said, he should move the expunging of the clause, on the ground that it was fatal to the rights of tenants, which as much deserved to be respected as the rights of proprietors.

said, the clause had been fully discussed on Friday last, and, now that a fair division had been taken upon the question, he trusted that no further opposition would be offered to the passing of the Bill through Committee, which he was most anxious to effect that day.

said, he had understood that the words on which they had just divided were not to be pressed; and upon that understanding many hon. Members had absented themselves from the House that morning. For himself he could not admit that there was any necessity for the Bill passing through Committee that day; and if such enactments as those contained in the clause under consideration were to be persisted in, he should not care if the Bill never passed at all. He should vote for expunging the clause.

said, he must deny that there had been any arrangement or understanding on Friday last that the words in question were not to be pressed.

said, he could see no difference between growing crops and crops after they had been severed from the land. No such distinction was recognised in Scotland or England; and what objection could there be to assimilating the law of the three countries in this respect? With every feeling on behalf of the tenant, he should vote for the clause.

said, he looked upon the Bill from beginning to end as one of pains and penalties against the tenantry of Ireland. He admitted that it was difficult to distinguish in principle between growing and cut crops. He had come to the conclusion, on the whole, that the right of distress should not exist at all unless there was reason to suppose that fraud was contemplated by the tenant—in fact, that the distress should operate simply in the way of a ne exeat regno, or an injunction. If the clause were agreed to, he should certainly take the sense of the House on the third reading.

said, he must regret that be was not in his place before the last division was taken, to make the few observations which he would now take the liberty of addressing to the Committee on the subject of this clause. If he was not mistaken, they were now discussing the question of whether the right ought to be conferred upon the landlord of distraining upon the growing crops of his tenant: that was substantially the question they were discussing. It was right, however, that he should state that in 1846 he introduced au Act of Parliament altering the law in that respect. He took that course in conformity with what appeared to him to be a wise recommendation in the Report of the Devon Commission, as well as in conformity with the wishes and opinions of the Lord Lieutenant of the time, and under the advice of the present Master of the Rolls. That change in the law he had no reason to regret, for although during the fatal period of the famine in Ireland there did occur an occasional instance of the surreptitious removal of growing crops, yet he was now happy to say that he was not aware of any recent instances of that nature which could justify their reverting to the old system. Whatever might be the right of the landlord in England respecting growing crops, it certainly had seldom or never been enforced in giving the power of distraint. For himself, he must say, after pretty long experience as a landlord, that he had never exercised the power of distress upon a tenant of his own; and, if it were now proposed practically to extend to Ireland a right of distress upon growing crops, which did not exist in England, he should certainly take the opportunity of voting against such a proposition.

said, he must support the clause as it stood; he could mention several cases where crops in Ireland had been cut down and carried off on a Sunday. Such proceedings invariably led to scenes of confusion and demoralisation, and he therefore hoped the Committee would not hesitate to change a law which served to encourage such a bad state of things. He hoped they might be able to abolish the right of distress altogether; but he thought that, taken in connexion with the other parts of the Bill, the clause was necessary. The Bill was improved in one respect, upon which he regretted that the right hon. Baronet was not present to hear the discussion on Friday. It was, that whereas the landlord had the power of distress for the recovery of six years' arrears, this Bill reduced it to one year, while great improvements were introduced in the mode of proceeding. He therefore trusted the Committee would allow the clause to stand part of the Bill.

said, that he thought he had reason to believe that his right hon. and learned Friend himself had no very strong opinion on this subject. His right hon. and learned Friend said he hoped to see the right of distress abolished altogether, and yet he retained that right in its most obnoxious form in the present clause. With regard to the removing of the crops on the Sunday, that was provided for in the Bill, because it was made a misdemeanour, and that was certainly a stronger law than any that existed in England.

said, he should support the clause. He had known numerous cases in which bands of infuriated men had assembled on the Sunday, and carried off the whole of the crops from the ground.

would suggest that the discussion should be taken upon I the third reading, because there were other matters contained in the clause besides that under review, and matters which it would certainly he desirable not to negative.

said, he was opposed to the clause. The question seemed to be treated as if the tenant had no other creditor but his landlord. It was the oppressive power already possessed by landlords over tenants which frequently prevented independent persons coming to their rescue, and assisting them with their capital, as was frequently done in the case of trade.

moved to omit the words "unless the same shall become necessary by reason of any fraudulent removal of the goods and chattels liable to such distress."

said, he objected to the clause, and must express his surprise that the Bill should in any case permit distresses to be made on Sundays. They were now endeavouring to close the Crystal Palace on Sundays, and he was shocked that such a power as this should be taken, under such circumstances, in favour of the landlords of Ireland.

said, the views of the hon. and learned Serjeant were exceedingly strange. The clause decided that distresses should not be levied on Sundays, Good Fridays, or Christmas Day; and the words objected to merely provided that the distress should be made on those days, in the case of a fraudulent removal. Nothing could be more reasonable than such a provision.

said, he should move its omission on the ground of its excessive hardship. If a tenant merely dug up potatoes upon a Sunday night, he would be liable to be punished as for a misdemeanour.

said, it was not necessary to constitute a misdemeanour that crops should be removed; they must be removed fraudulently with the object of evading the payment of rent.

opposed the clause; but before the hon. Member had concluded his objections, four o'clock arrived, when the Chairman left the Chair.

I rise, Sir, to put two questions to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London with respect to the present state of affairs in the East. The first refers to a document which has reached this metropolis to-day, and which bears the title of a "circular despatch," addressed to the diplomatic agents of the Court of St. Petersburgh, and purports to be signed by Count Nesselrode. This document states that the occupation of the Danubian principalities by the Russians has been occasioned as much by the naval occupation of the Turkish ports by the combined fleets of England and France, as by the refusal of the Sultan to give that satisfaction to the Emperor of Russia which he demands; and it further states, that the Emperor will not retire from the principalities until complete satisfaction has been accorded to him by the Sultan, and until the combined fleets of England and France have left those ports in the Sultan's dominions which they at present occupy. I wish to know whether a copy of this circular despatch has been presented to Her Majesty's Government; and if it has not been presented, I wish to know whether, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it is an authentic document?

In the last despatch received, Sir George Hamilton Seymour stated that he had not seen the circular despatch said to be signed by Count Nesselrode. I have no doubt, however, that, substantially, the despatch to which the right hon. Gentleman has alluded, and which has been published in the public journals, is authentic. I will not enter into the particulars to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred; but I do not think, in the first place, that Her Majesty's Government can in any manner substantiate the fact that the entry of the Russian troops into the principalities was caused by the sailing of the English and French fleets into the waters of Turkey; and, in the second place, I do not know, from my reading of the document, that there was any declaration in it to the effect that matters would not be arranged between Russia and Turkey unless the English and French fleets first left the Turkish waters.

The next question I have to ask Sir, is, whether Her Majesty's Government have received any information of the occupation of the Bosnian provinces by the Austrian army?

We have not received any information of that nature. Indeed, the Austrian Minister has communicated to the Earl of Clarendon his total disbelief of any such occurrence. He says that he believes the report has been owing to the occupation of Peterwariden, a town within the Austrian territory, and he supposes that that step has given rise to the report.

said, he did not at all agree with the complaints which had been urged against the Government, relative to the position in which that House had been placed with regard to the India Bills—such complaints as that the measure had not been introduced earlier in the Session; while, if any were made at all, it ought to fall upon the Ministry of 1850 rather than upon the present Government, for not baying appointed a Committee of Inquiry similar to that appointed in 1830; and he hoped hon. Gentlemen opposite would excuse his saying that some degree of blame attached to the Opposition. The noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), on the second reading of the Bill, introduced the question of the expediency of delay in legislation—a question which, in his opinion, ought to have been, if raised at all, raised on the first reading; and the result was, that, although there had been a long discussion as to the necessity of delay, in strict truth, there had been none whatever upon the second reading of the Bill. There were principles involved in the details of the clause under consideration which made him feel desirous of provoking a discussion upon them, and for that reason he had risen to address the Committee. There were two questions decided by the vote of the other night: the first was, that there should be no delay in legislation, and the second was that the double government should be continued. He had not entered into the discussion, but recorded his vote without any consideration of the period of the Session, or the time of the introduction of the measure. As regarded the double government, he quite agreed with the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn, that, as far as the term was concerned, it was impossible to imagine a more unsatisfactory one. The very name implied in itself evils and confusion. The truth really was, that it was a system of mixed government. It was most important that, if a check were exercised upon the power of the Crown, it should be one of a perfectly independent nature, and he hoped that his Amendment would go towards accomplishing that object. He did not wish, like some hon. Gentlemen, to contract the principles of the Bill by his Amendment, but rather to carry them more fully into effect. He would, in proceeding to notice the principles of the clause, protest against the supposition that he was bringing forward anything adverse to the Government measure; he was, he believed, making a proposal which would give force to the measure, and he hoped that his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control would support it. What was the proposal of the Government with regard to the constitution of the Court of Directors? They proposed appointing a number of nominees on the Direction; the mere word itself, which described them, was associated with feelings of odium—

Why do you use it then?

He could not help it, because it had come to be appropriated to persons appointed by the Crown; it was a word well known in our Colonial Government, and the noble Lord knew it well himself; or he might appeal to the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), whose experience in the Australian Colonies must have led him to take the same views as himself on the subject of the odium in which nominees of the Crown were held. He did not mean to say that nomination in a representative assembly in the Colonies was quite the same as nomination in the present instance would be to the Court of Directors. But who were those who would be appointed, if the Bill in its present shape were carried? The persons whom the Government had to put into the Court were those who had returned from service in India, and had procured seats in Parliament. The first object of those persons, after procuring a seat in that House, would be to go to the Treasury, and to ask the Secretary to the Treasury, or the noble Lord, to put them on the list of Directors for India. The claim of a seat in Parliament would be felt to be quite strong enough. A great cause of the inefficiency of the present system had been the difficulty of placing able men in the Court of Directors, well acquainted with Indian affairs; but he did not think that the present measure would obviate that difficulty. In the course of the inquiry, names of persons of high eminence had been brought forward, who had refused to enter the Board of Directors, on account of the system of canvassing. Now, he would not enter upon the question of canvassing, but would simply ask was it very likely that the men who had been deterred by that system from taking a seat at the Board of Directors, would consent to sit there as Government nominees? It was not to be expected that such men as Sir Charles Metcalfe, Lord Elphinstone, or Sir Henry Pottinger, would consent to be placed in the Court of Directors with a small salary, in order merely to become the instrument of Ministers, for the purpose of attending the House of Commons, to make a House and keep a House, which were the duties which Mr. Canning assigned to similar offices. He believed that the present proposal of the Government to add six nominees to six old Indian servants elected by the Court of Directors, in addition to six more elected by them, for what qualifications was yet unknown, if carried into effect, could not by possibility be brought to work harmoniously, for each section would be resolved to have their own way, as thinking it of necessity the only course which was correct. Again, what would be the position of the Crown nominees in the Court? If the nominees were men of activity and of great ability, they would say—"The House of Commons and the Government have selected us, and we will override the other Directors elected by the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors;" and if they were not active and able men, the other Directors would say—"We are the real representatives, you are but the nominees, and the power must belong to us." What now were they to do with the Secret Committee, which was composed of old Indian servants, and the effect of which was to reduce gentlemen to the mere duty of registering in the books of the Company the opinions which were approved of by others. If the nominees of the Crown would embarrass the Court of Directors, how much more would the President of the Board of Control be stultified by his own nominees if he purposed to continue the P.C. correspondence. The right hon. Gentleman had a veto vested in him; he might think that a particular despatch was objectionable; a meeting with the Court of Directors was the consequence; but when he should object to it, he would find himself answered by the Court asking how he could object to it, since it was chiefly supported by his own nominees, or how he could wish to undo his own arrangements, which had placed these six gentlemen in the Court? He should be glad to see the President of the Board of Control under the same roof as the Court of Directors; and it might still be desirable even now to introduce a clause into the Bill which would have the effect of bringing that about; for no man who had ever trod the floor of an office could doubt for one moment that much time might be saved, and a vast amount of business got through, if both the parties concerned in it were under the same roof. That, besides, would have the effect of checking the little jealousies which were but too apt to grow up between the two offices, such as, indeed, he had himself witnessed in operation, manifested by the one office picking holes in every thing which was sent up from the other. As to the President himself, he had no wish to diminish his power, and he was only sorry to see the right hon. Gentleman was not taking any means to increase it. The President of the Board of Control did not fill that office in the Cabinet which he ought to do. He did not mean that he ought to be a Secretary of State, because there would be a difficulty about a Secretary of State issuing orders to the Court of Directors, which was a very sufficient reason for not making that change. But he would increase his salary, which had been cut so low in one of those hot fits of economy that the office was now become either a stepping-stone or a refuge. It was very evident that the President did not have that sway which his position entitled him to, and his functions would require. In support of his opinion respecting the Court of Directors, he might refer to the opinion of the right hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Macaulay), and if he were in the House he trusted to have his support. That right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh said—

"The plan suggested by Mr. Wynn, is, I think, the very worst I ever heard. He would have Directors nominated every four years by the Crown. Is it not plain that these Directors would always be appointed from among the supporters of the Ministry for the time being?—that their situations would depend upon the permanence of that Ministry?—that, therefore, all their power and patronage would be employed for the purpose of propping that Ministry, and, in case of a change, for the purpose of molesting those who Wright succeed to power?—that they would be subservient while their friends were in, and factious when their friends were out?"—[3 Hansard, xix. 516.]

His Amendment was, to leave out the words, "It shall be lawful that Her Majesty, by Her Sign Manual;" and if he were successful in that, he proposed introducing in their stead the following: "The Court of Directors, with the approbation of Her Majesty, to be signified by Her Royal Sign Manual, countersigned by the President and Commissioners for the Affairs of India." The effect of it would be to make the appointment an appointment by the Court of Directors, limited, if it pleased the House to do so, to three-fourths of the assembly, which was the minimum required by the Act of 1773. He would further limit them by excluding ex-Directors from the list of those who were eligible, so that it might not be said they were choosing one another. He should also say that those who had been absent more than a certain time from India, ought not to be eligible. At the same time that he laid these views before the Committee, he wished not to be supposed as thinking that Her Majesty's Ministers, with the public eyes upon them, were capable of transacting a job in the constitution of that Court which they professed a desire to improve, and not to deteriorate. In the main, he found himself supported in these views by Lord Harding, who, when before the Committee, said that, of two members chosen by the Court of Directors, one ought to be taken from among their Indian servants. Mr. Halliday, one of the best of our East India public servants, stated in his evidence before the Committee—

"I have heard it proposed that they should be nominated by the Crown. I have heard it proposed, also, that they should be partly elected as at present, and partly elected by the body of Directors themselves. I have heard it proposed, also, that they should be elected by the holders of East India stock here and in India. Of those methods of appointment or selection I confess, on the whole, I am inclined to prefer, with great reserve and diffidence as before, the plan of electing them as at present for the most part, and, as vacancies occur, allowing a portion to be nominated—say one-third or one-fourth, as the case may be—by the Directors themselves. It appears to me that you would then, perhaps, have greater security on the whole for the selection of fit persons than you have at present, and you would, at all events, open a door for the election into the Court of those fit persons who are occasionally found in circumstances which deter them, or render it unfit or impossible for them, to incur the expense and delay and trouble of a canvass."

Another eminent authority to whom frequent reference had been made in that House—Mr. Marshman—stated in answer to a question put by the Committee—

"I have sometimes thought, if you still continue to keep up this system of a double government—that is, the Court of Directors and the Board of Control—it would be an advantage if one-fourth, or even one-third, of the Directors were appointed by direct nomination from among those who have had long Indian experience, whether acquired officially or non-officially. With regard to the nomination of those Directors, if it was considered constitutionally improper that they should be appointed by the Crown, they might then be selected by the Court of Directors, and the Minister for India should have a veto upon their nomination."

He did not believe, as had been insinuated, that the President of the Board of Control framed this clause with a view to ultimately getting rid of the Board of Directors altogether. If that had been the right hon. Gentleman's intention, he believed he would have declared it; but others might have that object in view, and be prepared to support the proposed plan as an experiment, which, if successful, might be carried further. At any rate, the Government had not fairly submitted to the House the constitutional question whether it was advisable to increase the influence of the Crown in reference to the nomination of a portion of the Court by the Crown. If such nominees should obtain seats in that House, they would be as likely to be as subservient to the Crown, as any of the officers of the Crown. Their tenure of office would, no doubt, terminate in six years, but that was the average duration of a Ministry. The nominees might, therefore, probably leave office at the expiration of a Ministry, and it would be open to the new Ministry to appoint new Directors, and thus obtain an undue influence in the Court of Directors. The Court of Directors would, in fact, by such a system as that proposed by the President of the Board of Control, be superseded. The plan proposed was an attempt to get in the small end of the wedge; and that was the chief ground on which he (Mr. V. Smith) opposed the plan. He was most decidedly in favour of the system of a mixed government. It was his firm conviction that the present double system of government had contributed most materially to the quiet and happinesss of our Indian empire. If hon. Gentlemen compared the condition of the aboriginals of that empire with those of any of our Colonies, they would find that the condition of the former was infinitely superior to that of the latter. Some hon. Gentlemen might point to the days in which the Great Mogul ruled the destinies of the people of India; but the vision, if any, must be dazzled by false glory, who believed that the natives of India were not now in a much better condition than they were under the reign of the Mogul. In New Zealand, Ceylon, and other Colonies, our Government had been of much more doubtful good. Who could compare an Indian administration with the result of our administration of affairs in the Cape of Good Hope? We had there inflicted the greatest barbarities, and incurred the heaviest expenditure. It might be true that there were some evils connected with the mixed government of India; but he believed that it was a system which had prevented more evils than it had created. It might not have stimulated the growth of cotton as it ought to have been stimulated; it might not have dealt with the salt monopoly as it ought to have been dealt with; but hon. Gentlemen should take into consideration how miserable India would at this time most probably be had there not been a double government. Without that double system, at the bidding of British constituencies, and for the interests of British consumers, the cultivation of cotton in India might have been urged to a greater extent than justice to the natives could bear, and some alteration might have been introduced with respect to the monopoly of salt which might have been detrimental to the revenues of India. He asked hon. Gentlemen, then, to support by their votes that night the system of double government. If they assented to the proposition of the President of the Board of Control, they would in effect destroy the independence of the Court of Directors.

said, that two things seemed now to be agreed upon—first, that the double government should be maintained, and, secondly, that a certain number of persons should be introduced into the Court of Directors as members of that body by some other mode than election by the proprietors of East India stock. The next point to be decided, then, was, by what means should these persons be introduced into the Court of Directors? The Bill proposed that they should be nominated by the Crown: the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) wished them to be elected by the Court of Directors. The proposition brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman had come under the attention of the Government, was duly considered, and rejected. Much, undoubtedly, might be urged in favour of the proposition; but, after mature deliberation, the Government decided in favour of the plan proposed in the Bill, as best calculated to insure the independence and efficiency of the Court of Directors. There had been times—and they might occur again—when party spirit ran high in the Court of Directors. On such an occasion the majority might be induced to elect two partisans, in order to destroy or reduce to insignificance the minority oppesed to them. The exercise of the veto of the Crown would be insufficient to guard against that evil. The right hon. Gentleman said that the plan proposed in the Bill would be likely to create dissension between the Court of Directors and the Crown; but really it appeared to be less open to that objection than the scheme suggested by the right hon. Gentleman himself. In the case supposed—that of the majority of the Directors having elected two of their partisans to swamp the minority—if the Crown should withhold its approval from them, there would not afterwards be much cordiality existing between the Court and the Government. As to what the right hon. Gentleman had said about Directors nominated by the Government being expected to come down to make a House and cheer Ministers, it was purely imaginative. A Minister who could select for the office men who would condescend to do such work, would be guilty of a shameful abuse of trust. The Government of the day would have the strongest interest in putting into the Direction the best men they could find. The salaries assigned to the Directors under the Bill were not sufficient to attract persons not in independent circumstances, while to men of independent circumstances the office would be an object of honourable ambition. The plan denounced by the right hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Maccaulay) in 1833, was not similar to that now proposed. If the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) had referred to what then took place, he would have found that the proposal to which the right hon. Member for Edinburgh objected was one which would have given the Crown power to nominate the whole Court of Directors. Little apprehension need be entertained that persons returning ripe with knowledge of Indian affairs, would, on entering the Court of Directors, permit themselves so to be mastered by English party feelings as to take a course which would be detrimental to the interest of India. Regarding this point also, it should be borne in mind that it would always be in the power of successive Governments to neutralise the appointment of partisans by their predecessors. Once appointed, there would be no distinction between the Directors nominated by the Crown and the other Directors. His right hon Friend said the word "nominee" was an odious word, but he could not at all see the matter in that light. All that the Government had in view was, that the body of Directors should be as effective as possible; and he did not think there was the least danger of that body being made dependent on the Crown by the system of nomination which was proposed. He believed that the nomination, which was to be restricted to persons who had served for a particular time in India, was not likely to be conferred on persons who would be dependent on the Crown. He did not see, for example, why so great a name as that of Mountstewart Elphinstone might not have been selected for such a duty, or that there would have been anything degrading or derogatory in his being selected on the ground of his great knowledge of India, and on that ground alone, to be a Member of the Court of Directors, and to give them the benefit of his pre-eminent qualifications. It was so much the interest of the Government to have at the head of the Indian administration, men of the highest intelligence and ability, that they would not fail to appoint those whom they believed to be in the highest degree qualified; and he was satisfied that, on the whole, the mode which they had proposed, was the most efficient that could be adopted. He therefore committed it with confidence to the consideration of the Committee.

said, that the right hon. Gentleman had argued this subject so temperately—he had stated so fairly the different sides of the question, that those who entertained a different opinion, as he (Mr. Herries) did, might perhaps fail in inducing the Committee to come to a different determination. He had intended to move an Amendment, the effect of which was to negative all the clauses relating to the proposed constitution of the Court of Directors, with the view of offering the most strenuous opposition to that system of mixed nomination by the Crown, and election by the proprietors, which he conceived to be so objectionable; but the Amendment moved by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. V. Smith) met so completely the intention which he (Mr. Herries) had in giving that notice, that he did not feel disposed to submit any Motion on the subject; and he should, therefore, give in his adhesion to the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, because he really thought that the whole object which he had in view would be completely answered by the proposition which had now been submitted to the Committee. He should, therefore, confine his observations entirely to the question of mixing nomination by the Crown with election by the proprietary body, and refrain from entering upon those general questions which had been very properly discussed in the second reading of the Bill. He might, however, observe that the House had already determined that legislation should take place now, and in the spirit of the existing Government of India. It was because he thought that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government introduced a new constitution of the Court of Directors, which was not in accordance with the principle of maintaining the existing form of government, that he now opposed the clause. It was the essence of the present constitution of what was called the double government, that the administrative body, acting under the control of the Crown, and advising the Crown, should be a perfectly independent body; and the question was now whether it could be so considered, if a considerable portion of its members were appointed by the Crown. He rejoiced that the opposition to this measure came from the other side of the House, for it removed from hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House even the suspicion that they were influenced by party views. The first difficulty which presented itself was this—the impossibility that a body of men, consisting partly of members who owed their existence to one authority, and partly of members who owed their existence to another authority, could act harmoniously together. He could not understand how it was expected that the nominees of the Crown would consider themselves or be considered by their colleagues, as being on the same footing altogether as the members elected by the proprietors? It seemed so difficult to entertain this belief, that no sooner was the provision known, than one universal feeling of condemnation was expressed. The press, so far as it reflected the feelings of the public, expressed a decided opinion against it. What was the reason? Because common sense and common reason must tell every one that a body so constituted could not act homogeneously. He would not go into details as to the working of the Board of Control in reference to all matters connected with the administration of affairs in India; but, he would ask, was it likely that members of a Court, some dependent upon the appointment of the Crown, and others elected by the proprietors, could consult together on equal terms, and concur in the advice to be given to the Government? If these appointments were worth holding at all, there would just be the nomination of the individuals, and then there would be the influence to be exercised by them; and he said it would only be in accordance with human nature that the persons nominated by the Crown would, in a great measure, conform to the wishes of the President of the Board of Control. Viewing the matter in this aspect, there was a danger of another kind to be apprehended. Moreover, the members nominated by the Crown were to possess the same amount of patronage which was possessed by the elected members. This patronage, he could not help thinking, would be, more or less, at the disposal of the President of the Board of Control. He, therefore, could not help thinking that he would obtain a very considerable share in the distribution of that patronage. The amount of patronage had hitherto been the only obstacle to entrusting to the hands of the Government the administration of Indian affairs—the immense influence, he meant, which that patronage would give to the Crown. He did not impute to the right hon. Gentleman any design in that respect. It had long since been determined that the Crown ought not to possess that patronage; but., according to the system now proposed, the President of the Board of Control would have a considerable share in the distribution of the patronage of India. A change of this kind, and of such great importance, ought not to be effected by a side wind. But the right hon. Gentleman had argued that an influence of another kind would be created. He said that authority and influence would be exercised by different parties in the Court of Directors. He (Mr. Herries) must say that during the time he mad the honour of discharging the office of President of the Board of Control, he knew nothing of any parties, nor of any dissensions, in the Court of Directors, nor did he believe that it was the habit of any President of the Board of Control to govern by means of any divisions in that Court. But let them look at the effect which this mixed council of administration would have on the public. He thought that the effect would be considerably to lower the character of the Court of Directors of the Company. He thought that if they introduced this check by means of the appointment of nominees of the Crown, they would taint in some degree and lower the character of the Directors in public estimation. It would, in fact, be saying that the proprietors were not able to select properly-qualified persons. On the other hand, the members introduced by the Crown would be suspected of being under the influence of the authority from which they derived their existence. Both these considerations were worthy of attention; but he must say that to lower the character of the Directors would be an egregious blunder, and would lead to the ultimate absorption of all power by the Crown. This was a step, as had been suggested, towards the government of India of the Crown; but it would be a wrong step if they wished to preserve to the Company while it lasted all the prestige, the respect, and the honour which at present belonged to it. Was it likely that a body so constituted would act harmoniously? The nominated members would regard with jealousy the elected members, and the elected members would not unnaturally suspect the nominated members of being under the influence of the President of the Board of Control. He could not imagine how the right hon. Gentleman had failed to see the natural consequences which must follow from this mixed system of nominated and elected members. The proposal made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. V. Smith) obviated all these difficulties; for, as the choice would be limited to persons who had served in India, the Directors would be better judges of the services of these persons than any Minister, and no danger would arise from appointments made by the Directors in the first instance. The Board of Control might accept or reject them, but there would still be a homogeneous body deriving its authority from the same source, from election by the proprietors. These were an obvious objections to the plan of the Government. They seemed not to have been sufficiently weighed by the right hon. Gentleman, who, by his answers, had not removed in the slightest degree from his (Mr. Herries's) mind the opinion that great disadvantages would occur from the proposed mode of nominating the Directors. He had confined himself altogether to the question now under discussion, and would avoid detaining the Committee by going into any other part of the subject. He agreed entirely in the view taken of the question by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith), and would be heartily glad if the Government would consider his observations in the spirit in which they were offered, which was, he felt assured, not an unfriendly one. For his own part, he had stated his views with the most perfect freedom and candour; he had supported the Government on the second reading of the Bill; and his sole aim was to make the measure as useful and as unobjectionable as possible. This scheme of the Government certainly was not unobjectionable; on the contrary, it had been objected to in almost every influential quarter which had expressed any opinion on the subject. He therefore once more entreated the President of the Board of Control to reconsider that portion of the Bill to which the Amendment referred, for it was of the first importance. He should give the Amendment of the right hon. Member for Northampton his entire sympathy and support.

said, he trusted he should be enabled to answer the observations of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, with the same abstinence of party spirit as that professed by the right hon. Gentleman. He could assure the Committee that it was not until after the most anxious consideration that Her Majesty's Government had decided upon taking the course to which the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be so decidedly opposed. There was much in the constitution of the Board of Directors as it now existed, which it had been clearly shown by the evidence which had been adduced before the Committee upstairs, it was extremely desirable to have remedied. Though nobody denied that the Directors were pares negotiis, yet instances had occurred, creating no little scandal, of many eminent men, though anxious for the honour of a seat in the Direction, being deterred from seeking it by the dread of the annoyances and humiliations of a canvass. The power of the Court of Directors was of one kind, and that of the Board of Control of another. The power of the Board of Control consisted in acting and deciding; whereas the power of the Court of Directors was that of reasoning and argument. One was more of an intellectual, the other more of a physical power; and the two powers might well work together for the benefit of India. He made these observations because they appeared to answer the objections urged with respect to the independence of the Court of Directors. Independent, in one sense, they could not be, because the law had placed the final decision with reference to their measures in the hands of the President of the Board of Control. In another sense they might, no doubt, be said to be independent, inasmuch as by offering sound advice and advancing strong arguments, they had it always in their power to exer- cise a most important control over a Minister who was responsible to the country for the line of policy which he might adopt. That latter description of independence it would be the effect of the proposal of the Government to augment rather than to diminish, inasmuch as it would tend to introduce into the Board of Directors men of greater experience, ability, and eminence, than up to the present moment could find admittance into that body. He had not the slightest doubt that the object of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith), in proposing the Amendment then under their consideration, was to secure what he supposed to be the best form of government for India; but the right hon. Gentleman did not seem to be taking a course which was likely to effect the precise object which he had in view. There were at present three classes of offices, the appointments to which were in a position exactly similar to that in which the right hon. Gentleman appeared anxious the appointment of one-third of the Board of Directors should be placed. The offices to which he (Mr. Lowe) referred were those of the Governor General of India, that of the fourth Member of the Legislative Council, and of the governors of subordinate presidencies. The appointments in those three instances were supposed to be made by the Court of Directors, subject to the approbation of the Crown. The result had been, that those offices were virtually in the nomination of the Crown; and the practice had been for the Board of Control to suggest the names to the Court of Directors, and the veto, when at all used, was used by the Directors. Thus, the course pointed out by the Act of Parliament was virtually reversed. Now, supposing the present Amendment carried, would not something of the same sort take place; and would the right hon. Gentleman gain anything by merely saying that the persons who would be, after all, nominees of the Crown, should not be elected ostensibly by the Crown, but should appear to be elected by the Directors, subject to the subsequent approbation of the Board of Control? The Amendment would, indeed, have the effect of relieving the President of the Board of Control from all, or nearly all, responsibility, and would thereby remove the best safeguard against that officer using his power in an improper way. But, arguing the question on the right hon. Gentleman's own ground, be contended that the Amendment would be perfectly nugatory. The power of rejecting the persons nominated by the Court of Directors could only be exercised by the President of the Board of Control, in the improbable case of their making grossly improper appointments; but no one acquainted with the Court of Directors would suspect them of doing anything of that sort; and then again, with respect to what was wanted—the admission of persons of great eminence and distinction into the Directorship—how that could be brought about by giving a veto to the Crown he could not see, unless the Crown fixed upon certain persons, and told the Directors at once that those were the persons whose nomination should receive the sanction of the Crown, and the election of all others would be vetoed. In this case the nomination would virtually pass to the Crown, while, if the Crown confined itself to its statutory function, its interference would be absolutely useless. Supposing, then, the Crown confined itself to its statutory function, the nomination would be in the Court of Directors. Now, for many years past, the Directors had had great influence in the elections for their own body; and the changes introduced in the present Bill with respect to canvassing and retrenchment of patronage, would probably throw into the hands of the Directors more influence than they even now possessed over the elections. Would it be wise, then, when things were tending in that direction, still further to increase the power of the Directors in the same line? The effects of self-election were known to everybody. All persons in giving their votes were prone to be influenced by indirect and improper considerations. But in no case did these considerations come so home to a man, and operate so forcibly on his mind, as in the case of self-election. The individual elected was either a partisan gained, or an opponent introduced into the body; and that circumstance afforded the very strongest motive for warping the elector's judgment, and inducing him to take the worse and reject the better candidate, if it should be his interest to adopt such a course. Now, as the object which they all desired to attain in that instance was the selection of the best men, it would be inexcusable on their parts wilfully and knowingly to introduce into the case the considerations which were of all others the most calculated to pervert the judgment and to warp the choice of the electors. It was said that the nominee members would be the mere creatures of the Crown; but be did not think the prize was sufficiently high for such a purpose. The salary was to be small; the Directors were not to be brought into immediate contact with the Crown; and the votes they might give, would, if they pleased, never be known. He believed that the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman would tend to exclude men of the highest character and capacity from the directorship. He could not help thinking that men who had filled important offices with great distinction in India, would shrink from the attempt to canvass even a small body of Directors, and would not expose themselves to the risk of a rejection of their solicitations even on the part of such a body. It appeared to him that one great advantage of the system proposed in the Bill was, that, as under that system there would be a twofold mode of election, an emulation would naturally arise between the Crown and the proprietors as to which of them should elect the men who would do the greatest credit to their choice. The right hon. Gentleman who had last addressed the Committee, had adopted what seemed to him (Mr. Lowe) an inconsistent course of argument. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the only serious objection to placing the Government of India in the hands of the Crown was the difficulty of disposing of the patronage—a difficulty which the right hon. Gentleman had told them had not yet been solved. He appeared to consider that in twenty years the Government of India must fall to the Crown, and that the ultimate absorption of the Company was inevitable. But if that were to be the case—if the Governments of Mr. Pitt, of Lord Liverpool, of Lord Grey, and of Lord Aberdeen had all concurred in diminishing more or less the power of the Court of Directors—if from the nature of the terms of the India debt, it would be the interest of the Government to pay off the proprietors in the year 1874, so that the very basis of the present Court of Directors would be removed—if those were the views of the right hon. Gentleman, how could he consistently object to the introduction of nominees of the Crown into the Court at the present moment? What would become of the Government of India if the event which the right hon. Gentleman seemed to foresee were to take place, and if the proprietors of India stock were no longer to exist? Could the right hon. Gentleman or the Committee suppose that the Ministers of this country would attempt to construct out of new elements a fresh body of Directors and of proprietors? Did the right hon. Gentleman think that after that mighty Company, which had produced so many generals and statesmen of which any empire might well be proud, should have been destroyed, another would be set up to replace it? Such a conclusion would be manifestly preposterous. The right hon. Gentleman had truly said, that when the event which he contemplated should take place, the Company would be absorbed in the Crown; and when it was so absorbed, how was India to be governed? When the veil between the Crown and the people of India should have been removed, what other agency would it be possible for human ingenuity to devise between the Crown and its Indian subjects than that very agency which the right hon. Gentleman at present denounced and repudiated—the agency of those very nominees of the Crown? Something like that machinery was the only agency which could then by any possibility be adopted. Therefore, taking the right hon. Gentleman's own premises, it would be wise to begin betimes, if they were to be driven to that Crown Government of India of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke, and make the experiment on a small scale, dealing with the embryo and the germ, rather than to be afterwards compelled to do the thing all at once, uno flatu. Arguing, then, upon the right hon. Gentleman's own premises, he should say, let them not wait for that great catastrophe unprepared, but let them make an experiment now, and if it should be found not to work, there would then be a locus penitentiœ, and the matter might be reformed in time. A good deal had been said in disparagement of nominees of the Crown; and he admitted that he had himself never been very friendly to the nominee system in the Colonies. But he believed that they could only be led into error and confusion by comparing India with the Colonies. The two cases were not only dissimilar but were diametrically opposed to each other. The essence of colonial government was representative government resident on the spot; the essence of Indian government was representative or quasi-representative government resident in a remote country. The essence of colonial government was responsibility to persons residing in the Colony; the essence of Indian government, and that which mitigated our despotism there, was respon- sibility to the people of England. In the Colonies a governor was looked upon as a subject discharging limited duties—as a mere officer or Minister of the Crown; in India the Governor General was put forward as a person who combined in himself the highest powers, and almost all the attributes of sovereignty; and we endeavoured to keep as much as possible in the background that machinery by which his powers were controlled. In the Colonies we looked forward to a brilliant future at no distant period, when nations would arise equal to ourselves in arts, in arms, and in every element of civilisation. In India the most sanguine could not for many centuries hope to see realised any such prospect. But, above all, the nominee system in the Colonies was regarded as the system of irresponsibility and repression; while in India the nominee system was regarded as the symbol of progress—as a means of giving a higher intellectual tone to the government of that country. Moreover, let it be remembered that nominees were introduced into colonial Legislative Councils for the purpose of voting away the money of the people without being their representatives, and that they had entrusted to them the very highest functions of a Government against the will of those whom they governed; while in India those who might be elected by the Company, as well as those who might be elected by the Government, must both be nominees, for neither could derive their power from the will of those whom they governed. There was this further distinction between the two cases, that a nominee in the Colonies was a legislator who had the power of the purse-strings; while it was not the duty of a Director of the East India Compay to act or to decide, so much as to suggest, to advise, to initiate, and to reason. In the case of a Colony there was a great necessity for combined action; in the case of India it was so far from being desirable that the action of the Directors should be combined, that if any strong combination should exist among them it would be the duty of the Government to introduce, if possible, into their body some heterogeneous and independent element which might lead to that conflict of intellect with intellect from which alone truth could be elicited. Under these circumstances, he contended that there was no inconsistency in his advocating the nominee system in India while he was opposed to that system in the Colonies.

said, that, until this debate commenced, there was hardly a person in that House who had not always been accustomed to hear, and who did not fully believe, that the great merit of the Court of Directors was, that it was a thoroughly independent body, and free from all political bias or influence. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down said he believed the Court would be a more independent body by the introduction of nominee members; but it required even more ingenuity than the hon. Gentleman was possessed of to make that clear. He (Mr. Elliot) did not think that either the President, or the Secretary of the Board of Control had convinced the Committee—certainly they had not convinced him—that an additional degree of independence would be given to the body by making one-third of it Government nominees. There was a peculiarity connected with these nominee Directors which he thought it right to mention. They were not to be appointed permanently, but only for a certain period, and they would sit at the Board with the expectation of being renominated. He was the last man to suppose they would do anything unworthy of themselves; but human nature was human nature, and he could not help thinking they would not occupy seats at the Board in that free and independent capacity in which all members of it ought to be placed. The great private and personal motive of persons desirous to get on the Directory had been the power of providing for a certain number of their own sons, and the sons of their relatives and friends. It was in vain to conceal the fact, that that was the great inducement which operated on the minds of those who returned to this country, like himself, after twenty or twenty-five years' service in India, and became candidates for Directorships. But was it likely that persons who came home, after a long life spent in India, would try to enter the Court of Directors when it was lowered in its character by being deprived of the most valuable portion of its patronage? He must say, that he should not himself consider a seat at the Board a distinction under such circumstances. The persons he had mentioned would consider the appointment derogatory to the position they formerly held in India. He knew several who, since the Bill had been made public, had declared that, however anxious they might have been formerly to become Directors, they were no longer so now. It was futile to allege that the patronage, which unquestionably had formed a leading attraction with the candidates for a Directorship, would still remain to that body, when the only patronage left to it was cadetships, an object comparatively indifferent; to take away the other patronage, and to give, instead, a mere increase of cadetships, was just like saying to a child, "Give me that sixpence, and I'll give you these two large pennies." He thought he was authorised, therefore, in drawing the conclusion, that it was not safe to establish this nominee system. He was very much afraid the Government would not succeed in obtaining the best men from India to accept a seat at the Board. He thought they would be more likely to get persons who would consider 500l. a year an object. It was absurd to suppose that men, who had received between 2,000l. and 3,000l. a year in India, would consider 500l. a year sufficient amount of remuneration after the service they had seen. It had always been an acknowledged principle that the Government of India should be kept free and distinct from all political influence; and he confessed he viewed, with some apprehension, the first step which was now proposed to be taken in opposition to that. He believed they would continue to go on in that course until the Government obtained possession of the whole of the Government of India, and the result would be that there would be more frequent discussions upon the affairs of India, and greater interference on the part of that House in regard to them. In his opinion, there could be no greater misfortune to India than the perpetual intermeddling of that House with the internal administration of that country. There were not ten men in the House who knew anything about India. The President of the Board of Control, and other Members of the Government, had endeavoured, in a most praiseworthy mannor, to become acquainted with India; he believed they had failed, for he had heard sentiments come from them, which no man who knew anything of the country, would have expressed. It would seldom happen that the President of the Board of Control could have any real knowledge of who were the best, most practical, hardworking, and serviceable men in India, to appoint to the Board of Directors. Then, how was he to find them out? He must go to the Court of Directors, who were the most qualified persons to give him the information. If that were so, why should the power of appointing the nominees not be given to the Directors?

said, he thought it was very desirable that they should confine themselves as strictly as possible to the subject which was absolutely before them; and such being his views, he would not, therefore, say one word on the various topics which, while they were not strictly comprised in the Amendment, had been introduced into that discussion. The right hon. Gentleman who had moved the Amendment had said something about the amalgamation of the two offices. Now, that was an important point, and one upon which, if it had been brought regularly before them, he should have been most happy to have supported the right hon. Gentleman. But that was not the question which they had then to consider. Another question had been raised as to the position which the President of the Board of Control ought to occupy, and as to the insufficiency of the salary which he at present received. There again he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman; but that was not the subject he had brought before them in that Amendment. The whole question they had then to consider was, as he understood, whether it was desirable or not that a certain number of the Court of Directors should be appointed by the Crown. Upon that point he agreed with the right hon. Gentleman in disapproving in many respects of the proposal of the Government. He thought that the right hon. Gentleman had criticised that proposal with great success; but he also thought that the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, when it had come to his turn to reply, had criticised with not less success the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. It appeared to him that it was hardly possible to deny that persons appointed by the Crown—that was to say, by the Minister of the day—for a short period, who were to be re-eligible to be appointed, and who were to be allowed to sit in Parliament, would, to a very great extent, be dependent upon the Government of the day. He did not think that would be any the less the case because those persons received a comparatively small salary. He was afraid that the smallness of the salary would only have the effect of rendering the office an object of ambition, not to the persons best qualified to fill it, but to those qualified in an inferior degree. The lower the salary was made, the lower would be the class of those who would offer themselves as candidates for the office; and he did not think it could be argued that the smallness of the salary would contribute to render those who might receive it more independent of the Government to which they might owe their appointments. He feared, therefore, that there was some real danger that they would not get the best class of Indian officials to accept these appointments. But when he came to consider the remedy proposed by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith), he certainly felt considerable objection to that proposal. It was, in the first place, a plan of self-election. Now, he did not believe there was any instance on record, in our present system of administration, of a system of self-election. But his main objection to the plan of the right hon. Gentleman was, that from its very nature its continuance was made dependent on that which he (Lord Stanley) believed most of them desired, and all of them expected, to see abolished in the course of a few years—namely, the continuance of the Court of Directors, and which, indeed, would expire of itself in the year 1874. But whether the Court of Directors expired or not in that year, the whole system on which the Directors were elected must be changed, because the elective body would then no longer exist. He objected to the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, because it seemed to him to be calculated to give permanence if not pepetuity to that very part of the present system which it was most desirable that they should do away with. He spoke with great diffidence upon that subject; but admitting fully, as he did, the difficulty of dealing with that question, he still thought there were some matters of detail in which the proposal of the Government might be improved without trenching on the principle on which it had been brought forward. For instance, he entertained a very strong objection to that part of the proposal of the Government which occurred in a subsequent clause, but which naturally fell into the present discussion—he meant that part of the proposal by which Directors nominated by the Crown were permitted to retain seats in Parliament. Of course, it was possible for a man to have a seat in Parliament, and not to be a political partisan. But if there should be such a case, it would be the exception and not the rule. As a general rule, he thought that when Members of that House were nominated by the Government to administer an office, although that office was to be held for a certain fixed period, and not during the pleasure of the Crown, the effect of such nominations would be to induce those Members to consider themselves—he would not say the tools—but necessarily and effectually the allies of the Government which had appointed them. But for that evil, however, there was a very obvious remedy; and that was to nominate those persons for a longer period than that proposed in the Bill—to nominate them for a period of ten or twelve years, or, at all events, for a time considerably beyond the average duration of Governments in this country, and then to refuse to make them re-eligible at the end of that period, and so to take away from them the hope of receiving in the same department of public affairs any future favour from the Government. In conclusion, he had to state that, although he did not approve of the whole of the Government plan, and although he felt it was liable to the objections of detail which he had mentioned, he felt himself unable to support the Amendment.

said, he did not think the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) was very intelligible, and he would have preferred his moving the rejection of the clause altogether. He (Mr. Hume) was one of those who was ready to vote for any Motion which was directed against, the system of nominees. He was for continuing the principle on which the East India Company had hitherto been maintained, and he could not understand by what course of reasoning the Government, who had spoken in such eulogistic language of the way in which the Company had been conducted during the last twenty years, should propose now to destroy that principle. The Court of Directors was a body constituted by several Acts of Parliament. The right was given to the proprietors, for pecuniary considerations, to elect those Directors, and Parliament had no power to take that right from them. He thought the Government of India by the East India Company had been productive of more benefit to that country than had been the Government of any other of our distant possessions to those possessions. The arguments of the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had only made the subject more confused, for instead of considering the Bill before the House, he had made a flimsy attempt to show what might be the state of things in the year 1874, and what Parliament might have then to do. He had heard no objection to the system of election, except that certain persons of high rank and great experience who had come from India had not been able to get on the Direction. If this were the only objection to the system, it might be got over without destroying the independence of the Board. He regarded this portion of the Bill as destructive of the independence of the Board of Directors. It might be said that the Board had yielded too much to the President of the Board of Control; but this was no reason why Parliament should destroy their independence altogether. He saw no reason why the Board should not be reformed by letting in men with 500l. stock, so as to increase the constituency, and to keep up a check upon the controlling power. He regretted that the Government had not allowed the present system to go on until 1874, when the proprietors would be paid whatever India owed them, and when a thorough reform might be effected. The Government had not objected to this form of administration during the last twenty years; but they were now about to introduce a measure, under the guise of an Amendment, the effect of which would be to unsettle everything, while it secured nothing. A great deal had been said as to the abuses which existed in India. He admitted that there were abuses in the administration of India; but the evidence given before the Select Committee showed, that looking at the circumstances of the country, and the difficulties to be encountered, there were more abuses in the public departments in this country than there were in India. He asserted, without fear of contradiction, that there were greater abuses in the present day in our Law Courts than had ever been traced to the Government of India. At the present moment, contentment and peace reigned over the whole of India, and there was every disposition on the part of the Directors to improve the condition of the country. In fact they had anticipated us in almost every question of public policy. They had opened their ports to ships of all nations—they had extended their commerce to different parts of the world—and they had removed all those duties which at one time formed so objectionable a feature in their Government. What Parliament ought to do, therefore, was to extend the system of election, to give more power to the Directors, to require the Secret Committee to keep records of all questions upon which they differed from the Board of Control, and to direct them to be supplied every month with an account of the expenditure. He greatly objected to the power which the Bill would give to the President of the Board of Control—a power which was greater than even that of the Crown. The President of the Board of Control could declare war, expend money and borrow money, without the consent of the House of Commons, or the sanction of the Court of Directors. This was the case during the last Affghan war, when 30,000,000l. had been expended without the knowledge or control of the Court of Directors. On these grounds he would vote for the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman; but he would much rather see the clauses relating to the mode of government expunged altogether from the Bill.

believed, that the single question before the House was, the best mode of selecting one third of the Court of Directors. It appeared that the House, whether rightly or wrongly, were agreed as to the expediency of selecting a portion of the Directors. That was the principle of the clause under discussion; and the object of the House—and he should hope of the Government also—was to adopt that form of selection which was most likely to produce the most able, the best informed, and most independent men. With respect to the system of selection, he could not help asking at the outset, if the selection were left to the Crown, or to the Court of Directors, what gentlemen coming home from India would become competitors for the office? Every distinguished Indian servant who thought he was fit for a seat in the Direction, would find himself, on his arrival in England, one among six similarly situated; and the chances were, that by adopting that mode of appointment, they would deteriorate the class of men who would come forward and offer themselves for office. He did not agree with those fastidious gentlemen who expressed such a horror of canvassing for a seat in the Direction. He thought there was something very un-English in that feeling. What would be said by any Gentleman who had the honour of a seat in that House, if he were told that he should not go amongst his constituents, or humble himself by soliciting their "sweet voices?" They all had to do that, at each and every election; whereas the candidate for a Directorship, if he succeeded in the object of his wishes, and afterwards discharged his duties ably and efficiently, was not elected for the short period of a Parliament, but for life. For his colleagues and himself, he indignantly repudiated the notion that there was any thing humiliating or dishonourable in canvassing for a seat in the Court of Directors. He would never have been a Director, if he had thought or believed that there was anything humiliating or dishonourable in aspiring to that office. With regard, in the second place, to the question as to the best mode of selection, he would briefly state the objections to the two plans before the House, leaving the House to judge which preponderated. The proposal of the Government was, that six Directors should be nominated by the Crown. Against that, it had been urged, with some weight, but not he thought with the force that had been attached to it, that those gentlemen when placed in the Direction would render themselves dependent upon the Crown, and would be so far influenced by an illegitimate feeling in the discharge of their duty. He was bound to say that he had no such apprehension. He believed that Gentlemen who had passed their lives in the civil and military services in India, and who had attained that position which rendered them eligible for a seat in the Direction, would discharge their duty honourably, independently, and uninfluenced by any considerations with regard to the person who appointed them. The noble Lord opposite had suggested, by way of amending the proposal of the Government, that the gentlemen so selected by the Crown should not be re-eligible. He trusted the President of the Board of Control would not adopt that recommendation. It meant that when a gentleman had been for six years, or whatever the time might be, in the discharge of his duty as a Director, and when he had acquired such experience as rendered his services useful to his colleagues and the country, he was to be excluded from the Direction, and likewise from a seat in that House. Now, if, according to constitutional principles, a person selected as a nominee of the Crown should be excluded from a seat in that House, there was at once an end to the whole question, because he thought it was impossible to agree to a plan which would subject six out of the eighteen Directors to political disqualifications; on the other hand, there were objections to the system of selection by the Court of Directors. He thought it was self-election to a certain extent, and he therefore so far disapproved of it. But the question for their consideration was, not whether this plan was perfect in itself, but whether it was less objectionable than the other. In addition to the objection already stated, there was this further reason for opposing the system of selection by the Court of Directors, that inasmuch as there was always a diversity of opinion in the Court, there was a danger of the majority selecting a gentleman who, when he joined the Direction would strengthen their party. That was a difficulty of considerable importance; but he was bound to admit that the right hon. Gentleman had almost if not quite removed it, by the provision that there should be the acquiescence of three-fourths of the Directors, who were unquestionably the parties most competent to select Gentlemen to act as their colleagues, as they were undoubtedly possessed of better means of knowledge than the President of the Board of Control. He believed that if the President of the Board of Control had the right of selection in his hands to-morrow, the first thing he would do would be to request the Court of Directors to recommend Gentlemen for the office. Whether, therefore, the selection rested with the Crown, or with the Court of Directors, he had no fears whatever as to the practical working of the plan, nor had he any apprehension that gentlemen so selected would be in the slightest degree dependent upon the Board of Control. It had been said that the situation would not be much coveted; if so, there was no use arguing the question any further. The object would be to get the best possible men—to secure men of the highest order, men of the most superior degree, men who would not condescend to any solicitation. But where were they to get these extraordinary men? Lord Metcalfe and Mountstewart Elphinstone had been talked of, as if such men were as plentiful as blackberries; but where did they find men like Metcalfe and Elphinstone? If these men had intimated, the day they arrived from India, that they desired to have a seat in the Direction, he (Sir J. W. Hogg) would say with confidence that, without soliciting a single vote, they would have come in the next vacancy. That statement he limited to men of that high stamp. The same thing was said by a very distinguished witness before the Committee, Sir George Clerk. He was a man of a very high order, of very superior abilities, and a man who had rendered distinguished services. He stated that he had been assured, when he returned from India, that he might, if he wished, come into the Direction, without the trouble of a canvass. But if they were to have men of that stamp, they must reward them in some way if they took from the Court the patronage which they had hitherto enjoyed. They (the Court) had been, in public estimation, the governors of India; they had been the fountain of all honour, of all appointments. Every servant in India knew that he derived his appointment from the Court of Directors. But now the Court stood partially condemned before the public by one-half of their number being withdrawn; they were no longer to have the appointment to the highest offices, formerly within their own exclusive nomination. They were no longer to appoint their own Advocate General; they were no longer to appoint Members of Council. These appointments were to be subject to the approbation of the Crown. They were no longer to appoint officers to the civil service. This was to be open to public competition. The same with regard to the medical service. The Government Bill had left them with the whole prestige of their power, but with all their patronage taken from them, with the exception of direct appointments, which amounted to no more than three or four in the year. It appeared as if they endeavoured to make the situation as little desirable as possible, that it might not be an object of solicitation or ambition. He would urge upon the House to make the situation as important as possible; that either in the way of position, or influence, or salary, or by some means or other, men of first-rate ability and experience might be introduced into the Direction; that the body to which they belonged might stand well before the public; and that the office which they filled might be an object of honourable ambition to such as desired to serve their country.

said, he believed that the Bill now before the House, and particularly the clause under discussion, was calculated to extinguish the Court of Directors, and put a speedy end to the present system of government in India. He was at a loss to understand what line of conduct the hon. Baronet who spoke last intended to pursue. The hon. Baronet had blown hot and cold upon the question before the House. In the first place, he had stated strong objections to the principle of nomination by the Crown; and, in the second place, he had urged equally strong objections to the principle of selection by the Court of Directors—

I object to both plans, but more especially to the system of nomination by the Crown.

said, he was glad to hear it, for he also strongly objected to the proposal of the Government, and would join the hon. Baronet in opposing it. For his part he could not understand the indignity of canvassing proprietors of India Stock. They were a non-political body, as also was the Court of Directors; and he thought, if the Government plan of nomination were once introduced, the effect would be to do away with that non-political character, and consequently he should oppose it. The gentlemen who came forward to solicit a Directorship were canvassed with a scrutiny very severe by those whom they solicited, and if found not honourable they were immediately rejected, He should say he preferred, to the plan of Her Majesty's Government, or the plan of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. V. Smith), the system of open election to all members of the Directors' Court. For if they impaired the independence of the body—if they so packed it as to render it subservient to the Minister of the day, they would aggravate a hundredfold the evils of the despotic system at present existing. At present the Government of India was regulated on the principle that the administration abroad had to render an account to a superior authority at home; and therefore he (Mr. Bruce) felt the strongest possible reason for providing that that authority should be constituted in a way so as to be perfectly free and independent in itself. With respect to public opinion in this country, it was never perfectly informed on Indian matters, and it was only when questions of this kind were agitated that any feeling of interest was inspired. By this measure the functions of the Court of Directors would be absorbed by what was called the Crown, but which really and substantially, under a Parliamentary administration, would be absorbed by the House of Commons. But this was not the only consideration for which he must decline to give these powers to a Board of Control. He would not trust a Minister of the Crown with such power and patronage as would be conferred upon him by this measure; and in order to show how much the independent action of the Board of Directors was interfered with by the action of party politics in this country, he need only refer to what occurred in 1835, when Lord Heytesbury was appointed to the Governor Generalship by Sir Robert Peel. What happened then? Why, the very day that the noble Lord embarked with his suite, the Government was changed. A Whig Administration succeeded to power, and the appointment of Lord Heytesbury was cancelled, and a supporter of the new Government was nominated in his stead. And it was his firm conviction that, in consequence of that change there ensued that deplorable and disastrous chapter in the history of India—the Affghanistan war; for if Lord Heytesbury had been allowed to proceed to India, that war would never have occurred. He therefore contended that they ought not to weaken the check of the Board of Directors over the powers of the Board of Control. It was quite impossible that gentlemen nominated to the Court of Directors could enter that body without carrying with them a strong leaning and favour towards that party by whom they had been nominated. They would carry with them political opinions, which would be introduced into that Board; and he could conceive nothing more prejudicial. It would cause everything which was done in India to be discussed in Parliament, and set up as a shaft of political enmity to the Government of the day. The introduction of these nominees would make the Court of Directors more and more a Court acting under party and political feeling, and the appointments themselves would fall, as a matter of course, under the ordinary system of political places, and everything would be given over and sacrificed, not to the interest of India, but to promote the interest of parties. He certainly could not agree with the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith), because he considered the system of open election by far the best; but he must say that he greatly preferred that Amendment to the course proposed by the Bill. He should, however, vote for the Amendment, inasmuch as he should take every opportunity of voting against the Bill.

said, it was his intention to vote for the clause as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, for he certainly preferred the nominees of the Crown to the mode of election by the proprietors of East India Stock in the manner it was constituted at present; and he thought every one who gave a calm and dispassionate consideration to the question, could not fail to come to the same conclusion. The present system had no connexion with the important duties which the men were so elected to perform. It had inspired the most able men with the deepest disgust, so much so that the most distinguished men in the service of the East India Company had said, without exception, that in spite of the power and the patronage, to the amount of 15,000l. a year, the humiliation of the canvass for an East India Director was so great they would not undergo it. He could have no object in saying anything offensive to any body of men; but any person who could maintain the opposite, he could affirm, was contradicted by the most recent facts. Had the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg) forgotten the case of Mr. Morris, for that was a proof that the choice of the electors did not always fall upon those who were most eminently entitled from their services to a place on the Direction? He (Mr. Phillimore) could say, with the greatest sincerity, that he believed the places in the Board of Directors were not rewards—they were not given to promote the interests of India, or to reward eminent merit, but to those who, like the heroes in the Dunciad, "could dive the swiftest through the mud."

said, he regretted the allusion of the hon. and learned Gentleman rendered it necessary for him to trouble the Committee with a few words, not for the purpose of depreciating the services of Mr. Morris, a civilian of standing, of much ability, and of great local knowledge, whom he knew and esteemed, and of whom he would not say one word of disparagement, but on his own behalf and in vindication of the recent election. No one had attempted to controvert the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, which had been borne out by the recent evidence before the Committee on Indian Affairs to the fullest extent, that English gentlemen, by which English gentlemen without Indian antecedents must be meant, must be admitted into the Direction if they wished to preserve its tone. If the hon. and learned Gentleman granted the correctness of that opinion, he must admit that the recent election afforded a fitting opportunity to carry it out, fifteen years having elapsed, and seventeen elections having taken place since the admission of such a person into the Board. He could not approve the system of nomination by the Government, nor that proposed by the Amendment.

in explanation, said, that he objected to the system, but was sure a better selection than the hon. Member could not have been made.

said, he wished to observe at the outset of his observations, that the hon. Gentleman who had just resumed his seat (Mr. Marjoribanks), bearing as he did a name so familiar to East India Stock proprietors, need have offered no excuse for having been a candidate for a place in the Direction. The name of Marjoribanks was one ever to be honoured by those who had any interest in Indian affairs, and surely, therefore, any relative of the late Campbell Maijoribanks might well be considered to have claims upon the consideration of the proprietors. He believed that it was very desirable they should look to the origin and course of this clause, which had been stated to be based upon the evidence given before the Select Committee, namely, that the duration of the service of distinguished officers of the Company militated against their chance of being elected to the Directory on their return from India. And though the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg) said that it was altogether ascribable to a morbid sensitiveness that such persons would not submit themselves to a practice so general and so common in England as that of canvassing a body of electors, yet he begged to remind the hon. Baronet, that it was a very different thing to pursue such a canvass after a residence of some twenty or five-and-twenty years in India—perhaps the individual in question being a person of high reputation, and with an honourable title, which alone might give him a claim for favourable consideration. He must confess he saw in that circumstance a very great impediment at any such person undergoing the trouble of a prolonged canvass. He could not understand what the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control proposed to himself, if it was not to adopt the best possible mode of selecting the Directors of the East India Company. He confessed he should have been puzzled by the clause if it had only the mere object of introducing individuals distinguished with respect to Indian affairs, and not also to strengthen the influence of the Board of Control in a way which it had never been pointed out that it was desirable to increase that influence. The clause gave the Crown the nomination of one-third of the Directors. He would pass over this point to the system of patronage which was thus introduced, and which he thought extremely objectionable. In his opinion, placing in the hands of the Crown the nomination of six individuals possessing great powers, and allowing them to sit in Parliament, was a great and serious objection. They were placed upon a different footing to the rest of the Directors, although the object was to assimilate the two portions, and to give them similar powers and similar privileges. Now, by the 10th clause, the duration of their office was made dependent upon the pleasure of the Crown. By that clause, consequently, their tenure of office depended upon the will of the Minister of the day. With respect to these gentlemen having a seat in Parliament, he differed with the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) on this as well as on other points, for he thought it was most desirable that they should have seats in that House. He thought, however, they would have a very different position if they came in with the joint assent of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. He felt quite sure that if it was their wish to promote the harmonious working of the Board, that object would be much more likely of attainment by requiring the joint, rather than the single, assent to their nomination. Any gentleman who returned from India would rather sit at the Board of Directors knowing that he possessed the confidence both of the Directors and of the Crown, than enter that body as a mere nominee of the Crown. He thought the position would be more agreeable to the gentlemen themselves; but, according to the present proposal, a line of demarcation would be drawn between them, which would lead to unceasing jealousies. If the object then was, as he believed it was, to introduce gentlemen who from their prejudices did not wish to canvass, or who from their age did not wish to wait too long, the mode was to make their introduction to the Board as similar as possible to that of the other Directors. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) objected to giving the Directors more power, which he said would be the case if the Amendment were adopted; yet he said they would have more power under the Bill as it stood. Now he (Mr. Thomas Baring) confessed he could not see how that could be, seeing that all their authority would be taken away. At the same time he would prefer to see their power increased, rather than it should be limited by the influence of the Crown. Those who seemed to favour the views of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, did so, as it appeared to him, because they wished to put an end to the present system—that system having been adopted by the present Ministry—of the agency of the Directors. His most anxious desire, then, was to see the Bill amended by the Government themselves. After having ascertained the feelings of the Court of Directors, and the views of those who wished to see the measure pass, he hoped Her Majesty's Government would take those feelings and views into consideration; and if their only object was to improve the Court of Directors without throwing into its composition the elements of discord, and planting in it the seeds of decay, they would, he thought, be disposed to adopt some suggestion like that made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton.

said, he could assure the Committee that the hon. Member who had just sat down had done no more than justice to Her Majesty's Government with regard to the point they were now discussing. Her Majesty's Government had no object, and they could have no object, but to do that which their duty compelled them to do, namely, to provide, by the arrangements they were now making, for the security and independence of the Board of Directors, and for maturing the best system of government for India. It was their sincere desire, whilst maintaining the independence of the Court of Directors, to take ample securities that it should be a most efficient and vigorous body—a body exercising no direct power, yet exercising great moral influence by means of the knowledge of Indian subjects which they pre-eminently possessed. The hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. T. Baring) seemed to think it was possible for the Government to increase their controlling power by nominating some persons with that particular view; but they, as a Government, could desire no additional power to that which they already enjoyed. Their power was already as large as the most ambitious ruler could desire, for the power of governing India was really vested in the President of the Board of Control, whilst the influence which was exercised by the Board of Directors was moral influence alone, so that, just in proportion as you added to the ability and knowledge of that Board, just in the same degree did you increase their moral influence. As far as related to direct power, the Government, therefore, asked for no additional power by seeking to add members to the Board of Directors in this way; but the moral influence of the Directors was increased by giving them additional weight. His hon. Friend (Mr. T. Baring) laboured under great misappre- hension if he thought that any power was given by the Bill to remove the nominees of the Crown at the pleasure of the Crown; because, so far from any such power being given, the words used in reference to the appointment of Directors were, he believed, the identical words used in the Act appointing County Court Judges, whose offices were held not during pleasure, but during good behaviour. At all events, it was these words specifying good behaviour which created the tenure under which these appointments would be held. But objection was taken to the power of removal. There must be some power of removal under peculiar circumstances. If he were not mistaken, the Court of Proprietors had already the power of removal, under circumstances described in the law for inability or misbehaviour. Surely it must be absolutely necessary that, as the Crown was to nominate, it should have the power of removal as well as the Court of Proprietors for inability or misbehaviour. His hon. Friend had used some strong expressions as to this Bill, which he called a rash and illusory measure. But what was the course he would adopt? He proposed more extensive changes than those proposed by the Government. He agreed with his hon. Friend, that, if there was any one point as to which all the evidence they had heard was conclusive and unanimous, it was against the system of canvassing. In the first place, it was quite certain that many most distinguished servants of the East India Company returned to this country after a long absence from it, having acquired habits which made it impossible to induce them to undergo a long canvass as a prelude to an election. Then, again, he was sorry to say he was convinced that, although there might be exceptions, in consequence of the present amount of patronage, coincident with the canvass, there had been promises of present and future distribution of patronage, which, he must say, threw some discredit upon the Court of Directors itself. It was necessary, he thought, to put an end to the system of canvassing, and they would be striking at the root of the evil by diminishing the amount of patronage. He certainly was of opinion that there was great force in the observation made by his hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), founded upon an assumption made by the right hon. Gentleman the late President of the Board of Control (Mr. Herries). He said it would be in vain to arrest the time, which was inevitable, when the present system on government for India must cease, when it must be vested in the hands of the Crown, and when the double system must terminate. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Herries) had stated that truly. Then in what year must it take place? In the year 1874. The term of the proprietary must be the period of its conclusion. At the conclusion of that time the present scheme of election by the proprietors as applied to the Court of Directors must terminate. This was the longest period for which the scheme would last. Now he had stated, when he addressed the House upon the second reading of the Bill, that this was a measure more or less experimental in its character. If it were successful, as he hoped and believed it would be, he had no doubt it would endure without any material change for the next twenty years; but, on the other hand, if it should not succeed, then he was satisfied that the next material change would be the substitution of a single government in the hands of the Crown. Was it prudent, then, when they were making changes, not to prepare for ulterior changes which were inevitably in view? In twenty years hence the government of India must be exclusively in the hands of the Crown. Possibly that event might be anticipated, and it might become necessary for the Crown to take the government earlier; but the great object was, on the part of the Government which introduced the measure, and on the part of the Legislature which had to deal with so important a matter, to make that inevitable change, come when it might, as little convulsive, and as easy in its transition, as legislation could make it. His own confident belief was that the proposition made by the Government was based on that view. He believed that the introduction into the Direction of a small proportion of Directors nominated by the Crown, would form the nucleus of a consultative body hereafter which should be the council of the sole Minister of India, named by the Crown. Then came the question, how, during the interval, would this mixed system work? His hon. Friend (Mr. T. Baring) said that it was absolutely necessary that this body should be homogeneous. But from its composition he (Sir J. Graham) did not believe it would be a discordant body; for it was impossible for a gentleman who had served in India, whether in a civil or military capacity, for several years, not to have a com- munity of feeling and habits with the body of Directors. Associated in the same Direction, they would have common interests and common views; and though one portion of them might draw their nomination from the Crown, and the other and larger portion, for the present, from the proprietary, still, when they were assembled at the Board, there would be such equality of position, and such perfect uniformity of past habits and feelings, that he felt confident there could be no division in the tenor of their proceedings. He did not, therefore, anticipate any discordance of opinion. He must say, also, it was quite open to discussion, when they came to the subsequent clauses, to consider whether six years should be the duration of the office held by the nominees of the Crown. It was quite possible that that period might be somewhat prolonged. It might also be a question whether ten years' service in India might not be deemed too long. A shorter period of service in India, and a longer duration in office after election, were both matters open for consideration. A prolonged period of service would materially diminish the objection as to the recurrence of favour or expected favour, on the part of the Crown, with regard to the nominee. Judging from past experience, the President of the Board of Control, who nominated, was not likely to be the President of the Board of Control at the end of six years from the nomination. He knew not whether a sense of past favours was a stronger motive to gratitude than, as was sometimes said, the sense of favours to come; but there could be no doubt that, generally speaking, the Minister who nominated for six years, would not be the Minister to nominate at the election after the expiration of that time. He must say, that although the question was of an embarrassed and difficult character, looking at the circumstances of the case, and carefully weighing the conflicting opinions, he certainly thought that, for the reasons he had stated, the proposition of the Government was the one which he hoped Committee would adopt; and he did not anticipate from it any of those evils which hon. Gentlemen had prophesied, but on the contrary he was strongly of opinion that from the system of self-election more evil was to be apprehended than from any nomination on the part of the Crown, particularly when that nomination devolved upon a Minister himself responsible to Parliament.

said, the right hon. Baronet had made an able speech against the system of nomination on the second reading of the Bill; but it appeared to him that the speech just made by the right hon. Baronet justified the course that he (Mr. Bright) and his friends then took by his argument against the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton. Unless it could be shown there would be no party spirit in 1874, that faction would be banished from that House, that patronage would not injure the Minister, and that several other things would not be just the same then as they were now, it appeared to him that the arguments of the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Jocelyn) would be just as strong in 1874 as they were at this moment. If it would be safe in 1874 to have a consultative Council and a responsible Minister for India, it would be just as safe to have them in 1853. The change which must come then, might as well be made now. With regard to the particular question, he conceived that the right hon. Member for Northampton had put himself in the worst possible position by the Amendment he proposed. If he had moved that eighteen Directors should be elected instead of twenty-four, he would have had a fair case against the proposition of the Government; but it appeared to him (Mr. Bright) that the proposition of the President of the Board of Control was admirable compared with that of the right hon. Gentleman. It was admitted that the twelve Directors were so badly elected, that it was proposed to put six in by another channel, in the hope of improving their quality; yet, after having consented to the twelve who were so badly elected that they could scarcely be tolerated at all, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith) suggested that six of their own election; should sit with them—six who must become dependent upon them, more dependent upon them than they were upon the Crown. If the Minister appointed the six, there would be responsibility to public opinion, and to that House; but if the twelve appointed them, he did not know where they would have to look for responsibility, or for any guarantee that they would not appoint relatives, friends, and people of I their own. Under such circumstances, there could not be a doubt as to what the decision of the Committee would be between the two propositions. Objectionable as he considered the Bill, the Amendment would make it far more unsatisfactory than it was now. Such a mass of inconsistency as had emanated from the Treasury bench on this subject, he had never before witnessed. Some papers had been presented from the India House which had not before been in the hands of Members; amongst which was a long letter from the Chairman of the India Board, and the sermon of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, in which, in combating the arguments of the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman, the right hon. Baronet availed himself of all the arguments of himself (Mr. Bright) and his friends against his own Bill.

said, he did not think, after what had fallen from the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), that any man who respected the system of double government could vote for the proposition of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman said, if they wished to provide for its suppression even before 1874, they ought to support the clause as it was framed. After all the civil speeches that had been made to the Directors, and the acknowledgment of the services rendered, of benefits conferred by them, nothing could be deeper than the ingratitude of leading them to rely upon a measure that was to provide for the destruction of their corporate independence and authority. He really hoped this clause before the Committee was better understood by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, than by the President of the Board of Control, who either did not comprehend the true bearing of his own measure, or had misled the House. He wished to ask the right hon. Baronet whether he intended that these nominees should be eligible for the chair of the Board of Directors? In such an event, the present clause would provide that those who were organs of the Court in direct communication with the Government, should be the Government's own nominees. If these nominees constituted the Secret Committee, it could not be considered independent. He had heard it attributed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, that they had exhibited great extravagance in the wars which had been carried on in India. Nothing could be more unjust; for if there had been extravagance at all on this subject, it lay at the door of the Board of Control, not of the East India House, since the Directors had no power to decide upon either making war or maintaining peace. He deeply lamented the perseverance of the Government in pushing for- ward this clause. If it was intended that nominees should be eligible to the chair of the Directors—in that case, the pure nominees would be eligible to form the Secret Committee, and to be the sole cheek on the secret acts and conduct of Her Majesty's Government by whom they were to be appointed. He felt the full force of the appeal of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), who called upon the Committee to preserve that independence of the Government of the day, of faction and of political parties in this country, which had sustained the high character and the influential position which the Court of Directors had hitherto enjoyed. It was not possible to expect that men of first-rate abilities, who had been labouring in India for the advantage of the country, would again labour for India unless the position was given to them which their services merited, any more than to expect that our leading merchants would consent to become the dependents of the ever-changing Administrations of this country. He believed the Court of Directors, as constituted, had proved of advantage to England, as it had proved of advantage to India. The existence of such a body as the Court of Directors had hitherto afforded to the commercial aristocracy of England an honourable object; it withdrew them from the pursuit of mere gain, and elevated them to a sphere worthy of their ambition. The Government and their supporters were about to strike down one of the most legitimate objects of ambition for the aristocracy of the middle classes of the country. If the hereditary and lauded aristocracy of England were so unwise as to make the office unworthy of the position which the Directory now afforded, they would bring on the middle classes to trample on their heels, and to tell them, "You have deprived us of that object of honourable ambition, that means of usefulness, for which our previous education and habits of life fitted us, and we now call on you to find us a position equal to that from which you have hitherto excluded us." These opinions might be untasteful to hon. Gentlemen opposite—to Gentlemen of the Manchester school, who called themselves the representatives of the middle classes; but, he repeated, they were seeking to destroy a position for the middle classes which they ought to maintain by all their power, if they had any real respect for the honourable ambition, the usefulness, and the character, of the middle classes.

said, he would have abstained from addressing the Committee on this question had it not been for the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir James Graham), who had managed to throw into the debate a little dash of personality even stronger than any that had fallen from the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright). That hon. Member had been contented with disparaging the constituency; and on this point he (Mr. Mangles) must say that, whether they took the test of intellect, or of character, or of wealth, there was no Gentleman who sat in that House who was elected by so respectable a constituency as the body of East India proprietors. The hon. Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Cowan) was a proprietor—he supposed they would admit that he was respectable. Mr. Hallam was also a member of that constituency; so was Lord Campbell. [Laughter.] He was simple enough not to understand that laugh; he had supposed it would be admitted that the Chief Justice of England was a man of some weight. And, with the exception of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), every eminent man in the City of London belonged to the body of East India proprietors. However, the charge of the hon. Member for Manchester was but a light matter compared with what had fallen from the lips of the First Lord of the Admiralty. One reason alleged for introducing this new element into the Court of Directors was, that distinguished Indian servants would thereby be saved from the harass and annoyance of a canvass. But the right hon. Baronet assigned another reason, which they had not heard before, namely, that the change was necessary in consequence of the promises which a candidate was compelled to make during his canvass being a source of discredit to the Court of Directors; but he would like the right hon. Baronet to adduce any single instance where such had been the case. He could say, for himself, that during the course of his canvass he did not gain a single vote in return for any promise of appointment; and many of his colleagues had told him the same thing. He could not see what right the right hon. Gentleman had to frame charges against honourable men, and then to adduce those charges as a source of discredit to the Board of Directors. The Government had professed that the primary consideration was to secure the independence of the Directors, and, the secondary one, to gain admission into the Court for men well skilled in Indian affairs without their having to undergo a canvass; but it seemed to him that the attainment of the second object would defeat the first. The right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control said, that if the election were given to the Court of Directors, the majority would elect; and he seemed to think that there was always a majority and a minority in the Court of Directors, as in that House. Such, however, was far from being the case; it was constantly changing. If the election were entrusted to the Court of Directors, he believed they would elect the most eminent men they could find.

said, that the only question which the Committee had to decide was this—both the Directors and the Government being equally qualified to judge who would be the proper men to be appointed the six Directors of the Court—the question was which of those two parties would act under the greatest responsibility. The hon. Member for Manchester said that the twelve Directors would job the appointments; and certainly if there was the least chance of their doing so, there was an end of the question. But did any one believe that they would do so? The Directors had no term of office under this Bill, and the effect of their jobbing these appointments would be that when it became known to the country, they and their nominees would be swept away together. But under what responsibility would the Government act in this matter? They all knew that the responsibility under which the Government acted was a majority in that House; and in case they had a majority, they might do as they pleased. He believed that the Directors would be under a much stricter responsibility than the Government; and he should, therefore, vote for the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. V. Smith).

said, he wished to ask the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty whether this Bill was introduced with the view of establishing a Council, and entirely abolishing the Court of Directors? For, if so, he quite agreed with the hon. Member for Manchester, that it would be much better to come forward and do it openly. The right hon. President of the Board of Control had distinctly told them that he approved of the double government, and would support it. One right hon. Gentleman had told them one thing, and another right hon. Gentleman told them another, and so led them into perplexity. It appeared now to be the intention of the Government to pull down the establishment which had governed India quietly and efficiently for so long a period.

said, the hon. Member for Montrose appeared to be somewhat slow to apprehend the meaning of what had been proposed; but his perplexity did not appear to have been shared by the Committee, who, by a decisive majority, had marked their approbation of the measure. His anxiety was to maintain the system of double government, which had been most successful; but, at the same time, he could not shut his eyes to the fact, on which the right hon. Member for Stamford (Mr. Herries) had dwelt, that the time must come, and that, probably, at the expiration of the next twenty years, when the system of double government must cease; and he thought it was wise to make provision for that inevitable occurrence. He thought the proposition now made did make that provision.

said, he would now move the Amendment of which he had given notice. The Committee had determined that Her Majesty, under the Royal Sign Manual, should appoint three of the Directors. His Amendment was that the appointment should be made from a list prepared of twelve persons who had served in India from twenty to thirty years. This was a very different proposition from that which had lately been under discussion, and the objections which had been urged to the last Amendment did not apply to this, which was a compromise between the two extremes that had been proposed.

objected to the Amendment, because it restricted the eligibility to twenty years' service, when the person to be elected might be disqualified by age, and because there was no provision for the removal of Directors. He was opposed also to any interference with the nomination of the Crown.

said, that if the period was thus limited it would only let in the Judges.

proposed an Amendment by substituting for the "one" Director, who is to be appointed for the first period of four years, the word "two," and also generally to amend the periods of service to three, six, and nine years.

objected to the Amendment on the ground that it would render it necessary that the elective Directors should be elected for no shorter period than nine years, which was more than double the time for which they were elected at present.

said, he objected to a short term of service, and he thought that the clause before the Committee ought to be considered in connexion with a subsesequent clause, which made Directors eligible to seats in the House of Commons. The clauses in conjunction would destroy the independence of Directors. What he desired was, that Directors should be elected for a fixed period—say eight or ten years—and be not eligible to re-election. If a man elected to the Direction in 1854 knew that he must go out of office in 1864, without pension or allowance, and be incapable of re-election, he would be totally independent of the Government; and if he should happen to be a Member of the House during the period, he would have no temptation, as the year 1864 drew near, to be more assiduous than usual in his attentions to the Treasury bench. It was supposed—whether truly or not he could not say—that there was always a strong leaning towards the Treasury bench on the part of Directors as the termination of a Charter approached; and he certainly had noticed recently an increasing affection between the East India Directors and the President of the Board of Control. It was not at all certain, therefore, that if the Bill should pass in its present shape, the Directors might not feel still more dependent on the Government—not dependent in the way in which some Members on the Ministerial benches were, but dependent as clerks were on the head of an office. If the clause should pass as it now stood, he would propose the omission of the clause allowing Directors to be Members of that House; for if there should be three or four elected Directors, and five or six nominees of the Crown in that House, an independent Member, on bringing forward any question connected with the Indian Government, would have to encounter not only the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), and the President of the Board of Control, as at present, but the fresh auxiliaries by whom they would then be supported, and would thus be borne down by the accumulated evidence of persons interested in giving a colour to transactions, or even in suppress- ing the truth. The clause ought to be postponed to afford the President of the Board of Control an opportunity of altering it to meet the wishes of the House. It would be much better to have the service terminable at the end of ten years, without any power of re-election. Perhaps the Government would agree to postpone the clause and consider that point.

said, the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) never could rise to discuss a question before that House without introducing matter of a personal nature into it. He had never known any occasion on which the hon. Member rose that he did not avail himself of the opportunity of saying something personally offensive. He had thought proper to allude to him (Sir J. W. Hogg); and he called on the hon. Member to state what he meant by his reference to the hon. Member for Honiton, and his vicinity to the Treasury bench. He (Sir J. W. Hogg) told the hon. Member that his conduct in Parliament had been at least as honourable and as independent as that of the hon. Member; and he had had an opportunity afforded him, which, perhaps, had not been afforded to the hon. Member, of evincing that independence, and evincing it too in connexion with his regard for India, and his desire to render that country any service in his power. The matter he was about to refer to he had never mentioned, either in public or in private; and he only now adverted to it in consequence of the observation that fell from the hon. Member a few nights ago, leading to the belief that the hon. Member had something on his mind which he had not the manliness to state. He would tell the hon. Member that he (Sir J. W. Hogg) was not devoid and—he did not pretend to be devoid—of that honourable ambition which led men to aspire to the honours of office and the emoluments of office; but it was upwards of nine years ago since he had the honour of being sent for by Sir Robert Peel, and offered a high office in the service of the Crown, including a seat in Her Majesty's Privy Council. Any man might have been justly proud of such an offer, and from such a man, coming, as it did, not only without the slightest solicitation, but without the slightest wish on his part. The offer was made shortly after he had been elected Deputy Chairman of the East India Company. He (Sir J. W. Hogg) thought it was desirable, not only for a person to be independent, but to take care that he was free from the very possibility of imputation. If he had been a simple Director he would gladly have availed himself of Sir Robert Peel's offer; but having been selected by his colleagues to fill an important and responsible office, he could not reconcile it to his feelings to abandon his colleagues or his duty to India on that occasion; and although there were in the Direction men as able as he was to discharge the duties of that office, he intimated to Sir Robert Peel that he could not consistently abandon the position in which his colleagues had placed him. He pledged his honour that he never hinted to a single individual of his colleagues the offer that had been made to him; and he pledged his honour also that though it was now nine years ago since the circumstance occurred, there were not more than three or four living men to whom he had ever mentioned the matter, though it was an offer of which any man might be proud. He regretted the necessity which had arisen for introducing a matter personal to himself; but he could not refrain from doing so, and hoped that he had shown that he was not influenced by the low considerations which the hon. Member would seem to impute to him.

Sir, the hon. Baronet has alluded to something which passed in a former debate, when he says I had not the manliness to say what I thought. I am of opinion that I generally say pretty much what I think. I did, on the occasion referred to, allude to the hon. Baronet's ambition, but not, I trust, in an offensive sense. I do not blame the hon. Baronet for being ambitious, and I think that men generally would perform much less if they were not ambitious. I think the Committee will agree with me in thinking that I did not to-night utter a syllable which any man had a right to deem offensive. Perhaps I have not been sufficiently regardful of the delicate position in which Directors of the hon. East India Company are placed, and of the state of feeling which may exist under such circumstances. I will try to be more careful in future, and avoid wounding them on such a very tender point.

said, that it did not appear that the Court of Proprietors had exercised much control over the policy of the Directors. If the Amendment was pressed to a division, he should vote for it.

said, he thought that if those nominees were capable of being reappointed, they would not get that infusion of fresh blood into the Court of Directors which seemed to be so much desired. He should be glad if the right hon. Gentleman would adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), and consent to postpone the clause, in order that it might be revised.

said, he would also suggest the postponement of the clause.

said, as the question involved the important one whether the Directors should have seats in Parliament, he would take the sense of the Committee upon it. It was desirable that as many persons of great influence and high character should have seats in that House as possible.

said, he would advise the hon. Gentleman not to divide. He had made the suggestion because the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had admitted that the clause might be improved.

said, he wished to propose to add the words "and shall not have quitted such service for more than five years." His object was to provide some security that the nominees of the Crown should be persons who possessed a recent acquaintance with the state of India.

thought it very desirable that such a limitation should be imposed. Cases might occur—though they would probably be exceptional cases—where it might be important to appoint to seats in the Direction persons who had been absent from India for a longer period than five years. It was, of course, extremely desirable that there should be in the Court of Directors an officer of eminence in the military service of the Company; but the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman would exclude from the Court—if his presence were thought necessary there—one of the most eminent military officers in the service of the Company, who had now been absent from India more than five years. The object the hon. Gentleman desired to secure was, that there should be in the Court of Directors persons who had come fresh from India, and he (Sir C. Wood) fully admitted the importance of that object; but, at the same time, he thought the limitation proposed by the hon. Member might operate injuriously to the public interests.

said, he would ask his hon. Friend whether it would not be desirable at present to suspend this question. He concurred with the right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Wood) that it was most undesirable to adopt a limitation which would exclude from the Court of Directors men of distinguished eminence in the administration of Indian affairs.

said, that after the observations that had been made, he would not press the Amendment.

said, he would ask if the Committee thought it was necessary to retain that part of the clause whereby it was provided that every person who was nominated by the Crown should be possessed of as much stock in the Company as should now be possessed by an elected Director. It was not desirable that the Crown should be limited when they came to choose the persons who were to fill those offices. It was stated with respect to a distinguished servant of the Company, that it would be exceedingly inconvenient for him, and perhaps impossible for him, out of his own funds to purchase as much of the stock of the Company as would be the qualification required by this clause. He would therefore propose that the words to which he referred should be left out of the clause.

said, he perfectly agreed in the recommendation of the hon. Member for Manchester. The Amendment which he had on the paper, but which he was precluded from bringing forward at that moment, involved the omission of this latter part of the clause.

said, so far as the Crown was concerned, they had no object in proposing this qualification; but as there prevailed a general impression that the Directors appointed by the Government should be assimilated in all respects to the elective members, the greatest possible pains had been taken to put them in all and every respect on precisely the same footing. Those persons who were appointed by the Government, would be Directors of the East India Company for all and every purpose, as well as for the Government of India, and it was, therefore, thought proper that they should be qualified in exactly the same way as the other Directors. The Crown had no interest in maintaining this qualification, but it was thought desirable that there should be a perfect identity of feeling and interest between the two classes of Directors.

said, that, considering that the persons to be appointed were men who had either filled important offices in India in the service of the Crown or in that of the Company, he thought it was perfectly unnecessary to exact from them the possession of a certain qualification in order to insure their feeling the necessary interest in the good government of India.

said, he had not heard from the right hon. President of the Board of Control a single argument in favour of retaining this qualification. He seemed to want to make two things look alike which were essentially different. Really, that was too puerile for the House of Commons. He believed that many of the best servants returned from India with little more than their pension, and that it would, therefore, be impossible for them to purchase this qualification with their own funds. True, they might borrow the necessary sum; but it was a bad way to get into office by getting into debt, and he did not think it was desirable to surround a man with additional pecuniary cares and embarrassment at the very time that important public services were required from him. Could the noble Lord the Member for the City of London give any good reason why this qualification should be insisted on?

said, he thought there was great weight in the observations of the hon. Member for Manchester, and that he had given very good reasons why these words should be omitted. The qualification was inserted in order to place on an equality the Directors nominated by the Crown, and those elected by the Proprietors. If, however, the Committee thought that the former would not in the absence of the qualification be placed in an inferior position to the latter, he should not object to the omission of these words.

said, he was glad the noble Lord had come to this decision. Nothing could be more injurious than that of going out of the way to make a factitious pecuniary qualification. He thought also, that the observations of the hon. Member for Manchester as to the ill effect of surrounding a man with pecuniary difficulty when you wanted the concentration of his mind on the public service, were very forcible.

said, he would express a hope that the qualification would also be abolished as to the Directors elected by the Proprietors.

said, the hon. Gentleman would presently have the opportunity of supporting an Amendment he intended to move for that purpose.

said, he hoped that the Committee would not impose upon the Court of Directors the painful task of reducing the number of their own body, and of thus declaring some of their members less efficient than others. He would suggest that the selection should be made by Her Majesty's Government, who had ample means of knowing who were the fittest Directors to be retained, and the most competent for the post.

said, he should certainly dissent from the suggestion of the hon. Baronet, which would have the effect of increasing the influence of the Crown, as every member of the Court so selected must be added to the number of the Government nominees.

said, he thought it would be better that the Directors to be retained should be selected by the Court of Proprietors. A more unpalatable, a more unfair, a more disgusting duty, was never imposed on any public body than that which was assigned to the Board of Directors by this clause.

said, no answer had been given whether the thirty Directors were to elect the fifteen. If they were, he concurred in thinking the worst fifteen would be elected. There was recently an election, and one of the candidates was a gentleman eminently qualified, and the other was a gentleman having no acquaintance with Indian affairs. He was informed that of the thirty Directors, twenty-six voted for the one, who, to say the least, had no great acquaintance with Indian subjects, and only four for the gentleman who had been twenty-eight years in India, and was eminently qualified for the situation. Seeing this, he had no confidence whatever in any election by the present Directors.

said, he could only express his surprise at the remarks of the hon. Member, after the statement of the hon. Member for Berwick. It was quite true the great majority of the Directors, twenty-five or twenty-six, did support Mr. Marjoribanks. The law of the land was, that the Directors should be selected by the proprietors, and there was no stipula- tion as to their having been in India. If the hon. Member had read the proceedings of the Committee he would have found that all the public servants, the Governors General of India, and every person competent to form an opinion, were decidedly opposed to the Court of Directors being constituted exclusively of Indian servants. If they were to collect at that Court thirty men of the same calling, who had all passed their lives in the same country, they would have that which some called an accumulation of experience, but which was more properly called an accumulation of prejudice. For the last twenty years, only one Director had been elected who had not been in India; and the time had arrived when the selection ought to fall on a gentleman who had not been in India. He knew that to excite prejudice it was said that Mr. Marjoribanks was a member of a banking house. He never was in a banking house in his life, and he had no occupation except that of an East India Director and a Member of that House. That hon. Member was well qualified by birth, station, fortune, and education for the appointment; and he told the hon. Member who had questioned the election, that it was as good an election as was ever made by the East India proprietors, and that the great majority of the Directors who supported his election was strong evidence of his fitness for the office to which he was elected.

said, he understood the law perfectly well, but dissented entirely from the views of the hon. Member.

said, he thought that it would be better to send back the whole of the Directors to their constituents, and let them select whom they thought the fittest.

wished to know if there was any objection to make it imperative on patentees to lodge specifications at Dublin and Edinburgh?

said, he only proposed at the present time to go into Committee pro formâ, in order that the numerous alterations might be printed. In answer to the hon. Member for Edinburgh, he must inform him that the requirement suggested would entail upon patentees a great deal of expense, and therefore was open to serious objection.

said, he must complain that this Bill would interfere with an Act passed only last Session for the amendment of the patent laws, upon which great pains had been bestowed, and that the Amendments altered it essentially, and made it utterly ineligible and utterly unworkable. He protested against such a system of legislation, and should object to proceed any stage at that hour.

said, it was most unusual to object to go into Committee pro formâ.

would ask whether it was quite usual to send a Bill to Members to read, and when they came to go into Committee to say, that was not the Bill, but it was quite a different Bill altogether?

said, he objected to the system of centralisation so apparent in the measure.

said, that there was a clause in the Bill which would meet the hon. and gallant Member's objection. He would also state that it was the intention to make all specifications lodged in Dublin evidence for all purposes; but it would be a saving of expense to the patentee if printed duplicates were sent to Dublin from the Patent Office here instead of manuscript copies.

said, he must ask for the postponement of the measure, in consequence of the lateness of the hour [one o'clock].

said, that all he intended to effect by the proposed measure was, to apply the Health of Towns Act to those places where an anxiety prevailed for its enactment, but not to those localities where no desire for its extension had been exhibited.

said, that in the year 1851 some persons in Ryde had expressed a wish to have the provisions of the Act in question extended to that town. There had been a large majority of the corporation of Ryde, however, opposed to it upon that occasion, and subsequently a petition against its enactment had been pre- sented upon the part of the inhabitants of Ryde to that House. It had been stated, he believed, by the right hon. Gentleman, that in those cases in which a majority of the ratepayers were opposed to the enactment of the measure, it should not be applied; and he (Colonel Harcourt) should therefore call upon him to take the sentiments of the inhabitants of Ryde as expressed with reference to the subject into his consideration. He contended that no additional power should be granted until the Board of Health was placed upon a different footing.

said, it was a mistake to suppose that because a town council had voted in favour of this Bill, the borough which elected the council was favourable to it also. He thought this Bill ought not to be pressed on at that late hour, when the parties interested in it could have no opportunity of making their wishes known, and he hoped the House would not allow the Bill to be committed to-night.

said, he must also resist the Motion for going into Committee, and he begged to inform the House that the town of Hertford, which was included in this Bill, did not wish for the interference of the Board of Health.

said, he must on the other hand, as one of the representatives for Hertford, declare that the majority of the inhabitants were decidedly in favour of the application of the Health Act to their town.

said, he would now beg to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the suppression of betting houses, and in doing so he considered it was not necessary for him to make any lengthened statement upon the subject, as the evils which had arisen from the introduction of these establishments were perfectly notorious and acknowledged upon all hands. The difficulty, however, which arose in legislating upon this subject was to be found in the disinclination which was felt against interfering with that description of betting which had so long existed at Tattersall's and elsewhere in connexion with the great national sport of horse racing. But these establishments assumed a totally different aspect—a new form of betting was introduced, which had been productive of the greatest evils. The course now was to open a house, and for the owner to hold himself forth as ready to bet with all comers, contrary to the usage which had prevailed at such places as Tattersall's, where individuals betted with each other, but no one there kept a gaming table, or, in other words, held a bag against all corners. The object then of this Bill was to suppress these houses, without interfering with that legitimate species of betting to which he had referred. It would prohibit the opening of houses, or shops, or booths, for the purpose of betting; and inasmuch as it appeared that the mischief of the existing vicious system seemed to arise from the advancing of money in the first instance with the expectation of receiving a larger sum on the completion of a certain event, it was proposed to prohibit the practice by distinct legislative enactment. The mischief arising from the existence of these betting shops was perfectly notorious. Servants, apprentices, and workmen, induced by the temptation of receiving a large sum for a small one, took their few shillings to these places, and the first effect of their losing was to tempt them to go on spending their money, in the hope of retrieving their losses, and for this purpose it not unfrequently happened that they were driven into robbing their masters and employers. There was not a prison or a house of correction in London which did not every day furnish abundant and conclusive testimony of the vast number of youths who were led into crime by the temptation of these establishments, of which there were from 100 to 150 in the metropolis alone, while there was a considerable number in the large towns of the provinces. He believed this Bill would have the effect of suppressing most of them, or, at all events, of preventing the spread of an evil which was admitted on all hands. It had been suggested that the more effectual course would be the licensing of these houses; but for his own part he believed that would be discreditable to the Government, and would only tend to increase the mischief instead of preventing it. He trusted and believed the Bill which he now sought to introduce, would have the desired effect, and he hoped the House would offer no objection to his bringing it in.