said, that he was anxious to learn from the hon Member for Sandwich (Mr. J. Macgregor), who was chairman of the South Eastern Railway Company, whether that company had given an undertaking to the Chairman of the Committee of the House of Lords with respect to the course which the South Eastern Company would take, in the event of a Bill being introduced in a future Session for extending the East Kent Railway from Canterbury to Dovor. If the hon. Mem- ber for Sandwich would state in his place in Parliament the facts of the case, he (Mr. Rice), acting on behalf of his hon. Friend the Member for East Kent (Sir E. Dering) would consent not to press the Motion of which he had given notice for postponing the consideration of the Lords' Amendments.

said, that all the Amendments which had been introduced during the passage of the Bill through the House of Lords were merely verbal and literal, with the exception of those which had been introduced at the instance of the company which was represented by the hon. Baronet the Member for East Kent—and this being the case, he was unable to understand what object the hon. Member could have in proposing that the Amendments should be postponed. In reply to the question put by the hon. Member for Dovor, all he had to say was, that an undertaking, under the common seal of the South Eastern Railway Company, had been deposited in the Private Bill Office of the House of Lords, by which that company bound themselves not to oppose any efforts that might hereafter be made by any parties to promote a Bill for extending a line of railway direct from Canterbury to Dovor.

said, he should move as an Amendment, that the Bill be read the third time this day three months, on the ground of the injury it would do to the property of the preferential shareholders.

as a Member of the Select Committee to whom the Bill had been referred, said he must defend the Bill, and would urge the House to assent to the third reading. He did not believe that the Bill would prove prejudicial to the interests of the preferential shareholders; on the contrary, they had themselves, at a meeting held at the George and Vulture Tavern, approved it, and had presented a petition to Parliament to that effect. He further contended that they were the best terms they could hope to receive; and if any alteration were made in them by the House, a guarantee given by Mr. Brassey would be completely nullified.

said, he should support the Amendment, for if the Bill was passed as it stood, many of the pre- ference shareholders would be involved in irretrievable ruin.

denied that Mr. Brassey had given his consent to the arrangement said to have been made with him; he contended that no case had been made out to justify the House in assenting to the Bill. What had taken place at any private meetings of the preferential shareholders could not be placed in opposition to their appearance before the Select Committee.

said, he wished to know if the Committee were supplied with any evidence of the proportion of the preferential shareholders who had assented to the measure?

replied in the negative.

would submit, under these circumstances, that the House ought not to pass the Bill. The preferential shareholders, by an Act of Parliament which was passed last Session, were guaranteed six per cent upon their stock, and now it was proposed to reduce that guarantee to four per cent, which would be a most unfair proceeding, unless the preferential shareholders were consenting parties to it. When a large proportion of shareholders had a Parliamentary bargain, and Parliament was asked to alter the terms of that arrangement, it became the House of Commons to be cautious how they assented to such a measure. Looking at the preamble and clauses of the Bill, he must say that unless he heard stronger arguments in its favour than had been yet adduced, he should vote against the third reading.

said, that as one of the directors of the company, he should support the measure, and would remind the House that the preferential stock having been issued in the first instance without the proviso, registration was illegal; but the directors, for the sake of securing the line from the creditors, whose claims amounted to between 300,000l. and 400,000l., consented to legalise the stock by the Act which was passed last Session. For precisely the same reason, the majority of the preferential shareholders had since elected to exchange the six per cent for a four per cent guarantee, with a power of redemption at the rate of 100l. for every 100l. stock; and he considered that the House would act unwisely if they rejected this Bill.

said, he wished to know whether the meeting of preferential shareholders referred to by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, had beet convened by public advertisement, so the all might have an opportunity of being present, or whether it was a private meeting?

said, the meeting was convened by public advertisement to petition the House of Lords to throw out the Bill; but instead of that a counter-proposition was carried to support the Bill.

said, the question was an important one. On the one hand Parliament was asked to annul a contract between two parties; and, on the other there was a unanimous Report from the Select Committee stating that the preference shareholders had received such particular advantages as rendered this proposition a just one. The position of the House was this:—Having taken extreme regard of the interests of preferential shareholders, it was provided by a Standing Order that changes with regard to them should never be made, except upon a special Report from the Committee alleging the reasons on which their decision had been founded. He had carefully perused the Report of the Committee, am he did not find such a statement of concurrence on the part of those concerned as he thought was desirable. He regretted to suggest anything like delay at this period of the Session; but they were compelled to judge of the decision of the Committee before they sanctioned it. He was of opinion that sufficient doubt had been cast over this case to render it impossible for the House to pass the third reading at this time, If, therefore, an arrangement could be made for printing the evidence in a short time, so that the House could ascertain for themselves, whether the Committee had had sufficient evidence before them of the advantage, gained by the preferential shareholders he thought that delay for that purpose, would be desirable.

said, that this case showed how careful they ought to be before they allowed parties to issue then preference shares, because when the preference shares were taken up by the public, and the concern was really bankrupt, these parties might turn round on the preference shareholders, and say, If you don't agree to such and such conditions you will lose your money. He had no interest whatever in the present question; but although he might not think that the ar- rangement would be so prejudicial to the preference shareholders as they themselves supposed, he did not think that a sufficient case had been made out for violating the contract.

said, that he was instructed to say on the part of Mr. Wason, that so far from repudiating the bargain, he was anxious to carry it out, and did not desire to oppose the third reading, if certain clauses were inserted in the Bill, so as to carry it out equitably. He understood also that four-fifths of the shareholders had declared their opposition to the measure, and, under these circumstances he appealed to the House whether they could sanction the arrangement. It had been said that Mr. Brassey was ready to give a guarantee, but there was no such guarantee in the Bill.

said, the question before the Committee turned upon whether the shares were preferential or guaranteed. The highest legal authorities had, however, decided that they were preferential, and he thought the Committee had decided justly in giving them a bonus of 9l., as they would not, in their position of preferential shareholders, be entitled to any continuous dividend, in the same manner as guaranteed shares.

said, he could not quite agree with the proposal of the right hon. the President of the Board of Trade, as it would lead to what should be avoided—namely, throwing over the decision of the Committee. He suggested, therefore, that the order for the third reading should be discharged, and that the Bill should be recommitted to the same Committee, with directions for the Committee to make a special Report. The House would then be in a situation to judge of the expediency of passing the Bill, without impugning the decision of the Committee.

said, he was persuaded that the preference shareholders would be most benefited by the Bill, and that if there was any repudiation it was on the part of the preference shareholders, who withdrew from an arrangement on the faith of which the creditors of the company had agreed to suspend their rights. Most of the preferential shares had been purchased at a discount, and although they had risen lately, that rise was to be attributed to an offer on the part of Mr. Brassey to purchase them at 9l. premium. As Chairman of the Committee be could assure the House that the directors had no desire to press the third reading now, if the House thought they could not put confidence in the Report of their Committee without further information.

said, he concurred in thinking the Bill should be recommitted, and the Committee could then inquire into the proceedings of the meeting to which allusion had been made. With that view he would move that the order for the third reading be discharged.

said, that Motion could not be made unless both the Amendment and the original Motion were withdrawn.

said, he must refuse to withdraw his Amendment.

said, he wished to know what principle was to guide the House in dealing with officers of the Navy in cases of salvage? Provision was taken in the estimates for the wear and tear of Her Majesty's ships, and he hoped that the days of high salvage were past. The squabbles which occasionally occurred between the owners of merchant vessels and captains of the Royal Navy on account of salvage, were perfectly scandalous, and he trusted that we should hear no more of them. He had no objection to allow salvage in cases where life had been risked, but there were other cases in which he was strongly of opinion that none should be allowed. He thought assistance ought to be given by Her Majesty's ships without any charge at all. They were ships of the public, and when any services were required by the public, they ought to be gratuitously rendered. There could be no objection to provision by merchants and shipowners making good any damage to the clothing of seamen, who were always ready to risk their lives in aiding the distressed; but that a captain of a merchant vessel should have to sell his cargo to meet the demands of the captain of one of Her Majesty's ships, as had been the case, ought no longer to be tolerated by that House.

said, he had an Amendment to move on this clause, the effect of which would be to release shipowners from any claim for salvage in regard to services rendered by Her Majesty's ships. There was a great distinction between the claim of a private merchant ship to be recompensed for such services, and that of a Queen's ship. He did not mean to undervalue the services rendered in the matter of salvage by Her Majesty's ships, but he considered that such services came within the legitimate range of their duties, and ought to be compensated, not by the merchant whose ship was benefited by their assistance, but rather by tire authorities of the Admiralty. Persons employed in the service of the State owed their labour to the State, and stood in a different position from private shipowners. He contended that while merchant vessels were entitled to salvage for services which they rendered, a similar honorarium should not be awarded to Queen's vessels, because, in the lucid language of Sir John Nichol, persons employed in the public service had a particular duty cast upon them to render aid—they sacrificed no time, because their time was paid for by the public, and they risked no property, because their property was paid for by the public. But this was not only the opinion of Sir John Nichol, for, although the Court had always felt itself bound to decide in accordance with precedent, that opinion had been concurred in by Lord Stowell, Sir Christopher Rawlinson, and Dr. Lushington. He believed that the Amendment which he proposed would be regarded as a great boon by the shipping interest, and that it would be so received by them. The present salvage arrangements had long been the subject of complaint from the shipowners of this country, and were repulsive to the sense of justice of the great trading community of Great Britain. It was worthy of remark that in no other country except England was the principle sanctioned of allowing special remuneration to the Navy of the State for the efforts made in the cause of humanity and benevolence. In this respect there was no analogy between the practice which obtained amongst the land and sea forces. It was notorious that in the case of a fire, or any great public calamity on shore, the Queen's troops were frequently called out to protect order, and even to work the fire-engines; but no attempt had ever been made to found upon their exertions in that respect a claim for additional remuneration. He did not mean to disparage the claims of the Navy, or to deny its services in the cause of humanity, on occasions of public distress and calamity. Neither did he mean to deny that their exertions ought to be compensated; but what he maintained was, that their labours should be remunerated, not by specific pecuniary rewards, granted by the parties benefited, but by honours, pensions, and promotions, to be awarded at the discretion of the Lords of the Admiralty. With these views, he trusted the House would concur in the Amendment of which he had given notice.

said, he was disposed to think that it might save the time of the Committee if he at once stated the views which Her Majesty's Government were inclined to take of this question. He admitted distinctly at the outset of his observations that it was a question of very grave importance, involving a consideration of national policy, since it not only materially affected the interests of sailors serving on board Her Majesty's ships, but, according to the view he took, also materially affected the safety of life and property embarked upon the seas. He would briefly state how the matter stood. The right involved in the law of salvage was the common-law right of every British subject. It was a right which had not originated in Statute, although it had been regulated by Statute and by the judicial decisions of the highest legal tribunals. From the earliest period every British subject who contributed his aid at the risk of his own life to the saving of the lives and property of others exposed to danger on the high seas, had a right, an inherent right, to reward for those services. What the House was now asked to do for the first time was, by means of a restriction, to bar the sailor from his common-law right, which had been enjoyed by him from the earliest time, and had been recognised and regulated by Statute and by the authority of the highest decisions. He contended—and he had stated it upon a former occasion as strongly as he could—that, considering the competition to which the trade and commerce of this country were now ex- posed, every needless incumbrance in the race of competition should be removed from the British shipowner. At the same time, however, they must take care that in so relaxing those restrictions they did not do an act of flagrant injustice to any portion of the seamen employed either in the merchant service or in the Queen's service. Reference had been made by the hon. Member who moved the Amendment to cases and decisions, and the judgment of Sir John Nichol had been quoted, he thought, in the case of the Clifton. But in the very book from which his hon. Friend had quoted, there was a decision by the same Judge in the case of the Lustre, immediately following, where the principle was laid down by Sir John Nichol himself in the clearest possible manner, in these terms:—

"The public force of the country is not to be employed gratuitously in the salvage of property of private persons to save them from expense. Government steamers are kept for the public service, and the officers in command cannot employ them in the service of individuals, and thus risk the public property, without authority or an indemnity for all expense and damage, nor are they then to hazard their lives or undergo labour without reward, though they are entitled to a lower rate of remuneration than private salvors."

That was the principle which had been laid down by the Court of Admiralty from the earliest time; had been sanctioned by the highest authority, and was now strictly enforced. Until lately, the claim for salvage had been twofold in its character. First, there was a claim on the part of the ship for tackle and boats attached to her, or for any loss or wear and tear which they might have sustained in the rescue; and, next, there was a claim on account of the services of the officers and men employed in it. He had given notice of a clause, however, which would bar the right of the Crown to make any claim for salvage or indemnity under the former of these heads. The words of that clause were—

"In cases where salvage services are rendered by any ship belonging to Her Majesty, or by the commander or crew thereof, no claim shall be made or allowed for any loss, damage, or risk, thereby caused to such ship, or to the stores, tackle, or furniture thereof, or for the use of any stores or other articles belonging to her Majesty, supplied in order to effect the salvage service, or for any other expense or loss sustained by Her Majesty by reason of such services."

With regard to the first branch of the claim, there was, therefore, a bar as extensive and conclusive as the shipowners could possibly desire. There remained, then, only the latter portion, which involved the claim on the part of the seamen for risk incurred in effecting the salvage. He must say that it appeared to him this question was deserving the most serious attention of the House. He did not think that it would be their wish to act with harshness, with injustice, or want of generosity, to a body of men remarkable for their own generosity, gallantry, and fidelity. He remembered that during the war there was an expression used common to both services which conveyed a very wide distinction in its meaning—there were the "come along" officers, and the "go along," officers. The "come along" officers were men of great daring, of great spirit, ruling the hearts of those who served under them, and never scarcely failing in any exploit which they undertook. The "go along" officers were more cold, more prudent, more calculating, but not equally successful. Let the Committee reflect upon the difference between these two characters when a ship was in danger or difficulty. In the one case, the "come along" officer exclaimed, "Now, then, volunteers, let's rescue that ship." Whatever the extent of that danger, however great its imminence, whatever the perils to the lives of the men, wherever that volunteering took place on board a Queen's ship, the chances of a rescue were great. In the other case, the officer who commanded would naturally hesitate long before he gave the order to man a boat, when he knew that the sailors serving in Her Majesty's ship, whatever might be the danger they encountered, and that some might even lose their lives, would receive no reward. That was the "go along" order, and by it undoubtedly the merchant service in the end would suffer. But what would the insurers say to this—what would they say to it at Lloyd's? Was it really in favour of the interests of life and property engaged in the merchant service that this Amendment should be agreed to? He was quite convinced that they could not do a more ungenerous or a more impolitic thing. How did the matter stand? Were these salvage claims lightly raised? Were there no restrictions? If the salvors, being in the Queen's service, went into a Court, the rule was distinctly laid clown that they were not to be deprived of all reward; but that, considering the peculiar circumstances of the sailors serving in Her Majesty's ships, they were to have a somewhat less reward than others. His pre- decessor at the Admiralty, foreseeing that there might be some abuse, notwithstanding that rigid rule in the Court, passed a general order, dated the 30th of January, 1852, which was now in force; and upon this point it said—

"When such services have been rendered, the commanding officer of the ship is to transmit a full report of the whole circumstances of the case, with a copy of the ship's log, to the commander-in-chief or senior naval officer of the station, whose written approval shall be requisite before any officer under his command can raise a claim for salvage, and such approval is not to be given, unless really important service, or service accompanied with hazard, has been rendered."

Was that a vain regulation? Clearly not. Let the House observe the restrictions in the first place. No officer in Her Majesty's ships could raise a claim for salvage until he had presented all the circumstances of the case to the commander-in-chief or senior naval officer of the station. If it were not entertained by that officer, the institution of the claim was not permitted. Then, when investigated and recommended by him, there was a further check, for the case was brought under the review of the Board of Admiralty, and they took into their consideration all the circumstances so sanctioned by the commanding officer, and decided whether they would permit the claim to be instituted in the courts or not. Now, let him show how the Board of Admiralty exercised that discretion thus placed in their hands. Without wishing to trouble the Committee at any length, he would just read the facts of a case which had only occurred last month. The officer commanding a Royal steamer was going from Liverpool on the 10th of June of the present year, and he thus described a case of salvage in which he had been concerned:—

"I have the honour to report to you, for the information of their Lordships, that yesterday morning, while lying in Douglas Bay, Isle of Man, and being about to sail for Loch Fyne, in compliance with instruction from the Board of Fisheries, I received intelligence of an American ship having gone on shore the previous night, about eleven o'clock, some six or eight miles to the southward of Douglas, and that she was in want of immediate assistance. I took the responsibility on myself, deeming it a case of great moment, to divert my vessel from the duties I was ordered upon, and went to her assistance. The weather was calm, but so thick a fog prevailed that it was attended with some risk my feeling my way by the lead alongshore. I came up to the stranded vessel about 8.50. a.m., and took up a position to heave her off. She proved to be the American ship Squantum, of Boston, which left Liverpool on the 7th of June, 1853, bound for Boston. It was then half flood, her bows were high up on the rocks on the shore, and her passengers, 250 in number, were all safe on shore. At a little before high water I succeeded in heaving her off safely without removing any of the cargo, and, finding that she would float, I towed her into Douglas Bay, and anchored her there in safety at 2. 15. p.m. A consultation was then held in my cabin by the High Bailiff of Douglas, the agent for Lloyd's, and the master of the Squantum, the result of which was the accompanying letter, and, the master having represented to me the extreme urgency of the case, and the great value of his cargo, I immediately decided on complying with the roaster's wish in towing her across channel at once to Liverpool, where she could be docked and repaired."

That officer asked the Board of Admiralty to recognise his claim to salvage. The effect of the regulation which he had read, and the value of cargo being considered, it was deemed fitting to act upon the strict rule, and the Admiralty refused permission to that officer to institute any claim whatever. The salvage was effected in the manner that he had detailed to the Committee. The vessel was towed into Liverpool, and no claim whatever from a British ship of war, even to a foreigner, was permitted to be made by the Admiralty. He produced that as an illustration of the spirit in which these cases were dealt with by the Admiralty. He had now stated what the alteration of the law was which he proposed to introduce. He had stated the principle on which the tribunals of justice adjudicated on salvage questions, and the restrictions which they placed upon Queen's vessels, that they should receive somewhat less, than, under similar circumstances, should be given to others. He had shown, that, by the existing regulations, except where there had been danger to life incurred, the Board of Admiralty would not permit a claim to be instituted at all; and he had read a clause which he proposed to introduce barring all claim to salvage on account of boats and tackle belonging to the Queen. The question was, would they allow sailors on board the Queen's ships, when they risked their lives for salvage, that reward to which, according to the common-law right of every British subject, they were entitled? Until the House of Commons came to such a decision, he could not believe, for one moment, that such a proceeding would be adopted. He was sure that a more fatal thing to the feelings of the seamen, when they had gallantly risked their lives for the preservation of others, could not be had recourse to. He was quite sure that it would prove most injurious with regard to the safety of life and property generally; he was equally sure that the service now voluntarily undertaken would not be undertaken in future with the same spirit. They must remember that the feelings of men were of a mixed character, and that seamen who were animated by the utmost daring and generosity, looked not only to their pay, but they also kept an eye upon pecuniary rewards. He was satisfied, if this claim on the part of the Navy were to be disallowed, that officers would be slow—very slow—to give orders for dangerous and hazardous enterprises; which, as the law now stood, they not merely sanctioned, but encouraged, in every way in their power. He would not detain the Committee longer, but, with the strongest desire to concede everything reasonable to the shipping interest which could be demanded, he most earnestly entreated the Committee not to accept the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for South Shields.

repudiated, on the part of the shipowners of the country, the imputations thrown out by the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton (Sir G. Pechell), that they wished to obtain the assistance of the officers of Her Majesty's Navy without any remuneration. He was sure he was speaking the sentiments of his constituents when he said they were most anxious that Her Majesty's officers should be placed upon precisely the same footing as any other party claiming salvage; that they should not be debarred the right of salvage which the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) had said they might claim under the common law. He dissented altogether from the observations which had fallen from the hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ingham), that ships had a right to claim the assistance of Her Majesty's officers in rescuing property, without being bound to tender remuneration. They had a right to claim their assistance in the protection of life and property from a foreign enemy, because they paid their share of the public taxes for that purpose; but they had no right and no wish to claim the services of the Navy without returning fit and proper remuneration. Were it otherwise the system would be unjust and contrary to sound policy.

said, that until he heard the observations of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Horsfall) he could not have deemed it possible that any body of shipowners in the kingdom could have refused their assent to the Amendment of the hon. Member for South Shields. No hon. Member, he believed, was prepared to contend that the services of the seamen in the Navy for salvage should not be rewarded; but the question was not whether they were to be rewarded or not, but who were to pay them? The mercantile navy had a claim upon the country in this respect. As to the officers, he submitted that their reward should be either by promotion or by increased pay.

said, he had heard but one opinion among the shipowners of London on this subject, and their opinion was that the claims for salvage on the part of the Royal Navy ought to be entirely abandoned. It was, therefore, with some surprise that he had heard the observations of the hon. Member for Liverpool. The instructions to which the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had referred were prepared by the right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) when First Lord of the Admiralty, in consequence of the strong opinion of the shipowners of London that the claims, as then made by the Royal Navy, were unjust and exorbitant. But since these instructions had been issued, a case had occurred which deserved the serious notice of the House. He alluded to the salvage of the barque Rosalie, by Her Majesty's steamer, Locust, in the River Plate. [The hon. Member read a narrative of this case, dated Liverpool, October 6, 1852, from which it appears that a fire broke out in the hold of the Rosalie. The captain procured the assistance of the captain of the Locust; but the Locust towed the Rosalie upon rocks from which they were got off by Admiral Grenfell of the Brazilian navy. For this service Admiral Grenfell made no claim upon the Rosalie; but when she got to Monte Video the commander of the Locust took possession of her, and would not release her until the captain had given a bond for 3,000l.; but after this the captain was served with an Admiralty writ for 6,000l.] He considered this case a disgrace to the Royal Navy. He could not conceive why Her Majesty's officers wanted salvage for having merely done their duty to a vessel in distress. The proper recompense for the officers should be increased pay or promotion, and the seamen might have a moderate sum allowed in case of absolute risk of life, or injury of person or property. On this ground he entreated the House to sanction the principle assorted by the hon. Member for South Shields. He might add that the last Government were so perfectly satisfied of the justice of the claim, that the late Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to propose its entire abolition.

said, that though it might have been the intention of the late Government to go the whole length of proposing the abolition of salvage, he should by no means have despaired of shaking their resolution if they had submitted their proposition to the House. He must say, however, that he could find no record at the Admiralty of any such intention. By the common-law right the ship salved, became, as it were, the property of the salvor. What was the proposition which the Government now made? It implied a very great abridgment of that power. They proposed that bonds should be taken, and that all right of lien should be suspended on receipt of that bond. All these clauses which they were now discussing had been framed by his right hon. Friend the Judge of the Admiralty Court, and that, he thought, might be taken as a strong guarantee for their practical efficiency. His hon. Friend the Member for Bridport (Mr. Mitchell) had referred to the case of time Rosalie. He would take that case in illustration of the mode of action adopted by the Admiralty. The late Board of Admiralty did not allow the claim against the Rosalie without a reference to the admiral commanding at the station; and the report of the admiral—Admiral Henderson—had been received since he (Sir J. Graham) had been at the Board. According to the statement of the hon. Member himself, it appeared that a man-of-war in attempting to save the Rosalie had placed herself in imminent danger, and had been for some time stranded, together with the ship which she salved—

No. The Locust got upon the rocks in a clear night, entering the harbour. If she chose to do that, it was the fault of her commander.

At all events, had not the Locust been engaged in this service, she could not have been placed in that hazardous position. His hon. Friend stated that Queen's ships were the property of the public. He admitted that; but there was something that was not the property of the public, and that was the lives of the officers and men on board those ships, when exposed in matters which did not form a portion of their duty. It was not a portion of their duty, and it never had been to risk their lives in a service of the nature involved in salvage, without a just expectation of that reward which, as he had before said, was the common and inherent right of every British subject. With respect to the Rosalie, however, he would read to the Committee the precise correspondence in that case, and then they would see what there really was in it which had been so much relied upon by his hon. Friend the Member for Bridport. It was by the merest chance that he had these documents with him. Writing from Buenos Ayres to the Admiralty, Admiral Henderson said—

"Lieutenant George F. Day, commanding Her Majesty's steam-vessel Locust, having represented to me that the salvage claim made for assistance rendered by that vessel to the British bark Rosalie in March, 1852, is in abeyance until the receipt of my written approval as the commander-in-chief, I beg to state for their Lordships' information that when I reported the particulars of the case in my letter, No. 36, of the 12th of April, 1852, I considered it unnecessary, for the reasons therein stated, to do more than forward a full report of the circumstances, together with a copy of the ship's log, because Lieutenant Day, in ignorance of the Admiralty circular, which had not then reached this station, had already raised his claim for salvage, and received a bond for 3,500l. as security. I refer to this circumstance as a reason for recording my approval after the lapse of twelve months; but I believe it to be due to Lieutenant Day, the officers, and ship's company of the Locust, to state my opinion that the services rendered to the bark Rosalie were not only really important, but accompanied with hazard to the persons employed, as may be seen from the enclosed copy of a letter from the assistant surgeon in charge. The services rendered did not cease upon their towing the vessel to Montevideo, as relays of men were employed for many days to remove the cargo, which was in a burning state. In acknowledging the receipt of Lieutenant Day's report, I approved his proceedings at the time, and I have no hesitation in stating now that as both officers and men sustained much loss in clothes, &c., while rendering the said service, I consider the claim raised is deserving of consideration."

The nature of the services rendered was verified by Mr. Clarke, the assistant surgeon in charge, who thus wrote to Lieutenant Day:—

"Bajada, Parana, Her Majesty's steam-vessel Locust, March 23, 1853.

"Sir—In reply to your letter of this day, I beg leave to state that, on reference to my journal, I find that Mr. Whitehouse, second-master in charge, and William Mason, able seaman, were of necessity placed on the sick list, suffering with illness produced, in my opinion, from over exposure in the hold of the bark Rosalie. I also recollect that, when the crew were employed clearing her for the first two days, I had to be on board of her in frequent attendance on several of the men brought up from the holds in a state of asphyxia, produced by the inhalation of carbonic acid, phosphuretted hydrogen, and ammoniacal vapour abundantly generated in the hold from the combustion of the hides, hair, bones and tallow therein stowed, and, the combustion still existing, I considered (as at that time I informed you) the duty imposed on the men to be attended with imminent peril from that cause,"

That was the case to which the hon. Gentleman had referred as an illustration of his charge of the exorbitant anti unjustifiable claims for salvage which were made by vessels in the service of the Crown. A weaker case, he ventured to say, never had been submitted to Parliament.

said, he thought it was only consistent with common justice that, in cases where the British sailors exposed their lives to imminent danger in their attempts to rescue vessels in distress, a reward should be granted to them in proportion to the risk they had encountered, and the value of the property saved. It was said that the French navy performed salvage services without remuneration; but the fact was that there was a fund in that country to support the widows and orphans of men who periled their lives, not in the strict performance of their duty. A pecuniary consideration would probably never either deter or incite the British sailor to do that which, from the generosity of his nature, he was ever ready to do, bravely to risk his own life in an effort to save that of his fellow-creature; but to rescue a crew from shipwreck was one thing, and to save mere merchandise from destruction was another, and the last of these services ought most undoubtedly to be compensated.

said, the Bill was a Shipowners' Bill. The operation of the 29th clause would be to increase the risk of merchant vessels; therefore, the sailor of the Royal Navy had an additional claim upon the mercantile interest in the nature of salvage. He had no doubt if all right to remuneration were withdrawn to-morrow, that the sailors would perform their duty as honestly and courageously as they did at present. But it should be remembered that it was not for saving lives but for saving property that these claims were made. There was in the breast of every man an inherent love of gain, otherwise what was it that made the merchant send his ship to sea, and what made the Parliament sanction the payment of prize money?

said, he fully concurred in the observations of the right hon. Baro- net (Sir J. Graham). In a letter from the Secretary of the Shipowners' Society in Liverpool, there was a paragraph in favour of the clause, on the ground that it would be detrimental to the merchants' interests if the right of the British sailor to salvage were called in question.

said, that unless additional inducement in the shape of salvage was given to the British seamen, no such risks would be incurred as were incurred by them for that purpose. He trusted, however, that the proportion of the property saved to go to the salvor would be determined by the Bill. At present this was entirely at the mercy of the commander.

said, he approved of the clause, and was convinced if the principles which had been laid down by the right hon. Baronet were adhered to by the Admiralty, there would be no fear of exorbitant overcharges. For his own part, speaking as a shipowner, he was perfectly ready to acquiesce in these salvage clauses.

said, he doubted the view which the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Graham) had taken of the common-law right to salvage inherent in the British sailor. The seaman could not go to render these salvage services except under the command of his officer; but directly a man suspended his own free action and acted under the command of another, it appeared to him that his common-law right was gone, and that he ceased to be a free agent. This matter had undergone very great consideration at various times, and the proof of it was, that the persons whose rights they were discussing had been treated upon a different principle from the ordinary class of the Queen's subjects. The right hon. Baronet, in his happy way, had introduced the subject of the "go along" and the "come along" officer; but that anecdote was as applicable to other services of honour and danger which Her Majesty's Navy were in the habit of rendering to the country as to salvage. It appeared to him, however, that the view of the Government, to use an illustration as common as that of the right hon. Gentleman was, that "money made the mare to go." If he understood the nature of the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ingrain), it was not that officers and seamen performing these services, in which danger or the risk of life was concerned, should not be rewarded, but that that reward ought to be of a dif- ferent class from that received by other portions of Her Majesty's subjects. The hon. Member did not say, nor should he (Mr. Henley), say, that persons performing such services should do so without reward. He regarded these salvage services as extra duty, and thought, therefore, that the seamen of the Royal Navy should not be called upon to perform them without an adequate reward, in the shape either of an honorary or pecuniary reward, as the case might be. Then, the only question was, what that reward ought to be? So far as he had had an opportunity of forming an opinion upon the matter, he believed that the complaint upon the part of the shipping interest had always been directed to the oppressive and arbitrary manner in which it was endeavoured to enforce these claims. They had to contest their claims in a Court which was not highly popular, owing to the expensive nature of its proceedings; and then, if they chose to appeal, the case was carried to the Committee of Privy Council, where, even if successful, the appeal cost more, perhaps, than the whole amount of the original sum claimed. The shipping interest, he believed, were quite prepared to pay something for services actually rendered, if they could only see some way of obtaining a settlement of the case which would be less environed with difficulties than that at present in existence. No doubt, some steps had been taken by the Government in the direction in which this Amendment tended. There used to be paid some time ago what was called head-money in cases of piracy and the like; but that had been done away with. He considered this to be a case strongly analogous to that. This was a public service rendered by persons in the service of the public, and they ought to receive their reward, whether pecuniary or honorary, at the hands of the public. He admitted that these clauses contained an amelioration, to a certain extent, of the present law; but they did not go far, and he did not know that the clause about to be introduced by the right hon. Baronet would make any very great difference in the charge which parties had to pay for salvage. The regulations proposed might prevent fictitious and unfounded charges being made, but would not secure a more speedy and inexpensive means of bringing cases to trial. It certainly was an aggravation to men who had just suffered a loss to find heavy charges made by Her Majesty's ships, when the ships of other countries rendered those services gratuitously. The long peace had brought that anomaly more clearly to light, and the general feeling seemed to be that the reward, whether pecuniary or honorary, should be received at the hands of the public. The great evil which the shipping interest had to complain of, was the mode in which the claims against them were enforced. He did not think that that subject would be much mended by the present Bill, and he doubted, even, whether they would not lay the foundation for a more aggravated state of things than at present existed.

said, he did not think that the remark of his right hon. Friend (Sir James Graham) with regard to the common-law right of the sailor had been properly understood. No doubt, sailors in the Navy were bound to obey the orders of their officers; but when they were exposed to dangers not in the discharge of their regular duties, though under orders, the common law secured them the right to compensation for the risk incurred. Would they say, therefore, that his object was reward, not glory, and that "money made the mare to go?" No such thing. The appeal was to glory, and to feeling rather than reward; and now, for the first time, they proposed, by the carrying of this Amendment, not only to injure the sailor in his pocket, but to hurt him in his feelings. It had been said that he should be paid out of the public money voted by Parliament; but how much more just and true had been the language of the hon. Member for Aberdeen (Mr. G. Thompson)., one of the largest shipowners in the country, who had drawn a distinction between general services due to the country, and special services rendered to individual ship-owners! It had also been said that the inconvenience of the present process was not mitigated by this measure. Not mitigated! Why, what was the present process? The fact was, they had an absolute lien—a positive transfer of the ship to the salvor, and the necessity of selling her, perhaps, to liquidate his claim. Such a right was now entirely abandoned, and the lien was destroyed. For the risk and danger which the Queen's ship had encountered, the shipowner had to pay nothing whatever. There was no demand except for personal service rendered. The Board of Admiralty, exercising their control over the servants of the Crown, would not allow an extravagant claim even to go into the Court; or, if they were so forgetful of their duty as to permit it, the Court of Admiralty could repudiate that demand. How could it be said, then, the defective process had not been remedied, when the lien was absolutely and entirely abolished, the claim for damages to the Queen's ship also entirely abolished, and nothing remained but the reasonable reward for hazardous personal services, which, to their honour, the shipowners of this country had always been ready to recognise? He was glad that the hon. Members for Liverpool had spoken upon this question, and he rejoiced that the Members for Glasgow, for Belfast, and for Aberdeen had honoured the Committee with their opinions. Seeing that the feelings of the representatives of the shipping ports were what they were, and considering that the underwriters had the deepest interest to make it the desire of the British Navy to do their utmost, both from a spirit of glory and of reward, to save every vessel in distress, he trusted, if they should divide, the Committee would affirm by a large majority the principle of the clause which they were discussing.

said, he must deny that the Bill did away with all lien on the ship. The salvor had the power of holding the ship in pledge until a bond to the amount fixed by the consular officer was given—a bond which bound the shipowner and his heirs for ever, even if the ship should never get home; and that was what was termed doing away with the lien.

said, a lien signified security by the possession of a thing. Now, as it was proposed that salvors should give up the possession of the ship and take only personal security, he did call that doing away with the lien.

said, he should support the Bill, being convinced that it was a great improvement upon the existing state of things. Although the shipowners, as a body, would, of course, be glad to be relieved by the State from any charge upon them, they would much prefer to pay for salvage services than to run the risk of not having them rendered.

in reply, said that the shipowners of the port which he represented were unanimous in their support of the Amendment which he had proposed.

said, he wished to put a question to his noble Friend the Member for the City of London on a subject of considerable importance, and which had occupied a large share of the attention of that House. A Bill had been introduced during the course of the present Session to remove the restrictions which prevented Jews from Sitting in that House, and, after receiving the sanction of that House, had been rejected by the House of Lords. A Bill had also been introduced into the other House of Parliament by a noble and learned Lord of great weight and authority, having for its object to substitute for the oaths of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, one form of oath which was thought better suited to the Circumstances of the times; and that had also been rejected. His noble Friend had, on a previous occasion, in reply to a question put to him by an hon. Member, stated that it was not the intention of the Government, during the present Session of Parliament, to introduce any similar measure for the attention of Parliament, and therein he (Sir G. Grey) thought they were exercising a wise discretion. He wished now to ask the noble Lord, whether, considering the unsatisfactory state of the law as it at present stood, it was the intention of the Government, during the next Session, to introduce a measure for the purpose of altering the oaths to be taken by Members of Parliament, either as a separate measure, or as part of that scheme of Parliamentary reform which it was understood the Government would propose?

said, he thought that the state of the law on this subject was such that no man could deem it to be satisfactory. In the case of a Gentleman who had endeavoured to take his seat in that House, there had been a decision of a superior Court of law. One of the learned Judges had expressed, on that occasion, his opinion that it was not illegal for a Gentleman to take his seat in that House without using the words, "On the true faith of a Christian;" and another learned Judge dissented from that opinion, and said that it would be much more satisfactory for Parliament to declare its meaning, and not to exclude Jews by an enact- ment which was not intended to refer to them at all. Since then it had been endeavoured to place the law on a more satisfactory footing, but no legislation had as yet taken place on the subject. He had thought, considering what had already taken place on the subject, and also the state of public business, that it would not be advisable to bring the subject before the House again this Session; but he should feel it his duty, during the next Session of Parliament, to bring in, a proposal, either in a Bill relating to the state of the representation generally, or as a separate measure, which would not only have for its object the relief of the Jews, but would be framed in a manner to alter the general form of oath, which, as it existed at present, appeared to him to be only consistent with ridiculous intolerance or practical absurdity.

said, he rose to call the attention of the noble Secretary for the Home Department to the evidence given before the Clare Election Committee respecting the riot at Six-mile Bridge, and to ask the noble Lord the Member for the City of London whether it was the intention of the Government to proceed against the Rev. John Burke and the. Rev. Michael Clune, Roman Catholic priests, who had been reported by an Election Committee of that House, the former to have excited the people, and to have taken part in the riot, and the latter to have excited the people to take part in the riot which occurred at Six-mile Bridge on the 22nd day of July, 1852; which, by destroying the freedom of election, rendered void the return of the two knights of the shire elected to serve in Parliament for the county of Clare at the general election of 1852. Did Government mean to vindicate the law which had been so grossly violated by the proceedings of certain parties at this election? He would remind the House that the candidates were three—Colonel Vandeleur, Sir John Fitzgerald, and Mr. O'Brien—gentlemen of influence in connexion with the neighbourhood; a circumstance which naturally gave rise to a sharp contest. For a time, however, there was every appearance of its going off as quietly as an election in Ireland could do, until a Mr. Wilson, an excitcable gentleman, and once in the commission of the peace, having seen at Cork, in an English newspaper, an account of the Stockport riots, returned home about the 12th of July, determined to excite as much as possible the feelings of the people, and forthwith put forth a violent placard calling on the people to save their religion from insult and destruction by their conduct at the forthcoming election. This was posted up about the 13th of July; the polling took place on the 22nd and 23rd. [The hon. Gentleman then proceeded to describe the assembling of voters on Lord Conyngham's estate, preparatory to their marching towards the polling place, and another party of voters, conducted by Mr. Delmege, a magistrate, under an escort of troops in the command of Captain Egar. The voters who were thus escorted advanced in cars into the town of Six-mile Bridge, through a crowd of people who lined the roads; and in order to reach the Court-house, the place of polling, as quietly as possible, turned aside by a back road, which happened to be unguarded by the police. There was hooting and hissing, but no violence, until the procession arrived opposite to the Roman Catholic chapel, where Captain Egar heard Father Burke use the words "God" and "traitor," believing that he said to the people, "Will you be traitors to your God?" Mr. Keane also heard him say," Fire, boys; rescue Keane's men, boys." That happened in the middle of the chapel ground. Father Burke came up to the cars, and asked one of the voters whether he was to vote against his religion? The man wished him to let him alone. After the rev. gentleman urged the rescue of the men, a rush was made upon the cars, and a soldier who came to the assistance of the voters was caught hold of by Father Burke, who said he did not care for the coat he wore. Two other men seized him, and he was knocked down from behind. Father Burke again said, "Boys, stand to your religion;" and was answered on the part of the mob with "Boys, fight for your religion—boys, fight for your religion;" and then with jumping in the air, and a wielding of their sticks. He thus excited the mob, and then took part in the riot. Captain Egar said the loss of life would have been greater but for the firing of the soldiers at the time they did. Corrigan, the head constable, stated that he heard Father Clune, about two minutes before the firing, addressing the mob and saying, "You are standing here idle; oh, what is this for; will you allow them to come?" The mob upon that ran round the Courthouse towards the place where the affray took place, and the witness immediately afterwards heard the firing.] It was for the House to consider what effect such interference had on the voters; but he thought they would agree that the Committee were right in the conclusion to which they had come. Two voters, of the names of Halloran and Bower, stated that they intended to vote for Colonel Vandeleur, but were intimidated. There were the other voters, M. Mahon and Malony, whose evidence was to the same effect. These four men had stated to the Committee that they were intimidated, and did not vote. It was for the House to say what it would do with regard to these two priests. It might be asked why the Committee had not recommended the House to adopt a particular course? The reason was, that they thought it necessary that the evidence should be printed, and laid before the House, and that the House should determine whether it would allow persons who had so violated the privileges of voters and freedom of election, as these priests had done, to escape with impunity. He would, therefore, beg to ask the noble Lord the question of which he had given notice.

said, before his noble Friend replied, he wished to state briefly the reasons which had induced him, as a Member of the Committee, to take a course different from that which was pursued by his hon. Friend the Chairman of the Committee (Mr. Miles). He ventured, at the outset, to say that this was not exactly the mode in which this question ought to have been brought forward. If the question was of that gravity which his hon. Friend believed it to be, it should have been matter for a Motion in itself; and he was sure no Member of the House could have expected that his hon. Friend, in simply putting a questions, would enter into a long statement, for the purpose of bringing a charge against the two persons whose names he had brought forward, and against the Government. He had risen, however, to, state, in a few words, the motives which caused him to oppose his hon. Friend in this matter, and which had induced him, when he moved in Committee a condemnation of two rev. gentlemen, to propose an Amendment to his Resolution. His belief was, that they had no right to bring charges against absent persons, who had not the means of appearing to answer for themselves, and that in condemning them the Committee had acted in a manner hardly just, proceeding as they did on exparte evidence. His hon. Friend had hardly stated the great difficulties which the Committee had to encounter as regarded the evidence. Indeed he could no help thinking that it would be better if Committees of that kind were composed of Irish Members, by whom the state of society and the peculiarities of the people would be better appreciated and understood. The difficulty of deciding on which side was the influence, or which the intimidation and injustice, was really beyond the capacity of any ordinary Englishman For instance, one of the witnesses, who was asked a question respecting the abduction of voters, said, "They were willing enough to go, provided they were forcibly taken away." In short, the evidence was such that he found it impossible t come to the conclusion at which the Chairman had arrived. But what he wished to call the particular attention of the House to was this—that after these rev. gentlemen had been held up to public opprobrium the Committee unanimously came to the conclusion that "there did not appear to have been any general undue interference on the part of the Roman Catholic clergy at the late election for the county of Clare." There was no doubt much violence, especially at Kilrush; but he must say the impression left on his mind was, that it was extremely doubtful whether it was right in Irish elections of this kind to permit the military to be present. It was found the persons were going along in cars very pleasantly—indeed making a joke of it, when the soldiers conveying them to the poll were booted and attacked. The question then arose, whether on the whole, as matter connected with the maintenance the public peace, it was right to allow the military to interfere in the direct manner they did? He found in the evidence the strongest proofs given of the gross misconduct of these rev. gentlemen; but, at the same time, he had also before him what was not technically referred to the Committee, though known to all its Members—the depositions taken before the coroner's inquest—and he found there the these rev. gentlemen totally denied and absolutely contradicted the evidence give against them on that occasion. Under all the circumstances of the case, therefore, he had not thought it right, as a Member of the Committee, to give a decision on the matter one way or the other. As to the question of prosecuting, he left that to the discretion of Her Majesty's Government.

Sir, I agree with my hon. Friend who has just spoken that the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Miles) has pursued rather an irregular course on this occasion, because, in asking a question of which he had given notice, he has entered into a very detailed and elaborate discussion of a matter which his question relates to. It is, Sir, a common saying, that it is a long lane which has no turning—even the longest lane has a turning; and I think that the longest bridge, even the Six-mile Bridge, ought to have an end. The object has been before the House ever since March last. The question has been fully discussed, and I think the opinion of he House was pronounced very emphatically upon it. It has been discussed, not July in this but in the other House of Parliament. It was the intention, as has been stated, of Her Majesty's Government originally, that these two priests should be prosecuted for the conduct which they pursued on the occasion of the Six-mile Bridge affair; and the Irish Government were informed that such was the desire of Her Majesty's Government. But the Irish Government, acting upon and with the advice of its legal officers, judged differently; and I have no hesitation in saying, that we approved of the decision so taken upon grounds which we afterwards stated to the House. It is not, therefore, the intention of Her Majesty's Government to order any further proceedings upon this case. Now, Sir, if hon. Gentleman, or any other person who had read the proceedings before the Clare Election Committee, had thought that the evidence given before that Committee would justify this House in taking the matter into own hands, and in giving directions for a prosecution, I think that course ought to have been taken at the time. This evidence was reported to the House in the beginning of June. If the matter had then been taken up, the assizes were coming on, and trial might have taken place. But the matter has been postponed until the assizes are over, and no legal prosecution could, I believe, now take place earlier than the spring of the next year. You would, therefore, be prosecuting these gentlemen in the year 1854 for conduct pursued by them in the summer of 1852. Well, Sir, it may be said that a prosecution is necessary for the sake of example. How can that be alleged? Why, since the Report of the Committee was laid before this House, we have had another election in the same county, and the very same candidates standing as were candidates at the election of 1852. This subsequent election has passed off with perfect tranquillity—no disturbance of any kind arose; and no complaint, that I have heard of, has been preferred against the conduct of any persons, whether lay or clerical. Now, therefore, a prosecution is not necessary for the purpose of example. But I shall perhaps be asked whether I concur in condemning the conduct which these rev. gentlemen pursued. I have no hesitation in saying that I do; and Her Majesty's. Government must have been of that opinion when they expressed a wish that a prosecution should take place. But I may be asked whether the conduct of these by rev. gentlemen, blameable and reprehensible as it was, is so marked an exception to the conduct pursued by the Catholic priesthood generally at the late election, as to make them fit subjects for punishment by way of example? I should say I am afraid I must answer that question in the negative. However reprehensible their conduct was, it does not stand so prominently forward as to make it a subject to be picked out and brought forward for the consideration of a legal tribunal. ["Oh, oh!"] Sir, I am bound to say, and I say with great regret—but I am bound in sincerity to say it—that the conduct of many of the Catholic priesthood at the late election some of the highest and some of the lowest rank, was such as I think must give great pain to all those who wish that the ministers of religion—be they Catholic or be they Protestant—should continue, by their conduct, to preserve that respect and deference which are essential to the due performance of their sacred calling. Things were said and done upon that occasion by Catholic clergymen which, if they had been said or done by Protestant clergymen in this country, would have raised an outcry from the Land's End to John o'Groat's. Well, then, on the other hand, it must be admitted that there were peculiar circumstances belonging to that crisis—that the circumstances attending the last election, if the do not justify, do at least furnish a great palliation, of the conduct complained of. In the first place, there was a great political crisis, which political crisis was in the opinion of the Roman Catholic priesthood of Ireland a kind of religious crisis. They had been threatened with Motions for taking away the endowment of Maynooth. They anticipated, most unjustly and most erroneously, that the party then in power would be likely to use the power which they had acquired for hostile purposes—to take away those grants, concessions, and liberties, which had been given by Acts of Parliament in former times to the Catholic subjects of the Queen. I must, therefore, make great allowance for the excitement which prevailed amongst the Catholic priesthood upon that occasion. But I would conjure the House to draw a veil of oblivion over everything that then passed. I conjure them not to rake up feelings and animosities which are now calmed and extinguished. I should hope that these reverend gentlemen feel that the dangers which they anticipated had no real existence, and that they will reflect more seriously upon their position and their duties. We have seen that in this last Clare election they have abstained from the repetition of any conduct which would be calculated to call for censure or condemnation; and I should be sorry that this debate should be continued this evening. If it were to be continued, we should pass an evening of irritating discussion, which would have a very mischievous effect, both in this country and Ireland. Her Majesty's Government would also be prevented from proceeding with other questions which relate to a more distant part of the Queen's dominions—questions, I think, of a more practical and important character than that of the Clare election of 1852. I, therefore, in reply to the hon. Gentleman, state that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to take any further steps with regard to these two reverend gentlemen; and I should hope that this House would pass an act of oblivion upon all the irregularities which occurred at the election of 1852. Let us all hope for better times, when both laymen and clergymen, priests and landlords, will agree to allow electors to act as they may deem best, and not compel them to act in that way which my hon. Friend (Mr. M. Mimes) has described—namely, that of being "willing to go if they were forced to do so." Let us hope that they will allow them to exercise their rights in such a way as they may choose, and that hereafter we may have Irish elections conducted more in harmony with the spirit and principles of the constitution.

said, he would ask, after the speech of the noble Lord, whether it was not possible to provide a remedy against the recurrence of such events as he had described? If the noble Lord expected that party spirit would cease, either in England, Scotland, or Ireland, he was greatly mistaken. The question was whether the ballot would not be a remedy for such evils; but if the Government had a better remedy let them propose it. Many complained of the interference of Roman Catholic priests at elections, and others might complain of the interference of Protestant clergymen; but still he though, that both classes had a right, if public interests warranted their interference, to interfere peaceably, legally, and quietly Spiritual influence, if it was exerted as alleged, could not be met by any legislation; but after the admissions, broad am large, made by the noble Lord, it was fit and proper to consider what remedy coup be applied to the evils complained of.

said, he wished to call the attention of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department to what was stated to have taken place previous to the late election for the county of Clare, with respect to the proceedings in a Roman Catholic chapel in that county. It had been reported that the occurrences which had taken place upon the last holiday of St. Peter and St Paul, in the chapel in question, had virtually decided the Clare election, for the rural electors had been there assembled and had been called out by name by the priest, and obliged to promise that they would record their votes in favour of the Liberal candidates. He should be gratified if the noble Lord could contradict that report, for he, for one, should be happy to draw the veil of oblivion over the occurrences at Six-mile Bridge. He hoped however, that something would be done to put a stop to that clerical interference with the people in Ireland, of which they had heard so much.

said, he though the Government had taken a wise and statesmanlike course when they determined after receiving the advice of their lay officers in Ireland, not to prosecute to two rev. gentlemen whose names had been mentioned by the hon. Member for Somersetshire (Mr. Miles). Every one who read the evidence must come to the same conclusion. His own opinion, after reading the evidence, was that there would have been no reasonable probability of the conviction by any jury of those two rev gentlemen; and, if they had been tried, by such a fair, honest, and impartial jury as he was in the habit of seeing in the Courts of Westminster, or upon his circuit, they would have been sure of an acquittal. At the same time he must say he never heard a more unfortunate statement than that made by the noble Lord, for the purpose, he supposed, of reconciling hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition benches to the course taken by the Government. The noble Lord thought proper to get up and make a charge against the whole body of the Roman Catholic clergy in Ireland, which he (Mr. Serjeant Shee) felt convinced could not be substantiated. Did the noble Lord know that, notwithstanding all the assertions made about intimidation and spiritual influence exercised by Catholic priests, for the purpose of procuring the return of Members to Parliament against the honest wishes of the electors, only in respect to one county and one borough in Ireland had the returns been set aside? Could any one read the evidence taken before the Election Committee for the borough of Sligo, without coming to the conclusion that the decisions at which the Committee had arrived, was one of the most doubtful decisions ever reported to that House? He was surprised at the course pursued by the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume). That hon. Member had for many years been an active friend of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, to whom at one time he owed his scat in Parliament. He had, in that House, constantly and repeatedly, protested against the grievances of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, and, by frequent Motions, had brought before the House that enormous scandal—that great ecclesiastical grievance which was a disgrace to the Protestant people of these realms—the maintenance of the Irish Church Establishment in its present condition, declaring that it was essential to the tranquillity and just government of Ireland that that grievance should be remedied. The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston), at a better period of his political life, had declared the removal of that grievance necessary for the restoration of tranquillity in Ireland, and for the good government of that country. The hon. Member for Montrose, like the noble Lord, appeared to have forgotten that grievance. [Mr. HUME: No, no!] At all events, they said nothing about it. Then, with respect to the recommendation of the hon. Member for Montrose. The ballot might do good—it might protect the honest voters, the tenants from the tyranny of their landlords; but as to restoring tranquillity, or destroying the influence of the friends of Ireland, that would be quite out of the question until the grievances of the people should be redressed. If this were done, the priests would be little disposed to interfere in political matters. In almost all the counties the interference of the priests was very small. There were twenty-seven Roman Catholic bishops, but not more than four or five of them had taken any part in polities. The truth was that the Romish hierarchy and the priesthood of Ireland were little disposed to political agitation. Let them pass a good Landlord and Tenant Bill, and a just law about the Church, and that would be the way to destroy what was called spiritual influence in Ireland. There were grievances to be remedied, which would too, he believed, be remedied, were it not that those who ought to be at the head of the people—the landlords and the aristocracy—had a personal and pecuniary interest in their continuance. He had stood two contested elections, one for Marylebone and one for Kilkenny, and he did not believe that the people at Irish elections were disposed to violence or that their conduct deserved the censure cast on them by the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston). With regard to the soldiers, he knew that generally they were not disposed to give trouble at elections, and the Irish people liked them; though it unfortunately happened at Six-mile Bridge the soldiers fired, through some irregularity, without orders.

said, though he had a strong feeling with respect to the affair at Six-mile Bridge, he felt much inclined to concur in the observation of the noble Lord, that it would be better to draw a veil over that occurrence, and to refrain from instituting, at this remote period, any prosecution; and he came to this conclusion with the greater satisfaction on account of the emphatic disapprobation pronounced by the noble Lord with respect to the conduct of the priests in Ireland. He thought, after the statement made by the noble Lord, the House had a right to expect that the, Government would henceforth take measures to repress these proceedings on the part of the Roman Catholic clergy in Ireland. He could not, however, concur in the observation made by the hon. and learned Member who had just spoken, that no jury such as that hon. and learned Gentleman was in the habit of addressing would convict, were a prosecution instituted by the Crown in the case of the two Catholic clergymen who had been referred to. He was perfectly satis- fied that a conviction would be the result if they were tried before an impartial Surrey jury, even with the learned Serjeant as their counsel. But whether that would have been the case or not, it was but right, at all events, under all the circumstances of the case, that the parties should have been placed upon their trial. He did not think that the transactions reported on by the Clare Election Committee ought to be passed over in silence; but there was some force in the observation, that at the present remote period it was not worth while to further notice them he perfectly concurred with the hon. Member for Montrose in thinking that the interference of the clergy in political matters, in Ireland, was an evil which required an immediate remedy and he must say that, much as he disliked the ballot, yet, if he deemed it adequate for the prevention of that evil, he should vote for its adoption in the sister country. He was of opinion, in fact, that it would be better to deprive the inhabitants of Ireland of the elective franchise altogether, than to permit them to be tyrannised over by their priests as was at present the case.

said, he must appeal to the House, and ask whether it was desirable that this discussion should go on? He did not, by any means, blame the hon. Member for Somersetshire (Mr. Miles) for taking advantage, if he could find no other opportunity, of the formal Motion of adjournment, to obtain from the Government some declaration as to whether or not it was intended to institute a prosecution against certain Roman Catholic priests, whose conduct had been adverted to by an Election Committee. But as the hon. Gentleman had made his statement, and as his noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) had replied to it on the part of the Government; as, too, the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny (Mr. Serjeant Shee) had commented on the statement of his noble Friend, he thought that, after all this, the House might rest satisfied with what had taken place, without entering into further debate, which could come to no definite result. Observations had been made about the ballot and the Irish Church Establishment; but whatever might be the opinions of hon. Gentlemen with regard to those questions, the opinion of the House with respect to them could not be tested on the present occasion, unless an Amendment were moved, as the Motion before the House only related to adjournment. Considering, then, that there was a great deal of business on the paper waiting for discussion, and for which hon. Members had come down, he trusted that the House would decide that it was not expedient to continue the present discussion any longer.

said, the noble Lord seemed to blame him for the time and manner in which he had brought on this question. But he could have taken no other course, having resolved upon bringing the matter before them on the first opportunity. After what had been said by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department, he would not utter another word of observation. He considered he had only done his duty in calling the attention of the Government to the circumstances.

said, he did not blame the hon. Gentleman in any way, neither did he attribute any blame to the hon. and learned Member for Kilkenny. He had merely put it to the House whether it would allow the discussion to continue.

said, he would detain the House but a very short period; but after the observations which had been made by the hon. and learned Member for Wallingford (Mr. Malins), and of certain words which he was told had been used by the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston)—for he was not in the House at the time—with respect to the conduct of the Irish Catholic clergy at the election time, he considered it imperative for him to make some reply. He hoped the noble Lord, or at least the Government to which he belonged, would not, for their own sakes, follow the advice which had been given them by the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Mantis) if any Catholic clergyman was guilty of a violation of the law—if he were guilty of a breach of the peace—if he were guilty of exciting the people to commit a breach of the peace—if, in the excitement of an election, a Catholic clergyman went beyond that fair and legitimate course which every one understood was the proper and fitting and almost necessary course—all he would say was, that he, no more than any Member of that House, would stand up and defend him, or ask that he might be excused from those penalties which he had incurred by violating the law. But when the hon. and learned Gentleman told them that appeals ought not to be made by the clergy to their people when certain candidates were proposed who would vote against their interests and against their religion, he would tell that hon. and learned Gentleman that it was perfectly monstrous and preposterous to suppose that such appeals would not be made; and he would further tell him that it was futile and absurd to endeavour to frame any law intended to prevent such appeals. He distinctly denied, and he was prepared to maintain that denial, that upon such occasions—namely, when candidates whom the priests and their flocks believed were inimical to their interests, inimical to their religion, were proposed—the clergy ought to be silent. Nay, more; he held that it was the absolute, the incumbent duty of the Catholic clergy of Ireland, if they believed that the proposed candidates would exercise their votes in that House in a manner injurious to the interests of their flocks, to advise, and counsel, and persuade them, by all constitutional and legal means, not to support such candidates. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, he repeated, that was their highest, their most solemn duty; and if any law were enacted to provide that the Catholic clergy, under such circumstances, should not do so, that law would turn out to be a dead letter. If they attempted such a course of legislation, they would find very rapidly that it would be utterly ineffectual for the purposes they intended to accomplish, and that it would prove utterly fruitless, except as tending to the discomfiture of those with whom it originated. He understood that the noble Lord had said that the conduct of the Catholic clergy at the recent Irish elections was discreditable. Not having been in the House at the time the noble Lord spoke, he was not aware whether he had said anything as to the conduct of the landlords. Every one knew that, at the last election, the landlords were more prominent and active in their interference with the electors than the clergy, and that it was, in fact, the intimidation of the landlords which aroused the clergy, or rather induced the clergy to counsel the voters not to allow their consciences to be swayed by landlord intimidation. What had taken place at the Sligo election in relation to the noble Lord's (Lord Palmerston's) own property there? One of the candidates at the last election thought it was a great boast that the influence of the noble Lord was not opposed to him; and a placard was drawn up recording the fact, and stating that letters had been received from Lord Palmerston, declaring that all the tenants on his estate were free to vote as they pleased—were at liberty to exercise the franchise according to their consciences. Well, what happened? That placard had not been on the walls of Sligo twenty-four hours when it was torn down, and succeeded by another, signed by the agent of the noble Lord, declaring that the information in the first placard was false; that no such letters had been received from the noble Lord, and that the inference drawn from such a statement was unfounded. The noble Lord probably heard these facts now for the first time, and he only mentioned them to show the House what sort of conduct was pursued at Irish elections in order to intimidate the voters. The conduct of the landlords upon such occasions was, in too many cases, oppressive, tyrannous, and calculated to exercise an unjust and unconstitutional authority over the consciences of the Catholic people of Ireland; and he once more repeated that the Irish Catholic clergy would be traitors to their trust—would disgrace their sacred character—would be deserving of the contempt of the whole empire—the scorn of the whole world, if, under such circumstances, they did not, by all lawful and constitutional means in their power, use their influence to prevail on the people to fulfil their duty, and to return fit and proper persons to represent their interests in Parliament, instead of a class of representatives who would use, or rather abuse, the legislative trust confided in them, for the purpose of trampling on the rights and privileges of their constituencies, and to sap, and, if it were possible, to destroy their religion.

The hon. Member having mentioned a case in which I was personally concerned, I trust I may be excused for saying a word or two in reply to his observations. The facts were these: As regards the Sligo election, I wrote to my agent, stating that, so far as my wish was concerned, and those persons who felt disposed to attend to my wishes, my wish was that my tenants should vote for the two candidates then sitting—one of them being the hon. Baronet (Sir R. Booth), and the other an hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gore), who lost his scat at the last election; but I also stated that those tenants were at perfect liberty to vote as they pleased—and that no consequences whatever should ensue to them if they did not vote in the manner I wished. Four or five days before the election it seems that some of the ten- antry had informed my agent in Sligo, that, if they were not protected or carried away, the Roman Catholic priest and his adherents would fall upon them and compel them to vote against their wishes; and the consequence was, that forty of them were literally obliged to be maintained in a House in Sligo, so as to keep them away from the violence which was anticipated from the Roman Catholic priests. I was also credibly informed, and I have no reason to doubt the fact, that, when the candidate whom they supported was going into the town to be nominated, he was told that there were waiting for him, at his entrance into the town, a mob of 2,000 people, headed by a priest with a double-barrelled gun in his hand.

said, he was of opinion that had it not been for the conciliatory spirit of the Roman Catholic clergy in Ireland, scenes of riot would have been much more frequent at the late elections than they had been. The Roman Catholic priests had hitherto been the principal counsellors of the people of Ireland, and it was through them mainly that the peace of that country had been preserved. He believed the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department would yet see reason to regret the speech he had made that evening, as the noble Lord the Member for London must have found reason to regret his well-known Durham letter.

said, he begged to move the insertion of words granting power to the Crown to remove any such Director upon an Address from either House of Parliament. As the clause stood in the Bill, Her Majesty was empowered, if She should think fit, to remove any Director appointed by the Crown for "inability or misbehaviour;" and he understood from the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty the other night, that those expressions had been taken from the Act relative to the appointment of County Court Judges. Now, he thought it must be apparent to the Committee that there was a great difference between the position of a County Court Judge, and that of a Director of the East India Company appointed by the Crown. There were various political reasons why the Government might feel it desirable to remove an obstinate Director; and the clause under discussion would enable them to do so with the greatest facility, inasmuch as it constituted them the sole judges of his "inability or misbehaviour." It was of the utmost importance that all the Directors of the East India Company should be made responsible to Parliament, and the only way to effect that was to place them in the position of the Judges of the Superior Courts, making them not removable, except upon an Address from either branch of the Legislature. There would then be no doubt in the mind of any man that they were thoroughly independent in their position, and that they were actuated alone by a desire for the good government of India.

supported the clause, and said that the words as to the removal of the Directors had been adopted from those in the County Courts Act, which had been considered applicable to the case.

said, he did not like to see any attempt made, under false pretences, to increase the political power of the Government. It was proposed by the clause to give the Ministers, without any check or control, the power of removing six members of the Court of Directors. He thought their removal ought to rest with the Court of Proprietors, and not with the Crown, And he should suggest to the noble Lord (Viscount Jocelyn) to propose the omission of the last line of the clause, in order that the Directors appointed by the Crown should be placed in exactly the same position as the other Directors in that respect. That would prevent the anomaly of a different rule being applied to different members of the Court in regard to their dismissal.

said, he had been disposed to support the clause as it stood, because he thought it right that the Directors should hold office quamdiu se bene gesserint; but, at the same time, he nest say that if the noble Lord pressed his Amendment to a division, he should tote with him, because he thought that the functions which the Directors had to perform were so extremely important, that an Address to the Crown should be necessary to their removal.

said, he should support the clause. That the Directors appointed by the Crown should be liable to be dismissed by the proprietors of East India Stock, as suggested by the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), seemed a proposition so utterly repugnant to reason that he imagined the Committee would not listen to it for a moment. He was not aware that the proprietors were empowered to dismiss even the Directors of their own nomination; at all events, no such dismissal, so far as he was aware, had taker place during the last fifty years.

said, he thought the House had been involved in a dilemma by the course which was adopted by the Government the other night in regard to the Amendment proposed by the right hon Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. V. Smith). He (Mr. Ellice) took it for granted that the object of all parties was to get the best persons that could be found as the new members of the Court of Directors, who should have served ten tears in India. The Government, in their jealousy of the Court of Directors, thought that that object could only be obtained by direct nomination of the Crown. Other members, however, himself among the number, thought that the object would be better obtained by giving the appointment of those members to the Court of Directors or at least to three-fourths of their number, allowing the Crown a veto on the appointment. If that course had been adopted by the Government, he believed there would have been no objection to the clause now before the Committee, enabling the Directors so appointed to sit in Parliament, because there was an obvious fitness in persons so qualified finding their way into that House, if it were only to give the House the benefit of their advice on matters with which they were necessarily better acquainted than other Members; and also to enable the Directors themselves to get rid of any local prejudices they might have contracted by their residence in India. But if they were directly appointed by the Crown, there was the great constitutional objection that, for the first time in the history of this country, it was now intended to give to six persons nominated by the Crown to offices of emolument the right to sit in the House of Commons. Still he thought it essential that they should have seats in that House, and hence he should support the present clause, notwithstanding his previous vote on the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton.

said, that if the noble Lord the Member for Lynn Regis pressed his Amendment to a division, he should feel it to be his duty to vote with him, considering, as he did, that it would tend very much to make the position of the Directors more independent.

said, he thought it was very essential that no person should make the mistake which the hon. Member for Montrose had made some time ago—namely, that of supposing that the appointments of those six Directors by the Crown were to be appointments during pleasure. The fact was, that the words "inability or misbehaviour" which were used in the clause, were words which had now received a legal sense in an existing Act of Parliament; but, even if this had not been the case, it was clear that it would be impossible for the Crown to dismiss the Directors in the mere exercise of their pleasure or caprice. It was only in cases of proved corruption, or manifest inability, from ill health or otherwise, to discharge the duties of the office, that the power of dismissal would be exercised.

said, he could not understand, after what the noble Lord had just said, why he objected to the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Lynn Regis. As the superior Judges were only removable by an Address from both Houses of Parliament, he could not understand why persons filling the important office of East India Directors should be removable by the Crown, and thus put upon a level with the inferior Judges of the County Courts. If the only object of the Government was to provide for the dismissal of the Directors in the most constitutional way in cases of misbehaviour there would be no difficulty, he was sure, in such cases in procuring Addresses from both Houses of Parliament.

said, he had not proposed to put the Directors on the footing of Judges of the County Courts. What he had said was, that, in order to express more clearly what was intended, he had adopted the words of the County Courts Act instead of the usual words quamdiu se bene gesserint.

said, he did not see what was the object of making the change from the present mode of removing the Directors. He could conceive no body of men being more thoroughly dependent than those Directors would be. They were to be nominated by time Crown, and that for a short period, and then their renomination would depend upon the Crown again. Unless something were done to make them more independent, he feared it would be found that the most valuable men in the Company's service would say that they could not accept office on those terms.

said, it was quite clear his hon. Friend did not understand the bearing of the clause. He seemed to think it was very strange that persons who were nominated by the Crown should be removeable by the Crown, in case of committing any offence against the law, or being totally disabled from performing their functions; but surely there was greater absurdity in persons nominated by the Crown being removeable by the Court of Proprietors. This clause enabled the Directors elected by the Court of Proprietors to be removed by the Court of Proprietors, and those nominated by the Crown to be removed by the Crown; and then words were used which clearly pointed out that the removal could only take place, either when everybody would say the party was no longer fit to fill his high office, or when he was incapable of performing its duties. He (Lord J. Russell) could not conceive how a provision of that kind could interfere with the independence of the Directors. His hon. Friend (Mr. Elliot) said, that the Directors would act under the impression that they would not be renominated unless they pleased the President of the Board of Control; but it was very doubtful whether that functionary would be the same individual at the end of the six years, who first nominated them; and it seemed to him an extravagant supposition, that a gentleman coming from India, and full of Indian knowledge and Indian experience, should, when appointed to the Board, consult all the opinions and wishes of the President of the Board of Control.

said, he thought the difficulty would be removed by the insertion of the words that "it shall not be lawful for Her Majesty to remove any such Director except for sickness or misbehaviour."

said, that the Amendment of the noble Lord (Lord Jocelyn), as regarded its importance, would depend in a great measure upon what was to follow with respect to the main object of the clause, namely, that the Directors appointed by Her Majesty should have scats in Parliament. If it were to be understood that the nominees of the Crown should not have seats in that House, then he thought it would be consistent with the principles of the Gentlemen with whom he usually voted, that the Crown should have the power to remove them, because their object was to remove as much as possible the power from the Court of Directors, and to place it in the hands of the Executive Government. Therefore if those gentlemen were not to be eligible to seats in that House, he could see no more objection to the Minister of the Crown having the absolute disposal of them, than there was to the removal of the Chairman of the Board of Customs, or to the recall of the Governor of Ceylon, or the Governor of Jamaica. The proposition altogether depended upon what was to be done with the subsequent part of the clause; and he felt some difficulty in voting at all until that was settled, because if it were decided that those gentlemen were to have seats in that House, he should wish the House to retain as much power as possible to secure the independence of these men; and if, on the other hand, they were not to have seats, he should wish to leave the responsibility as much as he could with the Executive Government.

said, that his experience of Parliament taught him that, whenever proceedings were to be taken against an individual, especially if that individual were a Member, Parliament invariably flinched from the duty. He should, therefore, prefer to have the power of displacement in the hands and on the responsibility of Ministers.

said, he agreed with his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), that it was difficult to decide how to vote, as the subsequent question was unsettled; but he should support the proposition of the noble Lord (Viscount Jocelyn), and move the rejection of the clause, if that should fail.

said, he had heard nothing to justify his withdrawing the Amendment. He was desirous to have the nominated Directors as independent as possible, and he was quite surprised how the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood), professing, as he did, to participate in that feeling, could vote against the proposition.

said, he thought the clause objectionable, because it would increase the staff of the Government, and every year tend to swell the Ministerial majority. It would put six placemen at the service of the Minister of the day; and before long independent Members would be unable to attempt any opposition to the Government.

said, he thought it desirable that the nominee Directors should be eligible to sit in Parliament. He could not understand why the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) should object to the proposal of the noble Lord.

said, he did not see that there was much difference, after all, between the clause as it stood, and the Amendment of the noble Lord. In the first place, it was clear that a Minister who was strong enough to remove a Director, would be able to carry an Address in Parliament. Then, again, as one of the two grounds of removal was to be inability, would it not be better to leave the decision of that question to a responsible Minister, than to drag a man before Parliament for the purpose of a painful investigation? They had seen discussions of that nature before now, and knew how painful they were in their character.

said, he should move the rejection of the clause as unconstitutionally increasing the powers of the Minister, and affecting the independence of Parliament. A question arose upon the clause well worthy the calm consideration of the Committee, because it affected not only the nominee Directors and the character of the Court, but also the power of the Minister and the independence of Parlia- ment, These, Directors were to have a salary of 500l. a year, with the disposition of the patronage, which was worth to each of them more thousands a year than he would venture to assert. He had understood from a Director of the East India company, and a Member of the House of commons, that if the money value of the patronage enjoyed by each Director was brought into the market, it would fetch full 12,000l. a year. When this Bill passed, the patronage would not be quite so valuable; but every one of these nominees would possess that patronage and a salary of 500l. a year, which was very likely to be increased to at least 1,000l. a year. There offices, then, were worth the acceptance of most men, for they had no kind of evidence that there was any very arduous labour attached to the office of East India Director; and not much labour, a fair salary, and desirable dignity as far s position went, would make the appointment very desirable. The time of office as short; but they were eligible for re-election, and, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, would doubtless be reappointed. He did not think that six men, nominees of that character, with that salary and patronage, appointed for a short time and eligible for re-election, appointed by Ministers, and liable at any time, he did not mean without some pretence, to be removed from office, would be desirable members of that House. The present Bill made a part of the Court of Directors perfectly independent, and the other part perfectly dependent, as regarded the Minister. That was one of the inconsistencies into which the President of the Board of Control had been led, because he would not take the advice of those who had more courage than himself. It seemed to be argued that these men would have great difficulty in getting into Parliament, and they would never have the whole six there. He believed, that, under the constitution if this country, no man had a better chance of being elected to that House than men who could dispense a great deal of patronage. They had had Secretaries of the Treasury going down to small boroughs, and being unanimously elected. Let the committee imagine the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles), the hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Masterman), going down to a borough having constituency of 300 or 400, and let them be as pure as they ought to be, and what would be the result? Every voter, although perfectly incorrupt, would believe, that with such an immense amount of patron age as those Gentlemen held, there was very good chance of something being gained by supporting them rather than any other candidate; and any gentleman, having only his principles and the independent maintenance of them in Parliament for his recommendation to a small constituency would find it difficult to fight an election battle with a Chairman, Deputy Chairman, or any other member of the Court of Directors. That was the reason why East India Directors had found their way into that House. They had already three or four, and they were to have in future five or six more as nominee Members. It was said to be desirable that the nominee Directors should have seats in that House, because they could give they House information about India. Now, as far as regarded information, they got information enough from the hon. Member for Honiton, the hon. Member for Guildford, and those Directors who were elected by the Proprietors. There never had been a time, he believed, since 1784, when members of the Court of Directors had not been in that House. Six years soon ran out, and though a man were so incorrupt as to vote precisely as his conscience dictated, in the last twelve months he would be liable to the imputation, if he voted with the Government, of voting for his re-election; and it might be that men of high character would vote against the Government rather than with them because they would not be subject to that imputation. He believed if they were allowed to have a seat in Parliament it would make them less useful in Leadenhall-street or Cannon-row, whilst it would render them less useful Members of Parliament, and more dependent on the Minister for the time being. If no nominee had been eligible for re-election, he would not have objected to the clause. But Ministers were not magnanimous when opposed; they were fallible men, as that House knew and saw every night of their lives—and they were very small-minded men sometimes; they might take offence at the very highest class of men possible to have in this office; a vote on a pinching occasion, or a speech on any inconvenient topic, and at an inconvenient time, might give grave offence; and then, when the six years were up, it would be very easy to say it Was better to have an infusion of new blood—some one who had come more recently from India—whereas, if they obliged the Minister, twenty reasons could be found why they should be reappointed, and no one appointed in their place. His opinion was, that the Court of Directors would be damaged by the nominee members sitting in Parliament, and that Parliament itself would be injured by their having seats. By the necessary constitution of things, the Minister could count on thirty-five votes, apart from others equally subservient, and if five or six were added, there would be forty, a number not very easy to overcome. If it were a question of argument, he would not care how many they were, but if it were a question of votes, he did object to five or six more Members not less dependent on the Government than any of those who sat on the Treasury bench. Having stated his views, be should propose that the clause be not agreed to.

could not think that the term "mere nominees" or "placemen," which had been applied to the gentlemen who would be nominated by the Government, was a proper term to use with regard to these persons. He did not think that any one who made use of such a term in this instance could have really considered what was the character of the persons likely to receive these appointments. The hon. Member for Montrose had talked about the gradually in-increasing number of placemen in that House, although the fact was that the number had considerably diminished of late years. Since he (Sir Charles Wood) had been in Parliament, five or six persons who held offices had been deprived of their seats. Formerly, there used to be upwards of forty Members, and the Government used to be able to make a House; but they could not do that now, and therefore the House was not likely to be overwhelmed with placemen. Neither were they likely to be overwhelmed with a number of Directors of the Company, for the number of Directors holding seats in that House had been also very greatly reduced of late years. But he would call attention to the class of persons from whom the nominee members of the Board were to be selected. They would be persons who had been in the service of the Company or of the Crown in India; but five-sixths of those appointed would be persons who had been in the service of the Company, and it was notorious that such men seldom returned from India until after some twenty to thirty years' service. The greater portion came home to a certain degree independent in point of fortune. All of them must necessarily be persons who had held high and important offices, and some of them would be used, not to move at the beck of Ministers, but to rule countries hardly inferior in extent to Scotland. Was it likely that persons of that description, men advanced in years, independent in character, and probably in a pecuniary point of view, would be men who, when they came home, were to be treated or thought of as mere placemen at the beck of a Government? The hon. Gentleman said they would only be appointed for six years, and that they must be at the beck of the Government for the whole of that period. Now, it was by no means so sure that the same Government would be in power at the end of this period; and the probability was that they would not be in power. Then, again, were not the persons whom he had described, the very class of persons whom they should desire to have in the House, who, from their knowledge and experience of India, having held high office there, must be conversant with the manners and habits of the people, and with the requirements and necessities of the country, and who could aid and instruct the House in its deliberations on the subject? Even at present the want of persons who were conversant with India, from their own personal experience, was perceptible. But he felt there was another point for consideration. The more we extended the freedom of election, the more independence we gave to the constituencies, the more it seemed to him advisable not to limit them in the choice of representatives. He thought it exceedingly desirable that the gentlemen selected in the manner proposed should have seats in that I House; and as he did not believe they would be obnoxious to the charge of being placemen, he hoped the Committee would agree I to the clause as it stood.

said, he thought this was by the most important clause in the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control had laid some stress upon the necessity of leaving to the constituencies the power of electing as their representative any person whom they might choose to elect. But in opposing this clause he did not profess to deprive any constituency of the power of electing any person to this House. The principle which his hon. Friend (Mr. Bright) asked the Committee to affirm was this: The Government proposed to nominate six men to the Board of Directors; and he said that, in making that selection, they ought not to take a man who was elected, or who was going to be elected, as a Member of Parliament, on the ground that the duties of the two offices were incompatible with each other. His hon. Friend did not say that the persons appointed by the Government might not resign their office, and then be elected. Were they, then, doing anything contrary to the democratic spirit involved in the argument used by the right hon. Gentleman? In the United States, where certainly no one would say that the democratic principle was not fully carried out, the constitution prohibited any man who held an office of emolument under the Government from having a seat in Congress at all. Now it appeared from the statements of the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), and from the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles), that there was already a vast amount of business to be done by the Board of Directors of the East India Company; and when there were only eighteen Directors instead of twenty-four to transact that business, as would be the case under the Bill, he submitted that the gentlemen to be nominated by the Government, would have enough to do in Leadenhall-street without undertaking the onerous and continually increasing duties of a Member of Parliament. These duties were increasing to such an extent that constituencies would be obliged more and more to adopt the principle of electing men who had no other claims upon their time than their Parliamentary duties. It was not only the hours of attendance required in this House. Blue books came like an avalanche upon hon. Members, and the difficulty was, not to read them—that was wholly impossible—but how to find shelf-room for them. How could these gentlemen serve their constituencies, and at the same time attend to their duties in Leadenhall-street? If what the hon. Members he had just alluded to, and others, said about the duties of the Directors, were true, it would be impossible for them to attempt to take upon themselves the ditties of legislators. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) said that these gentlemen, if in the House, would aid Parliament by their counsels. But the House could send for them now whenever their counsels were wanted. The persons so nominated might be sent for before a Committee, and in this way their experience and personal knowledge were always at command. There were several Directors in that House at present; but the gentlemen nominated to serve on the Board would be dependent upon the will of the Crown to a greater extent than was supposed. It was not merely that they might by services to the Ministry of the day procure their reappointment at the end of six years; but it must be remembered that they came from India, and would know very well, therefore, that there were great prizes in that country at the disposal of the Minister of the Crown; that there were posts to be given away there worth from 5,000l. to 25,000l. a year, to which these six gentlemen would all be liable. The military men might be made Commanders in Chief, and the civilians might be appointed Governors General, Governors of the Presidencies, or members of the Legislative Council, with 10,000l. a year; and he maintained that the gentlemen in question would be something more than human if, sitting in that House, and knowing all these rich prizes awaited them in India, they did not vote in accordance with the will and desire of the Crown, with a view to obtain some of the appointments in their gift. In this way the greatest temptations would be presented to these gentlemen that ever mortal man was exposed to, if they were brought into that House. Let the Committee remember that what they were now discussing was the question which had broken up the Government of Mr. Fox seventy years ago. It was the question of the patronage of India, and the patronage then was but as a drop in the ocean compared with what it was now. There was, he admitted, no danger now as regarded the abuse of patronage on the part of the Crown, but the same danger and difficulty existed as to the Minister of the Crown which prevailed seventy years ago; and they would be wanting in that spirit of proper jealousy which characterised their forefathers at that time, if they allowed men to enter that House who were dependent for their emoluments and honourable position on the approval of the Minister of the day. He hoped and trusted that the question would be carefully considered and discussed in all its gravity, before they came to a decision on the subject.

said, he thought the same argument that applied against the admission of the Crown nominees to Parliament, applied equally against the admission into the Court of Directors. He could not, however, understand what would be the position of these nominees as regarded salary or patronage, and he wished, therefore, to ascertain from the right hon. Gentleman some information on these points, as they were most important elements in determining the consideration of the question which they were called on to decide.

They will be in precisely a similar position as regards salary and patronage as the other Directors.

said, the right hon. Gentleman opposite, if he understood him correctly, rested his defence of this clause upon two grounds, which were perfectly inconsistent with each other. For, first of all, he declared that these nominees would not be dependent upon the Crown at all; and he argued, in the second place, that if, after all, they were to be rather dependent upon the Government, that there would be no great harm in such a circumstance. The great point of the right hon. Gentleman's argument was directed to this, that the influence of the Crown had diminished, that it was diminishing, and that it ought to be increased. And he certainly said that, in proportion as the power of the constituencies extended, it was the more necessary to have some counteracting force. Well, that was a point upon which it was hardly necessary to argue in the House of Commons; and he must say he joined issue entirely with the right hon. Baronet in its regard. But yet it was utterly inconsistent with the second point advanced by the right hon. Gentleman, in which he contended—though he (Lord Stanley) thought not very successfully—that the nominees of the Government would, in reality, be independent of the Minister of the day. Now, upon what ground did the right hon. Baronet say that the nominees would be independent? Why, he said they would be men who had filled high offices, who were advanced in years, and who, generally speaking, would be pecuniarily well off. As regarded the latter head, he (Lord Stanley), however, confessed he was by no means so certain. India was no longer a place for amassing fortunes at once, and gentlemen who went there generally returned, not advanced in life and perfectly independent in situation, but generally under fifty, and in circumstances that would induce them to keep their reappointment in view, and so render them snbservient to the party which appointed them. On these grounds he objected to the Bill. For it ought to be very strongly recollected that these nominees were to be appointed but for a very short time, and also that they were re-eligible after a short period. And that appeared to him entirely to dispose of the argument that they must be very often independent of the Government, because it would occur that there might be a prospect of the retirement of the existing Government before they came to be re-elected. No doubt that might happen; but he begged to warn Gentlemen that the moment a feeling of gratitude ceased to operate upon the minds of man, a feeling of self-interest began to prevail; and when, therefore, a nominee had held his seat in the Direction for a certain period, he would naturally begin to think of the probability, or rather the possibility, of his re-election; and, therefore, it would come to pass that they would have a body of nominees who would be dependent upon the Minister, either from a feeling of gratitude, or, as the period of re-election approached, from a feeling of self-interest. But even supposing the nominees to be independent—which he did not think possible—still, he was by no means certain that they ought to have seats in that House. He certainly did not think it very advisable that they should have members of the Executive, gentlemen employed under Government, putting themselves in opposition to the Administration of the day. He could conceive nothing that could prove more inconvenient either to the Minister or to the persons acting under that Minister; and he therefore believed that they would be conferring a very great service indeed upon the nominees by relieving them from all the embarrassment and unpleasantness in which they must be placed by becoming Members of that House. For instance, let them just conceive a great question of Indian policy coming on—such a case as that of the Affghan war—a couple of years after one of these gentlemen had obtained his seat on the Direction; perhaps such a person might choose either to resign his seat in that House or on the Direction, to avoid the difficulty of the position. But, at all events, they would not tell him that a person so circumstanced might not be placed in a very great dilemma. They would not tell him that such a one would find it easy to act in deference to his own convictions against the Minister who appointed him on the Direction, and to whom he felt he owed his office. Well, then, he maintained that there was the strongest possible primâ facie ground against granting these nominees seats in Parliament Nor did he think that they could fairly say it was an infringement upon the rights of the electors to reject the clause. No doubt an argument from the practice of every day life, in the case of a mercantile firm for instance, had not the party employing an individual a right to the entire service of the person employed? and had not the Crown, according to the principles of the constitution, a right to hold the same language to its servants? But this argument had been used—that it would not be worth the while of persons who had held high office in India to accept seats in the House of Commons. He, however, did not think when they looked at the power and patron age which would be placed at their disposal, that they would be influenced by such a consideration. On the contrary, he thought it would be found that the appointments would be objects of ambition, and of very great competition among the members of the Indian service. But if it happened that having made the experiment they should afterwards find that they could not get the class of persons contemplated for these offices, the remedy to be applied was so to increase the salaries as to render the position of the Director a more eligible one, and not in increasing the power of the Government in that House to augment the risk of electoral corruption amongst the constituencies by placing persons who are practically of the Executive in the position of independent Members of Parliament.

said, he wished to call the attention of the noble Lord who had just spoken to the argument which he had used when he had advocated that the nomination of the six members whom it was proposed to introduce into the Court of Directors should take place in some other way than by election. The House was then told that distinguished men who had held high office and rendered great public services in India, would not condescend to accept a seat in the Direction by the ordinary means of election—that of canvassing for votes. The House was told that it was absolutely necessary to adopt some means to secure the presence in the Court of Directors of men of a superior stamp, and that they would not condescend to solicit the electors for votes. It would probably interest the House to observe how the arguments now used tended to over throw that opinion. The Amendment proposed would, in his opinion, entirely defeat whole measure. If the impression were confirmed that these men admitted into the Court of Directors were to be stigmatised as mere Government nominees, as mere placemen, would men of lofty mind and high spirit, who had held responsible office in India, who would not condescend to accept a seat in the Direction in the ordinary way, be willing to accept it with the stigma that they were mere placemen? He was only anxious to insure, as far as possible success to this measure; and, as the House of Commons had assented to the principle of introducing Government nominees into the Board of Directors, he was only anxious, although he had been himself opposed to the system of nominees, he was anxious that the system should be made to work as well as it possibly could. It could not work, unless it placed the best men in the court of Directors; and if it were announced, and the principle recognised, that the nominees were placemen at the beck of the Minister of the day, if they were placed in the Court of Directors bearing the badge of dependency, all would be accomplished that could have been devised to defeat the operation of the measure. He would admit that the question was one of considerable difficulty; but the fact was, that these nominees, when they took their seat in the Court of Directors, would no longer be servants of the Crown, but servants of the company. It was true that they would be nominated by a Minister of the Crown; but he could assure the Committee—and he could confidently appeal to hon. Gentlemen who were conversant with the affairs of India for confirmation—that when a ma of Indian experience got into the Direction, he thought of nothing else but the duties of his position. He could not explain the fact; but it was no less true, that they did not perform the duties of their office from merely feelings of honour and duty, but throughout the whole of the service there was a particular feeling existing which caused them to identify themselves entirely with the interest and service of India Every man felt that he had almost a personal interest in the success of the particular duty he had to perform. He had no doubt that the noble Lord the Member for Lynn Regis (Lord Stanley) had himself noticed the existence of that feeling in India. He should have wished that these nominees were to be chosen by the Court of Directors; but, even if chosen by the Crown, he had no doubt that when they got into the Court of Directors they would be actuated by the same principle. He could assure the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), and the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), that the Directors of the East India Company had no light duties to perform, and that they were assiduous in their attention to them. From the evidence of Mr. Mill, no slight authority on these matters, it appeared that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors attended at the India House from twelve to four or five o'clock on every Court day. There were on those occasions at least twenty out of the twenty-four Directors present, and seven or eight attended every day. There was some force in the argument of the hon. Member for the West Riding, that there were places of responsibility and distinction in India, and that a desire of obtaining such a place might possibly influence the Parliamentary conduct of a Director; but the argument, after all, was not conclusive. The time of life at which men generally returned from India, rendered it improbable that they should wish to return there. Persons in the army or civil service had usually quitted the service on a retiring pension. Another thing he wished to point out was, that the argument against this clause had been based upon the assumption that all these six men were to obtain seats in Parliament. Why, at present the whole Company had only five representatives in that House. He did not think it at all probable that more than one of the six would obtain a seat. What the noble Lord the Member for Lynn Regis said with regard to the altered state of India was perfectly true, and many persons returned from that country with means not sufficient to enable them to obtain a seat in that House. The thing necessary to insure the success of this measure was, he believed, to elevate the character of the men to be placed in the Court of Directors; and if it were considered that it tended to elevate the character of those persons by excluding them from seats in that House, and placing them under a disqualification, he was unable to share that opinion. He could not see any reason why the six men chosen by the Crown should be placed in a worse position than those chosen by the very constituency of which hon. Members had spoken in a not very respectful manner. It was a matter to which the highest possible importance was attached, and he trusted that the House would not sanction an Amendment which, he felt convinced, would tend to prevent persons of the highest capability from consenting to enter the Court of Directors as nominees of the Government.

said, he should be sorry to dispute the statement made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton as to the zealous manner in which the gentlemen connected with the East India service performed the duties connected with their position; but he could not, on the other hand, run into the extreme of supposing that they were entirely exempt from the infirmities of the rest of mankind. The Legislature had always shown themselves extremely jealous of the independence of Parliament, and of the admission of placemen to that House. He could not say that what had been urged in this case was sufficient to render it an exception from the rules which Parliament had prescribed under similar circumstances. He had been rather surprised when he heard the hon. Baronet dilating on the extreme attention which gentlemen holding office under the East India Company bestowed upon the duties of their profession, for when the hon. Baronet said that their whole time was devoted to the public service, he could not help thinking to himself that if that were so, they would have but little time to devote to the business of that House; and it was not very improbable that a gentleman, the whole of whose time was occupied in performing the duties of a position to which he had been appointed by the Government, would attend in that House merely in obedience to a circular from the Treasury to support the Minister; and, if that were so, it became a question concerning the independence of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control had seemed to say that we lived now in better times, and that it was not necessary to take the same precautions against corruption now as it had been in a more corrupt period of history. If that was his real opinion, why did he not raise the general question, and bring in a Bill to repeal the Statute? Let the whole question be raised on the broad principle; but he objected to its being disposed of by the importation into that House of six new placemen by a clause in an India Bill. The Act 6 Anne, cap. 7, in Clause 25, said, Be it enacted—

"That no person who shall have in his own. name, or in the name of any person in trust for him or for his benefit, any new office or place of profit whatever under the Crown, which at any time since the 25th of October, 1705, has been created or hereafter shall be created, shall be capable of being elected, or of sitting or voting as a Member in the House of Commons in any Parliament which shall be hereafter summoned and holden."

If the whole question were openly raised on the broad basis as to the expediency of repealing that Act or not, it would be a very different matter. He would merely observe, that at the present time it was permitted to have in the House the President of the Board of Control, a Secretary of the Board of Control—[Mr. DISRAELI: Two Secretaries.] Two Secretaries; and by the present measure it was proposed to let in six Directors nominated by the Crown, who would, in point of fact, be nothing more or less than Under Secretaries, and thus the Board of Control would have no less than nine placemen to represent it in that House. By an Act Geo II., no department was entitled to more than one Under Secretary, and he did not understand why a virtual alteration should be made as regarded the Board of Control. The question was one of a most important constitutional character, and it was made certainly rather an alarming one by the speech of the President of the Board of Control, for the right hon. Gentleman seemed to argue that the present age was so much in advance of past times as to render it unnecessary to take any safeguards to secure the independence of Parliament. As it was, he was convinced that the Government had already a sufficient number of representatives in that House, and he did not see why the number should be increased. Under these circumstances, he should certainly vote for the exclusion of the clause.

said, he could not wonder at there being some jealousy felt with regard to the introduction of, possibly it might be, six persons into that House who had been nominated by the Crown to the Board of Directors. At the same time, it was certainly extraordinary to find that those who a week or two ago were so exceedingly jealous of the Directors that they were for throwing into the hands of the Crown an immense amount of power which would have enabled it to exercise much more influence over Members of that House than that it hitherto had, should now have altogether lost that jealousy, and endeavoured to depress the Crown in comparison with the Court of Directors. No man could deny that if there were eighteen persons in the Direction, and the twelve who were nominated by the proprietors should have the power of sitting in Parliament, while the six nominated by the Crown had not that privilege, the twelve nominated by the proprietors would be immeasurably above the six nominated by the Crown. You weakened pro tanto the influence of the Directors nominated by the Crown, and raised the influence and authority of those nominated by the proprietors. This might be the right course to take; but it was the opposite to that which hon. Gentlemen opposite had taken a fortnight ago. With regard to the broad principle which his right hon. Friend who spoke last wished the House to assert, of the exclusion of placemen from Parliament, he was afraid his right hon. Friend had not well studied the exact history of the Act of Anne which he had quoted. If he had, he would have known that that which he called the assertion of a broad principle, was nothing more or less than a compromise between two principles which were broadly asserted by opposite parties. The Tory party maintained that no person named by the Crown ought to have a seat in that House; while the Whig party, taking, as he thought, a much more rational view of the constitution, said there ought to be no restriction upon the privilege and right of a constituency to elect whom they pleased, and that persons holding offices from the Crown were as well entitled as anybody else to seats in that House. The principle was debated upon broad grounds on either side of the House, and there was very little likelihood of their coming to a decision, until Mr. West suggested an expedient that men who took office should be re-elected and sit in Parliament according to principle. So this broad principle was in fact a compromise, which went by the name of "West's Expedient," and it had existed ever since. He did not say it was a bad expedient, because it had established the principle for which every Whig contended—that the Ministers of the Crown should sit in Parliament. Since that time they had seen that the number of placemen in Parliament had been very much diminished. Not very long ago—he was not sure whether he was in Parliament at the time, but certainly about the time he entered Parliament—there was a Treasurer of the Navy, two joint Paymasters of the Army, a Treasurer of the Ordnance—making five persons—representing the organ of payment alone. There was not at this moment a single Member of the House of Commons representing that department. This was one instance among several he could quote, in which the number of persons holding office in that House had been reduced. There had been one or two from the Treasury, and some other officers, reduced. So that, in fact, with regard to the number of officers, if they were to allow this clause to pass as it was, there would not be so many persons eligible to seats in Parliament as there were not a great many years ago. But look at the practical effect of this doctrine. It was always represented as if the whole of these Members nominated by the Crown might be sitting in Parliament, That might be a good bugbear with respect to the East India Company, if experience did not contradict it. At present there were twenty-four members belonging to the Company, all of whom were eligible to seats in Parliament, and it might be said, "Look at the influence of these twenty four men, sitting in the House of Commons, all of them bound together by a common tie, and able to determine, in favour of any party that they chose, the decision of the House on the most important questions." Well, but everybody knew that this was not so, and that they never had had twenty-four Directors of the East India Company sitting there and acting as a party. They had had five, or six, or perhaps as many as eight, which was one-third of the whole body of Directors sitting in that House, and he did not know that there had been any occasion on which they had all belonged to the same party; perhaps five had been of one party, and two or three of another, and in that manner there had been no very dangerous influence exercised. But if the whole of the present number of twenty-four Directors had not sat in the House together, why should they suppose that the whole of the six Directors nominated by the Crowe should have seats there? He believed that the utmost number of East Indian Directors who of late years had sat in the House of Commons had been eight—that was to say, one-third of the entire number—and he should think that one-third of the Directors nominated by the Crown—namely, two—would also be the number that would probably sit in Parliament. And of these two, how many would there be who would be likely to follow the Minister of the day? It was supposed, but in his opinion most unwarrantably, that these two Directors would be in the same situation as gentleman who held office during pleasure, and who always attended to give their votes in favour of the Government. Now, it seemed to him (Lord John Russell) a most irrational supposition that that should be the case. In the first place, these were to be gentlemen of certain qualifications, who had served ten years in India; they would probably be pointed out by their qualifications to the Minister of the Crown, and they would probably come home with no great political bias; but whatever might be their opinions, whether in favour of a particular Government or against it, It he (Lord John Russell) thought that no President of the Board of Control could oppose the appointment of any eminent man on the Opposition side of the House, on the ground simply that he did not belong to the Government party. And if a person were nominated to office, and should be so fortunate as to obtain a seat in that House, it was most improbable that he would consider himself under such obligations to the Government for naming him to that office, that he would think himself bound to support that Government on all occasions. On the contrary, he (Lord John Russell) should suppose that he would always vote with his party, that he would vote for the Government if he belonged to them, and otherwise if he were against them. He would not be in that House for the purpose of assisting the Government. Everybody knew that the purpose of Government was to carry on the general business of the country; but the nominated Directors would not be appointed for any such purpose, but for the special purpose of attending to the affairs of India, so that he might say at once, as an Englishman of independence of mind would say, "If I receive this office do not suppose that I am to be bound to vote with the Government on every occasion;" and if he were to say so, no President of the Board of Control would venture to contradict him. The probability, then, was, that this great danger, which was so much talked of—this hobgoblin that had been raised against the proposition—would amount to this—that they would have two men sitting in Parliament, one most likely in opposition to the Government, and the other sitting on the Government side, but not voting on every occasion with the Government. There was another respect in which it was quite obvious that these gentlemen would not be in the position of persons holding office during plea- sure. When the Minister of the day resigned, every person holding office during pleasure resigned with him, and others were appointed in their place by the new Minister. But these gentlemen belonging to the Court of Directors would remain in their offices, and would retain their seats for the term appointed; and no one could suppose that they would have so much subserviency as to change their votes with every change of Ministry. It must be recollected that they were not now sitting in a Parliament where so many seats were dependent on borough nominations. These gentlemen must have constituents, and those constituents must have elected them on certain principles. One man might be a friend of free trade, another might be favourable to Protection; one might support the Established Church, and another might be opposed to it; but whatever their principles might be, they would have declared them to their constituents, and therefore it was not a change of Government that would induce those men to alter their conduct. He consequently submitted that, whatever might be the unfavourable appearance of admitting these six Directors to sit in that House, the real practical danger was very small; and as for the broad principle which his right hon. Friend (Mr. M. Gibson) contended for, it was no broad principle at all; it was merely a compromise—a very useful compromise—effected for the sake of convenience. If the broad principle for which the Tory party contended had been established, no person holding office would have a seat in that House, and the constitution of this country would be totally different from what it now was.

said, he must yet contend that while the Indian Board was represented by its Members in that House, and the Government by the Secretary of the Board of Control, the Government nominees would neither represent India nor the Government, and stood, therefore, in a most anomalous position. The House had acted on the principle of getting rid of the subordinate officers of Government, as in the case of the Commissioners of Greenwich Hospital, and in other instances, and these Directors would not be in such a high station that they ought to have seats. He would recommend that there should be a limitation placed to their tenure of office. If they were to have seats at the Board renewable at the pleasure of the Minister, he was afraid they would not do much honour to themselves. The best men for the office of Directors would be those who on their return from India would be least desirous of a seat in that House, and who, probably, would not have means enough for it. Feeling the Directors nominated by the Crown could not be independent, he would vote against the clause.

said, he had listened with great satisfaction to this discussion, and he thought he might venture to say that if he had brought forward that evening the proposition which he had laid before the House a few nights ago, he should have had the support of the noble Lord the Member for Lynn Regis, and of the hon. Member for Manchester. He had objected to that part of the Government plan by which a portion of the Court of Directors was to be nominated by the Crown, and he did so still; but he would not consent to brand those gentlemen who were to be thus appointed. There was no word of abuse which had not been lavished on the gentlemen whom the House the other night determined to appoint as part of the Board; but, objecting to that as he had done, he would not consent to place a hand on a portion of the Board and to exclude six of the eighteen members of the Board they were about to form from Parliament. He did not think there was anything in the argument that these gentlemen would have no time to sit in that House: there were many others engaged in business in that House, from whose presence they derived great advantage; but he must say there had been an inconsistency in the arguments of the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, and of the noble Lord the Member for London; for at one time they had contended these gentlemen would not be at the beck and call of the Minister, and at another they said that the number of officers of Government sitting in Parliament had been so much in diminished that there could be no harm in admitting them. He, therefore, contended that these gentlemen would be liable to the influence of the Crown, though he thought there would be certain advantages in the discussion of Indian affairs in having them present. At a future period it was his intention to propose to exclude one of the Secretaries of the Board of control from a seat in that House. He thought it would be much better to have me political secretary and one permanent secretary. That change would only diminish by one the number of the Members of Government with seats, and the use of a permanent secretary would be greatly felt. If they formed a Board—six to be elected one way, six to be elected another, and six to be nominated by the Crown, who alone could not sit in Parliament, they would draw a most invidious distinction; and in the difficulty, which he admitted to be very great, the best way appeared to be to leave the constituencies of the country to choose these gentlemen at pleasure.

said, he was not surprised to find the clause had given rise to the constitutional jealousy of the House; but he thought that jealousy might be much lessened if the Government would make a slight alteration in an earlier clause of the Bill. The only reason for supposing these Directors would be dependent on the will of the Minister, was to be found in the duration of their office and its renewal. He strongly recommended the President of the Board of Control to consider the propriety of limiting the appointment for a term of years without any capacity of reappointment. They ought not to have the power of returning the same six persons indefinitely, and if they wished to retain the services of the best qualified persons in India, they would make the office of brief tenure.

moved as an Amendment, that a declaration should be substituted for an oath, contending that nothing attached to the duties of a Director which could warrant the solemnity of an oath for their discharge.

said, he should support the Amendment. He would submit to the Committee whether it was not worth while, when they were called upon to re-enact the Directors' oath, that they should set an example of getting rid of the oath altogether, and substituting a declaration for it. He was happy to think that of late great progress had been made in the public mind on this subject, and in the right direction. Did the Committee think a Director would fulfil his duty one whit the better by reason of his taking an oath, instead of a solemn declaration to the same effect? He thought it was part of the true policy of the country to seek to diminish oaths on every occasion on which it was practicable, by which means the standard of truth and integrity would be raised among he people.

said, the moral feeling of the community was shocked by the multiplicity of oaths, which he was confident, instead of tending to truth, had a contrary effect.

said, he was against the taking of oaths, both on moral and religious grounds; and there was no doubt that the feeling of the age was in favour of their discontinuance as much as possible. He believed the noble Lord the Member for the City of London intended to introduce a Bill for the abolition of unnecessary oaths, especially with regard to Jews; and he (Mr. E wart) should like to know upon what grounds they would be justified in retaining oaths in an India Bill when Parliament was about to abolish them with regard to other persons?

said, there was a case which came under his notice before a recent Election Committee, in which it struck him that persons of high moral character, who might have some conscientious scruple against taking an oath, might have no objection to make a declaration; and if this clause passed as it stood, such persons, however undoubted their capacity and fitness, would be precluded from serving as Directors. He hoped, after the experience they had had, the Committee would consent in this case to the substitution of a declaration for an oath.

said, that they had already substituted a declaration for an oath with respect to the qualification of Members of Parliament, and he did not see why they should require a Director to take an oath that he possessed a certain amount of stock.

said, he had already proposed to leave out the oath as to qualification, and to substitute a declaration instead; the oath would then simply stand as an oath of office, pledging the persons not to allow themselves to be actuated by improper or corrupt motives. He must say that, if an oath was to be taken in any case whatever, he could hardly conceive a case more solemn than when an oath was to be imposed on a man that he would discharge a trust without being influenced by corrupt motives.

said, he had hoped the Government would have taken the present opportunity of getting rid of the administering at least of one oath, and thereby read a moral lesson to the country.

said, he had heard many recommendations with respect to the abolition of the imposition of oaths, but he had never heard the suggestion to abolish the oath of allegiance. The Directors of the East India Company, in many instances, had to discharge functions similar to those discharged by Members of Parliament, and he should oppose the present proposal to substitute a declaration for the formal oath.

said, he should support the Amendment, believing that the honour of the person appointed would be a sufficient security for the faithful performance of the trust confided to him.

said, he believed that no oath was taken by the Ministers of the Crown on their assuming office, but that they simply made a declaration that they would protect the institutions of the realm. That declaration was of the most solemn and binding obligation. Surely, if a declaration was sufficient protection for the Protestant Church, and for the proper performance of the high office of a Minister of State, it was quite sufficient to secure a due discharge of the duties of a Director of the East India Company.

said, he believed that a man was equally liable to penalties whether he violated an oath or a solemn declaration; and he did not, therefore, in that point of view, think that the doing away with an oath was of any very important consequence. But he apprehended there was something more in the proposed Amendment than the mere changing of an oath for a declaration, and that it was intended to imply that, an oath being needless in the present case, it afforded no security. Being himself of that opinion, he should support the Amendment.

said, he had no doubt that a declaration, subjecting the person taking it to penalties, would be equally binding as an oath; and he thought his right hon. Friend (Sir C. Wood) would do well to adopt the Amendment proposed, and at once substitute a declaration for an oath.

said, he considered the statement of the hon. and learned Serjeant (Mr. Serjeant Shee) was erroneous—namely, that Ministers take office upon a mere declaration; for, on the contrary, they have an oath solemnly administered to them. The proposition before the Committee was not merely to abolish the oath in this instance, but to abolish oaths generally. Knowing the influence which oaths had on the consciences of men, he, for one, could never agree to that proposition.

he very much objected to taking oaths unnecessarily, and he thought the Government would do wisely to accede to the Amendment. Formerly an East India Proprietor had to swear to his qualification; but by his efforts that oath had been dispensed with, and a declaration had been substituted. He had found throughout life that where unnecessary oaths were imposed, they produced no good effect, and the public feeling was always in favour of their abolition.

said, he thought that the general expression of opinion on this occasion ought at once to influence the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood), and induce him to accede to the proposal which had been made. He believed the concession would be exceedingly well received by all parties.

said, that he would not ask the attention of the Committee but for the last observations of the hon. Member for Manchester; but as he found his silence misunderstood, he was bound to say for himself, and certainly for many who were sitting near him, that they entirely dissented from the views of the hon. Gentleman. Let him, in the first place, correct a mistake into which the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Vernon Smith), and some other Gentlemen, had fallen. It had been said that a declaration would be equally binding as an oath, since its violation would entail the penalties of perjury. Whatever value might be in the argument, it was founded upon a complete mistake. In neither case would any penal consequence follow the violation-of the engagement, whether it was in the form of an oath or a declaration. No principle of law was better settled than this, that no criminal prosecution could be maintained for a violation of an oath of this nature—an oath of fidelity or good conduct in an office. Its only effect was as it bound the conscience of the person who took it. Had any reason been given why the engagement in this instance should not be entered into with every possible solemnity? The proposal was not to dispense with any obligation, but to substitute a mere declaration for an oath. If it was intended to raise the general question as to oaths, it was raised in the most inconvenient form. Let the hon. Gentleman bring forward a proposal that oaths ought in every case to be dispensed with, and he was ready to meet him. But while they retained their oaths of office in every other department, what reason could be given for dispensing with it in an office in which they intrusted a man with power over the government of 100,000,000 of people? The right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control had set the question at rest when he said that if in any case they ought to impose an oath, they ought to do so in this. If hon. Gentlemen opposite wished to get rid of oaths as a part of our social polity, let them raise that question boldly and firmly. Let them propose to abolish the oaths taken by Members at the table of that House—to dispense with oaths in all the high offices of State—let judges and magistrates administer the law without being sworn to execute justice impartially—let jurors be no longer sworn to give true verdicts. Would any man venture to tell him the feeling of the country was in favour of this? Would Englishmen be satisfied that their lives and properties should be disposed of in courts of justice by men not acting under the solemn obligation of an oath? He utterly denied that the feeling of the country was against the taking of an oath upon occasions that justified that solemn appeal to the Creator, The feeling of the country was against the use of an oath upon a trivial occasion—but why?—in order that it might be reserved unimpaired in all its solemnity and reverence for those occasions which justified it. He thought that the case now before them was one that did so, and he emphatically contradicted the assertion that to impose an oath upon such an occasion was to outrage the moral or religious feeling of the country. But yesterday that House had compelled him (Mr. Butt) to swear at the table that he would do impartial justice when they trusted him with the determination of a disputed election. He was not ashamed to say that he went to the discharge of those duties with a resolution to do justice, supported and solemnised by the remembrance of that obligation. But was he now to be told that when he took that oath at that table he had done an act which was an outrage to the moral and religious feeling of the country? This was the ground upon which they were asked to dispense with an oath of office from the East India Directors. He implored of the House to pause before they yielded to an argument like this. An oath was now the foundation of their whole social polity. Were they prepared to brand the whole structure of their Legislature, their social and their Judicial system, as outraging the moral and religious feeling of the country? Let no man mistake the true question that was now before them. The true objection to the oath by hon. Gentlemen opposite was an objection to anything that implied a national recognition of Divine Providence. ["No, no!"] Upon what other grounds did they propose to substitute a declaration for an oath? It was argued, indeed, that these pledges would not bind men to act honestly who would not act honestly without them. But you do not act upon that principle. You ask for the pledge—you impose a declaration, and only object to the oath. What was the difference? In the one case you bound men by an engagement which appealed to feelings of honour between man and man; in the other you added to the obligation of that promise the sacredness of an appeal to the presence of the Creator. He trusted the Government would not give way upon this question, which involved principles of serious importance; he believed the hon. Member for Manchester had entirely mistaken the feeling of the House—certainly of those who sat near him (Mr. Butt). He believed a majority of the House were perfectly ready to support the right hon. Baronet in resisting the Amendment. He would vote against that Amendment upon the plain ground that they were not justified in bringing incidentally into question a principle that pervaded the whole system of their polity—the principle that those who administered great and solemn trusts should do so under the religious sanction of an oath. If hon. Gentlemen opposite desired to get rid of that principle, let them bring forward a general Resolution. He was convinced that the people of those countries deliberately desired to see that principle maintained. He thought it was right and fitting that as a Christian nation we should attach a religious sanction to important national trusts; and while this was the principle of our polity, he could conceive no more fitting or solemn occasion than that upon which the oath they were now discussing was proposed.

said, the only argument of the hon. and learned Gentlemen was, that they were not doing right in dealing with this question on the present occasion. He did not understand the hon. and learned Gentleman to say that the efforts which had been made to diminish the number of oaths were unwise, and surely he did not mean to deny that they had now been for some time gradually abolishing oaths. Was he ignorant that the Duke of Richmond once boasted in the House of Commons that he had been instrumental in abolishing some millions of oaths per annum? Did he object to that; would he revive those oaths; would he restore the oaths which were taken in the Custom House, for instance? The hon. and learned Gentleman did not object to the principle of diminishing the number of oaths, but he objected to deal with the subject now. But how were they to prevent the increase in the number of oaths except by stopping the principle when it was proposed to introduce it, as in the present case? What was said now was, not that they would abolish all oaths taken by magistrates, lords lieutenant, and every other official. They were not proposing to prevent the hon. and learned Gentleman from cross-examining a witness according to law under the responsibility of an oath, nor from going into a Committee room to discharge those functions the responsibility of which he professed weighed upon him when he had taken an oath. For himself, he hoped he should go into a Committee room without having taken an oath with just the same feelings of responsibility as if he had gone through that ceremony. The single question before the Committee was, whether or not they would consent to increase the number of oaths in a case where it had been clearly demonstrated to be unnecessary?

said, he did not think the hon. Gentleman had quite followed the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not argue that it would be incompetent or unwise for Parliament to abolish oaths when they were unnecessary, or when they were taken upon trivial occasions; but what he said was, that this was not a trivial occasion, or an insignificant or trifling oath, but an oath taken upon a solemn occasion, and for solemn purposes. The question was not, as had been stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding, whether or not they should add additional oaths to those already taken—because there was an oath now imposed upon persons elected to the office of Director of the East India Company, and, some parts of it being thought unnecessary, it was proposed to leave them out—but it really was, whether the occasion of taking an office of this great importance, power, and responsibility, was one fitted for taking an oath. If it was a fitting occasion, then the principle was not in question; but if it was not, then the oaths taken by the Lord Lieutenant, the Lord President of the Council, and all other persons holding office in this country, were improper, and there ought to be an Act passed to abolish them.

said, he would move the insertion of the words, "Or declaration," with a view of making it optional for persons whether to take the oath or make a declaration.

said, that the general law already provided for cases where declarations could be substituted for oaths, and there was, therefore, no occasion for inserting a particular provision in the Bill to meet this particular case.

thought there would be less objection on that account to insert this provision.

said, he thought the right hon. Gentlemen was misleading the Committee entirely on this point. A declaration could only be substituted for an oath in the case of persons belonging to the Society of Friends, of Moravians, or of Separatists, all three very small bodies. Indeed, he believed, he had never met with but one Separatist in his life. However, the great bulk of persons, 99 out of 100, would be obliged to take the oath, and it was possible that they might thus shut out a number of persons whose services would be very valuable. The Bill introduced by the right hon. and learned Recorder of London (Mr. S. Wortley), for the purpose of substituting declarations for oaths in certain cases, would not meet this case, as it applied only to judicial oaths, and would afford no relief to those who were called on to take the oath of office for a Director of the East India Company. He really thought the Government ought to give way, especially after the late division, when almost every Member on that side of the House, except the Members on the Treasury bench, had voted in the minority. It was only by coalescing with hon. Gen- tlemen opposite—a course which was considered treason to the Treasury bench, when Gentlemen on that side of the House took it—that the Government had obtained a majority of thirty-nine, a number which the hon. Baronet below (Sir R H. Inglis), the great stickler for oaths, would no doubt think more highly of than ever.

said, he had voted with the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), not because he objected to oaths altogether, but because he considered that the more seldom they were administered the more solemn they would be.

said, that some members even of the Church of England objected to oaths on the ground that they thought the text "swear not all," ought to be literally construed, and they would not be relieved by the existing law. There were a great many persons, not Quakers or Moravians, who had conscientious objections to taking an oath, and they should have the option of making a declaration.

wished to know if the sects now privileged by law in other cases would be exempted from taking the oath under this Act?

wished to say, that if an oath was to be taken at all, this was an occasion on which it should be taken. If it was wished that oaths should not be taken, then let there be a general measure for that purpose; but he objected to a partial proposition in a Bill like the present. In answer to the question of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), he had to state that, whenever by the existing law a person was relieved from taking an oath, he would also be relieved under this Bill.

said, this was not a question of oaths. What he proposed was that there should be the option of making a declaration on the part of those who were neither Quakers nor Moravians, but who, nevertheless, objected to taking an oath.

said, he objected to this clause, that it would not have the effect of preventing canvassing for the office of Director, except on the part of proprietors of East India Stock, or Directors; it could therefore be easily evaded by aspirants after a seat at the Board.

hoped the Committee would allow them to proceed with that and the 14th clause.

thought it would be better to have a statutory declaration against canvassing than a by-law.

said, the clause would not prevent canvassing. If a candidate could not canvass, he could get some one to canvass for him.

said, that if they precluded proprietors from canvassing, they precluded the candidate, because no one could be a candidate who was not a proprietor. In point of fact, though the clause did not appear to be effectual, it did all that could be done, and he thought if they got the proprietors to pass a by-law to put an end to what all admitted to be an evil, that and public opinion together would prevent the binding of votes for two or three vacancies which now occurred. It would be much better that the candidates should send in their testimonials to the proprietors, and that the proprietors should then go to the election without canvass.

said, he quite agreed with the hon. Baronet that public opinion might do a great deal, but public opinion would do as much without this clause as with it. What reason was there why Parliament should not take the matter directly into its own hands, and prohibit what was proposed to be prohibited by a by-law?

thought this a most ineffectual clause. If a man sitting at a dinner table said to another, "I should be glad if you would vote for my friend," he would be fined under the proposed by-law, 100l. This appeared to him a disturbance of all the ordinary rides of society, and he should vote against the clause as impracticable.

said, he was in favour of canvassing, and was against the clause on that account. A man might send a cartload of testimonials, but he would rather see his face and the shape of his head. He had known the most incompetent men produce unexceptionable testimonials.

said, he was perfectly ready to give up the clause.

said, this was a most curious clause. The object of it was to snuff out that moribund body, the Court of Proprietors, when any serious business was done. When any business was brought on which the Court of Directors did not like, the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. Hogg) would only have to give a hint to his friends to go into the next room, and the House was up. He did not wish to set up the Court of Proprietors; they were as near defunct as possible, and this clause would kill them outright. Mr. Melvill, in his evidence, recommended that there should be a quorum, because at present, when there might be only four or five proprietors present, speeches were made which got into the newspapers.

said, the Directors were obliged by law to lay certain documents before the Quarterly Court of Proprietors, which were then placed in a room in the India House, and all proprietors had access to them. Suppose a meeting, at which there were only four or five proprietors, some one might get up and say there was not a quorum, and the Directors would then not be able to lay these documents before them. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) had referred to the importance of the debates which took place in the Court of Proprietors; but he could assure the hon. Member that these discussions, which sometimes extended over several days, or to an advanced hour of the night, were exceedingly inconvenient, because they obstructed public business, and were generally carried on by only two or three proprietors. The business of a Quarterly Court ought not to be stopped by discussions of a useless character, and he hoped the precautions which the clause provided against such obstructions would be agreed to.

said, he objected to the quorum, for it was only right that an occasion should be set apart once a quarter upon which the grievances of India could be discussed. He had often been present at these meetings, and he could bear testimony to their usefulness.

would suggest that stringent powers should be given to the Chairman of the Company to preserve order in these quarterly meetings of the proprietors.

said, that he wished to propose several additional Amendments, and he hoped the further consideration of the measure would be postponed to some day on which a discussion could take place.

said, he would suggest that the hon. Member for Montrose should defer the provisions he wished to engraft upon the Bill until next Session, when the noble Member for the City of London intended to bring forward a general measure on the subject of the representation.

said, he had never heard of any complaint in Scotland with regard to the proceedings to which the Bill referred, and he would, therefore, oppose the application of the measure to that country.

said, he could not see, if this Bill was a good one, as he supposed it was, why it should not apply to Scotland as well as to England.

had before said that he looked upon this as a mean, dirty, shabby Bill, and he still entertained the same opinion. Entertaining that opinion—however he might regret that an hon. Friend of his should be excluded from the House—he hoped that that would be the effect of the Bill. Whoever dared to attempt to deny his constituents the power of expressing their proper feelings on such occasions, was unworthy to be returned by them. He should only have expected such a Bill from one who had not a shilling in his pocket. He should move that the further consideration of this Bill should be postponed till that day three months.

said, he felt very strong objections to this Bill, because he thought it attempted to do that which never could be done—namely, to put down the expression of popular feeling. There was a large class of the community who were not intrusted with the franchise, but, at the same time, it was admitted that those who were intrusted with it were trustees for those who were not. Well, then, this large class of non-electors had scarcely any means of expressing their opinions, if the Legislature put down the use of all outward em- blems, such as mustering under flags, and marching in procession with music. Those classes had a right to express their opinions, and if they were deprived of the means of peaceably expressing them, they would be driven to adopt a way which would be more difficult to deal with, and greatly more injurious. Besides, there was often a great deal of undue influence exercised at elections, which it was very difficult for a man to withstand without the legitimate excitement which took place on such occasions.

said, he only wished to express the strong objection which he entertained to the practice of bringing on opposed and debated Bills at such a late hour [half-past 1 o'clock].

said, he thought that this Bill had been allowed to pass through its previous stages without due deliberation, for it seemed to him that its provisions were by much too stringent. One clause, for instance, exposed a Member to the loss of his seat if it were proved that he had been instrumental in causing other persons to play on instruments; while another clause provided that if a person totally unconnected with the candidate blew on a French horn or beat a drum, or the like, he should be taken before two justices and heavily fined. He thought the House should rather endeavour to improve the taste of the public for music, than try to stop it in this way.