efficiency in which the French Government had placed their navy, though they had no commerce to protect, or at least in comparison with England. He thought that seeing such exertions made by Prance for the increase of their naval force, the Government of this country ought to be upon its guard. We had great means of defence available to this country in its mercantile steam force; each vessel might be made to carry one or more swivel guns; and this species of defence would be applicable to all the harbours on the coasts. He had no desire to provoke hostilities with France; on the contrary, he concurred with an hon. Gentleman who spoke early in the debate, that it was not for the interest either of the French nation or the French President to go to war with this country; and he was satisfied that so long as England and France were united, they would be the arbiters of peace or war throughout the world. But with reference to this militia question he would observe that even if the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) and his friends were correct in their anticipations of peace, still no harm would be done by this Bill beyond the expense that was incurred. Whereas, supposing these gentlemen to be mistaken—supposing the late and the present Governments to be right—and supposing the Duke of Wellington—the most pacific statesman as well as the most successful general this country ever possessed—to be correct in his anticipations, then this measure would conduce to the safety of the country. So long as we were assailable, it was the imperative duty of Government to bring forward such measures as they thought necessary for the security of the country; and to neglect to do so would expose them to national infamy. There was one proposition which was thrown out in a former debate by the hon. Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Cobden); he said that this question of national defences ought to be referred to a Select Committee. He (Sir H. Verney) earnestly hoped that this suggestion would not be lost sight of by the Government, and he had that confidence in the candour of the honourable Member for the West Biding, that if he were convinced the country was not now in a proper state of defence, he was satisfied the hon. Gentleman would be the first to come forward and propose additional measures of protection. Upon the whole, though this Bill was not in every respect what he could wish it to he, yet as he believed that the country required defence, and as this was the only proposition for that purpose before them, he would cordially support it.

said, that as he had never offered any vexatious opposition to this Bill, and had opposed it only by a. silent vote, he hoped that, before the measure was finally passed into law, he might be allowed to say a few-words on the subject. For the last five hours hon. Gentlemen had risen to record their opinions against the principle of the Bill; but they had been unsuccessful in obtaining any response from the Government bench; and the hon. and gallant Member for Bedford (Sir H. Verney) seemed to have taken upon himself the defence of the Bill, and the responsibility of passing it into law. He (Mr. B. Osborne) must say, that if there were no other reasons for the measure than those that had been adduced by the hon. Baronet, then the dislike with which the country now regarded the measure, was not likely to be lessened in future. He had never heard a more warlike speech expressed in blander terms than that which was just concluded by the hon. Baronet. Not content with voting for the third reading of this Bill, the hon. Gentleman called upon the Ministers to put the Martello towers in order—to produce the swivel guns that had been laid up since the last war, and then they might laugh to scorn a French invasion. He (Mr. B. Osborne) must say, that he believed no money had been more completely thrown away than that expended in the construction of the Martello towers. He had been obliged to refer to what was said by the hon. Member for Bedford for want of any other arguments in favour of the measure; and, whatever objections he might have to the principle of this Bill, he would confess at once that he did not found those objections on the views and principles of the Peace party in or out of that House; but, at the same time, he hoped he would never be found to undervalue the exertions or to impeach the motives of that truly benevolent body of men. It was very easy to deride the efforts and to laugh at the theories of those men; but he would remind hon. Gentlemen that what they thought so novel and enthusiastic, the products of a distempered imagination, were promoted by some of the wisest and greatest men of ancient times; by no less a person than Plato, and, passing by the Divine Founder of our religion, and coming down to later times, they found that sovereigns like Henry IV. of France, and our own Elizabeth, had formed a plan of general pacification on the same principles; and coming down to a still later period, the great Spanish statesman Alberoni declared that such a scheme was not unworthy of his consideration. Far from depreciating the efforts or the motives of men who not only preached but practised the principles of general benevolence and good will, he concurred with them in opinion that, whoever reviewed the history of our past Continental wars would come to be of opinion with a popular writer, that taxes had been raised not to carry on wars, but that wars had been raised to carry on taxes; and he believed the large majority of that House would not dispute the proposition that the greatest glory of war was only an occasion of taxation, and that the most expensive luxury of the day was a successful general. But at the same time he drew a material distinction between armies raised for the purposes of foreign aggression, and armies for the purpose of home defence; and he would submit to those Gentlemen—if there were any such—who doubted the lawfulness of defensive war, that in the Utopia of the learned and pious Sir Thomas More, though he depicted a society in all the enjoyment of perennial happiness, detesting war, despising glory, and prohibiting alike lawyers and soldiers, neither allowing Martello towers, nor briefs in Chancery; yet even he did not debar the natives of his Happy Island from the use of arms, when their liberties were attacked; but they were allowed to fight in defence of their laws and institutions. Now, he could not imagine that anybody, either in that House or out of it, would be more Utopian than the Utopians themselves. He must say, for himself, that he could not look upon the present state of the Continent of Europe with satisfaction, filled as it was with gigantic armies and with reactionary rulers at the head of these armies; and that the Parliament of this country was fully justified in reviewing the capabilities of the defences of this country, and putting them into the most efficient state. It might he very well, though he could hardly follow the hon. Baronet the Member for Bedford through his medley of Martello towers, rifles, and Louis Napoleon, it might be very well for the hon. Baronet to say that he had confidence in Louis Napoleon. He (Mr. B. Osborne) did not wish to say anything that would trench upon the feelings of the most fastidious Frenchman, but he could not say that he shared in the hon. Baronet's confidence. He thought it was natural that a man who had been raised to power by the military order, should act in accordance with military prejudices. And after all, what did the hon. Gentleman say? I have confidence in Louis Napoleon; but for all that double your Army—increase your rifle corps—man your Martello towers—get ready your swivel guns—but still I have great confidence in Louis Napoleon. It was better to say at once they had no confidence in Louis Napoleon, and they had no right to have confidence in him. He was surprised that no hon. Gentleman had ever quoted in the House the revelation which was made by M. Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies in 1851, which told heavily against Louis Napolecm, and which would amply justify the Government in seeing that the defences that they had—and which he maintained were amply sufficient—were put in a most efficient state. On the 17th of January, 1851, M. Thiers told the French Chamber that in an interview he had with Louis Napoleon, the President said that it was necessary to occupy the public mind in France, and that to do that it would be necessary to undertake some great enterprise abroad which would captivate the attention of the masses, and attach them to the Government. He thought Government must be blinded indeed, if, after that, they did not take every precaution to put the defences of the country in the most efficient state consistent with the large sums of money they voted for that purpose. But in granting that, he thought that Ministers were hound to supply fuller and greater information as to the state of the defences, and of the condition of the Army. Had any statement of that kind been made to the House? They had from year to year enormous estimates submitted, and yet no satisfactory account was ever given of the manner in which the money was laid out. He was prepared to say, that the sums annually voted were quite enough for national defence, without either militia, Martello towers, or riflemen. We might take a lesson from the way in which the French estimates were prepared in 1848, from which it would appear that in one sense the old proverb was true, and that one Englishman was still worth two Frenchmen, for an English soldier was just double the cost of a French soldier. He had the French estimates in his hand, and he would read one or two extracts from them to show that our service was managed in the most extravagant and reckless way, and that we should do well if we took a leaf out of our next neighbour's book. The English Army consisted of 113,287 men, and it cost 9,337,000l. or 82l. 8s. 4d. a soldier. The French Army in 1848 was composed of 338,653 men, and cost 12,183,000l., or 41l. 12s. 8d. per man. But he would go further. What was the number of generals in the English service? We had no less than 117 generals for an Army of 113,287 men, while the French Army, which in 1848 was treble, and was now quadruple the amount of our force, had but eight marshals and 143 general officers. He would take also the staff of the two armies, and compare the proportionate expense incurred. In the English Army the charge for the effective service was 3,270,000l., or about 38¼ per cent upon a total expenditure of 9,337,000l., while the French staff cost but 2,260,000l., which was a charge rather under 19 per cent on an expenditure of 12,183,000l. When, therefore, hon. Gentlemen talked of the country not being in a proper state of defence, he would advise them to look a little into these French estimates; and the House would bear in mind that in this comparison no account whatever was taken of the dead weight. He found also that the French soldiers, being clothed on a system of open contracts, were clothed at 12s. a head less than our own soldiers, though their uniforms were furnished in a country which ought to be the cheapest country in the world for woollen clothing. Another thing which he found was this—that in the French Army, trebling our own in amount, military justice was administered at a cost of 8,000l., while in the English Army it cost 32,000l. When it was known that the French Army was kept in the highest state of discipline and efficiency, at one half of the cost of the British Army, it was clear that there was something amiss in the conduct of our departments. There must be something wrong in all this. There must be some great waste somewhere. The money which the House of Commons voted annually for military purposes could not be laid out to the best advantage, or else why was so great a difference observable in the French estimates and our own? It was true that we spent but 22,000l. in powder, while the French outlay for that article quadrupled that amount; and the French soldier was armed with the Minié rifle, and equipped with every improvement suggested by modern military science, while the English soldier was only supplied with the miserable musket. He repeated that it was evident that something wrong was going on, and that the House ought, before they agreed to the third reading of the Bill, to insist on some better information being given on the subject of military expenditure than had been afforded. He thought that if an intelligent foreigner had come into the House during the debate on the introduction of the Bill, he would have been rather surprised to see the Home Secretary, who was very skilful, no doubt, in the conduct of a Chancery suit, coming forward to propose that 50,000 men should be raised to form a militia. What could the right hon. Gentleman a Chancery Barrister and Home Secretary know about military matters? In saying this, he did not attribute any blame to the Minister of the day; what he found fault with was the system. He thought these matters ought to be in the hands of a War Minister, who ought to be able to explain to the House the condition of the Army, and the nature and extent of our resources. The consequence of the present system was, that the House was about to pass a Bill in a panic, which no one in his heart believed to be of any service, and which the majority of military men, and all civilians, with some few exceptions, believed to be inefficient for its purpose. He said, "with some few exceptions," because he had perceived to-day in the papers an address from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to his constituents in Buckinghamshire—the confiding farmers who believed in him. The right hon. Gentleman recounted in an address those rapid acts of statesmanship for which he wished his Government to go down to the admiration of posterity. The right hon. Gentleman plumed himself on one "as a measure of internal defence, which it is believed"—the right hon. Gentleman did not state his own opinion on the subject—"will soon prove both popular, economical, and efficient." He (Mr. B. Osborne) would take leave to parody the words of the right hon. Gentleman, and to assert his belief that this "internal defence" would soon become an internal complaint, which would prove neither economical nor beneficial. He was very much mistaken if even the confiding farmers of Buckinghamshire did not ask the right hon. Gentleman some more questions about the origin of this Bill. He was rather surprised to find that the right hon. Gentleman should have assumed the parentage of this measure; but he was prepared to prove that he was only its putative father, and that he really had nothing to do with such a miserable abortion. He could prove that the idea was taken by the Home Secretary from a pamphlet written in 1848, by Mr. Frederick Hill, inspector of prisons, under the title of An Economical Defence of England from Internal Tumult and Foreign Aggression—but with the omission of some of its most useful suggestions, an omission which would remind the House of two tolerably well-known lines:—

"Quern recitas mens est, O Fidelline, libellus,

Sed male cum recitas, incipit esse tuus."

Every hon. Member recollected the proposition which the right hon. Gentleman made to give militiamen a vote after two years' service; and they also remembered the most sudden fit of Parliamentary repentance on record, when the right hon. Gentleman came down to the House on the following Monday, and said that he did not mean to give them a vote. There was a great variety of opinion about this movement. Some said that the tendencies of the right hon. Gentleman were democratic; others, that the proposal was a joke of Lord Derby's. But it was no joke at all. He believed that the Government had deliberately weighed the proposal, but it was none of their thunder. He knew where the right hon. Gentleman stole it from. He took it from a speech of Mr. Windham's in 1805, who proposed to induce soldiers to enlist by giving their sergeants a right to shoot game. This Bill bore on its face the marks of hasty compilation. It was a piece of political patchwork, not intended for the defence of the country, but for the political exigencies of a Ministry in its last moments. The country did not want it, it had no belief in it, and, what was more, it would be of no use to the country. There was a perfect apathy about it out of doors, and no one out of the House talked about Martello towers. But then it was said, "Let us have an army of reserve." The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that it was enough to put a man in a red coat, and make him shoulder a musket, to make him a soldier. He should have supposed that he had read Mr. Windham with sufficient attention to satisfy himself that mere numbers were not a sufficient defence of a country. The right hon. Gentleman proposed to raise the militia by giving a bounty, which it was clear would operate most unequally in different parts of the country. In the rural districts it would deprive the farmers of a great deal of labour, probably when they most wanted it; while in the manufacturing districts, where the bounty would be of no avail, the Government must resort to the ballot—a proceeding contrary to the "genius of the epoch," which no statesmen ought to disregard. With regard, however, to this army of reserve, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department told the House with considerable aplomb and confidence, that he proposed to make them efficient soldiers by drilling them for twenty-one days. He was really quite astonished at the simplicity of the right hon. Gentleman. Where had he been living all his life? Had his briefs been so numerous in the Court of Chancery that he knew nothing of the organisation of arms? He defied Her Majesty's Ministers themselves, though he admitted they were active recruits, to acquire a knowledge of their profession in twenty-one days. He admitted that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had shown much skill in performing a rather difficult evolution—namely, changing front in the presence of his adversary. He admitted also that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was very skilful in light-infantry movements, and that he had shown that he knew how to advance and retreat in the budget. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department was rather slow in his movements, but no doubt he would soon improve; and as for the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General, he was an old soldier, who would serve under any officer, and give fire anywhere. But for all, he denied that twenty-one days were sufficient to impart any other military training than the rudiments of the goosestep. This organised force, therefore, would not even be valuable as an "organised hypocrisy;" they would know the worth of it on the other side of the Channel, and put it down as a paper army, and it would be more likely to invite an invasion than to repel it. The right hon. Gentleman went on to propose that after five years' service the militiamen should become émérités, and fall back into the reserve. Was it not clear, then, that the House was presiding at the creation of an irregular horde, who would be more dangerous to their countrymen than to anybody else? Mr. Pitt had been put forward as an advocate for a militia force; but Mr. Pitt's opinion was that the militia should be brigaded, and have a regular staff. But the Government were afraid to ask the country for that. He would remind them that. when a Gentleman who resembled in his amiability and general want of understanding on these points the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department proposed that the militia should be drilled for twenty days, Mr. Pitt said he would ask any thinking man whether it was possible to teach them their regimental duty in that time? He would ask the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control (Mr. Herries), who might have heard Mr. Pitt speak, whether he thought it possible that an efficient soldier could be formed in twenty-one days? He was astonished that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have sought to imitate, not Mr. Pitt, but Pompey the Great, who vainly boasted that he could raise legions by stamping with his foot. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to imagine that he could act as Pompey thought he could; but he (Mr. Osborne) cautioned him that he was more likely to fall to the level of the famous hero in the farce, and that when he had got his 50,000 men he would have to say. "Begone, brave army, don't kick up a row." The whole Bill was in his eyes a miserable abortion; but one clause in it was so obnoxious, that he thought Her Majesty's Ministers, who on the eve of a general election might be anxious for some little popularity, and to consider "the genius of the epoch," would do well not to exempt Peers from the ballot. The exemption was an insult to the aristocracy, because, whatever their faults might be, they had never shrunk from coming forward in the defence of their country; and, therefore, on the part of the House of Lords, he almost felt inclined to resent this insult upon them. Hon. Gentlemen who had spoken in favour of the Bill had appealed to the example set by the American militia in the war of independence; but the Americans achieved their independence not by their militia, but by our mistakes. No man ever made greater complaints, or entertained a greater contempt for the militia, than Washington, In 1776 Washington said—

"It takes two or three months to bring new men acquainted with their duty; it takes a longer time to bring people of the temper and genius of these into such a subordinate way of thinking as is necessary for a soldier."

In September, 1776, after the battle of Brooklyn, Washington, writing to the President, said—

"Our situation is truly distressing…The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off, almost by whole regiments. With the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality."

Again, in December of the same year, Washington, in a letter to his brother, said—

"If every nerve be not strained, the game is pretty well up, owing in great measure to the insidious arts of the enemy, but principally to the ruinous policy of short enlistments, and placing too great a dependence on the militia."

Hon. Gentlemen pointed also to the French National Guard as an instance of what a militia could do; but what did General de Grammont say? He stated that on the 28th of June, 1848, out of 237,000 National Guards of Paris, only 8,000 men could be prevailed upon to muster for the defence of the institutions of the country. He hoped the House would not be led away—not by any eloquence which had been delivered that evening, but—by any fear of danger, to agree to the third reading of this Bill. They were about to do the most inconsistent thing in the world, for they were about to pass a Bill at the instigation of Ministers, in whom no one had any confidence on the Opposition side of the House, and, he believed, very few on the other. He called upon the reasonable portion of the House to pause before it gave its assent to the Bill. If protection for the nation were wanted, it could most readily he obtained from the "wooden walls" of England," and from giving full scope to the development of volunteer rifle corps. He called upon the House, in the words of a late Minister, to pause, lest, while they were taking precautions against a French army, they fell victims to a designing Ministry; and, in conclusion, he called upon the House not to agree to a measure which had been brought forward in the hurried scramble of a party to power, and which had been discussed in the panic of an expiring Parliament.

said, there were two questions for the consideration of the House: first, whether in the present state of the country and of Europe it was necessary to strengthen our national defences; and, next, was the militia the fittest means of so strengthening those defences? The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had referred to the authority of Mr. Pitt and other eminent persons in support of his views; but if the House were to regard authority in the matter, the Bill before the House would not stand without support, for the great Soldier who commanded our Army, and the distinguished General now at the head of the Ordnance Department, concurred with every statesman of the day that at the present time it was essentially necessary to add to our national defences, and that it was by a militia that that addition should be supplied. By the Ministry of the late Sir Robert Peel the necessity was recognised, and instructions were given to prepare a Bill on the subject; and the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) at the head of the late Government thought it necessary to introduce a Bill which, though different from the measure of the present Government in some of its details, distinctly acknowledged the principle of an increase of our defensive force by means of a militia; and it could not be denied that the time had arrived when it was the common duty of Government to bring forward a measure for that purpose. But hon. Gentlemen had that night directed their opposition, not so much against an increase of their defensive force, as against the present measure, and they argued in favour of an increase of the regular Army in preference to a militia. He could understand their argument if the increased defences were asked for after a sudden emergency, or after a declaration of war from France; but at the present time, if the proposal to increase the regular Army had come from Her Majesty's Government, it would have been met by a storm of opposition from the very Members who now brought it forward as a counter proposition. From the Revolution the constitution and legislation of this country had been directed against any increase in the standing Army; and yet it was from those who boasted that they represented the Whigs of 1688 that the argument first came, that if the country was to be defended it should be by an increase of the regular Army. He could not help expressing his surprise at such inconsistency. How long did they think, if such an increase in the standing Army were granted, it would be maintained? In case of the danger occurring which was so justly apprehended, it was on a force like the militia they must rely to man their forts and garrison their towns while the regular Army was in the field. As to the hon. Gentleman's (Mr. B. Osborne's) allusion to the Navy, he must observe that while admitting the great advantage of an efficient Navy, that various casualties, such as adverse winds, orders misunderstood, and various other circumstances, might arise in the critical juncture to expose their shores to hostile incursions, and in such a case the advantage of an organised military defence with the limits of the Kingdom were abundantly obvious. He trusted the amicable relations which now subsisted between us and foreign countries would long continue; but he asked the House to pass this Bill, on the plain principle that the best means of preventing an attempt at invasion was to show foreign countries we were prepared to meet it.

was sure that not a man in the House felt he. could rely on the proposed force with confidence. While talking of the means of invasion which had sprung up recently, they forgot that they had also obtained new means of defence. They could speak to their allies, to Vienna or to the sister country, in one day, and bring all their friends to assist them in case of danger. It could not be denied that the Government were by this measure disturbing the industry of the country. It was an attempt at a species of defence which was calculated to alienate the feelings of the people; while, at the same time, it was a measure that must prove utterly inefficient in the event of an actual invasion. There existed throughout the country an intensity of feeling against the measure, of which the Government appeared to be but little conscious, and he thought that if there were any real danger, the most politic course would be to augment the Army and Navy.

then moved that the following proviso be added to Clause 18, which provided, that where men could not be raised by voluntary enlistment, Her Majesty in Council may order a ballot, namely—

"No member of the Senate of the University of London, nor any examiner, professor, tutor, or lecturer of the said University, or of any college, school, or institution connected with the said University under the provisions of any charter thereof; nor any student of any such college, school, or institution, duly matriculated in the said University, and actually receiving education in any of the said colleges, schools, or institutions; nor any resident member of the University of Durham, shall be liable to serve or provide a substitute for the militia."

said, if they exempted the Universities of London and Durham, they ought likewise to extend the exemption to the members and students residing at St. David's College, Lampeter, and he begged to move accordingly.

thought that the Owen's College, Manchester, which was in many respects a kindred institution to those which it was sought to exempt from the operation of the clause, ought also to be included within the exemption. There was also a large college in the neighbourhood of Manchester, intended for the education of ministers of the Independent body of Nonconformists, as well as several others in different parts of the kingdom. He could not discover any reason why those colleges embraced in the proviso of the hon. Member (Mr. Thornely) should be exempted, and why other colleges of much the same character should be differently treated, especially those where young men were being trained to the Christian ministry.

thought the College of St. Bees stood in the same category with reference to the claim of exemption.

said, that the so-called College of St. Bees was rather a school than a college. With respect to the colleges referred to by the hon. Member for Manchester, they would be exempted in virtue of their connexion with London University.

moved to leave out from the word "enrolled" to the word "whenever" in Clause 18. [Several VOICES: Clause 16.] It was Clause 16 in the original Bill, but it was Clause 18 in the amended Bill. The clause would establish a system of conscription, which ought not to be endured by the people of this country.

reminded the House that the clause had been amply debated in Committee, and a division taken upon it. He put it to the hon. Gentleman, therefore, whether it was worth his while to put the House to the trouble of again dividing upon it. He begged further to remark that in the clause as it stood there was nothing of a compulsory nature—there was nothing which made it obligatory upon the Executive Government to put the ballot in force in case the system of voluntary enlistment should fail. It was a mere permissive clause, enabling the Crown to put the ballot in force in case of necessity. If they left out the clause, they must also leave out the proviso at the end of another clause, which restrained the Government from putting in operation the statute of George III., and that would leave the Government, not with the power merely, but actually under the obligation, to put the ballot in operation, in case they failed to raise the required number of volunteers. He believed, therefore, that the Bill, as it stood, was much more likely to carry out the object in view by leaving a permissive power to Government, than if they compelled them to have recourse to the ballot.

then moved a proviso to Clause 35, to the effect that the ballot should not be resorted to except in time of war, or when the danger of an invasion was imminent.

objected to the proviso. This question had, he thought been finally settled by the division which had just taken place.

said, though the last division had been upon Clause 18, it appeared upon the notice-paper as on Clause 16, and he was sure many hon. Gentlemen had voted under the impression that they were voting on the 16th Clause, which related to the administration of oaths to volunteers. He did not think, therefore, that that division afforded a fair test of the feeling of the House, and he requested the hon. and gallant Member to press his Amendment to a division.

supported the Amendment. The Bill as it stood made the ballot possible at any time and under any circumstances; which was repugnant to the genius of the British constitution and to the age in which we lived. The Amendment, if agreed to, would impose an important and salutary check. He hoped the hon. and gallant Member would take the sense of the House upon the Amendment.

asked the House to consider what would be the effect of the proviso proposed. He understood it was an Amendment to Clause 35; and, that being the case, the effect would be to exclude the miners of Cornwall from the ballot, while the ballot was rendered applicable to every other class of men in the country, He hoped the House would negative the proposition.

desired to know if it were intended by this Bill to leave three months' pay in arrears instead of six months'?