said, that it was his duty to state to the House that he had received a communication informing him of the decease of the brother of one of the Members appointed to try this petition. Colonel Vernon Harcourt had addressed a letter to him stating that he (Col. Harcourt) had just heard of the death of one of his brothers, and that, although it was his duty to appear at the table of the House at Four o'clock, in order to be sworn, he trusted to the indulgence of his fellow-committee men and of the House for one week, if that indulgence could be granted to him. It was clear that, under those circumstances, the Committee were not in a condition to act, inasmuch as it was necessary that the Members should be sworn at the table. In support of the letter which had been addressed to him, he (Sir J. Trollope) held in his hand an affidavit made by Lord Hotham, who stated that he had received information of the death of the brother of Col. Harcourt. Under these circumstances he (Sir J. Trollope) had to move that the House would be pleased to dispense with the attendance of Col. Harcourt; that the present Committee be discharged; and that it be referred to the Committee of Selection to appoint another Committee. That, he thought, would be a bettor course than that the Committee already appointed should adjourn its sittings.

said, he would beg to inquire upon what clause of the Act relating to contested elections the hon. Member rested his Motion?

On the 71st Clause.

said, he wished to know from the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. T. Duncombe) what course he intended to pursue in the case of the Norwich Election Petition. He had understood that the hon. Gentleman was prepared with some proposition; hut on looking to the Votes of the day he saw no reference made to the subject. It was desirable that some course should he taken, as the name of an hon. Member was involved, and the sooner it was inquired into the better.

said, that the House having thought fit to take the matter out of his hands last night, he did not hold himself at all responsible for the matter. No doubt, the House had placed itself in a very peculiar position with regard to the public. Here was a charge made, and there appeared to be no means of inquiry. He had been advised to refer the petition to the Committee of the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) which was in nubibus. He was quite ready for inquiry, and wished to have it at the bar of the House. He believed the Tory electors had been very ill-treated by the Tory party in that House, and by the Carlton Club. Mr. Brown had no authority whatever to act as he had done. It was a fraud on the House; but Mr. Speaker had decided that a fraud on the House was not a breach of privilege. If the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) would consent to it, he would move for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the case at the time of private business on Monday next.

said, he was anxious to make some inquiry into the truth of the statements made by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), and the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson), at a meeting in the Free Trade-hall of Manchester, on Jan. 28, because his vote on the Army Estimates might be influenced by the result. A few days ago a letter had been read in that House from a person named Somerville, who had been in the Army, and was flogged. The Peace Society attempted to raise a popular feeling against the militia by quoting the case of Somerville, who, however, in a letter which did him infinite credit, repudiated the attempt. But the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. M. Gibson), after talking a good deal against the armaments of the country, and especially against our defensive preparations, used these words:—

"But we have also got one or two generals on our side, and one of them, General Evans, the Member for Westminster, made a similar calcution in reference to the French army and to their arrangements, and he proved to the House of Commons that the French had really not more than some 15,000 disposable soldiers; so that it appears to me that by making this sort of arbitrary calculation—by saying that you must keep an army afloat always—going backwards and forwards to the Colonies, or in the Colonies, or distributed about according to the caprice of the person who is making the speech for his own purpose, you may prove anything; and if we voted ten times the Estimates, and gave the Executive of the country a much larger force than they now possess, by this sort of arbitrary and capricious arrangement of the forces you might reduce the largest force to a very small one, in reference to the defence of the country in case of invasion."

He wished to know from the hon. and gallant Officer whether he had really used the language attributed to him. Adverting to the other branch of the service, the right hon. Gentleman spoke as follows: —

"Sir Henry Parnell—a high authority—declared that there is no effective mode of enforcing economy in the expenditure for our great establishments in the Government, except by refusing increased grants, and calling on them to do with less. I believe that that course within certain limits is the proper course to take in order to ensure economy, and that it is impossible for Members of Parliament to bring themselves into successful opposition to persons connected with dockyards and the military profession upon every point of detail; and if the country, in reference to the armaments of foreign States, and in reference to the general foreign relations in which we are placed, considers that the amount demanded is too large, then, I say, let. them take Sir Henry Parnell's advice, and without going into every minute matter in dockyards and in regiments, let them say, 'You have got your 15,000,000l. or your 14,000,000l. and we will refuse any increase on that demand, and in that way we will oblige you to carry out these matters of economy which have been recommended by persons connected with the various professions during difficult periods of our country.' Why, only consider; Sir James Stirling himself, a man high in the navy, actually in a committee of the House of Lords upon the question of the Navigation Laws, declared that it was his opinion that the number of officers in the British navy over and above what was really necessary for the work to be done either in peace or in war—observe!—was equal to the keep of 20,000 seamen. Is that true, or is it not? Have they contradicted Sir James Stirling? —as high an authority, I contend, upon naval matters, as any one in this country. Not a bit of it. Not one word has been said to dispute the truth of that statement. Well, then, I say, can you expect these anomalies to be rectified if Members of Parliament are to be put down as enemies of the country and foolish visionaries, who are desirous of scrutinising carefully our naval and military expenditure, and who refuse, in addition to large estimates, to grant indefinite increases merely founded upon some foolish panic?"

And the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) elicited cheers from his audience by such language as the following:—

"We want to create such an effect on public opinion, and speedily, too, that we shall change altogether the tendency of the press, and the tendency of the legislation of Parliament. Why, I want, in the first place, to see twenty or thirty men in the House who are resolved that they will hold no terms, give no allegiance to a Government, that takes another step in the direction of increase of our armaments, unless some facts and evidence are shown as to the necessity for it. Now, I say for myself, I pledge myself—and I have not been wanting in my word in Parliament in what I have said in this hall—pledge myself that I will hold no terms with any Government that repeats what I have seen so often done—that while on their lips you hear expressions of the most perfect confidence and reliance on the good intentions of the Government of every other country, yet they are in the same breath proposing an Increase of our warlike establishments. I will hold no terms with that Government, call it what you will, Whig, Tory, or Peelite—I will do my best to turn out that Government; and when that Government is out, I will give notice to its successors that they shall have the same terms from me, if they pursue the same course."

The hon. Member for the West Riding had appeared in the character of a prophet, and surely never was there a more false prophet. He prophesied there would be no more French revolutions; but the words were scarcely uttered when the French were cutting one another's throats. Since the hon. Gentleman had announced that there was no danger of an invasion, he (Colonel North) actually began to suspect that the French would make a descent upon our shores. The hon. Gentleman appeared before the public not only as a prophet, but as a conjuror, for he said the French had as many silver spoons to lose as the English, which, deeming the population of France was more than double that of England, was a very surprising and clever statement. The hon. Gentleman did not confine himself to prophecies, but he indulged in some witticisms at the expense of the militia. He said they were a parcel of simpletons. He (Colonel North) did not think such language was very becoming, proceeding from a Member of the Legislature—a Legislature, too, which had just declared by a large majority that the mili- tia was necessary for the defence of the country. Now, he begged to tell the hon. Gentleman, who was so fond of sneering at the militia, and at those agricultural districts which showed the greatest zeal and readiness to enlist in that force, that his aspersions, and the ridicule he attempted to cast upon the militia, recoiled upon himself; and the inhabitants of those agricultural districts were prepared not only to enlist in the militia, but to spend the last sixpence in their pockets, and the last drop of blood in their body, on behalf of their country. The hon. Gentleman had taken up the position of a dictator in that House, and had said that unless Members voted as they ought to do, his hope was that the country would put such a pressure upon them as would bring matters to a speedy issue, The hon. Gentleman also sneered, as was his custom, at the Army and Navy; and he was sorry to say that his remarks seemed to have been received with applause by the audience whom he addressed. He (Colonel North) well remembered having commanded a force of 100 men in the manufacturing districts, whose presence was necessary in order to protect factories from the violence of the people. Upon such occasions as these, neither the hon. Gentleman nor his auditors would be inclined to sneer at those brave men whose lives were always at the disposal of the State. He would conclude by asking the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster whether the words attributed to him were correctly given?

said, he considered it necessary to say a few words after the allusion that had been made to him by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He could not charge his memory at this time with the exact words which he had used with regard to the French Army; but he was sure that it was a mistake to represent that he had ever said that there were only 15,000 men of the entire French Army who could be available for any attempted invasion of England. He could only recollect that he had argued that the large number of troops required for the numerous garrisons throughout France would diminish very considerably the amount of force which would be available for any such invasion.

said, that previous to the House going into Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates he wished to bring under the notice of hon. Members the expediency of gradually increasing the numbers and efficiency of our reserved force of pensioner battalions without detriment to the established militia and regular forces. It was not his intention to follow the hon. and gallant Member (Colonel North) into the remarks which had fallen from him; but he wished the House to consider, not the amount of our forces, which would be moved for to-night, but whether we might not obtain much greater advantage from those forces than as yet we had received from them. The Army ought to be regarded in its two branches—the active army and army of reserve; but it had been too much the custom to look only to the active army. More attention had, however, been recently directed to the reserve branch, and a militia had been formed, perhaps hurriedly, but he would not at the present time discuss the value of a militia. All parties wished the cost of the standing Army to be reduced so far as was consistent with the security of the country; but no considerable reduction could be made until we possessed a powerful reserve force equal in every military respect to the regular troops with which it might be called upon to act, whether in garrison or in the field. Some years ago the noble Lord now at the head of the Army organised a system of pensioner battalions, fitted to form the nucleus of an army of reserve. Before that time, it was true, the pensioners might be called out on any emergency; but it was to Lord Hardinge that the country was indebted for their organisation; and now we had a force of some 30,000 enrolled pensioners, ready to be called out at a moment's notice, at a cost of 40,000 a year, or little more than 25s. per head. A portion, indeed, of these veterans of fifty-five years and upwards had never yet been called out, and never would be except in case of emergency, when very possibly they would act in garrison or in some other position where experience and coolness were more requisite than strength and energy; but the remainder—those ranging from forty to fifty-five years, and amounting to from 16,000 to 18,000—had been called out, and were duly exercised every year: from their steadiness under arms, and the precision of their movements, it was clear they might render the greatest service in eases of sudden emergency; but no one could expect them to be equal to the wear and tear of a long campaign. Neither were they in numbers sufficient to form an army of reserve; but happily we had the means! of increasing those numbers, and rendering them efficient for all purposes. How this could be accomplished he would endeavour to show. In the first place, our Army at present consisted in round numbers of 150,000 men. The right hon. Secretary at War would to-night ask for 100,000 for the home and colonial stations: we had 30,000 more in India; and there were also the artillery, sappers and miners, and the marines, making about 30,000 more; giving a total of 160,000, or (exclusive of commissioned officers) 150,000 in noncommissioned officers and rank and file. Now, if these 150,000 men were by annual rotation to be renewed every tenth year, then each year would successively throw out, if enrolled, some 12,000 or 14,000 men, which would give us, in ten years, an army of reserve of 100,000 men. This was much more than we required; but he wag only showing what a powerful machinery we had at our command for raising an army of reserve. From the total number of soldiers annually completing their regular twenty-one years of service, and entitling them to a pension, large deductions must be made for those whose constitutions were so broken down as to be unable to serve in the first-class, pensioner battalions, or indeed to serve at all; but, upon the whole, there were between 1,000 and 1,200 who annually went into the pensioner battalions, and filled up the vacancies caused by death or increasing infirmity. The influx thus did little more now than supply the efflux; we must, not, therefore, under the present system, expect to extend our pensioner battalions to much more than from 16,000 to 18,000 men. He wished to say nothing in disparagement of this body of men; but it was clear that they were not equal to the exigencies of national defence. But those exigencies might be met: that national defence might most safely and advantageously be derived from our regular Army. Now, in looking at that Army, the first thing that arrested his attention was the fact, that although the men were well paid, well fed, well clothed, and well treated in every respect, yet the service was not popular with the class from which it should be recruited. The proof of this was apparent from the number of purchased discharges that took place, and the privations to which the relations of young men who had enlisted would submit in order to buy them off. A clearer proof still of the unpopularity of the Army was the fact that so many men who had been twelve or fourteen years in the service, and would in a few years longer be entitled to a pension, were found desirous to forfeit their pension rather than continue in the service for the lengthened period of twenty-one years. That is, to sacrifice what was even then worth from 100l. to 200l. Now, in all the other departments of the State so long a term as twenty-one years was not insisted upon before the parties were entitled to a pension. Our excisemen, custom - house officers, tide-waiters, and coast-guardmen were under certain conditions entitled to superannuation after ten years' service, and there was a graduated scale for longer periods. Why, then, should the Army be placed in a worse position than the civil services in this respect? Why should our soldiers not have the option of retiring on smaller pensions for shorter periods of service? If that boon were conceded, it would do more to popularise the Army than any other measure that he could name. By making the pension commensurate with the reduced term of service, they would lower the average age, and largely increase their number of pensioners without increasing the charge to the country. The amount of pension paid to these men would be rated in proportion to the number of years they had served, and without going into abstruse calculations of the values of lives, it might fairly be asserted that two men upon a pension of 6d. a day would not cost more than one man upon 1s. a day. But, while this plan would not add a shilling to the public charge, it would double the numbers and quadruple the efficiency of the army of reserve. We must consider also, that after twenty-one years' service, a soldier's habits are formed, and it becomes difficult for him to revert to his former calling. He is, too, in the receipt of a pension which just enables him to "get on," as it is called, and there is danger lest an idle and perhaps not a particularly sober person be thrown upon the public. If, on the other hand, you gave him a small pension, after ten years' service, he would not at the end of that time have so far forgotten his early occupation as to be unwilling or unable to revert to it. At all events, he would find work more easily, and not having wherewithal to live without it, would seek for it more zealously. The Government would thus raise the whole tone and condition of the Army, and might ultimately so change a large portion of the recruiting service. There was another reason for adopting the plan of short pensions for short service. The Short Enlistment Act had been about five years in operation, and the first series of men who had completed their term of service would ere long be turned loose upon the world. Each successive year there would be a like number of men entitled to their discharge under this Act, and it was highly desirable they should not be cast adrift, and lost to the Army. Lord Panmure, when Secretary at War, proposed a clause entitling these men to a small pension upon completing a short additional term of service; but this clause was unfortunately withdrawn. The colonies furnished an additional argument in favour of his plan. There were now 2,000 pensioners doing good service in Canada, Australia, Van Diemen's Land, and the Cape of Good Hope. If the House should adopt his suggestion of materially increasing the number and lowering the average age of the pensioners by reducing the number of years of service in the regular Army, it would soon be in the power of the Government to encourage the emigration of a body of military settlers, whose presence would afford the colonies an admirable means of defence; while the regiments now there might be withdrawn, and the expense of their maintenance and transit would be saved to the home country. The only objection to his plan was, that it would drain the Army of some of the best and most valuable soldiers. But is a reluctant, although an old soldier, really so very valuable? At all events, the pensioners under his plan would be available for their country's most pressing service, and at a moment's notice. The best period of a soldier's service was between his sixth and twelfth years—and this the regular Army would retain; while the country would have the prolonged benefit of his active or latest services during the whole extent of his military life: many of the soldiers who would be entitled to their discharge, would, he had no doubt, prefer to remain with their regiments. These willing and experienced veterans who do form the backbone, and give heart and tone to a regiment, would, in no degree be affected by his proposal, which would only drain off, and usefully drain off those men, who from various causes, grown weary of the service, not unfrequently degenerate into schemers and grumblers. He did not intend to interfere with pensions as they now stood. Let the full-time pensions and full-time service remain, but let it be accompanied also by small pensions for short service. By such a mode they would give alacrity and cheerfulness to the Army, at only an extra expense of 40s. or 50s. a year per head for annual enrolment and exercise. The plan he proposed would, by providing a reserve force large enough for all purposes of national defence, relieve the country of those periodical alarms which reflected so much discredit upon it, and which not un-frequently caused it to run into not very wise, although very expensive, temporary expedients.

said, he had listened to the statement of his hon. Friend in reference to the advantage which would result from a different system of organisation for the pensioners of the Army, and had heard also a similar proposal made by him last year in a very ingenious and elaborate argument, in which he endeavoured to show that his plan offered a preferable substitute for the militia. It appeared to him (Mr. S. Herbert), however, that the proposal of substituting an army of pensioners, whose services could not be secured until the expiry of a period of ten years from 1847, under the Limited Enlistment Act, would not give us a force at all commensurate for the purposes of defence with that which had been given by the militia. At the same time, he must acknowledge that, in consequence of the alteration as to the term of military service, very properly introduced by Lord Panmure, his predecessor in the office he held, it would become necessary to take some measures for replacing the organisation of discharged pensioners as soldiers available for any exigency. He did not himself believe that the effect of such a measure would be so great as the hon. Gentleman thought, because when the system of discharging men after short periods was first introduced by Lord Har-dinge, the expectations entertained as to the increased number of persons thus become habituated to the use of arms, by no means justified the result. When men who were formed into soldiers had the power of leaving the service when they chose, very likely the temptation to do so would be diminished by its being placed within their reach. The men of ten years service and upwards formed the real strength of the Army, from their length of service, experience, and habits of attachment to their standards; but the House would be surprised to find how few they were. He believed that when ten years of service were performed, it would be found that, instead of availing themselves of the opportunity of leaving the Army and settling in some of the occupations of civil life, the majority would be inclined to continue in the service. He did not adduce this as any reason whatever against making some alteration on the principle advocated by the hon. Gentleman, because he thought it a very sound position that they should not disperse throughout the country a very large body of men inured to arms, and who could render great service to the State if necessary, without keeping some hold of them, and having the means of securing their service in case of emergency. It would be matter for consideration how this should be effected—whether by deferred pensions, or by temporary pensions granted for short periods after ten years' active service. At present, the commanding officers of regiments were very unwilling to lose men of ten years' service; and no doubt the discipline and spirit of regiments depended very much on men who had served in it for some years. He would not detain the House by entering further at present into a question which was well worthy of consideration, and to which the military authorities were disposed to give their best attention.

said, in moving the Address of which he had given notice, he wished to direct the attention of the House to a few circumstances connected with the Burmese war, as they were made to appear in the documents now on the table of the House, which brought the accounts down to March, 1852. He should not have pressed the matter if he had not felt that the whole question of peace and war in India ought to be considered by Parliament. In other cases of wars, there was in Parliament a responsible Minister to go to, and an House of Commons to guard the public purse; but in India there was no check on the exercise of the practically unlimited powers lodged in the hands of the Governor General and his advisers. The war in which we had lately been involved with the Burmese might be a just one or not; if it were not just, we had got into a hopeless scrape. The question in his mind was, whether this war might not have been avoided, and whether, in point of fact, the British Empire had any great interest in carrying this war to a conclusion. He thought that of late years the military and naval forces of the Empire had been directed with too great recklessness against those nations of the earth who happened to be less advanced in civilisation than ourselves. We all know what had been the consequence of invading Affghanistan, and also of the Burmese war in 1825, which had led to such a waste of treasure. The Indian finance was damaged to the extent of ten to twelve millions, though it was true we recovered 1,000,000l. of the expense from the King of Ava, paid in very doubtful coin; but it would be difficult to make out that the British Empire gained much by that transaction. He wished, however, to call attention to the origin of the present war in Burmah. It arose in 1851 in consequence of wrong done to the owners of two ships, and he believed so far there was a good foundation for it. But he should like to ask the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) whether there was any definite policy laid down to induce the Governor General to take the course he did? The policy began on a demand for 10,000 rupees, or under 1,000l., and in one year it changed into the annexation of one of the most valuable provinces of the Burmese Empire. So great had been the change of policy, that he (Sir H. Willough-by) wished to know the ground of it. On the 31st of October, 1851, the Governor General laid down the principle of negotiation, and that there should be no act of hostility till definite instructions were given by the Governor General to the party charged with the negotiation. On 28th November, 1851, Commodore Lambert was sent to Rangoon to negotiate and to obtain redress, by the recall of the Governor of Rangoon. The Governor was recalled, and in January, 1852, Commodore Lambert expressed great confidence in the intentions of the king. The new Governor of Rangoon having arrived on 2nd January, a dispute arose on a question of etiquette, which was very strictly observed in Ava. The Governor expected a visit from the Commodore; but an inferior officer having been sent, differences arose, and on the night of 6th January, the Commodore took possession of one of the King of Ava's ships of war, and in carrying it off on 10th January a contest took place, in which many Burmese were killed, and on that day the whole question of peace or war was determined. If Commodore Lambert had not succeeded in negotiation, he should have established a blockade according to his express orders; but instead of that, by way of reprisal, he took a ship of war, and from that time all hope of accommodation ceased, and thus the course taken by the Commodore defeated the peaceful policy of the Governor General. No allusion was made in the despatches to the wrongful seizure of that ship, which was the cause of the war. After the loss of the ship, the Burmese were still willing to negotiate, and they sent a letter in a case covered with velvet, and officers with golden umbrellas, to the Resident at Moulenden, to see if he could bring matters to a happy conclusion; and yet, after all, we had this second edition of a Kafir war, with the addition of swamps and a pestilential climate. It was most important that no war should be undertaken in India without the distinct authority of the Government at home. This was not a war in India Proper. What was intended? Were we going to annex the whole Burmese Empire, and then go further? The people on the frontiers were robbers, and just the sort of neighbours we should wish to avoid. It was said Pegu would pay; but how were we to defend the frontier? When we saw the effect of the war there, it must be felt that the responsibility of the question of peace or war should be in the hands of some one in this country. With regard to the military operations, he did not believe that at home we had sufficient data to form an opinion upon them; but it was clear there had been a great vacillation in policy, towns had been taken, evacuated, and retaken with loss of valuable lives. If any proof was wanted of the kind of enemy with whom we had to deal, it would be found in the despatch of General Godwin of 29th December. It was a despatch sufficiently elaborate to have described the battle of Waterloo, yet not a single Burmese was taken killed or wounded. He wished to know whether the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control would grant the papers he (Sir H. Willoughby) asked for. It had been supposed that the power of peace and war lay with the directors of the East India Company in Leadenhall-street; but in fact they were just as much responsible as be (Sir H. Willoughby) was, and all they had to do was to pay. Nor was the power in the Secret Committee, which was only a means of communication between the Board of Control and the directors. He thought the war had not originated with the Governor General, but in the hasty acts of Commodore Lambert in seizing the Burmese ship, after which diplomatic negotiations were at an end.

said, he did not think that the House would he of opinion that this was a convenient opportunity for discussing the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's observations as to the responsibility on the question of peace and war in India. An opportunity would, without doubt, occur in the course of the Session for that discussion. With regard to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman, he (Sir C. Wood) had intimated that he would lay on the table all the papers, completing the information contained in those which had been laid on the table at the close of the last Session. The war in Ava had reached an epoch by the annexation of Pegu; and he thought that the House should be put in possession of all the papers, and they were now in the hands of the printer. Should the hon. Member, after reading the papers, be desirous of reopening the subject, he (Sir C. Wood) would be prepared to meet him. At the same time, it was desirable to correct, on the present occasion, an error in the statement of the hon. Member. It was not strictly accurate to say that the war originated in the question of etiquette which had been referred to. It might have been the proximate cause of hostilities, for it was a realisation of the old proverb, that it is the last pound that breaks the horse's hack, and it was the last of a series of injuries and insults on the part of the Governor of Rangoon which led to consequences which were as much deprecated by the Governor General and the authorities at home as by any one. Every effort had been made to avert hostilities. It was said that in Ava much im- portance was attached to ceremonies; hut that was the case among all Oriental nations, and a submission on our part to studied insult would have been construed into a sign of weakness. The insult offered was most offensive and grievous to a British officer. An opportunity was given to retract, to apologise, or to explain; hut no step of that kind was taken. Under all the circumstances he would say no more at present. The Governor General was anxious to avoid annexation, but the step was forced upon him, and he (Sir C. Wood) was convinced that when the House saw the papers, they would agree with the present and the late Government in approving his conduct, and admit that all he had done was forced upon him by the Government of Ava. After a careful review of the instructions sent out by his (Sir C. Wood's) predecessor, he must say that he entirely concurred in them. He would now only repeat that the House would he in a better condition to discuss this question when the papers were before them, which they would be in three or four days.

said, he agreed with the right hon. President of the Board of Control that the present was not the most convenient time for discussing the subject. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir H. Willoughby) should know that the responsible Minister for India was the President of the Board of Control, and that everything that took place in reference to peace or war was by his authority. The people of this country erroneously supposed that the East India Company had the power of making war in India; but they had no more to do with it than he (Mr. Hume) had. At this moment the Court of Directors were not in possession of a single despatch to show the origin of the war, and were as ignorant of it as he (Mr. Hume) was himself. In like manner, with regard to the first Burmese war, the Indian Government had been obliged to pay 13,000,000l. for its expenses, without having before them a single despatch. He agreed with the hon. Baronet in thinking that this war might have been avoided. Commodore Lambert had sent on shore an officer to obtain an interview with the Governor of the fort at Rangoon, who, probably thinking that the affair ought to have been arranged in an interview between the Commodore and himself, deemed himself improperly treated, and redress was, in consequence, refused, which led to the seizure of the Burmese ship. What should we think if the French or Americans sent an Ambassador here, whom we refused to receive on the ground of his credentials being informal, and proceeded, in consequence, to seize British ships in their own waters and towing her away. In speaking of Lord Dalhousie, he had every reason to believe that he had a difficult duty to perform, and was as anxious to avoid war as any person; but by the course that had been adopted, the Government of Ava was called upon to deal with a man who had taken and kept one of their ships. But though the King of Ava had to send a message to a man who had, as he thought, violated the law, the most complimentary mode of sending it was adopted by him, as indicated by the number of attendants, that being the mode resorted to by the native princes of evincing their desire to pay a compliment. As far as his (Mr. Hume's) impression went, Commodore Lambert was the cause of the war, though he perceived that he had already received a pension of 150l. a year for good services on the Irrawaddy. He hoped that these events would lead to the adoption of a different course with regard to the Government of India. He differed from many persons who thought that the Court of Directors might be dispensed with. He thought they could exercise most useful powers in examining the details of the revenue and of the Army, and to enable them to do so effectively they should be made acquainted with the facts. He had a strong opinion that there were men in the Court of Directors whose local experience and constant attention and devotion to the affairs of India would make them an able council for any Government to carry on the affairs of India. He wished to see a Minister for India in that House, instead of having a Board that never sat, and Commissioners that never acted. All that was a perfect mockery, and an insult to common sense; but he hoped the result of the inquiry now going on would lead to a better state of things.

said, he thought it would have been much better to have withheld this discussion till all the papers on the subject of Ava had been laid on the table, especially as his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control had intimated to the hon. Gentleman who moved for the production of the papers that they would be produced at the earliest possible opportunity. Some reference had been made to the constitution of the Court of Directors; but at present the discussion seemed chiefly to relate to the origin of the Burmese war. Now, whatever observations he might make upon this point, he must declare that the last thing he expected to have heard in that House more particularly was any question as to the justice of that war. It might have been expected that various commentaries would be made on the manner of carrying on the war; but to hear the origin and justice of that war questioned by hon. Members who had had an opportunity of reading the papers already on the table of the House, excited his astonishment. It had been said, and said truly, that the propriety of this war and of the operations, so far as they had proceeded, had been sanctioned by three Governments—by the Government of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, by the late Government, presided over by the Earl of Derby, and by the present Administration. But there was an authority which had been referred to on this question greater still than any one of these, and that was the authority of the illustrious man who was now no more. In another place the Earl of Derby had in a recent discussion produced and read a memorandum proceeding from the illustrious Duke of Wellington on this very subject; and it was a document which seemed to answer, in anticipation, what had been said there as well as in another place. The noble Duke, with all the necessary papers before him, and only three weeks before his lamented death, said: "It appears to me that the war could not be averted—that the operations fixed upon were judicious, and have been ably carried into execution with great gallantry by the officers and troops." After testimony such as that, not only to the plan of operations and the success that had attended them, but to the necessity of the war, it would be useless for him to occupy their time longer upon that subject. But his hon. Friend (Sir H. Willoughby) talked of the sum of 1,000l. which had been demanded, and seemed to speak of it as an isolated fact that had caused the war. Now, he must by aware that the events connected with these latter transactions were but events crowning a long series of insults cast upon the dignity of the Government of India, and most injurious to the persons and property of British subjects in India; that they were, in fact, but the climax and crisis of a policy that had been going on for a period of ten or fifteen years. Did he not know that by treaty the Burmese Government allowed an Ambassador from the Government of India to reside at the Court of Ava, and that Ambassador (Colonel Burney) was forced to retire from the Court, having been treated with the utmost contempt? Was he not also aware that when Colonel Benson was sent to Ava, he was treated much worse? The outrages and indignities heaped upon him exceeded belief; his life was in danger, and he was obliged to retire. Did he not know of the injuries also committed at various times upon British merchants, and of the refusals continually persisted in to give reparation? As to the course taken by Lord Dalhousie, his great effort had all along been to avoid extremities; and, when driven into unavoidable hostilities, his declaration throughout was, that he desired nothing more than to obtain compensation for the past, and security for the future—that the expedition should be conducted with the least possible risk as to life, and without the least anxiety for an extension of our territory, which he, as everybody else, regarded as a great calamity. Accordingly, he thought that by striking a decisive blow, and taking possession of Rangoon, he would compel the Burmese Government to come to a settlement, make an apology, and thus bring the war to an end. The demand which he then made for money was so trifling that the public press of India made it matter of comment; but his demand not being conceded, he by degrees increased it, though still to a moderate degree. When charges were brought against Commodore Lambert such as had been made that night, he felt bound to say, that so far from Commodore Lambert being desirous of war, he wrote to the Governor General to say that he had every reason to believe he would be able to bring the matter to an amicable conclusion. The hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) had spoken of the usages of the Burmese as an apology for the manner in which they had treated Commodore Lambert. But the fact was, that a deputation was sent to him composed of such inferior officers that the only object could have been to insult him. He, nevertheles, received them with courtesy, and sent, in return, a deputation headed by the second in command. And what was their treatment? They were kept waiting for a length of time in the sun, and at length were told they might go into the shod and wait there, for the Governor was asleep. Now, they could afford to do much and lose much, but in India they could not afford to submit to the slightest indignity or insult, if they meant to retain their power and authority in that country. After the war was commenced, even when matters had gone to an extremity, all that was asked was the expenses of the war and the compensation that was requisite; but when these demands, repeated from time to time, were refused, the conclusion was arrived at that it was absolutely necessary—not to make the conquest of a mighty empire, for that was never thought of by Lord Dalhousie—but to look to the military possession of Pegu, and to take by force that compensation for the past and that security for the future which could not be obtained by treaty or conciliation. But, in point of fact, this possession of Pegu, instead of being an extension, was rather a consolidation of our Empire. In another place some animadversions had been made by one whose opinion must always command respect upon Lord Dalhousie and the military operations that had taken place; and being in a position to meet these animadversions, he (Sir J. Hogg) felt it his duty to do so, seeing the opportunity had arisen. It had been said that nothing was so preposterous as to take possession of Rangoon without having an abundance of animals and carriages for the purposes of transport. Now, for the purpose of Lord Dalhousie's occupation of Rangoon, what was necessary? It was necessary to have the power of transporting the carriages for the military force that was moving from Martaban to Rangoon, which was to the eastward of Prome; and the question came to be, was that force without the means of transport? Lord Dalhousie, with that energy, and, he would add, with that judgment and sagacity which characterised him, was personally present, and gave orders that the force should be provided with the necessary amount of animals and carriages. Orders were given to assemble elephants, bullocks, and all that was requisite for the march, and these orders were admirably carried out by Colonel Ogle. Another order was given that 150 elephants should be collected from the Government establishments, and sent to Arracan. It had been said these elephants were utterly useless, because the Aeng Pass over the Arracan mountains was occupied by Burmese forces that could not be displaced. Now, it never was contemplated to send the elephants by the Aeng Pass. The pass through which the elephants were to be taken was within a few miles of Prome, where the forces were; whereas, if the elephants could have passed through the Aeng Pass, they would have descended to the valley of the Irrawaddy, ninety miles to the north of Prome, and would have been utterly useless if they had not been accompanied by an army. He begged to say, that animadversions like these, unless they were merited—unless they were supported by documents that no one could arraign or deny—were most mischievous in their character, and tended to paralyse and destroy the efforts of those engaged in important enterprises. With reference to the cost of this war, the utmost exaggeration had been employed. When the first expedition went for the seizure of Rangoon, the cost incurred was stated in the Indian papers to be 240,000l. But how much, in reality, did the House think this first expedition cost? The financial secretary told him, in a letter which he had received, that the whole expense was 30,000l. A statement had been made elsewhere that the expense of the operations in which we were now engaged could not be less than 130,000l. —probably 150,000l.—a month. Now, a copy of the sketch estimates for 1852–53 had been received, and the whole of the war expenditure from the 30th of April, 1852, to the 31st of May, 1853, was put down at 50 lacs, or 500,000l., being about 40,000l. a month. Reference had also been made to the unhealthy condition of the troops; and this had been attributed to the want of clothing and covering, and proper medical attendance. Now, he was able to say that the wants of the troops in these respects had been provided for most successfully. Before the war broke out, the preparation of skeleton houses, and every requisite accommodation for 6,000 or 7,000 men, had been ordered, and they were conveyed in steamers to the places were they were required. According to the medical returns, it appeared that the health of the troops at Rangoon, during the rain, was as good, on the average, as the health of the troops at the same time in the plains of Bengal. Every precaution in the matter that man could take had been taken, though economically, yet effectually, by Lord Dalhousie. There was one serious consideration that embarrassed Lord Dalhousie, and might have embarrassed that distinguished officer, General Godwin, and that was the fear of compromising the inhabitants of the district of Pegu. During the last war it was rumoured that Pegu would be retained; but the result was, that it was restored to Burmah, and the retaliation taken on those inhabitants who were supposed to be friendly to British power was something so terrific that he should not like to describe it. Therefore, both General Godwin and Lord Dalhousie were apprehensive of giving any intimation that the Peguans had sided with the British against the Burmese, until they were sure that the annexation would be sanctioned, and the troops would not be ordered to withdraw from Pegu. Scarcely had the proclamation been issued, when offers were received from two of the leading chiefs, offering to put down the dacoits and plunderers, and a thousand muskets having been supplied to them, great confidence was thereby given to the natives. By Lord Dalhousie's personal superintendence in that province, he had established order sooner than it had been established in any province that had previously been annexed to the British Empire. He was happy to say that at the regular period for the termination of the Governor Generalship of the Marquess of Dalhousie, India would not be deprived of the services of that excellent administrator. The Court of Directors had, with the remission of the Government, preferred a request to the Marquess of Dalhousie, founded solely on public grounds, that he would not look to the usual period of five years as the termination of his Government. That noble Lord, though having strong private reasons to induce him to return to this country, nevertheless acceded to the request made him, and India would continue to benefit from the noble Marquess's able administration.

said, he now would beg, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the quality of the bread that was supplied to Her Majesty's forces in Great Britain, under the existing contracts. In the union workhouses, in the county gaols, and in their convict establishments, the most unexceptionable quality of bread was supplied, and when it was found that the bread supplied to the troops was not of a good quality, it was natural that it should excite discontent amongst them. Representations had been made at various periods with regard to this evil; and the mode in which it was attempted to be redressed was felt to be ten times more mischievous than the evil itself. Permission had been most unwisely given that the troops should pay the difference to the contractor, to be furnished with a better description of bread than he was bound by the contract to furnish. In his opinion that led to serious evils, and tended to make the contractor furnish a worse description of bread than he would otherwise have been able to do, even under the contract. It might have the effect of inducing him to take the contract at an extremely low rate, by which he might be a loser, hoping to be able to pay himself by what he might receive in addition from the soldiers. The household troops were differently supplied. They were allowed through their colonel to make monthly contracts for their bread. The consequence was, that the burden which had fallen on the line, was totally avoided by the household troops, and no charge was made to them for receiving sufficiently good bread. He thought it was not too much to expect that a wholesome kind of household bread should constantly be in use among all classes of troops in the service. In the event of a bad harvest, which would, of course, considerably increase the price of bread, the most serious inconvenience might ensue to the service. It was on these grounds that he had felt it his duty to bring these subjects under the consideration of the Government; and he could now only beg that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War would give the matter his serious consideration.

said, the subject of the mode of supplying the soldiers with bread came before a Committee on the Army and Ordnance department, which sat two or three years ago; and in consequence of the recommendations of that Committee, which were drawn up by Lord Hardinge, Sir Willoughby Gordon, and Sir Randolph Routh, it was decided that for the future the quality of the bread which was called "seconds" should be used among the soldiers. It was further decided, on the evidence given before that Committee, that, upon the whole, what was called the regimental system of contract appeared to give the most satisfaction to the troops. The system in Ireland was by means of the commissariat, in England by the ordnance contract system, and in the Guards the system of regimental con- tracts were in practice. The commissariat was the most expensive; and the regimental that which gave most satisfaction to the men individually; hut there was this disadvantage in it, that in case of disturbance or war that system of contract would break down; for they would then require an organisation for which they had no preparation. There was also this difficulty: where a whole regiment was together in one place, the contract would be made very cheap; but where companies of the regiment were stationed in different countries, they were supplied with bread at a very exorbitant rate It was not, perhaps, just to describe the bread in use among the troops as bad, seeing that the same kind of bread was frequently used by the aristocratic classes on account of its exceedingly wholesome and nutritious quality, and generally by the labouring and all other classes who were accustomed to use bread as a principal article of food.

said, that in moving the Estimates for the Army for the ensuing year, he should perhaps best consult the convenience of the House by abstaining from going into any lengthened statement with respect to the number of men required for the service of the year. On the first night of the Session his noble I Friend (Lord John Russell) stated that it was the intention of the Government to take no vote for any increase of the num-ber of men in the Army, Navy, or Ordnance over the number proposed by the late Government; and, as that announce-ment appeared to be received with general acquiescence and satisfaction on the part of the House, he thought he should be uselessly taking up the time of the Commit-tee were he to enter into those reasons which induced the Government to maintain the number as it now stood. When he said there was no change in the number of men, of course he did not mean that positively there would be no alteration in the numbers, because, in fact, there was a slight increase, resulting from the return of a regiment of cavalry from India, which now augmented the aggregate number proposed to be maintained by between 200 and 300, and which affected the estimate by a charge, in connexion with some few other items, of 17,000l. He would now shortly state what were the heads of difference in the several votes before he proceeded to draw the attention of the Committee to some points which he thought worthy of their consideration. The changes in the first vote arose principally from the augmentations occasioned by the return of troops from India, to which he had previously adverted. Upon the staff there would be found an alteration resulting from reductions which the vigilance of the War Office was always endeavouring to effect, and also from the manner of placing on the Estimates certain charges. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) would recollect that in 1834 and 1835 there was a recommendation from the Committee of the Army and Navy Departments that for the future all governors of sinecure garrisons should be abolished, and that the proceeds of them should be devoted to the forming of a fund which should be distributed as rewards for distinguished services to officers who had been recommended for such rewards in consideration of their long services, and that that should continue augmenting till the whole sum reached the amount of 18,000l. The transfer of the vote for the Tower to the estimate he had mentioned, completed that sum of 18,000l., and for the future the proceeds of that department would be distributed in the shape of rewards for distinguished services among deserving officers. In the meantime it would be necessary to place on the staff a small effective force, which should perform the duties of the garrison. The reductions under the head of the foreign staff were effected by the diminution in the troops in Africa, Bermuda, Australia, Canada, and, generally speaking, in all the British colonies. The vote for the public departments would be found almost in the same state as it was last year; but under the head of postage there was an increase of 5,900l., which, he feared, was an indication of a large increase of business, arising partly from arrangements with respect to the militia, and calculated, he apprehended, to aug- ment in a future year the charge for the War Office, which in the present estimates exhibited a decrease. Under the head of the Royal Military College there was a slight decrease, and under that of the Royal Military Asylum some small augmentation, arising from an increase of the staff for the training schools, and one or two items of that description. There was one point in connexion with this vote to which he wished to call the attention of the Committee. It would be recollected that there was some complaint, that when the good-conduct pay was first established by Lord Howick, sergeants were excluded from all participation in those rewards. He confessed that, in his opinion, they had no title to that augmentation. Good-conduct pay was a commutation for additional pay for length of service, which the privates had previously enjoyed, but which the non-commissioned officers had never had. Clearly, therefore, they could have no right to a payment given in exchange for advantages which they had never possessed. When, however, the second change took place in the good-conduct pay, the advantages to the men were increased over what was first contemplated. Then the sergeants had some claim; and he would say that there was no body of men to whom the army owed so much for the formation of its regiments and the maintenance of discipline as to its non-commissioned officers, and that no army possessed such effective non-commissioned officers as ours. He proposed, therefore, to increase by 2,000l. a year the sum for distribution in good-conduct rewards to non-commissioned officers; but that increase was not to be made all at once; for if all the grants were made in one year, there would be a stagnation for many years to come for want of vacancies; the grant, therefore, was to be increased annually 250l. until the increase was 2,000l. As to the vote for half-pay, for general officers' widows, and foreign officers, there was this year, as there had been for some years past, a very considerable reduction, though it was not so large as usual; but, although there was that diminution in the half-pay, there was an increase on the out-pension of Chelsea of 8,997l. It was the first increase of that charge that had taken place for several years; but he trusted, however, that that would be the last of the kind. These were the principal heads of difference between the Estimates of the present and of last year. His right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out the other night, in moving the Navy Estimates, how great had been the diminution in the charge for the necessary force, while we were able to maintain as large an efficient force in number. That was not peculiar to the Navy. In the Army, he thought, he could show that that had been carried to as great an extent. It must be recollected that the War Office had been occupied for a long succession of years by some of the most sagacious administrators this country had produced—Lord Palmerston, Sir Henry Parnell, Lord Howick, Mr. Ellice, Sir John Hobhouse, Lord Hardinge, and Lord Panmure. These were men who had devoted great care and attention to all the details of the department over which they presided, and they had especially met with great success in the efforts they made, first, in increasing the comfort and well-being of the soldier; and, secondly, in reducing the expenditure of that department. In 1835, which was always taken as the pattern year of economy, the whole estimate was 5,907,782l.; this year it was 6,025,016l. There was an apparent increase in the latter estimate over the former of 117,234l.; but in order to institute a fair comparison with the year 1835, they ought to deduct from the latter sum all those items which, since 1835, had been added to the Estimates by the recommendations of Commissions, or of the military authorities, or of the Secretary at War. The additional items put in the Estimates since 1835 amounted to 250,000l.; and, if that were deducted, it would show a reduction of 132,766l. as compared with the Estimate of 1835; but then for this smaller sum we maintained 21,000 men more than in 1835. That was a most signal proof of vigilance in the administration of this department—that in eighteen years the expenditure should be reduced, and yet for the lesser expenditure 21,000 men more should be maintained. It might be said he was taking items of expenditure which it was impossible to avoid, and which were necessary for the efficiency of the Army; but he could assure the Committee that the increase had been, to a great extent, on the non-effective part of the Estimate. For instance, they had to take away the charge for postage, which was a fictitious sum, as it was only paid to another department, but it swelled the Estimate 35,000l. Then there was an addition for black and foreign pensioners of 12,000. The organisation of the enrolled pensioners cost about 45,000l. The poundage for the Chelsea pensioners, which amounted to 50,000l., was given up by Lord Panmure, and, taking out these large items, and leaving the additional items for schools, the new system of prisons, the barrack libraries, and other things intended for the benefit and welfare of the soldiers, they would come to the same result—that in 1853 we were maintaining 21,000 men more than in 1835 for a less sum than was spent then. He thought he could show that that had not been done entirely by the reduction of half-pay. The cost of each man in 1835 was 42l. 15s. l1d.; in the present year it was only 40l. 3s. 6d. That included the cost of the officers; exclusive of officers, the cost of each man was little more than 30l. So that the cost of each private, including the cost of the officers commanding him, and clothing and producing him in the field, had been reduced 2l. 12s. 5d. since 1835. And that had been effected without in any way curtailing the comforts of the men. He did not believe that at any period had the soldier been more comfortable than at the present moment. His hon. Friend behind him (Mr. Rich) had said that evening that the service was not popular. He very much doubted that. Whether it was that the short service was beginning to tell, or the increased comforts, or the diminished punishments, he did not know, but it was certain that recruiting was never more easy, and never produced a better class of recruits than at the present time, though 50,000 men were being raised simultaneously for the militia. Since 1835, too, the stoppage for rations abroad had been lowered. The soldier had complained, and justly, that on some stations, where provisions were notoriously cheap, he was charged a very high rate; but the principle was sound, for in other places the provisions were just as dear. The stoppage, however, was pitched too high, and a lower rate had therefore been substituted, which was universal throughout our colonies. That had given satisfaction to the men, and was not, he believed, except comparatively with the previous system, any loss to the public. The good-conduct pay had been increased— the whole increase, as it now stood, was 65,000l. a year. Barrack libraries had also been established, and they were most useful. The first was established in 1840. There were now 150 libraries, with 16,000 subscribers, and consisting of 117,000 volumes. By a late arrangement officers were permitted to subscribe, and had the use of the libraries, but, as it was clear their sharing in them might deter the men from subscribing, a restriction was put upon them to prevent the clashing of any interests in that respect, and leave the men perfect access to their own libraries. The men paid one penny a month; the officers one day's pay every quarter, and both they and the soldiers were able to borrow the books to read in their own quarters, but not so as to interfere with their duties. Regimental schools were established in 1846, and he must here say he owed a debt of gratitude to his noble Friend Lord Panmure for the manner in which he had carried out the plan. It originated with himself (Mr. S. Herbert) before he left office; but every one who knew anything of administration knew how much easier it was to draw out a plan upon paper than to carry it into practice. At first the plan met with a great deal of prejudice and objection; but, by a steady perseverance, all the difficulties had been removed, and he was happy to say that, so far from objecting to them, there was now a great anxiety among commanding officers to secure properly-trained schoolmasters for their schools. The general establishment had been made in this way: There was a large school for the orphans of soldiers. It was conducted entirely by commissioned and non-commissioned officers; but it was considerably behind the standard of all schools of that class, and had therefore been put upon an entirely new footing. A training school for masters was grafted upon that, and the persons who came there to train schoolmasters were practised in teaching. He would now read a short statement upon the result of that system:—

"There are now employed with different corps fifty-eight masters, and two on sick leave, and sixteen assistant-masters. They teach both the children and the non-commissioned officers and privates; and all the reports, as well from commanding officers as from the Inspector General, describe their labours as very beneficial. Indeed, wherever the commanding officer gives his countenance to the arrangement, the men attend school in such numbers as test the physical as well as the intellectual powers of the masters severely. In the 77th Regiment, for example, now quartered at Weedon, the school roll shows an attendance of not fewer than 538 adults. The 35th Regiment sends 371 to school, the 82nd Regiment, 270. Indeed, the lowest attendance in the infantry, that of the 59th depot, does not fall short of 51. It is worthy of remark, that except in the case of recruits, all this attendance is voluntary; and it is all paid for. The recruits are required by regulation to attend till dismissed drill. For a time they not unfrequently lay aside school with drill; but in almost every instance those who have made even moderate progrens come back after an interval of a few months."

The attendance of the recruits, so long as their drilling lasted, was the only compulsory attendance. After that time it was voluntary—all contributed—and he thought it was a very gratifying testimony to the taste among the men for acquiring knowledge that would better fit them for the duties they had to discharge. He had great confidence in the present system, and thought it had contributed, among other circumstances, to that increased good conduct which was so remarkable among all ranks of the Army. As another proof of the increasing comfort and well-being of the men, he would just allude to the return of the deposits in the savings banks. They were established in 1844. There were then 1,890 depositors, and the amount deposited was 14,849l. In 1852 the number of depositors was 9,447; the amount deposited was 111,920l. There was also a great diminution of punishments in the Army simultaneous with this. In 1838 the number of corporal punishments was 879. Of course the strength of the Army at different periods would influence the value of the returns; but since that year there had been a diminution. In 1843 the number was 620; in 1846, 461; in 1849, 311; in 1850,247; in 1851,206; in 1852 the return was only for the troops at home, and half the force on foreign stations; but the number of corporal punishments had diminished to 96. It was not because there was a greater laxity of discipline that that change had occurred; but there were other modes of punishment—such, for example, as military prisons—and, of course, there had been a great increase in the number of those punishments; but the question was, had there been an increase in the number of offences and of persons tried by courts-martial? In 1838 the number of persons tried, in proportion to the effective force, was I in 11½ Now it was only I in 16. The number of persons admitted to the military prisons in. 1850 was 3,565, in 1851 it was 3,266, and last year it was 3,313, being a slight increase over the preceding year, but not greater than the increase of the effective strength of the Army. He believed that the system of military prisons had answered extremely well. It was conducted upon a principle which had been occasionally questioned in that House, and was sometimes extremely severe; but it must be recollected that the object they had in the imprisonment of a soldier was different from that which they had in the imprisonment of a civilian, for every day the punishment was protracted they were giving punishment to the well-behaved comrade of the prisoner. The diet, therefore, during imprisonment, was low, and the labour exacted severe; but it was found that the health of the men did not suffer. There was but one other point upon this subject with respect to the well-being of the Army in general, to which he would call the attention of the Committee, and that was the health of the Army. He believed it was at no former period so healthy as that moment. Some years ago there was a most fearful mortality from the peculiar stations in which some of the barracks were placed. Lord Howick devoted great attention to the remedy of that evil, and with great success; and the result was that the return up to last March, being the last return made, showed that the health of the Army was better at that time than it had ever been before. Taking Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands, being the whole of the Mediterranean force, the mortality for the year ending the 31st of March, 1852, was 12 7–10ths in 1,000; the average for the thirty years previously to 1846 being 19 l–10th. In the American colonies, which were always very favourable, the proportion was 14 in 1,000; the average for the thirty years previously to 1846 was 15. For St. Helena, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land, and New Zealand, he found the average was 19 l–10th in 1,000; but as to the Cape of Good Hope the average was disturbed by the mortality arising during the operations of the Kafir war. The return for the Cape of Good Hope, however, exclusive of the war, was 24 in 1,000; hut that he understood was not very high—it was much less than for the French Army in Algeria. The average of New Zealand was 12 in 1,000; of New South Wales and Van Die-men's land 9 1–10th, and of St. Helena 6 two-tenths. For the West Indies, up to March last, exclusive of Jamaica, the mortality was 22 1–10th in 1,000; for Jamaica it was 44. Since that time the yel- low fever had broken out in Barbadoes, and there was this singular circumstance in the last attack of this disease, that it had come in a manner quite different from that in which it usually came: it did not originate in the island, and it had had much more effect among the civilians than among the Army; and again it had been much more fatal among the officers than among the men, contrary to what was usually the case. But upon the whole the mortality had not been so high as 6 per cent, and he did not know of any other instance in which the mortality had been so small. Measures had been taken immediately on the outbreak of the fever, and the medical officers had adopted all means in their power, both as to the construction of the barracks and as to drainage, to remove the causes that might be thought to have had such an effect. As to the West Indies generally, exclusive of Barbadoes, there had been far less mortality than in any year before. At the Mauritius and Ceylon the mortality had diminished from 43 6–10ths, the average of the past thirty years, to 22⅓ per 1,000. It was in the East Indies and Hongkong that the chief loss of the British troops was usually to be found; but even there the past year presented highly favourable results, the mortality in the three presidencies having fallen from 74 3–18ths, the average of the past thirty-five years, to 48 5–10ths, per 1,000; and that at Hongkong, usually the most unhealthy of our stations, from 150 per 1,000 to 69. Arrangements, he might add, with reference to Honkong, were in progress for keeping a portion of the troops on shipboard in the harbour during periods of sickness—a measure which had always been attended with the best possible effect, when facilities could be obtained for their accommodation. Accounts had, indeed, been received by him from India just before he came down to the House, which showed that the proportion of mortality there among the troops was still more favourable than he had just stated, the rate in Bengal being only 2 per cent. The same accounts fully confirmed the statement which had been made that evening by the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. Hogg) as to the healthy condition of our army at Rangoon; for it appeared that the mortality among those troops at the latest moment was under 4 per cent. This improvement in the health of our troops was, in great degree, the result of improvements in their medical treatment; but it was also largely attributable to the improvement in the habits of the men themselves—to the diminution—very great, though still susceptible of extension—of drunkenness, which had hitherto so widely undermined the constitutions of our soldiers, especially in tropical climates. Having thus recapitulated the various measures which had been adopted of late years by the Government for improving our soldiers, he would proceed to state that the next great object of attention was to make our Army as efficient as possible for the service of the field. There was no doubt that hitherto we had been far too remiss in this very essential matter; that we had been in the habit of using our Army far too much as a police force in aid of the civil magistrates, spreading it for this purpose in separate detachments all over the country, so that the men had had no opportunities for field practice, or scarcely a chance of seeing two regiments brigaded together, with a view to the acquisition of a knowledge of manoeuvres on anything like a large scale. In Ireland alone there were as many as 200 stations, occupied by about 20,000 troops, and in England and the Colonies the same thing to a great extent occurred. He had, however, a confident hope that he should be able before long to effect such a concentration of our troops in this country as would remedy this great defect, and render our Army thoroughly effective for any contingency. There was a great difference between the Army and the Navy in one important respect, namely, that the Navy was so nearly in the same condition of preparation in peace as in war, that the occurrence of war required little more than the shotting of guns, and so on, to place it in a state of readiness; whereas the Army, in peace, is placed in circumstances quite different from those which constitute the conditions of war, and as the matter stood at present, was distributed about, here and there and everywhere, in small detachments, without any opportunities of exercising in masses. This very great defect he proposed to remedy. A very small sum would suffice to provide a station where there could be ball practice with the Minie rifle; noncommissioned officers, and a certain proportion of men from each regiment, would there be enabled to acquire the practice of rifle firing at various distances, and, with this practice thoroughly attained, would then return to their respective regiments, and communicate that scientific practice to their comrades; the whole Army would thus by degrees be brought into one system of effective firing. In the summer it was proposed to form an encampment somewhere in the country, whither various regiments would proceed for the purposes of that instruction in which, as he had said, our troops were at present so very deficient. From this measure he anticipated a large amount of advantage, and, he might add, it would not give the less satisfaction to the country that it would be attended with very slight additional expense; the movement of troops to the encampment involving, in point of fact, no more outlay than the ordinary change of troops from one station to another. The increased wear and tear, and the additional allowances to officers and men, the main sources of greater outlay, would bear no proportion whatever to the public benefit of the result. As to arms, Lord Hardinge had for some time past been taking the greatest pains to procure the most effective weapons that science could invent; he had sent to America, and to various parts of the Continent, for the most approved specimens of arms, and he had applied all the knowledge, experience, and science at his disposal to test their various merits, and ascertain their defects. As the result of this investigation, Lord Har-dinge had now full confidence that he should be shortly able to place in the hands of our soldiers a weapon lighter, and equally efficient, in every respect, with the Minie rifle. By these various means the Government had every expectation that they should, ere long, place our Army in the highest possible state of efficiency. Our standing Army was now, as it had always been, comparatively small in numbers; but there was no reason why it should not be so armed, so provided, so trained, as to become even beyond what it was now, perfect in its efficiency. The United States, for instance, kept a small standing Army, but the arm selected for that Army were those which required the highest amount of training, and the greatest time for preparation, in order to be used with efficiency, namely, the artillery force. We had the finest possible materials at our disposal in every respect; and it should be no fault of the Government if those materials were not applied to the best purpose, considering, as they did, that an Army for which the people contributed so largely should be placed in the most thorough—in a perfect state of efficiency. So long as he had the honour to hold his present office, he would apply his most vigilant attention to the expenditure within his department, so that it might produce the greatest possible amount of advantage to the country; and so that the least amount possible should be wasted in that dead weight which had been found so materially to interfere with the completeness and vigour of the active force. By the course he had thus outlined to the Committee, he fully believed that the British Army would be before long rendered more thoroughly efficient than it had ever been. Trusting that the Committee would excuse the extent of details into which his explanation had led him, and that no difficulty would be interposed in the way of the proposition he was about to place in the hands of the Chairman, he begged leave to propose to the Committee the first Vote.

said, he heard the general statement of the right hon. Gentleman with great satisfaction. No man had ever manifested more anxiety than the right hon. Gentleman had that the character of our troops for discipline and good conduct should stand high, and he considered that the various improvements in the management of the Army stated by his right hon. Friend would eminently conduce to this great object. He was especially rejoiced to learn that there was such a marked diminution in the number of corporal punishments inflicted. He considered that Lord Panmure had introduced many excellent regulations into the force. The good-conduct pay was a great advantage. He hoped that, in addition to the barrack libraries, the officers of the various regiments would be instructed to provide the men with various rational recreations to occupy their leisure hours; and he conceived, further, that much good might be done by enabling the soldiers, as well as the rest of the community, to have readier and larger access to our various literary, scientific, and artistic establishments. He should be glad to hear from his right hon. Friend, in connexion with his gratifying statement as to the diminution of drunkenness in the Army, what had been the result, of the recent alteration in the canteen system; and also, whether steps were being taken to improve the present still very unsatisfactory condition of the barracks. At the Plymouth barracks, which he visited about three years ago, and where about 3,000 men were generally located, there was a great want of accommodation; the men had to wash in open sheds, and there was no attention to the comforts and decency of married men. Moral improvements and good discipline ought to go together, and then the lash would be needless. He entirely concurred with the right hon. Gentleman as to the inexpediency and impolicy of employing our soldiers as police; and he trusted that the noble Secretary for the Home Department would take care that every county provided itself, as it ought to do under the Police Act, with the full police force required for the aid of the civil magistrate within its limits. In many of the counties where police were more needed than in others, they had none at all; the magistrates relying on the military. This was unfair, as throwing an expense which ought to fall on those districts on the country at large. He had supported the establishment of the police in the metropolis, and he believed that the poor benefited more by their services than the rich. If the police establishment was to be maintained, let it be made effective, by being extended to all parts of the country. Magistrates must be taught to depend more than they had hitherto done on the civil force. He was glad to hear that, although we had now 21,000 men more than in 1835, it was at no increase of cost; but he still considered the number of men proposed altogether beyond the necessity of the case. It was quite lamentable that the paroxysm of utterly absurd fear that had come over us should induce us to sanction the maintenance of a standing Army larger by 20,000 men than the Duke of Wellington considered sufficient for our defence. He had frequently urged a reduction of the Army; but there were such extraordinary changes in the public feeling that it was difficult to effect any alteration. There was just now a paroxysm of alarm, which he considered was wholly unfounded. But this increase in the number of men necessitated an increase of expense in other directions. While the Army had been increased one-fourth, the Navy and artillery had been doubled; and the aggregate of the Estimates now amounted to 17,000,000l. or 18,000,000l. He was confident there was no necessity for this large increase; but he yet thought it better to be over-prepared than to be deficient in that respect. His plan would be to bring in the vessels of war from the Pacific and the African and American coasts. There were far more ships than were needed in South America. He objected to having such an enormous body of men in arms, taken from their industrial occupations. For the purpose of defence it would be far better to enrol volunteers, who were actuated by a national feeling. A thousand of such would be worth three thousand militiamen, taken from the lowest ranks, and paid at the rate of a shilling a day. The burden of these increased Estimates would fall on the landed interest; for, with the existing facilities for emigration, the working classes would not stay at home to be taxed so heavily. Let the country gentlemen consider this, and reflect what their situation would be should emigration proceed to a much greater extent. The land could not run away. With the existing large military establishments in every country of Europe, the vitals of the Continent were almost eaten up. Nothing could be more expedient in such circumstances than the scheme proposed by his hon. Friend near him (Mr. Cobden), and for which he had been so much ridiculed—that of a friendly communication between the different Governments with a view to disarmament. But his hon. Friend had not the credit of originating this proposition, absurd as it was said to be, for the Earl of Aberdeen, in 1846, had advocated the same thing. He said that he should have no confidence for the security of peace until he saw a large reduction in the armies of Europe. Sir Robert Peel had also urged the same view. Lord Aberdeen said that he was disposed to dissent from the maxim which had received a very general assent, that the best security for the continuance of peace was to be prepared for war; that that was a maxim which might have applied to the nations of antiquity, but did not apply to modern nations, when the facilities for preparations were very great; and that with respect to the stability of peace he should have no hope till he saw a great reduction in the military establishments, which ought to be the object of all Governments, but especially of the Government of this country. His hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden) was abused for recommending precisely what Lord Aberdeen in his place had recommended. What was the present state of our military establishments? The regular Army consisted of 155,000 men and officers—the pensioners, the dockyard establishments, and the yeo- manry of 42,000—the coast-guard service, the Irish constabulary, and the English police of 31,000, and the enrolled militia of 65,000; making, altogether, 293,000 men who were taken away from the productive industry of the country. By the Act of last year, 40,000 more might be added to these, so as to increase the Army reserves to 120,000. When all the additions which had been allowed had been made to these forces, they would be increased to 358,500 men. With respect to the pay of both officers and men in the Army, he did not think that they were paid too much, but considered that the expenses of the staff might be considerably reduced. A considerable saving might also be effected by the union in one department of the Army and Ordnance. It was calculated that there were in Europe at the present moment 7,000,000 of men capable of bearing arms, and that of these 4,000,000, or more than one-half, were in arms, and paid by the rest. Let the Committee think of the double evil that such a system created—the abstraction of such a number of able-bodied men on the one side, and the abstraction of the fruits of the labour of others to maintain them on the other. He would not, however, oppose the proposition, but he would enter his protest against keeping up these large establishments. He willingly admitted the good government of the Army; he believed that its administration was as well conducted as it was possible for an Army to be; and he could assure the right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary at War, that he fully appreciated the importance of the improvements he proposed, and he would suggest to him the necessity of still further carrying out those arrangements for the reduction of the half-pay list which Lord Hardinge commenced when he was Secretary at War.

said, he had listened to the observations with which the hon. Member for Montrose always favoured that House when any question was brought forward relating to the Army or Navy, although he should have hoped, from the assent which the hon. Member appeared to give to the Estimates of the Secretary at War, that the Committee would have been spared from his long and laborious dissertation, which had, after all, ended in smoke. The hon. Gentleman had called attention to the inconvenience of the present barracks, and the inadequacy of proper accommodation for soldiers. He (Co- lonel Sibthorp) was ready to grant anything to the soldiers which could add to their comfort; but he wondered whether the hon. Gentleman would be prepared to allow the additional expense which would be necessary for carrying out the recommendations he had made. He (Colonel Sibthorp) was a friend to economy, but he would not deny the soldier the comforts he had a right to claim; and, therefore, he was disposed to give any grant that might be necessary for that purpose. The hon Gentleman had talked about interference with the industry of the country. He would tell him what had interfered with the industry of the country. It was that infernal system of free trade that had interfered with the industry of the country. He was not in favour of free trade, and giving a preference to the foreigner over his own countrymen. If the hon. Gentleman talked of interference with native industry, let them keep out the foreigner and the free-trade system, and he went so far as to say—expel every Member out of this House who was in favour of that system. Let the country gentleman alone, and they would take care of those who placed confidence in them, and looked up to them for protection in time of need, and not to the foreigner who robbed them. Remember the Crystal Palace. He never went through the city of London but he heard respectable tradesmen tell him, "We cannot do anything, Sir." "Why?" "The foreigner steps in and sells his articles cheap, but nasty." He knew it from his own experience in some instances. He had offered, and would offer, to the English tradesman double, aye, and treble as much more for the articles he sold, because he felt that the English tradesmen was honest, and he could find him when he wanted him, than he would give to the foreigner for all the trash he brought to this country. He would bring it here, and sell it here, and then he ran away and could not be found after he had cheated you. He caught something from the hon. Gentleman about the Peace Society. He was of opinion that the members of the Peace Society would be the very first, if their mills were in danger, to call out for the military whom they abused, to save them. But they would be found either low in the cellar, or under the bed. They would have no objection to pay the military then, but they would keep out of the way of danger. Peace Society! In his opinion, directly and indirectly, they were encouraging everything that was adverse to peace. They were firebrands and faggots wherever they went, and he would rather see the devil in his house than a member of the Peace Society. He thanked the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War for the able manner in which he had brought forward the Estimates. Although he might differ with the right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury bench, they would not find an opponent, but a regular supporter, in him of all those measures, whatever might be their politics, which might best contribute to the security, welfare, and dignity of the country.

said, he begged to put a question to the right hon. Secretary at War, with regard to the recruiting service. A Committee had been appointed, which had given a report, but there was considerable difference of opinion on the subject. The expense, 90,000l., was very great, and he thought some economical alterations might be effected.

said, there had been two Committees appointed since the one referred to by the hon. Gentleman. Lord Panmure had, after much consideration, decided against a suggestion made to one of the Committees, with regard to the employment of pensioners in the recruiting service. From the evidence he had received, he was inclined to be of the same opinion, because, if men belonged to no particular regiment, the recruits they enlisted would not be as efficient as they were when each regiment recruited for itself.

said, he wished to draw attention to the expediency and economy of the institution of a lectureship or professorship of military surgery in the King's College, or in one of the medical schools in London; and a similar establishment in the University or at the College of Surgeons in Dublin; and to suggest the removal to the metropolis of the Museum of Preparations of Diseases of Foreign Climates now in Fort Pitt, Chatham, where it was comparatively useless and inaccessible to medical students for the Army and Navy. The expense attending the establishment of the lectureships to which he referred would be extremely small, and favourable opinions had been expressed by high authorities as to their probable effect. For the want of adequate instruction to medical officers, the nation had wasted large sums of money, and many lives had been lost. Much also remained to be done with regard to the improvement of the sanitary condition of barracks.

said, it was quite true that there was no professorship of military surgery either at Dublin or London, and that such an institution existed only at Edinburgh. He was not, however, aware by what funds that professorship was endowed, for it did not stand upon the Estimates at all. Recognising the importance of the proposition made, he was not prepared to state how far the proposal which the hon. and gallant Officer had made could be carried out with economy, and at the same time with due regard to efficiency. The removal of the Museum from Fort Pitt would certainly render it accessible to a larger number of persons, and he did not say that such a removal was impossible, but at present he could not state whether any place could be obtained in London for the purpose of that museum. With regard to the institution of professorships he would make inquiry, and until he had done so he should be unable to answer the question. With regard to barracks, as soon as the pressure of works now in progress was at an end, he hoped to be able to effect some improvements in the old barracks.

said, he wished to know on what precedent the Commander-in-Chief was to receive the allowance of 3,458l. which appeared on the Votes?

said, that allowance was in lieu of a larger sum which it had been usual to pay his predecessor.

thought that when the Duke of Wellington was deceased, the Government would have attended to what had been recommended by the Committee upstairs, namely, that some change should take place with regard to the allowance in question, favourable to the finances of the country. He also wished to know why the soldiers were not withdrawn from Australia, now that that colony had obtained self-government?

said, that by an arrangement entered into with the Australian colonies by the late Government, the colonies were to pay all the maintenance of the troops stationed there, with the single exception of the cost of their arms.

said, there were no Estimates to which he should be more disposed to object than these. One half of those who entered these corps did so for the purpose of getting coats and uniforms to produce an effect in ball-rooms, and they ought to pay for the privilege of wearing them. He was for regular troops, and if they wanted an addition to the forces, why not raise a couple more regiments?

said, that offers were made about a year ago to the late Government of the service of certain volunteer rifle corps, which appeared to be favourably received; at all events he had not been able to elicit from the late Home Secretary that there was any objection to the acceptance of such service. During the last war the principle of enrolling and employing volunteers, it would be remembered, was carried on to a considerable extent, and he believed they had been found a very useful aid in the defences of the country. He wished to ask the noble Lord who now held the office of Home Secretary whether the present Government proposed to avail themselves of the offers of voluntary services to which he had alluded?

said, it was better to do one thing at a time. They were now engaged in organising a militia, and he was desirous of postponing the consideration of volunteer corps or rifle companies until they had got the militia well and completely organised. He believed the utmost reliance might be placed upon the spirit of the people of this country whenever their volunteer services might be required; but as the corps alluded to, however much of a volunteer character they might have, were attended with a considerable degree of expense, it might be as well to postpone the consideration of the subject, at all events for the present year.

said, he did not think the noble Lord was happy in his explanation. We wanted the nation to be defended at as little expense as possible, and the noble Lord did not seem to be aware that the militia was costing the country 100,000l. a year, which was taken from the industrious classes, and obliged them to continue the soap and other objectionable taxes. Why should not the noble Lord try if he could get these volunteers? He thought every man bound to contribute to the defence as well as to the taxation of the country. If Surrey and Middlesex required a certain number of riflemen, let the people of those counties turn out and choose their own officers. They would then create a corps with hearts and hands ready in case of need to defend their country, and one which in his opinion would be much better than this paltry, miserable corps at an expense of 88,000l.

said, he had understood that of all the jobs the noble Lord had undertaken, the formation of the militia was that in which he had best succeeded, and that thousands of men more than sufficient were ready to be enrolled, and only anxious to get at the French. But on looking at a return laid on the table a short time ago, he found that in Kent and Sussex, those counties which they were told were most in danger, only about half the quota of militiamen had been raised. In his county (Sussex) he knew that the labouring classes were all well employed and by no means desirous of volunteering into the militia, nor were the inhabitants generally afraid of a French invasion. In Brighton, especially, they were far more afraid of the militia than of the French. He wished to know when an amended return would be presented, showing the number enrolled in those counties to the present date.

begged to say that both the counties of Sussex and Kent would be very amply represented so far as the militia was concerned. The numbers were not completed yet, but he believed the enlistment was going on as favourably as could be anticipated.

said, in the county that he had the honour to represent (Surrey), the gentry had met and proposed to form themselves into a rifle corps; and, if that proposition had been encouraged, the country would no doubt have had an efficient corps without its costing them one farthing of expense. He hoped the noble Viscount would take the subject into his consideration, and that the present Government would be disposed to allow the formation of this corps.

said, he did not mean to undervalue the use of volun- teer corps, but, being pressed, he must say he could not consider them as nearly so efficient for the purposes of national defence as a regiment of militia. That was the view taken in this country during the war which began in 1803; in the beginning of that war volunteer corps were set on foot to a considerable extent; they were gradually diminished, and a local militia was substituted. Who were the persons likely to form these volunteer corps? They were tradesmen, professional men, clerks, and apprentices—men accustomed to a comfortable existence and to take care of themselves—not men accustomed to rough work. These individuals were not calculated to lead the life of soldiers, and if called out to live in camp, to sleep in the fields, and be exposed to the rain and inclement weather, many of them would be soon fitter subjects for the hospital than the field. Moreover, they would all have to leave their homes and business, and be carried to the coast to serve with the regular Army. He fully agreed with those who thought volunteer corps might be very useful as the police of their districts, and, no doubt, also in seaport towns they might be useful as a means of natural defence; but he did not think that, as part of a permanent system of military organisation, you could reckon upon such a force as you could upon the militia.

said, the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir G. Pechell) had spoken of the militia as if that force were much less than might have been expected. It must be remembered, however, that the machinery for raising the militia had to be put in force during the month of August, and that before the end of September six counties had completed their quota, while by the end of December, when the return which had been printed on the subject was laid upon the table of the House, notwithstanding the apprehensions of those who opposed this measure, no fewer than, he believed, 35,000 men were raised, the most extraordinary instance of recruiting an effective military force, as he trusted the militia would become, which could be found in the annals of this country. He had been reproached for discouraging volunteer efforts; but he thought he had given sound reasons for the course which the late Government had pursued upon this subject. They were in effect the same as those which had been just given by the noble Viscount—that the object in raising the militia was to obtain, not a changeable but a permanent force in the country, and one upon which we could permanently rely —a body of men who could not retire from the service whenever it pleased them to do so. He would, however, remind the hon. and gallant General (Sir De L. Evans) that the Government of Lord Derby was about to sanction the establishment of volunteer rifle corps. There were only three or four which applied for Government sanction; but, before giving it, he had required of those regiments that they should submit themselves to all the regulations laid down by the Act of Parliament, and to certain necessary restrictions. Three out of the four regiments bad, however, declined to embody themselves on those terms; and this, he conceived, did not encourage the Government to go on.

said, he still thought the country would not understand why the establishment of this force should be discouraged.

said, the answer of the noble Viscount was not very satisfactory. If the country ought to be prepared, as they had been told, why should not the voluntary service be general?

said, the persons who composed all volunteer forces were totally different from those who composed the bulk of the privates of the militia regiments. They were not, as he had before said, persons who were fitted for the hardships of military life, and could not be carried away from their private occupations and from their homes to do permanent service, without serious inconvenience. If they were expected to march out, and encamp, and serve in the field, what would become of the business of the country?

thought the noble Lord was blowing hot and cold; for he said before that in case of invasion business would be put a stop to, and every man would fly to arms.

said, the abolition of Kilmainham Hospital was recommended by the Committee on the Army and Navy Estimates, and he thought it had been carried out by the Government.

said, two proposals had been made—one to consolidate Kilmainham with Chelsea Hospital, and the other not to make any fresh appointments, and to let the institution die a natural death. At present no new appointments were made.

said, it was in evidence before the Committee that it was difficult to fill Chelsea Hospital, and that it would be advisable to transfer the pensioners from Kilmainham thither. A large establishment ought not to be kept up for a few inmates when there was plenty of room at Chelsea.

said, he remembered very well the appeal which had been made by several Irish Members on behalf of the Kilmainham pensioners, who stated it to be hard that the Irish soldiers should be taken from that hospital to a place where their relations could never see them—and he thought it had been successful.

said, the subject was carefully considered by the Committee, and their opinion was that Kilmainham Hospital ought to be done away with. He understood that it was now in course of being put an end to.

said, the recommendation of the Committee was in accordance with the wishes of Irish Members. If they allowed to the Irish soldiers in their own homes the same amount expended in Kilmainham Hospital, they would be much better off. He did not object to the vote for the purpose of saving the money.

said, he must protest against the abolition of this hospital as an unnecessary insult and injury to the Irish soldiers.

said, he must ask for an explanation of this Bill. The original notice was for a Bill to pay off certain charges on the Crown Lands, by virtue of an additional charge on the London Bridge Approaches Fund. That notice attracted his attention; but he was assured that the Bill would involve no further charge upon the coal duties, and that, when brought in it would show the matter quite plainly. The Bill, however, was anything but plain, and several professional Members had assured him that it was neither Queen's English nor lawyer's English. The 12th Clause ran thus: —

"Inasmuch as the whole of the said moneys so charged on the London Bridge Approaches Fund being directed, as aforesaid, to be paid to the account of the Consolidated Fund freed from the said moneys directed to be paid in respect of the Southwark improvements, the Commissioners of the Treasury shall, out of the Consolidated Fund, pay to the Commissioners of Works such a sum of money," &c

It was not grammar. The Bill was not printed for circulation till Wednesday, and the Newcastle Coal Trade Committee had not had time to communicate their opinion upon it.

said, he hoped there would be no objection to read the Bill a Second Time, It would not in any way increase the charges upon the coal duty. The object was this: —A sum had been raised on the security of the coal duties for certain metropolitan improvements; there were balances in the Exchequer now, and the Government wished to employ part of them in paying off this debt, for which they were paying high interest. It was simply a financial trans action, to save interest, and not an additional farthing would be charged on the coal duties.

, said, that formerly the offices of Works and Land Revenues were in one department, and the head of the department being pressed to make some public improvements, and money being wanted, the land revenues were mortgaged for the purpose. The money was borrowed from the coal fund. This circumstance led to the division of the departments of Works and Land Revenues, so that such confusion should not occur again. A sum of 800,000l. had been borrowed, and the interest was paid out of the land revenues, and it came to the same thing whether it was paid out of those revenues or the Consolidated Fund; with this exception, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was enabled to raise the money at a reduced rate of interest. The Bill did not affect the coal trade in the least.

hoped the right hon. Baronet (Sir W. Molesworth) would not press the Second Reading; for the Bill was in such a state that no man could elicit any meaning whatever from either Clause I or Clause 12. The Bill presented a barbarity of expression which might safely challenge comparison with anything in the Statute-book.

said, there existed some misapprehensions in the north of England on the subject of the Bill, which he hoped might be removed on its passage through Committee.

said, he would briefly state what the object of the Bill was. Some years ago a Commission had been appointed for the purpose of executing certain improvements in the metropolis. Large sums of money had to be borrowed, and the Commissioners had applied to the Bank of England for a loan. The Bank of England had been unwilling to lend money on the security of the Commissioners, and it had been proposed to give to the Bank the security of the land revenues. Interest had then been paid for many years out of the proceeds of the land revenues, but subsequently it had been found that this was a very onerous and expensive way of raising money. The object of the present Bill was to enable the land revenues to be discharged from the obligation which they now laboured under, and that the sums borrowed should be paid out of the balances now in the Exchequer, which wore at present yielding no interest. He believed the obscurity in the language of the Bill arose from the complicated circumstances out of which they arose.

said, that considering the great talents of the present Government, he had to express his regret that this Bill had been brought forward in a manner so unsatisfactory. It appeared to be the intention of the Bill to terminate what had originally been a very improvident arrangement, by a method which, however desirable it might be in a merely financial respect, would yet result in diminishing the balances in the Exchequer. Now it was of very great importance that these balances should be maintained. He should like to know to what amount the balances in the Exchequer would be diminished by this arrangement. It was of great importance that the amount of those bal- ances should be sustained. That was a consideration which the House ought to entertain, and they must not consider that they were terminating a pressure while they were imposing a charge of a far more injurious character. It certainly appeared to him that this Bill had been drawn up in a very obscure manner, and that it was founded on a principle which the House ought to look at with very great suspicion. They ought at least to know to what extent the balances in the Exchequer would be affected.

said, that the amount for which the Exchequer balances would be appropriated was 960,000l., which, with interest, came to about 1,000,070l., and the Exchequer was in a state in which it was rather convenient that it should be charged with this sum. They had a claim on the coal duties to repay this sum to the Exchequer, and the amount of the duties for the present year was 80,000l. The charge was not to form a permanent payment from the balances in the Exchequer, but was to be paid by the balances to the Bank of England, to terminate a debt on which they now paid 4 per cent, while the Exchequer balances were lying unemployed. The Exchequer would be repaid by the coal duties till all the money advanced was made good.

said, he must appeal to the Government to admit that the Bill was drawn in such a way as to be discreditable to the legislation of the House. He thought they had received a sort of guarantee at the commencement of the Session that Bills should be clearly drawn up; but the Bill before them was drawn in such a way that not a lawyer in Westminster Hall could tell what it meant. There could not be a more vicious or involved Act on the Statute-book. He thought Government should see Bills were intelligibly drawn, so that the House could understand them.

said, his question had not been answered. He wished to know the amount which was now in the Exchequer as balances, the amount which would be drawn from the Exchequer balances for the purpose of the Bill, and the time when that amount would be repaid?

said, that the balances in the Exchequer were about 9,000,000l. sterling, which would be reduced by 1,000,000l., or thereabouts, by this measure. This sum would be repaid by the accruing duties on coals, which amounted, in the present year, to 80,000l. It was to relieve the land revenue of the Crown, which was liable at present, that the change was made. He quite admitted that the Bill was one of the most difficult to understand, but that was owing to the difficulties arising from the discreditable arrangements which had been made when the debt was formed, rather than from any want of clearness in those who drew it.

said, he quite agreed with the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Phinn), who said that this Bill was so drawn that it was impossible for anybody to understand what it provided or what it meant.

said, that under the Acts of Parliament on the subject, the coal tax was charged to the Government not only for the principal sum of the expenditure for metropolitan improvements, but also for the interest at the rate of 5 per cent; and he believed that there was now due to the Government under the Act a sum of about 900,000l. as principal, and 130,000l. more for interest.

thought it would be remembered that the Chancellor of the Exchequer (who was not now in his place), when he introduced the Bill, explained that its details were complicated and difficult to understand; and therefore he (Mr. Wal-pole) would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman who now had the charge of the measure, that it would be better to postpone the second reading till Monday, in order that the House might receive an explanation respecting the Bill, for really nobody who read it could understand it as it stood.

hoped that an explanation would be made of the security that was given for this money, as the Bill referred to other Acts, and the matter was utterly unintelligible to everybody.

said, he thought the Bill ought to be postponed, and that an inquiry should be instituted into the nature of the coal tax. He understood that the security at present rested upon the coal tax and the land revenues of the Crown conjointly, and that the moment this Bill passed the whole liability would be borne by the coal tax alone.

said, he must complain that Government was pressing forward a Bill with which no one seemed to be satisfied. He was satisfied they would be left in a minority if they went to a division.