begged to ask the noble Lord the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs the question of which he had given notice. The public was aware, though not through any official source, that a loan effected by the representative of the Turkish Government at Paris was either rejected altogether, or not ratified, and that repayment of the money advanced, with a certain amount of interest, was offered. He did not desire by anything he said to encourage British subjects in speculating in foreign loans. But he wished to ask the noble Lord if he had any objection to state to the House the information that had been received by the Government as to the repayment of the loan, or whether there was any objection to lay the papers before the House?

said, the subject to which the hon. Gentleman alluded had attracted much attention, but he thought the House would agree with him that it would not be expedient to lay upon the table papers relating to it at a period when it could hardly be said that the proceedings had terminated. He had no objection, however, to state in a few words a general outline of the case. It was well known that the Turkish Minister charged with the negotiation of the loan in question had departed widely from the instructions he had received, and contracted in the name of his Government a loan which no judicious adviser of the Porte could have recommended the Porte to ratify. The consequence was, that, after a trifling delay, the Porte refused to ratify the loan, and at the same time immediately announced its intention to repay the portion of the loan already received, together with interest thereon. Further than that, he could only state that from all the information the Government possessed, it appeared that the Turkish Government were acting in a most fair and honourable manner; and they entertained a confident expectation that the affair would be speedily and satisfactorily dealt with.

I beg, Sir, to ask the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, whether any despatches have been transmitted to that Department from the Foreign Office containing information or statistics bearing on the working of the Maritime Laws or the United Kingdom, and if, so, whether he will have any objection to lay them on the table, of the House; also, whether, any inquiries have been made by the Board of Trade of the British Consuls through the Foreign office?

I think, Sir, I had better answer the last question of the hon. Gentleman first. There was a letter addressed from the Foreign Office to the several Consuls, directing them to make returns in the form suggested. Returns from some of those Consuls have been received. There have not been many received in reference to 1850; those received have reference principally to 1851, therefore they do not contain much information that would enable us to make a comparison with respect to what the trade has been at different periods. The hon. Gentleman applies, I suppose, to the indirect trade that has grown up since the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and the returns do not afford much information on the subject. In a portion of the despatches some of the Consuls give an opinion one way, and some another; but they do not contain any facts of importance so far as the returns at pre-sent go. If the hon. Member wishes to see them, there is no objection to put them on the table of the House; hut perhaps he would he good enough to look over them first, and see if they are worth printing.

I wish to ask a question in reference to those Bills for the amalgamation of Railways, several of which, of great importance, are expected to come before the House at no distant period. The question I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman is, whether he has given this subject his consideration, and whether he will be prepared at the proper time to recommend to the House the course best calculated to enable the House to consider the subject with a view to protect the interests of the public and the parties concerned?

The question that has been addressed to me by the right hon. Gentleman can hardly he overrated in importance. I have not had an opportunity, nor has the Department with which I have the honour to he connected, had an opportunity, of knowing anything of those Amalgamation Bills except through the means that are open to the public at large —the Gazette notices. It is from that source alone that I have derived any information. It is quite clear from the notices that many large schemes of amalgamation are contemplated. I have given as much attention to the subject as I have been able, and I think it will be the duty of this House, as far as I can see at present, to appoint a Committee to inquire into the whole subject in a very large and wide manner, and to adopt such measures, either by Standing Orders or otherwise, as will best enable them to meet the urgency of the case. I think, for the sake of the public as well as for the sake of the parties themselves, some means should be adopted to take care that those great steps should not be taken unadvisedly.

I beg, Sir, to inquire of the noble Lord the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, if any steps have been taken for the examination or other test of fitness of candidates for the Diplomatic service of the country; whether there will be any objection to lay a statement of the examination or qualification required before the House; and also whether any qualification will be required from candidates for the Consular service?

The hon. Member for Dumfries, in June last, put to me a question similar to that he now puts, and I then did hope that I should by this time have been able to give to that or a similar inquiry a more satisfactory answer than I am afraid I shall now he able to give. This subject of education for the diplomatic service has engaged the attention of Government for some time past, and a plan has been prepared, which I trust, with some modification, will be adopted, but which is not yet in a state to lay before the House. In drawing out the plan, it was found necessary, or at least desirable, that some other changes should at the same time be made in reference to the junior members of the Diplomatic service, and as those changes involve some increase of expenditure (though not, perhaps, a large increase), it was determined not to include them in the arrangements of the present year. I can assure the hon. Member that the Government have not lost sight of the subject—that it is even now engaging their attention, and that they hope to be shortly able to lay before the House and the country such a plan as I have referred to. With regard to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question, as to whether it is intended to apply any test of qualification to candidates for the Consular service, I beg to say it is not the intention of the Government to apply any such test. To do so would involve an entire change in the system under which Consuls are now appointed. The majority of those persons who entered the Consular service, entered it late in life, or at any rate at an age when it would be difficult to subject them to such a general examination as might he highly proper for young men who had just left school. Many of the British Consuls have been officers in the two services; some have been Members of this House, others are persons engaged in trade: and in none of these cases, but especially the last, would such an examination as the hon. Gentleman proposes be possible. A practical knowledge of commercial affairs, and an acquaintance (which ought always to be required) with the language of the country in which he exercises his office, are sufficient qualifications for a Consul.

I beg, Sir, to ask the noble Lord the Secretary for Ireland whether it be the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose any alteration in the system of national education at present established in Ireland?

I was certainly not aware, Sir, that any intimation had been given by any Member of Her Majesty's Government, that it was their intention to propose any alteration in the system of national education in Ireland, and I am bound to say that it is not the intention of the Government to propose any such alteration. I have further to state that they would view with considerable regret any alteration in that system that would interfere with its efficiency, and deprive the people of Ireland of the benefits of education, which are now so largely extended amongst them. If it shall seem to any hon. Gentleman on either side of the House, either that the object for which that system was originally established has not been fully carried out, or that by an addition to, or the amendment of, any of the existing rules, conscientious scruples might be avoided, and extended spheres of usefulness given to the system, it would be the duty of Government not only to acquiesce but to assist in such an inquiry to the utmost of their power, and to give any proposal that was made of that nature all the care and consideration which the difficulty and delicacy of the subject demand.

I wish, Sir, to put a question to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, with reference to an observation which fell from him on a former occasion as to the sitting of Convocation not being continued with the sanction of the Government. The question I have to ask is, whether, as we perceive the Convocation is postponed to February next, the sitting is then to be resumed, or whether it is adjourned in the usual way?

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for asking the question, because I think a misunderstanding has prevailed with reference to the onduct of the Government as regards the Convocation, and the mode of proroguing it. Now I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that the usual course observed with reference to the Convocation is to leave it, not to the Crown, but, according to law, to the Archbishop of Canterbury, either with or without the consent of his brethren (for that is a question that is not yet determined) to prorogue Convocation when the Address is presented. That course the Government has not interfered with, nor could the Government be required to interfere at all unless the licence of the Crown was required, permitting them to meet to make canons or ordinances, or continue their sittings for such a purpose as that. What I said the other night was, that the Archbishop of Canterbury had never made any application with reference to this subject, either to me or the other Members of the Government, and, as far as I am aware, that statement is perfectly correct. Until to-day I never saw the Archbishop of Canterbury on the subject. I stated, also, what is perfectly true, that, as far as I am concerned, I was determined never, on the part of the Government, to allow any deviation from the usual course relative to the sittings or powers of Convocation. The Government has strictly and steadily adhered to that determination. I have taken no part whatever in the matter, nor was I likely to be called upon to do so unless the Convocation required the licence of the Crown, or unless I had reason to believe that a different course of conduct was about to be pursued from that which was pursued on previous occasions. The only deviation that has taken place on the present occasion is this—that the Address has been debated upon three days instead of upon one, and that a Committee has been appointed. The Government had nothing to do with the appointment of that Committee. The Government could not interfere. [Sir JAMES GRAHAM intimated dissent.] My right hon. Friend shakes his head. But I think I am right. If I am wrong, it is from some misconception of the power of the Government which the novelty of the subject may have thrown some doubt upon. To the best of my belief, however, the Government has no power to interfere at all until it comes to a question of prorogation. That question could not arise before the Address was answered, and the Address, as yet, has not been presented. Great interest has been manifested on this subject; and, therefore, perhaps I may be permitted to add, that after much thought I have formed a deli- berate opinion upon it, and I can assure the House that, so long as I have the honour to hold the office I now hold, nothing will induce me to advise the Crown to grant a licence to Convocation to make canons. I have never made that declaration before, because I have never been called upon to make it; but I make it now, that there may be no misunderstandings, for I entertain that opinion in the strongest manner, firmly believing that nothing would be so detrimental to the Church of England, or so likely to create divisions in that Church, as to revive Convocation for such a purpose.

I beg to give notice, Sir, that on Tuesday, the twenty-third, on the Motion of the hon, Member for Wolverhampton, I will move a Resolution by way of Amendment, expressed in this language: —

"That this House acknowledges with satisfaction that the cheapness of provisions, occasioned by recent Legislation, has mainly contributed to improve the condition and increase the comforts of the working classes; and that unrestricted competition having been adopted, after duo deliberation, as the principle of our Commercial System, this House is of opinion that it is the duty of the Government unreservedly to adhere to that policy in those measures of Financial and Administrative Reform which, under the circumstances of the Country, they may deem it their duty to introduce."

Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated, at the commencement of the Session, that no recent information had been received from the Cape of Good Hope; but that he expected to receive information of a favourable nature, and gave us hopes of a termination of hostilities. I perceive that more information has since been received, and no doubt despatches have been received by the Colonial Secretary. I therefore venture to ask the right hon. Gentleman what is the nature of those despatches, and how far they support the hopes he held out to the House? I perceive, likewise, by the intelligence from the Cape, that some dissatisfaction has been caused by the non-arrival of the Constitution; and if it be convenient to the right hon. Gentleman, it would be desirable if he could now make an explanation regarding it.

Sir, in an- swer to the first part of the question of the noble Lord, I am very happy to be able to say that the recent intelligence from the Cape has very much, if not entirely, confirmed the favourable view I held out at the commencement of the Session, and to which the noble Lord has just referred. Perhaps I cannot better put the House in possession of the extent to which the information is really favourable than by reading a few words from the despatch of General Cathcart conveying the intelligence:—

"I might now almost report that the war is at an end; but, although characterised as a war, it has been, in fact, a rebellion. A war may be terminated by the surrender or capitulation of the hostile sovereign or chief, who answers for his people, but in the suppression of a rebellion the refractory subjects of the ruling Power must all be chastised and subdued. This has nearly been accomplished, and military occupation must keep them in subjection; but as it is difficult to define the origin or nature of this war, if it be considered as a war, so it is difficult to define the time when peace may be considered to be restored."

In confirmation of that report of General Cathcart I may mention that Macomo, one of the principal chiefs, has been expelled from the Waterklooff, and though he has not yet surrendered, he has been driven to the Amatola mountains, with Colonel Eyre in pursuit of him. The Hottentot leader Uithalder, is, I believe, still in the Amatolas, where his followers are reduced to a very few in number, and that he is in a difficult position, though the latest accounts do not refer to him in any particular manner. I hope this intelligence will be satisfactory to the House, and that the House will see that I was not too sanguine in my recent anticipations. I shall proceed now to answer the second part of the noble Lord's question respecting the dissatisfaction which he says is felt at the Cape in consequence of the non-arrival of the Constitution. I feel that this question is one of interest both in this House and in the Colony, and I hope the House will indulge me if, in answering the question, I enter into some explanation as to the conduct which the Government has pursued, and their reasons for that conduct. Up to this time Her Majesty's Government have not thought it to be their duty to confirm the Constitution; but I beg to add when I say that, that I feel extreme regret that they felt themselves obliged to take that course. I think the conduct of the Government in the last Session, with regard to New Zealand and Australia, proves that we have no indisposition to trust our colonists with the power of Self-government to which Englishmen are accustomed, and to which they have a right to look. On the contrary, they are most anxious to see the principle extended; and with regard to the Cape of Good Hope, I most distinctly admit that the faith of the Imperial Government has been so strongly pledged to grant free representative institutions to that Colony, that the question of granting those institutions must be only regarded as one of time. The House, however, at the same time must admit that, considering the particular position of the Cape Colony at this time, and the great changes that have taken place in the state of that Colony since the free Constitution was proposed and decided upon, it is a case in which it is the duty of the Government to exercise great caution and deliberation. We might, no doubt, have caught a passing cheer from this House by coming down last July and stating that the Constitution, from the state of that Colony, should be at once conceded; but, irrespective of other considerations to which I must hereafter briefly advert, we found that in the Constitution which came over from the Cape last July, the important question of the franchise was surrounded with new and unexpected difficulties. The House is aware that the Constitution ordinance was sent out by Earl Grey, and that the Council at the Cape Was called upon to decide on that Ordinance. The House is also aware that when the Council at the Cape took that Ordinance into consideration last February, an Amendment was moved and carried very much raising the proposed franchise. Of this the House is aware; but the House is not aware that subsequent to the passing of that Ordinance of the Council, it was discovered, from the opinion of the Attorney General of the Cape of Good Hope, that the franchise sent out by Earl Grey in the Constitution ordinance, instead of being, as it was supposed to be, a very liberal, comprehensive, and widely-extended franchise, restricted in fact the elective franchise more than the Amendment that was carried. When the question of the Constitution was discussed by the Council at the Cape, it was proposed that every person occupying property of the value of 25l. for twelve months should have the franchise. A secession from the Council took place, and the four seceding Members drew up a plan of Constitution. In their plan of a Constitution it was laid down again that there should be a property franchise of 25l.; and in illustration of the light in which the franchise was viewed at the Cape, they stated that it was intended to extend the franchise to every coloured man at the Cape that was neither a vagrant, a pauper, nor a criminal. It was intended for a very extensive franchise—-it was regarded universally at the Cape as a very extended franchise, and that the object of it was to embrace the coloured population; but the franchise sent out by Earl Grey, instead of being a property qualification of 25l., required the occupation of buildings of the value of 25l. Last February the Council discussed the question on the Understanding that it was an extended franchise; and it was only after the Amendment was proposed and carried, that on the construction of the Attorney General at the Cape, it appeared that it was not so liberal a franchise as was supposed. The Attorney General was called on to put his opinion in writing, and he did put the opinion in writing, that it was a very limited, instead of a very extended, franchise. The House will perceive that the Government thus found themselves placed in an unexpected difficulty; they had three questions regarding the franchise before them—the original franchise, the amended franchise as altered by the Council, and the Attorney General's construction of Earl Grey's franchise, differing from the others. Looking to the extent of the population at the Cape, and the peculiar state of the Colony, I very naturally inquired for some statistical information under these circumstances. I naturally inquired what would be the effect of the franchise on the population, and I found there was no statistical information in existence. I found no person could tell me how many persons would be admitted to the franchise under the various denominations, and with regard even to the population the greatest difference of opinion existed. I wrote, therefore, to Lieutenant-Governor Darling for information, and from him I have received an answer, dated the 9th of October last. He says—

"Your observations With respect to the 252. franchise are undoubtedly just. I believe that the limitation which the Attorney General, when called upon for his written opinion by me, assigned to that franchise, is not generally received, or by any means known, in the colony. But it is the view which, if words have any meaning at all, must have been attached to it by all who have paid any attention to the language of the clause. So inaccurate is our statistical information, so various the tendency of that which I obtain from individuals, that I cannot as yet come to any satisfactory conclusion as to which franchise would, upon the whole, admit the greatest number of the labouring population."

This state of things involves us in considerable difficulty. We have further to consider the character of the population at the Cape, and here, again, we have no statistical knowledge; but I observe, from an approximation to it, that if the population were divided into six parts, it would be found that one-sixth were British, two-sixths Dutch, and three-sixths, or one-half of the whole, coloured people. Since it was determined to grant this Constitution, a considerable number of those coloured people were in arms against the Crown. Under these circumstances we must exercise the greatest caution in deciding the important preliminary step of the settlement of the franchise. We must either alter the Ordinance so as to bring it back to the original property qualification, or confirm Earl Grey's plan, which would be, in fact, a delusion on the Colony, or adopt the Amendment. We, therefore, experience considerable difficulty in establishing free institutions in a Colony where there are various races and a large body of people. I think the House will admit that this ground alone affords sufficient reason for hesitation on the part of the Government; but, in addition to this, I must beg the House will recollect that, by the occurrence of late affairs at the Cape, most important questions have arisen, and wait for discussion, with regard to the future government of that Colony. We shall have to decide whether the Orange territory shall be retained; we shall have also to decide as to the eastern boundary of the Cape, as to the whole state of the Government, and as to whether the Colony shall be divided into two Governments, On this subject I thought it to be my duty to communicate with the Governor of the Colony, and I have only received an answer by the late mail. The House will recollect that every one of those questions bears closely on the question as to the shape in which the Constitution should be granted. I have further to remind the House that the Governor of the Colony is engaged in prosecuting the war; and I have the authority of the noble Lord himself in 1851, when referring to Sir Harry Smith, that while the Governor is employed in performing his duties as a general, it is impossible for him, as Governor, to assist in bringing the Constitution into operation. For these reasons, and as the Governor has not sent the report which Earl Grey called for, we thought it our duty to pause for further information; but I beg distinctly to say that we are prepared to grant a free Constitution to the Cape Colony as soon as we think it can be done with a due regard to the interests of the Colony and our duty to the Crown.

After the statement just made by the right hon. Baronet, I feel it necessary to ask some further questions. The first question I have to ask is, whether that opinion which he has stated with regard to Earl Grey's proposed Ordnance has been given only by the Attorney General of the Cape, or whether that opinion has been confirmed by the law officers of the Crown in this country; secondly, whether there was not reserved in the Ordinance sent out to the Cape a power to alter the original Ordinance, or the Ordinance that came from the Cape after the Constitution had been received here; and, lastly, whether, in the present state of affairs, the right hon. Gentleman has any objection to lay the papers relating to the Constitution before the House?

Sir, my answer to the first question of the noble Lord is, that I have not taken the formal opinion of the law officers of the Crown, but I have submitted the question to the highest law authority in the country, who states he has no reasonable doubt that that is the proper construction of the clause. In reply to the second question, the Ordinance does, I admit, contain that power; but I think the explanation I have given must show the noble Lord that until we have more statistical information, and are better prepared for the whole policy we should adopt, it would not be well to exorcise that power. In answer to the third question, I have no objection to lay the papers on the table.

was about to rise to bring under the consideration of the House the petition of the Electors of the Borough of Derby, when

I think it right to direct the attention of the House to what I consider an informality in this petition, and if the House shall be of the same opinion, it will not be competent for the hon. and learned Member for Southampton to pro- ceed with his Motion. I wish, in the first place, to call its attention to a clause in the 11th and 12th Victoria, which declares what shall he deemed an Election Petition. This clause enacts that every petition presented to the House of Commons within the time from time to time allowed by the House for receiving Election Petitions, complaining of an undue election and return of any Member of Parliament, or that no return had been made, and which petition shall he signed by some person who had voted, or had a right to vote, at the election to which it related, shall be deemed an Election Petition. Now, this petition begins by stating—

"That your petitioners are electors of the Borough of Derby, and voted at the last election of Members to serve in this present Parliament for the said Borough."

It contains another allegation, namely—

"That the return of the said Thomas Berry Horsfall was procured by illegal and corrupt means, and by an organised system of bribery, which was resorted to, and successfully carried out, for the purpose of procuring, and which did procure, the said return."

And the prayer of the petition is as follows:—

"Your petitioners therefore humbly pray your Honourable House to institute a full and searching inquiry into the allegations of this petition, and into the proceedings of the said Right Hon. William Beresford, with reference to the last election for the Borough of Derby."

Now the question is, whether this allegation—

"That the return of the said Thomas Berry Horsfall was procured by illegal and corrupt means, and by an organised system of bribery, which was resorted to and successfully carried out for the purpose of procuring, and which did procure, the said return,"

should not be considered as an allegation complaining of an undue return for the Borough of Derby, in which case the petition would be an Election Petition, as defined by the Statute.

Understanding, Sir, that you entertain a strong opinion upon the point of formality, which you have stated to the House, I should not be inclined to struggle against that opinion; but it strikes me that inasmuch as the prayer of the petition is not to make void the return, and inasmuch as the bribery that is alleged is not stated to have been committed by the sitting Member, or by any person for whose acts the sitting Member would be responsible, this petition, it strikes me, does not come with- in the clause of the Act. At the same time, I think it will be a great pity to take up the time of the House in discussing a question of that kind; and if, Sir, you entertain that view, I will withdraw my Motion—for I have not the slightest wish to press it forward against your opinion—and will leave the petitioners, if they think proper, to present another petition.

said, he begged to state, on behalf of his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, that he (Sir J. Y. Buller) was quite prepared on his part to go into the case now, unless Mr. Speaker ruled that the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir A. Cockburn) could not be entertained by the House.

If the House allows the debate to proceed on this petition, it will really have received a petition which it ought not to have received at all, because the Act states that no election petitions can be received by the House unless they are endorsed by the officer of election recognizances, who must state that the recognizances had been properly entered. Now, if this petition comes within the definition given in the Act of an election petition, then it ought to have been endorsed by the officer of election recognizances; and as it has not been so endorsed, I do not think it ought to have been received; and I am of opinion that the House cannot proceed with the debate.

This, then, being your view, Sir, as I said before, I will not struggle against it, but will withdraw my Motion. But I do think these petitioners are bound to give the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War an opportunity of clearing himself of the charges that have been brought against him; and, therefore, I hope the parties who presented this petition—having failed from the informality which you have pointed out—will not hesitate to come before the House again with the least possible delay.

It is unnecessary for me, after what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, to add a word. I merely rise to say, I think it would be inexpedient to act contrary to the regulations of the House on such an important subject. But I think there will be no difficulty in devising some means by which a full and speedy inquiry shall be given to it, and I think that must be the wish of every Gentleman on both sides of the House.

moved for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the procedure in the Superior Courts of Common Law in Ireland. The Preamble of the Bill recited—

"That it was expedient to simplify and amend the course of procedure as to the process, practice, pleadings, and evidence in the Superior Courts of Common Law in Ireland, so as to make the same less dilatory and expensive, and to prevent substantial justice from being defeated by reason of the variety of forms of action, the technicalities and prolixity of pleadings, and the unnecessary length of records; and to consolidate the provisions of several statutes and rules of Court relating to such proceedings, and also to enable the Superior Courts of Common Law to give effect to certain legal rights and just defences, so far as might be, without the expense and delay of a resort to a Court of Equity."

The necessity for a reform like that proposed by the Bill he now had to ask permission of the House to bring in, was obvious and pressing. The Legislature, in its wisdom, had created County Courts throughout England and Ireland, and made the procedure in those Courts short and inexpensive. Now, in his humble judgment, the reform of the Courts of Law had begun at the wrong end; but as the County Courts were established, and had distributed justice to the satisfaction of the public, our duty was to preserve, and if necessary to improve, them for the purposes to which they were designed. The great fact was, that at present there were two classes of tribunals in Ireland—-one administering cheap justice, with a jurisdiction extending to 40l.; and the other set of tribunals, of superior structure and excellent design, administering justice in cases involving the amount of 4l., at comparatively a dear rate, and in comparatively a cumbrous method. It appeared to him that these two systems, acting on opposite principles and practice, could not exist; and nothing remained to be done but to reform the Superior Courts of Common Law on a comprehensive plan, and in accordance with the wants of the public and the spirit of the age. The House was aware that in the County Courts the question at issue between the parties was brought to a hearing by a short and simple plaint. But the case was far different with respect to the proceedings in the Superior Courts of Common Law. There we had the writ, which gives the defendant no information; and the appearance, which gives as little to the plaintiff; then the plaintiff's declaration, which must be adapted to a particular form of action, told the defendant nothing; and, next, the plea of the general issue by the defendant told the plaintiff nothing; and other proceedings followed, which left the parties as little acquainted with the case as if there had been no pleadings at all. Sometimes there was what was termed in law a replication; then there might be a rejoinder, and afterwards in succession a surrejoinder, rebutter, and surrebutter. At any part of the series of proceedings a demurrer might be put in, which would have the effect, as classically expressed, of hanging up the suit for twelve months. But, supposing the issue of fact to be joined by the parties, the whole of the proceedings must then be transcribed on a formidable roll of parchment, which was called the record, although all the pleadings were recorded already; and this record was stamped, tied up, and despatched to the Judges' Registrar before the trial. The Registrar never looked at it, the Judge followed the same course, and the counsel on either side never read it; the ends of justice being satisfied by a short and simple abstract of the proceedings, which was prepared by the junior counsel, and handed to the Judge for his information. If the counsel adverted to it, he did so only for the purpose of tripping up his adversary on some formal and technical point. One question, then, to be decided was, what was the use of continuing this costly and utterly abortive proceeding? Lord Brougham, in his speech on Law Reform, delivered in that House, and which led to so many important and valuable results, truly said—

"I regret to say that the last century and a half has witnessed great and prejudicial alterations in the original plan of pleading, so that the record, in the great majority of cases, instead of exhibiting a plain view of what each party is prepared to prove, contains an endless multitude of words, from which, if the real matter in dispute can be gathered at all, it is only by guesswork, or by circumstances out of the record, relating to things of which he gives not even a hint."

He then added—

"Of the circumstances peculiar to the transaction, the pleadings tell the defendant nothing, they tell the counsel nothing, they tell the Judge nothing. It may be said that the defendant must know the cause of action himself; but that does not always follow, especially if the allegations are groundless. There is, however, one person who must know the cause of action, and that is the plaintiff. He ought, for the satisfaction of all concerned, to state it distinctly."

It sometimes happened even that this expensive record was framed and drawn up on a wrong issue, and the Judges could then do nothing hut direct a re-pleader. In addition to this, there was, moreover, a large class of minor evils—uncertainty in pleading and other matters—all leading to great expense, and consequently to a denial of justice; and it must he remembered, that the plaintiff is compelled to select at his peril a particular form of action, and to describe it by the right name. His purpose on the present occasion was, if possible, to reform these abuses. He objected to the present system, because the steps in the cause were too many, and he thought they ought to be made fewer, and the proceeding rendered cheaper. He objected, next, to the falseness of pleas— injurious alike to morality and justice—to a lengthy record of matters already recorded, to the triumph of form over substance, of technicality over truth. He objected also to a suitor being driven like a shuttlecock from a Court of Law to a Court of Equity, and being sent to Chancery to be enabled to go to Common Law. He objected to the anomaly that some debts were assignable at Law, others only in Equity, and insisted that a remedy should be applied to these abuses, and that to be satisfactory, the remedy should be searching, cheap, and comprehensive. He had now sketched the evils which existed, and his objections to them. What were the remedies? He first wished the House to consider the principle of this Bill, and then to see what difficulty there would be in carrying it out. Its leading principle was to assimilate the procedure of the Superior Courts of Common Law in Ireland to that of the County Courts, so that justice might be done simply and cheaply; and, if that end were attained, it would recommend the venerable tribunals of the country to the confidence of the people. Now, there was an ample supply of materials for a measure of practical Law Reform, 1st, There was the procedure of the County Courts of England; 2nd, the procedure of the County Courts of Ireland; 3rd, the Act for the Regulation of Civil Procedure in Scotland; 4th, the Report of the Commissioners on the Common Law Procedure of England; 5th, the Act for the Amendment of the law in England passed last Session; and, 6th, he was not afraid to add, the American Code and the Report of the Commissioners of the State of New York. The first head of any great measure of reform was to abolish all distinctions as to the form of action. At present there were eight or nine different forms of action. For instance, Breach of Duty might be converted into Breach of Covenant, and Breach of Covenant into Breach of Duty. The value of retaining these forms would be discovered by the recollection of the great case of the squib. A party at a fair fired off a squib—it fell on some gingerbread. Another party near at hand took it up, and threw it at a third; it struck him in the eye, and he lost his sight. He brought his action of trespass against the party who fired off the squib. The jury gave him a verdict for damages; but a question arose on the form of the action. A reasonable person would have supposed that the substantial question was whether the plaintiff had lost his eye by the act of the defendant. But, no, said the lawyers, that is immaterial; the real question is, whether it should be called an action of trespass vi et armis, or an action of trespass on the case, and it was contended that it must be an action on the case, because the squib had first touched the gingerbread. Sir William Blackstone exhausted his learning in proving that the unfortunate man who had lost his eye was entitled to receive nothing, because his action was brought in an improper form. The learned Commentator failed in his attempt; but his argument [ought to have mitigated his eulogium upon pleading. That was an English case. He would now give an Irish one of the same nature. A priest was travelling outside a stage-coach; a race took place between that and a rival coach, and the horses ran away. The priest was alarmed — he threw himself off the coach, and broke his leg. He brought his action for the injury; but the pleader unluckily called it by a wrong name —he called it trespass. It was argued that it was an act of necessity—that the priest threw himself off to save his life. On the other side it was said he had not been struck—that the act was his own; and, because he would not remain on the coach and lose his life, to settle the point of law, his action was held to be wrong; and he not only lost his leg, but his damages also. These cases might be multiplied, and showed the mischievous effects of retaining technical distinctions in forms of action. The Commissioners for the Improvement of Common Law Procedure had recommended their abolition, and a clause to that effect had been introduced into the Bill for England. The House of Lords, however, struck out that clause; and although, when the Bill came to this House, the hon. and learned Attorney General had done all he could to improve it, yet that portion of it had been lost to the public. Possibly their Lordships preserved the forms of action, because the English Bill preserved the system of special pleading with which those forms were interwoven. To meet this difficulty he proposed to abolish both. The next step of reform, therefore, after abolishing the distinction in forms of action, was to abolish what was technically called special pleading. He wished to have distinctly stated the ground of action on the one hand, and on the other the ground of defence; so that each might be intelligible to every man—stated in the language of the people—who ought to understand the language of the law. For that purpose forms of plaint were given in this draft of a Bill; but a literal adherence to them was of no consequence, provided the substantial ground of action were stated. This was the principle acted upon in the County Courts of Ireland every day. The great end of all special pleading was to eliminate an issue—to ascertain the true question to be tried in the fewest words; and this valuable principle was carefully preserved by the proposed measure. The Bill further provided, that the plaintiff should supply an abstract of the issue to be tried. If his adversary disputed the form or substance of the issue proposed, he might take the opinion of a junior Judge of the Court, at the risk of costs, if his objection was frivolous, and the question stated in the abstract was to be taken as the question to be tried. A simple question was now buried under a mass of papers which might be stated in a very small compass. They had an instance of this in the books of 2,000 folios of pleading, irritating the Judges so that they asked counsel in Court to settle the issue. They did so on a quarter of a sheet of paper; and he believed that almost every question to be tried might be as concisely stated. What was the use of a record except as stuffing for the attorneys to make their brief? Again, he objected to the number of steps in a suit, and he proposed that process should not only call upon the party to appear in Court on a certain day, but should also tell him why he was so called upon, and should state concisely the cause of action. The declaration as a separate step was useless. So, on the other hand, he proposed that the appearance and the defence should be combined in one. The next important question was whether or not the pleadings should be verified, and how? This Bill contained a new principle, and that was that the plaintiff should verify his plaint by a short affidavit to the effect that he believed what he had stated was true; and that the defendant should in like manner verify his pleading in defence. At the present clay there was no check or limit to false pleading. Sugpose an action were brought for payment of a bond. The pleas set up might be that the bond was not given—that was lie the first; that the bond was paid on the day required —that was lie the second; that the bond was paid after the day—that was lie the third; that a release was given —and that was lie the fourth. All that was the flourish of the pleader; but he proposed that the pleading now should be tested by the oath of the defendant. It was nothing but a revival of the ancient system of pleading in this country, which was bottomed on truth (formerly if a man denied his deed falsely, he was fined and imprisoned); and it had been recommended and adopted in the Code of Civil Procedure in New York. Upon that subject the Code contained the following admirable passage:—

"Ought these solemn allegations of the parties, which are called pleadings, and which set forth the cause of action and defence, to be verified or not? The solution of this question depends upon two others—first, whether a party should be allowed to aver what he does not believe; and, second, whether there be any better test of his belief than his own affidavit. Both questions admit of easy answers. There are several reasons why a party should not be permitted to aver in a court of justice what he does not believe. First, the courts are, or should be, schools of morals. It becomes them to sot virtuous examples. Of all the institutions of society, Courts of justice should be the most sacred to truth. Whenever, therefore, they sanction, connive at, or open the door to untruths, they falsify their own professions, and become the corrupters rather than the teachers of mankind. Second, men should be protected, as far as possible, against false charges. It is signally unjust that any person should vex another with a claim founded upon statements which he does not believe.…What sort of protection does it afford if it allows these rights to be assailed by every adventurer, even though he furnishes not only no security against his misconduct, and no proofs of his charge, hut no test of his sincerity—not so much even as his affidavit of belief in it? Third, lawsuits are a disadvantage to society at large. They require a large array of public officers. They require the attendance of citizens, either as jurors or as witnesses, to the detriment of their own affairs. It seems, consequently, most fit that a check, at least as great as this, should be interposed to the prosecution of frivolous or factious lawsuits. Fourth, if the party be not confined in his pleadings to what he believes, no adequate reform in pleading can ever be effected.… If, then, it be clear that no party should he allowed to aver in a court of justice what he does not believe, the remaining inquiry is, whether there be any better test of one's belief than his affidavit? Here there seems no room for question. The oath is the universal test applied to the consciences of witnesses. If it be good for the witnesses, it is equally good for the litigants."

He would now explain why it was that this Bill contained 274 clauses. The Bill brought in for England by the hon. and learned Attorney General, who had bestowed on it all the care and anxiety possible, had been considered defective in some respects by certain Societies in the metropolis for the amendment of the law. In order that the present measure might obviate one of those objections, it was a measure of codification and condensation. All the Acts which had been passed for the amendment of the law as to pleading, practice, and evidence in Ireland, had been condensed and concentrated into this Bill; and if Parliament should accept the new procedure contained in it, the new procedure was made to apply to all those useful statutes which previously existed. Another reform proposed was, to abolish the necessity of personal service of process. By the County Courts Act of Ireland, service was not required to be personal on a debtor; it would be sufficient if process were served upon any member of his family, as pointed out in the Act, and a similar rule prevailed in the Court of Chancery. Why, then, should they insist on a different rule in serving process of a Court of Common Law? By this Bill the system of substituted service was adopted without the expense of applying to the Court to allow it. He now approached a subject of some importance—the equitable jurisdiction of Courts of Common Law. He was quite aware of the distinction that existed between the Courts of Equity and the Courts of Common Law; that the former dealt with complicated questions, arising between many parties, while in the latter the simplicity and directness of the ancient Common Law were applied to determine a precise question arising between the plaintiff and defendant upon the pleadings. But while he admitted that it was impossible to unite Law and Equity with the present systems of procedure, yet, on the other hand, he thought it was perfectly possible to remove many obstructions that now prevented the free action of the Superior Courts of Common Law, and the necessity of applying to the Court of Chancery for the purpose, so that one tribunal might do complete justice between the parties. First, then, he proposed that choses in action should be assignable at law. He proposed to make every form of debt assignable at Common Law as they were in Equity. Assignments, he proposed, should be registered in an Office. He was not without an authority, and a strange authority, upon this subject—that of Oliver Cromwell. In 1654 a Commission was appointed by the then House of Commons to consider the best mode of reforming our laws; and on that Commission sat Mr. Oliver Cromwell and Mr. Mathew Hale. He trusted that what had been recommended by such great authorities would not be considered as a rash innovation. He next proposed to deal with cases of lost bonds and lost bills of exchange or other instruments. At present a person losing a bill of exchange had to go to a Court of Chancery to settle an indemnity. He proposed to give to Courts of Common Law all the powers of Courts of Equity in deciding on the sufficiency of any indemnity for a lost bond or bill of exchange, or other instrument of a like nature. The Court of Chancery now must also be applied to by a person who had a contract for the possession of premises but not a legal title. In the County Courts of Ireland the existence of such an agreement for a lease would prevent the landlord from ejecting the tenant, and the Judges in the Superior Courts would on appeal confirm such a decision. He now proposed to give the Judges in the first instance the power they at present possessed after the decision of the inferior Courts, and to make a contract of that nature a good defence to an action of ejectment in a superior Court, thus saving the party from the necessity of a Chancery suit. Another part of the Bill applied to the removal of obstructions from the trial and ascertainment of a legal right in reference to a legal matter. A party now desired to dispute the will of his ancestor, who had disinherited him, and wanted to try its validity. If it affected real estate, it must be tried according to Common Law by a Judge and Jury; but when the party began to try the validity of the will, he was threatened with "temporary bars," and he could not go on with his action without going into the Court of Chancery for their removal. It was now proposed that the Courts of Common Law should exercise a jurisdiction without the aid of Equity in these cases. Lastly, there was one other subject which he submitted might be made the subject of a legal defence in a Court of Law. There were cases in which a person sued, had, according to the strict letter of the Common Law, no defence, but had equity, conscience, reason, and justice with him; and when he went to a Court of Equity, it would grant a perpetual injunction against his adversary, so that he could never move against him in a Court of Common law. To give Common Law Courts a right to decide nice questions of complicated equity, would be impossible; but in such a case, why should a party when he was persecuted wrongfully, he also vexed by a suit in a Court of Equity? If a party could set forth facts which would entitle him to a perpetual injunction in Chancery, it was proposed that such defence should be available at Common Law. These were the principal reforms adverted to by this Bill. They were large and comprehensive, and, in addition to their value in that respect, he thought it would be found, when the table of fees and costs were added, that, in ordinary cases, the costs would be reduced nearly one-half, and certainly one-third, so that failure in a lawsuit would not entail ruin upon the plaintiff or defenfant. These propositions, he ventured to hope, would not meet with much opposition, or at least would only be opposed in a friendly spirit—as they were calculated, he firmly believed, to give satisfaction to all classes of the people. He could not conclude without returning his thanks to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, who had clearly and decidedly expressed his approbation of these measures of reform. The Bill had also received, in reference to the verification of pleadings and other important provisions, the sanction of the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench in Ireland, and of his right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General for that country. The object of the measure was to make justice easier, cheaper, and more accessible; and, presenting it in that character, he respectfully solicited for it a favourable reception on the part of the House. It was offered as an instalment of the series of legal reforms which the Government intended to submit, and as such he trusted it would be graciously accepted.

said, that he, for one, heartily thanked the hon. and learned Gentleman for the measure he had thus introduced; and which, he concluded, would have the cordial support of the Government. The reform of the law, on cither side of the Channel, was essential, not merely for the removal of delay and uncertainty, but, practically, as an important relief from taxation.

said, he had no desire to detain the House long with his Motion for a call of the House on Monday; but as there were many Members who had never been present on occasions when a call of the House had been enforced, he wished briefly to state the nature of his proposal, and why he considered it expedient. It was the theory of the Constitution, that the Members should be always in attendance when the House was sitting, and it was in conformity with this doctrine that, when a Member died, a Motion was immediately made for a writ to empower the election of a new Member to take his place. His proposal, he was aware, might occasion some trouble to those Members who were not in the habit of attending the House, or who desired, just now, to be in the country; but the duties of Parliament should be attended to by those who accepted its honours. It might be that, as a general rule, the actual business of the House was better done when but comparatively few Members were present; but there were, from time to time, great occasions on which solemn questions vitally affecting the whole Nation were at issue, and upon such occasions it was of vast importance that the entire body of the Representatives of the Nation should be present to record their judgment. Such an occasion was this, on which he now proposed that the House should be called upon to give its complete attendance. Never, in fact, throughout his long Parliamentary experience, had an occasion more essentially requiring the solemn attendance of the universal body of the representation of the people occurred, being, as this was, an occasion on which the Government of the country, unable to form any opinion on the particular subject in question — ["Oh, oh!"]—or, if they had formed an opinion, being ready, in deference to the House, to do this or that—ready, as he understood his right hon. Friend's Resolution, announced that evening—if the House would do so and so, to do so and so too—[The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: NO!] Well, at all events, in Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne there was this paragraph:—

"It gives Me Pleasure to be enabled, by the Blessing of Providence, to congratulate you on the generally improved Condition of the Country, and especially of the Industrious Classes. If you should be of opinion that recent Legislation, in contributing, with other Causes, to this happy Result, has at the same Time inflicted unavoidable Injury on certain important Interests, I recommend you dispassionately to consider how far it may be practicable equitably to mitigate that Injury, and to enable the Industry of the Country to meet successfully that unrestricted Competition to which Parliament, in its Wisdom, has decided that it should be subjected."

The solemn judgment of the House being thus required on this most vital subject, he considered that the judgment of the whole House should be delivered, and therefore it was that he proposed a call of the House should take place. It would not do to go on shilly-shally, one day this way, another day that; they must come to a clear, solemn, and general decision on the matter once for all. Hon. Gentlemen who desired to have a full knowledge of the occasions on which the House had directed such calls to be made, would find an accurate account of them in a Work which had been laid on the table of the House, by Mr. Speaker, and which ought to be printed at the expense of the House, and placed in the hands of every Member—he referred to Mr, May's talented work on the constitution, powers, and privileges of Parliament. There Was, some fifty years ago, a sort of manual of the Rules and Orders of the House, and such a work ought now to be placed in the hands of each Member, with the more recently elected, among whom it was no easy matter to. understand the usages and regulations of the House. However, in Mr. May's book would be found all the information requisite on the subject of calls of the House. Upon reference to that work, he found that there had been, in the course of the last thirty-two years, since 1820, forty-three calls of the House, the intervals between the order and the call itself having varied from one day to six weeks and one day; the last call of the House had been in 1840 on the subject of the Corn Laws. In March, 1822, for example, the present noble Member for the city of London moved for a call of the House on the subject of Parliamentary Reform, and in that case the interval between the order and the call was six weeks; on the 5th of May, 1829, Sir Robert, then Mr. Peel moved a call of the House on the subject of Roman Catholic disabilities; on the 18th of May, 1832, he himself moved for a call of the House on the subject of Reform and of Ministerial arrangements, and in that case the interval between the order and the call was three days. In 1833, on Lord Althorp's Bill for the Suppression of Disturbances in Ireland; in 1834, on the Motion of Mr. Spring Rice, now Lord Monteagle, on the subject of Mr. O'Connell's Motion for a Repeal of the Union. In 1835 a call took place, on the Motion of Lord John Russell, on the Irish Church, at thirteen days' notice; on the 19th of April, 1836, upon the Motion of Mr. Daniel Whittle Harvey, on the State of the Nation; in 1838, upon the subject of Canada; in 1838 again, after twelve days' notice, upon the Motion of Sir William Molesworth,' on Colonial administration; in 1839, after three days' notice, upon the Corn Laws; and in 1839 again, after ten days' notice, upon the Motion of Lord Stanley on National Education in Ireland, He admitted the importance of the topics which were discussed on all those occasions; but he would not admit that they were of superior importance to the question which was about to be submitted—a question in which the fate of Free Trade was involved. He had obtained these precedents with the assistance of Mr. Erskine May and the librarians of the House; and he wished to assure new Members that, if they were desirous of obtaining any information upon such subjects, they would always find the utmost courtesy and attention from the librarians. Upon all these occasions the principle laid down had been that the House should be fully attended by Members. In the present instance the constituencies of many places had great doubts as to the principles on which their Members had been returned—whether as Freetraders or Protectionists. He thought it, therefore, of importance for the final settlement of this question that the greatest possible number of Members should be present. He begged to move, in the usual form, the Motion of which he had given notice.

seconded the Motion.

did not know whether it was the intention of any hon. Member to oppose this Motion. So far as he was personally concerned, it was a matter of perfect indifference to him whether the House was called over or not, because he was not generally absent from his post on such important questions as that to be discussed on Tuesday next. But, as the hon. Member had stated that the object of a call of the House was that every Member should be present, he would beg to ask the hon. Member what power he had to insure the attendance of Members except at the call of the House? If he could insure their attendance at the debate, that would be something; but the fact was, that he could neither ensure it at the debate nor the division. There was no such power; and half those who attended on Monday and answered to their names might, if they chose, be absent on Tuesday. He merely threw this out that the hon. Member might sec whether any useful object could be gained by this Motion; because, if not, it would hardly be worth while putting people to the inconvenience which it would occasion.

said, the House had the power of enforcing the attendance of Members on Monday; and if they attended on Monday and absented themselves on Tuesday, that would be a question between them and their constituencies.

said, that, although there was no security for the attendance of Members on Tuesday, yet there was a strong probability that if they attended on Monday they would do so on Tuesday. There must, moreover, in his opinion, have been some good reason for the adoption of a rule by the House which had been so frequently acted upon.

said, he wished to point out to the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) the great inconvenience and injustice which he might occasion to some Members if he persevered in this Motion. He was there prepared to vote; but if he had been at home in the south of Ireland it would have been utterly impossible for him to arrive at the House in time after being made aware of the decision of the House.

said, that when Parliament was called together by the Queen's proclamation it was the duty of all Members to attend; and if, instead of being there they were in the south of Ireland or the south of France, or anywhere else, they had no right to plead such absence from their duty as an argument against a proposition of this nature.

said, he perceived that Mr. Erskine May, the gentleman whom his hon. Friend (Mr. Hume) had so very justly and properly praised, observed in his work upon The Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament, "If it be really intended to enforce the call, not less than a week or ton days should intervene between the order and the day named for the call." He thought it always expedient to take as great care as possible that when there was a call of the House there should be very ample time between the order and the day named; but certainly, as a general rule, he should be very sorry to oppose a Motion of this kind; and, as he gathered from the feeling of the House that there was a desire to make the Motion of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. C. Villiers) more or less a Motion of confidence in the Government, he should wish to see as large an attendance upon the occasion as possible; and certainly he should not himself oppose the Motion of the hon. Gentleman.

said, he wished to state the case of some hon. Friends of his, Members for counties in the south and west of Ireland, who he knew could not by possibility be present. Having had no reason to suppose that any business would so soon come before the House on which any great difference of opinion could arise, they had not yet attended the House; and it was impossible that they could now arrive in time; that being so, he thought it would be very bard upon them that they should be taken into the custody of the Serjeant-at-Arms. Unless the House had the power, therefore, to make exceptions in such cases, the Motion would be calculated to inflict a great injustice.

said, he thought it would have been much better if the hon. Member for Montrose, immediately after the announcement of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton that he intended to bring forward his Motion, had given notice of his intention at an early day to make a Motion for a call of the House. [Mr. HUME: I did so the very next day.] As it was, the time at present was certainly very short. However, according to the practice which he had always seen adopted when the House had been called over, if any valid excuse for absence were given, such, for instance, as being abroad, and unable to arrive in time, that had always been taken by the House, upon the allegation of any hon. Member, to be sufficient. He presumed his hon. Friend intended to pursue the same course in the present instance, and that on any Member not appearing, the question would be asked whether there were any ground or excuse for his absence. Having said thus much, he must say that he did not see any great advantage in the Motion. Certainly it had been practised upon former occasions when any questions of great importance were to be discussed, and, as the Motion of the hon. Member for Wolverhampton was one of that nature, it was unquestionably of great importance that it should be known whether they had adopted Free Trade and renounced Protection, or had returned to Protection and renounced Free Trade: he thought then, in this instance, the practice of former years might very well be followed.