moved, according to notice, that the Bill be read a third time that day three months. He said, that on the last occasion when the matter was brought under the notice of the House the Bill was re-committed on the ground that the first Committee had decided in favour of it without having obtained the assent of the majority of the shareholders. No less than 300,000l. stock was dissentient, and the House had been petitioned by merchants, bankers, and stockbrokers, who had prayed that the Bill might not pass into law, as if it were carried it would tend to shake the public confidence in all preference shares and property of that description. The petition had been signed by Messrs. Gurney, Dimsdale, Robarts, Stone, Martin and Co., and a great number of leading merchants, bankers, and brokers, including the Government broker, Mr. Mullins. The object of the Bill was to deprive the preference shareholders of their guaranteed interest of 6 per cent, and to give them instead 4 per cent, and a bonus of 9l. per share. He was sure that Parliament would not confiscate, as was proposed by the Bill now under discussion, the property of persons who had lent their money in a moment of great difficulty to this railway company.

seconded the Amendment, he said, that he was in the happy and independent position of a person who had never held a railway share in his life. He was influenced in the course he was adopt- ing simply from a view to see justice done to a class of persons who had their interests protected by two or three Acts of Parliament. Was it possible that persons would lend their money to railway undertakings, or make provision for their families by the purchase of such stock, if Parliament was to interfere and to do that which the law would not allow private individuals to do to each other? He had looked through the list of the petitioners against this Bill, and he was gratified to find that it contained the names of the most respectable and influential bankers and merchants in the metropolis. Those parties had stated that this proposition would inflict a serious blow upon the confidence reposed in Parliamentary guarantees, and be seriously detrimental to the value of preference shares in future.

said, he should, perhaps, save the time of the House by stating his views upon this Bill. It came to them recommended by the unanimous vote of a Committee formed of Gentlemen most competent for such an investigation, and it was with pain he differed from the unanimous finding of that Committee, but he felt it impossible to give his vote in favour of the third reading of the Bill. The Bill was promoted by the shareholders of the Company, and not by any creditors, and therefore the point to be considered was whether the preference shareholders had consented to an abrogation of their statutory rights. In consequence of negotiations with the preference shareholders, a Bill was introduced in 1852, and the Select Committee required to know if the preference shareholders consented to the creation of a stock having preference to theirs. The preference shareholders had a meeting, and said they would not agree to anything which affected their property in regard to claims posterior to their own, but they would agree to affecting their property in favour of claims anterior to theirs. The Act of 1852 accordingly passed, authorising the raising of preference stock, overriding the preference shareholders, for the purpose of liquidating the debts of the Company. The creditors were not paid off, and this year this Bill was introduced again to alter the standing of the preference shareholders. It was important to ascertain if they consented to such an arrangement; and whatever might be said of any loose decision, by a majority of preference shareholders at a public meeting, he was bound to say, looking at the evidence, that there was no dry legal proof to satisfy the House that they did so consent. There was about 360,000l. of preference stock, about half of which was registered, and the secretary of the Company stated before the Committee that shareholders representing no less than 56,000l. of this stock recorded their dissent to this Bill. It might be a good or it might be a bad arrangement; but the question was, whether the facts were such as to justify Parliament depriving those who resisted it of certain rights which by preceding Acts of Parliament they had acquired.

said, that as Chairman of the Committee he could state that, although this was not strictly speaking a creditors' Bill, the creditors had the deepest possible interest in it, because they would not consent to waive a great portion of their claim, or to capitalise their debt, unless the preference shareholders consented to the passing of this Bill. The Eastern Union Railway Company was now absolutely insolvent, while at the same time it was exposed to a ruinous competition. Mr. Brassey and the other creditors had no faith in their present security, for they knew that unless some arrangement could be come to for the working of the line with one of the powerful companies, and for an understanding with the preference shareholders, it was worth nothing. He believed that this Bill would very much improve the property of the preference shareholders, and he strongly recommended the House to read it a third time.

said, he had read with great regret the long details which had been handed round to hon. Members. But he would ask, whether the power of Parliament ought to be thus appealed to? He did not think Parliament ought to be appealed to in order to interfere with previous arrangements. He was himself a considerable holder, and he did not think that the present Bill would tend to do justice to all parties. It would be one of the greatest calamities that could happen if that House once admitted that Parliament could be unjust. He admitted that injustice had taken place, but he had always protested against such acts. He hoped this House would not agree to anything unfair; and he supported this view, even though he quite agreed with the statement that the preference creditors would fare better under this Bill.

said, that as a director of the Company, he was anxious to answer the objections made by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, and those of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Montrose. He denied that the object of this Bill was repudiation. It was because he disapproved of repudiation that he was in favour of this Bill, and he sincerely believed that if the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade had been one of the Committee, he would also vote for the third reading. The facts of the case were these. Mr. Sturge, a very wealthy preference shareholder, made a communication to the directors, and implored them to intercede with the creditors not to press their claims; as, if so, the line would be stopped altogether, and nobody would get anything. These negotiations lasted for five months, and Mr. Brassey, having given up 15,000l. worth of arrears, signed an agreement, on the understanding that Mr. Sturge, and those whom he represented, would consent to take a lower rate of interest. The gripe of the judgment creditors having been thus taken off the throats of the preference shareholders, they repudiated their proposition; and the result was, that the shares rose in the market from 9l. to 21l., the present price. Talk of repudiation after that! Why, it was the preference shareholders who had repudiated, and nobody else; and this they did no less than three times. This was substantially a creditors' Bill; but it was impossible, by the forms of that House, to introduce a Bill in that shape, unless as a shareholders' Bill. There were now over-due debentures to the amount of 250,000l. with no means of paying them, and therefore it was impossible to deny that the Bill was not a creditors' Bill. After the passing of the Act of 1852, a committee of shareholders was appointed to negotiate with the preference shareholders, and another meeting was called in December, 1852, when a third proposition was made to carry out the very object of the present Bill. Mr. Brassey, who was a holder of 30,000l. worth of common stock, and of 30,000l. preference stock, and was also a creditor of the Company to the amount of 165,000l., attended that meeting, and said he would guarantee the shareholders 100l. or par for the money they had advanced, and three years' arrears of interest, at three per cent, making 109l. The object of the present Bill was to enable Mr. Brassey to do this; and surely it could not be said that, after such an arrangement agreed to by the preference shareholders, they could talk of repudiation. He called upon the House to look at this matter, not in a nisi prius point of view, but as the great court of moral equity, bound to do justice between the parties. He denied that the majority of the preference shareholders were opposed to this Bill; because, if they would look at the propositions, they would find that five-sixths of the proprietors of registered stock were in favour of the Bill, against 30,000l. dissentient. He would earnestly call upon the House, while it abjured repudiation, and anything approaching to confiscation, to pass a Bill, which, so far from repudiating, actually proposed to pay the preference shareholders 109l. for every 100l. they had advanced; and he could only hope that every person who had to deal with repudiators might meet with the same kind of repudiation.

said, he intended to have moved for an inquiry into the allegations of the petition of Mr. Rigby Wason, and, therefore, wished the Bill to be recommitted, that investigation might be made into the charges of a petition so important, which alleged that the

"directors of the said railroad company, as promoters of the Bill now before Parliament, although, as trustees for all classess of shareholders, they are bound to act justly towards the six per cent preference shareholders, did improperly suppress part of a chain of evidence, for the purpose of inducing the Committee on the said Bill to arrive at an unjust decision, and to disturb an agreement which the said directors clandestinely concealed from the said Committee, entered into between the directors and the six per cent preference sharholders, by which, in consideration of the latter assenting to the retention of certain provisions in the said Bill affecting their legal rights, the directors agreed not to lower their preferential share."

He thought that those interested should themselves be the most anxious for an inquiry, and that under all the circumstances the Bill ought not to pass this Session. If there was even a suspicion that any evidence had been concealed from the Committee, the House ought not to pass the Bill.

said, that as a Member of the Committee to which the Bill was referred, be was quite prepared to defend the decision to which they had arrived. He had no doubt in his own mind that a jury of twelve intelligent men would have arrived at the same conclusion, and would have agreed in thinking that the interests of all parties were consulted for by the present Bill.

Mr. Bouverie—The three Resolutions which I have laid upon the table will not require from me any lengthened statement. The first Resolution, I may say, explains itself. It is simply to enable me to make provision to charge upon the Consolidated Fund the sums which the public will be bound to pay in the month of January and the month of April next under the notices which have been given according to the statute passed in the present Session of Parliament. At the same time I shall be quite ready to enter into any further explanation of that Resolution which may be desired by any hon. Member. With respect to the second and third Resolutions, they will require a few words of explanation. The second Resolution provides that the South Sea Company may be permitted, within a time to be limited—

"To commute, if they shall think fit, such portion of the capital stock of the Company as stands in the names of the Accountant General of the Court of Chancery of England and Ireland respectively, and of the Accountant in Bankruptcy in England, and likewise such portion as stands in the names of trustees and others disabled from voting in the general Court of Proprietors of the said Company."

As respects such portion of the stock as stands in the names of the Accountant General in Chancery and the Accountant in Bankruptcy, the reason for permitting to commute is probably sufficiently obvious to the Committee. It is because they were precluded from acting on the provisions of the late Statute, and it was thought unfair that they should be permanently deprived of any opportunity such as that which was afforded to private parties, or at least to persons who were masters of their own acts; whereas these were under the control of the Courts of Chancery and Bankruptcy. The reason of the postponement of the provision intended to operate in the case of those who were under the control of the Court was, that it was hoped it might be possible, even during the present Session, to introduce a measure which should have made a more extended alteration in the law with respect to Chancery and Bankruptcy accounts. The great mass of business, however, that has come before the House of Commons, has made it impossible for it to carry such a measure, and rendered it inexpedient, under the circumstances, to oppose it. That being so, I do not think it will be right, especially as a discussion took place upon this subject in another place, where a desire was expressed that some opening should be made for persons who had investments in the names of the Accountant General in Chancery and the Accountant in Bankruptcy, that it would be right to allow their case to remain entirely without provision until next year. But besides the stock that is held by the Accountant General in Chancery and by the Accountant in Bankruptcy, we propose to make a further provision in respect of such portion of South Sea Stock as held by trustees, or is otherwise held in joint names. The reason for that provision I will shortly explain. Those parties are the holders of more than a moiety the South Sea Company's Stock; but by law they were disabled from giving are vote upon the question whether the South Sea Company should commute or should take money for its stock. The consequence of this course was, that the question whether the South Sea Company should commute, or whether it should take money for its stock, was decided by the representatives of the smaller portion of the property. It was not, however, on account of that which might, perhaps, be called a technical anomaly, that the proposition would have been made if we had had reason to suppose that the cases of the sole holders of stock and of the joint holders were analogous. In point of fact, it is far otherwise. The joint holders are persons who, if they were paid off in money, would, in almost every case, be compelled immediately to reinvest. Being paid off in money, there fore, would be extremely inconvenient to them, and it would be a very hard case upon them that they should be subject to be so paid off in money without having had the opportunity or determining whether they would commute or whether they would not. And I may state that information has come to me from authentic sources that the generality of those trustees, or a large portion of them, were actually desirous to effect a commutation; but that, not being competent in law to take part in the proceedings of the Company, they were unable to give effect to their desire. I propose, therefore, to reopen the power of commutation for those parties—that is to say, for the joint holders of stock, being principally trustees who hold the stock of the South Sea Company. Besides those two classes of holders—namely, those whose stock stands in the names of the public accountants, and those who may be regarded as trustees—I propose by the third Resolution to make another provision founded upon a similar principle, but relating to a subject altogether new to the Committee, except to such Members of it as may possibly have paid attention to a private Bill now passing through this House. The fact was the South Sea Company has long, I believe, entertained a project for undertaking the office of voluntary trustees for all such parties as might be inclined to avail themselves of its services in private trusts, and charging a commission for those services. During the present year the resolution to pay off their stock has brought that intention on the part of the Company to a head; and the consequence has been, that after consulting the proper departments of the Government, they have introduced a Bill into Parliament, which is at present going through its stages, to enable them to become and to act as trustees on behalf of all persons who are inclined to avail themselves of their services. One of the clauses of that Bill requires that a certain guarantee fund, of not less than 300,000l., shall be kept by the Company in the public securities. That being so, it is obviously convenient that the South Sea Company should continue to hold in some public security by way of commutation, rather than that in respect of its stock it should be paid off, and be compelled to reinvest. In point of fact, about 2,500,000l., or more, may be said to be embraced within the scope of the second and third Resolutions; and the effect of those Resolutions will be to prevent the inconvenience of unnecessarily launching on the money market in the month of January next 2,500,000l. of money, and thereby producing an artificial and unnecessary redundancy of money to be absorbed again almost immediately by a necessary and obligatory purchase of stock. It is undoubtedly desirable, and also convenient, if that public stock is to be paid off, that the paying off should be restricted to the real liquidation of debt, and that there should be no actual paying off where the liquidation is merely nominal, and the reinvestment will follow immediately. That is the object of the second and third Resolutions. But there is one other point in those two Resolutions on which I must say a word. It may be observed by those hon. Members who have read them that I do not propose to confine the power of commutation under these Resolutions absolutely to the options which were opened under the Statute of the present year; because owing to the great change of circumstance which has taken place within the three or four months since the passing of those Resolutions by the House, the mere reopening of those options might very possibly be offering to the parties only an opportunity, which, in their views, judged and measured by present circumstances, would be quite valueless, and therefore would no take effect. I think that the disposition of the Committee would be to offer to those parties, if any offer at all is to be made to them, something which should be really equivalent to what those options were in tended and believed to be at the time that the former Resolutions were adopted by the House. In the present state of matters, with the uncertainty, partly of political affairs abroad, but especially with respect to the prospect of the harvest a home, it would be very difficult indeed to fix at the present moment upon any modified terms; and, besides, there would be a disadvantage, I think, in reopening the conditions of the late Act of Parliament in reference to the particular stock which it affected. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me that the best course would be to ask Parliament to enable the Treasury to offer to those parties at it discretion, according to the state of the circumstances when the power shall have been given to it for the purpose, the liberty of availing themselves of the options afforded by the late Act of Parliament; or in case those options should not be satisfactory to the parties under existing circumstances, that the Treasury shall have the power of offering them stock of the description which is commonly called "3l. 5s. per centum annuities, 1844," that is the stock which was created by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Goulburn) in 1844. It is at present a 3¼ per cent stock, but within a single half year after the date fixed for liquidating the stocks which are the subject of the present Resolution, it will become a 3 per cent stock; and the only difference between it and Consols or Reduced will be, that it is a 3 per cent stock guaranteed for twenty years. That guarantee has considerable value in the eyes of the public, and that circumstance seems to point it out as the most convenient stock to be the subject of commutation in respect of these trustees. Perhaps it may be thought, if an option of this sort is to be given to these trustees, that it should likewise be given to all those who were embraced in the Act of the present Session. Well, but with regard to that, I think the Committee would act more wisely if they were to postpone for a while the consideration of that subject. I think, in the first place, it is quite plain that something is due to those trustees; that at the present moment we have done less for them than we have done for others; and that we ought without delay to do that which will place them upon, as nearly as possible, an equal footing with those who had certain options offered to them for the present year. This will not only be for the interest of the trustees, but for the interest of the public, as identified with the interest of the State, but it will be likewise for the interest of the trading public; because, as I have already stated, it is very advantageous with respect to the money market, and the conduct of trade in general, that we should avoid making an unnecessary redundancy of money in January next. Therefore I think that the reasons against the extension of the proposition at the present moment are conclusive. I think it is obvious that we cannot wisely and prudently fix by Resolutions the terms of commutation in 3¼ per cent stock that ought to be offered to those parties. If we could, the question would be a simple one; but, in the uncertainty of present circumstances, which are varying from week to week, I think that those terms cannot wisely be fixed by Resolution. I have no hesitation, therefore, in asking the Committee, looking at the limited scope of the transaction, to entrust the Treasury with the discretionary power of fixing the terms with regard to these particular parties, because the whole amount at issue is comparatively trifling; but I should feel great scruples in asking the Committee to authorise the Treasury to fix at its own discretion the terms on which an extended operation of the commutation might take place. For that rea- son, therefore, I am not prepared to propose any extension of the discretionary power beyond the narrow and limited sphere which I have referred to at the present moment. The wise course for the Committee to pursue, I think, will be this: Let us avail ourselves of the experience which we may gain by our dealing with these parties during the present autumn. We shall then be in a position to consider, at the opening of the next Session, what terms may deliberately, and with a fair prospect of success, be offered to the holders of stock generally, over a wider sphere, if the House should then be disposed to entertain the question. For these reasons, I think it wise to make the very limited and narrow proposition which I make to the Committee at the present moment, and to confine that proposition strictly within those limits. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the first Resolution.

Sir, these Resolutions come rather suddenly upon the consideration of the Committee. I myself, certainly, not having had the advantage of being in the House yesterday, only learnt at a rather late hour this morning that it was the intention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to call our attention to the consideration of this very important subject. This is to be regretted, because, although these Resolutions apparently have a limited scope, and seem, at first, to be composed with some simplicity, really, if examined, they will be found to involve very important considerations. In the first place, we must recollect that the stocks to the commutation of which those Resolutions particularly refer, form part of a great financial scheme that was brought before the consideration of the Committee, and the results of which were immediately to affect the Budget of the right hon. Gentleman for this year. The right hon. Gentleman estimated that this particular stock, or rather this group of small stocks which the Committee consented the right hon. Gentleman should deal with, would, if commuted, yield an estimated moderate surplus of 25,000l. a year by the operation. But by a larger commutation which he also introduced to our notice at that time, there would have been a saving upon the year, which would have been an element of the surplus of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, of not less in addition than, I think, 75,000l. The whole sum, therefore, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated that he would immediately save by the scheme of commutation, and which saving was an element of his surplus, was not less than 100,000l. The ulterior effects of the scheme, however, which were estimated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, were of a much larger amount and character. Nor is it indeed surprising that he should have indulged in those estimates, when we remember how great were the dimensions of the scheme which he brought under our notice, and which the House sanctioned. It was not at that time merely the intention of the Government to commute this group of small stocks, but they were to lay the foundation of an irredeemable 2½ per cent stock, irredeemable at least at the option of the holders—and they were also to sanction the circulation of what they were given to believe would be a very popular and current security—namely, Exchequer bonds. Originally when that plan was brought before the consideration of the Committee, the great mass of the public debt was contemplated as to be dealt with by the Government. There were subsequently limits applied to the various stocks; but I do not think that ultimately the suns which the Government intended to deal with was less than 90,000,000l. The Committee would do well to recollect that with regard to the foundation of the 2½ per cent stock, and the production of a very current and popular security in the shape of an Exchequer bond, the plans of the Government have been an entire failure. With regard to the third branch brought under our consideration, the one which was of lesser importance at the moment, and which is now at the end of the Session obliged again to be called to our attention, it is unnecessary for me to describe what has been the fate of that proposition, because the appearance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer before us with these Resolutions to-day is sufficient to show that the calculations on which that plan was framed and formed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, have been most illusory. To those Resolutions referring to that proposition, I have now to call the attention of the Committee. Of course with reference to the first Resolution, it is unnecessary for me to say that I neither offer nor recommend opposition to it, because it is merely a declaration that the House of Commons will fulfil engagements which the public credit of the country demands. But I think the second Resolution will require considerable attention. In the first place, I very much object, when a proposition has really failed, to these schemes for continuing its operation, and bringing it to bear upon interests that before were not subjected to the option which it offered. It would be a very fair argument to use in favour of that portion of the stock of the South Sea Company which is in the hands of the Accountants General of the Courts of Chancery, or of the Accountant in Bankruptcy, or of trustees, if advantages had been enjoyed by those who were holders of that stock, but were not in that situation—it would be a very fair argument to say that those parties should not be debarred from participating in the same advantages. But what occurs to me is, that it has not been proved that those persons who are under the influence of trustees, or who are in the same position, have been debarred of any advantages whatever. The effect of the proposition as regards those holders of stock who are not under the influence of the Accountants General, or who are not under the regulation of trustees, is, I think, on the contrary, not such as to call upon us, on the principle of impartial justice, to extend the same options to persons who, before that arrangement of the law, were not empowered to avail themselves of that offer, The proposition, in short, has failed as regards the great mass of the funds, and, therefore, having so failed, we should make up our minds to conclude, on the best terms we can, an arrangement which has been so unfortunate: that, I think, would be the simplest and the best course for us to pursue. If we confine our consideration, in the first place, to the project of the right hon. Gentleman, as originally offered with respect to these persons, I do not see any fair prsspect that they would accept the options which have been refused by those whose property is not in trusteeship or in Chancery. I think that the prospect before us whether we look to the state of the harvest, or to the state of our foreign relations, is not so encouraging that we have a right to suppose that the money market would be in such a state in the course of this year, or before Parliament meets again, that those persons whose property is in trust or in Chancery would avail themselves of a new power which it is now proposed we should extend to them, and accept those options which already have been refused by what I should have thought was the larger portion of the holders of the funds at issue. Nor do I think that the right hon. Gentleman, from his tone to-day, anticipates, if the second Resolution had included those persons, that there would have been the slightest chance of any commutation taking place; and, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman introduces a novel element into that Resolution. First of all, he has extended the area of commutation by introducing a new stock; and then he has done that of which I confess I entirely disapprove, and which I trust the Committee will ponder well before they sanction—he has proposed that the power shall be granted to the Government—which is very unusual, if not unprecedented—of concluding at their own discretion the terms on which a proposition of financial commutation shall take place. If the former proposition of the Government on this subject had been successful—if they had shown such an acquaintance with the money market, and such a mastery of the phenomena with which they had to deal as would give them a right to appeal to our confidence—I confess that, as a matter of principle, I should hesitate even then before I would confide to a Government so great a degree of power, the possession of which by them I do not consider at all necessary. But I have a right to consider whether the antecedents of the Government are such as ought to entitle them to the confidence which they claim on tins subject. Looking at those antecedents, I cannot say, but I should hardly think, that the right hon. Gentleman or his Colleagues will prefer any claim for that unusual confidence on the ground of the success of their financial operations. Certainly, as far as I can form a judgment on this important subject of the commutation of the public funds, I do not think that their success has been such as that they can look back to it themselves with unlimited or unalloyed satisfaction or self-gratulation. The project, when first brought before us, was of very large dimensions. Before any discussion hardly could take place upon it, it was greatly altered and modified. The limitations which were proposed to the various kinds of stock which were brought under our consideration, varied from day to day, and the measures were hurried through this House because we were told that there was such eagerness to accept the commutation that we must waive our right of criticism—[The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Oh, no !] I certainly understood so from various Members of the Government, and I muse appeal to the Committee, and to those who are present, whether that was not the conclusion at which they also arrived? I confess, then, that I am rather surprises at the interruption of the right hon. Gentleman when I recalled to the recollection of the Committee the fact that I believe on discussion upon those important measure took place upon the principal occasions on which discussions do generally occur. On all those important stages, such as the second or third reading, upon which discussions do occur, none did take place, am the only debate of importance which I can recollect was upon an occasion when an important debate upon measures of the consequence seldom does occur. The debate which then arose took place because the right hon. Gentleman, no doubt animated by a high sense of duty, moved the second reading of the Bill at past midnight; and it now arises, upon another occasion, on which the right hon. Gentleman certainly offers some apology to the Committee, at a time when no one could expect that it would have been brought forward. It is not in my power to speak except generally upon this point, because as I said before, the question come very suddenly under our consideration; but feel confident that I am correct in the main in the representations I am making and that all those hon. Gentlemen who have taken an interest in this particular question can bear witness to the truth of what I am stating. I was pursuing some arguments, however, which the interruption of the right hon. Gentleman diverted me from. I think I was impressing upon the Committee two points: first, that is most unwise to extend to any Ministry the power of entering at their discretion into bargains of this kind; and secondly, I was, not I trust in language offensive to the right hon. Gentleman, reminding the Committee, and I thought I was only fulfilling my duty in so reminding them, that the antecedents of he present Government with respect to this question are not such as should make their case an exception to the rule which I ventured to impress upon the attention of the Committee. I think that we ought to resist such a discretion as they now ask for. Why is it to be granted? The right hon. Gentleman has made a proposition of a financial commutation, and has brought in a measure which has not succeeded. Well, it appears to me that the wisest course would be to conclude and to close that business as soon as possible. These persons must be paid, and they must be paid in money. Let us know what is the cost of the transaction. Let us learn that, instead of the "moderate saving of 25,000l. a year" (which I think were the very words used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer), there is to be a certain loss. Let us understand what that loss will be; and we shall then be better acquainted with the state of our finances. But, because the Government has made a proposition, and has brought forward a measure, and has carried a measure, which has turned out, as they were warned it would turn out, to be perfectly illusory and inefficient, it appears to be most unwise that at the end of the Session we should be patching up that scheme, entering into new speculations founded upon the same, as I think, erroneous and imperfect data, and asking the House of Commons to grant a power to the Administration which, when Parliament shall be prorogued, must leave the state of our finances, to a certain degree, in a condition of uncertainty and doubt. I said that the Government were warned of what would be the effect of their propositions. I shall not refer to any word that I said myself upon that subject, for I never have any wish to exaggerate the importance of anything that I may say in this House upon any subject; and the right hon. Gentleman may tell me that in any criticism which I offer I may have been influenced by those party feelings that are sometimes reprobated by Ministers when they think it convenient. But let me remind the Committee that my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), no mean authority upon such a question, and not a Gentleman whose judgment can be supposed to be warped by too strong a feeling of political connexion—my hon. Friend took occasion to express his opinion to the House upon the whole of the financial propositions of the Ministry. He said, that in all these affairs you ought to consider, in the first place, the time; and, in the second place, the mode. He thought that the time was unfavourable for such propositions; and even if the time were favourable, he thought that the mode by which the end was sought to be attained, was extremely perplexed, unsatisfactory, and complicated. I think, though I speak from memory, that that is not an unfair account of what fell from the authoritative lips of my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, with respect to the financial scheme of the right hon. Gentleman. Well, Sir, I say, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman was fairly and thorougly warned of the result of his propositions. A return which I hold in my hand, places that result generally before the Committee. There is no 2½ per cent stock really established. We were informed that it was a great disadvantage to have a number of small stocks in the market, and we were told that we ought to have a 2½ per cent stock which should be in everybody's hands. Now, the fact is that if there is any 2½ per cent stock, it is in nobody's hands, because nobody has accepted these options, except some unfortunate persons whose property was in trust or whose consent has been given by their agents, in their absence, and in total ignorance of the nature of these transactions Then, inasmuch as the Government cannot bring their 2½ per cent stock into the market on the terms in which they purchased it, without incurring considerable loss, of course that 2½ per cent stock is limited, as its amount never appears. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon said, that the time was unfortunate whet the right hon. Gentleman proposed his financial Resolutions. Well, Sir, the time was unfortunate. The right hon. Gentleman set about reducing the rate of the public interest in a falling market; and that brings me to the consideration of an important point, which mast not be lost sight of when Resolutions of this kind an brought before our notice, and that is, the state of the unfunded debt of the country at the present moment. It appears, from a return which I moved for, and which is on the table of the House, that that unfunded debt has been reduced to the amount, in round numbers, of 3,500,000l,; that in consequence of the reduction of the rate of interest on Exchequer bills, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, in the month of June last, to meet from the public balances Exchequer bills to the amount of about 3,500,000l. He paid, I think, as well as I remember, about 3,170,000l. out of his balances at his bankers; about 360,000l. or 370,000l. he was relieved from by the commissioners of savings banks, and some small amount, I think 50,000l. or 60,000l., was discharged by liquidating a corresponding amount of the public debt. In round numbers, 3,500,000l. of Exchequer bills had to be liquidated in consequence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's reducing, I think most imprudently, the interest upon that species of security—

The amount was 3,100,000l.

Well, 3,100,000l. out of the balances of the Exchequer. I think that we ought to know, especially when a discretionary power is asked by the Minister which will permit him to enter into pecuniary bargains for the commutation of stocks while Parliament is not sitting, what has been the effect of that reduction of the unfunded debt. I think we ought to know what is the state of the balances in the Exchequer. I think we ought to know, in fact, what is the balance at the Government bankers'. Those are points which I think the right hon. Gentleman ought to communicate. I think he ought to tell us—

Have you not seen the balance sheet?

Yes, I have seen the balance sheet; but there are many things in balance sheets which are not known to the world, and which, I think, ought to be mentioned in discussion. Many persons do not see balance sheets, and in a popular assembly, when we are touching upon subjects of this nature, it is quite legitimate to take the opportunity of bringing, and frequently bringing, the most salient and important facts before the public in general. I thought it possible that the right hon. Gentleman would have favoured us with some observations upon these points, and that he would have contradicted me in my statements if I were erroneous in my recollection. But there is one point which we shall not find even in the balance sheet, and that is the intention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer with regard to the unfunded debt in future, and especially in the interval during which that important power is sought to be exercised by the Government; in fact, I will not say "interval," because, if I understand the Resolution correctly, the Government are asking to be entrusted with unlimited discretionary power. Unless I mistake the language of the Resolution, they are at all times to be entrusted, so far as these funds are concerned, with the power of making bargains on the part of the public with respect to the commutation of stock. Then, I want to know, during that time, what are their views? I do not want to bind them to any specific pledge; but what are their views, with regard to the interest that will be paid upon the unfunded debt? The unfunded debt is now reduced by a very large amount—to an extent which I should myself suppose, but of course the Chancellor of the Exchequer can inform us—somewhat inconvenient to the transaction of the public business of the country. 3,500,000l. of Exchequer bills cannot well be taken out of a market—and a market where Exchequer bills do not at the present moment pay an interest which keeps them at that rate at which the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to feel comfortable—without, I should think, considerable inconvenience. I say, then, that such a transaction violating the principle on which the unfunded debt ought to be managed, cannot take place without seriously affecting the Minister who has the discretionary power of fixing the terms on which the commutation of any stock is to occur. That, therefore, is a subject on which I think we ought to insist on some explanation from the Minister before we proceed with the consideration of the second Resolution. The first Resolution is, I believe, the only one at present before us. If I am right in my interpretation of the first Resolution, I should not think that any one would offer any opposition to it. But I have felt bound to make some comments upon the second Resolution, which I hope are not altogether unworthy of the attention of the Committee. I think they ought to consider, in the first place, whether, this plan having failed, it is expedient in any way to continue it; and, in the second place, if it be expedient in any way to continue it, whether it is wise to increase the area of commutation by bringing in a new stock, and then leaving to the Minister, who has failed in his original project, the unprecedented power of settling the terms on which future commutations shall take place. These are the principal points which strike me on reading these Resolutions.

said, he would not discuss the second Resolution until it should be put from the Chair; but he should be glad if the Chancellor of the Exchequer could inform him what would be the extent of the charge upon the Consolidated Fund arising out of the proposed plan?

said, that it was not very easy to answer the question of the hon. Baronet without answering at the same time the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli). If the hon. Baronet meant by the "charge" the loss which the country would suffer, and which the right hon. Gentleman had spoken of as a certain loss, without at all putting his authority in competition with that of the right hon. Gentleman, he ventured to say that there would be no loss, but a considerable gain in consequence of the operation of the plan as it stood at the present moment.

said, he wished to know what amount would be required to pay off those persons who assented to the commutation of the South Sea Stock?

said, that the total amount which might have to be provided for upon the 5th of January would be 6,100,000l.; and the total amount, assuming that the trustees affected by the second and third Resolutions accepted the commutation, would be in round numbers about 3,500,000l. or rather less. The maximum amount therefore would be 6,100,000l.; and the minimum amount 3,500,000l.

wished to know whether the 6,100,000l. was arrived at after deducting all that was commuted already into new stock?

Certainly.

said, that although the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) had characterised the plan of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so far as it had been carried out, as a failure, he contended that no human wisdom could have foreseen the events which had taken place since that proposition had been submitted to Parliament. Whatever want of success there had been in the measures of the Government, he did not attribute it to any deficiency of talent in the right hon. Gentleman.

said, that grateful as he was to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for his scheme of finance generally, he must say, in justice to Gentlemen op- posite who objected to this part of the plan, that the result had been the failure which they expected and predicted. What his hon. Friend (Mr. Williams) had said with reference to the occurrence of events which could not be foreseen, was no doubt true; but, nevertheless, there was very little difference in the prices of stock now compared with what they were when the right hon. Gentleman brought forward his scheme. The mistake into which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had fallen was, that he had made an attempt to pay off the interest on the debt at a time when the market rate would not properly allow it. He thought the right hon. Gentleman should only ask for leave to raise money for the particular purpose for which it was now required, and not ask for such extensive powers as were involved in these Resolutions.

said, that in agreeing to the first Resolution he could not accept the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the amount that would be charged upon the Consolidated Fund. According to the best calculation he could make, the amount to be paid off would be between 9,000,000l. and 10,000,000l. About 2,000,000l. had been already paid off, so that the entire sum would be somewhere about 8,000,000l.; but, whether it was 6,000,000l. or 8,000,000l., the faith of Parliament was now pledged to pay off the stock at par, and on this ground only he would offer no opposition to the Resolution.

said, he would like to know the exact amount that would fall on the Consolidated Fund. So far as he could make out, it would be 9,500,000l., but the right hon. Gentleman called it 6,100,000l.

said, there was no practical difference between them. He now asked the Committee to make arrangements with respect to payments due on the 5th of January next. He did not ask them to make arrangements with respect to payments that would become due at a period after the meeting of Parliament next Session. These the House would consider when the proper time came. There was a portion of payments due on the 5th of April, in addition to what were due on the 5th of January, and that portion constituted the difference between the hon. Baronet's statement and his own. That difference was about in round numbers 2,000,000l. The maximum amount, as he had previously stated, payable on the 5th of 6,100,000l.; the minimumamount payable was 3,500,000.

said, he would now propose the Second Resolution.

said, that in consequence of the Resolutions not being in the hands of Members earlier, he was not so fully prepared to speak on them as he might otherwise have been. He was satisfied, however, that the second Resolution was very objectionable. In the first place, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) had said, an option was given to the holders of South Sea Stock of converting it into other stocks, which they had already had the option of doing, but which they had refused. Where was the use of making this offer a second time? [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: That is not so.] Was it not so? Then, this was a consequence of not having had time to consider the Resolutions previously to their being called upon to speak on them. He had understood that they were to have the option of accepting the 2½ per cent stock, and that failing, the Treasury were to have the power to make a bargain with them to accept 3½ per cent. He objected altogether to leaving it to the Treasury to make a second bargain with parties who had already had an opportunity of accepting one. How could they tell whether the holders of this stock would accede to any proposition of the Government? Suppose they did not accept it, they would be in a position to dictate their own terms. It appeared to him that the principle was a false one, that when they made an offer to the holders of stock, and they refused that offer, the Government should be bound to pay them off in the way now proposed. The Government, it was clear, must now get the money in the best way they could. About 3,000,000l. of Exchequer bills had been paid off, and there remained 6,000,000l. to be paid. Now, if the right hon. Gentleman would issue Exchequer bills to that amount, he might have to raise the interest, perhaps, from 1d. to 1¼d. a day, but even that would be a better measure than he had proposed, as it would be only temporary. He protested, however, altogether against the principle of making second bargain with parties who had had the option already of taking a particular course. The parties knew well that when they refused in one case they would obtain better terms in another; and was it likely, in such circumstances, that with respect to the 500,000,000l. of public debt with which they had to deal, they would have any chance of making really good terms? He should therefore feel it his duty to vote against the second Resolution.

said, he thought the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, was very greatly mistaken as to the operations that would take place under this Resolution. As to a bargain having been made before, it should be recollected that that bargain was made under peculiar circumstances. At the time the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed his measure to the House, the funds were rising, and the greatest unanimity was felt with regard to those measures both in London and elsewhere; and to his knowledge great sums had been transferred into the bankers' hands for the purpose of taking advantage of them. But soon after, political matters on the Continent, and other questions, gave a different tendency to the money market, and, though money was abundant, the same desire for investing did not exist as at the time when the right hon. Gentleman proposed his measures. Now, looking at the whole of the financial measures of the Government, and looking at the prospect of a not favourable harvest, he thought this Resolution was by no means either unwise or impracticable, and he should certainly vote for it. Unless they gave a discretionary power to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in these matters, his hands would be so tied up that he would be unable to do the best that his judgment suggested.

said, the first Resolution had been allowed to pass on his side of the House without objection; but the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer would perhaps permit him to suggest that the language of that Resolution extended to a remoter period than he had intimated, and that it included the 5th of April well as as the 5th of January, to which he intended to limit its operation. Perhaps, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman would so far modify the terms of the Resolution as to make it accord with the statement which he had made. With regard to the second Resolution, he felt it his duty to oppose it in every possible way. He would also take an early opportunity of bringing under the notice of the House the question involved in the Act of Parliament which had already been referred to. He begged, however, to call the attention of the Committee to the real question involved, which was, whether Parliament would confer on a body who stood in the situation of trustees for those who had no power to act, or even to speak for themselves, the power to meet the views of the Government in such a manner as to sacrifice very largely the interests of those for whom they acted as trustees? He thought the right hon. Gentleman could not have fully considered the extent of the matter. The parties were not free agents. The Company, as trustees, were to have power to commute, and the holders were to be consulted as free agents. The Committee were called upon a few hours' notice to confer on the South Sea Company the power of commuting certain stocks, and stocks standing in the hands of the Accountants General; and if these stocks were not the property of parties who had the misfortune to have their affairs in the Court of Chancery or Court of Bankruptcy, he did not know to what stocks the Resolution applied. If they applied to these stocks, then he was satisfied the Committee ought never to agree to the second Resolution. But, whatever the class of persons to which the stocks might refer, he opposed the Resolution on the ground that it was not just or right to convert stocks in the way proposed without the consent or sanction of the pro- prietors of that stock. What was the history of their legislation on this question There were certain stocks denominates small or minor stocks, involving somewhere about 10,000,000l., with which in the early part of the Session they were asked to deal, and it was declared by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to be expedient that those stocks should be paid off. Accordingly, the consent of the House was given to a Bill to enable the Government to cancel those stocks, and this in spite of the warning voice of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring) and others, that the moment chosen for this operation was a most unfortunate one. He could no blame the Government for events that had since occurred, and which probably they did not anticipate. At the moment, too when the scheme was proposed, the market was perhaps a rising one; but during the progress of the measure through the House things occurred that suggested some doubts whether the moment chosen by the Government for effecting their object was a right one. However, the Bill was passed, and the consequence was that the right hon. Gentleman had to pay off every 100l. stock with 100l. sterling, stock being at the time above par, while at this moment the same stock was not worth more than 98l. or 99l. in the market. So that of the 8,000,000l. to be paid off in January, there was a loss of at least for 2 per cent, because the right hon. Gentleman had chosen a wrong time to make this operation. But, passing to the other provisions of the Bill, which were now applied to an altogether new case, he would say that if the right hon. Gentleman had contented himself, when the Bill was brought forward, with the payment of the South Sea and other minor stocks, and to raising a sufficient sum for that purpose, little observation would have been necessary then, and none would been required now. But the right hon. Gentleman, who seemed to have the idea that he was destined to carry out some gigantic measure of finance, involving sooner or later the extinction of the whole national debs of the country, proposed to add to his scheme a project of creating a 2½ per cent stock, 3½ per cent, and Exchequer bonds. The right hon. Gentleman, instead of confining his operation to the paying off of a certain amount of national debt, in a certain way, and raising money to pay off that portion of the debt, took upon himself the impossible task of determining not the exact, but the fair value in the market of three new and untried stocks. The two stocks were complicated in their conception, and the new Exchequer bonds had not yet been tried. The right hon. Gentleman, instead of ascertaining as had always been adopted by the Minister of the day in similar cases, their value by tender, took upon himself to fix the value himself. At the time, some hon. Members on his side of the House ventured to tell the right hon. Gentleman that if his proposal were accepted, it would bring about a losing and disadvantageous bargain for the public, should stocks be above par; if not, then the whole scheme would fall to the ground, because it would not be accepted. It was pointed out at the time that mischief would ensue if such elements of disturbance were introduced into the money market. He would not repeat the arguments by which the opposition to the measure was supported; he would only just ask the Committee to see the practical result of the operation. It was impossible to say, if the funds had remained about par, as they were when the Bill was brought forward, what might have been the effect of the 2½ per cent stock on the public, He was inclined to think that a larger sum—not 40,000,000l., but about 20,000,000l.—would have been accepted by the public; but the amount taken had been so insignificant, in consequence of the funds falling, as to be scarcely worth a consideration. Those who had accepted the 2½ per cent stock had done so, because they trusted too implicitly to the statements of the right hon. Gentleman; and with regard to the other stocks, the small portion that had been taken, he would leave the right hon. Gentleman to say in what position those parties were now placed. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would tell the Committee what he thought the 100l. of these stocks worth now? If the new holders were to sell, what would they get for this change? Such, then, was the entire failure of the scheme—such the condition of these new stocks, that the stocks were now unheard of in the market; they were a dead letter in the market, and their very existence was ignored. He was sure that the owner of 100l. sterling of these new stocks could not obtain more than 93l. in the market. In consequence, therefore, of holding out to the public that 100l. of the new stock was worth as much as 100l. of the old stock, the right hon. Gentleman had induced many to buy the new stocks, and trustees to buy for others, and thus to lose 7 per cent. And why did he allude to this? Because by the present Resolution the same vicious and losing principle was to be compulsorily extended to another class of stockholders. There was no means of knowing from the words of the Resolution to what particular class of stocks, and to what amount, it was limited. It was clear, however, there was a class of persons who under the Act recently passed had no power to convert their stock. But the meaning and effect of the Resolution was, that the holders of stock in the hands of the Court of Chancery and Court of Bankruptcy were to have their stocks arbitrarily commuted. He now came to another part of this Resolution, with regard to which he thought the Committee were entitled to some explanation. Government invited other classes of trustees to sacrifice the property of their cestuique trusts by this newly proposed stock. There was now one class of persons, whose stock being in the name of the Accountant Generals in Chancery or Bankruptcy, could not be converted. But the South Sea Company were now to be permitted to commute it, and those persons were to receive not 100l. sterling, but 2½ per cent or 3½ per cent stock, or Exchequer bonds—the per cent fetching only 93l., the 3½ per cent 91l., and the Exchequer bonds 90l. That was all they were to receive for 100l. Was that the way to deal with persons who could not help themselves? Would Parliament be a party to such an act of obvious injustice? And whether the parties were small holders or large, few or many, the Resolution was neither more nor less than to give a power to the South Sea Company to compel parties to commute one stock for a stock of less market value, He thought the right hon. Gentleman ought to have explained his views more clearly when he brought forward his Resolutions, for certainly at this moment he could not fully comprehend their purport and probable effect. There was, it was true, another option—that the holders were to have the value, which value was to be hereafter fixed, of the 3¼ per cent stock. So then, that class of persons who had lost eight or nine per cent in taking the 2½ per cent stock, were to be compelled to put up with their loss. But in order to induce the new class of victims to come forward, the advantage was offered of giving them the option of the money price of the 3¼ per cent stock. He objected to the Resolution, first, on the ground of the con- verting of good stocks into 2½ and 3¼ stock, or the Exchequer bonds, being an attempt to induce persons to incur a loss, and at the same time to conceal that loss from them. The proposal was unbecoming on the part of Government, as it in effect confiscated a portion of the property of those who might be induced to accept the proposal. He should oppose every stage both of the Resolution and the Bill which gave the South Sea Company the power of converting into this stock. He objected also to that part of the clause in which the Government claimed the confidence of the House with regard to the terms they would be able to effect. As to the 3½ per cents, he admitted that the calculation of the right hon. Gentleman was as nearly correct as it could be under the circumstances; but he saw nothing to induce him to leave to the judgment of the Government the amount to which the holders of this stock were to be compensated.

said, it was a matter of great regret and concern to him that he had been prevented by circumstances from paying the respect that was due to that House, and he must say the justice that was due to the Government and to himself, by replying on that occasion, and on the discussion of these Resolutions, to an attack which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli), and by the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down, upon the Government, not with reference to these Resolutions merely, but with reference to an Act of the present Session, and to the whole financial policy taken by the Government. That at this moment was totally impossible. [It was now within a minute or two of four o'clock, the hour of adjournment.] He hoped, however, that it might be possible, in the course of the present evening—if at all in conformity with the rules of the House—to resume that discussion, when he should show his respect to the Committee by replying to the statements to which they had listened. He would only say that he fully recognised the reasonableness of the demand for time to give full consideration to Resolutions like the present; and he might state that he came down to the House at six o'clock on Tuesday, with the intention of announcing these Resolutions for the present day—a notice of two days, being precisely the same notice that was given by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge Univer- sity, in 1844, when he proposed to convert 250,000,000l. of stock; but the counting out of the House on that evening prevented him carrying out his intention. He could assure the hon. Member behind him (Mr. J. E. Smith), that he would have concurred entirely with him, if he had been at all correct in the inferences which he had drawn from the Resolutions. The hon. Gentleman said he would never offer new terms to persons who had rejected those which had been placed before them, and in that he entirely agreed with him. [Here the right hon. Gentleman was stopped by the CHAIRMAN, it being now four o'clock, and the sitting was suspended. The House resumed at six o'clock.]

said, it was now his duty to appeal to the Government and to Parliament whether the time had not arrived at which the monopoly of salt possessed by the East India Company ought to be entirely abolished. He made the Motion in no party sense, and with no party object, but rested it entirely on the merits and justice of the case. If there was one portion of the House to which he appealed more earnestly than to any other, it was to Her Majesty's Government; and he did so on the ground that, in whatever light the subject was viewed, it was the duty of Parliament to put an end to this obnoxious monopoly, which had been the subject of long and just complaint both in England and in India. Whether it was viewed as affecting the welfare of India, the trade and commerce of England, or the consistency of their commercial legislation; on either or all these grounds he thought he could show that this was a question entitled to the gravest consideration of Parliament, and one on which he thought he should be able to show that Parliament had had no fair option. He did not need to remind the House that in all countries salt was a first necessary of life; but in India, where the diet was vegetable, it was particularly more required than elsewhere. In India that necessary of life was scarce, the supply was deficient, and the price exorbitantly high. In England there was no limit to the supply, and the price was proportionately cheap. Why did not the usual law of supply and demand operate in this case? What was it that prevented the supply and cheapness of the article in England from being applied to relieve the deficiency and dearness of India? It was the East India Company, who stepped in with this monopoly. They manufactured, charged whatever price they liked, imposed a duty of 300 or 400 per cent on the article, whether produced in India or imported, and thus they injured the people whom they were bound to protect, preventing the usual laws of supply and demand, and the ordinary rules of commerce, from operating. If the President of the Board of Control said the remedy was to be found in India, his reply was, that the Indian Government and the East India Company could not be depended upon; and if a remedy was to be given it must be so by the British Parliament. In the first place, he should draw the attention of the House to the price of salt in India. He should quote from the Calcutta Review, and with the less hesitation because he found in the papers laid before the House by the Court of Directors that the calcutta Review was referred to as a work of authority. He should also take the Company's own figures, and prove the case from the Company's own witnesses. One of those witnesses was Mr. Halliday—a gentleman of great ability and authority in India; there were also his hon. Friend opposite the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), and Lord Dalhousie, the Governor General of India. The East India Company put the cost of their own manufacture at 80 rupees for the 100 maunds. They added a duty which was no less than 250 rupees on the 100 maunds, making a total of 350 rupees for the 100 maunds. That sum in English money amounted to about 8l. 5s. for the ton of salt. The Calcutta Review said—

"Now commences the chief iniquity of the system. A great proportion of the salt for inland consumption throughout the country is purchased by large wholesale merchants at less than 4 rupees the maund" [10l. per ton]. "These mix a fixed proportion of sand, chiefly got a few miles to the south-east of Dacca, and sell the mixture to a second, or (counting the Government) a third monopolist, at about 5 or 6 rupees. This dealer has more earth or ashes, and thus passing through more hands from the larger towns to villages, the price is still further raised from 8 to 10 rupees, and the proportion of adulteration from 25 to 40 per cent."

He would next call attention to the English price of this necessary article. Salt in Worcestershire cost 10s. per ton; in Cheshire 6s. or 7s. per ton; so that the price in the interior of India was actually fifty times higher than the cost price in England. Salt that had cost 10s. in Worcestershire could be shipped at 15s.; and, with 25s. more for freight and cost of transit to Calcutta, the price at which it was landed there was about 2l. per ton. It would there have to pay the duty of 2½ rupees per maund, which raised the charge as nearly as possible 1,400 per cent on the first cost, The article cost as soon as it was taken out of bond 9l. per ton. It then got into the hands of the monopolist. It afterwards underwent adulteration, though not to the same extent as the native article; and when it reached the interior it was exposed for sale at the exorbitant price, of 18l., 20l., or 25l. for the English ton. Such was the charge which the unfortunate native of India had to pay. He would next draw attention to the consumption. The first question that arose was, what was the consumption necessary for the purposes of health? The consumption per head per annum in England varied from 21lb. to 25lb.; in the United States, where there was no Excise, and a moderate import duty, the average was 27lb.; in Russia, where there was a heavy import duty, 23lb.; in Austria, where there was a Crown monopoly, 20lb.; in Prussia, where there was also a Government monopoly, 18lb.; in France, Belgium, and Holland, 21lb. What was the consumption of India? According to a paper of the Court of Directors, it was only 12 lb. per head per annum—as nearly as might be half the consumption in Europe and America. That diminished consumption also took place, it should be remembered, in India, a country in which the great extent to which vegetable diet was used rendered the consumption of salt more necessary than it was in other countries. It should be remembered also that the salt consumed in Europe and America was pure and unadulterated, while of that which was used in India more than one-half was mere dirt and ashes. Now what, he would ask, were the effects which had been produced in India by a state of things such as that to which he had just called the attention of the House? He had before him papers issued by the Court of Directors this year, in which they had not stated the case so frankly as they might. The consumption of 12 lb. per head per annum was, he believed, a great exaggeration as regarded Bengal; but they proceeded to estimate the wages of the Indian peasant at three rupees per month—an amount which might be received for work on a railway, but which was greatly beyond the average amount received for Indian labour. Taking that amount, and the case of single men, they declared the deduction for this exorbitant monopoly did not exceed 1½ per cent on the earnings of a man. Instead of taking a single person, the average ought to be taken of a man with his family—of five persons instead of one. Then it would be found that the Indian labourer had to pay various prices, from 7 to 12 per cent on his income, to purchase the primary necessary of salt; and in some cases it would take two months' labour to provide him with that portion of salt which was indispensable, not only for his comfort, but for his health. The Court of Directors further stated that—

"The pressure of the salt tax on the labourer could not be regarded as severe, inasmuch as it was the only way in which he contributed to the pecuniary necessities of the State; in all other respects he was not necessarily subject to taxation."

The Directors said so in 1853, with a new Act for the government of India, hanging over their heads. He should, before he proceeded further upon this point, refer them to the evidence of Mr. Halliday, who in 1847 stated—

"That the people in the interior still buy their salt at a price which presses hardly on their means, and that no small portion of the community obtain no salt at all, but are obliged to substitute for it adulterated and often deleterious articles, are, unfortunately, notorious facts."

He wished next to remind the House of what Mr. Halliday had said the other day before the Committee now sitting on Indian Affairs, when asked what would be the probable effect with respect to the manufacture of salt if the duty were altogether removed:—

"It is generally understood by those best acquainted with the subject, and it cannot be denied by any one who looks into the details, that the present price of the Government manufactured salt in Bengal is very much raised to the consumer in the market by the necessary want of economy, not to say extravagance, connected with the Government system of manufacture, and by those many speculations and extortions and corruptions which are inevitable in such a system, and carried on with such instruments."

He now came to another painful part of the subject, which he sincerely hoped would weigh with the Government and the House—namely, the effect which the state of things he had just described produced on the health and lives of the natives of India, The first witness he should quote was not an interested English manufacturer, nor an enthusiastic writer from the Parliamentary party known as "Young India," but a homely but useful book—namely, Dr. Graham's Domestic Medicine, a work which was written long before this question arose, so that this writer was at all events an impartial witness:—

"Salt is a natural stimulant to the digestive organs, and seems absolutely necessary to the health of the animal body; for those who neglect it as an article of diet have a weak and depraved digestion, and engender worms; often with frightful rapidity."

But what are the effects of an utter and compulsory want of it? The same writer also tells us in a note on the above passage:—

"A mode of punishment formerly existed in Holland, which places the effects resulting from a total disuse of salt, more especially in moist climates, in a striking point of view. The ancient laws of the country enacted that certain convicted men should be kept on bread alone, unmixed with salt, as the severest punishment that could be inflicted on them in their moist climate. The effect was horrible; these wretched criminals are said to have been devoured by worms engendered in their own stomachs."

Mr. Carnac Brown, from whose pamphlet he had quoted this extract from Dr. Graham, added:—

"Be it noted that this effect was produced upon these persons by confining them to a vegetable diet uncorrected by salt. A diet wholly vegetable is the diet of numerous classes in India, and a diet almost wholly so is the diet of the rest of the population. A punishment, therefore, the most horrible and loathsome which human barbarity ever devised in the dark ages, for the torture of the worst criminals, is the fide which the East India Company maintain and defend as one of their principal fiscal resources, and which they deliberately run the risk of inflicting, in this the nineteenth century, upon the millions of innocent men whom humane England has confided to their governance! Not only do multitudes of natives die annually in the interior of disease produced by the want of a sufficient supply of salt to sustain life in a healthy state; but no man who has used his opportunities of observation among them can entertain a doubt that many of those who survive and are met with in every part, victims to the most loathsome and miserable diseases, gradually making them objects truly horrible to behold, owe the origin and the inveterancy of their sufferings to the same cause, which converts the blood in their bodies into a mass of corruption."

He would next turn to the Calcutta Review of March last. What did it say on the subject?—

"The curse which this tax thus proves to the country is manifest to every one intimately acquainted with the condition of the poor; not only do they suffer from the ruinous price at which it is sold, but from its deleterious character. They eat, but they are not satisfied; they heap on salt, for which they have paid dearly, but there is no savour in the rice. And those who cannot afford to purify it are compelled, in violence to their habitual cleanliness in diet, to consume a large proportion of injurious sand and filth. Disease is the inevitable result, especially in a low country, and where vegetable diet is the universal food. Every one acquainted with the constitution of the Bengali, knows that the prevailing complaint of the country is worms. A missionary of twenty years' experience in dealing with the bodies, as well as the souls of the natives, once told us—'If ever I am at a loss to know what is the matter with a man, I prescribe salt and pomegranate bark, for he is sure to have worms, whatever other complaints he may have.' To this state of the native constitution are to be imputed many diseases of the digestive organs and bowels; that general debility, which induces recurring fever, and causes fatal results to accrue from cholera and other violent attacks, while it is the immediate producer of that most loathsome judgment, not unfrequent, among the poor, of being literally eaten up by worms."

The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control would perhaps tell him that Dr. Graham was no authority on medical subjects, and that the writer in the Calcutta Review was an anonymous writer; but, at all events, he would not venture to tell him that salt was not absolutely essential to life and health in India, and that, under the existing arrangements, the native Indians were deprived of that quantity as well as that wholesome quality of salt, without which it was impossible they could have health or enjoyment. He challenged the right hon. Gentleman to disprove his assertions on that point, but he did not believe he would attempt it. Leaving that question to be solved by the facts which he had laid before the House, and by those to which he would subsequently call their attention, he would now turn to another aspect of the question, and view it as connected with the Indian trade. He asked the House to bear in mind what he thought was not an unimportant consideration—namely, what but for this monopoly would be the condition of the fisheries of India. They all knew the importance of the mackerel fishery at Newfoundland and around the coast of North America. They knew what sources of wealth were the pilchard and herring fisheries on the coasts of England and Scotland, and the sardine fishery in the Mediterranean. But were they aware that sardines were as abundant in the Indian seas as in the Mediterranean, and that but for the salt monopoly they might form an important element, not only of the Indian trade, but of the comfort of the natives? He had the authority of Bishop—Herbert for saying

"It is well known to all persons acquainted with the history of the West Indies during the slavery period, that a portion of salt fish was regularly served out to the negroes as an essential and legal part of their rations, without which they could not subsist, nor work in health for their masters."

Bishop Heber related, in his Travels—

"That in the remotest parts he visited in Hindostan he found a small addition of salt fish valued as a grateful relish to their vegetable food by all classes of natives able to consume it."

He would next give them the opinion of Mr. Carnac Brown on the same subject:—

"I have seen a French ship arrive on the west coast in the sardine season freighted with the usual supply of Nantes sardines. I have seen her readily sell off canister after canister of them, containing, perhaps, two dozen fish, to the English residents, for 18s. to 20s. each (nine or ten rupees); and, at the very same time, I have seen a native fisherman return to the shore with a boatload of fresh sardines, the fruit of a whole night's toil; I have seen this man glad to sell his many thousands of fish for 2s., or one rupee, to be used as manure, as the only choice left to him to save them from rotting on the beach, because of his utter inability to buy the Company's monopoly—salt, requisite to cure and convert his sardines into an article of the same universal demand and value as the French sardines selling before his eyes."

He thought the House would admit that these facts formed a strong claim for consideration on the part of the House of Commons. On what principle—above all, how, on their own principles, did the Government justify a monopoly of this kind, which they must acknowledge was injurious to British trade, inasmuch as it compelled the English manufacturer to keep his salt at home, and prevented him sending it to a market where it was wanted to supply the necessities of the people of India, as well as restricted the use of British shipping in conveying it where it was required? He might be told that at present shipping was abundantly employed. He admitted it, but that was no answer to his argument, for that was only the ephemeral effect of the passing hour; and he did not believe that they would tell him that it was a wise policy to restrict the use of British shipping in any single branch of commerce. These were some of the crying evils to which this monopoly had led. And who was to blame for them? He was sorry to say he could impute the blame to no one but the Indian Government and the East India Company. He could show the House that not only had the Government of India incessantly struggled for years to keep up this monopoly, but that at this very moment they were as much as ever—nay, he believed, more than ever, struggling not only to maintain, but to increase the monopoly. In 1836 so pressing was this subject felt to be that a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to investigate the merits of the question. He would beg the attention of the House to the Report of that Committee. It stated that this monopoly was subject to all the evils which attended monopolies under ordinary circumstances—that it formed no exception; and then it proceeded to say—

"Your Committee cannot conclude without expressing their conviction, that however modified the monopoly may be, the evils of the system can never be totally eradicated but by its extinction; and, entertaining a strong opinion that the interests of the consumer and revenue will ultimately be best secured by a considerable reduction of the duty under a system of free competition, they repeat the expression of their hope that the Government will not neglect to give their early and serious attention to this important subject."

The passage he had read formed part of the Resolutions of the Committee. He further found that the hon. Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg), who was a Member of the Committee, moved an Amendment that the words after "extinction" should be omitted; but the hon. Baronet was a party to the emphatic declaration that nothing but the extinction of the salt monopoly would remedy the evil of the system. [Sir J. W. HOGG: Hear, hear!] Well, year passed away after year, and still this monopoly continued in full action, and the natives of India continued to be oppressed by this state of things. At last, in 1845, the trade of this country cried out loudly; and he considered it his duty to go to the India House with a deputation to remonstrate on the fact that for nine intervening years nothing except the lowering of the duty in 1844 had been done to remedy the evils complained of. In 1845 the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton was what was generally called "a Chair." [Laughter.] That is, he was one of two chairs—he feared not always very easy chairs. The hon. Baronet was then, as he generally was, attended by a most respectable elderly gentleman, who seemed to think it his first duty to do whatever the hon. Baronet bade him, and to echo whatever the hon. Baronet said. He felt bound to say, that nothing could exceed the courtesy of his hon. Friend on that occasion. He took the deputation completely aback, and made them look extremely foolish. The hon. Baronet virtually told them that they had come on a fool's errand; that they were entirely mistaken in supposing that English salt was excluded from India; that salt might be sent to India as to any other market, upon payment of the duty, which said duty, however, was certainly enormous—as much, indeed, as 400 per cent. An English merchant who was one of the deputation was so delighted with the hon. Baronet's courteous bearing, and so carried away with his assurances, that he actually sent off 2,000 tons of salt to India on the faith of them. The result was, that he found the hon. Baronet's description strictly true as to the letter, but wholly erroneous as to substance. He was not only asked to pay the duty on his salt, but to pay it before it went over the ship's side, at the risk of great wastage. He was told that he was perfectly free to warehouse it; but there was no warehouse. In fact, the whole thing broke down; and the owner was obliged to send it where it was less wanted than anywhere else—to the bottom of the sea, and he resolved to try no more experiments in connexion with the subject until the salt trade was on a better footing. This, however, brought things to a crisis. He (Sir J. Pakington) and some others waited on Lord Broughton, who received them in the most favourable way, and evinced an anxiety, which he believed he sincerely felt, to put an end to the evil. And what, perhaps, was of more importance, the subject was taken up by the late Sir Robert Peel, who presented a petition on the subject in such a manner as showed he was fully alive to the enormity of the grievance. In February, 1847, an ateration was made by the Company to the effect of allowing the duty to be paid when the salt was taken out of bond, making a fair allowance for wastage, and providing warehouses, but still retaining the enormous duty. What was the result? In 1847, the exports from England were 25,754 tons; in 1.848, 15,507 tons; in 1849, they rose to 27,640 tons; in 1850, to 36,341 tons; and in 1851, to 61,711 tons; but in 1852 they fell to 37,677 tons, owing to the high rate of freights occasioned by the gold discoveries in Australia. So that, in point of fact, even the exports of the year 1852 could not be said to form any exception to the general rule which had led to the increase he had mentioned. And this had occurred in spite of what he thought was not quite bonâ fide conduct on the part of the Company. The Government of India professed to carry out the recommendations of the Select Committee of 1836, namely, to allow foreign salt to enter into fair competition with native salt; but in a minute by the Governor General it was laid down that—

"To warrant the Government of Bengal in continuing this system, I conceive it is essential that the operation of the system should clearly involve no injustice to the importer of salt from without, or to the producer of home salt in India. The representations of the Revenue Board, in my humble judgment, have established that under the existing system, no injustice is done to the importer of salt, but that great and growing injustice is inflicted on the native producer of that article. For, the importer of salt from England or from elsewhere has a right to expect that he should not be exposed, by the determination of the Government of Bengal to retain the monopoly of salt in its own hands, to any greater competition than he would have to contend with if the monopoly were abolished, and the traffic in salt, like the traffic in any other article, were carried on by ordinary traders. The Government of Bengal, acquiescing in that principle, have long since given effect to it by establishing that the selling price of their native salt shall consist of the amount of the import duty on foreign salt, plus the cost of manufacture and conveyance for sale of the native article."

The whole course of the Company's conduct, indeed, showed that they had not the slightest intention of carrying out the arrangement in the spirit of the Committee's Report. It appeared from the papers which had been produced to the Committee the other day by Mr. Aylwin that the Company had actually sold their salt at a loss as compared with the amount which they would have received from the payment of the duty by the importer. From that duty they would have derived in seven years a sum of 80,626,000 rupees, while the sum they had received during that period had only amounted to 69,253,633 rupees; so that they had suffered a loss in those years of not less than 11,372,370 rupees, or 1,137,237l. Mr. Halliday, indeed, in his answers to the Committee, had endeavoured to explain away a fact so damaging to the system, but his answers had completely failed to substantiate the proposition which he desired to establish. This witness, in fact, after Mr. Aylwin's figures had been shown him, admitted that one fifth of the Company's salt had been sold retail at a lower rate than the regulation price; that was to say, the cost of manufacture, plus the duty, which was precisely the charge that was made against the Company in this particular. Mr. Halliday's next explanation of the matter was, that Mr. Aylwin had not included in the price he gave the cost of the prevention, that was to say, the cost of the prevention of smuggling, and so on; which, said Mr. Halliday, ought to have been included by him in the cost of the manufacture. But this answer, like his others, only served to establish the case against the East India Government. He would now call the attention of the House to the effects upon the importation of salt into India, of the change effected in 1847. In 1829–30, the imports of salt into Calcutta, were 10,498 maunds; they increased gradually and slowly till 1847–48, when they were 1,772,134 maunds. In 1851–52, they were 3,174,370 maunds, while they had sold of the Company's salt only 3,135,949 maunds, making a total of 6,31.0,319 maunds. When, however, you looked at the Company's sales, these which in 1847–8 were 4,907,387 maunds, had fallen in 1851–2 to 3,135,949 maunds, in which year, as he had just shown, the imports of foreign salt, notwithstanding the enormous duty of 300 or 400 per cent, had actually turned the scale, and now exceeded the sale of the home manufacture by 38,421 maunds. This brought him to the proposition, that the Indian authorities, so far from relaxing in their monopoly—so far from yielding to the wants and wishes of India in this essential matter, were now setting every nerve to work to revive that monopoly and to make it more oppressive. The Indian year ended in April. Just after the close of this year, 1851–2, the change he had described in the relative position of imported salt and home salt becoming manifest, the Indian authorities discovered all of a sudden that they had been committing, as Lord Dalhousie benevolently styled it, "the blunder" of charging as cost of manufacture certain items which ought to have been charged to revenue, under the head of " preventive cost." Justice to the producer forthwith became the cry with the Indian authorities, and a long letter was written from the Board of Revenue on the subject, to which the Governor General, for whose character and abilities he entertained the highest respect, was induced to append a minute, in terms which clearly manifested, that, in the candid simplicity of his heart, he had no idea that he was therein making himself a party to the most palpable dodge that was ever seen on the part of the East India Company. So long as the import of salt was limited, so long as the home manufacture thrived, the Company found it remarkably convenient to charge on the poor consumers of India the items for prevention; but the moment it became clear that the home manufacture was in danger, the Company wrote to the Governor General that these items ought to have been borne by the revenue. The law had been framed to favour the home manufacture; and the only point in favour of the importer was, that he sold salt, while the native article was composed of sand and ashes and other deleterious substances. The Company at length feared that they should be driven out of the market; and Lord Dalhousie stated that they ought not to be deterred by any sense of false shame from confessing their former blunder. But there had been in reality no blunder at all; it was a system by which, so long as they found it at all answer, they sought to maintain their monopoly; and their only reason for making a change was, that they desired, by a new process, to undersell the foreign importer, who had at length managed to undersell them, and having, by a dodge, recovered their position, to revive their monopoly in full force. By transferring the items for prevention from cost of manufacture to revenue, they would reduce the cost price from 80 rupees per 100 manilas, to 65 rupees per 100 maunds, or 7s. 6d. per ton, the price of salt in Cheshire; a reduction by which they anticipated they should be able again to undersell the foreign importer, and so, keeping his salt out of the market, revive their own monopoly. That was the case he had to lay before Parliament; and he could hardly think that it was necessary for him to enter into any lengthened argument for the purpose of establishing his position. What was it that he was then doing? Would the House believe—would the country believe that it was necessary for him, in the year 1853, to appeal to the followers of the late Sir Robert Peel, the great advocate of commercial freedom, and the great enemy of commercial restriction, to put an end to a monopoly fatal to the health, the comfort, the lives of the people of India, and which injured to a considerable extent one important branch of the trade and shipping of this country? He supposed he would be met upon that occasion by the single argument of money. He would be told, perhaps, that the Government of India could not dispense with the revenue which it derived from the monopoly. He had two answers to give to any such argument. In the first place, he had to tell them that they were governing India under a deep and heavy responsibility, and that they were not justified, in the sight of God or man, in raising a revenue by injuring and oppressing the people of that country. His second answer was, that in point of fact their revenue was not at stake in that question. At all events, he did not ask them to abandon their revenue. He begged them to remember that all he asked them to do was to adopt a combined system of Excise and of Customs duties. In Bombay they had adopted that combined system with regard to salt, and there the revenue had flourished. He did not see why the same system should not answer in Bengal. He should add, however, that he certainly contemplated a reduction of the duty. He believed that the duty ought to be lowered, and that the natives of India and the British merchants could not in justice or in policy be subjected to a continuance of the present exorbitant duty, which amounted to not less than 300 or 400 per cent. He felt, however, that there were good reasons to expect, that, with modified customs and with lower duties, the revenue would not seriously suffer, if it should suffer at all. The duty on salt had been reduced on three former occasions; it had been reduced in 1844, in 1847, and in 1849; and the result of those three experiments showed that salt in India was no exception to the rule which held good in this country with regard to other articles of commerce, that a reduction of duty led to an increase of consumption. But he would revert to his first argument, that they were not morally justified in raising a revenue from a source which led to grievous, and in many instances fatal, injury to the people of India. Upon that point he would quote no less distinguished an authority than Lord Dalhousie. In the minute written by Lord Dalhousie the other day, he found the following emphatic passage:—

"If it be objected that to do so" [to lower the price] "will involve a sacrifice of revenue, I reply, that even if it should reduce the revenue, the plea cannot be admitted."

The noble Lord went on to say—

"This is a question of duty and justice, and not one of expediency or profit. If it be admitted, as I think it must, that the people are bearing an unfair burden, it is the duty of the Government to lighten it at whatever sacrifice or cost."

He was ready to admit, that Lord Dalhousie had used that argument with immediate reference to the salt producers; but he contended, at the same time, that the noble Lord's language admitted of a wide, and even of a general application. Those were noble words; and he (Sir J. Pakington) cared not what might be the special object for which they had been employed. They were large words, and as such he adopted them. It was true that he was acting upon that occasion at the request of the salt manufacturers of Worcestershire and Cheshire; but it was also true that before that request had been addressed to him, he had given notice of his intention to bring that subject under the consideration of the House. He had taken up the question with the full and deliberate conviction that the conduct of the authorities in India upon that matter was a stain on our Government in that country. The right hon. President of the Board of Control, in introducing that Bill to the notice of the House, had consumed four or five hours in boasting of the blessings which our rule had conferred on the people of India; but he (Sir J. Pakington) said that they had no right to make that boast so long as they left that people to be the victims of elephantiasis and many other diseases brought on them by a want of the first necessary of life in such a land—a necessary of life which they as a paternal Government were bound to place within their reach. So long as they did not place it within their reach he held that they were guilty of a breach of one of the first duties imposed on them by the authority which they exercised in India. He challenged and invited them to defend that monopoly if they could. He believed that it could not be defended; and in the name of the people of India he demanded that it should be repealed. Clause—

"And whereas by the Act 3 & 4 Will. 4, hereinbefore recited, it was enacted, 'That the said Company shall with all convenient speed, after the twenty-second day of April 1834, close their commercial business, and make sale of all their merchandise, stores, and effects, at home and abroad, distinguished in their account books as commercial assets, and all their warehouses, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and property whatsoever, which may not be retained for the purposes of government of the said territories, and get in all debts due to them on account of the commercial branch of their affairs, and reduce their commercial establishment as the same shall become unnecessary, and discontinue and abstain from all commercial business which shall not be incident to the closing of their actual concerns, and to the conversion into money of the property hereinbefore directed to be sold, or which shall not be carried on for the purposes of the said Government.

"And whereas the said East India Company have continued to carry on the manufacture and sale of Salt, from the date of the said Act to the present time, notwithstanding the aforesaid provision.

"And whereas it is expedient that the said Salt monopoly should absolutely cease and determine: Be it Enacted, That from and after the first day of May 1856, it shall be unlawful for the said East India Company to continue the manufacture of Salt as at present carried on by them in the province of Bengal, and that such manufacture shall absolutely cease, whether carried on by the East India Company or on the account and under the control of the said Company, and that the manufacture and sale of Salt in India shall be absolutely free, subject only to such Excise or other Duties as may now or from time to time be levied upon such Salt so manufactured."

thought that if the right hon. Baronet had concluded his speech by saying that, in the name of the people of Droitwich, he called upon the House to alter the mode of levying the duty upon salt, his appeal would have been much more consistent with the arguments he had used. There had been various anomalies and contradictions during the debates on this measure, but be certainly had been surprised to hear the right hon. Baronet appealing to God and man against the enormity of imposing a duty upon the food of the people. A right hon. Gentleman who had advocated the maintenance of a duty upon corn, and upon other articles of food in this country, now appealed to the House to declare that it was utterly impossible, in the face of God and man, to maintain one single tax in India upon an article of consumption. The people of India paid a tax upon one single article of consumption—salt, and the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends considered that tax so utterly unjustifiable that they contended the House was bound to repeal it all hazards. The argument sounded strangely from the lips of the right hon. Gentleman—he had introduced in almost every other sentence of his speech the unpalatable word "monopoly;" but so little did the right hon. Gentleman appear to understand the meaning of that term that he had actually complained of a proceeding on the part of the Governor General of India, the effect of which would be to reduce the price of salt to the consumer, as an attempt to increase and enhance an existing monopoly. He (Sir C. Wood) had always understood that a monopoly meant an endeavour, by artificial means, to raise the price to the consumer; but the Governor General of India had sanctioned a measure the effect of which would be to reduce the price of salt from 80 to 65 rupees per 100 maunds. The effect of this reduction of the price of salt made in Bengal would of course be to compel a reduction in the price of salt exported from this country; but though it might be natural that the exporter from England should complain, the consumer in India would clearly gain by the reduction. The Indian Government were taking measures against monopoly. What the right hon. Baronet wanted was to maintain a partial protection on behalf of the exporters of salt in this country. The right hon. Gentleman had found fault with a reduction of the price of salt, which was clearly for the benefit of the Indian consumer, and had charged Lord Dalhousie with what he called a "dodge"—

was sure the right hon. Baronet did not mean intentionally to misrepresent him, but he must state that he had said nothing of the sort. He entertained the greatest respect for Lord Dalhousie, and he had applied the word "dodge" not to the conduct of the noble Lord, but to that of the Company.

said, it was true the right hon. Gentleman had expressed great respect for Lord Dalhousie, but, as he was commenting upon the policy of the Government, declared in Lord Dalhousie's minute, the terra "dodge" could only be regarded as applying to that noble Lord. The right hon. Baronet had referred to what had taken place in years gone by, when, undoubtedly, a monopoly with regard to the sale of salt in India had existed; but the Resolutions of the Committee of 1836, as the right hon. Gentle- man had shown, had been fully carried into effect in 1847, when that monopoly ceased. His statements and his arguments applied to a state of things long gone by. The right hon. Member for Droitwich had referred to the reports of the Secretary to the Revenue Board, who stated most distinctly that the Government of India had no monopoly, in the ordinary sense of the word, and that they were not themselves manufacturers of salt. A large revenue was derived from the consumption of salt in India, and the Company adopted the mode of collecting the revenue which they regarded as the cheapest and most convenient. There was in Bengal one large establishment for manufacturing salt, an excise duty being charged upon the produce; but an unlimited supply of salt was imported, upon which a revenue duty, equal to the excise duty, was charged. Salt might also be introduced from the Northwestern Provinces. The Government officers entered into contracts for salt by means which were equivalent to public competition, and, so far as the consumers were concerned, there was no monopoly with regard to the sale of that article. There were, in fact, in India five different competing supplies of salt, the duty upon all being equal, whether levied by customs or by excise. It would have been something to the purpose if any evidence had been laid before the House to show that the natives of India had any reason to complain of the want of salt. [Cries of Oh, oh!"] Well, he would ask those who had read the evidence, whether it contained a single syllable showing that the natives of India suffered from the want of salt, or that the duty was a heavy charge upon them? It appeared from the inquiries before the Committee of 1836, that in the household of a great native landowner, with an income of 20,000l. a year, the average consumption of salt by each individual was 12 lb. of salt per annum. The consumption per head throughout India now amounted to 12 lb. per head. Mr. Halliday's evidence established the same fact as to the peasantry of Bengal. There was, therefore, no evidence of consumption being materially diminished by high price. The duty upon salt was three-farthings per pound, and, therefore, taking 12 lb. of salt as the average consumption in India, the amount of duty paid would be only 9d. per head. The right hon. Gentleman had thrown discredit on the statistical information of the East India House; but, so far from that being just, the Company in this instance had understated their case. According to their statement the charge on the labourer was greater than it really was. Numerous witnesses had been examined as to the effect of the salt duties. Mr. J. Dykes, for example, had stated distinctly that it was the only tax paid by the people of India, and that a week's labour would pay the whole amount. Mr. Turner, a collector in the North-western Provinces, had stated that he had never heard the slightest complaint respecting it. To the elaborate and highly-coloured pictures drawn by the right hon. Gentleman of the effect of a want of salt, he must reply, that there was no evidence at all to show that the natives of India had not a fair amount of salt for consumption. The right hon. Gentleman had also drawn a comparison between the native salt and the imported salt, and had stated that the former was very impure. The fact was, however, that the adulterations complained of were made after the article had left the company's warehouses, and they were made to an equal extent in the imported salt. Another part of the right hon. Gentleman's case was, that the reduction of duty on salt by the Governor General prevented the importation of the article from this country. But why had that reduction been made? Partly, no doubt, to prevent the adulteration of the imported article, but also for another more important reason. There were a great many persons employed in India in the manufacture of salt; persons whose Forefathers had been engaged in the same manufacture for centuries; and it was found, upon inquiry, that a very large proportion of these had been thrown out of employment by the increased importation of the article. He was quite ready to subscribe to the principle, that, for the benefit of the consumer, there ought to be fair opening for the importation of salt into India; but the House, in deciding this question, ought not to do so with reference to the interests of a particular class in England, but only with reference to the interests of the natives of India. One of the grounds urged by the witnesses from Cheshire was the employment of the people there. But how did this argument apply to India? Referring to the increased importation of British salt to which the right hon. Gentleman had alluded, and, taking the last twenty years, he found that then had been a diminished consumption of native salt amounting to 1,600,000 maunds The number of people who had been thereby thrown out of employment in India was about 32,000l. Looking to the interests of the people of India, then, he thought the Governor General perfectly right in taking care that they were no subjected to an unfair competition with English salt, which really was the case at present. It was found by the Governor General, on inquiry, that several of the salt agencies, where the salt was manufactured, had ceased to be productive, and had been closed, thereby throwing large numbers of people out of employment In his opinion, therefore, the Governor General would have been guilty of serious neglect of duty, if, when he discovered these facts, he had not at once endeavoured to make the competition fair an equal. The reduction of the duty by the Governor General was therefore just and reasonable. He thought he had clearly established the fact that it was not in the name of the people of India that the right, hon. Gentleman had adjured the House to consider this question—that he had complained of a monopoly which, in point of fact, did not exist—and that it was only reasonable that the East India Company should be allowed to decide how they were best able to raise the revenue in India. With regard to the latter, he would only advert to the fact that the Government of India reduced the duty on salt full 25 per cent within the last eight years; and though the revenue had suffered considerably in consequence, it was his firm belief that before very long it would arrive at former amount. When that should be accomplished, he had no doubt that the Government would at once propose a further reduction in the duty on salt. Such, however, would not be the effect of the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, for it did not affect in any way the amount of duty. It only put an end to the present mode levying the duty, which the best authorities in India considered to be the cheapest and least oppressive to the people. If it were carried, it would force the Governor General to establish a system of excise through out India, and it would seriously distress the very large number of persons who depended on the manufacture of salt for the livelihood. Having the whole case before them, he considered the House was called upon to say whether the salt duty was to be repealed or not. He had shown that the general tenor of the evidence adduced before the Committee established the fact, that the pressure of the duty was not complained of, that it produced a revenue of 1,500,000l., and that no substitute had been proposed for it. It was true, indeed, that one witness had proposed to impose in its place a large duty on sugar; but that, he supposed, would not suit the views of the right hon. Gentleman. But almost every witness had stated clearly and distinctly, that the salt duty was anything but an oppressive tax, and they had seriously impressed upon the Government the impropriety of attempting to impose a new tax—new taxes being more distasteful and obnoxious than in any other part of the world. The principle of legislation on which the House had acted of late years, had been to abolish as many of the smaller customs duties as possible, and to depend for the revenue on two or three great articles of consumption. The Government of India was further advanced in this respect. All taxes on consumption in India were confined to the one duty on salt, and that had been reduced full 25 per cent. If they had been able to do that in this country they would be remarkably well off. He must here notice another argument adduced by the right hon. Gentleman. He had stated that the monopoly of the East India Company in the manufacture of salt materially diminished the importation of salt from England; but the right hon. Gentleman had quite forgotten, or was ignorant of, the state of the case as regarded Bombay. In that Presidency the duty was an excise duty; much lower in amount than in Bengal; but not a single pound of English salt had been imported into the former. That, he thought, proved that the right hon. Gentleman would fail to effect the object he had in view, even if he succeeded in carrying his Motion. Neither the consumer nor the importer would be benefited by the change which the right hon. Gentleman proposed in the mode of levying the duty. On all these grounds, he asked the House to resist the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, he thought that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control had abounded in serious mistakes and misrepresentations of the question before the House. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) had been charged with bringing forward his Motion solely in consequence of the particular constituency which he represented; but he (Mr. Phillimore) would be at least free from any such imputation, and it would be admitted that he had no other motive but the welfare of the people of India. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) had referred to the Indian Customs Report; but when he did so he must have been ignorant that a high authority had shown that document to be full of the most incredible misrepresentations. Surely he must have forgotten how very much garbled that Report had been. Authorities on Indian matters had declared that Report to be a tissue of misrepresentations. He alluded to the declaration of Mr. Craufurd. Mr. Craufurd said that nothing could be more absurd than to suppose that the Bengalee would not consume more of that necessary article, salt, than he did if he could procure a cheap and wholesome supply, instead of an adulterated and abominable mass of putrefaction. And he (Mr. Phillimore) might add that he had just been called out of the House by Mr. Chapman, who had recently published a pamphlet, in which he showed that the consumption of salt by the natives of Bombay was 33 lbs. a head annually instead of 12 lbs., but that with respect to the annual consumption of the Bengalee, instead of its being 12 lbs. a head, he did not believe it amounted to 7 lbs. But the East India Company furnished a complete refutation of their own statements; for, according to Mr. Craufurd, the Madras sepoy, when on foreign service, received at the rate of an annual allowance of 17 lbs. of salt; the Bombay sepoy received 45 lbs; and the Bengalee sepoy 23 lbs. What became, then, of the right hon. Baronet's argument, that the present system operated for the advantage of the people of India? What became of his extraordinary statement that this Motion was got up for the benefit of certain classes in England? When the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Trade twitted the right Gentleman the Member for Droitwich with his change of opinions on the subject of free trade, he did not perceive that he himself had changed his opinions in favour of monopoly. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich had gone forward—the right hon. Member for Halifax had gone back- ward. He, the former friend of free trade, was now the advocate of monopoly, and of a monopoly as gross and cruel as any individual or any nation ever groaned under. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax complained of the use of the word "monopoly." Why, it was the very word made use of by Lord Dalhousie himself. In the despatches laid on the table, Lord Dalhousie used the expression, "The Government is determined to retain the monopoly of salt in its own hands." It was then a monopoly; and it was a miserable evasion, a quibble, a putting aside of the facts of the case, to say that it was not, Defend it if they would—say that it was just and right; but deny not that it was a monopoly. Mr. Craufurd fully disposed of the argument that the people of Bengal would not consume more salt if they could get it. He showed that their climate was damp—that the country was distant from the sea—that the soil was not impregnated with saline particles—that the diet of the people was vegetable and insipid, and that their poverty excluded them from the use of every other condiment. But that was not all. Mr. Colebrooke, one of the ablest of Indian statists, described very graphically the delight of the Indian when he could get salt, and showed how much he would use it if it were brought within the reach of his means. And the right hon. Member for Droitwich had clearly shown, that far from being a gainer by this monopoly, the East India Company were losers by it. According to the regulations of the Company, the price of salt was fixed on the principle that it should not fall short of the cost of production, together with a fixed duty on it as revenue. The high price thus fixed tended to lessen the consumption, and the consequence had been that the revenue lost, between 1845 and 1851, no less than 1,137,237l. It was not, therefore, for the sake of the revenue of India that the monopoly was kept up. But the right hon. Gentleman challenged them to point out any means by which this deficiency in the revenue might be supplied. He thought the remedy was very obvious. If Government would lower the duty in such a way as to allow of the manufacture of a cheap and wholesome article, levying a duty at the rate of one rupee per maund, which would be equal to a duty of 2l. 14s. 6d. per ton, that would produce a revenue of 2,206,677l., and it would confer upon the inhabitants of Hin- dostan the supply of a cheap and wholesome salt. At the workhouse in Liverpool the average amount of salt consumed per head was 16 lbs., at Coldbath-fields Prison, 13 lbs.; and at Glasgow Bridewell, 16 lbs.; and yet the right hon. Gentleman said that 12 lbs. per head was sufficient for an Indian living on rice and vegetable diet! The monopoly was a cruel and grievous one, and it had been continued because the people of India had no representatives to bring their wrongs before Parliament; and now, when a right hon. Gentleman came forward, and in a manly manner exposed the true state of the case, he was met by the imputation that he acted from the consideration merely of local interests. But there was another fact. The right hon. Gentleman never touched upon the adulteration of salt. Did he deny it? If he did not deny it, would he say that the system of adulteration ought to continue? To such an extent was it adulterated, that on the late expedition to China, when our troops were compelled to use the Bengal salt, it produced a dreadful disease and a great mortality among them. But further, the right hon. Gentleman did not seem to be aware that there was a distinction in the price of salt in Madras and in Bengal. Bengal, according to Mr. Crauford, was a corn country, but it was deficient in salt; Madras, on the contrary, produced abundance of salt, but it was deficient in corn. And yet the Bengal Government taxed severely the importation of salt, and the Madras Government did the same with the importation of corn. This was the improved system of finance and legislation which the right hon. Presisident of the Board of Control called upon them to imitate. This question then came to be this, whether the Government would consent to abolish this monopoly, which was so pernicious to the interests of England, and so fraught with mischief to the interests of the Hindoos? Whatever the Directors of the East India Company might say in that House, it was as certain that the people of Bengal would be glad to shake off their yoke, as it was certain that fire would burn, or water flow. It was disgraceful to a Christian country that they were more merciless to their Hindoo dependants than their former Mahomedan conquerors He would not enter into other arguments. He would admit that they had a right to extinguish every spark of generous enthusiasm over the vast conti- nent which they were called upon to govern. He would admit that they had a right to stifle those hopes throughout India, without which Englishmen would find life intolerable. He would admit that they had a right to look upon the Hindoos as slaves, as helots, as beasts of burden; but they had no right to corrupt their food. If they were determined to reject all higher motives—and as the hon. Member for Honiton once told him, it was only schoolboys who talked of justice and right in an English House of Commons—if they were deaf to the cries of India, let them at least listen to the complaint of England—to the voice of her manufacturers—and let them relinquish a monopoly which was not only wicked in itself, but which was unprofitable to retain.

said, that the question before the House was simple and easy of solution, if irrelevant matter were not introduced into the discussion. He admitted that there existed just ground of complaint anterior to 1836; and, as something had been said in reference to himself, he begged to say that the opinions he then expressed he still entertained. He was then, as he was now, hostile to monopoly; but the House had not heard how the matter stood anterior to 1836. Before that period the East India Company had the monopoly not only of the production but also of the sale of salt, and nobody could import salt, except at a duty imposed by the Company, which amounted and operated as a practical exclusion of all foreign salt. That was the just and well-founded complaint of the merchants, particularly those of Cheshire and Droitwich; and the complaint of the Indians was, that there existed a sub-monopoly, which operated to their disadvantage—that the sales were by auction and only at stated periods, and the quantity being limited the Company could impose upon salt whatever price they chose. Now, the proper Parliamentary course when a Committee had made a Report, was not to fix upon one particular witness, and quote what he had said before the Committee, but to refer to the Report come to after long and serious investigation. Well, the Report of that Committee contained three Resolutions, which, being acted upon, did away with all those disadvantages to which he had just adverted. By these Resolutions, the Committee submitted with confidence the following recommendations:—

"That the Government do abolish the system of periodical sales, and do keep their golahs at all times open for the sale of salt at the cost price, in quantities not less than 100 maunds, the purchaser to pay in addition a fixed duty on removing the salt from the golahs."

Anterior to this the golahs were not always open, and the sales were periodical, so that great capitalists could buy large quantities of salt, and thus establish a sub-monopoly. But by keeping the golahs alway open, this sub-monopoly was destroyed. The second recommendation was—

"That salt manufactured in any country other than the district subject to the Bengal monopoly, may be sold at such times as the proprietors may please, in quantities not less than 100 maunds; and that such salt on being removed do pay the same duty as that sold by the East India Company, and no other duty or charge whatsoever, except a fair and reasonable rent on such salt as may have been bonded."

By that Resolution the monopoly was abolished, and a free trade in salt established; the East India Company being precluded from charging a duty upon imported salt more than the excise duty. The change thus recommended by the Committee was, in fact, carried into effect by the Government of Bengal previously to the Resolution being communicated to them, and from that time there had been to all intents and purposes free trade in salt; and, in fact, salt had been imported into India from America, Spain, France, the Eastern Archipelago, and, above all, from Great Britain, paying only the same duty as the manufacturer of salt paid in India as excise duty, or monopoly duty, as his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich was pleased to call it. The third Resolution was—

"That the duty to be imposed shall be fixed at the lowest rate consistent with the maintenance of the revenue, and not exceeding the average rate of the net profit of the Company's monopoly for the last ten years."

He begged to ask, therefore, would it not have been better if the right hon. Gentleman, instead of reading a single paragraph deprecating monopoly, had read the three Resolutions of the Committee, by one of which that very monopoly was abolished. He maintained that those Resolutions had been fairly carried into execution, though the importers of salt had at one time a ground of complaint, in consequence of some inconvenience in the mode of levying the duty, and also in reference to the wastage of salt. Those objections had, however, in consequence of representations from the gentlemen of Cheshire been re- moved; and the result, which his anxiety for the interests of the people of India must make him regret, had been, that the foreign salt had to a great extent beaten the home-made salt out of the market. In olden times the East India Company having the monopoly, not only of the sale but of the manufacture of salt, were in the habit of charging, as the cost price of the manufacture, the expenses of agents with large salaries, and the whole revenue expenses attached to the manufacture. But as it was desired to carry out the recommendations of the Committee of the House of Commons of 1836 fairly, both as regarded the importer and the home producer, the Board of Revenue in India sent in a Report to the Governor General, stating that it was not fit and right to charge as part of the cost of the manufacture of salt, the expenses of the revenue in protecting the manufacture from the effects of smuggling. He regretted that his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich had said that there was any unworthy dodge, and that in repudiating the expression as applicable to Lord Dalhousie, he had said that it had been applied to the East India Company. He begged to tell him that the Report of the Board of Revenue was sent home with the assent and approbation of Lord Dalhousie; and the Court of Directors sent out instructions desiring that a strict investigation should be made, and that what appertained to the cost of production, should be debited to production, excluding all expenses connected with the protection of the revenue. If his right hon. Friend read the Report of Lord Dalhousie, he would see that the loss sustained was a loss that would be sustained by the revenue in doing justice to the native producer. Lord Dalhousie said, "If in doing justice to the native manufacturer of salt, to enable him to compete with the importer of salt, the revenue is injured, let it be injured, but let justice be done." He believed the despatch of Lord Dalhousie and the Minute of the Board of Revenue to be in strict accordance with the Resolutions of 1836. The Board's Report ran thus:—

"In the Board's opinion, the correct principle which ought then to have been, and now to be adopted, in calculating the prime cost of homemade salt, is to add to the price actually paid to the Molunghees so much of the expense incurred by Government in bringing it to market as would be incurred by private individuals or a joint-stock company for the same purpose, on the supposition that the salt were manufactured under an excise system, and subject to the restrictions inseparable from that mode of management, the operations of Government being confined to the collection of the fixed duty, and the prevention of illicit dealings."

Lord Dalhousie says—

"Necessity may unfortunately compel this Government for the present to continue to raise an objectionable impost upon an article of first necessity, but nothing can justify the Government in pursuing for this purpose a system which unduly exposes a portion of its people to disadvantages that are rapidly depriving them of their means of livelihood."

Then came the paragraph alluded to by his hon. Friend opposite. It was the context which showed the meaning;—

If it be objected that to do so will involve a sacrifice of revenue, I reply that, even if it should reduce the revenue, the plea cannot be admitted. This is a question of duty and justice, not one of expediency or profit. If it be admitted, as I think it must, that the people are bearing an unfair burden, it is the duty of Government to lighten it at whatever sacrifice. Lastly, if it should be objected that this revisal of the selling price of native salt in India will create remonstrances, and raise clamour among the owners and exporters of salt from England to India, the answer is easy; the Act of the Government here can be shown to be founded on justice and necessity; any clamour against it in England, therefore, will have no foundation in justice or reason, and accordingly it ought to be, and safely may be, disregarded."

With regard to the reduction of the tax on salt, he said let them reduce it as much as they possibly could, not from a regard to people in this country, but out of consideration for the people of India. The tax had been reduced three or four times already, and let the House mark the operation of these reductions. The reduction of a tax upon an article of consumption might have the effect of so increasing the consumption as very shortly to make up for the deficiency in the revenue at first occasioned by the reduction; and this was the result with respect to the first three reductions of the salt duty. But the fourth and last reduction did not increase the consumption, and therefore, if a conclusion founded on the principles of political economy were drawn, it would be that the consumption had gone nearly as far as it could. He thought, however, that that was only partially true, and he was induced to hope that in a short time the consumption would further increase. The very moment the revenue regained its strength, he hoped and felt confident that the Government would seize the opportunity to make another reduction. He quite agreed with his right hon. Friend, that salt was a necessary of life, and that in India it was particularly so. It was well known how generally the Natives made use of spices, curries, and other stimulants, as condiments, which rendered a less amount of salt necessary. As to the consumption of salt per head, or an average, he was disposed to regard 12 lbs. as a fair and adequate allowance; but, a statement had been made, that the sepoys were allowed 45 lbs. He must say that he had never heard of it before, and should certainly be surprised to find it turn out accurate. Some doubts had been thrown upon certain statistics which had been prepared by a gentleman who presided over the statistical department at the India House, and which he believed were singularly correct. Mr. Aylwyn, whose evidence had been referred to, assailed these statistics with reference to the proportion of the earnings of an individual which must go to to the purchase of the quantity of salt. He would refer to an authority upon the point which the House would deem satisfactory. Mr. Halliday, in, his evidence, says—

"It so happened that, long before I ever thought of coming to England, or being examined on this subject, and without the slightest regard to any inquiry of this kind, I had a casual conversation with a man likely to be very well informed upon these subjects; an East Indian, a deputy collector, and a man who has mixed intimately and familiarly with the Natives from his birth, and has been officially employed among them, and is thoroughly acquainted with all their concerns. I happened to ask him (and to jot down, as I was accustomed to do, the heads of his information) something about the cost of salt to the Ryots in the Bengal villages. I had no conception whatever that it would ever turn to account in this way. When I saw the evidence of Mr. Aylwyn, I turned to it, and I found it remarkably corroborated by the statistical tables which have been referred to. He told me that in a Bengal village, salt costs to the peasant, one anna and a-half to one anna and three-quarters a seer; that will be at the rate of about 1¾a lb. The consumption is at the rate of about half' an anna a head per measure; or six annas, equal to about 8d. a head per annum. Their earnings, he said, he reckoned at from two to three rupees a month, so that the cost of salt is a little more than 1 per cent upon their earnings. Mr. Thornton's tables give 1½ per cent."

Mr. E. Thornton's tables gave 1½ per cent, so that the statement which had been commented upon as erroneous and exaggerated, gives ½ per cent more on the testimony of Mr. Halliday. In answer to the statement that the salt monopoly had not been broken up, he might quote the words of Mr. Halliday, who declared that the sub-monopoly had been destroyed by the system of open golahs and small sales. The Report of the Committee of the House of Commons recommended sales in quantities so small as 100 maunds. The Government of India reduced the amount to 50 maunds; and the golahs were open throughout the year any day to every person who chose to go and buy 50 maunds. Mr. Halliday said, with reference to the statement of Mr. Alywyn, which was commented upon by his right hon. Friend, that smuggling had been almost entirely abolished. He begged to ask whether, looking upon the question as a matter of revenue, the easiest way of levying the duty would not be to import the whole of the salt, and to levy the duty upon the article when imported. That would be the simplest, the easiest, and the most economical way of raising the revenue. The only object of encouraging the home production, was the consideration of the home producers, Mr. Alywyn said, that by taking the whole amount of salt imported and manufactured, and by multiplying it by the amount of duty per maund, the total amount of duty which ought to go into the Exchequer is obtained. Mr. Alywyn then gave the amount which now goes into the Exchequer, and said, that the difference was so much lost, and that the importer was wronged to that extent. MR. Halliday, who had been threee yars in one of the salt districts, pointed out the error of the reasoning. He said that in the aggregate of salt, that which was sold in the salt-producing districts was included; that it was impossible to sell salt at an enhanced price in the very district where it was manufactured, for if that was done, the smuggler would beat the Government, so that the only chance of preventing smuggling in districts where salt was produced, was to sell at such a price as would compete with the smuggler. One-fifth of the whole amount of salt was therefore sold by retail in the manufacturing districts, and was not sold at the usual duty, but at such a price as could be realised; and as regarded one-fifth of the aggregate amount, the statement of Mr. Alywyn was therefore fallacious. Then his right hon. Friend argued that it was not right to charge as the cost of production anything that would not be charged if a system of excise prevailed. Mr. Halliday stated, that when no deduction was made for salt agents and the preventive service, the Native producer suffered a detriment, and not the importer. Thus the Native manufacturer had upon the ag- gregate of seven years suffered an actual loss by having the cost price of his salt enhanced to the benefit of the importer. Then there was another benefit which the importer had, and which Mr. Worthington, who came up from Cheshire, acknowledged. Mr. Worthington said, the Cheshire salt was better, because it sold better and paid the same duty. If, then, it sold higher and paid the same duty, there was no discriminating duty in favour of native salt. It had been said that 5,000 people in Cheshire were dependent upon the hope of sending salt to India; but was not consideration to be shown to ten times 5,000 Natives of India, who would be thrown out of occupation, and would have no other to which they could turn themselves. He contended for no peculiar benefit to the Native of India in this matter, but he stood up as the advocate of free trade, there must either be no duty at all, or else the same duty must be placed upon the imported article and the article produced at home. What would be the result if there were no duty? He hoped there was an approximation to that good end; but if the tax were abolished to-morrow, one ounce of imported salt never would go into India, as every man would have his little earthen pot, and would make his own salt. He should be sorry to see Cheshire suffer; but he was sure his right hon. Friend opposite did not wish Cheshire to reap an advantage to the detriment of the native manufacture. True, it might be called an objectionable tax; but it was the only tax the Native of India paid, and could a better be substituted? Mr. Halliday, in his evidence, said, "I do not think that the same revenue could be derived from any other tax with so little detriment to the people." Mr. Marshman said, "The impost on salt in India, though heavy, is perhaps less felt by the great body of the people than any other tax of equivalent value would be." He begged it to be understood, he was not advocating the tax. He only stood up for it, because it was evident from the testimony of several witnesses, that if the salt duty were abolished, no substitute could be proposed less onerous or likely to be paid with greater facility. It had been asked, why not have a system of excise? To that he would not object, and he agreed with Mr. Halliday, that instructions to that effect might be sent out. Mr. Halliday made a suggestion, that the present system should not be abolished now, but kept in existence, in order that it might remain for the Government to fall back on in case of need, and that in the meantime the system of excise should be tried in some districts. He should be glad to see that system tried; but he repeated, that hitherto the Indian Government had faithfully carried out the recommendations of the Committee of 1836, and had established a system of free trade with respect to salt.

said, though the question was one in which many of his constituents were greatly interested, he would not have trespassed upon the House had not the arguments of his right hon. Friend (Sir J. Pakington) been completely misrepresented both by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, and the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. Hogg), who had accused him of treating it as a question of the producer against the consumer. The hon. Baronet had talked of the concessions made by the Company; but what had been the very gravamen of the charge against it? No doubt it was quite true that the Company had carried out the recommendations of the Committee of 1836; but then each concession made had been wrung from the East India Company most unwillingly. A friend of his had sent out a large cargo of salt to India, and when it arrived he found that he had to pay the duty upon it before he was permitted to take the salt over the vessel's side. The hon. Gentleman talked of the reductions of the duty, but he had forgotten the increase from 2l. 10s. to 16l. or 18l. which had been attempted, till the failing consumption compelled them to give it up. He thought, therefore, that the conduct of the India Government fully justified the application to it by his right hon. Friend of the expressive term "dodge." He was glad to hear hon. Gentlemen advocating the introduction of the excise system; and after that he thought he might fairly claim their votes for the Motion of his right hon. Friend. They might depend upon it that they would never have a system of free trade (of which the hon. Baronet was so consistent a supporter) until they procured the abolition of the Company's monopoly of production. He was really ashamed to hear the hon. Baronet attribute such un- worthy motives as he had done to the supporters of the Motion; but the taunt would fall quite innocuous on him (Mr. Egerton). He had always imagined that the argument of the hon. Gentleman and his party was, that the reduction of a duty was an advantage to both the consumer and the producer; because it left a larger surplus for either the necessaries or the luxuries of life. On that ground, too, he thought the hon. Baronet ought not to oppose the Motion. At all events, he hoped the House would consent to the very moderate proposition of his right hon. Friend.

said, that two of the reductions in Bengal had taken place under himself; and one great reason for the step was, that the amount of salt stored in the golahs, or Government warehouses, had become so enormously disproportionate to the demand, that it was considered desirable not only to reduce the duty, but the production of the article itself. Accordingly he diminished annually the quantity produced; and he could bear his testimony to the truth of what his hon. Friend (Sir J. Hogg) had said respecting the alarm of the people. Indeed, so earnest were their remonstrances in some cases that they had found it necessary to alter the plans of the Government. He was himself an advocate for the gradual reduction of the duty. That gradual reduction had gone on while he was in Bengal, and he thought it would have been right to have continued it to the present day. At the same time he really believed that the more they reduced the duty the less would be the quantity of English salt that would be consumed in India. It was proposed that the present system should be superseded by an excise duty on home-made, and a customs duty on the imported article. Now, though he decidedly objected to any enactment of Parliament on the matter, he was quite willing that the plan itself should be tried. He must say that he was surprised Mr. Halliday should have thought the excise system practicable; but that gentleman had certainly had more experience than himself. The salt manufacturers in Bengal were thousands in number, and the quantity made by each was very small, so that he should himself have thought the expense of the preventive force, necessary to prevent frauds upon the revenue, would have swallowed up most of the revenue itself. But still he was most ready to sanction any measure to es- tablish a system which he should consider preferable to that which was called a monopoly.

said, it seemed to him, on a consideration of the mode in which the Government and the representatives of the East India Directors had met the proposition, that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich had the best of the argument. The right hon. Baronet had pointed out the monopoly existing in India—a monopoly odious in itself, and pernicious to the country—and the Members of the Government and the hon. Baronet the Member for Honiton (Sir J. Hogg) had attempted to meet the argument by saying that that was not a monopoly, which was one of the grossest kind. Although he thought the Government had the worst of the argument, he saw a line of argument which they might have taken, and which was unanswerable, and which would prevent him from voting with the right hon. Member for Droitwich, namely, that whatever might be the merits of the question, that was not the place to deal with it. If that House took upon itself to deal with the details of the fiscal measures of India, they would adopt the first step towards effecting the ruin of the British rule in that country. It had been truly said by Napoleon to Talleyrand, that if ever the mode of communication between England and India was of such a nature that England could undertake the internal administration of the affairs of India, they would lose that country, because the Government of every dependency should be localised in that dependency. He desired to know whether the House would undertake the trouble to fill up the vacuum in the revenue of India which such a Resolution as that proposed would create? They would, also, throw whole classes out of employment by this very deceitful Motion. On these grounds he should vote against the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, he entirely agreed with the hon. Gentleman who had last spoken, except that he could not allow that that House ought not to give its attention to the taxation of India. If they were not to have a responsible Government in India (which they could never have), where were the natives of India to look but to that House? He had taken part in the struggle for the removal of the salt tax at home, and they had all seen the wonderful results which had occurred in social life, and, he might say, in science. The Resolution affirmed nothing but that the Company ought not to be traders, and with that he fully agreed. He would, therefore, give his vote for the proposition.

said, that in the strictest sense of the term the salt trade was a monopoly, because it was only the East India Company who could sell salt. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Board of Control had stated that there were no complaints on that subject from India; but the petition of the Native inhabitants of the Presidency of Bengal, setting forth in what way that monopoly injuriously affected the poor of India, amply refuted that statement. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that salt was not regarded in India as it was in this country; but the fact was, that salt fish was a common trade among all the nations of Asia, from the banks of the Caspian to China, and the Company's monopoly had, he believed, had a most injurious effect upon the fisheries in India. When it was stated that the salt duty was only at the rate of 10d. per head in Bengal, it must be remembered that a family did not consist of a single individual, but of five or six; and as it was shown that the remuneration for labour in some parts of India was not more than 2s. a month, upon which the labourer had to maintain himself and his family, the effect of the tax would at once be seen. Altogether he should certainly vote with the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington), because he believed that, without pressing the Government to any great extent, he must say they had not shown sufficient care or sufficient goodwill towards the Natives of India, to induce the belief that they would diminish those expenses and abolish those sinecures which would enable them to repeal or greatly to reduce this tax.

said, he would not detain the House very long, but there were one or two remarks which he felt it was necessary to make before a division was come to upon this question. There had really been so much eloquence, and—the hon. and learned Member for Leominster (Mr. J. G. Phillimore) would excuse him for saying—so much declamation on this point that he feared there was some danger of their losing sight of the real question at issue, that which the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich wished the House to vote upon. The first thing the right hon. Baronet had done was to recite the Act 3 & 4 Will. IV., by which it was enacted that the Company should, with a convenient speed after the passing of the said Act, wind up their commercial bus ness, and discontinue and abstain from all commercial business "which shall not be carried on for the purposes of the said Government." Having done this, the right hon. Baronet proceeded to state that the Company had carried on trade notwithstanding this provision, and he then wet on to contend that this manufacture an sale of salt must be prohibited for the future. Now he (Mr. Lowe) would put it t the House whether that was a logical conclusion to come to. The right hon. Baronet had cited a further part of the Act expressly excepting from the prohibition this very case, and providing that trade should not be carried on except for the purposes of raising revenue, and the purpose of Government. [Cries of "No, no!"] If hon. Gentleman doubted, he would prove it. In that case the right hon. Gentleman's Motion amounted to a non sequitur. If the Act absolutely prohibited the manufacture of salt, it was evident the Compare had done what was illegal; and the proper inference was that the Attorney General, or some other person, should have been employed to prosecute theta for violating the statute, but not that a new law shoal be made, if the old one was sufficient already. It must be one way or the other, and in either way what the House was called upon to affirm was absurd. If the Act were prohibitory already, they did not want a new law, and if it was not prohibitory there was no occasion to cite a law which was irrelevant. The real question was, whether this manufacture were carried on for the purposes of government, and whether it were carried on as a monopoly. Let hon. Gentlemen consider, and not be led away by names. It was easy to call things a monopoly, but what was monopoly? In his view a monopoly meant an exclusive privilege of selling a thing. That was no doubt the original meaning the word. When one person was thus exclusively privileged he had an interest opposed to that of the people, who were the buyers, and exercised that privilege to degree hurtful to the people. In that sense the East India Company had monopoly at all. ["Oh, oh!"] What he maintained was, that it was not a monopoly in any odious sense whatever. It was an exclusive privilege, but not a monopoly in any odious sense. And why? What was this odious monopoly? It was this— that whereas the East India Company was driven to raise an amount of revenue beyond that which they derived from rent o lands; and whereas not one had been yet discovered to return what was produced by this—as every one admitted it to be—objectionable tax; and whereas India we a country which in itself produced salt t a great extent, the East India Company had adopted this course—it had place, upon the import of salt a duty of two rupees and eight annas a maund, which was equal to ¾d. a pound; and in certain parts of the country, where considerable facilities for the manufacture existed, the, had imposed an excise duty, which, allowing for the other taxation, was considered an equivalent according to the exigencies of the country; and in another district, principally the district of the Sonderbund, the Delta of the Ganges, an equivalent had been substituted in exchange for the excise duty, and that was what was called the monopoly. The Molungees were the persons who manufactured the salt, and the Company taxed the manufacture, and agree to purchase their salt from them at a fixed price, and then, having got it at this fixed price, they added to it this tax of ¾d. per pound, and then kept their stores open at all times to sell it at that price. It was no object of the East India Company to have this exclusive monopoly. They game nothing, and could gain nothing, by it; neither had they any selfish interest in it whatever. If they were to attempt to ask more for the manufacture than they were entitled to from the cost of manufacture, and adding to that the amount of excise duty, they would not be in a condition to compete with the importer of salt, an would be driven out of the market. It was not their interest to get a high profit as manufacturers. They stood in a perfectly impartial position between the foreign importer, the native producer under the excise duty, and the consumer. It was matter of perfect indifference to them, so long as the revenue was raised, from what source it came, with this single exception, that it might come to pass that the constituents of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) would ultimately undersell the Indian producer, and the latter would be left to perish of hunger. Except in the point of view, the East India Company had no interest whatever in perpetuating what had been so repeatedly termed, during this discussion, this odious monopoly—this detestable tax—this horrible thing—which could not be spoken of without detestation and horror. Distrust it as they would, that was the fact, and that was the state of things they were about to meddle with. And in what way? Any one who listened to the speeches of the right hon. Baronet and those who supported him would suppose he was going to lighten the burdens of the people of India which he wished to God they could do; but in reality the right hon. Baronet made no such proposal—he did not seek to relieve them of their load by the weigh of his little finger; and after such a speech, backed by bad logic, and after all the declamation wasted on the subject, an, after they had taken a step in the dark, they would leave the people of India still suffering under the grievous load of which they complained. But they would have done this—they would have entered on subject of which they had, and of which they could have, no knowledge whatever—they would have applied the powers of Parliament not to great and important principles, but to the minute details of the management of a distant and unknown Empire; and while they were philosophising on free trade and the rights of man, they were interfering with all the fiscal arrangements of the East India Company, conducted on the principles laid down by the greatest of their councillors and servants. They should remember that this was not entirely an Indian question—it was one of a local and practical kind, relating to a portion of India only—all he would ask those who had spoken with such ardour and rancour on the subject, if they were competent to deal with it? Taking into consideration the nature of the Sonderbunds, those vast alluvial tract by the side of the Ganges, where it was almost impossible to prevent this manufacture taking place, they had to decide whether it was absolutely necessary to keep up the principle at present in force, or whether they could introduce a system of excise for the collection of revenue. The greatest Indian authorities differed on the subject; and he must be guilty of the presumption of offering the least shadow of an opinion upon it. If it were right and proper to collect the revenue by a system of excise, let it be done: if that was not right, let it be raised, as it must be raised, by means of this odious monopoly; but never having been in India, and not having that intimate knowledge of Indian affairs, which seemed to have dawned on so many hon. Members in the course of that debate, he would not venture to decide the question. This, however, he would say, that if they precipitated the Government of India into the abolition of this system, and into the adoption of one to which the country was not suited, they would do a mischief which subsequent legislation could not repair. He put it to the right hon. Member for Droitwich, as a Member for a borough not very distant from that which he (Mr. Lowe) had the honour to represent, the constituents in which, judging from the right hon. Baronet's speech, did not very well understand the question—nor did he believe the House did either—when he said the importation of English salt was increasing every year, and that it was larger than the quantity produced by the Molungees—to consider well whether he was doing wisely to disturb such a system and whether he was not taking a desperate leap in the dark in forcing Parliament to abandon it and to try a new system, which might or might not have the same effect, but which would, in case it had not the same effect, destroy the competition between the English manufacturers and the Natives of India. Would he not do more wisely to leave well alone? When hon. Gentlemen talked of this odious monopoly, he would put a question to them. What did they call the restrictions on the growth of tobacco in England? Had the Government a monopoly of tobacco? That was entirely a parallel case. It was not for the pleasure of tormenting people who smoked, but for the purposes of revenue that the Government forbade the growth of tobacco in this country. One word more, and he had done. He was persuaded that in dealing with this question they were making a beginning of a grey evil for India. It had been always said—and he put it to those who were anxious to place the Government of India in the hands of a Minister of the Crown, whether the course they adopted now was likely to induce the country to follow them—that if Parliament interfered in these matter men would come forward in that House with the local interests of their constituent to oppose to those of the people of India. One hon. Member would carry one point on this side, another would carry a point on the other—they would press the House to sacrifice the people of India to their local interests. They would be thinking of their boroughs and counties here at home, and of the interests of their manufacturers, and the interests of India would suffer. That had been said by great authorities and distinguished persons who knew the subject well; and if they treated the Governor General of India and the Council of India as utterly unfit to arrange the mere technical details of collecting a tax, be would ask, was that the way to give the country confidence in any plan which would place the Government of India more under the control of Parliament? He, therefore, trusted that the House would reject the inexpedient, unreasonable, and illogical Motion of the right hon Baronet.

regretted exceedingly to hear the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster, with regard to the great economical principles of the salt duties; but, as he conceived the Amendment to be a most dangerous experiment, he would vote against it, differing altogether, however, from the financial principles of the hon. Member who had just sat down.

said, he had never heard of a subject so full of anomalies as the India question; but it was long before he could have imagined such an anomaly as hearing a free-trade Minister standing up for the interests of the salt producers of Bengal, and giving an explanation of the word "monopoly" which would, he trusted, make the right hon. Member repent ever having applied the term to the corn laws. It was twenty years ago since Mr. Wilbraham brought forward a proposition against the Indian salt tax, and in the debate which ensued, Mr. Charles Grant, afterwards Lord Glenelg, said he did not defend it. No one could deny the expediency of removing it, and the Government thought it should be got rid of as soon as possible. Mr. Cutlar Fergusson, the advocate of the East India Company, could only defend it by saying the prejudices of the Indians were so powerful as to offer a complete bar to the substitution of any other tax; and on the assurance that the Government would consider the alteration of the tax as soon as possible, Mr. Wilbraham's Amendment was withdrawn. The Parliament consented to leave the abolition of the tax to the discretionary power of the local authorities in India; but now that they heard arguments Lord Glenelg would have been ashamed to use, he trusted they would not consent once more to leave the question in such hands.

Sir, I wish to say something with regard to what appears to me to be the extraordinary step proposed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir J. Pakington). And, first, let me remark that though the right hon. Gentleman's speech was entirely directed against the tax on salt, his Amendment does not touch that question. With regard to the tax itself, there is no doubt much to be said, and I should be much disposed to vote for its repeal; but the right hon. Gentleman, after a long speech against the vicious and oppressive nature of the salt tax, proposed to levy it not as the Indian Government should think fit, but to interfere with the mode in which the tax is levied, and raise the amount by a system of excise. Now, supposing the House to agree with this Motion, they would by no means get rid of the salt tax in India, which is called indeed a monopoly, but which my hon. Friend near me (Mr. Lowe) has proved to be none. But there is one point which it behoves the House to consider. The Indian Government, in the exercise of its discretion, and presided over by a noble Lord who is certainly as conversant with matters of trade and commerce as any one who ever went to India—that Government thinks that the best mode of raising the revenue of India is partly by a salt tax, and that the best mode of raising that tax is by leaving its manufacture in Bengal in the hands of the East India Company. I have heard it said that we were responsible for any deficiency in the Indian revenue. I ever thought that doctrine was entirely unfounded, and I have never subscribed to that opinion. I conceive that the dividends on East India Stock are payable out of the territorial revenue of India, and that the Company has no claim whatever upon the Home Government. But the case will be totally altered if you agree to the Motion proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. If you say, "There shall no longer be a revenue of 2,000,000l. raised in the manner in which the Indian Government, with all the assistance of the most able men, has thought fit to raise it," how can you tell what may be the consequences? We all know that a salt tax levied by means of the excise is a tax which occasions a great of deal irritation and vexation, and which may be so oppressive to the inhabitants of a country that the revenue arising from it may fall very far short of what is expected from it. Supposing that 1,000,000l. should be wanting in the revenue derived from the salt tax in India, who will be responsible? Will it be the Indian Government? Would they be bound to lay on a new tax to supply the deficiency? No Sir; in that case they can say, for the first time with justice, that the deficiency has been caused by the House of Commons. I hope the House, before it indulges the right hon. Gentleman opposite and his constituents with the prospect of an extended market for salt, will consider that this is a subject which affects India itself far more than any particular interest in this country. We ought not to set the example of regulating the finances of India, relying on our own information, which must be very imperfect, but we should, I think, leave this great and important subject in the hands of the Government of India.

Sir, I should not have risen to address the House but for one observation of the noble Lord who has just sat down. The noble Lord says, if this was a Motion to repeal the tax upon salt in India, he would have supported it. I think the noble Lord brought an accusation against my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Pakington), and said there was an inconsistency between his speech and his Resolution. The noble Lord said that my right hon. Friend's speech was in favour of the abolition of the tax in India, but that his Motion was not for the repeal of the tax, but for an alteration in the mode of raising it. I think, Sir, that I have a right to conclude that the noble Lord himself was in favour of making some change, and that was the reason why I took the liberty of rising, because I could not easily see how my right hon. Friend was open to the charge which would be inferred from the observation of the noble Lord. For the argument of the noble Lord was this:—Carry the Resolution, but that will not be a repeal of the tax, which is so odious. Now, my right hon. Friend said—The first step that I have to take is to destroy the monopoly, and when I have destroyed the monopoly, I will defy you to raise an excessive tax in the country. The observation of the noble Lord does not answer that position which was taken up by my right hon. Friend. Nor, Sir, can I agree with the noble Lord as to the difference which he has so precisely laid down between the revenue of England and the revenue of India. The noble Lord the leader of the House of Commons tells us that he recognises no identity between the revenue of England and the revenue of India. I should like to know whether that is the opinion of those colleagues of the noble Lord who are proud to be the disciples and profess to be guided by the opinions of the late Sir Robert Peel. That was not the opinion of Sir Robert Peel. All of us have read, and some of us have heard, that eminent personage say in this House, that he could not for a moment acknowledge that there was any difference between the revenue of England and the revenue of India; and the state of the Indian finances formed one of his principal arguments in favour of the income tax; and he asked whether there was any one who could suppose that embarrassment in the finances of India would not produce are effect on this country. Until the noble Lord rose to-night, I really never heard any person in authority in this House profess an opposite opinion. I do not agree with the noble Lord in his opinion. I am sure that it there be any embarrassment in Indian finances, ultimately England must examine into and deal with that embarrassment. But I cannot allow any opinion which we may have, one way or anoother, at all to interfere with the conclusion which we ought to draw upon the particular topic before us. We are not called upon to consider what should be the Government of India. On that subject the House has already arrived at a decision, and not for a considerable space of time—probably not for twenty years—is that Government likely to be altered. But it has been laid before this House that there is a fiscal relation in that country, which, in the opinion of my right hon. Friend, tends to the detriment of that country and to the serious injury of its in habitants. He has laid before us the circumstances and the causes which have induced him to adopt that opinion, and I must say that I have heard nothing from noble Lords or right hon. Gentlemen who differ from my right hon. Friend that has at all met the case which he put before the House. Well, if it be found that a salt monopoly—call it, if you like, by any other name, it will smell as sweet—does produce consequences so injurious to the great body of the population of India, I want to know how that evil is to be dealt with, except by the action of the British Parliament, and when a more fitting opportunity can occur for Parliament to consider the alleviating means in that respect than the one which now solicits our attention, and the occasion which now forces itself upon our notice? That is, I think the point which we have to consider. Here is an evil the immensity of which cannot well be described. It is well for you say, "You must not interfere with the fiscal relations of India—leave them to the Court of Directors—leave them to the Governor General." But we have to consider—are the Court of Directors or are our viceroys inclined or powerful enough to compete with this grievance; and if they neglect or are too powerless to do so, is it not our duty to step in, and to perform that which they have omitted to accomplish, or are unable to achieve? And if that be so, can there be a fitter opportunity than the present? No Gentleman has risen and met that which is the real point of the discussion. There is one, indeed, not a noble Lord nor a right hon. Gentleman, who has come forward, and, certainly with a confidence which none but the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) could have exhibited, has encountered that difficulty, as he would be prepared to encounter all difficulties on this and every other subject. There is nothing more interesting to me than to see a free-trader at bay. The hon. Gentleman fought most gallantly in the perilous position in which he was placed. He has read us a lecture, not merely on Indian legislation, but on legislation in general. He tells us there are very few subjects on which the House of Commons ought to presume to give an opinion, and certainly there are not many subjects on which the hon. Member is not ready to give the House of Commons his advice. I must, however, protest against the analogy which the hon. Member drew between the regulation affecting the production of tobacco in England, and of salt in India. The hon. Member seems to forget that the people of India are permitted to produce salt, but the people of this country are not permitted to produce tobacco. Now that is a very considerable difference—

There is no monopoly in either case.

I am not aware that I made use of the word "monopoly." The hon. Member has had some experience in other assemblies, and he is always ready with suggestions, at all times interesting, and sometimes, when you are speaking, inconvenient. I want to draw the attention of the House to the real point before us, and not to be diverted by foreign considerations. Is it or is it not the fact that the present state of the law, and the fiscal regulations in India with respect to the production of salt, are an enormous grievance, tending to the degradation of the people of that country? If that be so, have we a fair chance of the evil being successfully dealt with by our Indian authorities? If, as I maintain, we cannot indulge in that hope, it is the duty of the Parliament of this country to interpose; and if it be the duty of Parliament to interpose, when, as I have before said, could there be a happier opportunity, or a more befitting occasion, than when we are deliberating upon the best mode of governing India? If that be a true description of our situation, it is one that entails upon us a great responsibility, from which I, for one, have not the courage to shrink. The evils of this system regulating the manufacture of salt are as great national evils as the imagination of man can well picture. I have not heard them deprecated by any Gentleman opposite. Even those who have resisted the Motion of my right hon. Friend, have not for a moment shown any inclination to pretend that the fiscal regulations respecting the manufacture of salt in India are not one of the greatest evils that can possibly exist. Is it the wish of the House of Commons that these evils should be permanent, and that no exertion should be made to remedy them? Have you well considered the circumstances of a population in a chronic state of bad health? [Laughter.] Because, although hon. Gentlemen may smile, that is the fair conclusion that we must draw from the authentic documents on that subject in our possession. Sir, I heard some sneers about my right hon. Friend studying the interests of his constituents in the Motion which he has brought forward. I have been astonished to hear them both from the right hon. President of the Board of Control and others. We, I hope, on both sides are sufficiently enlightened, when our attention is drawn to the consideration of a topic of this extensive interest, not to be led by the representations of any individual who may have an interest in a limited body of human beings. But I deny that we have in this question to consider what constituency the Member represents who brings a question of this kind under our notice. I, who know my right hon. Friend well, know that something beyond the interests of his constituents at Droitwich animated him tonight in that able appeal which he has made to the House. But I should like to ask some of the enthusiastic free-traders whom I see opposite to me, whether, when the hon. Member for Stockport—whether, when any other hon. Gentleman who re- presented the interests of Lancashire, came forward and called upon us to repeal the duties which regulated the importation of foreign corn ten years ago—whether the would have thought it a conclusive answer to such a question, to say that he was advocating the interests of his constituents and that his only object and his only view in the course he was taking was, that he should benefit those whom he immediately and particularly represented in this House. Indeed, Sir, whatever may be our opinion upon these subjects—whether we consider them in a philanthropic or a purely commercial light—I am surprised that any one, especially a Minister of the Queen holding the responsible office of head of that department which peculiarly preside, over the fortunes of India, should consider it the happiest retort and the most felicitous repartee to such a Motion, introduced in such a manner, that my right hon. Friend was thinking only of the interest of his own constituents at Droitwich. I argue, from such all answer as that, that the case which the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control rose to support, was not one of the strongest that was ever placed before the House of Commons. I believe that the House decide upon the broad merits of the cast such as I have endeavoured, very feebly am aware, to place before them. I am convinced that they will decide to-night so far as they can, whether they approve of a system that has prevailed long, and in my opinion too long, in India, with respect to the manufacture of the first necessary of life in that country, or whether they are not of the same opinion as my right hon. Friend, that, if this opportunity to remedy the evil, and to add to the continued and increasing welfare of the people of the country be lost, another will easily offer itself to the consideration of the House of Commons.

said, the object of the clause of which he wished to move the insertion, was to secure at least a discussion on. Indian affairs in each Session of Parliament, and was strictly in accordance with the opinion which the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control had expressed in favour of such an annual statement of Indian finance. It might, indeed, be said that it was unusual to bind the Government by enactment on such a point. But he thought it was expedient under the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Government were not forced by the necessity of taking a vote to bring the subject forward; and the promise of the right hon. Gentleman that such a statement should be made, could only bind him, and might be disregarded by his successors.

said, he must oppose the clause, which he considered to be of a most unusual nature. Besides, as it stood at present, it was really very incomplete. He thought the hon. Gentleman should specify how long the speech was to be. Would he be content with a speech of ten minutes or a quarter of an hour? If not, he should enact by the clause that it should not be under three quarters of an hour, or an hour. Then there certainly should be some penalty to enforce obedience: if the President of the Board of Control did not make the statement, was he to be sent to prison upon the demand of the hon. Member? It seemed to him inexpedient to enact that a speech should be made in the House of Commons by the President of the Board of Control, who might not even have a seat in that assembly."

The clause says, "or some other Member of Her Majesty's Government."

said, he was surprised at the remarks of the noble Lord. He thought it was highly desirable, as he understood the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) to admit, that there should be an annual statement on the Indian finances; and as the practice began by Mr. Dundas had been since discontinued by subsequent Presidents of the Board of Control, he thought it was absolutely necessary to secure the performance of this duty by Act of Parliament. If the noble Lord was afraid of long speeches, he (Mr. Hume) would next Session submit a Motion that no Member should address the House for more than one hour at a time.

said, that he did not object to a statement on the Indian finances being made. On the contrary he thought it would be very useful to restore this custom. All that he objected to was, the making it compulsory upon the President of the Board of Control by Act of Parliament to make his yearly statement.

said, he wished to suggest that if the House agreed to the clause, it should also be enacted that the statement of accounts should be made in pounds sterling, and not in sicca rupees.

said, he would now beg to move the addition of the following Clause:—

"That no law or regulation made by the Governor General in Council under the powers of the Statute 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 85, s. 43, shall be invalid by reason only that the same affects any prerogative of the Crown, provided such law or regulation shall have received the previous sanction of the Crown, signified under the Royal sign manual of Her Majesty, countersigned by the President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India."

Power was given by the present Charter to the Governor General in Council, of legislating for all places in India, in very ample terms, but subject to specific restrictions, and amongst those restrictions was one that no law should pass which affected the Prerogative of the Crown. On several occasions the existence of that restriction had been productive of many practical difficulties, the remedy for which was obviously very simple, by adopting the short clause which he now submitted to the House.

said, he had no objection to the clause.

said, he now wished to move the addition of another Clause:—

"That all fines and penalties incurred by the sentence or order of any court of justice within the territories under the Government of the East India Company, and all forfeitures for crimes of any real or personal estate within the said territories, and all real and personal estate within the said territories, escheating or lapsing for want of an heir or successor, and alt property within the said territories devolving as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner, shall (as part of the revenues of India) belong to the East India Company, in trust for Her Majesty, for the service of the Government of India: provided also, that the Governor General in Council, and any other person or persons who may be authorised by any Act passed in that behalf by the Governor General in Council, shall have power (in cases where the same may appear suitable and proper) to make any grant or disposition of any property so accruing by forfeiture, escheat, or otherwise, to or in favour of any relative or connexion of the person from whom the same shall hare accrued, or to or in favour of any other persons."

At present there was great discrepancy and confusion with respect to fines, penalties, forfeitures, and escheats, belonging to the Crown. The law was different in the Presidency towns. In Calcutta fines and penalties were received by the Crown, whilst in Madras and Bombay they were granted to the Company. Forfeitures of real and personal estate for crimes and offences were on a different footing in Bombay from the other two Presidency towns. All the rights of the Crown in Bombay were granted in the original Charter by Charles II. to the East India Company; but in the two other Presidency towns those rights were reserved, so that when it was proper the relatives should apply for a grant of the land forfeited, they had to send a memorial home for that purpose. It was the same as regarded escheats; but that kind of anomaly was obviously extremely absurd, and it was to rectify it that he proposed that clause.

said, he would also agree to this clause.

said, he also wished to move the addition of a clause. He thought the time was arrived when it was fitting Her Majesty's territories in the East Indies should be governed in Her Majesty's name. If the authority of the East India Company had not been diminished, he should still have been of the same opinion; but considering how greatly the power and authority of the Directors had been shorn by this Bill, it appeared to him the more deserving of consideration. Although obedience had been shown, the name of the Company had not been treated with that respect which was to be expected on the part of the rulers of so great an Empire. The Company was ordinarily called by the name of "John Company," which was more jocularly changed into "Honourable john," whilst the illiterate people of India imagined the Company was an old woman. He could not imagine there could be any objection to the proposal, and he thought it scarcely possible to overrate the importance of having justice and the law in India administered in the name of Her Majesty.

said, that this question had already been raised, and the House had decided that the Government of India should remain for a time entrusted to the East India Company, and it ought not therefore to reopen the question raised by the hon. Member.

said, he had given notice some time ago of his intention to bring up two clauses fixing the qualifica- tion and salaries of the Directors. Objections had been made to the large money qualification now required, and he though it very desirable that that qualification should be reduced. He considered, also, that it was most desirable that all the Directors should possess the same qualification. He therefore proposed a clause reducing the qualification of elected Directors from 2,000l. to 1,000l., and enacting that all Directors, whether elected or appointed, should have that qualification, and should be required to make a declaration that they were in possession of stock to such an amount. He thought it desirable that all the Members of the Board should be placed upon the same footing, in order to secure their harmonious working. A Director could not take part in the proceedings of the Court of Proprietors unless he held the stock of the Company.

said, he thought this clause was a departure from the under standing which had been come to with his hon. Friend the Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) for the withdrawal of the pecuniary qualification for the office of a Director; and his hon. Friend being unavoidably absent, he could not promise for him that he would not propose to strike out this clause on the third reading, should it non be agreed to.

said, he hoped they would remember the Bill originally proposed to fix the salaries of the Director at 500l. each; but the amount was received by the hon. Member for Manchester with a sneer, and, indeed, the general feeling of the House appeared to be, that the salary should not remain at an amount which was more in the nature of an honorarium than an adequate remuneration for the services that had to be performed. He therefore, proposed in this clause, to fix the salaries of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman at 1,500l. each, and that of a Director at 1,000l. per annum.

said, he objected to the clause. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, in the early stage of the Bill, fixed the salary at 500l., and he saw no reason for increas- ing it now. But what he principally complained of was this: it was said they nominally paid the Directors a salary, but their chief remuneration was to be patronage which they enjoyed, and which was estimated to be worth 10,000l. a year. Now he wanted to know how this patronage was distributed? It might, for aught he knew, be used by some Directors to obtain seats in that House—indeed it was somewhat remarkable that two of the Directors who held seats in that House represented the smallest constituencies in the country; and he thought, before they increased the salaries, the House ought to obtain some control over the distribution of this extensive patronage.

said, he concurred very much with the hon. Gentleman in his opposition to this clause. He held in his hand a statement showing, in a tabular form, the patronage distributed by the Directors between 1835 and 1851, and from this return it appeared, that in that time no less than 4,569 cadetships had been given away by the Directors, which gave to each Director ten cadetships and a fraction a year, and to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman twenty and a fraction. Now it appeared, from the records of the Court of Directors, that each cadetship was valued at 1,000l., so that in cadetships alone, each Director enjoyed patronage to the extent of 10,000l. a year. With regard to writer-ships, it appeared from the same return, that on the average each Director had one writership at his disposal every year, thus increasing the value of his patronage to 13,700l. a year; but by this Bill the patronage of the writerships was taken away from the Directors, and to that extent their patronage would certainly be reduced. This loss, however, would be made up by the increase which would take place in the vacancies for cadetships which the formation of the new European regiments would occasion. According to the Earl of Ellen-borough, the creation of the new force would place 300 appointments at the disposal of the Company; but, taking only a half of that number, it would give each Director seven or eight additional cadetships in 1854, and he thought with this patronage in their hands the Directors had no claim to an increased salary. Abolish the patronage, and he should be quite ready to double the salaries; but while the existing system continued, 500l. a year would be amply sufficient, and he would move an Amendment to that effect.

said, he should support the Motion of the hon. Member who had just sat down. He thought it most essential that the House should have had notice of the sum intended to be proposed by the right hon. Baronet. The only thing they found on the paper was, that the President of the Board of Control was to move a clause, fixing the salaries of the Directors, and if for no other reason than that nothing more definite was stated, he should vote against the clause.

said, no one could fail to be struck with the manner and time of the proposition of the right hon. Baronet, which was made without notice, or opportunity of knowing what the salaries were to be. He did not blame the Directors—they were wise in their generation; but the present Motion was a most unreasonable one, and he should give it his most cordial opposition.

said, that the object of the proposal was to secure the services of the best men. It was not to be expected that gentlemen returning from India, with large fortunes, would undertake the arduous duties of Directors, unless a proper remuneration was given. He thought hon. Gentlemen committed an error in confounding patronage with salary. Persons disposing of patronage derived no pecuniary advantage from it. The patronage of which the Secretary to the Treasury disposed was enormous; but would any one, for that reason, say he ought to have on salary?

said, the question then before the House was, not as to the amount of salary; but the question was, that the house should go into Committee to consider it.

said, he must protest against these continued attacks upon the honour and integrity of the Board of Directors. It was not a question of pecuniary compensation which would induce men to dispose of the patronage which would be in their hands. He and his co-Directors took a solemn oath upon every occasion of an appointment being made, that they had not nor would not receive any consideration in money or money's worth. Although he felt bound to defend their own conduct, yet he was quite ashamed to advert to such a fact. As to the intimation respecting the independency of their constituencies, he begged to tell hon. Gentlemen, that his own constituency was an independent constituency. He had never been asked for an appointment by any one of them.

said, the question was one that applied particularly to the people of India, and nut to the people of England, for the former would have to pay the money. Further time ought to be given for the Committee to consider such an important matter before voting those sums of money.

said, in that part of the House many Gentlemen entertained a very great disposition that the question should be adjourned. He owned he felt surprised at the very large sums proposed to be given to the Directors and Chairman, and if the proposition were persisted in, he should move, as an Amendment, that the former should be paid 500l. and the latter 1,000l. per annum. [Amidst cries of "Move!" the hon. Member moved that We Chairman report progress.]

said, he strongly objected to the improper way in which the clause had been introduced. It had been put on the paper without notice having been given, and it was not right to press it on the Committee.

said, that if there was any wish on the part of the Committee to have further time, the Government were quite ready to consider this clause on the third reading, and for that purpose he would agree to the Motion for reporting progress. There had been from the beginning a great deal of debate whether the salary of the Directors bad not been placed too low. Many hon. Members had expressed themselves of the same opinion with the noble Lord the Member for Lynn Regis (Lord Stanley), who on the second reading of the Bill said that the salary of the Directors was too low. Their observations seemed to have a great deal of force and truth, and the increase was agreed to rather in consequence of what was said by hon. Members, who appeared to give good reasons for their opinion, than from any desire on the part of the Government for the increase in question. The question that he wished the House to decide was, which was the best way of obtaining the services of the best men in the Government of India. If the Directors were to have the disposal of so many millions of men and the revenues of India, the House ought not, for the sake of 500l. a year, to lose the services of the men who could govern India with the greatest wisdom. Many of the men who came from India, and who might be offered the situation of Director, might say that the salary of 500l. would not enable them to incur the additional expense of living in London without a loss of income. They might therefore decline accepting the post of Director, and say that they meant to live in a cheaper part of the country. The real intention of the clause was to secure the services of the men who could govern India well. He agreed that the patronage attached to the office of Director went for something in the consideration of their recompense. Patronage was power, and the being enabled to oblige a man whom a person in office considered worthy, added to the consideration in which he was held. He did not allude to the bestowal of patronage in a sordid sense and from sordid motives; but a man liked to be in a position to give a reward to persons whom he thought deserving, and to choose among his fellow-citizens the persons he considered worthy to fill situations of power and responsibility.

said, he wished to know if this clause had not been enacted in consequence of the late strike? Why had not notice been given of it?

said, that the intention of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the Home Department, whose state of health prevented him being present, had been simply that the Legislature should put itself quite in the right towards the cab interest, while it showed its determination not to depart from what it considered just towards the public.

said, he rose to corroborate the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. He had that afternoon been present at a deputation of cab proprietors who had waited on the Under Secretary of State, and he had heard that deputation state positively that the Resolution just read from the Chair, had been laid before them previous to the occurrence which had lately taken place, and the reason of the delay in bringing it before the House had been a mere question as to the wording of the clause, which had only been settled a short time ago. He certainly hoped that Her Majesty's Government would not give way on this occasion. As one of the Metropolitan Members, he had been very anxious to see any just demands which the cab proprietors might have met in a proper spirit, and settled if possible; but, at the same time, he was bound to say that the circumstances under which they now came before the House were very materially altered by the course which they had pursued, He thought the most dignified course for the House to pursue would be to look upon these men now as entirely out of court; when they had brought their cabs back on the stands, then let them petition Parliament, and any just grievances which they had might be redressed in a fair spirit.

quite agreed with the right hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer that this question must be treated as a question of justice, and without any reference to what had taken place. He was one of those who believed, with the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford, that they ought not to have fixed the fares, without evidence before them that those fares were just. His conviction was then, and it still continued the same, that it was not just to require them to go for a sixpenny fare at all.

said, that if he understood the clause rightly, it was to allow cabs, which were only licensed to carry two, to break the law by carrying more, and get additional fare for it. He had no objection to the cabs carrying more than two, but he did not like to see it put in the light of an infraction of the law.

said, that to carry two, meant that they were not to be compelled to carry more than two, and not that they were to be limited to carrying two only.

thought that they were knocking under to the great proprietors by amending the Act in this manner. It was notorious that it was not the men who owned one or two cabs who had organised and were carrying on this strike, but the large cab proprietors, and it would be fat better for the House to adjourn the consideration of this question for a few days, and when the cab proprietors came to then senses, no doubt the House would entertain any reasonable proposal for the relief of any real grievance under which they might be suffering.

said, he thought, with the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner), that justice ought to be done in this case independent of the present state of things. When the conduct of the Dublin cabmen was contrasted with that of the London cabmen, it must be remembered that the latter had never had an inquiry referred to them. He thought it would be much more Consistent to leave the responsibility of arranging the matter in the hands of the Government; but he entertained a strong opinion that the scale of fares laid down in the Bill was not remunerative. He certainly thought that at least an inquiry into its justice should have been made before such a reduction was attempted.

said, he agreed with those who thought the House ought to resist anything like a concession to clamour. He lamented very much the state of things out of doors, and chiefly for the sake of the persons who had occasioned that state of things, for there could be no doubt that the persons engaged in the cab trade would be those who would suffer the most inconvenience from the strike. In taking such a course they had been ill-advised; but at the same time he could not help reminding hon. Gentlemen that the present difficulty, and the public annoyance experienced, had been brought upon the House by their own conduct. If the Select Committee asked for had been granted, all the details connected with the matter would have been properly examined, and the mistake would not have been made which had involved them in so much difficulty. Another time, in legislating, the House should remember the good old proverb, "The more haste, the less speed."

said, if the Committee felt inclined to discuss the subject of the sixpenny fare, and whether the legislation of the House, was to be reversed, he would withdraw the clause altogether. That point was not pressed by the cab proprietors themselves. It was most desirable to confine the discussion to the real point, and he trusted the Committee would at once either affirm the clause or postpone it. The general feeling appeared to be in favour of the clause, and he thought it would be better to adopt it than to enter into a disquisition as to who was right and who was wrong.

said, that trifling as the occasion might appear, there was an important constitutional principle involved in the present discussion. If the Committee were now to yield to the dictation of a particular class of persons, who happened to belong to the metropolis, it would open a most dangerous precedent to encourage the future adoption of a similar improper course by other classes who might have any fancied or real grievance to complain of. It would also create very just discontents in provincial districts, from whence decorous remonstrances often remained unattended to by the Legislature. It would suggest to the car owners of the city of Dublin, as well as to other classes there, that their local grievances would have a much better chance of being speedily redressed if they now had their own local Parliament in College Green. A deputation from those Dublin car owners was at present in London, seeking by legitimate means an alteration in the Dublin Carriages Bill, and their conduct afforded a striking contrast to that pursued by the cabmen of London. Members of the House had certainly suffered some personal inconveniences during the last two days; but those might be easily obviated, either by proper official regulations, or, if necessary, by immediate legislation. They could all remember when, in the year 1848, a special Act of Parliament had been passed through all its stages in a single day, in order to suppress summarily what had been called the "cabbage-garden rebellion" in Ireland. The present state of things, however, should at once be put an end to in one way or other; and as it was a sort of little London cab rebellion, he thought it lay entirely with the Executive Government to suppress it in such form as they might think best. He could not think they were now proposing the most effectual course. Were he allowed to offer a suggestion, he would state that they might never again have so good an opportunity to pass a law introducing a perfect free trade in cabs, by permitting the owner of any vehicle in London, or in any other town, to register it at the commencement of each year, to run at any fare he might think fit; and, at the same time, to take effectual measures to repress combination of any sort. By such means they would have some vehicles, suited to the humbler classes, plying at fourpence, or even twopence per mile, while they would also have a very superior class of carriages running at sixpence or eightpence, or perhaps one shilling per mile. Any interference with the principles of free trade, whether by public Act of Parliament, or by private combination among individuals, was always productive of injury to the public and to the individuals themselves. For his own part, having stated these views, he would leave on the Government the responsibility of taking such steps as they might think proper to suppress this little cab rebellion.

said, he had been present at an interview between a deputation of cab proprietors and the Secretary to the Treasury, and could state that his hon. Friend had done his utmost to arrive at an equitable conclusion as regarded all parties. It appeared, however, almost impossible to satisfy the proprietors. He hoped the Committee would proceed to pass these clauses.

would suggest that they really ought not to divide. He felt the cab proprietors were very much in the wrong; but he could not conceal from himself that the House had been a little inadvertent. Let them put themselves right by adopting the two clauses proposed by the Government, and then all would go well.

did not wish to stand in the way of an arrangement, but the clause would not carry out the object in view. He certainly would oppose it in the interest of the public.

said, as one who was present at the interview of the cab proprietors with the hon. Gentleman, he thought it right to state they were satisfied with the Resolutions so far as they went, but that nothing would completely satisfy them except a shilling for the first mile.