said, he wished to put two questions to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer with respect to the Resolutions now on the table of the House. The first was this—supposing the Resolutions received the sanction of Parliament, and any number of persons should elect to com- mute their stock into the 3¼ per cent stock 1844, was it the intention of the Government to make purchase of that description of stock to supply the demand so created, or to create stock, on the same terms of course as that created under the Act of 1844? And if the latter course were intended, then he desired to know whether the creation of the stock would be attended with any condition as to the increase of the capital amount of the National Debt. He also begged to ask what was the description of persons who would be the subject of these Resolutions whose stock stood in the names of the Accountants General in Chancery, or the Accountant in Bankruptcy, and in what relation they stood to the South Sea Company whose stock was to be dealt with by these Resolutions?

Sir, I may answer those questions without any difficulty. With respect to the first question, our intention is, in case any commutation on the part of these trustees should be effected, that the means for that commutation shall be provided by the creation of new stock. With regard to the question of the increase of the capital of the national debt, my expectation is that this arrangement will be effected with some diminution of the capital of the national debt. It is a very small amount—scarcely worth mentioning—but I have no doubt that, instead of an increase, it will occasion a diminution of the capital of the debt. With regard to the third question, who the persons are that stand upon the Accountant Generals' accounts in Bankruptcy and in Chancery, I shall give an answer which will probably be the most intelligible to the hon. and learned Gentleman, with his professional knowledge. I believe that they will be the same miscellaneous description of persons as those who stand upon the Accountant Generals' accounts in other larger stocks. With respect to their relation to the South Sea Company, that, I apprehend, is a question of law, which I am not well able to answer it the present moment. I presume, however, but I speak under correction, that he Accountants General must be partners in the South Sea Company, just like any other partners in respect of those stocks, and that the persons to whom those stocks really belong can have no legal rights as partners in the South Sea Company. I will not go into the question of how they are to be protected, or whether they are likely to be damnified; but I think I am right in stating that that is their legal position.

Sir, in introducing these Resolutions yesterday to the notice of the Committee, for two reasons I confined myself very strictly to a brief and dry comment upon the text of the Resolutions. One of those reasons was, that at the present period of the Session, and in the present state of the business of the House, I was not willing, without necessity, to occupy the time of the Committee, and thereby contribute to the prolongation of a Session which has been unusually long and laborious. And the other reason was, that in my judgment the time for a full discussion of this question had not yet arrived. But the speeches which were subsequently made gave a much larger range to the subject, and have imposed upon me the necessity, which for the reasons I have stated I much regret, of troubling the Committee at greater length than I should otherwise have done, and of bringing before them matters to which I did not advert in my opening address. In point of fact, three subjects of a character in a great measure distinct have been so far introduced to the notice of the Committee as to make it necessary for me to remark upon them, two of them being subjects which undoubtedly demand, or will demand, a fuller consideration than any that they can now receive, and the third being the subject of the Resolutions upon the table of the House, which I conceive, with great respect to the Committee, to be a matter of minor range and scope. The other two subjects are the merits or demerits, as it may be, of the Act of Parliament passed at an early period of the present Session, and the subject of the unfunded debt. Both of these are matters of great consequence. Both of them are matters which we can at present discuss with only a partial and limited knowledge, the circumstances not being ripe for the Committee to form an opinion upon them. I have to apologise, therefore, for the necessity of touching upon them. It is a necessity, however, which has been occasioned by the speeches the have been made. Now, as regards the present Resolution, to which I will first address myself, an objection has been taken in the Committee, to which I must refer. It was countenanced by the vague and indefinite language of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), and it assumed the form of a full-blown misunderstanding in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Mr. J. B. Smith). It was, that we ought not to revive or to resuscitate a plan which was really defunct, by offering new terms of commutation to parties, who, having already had the option of commuting, have not thought fit to avail themselves of it. Sir, there is no attempt to revive or to resuscitate that proposal. There is no intention, and there is no proposition on the table which would have the effect, with the insignificant exception of the small sum contained in the third Resolution, which we are not discussing, of offering to the holders of stock, who had the power of commutation under the Act of the present Session, and declined to avail themselves of it, any new power, or reopening of the option, whatever. I am very desirous that this should be clearly understood both by the Committee and by the public out of doors. It was not for my own sake, or for the sake of the Government., which is comparatively a matter of trifling importance, that I am so anxious, since any misunderstanding which affects them will be cleared up by the lapse of a few months; but it is because impressions of an erroneous kind, propagated by the speeches of Members of this House, immediately fly abroad, and their injurious influence on the very moment is felt in the state and condition of the public credit. For that reason I am most anxious that this misapprehension, at all events, should be entirely put out of the way, and that it should be distinctly understood that there is no individual who had the option offered to him by the Act of the present Session, and who declined that option, to whom any offer is now proposed to be made. I confess I was surprised at some statements which I heard yesterday, and which it appears to me need not to have been made, even after a most superficial inspection of the terms of these Resolutions. It was stated that it was proposed to take the power of making an arrangement with those parties for an unlimited time. Why, the language of the Resolution is, that that power shall be taken for a time to be limited. In the Resolutions, in accordance with all form and precedent, are included the general outlines of what we propose to do, while the filling up of those outlines is necessarily reserved for the Bill to be founded upon them. The only question is, whether a custom has not grown up, from which certainly I have not derogated, owing to the desire to give as much information as possible, of rather overloading Resolutions of this character with a formality of statement, and in that manner making them much less easily intelligible than they would otherwise be? In point of fact, the meaning of the second Resolution, which would have run to a very great length indeed, if all the particulars had been included, and which at present is rather formidable, is simply this—that certain parties being holders of South Sea Stock, and having been disqualified by law from taking advantage of the late Act of Parliament, should now have an offer made to them, analogous, as far as it can be, after the change of circumstances, to that which at a former period was made to their fellow holders. That is really the meaning of the second Resolution. Then the hon. and learned Member for Suffolk (Sir F. Kelly) makes an objection to this Resolution that the power which it gives of commuting stocks is given to the South Sea Company as a body, and not to the particular holders, whom I have already declared, and whom the Resulution declares, to be the exclusive objects of this proposition. Well, Sir, I should have hoped that the hon. and learned Gentleman's professional experience would have brought him to the same conclusion as the professional experience of my advisers brings them; and would have told him that in the case of an incorporated Company it would be very difficult for this House to establish direct relations with individuals who are the members of that Company. The form of the Resolution in that respect, empowering the South Sea Company to act, in lieu of empowering certain individuals who are holders in it to act, is simply founded upon considerations of convenience, and on the fact that if we endeavour to establish those relations with individual holders, a great deal of enactment will be necessary to render that process practicable, which is much better spared. But when the hon. and learned Gentleman says that those parties may be damnified by giving this power to the South Sea Company, there again he falls into the same error of assuming that every provision which a Bill of this nature is to contain, ought to be set forth in the Resolutions. There are certain things so absurd upon the face of them that it is not always deemed necessary to specify in a document that they are not to be done. I should have thought it was perfectly manifest that no one gifted with the use of his five senses could possibly have contemplated anything so ridiculous and so tyrannical and unjust as it would be to put into the hands of the South Sea Company, as a body, the power of dealing arbitrarily with the interests of certain of its partners. Of course, it is intended that the South Sea Company shall merely act on behalf of those parties, and that its so acting shall be with their consent, at their instance, at their desire, and, of course, exclusively for their benefit. I have looked at the Resolution to see whether I might not in some way satisfy the squeamish apprehensions of the hon. and learned Gentleman, by inserting in it something to convey that what is done must be with the consent of those parties. I do not say that it may not be done, but it will add a great deal to the length, while it will not at all add to the clearness of the Resolution. I am an advocate for brevity and clearness, and I hope that the Committee, therefore, will be content to rest satisfied with the assurance I have given, and that they will look at the Bill to see that that which is the intention of the plan shall be so secure that there can be no deviation from it in carrying the plan into execution. We heard yesterday that the power which is asked in this Resolution on behalf of the Treasury, was an unlimited and unprecedented power. I confess I listened with very great surprise to that objection. It is perfectly obvious that certain powers of discretion must be reposed in the Treasury, or in any department, or in any Minister, that has the management of the public money. In my opinion you do not go wrong in reposing that discretion, but you do go wrong if you do not call the Minister to a strict account when it has been misused. I had neither the intention nor the desire to call for any extension of such powers beyond the limit that usage and the law prescribe. What have I asked for in the present instance? I have asked for a power to exchange certain portions of the South Sea Stock for 3¼ per cents; and the total amount contemplated by the present Resolution which could possibly come under that exchange would be about 2,000,000l. Parliament, perhaps, may wish to limit that power. If it be so desired, I really do not entertain any deci ded objection to it, but I do not think that it would be advantageous to the public interest. I think it would be much better for the public interest, when you want your agent to deal with certain parties, that you should send him without minute instructions, which must be given in the face of the world, and which, in fact, only aids and assists those with whom you are going to make a bargain. That, I think, is a left-handed mode of proceeding. The proper mode is—first, to choose a proper agent, and if he is not a proper agent whom you have in your Chancellor of the Exchequer, put him out and get a proper one. Then, having got a proper one, give him discretion that may be used for the advantage of the public, mid when it has been used then call him to account. But, only to satisfy the Committee that the power which I am asking is perfectly trivial in comparison with the statutory powers already in the hands of the Minister of Finance, I will just make two references. At the present moment you give by Statute to the Treasury, or to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the power of disposing of 30,000,000l. of the public obligations under the name of Exchequer bonds, which it is in the power of the Treasury, by an enactment which you have passed, to bring into the market and to sell at any terms they please. It is likewise in their power to saddle the public with the payment, at the option of the holder, of those Exchequer bonds. Perhaps you will say that that was done by a recent Statute; but I ask, is it out of keeping with the power which you have given the Chancellor of the Exchequer by other Statutes? There is a Statute, which you renew from year to year, with respect to Exchequer bills. What was the power given in the Act of the present year? You have authorised the issue of 17,800,000l. in Exchequer bills. The present rate of interest upon these bills in round numbers is 1½ per cent; but you have placed unlimited and uncontrolled power in the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, without any notice to anybody, to raise that interest threefold. The total sum of interest due from the public at this moment, at the existing rate, on the present amount of Exchequer bills, which is something more than 14,000,000l., would be about 210,000l. But it is in his power, by stroke of the pen, to saddle on the country, instead of 210,000l, for the current year, the payment of 630,000l. by raising the rate of interest on Exchequer bills. I merely quote that in answer to what was stated yesterday; but, after all, this House has been accustomed to proceed upon the assumption, not that men who are placed in public offices are only fit inmates for lunatic asylums, but upon the assumption that the system of Parliamentary responsibility is worth something, and imposed limits to abuses which could not well be transgressed. All I wish to impress upon the Committee at this moment is, that if there be a jealousy and a desire to restrain the exercise of that discretion, I will not say that I should think it my duty absolutely to resist it; but I am quite sure that it would be a very left-handed method of proceeding, and one which would operate exclusively against the public. Taking the subject, however, as it now stands, upon the Resolution as I have proposed it, which I think is the best and most proper form, it is altogether insignificant as compared with the powers which you absolutely, from year to year, and I shall say of necessity, confer upon the Minister who fills the department of Minister of Finance. It was stated last night that this was no party question, and an intimation was given by an hon. Gentleman behind me, that upon that account he would exercise his own option, and would vote, I think he said, against the Resolution which I have brought forward. The hon. Gentleman gave that intimation, I am aware, under a misapprehension which was probably due to the hurry with which he had been obliged to read the Resolution. I have now, however, distinctly explained to him, I hope, that this; Resolution does nothing of the kind that he anticipated, and that it does not reopen the option to parties to whom it has already been given by the Act of the present Session, and by whom it has been refused. With respect to this, must beg to remind the hon. Member, that, in the exercise of his undoubted discretion the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire has given an entirely different character to this discussion. The right hon. Gentleman stated that it was necessary that the House should pause before it passed these Resolutions; and he based his objection to the measure distinctly on the ground of the incapacity of the Government, and their failure in dealing with financial questions. That challenge the right hon. Gentleman has fairly given. That is the issue which he has raised. By that issue I am perfectly content to be judged; and if that is the point at which we have arrived, no man is less disposed to flinch from trying that issue, and no man is more desirous, if that is the view of the House of Commons, that they should proceed to make better arrangements than can be made while I am Chancellor of the Exchequer in managing the finances of the country. Having noticed the objections which have been taken to the second Resolution, I will now state in a very few words the positive reasons which appear to me to render it a matter of good policy—and not of good policy only, but of justice—that the Committee should adopt a measure of this nature. The main proposition to which I ask your assent is, that certain options should now be given to parties who were intended to have the benefit of the former Act of Parliament, but who were disqualified by law from availing themselves of that benefit at the time the Act passed. I say that justice to those parties demands it. I distinctly place the claim for passing this Resolution upon the ground of justice. I place it upon the ground of justice, because it has always been the habit of Parliament, and because it is the dictate of natural equity, that when you are dealing with the holders of stock of a particular description you have no right to draw a distinction between them, but should observe substantially the same line of conduct with regard to them all. On proposing myself that persons; holding stock in the names of the Accountants General in Chancery and in Bankruptcy should be precluded from taking the benefit of the Act, what was the effect of that proposition, and who was the first person to notice the injustice of that decision? The Lord Chancellor of the late Government. That noble and learned Lord it was who raised that point fully in the House of Lords, and who at once obtained from my Colleagues in that House, the assurance that an enactment should be proposed which should substantially place parties in a position as good as that of those to whom the options were given by the Act. It is that pledge, given in answer to the Lord Chancellor of the late Government—a noble Lord whose power to form a judgment of what equity requires in such a case no man will dispute—it is that pledge that I now propose to redeem. But it would be absurd to pro- pose to redeem it by merely giving the options which were offered in April last. The change of circumstances which has taken place since that time makes those options appear valueless now which appeared valuable then. I propose, therefore, that you should make an offer to them which should be as good to them during the time which has to elapse before the 5th of next January, as the options which you offered in April were at that period to the parties who were in a condition to take advantage of them. The Resolution relates to persons who hold stock in the names of the Accountants General in Chancery and Bankruptcy; but the persons principally contemplated by it are in a different predicament. Their case had not been brought before me at the time when I made the original proposal to the House. I had no idea either that the proportion of stock of the South Sea Company held in trust was so considerable, or that there were no means by which the voice of the persons holding that stock could be made available in determining the course that was to be taken by the Company. But the case as it is now before us is perfectly clear. Those parties are absolutely disqualified by law—not by our Statute, but by a law wholly independent of our Statute—from voting on the question whether the Company should commute its stock, or whether it should not. That being so, I say that you are bound, in common justice, to make some offer to those parties. It is a very hard case upon the holders of trust stock, when individuals have had the option of commuting, with regard to whom the fact of being paid off would generally be no great hardship, that trustees to whom it almost always is a great hardship, and with whom it is generally worth while to take any commutation that Parliament offers, should be entirely shut out from the possibility of availing themselves of such commutation. Therefore, not having interfered with South Sea Stock as a whole, and having given to persons the opportunity to commute, I say, do not allow these other parties who are trustees to suffer so serious an injustice as that they shall be compelled, without any option being given to them whatever, and when you have taken a different course with regard to other partners in the Company, to receive certain moneys on the 6th of January next, irrespective of what changes might accrue between the Interval yet to elapse, with the obligation which they are pretty certain to be under of being compelled to reinvest them forthwith in the public securities. I think, then, that justice to those parties demands the adoption of a proposition of this kind. I must also point out to the Committee that the convenience of trade requires this measure; because, as I stated yesterday, nothing can be more adverse to the convenience of trade than the sudden issue of money. And this particularly applies in the present case, for the sudden issue, amounting to 2,000,000l., and coming, as it must., at a time which coincides with the payment of the dividends, will necessarily have the effect of producing an artificial abundance of money. If it were a bonâ fide liquidation of debt, you might say that it was an inconvenience which could not be avoided. No doubt; but this is not a bonâ fide liquidation, because the very creditors whom you pay off would again become your creditors by forthwith buying into the public funds. Having had the money unlocked on the 5th of January, it would be locked up again upon the 7th. That is a very inconvenient course of things, and it is one which it is not necessary to incur. I do not say that it is an inconvenience which could not be borne, but it is one which may be spared, and therefore it is the duty of the Committee to obviate it. I do not hesitate to say that, besides being demanded by justice—beside; being a means of obviating inconvenience to those who are engaged in trade and commerce, it is likewise for the advantage of the State that there should be no unnecessary—issue of public money upon the 5th of January. As matters stand at the present moment, I do not anticipate any difficulty in meeting the maximum demand that may be made upon the Treasury; but I will state at once that I cannot consistently with my duty, and I say it with all respect—I will not enter into any defence of myself which involves a statement of any expectations and views with respect to that amount. No amount of debate, in amount of attack from the right hon. Gentleman opposite, shall induce me to deviate from that resolution, because I am convinced that were I to do so, it would be injurious to the public interests. All I can say is, that I anticipate no difficulty what ever—and, as far as one may presume upon no extraordinary circumstances happening in the interval, I am confident that I shall have no difficulty whatever—in meeting the demands which may be made in January cued April under this operation. But I am no prophet. I never pretended to be master of the elements. I never professed to be gifted with more sense than other people or boasted of the possession of faculties beyond the range of other men, or that I could strike out a course entirely independent of the course of former times. I am quite content to walk in the way of tradition and precedent, and when I cannot do a great thing for the public, I am perfectly ready to do a small one. I really cannot tell you now, though it may appear a somewhat humiliating confession, what the harvest may be, or what quantity of corn may come from abroad. I know that there is 4,000,000l. less bullion in the Bank of England now than there was twelve months ago; but I cannot say how much of that bullion may be required for paying for corn. I think it for the convenience of the public, however, to narrow the margin as far as other circumstances permit, and render it convenient and just. If, then, it is for the convenience of the public, nothing is more absurd than to say, because I have misconducted myself that therefore the public shall suffer. Pass any censure you please upon me, I am perfectly ready to meet it; but do not refuse to the public that which is a convenience and an advantage to them on account of any feeling which you may entertain of the adroitness or mad-adroitness of the way in which the finances of the country are conducted. That is all I think it necessary to say at present with respect to the substance of the second Resolution. But, as I have said, I am under the necessity of adverting to other matters, because the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, followed by his alter ego in finance, the hon. and learned Member for East Suffolk (Sir P. Kelly), entered into a discussion of the merits of the whole measure of last spring. I have not the least disposition to check the liberty of the right hon. Gentleman to discuss any measure at any time he thinks fit; but if he says that this is the time at which the merits of that measure ought to be discussed, I beg leave most respectfully to differ from him; and my reason is this, that you cannot ferns a view of the operation until the operation is complete. Yon will have that opportunity next year. It cannot be postponed. It is all written down in the law. Whatever the effect may be, on the 5th of January next and the 5th of April next, that effect must become final and conclusive. You will then have an opportunity of calling the Minister to account, and I shall then be in a condition to exhibit to you what are the actual pecuniary results of the measure But at the present moment you know nothing, except that about one-fourth of the persons holding minor stocks—stock other than that of the South Sea Company have agreed to commute, and that three fourths have not agreed to commute. The right hon. Gentleman, in his impatience thought that he might take advantage of the bad weather and the state of stocks and that he had much better not wait until the proper time for discussing this question. There has been a turn of affairs one way; there may be a turn of affairs another way. The right hon. Gentleman, who is great master of tactics, thought it well t seize the moment to raise the prejudice when he could, for a little sunshine probably might dissipate a good deal of what he said I do not wish to check discussion, but I do say that the Committee will not be in a position to form an opinion upon the merit of this measure, until the time shall arrive when the payments shall be actually made and when you see the state of the public revenue, the state of the public balances and the state of the unfunded debt, after those payments have been made. That is the time when you will be able to form your judgment, and anything that can now be said, must of necessity be partial am inconclusive. But the right hon. Gentleman complains that the measure of the present spring was hurried through the House; and, in relation to that complaint of his, I think it my duty to speak with great plainness, and to state the which I conscientiously entertain, irrespectively of the question whether it may be agreeable to everybody or not. So far from that measure having been hurried through, I say that that measure was most unfortunately delayed in its passage through this House. I say this, and I wish it to be remembered, not for the present occasion only, not for the present Minister, not for the present Government merely, but I say that it is impossible for this House to undertake the management of the finances of the country in public debate. A Minister may mismanage them. This House if it so undertakes them, must mismanage, them. I defy you to conduct them in public here, watched by the whole world, including those with whom you are going to transact business, without serious injury to the public interests. That injury did result from the delay which occurred in passing the measure in the spring. It is well known, it is perfectly notorious, that if it had passed with greater expedition, it would have effected a great deal more than it did, and the advantage to the public would have been much more considerable, had it not been for that delay. I am not interfering with the freedom of public debate, but I point out the consequence to the public interests. They must be damaged by delay in carrying out these propositions, and either you ought to make up your minds to reject or to accept them at the earliest possible time. As to complaining that a particular stage of a Bill was passed after eleven o'clock at one time, and that it is brought forward at a very inconvenient period at another time, submitting all kinds of crude and impossible theories, and discussing the same thing over and over again, that may be all very good political economy, or it may be the worst that ever was heard of, but altogether the season is very inopportune. But, to return to the Resolution: you must either be content to have these plans marred in their operation, or you must be content to repose a large discretion in the Minister, in which event you can call to account, and to a strict account, the person in whom you repose that discretion. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) exhibited great compassion for what he called my "disappointment." Yes, Sir; but, if my disappointment is considerable, what must his be? I am disappointed. I did not anticipate in the first week in April all that has since taken place in the political world, or in the natural world. Circumstances, I think it will be admitted, have changed a good deal since that time. Look to the rate of discount at the Bank; look at the rate of interest allowed by the great bill brokers; look at the state of gold in the Bank and the price of funds, and you will see that there has been an essential turn in the state of affairs which it was impossible to anticipate. The hon. and learned Member for East Suffolk says, that during the discussion in the spring, circumstances occurred which ought to have made me hesitate; and he added that when doubts arose I ought to have receded. Now, that affords an exact illustrationn of the mischief which resulted from the protracted nature of the debates upon that measure. But because doubts have arisen one way, non constat that doubts may not arise of an exactly opposite description. The doubts which have arisen one week may disappear the next week; and the mere fact that a little cloud appears on the horizon, which may grow into a great one, or which may disappear altogether, is not to justify a change in a measure of an important character, which is announced to Parliament upon the responsibility of the Government. Well, Sir, I am disappointed. I think the doctrine of the ancient mythology was, that there was a fate which proceeded from the mouth and the will of the gods, and against that fate it is said in the ancient poets a valiant man, determined to do his duty, might struggle with success; but there was a higher unwritten fate, against which no man and no god could struggle. I think that I have had that unwritten fate to contend with—a fate against which no man could struggle. I frankly own that it was not in my power to control either politics or the weather. I have suffered the consequences; but if I am disappointed, the right hon. Gentleman must be much more so. What was his charge against the plan of the Government? He refers conveniently to the speech of the hon. Member for Huntingdon. (Mr. T. Baring); and I am desirous that the hon. Member for Huntingdon, whose candour and moderation invariably add weight even to his experience and ability, should have the fullest credit for the suspicions and apprehensions which he entertained, and which I rather think my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-upon-Trent (Mr. Ricardo) also entertained, with respect to the success of the plan. But the right hon. Gentleman objected to it on quite a different ground from that which occurred to those two hon. Members. He objected to it on the ground that the result which I proposed was not at all adequate to what might be expected. He read what he thought the maximum saving might be, and I think he calculated it at 600,000l. a year. He quoted Sir Robert Walpole. He referred to all the previous reductions of interest during the last forty years, from 6 per cent down to 3. He showed that I had not held out any such expectations, and he left you to conclude what an insignificant fellow you had now got for Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the line of the right hon. Gentleman; and what was the tone of the objection of the hon. and learned Gentleman who so faithfully reflects his mind in matters of finance, and who now sits beside him? Did the hon. and learned Member for East Suffok anticipate that that plan would be inoperative? No. He came forward yesterday with his compassion for those persons who, "trusting to the calculations of the Government," had accepted the commuted stocks, and found themselves disappointed with the results. The calculations of the Government! No, they were not the calculations of the Government, but I will tell you whose they were. They were not misled by my calculations, but they were misled by his calculations. Now, I'll contrast the words which were used by myself with regard to that measure with the words that were used by the hon. and learned Gentleman who taunts me with having misled the world. Here is something like a rule-of-three sum of the hon. and learned Gentleman's. He is a master of figures, no doubt. He found that in the last forty years there had been a fall in the rate of interest from 6 per cent to 3 per cent; and, darting forthwith into figures, and making use of his imagination as well as of the rule-of-three, he says, that as it has fallen from 6 per cent to 3 per cent in forty years, so it is probable that it will fall in the next forty years from 3 per cent to 2 per cent. He then says—

"In the forty years now completed, the interest of money in the funds had fallen 2 per cent. Looking, then, to the increasing commerce and prosperity of this country—to the vast amount of capital at their disposal—at the great influx of capital from foreign States, where the same confidence as to political affairs did not exist—was it extravagant or unreasonable to suppose, trusted as this country was to an indefinite amount by the whole civilised world, that in the next forty years the interest on the money in the funds might fall from 3 to 2 per cent?"

That was the language of the hon. and learned Gentleman—

And is now.

Well. if that were his language, surely he has no right to talk now of persons being misled by the calculations of the Government. Did I subscribe to that? On the contrary, I did my best on the instant utterly to protest against it, and to expose the gross futility of such a notion. How did I describe that measure to the House in introducing it? The right hon. Gentleman said, that I seemed to be under the impression that I was going to effect a gigantic operation, and to think that I was destined to bring about some wondrous revolution. Upon the 8th of April of the present year I said—

"I do not recommend the proposition that is now before the Committee as a proposition which can effect any sweeping or fundamental change; but I venture to recommend it to them as a proposition which is just and prudent in itself, and which will probably lay the foundation for more extended improvements in future."—[3 Hansard, cxxv. 810.]

These were the words, Sir, in which I recommended that measure to the House. I begged the House to moderate its expectations; I referred to what I thought were the inflated expectations out of doors, and I said that the merit of the proposition, if it had any merit in it, was that it was both safe and just, and that it would be good and beneficial for the present, while it would open an opportunity and afford a promise of more extended operations in future. If the hon. and learned Gentleman says that he does not change his language, I think that I may also say I do not change mine. Disappointed as I am, however, I still say that the little that has been done has entailed no loss and no evil on the public, but that it has laid the foundation for more extended operations in the future. Again, I must refer to the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, who spoke of the "certain loss" inflicted by that measure. He did not tell me what that loss was. He did not tell me where be had heard it—

I meant the loss of the 100,000l., which you counted as gain. I did not mean any absolute loss.

Oh, you mean the disappearance of that which was anticipated as gain, and do not speak of any absolute loss. I am glad I understand that. With respect, then, to the measure generally—I mean the Act of the present Session—what I do say is, that whatever attacks may be made upon me, my defence must necessarily stand over until the time when the dissentient stockholders shall be paid off. I cannot make it now, for two reasons—first, because the saying what I might say would not, perhaps, be altogether for the public interest; and, secondly, because we cannot anticipate, except within certain limits, what will be the precise state of circumstances upon the 5th of January and the 5th of April next. I wish that persons should contemplate the measure, so far as it has gone, upon a knowledge of the exact truth. Upon this point I have already re- ferred to the restraints and the curbs which I endeavoured to impose upon public expectation with regard to the immediate effect of the measure. Besides that, I wish to go so far at least as this, with reference o my own defence and the defence of the Government, and I would not go so far even were it not that, irrespective of party differences in this House, we all have a common interest in the maintenance of public credit, and in preventing the dissemination of rumours and alarms which tend to its depreciation. What I wish to stand upon s this:—I did not enter into the proposition of last April upon the assumption that those minor stocks must necessarily be converted. I think, if I had done so, and had advised the House to propose that commutation with the alternative of paying off, and had not taken into view what must have happened in the event of the commutation not taking place, I should have been very deficient in my duty. It appears to be assumed, however, by those who condemn the measure, that there was in my view but one alternative—that of commutation. That is not the case. As well as circumstances permitted, I endeavoured to try and calculate what would happen to the public in case the commutation should have been rejected. You cannot form a judgment upon the measure by merely asking whether the commutation has been generally accepted or declined. The question is, what will be the fate of the public in either event, and what will be its effect upon the public interests now that three-fourths of the shareholders have declined to commute, and, therefore, that three-fourths of the money must be provided? That question must be answered. Well, suppose that, notwithstanding the failure of the commutation, it appears that the paying off of those stocks can be effected with positive economy to the public, and without rendering the state of the public credit in any degree insecure: is the measure, then, a bad one? Is public saving per se a bad thing? It is not my duty, now, to enter largely into the means by which that payment may be effected; but there are three things absolutely essential for you to take into consideration before you can form a judgment upon the measure: first, the state and prospects of the public revenue; second, the state of the balances in the Bank of England; and, third, the state of the unfunded debt. The whole thing turns upon that. If you have ample means of meeting the claims of next year, then I shall stand up for my measure, and shall contend that it has not been, as alleged by hon. Gentlemen opposite, a total failure, for I shall have made out my case before the country irrespectively of those parties accepting the commutation. I had taken into consideration the possibility of their not commuting. I did not expect that they would commute. I was not so outrageously sanguine as the right hon. Gentleman opposite stated to the House, that people were waiting in eagerness to accept the commutation. I beg to state that I said nothing of the kind. [Mr. DISRAELI: I said that the Government said so.] That is a distinction which I did not observe. But certainly I never said so; and those who know my private conversation, know what the state of my mind was. I was very open on the subject, and was very much convinced of the uncertainty of the matter. I was by no means outrageously sanguine with respect to it. But on the state of those three things which I have mentioned will depend entirely the question, whether the measure was a good one or a bad one. A limited one I grant you it was; but I contend that it was not a measure involving danger to the public, but, as far as it went, that it was not only a just but a prudent measure. The right hon. Gentleman opposite has himself adverted to the important subject of the unfounded debt, and I thank him for having introduced it into this discussion. I am quite aware that the state of the unfounded debt is very different from what it was twelve months ago; and I do not feel the slightest inclination either to keep back the fullest investigation as to the extent of that difference, or to avoid any discussion as to the means by which it was brought about. I repeat I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for having introduced this subject to the notice of the Committee, and though here again we are not in a condition to form any final conclusion, yet I say so far as we have as yet gone, I regard with considerable satisfaction the state of the unfunded debt, compared with what it was twelve months ago. It has been reduced by 3,100,000l. The present issue of Exchequer bills is 3,500,000l. within the statutory limit; and it is quite clear that that 3,500,000l. forms a margin of which I may avail myself to meet those payments on account of the uncommuted stocks as they fall in. Now the present state of the unfunded debt is this:—It has been reduced by 3,100,000l. The interest also has been reduced. The reduction of the interest is a matter on which no permanent calculation can be founded. It is always subject to variation once in twelve months, and sometimes more than that. Circumstances may at any moment arise which may make it the duty of the Finance Minister to alter the rate of interest on Exchequer bills. Now what was the charge upon the public for Exchequer bills last year, and what will be the charge during the present year? The Exchequer bills of 1852 fell due in March and June, 1853, and the rate of interest has been fixed in 1852. The amount of interest payable on the bills due in March was 192,000l., and the amount payable on the bills due in June was 174,000l. That, of course, has been liquidated, and new Exchequer bills have been issued. The amount payable upon the March Exchequer bills of 1854, instead of being 192,000l., will be only 125,000l., and the amount payable in June, 1854, instead of 174,000l., will be but 89,000l. The total amount payable for interest this year was 366,000l.; but the total charge to the public, irrespectively of any change in circumstances, upon the Exchequer bills of 1853, which will be payable in 1854, will be only 214,000l., showing a saving of 152,000l. on the Exchequer bills of the year. As I have said, I did not expect under present circumstances that either I or any one else could effect any large saving. I am, therefore, very well content to take that small saving, when I can't get anything that is better; but I must confess that, in my view, that question of the annual saving is only a very small part of the question. I most sincerely wish that we were now discussing the subject of Exchequer bills, at a time when we might take a larger range, when a larger portion of the House was here, and when we might bring home to our minds many important considerations in regard to the unfunded debt. One thing, however, I am very desirous to say. There is an impression among the public that the unfunded debt, as it has been habitually managed up to the present time, is a cheap and economical portion of the public obligations. The examination of the subject has convinced me that that is an entire misconception, and that, on the contrary, the unfunded debt, in its practical operation, is the most expensive portion of the public obligations; and I will tell you why. The mode of management has been this:—In easy times Parliament has been content to make the provision from year to year, gratified, perhaps, by the lowness of the rate of interest. In difficult times it has been necessary to raise the rate of interest; but the difficulty has been imminent, and it has been submitted to. But that is not the serious part of the question. The serious part of the question is this, and it is one which you may amend:—The practice has been, in easy times, to keep the amount of the capital of the unfunded debt up to what the state of the market would tolerably well bear. The consequence is, that in difficult times it has been found necessary from time to time to reduce the capital of your unfunded debt by commuting it into funded debt. That has been done not once, but over and over again. It was done in 1819, again in 1821, in 1826, in 1830, and in 1841. Upon every one of those five occasions it was done under difficulties, and when there was a pressure upon the money market. Now, has the Committee the smallest notion of the amount which has been added by these successive operations to the permanent obligations of the country? No less a sum than 48,800,000l. has passed since 1819 out of the condition of unfunded debt into the condition of funded debt. The choice which you have is this—will you reduce your unfunded debt in easy times or in difficult times? I have chosen the reduction of the unfunded debt in times comparatively easy. The consequence is this—3,100,000l. has been paid out of the public balances without causing any sensible inconvenience to the public. That is the course which I have taken, and that is the course for which the right hon. Gentleman calls me to account. The Exchequer-bill market has been relieved to the extent of that reduction, just the same as it would have been by funding, but with this difference to the public, that I venture to say that it has not cost the public one farthing. What would have been the case if, instead of that, I had let the unfunded debt remain where it was until we came into difficulties? I will show the Committee at what rates the capital of the unfunded debt has been funded in former times; and, remember, that which you call the unfunded debt, and which you look upon as temporary, has been passing from time to time into funded debt, and since 1819 has added 48,800,000l. to the public obligations. In 1819 you funded 27,000,000l., at the rate of about 5¼ per cent. In 1821 you funded 7,000,000l.; in 1826, 8,000,000l.; in 1830, 3,000,000l.; and in 1841, 3,800,000l., altogether the amount I have before mentioned, namely, 48,800,000l.; and the average rate of interest which the country is now paying for that 48,00,000l. is, as nearly as possible 5 per cent. There is, then, a permanent obligation entailed on the country of 5 per cent on 48,800,000l., which previously to 1819 was unfunded debt, but is now funded, and which arises from the practice of not funding till difficult times. It is fair to admit that the case is not quite so bad as it looks, because the funding of 1819 must be regarded as retrospective—it was effecting a transition from a war state to a peace state of finance. Deduct, therefore, the operations of 1819, and take the operation of the subsequent periods from 1821 to 1841, and it will be seen that the rates of interest at which the unfunded debt was funded from that time, after all, were not so much more favourable. The average rate was 4l. 6s. 8d. per cent, which is the permanent burden inflicted on the public in respect of each 100l. which was the capital of the unfunded debt. That is entailed for ever. I think I am justified, then, in the assertion that that unfunded debt is not the cheap and economical portion of the public obligations which it seems to be, but that, in point of fact, in the long run, where you watch its working, you will find that it is a very expensive portion of the public burdens. Even the rate of interest upon Exchequer bills, although we may be much gratified that it is 1d. or 1¼d. or 1¼d. a day, which are very moderate rates, are not quite so favourable as may be supposed, for if we take the average rate of Exchequer bills since 1816, it will be found to be 3l. 8s. per cent from 1816 to 1834; and during the last eighteen years, from 1835 to 1852, we have not been able to get it down to 3l., the average rate having been 3l. 2s. per cent. If the 3,100,000l. which has now been discharged from the unfunded debt, without costing the public any appreciable sum at the time, had been funded at the average rate at which funding has taken place since 1821, it would have entailed upon the country a permanent charge of 134,000l. a year. Had it been funded on terms more favourable than any funding that has heretofore taken place—that is, at the rate indicated by the average rate of Exchequer bills since 1834, at nearly 3¼ per cent, it would then have entailed a permanent charge on the country amount- ing to 96,000l. a year. I am glad that I have been led to go thus far, by way of opening to the Committee considerations which I think of the utmost importance with regard to the unfunded debt; and which I trust will lead the Committee and persons out of doors to suspect and to watch more closely and jealously those popular notions which are abroad on the subject. This is going beyond the mere defence of myself or the Government, and beyond the attack of the right hon. Gentleman; but, even as a matter of defence, I think that I am justified in tendering him the acknowledgments with which I set out, for having led the Committee into the discussion of the state of the unfunded debt. I do not advance this as a final statement. I have said distinctly that those different elements, the conversion of South Sea Stock, the state of the revenue, the state of the public balances, and the state of the unfunded debt, are all at present in essential relation with one another, and that you cannot form a final judgment on these operations until you have seen the liquidation which is to take place at the commencement or next year completed. You will then be in a condition to form a judgment. I do not ask you to form a judgment now. I think if you do so, that it must necessarily be immature, but, judging from the results of the operations on the unfunded debt hitherto, I say that they have been eminently favourable, and that they will be attended, in all probability, not only with temporarily, but with permanently, beneficial results to the public. I am sorry to have led the Committee so far into these subjects, and so far away from the question immediately before us; but, having entered into these explanations, I sincerely trust that the Committee will arrive at a favourable decision upon them, and will assent to the Resolutions which are now upon the table.

said, that when he had before addressed the Committee upon these Resolutions, he had done so in almost total ignorance of what the effect of them would be upon the public and the persons interested, supposing them to receive the sanction of Parliament. Even after the lengthened statement of the right hon. Gentleman, the objection which he entertained to this measure had not been obviated—that objection being that it gave a power to trustees to effect a commutation of the South Sea Stock without the full consent of all the per- sons who were directly or indirectly interested. It was impossible to conceal the fact that every person who had accepted these commutations had inflicted a very considerable loss upon himself; and when they found that the property of infants and of others was liable to be dealt with in the same fashion, he trusted that the Committee would be induced to reject these Resolutions. He regretted that there was no law officer of the Crown present, because he was convinced that the right hon. Gentleman was not aware of the legal effect of that—which he was doing. The Resolution permitted the South Sea Company to commute all or any part of their stocks standing in the name of the Accountants General. He had acquired some knowledge of the nature of this corporate body, and of the fund with which they had to deal, but not from any information given by the Government. It appeared to have escaped the attention of the framers of the Resolution that the stock of the Company was indivisible as regarded their shareholders; and if twenty, or any other number, of the shareholders were desirous of commuting, no Resolution of that House could empower them to do it. The impression seemed to be that every holder of South Sea Stock possessed an integral and distinct share, than which nothing could be more erroneous. Supposing an Act were to pass in accordance with the terms of this Resolution, it would be entirely inoperative. The Resolution assumed that every shareholder in the South Sea Company was entitled to a certain specific portion of the capital stock of the Company. But that was not so. The gross capital was 2,662,784l. 8s. 6d., a sum which was not divisible into specific portions. There was no part of their stock," payable in respect of shares," and the Resolution was framed for a state of things which did not exist. So much for the form of the Resolution. As to the scope of it, if it were fair and equitable that there should be another alternative of commuting the stock into 3¼ per cent stock, 1844, why was it not proposed with the original alternatives which had been embodied in Act of Parliament? It was a great injustice and wrong to make the proposal now that persons had accepted some of the new stocks, and lost 7 per cent of their capital by the representations of the Government. He challenged the Chancellor of the Exchequer to deny that every one of those persons who had commuted their stock into the 2½ per cent stock, or into the 3½ per cent stock, or into Exchequer bonds, had lost at least 7 per cent of their capital. They had not the advantage of the experience of daily sales; but if by bankruptcy, or any other event, holders were compelled to sell, it was the opinion of persons accustomed to deal with public securities, that the prices would be for the 110l. 2½ per cent stock, 93l.; for the 100l. Exchequer bonds, 91l.; and for the 82l. 10s., 3½, per cent stock 90l. Thus the loss varied from 7 to 10 per cent; and it was most unjust, when parties had, by the representations of the Government, incurred that loss, to offer a more favourable alternative to those who were actually in the same position with them. Looking to the calculations of the Government, he did not feel inclined to trust them unnecessarily with terms of a new bargain; and, therefore, he could not consent to this Resolution. He ventured to tell the right hon. Gentleman at the time his first proposition was before the House, it was most unwise, improvident, and injudicious, to tie the hands of the Government for forty years with a guarantee of any given degree of interest, whether small or large, and nothing had occurred since to make him retract that opinion. The right hon. Gentleman, in introducing the scheme, said one great object was, to extinguish and do away with these small stocks, which disturbed the ordinary course of financial operations. He then ventured to ask whether the effect of the Bill might not be to bring into existence three stocks still smaller than those it was proposed to extinguish? Events had shown the accuracy of his anticipations. It did not require a gentleman of the transcendent abilities of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to discover that the giving three alternatives was a great blot and blemish on the Bill. It was palpable to any one having an ordinary acquaintance with arithmetic; though he ventured to say the creation of three smaller stocks, to last for forty years, was a result which the right hon. Gentleman did not anticipate. He thought it was a fallacy to assert that the depression of the new funds could be attributed to the unfavourableness of the season, or any of the causes which had been assigned, as there had been no cause mentioned which should not have produced an equal depression in 3 per cents and other previously-existing securities. He believed that the holders had suffered solely from their blind and unwarranted confidence in the assurances of Ministers; and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman, instead of endeavouring to spread the evil, would apply his time and abilities to remedying the mischief which he had already done. He had directed the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the consideration of the possibility of giving effect to this Resolution by dealing with the holders of South Sea shares as if they had rights to integral portions of the capital stock of the Company; and he submitted that until these points were more satisfactorily settled, the Resolutions ought not to receive the sanction of the Committee.

said, the right hon. Gentleman proposed by this Resolution to give to certain persons, who could not under the present Act avail themselves of the offers therein made, the same terms that were offered to the South Sea Company itself; but the right hon. Gentleman went further, and proposed that these persons should now have the advantage of a fresh arrangement—a new offer, much more advantageous than that which was offered to the South Sea Company. If this was carried into effect, they would see two distinct parties holding South Sea Stock—those who had made a bad bargain, and those who had made a good bargain; and who could doubt that the former of these would be highly dissatisfied with their position? He thought it was pretty evident that those who had not accepted the former proposition of the Government, had not lost anything by their holding back. The injustice done, was to those who had placed confidence in the right hon. Gentleman. He objected to this arrangement as wrong in principle, and must therefore oppose the Resolution.

would not enter upon the question of the general policy of the Government; but with reference to the Resolution before the Committee his objections were very strong. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said there was a class of parties who were unable to take advantage of the present Act; but instead of confining himself to the terms of the Act, he introduced into the Resolution a fresh option—that of taking the 3¼ per cent stock of 1844. He must complain of the large powers conferred on the Treasury by this Resolution. He did not know a more dangerous licence than that of placing in the hands of the Treasury the power of dealing with persons as to the precise amount of stock they were to receive for their 100l. It would make them the greatest stockjobbers in the country. Then there could be no doubt that the fresh offer now made by the Government was an act of injustice to the holders of the new stock, and he believed nothing would eradicate from the minds of these parties a strong sense of that injustice.

said, he should certainly agree with what had fallen from the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. J. B. Smith) if he thought with him that this could be regarded as a new offer; but the words of the Resolution explicitly conveyed the meaning to be, that the parties now to be benefited were those parties who by some oversight, or some imperfect comprehension of their position when the previous Act was passed, had not the power of receiving any offer, or exercising any option whatever. The real question was, whether, in point of fact, it was more convenient for Her Majesty's Treasury to make arrangements with bodies like these, and with trustees, or with large classes of individuals? and, speaking practically, he thought there could be no question on the point. Everybody knew that the Chancellor of the Exchequer always went into the market to negotiate at a disadvantage; and the only way in which be could possibly be expected to negotiate with advantage in this instance was to be empowered to make over to the South Sea Company, in lieu of stock they now held, a certain portion of the stock of the national debt. He thought that a more economical, and in every respect a better, mode of dealing with the question than any that he had yet heard suggested. There was only one part of the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which he disagreed with—he alluded to the announcement that it was not his intention to proceed with a Bill for the purpose of settling the question with regard to the funds in the hands of the Accountants General. He knew of no class of persons who were in a more hopeless or helpless position than those unfortunate people whose funds were in the Court of Chancery. They were so placed that every contingency operated against them, and nothing for them; and therefore he did hope that the right hon. Gentleman would give his attention to the subject, and not omit the very first occasion that presented itself of settling this very important question. With regard to the unfounded debt, he quite agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the points at issue on that subject. He was willing to admit that the course he had taken—and which was forced upon him at the time—had been a beneficial one, for by it be was enabled to reduce the interest on the floating debt; and he was satisfied that the employment of the public balances in the way stated had done a positive good, even if there was no other merit attaching to it. The accumulation of these balances in the hands of the Bank every quarter had been a great evil; and if there was no other reason for applying them to the payment of the interest of the unfunded debt than to prevent this, he thought the reason would be a good one.

said, he wished to know what was the amount they would have to deal with, provided the second Resolution was agreed to? He wished to call the attention of the Committee to a Bill which he held in his hand, which contained exactly the same provisions that were embodied in the Resolutions now before the Committee. All the arrangements in favour of the South Sea Company were in this Bill, just as he found them in the Resolutions, and he hoped some explanation of the connexion between the two would be given.

said, the hon. Gentleman was quite right in saying there appeared to be an intimate connexion between the Resolutions and the object of the Bill he spoke of; but, nevertheless, the connexion was as wide as possible. The reason why these persons were unable to accept either of the options contained in the former Act was, that by the constitution of the South Sea Company they were unable to express any option whatever; and this Bill was introduced to enable them to avail themselves of the opportunity of converting their stock, should they choose so to do. They asked Parliament to enable them to avail themselves of that commutation if they thought it necessary, but it was a Bill with which the Government had nothing to do. It was, in fact, a private Bill for the convenience of the stockholders.

said, he understood the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that he would object to any new offer being made; but, were these new terms or were they not? They were made in favour of persons who were formerly disabled from accepting the offers they made; but still, to him they appeared to be new offers.

said, he wished to know whether the South Sea Company, as a Company, had not refused the terms offered, and whether the effect of this measure would not be to introduce a power of voting by persons that would override the vote of the corporation?

said, he would answer, No; and in reply to a previous question of the hon. Gentleman, as to the amount of stock to be dealt with, he had to repeat what he had stated yesterday, that it would be something over 2,000,000l.

said, as he knew that important business was to come before the House, he would detain them but a very short time; but he could not overlook one or two observations of the right hon. Gentleman. In the first place, he entirely protested against the new view taken by the Government that the failure of their great financial scheme was to be attributed to the state of the weather or of the Continent. The state of the weather or the Continent had nothing whatever to do with it. It was condemned at the first by all practical men, and he knew numerous instances in which funds were held by corporations and individuals who went for consultation to those whose opinions carried the greatest weight on this subject, and by whom the scheme was universally condemned. There was one society he recollected particularly—of which, he believed, the right hon. Gentleman was a member—the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which held 15,000l. in these small stocks, and they immediately consulted gentlemen well known to the Treasury, and of the highest reputation, who recommended them to have nothing to do with a proposition of so illusive a character. The only other observation he was bound to notice was that made by the right hon. Gentleman as to his manner of dealing with the unfunded debt of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to convey to the Committee and the country the impression that he had systematically and successfully dealt with the unfunded debt of the country. Now, the right hon. Gentleman had already received on this point a friendly reminder and reproof from the hon. Gentleman behind him, and generally a supporter of his. He reminded him that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was forced to take the course which he had taken in this matter. Now, he (Mr. Disraeli) entirely reprobated the principle of keeping up extravagant balances in the Exchequer; nor was he averse, when the proper opportunity occurred, to dealing with the unfunded debt of the country. But then he held that they should deal with the unfunded debt in such a manner that those securities should not be at a discount in the market. This was a feature in the right hon. Gentleman's career to which he had not adverted. He should like also to hear from the right hon. Gentleman what was the amount of those deficiency bills to which he so slightly alluded. He suspected they were larger than he seemed to think, and involved a greater amount than he had spoken of. He was certain that the amount of interest to be paid for these deficiency bills must be greater than the few hundreds of which he spoke, unless, indeed, the Bank of England had been giving him accommodation much below the rate of interest they were charging to the merchants of this country. If, instead of charging 2½ and 3 per cent, as they did to the bankers and merchants of this metropolis for accommodation, they were charging only 1 or 1½ per cent to the Government, then he thought they were dealing with the stock of the Bank in such a manner as to incur great responsibility, and for which it was not unlikely the holders of Bank stock would think it their duty to call them to account. He would not longer detain the Committee, but merely state that it was his intention to vote against the Resolution.

said, the last Resolution was one required by justice. It was unnecessary to make any remarks respecting it; but he wished to make one observation with reference to what had fallen from the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner). The hon. Gentleman seemed to think there was an occult relation between the private Bill to which he had referred, and this Resolution. Now, he would assure him that there was no design to ask the Committee, by agreeing to this Resolution, to prejudge the Bill in question. That Bill was to be considered on its own merits. The effect of this Resolution was, in case the House should see fit to confirm the Bill, to enable the South Sea Company, if it chose to arrange it amongst its proprietors, to continue public creditors without going through the form of liquidation and subsequent reinvestment; then that the Government should have power under the Resolution to deal with the Company in that way. It was merely an empowering Resotion, founded on the possibility that the House would adopt the Bill.

said, the Committee had, in fact, prejudged the private Bill, as the whole scheme involved in the Resolutions went on the assumption that the South Sea Company would obtain the powers provided for by the Bill.

said, he would not divide the Committee upon this Resolution, but would reserve to himself the power of taking the sense of the House upon the principle involved at some other opportunity. In the meantime, he wished to know when the Bill to be founded on these Resolutions would be brought in?

said, the Bill would be in the hands of hon. Members on Tuesday.

said, that last night, in his absence, the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control had inserted an additional clause in the Bill, reintroducing, as a qualification to all seats in the Court of Directors, the possession of a certain amount of the Company's stock. He (Mr. Bright) thought that it had been agreed that that clause should be left out, and there was reason to complain that the right hon. Gentleman had given no notice of his intention to bring it forward.

said, that he had stated on a former occasion how desirable it was that there should be no distinction between the Directors, and he had accordingly reduced the qualification of the elected Directors from 2,000l. to 1,000l., and had substituted the latter amount as a qualification for all the Directors.

rose to move the clause of which he had given notice. It was his opinion that no form of government could materially improve the condition of India while the present tenure of land existed, and that if the system of freeholds were introduced, the same beneficial result would follow that had taken place in this country and the United States.

seconded the Resolution. He believed India had not derived that advantage from her connexion with this country which she had a right to expect, and that the Government had been guilty of neglecting the interests of that part of Her Majesty's dominions.

said, the clause did not seem to him to be framed in such a manner as to be added to the Bill; and he doubted whether, if it were properly framed, the proposal was one that would be at all adapted to the situation of India. He thought it was utterly unsuited to the present situation of India; and he did not see how, under these words, anything could be done by the Government of India to give effect to it. Therefore, he did not see that it ought to be adopted.

said, there was only one part of India which was adapted for settlement; but he had heard of no difficulty of obtaining land in any part of India. The great evil was, as proved by two able witnesses, that it was no use cultivating any district in the interior, because the produce would not bear the expense of its conveyance to the coast. The means of transit was, therefore, the first consideration. Lord Dalhousie had directed his attention to this question; and it was to be hoped that improved means of conveyance would soon be provided. He believed it was possible to purchase any quantity of land; and no doubt the Indian Government would have an eye to that, for the sake of their revenue. The object of his hon. Friend was a benevolent one, but he did not think it could be accomplished by a Resolution of that House.

said, he thought the hon. Member for Honiton would be conferring a great benefit upon the House if he would inform them upon what tenure land was held at the present day in India.

said, that the Resolution only expressed the opinion and wishes of himself and his Colleagues. Twenty years ago, an application was made to the Government of India for a large tract of uncultivated land, and 1,000,000 acres were granted for forty years; but it turned out that the land was only taken by the applicants for purposes of jobbing, and the result was a total failure. Any system of freehold in India would not be practicable or desirable, for the revenue of that country was derived almost exclusively from land, and it would be extremely unwise to anticipate the revenue by selling great districts of land. But at present any person might have a grant of any uncultivated lands for forty years, on the following terms: the whole of the ground to be entirely free for three years, and one-fourth entirely free for the whole forty years; on the other three-fourths, after three years, one-twentieth part of the revenue would be charged each year, until, by degrees, a maximum was attained of 1s. 6d. an acre. He might add, that, at the end of forty years, the Indian Government, by the custom of India, had no power to dispossess the tenant, so long as he chose to remain on the land and pay the rent.

said, that the great want of internal improvements in India was owing to the fact, that the money accumulated there by Europeans was taken away from the country, instead of being expended in it; and persons who had been twenty years absent from India found the country on their return in precisely the same state as they had left it, without the least perceptible advance. He had travelled through India and other parts of the world, and he could declare that be never saw a population in a greater state of misery than that under which the natives of India laboured. He believed it would be impossible for the House to obtain correct information of the real state of the country until the evidence of native witnesses was taken. He considered that the condition of the people of India was so bad, that any change that could be made in it must be for the better; and he should, therefore, support the clause before the House, as being a step in the right direction.

said, he would beg to propose a clause providing that any person suffering under alleged wrongs at the hands of the Indian Government should be enabled to lay his case before the Lords Justices, and if they allowed a further prosecution of the case, that it should be referred to the decision of the Privy Council. Having already explained his motives for making this Motion when he brought it forward on a previous occasion in another shape, he should not trouble the House at any length now. He had first intended to propose that those cases should be laid before the President of the Board of Control, but on consideration he had thought it better to substitute for that Minister the Lords Justices as the tribunal, because he believed that their position excluded them from all political influence. The grievances suffered by our Indian fellow-subjects were flagrant and notorious, and for them to remain any longer without a mode of obtaining redress was inconsistent with the character of a civilised country. On a former occasion he hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had objected to the tribunal which he (Mr. Phillimore) proposed to establish, that it would have to be administered by the objects of a State which was a party to the suit. But it was an inseparable characteristic of international law that it should be administered in that manner; and Lord Mansfield had laid it down that any other mode of trial in the case of an international dispute would be manifestly unjust, absurd, and impracticable. Now, the fact was unquestionable that the Native princes of India were loud in their complaints, and it was equally undoubted that here was no tribunal to try these cases. These princes complained that their territories had been absorbed, and themselves condemned upon ex parte statements which they had no opportunity of answering. Sir Henry Russell, a distinguished servant of the East India Company, had declared that the Court of Directors "had contracted engagements as if they were never to be fulfilled, and had fulfilled them as if they had never been contracted." The misfortune was that the interest of the East India Directors was, as Lord William Bentinck had stated, directly at variance the interests of the people of this country and of India. The interest of the Directors was to increase the amount of their own patronage, and every new State we annexed, as a general rule, increased the patronage of the Directors. Then there came a loss to the revenue, and that loss had to be borne by the people of India, Why, the recent annexation of Pegu wag followed by a long list of appointments; and be believed the possession of that country would be attended with financial loss to its new rulers. There was another point to which he felt it his duty to direct the attention of the House. Lord Dalhousie had sanctioned, or at least had no, disavowed, the alarming doctrine of the denial to the Native Princes of India of the right of adoption—a right to which the rajpoots were deeply attached. The course pursued by the Government of India towards the Native Princes could only be compared to the conduct of a foreign conquerer, who, after overrunning this country, should wrest such seats as Blenheim and Strathfieldsaye from their lawful proprietors. The case of the Rajah of Sattara, involving, as it did, a gross violation of the law of nations, was bad enough, yet he would not now further allude to it; but the case of the Rajah of Coorg was harder still. The Rajah of Coorg was a person to whom England owed a great deal for the assistance he rendered in the war with Tippoo Saib; but the Government of India deposed him, and gave him 6,000l. a year; and besides this his father and his other relations had put by a sum of about 90,000l. or 100,000l., which they invested in the East India Company's funds. The Company had actually refused to allow him this 6,000l. a year, which they contracted to pay when they stripped him of his dominions. For fifteen years the Rajah of Coorg had been trying to get some acknowledgment for the 90,000l. which his father had deposited with the East India Company; but he had been bandied about from the Court of Directors to the local governments, and had never received an answer to his claim. He (Mr. Phillimore) was not contending that his claim was just one; but he said that it ought to be investigated, and the Rajah of Coorg ought not to be allowed to have the solid ground of complaint against them, that they denied him that trial to which he was entitled upon those common principles of probity which united mankind together in society. The fact was patent that the East India Company had refused to allow him to stay any longer in this country, where he came to prosecute his claim, and they basely tore him from his daughter, who had become a Christian, by withholding from him his annual allowance. He (Mr. Phillimore) said that to tear a father from his daughter in such a violent manner as they had done, was an outrageous and abominable proceeding, which the East India Directors, upon no code of law or morality, could justify. For the investigation of this case, as well as others which he need not enumerate, he thought the House ought to agree to the establishment of some such tribunal as he had suggested, and he hoped they would not refuse to throw a shield of protection around those of their fellow-subjects who were the victims of absolute power.

said, he should not attempt to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman into all the topics he had gone into; in the first place, because the question had already been partially decided by the house when in Committee on the Bill; and, in the second place, because the remarks of the hon. and learned Gentleman were entirely irrelevant to the new proposition, such as it was. The proposition before the House was this:—

"That persons suffering under alleged wrong may lay their case before the Lords Justices, and that if they shall allow the further prosecution of the case, it shall be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the decision of the Judicial Committee upon such case shall be final."

Now, he (Mr. Lowe) would ask the House whether the hon. and learned Gentleman had shown any reason whatever for this proposition? His former proposition was that the Judges of the Supreme Court in India should have power to decide cases of dispute between the Indian Government and the Native Princes; and in the present Motion he proposed the Lords Justices. Now, there might be some good reason why the Lords Justices, who knew nothing generally about India, should be constituted a Court of Appeal in Indian cases; but he confessed he did not know of any, and he should certainly like to have heard some assigned. He should also like to have heard some reason given why, if one Court of Justice was to have cognisance of such cases, they should afterwards be sent to another Court of Justice for decision; in other words, he wished to know why the Lords Justices should be made a sort of grand jury in order to see whether or not the cases should be sent to the Privy Council? But the fact was, as he had said, that this question had been already decided, and he did not think it right to waste the time of the House by discussing it again, especially as the hon. and learned Gentleman had not brought forward a single new argument in its support. Instead of supporting his Motion by argument, the hon. and learned Gentleman had treated them to a detail of the grievances of certain Indian princes, of whom they had all previously heard a great deal in that House, and he had imputed the blame of those grievances to the Court of Directors. Now, the fact was, as the hon. and learned Gentleman must be aware, that nothing could have been done by the Court of Directors in those cases without the consent of Her Majesty, as expressed through the President of the Board of Control. He hoped the house would adhere to its previous decision, and reject this Motion.

said, that at present the time of the Lords Justices was fully occupied with the business of the Court of Chancery, and if they were compelled to take up all the cases that might be brought before them by the "Young India" party, he should wish to know what would become of the suitors in the Court of Chancery?

said, he could assure the House that he had no wish to intrude unnecessarily or presumptuously on their time. But he could not help observing that the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) was not an older Member of that House than himself, and he should add that as regarded public opinion, and he might almost add as regarded decency, he could conceive nothing more impolitic than that the cases of persons of high rank in India, whose grievances had been brought under the notice of that House, should be passed over in the tone which had been assumed on that occasion by the hon. Member. He would support the proposal of his hon. and learned Friend, on the simple ground that no wrong should exist without a remedy. The hon. Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley), last night, said that, whether the salt tax was a good or a bad tax, that House was not a fit place to legislate upon the subject; and certainly the same remark applied still more strongly as to the unfitness of that House to deal with personal cases of alleged wrong. If they did not create such a tribunal as that proposed by his hon. and learned Friend, they would be driven to the disagreeable, and even mischievous, necessity of discussing in that House the cases of Indian Princes who alleged that they had been exposed under our rule to grievous injustice. That was the very ground upon which the late Sir Robert Peel, the most distinguished and the most respected statesman of our time, had pronounced in the year 1832 an opinion in favour of the identical proposition which had been submitted to the House that evening by his hon. and learned Friend. Sir Robert Peel, on the 14th of June, 1832, said in the course of that year that—

"he hoped the Charter of the Company would not be renewed without their consenting to the appointment of some body, whether members of the Privy Council or of a Special Committee, who would relieve the House of Commons from the odium of resisting the just applications of individuals, through a sense of the inconvenience of the precedent, or from a conviction of their own incompetency."

He should certainly vote in favour of a proposal which was thus supported by the high authority of Sir Robert Peel.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is utterly impossible to overestimate the importance of the clause which has been moved by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leominster, and met with such contumelious flippancy by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster, not merely in reference to the fortunes and vicissitudes of individuals, but also in its relation to that vast and momentous question of Indian government, which has so lately attracted the attention and engrossed the discussion of the House. I conceive that the intelligence of this country may be more forcibly addressed to the real condition of India through the medium of those cases which have just been mentioned, than by any generality of statement, however well such statement may be authenticated, When it is desirable to attract the understanding of one people to a consideration of the sufferings of another, you must illustrate rather than declaim; in order that the result may be aught than an amount of unappropriated, and perchance morbid, sympathy, you must exemplify rather than describe. Thus the Rohilla massacre, the plunder of the Holy City, and the spoliation of the Begums realise to the mind the rapine, the cruelty and oppression by which our power was first established in Hindostan; and who, let me ask, who is in anywise conversant with the details of perfidy and fraud connected with the cases of the Rajah of Coorg and the Carnatic stipendiaries, which have been mentioned to the House, can be so perversely foolish as to suppose that those cases are solitary or isolated in their character, or aught but the reflection of the sufferings of Indian millions? Sir, the simple story of the Carnatic stipendiaries, betrays an amount of treachery and ingratitude unsurpassed even on the dark and sickening record of crime which forms the polluted and disgraceful history of our Eastern Government. To the common ancestor of these men, the East India Company were bound by every tie which good men hold sacred, and even bad men hesitate to sever. Hospitality in a strange land—loans under circumstances of pressing emergency—personal service on the battle field—and the destruction of a rival Power at a crisis when their very existence hung trembling in the balance; but no sooner had Mahomed Ali died than their whole attention was directed to the spoliation of his descendants; and on the last illness of his son, thirty years after the expulsion of the French, the palace of Chepauk was entered, the monarch insulted, his heir deposed, his territory seized, a usurper seated on his musnud, and the private property of his nobles confiscated by means of a base conspiracy conceived and consummated by the Company, for purposes as infamously sordid as were ever yet held up to public execration. In any European country such measures would have excited a most praiseworthy and justifiable resistance; but the Oriental, accustomed from his cradle to crouch to oppression, submitted, if not without a murmur, at all events without opposition. From a Government infected with the rapacity of Hastings, and tribunals polluted with the corruptions of Impey, he could anticipate no redress; and now, when this disgraceful body, who have governed India not with the dignity of statesmen, but in the marauding fashion of a gang of freebooters, have withheld from the descendants of Ul Omrah the miserable pittance which they affected to bestow in compensation for estates from which they are now deriving an annual revenue of nearly three million rupees, and these unfortunate men have journeyed to this country to seek sympathy and protection from an assembly of English gentlemen—I ask, is it fair, is it decent, that their case should be met by the flippant sneers of the hon. Member for Kidderminster? Sir, it was but a few nights since that I listened with much surprise and dissatisfaction to the panegyric which was passed on the persons entrusted with the government of India by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Edinburgh. Yielding to no one in my admiration for the brilliant orator before whose powers my humbler genius stands rebuked, I yet regret that such a speech should have emanated from such a source—that that strong current of thought should have been compelled to flow through so circumscribed a channel—and that those vast endowments with which he has been gifted, doubtless for the benefit of a universe, should have been rendered the subservient ministers of party purposes. Far be it from me to utter a single word in depreciation of classic acquirements or the higher attainments of intellectual culture; but I must be permitted to doubt whether some other standard ought not to be required for an Indian Government than quickness in the solution of a problem, or the facile composition of sapphics and alcaics. The investiture of absolute power and uncontrolled despotism requires some other securities than the enrolment of an individual name among the pages of the Musæ Cantabrigienses; and if the right hon. Gentleman will suffer his imagination to wander in such obscure and unworthy companionship, I would direct his attention to that schoolroom of ancient Corinth, and recall to his mind its former occupant who was at once the best scholar and the worst ruler of his age. For the government of a people amongst whom public opinion is unknown, I should have thought that inflexible integrity would have been the strongest recommendation, and that an English Parliament, instead of limiting its choice of selection by that close system of which the right hon. Gentleman appears as the champion, would have been desirous of discovering in a more extended sphere, men who would—

"Rather coin their hearts And drop their blood in drachmas, than to wring From the hard hands of natives their vile trash By any indirection."

I know there are those behind the Government who are accustomed to regard with a most callous indifference the suffering of our Indian millions, and who ignore the existence of Asiatic possessions for every purpose, save that of swelling the importance of Leadenhall-street. Such wretched infatuation, though marvellous, believe me, is not unparalleled. When the city of Benares was in danger, we are told that the safety of the sacred Apes engrossed the solicitude of the people; so upon this occasion, when the interests of justice—aye, of humanity—demand investigation, the whole solicitude of these men is directed to break the fall of the Directory. But without the House is determined to regard the Indian Peninsula as fulfilling no higher purpose than that of a vast hive in order to extract the sweets from which it is both lawful and justifiable to destroy the inhabitants, I charge them to pass this clause, to discard all party feeling on the question before us—a question which in some future, but perchance not far distant, hour of peril, may exercise a paramount influence upon our Eastern destinies; for I stand here impressed with a profound conviction that if from these walls you suffer these men to depart with their prayers rejected and their petitions discarded, their appeal will not be in vain to that Providence which is at once the protector and avenger of Princes.

was inclined to agree with the hon. and learned Member for Newcastle-on-Tyne (Mr. Blackett), who with so much moderation and tact had brought back the House to the real difficulties of the case. The question was, whether that House was a fit tribunal for the investigation of wrongs occurring even at home, and still more whether it was a fit tribunal for wrongs inflicted upon a people differing from us in race, language, and religion? If it was not, then there was great force in the argument that a tribunal should be constituted, to relieve this House from the difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of redressing wrongs which yet it professed to do. But the proper tribunal was, he feared, not that which the hon. and learned Member for Leominster proposed. He wished to know, however, if an award was made by the Lords Justices, or by the Privy Council, in what manner the President of the Board of Control proposed to enforce the decree, for he believed the East India Company had already, on more than one occasion, resisted the payment of sums which the decisions of legal tribunals had declared to be due from them? He would not enter into the cases of the Rajah of Sattara and the Rajah of Coorg; he doubted, indeed, the accuracy of the statements made by the hon. and learned Member, but he took up the subject upon this ground, that there must be wrongs occasionally occurring in India, agreeing with the hon. Member for Newcastle-on-Tyne, that where there were wrongs there ought to be remedies, and that the remedy was to be found in some such direction as was indicated by the hon. and learned Member for Leominster.

said, no one had submitted more grievances of the inhabitants of India to that House than he had done, and he was sorry to say with very little success. He did not say that the fault always lay with the Court of Directors; but this he must say that one great cause of discontent among the natives of India was, that that House so frequently rejected claims of which there could be no dispute. Whether the proper tribunal for hearing such claims should be the Lords Justices or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, he was not prepared to say; but this he knew, that the question was of such grave importance as to deserve a better answer than that given by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe). He hoped the noble Lord the Member for London would not say that it was too late to discuss the question. Believing that there were wrongs inflicted, and that there were at present no means of remedying them, he felt himself bound to support the clause proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Leominster.

My hon. Friend who has just sat down seems to have omitted one consideration—and really the most important consideration in this question—whether the clause proposed will give a useful and efficient remedy for the wrongs complained of. That is really the most important question of the whole. My hon. Friend the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir R. H. Inglis) says that there are grievances—that there are cases in which the Government of India is in the wrong, and the complainants are in the right; and then he says that there ought to be a remedy for these wrongs. But it appears to me, Sir, that there is still another step—whether the remedy is a good remedy or not. My hon. Friend (Mr. Hume) says that is a matter of indifference; that, provided something is enacted which is called a remedy, he does not care whether that remedy does good or does harm—whether it makes things better or makes them worse. [Mr. HUME: No, no!] Now let us consider what is the present state of things. The present state of things is, that in all questions where the law is said to be infringed, the natives of India can go to the Courts of Justice, and in cases of importance they can make their ultimate appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is appointed to decide such cases. No one complains of the Judicial Committee; on the contrary, it is found that in all cases of law it is learned and impartial. But then, it is said, there are cases respecting the Native Princes of India, though subjects of the Crown, who have been wronged, and in whose cases the decisions come to by the Government of India have been unfair and unjust towards them. One case has been mentioned—one is certainly as good as many—but one into which I need not enter—the case of the Rajah of Sattara. But I ask the House to consider what it is we have been doing with regard to this whole Bill. The argument has been—and in its general terms the hon. Member agrees as much as any one—fully as much as any Member of this House—the argument has all along been, that the first step you must take is to create a despotism. Nobody denies that proposition. Next it is endeavoured to temper that despotism as far as possible, and to prevent as far as possible acts of caprice and injustice being committed under that despotism. To do this you have created a Government, which a great authority, Lord Ellenborough, has said is complicated, dilatory, and expensive. I do not deny that there is a good deal of truth in all these charges. It is complicated, dilatory, and expensive. And why so? Because you wish to have some remedy against the caprices and violent acts of despotism, which cannot be had without creating various checks—long processes of examination which cause delay, conducted by officers requiring large salaries, and therefore expensive. Here are evils which you submit to in order to obtain that which you seek—a check upon despotic authority—a remedy against injustice and wrong. If you have this—if you have obtained a process which tempers despotism—then it is not necessary, with regard to acts which concern the policy of the Empire—acts which naturally and inevitably go beyond the scope of the law—it is not necessary for such that you should have recourse to specific tribunals. Now, take the case of the Rajah of Sattara, which was a case of disputed succession. [An Hon. MEMBER: No, a case of deposition.] In the first instance, it was a case of deposition; but it afterwards became a case of disputed succession—involved various questions of the law, customs, and policy of India. You had men of the highest ability who applied their minds to that case. You had, first, men of the highest authority in Bombay; then it was considered by the Governor General of India; and, I think, no one will dispute that the Governors General of India have usually been men of the highest eminence in this country. You then have questions of this kind referred repeatedly to the Government at home—to the consideration of the Court of Directors—ultimately to the consideration of the President of the Board of Control—and in the last case it was referred to this House. I admit the hon. Gentleman has attempted to show that this House is a bad tribunal before which to carry any case of justice; but I say that the great, the only, the essential tribunal in regard to great acts of policy, is the British Parliament. For my part, I do not think it possible, notwithstanding all that has been said, when cases of this kind go, in the first place, before the authorities of India, next before the Governor General, next when they are considered by the Court of Directors at home, and next by the President of the Board of Control—I do not think it possible, after all, that flagrant acts of injustice can be committed. I do not say that in deciding a complicated case, some hon. Gentleman may not be on one side, and others on another. That occurs even in questions of law; much more may it be expected to occur in questions of policy. But I say you have here a remedy for flagrant acts of injustice. If you have not, the whole defence of this Bill falls to the ground. Unless there is provision made by this Bill for tempering the gross acts of injustice, so natural to despotism, it would be far better that the Governor General should be left altogether uncontrolled. It is the great object of this Bill to provide for the benefit of the people of India by interposing between them and the Government a series of checks; and I believe it will be efficient for that purpose. I hope we shall not again see what has been once seen in this country, an impeachment by the House of Commons of a Governor General, which lasted through a long series of years, and was distinguished for the eloquence of those who carried on the prosecution against him. But that must ever be considered as the ultimate remedy of the State ["No, no!"] It is the ultimate remedy of the State, but I say, I hope never to see it again called into exercise, because I believe that this is a measure which will render that remedy unnecessary. I say that the wrongs which existed in former times, but do not exist now, have been prevented by the great power which exists in the Parliament of this country. I believe that that power exists in Parliament and nowhere else. I do not believe that the grievances complained of by Native Princes of India, who govern from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 of subjects, and who had reason to complain of the conduct of our authorities in India—I do not believe that if you were to place their complaints before the Lords Justices, that their charges would obtain due attention. I have a great respect for the Lords Justices—I believe, as was said by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Malins), that they attend diligently to questions of equity, and decide them with great learning—that they have not now a single case in arrear, and that all are well and ably decided. But if you put the Lords Justices from day to day to hear every complaint that may arise in India, and ask them whether each case is fit to go before the Privy Council, then I say you will produce inextricable confusion. Amongst the various and conflicting statements of the natives of India, they will be unable to say which is right and which is wrong. With regard, again, to the Committee of Privy Council, it will be impossible to give them the authority asked for without entrusting to them powers which they not now possess—powers which will override the Court of Directors, which will override the Governor General, and which will override the great powers of Parliament itself. In fact, the remedy which the hon. and learned Gentleman proposes, is a remedy which runs all through this Bill. Unless that remedy is contained in all the clauses of this Bill, the Bill is good for nothing, and we ought to seek the remedy not in this clause, but in some other mode of legislation altogether.

said, he took a different view of this subject from that of the noble Lord, who seemed to think that no evil could now be done in India, and that what had occurred under Warren Hastings could not occur under Lord Dalhousie. Now he (Mr. Bright) was of opinion that in the last fifteen years, as in the cases of the Rajah of Sattara and the Ameers of Seinde, there had been committed crimes of as great magnitude as there ever were in the earliest and worst times in India. With regard to this clause, it was really intended to meet two sorts of cases. Firstly, cases like that of the Rajah of Sattara and the Rajah of Coorg, and Native Princes, who, because they were not deposed, were said to be independent; and, secondly, cases in which subjects of the Queen had claims which could not be decided in a court of law. The noble Lord had not touched on this last class of cases; he had dealt only with the first category of grievances, and on that point perhaps he could understand the weight of the agreements adduced. There might be a difficulty in establishing a tribunal for the case of Native Princes who, being deposed and imprisoned or sent to other countries, died prematurely; but with regard to the case of the claims of British subjects, there could be no difficulty. Since he had referred a short time ago to the case of Colonel Frith, he had seen the opinions of two eminent counsel, Mr. Serjeant Spankie and Sir Herbert Compton, which confirmed what he had stated, namely, that there was undoubtedly a great moral claim on the part of Colonel Frith against the East India Company, but there was no legal tribunal in which it could be prosecuted. He would read an extract from the opinion of Mr. Serjeant Spankie, to the effect—

"That referring to another case, Colonel Frith's was a stronger one, as the money he claimed had been applied to the purposes of the Company; but the courts of law and equity had no power to enforce contracts made with the Company in their political capacity."

What could be more rational than to have a tribunal like that proposed in this clause, such as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? He could say, on behalf of Colonel Frith, that if he could go before the Judicial Committee and produce his evidence, he would leave his case to their adjudication; and if even their decision was against him, He would spend the rest of his day, in tranquillity, because he would at least feel that justice had been done to him, and that he was not shut out from a hearing of his case. Sir Herbert Compton, speaking of the case of Colonel Frith, said, that "had a just and moral right to what he claimed, but there was no legal remedy for his case." There was no established tribunal that could deal with such a case as this, which had stood over in the name of the present Colonel Frith for more than twenty years, and it was the case brought forward by Sir John Malcolm in 1832, and with regard to which Sir Robert Peel and Lord Althorp had expressed an opinion favourable to the establishment of tribunals such as this. The noble Lord could not rest satisfied, he thought, with his speech which referred to only one branch of the subject, and excluded that which the clause embodied—namely, the establishment of a tribunal for the trial of the cases of subjects of the Queen, without reference to the Native Princes; and he hoped the noble Lord would not let this Bill pass without a clause establishing such a tribunal. He hoped, even if this clause was not admitted that some similar clause would be introduced in the other House.

said, he, know there were cases occurring in India for which there was no proper tribunal With respect to the case of the Rajah of Sattara, to which the noble Lord alluded it divided itself into two parts. There was, indeed, a question of disputed succession, but there was a previous question of deposition, and when that occurred, he (Sir H. Maddock) happened to be chief secretary to Lord Auckland, the Governor General, who was then at Simla. It happened that the Governor of Bombay, under whom Sattara was placed, had lately arrived from England, and from being a Director of the East India Company, had been appointed directly to the Government of Bombay. He had also recently been Chairman of the Company. Immediately on his arrival, the question, which had been going on long before, came before, him for his decision, and he intimated to the Governor General that he proposed to go to Sattara himself, and have an interview with the Rajah. He went, and the consequence was the deposition of that prince, which was reported to the Governor General for his confirmation. Now, he (Sir H. Maddock) was in a position to inform the House, that, in confirming this deposition, Lord Auckland was precluded from the exercise of his own unbiassed judgment, because a despatch came out with the Bombay Governor, addressed to the Governor General, informing him that the Governor of Bombay was in possession of the sentiments of the Court of Directors with regard to the Rajah of Sattara, and that he would be able to settle it. It was entirely in consequence of that despatch that Lord Auckland, who disapproved entirely of the proceedings, felt himself compelled to confirm the deposition.

begged to supply an inadvertent omission in the account of the dethronement of the Rajah of Sattara, given by the hon. Member. The Governor of Bombay to whom he had alluded was Sir James Carnac, who, in the Court of Directors, was one of a very small minority opposed to the general opinions of the Court against the Rajah. But he had no sooner investigated the case in India, which he did immediately after his arrival in Bombay, than he found ample reason for changing his opinion, and agreeing with the majority of the Court of Directors. The House must see, then, with what fairness the Court of Directors and the Board of Control had acted in sending to Sattara to adjudicate upon the case the very man who had formerly held an opinion adverse to their own, and had recorded that opinion in very strong language. Respect for the House induced him to abstain from referring to the language used by the hon. and learned Member for Leominster in introducing this clause; but he had been sufficiently long in that House to be aware that, when an hon. Member ventured to indulge in such language, it proved injurious to no one but himself. The clause was in itself most objectionable, because it referred to matters of public policy, and he thought the House was scarcely prepared to sanction the establishment of a tribunal which should sit in judgment upon the acts of the Government of the country. To govern India well they must send out good and competent men; but to say that the acts of the Government should be criticised and overruled by any tribunal, however well constituted, would certainly not advance the object they had in view. The jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court had been cited; but surely there was no analogy between that tribunal and the one which this clause proposed to establish, for, though on the breaking out of a war, that Court, by international usage and a long unbroken series of precedents, had power to decide what the effects of the state of war would be in certain cases, it had no authority whatever to decide whether or not war should be declared, or to pronounce an opinion on its justice or propriety. Those were questions of public policy, upon which no tribunal had a right to decide authoritatively. This distinction had evidently forced itself on the mind of the hon. Member for Manchester, who had confined his observations to the claims of individuals upon the East India Company. With regard to questions of private right, he contended those were already provided for by the existing tribunals. The Rajah of Coorg might bring his action against the Company in the local courts; and, if he failed, he had a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the very tribunal which the hon. and learned Member proposed. The claims of Princes could scarcely ever be divided from the question of public policy. In the case of the Rajah of Sattara, it was a question whether or not the Rajah was a traitor to the State. The hon. and learned Member for Leominster had confounded questions of public policy and political morality with questions of law, which could be decided by tribunals conversant with the laws by which such matters must be determined. The claims of Colonel Frith and Mr. Hutchinson, to which allusion had been made in the course of the debate, were claims upon Native Princes, and it was scarcely possible, he thought, to constitute a tribunal in this country which should decide how far the East India Company were bound to coerce a Native Prince to pay money which he maintained he did not owe. He scarcely knew a case for which they could constitute a tribunal but that of some person, being a British subject, who had a claim upon the East India Company, which was so connected with matters of public policy as to be removed from the jurisdiction of the local tribunals; and even such a case was already met by an appeal to that House, which, if it thought fit, could always appoint a Committee to inquire into the circumstances. These cases were always more or less mixed up with questions of public policy, and he certainly should not advise the House to abdicate its privilege of investigating and deciding on such matters in favour of any tribunal, however well constituted.

said, that he would withdraw that part of the clause which gave an appeal to the Lords Justices, which was, indeed, only inserted as a security against frivolous complaints. He would, indeed, withdraw the whole clause, if the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) would say that it was the intention of the Government to give effect to the suggestion of Sir Robert Peel, which met the approbation of Lord Althorp.

said, that Sir Robert Peel never brought forward any measure on this subject. He only suggested the point to Lord Althorp as one well worthy of consideration. His Lordship promised that it should be, and no doubt it was, considered. He supposed, however, that it was then found that there were, as it certainly seemed to him to be the case, practical objections to any such tribunal being constituted. He did not see any reason why the subject should not be again considered, with a view to the introduction of some measure, if it were practicable; but he could not pledge himself to the erection of such a tribunal, to which at present he did not see his way.

then moved the Clause of which he had given notice:—

"And be it Enacted, with regard to admissions into the Military College at Addiscombe, that the nominations shall be made by the Chairman of the Bard of Directors, the President of the Board of Control, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and the Governor General of India, respectively, for the time being, in equal proportions of one-fourth of such nominations."

said, that he certainly did not see what the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland had to do with this matter.

said, that the Government had originally introduced a provision with respect to the admissions to the military college at Addiscombe, but had since withdrawn it in consequence of the general opinion which was expressed by the House on a former evening in favour of retaining the present system. The question had been already discussed by the House, and he hoped that they would now adhere to the decision which they had most distinctly pronounced.

said, he now would move a clause providing that suitable offices shall be provided for the East India Company and for the Board of Control, if possible, under the same root. Haying already proposed this clause in the Committee on the Bill, he should not now repeat the arguments which he then brought forward. He thought it was impossible to doubt that great delay in the transaction of business was caused by the fact of the two departments being separated by a distance of between two and three miles. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control had on a former occasion opposed this proposition, on the ground that it would be highly inconvenient for Directors of the East India Company, who were engaged on business in the City, to attend meetings of the Board in the neighbourhood of Downing-street. But it could not be expected that the President of the Board of Control should go to the other side of Temple-bar. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) had said that evening, that the Government of India was complicated and dilatory; and this was a plan to diminish those evils. The right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) did very quickly what he had to do; but he did not always do it very well, and he would have more time, and probably do things better, if his communication with the India House was more direct. He (Mr. Bright) proposed that the building for the combined departments should be in Downing-street, and, therefore, as that was a favourite locality, the right hon. Gentleman would probably offer, on this occasion, less stringent objections than he had urged when this suggestion was last before the House. A proposition had been carried the other night, for increasing the salary of the President of the Board of Control to 5,000l. a year, for making that a first-class office, and Mr. Marshman had characterised this as "the penal station" of the Cabinet. Now, he did not want the President of the Board of Control to be in such a position that an influential writer in favour of the East India Company could characterise his office as "the penal station" of the Cabinet, and therefore he did not oppose that increase of salary. But if the office was to be made a first-class office with a first-class salary, the hon. Gentleman should not shrink from attaching to it duties of a first-class character. The right hon. Gentleman was now about to bring up a clause to increase the salaries of the Directors to triple their present amount, and double the amount originally proposed by this Bill. If, then, the dignity and emoluments of both the President of the Board and of the Directors were to be increased, he (Mr. Bright) said, that both should have allotted to them duties more responsible and intelligible than they discharged at present. He proposed, then, that within two years, or, if that was too short a time, within three or four years, they should be provided with offices in the same building, in order that their communications with each other might be carried on to some extent by oral discussions, instead of entirely by the incessant note writing which took place at present. He believed that the change would tend to the better working both of the Home Government and of the Government in India. The expense of one department amounted to 187,650l., and the expense of the other amounted to 29,140l., making the whole sum for the two departments 216,790l. He would suggest that they might sell the India House, and as it would bring a large sum, they might expect, after defraying the expense of building offices for the two departments in a fitter locality, to have a balance of 200,000l. applicable to purposes connected with India. The salaries of the Directors were to be increased, and they ought not to think it too much trouble to come to the West End to discharge their duties. The cab fare was only 1s. 6d., or they might come for 2d. by the boat, or travel by the omnibus.

would not follow the hon. Member into the various topics he had introduced into his remarks in moving the clause, but would be prepared to state his reasons for proposing an increase of salary to the Directors when he came to move the clause for that purpose. He did not see what the hon. Member's allusion to the salary which the House had been pleased to attach to the office he held, had to do with the subject under discussion. It seemed to be the intention of Parliament to throw more responsible duties on the office, and all he could say was, that no exertion should be wanting on his part to discharge them to the best of his ability. As to the clause now introduced, he could only say, the question it raised had already been discussed and decided by the House; it had been pressed on them by the same arguments before as they had heard just that moment, and he would not trouble the House by repeating the replies which those arguments had already received. The hon. Member seemed to think it absurd in him (Sir C. Wood) to suppose, that it would be more convenient for gentlemen engaged in the City to attend in Leadenhall-street than at this end of the town; but he could not agree with Directors the hon. Member on that point. He could not see that the plan would save any considerable sum of money. In the first place, they could not sell the whole of the buildings of the East India House, as they were not all the property of the Company, and it would cost an enormous sum to build new offices near Whitehall. He had been informed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that when the Government wanted to buy some ground near Downing street, they were asked 300,000l. for it. He did not think that there would be such economy of time or money, or such a gain in the despatch of business, as would authorise them to undertake a great outlay of that sort; nor could he admit that so much delay now took place as the hon. Member asserted. He must oppose the clause.

said, he would be very glad if his hon. Friend the Member for Manchester would go to time India House, examine the different departments, and see what was done; and if he should do so, he did not think he would return from the opinions he then entertained. The hon. Gentleman seemed to think that nothing was done in Leadenhall-street; the fact, however, was, that the supervision of the entire affairs of India came under the charge of the various de- partments of the India House. He could not support the proposition, and hoped his hon. Friend would not press it.

said, the President of the Board of Control had not assigned a single reason for not acceding to the proposition of the hon. Member for Manchester. It was admitted by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood), that whenever a single government should be established, it would no doubt be more convenient to unite the offices as was now proposed; and that disposed of every other objection the right hon. Gentleman had made, because he merely made it a question of time. With regard to the expense, any temporary expense that could be incurred was altogether inconsiderable when compared with the expenses of the Indian Government. As to the inconvenience that might be caused to Directors, if they referred to the Court of Directors as at present constituted, it would be seen that the great majority of the Directors were not at the present moment engaged in other business. Any measure was rather desirable than otherwise that would tend to confine the Directors to the duties of their office as Directors. They sometimes heard that the double staff was a security for the business of detail being more efficiently transacted, but he thought the fact was exactly the reverse. When they had two sets of permanent officials employed to go over the same business, the chances were much greater that the business would be neglected than if it were placed in the hands of a single staff of officers. He cordially supported the Amendment.

said, he should also support it. The argument of the right hon. Gentleman, that as the Directors were to be an independent body they ought to sit in a separate building, was trivial. As to the argument about expense, it was utterly worthless. He considered that a superfluous speech at that time of the Session was mischievous, and should say no more.

said, the next best thing to making no speech was to make a short one. So he should simply say that, as a double Government was to be kept up, it would be wise to retain the establishment at Leadenhall-street.

said, he felt the importance of maintaining the Court of Directors as a control over the despotic power of the Board of Control. To secure their independent exercise of this control, it was necessary that they should have se- parate eyes and ears, and an independent establishment. He should, therefore, oppose the clause.

then brought forward the clause of which he had given notice, for fixing the salaries of the Directors. In Committee he would propose to fill up the blanks in the clause with the sums of 1,500l. as the salaries of the Chairman, and 1,000l. as the salary of each Director. The proposed increase was made in conformity with the desire of the House, generally expressed.

said, he objected to statement of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) which cast the responsibility of this increase of salary upon the House. Certainly nothing which he (Mr. Hadfield) had said could have led the President of the Board of Control to entertain an idea that the salary was too small. He thought that the amount originally named was ample. There had never been any difficulty in obtaining Directors when the salary was only 300l. a year. A thousand pounds, in his judgment, was altogether unnecessary, wasteful, and improper. There was another reason to be urged, that this state things could not last long, that House having reserved to itself annually the power of discussing this question, and it would very soon therefore make an alteration. It seemed that so far from suffering by the alteration in the patronage, they had benefited by it. The increase to 500l. was a moderate thing, but an increase to 1,000l..seemed inconsistent. He moved therefore, that the salary of the Chairman be as at first proposed 1,000l.instead of 1,500l.

said, he would second the Amendment, although not upon the same grounds as the hon. Gentleman who moved it. He remembered some time back that a proposition had been made to increase the salaries of the Directors, and after a long discussion at the India House, which lasted two days, the proposal was rejected, not on account of the sum of money involved, but because it was considered that the increased salary would bring forward a different class of men to the present Directors; and he believed that such was the feeling of the great body of the Proprietors. He wished also to correct a misapprehension which existed as to the salaries of the Directors. They did not receive 300l. a year as a payment for their services, but merely to pay for the expenses of carriage incidental to their position and their duties. With regard to the patronage of the Directors, although it was true, no doubt, that persons were desirous of providing for their sons and other relatives, still, it was to be remembered that, as far as the civil service went, that patronage would no longer exist, for, although Directors might nominate their relatives, if they were unable to pass the examination they would not receive the appointment. When the Government originally proposed to increase the salary of the Directors to 500l., it was also proposed to take away the Addiscombe patronage; but it was now determined that that patronage should be left in their hands, so that it seemed to him that there was less reason than ever for increasing the salary. He should be sorry to see the proposed increase of salary, for it would, in his opinion, be dangerous to the independence of that House. The first thing persons coming home from India would strive to obtain would be a seat in that House, with the view of obtaining a Directorship, and he much feared that such a desire would lead to great corruption. Not very long ago the House of Commons would have started at the proposition to add a single placeman to their number; but now they were asked to admit not only one but six. He must protest against such a proceeding, and he hoped that the Committee would adhere to the original proposal of only raising the salary to 500l. a year. With regard to the increase of the salary of the Chairman, he had not the same strong objections, for that position involved a considerable employment of time and labour; but he thought that the proposed increase in the salaries of the Directors was quite gratuitous.

said, he would re- mind the Committee that there was greater necessity for caution in dealing with this subject than with any other, for it was not the money of this country which they were voting away, but that of the unrepresented people of India. He would venture to suggest that the division should be taken, not upon the Amendment proposed, but upon the question that this clause stand part of the Bill.

said, that the hon. Member who moved the Amendment had introduced for about the thirtieth time into the discussion the argument that the Directors were paid by patronage, and he must therefore either believe that such was the case or that it was not; and if he believed that such was the case he believed necessarily that the Directors had exercised that patronage in an unworthy, base, and perjured manner; but he was sure that the hon. Member did not believe that such was the case. If the Directors were called upon to make a return of the distribution of their patronage to the House of Commons, it would be equally reasonable to call upon the First Lord of the Treasury or any Minister of the Crown to make a similar return. He was convinced that, on the whole, the patronage of the Dihau been exercised in the most worthy manner. He remembered no very long time ago visiting a school in the neighbourhood of London, where one of the Directors of the East India Company had given away no less than seven cadetships as prizes for industry and merit, and he really did not believe that it was an extreme case. But with the declaration upon oath, and after an experience of many years, during which not more than three instances of corrupt practices had been suspected, he should have thought that the allegation which had been brought forward and the arguments founded upon it might well have been spared.

said, he should support the clause, for he would, if he had taken any part in time discussion of this subject, have moved a clause to the same effect as the one now brought forward by the Government. When the number of Directors was decreased, and consequently the duties of the remaining Directors proportionately increased, and when they were expected to devote the whole of their time and attention to the consideration of affairs connected with the government of a mighty Empire, he saw no reason why such persons should not receive a salary adequate to their employment. He had heard the subject discussed, and he could name gentlemen who, he had no doubt, time Government would consider qualified from their practical experience to fill the position of Director who had made the objection, that there were gentlemen whose means enabled them to live in the country in comfort; but if such persons were made Directors, they would be obliged to live in London, and 500l. a year would hardly cover the difference of time expense to which they would be put in London to that which they incurred in the country. The question was one concerning the payment of men employed in conducting the government of an Empire containing 150,000,000 of inhabitants, and yielding a revenue of 30,000,000l., and he thought that it was beneath the dignity of this country to be too particular about the amount of their salaries. Would any hon. Member say that 1,000l. a year was an undue payment for a gentleman who gave his whole time and attention to his duties? With regard to the corruption which the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume) seemed to apprehend, he did not think that gentlemen would be so anxious as he thought to obtain a salary of 1,000l. a year for such service. A person well qualified for the position ought to receive a proper salary, and, if anything, he thought that 1,000l. a year was too little. He would just say one word with regard to the subject of patronage. He quite agreed with the hon. Baronet the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir R. H. Inglis) that the patronage of the Directors had, on the whole, been most fairly distributed. It was not unnatural that persons having relatives should wish to provide for them; indeed, it was the rule of nature, and as long as those relatives who received appointments were qualified for them, he saw no cause whatever for complaint. If he thought that appointments were ever made the subject of a money bargain, he should be prepared to vote for the total abolition of the Court of Directors; but, believing that such was not the case, and also thinking that a properly-qualified person should be fairly paid for his labour, he should vote against the Amendment.

said, he believed the office was looked to more as one of patronage and honour than of direct emolument; and there were hundreds of merchants in the City having a knowledge of Indian affairs, who would accept a po- sition with such honour and patronage, however small the emolument might be. Men were willing enough to accept the office of directors of railway companies and such like undertakings, and give their time and attention for a comparatively small emolument. They had their patronage and various incidental advantages, and were satisfied with them. For these reasons he should vote for the Amendment.

said, he had always guarded himself against making a charge of a corrupt exercise of patronage by the Directors; but he must remind the Committee that this phrase of paying in patronage had been a common phrase, and was well understood, and until this year no one had thought of taking exception to it; and, indeed, the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell) last night said, that the possession of patronage—without supposing an improper use of it—gave consideration and dignity to a man. He objected altogether to the system of paying in patronage, and he wished the patronage could be exercised in some other mode, but he protested most earnestly against their being paid both by patronage and salary.

said, the right hon. President of the Board of Control wished the Committee to believe that the time and energy of these Directors were exclusively devoted to their labours in the India House. Now, he believed it was quite notorious that several of the Directors, probably a majority of them, attended there very little; and, in point of fact, their duties in the actual administration of Indian affairs were much more nominal than real, because they all knew that when persons were elected without much responsibility, the business gradually got into the hands of heads of departments. They had themselves seen Members in that House who certainly had not taken any very active part in the management of East India business, and, indeed, he found that nearly the whole of them held various other appointments. Almost the whole body were directors of insurance offices, or railway companies, of banks, or other undertakings. In point of fact, unless the directors of those undertakings were mere shams, they could not attend to the service of the East India Company, for he defied anybody to do it unless they possessed greater powers than any individual he was acquainted with. Besides, it must be remembered that some of these gentlemen were Members of that House, where they were frequently present from four o'clock in the afternoon till one or two the next morning. Being Members of Parliament, of course they had correspondence with constituents, and duties of that description, the weight of which many hon. Gentlemen well knew. Now, he would ask, how much time could Gentlemen so situated possibly have to devote to the affairs of India, and whether it was absolutely necessary that they should receive 1,000l. a year for such services? He did not object to 1,000l. a year being paid if real duties were performed, and if they actually gave their whole time and attention to the affairs of India; but it was obvious that they did not, and could not, under the circumstances he had described. In his opinion, it would have been wiser if the Government had condensed the whole of the Court of Directors into a council of some half dozen, to assist and advise the President of the Board of Control. The President of the Board of Control knew nothing of India. He did not mean the right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax, for he had been studying India very much for the last three months, but other Gentlemen who might be holding the same office. To such he would give the advantage of such a council. Having thus obtained the best men, they might give them 1,500l., or even 2,000l. a year. They knew, however, that at present the Directors had little to do, and that all the business was done by their clever clerks. They were allowed, moreover, to sit in that House, and to have occupations of every kind besides; and it was well known that the office of Director itself was a stepping-stone to almost every good thing to be had in the City. It was because he thought the Government was proposing to increase the salaries of the Directors without securing any benefit for India or for this country, that he should vote against the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, he felt that the right hon. Gentleman opposite was not justified in saying that the clause was agreeable to the majority of that House, as that was a conclusion which could only be determined by the result of the approaching division. In the meantime, however, he must remind the Committee that they had as yet heard no reasons to determine them to accept the proposal. And as the salaries were to be paid out of the revenue of India, it was the more incumbent on Her Majesty's Government to furnish the House of Commons with valid and substantial grounds for the deviation from their original proposal. He could not consent under these circumstances, to the increase of salary, and he believed that the opinion of the majority of that House was not so favourable to it either.

said, he would take that opportunity of stating that upon this subject he had had no communication whatever with the Directors. The reason which he gave for his proposition might be a good one or it might be a bad one, but surely the noble Lord had not listened to what be said in introducing the clause otherwise he would hardly have stated that he gave no reason. What he stated was that he had been told by Members of that House, as well as by other persons, that a salary of 500l. a year was not sufficient to ensure the services of the best men in the Indian services, and that it would, there fore, be advisable to increase the amount of remuneration.

said, that although he could not compliment his right hon. Friend (Sir C. Wood) upon having made many concessions in the course of the discussions upon this Bill, yet he thought that what had occurred that evening was a sufficient justification of his conduct. This was a question of some interest. Their object was to procure the best men. In ordinary cases a competent salary was one means of securing good men; but this was not an ordinary case He confessed he was one of those who thought that 500l. a year was a contemptible sum to give a man who was to hold a high office; but then his opinion had always been that the number of Directors ought to have been reduced at least to twelve, in which case they would have been justified in giving them a competent salary, requiring them to give their whole time to the services of India. There was another way of dealing with the question. Hitherto the Directors had been a very independent body, receiving an annual sum of 300l. each—he supposed to defray their carriage expenses—and he was sorry that his right hon. Friend, having refused to adopt the first mode of settling the question, shout have proposed any increase at all. A great deal had been said of the patronage enjoyed by the Directors. Nobody supposed that there was a sale of patronage; but it was a mistake to imagine that patronage was not an advantage. Patronage was power, and it might be a sufficient advantage to induce gentlemen to take office as Directors. It was also to be remembered that if the Directors enjoyed sufficient leisure to engage in the pursuits enumerated by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), they must be in the receipt of other salaries. As regarded, then, the gentlemen who were resident in London, who were engaged in other occupations, and to whom patronage might be a sufficient inducement, he thought the case was perfectly clear; but there was a difficulty with respect to persons returning from India. There were numbers of meritorious public servants who had returned from India almost without adequate means, and to such persons it might be necessary to offer an increased salary in order to induce them to take office. But by this plan they would make a distinction between the nominees of the Crown and the other Directors; and, upon the whole, seeing that the feeling of the Committee seemed to be against any increase of salary, he would advise his right hon. Friend to adhere to his original proposition.

said, he would wish to make a few remarks in reference to the question put by the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Manners) before the Committee came to a division. The noble Lord had said that no reasons had been given for nominating this particular sum of 1,000l. a year as the salary of a Director. Now really, the fact was, it was exceedingly difficult to assign reasons for any particular sum—be it 500l. or 1,000l., or to say why one was sufficient and the other not. That was a question for each hon. Gentleman to decide for himself according to his estimate of the duties and the services of a Director. And when the hon. Member for Manchester said that each Director ought to be allowed a salary of 2,000l. a year, there was, perhaps, quite as little of reason in his proposal as in that of the Government. But these gentlemen, whether they were appointed by the Crown or elected by the Proprietors, were only appointed after evidence had been given of the necessity before the Committee. That distinguished person, Lord Hardinge, had stated that many gentlemen came home after long service with small fortunes, and were, therefore, unable to take the trouble and expense of a canvass. The men of competent fortune in the Direction cared little or nothing for the 300l. a year; but if one of these returned gentlemen was offered 300l. or even 500l., although patronage might be combined with it, he would refuse it, because he could not afford to keep a house in London and attend to the duties of the office. Hon. Gentlemen said when 500l. was proposed that it was too little; now, however, they said anything more—even 1l.—would be too much. That was not a satisfactory state of things for those who had to make propositions. He (Lord J. Russell) was indifferent as to whether the sum was 500l. or 1,000l.; but he thought the latter was the better proposal, and he was of opinion that the Committee should adopt it.

said, he wished to propose a clause, declaring that if a Member of that House should be nominated a Director by the Crown, he should not continue to sit in the House unless re-elected.

believed that there was not the slightest doubt that a Member of the House being nominated a Director by the Crown, must vacate his seat under the Act of Anne, as he would be appointed by the Crown to an office of emolument.

moved that Clause 29 be disagreed to. He would not press his proposal to a division, as his only object was to elicit from the Minister for India an explanation, and to ascertain the exact meaning and intention of the Government with regard to this clause, which had been passed at an early hour in a thin House without a single remark. The 29th clause enacted that the limit of the European troops of the Company and of their troops in training should be extended, and permitted the Company to increase their force composed of British subjects from 14,000 to 24,000. Some years ago Parliament fixed the limit at 12,200 men, and also authorised the Company to employ 8,000 Imperial troops on paying the cost of the same. In 1813 Parliament authorised the Company to call for any number of the national forces, and they required at that time 20,000. The force now in India amounted to about 30,000 men, and under this Act the East India Company might ask for 50,000 men on paying the necessary charges. Now he wanted the House to consider whether this ancient policy should be continued or not. He doubted the wisdom of the proposed change, and he would state as shortly as possible the objection be felt to this augmentation of the Company's force in India. He thought it extremely objectionable in a constitutional point of view to have an English army of 20,000 men in India, and of 4,000 recruits in England, entirely free from the control of Parliament., and in the pay and under the orders of an irresposible mysterious Company in Leadenhall-street. The double military system was a greater absurdity and more to be condemned than the double civil system which had been so much discussed during this India debate. A great reform of the Indian army was requisite, and he was surprised that such a clause as this was introduced, which would render any future improvement still more difficult. He objected, secondly, because indirectly it would tend to impair the efficiency of the British army. India was the chief field on which the English army could take part in extensive military operations, and he concluded that the Queen's troops would not be required to the same extent if the Anglo-Indian army was to be increased by 9,800 men. Was it expedient by diminishing the contingent of the Royal army for those dominions, to render the number still less of commanders of brigades and divisions, exercised and organised by the vicissitudes and duties of our great military provinces? He was a lover of peace, and hoped there would be no more wars, especially in India, where our territories were inconveniently extensive; but if an army were necessary and regiments were to be raised, be thought the present proposal the least desirable mode of doing it, being as prejudicial to imperial interests, as it was unjust to our national army. He thought, too, that the system of English troops permanently stationed in India was disadvantageous in a military point of view. The native troops, amounting to about 300,000 men, were bold and intrepid soldiers; but they looked to the example and support of the British troops. The English regiments in the service of the Company, from a long residence in a hot climate, suffered in health, and discipline was not maintained. The mainspring, therefore, of our success, was the system of frequent relief among the Queen's corps. Was there ever any great establishment, civil or military, altogether removed from the central Government—from the action of home opinion, which did not degrade in character, lose vigour, and sometimes become comparatively useless? The armies of India had been preserved from the mere provincial character by the relief system. The substitution of a permanent provincial for a Royal army, tended to the destruction of that unity and military link which ought to exist between India, our beloved Queen, and our country. He, and he believed a large majority of that House, felt that the time was come when it was fitting that the Government of India should be carried on in the name of the Sovereign, and not, as the hon. Baronet the Member for Rochester had observed "in the name of the Company, which the illiterate people of India imagined to be a old woman." It would be found too that the services required of troops could not be performed by men long stationed in India so well as by the imperial troops sent out from time to time. He did not doubt the courage of the European troops in the Company's service, but the constitutions of the men could not be of the same character and it was notorious that the discipline was materially relaxed. With reference to the inevitable consequences, physical and moral which experience had proved to result from existence in tropical climates, he would read to the House a statement made by Colonel Mansfield, of the 53rd foot, within the last few days:—"However cheerfully we may pass our lives and serve our country in those climates, we must admit, practically, that such existence is a long disease to an Englishman. He may battle against it for years, but still it is a disease—a long protracted disease. What it is to a man, so it is to a regiment of Englishmen. We must not shrink from contemplating the results of the change which is now sought to be initiated. It is no question of rival services—of one seeking paltry advantages at the expense of the other—but it is a question whether, for the sake of little patronage now and then, we shall consent to relinquish the defence given us naturally, against the influences of climate and the corruptions of languid habits. The right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Wood) does not know the difficulty of keeping troops up to the mark in an Indian climate, and no one without regimental experience, can appreciate the gradual creeping langour over a body of men, commencing with the commanding officer." This letter, written by an able and experienced officer with reference to this clause, proved, he thought that he was justified in preferring the em- ployment of imperial troops, that were relieved from time to time, to the Company's troops, that were stationed in India, perhaps, for twenty years or more. Another objection which he entertained to this clause was, that it increased the patronage of the East India Company, for it would give them this year from 400 to 500 appointments. The Minister for India had promised to decrease the influence of the Directors, and yet he increased their salaries and their patronage, which he feared would be used, as it always had been, as private property, and not as a great and sacred trust. He was aware that he should be told that Lord Dalhousie had recommended this measure, and the Minister would say that there was a war in Burmah. In his opinion there ought to have been no such war. But even if there were any necessity for more troops, it appeared to him more desirable that Her Majesty's troops should be increased and sent to the East, than that the East India Company should be allowed to increase their forces.

would remind the hon. Gentleman that it was not a very usual course to move the rejection of a clause upon the third reading, when that clause had passed through Committee without any objection being taken to it. The question for the House to decide upon was, not whether the army in India should be the Queen's army, but it was the mere number of the European troops in the Company's service. The Company's forces were now precisely what they were seventy years ago, while the Queen's troops had been considerably increased, and, therefore, what the hon. Gentleman desired had in reality taken place, no increase in the Company's European troops having been effected since the year 1788. During this time it would be remembered that there had been a considerable addition to the territories of the East India Company, and there had been a considerable increase in the Native army. It had been thought desirable by the Government of India, and had been recommended by Lord Dalhousie, that an increase should be made in the East India Company's European forces. The old clause said that the number should not be beyond 12,000 men, and this clause that the number should not be beyond 20,000; but neither of these clauses defined that the number should absolutely be either 12,000 or 20,000. It was desirable when the Government were fixing a limit, to fix it at something beyond what might be wanted. He had asked the opinion of Lord Hardinge upon this point, and his Lordship strongly advised him to concur in the Earl of Dalhousie's recommendation. He would not dwell upon the question of patronage, but all the authorities agreed that an increase of the Company's European forces was desirable; upon that opinion he had acted, and he hoped the House would not reject the clause he had introduced.