said, he wished to inquire of the right hon. Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) by what authority, and with what object, the 19th question was inserted in the form of inquiry as to endowed, National, British, infant, and other schools; and the 20th question in the form of inquiry, as to endowed grammar schools, by the Charity Commissioners? and whether those questions were addressed to Roman Catholic and Dissenting schools, or only to those of the Church of England?

said, that the authority under which the questions referred to had been inserted in the form of inquiry was contained in the 9th and 10th sections of the Act of last Session, establishing the Charities Commission. The first of these sections empowered the Commissioners to examine and inquire into all charities in England and Wales, and the nature, objects, management, and result thereof. The second section required all trustees or persons concerned in the management of any charity to answer all inquiries addressed to them by direction of the Board relating to those matters. The object with which the particular question had been inserted in the inquiries was to ascertain to what class of children any particular school was open, and whether in any endowed school there was any particular exclusion of children of Dissenters. This inquiry was an important one with respect to that class of cases in which it might be proposed to apply to educational purposes and other exigencies of a school inefficiently endowed the funds of other charities founded for the benefit of the poor of any particular place without distinction of creed. With regard to the question of the noble Lord, whether they were to be addressed to Roman Catholic schools, he had to state that these questions were not addressed to Roman Catholic schools, because, by the 62nd section, Roman Catholic charities were for two years exempted from the operation of the Act. With respect to schools managed by Protestant Dissenters, these particular questions would be clearly inapplicable. The form of inquiry included all the ques- tions fit to be put in any case, but the particular inquiries would be varied according to the circumstances of the case, while the same principle would be applied to all cases of Dissenting schools desiring to participate in the benefits of the general charity.

said, he begged to inquire of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) whether Russian ships chartered by British merchants to bring corn from the Black Sea, and by a firman of the Sultan (issued after his declaration of war against Russia) permitted to pass the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, would be also permitted to pass unmolested by British men-of-war, in the event of war occurring between Great Britain and Russia? and whether the Government would use its good offices with the Government of France to insure for the vessels so circumstanced a safe conduct from French cruisers likewise?

Sir, the question of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets is one of considerable interest, and, at the same time, one of great delicacy; and I must say, before answering the question, that I think it would be inure convenient if the merchants interested in this question would address an application on the subject to the Foreign-office. My noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) would then direct an answer to be sent in writing, stating the exact directions which Her Majesty's Government could give on the subject. The facts with respect to this particular case to which the hon. Baronet refers are these:—In the month of February an application was made by certain merchants of Hull to know whether Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, would be instructed to obtain from the Sultan protection for certain Russian vessels then loading in the Black Sea, and expected to come back with cargoes on British account. Lord Stratford was directed to apply to the Porte on the subject. The Sultan acceded to the request made, and those vessels were protected in their passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. In December there were some other vessels, with respect to which an application was made, and Lord Stratford was again desired to protect British interests as far as he could. But with respect to the original application, there was a subsequent request in February, asking whether British cruisers would be bound to respect Russian vessels similarly circumstanced in the Mediterranean, in the event of war between Russia and this country. Lord Clarendon, in answer to this request, desired to know the names of the vessels referred to, and a list of four vessels was sent to the Foreign Office. With respect to those vessels, Lord Clarendon will take care, and Her Majesty's Government will take care, that in case of war directions shall be given to British cruisers to respect those vessels, which have been allowed by the Sultan to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. With respect to any protection from French men-of-war, that is, of course, a thing which we cannot possibly demand of the French Government. But Her Majesty's Government will use their good offices with the French Government, with the view of getting them that protection to which, by the law of nations, they would not, in the case of war, be entitled. But lest this question and the answer which I have given might receive a more general interpretation than it is intended to have, I will repeat what I stated at the commencement—that it is most desirous that applications on the subject should be made in writing, and that persons should not be misled by thinking that the protection of the British Government can be afforded further than those cases to which Her Majesty's Government think they are entitled to carry it in the present instance.

Sir, in reference to a question put by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Sir W. Clay), as to whether certain Russian ships will be allowed to pass our vessels under certain circumstances, I wish to ask the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) whether we may expect the decision of the Government in reference to the right of neutral flags, in case of war breaking out? That is, whether the Government has come to a decision, and whether they will announce that decision—whether free ships are to make free goods, and neutral flags be respected? Of course, I refer to neutral ships carrying ordinary mercantile produce, not to ships carrying muniments of war.

The question is of the greatest importance, and is altogether under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government at the present moment. At present I am not able to announce a decision on any of the various points of the matter. But before any declaration of war is made we will be prepared to answer the question.

said, he wished to make a short statement in reply to the observations which fell from the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. Maguire) on Friday evening, with respect to certain proceedings which had taken place in the metropolitan districts in connection with the removal of paupers to Ireland. Some of the remarks of the hon. Gentleman were of so startling a character, and bore so harshly upon the conduct of the parochial officers in the metropolis, especially those in the parish of St. Pancras, that he had considered if his duty, as a representative of one of the metropolitan boroughs, to inquire into the subject, in order to ascertain whether the facts were really such as the hon. Gentleman had represented them to be. He was informed that the statement made by the hon. Gentleman, so far as the parish of St. Pancras was concerned, was wholly without foundation; and although he did not blame the hon. Member for bringing the subject forward, yet he could not help thinking that those persons who had supplied the hon. Gentleman with the extraordinary cases of hardship and oppression which he had narrated to the House should have been more careful in their inquiries, and more accurate in their information, before they called upon him to bring the subject under the notice of Parliament. It was very inconvenient that those statements should be made at a time when the House was about to go into Committee of Supply, and thus obstruct the public business. The hon. Member was reported to have said:—

"One poor woman—Anne Harris—not the Mrs. Harris of the novelist, but a Mrs. Harris of real life—had resided seven years in St. Pancras; but about three months since her husband broke his leg, and was obliged to go into Middlesex Hospital, and a few weeks since she applied for and obtained relief for herself and her children, born in the parish. The mother and children entered the workhouse, and on recovering from the sickness caused by the privations they bad undergone, she asked for her discharge. The parish authorities were too glad to have her at their mercy, and the poor woman and her children were sent off to Ireland, without the knowledge or consent of the sick husband, then lying in the hospital."

What were the facts of the ease? No such a person as Mrs. Harris existed; and at the time when it was said she was re- lieved in the workhouse, there was no man of the name of Harris in the Middlesex Hospital. About the period referred to a woman of the name of Macarthy was removed to Ireland by the authorities of St. Pancras; but she was a woman of abandoned character, unmarried, and with two illegitimate children. During the last few years the expense of removing paupers from St. Pancras to Ireland had been only 21l. 13s. 2d. per annum, though the parish contained a population of 667,000 souls. He did not intend to enter into a defence of the conduct of the officers of other parishes; but if the statements which the hon. Member for Durgarvan had made with respect to the other metropolitan districts were no better founded than those which he had put forth in regard to St. Pancras, he could tell him that they were not of any value whatever.

said, he would not take the recommendation of the hon. Baronet with regard to the statements which, in the exercise of his discretion, he should bring forward. The hon. Baronet had so confused and thimble-rigged his explanation—one moment the pea being here and the next moment there—that it was difficult to understand. One moment, this Mrs. Harris was a woman of infamous character, and another of no character at all. [Laughter.] He asked the hon. Gentlemen who laughed whether they could say there was no difference between "no character at all and an infamous character?" There was a great difference in politics between the two, and he thought there was also in morals. The authority upon which he had made the statement was the declaration of the woman herself made before a magistrate of the county of Cork, a copy of which had been forwarded to him by the clerk of the board of guardians, whom he had requested to furnish him with cases bearing upon the Motion he had given notice of bringing forward. He did not mean to say that the woman was really a Mrs. Harris, for in Ireland it was no uncommon occurrence for a married woman to give her maiden name. Therefore, though the declaration was made by Anne Harris, that was no reason for saying that she was not a married woman, and a woman of good character.

said, that he was anxious, previous to going into Com- mittee of Supply, to call the attention of the House to a portion of the naval policy which had been pursued by Her Majesty's Government with regard to our fleet in the Bosphorus. The House would remember that the Turkish flotilla at Sinope was destroyed by the Russians on the last day of November, 1853, and that a British squadron had been lying in the Bosphorus since the 1st of November. He would not then enter into the question of the harsh measures adopted by the Russians at Sinope, further than by saying that, if they had a right to destroy the Turkish flotilla, they exercised that right in a bloody and barbarous manner. The question which he wished the First Lord of the Admiralty to answer was, how did it happen that that lamentable catastrophe was not prevented? It must be obvious to the House that the instant that that catastrophe took place all hope of peace had expired; and there could be no doubt that the destruction of the Turkish fleet, under the circumstances to which he would allude, was well calculated to tarnish the hitherto unblemished reputation of British faith. He wished to be informed whether it was or was not true that Her Majesty's Government insisted upon the Turks not sending out their fleet to the Black Sea. He apprehended that the despatch of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Clarendon on the 5th of November, 1853, to the effect that he had succeeded in persuading the Turks not to send their fleet to the Black Sea, left no doubt about the matter. Turkey had at that time a large fleet. One portion of that fleet consisted of four sail of the line and ten frigates, the latter as large as our seventy-fours, and had it been allowed to enter the Black Sea and anchor at Sinope, the result would have been more favourable to the Turks. But the Turks not having been permitted to defend themselves, it became the duty of those who commanded the British squadron in the Bosphorus to take care that no harm should be done to Turkish vessels by the Russian fleet. As early as the 5th of October, 1853, Lord Stratford declared his opinion to be that, unless they gave naval aid to Turkey cordially and frankly, Russia would finally succeed. Lord Clarendon anticipated that letter of Lord Stratford's by writing to Lord Cowley, at Paris, on the 7th of October, and on the 8th of that month to Lord Stratford, at Constantinople, ordering that the British squadron was to go to the Bosphorus from the Dardanelles. In those letters he used the expression, "If the fleets of the Russians should leave Sebastopol, the British squadron will, of course, pass into the Bosphorus." Now, he (Sir H. Willoughby) wished to learn from the First Lord of the Admiralty how it happened that, after the Russians had notoriously gone from Sebastopol, the British squadron remained inactive in the Bosphorus, and did not enter the Black Sea? But that was not all. On the 8th of October Lord Clarendon wrote to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe:—

"It will be necessary that Admiral Dundas should inform the Russian Admiral commanding at Sebastopol, that if the Russian fleet should come out of that port for the purpose of landing troops on any portion of the Turkish territory, or of committing any act of overt hostility against the Porte, his orders are to protect the Sultan's dominions from attack."

Those instructions were despatched to Constantinople on the 8th day of October, nearly two months before the affair at Sinope, and he wanted to know from the right hon. Baronet why they were not carried into effect. The importance of those instructions was very great, because it was quite clear that if the Russian Admiral had been informed that the territories and ships of the Turks would be protected by the British and French fleets, no Russian fleet would have appeared at Sinope; at all events, such a catastrophe as that which had occurred would have been a direct offence on the part of Russia against the British and French Governments, and the consequences could in no way have been eluded by the Russians. He (Sir H. Willoughby) was so struck with that view of the matter, on reading the despatch of Lord Clarendon, of the 8th of October, that he asked the noble Lord the Member for the City of London whether the instructions contained in it had been carried into effect. To that question, the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) gave a most extraordinary answer, for he said that the instructions had been brilliantly carried out by Captain Drummond. But that was no answer at all, for the affair in which Captain Drummond figured took place in January, 1854, and, of course, long after the catastrophe of Sinope. The noble Lord must surely have forgotten all the dates connected with this matter. No doubt, something relating to the instructions of the 8th of October did transpire at St. Petersburg, for Count Nesselrode appeared to have said to Sir Hamilton Seymour, by way of defending the destruction at Sinope, that Russia had supposed, that England had only meant at that time to have protected the Turkish territory and not the fleets of the Turks. He (Sir H. Willoughby), therefore, wished the First Lord of the Admiralty to state why the important instructions of the 8th of October had not been carried into effect, because it was his deliberate opinion that if they had been, the lives of 4,000 Turks, who perished at Sinope—a loss greater than had occurred in some of the chief naval engagements in which England had taken part—would have been saved, and the chances of peace have been greater. The House would bear in mind the fact that the presence of a large Russian fleet, including fourteen sail of the line, in the Black Sea, was perfectly notorious. And it was also well known, that in the middle of November two Turkish steamers were actually taken by the Russians. He wished the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty to explain what the British fleet was then doing at the mouth of the Bosphorus? why was it not watching, with the eyes of an Argus, the powerful fleet of Russia? Had the British fleet properly obeyed the instructions of Lord Clarendon on the 8th of October, it would have narrowly watched the movements of the gigantic power then existing at Sebastopol. But the British fleet would not allow the Turkish ships to go out; and that prohibition would, perhaps, have been a wise one if the British fleet had itself undertaken the duty of preventing the Russians from doing any injury to the Turks. After the catastrophe at Sinope, only two steam frigates went to inquire what had taken place there; and if the Russian fleet had been at Sinope, it could have made those two frigates turn tail and go back again. It seemed clear, then, to him (Sir H. Willoughby) that, all through the affair, there had been a want of vigour, foresight, and determination on the part of the authorities at Constantinople. He felt quite persuaded that the conduct of our fleet in this affair had damaged the reputation of British faith in the opinion of the nations of Europe. With regard to the conduct of our fleet towards Turkey, he was inclined to use the phrase which the First Lord of the Admiralty had a few evenings ago applied to those who quoted from the blue books in support of their arguments in the debate on the Eastern question—he was afraid that our fleet had "pottered" much too long in Besika Bay and in the Bosphorus. The dilatory conduct of our fleet in the Bosphorus, notwithstanding the daring conduct of the Czar, was such as our military and naval history proved was likely to produce immense disasters. He was quite persuaded that the blue books did not furnish a full narrative of the affair at Sinope. The hon. Member for Roscommon (Mr. French) had, on Friday last, stated the circumstances attending that affair with great detail, but Her Majesty's Government suffered his observations to pass without remark. He (Sir H. Willoughby) therefore trusted that he should not be considered to be interrupting the course of public business if he asked the First Lord of the Admiralty to explain to the House how it was that the destruction at Sinope had happened without the interference of the British fleet? He sincerely believed that the matter required investigation.

said, he was very far from imputing any blame to the hon. Baronet for having brought forward this discussion. On a former evening the hon. Baronet sought an opportunity of bringing the matter forward, but, by the rules of the House, he was prevented, and, therefore, he (Sir J. Graham) had not one word to say now against the course the hon. Baronet was pursuing. At the same time, he thought it would be in the recollection of the House when he reminded the hon. Baronet that in the course of a long discussion in going into a Committee of Supply on a previous occasion, this part of the matter was dwelt upon by various hon. Members, and that upon the part of Her Majesty's Government, it received what he thought a full and complete explanation. At all events, when he himself had the honour of addressing the House, he did not seek to evade this part of the case, but expressed—what was the feeling of the House, of the country, and of Europe—the deepest regret—he had almost said the most unfeigned indignation—at the outrage of Sinope, which had led to such grave results. As to the facts of the case, the hon. Baronet and himself were almost entirely agreed. The order despatched by the British Government to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Admiral Dundas on the 8th October was an order to protect the Turkish territories only against direct aggression on the part of Russia; but when intelligence of the outrage at Sinope arrived in England, an order was immediately despatched by Her Majesty's Ministers, acting in concert with the Government of France, which carried the instructions of the 8th of October much further, and directed that protection should be given, not only to the territories of Turkey, but to the flag of Turkey in the Black Sea—that means should be taken by the combined fleets to prevent any Russian ship of war whatever from navigating the Black Sea, and that if any such Russian ship of war should appear in the Black Sea, it should be requested, in the first instance, and compelled, if necessary, to return to Sebastopol. But the hon. Baronet said they had not accounted for the delay which took place in sending the entire fleet into the Black Sea. Now, upon that point, the fullest information had been given in the course of the late debate. It was stated that power was given to the English Ambassador at Constantinople, to communicate to the Russian Admiral commanding at Sebastopol, the instructions contained in the despatch of the 8th of October; but that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, exercising a discretion on the spot, did not, at that time, think it expedient to do so; and, consequently, when the affair at Sinope occurred, the order of the British Government had not been communicated to the Russian Admiral. But the hon. Baronet said that the blue books afforded no explanation of those transactions. Now the despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, written in December, clearly proved that in his opinion the catastrophe at Sinope was owing to the culpable negligence of the Turkish Commander. This was shown by a despatch from Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford, dated the 22nd of November, and in closed in a despatch from Lord Stratford to Lord Clarendon (No. 336), dated the 5th of December, after the catastrophe of Sinope. Lord Stratford said,—

"Your Lordship will perceive from Mr. Guarracino's reports that the danger to which the Turkish flotilla at Sinope was exposed, had not escaped observation before the catastrophe."

The letter inclosed from Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford contained the following passage:—

"At the time the Medari Tidjaret was captured, there were seven Turkish sailing men-of-war at anchor at Sinope. After hearing of the capture of the steamer, the commander of this squadron gave orders that the ships should put to sea directly; and the steamers lit their fires to prepare, but a contrary order was issued soon after."

The House would observe that this letter was dated eight days before the Russian attack upon Sinope took place. But really he thought he could not so well discharge his duty to the House, as to read the explanation which Admiral Dundas had given to him from time to time of these transactions. Admiral Dundas was well known to the Members of that House, and though the hon. Baronet said he had failed in vigour—[Sir H. WILLOUGHBY: I said the Government had failed in vigour.]—By the orders of the 8th of October a discretionary power was given to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Admiral Dundas to send the fleet into the Black Sea, in order to protect the territories of Turkey against aggression on the part of Russia. The fleet was not actually sent into the Black Sea until after the disaster at Sinope, but he might state to the House that Admiral Dundas, on the 17th of November, did offer to go into the Black Sea. Circumstances, however, arose which prevented effect being given to that offer, but it was distinctly made by Admiral Dundas, who did not deserve that any doubt should be cast on his vigour and decision. Whatever other qualities Admiral Dundas might possess, he was confident that, whenever a fit occasion should arise, he would prove to that House and the country, that neither in vigour nor in decision would he be found wanting. The gallant Admiral, writing on the 3rd of December, after the catastrophe of Sinope, said:—

"It is necessary to remark that this Turkish force of five frigates had been for weeks at Sinope, although ordered to return to Constantinople; and that Sinope is not defended by any guns, and no soldiers are stationed there."

Writing on the 9th of December, Admiral Dundas said—

"The cause of this calamity is the Turks leaving this squadron in so unprotected a bay for so long a period."

He added:—

"It is most extraordinary the careless manner in which these Turkish ships have been left. For three weeks, at least, five frigates lay inactive in this open bay; and, when it is considered that since 1829 no Turkish sailing ship has been cruising in the Black Sea, the month of November was the worst time to send them out. When I arrived at this anchorage 1 was asked my opinion, and I frankly told them that if their ships were sent out to cruise they would certainly lose them either by shipwreck or the enemy. The steamer that did escape was one of the squadron, and left by the commander of the squadron to assist in towing out the ships from Sinope. But it appears that the two Pashas differed in opinion, and the determination not to sail was unfortunately de- cided on, otherwise, the wind being fresh from the eastward, all would have been safe."

On the 12th of December he wrote:—

"My letters will have told you of the unfortunate affair at Sinope, all owing to the great neglect of the Turks keeping ships in an open road-stead within 150 miles of Sebastopol."

It appeared thus that the Capitan Pasha differed in opinion from Admiral Dundas; the ships were consequently sent into the Black Sea, and the House knew the result. Moreover, they had the testimony of Admiral Dundas to the fact that, even after they had entered the Black Sea and arrived at Sinope, the Turkish frigates were ordered to return to Constantinople, and that if that order had been obeyed, the subsequent disaster would not have occurred. Certainly, then, Admiral Dundas having offered to go into the Black Sea on the 17th of November, and having warned the Turkish authorities of the danger to which the frigates would be exposed, and that order having been given for the return of the flotilla, he still strongly held by the opinion that, though the disaster at Sinope was lamentable in the extreme, all blame was removed from the British Government and the British Admiral. Distinct orders had now been issued, both by the French and English Admirals, that no Russian ship of war should navigate the Black Sea if the English and French fleets could prevent it. He was confident that, whenever vigour and decision were required, they would not be found wanting on the part either of the British or French Admirals.

said, that, whatever notice might have been given to the Turkish frigates at Sinope of the presence of the Russian fleet, no intimation of the sort was made to the single English vessel which happened to be there at the time. He regretted to say that two of the crew were murdered by the Russians, and the rest would have been killed likewise, if they had nut put themselves under the authority of the Austrian Consul.

said, there was only one English ship at Sinope, which had arrived a very short time before the attack was made. He believed the crew were placed in a most cruel position. They were attacked outside the harbour by the most barbarous and cruel fire that could be opened upon an unresisting merchant vessel, and when the crew sought to escape and to get on shore, they were exposed to outrages on the part of the Turkish population.

said, he thought that the statement which had been made by the First Lord of the Admiralty completely exonerated the British Admiral from the slightest blame in connection with the affair at Sinope. He wished, however, to ask the right hon. Baronet whether any information had reached the Government to the effect that two Russian frigates had looked into Trebizond, and stayed there for a short time? He wished also to know whether it had come to the knowledge of the right hon. Baronet that the Russian fleet was still continuing communications with the coast of Circassia!

said, in the communications which he had received from Admiral Dundas it was stated that the screw ships of war and the steamers of the combined fleets had visited the different ports in the Black Sea. They had visited Varna more than once; they had visited the entrance to the Sea of Azof; they had visited the coast of Circassia; and with the exception of three small ships of war in a harbour near the Sea of Azof, they had never yet seen a Russian ship of war.

said, it was not his intention to trespass on the indulgence of the House for any time, and that only in relation to the battle of Sinope. As regarded the tenor of the negotiation published in the blue books, he would simply express the persuasion which he had always entertained, that a vigorous policy was that best calculated to avert war, and that a timid policy was fraught with danger and ultimate disaster. In this spirit he saw cause for regret that, upon the occupation of the Principalities by the Russians, the attitude best befitting England was not followed, by the coincident entrance of the Black Sea by the British fleet. The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord D. Stuart), speaking, as he said, under correction of naval Members of the House, expressed his impression that a line-of-battle ship would not fire into a frigate. In such case, it would be the duty of a British line-of-battle ship to fire clear of the frigate, and if the frigate did not surrender, it would be her duty to fire into and sink it; but if the frigate were sunk, no effort would be spared on the part of the crew of the British line-of-battle ship to save every man they could. The noble Lord the Member for London expressed his astonishment that seven ships of the line, sailing down upon, and destroying, seven frigates, should have been made the subject of congratulation by the Emperor of Russia. He also shared in the difficulty which the noble Lord felt. He could not elicit from the English language words capable of embodying the sense he entertained of the ignoble, nay, inhuman and cowardly carnage, perpetrated by the Russian Admiral and his squadron on an unresisting enemy, nor the admiration of the heroic and almost superhuman defence made by the Turkish ships. The battle of Sinope would reflect everlasting honour on the arms of Turkey, and tarnish the escutcheon of Russia with a disgrace which time would not obliterate. The right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty stated the other night that the defenceless state of Sinope being evident, the Ambassadors of England and France had made known to their respective Admirals the necessity that the fleets should immediately proceed thither; that Admiral Dundas had responded to the communication, but that the French Admiral demurred in the first instance, in consequence of the recall of his Ambassador and a desire to avoid incurring the responsibility; and afterwards, on the arrival of a successor in the embassy, upon the ground of unwillingness at that season to risk his ships in the waters of the Black Sea. He regretted that Admiral Dundas, under the circumstances, did not consider himself justified in proceeding alone, as the British fleet was more than equal to engage any Russian fleet which could have been opposed to him. There would have been, then, but small, if any, risk of collision, or of the safety of the port of Sinope. In the first instance, however, in fair justice, he must observe that for some time past, before the 30th of November, the Russians and the Turks had been at active war on land. Under those circumstances, to destroy an enemy's squadron which had been employed in the convoy of arms and ammunition, was nothing more than an act of awful warfare—deadly as the attendant slaughter might be, and deeply to be deplored. If such were not the design of naval operations, he could wish to have defined that course which was to be followed by opposed fleets and armies when sent out by legitimate authority to vanquish and overcome the enemies of their country. As a sailor—and he believed he should have with him all military men—and all conversant with the conduct of war —he was of opinion that the Russian Admiral did no more than his duty by leading into the port of Sinope an overwhelming force, so as to obtain his object at the least possible risk to his own ships and men; for the highest merit and the first duty of a naval commander was to bring his fleet out of action in as efficient a state as possible for resuming hostilities, and the circumstance of taking a greatly superior force would have been an act of humanity, if properly used. It was his subsequent conduct which clouded his squadron and himself with condemnation and detestation. To turn to the larger question from this distressing subject, the fate of an empire which adjusted the equilibrium of European power was now at stake—a State considered to be so feeble and tottering by its northern enemy as to be ready, at her shaking, to crumble into powder. He exulted in knowing that she was not to be left to her own heroic defence, that she was not now to be unsupported in her struggle for independence—not now to be uncared for, when she called for help to that nation which had ever been the protector of the weak, On the deliberations and voice of that House depended the extension of that aid and succour which was submitted to its consideration in the estimates now lying on the table, and which would, he trusted, place the military and naval forces of the country in a condition to fulfil the expectations of the nation. He would only observe that no country was more guilty of evil consequences, than that which underrated the power of the country opposed to it, or undervalued its means of defence. It was to be borne in mind that Russia had always gained more by diplomacy than by arms. She began her career by assuming to be the protector of Poland, the Crimea, and Circassia; she ended by being the tyrant. So, now, would she claim the protectorate over 12,000,000 of Greek Christians in Turkey. The Czar, under the specious mask of sympathy with his co-religionists, aimed at a dominion that would vanquish and enslave all Christendom. Russia had already wrested from Sweden a domain larger than the remains of her own ancient kingdom; from Denmark, Norway; from Poland, as much as the Austrian empire; from Turkey in Europe, as much as the dominions of Prussia proper; from Turkey in Asia, as much as the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, Belgium, and Holland; from Persia, as much as England. In sixty-four years Russia had advanced her frontier between 800 and 900 miles towards Vienna, Berlin, and Paris; between 400 and 500 miles nearer to Constantinople; within a few leagues of Stockholm, and 1,000 miles nearer to Teheran and India. She was now coiling round the south and east of Austria. The safety and policy of Europe required a barrier against Russia; she must not extend her jurisdiction and supremacy over the East, or make the Baltic and the Black Sea Russian lakes, or the Sound and the Bosphorous the bases of her colossal stride. She must not be allowed to threaten the Mediterranean and the high road to India. A stand must be made, and the limits of Russia must not be transgressed. On the part of France and England the war would not be one of ambition, but a patriotic war, undertaken to preserve their interests, while Russia threatened the balance of European power, extended her frontier to the prejudice and peril of independent States, enlarged the bounds of the protectorate which she at present exercised in Germany, and aimed at converting Constantinople into a centre of future conquests and the metropolis of a universal empire. Steady, aggressive, and unscrupulous in her course for more than 100 years, her ambition would be contented with no less a destiny. He made no question but that this country would emerge from any position, however difficult, in which she might be placed, with increased honour shed on the sister services, and with additional renown to her already high name among all the nations of the earth.

If this country expects to be well served, it becomes this House to set its face strenuously against unprofessional observations on the commanders it employs. It seems to me a matter of wonder that any one should have insinuated that Admiral Dundas has, in the remotest degree, shown a want of energy and decision. Many years ago I was sailing with him in the Mediterranean, and he said to me, "Some day or other I shall be an admiral; there will be a war; I shall be commanding here; and the worst thing I shall have to contend against will be the satiric observations of ignorant people at home." And I remember well he added, "When the time arrives I shall quote you as a witness that I told you this many years ago."

said, he so far agreed with the hon. Member for West Surrey that civilians ought to abstain from criticising professional details, but he could not concur in thinking it no part of the duty of the British House of Commons to discuss when the English fleet ought or ought not to act. He rose, however, to call attention to the manner in which the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had altogether evaded the questions put to him by the hon. Member for Evesham (Sir H. Willoughby). The hon. Member required some explanation of the inactivity of our fleet, when it had been represented that Admiral Dundas was under orders to go into the Black Sea. The right hon. Baronet's (Sir J. Graham's) reason for that inactivity was that, a change of ambassadors occurring about that time, the French Admiral declined to enter the Black Sea at that period. It appeared to him (Mr. French) that it was not so very essential that the two fleets should advance side by side, especially as it must be recollected the French fleet proceeded to the Greek waters whilst the English fleet remained at Malta. Admiral Dundas had thirteen sail of the line, a fleet perfectly sufficient to have swept the Black Sea and driven the Russian fleet into Sebastopol. He did not attempt to explain why English interference was used to prevent Admiral Slade entering the Black Sea at the head of a squadron perfectly able to compete with the Russian fleet. The right hon. Baronet shook his head, as if he thought that was not the case, but it was Admiral Slade's own opinion, it being his intention, if, entering the Black Sea, he did not find the Russian fleet at Sinope, to go round by Circassia to search for it; and he said in a letter, that they might expect in a few days to hear of a conflict between himself and the Russians. It was his opinion that with the Egyptian and the Turkish line-of-battle ships combined he should be able to attack and destroy the Russians. The right hon. Baronet had said that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had attributed the disaster to the Turks themselves; surely he must have forgotten the despatch in which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote, "I cannot disguise from myself the fact that, had our fleet gone into the Black Sea, this disaster would not have happened." He was, however, glad to hear that there was no foundation for the report that serious differences existed between Admiral Dundas and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and that there was no truth in the assertion that the gallant Admiral would not obey the orders of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe without seeing the despatches from the Government, claiming a right to put an interpretation of his own upon those important documents. No person, after reading the papers before the House, could charge Lord Stratford de Redcliffe with not acting vigorously, without doing great injustice to that noble Lord. At the same time, the personal prowess of the gallant Admiral was known to them all; and, no doubt, if not fettered by the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs, he would be able, there was little doubt, by and by, to give a very good account of himself.

said, he felt that the House was very much obliged to the hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) for raising this discussion, and that the Government could not possibly be surprised that an affair which had excited so much indignation as the catastrophe of Sinope should be fully discussed by the House of Commons. He looked upon that catastrophe as occasioned by the hesitating, feeble, and vacillating policy pursued by the Government, which had aroused such a deep feeling of indignation, not only in this country, but throughout Europe; but he was rejoiced to see that they had at length discovered their error, and were preparing to pursue a firmer and more energetic course. In his opinion the combined fleets ought to have been in the Black Sea long before it was, and by his despatches it was plain Lord Stratford greatly regretted that such a measure was not taken. As early as the month of October it was in the contemplation of the two Governments, and instructions were sent to the Ambassadors to send those fleets to operate wherever they might judge it to be necessary for the protection of the Turkish territory. It appeared in the despatches, both from London and Paris, that if the Russian fleet came out of Sebastopol, the combined fleets were, as a matter of course, to enter the Bosphorus. He believed that, although the whole of the Russian fleet might not have come out in a body from Sebastopol, yet for a very long period previous to the affair of Sinope a large portion of it was cruising in the Black Sea. When at Con- stantinople, he heard the Russian fleet described as a very powerful and formidable fleet; and when he went on board the Admiral's ship at Besika Bay, he asked the officers how that was known, since no one had had any opportunity of observing it. The answer he received was, "It is true we have not seen the Russian fleet, and have had no opportunity of observing it; but this we know—it has kept the Black Sea for two months, which no other fleet has done, and therefore it cannot be a very bad one." He could not conceive that the Ambassadors would not have thought it their duty to send the combined fleets into that sea to meet the Russians if their general instructions had not been to avoid any possible chance of collision. He looked upon that policy as weak and feeble, and very unlikely to conduce to that peace which was so much desired. He was exceedingly glad to hear the explanation which had been given by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty with regard to the readiness of Admiral Dundas to go into the Black Sea, because he thought that completely relieved Admiral Dundas from any imputation of showing reluctance to be there. It was unfortunate that offer was not accepted, and it was unfortunate that the Turkish Government was dissuaded from sending the fleet of Admiral Slade into the Black Sea. The Turkish ships were very fine ships, and manned by very gallant men; and if the whole of the fleet had been at Sinope, most probably the Russians would not have attacked them at all, or, if they had, the Russian fleet would have been beaten off. In either case the catastrophe of Sinope would have been averted. He agreed with his hon. Friend opposite (Sir H. Willoughby), that, bulky as the blue books were, they did not afford a narrative of all the circumstances which had led to this war, nor did they contain all the information which they ought to contain. It was stated in the papers that the Russian Admiral issued a kind of manifesto to the Austrian Consul at Sinope, justifying the attack on the Turkish fleet. That document was not to be found in the blue books; and there were others, he understood, which would throw light upon the subject. Other documents, he had been given to understand, were in possession of the Government, and he wished to ask whether no report as to the situation and capacity of Sinope as a harbour had been received which could be laid on the table of the House? But if, before the catastrophe at Sinope, a reluctance had been shown to enter the Black Sea, why was that reluctance continued after that dreadful event? That fearful event, which the noble Lord had so well described as the butchery of Sinope, occurred on the 30th of November, and the fleets did not leave the Bosphorus until the 5th of January. It was also much to be regretted that they remained only a short time in the Black Sea, and then returned to Beycos. He was told the Black Sea, though deficient in harbours, and subject to fogs and violent gales, was remarkably free from rocks and shoals; and although there was no port at Sinope, the holding ground was so good that the largest ships might anchor there in perfect safety. There might be some difficulty in getting provisions and water at Sinope, but that might have been overcome, and ought, in his opinion, to have been encountered, when the great and paramount object, as borne out by the despatches, was to sweep the Russian flag from that sea. How, he would ask, could that be done if the fleets did not remain in that sea? He knew when they came back to the waters of the Bosphorus it greatly discouraged the Turks and elated time partisans of Russia. The Greeks all said the reason why they came back was because they dare not meet the Russian fleet. Such an observation might, from its absurdity, raise a smile on the countenances of hon. Gentlemen here, but he had no doubt that was the impression conveyed to the minds of the Greek population, and that they believed it sincerely. Orders were mentioned in the despatches that the Admirals were not to allow time Russian fleet to appear in those waters, and if a Russian fleet appeared they were to call upon it to retire, and if not assented to to have recourse to force. The words were very fine, and sounded very bold; but, as he was informed, the Russians had taken no notice of them, had continued to navigate the Black Sea, and to make direct aggressions in the Turkish territory. In the letter of an intelligent officer in one of the ships of the combined fleet, addressed to himself, he found it stated that scarcely had they retired from Batoum when the Russian ships of war cannonaded Fort St. Nicholas at the same time that it was attacked by land. The Russians were, however, repulsed. That was on the 4th of January, and a few days afterwards they cannonaded another small fort, a few miles east of Trebizond. He could not blame the French and English Admirals. He could understand why they should have very little relish for half measures, and not like to expose their ships without having anything considerable to accomplish. He could not but express his surprise at the answer he had received to a request to lay on the table of the House a despatch of the Prime Minister, which the noble Earl had quoted as a proof that he did not deserve to be attacked for any undue predilection for the Government of Russia. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) told him that there was an objection to produce that despatch. He (Lord D. Stuart) always thought it was a rule that the country had a right to see any public document referred to by a Minister of the Crown in Parliament, and he trusted his noble Friend would reconsider the answer he had given to him. He trusted, however, that the time was now come when half measures wire to be superseded by vigorous action, and when such a course should be enjoined on our admirals, and such a spirit imparted to every officer and seaman in our fleet, as would enable them to sustain with honour the proud position which this country had hitherto enjoyed. After the speech of the noble and eloquent leader of the House, who exposed the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, and told them England was determined to restrain his ambition, to chasten his presumption, to assert the rights of Turkey and the liberty of Europe, and after the address of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, in another place, had proclaimed his intention of arresting the aggressions of Russia, putting a check upon the unscrupulous conduct of that Government, and, above all, of procuring a solemn guarantee that the pence of Europe should not be disturbed at the simple will of an ambitious Autocrat, he thought they could not but give a hearty support to the Government in carrying out these designs, and ought not to criticise with too great minuteness the actions of their officers.

said, that the hon. Member for Roscommon (Mr. F. French), in answer to the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond), asked, should not the House of Commons determine whether the fleets should go into the Black Sea? He would answer—the House of Commons could not tell. It must depend on the winds and weather. It was utterly impossible for them to sit there and con- duct the Black Sea fleet. It was also utterly impossible for the British Ambassador at Constantinople to conduct it. The head of the fleet, the Admiral in command of the fleet, if he received orders from the Ambassador, must still judge of the condition of the weather at the time he received those orders. It had been said, why did not the English fleet go alone into the Black Sea? Why? Would not such a course have been most unwise? Would not the Government, by such a step, have incurred the risk of embarking in a war with Russia without France? We should have committed an aggression, France would have committed no aggression; and yet some Gentlemen would have had us alone attack the Russian fleet without any declaration of war. Then it was asked, why did they not permit the Turkish fleet to go and thrash the Russian fleet? There was one portion of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, and that was not equal to meet the Russian fleet. Admiral Slade was a gallant man, and might have attempted it; but if the Russians had known the whole Turkish fleet was in the Black Sea, instead of seven sail of the line, they would have brought out fourteen or fifteen sail of the line, and overwhelmed the whole of them. The portion of the Turkish fleet which was destroyed was lying, as they had heard, for weeks at Sinope, doing nothing, except tempting the Russians to come out and destroy them; for 150 miles, the distance between Sinope and Sebastopol, was only a few hours' sail with a fair wind. He agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for Christchurch (Adm. Walcott), that there was quite enough of war between Turkey and Russia to justify the Russian Admiral in the attack he made under circumstances of great advantage, but he would not attempt to justify the horrors of the massacre at the termination of the action. Then it must be remembered that until the battle of Sinope the orders only were to protect the Turkish territory. It was the battle of Sinope which drew forth the order to send Russian vessels back to Sebastopol, even by force if necessary. That was a very different state of things. But for that battle such an order would not have been given so soon. It only astonished him that Russia had not treated it as a declaration of war. Russia had, however, put up with the affront, for affront it was; and he supposed, even now, if the combined fleets met a Russian squadron, they must tell them civilly to go into port, and if they as civilly consented, no shots must be fired, but the Admirals must take off their hats to each other, and say they were mutually obliged. The House must recollect that the Black Sea was a very dangerous sea, and that a fleet at sea required a great deal of room, and that its movements must always be regulated by the slowest ships belonging to it. He really thought, as far as he was able to judge of the conduct of the Government, that they had taken steps in advance of the circumstances; for it was something new to hear it said, even before there was a declaration of war, that the fleets of another nation were to be forced back into port. Let them stop until war was declared, and then he had no doubt that the hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) and the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord D. Stuart) would be perfectly satisfied with what the British fleet would do. Nothing could be more irksome than for a fleet to be placed in such circumstances, and to be kept without orders to act; but only let those orders be given, and he was sure that the same energy, and decision, and vigour in action would be shown which had always hitherto characterised the Navy of this country.

said, that no information had been afforded to the House with regard to the attack of the Russians upon Fort St. Nicholas, and he thought that, if such information had been received, it ought to be laid upon the table. He wished to know whether Her Majesty's Government were in possession of any information on that subject, and, if so, whether they were prepared to lay it before the House? The people of this country seemed to think that whenever the British fleet was withdrawn from the Black Sea there was certain to be some fresh aggression on the part of Russia, and he therefore considered it important that the Government should produce any information which might be in their possession with respect to the attack on Fort St. Nicholas.

It is not my intention, Sir, to trespass upon the time of the House, or to prevent its going into Committee of Supply beyond a very few minutes. The untoward affair at Sinope was, all must admit, a most unfortunate event, and characterised, on the part of Russia, by the greatest cruelty and barbarity, and, as expressed by the noble Lord, was "a horrid butchery of the Turks whilst lying peaceably in their own har- bour." After listening to this discussion, I find a difficulty in deciding where to lay the blame. The right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty says, the Turks alone were to blame for their loss at Sinope, as they had been lying there for several weeks in a most unguarded state; and, further, had been warned of their danger by our Ambassador at Constantinople. Another hon. Gentleman lays the blame on Admiral Dundas for not following out the orders and instructions he had received. Again, the hon. Baronet below me, who originated this discussion, says the fault was with our Ambassador in not allowing Admiral Slade to proceed into the Black Sea with the rest of the Turkish fleet, which fleet was fully able to have protected the fleet at Sinope, and to have coped successfully with that of Russia. I repeat, I find it impossible to decide which of these statements is correct, and who is to blame for this bloody massacre at Sinope. But, Sir, I may be allowed to express my belief that if our Government had been more energetic at the commencement of these Eastern difficulties, if an early expression of our ultimate intentions had been given to Russia, if the passage of the Pruth had been made a casus belli, then I believe we should not have been at this moment on the eve of a terrible war, of which no one can foresee the end. As we are about to embark in this war, let it not be barren of results. We want, first, security from Russia against her invading prosperous and peaceful countries. We want also the abrogation of the old treaties between the Porte and Russia, and the renunciation on her part of all control over the Principalities and of Servia; the restoration of the mouths of the Danube to the Porte, and the opening of the Black Sea to the fleets and ships of all nations. These are the objects we have to accomplish, and without which we shall have entered on a bloody and costly war to very little purpose. In fact, if we go to war, we should not be at war for nothing, but demand from Russia a quid pro quo, not a hollow peace, putting off the evil day for a few years when we may not be in the same favourable position as at present for repelling her aggression. We are now at peace with all the world—France our firm ally, Austria and Prussia favourable to our policy; Russia stands alone. I have said that the Government made a mistake in not acting with more energy and determination at the commencement of this affair; yet, at the same time, I give them the credit of intending to act for the best, with a laudable desire to preserve the peace a the world, and I am willing to give them my support, and to vote the necessary supplies to enable them to carry on the war with vigour, in order to bring it to a speedy termination. I do not see, the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) in his place. I heard his speech the other night with regret. It was, as usual, an able speech, but in my opinion a most dangerous one; and, I venture to say, not expressing the opinions of that great and enlightened constituency which he represents in this House. The hon. Gentleman said he did not wish to see the Czar in possession of Constantinople, but that he would not go out of his way to prevent it. He further advised the Government to accept of the celebrated Vienna note, and induce Turkey to accede to it, and this after it had been repudiated, not only by Turkey, but by this country, France, Prussia, and Austria. Sir, these are not the opinions of the constituency of the West Riding. I ought to know what their feeling is on this question, representing, as I do, a borough in the very heart of that constituency. I remember hearing a speech from the hon. Gentleman on this subject at the close of the last Session; I said at the time it was a speech calculated to do much harm at foreign Courts; and this has since been confirmed from more quarters than one. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War declared the other night that he knew it had had an unfortunate bearing on the present state of affairs between this country and Russia. The Czar put confidence in the statements of the hon. Gentleman, and believed that we should never go to war to support, as the hon. Gentleman said, so weak a Power, and one that would not long exist as a European Power; that the Mahomedan religion could not exist along with the Christian religion; and that, in fact, it was useless attempting to defend Turkey. The hon. Gentleman has, no doubt, great influence with certain parties in this country, and perhaps still more with foreign Governments, as having been at the head of a large and successful party; but in proportion as the hon. Gentleman's influence is great, so ought he at the present crisis to be more guarded in the expression of his peculiar opinions. In conclusion, Sir, I must say; much as I abhor war, and I yield to none in my dislike to it, still I am not sorry that the last protocol from Vienna was not accepted by Russia; nor do I regret that the proposals in the letter of the Emperor of the French were not accepted. The people of England wish to have the Black Sea thrown open to the ships of all nations; they wish that the mouths of the Danube should be again placed under the sway of Turkey. Hon. Gentlemen are not, perhaps, aware of the great loss and inconvenience which have been experienced by commercial men in this country owing to the imperfect state of the Sulina mouth of the Danube, and I believe Russia has an interest in keeping it in that state. In fact, the time has come when Russia must be taught to respect the independence of other countries, and to give securities for the preservation of peace for the future.

said, the hon. and gallant Member for Bath has justly stated, that it is impossible for this House to conduct the fleet in the Black Sea; and it is at least equally impossible for the hon. and gallant Member himself to judge of the ability of Admiral Slade to estimate the relative strength of the Russian squadron and of the armament under his own command. And if the hon. Gentleman the Member for Wakefield, who spoke last, had considered all the circumstances connected with our Eastern diplomacy for the last thirty years, he would have been at no loss to apportion the blame or to arrive at a clear conclusion as to the cause of the existing difficulties. He would have been enabled to point out not only the measures, but almost the men who had created them; although, perchance, I myself might have been diverted from the consideration of those measures by the invective which has been heaped upon the noble Lord the head of Her Majesty's Government, and the acclamations which have been bestowed upon the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton—invective and acclamations, in my opinion, equally undeserved—had it not been that these plain questions have been so often put, and as often evaded, why was Admiral Slade prevented from protecting the Turkish flotilla at Sinope? Why, and by whose orders, was he told that, if he entered the Black Sea, the French and English fleets should go back to the Mediterranean? Why were those fleets made the means of intimidating the Power which they were sent out nominally to protect? The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone has referred to the withholding of a despatch. I apprehend that, under our system of government this House has a constitutional right to insist upon the production of this despatch, but we are not without a precedent for withholding important papers. In the years 1831, 1832, and 1833, momentous events were taking place. The Pasha of Egypt had embarked in a struggle with the Sultan for securing to himself the independence of his throne and the pashalic of Acre, in the autumn of 1831; his forces commenced their march in July, 1832, and after various successes, his army passed the Taurus and was almost at the gates of Constantinople. In this extremity the Porte appealed to England for protection and Russia joined in that appeal. However, the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, who at that period held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, refused his interference; and in September the battle of Kornah was fought. In December, Lord Ponsonby was appointed Ambassador to the Porte; but amusing himself in Italy, after the fatigues of his diplomatic exertions in Belgium, he did not reach Constantinople until May, 1833; during this important and critical interval, England was represented at Constantinople by an ordinary secretary of legation. It was under these circumstances that Russia tendered her assistance to the Porte, and her fleet anchored in the Bosphorus; and in a few days afterwards, 2,000 Russians encamped on the Asiatic side, the consequence of which was, that Count Orloff, in July, 1833, extorted from the Sultan a treaty, by which he closed the Dardanelles to all Powers at war with, and virtually surrendered himself to Russia. That treaty has never been laid upon the table of this House; it was required by Mr. Sheil in 1834, and he was told by the noble Lord, that its production at that period might affect our diplomatic negotiations with Russia and endanger the peace of Europe. It was again asked for in 1837, and the noble Lord, with much effrontery, told the House that it had been produced three years before. Is the same thing, I ask, to happen again? Are we to be told three years or three months hence that this despatch which is now withheld was produced on this occasion? There is a growing feeling in the country that the armaments which are being sent forth are intended, not for the protection, but for the partition of Turkey; but I caution the Government not to become the antagonist of the people. As the sword has been drawn with reluctance, the scabbard must not be resumed without consideration; the people will not be well pleased with barren exertions; they will not permit any Minister to lose in diplomacy that which may be bought with blood. The Euxine must be free to every flag; the ports of the Danube free to every sail; the punishment of Russia must be severe, as it has been tardy; it must be worthy of the nations which inflict it. And if the necessity arises, they must be prepared to circumscribe within the original limits of a Muscovite dukedom a Power that would not only efface the prescriptive confines of Turkish empire, but eradicate the civilisation and trample upon the liberties of Europe.

said, he thought it was useless to enter into a discussion as to what might have been the result if a different course of action had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government. He considered that the House ought to adopt one of two courses—either to say that the Government had so completely mismanaged matters during these long negotiations that they were unfit to be trusted with the conduct of the war; or to give them the confidence of the House, and allow them to adopt such measures as they deemed requisite. He hoped that, as he was the least important speaker in that debate, he might be the last, and he would only add that he was prepared to give his humble support to any measures that might be necessary for carrying on the war.

said, he trusted that the suggestion of the hon. Gentleman who had last spoken would be acted upon by the House, and that this discussion might now be considered as finished. He (Lord J. Russell) would have been very glad if he had been able to answer correctly, at that moment, the question of the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Manners). On a former evening he (Lord J. Russell) had with him in the House the papers relating to that subject; but, as he had not those papers with him now, he was not sure that he could give the noble Lord a correct description of what had occurred. There had been rumours, which afterwards turned out to be false, of an attack upon the Turkish coast; but there had been an attack by land upon the fort of St. Nicholas, and an attack was also made by three small steamers upon a fort near Trebizond, but on the firing of a few shots they disappeared. Nothing, in short, of any serious kind had occurred since the disaster at Sinope. On the other hand, Sir Edmund Lyons had gone twice with a squadron to Batoum, and had convoyed vessels containing a large number of troops. Another squadron of English and French steamers had gone to the neighbourhood of Sebastopol; they had sailed to the entrance of the Sea of Azof, and they had only seen three small Russian steamers at anchor. He was assured that no Russian men-of-war had been seen at sea by the various vessels of the combined fleets which had been despatched in different directions. The squadron sent to Varna could not observe any Russian men-of-war; and, in fact, the Russians had not kept at sea since the orders were given to the combined fleets subsequently to the affair of Sinope. He (Lord J. Russell) had no further statement to make to the House at that moment, and he hoped they would now go into Committee of Supply.

said, he would now take the opportunity, which he could not do when, on a previous occasion, the estimates were first brought in at two o'clock in the morning, to make some general observations respecting them. He begged, in the first place, to call the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the number of admirals. It appeared by these votes that there were sixteen admirals on active service, only ten of whom were employed on board, the other four being what were called port admirals. Against these there were 261 admirals in a state of idleness, receiving half-pay or on the pension list. Again, take the captains; there were ninety-three captains and 127 commanders, making a total of 220 on the active list, against 464 in a state of idleness. Then again, as to lieutenants and masters, there were 519 employed, against 1,143 unemployed. Really this exhibited a monstrous state of things, and he hoped the right hon. Baronet would take the subject seriously into his consideration. Only think of 755 officers of all ranks being employed in a fleet the most powerful ever sent out by this country, and 1,868 in a state of idleness. He (Mr. Williams) must say that, since the present First Lord of the Admiralty had been in office, he believed the management of that department had been much more economical and efficient than was formerly the case; but he wished to call the attention of the right hon. Baronet to the fact that, since the termination of the last war, there had been an expenditure of 62,500,000l. upon wages, machinery, and other items in the dockyards, and he would like to know what practical advantage the country had derived in return for such vast expenditure. There had also been, within the same period, an expenditure of 10,500,000l, for the enlargement of dockyards; only one new one, that of Pembroke, having been constructed. If the right hon. Gentleman would take stock of the ships, putting a fair value on them, and making a most liberal allowance for repairs, he ventured to assert he would find at least 25,000,000l. of money that could not be accounted for—that had been squandered in extravagance, mismanagement, and inability in the dockyards. Ships had been altered, and almost made entirely new, two or three times over. He also wished to call the attention of the right hon. Baronet to the large expenditure of naval agents at different stations, for taking care of stores, ammunition, and various things. They had large establishments belonging to the Navy department, and still larger for the Ordnance and commissariat department, all at the same place. He thought a saving might be made, if the same agent conducted the three departments. He would also suggest that a savings bank should be established for the Navy.

said, he must thank the hon. Member for the support which he had given to the Government in reference to these estimates hitherto, and would gladly answer his observations, although they had no direct reference to the vote immediately before the Committee. And, first, with respect to the number of officers on half-pay, beginning, as his hon. Friend had done, with those of the highest rank. His hon. Friend must be aware that this question had been very closely examined by the Committee on the Naval Estimates, of which the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) was Chairman; that the number of admirals on the active list was at that time considerably larger than at present; that, in conformity with the recommendation of that Committee, the number had been reduced to 100, at which it remained fixed; that the pro- motions were only made one by one from the list of post-captains as vacancies occurred; and that all brevets had ceased. With respect to captains and commanders, the rule which limited the promotions to one for every three vacancies, was strictly adhered to, and there was every desire upon the part of the Admiralty to reduce the number to the minimum consistent with the efficiency of the service. With respect to the lieutenants, the number on the effective list had been so much reduced, that in the armaments which were now taking place, they had really immense difficulty in getting the number they required; and he did think, that with respect to that list, some reconsideration of the rule now in force would become essential; and if brevets were to cease, as he thought they ought in reference to the higher ranks, he did think that some promotions from lieutenants to commanders would be found indispenably necessary in order to afford encouragement to this most important and hard-working class of officers. With respect to the expenditure for wages and materials in the dockyards, his hon. Friend should recollect the immense changes which had lately taken place with respect to the construction of ships; first, from sailing vessels having given way to paddle-wheel steamers, and still more recently from the introduction of the screw. It was impossible that changes so considerable could be made without expense; but considering that it was our duty at all times to maintain our position as the greatest naval nation in the world, he, for one, did not regret that we had so large a number of vessels in ordinary, because it had been shown that they could be converted into most effective screw ships at a very moderate expense. The experiment of placing the navy agency in the hands of the commissariat had been tried to a certain extent at Hong Kong, but it had been found to produce so much confusion in the accounts, and so much disadvantage to the naval service, that he had felt himself bound by a regard to the efficiency of that service to require that it should be abandoned. With respect to the encouraging of savings banks, he must inform the hon. Member that facilities for investment had been given to our seamen twenty years ago, but it had not suited their tastes to avail themselves of it, and he regretted to say, that the sums invested hitherto had been comparatively small. He admitted the great importance of the sub- ject, and his attention would continue to be, as it had been, anxiously directed to the subject. He attributed the difference between our soldiers and seamen in this respect to the difference in the mode in which they were paid. The wages of the seaman were allowed to accumulate for a long time, and he received a large sum at once when the ship was paid off at one or other of the outposts, where he was subject to immense temptations to spend it prodigally. He thought it most desirable to assimilate the two services in this respect, and he trusted his hon. Friend would give him credit for a desire to introduce the change at the earliest moment at which it could be advantageously made. He did not think the present time—when they were entering different classes of men under different circumstances, and at different rates of pay—was a favourable one to make the alteration, and he could not positively say that he would propose it during the Session. He should, however, lose no time in doing so when an opportune moment arrived; for he looked upon it as of great importance, and as likely to have a very salutary moral effect upon the character of the men.

said, on the subject of officers' ages, that you could not blame old officers for having become old. A new system was wanted, and the active list ought to be reduced by at least one-half. At present we had officers enough for the whole navy of the world, enough for the navies of two worlds in fact. He thought it very right to have such a force as the naval coast volunteers, but felt bound to call attention to an existing impropriety in the way of raising them. We wished very wisely to say nothing and to do nothing with impressment, but according to the representations of the newspapers, the officers who went along the coast making speeches to obtain volunteers, constantly told them as an inducement, that if they entered there they would be free from impressment. That was the very worst thing they could do for the general service. He wished to know why, when these volunteers were given a bounty, none was allowed to able seamen? The sailors had never been tried under that system; but he believed that, of all bodies of men, sailors were most easily accessible by ready money. They wanted it; when he was a midshipman he recollected it himself. They did not like to come and offer themselves when they were out at elbows; and such a bounty would enable them to get clothes. He believed the answer to him was, that there were plenty of men to be got without a bounty, and that, therefore, to give one would be to incur a needless expenditure. There might be plenty of men, but he doubted whether there were plenty of seamen, else why call the coast guard into service? Why rummage up old pensioners? Why these appeals to the owners of yachts? They should treat the sailor as nearly as possible as they did the soldier, and not refuse him a bounty when asking him what they never asked before—that he should give them ten years' service—place his body at their disposal—go in what ship, to what climate, and to what duty they pleased. Let this be given only to the able, trained seamen; but let it be remembered that they had grown into a less careless and a more thinking race, and that they believed themselves, in this matter, to be treated with injustice.

said, that without impugning the excellence of the hon. and gallant Officer's motives in these suggestions as to bounty, he still thought that if any course could be taken calculated to thwart the operations of the executive Government at the present time, it was this constant recurrence to the question of bounty. As matters stood at present he had not the least intention of offering a bounty, and thereby entailing—as thereby he should entail—upon the country an immediate expenditure of 200,000l. Why was that sum to be expended unless there was an absolute necessity for it? Such necessity, as far as he could see, had no existence, and without it that expense could not, of course, be justified. Greatly to the credit of our seamen he said it, that, although some few months ago there was difficulty in getting men for the fleet, just in proportion as danger had been increasing, the willingness of the sailor to enter without bounty had increased also; and since the certainty of war had become clear, the whole population of the country, more especially the seafaring population, had come forward with a spirit which it was impossible for hon. Members of that House too much to admire. There was, then, no need of a bounty, especially since the addition of pay last year in consideration of enlisting for long service, the care now taken to prevent arbitrary punishments, and the mitigation of secondary punishments in the Navy were better known and more fully appreciated. The bounty offered to the naval coast volunteers was offered them because they were on the same footing as the militia; the Army and Navy were not on the same; and as to the bounty given to the soldier, none was offered which was not consumed at once for necessaries on first joining his regiment. So, in the Marines, the bounty was consumed in furnishing necessaries. If the hon. and gallant Member was not desirous of putting difficulties in the way of the Government, and of incurring needless expense for the country, he would now let this subject drop.

said, he thought it would be extremely useful to the Committee if some information could be given them as to how the force of naval coast volunteers had been raised, and whether the number of men who had come forward—many of whom could not be altogether seamen—was equal to that for which the vote had been taken last year. When the subject was before the House last year he took an occasion to express an opinion, which was met with ridicule by an hon. and gallant Admiral as rather an antiquated notion. He still believed that we must depend on the mercantile marine for the manning of the Navy, and experience had since shown that he was correct in that belief. It was most desirable that there should be always at hand a sufficient supply of sailors for continuously manning our fleet when required. The plan proposed, in a pamphlet written by Admiral Bowles, was, that there should be a naval militia, independent of the coast volunteers, formed along the coast, and within five miles of it; and also, that there should be a quota establishment for each great seaport town in England. This force the author proposed to divide into classes; and he suggested that the first class, composed of men of from eighteen to thirty years of age, should be made available for the service of the Royal Navy for a certain fixed period, liable to be called out like the militia, and with equal bounties and advantages. The second class would consist of men between thirty and forty years of age, liable to limited service in the United Kingdom; and in this way a force would be established which would be at all times available. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would give to the plan of the gallant officer that consideration which he (Sir G. Tyler) thought it deserved.

said, he must disclaim any intention of ever ridiculing what fell from the hon. and gallant Mem- ber who had just spoke. In stating that the Navy brought up men for her own service, and did not get them from the merchant service, he had stated what was the fact; and he might mention that it was illustrated in the case of a ship at Devonport the other day, into the circumstances of which he had inquired. The character of all the men was good; and when he came to analyse that ship's company, he found that the whole of the men, with one or two exceptions among the petty officers, were brought up in the flag-ship at Devonport. His intention was not to disparage the merchant service; but he repeated what he had said, that we were raising the very best men for our own ships and our own service. We had, however, in very many instances, received from the merchant service ordinary men, who no doubt would, in due time, make very good seamen. The coast guards were a very fine body of men, and captains spoke of them in terms of the highest praise. The enrolment of coast volunteers had only been going on for three weeks, and it was almost impossible at this early stage to say how it would proceed. However, already the force amounted, in these three weeks, to about 1,000 men.

said, he wished briefly to recur to the subject of the bounty. The First Lord of the Admiralty had told them that what he (Capt. Scobell) was saying would prevent the manning of the Navy. His argument was, that it assisted the manning of the Navy. How could a bounty retard the manning of the Navy? He had been misunderstood if it was supposed that be would give it to a single man who did not enter for twenty years; and this must be considered as against the right hon. Baronet's estimate of 200,000l. expense, arising from the adoption of this course. He would exclude ordinary seamen and landsmen altogether; but he wanted to see the better class of seamen brought forward by the bounty. His sole object was to assist in the manning of the Navy with proper men.

said, he roust beg to express his gratification at the First Lord of the Admiralty's statement of the effects of the diminution of corporal punishment. He hoped the right hon. Baronet would keep his attention on that point; for he was convinced that wherever you found an officer inflicting numerous punishments on board his ship, there you found an officer not fit for command.

said, he wished to call attention to the very long interval that occurred between the completion of surveys on our coasts and the publication of the charts. He hoped there was some probability of their soon getting the very great arrear of charts now due.

said, he must acknowledge that the more speedy publication of the result of the surveys was a matter of great importance. He had given his attention to the reorganisation of the hydrographical department, and an officer well known for his scientific acquirements, Captain Washington, had been appointed as assistant to Admiral Beaufort. The attention of these officers had been directed to the urgent necessity of a more speedy publication of the surveys which had been made, as charts became comparatively useless if their publication was long delayed, and he believed the result of their joint efforts would be that the wishes of his hon. Friend would, before long, be accomplished.

said, he must own that, comparing the Votes of this and the previous year with those taken for the last twenty-five or thirty years, and, looking at the efficient Navy which we now possessed under the auspices of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, there was touch food for congratulation as to the small amount required to prepare such an efficient fleet as contrasted with years when there was scarcely any fleet at all for the defence of the country.

said, while acknowledging the admirable state of efficiency into which the fleet had been brought, there was one arm in which he feared it was deficient; he alluded to ships fitted for carrying mortars. When he was at the Admiralty, a second-class steam-sloop was fitted for that purpose, and the experiment was looked upon as a successful one.

said, that all our large ships at present threw shells from their 68-pounders, almost in the same way as mortars, and were capable of bursting their shells at the same distance as mortars.

But without the power of elevation.

said, he hoped the improvement of the small arms would not be lost sight of. Some of the marines, he apprehended, were now practised in the use of the Minié rifle. He wished to ask whether the Board of Admiralty had finally made up their minds as to the propriety of employing iron as a material for ships of war? He wished also to put a question to the right hon. Gentleman with regard to the reward given to the inventor of the screw-propeller. He understood there were parties who were said to have a reasonable claim to be considered in the matter, and who urged that the screw-propeller invented by them was the very one which the Royal Navy now used, and for which the premium had been awarded.

said, he had great pleasure in informing the hon. and gallant Member that the muskets supplied on board Her Majesty's ships were of the most improved description. With regard to the second question which had been put to him, be had to state that the result of the inquiries which had been made afforded proof that iron was not a material well adapted for the construction of ships of war. With regard to the subject of the inventor of the screw-propeller referred to by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, the circumstances of the case were, that a sum of 10,000l. had been paid to persons who claimed to be the inventors of the screw-propeller in use in Her Majesty's ships, but, at the same time, a bond of indemnity had been required, in the event of any person hereafter coming forward and proving himself to have been the original inventor, and, if Captain Carpenter were, in fact, the original inventor, he could institute a legal claim.

said, when he was at the Admiralty the patentees of different inventions claimed from the Admiralty payment for the use of their screw-propellers. Whilst the question was in the Court of Chancery, the Admiralty declined making any payments. At last the parties made an arrangement, vesting the claims in one company, and then a demand was made on the Admiralty for the sum due, which was a very considerable sum. When the matter came before him, he said he should like to have it settled not only for the past, but also for the future. The parties took a liberal view of the subject, and he felt satisfied that, if the Admiralty had been called upon to pay for each particular invention, the amount would have been much larger than that paid, namely, 10,000l. A guarantee was taken from the parties holding the Government harmless for the future.

said, he felt bound to state that, in his opinion, the credit of the application of the screw-propeller to ships was due to Captain Evans. That officer had been sent to inspect the Archimedes, which, he believed, was one of the first ships which was fitted with a screw-propeller, and he had been present at the trial which took place, and the inventor was at that time utterly ignorant of the power which the screw gave over the helm, and every one of the statements which Captain Evans made on that occasion had since been justified by the result. When credit was claimed by different persons for the application of the screw-propeller, he thought that some credit was due to an officer who had so materially facilitated its adaptation.

said, he believed the money had been paid to a company, and by that company to a Mr. Lowe. In 1852, Mr. Lowe petitioned for an extension of his patent, and the petition was heard by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council, who were unanimously of opinion that Mr. Lowe was not the inventor or patentee of the screw-propeller used in Her Majesty's service, and, therefore, refused to extend his patent. Captain Carpenter had spent 3,000l. in carrying out his plans, and it would be very hard for him to have to fight the matter in a court of law against a large company. The screw in the Agamemnon, and some other ships, was as nearly as possible the screw of Captain Carpenter, and was not in the shape of Mr. Lowe's screw.

said, the decision that Mr. Lowe had no claim for the extension of his patent was no proof that the Admiralty were not bound to pay whilst that patent was in operation. It was a combination of a great number of patents, and until Captain Carpenter could establish a legal right he could have no claim.

said, that the Board of Admiralty which followed that of which the right hon. Baronet was the head took the same view of the subject, and carried it out.

said, that Captain Carpenter had devoted the entire of his private fortune to the advantage of his profession, and was unable to take proceedings in a court of law.

thought that, accustomed as we had been to refer the high position which England held among nations to the superiority of her naval power, he could not do otherwise than concur in any measure which should make a more adequate provision for manning the Navy. For of what possible use or avail could it be to boast of a splendid navy of ships, unless manned with the sinews and nerves to render them efficient? But it was necessary plainly to tell the man-of-war's man to what he might look forward—to satisfy him of the certainty of that provision which was proposed for his welfare, present and future. The officers should possess the perfect conviction that no disposal of patronage, for ends private or political, would mar their prospect of the reward due to merit. Then this country would reap the full benefit of such a generous and fostering care of a noble profession. He agreed wholly in opinion with the hon. and gallant Member for Bath (Capt. Scobell), that nothing could be more unwise than to encumber a ship with any large proportion of landsmen. Very few, indeed, but ordinary seamen ought to be taken on board. Lads of from fourteen to eighteen years of age were the material from which blue jackets must be made. In the Navy yearly from 3,000 to 4,000 such ought to be entered, in order to supply regular men-of-war's men. He was gratified by the testimony borne by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty to the services of his predecessors at that board. To the Duke of Northumberland the service was indebted for the Committee on Manning the Navy, of such vast importance in its results. He believed that no man ever entered upon that office with more single-minded purpose, or more earnest desire to conduce by every possible exertion to its efficiency; and, as regarded its patronage, to make merit the sole criterion of advancement. Allusion had been made to the crowded state of the lists. It ought and must be remembered that during the last war we had at one time no less than 1,000 pendants flying, and to officer those ships was a matter of the first necessity. The officers then employed served their country with fidelity, and to its utmost advantage, and they ought not to be dealt with in speeches of disparagement. Many in peace time earnestly and perseveringly, advanced their claims to continued service—many were still most desirous of employment, and he was one of those humble individuals, and in a short time hundreds of these men would no longer need the reward of good and gallant service. But he would remind the House that the first evidence and sign of a declining nation was ingratitude displayed towards those who had stood by their country, giving her strength and life in that hour in which she most needed them. The country was entering upon another war; and she would require able heads and youthful spirit and vigour, and they ought to be cheered onwards by the bright hope that the country would not be disregardful of their claims upon her consideration. Their ardour should not be damped by indifference shown to those who preceded them in a career no less noble or momentous to the interests of their country.

said, there was an Order in Council relating to the dockyard which provided that promotions should go by merit, and on public grounds, and that every application out of the authorised course would not only be discountenanced, but would tend to check the future advancement of the parties. Let the Admiralty apply that regulation to the Navy, and they would soon make a wonderful change in its efficiency. He was afraid that, when a few persons were employed, they were selected not from public merit only; and he believed that one-half the lieutenants never got beyond that rank.

said, that as the hon. and gallant Member for Christchurch (Admiral Walcott) had observed that officers of merit in the sea service had been neglected, he could not help contrasting the manner in which naval officers were treated with the conduct pursued towards officers in the Army, in reference to good-service pensions. He perceived by the estimates that one of the persons receiving a good-service pension in the Navy was Commodore Michael Seymour. This gentlemen entered the service on the 5th of November, 1813, and doubtless must then have been very young. In March, 1814, only four months afterwards, he was present, while serving in the Hannibal, at the capture of the French frigate La Sultane, and that was the only service he had rendered for his good-service pension. It was true that he had held the appointment of Commodore Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard since September, 1851, and had been actively employed afloat as a commissioned officer about eighteen years; but he had been very fortunate in obtaining those two employments, and many an officer would have been glad to have the appointments. The grant of a good-service pension for the single service he had mentioned exhibited a liberality of which the hon. and gallant Admiral had no right to complain, especially when many men in the Army who had served in the Peninsula and at Waterloo were not so well rewarded; he therefore thought that there was no ground for complaint.

said, the hon. Gentleman was rather unfortunate in the instance he had adduced of ill bestowed reward. Commodore Seymour's services were set forth in the paper before the House, and as he had had an interview that very day with the gallant commodore, he would tell the House what the nature of that interview was. It became the duty of the Admiralty to select a captain of the fleet for the force to be commanded by Sir Charles Napier, and he accordingly consulted Sir Charles Napier as to the other who, on the whole, would be most efficient for that post. After conferring together and looking at the list of officers, they both came to the conclusion that, if Commodore Seymour could be induced to accept the appointment, he would be the most efficient person. That gallant officer was at the moment Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard, and was also, on account of personal and professional services—without regard to the character of his gallant father, who had been one of the most distinguished officers in the Navy—in the receipt of a good-service pension. The moment Commodore Seymour was told it would be for the good of the service for him to leave the dockyard at Devonport and go on board the Duke of Wellington as captain of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier, he said, "I am ready to go at eight-and-forty hours' notice. I was treated generously in the profession to which my heart is devoted. I am ready to go at once, and to resign my civil appointment." He did not think it right to take Commodore Seymour at his word, but said he thought it important that he should go on board the Duke of Wellington for that special service, and that arrangements should be made to keep the appointment open until that special service should be performed. On this understanding he had obtained the hearty good-will, without any considerations of a private nature, of an officer whose services he was quite certain would not disappoint the expectations of Sir Charles Napier, or of the public, in the important position to which he had been appointed.

said, he had meant to cast no reflection on the gallant officer, but he thought that many a lieutenant who had fought and had been wounded in some of the great battles of Nelson, and bad nothing but their miserable half-pay to depend on, might consider themselves hardly treated when they compared the reward of their services with that given to a gentleman whose good service was confined to the first four months after his joining the Navy.

said, he considered that he had reason to complain that on a late occasion a merchant steamer was employed for the conveyance of troops from Plymouth to Dublin, though two war steamers were lying at anchor in the harbour useless. The effect of this arrangement was not only great expense, but it was attended with much inconvenience to the men, who were kept on deck during the greater part of the time in rainy weather.

said, though the hon. Member seemed disposed to quarrel with the largeness of this Vote, he was afraid he would be compelled to call the attention of the House to it again before the close of the Session, as it was altogether inadequate to meet the large expenditure at present incurred by the removal of troops. [Mr. WILLIAMS: Oh, yes; I don't mean that.] The hon. Member asked why the troops were not removed in men-of-war. The reason was very simple, that whatever might be the want of accommodation for troops in merchant steamers, the inconvenience in war steamers was tenfold. With respect to this particular Vote, he might state that measures had been taken within the last fortnight for the removal of 10,000 men to the Mediterranean, and within the next fortnight arrangements would be made for doubling that number—exertions which he trusted would not be thrown away upon other Powers. He had now only to thank both sides of the House for the generous support they had given him in voting these estimates.

said, there were three Russian men-of-war in the Austrian ports in the Mediterranean. Now, the Russians who had charge of these vessels of course saw our newspapers, and they thereby could be aware of the voyage outwards of our ships without guns. Had the Government taken any steps to prevent the possibility of Russian war-steamers injuring English vessels conveying troops to the Mediterranean? There appeared to be great impatience manifested with respect to the remarks which he had thought it his duty to make, from time to time, on these estimates, but he must say that the 6,500,000l. of money which had been agreed to as supplies for the Navy had been voted away with steam-like rapidity.

said, it would not be necessary to escort any of our ships engaged in conveying troops to the Mediterranean. It was very true that there were three Russian war-steamers at Trieste, but he had great pleasure in stating that there were three English men-of-war in that neighbourhood; and if they were not a sufficient match for the Russian war-steamers, there were two powerful French men-of-war to help the English. The three Russian men-of-war were in the outer harbour at Trieste at first, but they were now hauled into the inner harbour, near the mole. Whilst they remained in that position, it would be impossible for the English men-of-war to get at them.

said that, in submitting the Ordnance Estimates, he should endeavour, as shortly as he could, to explain the reasons for the increase in the different votes; and he thought he should be able to satisfy the House that some, at least, of that increase would leave for future years a permanent annual saving. Upon the first vote, the increase of the Royal Artillery was 53,023l.; the engineers, 29,461l. and the increased recruiting necessary for the addition to the forces, 20,167l. It would be hardly necessary for him at present, after the statements made by his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary at War who had preceded him, to give any reason for this increase; but he thought the Committee would be gratified by his giving very shortly a statement of the condition in which the artillery force now was. He was happy to say that the schools connected with the force which for several years had been progressively increasing, were admirably conducted. The Royal Military Repository had now in it a class of twenty-four non-commissioned officers, who, besides acquiring a knowledge of the use and transport of military machines, were taught geometry, mensuration, and all those other studies which were necessary to the discharge of their duties. The Royal Artillery Institution, which was an institution of more recent foundation, had this year been opened, and already it had conferred very great advantages indeed in the way of a thorough system of education upon the officers of the artillery force. So great was the interest taken in this establishment that the annual subscriptions on the part of the officers themselves, which were last year 153l., had risen this year to 420l. A course of lectures was about to commence on those subjects which were the most useful for the officers of the artillery to be acquainted with—military carriages, fortification, &c.; and in addition to this, Lord Raglan, the Master-General of the Ordnance, last year, for the first time, established a class of young men who had just received their commissions, and sent them to the Continent with experienced officers to visit the best fortifications upon the Continent, so that they might become acquainted with those improvements in the sciences connected with the artillery which were likely to render them most efficient in the discharge of their duties. He did not know if it had ever occurred to any hon. Gentleman to compare the state of the artillery force now about to leave these shores for the East, and the condition of that force which, under the late Duke of Wellington, and amounting to about the same number, quitted these shores for the Tagus in 1808. He thought nothing could be more remarkable or more satisfactory than such a comparison. In every single par- ticular the greatest possible improvement was manifest. In the first place, instead of the small howitzers of 4 2–5ths or 5½ inches bore, the howitzers now sent out are all of 12 inches diameter, consequently heavier, more effective, and of the best possible description. In the ordnance in 1808, in each of the batteries there were three kinds or different sorts of guns used, which caused great confusion in the supply and distribution of ammunition. At present there are only two kinds of guns, and the distribution of the ammunition is on a very simple and uniform plan. In 1808 civil artificers accompanied the field batteries, and were found most unserviceable and troublesome; but now, instead of civil artificers, military artificers form a component part of every troop. At the former period there were no instructions for exercise, and every captain used his own discretion; at the present time the most clear and precise instructions are laid down, and are in the hands of every artillery officer, the effect of which has been to secure a perfect uniformity in the execution of all duties committed to them. The code of finance regulations was not settled in 1808, from which many hardships arose; but now the finance regulations are in the hands of every commanding officer. Perhaps one of the most striking contrasts between the two forces was in the sort of horses sent out. Any Gentleman who would refer to the despatches of the Duke of Wellington would find that the horses which accompanied the artillery in 1808 were very inefficient, and were described by Colonel Hardinge as a set of broken-down Irish horses, taken from the Irish commissariat. They were utterly useless when they came into action, and their inefficiency frequently necessitated the leaving behind of guns at a time when their services were most required. The artillery force about to leave our shores would have 1,000 horses in the highest possible condition and order. Then, with regard to pontooning, any Gentleman who had at all studied the history of the Peninsular War would be aware that the difficulties occasioned by a deficiency of pontoons were remarkable. He believed it was only the year before the expedition he was now referring to, and in South America, our forces were stopped for several days by a trench eight or nine feet wide, on account of the absence of pontoons. A sufficient number of pontoons would start with our forces now, and they would be altogether in the highest possible efficiency. He might mention many more particulars to the Committee, but he would not weary it by going any further into the details of the subject. He had, however, thought it of importance to point out the greatly increased state of efficiency of the artillery force, which everybody knew was the most important arm at the disposal of any country in a time of war. He would proceed next to the increase in the Vote for the commissariat supplies, the greater part of which increase was occasioned by the extraordinary rise in the price of forage and other articles required for the keep of horses. The increase of price in that Vote alone amounted to 158,000l. In the barrack supplies which were necessary this year he took an increased quantity on account of a miscalculation last year; 35,298l. was the increase occasioned by the increase of price; and the increase of 32,000l. was for the increase necessary to be made to the number of stores. Upon the Vote for the Ordnance Office, there was a decrease of 600l. a year in the pay of the clerks, on account of some of the senior clerks having died, and others retired from the service, but there was no decrease in the rate of payment. On the contrary, the Treasury Committee which sat upon the Ordnance Department, and investigated most minutely all its affairs, were convinced that several of the clerks were most inadequately paid, and instead of a reduction, he was happy to state that they recommended that several of their salaries should be raised. Upon the Votes for the salaries, allowances, and contingencies in establishments in the United Kingdom and Colonies, there was a decrease of the expenditure of 14,741l. This, the Committee would observe, was likely to be a permanent decrease, inasmuch as an increase of the establishments for the West Indies, Canada, and other British possessions, would not probably be again required. The Committee might, therefore, regard this decrease as an annual permanent decrease of about 14,000l. a year. Upon the Vote for the wages of artificers, there was an increase of upwards of 20,000l., altogether occasioned by the increase of wages rendered necessary in the Royal carriage and other departments, through the anxiety to provide an additional number of gun carriages for the ships now fitting out for the Baltic fleet and a change in the batteries of from six to nine pounders of the Royal Artillery. The next Vote was for stores, and there was an increase upon it amounting in the whole to 267,855l. Of this sum the increase occasioned by the new machinery which it was proposed to erect at Woolwich and in its neighbourhood, including the gun factory, upon which he should have to say a few words hereafter, amounted to 138,000l. Deducting that 138,000l. from 267,000l., 129,000l. remained, of which 79,000l. was for increase in price, leaving 50,000l. only to be accounted for. 25,600l. of that sum was on account of small arms, 6,827l. for gunpowder cases for the equipments of frigates of the navy; and there was another item for the carriages of the artillery, which bad already been referred to. The next Vote, for works, buildings, and repairs at home and abroad, was 902,821l.; and of that sum 336,756l. was required for fortifications and other works already sanctioned by Parliament; and 262,687l. was for ordinary and current expenses. Now, that 262,687l. for ordinary and current expenses was an increase upon the same item in last year's estimates of somewhere about 40,000l., and he thought it right to mention to the Committee that that increase was mainly occasioned by the incidental items having been in no instance this year reduced. It had been considered expedient to pursue that course, though the system had been usually adopted of reducing every year the incidental items sent in to the different stations throughout the country, amounting to some 25,000l. At the end of the year it was found impossible, without suffering serious injury, to dispense with the expenditure which bad been contemplated by the superior officer, and afterwards reduced; and applications had then to be made to the Treasury to allow the money to be given from some unexhausted surplus, so that the apparent reduction on the vote was no real reduction of expenditure. Of the remaining increase in this vote there was an item of 100,000l. for the purchase of land at Aldershott, near Bagshot, for a camp. The Committee might be aware that Chobham was to be immediately inclosed, and all the land about it was inclosed, so that it would soon have been impossible to get any ground near London for the purpose of a camp if they had not secured this place. The ground had been purchased at a very moderate rate, at sums varying from 10l. to 12l. an acre, and at any future time it would be quite possible to realise the expenditure. The next item he had to allude to was one of 85,000l. for a practice range at Woolwich, and he had shortly stated the other day, in answer to the hon. Baronet the Member for Westminster, the reasons for that vote. There had been for many years a practice range at Woolwich, which, he believed, had answered every purpose perfectly well until some twelve or fourteen years ago. At that period, when the use of steam upon the Thames had become so largely increased, the range was found unsafe in consequence of the number of vessels continually passing. As it was perfectly essential, however, that the artillery force should have constant practice, it was of the last importance that that arm of the service should be preserved in every way possible. He thought the House would agree with him that no vote he had to propose was really of greater importance to the service than this, and he believed none would be more cheerfully acquiesced in. Abroad a sum of 2,300l. was required for the erection of a garrison hospital at Cephalonia, which would be the means of effecting an annual saving of 190l., now paid. The increased accommodation required at Malta would entail an expenditure of about 7,000l., and a sum of 10,000l. would be required for the improvement and repair of the defences of St. Helena. It was thought proper, however, merely to ask for 2,500l this year 3,000l. would be required for additions and alterations at the cadets' barracks at Woolwich, and he thought no alterations were more imperatively required than this; for, absolutely, the cadets at Woolwich were obliged to sleep two or three in a room, and they had no place whatever to study in. By the proposed alterations, every one of the forty cadets would be provided with a separate room. A sum of 7,000l. or 8,000l. would also be required for increased hospital accommodation, drainage at various stations, gas, &c. Upon the Vote for the Ordnance surveys of the kingdom, 25,000l. additional was taken for the ordinary survey, and he might now mention the precise position of this matter with regard to the scale of the survey as it now stood. The Committee would, perhaps, be aware that, acting on the authority of the Duke of Wellington, the Irish scale of the survey was adopted for Great Britain. About a year ago, a great feeling arose in Scotland that that scale was either too large or too small, and last year the question was submitted by the Treasury to some of the most scientific men in this country, and by far the largest number of them reported that it would be of the greatest possible benefit to have the survey taken on a larger scale, though they differed among themselves as to what that precise scale should be. It was now proposed by the Treasury again to submit the question to them, and to require them to state, admitting that the scale should be raised, what in their opinion was the precise extent to which it should be raised, whether twenty-six and a half inches, or twenty-four, or twenty. He might state that the operations now going on in Scotland were so conducted that they could be adapted either to the one scale or the other. He had already mentioned that there was a sum of 138,000l. for machinery, and that he should return to the subject, as it was possible that, with regard to some portion of the Vote, there might be some difference of opinion. In the first instance, he asked the Committee to consider the two items he proposed to take for the improvement of the machinery of the Royal carriage department and of the Royal laboratory at Woolwich, amounting together to 138,000l. Those Gentlemen who had looked into the estimates of this year would be aware of the enormous sums paid in wages in these establishments, amounting, he thought, to somewhere about 75,000l. He was sorry to say that the Royal laboratory, considering it in the light of a manufactory, was in an extremely primitive state. The rooms in it were so small that it was impossible to have any effective superintendence over the workmen in order to see that they attended to and conducted their work properly. It was of the utmost importance that in any manufactory the order of manufacture should be consecutive—that, no article should have to travel in the course of its manufacture twice over the same ground. At present that simple rule was not attended to, and, on account of the insufficient arrangements, there were very considerable difficulties, particularly at the present moment, in making this department keep pace with the demands of the service. He would ask the Committee to consider what the necessary effect of this was. The consequence was that great numbers of articles were manufactured in time of peace to be ready against an emergency; they were kept in store till some got quite obsolete, and others were entirely rotten. At the present time there were carriages in the Royal carriage department which were utterly useless, which only took up room, and which, after having cost the country an enormous sum of money, were good for nothing but fire-wood. At the present moment these two departments—the Royal carriage department, which produced all the gun carriages, and the Royal laboratory, which produced all our projectiles of war—expended in wages at least 75,000l.; at least, that was the sum put down in this estimate, though he should deceive the Committee if he were not to tell them that he should not probably have to call on them for a further vote. The new buildings it was proposed to erect for these departments would cost from 85,000l. to 90,000l. Taking the cost at 90,000l., that sum, at 3 per cent, would represent about 3,000l. a year; but the improvements that would be introduced would, in the opinion of the most practical men, reduce the amount of wages by one-half; in other words, the 75,000l. now paid every year would be reduced to about 37,500l. a year—an obvious benefit, which would be secured to the country by the expenditure of a sum the annual interest on which would not be more than 3,000l. He thought he could show that this was not an imaginary calculation, by mentioning some of the effects already produced by machinery in the Royal carriage department, which was in a more advanced state than the Royal laboratory, chiefly owing to the exertions, the skill, and the knowledge of a gallant officer whose loss the service had had this year to deplore. He referred to Colonel Colquhoun. In a report prepared by that gallant officer's successor, he mentioned that, although machinery was only partially introduced into the department, the saving by it in the expense of labour, comparing the years 1844 and 1854, was no less than one-sixth. At the present time only 895 men were employed, where 1,094 were required before to perform the same amount of work; but when all the contemplated improvements were made, the reduction would amount to one-half. The saving already in wages had been 11,981l. a year, which, at 3 per cent, would represent a capital of 399,000l. And how much had this machinery cost? He begged the Committee to mark this well. Why, the actual expenditure in machinery up to 1854 had been only 14,571l. Without going into the detail of the saving, he thought these few facts must satisfy hon. Gentlemen that it would be expedient to adopt the suggestions which he submitted to their consideration. The next sum he had to bring under the notice of the Committee was probably one on which there would be great apprehen- sions—it was the sum of 100,000l. for the establishment of a gun factory. He begged the committee to understand that it was not proposed to multiply Government factories—in fact, two Government establishments were to be discontinued. At present Government had an establishment at Birmingham, which this year cost 5,094l., and one at Enfield, which cost 14,783l. It was proposed to get rid of these two factories—each of them, from their position, could probably be disposed of very profitably—and in their place to erect a gun factory somewhere in the neighbourhood of Woolwich. The Board of Ordnance had but one thing to consider, and that was to get the best arm at the cheapest rate, and with the greatest possible expedition. These, of course, were the only consideration which could weigh with them, but at the same time he should be very sorry that it should be supposed that he was at all indifferent to the position of the gunmakers, who seemed to consider themselves aggrieved by what was about to be done. The question had been forced en the consideration of the Board at the time of the first introduction of the Minié rifle into our service. When the Board was called on to produce Minié rifles sufficient for the whole army, they would have been neglecting their duty if they had not taken into consideration the system which had prevailed up to that time, whether it had worked well, and whether, on the whole, it was calculated efficiently to supply the wants of the service. Colonel Tulloh and Mr. Anderson, two gentlemen of great experience and ability, proceeded to Birmingham and other places where guns and bayonets were manufactured. They reported the gun trade to be—

"Altogether in a very lamentable state, and far behind any other trade to which it can be compared. With the exception of the barrel of the musket, they found the greater portion produced by hand-labour alone. At the bayonet works which they visited hardly any machinery worthy of the name is employed, and, consequently, the expense of a bayonet is considerably more than double what it may be expected to be made by machinery."

For the last ten years the Board of Ordnance had been engaged in a struggle with the gunmakers. He would not deny that there might be faults on both sides, but he believed he could show positively that on the side of the gunmakers there were very considerable faults. The system pursued by the Board of Ordnance was fully considered by a Committee of that House which sat in the year 1849, from whose Report the following was an extract:—

"Your Committee made some inquiries into the mode of contracting fir muskets, with a view of ascertaining whether any reduction could be made in their cost without endangering the efficiency of the weapon supplied. Upon this point conflicting opinions will be found in the evidence. The weight of the musket is in great measure regulated by the length and calibre of the barrel. These points have been decided by the highest military authority, and this decision your Committee suppose was made on sufficient reasons. Objections which have been urged against the present rigid system of inspection do not appear to rest on any valid grounds. It is the duty of the Board of Ordnance to take every security that the muskets supplied shall conform to the pattern approved, and your Committee have not heard that any favouritism has been imputed to the viewers or other officers employed in this service."

In the year 1851 tenders were called for for what was then called the Minié musket, and on the 26th of June, 1852, the following petition was received from the military gun-lock makers:—

"Consequences to be deplored have resulted from this state of things, for the men have from time to film, embraced remunerative employment, as, for instance, great numbers are employed upon revolving pistols; and at this present juncture we could not rely upon more than twenty, or, at most, thirty efficient workmen to execute your order; and we are sorry to say that the difficulties that surround us absolutely deter us from undertaking to supply a specified quantity, and it would be impossible to supply the quantity required."

The difficulties with regard to the production of this musket were so great that it was nearly two years after the order was given that the whole of it was supplied. During the last year there had been an order given for 2,000 carbines for the artillery, and, though the first steps were taken as far back as the beginning of March, the whole of that order had not been received at this moment. At the beginning of last year 20,000 new Minié rifles were ordered; tenders were called for—not called from London or Birmingham, or any one particular place, but from all England, Scotland, or Ireland; those received, being unsatisfactory, were declined, and new tenders advertised for in the papers. This failed to excite any more competition, and Sir Thomas Hastings, the Comptroller of the Stores, a gentleman of the highest intelligence and experience, and one who was considered by all the gun-makers as one of the most just and fair officers, went down to Birmingham, and, having succeeded in making better terms, ordered 20,000 Minié muskets there. This was on the 26th of October, 1853, and since then they had received from the gunmakers numbers of letters alleging various reasons for the non-completion of this order. With some it was a general strike of the workmen—others had been unable to get rod-makers, others had made miscalculations of other descriptions; but with almost all, for one reason or another, there was a total impossibility of completing the work. This was one part of the present system which the Board had to consider; and they had also to consider the price for which the musket could be made. The task they had before them was to provide a new musket for the whole of the army—including artillery, marines, and coastguard, the price of which, at present, would be something under 3l. a-piece. They were strongly warned by many of the ablest officers in the army that it was not safe for the country to rely upon the existing system, and they therefore turned their attention in the first place to the system which prevailed in the United States. There they found that the Government had in its hands two gun-factories capable of turning out 500 rifle muskets a-week at 37s. a-piece. They found also an ample amount of muskets in store, and the latest improvements of machinery, by means of which the different parts of the musket were made with such accuracy that the parts of one musket fitted into the parts of any other indiscriminately. He had been told that bags of the different materials of which muskets were composed were sent to Mexico, and that, being opened on their arrival there, the parts were taken out promiscuously, and fitted into each other with as much nicety as if each had been made specially for the other. That he believed was what could not be said of two of Purday's rifles if taken out of the same case. But there was also another consideration which he wished to point out to the Committee. In 1841 the percussion arm was introduced into our service, and, all the old flint muskets being thus rendered useless—for the attempt to alter them was never successful—the expense, of course, was enormous. But did they think that in this age of rapid progress the musket which they were now about to introduce, would retain for many years the pre-eminence which it now enjoyed? And was it not advisable on that account to devise a plan, by means of which a large number of muskets might be readily manufactured, which would render it unnecessary to retain such an inordinate number of muskets in store, and avoid the risk of the country being put to a similar expense as that which was incurred when the percussion musket came into use? When the late Duke of Wellington was Master-General of the Ordnance, and Lord Hardinge Clerk of the Ordnance, they decided that the number of muskets to be kept in store should be 457,000; but without going to that enormous number, it was quite clear that with the present amount of production at our disposal, 300,000 was a sufficient store to keep up, putting the requirements of the Colonies on one side. With a gun-factory however, capable of producing 500 muskets a-day, we should manifestly be in a better position with 100,000 muskets in store than we had been before with 300,000, avoiding the risk of great loss in future, besides saving the capital represented by the difference in the two numbers. Let the Committee for a moment consider the pecuniary result of the proposed change. Instead of keeping 300,000 muskets in store, which would have cost 900,000l., we should only have 100,000, representing a cost of 300,000l. Here would at once be a saving of the annual interest upon 600,000l., by the expenditure, whatever it might be, necessary for the new factory, which it was believed, upon the most careful calculations, might be erected for 150,000l. The factory, too, would produce not only muskets, but bayonets. He had said that he would ask the Committee to consider the financial effects of the measure he proposed. For the line there would be required 110,000 Minié muskets; for the artillery, 10,000; for the marines, 15,000; and for the militia, 50,000; the number for store being 300,000; or, altogether, 485,000, exclusive of the Colonies: 485,000 muskets, at 3l. each, would cost 1,455,000l.; but the highest authorities believed that the musket might be produced for 1l. 10s. He had stated that the price for which the musket was produced in the United States was 37s. each; but, considering the improvements which it was believed by those best competent to form an opinion on the subject—by those who were engaged in designs for the factory—could be made on the American machinery, he was prepared to express the belief that the musket could be produced at the proposed factory for 30s. each. Taking this estimate, the saving that would be effected upon the previous estimate he had stated, of 3l. each, would be 727,500l. But, further, he had men- tioned that, by means of the proposed system, the store, in time of peace, could be diminished by 200,000, the difference resulting from which would represent a capital of 600,000l. in favour of the public, the interest upon which would be a considerable and permanent saving. All this advantage would be realised by the outlay of 150,000l., from which, moreover, was to be deducted whatever the present establishments at Birmingham and Enfield might produce when sold. All these Minié rifles must have new bayonets; 485,000 bayonets, at 7s. 6d., the ordinary price, would cost 181,875l.; but it was calculated that at the factory they could be produced for ls. 6d. each, which would amount to only 36,375l., or a difference in favour of the public, by means of the factory, of not less than 145,500l. When, upon the authority of Mr. Anderson, the same gentleman who had effected such enormous savings in the Royal carriage department, he could show the Committee that, by the expenditure of the proposed 150,000l., such a large amount of arms could be produced at such a vast reduction of cost, he felt that Lord Raglan was, indeed, perfectly right in considering the matter now before the Committee as one of the very highest importance to the public service, as pre-eminently conducive to the permanent safety and well-being of the country. Under these circumstances, he hoped the Committee would pass this Vote unanimously. He had stated that he did not conceive the proposed arrangement would do the injury to the gun trade of this country which that trade anticipated. Let it be borne in mind that our gun trade was at present in a very low condition, whereas that of the United States was in a very flourishing and advanced state. In the Report which was presented to the House the other day, with regard to the machinery department of the United States' Great Exhibition, it was stated that the gun trade of America was in a very high condition, and there seemed every reason to fear that, unless our gun trade became immensely improved, the whole trade would be transferred to the United States. Under such circumstances, to have a really good machinery for the construction of guns introduced to the observation of the gunmakers of England, whether by Government or by individuals, could not be deemed other than a public benefit. How stood the gun trade of England now? In 1851, we exported 247,236 muskets; in 1853, the number had fallen to 238,767. But now, turn to pistols. In 1851, we exported 5,333 pistols; in 1853, we exported 22,235 pistols, or more than four times the number we exported in 1851. How had this happened? Why, because Colonel Colt had introduced among us this very system of machinery, by means of which, producing pistols of admirable quality at a cheap rate, we had been enabled to effect so largely increased a demand for our pistols—surely a benefit to the gun trade of the country, which, with regard to muskets, had undergone deterioration. It was his opinion, that by the introduction, in like manner, of improvements in the construction of muskets, the Government would be benefiting our gun trade far more than the stoppage of the intermittent Government contracts would injure it; for those improvements would continue, and enlarge for the trade the whole market of Europe. He trusted that he had now satisfied the Committee, and that he should satisfy the deputation who had waited on him from the gunmakers, that the proposal he had made as to a Government factory would largely benefit the public, without sacrificing the permanent interests of the small number of persons whom that deputation represented.

said, the great cause of the dispute between the Board of Ordnance and the workmen in Birmingham had been the Minié rifle, an article with which, until lately, all parties were totally unacquainted. Difficulties had been thrown in the way by the Ordnance, and the people connected with the department, and that was the reason of the delay. The hon. Gentleman had laid great stress upon the saving to be made by creating this establishment, and filling it with machinery. But already a great portion of the manufacture of guns was done by machinery; and he took leave to doubt altogether the statement made as to the amount of saving to be effected. If the guns were fairly inspected, and the manufacturers had consecutive orders, there was no reason why any quantity of arms should not be made by the private manufacturers quite as well, and more cheaply, than they could be made by the Government. In estimating the saving to be effected by the new machinery, the hon. Gentleman had compared the cost of the work to be done with that of work hitherto done with the Ordnance, instead of, as he ought to have compared it, with that of work done by private individuals. He (Mr. Muntz) challenged any one to show an instance in which the Government had manufactured any article, in the manufacture of which private competition was possible, in which they had not lost 25 or 35 per cent by the manufacture; and so he was persuaded it would continue to be. If they were to effect the saving in the amount of stock to which the hon. Gentleman had referred, as a result of their having Government factories, it would be necessary to have a large number of men constantly ready for work, and this would necessarily be attended with great expense. With regard to the delay in the supply of Minié rifles, Mr. Muntz said, that these arms were quite a new article, new both to the Ordnance and the gunmakers; that there was a delay in the issuing of the patterns; and that after the sights had been fixed upon a number of the rifles, according to the directions of the Ordnance inspector, it was found that they were all wrong, and they had to be altered at the expense of the Board. This inspector was a man who did not understand his business, but he had resigned, and within the last fortnight the Board of Ordnance had appointed in his place a straightforward and able man. One serious cause of complaint, both by the gunmakers and their workmen, was, that when the tenders had been divided among the various manufacturers, no further orders were given until the whole of the first contract was sent in, so that if one man did not finish his contract, all the other manufacturers and their workmen were at a stand-still, frequently for many weeks together. Of course the result of this was, that the manufacturers could not do the work so cheaply as if they were consecutively employed, or in such quantities as were required. When the vote for the manufactory was proposed, he (Mr. Muntz) should move that it should be suspended for two months, and if the manufacturers did not within that time prove to the Ordnance, that they could manufacture any quantity of as good muskets as ever were seen, and as rapidly as they were required, be would give no further opposition to the vote. He ventured to say that, even if they got the factory, it would be two years before they got a single arm out of it.

said, he could bear testimony to the efficiency of our artillery, which he considered to be equal to any artillery in Europe. He thought the improvements contemplated with reference to the practice at Woolwich most advantageous, as the present grounds were certainly not sufficient for field guns, for which, if a proper range could be obtained, it would be of the greatest service to the corps. He considered that the question as to the manufacture of small arms was of the highest importance, and one which ought not to be lightly or hastily disposed of. He should like, also, to see the improvements suggested carried out in the laboratory, inasmuch as he believed them to be most necessary; and nothing would please him more than to see the present estimates framed upon a basis at once efficient and perfect, and such as was not only desirable but requisite, in a time of emergency like the present.

said, he could not help noticing the very large increase in the number of men in the Ordnance corps and departments, which in the years immediately preceding 1845 amounted only to about 7,000 or 8,000 men, in 1845 to 9,000; but in the present year, according to the proposed estimates, to 19,000. He thought the charge of 8,500l. for the servants of the 330 officers in the Engineers a very large sum, and also the amount of 120,000l. for additional aid and allowance, one that was out of all proportion, as compared with similar items for the Army and Navy. He should be very glad to see the improvements which had been spoken of carried out; but at the same time it was necessary that the Committee should use the greatest care in voting these estimates.

said, as the subject of clothing had been mentioned during the discussions on the Army Estimates, and as everybody followed French fashions nowadays, he begged to point out—while expressing his satisfaction at the more comfortable clothing which they were going to give the troops—a very commendable custom that prevailed in the French army. In every sentry-box in France there was a large cloak, in addition to the great-coat of the soldier, and the use of this cloak was considered by the medical men of France to be of great advantage to the men. This was a matter well worth consideration. He must say that he cordially concurred in the proposal that the system of clothing by the colonels should be altogether abolished.

said, he would beg to suggest that the barrack establishments, and those for the commissariat at home, ought not to be kept up separately, but combined into one system.

said, he wished to draw attention to the want of accommodation for married men in barracks. It was known that women were required for washing, cooking, &c., and a certain number per troop or company were allowed to live in barracks, provided their characters were good. The married men were allowed the space occupied by two beds, and that was all, while the women were compelled to live habitually in the same room with sixty or seventy men. Much attention had been lately paid to the subject of the amelioration of the morals of the people, and why should not the soldier have the same consideration paid to him? This matter was a part of our military system which was degrading to the soldier and disgusting to the officer. He hoped the hon. Gentleman the Clerk of the Ordnance would take the case of these poor women into consideration, and enable them to observe the decencies of life.

said, that no one who had ever seen a barrack could fail to concur with the hon. and gallant Member who had just addressed the Committee. He (Sir W. Clay) believed that there was hardly a barrack in the kingdom that would bear a moment's comparison for comfort and accommodation with either a gaol, a penitentiary, or an union workhouse. It was creditable to the spirit of the profession that our soldiers did not trouble Parliament or the public with complaints; and this abstinence from complaint on their part was in itself a reason why their grievances should be promptly and efficiently redressed. There were no barracks in the kingdom where ventilation was attended to. Where forty or fifty men slept in one room, as was at present the case, the atmosphere was almost insupportable, and great injury to health was the necessary result. Ophthalmia and other diseases among the soldiers could be traced to this cause. The evil might be remedied by a very small outlay of the public money. He wished next to call attention to the very defective state of the accommodation afforded to soldiers who were disposed to avail themselves of the regimental libraries. At a barrack he (Sir W. Clay) had recently visited, calculated to hold 1,000 men, the only accommodation for the use of the library was a closet of perhaps 10 feet by 6—but he was informed that, if a proper reading-room were provided, in which the men could sit and read, instead of being driven to the canteen and other places of resort, twenty books would be taken out of the library where one was taken out at present. Another want which was severely felt by the soldiers was that there was hardly a decent room for washing attached to any of the barracks in the kingdom. He was sure that that House and the country would cheerfully grant the necessary funds for providing the army with the comforts to which he had referred.

said, that he sympathised with the kind wishes which had been expressed for the comfort of the soldiers, but he was sure hon. Gentlemen must see how difficult it was to carry out the different views which had been put forth. In all the new barracks the accommodation for married women had been touch improved, as, indeed, were the comforts of the soldier generally; but, in the case of the old barracks, great difficulty was experienced in making the required alterations.

said, he thought that in the old barracks the same arrangement might be effected for the benefit of married soldiers as was adopted in behalf of the colour-sergeants—that was, their rooms might be separated by partitions.

said, it would appear that the House of Commons had either been niggardly in supplying the wants of the soldier, or that the money which it had voted had been very ill spent. It was shown before the Committee on the Ordnance Estimates that great improvements had of late years taken place in the accommodations of the soldier. It was there stated that the accommodation had increased to that extent that the cost of supplying it for the soldiers in barracks amounted to 100l. a man. Now, if that was so, the soldier should certainly be very well supplied and well lodged. They had been told that the soldiers had no means of washing themselves in barracks, but he remembered that a large sum was voted for this very purpose when the subject of lavatories was brought forward by Lord Panmure, and there was a sum taken every year for washing in the new barracks; so that, so far from grudging good accommodation to the soldiers, the House of Commons had been most liberal on their behalf. No blame, therefore, attached to that House, though he was unable to say how the accommodation had been carried out by the proper officers.

said, he had belonged to a regiment which was stationed in new barracks, and certainly he was unable to discover any difference between them and old barracks in regard to the accommodation for married soldiers.

said, that since he had entered the service there could be no doubt that the comfort of the soldier was more attended to than it used to be.

said, he should propose that this Vote be postponed for two months, for the reasons he had already stated.

said, he had already explained to the Committee the grounds upon which he thought this Vote was necessary, and it was impossible for him to agree to the proposition of the hon. Gentleman.

was about to second the request made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, that the Government would postpone the vote of 100,000l. for establishing a Government manufactory of small arms, but he begged the House to believe that, if this postponement would, in the present emergency and prospects of war, in any way delay the necessary supply of arms for our troops, he (Mr. Newdegate) would never have sanctioned, tolerated, or joined in requesting it, but he was prepared to show that, instead of delaying the immediate supply of arms, this postponement would have the opposite effect. He held in his hand the copy of an offer of an immediate supply of arms, which had been made to the Board of Ordnance, contingent upon their not taking the general supply of arms for the Army out of the hands of the manufacturers of Birmingham and London, who, during the last war, had not only supplied the English Army, but many of their foreign contingents, and had maintained this country independent of a foreign supply of arms—no slight national advantage in any extended war. This offer was as follows:—

"We, the undersigned, on behalf of the gun trade, will undertake (if the Board of Ordnance will enter into contracts for that purpose) to supply and deliver complete 50,000 rifled muskets within the first year, 100,000 in the second year, and a much greater quantity in the third year.

"We will undertake to find all the materials for the above muskets except the rough stocks, of which the Board of Ordnance have a large quantity in store, and can supply.

"If the Board of Ordnance will entertain this offer, we will immediately make twenty rifled muskets of the pattern required as samples, which shall be inspected, marked, and sealed by the inspector of small arms, ten of which shall be retained by the Board of Ordnance, and ten retained by the contractors; the whole of which shall be kept for reference in case of dispute.

"We propose that the course of inspection shall be the same as carried out by the Board of Ordnance; that is to say, each part of the musket shall be inspected and marked in each stage of manufacture as being of proper quality and make. But we will undertake and hold ourselves responsible for the production of a perfect arm, according to the pattern supplied.

(Signed) "HOLLIS AND SHEATH.

"CHAS. P. SWINBURN AND SON.

"THOMAS TURNER.

"TIPPING AND LAWDEN."

Now, this was an offer to supply 150,000 rifle muskets within two years. If the first stone or brick of the proposed Government factory were now laid, it would be quite impossible to produce from it a single musket within a year; it was highly improbable that this, as yet, foundationless factory could be fairly in work before the eighteen months had expired. It was not unreasonable to expect that it would be two years before muskets could be produced from it in any great quantity, and within which time the manufacturers of Birmingham offered to supply no less than 150,000 rifle muskets, of the most approved pattern, if the supply of arms were confided to them, and their trade not supplanted. The quickness of supply, therefore, rested in favour of the postponement of this Vote. The Government said the Birmingham manufacturers were not able to manufacture muskets or rifles for them, and rested their whole case on the success of the Springfield manufactory of arms, which the Government of the United States had established; yet he (Mr. Newdegate) understood that parts of some arms turned out of that factory had been supplied from Birmingham. He found that, on an average of three years, Birmingham and London turned out above 274,000 muskets and fowling-pieces annually; and yet the Government had ventured to assert that they were unable to get supplies of arms in England. He might also instance a case in which the French Government sent over an officer to Birmingham, who, after inspecting the patterns made for the Board of Ordnance, adopted a Birmingham improvement, which cost 3s. 6d. additional for each musket. This improvement the Board of ordnance had rejected, and the consequence was, that the French troops were supplied with a better arm than the British troops. He might be told that there would be no better chance of the contract being completed, if this offer were accepted, than of the completion of the contracts, the failure of which has caused the Government to entertain the notion of manufacturing for themselves. He (Mr. Newdegate) should be quite of that opinion if any of the Lovell family were to be continued in the office of inspectors or viewers of the arms in Birmingham; for first the son and then the father, Mr. Lovell, had held these offices, and it was impossible that any officers could have adopted more persevering or ingenious means to defeat the intention of their employers, and to destroy the trade they were appointed to regulate. But first the son Lovell, and now the father Lovell, have been removed; and the arms trade of Birmingham, trusting that, at last, they might have fair play, approach the Board of Ordnance and this House with the expression of their hope that they will not deprive them of the first fair opportunity for serving them that the trade of Birmingham have had for many years. He therefore felt confident that, if the Government chose to accept this offer, and to make the terms of the contract such as will enable the trade of Birmingham freely to complete it, there can be no doubt of its being faithfully executed. He not only asked the Government to avail themselves of the immediate means of supplying the country with arms, but he asked them, in justice to the public service, and in justice to this House, to allow a Committee of that House to examine into the alleged causes which are said to necessitate this vote of 100,000l., and into the effect upon the public service which their declining the offer he had read to the house, and insisting on this Vote, were likely to produce. If the House would grant this inquiry, he believed it could be easily shown that, although there had been faults on both sides, the failure of timely compliance with orders, on the part of the Birmingham arms trade, was, in great measure, if not entirely, attri- butable to the conduct of successive Governments, and of the Boards of Ordnance, especially the conduct of the subordinates of the Ordnance Department, who had had the immediate direction of the trade. One of the principal causes of complaint on the part of the arms trade is, that, instead of availing themselves of the recent improvements in the manufacture of arms, by applying scientific examination to them for years past, as the French Governments, under all the vicissitudes to which they have been subject, have done, and then sending to Birmingham contracts extended over a sufficient period in peaceful times to keep the trade employed, the Board of Ordnance for years closed their eyes to these improvements, until, about two years since, they were startled from their sleep by the announcement that 10,000 of the French army were armed with Minié rifles, which are effective at 1,000 yards, instead of at 200 or 300, the effective range of the old musket; and then all of a sudden, having left the Birmingham trade almost without orders for a length of time, and having rejected all suggestions for the improvement of the arms, suddenly the Board of Ordnance send down contracts for arms of a kind never made before, limited to such short periods as to render it almost impossible at once to obtain the best hands to carry out this new plan, owing to their having sought other employments during the previous long abeyance of Government orders. But the great, the most recent, and the most aggravated impediment, thrown by the Ordnance in the way of the arms trade of Birmingham, has been, by the appointment of inspectors, determined to obstruct the completion of the Government contracts in Birmingham. Mr. Lovell, the father, was some years since appointed to manage the Enfield establishment; he seems to have done this with zeal and ability; he greatly improved the make of the old musket, but he was always jealous of the fact the Enfield could not turn out muskets so cheaply as Birmingham. Mr. Lovell had two sons, both of whom he brought up to the arms trade; he always wanted the Government to manufacture more largely for themselves, but failing in that, he sent one of his sons to set up in the arms trade at Liege, and he got the other appointed inspector at Birmingham. Of course the whole family became more interested in the success of the trade of Liege, where one of the brothers was manufacturing on his own account, than in the success of Birmingham; and one of the first things he (Mr. Newdegate) heard of Mr. Lovell the younger, when Government inspector at Birmingham, with full liberty of access to all the Birmingham factories by virtue of his office, was, that an improvement in rolling barrels for muskets had been made in Birmingham, and that Mr. Lovell, Jun., used the opportunities of his office to procure patterns of the machinery, which was patented, and to send men from Birmingham to set up the like of it in Liege. So absolute was the power with which his office of inspector invested him, that the manufacturer and patentee dare not complain. Well, time rolled on, and he (Mr. Newdegate) heard many complaints of the injustice perpetrated by the rejection of good articles, and by other annoyances, to which this inspector subjected the trade. At last, just about the time that Lord Hardinge was appointed Master General of the Ordnance, Mr. Lovell's injustice grew to such a pitch, that he rejected sixty per cent of good barrels. The trade set a trap for the inspector; they put a private mark on the rejected barrels, cleaned them up, and sent them in again to the inspector with some others. On the second view, the inspector passed almost all those very barrels which he had previously rejected. This was made known to Lord Hardinge, and Mr. Lovell, Jun., was very soon after removed from the inspectorship of Birmingham. The trade rejoiced, but their satisfaction was not to be of long continuance; Lord Hardinge was unfortunately persuaded to remove Mr. Lovell, the father, from Enfield, and send him to Birmingham as successor to his son. From that hour the brief prospect of fair play for the trade of Birmingham waned; Mr. Lovell, the father, was certainly more competent than his son, but it was not owing to his incompetence that his son had failed to do justice to his employers, and to the trade of Birmingham. In 1851 and 1852, a contract for 23,000 Minié rifles was in course of completion at Birmingham, and delivery of them had commenced. Mr. Lovell, the father, had then been about six months in office, at Birmingham, when it was discovered that the sights had been placed crooked on the greater part of 23,000 rifled muskets—a more diabolical invention than supplying our troops with muskets made to shoot crooked, could, he thought, scarcely have been devised, if this was the result of design—or a grosser case of neglect, if it was an oversight. It was part of the duty of the inspector of small arms to have the barrels marked for affixing the sights, and a very singular fact is, that, although Mr. Lovell, the father, had been some time in office at Birmingham, and was the inventor of a very effective machine to ascertain the straight-sighting of muskets, he never discovered, at all events was not the first to make known, this gross abuse; but more than this—the workmen, who were employed in Birmingham, are prepared to testify, that they told Mr. Lovell that in working to their marks on the barrels, as they (the inspectors) directed, they were sighting the muskets crooked, and were retorted upon by being told to mind their own business. Now this abuse may have commenced under the regime of the son Lovell, who was displaced, but it continued under that of the father Lovell who succeeded him; he (Mr. Newdegate) believed that Lord Hardinge was persuaded that the father had not been a party to originally crooked marking the barrels for sighting, but had simply failed to detect the mischief his son had set on foot. He (Mr. Newdegate) thought his Lordship mistaken, and, on the part of the trade, represented to his Lordship that they were convinced, if Mr. Lovell was continued at Birmingham, the trade would be prevented fulfilling their contracts, and it has been so. On the general ground of economy he was prepared to contend, that the attempt on the part of the Government to manufacture for themselves was extravagant, because they could not get the work done so cheaply as it can be procured through the exertions of the regular trade, stimulated by competition; and, further, he contended that the great improvements, which are likely to be made in the musket, did not originate at Enfield, but are the result of the mechanical knowledge, ingenuity, and enterprise of private individuals; and that, whether the House regard economy or the improvement of arms, it is inexpedient to transfer the supply to a Government establishment. He might be told, indeed, that there is some improvement in machinery, by which, in America, muskets can be produced ready-made, without, or almost without, the intervention of manual labour, or the superintendence of human intellect. He did not believe that rifled muskets, such as those now required by Government from the trade of Birmingham, could be produced almost exclusively by machinery, and he thought the House would do very wrong, were it to sanction a large expenditure for the purpose of trying the ex- periment, which the erection of this machinery would involve, without appointing a committee to inquire into the feasibility of the scheme. But suppose it is true, that much may be done by machinery, what presumption was there that Birmingham cannot use such machinery to as good purpose as the Government? He should certainly vote for the postponement and inquiry proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham.

said, that the Committee could not forget that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down and the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) had, to a certain extent, been speaking, and fairly so, on behalf of the constituencies they represented. The question the Committee really had to consider was, how the service could be best supplied with arms. They had been told by the Clerk of the Ordnance of the great public inconvenience caused by the want of a sufficient supply of arms. He thought that gentleman was justified in making that statement, not only as regarded the necessity for a present supply, but also as to the past. He recollected that some few years ago a Committee sat and deliberated as to what arms should be given to the Rifle Brigade, and after the arms had been decided upon, it was nearly three years before they were supplied. The question was, whether they should combine the two establishments now in existence and form one establishment, by means of which the service would be better supplied. He considered the argument used by the hon. Gentleman as to the Government inspector being sent down to Birmingham was one of the strongest arguments that could be used in favour of the arms being manufactured in one establishment. He did not think that this would be injurious to the trade, for what the Birmingham manufacturers required was a stimulus, and when they could produce a better arm than the establishment proposed by Government, no doubt their proposals would be accepted. [A laugh.] Hon. Gentlemen might smile, but he believed that he was fully justified in saying that, if such a stimulus were given to private enterprise, it would cause manufacturers to produce a better article than the Government itself, so that eventually the Government would be able to get rid of the manufacture altogether. He certainly would be no party to refusing, at such a time as this, a Vote which Her Majesty's Government considered to be necessary in order to enable them to provide efficient arms for their troops.

said that, with regard to the question of the American gun to be made for 37s., he found that it could easily be made in this country for 28s. or 30s., and that it had no connection with the Minié rifle.

said, he considered the proposition of the Government as an unjustifiable interference with private enterprise. Nothing could be more fallacious than to suppose that a Government establishment could be conducted with greater economy or efficiency than a private enterprise. It was really amusing to compare the manner in which the work was done in Government as compared with private establishments. As the hon. Gentleman the Clerk of the Ordnance had mentioned the name of a Gentleman on whose calculations they had depended, and as it was the same gentleman who had stated that private enterprise was unable to supply Government with arms, he could not help telling to the Committee a circumstance which occurred two months ago. At that time he was at the Society of Civil Engineers, when this gentleman, Mr. Anderton, came forward and warned them against extending the size of the ships, as beyond a certain size great difficulties would arise, and the ship would be rendered capable of carrying little else than its own fuel, and the speed would not be increased. It had been found, however, that the Himalaya, now employed in the conveyance of troops, was, although one of the largest ships ever built, one of the most efficient. So that, if they had had the same confidence in Mr. Anderton that the Government had, the improvements in shipbuilding would not have gone on to any extent. The hon. Gentleman spoke of the manufacture of guns by machinery; every one who knew anything at all about manufacturing by machinery knew that it was necessarily imperfect at first, and that they went on slowly and gradually improving. But Government required the article to be perfect at once, and yet be manufactured by machinery. Was it to be supposed that in a country like this, where the manufacture of arms had been carried on for so long a period, they could not rely upon private enterprise, but must have a Government establishment to make them safe? This was not, as he bad said, a question of whether they should employ such and such gunmakers, but whether they should pay extravagantly for the same description of article which gunmakers could furnish cheaply. Reference bad been made to American machinery and to Colonel Colt; he gave great credit to Colonel Colt for his improvements, and was glad he had come to England. Private enterprise, conducted with skill and industry, was sure to succeed in this country, but the Government establishments had no profit or loss account whether they conducted matters well or ill and if the present proposition were agreed to, they would hear nothing of difficulty or expense in the process of manufacturing. Had the Government exhausted all the means which existed in this country for the supply of arms, then, indeed, they might come forward to ask for public money for the purpose of constructing a manufactory which would compete with private enterprise; but they had not exhausted the means which already existed, for he ventured to say that, if any merchant received at the present time an order for a stand of 10,000 arms, of equal quality to those which the Government required, they would find a means of getting supplied, while the Government by its false system would not. He hoped the Committee would not consent to the proposition made by Government.

said, he thought the hon. Member who had just sat down had, in several particulars, greatly misrepresented the proposal he had had the honour to make to the House. In the first instance, he had spoken of a Mr. Anderton, with whom he (Mr. Monsell) had nothing to do—the gentleman he spoke of being Mr. Anderson. Then the hon. Gentleman had said, if the Government made this establishment, they would go on well or ill, as the case might be, without at all troubling their head about difficulties or expense. The hon. Gentleman was not justified in forming any such conclusion; he must have forgotten that he (Mr. Monsell) had had, on a former occasion, the honour of submitting to the House a proposition for the improvement of the carriage department. Did that show any great self-laudation or reliance upon their own powers? On the contrary, did it not show that they were animated by a desire for improvement, and did not the present proposal evince the wish of the Government to proceed in the best, and, at the same time, the cheapest manner? On that latter point no hon. Gentleman who had spoken had addressed one word to the Committee. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) had, indeed, asked him whether the musket proposed to be manufactured in the Government establishment, was the American rifle, and whether that was the Minié rifle or not. To that question he said, he did not know; but he knew that it was a very admirable rifle, and very celebrated for its range and execution. But the hon. Member had altogether misconceived the statement he (Mr. Monsell) made, if he imagined he rested his case on the American rifle costing the Government only 30s. He had stated in the most minute manner, that the calculations which had been made led them to imagine that their musket would be manufactured for 30s., and that that musket would be as good or better than the musket for which they now paid more than 3l. If that were the case, surely the hon. Gentleman could not maintain that there were any public grounds for resisting the proposition made to the House. At present they had an enormous demand made upon them for arms, and, having the necessity imposed upon them of supplying that demand with the least possible delay, if they could show the Committee that, by providing for it in the way they suggested, they could save some 70,000l. or 80,000l. of the public money, the Committee would have had very good grounds for finding fault with the Government if they had not made the proposition, and would show great neglect of the interest of the country if they did not support it. As to the observations which were made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), he believed a similar statement had been made to Lord Hardinge, when Master General of the Ordnance, and was well considered by his Lordship, who did not arrive at the same conclusion. It was beside the question, and a strong argument in favour of the proposition, showing, as it did, how difficult it was to make the system of manufacturing in different parts, and then getting a viewer to have it set up perfect. On this subject he referred hon. Gentlemen to the report of Mr. Whitwill, of Springfield establishment, in America. But he would call the attention of the Committee again to the fact with which he commenced—that this was not merely a question of getting the best arm, or getting the best arm in the shortest time, but a question involving material financial considerations. By the course they proposed, they would save a large sum of money to the country, and the arm that would be produced would be much better than the one now produced at Birmingham.

said, he considered the question one of great importance, and he was sorry to see it prejudiced by being brought forward as a Meal question relating to Birmingham. The question of Government manufactories and Government manufactures had frequently come under the consideration of Committees of that House, especially on the Navy and Ordnance Estimates. The opinion, he believed, of several members of the Cabinet, which was coincided in by general opinion, was that Government manufactories were not advisable. It might be well to have a small manufactory, as some cheek upon the private producer, but nothing more—the general system should be that of contract. As to cheapness in Government establishments, he asked, was there any man in that House who believed in it? Would any member of the Cabinet get up and say he believed Government manufactures were cheap? They might get up an article so as to be certain of its quality, but they would have to pay a great deal more to get it up in that manner. But what did the Clerk of the Ordnance tell them to do? To establish a large factory to supply the whole of the muskets for the use of the Government. They were told it was always for the interest of the Government and the nation to produce largely, and, accordingly, they were to make an immense number of muskets in the one year. These muskets were now required, but that number would not always be wanted; and how were they to reduce the establishment, for they well knew if machinery was not constantly at full work, the production of the article was carried on at great loss? Having once established this manufactory, that very circumstance would be used as an argument why they should continue to keep it in work and make an immense stock. Thus, they would be involved in enormous expense, without having any adequate use for the articles produced. It was for the present war these muskets were required, and he wanted to know if this proposition were granted, how soon this establishment would be at work? Would it be eighteen months or two years? And would the Clerk of the Ordnance guarantee that they should produce 50,000 muskets in that time? They were told that new discoveries and new improvements were being made with wonderful rapidity, and he doubted whether, by the time the proposed establishment had got into proper working condition, the improvements in the general manufacture would not place them in a very disadvantageous position. He would, therefore, recommend the Government to postpone this Vote for a time. If there was a refusal on the part of manufacturers to work fairly, or if they attempted to make unfair terms with the Government, let them be told that the House of Commons would furnish all the money that was necessary, but would not heedlessly run into unnecessary expenses.

said, he would recommend the Government to adopt the same system with regard to the manufactory of small arms as was adopted with regard to the manufactory of gunpowder. The inspector of that department had told him in 1842 that 20,000 barrels of gunpowder would be required in the year, but, instead of inserting all item in the Ordnance Estimates and increasing the amount supplied from the Government manufactory, he had only obtained 10,000 or 12,000 barrels from the manufactory, and had distributed the remainder of the amount required among the various firms of gunpowder manufacturers in the neighbourhood of London. By allowing those manufacturers to supply 2,000 or 3,000 barrels each a year, they were able to keep up their establishments, and employ a good body of workmen; and upon an emergency such as this, they could thus supply any quantity that might be required; whereas if the Government had supplied the whole of the amount themselves, the manufacturers would, as he had been told by a friend of his who was a manufacturer, require eight or ten months before they would be in a position to assist the Government. There might be good reasons for the contemplated removal of the gunpowder manufactory, although he could not understand why that removal was necessary, as, in his opinion, our present gunpowder establishment was as perfect as it could be; but, Wherever they established themselves, he hoped they would adopt his suggestion as to not manufacturing the whole of the gunpowder required in their own establishments. The gunpowder manufacturers were intelligent, honourable men, who would give every assistance they could to the Government, and he had no doubt that was also the case with the manufacturers of Birmingham.

said, that, notwithstanding the natural impatience of the Committee at that late hour (ten minutes after twelve), he trusted they would permit him to address a few words to them upon a question of such interest as that which was now under their consideration, for although this was a Vote in the Ordnance Estimates, for which his hon. Friend (Mr. Monsell) was primarily responsible, yet, as the person immediately charged with the care of the finances of the country, he should feel himself deeply culpable if he permitted a Vote of this nature, for such a sum, and at such a period, to be proposed to the Committee without having given it the fullest consideration, and entirely satisfied himself as to its propriety. Therefore, trusting to the patience and impartiality of the Committee, he would state generally the grounds on which the Government made this proposition. At the same time he admitted, at the outset, that there was great difficulty, considering the novelty of the proposal and the strength and activity of the interests which it had aroused, in conveying to the mind of the Committee with clearness those points of detail on which the question in great part really turned. The motives which had induced the Government to adopt the proposal of the Ordnance Department were these:—In the first place, the extreme dearness of the arm which was at present furnished to the forces; in the next place, the slowness with which that arm was prepared; and, in the third place, the inferiority consequent upon the present mode of manufacture. In the first place, with regard to its dearness. It cost 3l., whereas the cost of the rifle musket used in America was only 1l. 17s. [Expressions of dissent.] Hon. Gentlemen cried down the quality of American arms; but, as far as general opinion went, he did not think they would be supported in the sentiments they had expressed. He thought the lesson they had received from Colonel Colt, a private American gentleman, who had shown England how to work in metals—that branch of trade with which we were beyond all others acquainted—was a pretty good example of, at least, the non-inferiority of American rifles. It was said by the noble Lord behind him (Lord Seymour), amid loud cheers, that the Government ought not to be manufacturers, and in those cheers he was perfectly prepared to join. He granted at once that the primâ facie case was against the Government being manufacturers, and it was with that impression that he himself had looked into the facts of the case. He was not very certain with respect to the propriety of all the manufactures now carried on by the Government, but there were at the same time certain cases in which the Government ought to be manufacturers, and in which no one denied that they ought to be manufacturers. No one denied that it was proper for the Government to continue its manufactory of gunpowder. It had been stated to him upon good authority that that manufactory had saved the country not less a sum than 500,000l. No one denied that Government ought to continue to be the manufacturer of its ammunition generally. No one objected to that. On what principle, then, was there a distinction drawn between certain articles of which it ought and other articles of which it ought not to be the manufacturer? The distinction obviously depended on the particularities and specialties of each case, and therefore, if they meant to settle the question on principle and on public duty, not on class interests, it was not to be settled by general dicta about the impropriety of Government being manufacturers, but by a careful examination of the particular merits of the case. What was the case in the present instance with regard to cost? The musket now cost 3l., and the Ordnance Department assure the Committee that our musket can be manufactured for 30s. But economy was not the only question. What was the case with regard to the rapidity of the manufacture? What said the Ordnance Department? It had ordered tenders to be sent in for 2,000 carbines on an improved plan to be ready by the 1st of March last, and not one of those carbines had yet been received into the stores. What was the case with regard to the certainty of the manufacture? It was this; the Committee were discussing the finest instrument that could be made, and which required in its manufacture the most rigid and minute precision. So great, indeed, was that precision that it was impossible to attain to it without having recourse to machinery. What had they been told that night? That the inspector of small arms in Birmingham, even although he was minute and critical in a fastidious degree, blundered as a viewer of arms. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Newdegate) seemed to think that this must be ascribed to some purpose on the part of the public officer, who, as he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) believed, had acted only from an error of judgment; but it proved to him the extreme difficulty, not to say impossibility, of judging by the eye with regard to the quality of a rifle. What, then, was really the nature of the present case? It was a question of whether they would continue to have guns made for Her Majesty's forces by the old and obsolete process of hand labour, or whether they would apply to this description of articles that which they had applied to every other description of articles, and would bring to bear upon it the force and economy of machinery? It was not at all a question about monopoly on the part of gun manufacturers or of extravagant profits, and he would make no accusation against them, of having entered into a combination, for he had no evidence to support it; but it was a question between superior and inferior processes, between labour and machinery. But the hon. Member for North Warwickshire admitted that machinery was employed in America for the manufacture of arms, while he said that hand labour was all that was necessary in this country.

said, he never stated that machinery was superior to hand labour in the manufacture of firearms.

said, the hon. Member had stated that, in point of fact, machinery had been employed for the manufacturing of arms in America, while the arms of Her Majesty's forces were made by hand labour, and the question was whether they would continue to employ hand labour or take to machinery? He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) said that they ought to employ machinery. It was said that they might trust to the resources of private trade, but that statement could he met both by argument and by experience. In former wars this country, it was well known, had been unable to obtain a sufficient supply of arms, and we were obliged to go to the manufacturers of Liege and other places for muskets to put in the hands of our soldiers. [An Hon. MEMBER: When?] The hon. Member never heard of it, but the thing occurred in the last war; it was a well-known fact, and the Ordnance Department could furnish the particulars of the transaction. It was a question of economy, therefore, whether we should have cheap instead of dear arms—whether arms should be rapidly made—whether they should be equally and precisely made by the unerring operation of machinery, or whether their production should be dependent on the uncertain and fluctuating application of the human hand and eye. As regarded economy, the result was most remarkable. Until he investigated the subject, he did not believe that, in a matter so comparatively small, it would be possible to realise a saving of from 800,000l. to 900,000l.; but that was the case as it stood on the positive estimate of what we were now paying and what we would have to pay, without taking into account the stock which it was necessary to keep in hand under the existing system. The noble Lord behind him (Lord Seymour) had asked whether the, Government were making provision for future years. They were making provision he was sorry to say, for the war now gathering around us. The noble Lord asked when the factory would be in operation. It would be in operation within twelve months, and the Government expected to obtain in the course of next year a full supply of arms. If the Government and the Ordnance Department merited censure, it was not for having made this proposition now, but for not having made it at an earlier period. The noble Lord condemned this plan, because he said it would necessitate the bringing together a large number of workmen, and he wanted to know what was to become of them when the demand for their labour, which was of an uncertain character, should slacken or cease altogether. Now he entreated the attention of the Committee to the answer he was about to give on this point, which was, in fact, the kernel of the whole ease. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) said it was a necessary ingredient in a fair contract that the demand should be continuous and equal. Now what security for continuity and equality could there be in the demand for arms? Let the House of Commons, whose duty it was to economise the public money, answer the question. In order to enable a private firm to fulfil a contract, must the Government undertake to keep up a war supply of arms in time of peace? The House of Commons, he apprehended, would say no. It was necessary to have the power of sudden expansion and rapid manufacture in emergencies, and those were the objects of the present proposition. Without the power of expansion, and without the power of producing with certainty a large amount of arms, we should be compelled to go on pottering with the private trade, and fail to obtain the supply we wanted, as had happened with the 2,000 carbines to which he had already referred. Was it necessary, because the Government would lay out a sum of money on machinery, that they should maintain a large staff of workmen? On the contrary. While we depended on hand labour, it was necessary to maintain a large number of skilled workmen, but by adopting machinery the case would be entirely changed. Then, instead of requiring 90 per cent of skilled labour, and 10 per cent of unskilled labour, we should require only 10 per cent of skilled to 90 per cent of unskilled labour. The Government, therefore, would maintain the small staff of skilled labour at all times, and when a time of emergency should arrive they could at once obtain unskilled labour and produce an unlimited supply of arms. It was not to depress the private trade that at such a moment the Government invited the House of Commons to undertake such an enterprise. Unless they had been well convinced it was important to the public interests, they would not have gone into such a proposal. They would not have gone into it unless they had been well convinced it would lead to an immense saving of the public money; above all, for higher objects than the saving of money—that it was material to the discharge of their duties in this emergency that they should put the country, not into a tolerable condition, but into the best possible condition with respect to the supply of arms. He hoped the House of Commons would not refuse to back the Government in the performance of that duty to the country; but, on the contrary, that they would assist the Government when they came to give a decisive vote in establishing the means to supply the country with superior arms at a lower price and with far greater certainty and rapidity than under the precarious and inconvenient system on which they were now dependent. One sentence more, and it would, perhaps, tend to shorten this debate. He had now stated the material considerations for agreeing to this proposition, but at the commencement he had allowed that, in the case of a novel proposition, it was hardly fair to invite the assent of the Committee, without giving some means of acquiring further knowledge. He could not dispense with the discharge of that duty, because he was most unwilling to evade the responsibility which certainly belonged to him as Minister of Finance with respect to the proposal, but he had no disposition to avoid any inquiry which the House of Commons might think fit to make. He would, therefore, explain what would be perfectly agreeable to the Government, provided it meet the views of the Committee. If the Committee thought fit to postpone this Vote for four weeks, with a view to the immediate appointment of a Committee—which Committee, sitting from day to day, should conduct its investigation into the whole question to a close in that period—to that proposal the Government would freely and readily assent. But, at the same time, he wished it to be understood that, not at all on account of any pertinacity in their own opinions, but on account of carrying forward the plan efficaciously, the Government did not propose to relax those preliminary and preparatory proceedings in which they were engaged; they would continue them on their own responsibility during the period the Committee was sitting, and leave the house of Commons to exercise its judgment freely when the result of that inquiry was made known.

said, that the right hon. Gentleman had made a very ingenious speech, as he always did when called to the rescue of his colleagues, and at the same time had shown he knew nothing about machinery. ["Oh, oh!"] It was very easy to say "oh, oh!" but what did the hon. Member know about it? The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was a question between machinery and hand labour. It was no such thing. Did any of them know what a good fowling-piece was? And yet not one fowling-piece in England was made by machinery. It was a compound of hand labour and machinery, and that was the American scheme. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to think making guns was like spinning cotton—they put iron and wood into a "hopper" at one end, and they came out Minié rifles at the other. Let the right hon. Gentleman show them first that the American rifle was a rifle. He said it was a plain simple musket, and did not cost 28s. The right hon. Gentleman said here the private trade charges 3l. for a gun which the Americans make for 30s. Let the right hon. Gentleman prove the cost. What did he know about the cost of guns? He had it upon autho- rity. Upon what authority? The Clerk of the Ordnance. The fact was, it was all assumption. Because the Government had got hold of a very clever talking character, they thought, if they had a fine piece of machinery, they must have a complete gun, and a perfect gun, and it must be made for 30s. He knew that 30s. would be 50s., and instead of 100,000l., the establishment; would cost 500,000l. Let the right hon. Gentleman prove that the American gun was a rifle; that he could make the gun for 30s.; and that the establishment would not cost more than 100,000l. The right hon. Gentleman knew he was wrong, and he confessed at the outset all Government establishments were bad. He (Mr. Muntz) was not surprised at that admission, for it was just what he should have expected from a man of such acuteness as the right hon. Gentleman. He was sorry to oppose the Government; but he considered his proposition was a moderate one, and he could not see how the Government could reasonably object to it. His proposition was, to allow the manufacturers two months only to deliver any quantity of guns required. He should, therefore, press his Amendment.

said, he did not object to the Amendment. He would propose the Vote again that day month. The hon. Member had challenged him with having shown no great knowledge of the subject, and his statement that arms were purchased abroad during the late war was scoffed at. He had in his hand a Report of the Board of Ordnance on the subject; and after stating the number of arms in store in 1792, the Report went on to say, "This made it absolutely necessary to collect arms from every part, and to purchase them in foreign countries;" and no less than 219,000 stand of arms were so purchased in foreign countries, besides those of our own manufacture.

said, he had observed that a great deal had been said about the trade of Birmingham, and he wished to say a few words with regard to that of London. There had been made in London, during the last ten years, no less than 584,376 small arms, which gave an average of something like 58,137 per annum. There were 1,900 workmen, and eighteen houses, already engaged in the manufacture of small arms in London; and he understood that eight or ten of these houses had offered their services to the Government, but they had been rejected.

said, he would advise I the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) to consent to the proposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. At the same time he (Mr. Spooner) would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that a month would scarcely afford sufficient time for an inquiry on this subject. The gunmakers said, "Tell us exactly what you want; tell us what time you will give us, and what price you will pay, and we will give you any security that we will manufacture arms as good and as speedily as you, the Government, can manufacture them yourselves. We can get our machinery cheaper and we can work it Letter than you can." The manufacturers, however, might not be able in a month to produce a fair sample of what they would be able to do if more time were allowed them. He had no hesitation in saying that if, upon inquiry, the gunmakers were unable to show that they could meet the exigencies of the case, there would not be one word of opposition from them to the proposal of the Government. He was satisfied that, if the Government threw themselves upon the private enterprise of the country, their demands would be fully met.

said, he did not think that it was possible, even in two months, to prove the case of the manufacturers as it ought to be proved. He was ready, however, to agree to the suggestion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that a month should be taken for the inquiry.

said, it was not intended to limit the sittings of the Committee by a single day; but he thought they should sit de die in diem, and that if due diligence were used they might complete their inquiry in a month.