said, that this measure, though a Private Bill, very materially affected the public interest. The original Act. authorising the formation of the dock, contained clauses providing that all lighters and craft entering the docks for the purpose of receiving on board the cargoes of ships lying in dock in order to be discharged, should be exempted from the payment of any rate. It was a very suspicious circumstance to see three dock companies now coming forward at the same time to attempt to repeal those clauses, and thus to violate their original Dock Acts. No doubt they came together to intimidate and to prevent opposition by a formidable array of power. This was not a mere question between the dock companies and the wharfingers, to whose wharfs those lighters conveyed the goods taken out of ships in dock; it was an attempt to attack the trade of the port of London, and of every constituency that was represented in that House. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. G. Duncan) had told him, the other day, that thousands of tons of a particular description of hemp were brought to London from India, and was there shipped on board the Dundee steamers. He trusted no interference would be allowed with that or any other trade. What ground was there for such a proposal as the present? Now, had the companies' stocks fallen in value, there might have been cause for this measure; but, on the contrary, it was well known they had increased 50 per cent. It was, in fact, a most iniquitous attempt to interfere with the free trade of the port of London. The City of London never would have consented to the construction of those docks, which deprived the port of a great deal of accommodation, but on the condition that such docks should be considered part of the port. He really hoped the House would not submit to any such attempt, by indirect means, to put a tax upon the trade of the country, and he should therefore move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months. Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

said, he had charge of the Bill, and would, therefore, trouble the House with a few observations on the question at issue. The dock companies were at the outset opposed by the same parties who now opposed this Bill, who at the time put in claims to the extent of 3,000,000l. for compensation, which was eventually reduced to 600,000l. An Act was passed giving clock companies certain privileges for twenty years, and afterwards for thirty years more. Government made relaxations in favour of private wharfingers, and at last the restrictions on the dock companies became so onerous that they were obliged to come to Parliament to ask for relief. The dock companies had made no changes in their original compact with Government and the public; but changes had been forced upon them which acted prejudicially on their fair privileges and profits. All the dock companies asked, was to be allowed to make a reasonable charge for labour done. It was alleged that wharfingers made no charge for services that the dock companies ask to be authorised to charge for; but he held in his hand a statement in black and white, which proved that the wharfingers made charges which the dock companies were at present precluded from making. He really thought the clock companies had good ground for what they asked, and he trusted the House would nut refuse to read the Bill a second time.

said, this was not a private, but most certainly a public Bill. It affected the trade of the country, and it was the duty of that House to affirm or not to affirm the principle of such a Bill in the legitimate stage in which that should be done—namely, on the second reading. He felt bound to do so in this case, and to give the measure his most decided opposition. For three years he had fought for the dock companies against the Board of Customs, and the trading interest of London had also supported the dock companies against that Board. It was, therefore, exceedingly bad taste on the part of the dock owners to attempt to force this Bill through the House—a Bill by which they not only wished to be paid as wharfingers, but to impose a tax upon the whole trade of the City of London. It was one of the main objects of the late Sir Robert Peel, in the debate upon the Customs, to make London the great entrepôt for the whole trade of the world, and to make London a place for transhipment by all possible means. Of course one of the modes of doing this was by a reduced charge, and giving increased facilities through the Board of Customs. The late Sir Robert Peel, he repeated, laid the greatest stress on this point. He hoped the House would not allow itself to be led away by the great names of the supporters of the Bill. Those Gentlemen were all interested in the docks. It was notorious to every gentleman engaged in commerce in London, that the dock companies were in the habit of sending touters, steam tugs, and lighters to Gravesend, to induce captains of vessels to bring their ships into the docks. The interest of the shipowner was totally distinct from that of the merchant. It was the interest of the former to place his ship where she would be safe at all times; but it was not the interest of the merchant that his goods should thus be taken into the docks. The inducements to shipowners to go into dock were so great, that in his (Mr. Mitchell's) own experience, in hundreds of cases he might say, the first notice he got of the arrival of his goods in London was in the form of a notice that the ship they were in had entered the docks without his having given any permission to that effect, or having had any voice in the matter at all. If this measure should pass he would be obliged to pay the taxes on lighters entering the docks to fetch his goods to the spot where he might wish them to be discharged. He protested against such a system, and against a tax not only upon wharfingers, but upon the general commerce of the country. The water of the Thames was public property, which had been given to the dock companies on an express agree- ment that, in return for that public property, no charge should be made on lighters going into the docks. He therefore hoped the House would reject the Bill.

said, he had strong reasons for not departing from the usual practice in the case of private Bills. He was anxious that no injustice should be done to the promoters of a private Bill; and he was also desirous that the time of the House should not be taken up by discussion which ought more properly to take place before a Committee. The dock companies proposed to repeal certain clauses in their original Acts. It was alleged on behalf of the commerce of the port of London—and he thought there was some reason in what they said—that such a repeal would inflict great injury on the trade of the country. The companies contended again that their circumstances to-day were quite different to what they were when the clause it was now proposed to repeal was enacted. He did not wish, however, to enter into the question, and he hoped the House would not go into it either. It was a question assuredly for the decision of a Committee; and he trusted the House would have confidence enough in the justice, integrity, and impartiality of a Committee to confide to them the settlement of the matter. On these grounds he should vote for the second reading.

said, the principle of the Bill was diametrically opposed to agreements which had been made with Parliament, and he should, therefore, oppose it.

said, that although it was not generally the practice for Government to take part in discussions on the second readings of private Bills, there were some circumstances that rendered it necessary he should make a statement in this particular case. The facts might be stated in a few words. When originally the dock companies were established, they looked for remuneration to the monopoly of the landing and warehousing of certain descriptions of goods, which was given to them for a limited time. A second source of profit was the valuable frontage given to them for warehouses, &c.; and a third was a toll levied on seagoing ships using the water of the docks; but there was at the same time an express enactment that no charge should be made for lighters or barges. There was, in fact, what was known in law as a complete dedication to the public of the newly-created water space, in as far as lighters were concerned. Now, he conceived that before a bargain of that kind was altered by the House, a very strong case should be made out by the parties seeking the alteration. Now, he certainly did not think that any such case could be made out or had been made out on the part of the dock companies, nor did he think there was that alteration in circumstances upon which they relied as the foundation of their case. The monopoly expired at the time it was intended to expire, and if altered circumstances caused some loss to the companies on one side, the great increase in trade had provided ample compensation on the other—a fact which was confirmed by the circumstance that out of the three companies two were building new warehouses, and even then did not expect to be able to meet the requirements of their extended traffic. This subject had been brought before the House of Commons two years before, in the case of the Victoria Docks. The promoters of the Victoria Docks Bill sent in their Bill without the clause in question, but the Committee thought it only fair to insert it. Other Dock Bills had been brought in during the present Session, and it was the intention of the Board of Trade to have called special attention to this clause. Let the House observe what would be the state of the case if this clause were conceded. The dock companies were in a statutory position as owners of water space, and in a statutory position as large wharfingers, in opposition to others not so circumstanced. Now, allowing the measure to become law, would undoubtedly place them in an advantageous position in competition with their rivals, and, therefore, he thought its progress should be jealously watched by Parliament. Then came the question whether they should adhere to the ordinary course, or whether they should object to the second reading. He felt very much pressed by the arguments of his hon. Friend the Chairman of Committees (Mr. Bouverie), and he should be sorry to favour that system of excitement and canvass by which it was sought to withhold a Bill from the investigation of a Select Committee, but having carefully considered the question in all its aspects, the result of this consideration was a determination to vote against the second reading of the Bill.

said, he was an owner of dock stock, and was, to a small extent, interested in warehouse property. He had, however, come to the same conclusion as the right hon. Gentleman, and thought it most unjust to attempt to do away with the bargain, made upon fair and just principles in the beginning, and which, he considered, the House ought not to depart from.

said, that the plea against the Bill was, that it would give the dock companies advantages over their competitors; the plea of the companies was, that now the competitors had all the advantages of their vast establishments and staff without giving anything by way of compensation. That was the ground upon which the Bill was advocated; and the arguments pro and con could, in his opinion, be much better discussed in a Committee up-stairs. This he would say, that the uses to which lighters were put had very much extended since the time when they first obtained exemption from clock dues.

said, that at one time barges merely carried water and provisions to the ships in dock, but as trade extended, although ships still came into dock for greater safety, the wharfingers by offering greater inducements, got all the landing and warehousing of the goods. He could mention one wharf from which 40,000 barges went into dock in the course of last year. Under these circumstances, was it to be held that the companies were to have nothing for keeping the docks in repair? The question was, would they protect the barge owners, lightermen, and wharfingers, at the expense of the dock owners? He should give his support to the second reading, thinking that the question in dispute could be best decided by a Committee.

said, he considered that there was another question to be decided besides the interests of the dock companies and the wharfingers, and that was the general interest of the country. He could assure the promoters of the measure that the greatest kindness they could do the country would be to withdraw their Bill. He knew of his own experience that goods were ordered to Hull in consequence of the oppressive charges in London. He had no interest in docks, but he had in the general trade of the country, and therefore felt bound to oppose the Bill.

said, that in begging to put four questions to the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, which stood in his name on the paper, he must observe, with respect to the last, that great dissatisfaction had been expressed at the lateness of the Session when the Indian Budget was brought on. He would now ask whether Mr. Marshman, the editor of the Friend of India, now held the office of Bengalee interpreter to the Government, and whether he had a paper contract from the Government? Also, why Mr. Marshman was allowed an access to public documents which is refused to other newspaper editors in Calcutta? And also, at what period of the Session the President of the Board of Contol proposed to bring in his Indian Budget this year?

said, with regard to the first three questions, which related to the state of things in Calcutta, he was unable to give any answer without reference to Calcutta. He did not know whether Mr. Marshman was interpreter to the Government, whether he had a paper contract with the Government, or whether he was allowed access to public documents which was refused to other editors. With regard to the last question, the papers upon which the statement was made were laid before Parliament, according to the Act, some time in the month of May. He should have been perfectly ready last year to make that statement at a much earlier time, but it was deferred, partly on account of public business, and partly that he might announce to the House the termination of financial operations then going on in India. As regarded the present year, he should be ready to make the statement on the earliest possible day after the papers were in the hands of Members and the state of public business would allow.

said, he had a question of great importance to put to the noble Lord at the head of the Government, namely, what measures had been taken or were in progress for the removal of the convalescents or the patients capable of re- moval, in the hospitals at Scutari or in the Crimea, to England, or to some of our Mediterrancan colonies, for the perfect restoration of their health?

A Commission was sent out by the noble Duke who held the office of Secretary of State for the War Department, to inquire into the condition of the hospitals, to recommend such measures as they might think right and proper, and to report, not merely to the Government at home, but to Lord Raglan; and Lord Raglan was requested to act on those recommendations without delay. It is the intention of my noble Friend at the head of the War Department to make arrangements for a periodical service between Constantinople and the Crimea on the one hand, and England on the other, for the purpose of bringing home such invalids as are in a condition to be transported by sea, and arrangements will be made for their reception in proper and suitable hospitals on their arrival here.

said, he begged on behalf of his hon. colleague (Mr. Horsfall) to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether instructions had been sent, or were intended to be sent, to Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade in China, to cancel the bonds taken on British trade at Shanghai between the 9th of February and the 12th of July, 1854; whether instructions had been given, or were intended to be given, to Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade in China, to interdict the interference of the consular courts in China, in reference to all the bonds and securities taken on British trade since the expulsion of the Imperial Customs' authorities from Shanghai by the insurgents in 1853; whether, when disputes of a pecuniary nature, and involving questions of international law, arose between British subjects and the Chinese authorities, it was intended that such disputes and questions should be decided by the British authorities in China, or referred home to be decided by the Supreme Government; and, whether Her Majesty's Government had taken, or intend to take, any measures to enforce upon the Imperial Government of China an equality and uniformity of practice in the levying and collection of the Customs' duties at all the ports in China open to foreign trade, in accordance with treaty stipulations; or whether it be intended to forbid all consular interference in the collection of the Chinese revenue, leaving the settlement of duties to be arranged between the native Chinese merchants and their own Custom House, according to the practice which prevails at Canton?

I beg to state, Sir, that instructions have been sent to China to cancel bonds taken at Shanghai for duties between February the 9th and July the 12th, 1854. Sir John Bowring has been called upon for a full report of all the circumstances under which the bonds were given, and generally as to the state of affairs at Shanghai at the time, and, until his report is received, Tier Majesty's Government must suspend their decision. Sir John Bowring has been informed that no proceedings can be taken in the consular courts in reference to the bonds and securities given at Shanghai between the 7th of September, 1853, and the 9th of February, 1854, which bonds and securities he has been directed to cancel and return to the parties. The decision in regard to bonds subsequently given must he reserved until Sir John Bowring's Report referred to is received. It would depend upon the nature of the question which may have been raised, whether it was susceptible of decision on the spot; but, as a general rule, questions involving the construction of treaty engagements, the solution of which is attended with reasonable doubt, must be referred home for decision by Her Majesty's Government. Directions have been given to warn the Chinese authorities that they must levy equal ditties with impartiality upon the trade of all nations. A state of things has lately arisen at Shanghai from which, although nothing more than what is due is taken in the shape of duties, and that front all alike, the merchants at Shanghai are placed in a disadvantageous position as compared with the merchants at other ports where a taxer system prevails. Sir John Bowring's attention has been particularly called to this state of things, and he has been directed to endeavour to remedy it, by urging the adoption at other ports of the Shanghai system, under which the duties are collected on behalf of the Chinese Government by a Committee of three foreigners; but no instructions have been given to urge the general adoption of the Canton system. The treaty with China prescribes a certain degree of consular interference for the protection of the Chinese revenue, and the consuls hold the ship's papers until proof is produced to them that the demands of the Chinese Custom House are satisfied.

said, he begged to ask the noble Viscount, who was lately the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether it is true that the new recordership at Brighton has been conferred on a Queen's Counsel who has been refused admittance to the Bench of the Inn to which he belongs?

Sir, I appointed that gentleman to his present office, and it is not true that a gentleman was appointed to that office who was refused admittance to the Bench of the Inn to which he belongs, in the way stated by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I selected from amongst the candidates the person who appeared to me, from the testimonials of the highest legal authorities, to be the best to fill the office. I had no personal knowledge of any of the candidates. I took the opinion of the highest legal authorities, and I have no reason to believe that I erred in my judgment.

Sir, I trust the House will grant me its kind indulgence while I make a few remarks upon the present aspect of public affairs. Under ordinary circumstances I would not have made such an appeal, but I hope the House will, with its usual kindness, extend to me the indulgence I ask, bearing in mind the deep interest which I have taken in the question which now agitates the country, and my conviction that the present is a most momentous crisis. It was not my intention to raise a debate this evening, but rather to avail myself of the opportunity which would have been offered when the House was called upon to nominate the Committee moved for by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, but I have heard that it is not impossible that some arrangement may be made between my hon. and learned Friend and the Government which will preclude the House from discussing any question that might otherwise have reasonably been brought before it on that occasion. Feeling as I do that the country would not be satisfied if, at a moment like this, an opportunity were not given, at least, to some Members of the House of expressing their opinions upon the present state of affairs, I think that no better occasion could arise than the present, when we are called upon to vote little less than the sum of 7,500,000l. for the support, the maintenance, and the recruiting of our army, an army, be it remembered, for which almost an equal sum was voted last year—which had been sent out unequalled in discipline, and possessed of everything requisite to render it victorious in the field—and which has dwindled down to little more than 12,000 men, notwithstanding a statement to the contrary which has been made by some members of Her Majesty's Government. Under these circumstances, I feel it imperatively necessary to call the attention of the country to the present state of affairs, for it is my firm conviction that we may be standing upon the very brink of ruin, some may be even inclined to think that we are already falling into the abyss of disgrace. I almost feel degraded in my own eyes, that last year I did not speak out more boldly —that I was restrained from stating those convictions to the House which were working in my mind, and which I should have made known had I not been influenced by a variety of considerations. I trust, therefore, that the House will bear with me while I make one or two remarks upon the actual condition of the Government as it stands. A short time ago my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) proposed a Committee of inquiry into the condition of our troops before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those who had had the management of the present war. That Motion was received on the part of the then Government, not so much as one that might be inconvenient if carried, but as a Motion that involved a direct censure on the members of that Government. That was the challenge thrown out to the House and the country, and both the House and the country accepted it. Not only was that distinctly understood, but every member of Her Majesty's Government who rose in his place upon that occasion stated that the Motion was considered not as a vote of censure upon any one individual member of the Government, but upon the Government as a whole. That challenge, also, was accepted. Now, what was the result? The Motion was carried by, perhaps, one of the largest majorities ever obtained in this House upon a question of such magnitude —it was carried by a majority of more than two to one. The country felt no doubt as to that result. I know hon. Members who voted for that Motion, who, personally, would rather have opposed it, but were compelled to support it on account of the feeling which pervaded the country. I also know there were some hon. Members who voted against that Motion, the pleasure of whose company, in consequence of that vote, we shall most certainly lose in a future Parliament. In fact, there was but one expression of opinion throughout the country. The Government consequently went out, and for some days it was found impossible to form an Administration. To the causes of that difficulty I will not now advert, although I may do so at a future period. After some days had elapsed the noble Lord now at the head of the Government succeeded in forming an Administration. What then do we see? We find that Administration composed almost identically of the same individuals as the late Government. Under ordinary circumstances, perhaps, in the straits to which the country is now reduced, such an Administration might have been accepted without much remark, but when we are called upon to trust to that Government the conduct of one of the greatest wars in which this country has ever been engaged—when we are called upon to vote large sums for the support of an army which has been reduced to but a fraction of what it was—when Parliament is thus asked to place confidence in the Government, it behoves the House to inquire what that Government is, and what it has done to merit the confidence of the country. It has been said, the same men did not fill the same offices now as heretofore. It is true some changes have been made, but others which might have been desired have not been made. Now, let the House consider how far those Members of the Cabinet who have been retained are deserving of the confidence of the country. The House was told a few nights since by an hon. Member (Mr. B. Osborne) that even the hon. Member for Aylesbury had not dared to attack the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty. Now, that hon. Gentleman must have a very short memory, for it certainly was surprising to hear such a challenge after what had passed over and over again in this House upon two of the most important subjects which could be mentioned in connection with the war—namely, the question of blockade and the question of the transport service. Has not the question of blockade been managed by the Admiralty in such a way as to cause immense mischief, and was it not one of the principal causes of our present difficulties? As to the transport service, have not hon. Members risen over and over again in this House to complain of the utter confusion which existed in that service and the almost helpless condition of the transport system? How, then, could the hon. Gentleman say that his department, or rather the department presided over by the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), had completely escaped all blame? Then, as to our diplomacy. I do not wish to say anything against the noble Lord who has the conduct of our Foreign Affairs, but, when challenged, it is the duty of every Member to discharge his duty to his constituents and the country without any false delicacy. There have been most serious mistakes made, in the course of this war, which have arisen, as I have always said, and still conscientiously believe, from the mismanagement of our diplomacy. Those melancholy, conferences at Vienna were a perfect disgrace to the diplomatic body. If a bolder diplomacy had been pursued we should not have been in the present state of war. With regard to the diplomatic service, I must remark that many appointments which have been made in it are not worthy of the country. I do not wish to mention names. I will only remind the House of a transaction between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Member of the diplomatic service, and a noble Lord who had retired from that service, whereby the noble Lord who had filled the highest post in the service, but who was from his age past service, was appointed to a mission by what the country called a "job." Such things ought nut to be passed over in silence. Then with regard to the conduct of Ministers representing great departments of State in this House, the people of this country wanted a little more truth —they desired that those who were intrusted with the Government should tell the truth. The country did not want any Member of the Government to give indiscreet answers to indiscreet questions, nor to betray the interests of the country by imprudent disclosures; but, if an hon. Member rose to ask a plain straightforward question, the country expected that a plain straightforward answer should be given, when the question was an important one which the Member was justified in putting. I have frequently asked whether a blockade existed, and was always told it did; but now, months afterwards, the Government admit by a new order that there has been no blockade. An hon. Gentleman had stated that there were only 12,000 effective men left in the Crimea. A right hon. Gentleman immediately answered that the number was 30,000. The Government, however, refused to show any document to support the assertion of the right hon. Gentleman, and afterwards it was admitted that the former was the more correct number. The country would not be satisfied with such a mode of dealing with these great subjects. When it was stated that our army was starving—that our men were feeding on French bread and clothed in French garments, the reply was made by some Member of the Government who told them that the army was revelling in luxuries and perfectly protected from the weather. The country, I again assert, will not be satisfied with those statements. Then, I would ask, what has been the general policy of the Government? Some days before Christmas, Parliament was called together upon an emergency to vote upon two measures, the Militia Bill and the Foreign Enlistment Bill. I will allude, first of all, to the second measure. Hon. Members of that House were called upon to swallow all their declarations made upon the hustings, because they were told the Bill was one of the utmost importance and must be passed at once. The noble Lord, then the leader of the Government in that House (Lord J. Russell), made a speech of two hours' duration to prove that the Bill was warranted both in principle and by precedent. I did not vote on that Bill, and I believe that there are Members who did vote for it who now regret that they have done so. The Bill was passed, but I believe that scarcely a man has been engaged under its provisions. When the Bill was brought forward—giving the Government credit for what it was said they were particularly possessed of—administrative capacity and political foresight—it was supposed that they had the measure cut and dried for immediate operation. Not so; far from it; and even up to this moment it is not known how it is to be carried out, and upon what footing those persons whose services are accepted will be placed. The result is, that France has been engaging men, Germany has been placing her armies on a war footing—if not mobilising them, placing them in what is called a state of readiness for war—by which all the horses necessary, all the ambulances, are prepared, so that the armies could take the field at fourteen days' notice. Thus, then, this country would be unable to get men at all, or, if they did get men, they would be the scum of the Continent. Then with respect to German cavalry, two or three months ago a foreign gentleman suggested to the Government where the best horses could be obtained, but not a step had been taken in consequence of that information, and now the difficulty of obtaining horses was greatly increased, and it was very doubtful whether the Government would be able to obtain such a force at all. I see that the House is asked to permit the Government to raise 14,000 men abroad, upon which point I hope some information will be given, for I do not see any money asked for on that account. Then, with respect to Asia Minor, we have been told that large contracts would be made in that country, but the very gentleman whom I mentioned as best calculated to enter upon those contracts wrote to me only two days ago to say that months ago he offered contracts to the Government, which they refused. He then went to the French Government, who accepted them, and that gentleman was now buying up all the cattle that could be got for transport and consumption on account of the French Government, so that now it would be very difficult for this country to obtain those supplies in that quarter. Last year I suggested to the Government to take measures for the employment of Turks, who were admirable material for soldiers, although I must confess their present officers are bad. Those unfortunate men who have been employed with our army have been thrown into the Crimea without provision for their wants—they have been treated by our soldiers and officers in a manner which I regret exceedingly, and which was unworthy of English soldiers and English officers—they have been driven almost to death by the treatment they have experienced in the Crimea —they were regarded only as beasts of burden—were insulted and even struck by our men. Was this statement true, or was it not? If true, was that conduct sanctioned by the authorities out there, or by those at home—and had any steps been taken to put an end to such a system? I have lately been told that 20,000 Turks have been engaged to serve under British officers, but I cannot vouch for the fact. Such has been the past conduct—the "antecedents," as they were called—of those who compose, with one exception, the pre- sent Cabinet, and it is proper, therefore, to inquire upon what grounds the House can be called upon to declare its confidence in the new Administration. Supposing that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) pressed his Motion for the appointment of a Committee, what is to be done? I have already expressed my opinion of that Committee, to which opinion I adhere. If the Committee were honestly and fairly worked, going into full details, it must, to a certain extent, be injurious to the conduct of public business, more especially so if the conduct of those actually in the Administration is to be canvassed, because there are Members of the present Administration who were also Members of the late Administration, and who were consequently among those who were blamed for the present state of affairs. The House, therefore, would be, by its Committee, sitting in judgment on the present Administration. There is, however, one ground upon which hon. Members, perhaps, would be justified in agreeing to the withdrawal of the hon. and learned Gentleman's Committee. That would be if they saw new, untried men, in power, whilst the noble Lord at the head of the Government held out such a programme as would insure the confidence of the country. Then, no doubt, hon. Members would willingly vote with the Government, but how can they do so now, when they see the Cabinet placed on the same footing as it stood a few days since? It becomes again, then, a vote of confidence in the Administration; and am I to vote confidence to-day in those upon whom I voted censure but a week ago? It is said that there is a new programme; but is there anything in the programme which should induce the House to alter the decision at which it but a few days since arrived? What are the remedies which the noble Lord proposes? Does he propose to sweep away any existing evil; does he propose to cut at the bottom of any existing wrong; does he propose to recall any individual? No; but he proposes a series of Commissions to go out to inquire into the conduct of persons implicated. Surely we have sufficient facts before us to enable us to judge as to that without Commissions. Take the Commissariat for example—we know that we have a gentleman at the head of the Commissariat against whom I have nothing to say except that he is somewhere about seventy years of age, and that he was an eminent officer in the Peninsular war. Beyond that, we have this fact, that the Commissariat is in such a state that the men have been starved for want of food. Are not those two facts sufficient to authorise the recall of the man who is at the head of the Commissariat, without sending out a Commission to inquire who would, perhaps, allow him to continue his office with impunity for a month or two longer? Let hen. Members look at the medical department. It is nearly three months since a Commission was sent out to inquire into the state of the medical staff. The same state of things, however, still exists. Dr. Hall is still at the head of the Medical Staff; and Mr. Lawson, after being reprimanded for conduct which the Commander in Chief characterised as disgraceful, instead of being removed from his office, is sent first to Scutari, where lie is put at the head of the hospital, and has since been removed to Rhodes. At least, I asked a question upon the subject the other night, and not having received an answer, I suppose that statement to be true. Well, but will you gain anything more by the proposed Commission of Inquiry into the Commissariat than you have gained by that Medical Commission? Clearly not. Whom have you appointed to conduct this new Commission? I will not say one word against Sir John M'Neill, for I believe that no man in this country has shown greater ability than he has done. He is a man of the highest ability, one for whom I have the highest respect. I have seen him, and he said, that he went out upon this office because he believed that it was a sacred act of duty to go, and he could not refuse. But Sir John M'Neill is no longer a young man. His health is so bad that he has been compelled to refuse offices of high trust and consideration for which his eminent abilities fully qualified him, and he has now undertaken this kind of second-rate duty of going out to inquire into the misdoings of the Commissariat. But how, I ask, can he go into all the corners of the camp and cold, and damp, and dirt? Why, you cannot ask him to do it. I say that it is physically impossible for him to perform the duty which will be east upon him; and, like every other man employed by the late Government or the present Government—for they are the same thing—Sir John M'Neill will lose his well-earned reputation. He will not be able to cure the evil, and you will place upon his head the fault and the blame which ought to fall on others. You are going to send a Commission also to inquire into the transport system. I surely thought that we had evidence enough of that. Who is at the head of the transports at Balaklava? Captain Christie, an old gentleman upwards of sixty years of age—a gallant gentleman, no doubt; but he probably cannot leave his ship after dark for fear of a catarrh, which might endanger his existence. I know that he was often five or six days without being able to land at Balaklava. Are you surprised, then, that Balaklava harbour should be in the state it was; and do you want a Commission to inquire how old Captain Christie is, or what is the state of Balaklava? Why, there is not a boy in the streets of London who could not answer the last question for you, at all events. What we want are men, and not Commissions. Make up your mind to put. an end to this system at once, and to cut at the real root of the evil. Depend upon it you will be obliged to do it at last, for the country will ere long compel you. When, at the time of the Revolution, the French army was reduced to that state to which our army is reduced, what did the French Assembly do They sent out their own Members, men who had no party considerations, who cared not for aristocratic influences, who went out determined to sacrifice those who were guilty, regardless of persons. They did so. The result was that in a few months that army achieved deeds which were unparalleled in the history of the world. Unless you adopt some more decisive measures than you have hitherto adopted—if you are to be satisfied with Commissions the country will take the matter into their own hands, have their own Commissioners, and compel you to do what the French National Assembly did. The country is sick of these Commissions; the country wants a man; do not let me be told that you cannot find a man—that is an insult to the common sense of the country. If your man, however, must be seventy years old, a member of Brookes's, and one who has always voted with the Government, I grant you that you may not find one of that class and stamp fitted for the duties which are required of him. But, when I see upon all sides of this great country works unequalled in magnitude since the beginning of the world; when I see men who from small means have risen to the position which they now enjoy; when I see around me an amount of money and internal resources which are unequalled in the history of the world—why, to tell me that you cannot find a man to put in order the harbour of Balaklava, or to bring it into a state of efficiency, is, I say, a positive insult to the common sense of this country. If you want the opinion of the army as to who ought to command them, you have only got to go to them with a ballot-box. If you went to the Artillery, for example, and said, "Now, every one write upon a piece of paper the name of the man whom he thinks most competent to command the Artillery, and put it into the ballot box;" there would be but one name come out. I would stake my existence upon it. Why, then, send Commissions to inquire whether this man is capable or that man? If you want to act vigorously do not send out despatches implying censure on a man, and then when you are asked whether he is recalled, say that he is not recalled, but that you have insulted him, and know that he must come home. Is that worthy of the country?—Is it manly?—Is it English? No. If a man is incompetent, recall him; but if he is not incompetent, let the Ministers have the manliness to say that he is not so, and stand by him. If you will do that, I undertake to say that the country will support you to a man. Well, such are the propositions contained in the noble Lord's speech. I have perused it very carefully, and, with the exception of allowing Lord Raglan to be a kind of head scavenger, there appears to be nothing else proposed by the Government. Yes, there is one other thing. You are sending out General Simpson to look after the staff and to make alterations and reports. That is a great mistake. You cannot go on with such a system of divided authority. General Simpson may be the ablest military man that ever lived—he may be the man above all others whom you should have chosen for an appointment of this kind under other circumstances; but, I ask, is it fair to Lord Raglan—is it fair to the public service—to send out a man in the position of General Simpson? If you had in this country a regularly - organised staff, of which General Simpson was the head—having risen through all the grades of that staff, as the head of the staff in France rises—that would be another thing. But you make a new appointment; and you send out a man to look into the conduct of Lord Raglan's staff, the members of which he has appointed himself. Now, has Lord Raglan assented to this, or has he not? Does he admit that his staff is incompetent, or does he not? If he does admit that it is incompetent, why not send home the officers who compose it? But if he does not, how are you insulting him by sending out men to inquire into the state of it. Do not send out all these Commissions. If you must have inquiry, send out a man in whom you have confidence; and if he will not dine every day with the officers of the staff, but will do as I did, and go about and mix with the regimental officers and the soldiers, I will warrant that he will learn in a very few days where the real evil exists. So much for the actual measures suggested by the Government, for I see no other definite proposals beyond these. There is nothing said about the Horse Guards. I thought everybody admitted that that was a great sink of iniquity; and there is one hon. Gentleman in particular, the hon. Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne) who with extraordinary zeal made a most telling speech against the system and his colleagues upon the subject. There is nothing, however, about a thorough reform of the Horse Guards in any proposition of the Government. I do not want to look at mere facts alone, but I want to look at principles—not that I wish the Government to say that in a few hours they will carry out those principles, but that they will be prepared in a general sense to act upon them. There is the Motion of the noble Lord the Member for Huddersfield (Viscount Goderich) for instance, with regard to the system of promotion in the army; surely the Government might have said something about that. Depend upon it the country will not be satisfied with the appointment of sixty sergeants. They are no longer in a humour to take as a concession and a privilege that which they demand as a principle and a right. Unless a radical change is effected in the Horse Guards, depend upon it that the country will not be satisfied with anything that you may do. The Government themselves admit that the state of the army is desperate. I saw with considerable surprise a passage in a speech made recently by the right hon. Gentleman who till lately held the office of Secretary of War, and which is so remarkable that, perhaps, the House will permit me to read it. The right hon. Gentleman says—

"We have had that war to wage by the instrumentality of an army which is one of the finest and noblest that ever left the shores of England— which never met the enemy except to conquer, but which, I regret to say, has met with an enemy more fell and more dangerous to it than the actual foe—that is, disease."

Is there nothing else which it has met with; is there no neglect—no maladministration which it has encountered?

"By which it has been crippled to a fearful extent, and has had to undergo privations and hardships which have been borne with a heroism almost unexampled, but which may be and must be attributed to causes that require searching investigation, in order that the proper remedy may be applied, and that the blame, if blame there be, should fall upon the right shoulders. This inquiry it behoves the Government to lose no time in instituting."

This is rather a strange observation for a Member of the Government who has opposed all inquiry.

"It has been the fashion, perhaps too indiscriminately, to heap blame upon the heads of those who are themselves engaged in carrying on the operations in the Crimea; and I say to those who may think that this is deserved, that there are others besides those who have been engaged in those operations—that there are others besides those whose business it is to minister to the wants of our army who are to blame for these transactions. It is better upon these subjects always to speak plainly the whole truth, however unpalatable it may be, and therefore I say that many of those who have been the most forward to decry what has been done, and to censure those who have been charged with its execution, have been apt to forget how much may be their own share of that blame which ought to be ascribed to those through whose errors those evils have unfortunately happened."

He then goes on to insinuate that it is to the House of Commons refusing to support an army equal to the emergencies of the public service that this state of things is to be attributed. Now, I will willingly meet that right hon. Gentleman upon those grounds. It is very easy to throw the blame from one person to another. The general in command in the Crimea says that he is crippled by the authorities at home. The Government at home say that he does not pursue the instructions which are sent out to him. He throws it upon the regimental officers. The right hon. Gentleman says that the soldiers are to blame. Every one concerned blames every one else, and, at last, all agree to blame the House of Commons. Well, let us investigate the accuracy of that charge. If it be the House of Commons that is to blame, let the people of this country force the House of Commons to do its duty. I, for one, do not believe that the blame is to be attributed to the House of Commons. I see by the Estimates that this House has, year after year, voted sums of money almost sufficient to support the armies of France, or any other of the other great continental Powers. It is not, then, the fault of the House of Commons, but it is to the maladministration of the money which has been voted by the House of Commons that the real blame is to be attributed. I do not believe that the most urgent Reformer has ever objected to a vote taken for a good purpose — no man objects to such votes; but what is objected to, is the system of favouritism and the general system at the Horse Guards. If the noble Lord at the head of the Government intends to act on similar principles, how can he ask for the confidence and support of those who feel that all this misery, that the heartrending and horrible condition of our army, is mainly owing to the state of things at the Horse Guards? I will tell the House where the mischief lies. There is, in the first place, a general fear of taking any responsibility; every one is afraid to act with vigour, and, with the permission of the House, I will mention two anecdotes to illustrate my position: One day, as I was going up to the lines of the army, in company with a gallant officer, we met a number of carts containing men suffering from disease and wounds, some of whom had actually died on the passage down, and with that convoy there were only two or three guards—privates of the line. The gallant officer who was with me was astounded that there was no medical man in charge of so many wounded and sick men. He went and requested Lord Raglan to see that convoy. Lord Raglan expressed that indignation which every honourable and humane man must feel at such a circumstance, and he instituted an inquiry. It was found that the medical man and officers had neglected their duty, and Lord Raglan published a general order, in which he stated that the conduct of certain persons had been disgraceful, but he added that he would spare their feelings and not mention their names. I can honour and reverence those feelings in a man, but I cannot honour or reverence such feelings in a general. What was the result? Why, I will tell the House. Two days afterwards, some of the marines having been landed from the fleet and put under the command of the Colonel who had the charge of Balaklava, they were employed upon the same duty as the troops of the line. At night, while on guard, one of the men was seized with cholera, and was taken to the hospital, but the medical man refused to leave his bed, saying that the man could not be admitted, as he was a marine. He was then taken to another hospital, where he was also refused admittance, and as the guard could not leave their post, the poor fellow was left upon the shore to die. That circumstance came to the notice of Lord Raglan, and what course did he adopt? He condemned the medical officers, but said that he had recently issued a general order reflecting on the conduct of medical officers, and if he so soon issued another the confidence of the army in the medical staff would be destroyed. I do not want to say a single word against Lord Raglan. I believe Lord Raglan to be an amiable and a good man; but what I say is, that it is not for amiable and good men alone to command armies. The men to command armies should be men of iron will and unflinching determination—men ready to sacrifice relations, private friends—even all they hold dear in the world, if it be necessary to do so, in order to perform what is an imperative duty. If you go on in the way you have commenced, depend upon it—before very few months have elapsed there will be but a very small remnant of that gallant army. Commissions will only increase the evil, and shelter those who ought to be called to account for their misdeeds. Send out a man of vigour who will cut at the root of the evil, who will spare no one or nothing if he deems it to be his duty to cut it down. If you do so at once, there may be a chance of saving the survivors of your gallant army; if you do not, they will all perish, and on your heads be their blood. I have been told by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies that the British Army is not accustomed to great campaigns, and that we cannot, therefore, do that which can be done by the French. Well, Sir, that is not true. I do not, mean to impugn the right hon. Gentleman's veracity; but what I mean is, that the assumption is false. Are not our campaigns and battles in India greater than those of the French in Algeria? Has there been a battle in Algeria to be compared with that of Sobraon, or a campaign greater than that of Affghanistan? Are the services of men engaged in such campaigns to be surpassed by those of men who have spent their lives in idleness? Through a mean and paltry jealousy you do not employ men who have saved your colonies, who have maintained the dignity of the country, and who have safely extricated armies from situations of great peril. And why not? Because they are not in the service of the Crown, but take pay from the East India Company. And for that reason you pass by men who have led their troops to glory, who have seen great campaigns, and you send out men of seventy years of age, who have never seen war, and who scarcely know how to put a regiment through its evolutions, but who happen to possess Parliamentary influence or family connection. Such a state of things in the present age is monstrous—it is intolerable. I am told that by taking this course I am pulling down the aristocracy. That is not the case. I want to save the aristocracy. What did one of the ablest men in this country write three months ago? He wrote, "If this army perishes, depend upon it it will be the greatest blow ever struck at the aristocracy of this country." This country is coming to the opinion that you have sacrificed its dearest interests because you will not allow men of talent to come between you and your nobility, and you have raised a voice that will take more trouble to allay than you may think. It is said by some that the Times is raising this cry, as if there were magic in Printing-house Square. Perhaps Charles I. said that the revolution which he thought was ruining the country was the result of the Puritan preachers, not seeing that it was the revolution which made the Puritan preachers. It was not Rousseau or Voltaire who made the general feeling of the French people, but it was the general feeling of the French people that made them; and so now, it is not the Times which is causing the public indignation of the people of this country, but it is the public indignation of the people of this country which has forced the Times to adopt the course it has adopted. No, Sir; it is not the Times which has caused this indignation, it is the mismanagement of the Administration of this country which has taken place. Do you think that the Times would be what it is if it met your views—if it deceived the country as you deceive the country? If you want to have the position the Times has—if you want to be backed by the people of this country—do as the Times has done. Come forward boldly, and tell us what you yourselves think of the present state of affairs, not what you want others to think. There are many other points upon which I should like to hear the opinion of the Government. We are told—and I believe the statement to be well founded—that a noble Lord the leader of the late Govern- ment in this House is going on a mission to Vienna; that he is to take a place once filled by Lord Castlereagh, but is he going to advocate the same principles as Lord Castlereagh? Are the "four points" to be the basis of negotiations? Do the Government now take the same views they took a few weeks ago, when we were told that the Cabinet was under the influence of the supporters of the head of the late Government? The noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown might have told us whether he was willing to accept peace on any terms—whether the country was going to engage in prolonged hostilities—whether it was proposed to engage on our behalf oppressed nationalities—whether the Circassians would be assisted by us or not—he might, in short, have conveyed some notion to time House of his foreign policy. The question is of such immense importance that we have a right to ask the noble Lord for plain and distinct information upon these points. How is our position with regard to France? I do not wish to enter into any subject which it would be dangerous to touch upon in a public assembly at a time like the present; but I would ask, does it never strike you that the people of England are placed in a position to bring upon them, on the part of our neighbours, feelings which we most dislike—feelings of contempt? Do you not feel that the country may bitterly rue what has happened, not on account of our own interest, but on account of time impression—the intolerable impression—made by it upon those who are, perhaps, enemies at heart, although they may now appear in the guise of friends? Does the Government forget that we occupy this position in the face of the world, with the eyes of all Europe upon us, and then do they hesitate in taking the necessary steps, or do they permit private, party, or family considerations to fetter their course of action? To do so would be to become a laughingstock to the whole world, and to show that we can no longer hold time high place we have held, but that we shall otter an easy prey to those who may seek our destruction. I hope the noble Lord will not consider me impertinent if I refer to Ids present position. No man had more general sympathy throughout England, or throughout Europe, than the noble Lord. As I have previously told hint, I have heard his name repeated in every variety of form throughout Europe; that came was a magic name, as the representative of tile great principles of liberty. That reputation was so bright that even the betrayed Sicilians and the betrayal of the cause of Italy in 1848 could not tarnish it; it had passed through every storm unblemished. He rose as no man hail ever risen before, and the whole of this House and the country were ready to support the noble Lord when he took office, because it was felt that in a moment of national difficulty he had undertaken a national task. Will the people of England now be satisfied with what has been done? It is the nature of the English people to be patient and long suffering; but the time comes when public feeling, with the force of a torrent, causes itself to be heard. It was so in the case of Roman Catholic Emancipation, of the Reform Bill, and of free trade. You may say now that the people are quiet, that the lake is still, but you have no security that it will continue so. A storm will arise, and, unless you do something to prevent it, not only you, but others besides you, will be shipwrecked. Sir, the state of public feeling at this moment I believe to be one which should be viewed with the greatest anxiety and pain by those who sit in this House. The country is not satisfied. The country, irrespective of men's qualifications at this moment, I believe, want to see whether they cannot be governed by something new. They do not wish to see the same parties in power over and over again. I have no doubt that a Cavendish in the Cabinet is a very important thing, but the public think more of 20,000 lives than they do of a Cavendish. It will not do. The people of England want thorough and I complete reform, and, if the noble Lord had thought of the wishes of Englishmen, we should have had a Cabinet which at least might have appealed to the House of Commons with some confidence for its support. I entreat the noble Lord to reflect once more, for his own sake and fur the sake of the people of this country. By continuing m his present course he will lose all confidence and all support. By turning from it he will save his own reputation and save this great nation.

said, he was not in the least surprised at the general feelings of indignation which prevailed out of doors as to the state of our army in the East after the manner in which it had been spoken of by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London and the lamentable accounts which reached this country through other channels. He thought, too, it was greatly to the credit of the country that this feeling had not been confined merely to those who had friends and relations in the army there, but that it was universal. No matter whether those near and dear to us formed part of that army, we all naturally shared in its glories and sympathised with it in its distresses and its misfortunes. We asked, "Can these things be? Can a British army, almost within sight of its own fleet, be suffering every privation and be wanting the common necessaries of life?" It was their duty first to inquire into the cause of these evils, and then to condemn the conduct of those through whose misconduct they had been brought about. The House of Commons, however, had reversed that principle. They had condemned in the first instance, and now they proposed to inquire. They had sacrificed a Prime Minister and a Secretary for War; and he could not, for the life of him, understand why the rest of the Cabinet should not have shared the same fate. He had voted against the Motion for inquiry; not as a mark of confidence in the Government, because he had not supported that Government, except to give it every assistance in his power to carry on the war. He believed that evils did exist in the management of the army, but his vote on that occasion was not one of confidence in the Government, but it was a vote of want of confidence in the tribunal to which they proposed to intrust this inquiry. He thought a Committee of Inquiry on this particular subject about the worst tribunal they could possibly create. He believed it to be unconstitutional, and, moreover, he believed it to be impracticable; and not only that, but he thought that House principally to blame in those transactions. The causes of the evils which were allowed to exist, and under which the army was suffering, were so plain and evident that no Committee of that House was wanted to inquire into them. The Government commenced a great war with inadequate means, and with those inadequate means they attempted more than any army could possibly execute. The cause of those evils was to be found in this—that from Lord Raglan down to the least drummer-boy in the army they had been called upon to perform a great deal more than they could carry out. The cause of the great mortality which had prevailed was that the men had been overworked and underfed. This was entirely borne out by the circumstance of the disproportion between the deaths of the officers and of the men. The noble Lord the Secretary for War said the other day that he could not account for this disproportion, but it was easily accounted for, and proved the truth of what he was advancing. The officers naturally were not subject to manual labour, and through their own greater command of resources had been better fed than the men. The consequence was, that the mortality among them had been less. This was fully confirmed by the accounts that came home as to the condition of the troops. The climate was healthy enough for those who had plenty of blankets and warm clothing, but to those who perhaps had only one blanket the climate was killing. Overwork, and want of proper food and proper clothing were, then, the cause of the sufferings of our army. It was next necessary to inquire to what these evils were owing. During the whole of last Session, night after night, it was pressed upon the Government to send out more troops to the East. Now, his impression was, that the first great mistake arose from sending out too many troops—more than the reduced state of our peace establishment admitted of. Whether this wish to send out as large a number of men as possible resulted from false pride or from jealousy of our noble allies he would not pause to inquire. The Government sent out in the first instance 27,000 men. To do that they were obliged to encourage volunteering from one regiment of the line into another. By-and-bye they were obliged to send out those regiments, and the consequence was that they went from this country with their efficiency seriously impaired. For example, three battalions of the Guards were sent out. In order to do this they had to draw strongly upon the others; and so, when they wanted to send out reinforcements, they found great difficulty in making up the numbers of another battalion. Now, it would have been far wiser, in the first instance, to have sent out some 10,000 or 15,000 men, and only to have attempted what some 10,000 or 15,000 men were able to accomplish. Instead of doing so, the Government sent out a considerably larger number, without corresponding power in the Commissariat and the medical departments. Now, what had happened with regard to our army in the Crimea? After the glorious battle of Alma the allied forces appeared before Sebastopol. They were at that time nearly equal in point of number, and the siege operations were divided between them. Their great object was to make the attack as soon as possible, before the Russians had received reinforcements. But after the battle of Inkerman our position was very different. The English troops were conducting the same amount of siege works as the French, with a daily diminishing army, while our allies, with their superior numbers, were able so to spare their men that they probably passed only one night out of four in the trenches, while our soldiers passed three out of four there. Lord Raglan then wrote home for reinforcements, and reinforcements were sent out, but they were composed of such young and unseasoned men that they rapidly died off or became unfit for service. That, no doubt, suggested to the Government the idea of looking elsewhere for men fitted for immediate service in the field; and they proposed the Foreign Enlistment Bill. What was the course taken by that House upon that Bill? Why, they made it a party question. Hon. Members took advantage of the natural feeling existing in this country against the employment of foreigners instead of Englishmen, and they endeavoured to procure the rejection of the Bill. Now, he was as much opposed as anybody could be to employing foreigners, but when Englishmen could not be procured, and it was absolutely necessary to get soldiers somewhere, he would take them wherever he could possibly lay his hands upon them. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had talked about the blame of the existing evils being bandied about from one to another. Now, as to the army itself, he (General Peel) thought it was impossible to speak in sufficiently high terms of it, whether it was of its bravery in the field, or of the patience and endurance with which it had borne great sufferings and privations elsewhere. Nobody found fault with the army. But then hon. Members turned round and abused the system. Among them was the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty, and, after what that hon. Gentleman had said, it certainly seemed surprising he should remain for one instant in office. Now he (General Peel) was of opinion that, as far as our regimental system had gone, and for the purposes for which it was applied, it was perfect. As far as our regimental system was concerned and our regimental officers he did not believe any army in the world could claim superiority to ours. But then it was said we had no able generals and no competent staff. Why, did not the House believe that here again it was our own fault? Did they not believe that these men who made such good regimental officers would make equally good generals and equally competent staff officers? To complain under such circumstances would be as if a man who kept only a gig should turn round upon his servant and complain because he could not drive four-in-hand. We never gave regimental officers an opportunity of qualifying themselves for more responsible duties, and, therefore, it was scarcely fair to complain of them. He implored the House to hesitate before sacrificing a system which, as far as it had been called upon, had, he believed, perfectly succeeded. The fact was that, if England was going to rival all the great military nations of the Continent, if we were going to pit ourselves against nations who could muster their hundreds of thousands of men, we must go to work in a very different manner. However much we admired a representative Government, the House might depend upon it they would never find anything equal to a despotic Government in carrying on a war. What General Bosquet said of the English cavalry charge at Balaklava might be said of the general result of our whole military system in the Crimea, "it is magnificent, but it is not war." He contended this war could not be adequately carried on by a representative Government. He was willing, for one, to make every sacrifice and use every possible exertion to bring the war to a happy and peaceful conclusion; and as soon as that end was obtained the sooner they returned to their peaceful position the better.

Sir, I should be the last man to blame anybody who should bring under the notice of this House any part of our administrative system, whether it be at home or abroad, which he may think has failed adequately to perform its functions, and which he may think ought, therefore, in any way to be improved. But, Sir, I do protest against the language which we have heard this evening from the hon. Member for Aylesbury, who, while he performs what he thinks a public duty, in pointing out what he considers to be errors and defects in the management of the army, says we have disgraced our country, tells us that we are the laughingstock of Europe, and has thought proper to mingle with his observations and recommendations what I must call vulgar declamation against the aristocracy of this country. Sir, I lament as deeply as the hon. Member or any man the sufferings of our brave army in the Crimea. I am as ready as any man to admit that those sufferings have in part been aggravated by a want of arrangement, and a want of proper management on the part of those who have had the administration of the details by which the wants of the army ought to have been provided for, but I must, in passing, say that it is a great mistake to suppose that these sufferings have been entirely confined to the British troops. Without speaking of our allies, who have certainly endured a great deal, I may say that I know, from pretty good authority, that in the camp of the Russians there are no less than 35,000 men in hospital, sick and wounded, in consequence of the results of the campaign. I say, then, that these sufferings, however they may have been increased by the want of arrangement and the want of proper management, have arisen in a great degree, if not principally, from causes beyond the power of man to control, considering the nature of the service in which the men have been engaged, and the inclemency of the weather to which they have been exposed. So far from feeling that the country stands lower in the estimation of the world in consequence of what has passed in the prosecution of this war, when I look, Sir, to the matchless bravery of the troops, when I look to the victories which they have achieved, and when I look to the share which the gentry and aristocracy of the country have taken in those conflicts, I say that, instead of feeling ashamed that my country stands lower in the estimation of the world, I feel proud of events from the merit of which the hon. Gentleman seeks to detract. Talk to me of the aristocracy of England! Why, look to that glorious charge of the cavalry at Balaklava —look to that charge, where the noblest and the wealthiest of the land rode foremost, followed by heroic men from the lowest classes of the community, each rivalling the other in bravery, neither the peer who led nor the trooper who followed being distinguished the one from the other. In that glorious band there were the sons of the gentry of England; leading were the noblest of the land, and following were the representatives of the people of this country. I say, if any instance be required to show that all classes of the country, from the highest to the lowest, enjoy in common those noblest qualities which dignify mankind, I would appeal to that gallant charge as an immortal proof of the glory of this country. Well, Sir, the hon. Gentleman has certainly followed a line of argument which has exceedingly surprised me. The hon. Gentleman, I believe, has consented to be a Member of the Committee proposed by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck), and he will of course vote for the appointment of that Committee. But what was the line of his argument? One of the lines of his argument was, that we, forsooth, are trifling with the interests of the country, trifling with the sufferings, and trifling with the sacred lives of the army, by sending out Commissions to the Crimea with full powers to act, to set right and to reorganise. And what is it he recommends? He approves the appointment of a Committee to examine witnesses, and send forth their Report in a blue book; and in preference to sending out Commissioners—some, indeed, have already gone out with full powers to inquire into and rectify, if possible, the very abuses and want of arrangement of which he complains—the hon. Gentleman proposes the example of the Committee of Safety of the French Revolution, and would have Commissioners sent out with powers to execute summary justice. Why, you might take the hon. Gentleman at his word, and if you were to add this instruction to the Committee, extending its functions, so that the Members thereof proceed instantly to the Crimea, and remain there during the rest of the Session, perhaps that would be satisfactory. Then, again, the hon. Gentleman says we have in some instances abstained from obtaining supplies from Asia Minor, which the French have been enabled to procure. I protest against this invidious distinction being drawn between two portions of the allied army, but I apprehend that Asia Minor may be found sufficiently large to furnish provisions both for English and French. Indeed, as I stated on a former occasion, arrangements have already been made to secure supplies from Sinope and its neighbourhood for the army in the Crimea. The hon. Gentleman, in his own argument, furnishes us with strong reasons against the conclusion to which he wishes the House to arrive. The hon. Gentleman says, the Government ought to have stated to the House what are the terms which my noble Friend the Member for the City of London is about to propose in the negotiations about to take place at Vienna. Why, Sir, this is the first time I ever heard it asked that we should, before entering into negotiations, explain fully to the adverse parties all the conditions we may be willing to ask, and all the conditions which, under certain circumstances, we may be willing to accept. I think if that was to be the course of negotiations which the hon. Gentleman might be appointed to conduct, I would much rather intrust them into the hands of my noble Friend the Member for the City of London. I think, if the course of policy advocated by the hon. Member were acted upon we should justly lay ourselves open to censure. But, Sir, the hon. Gentleman says that I have, between Friday night and Monday afternoon, fallen greatly in the confidence of the country, and the hon. Gentleman says that arises from the fact that I have not recommended to the Queen a Cabinet of a different complexion. Now, Sir, the hon. Gentleman omitted to state exactly how that Cabinet ought to be composed; but I hope he may have the goodness, in succession to the members of the proposed Committee, to add also the members of the proposed Cabinet. The House would then be able to judge between the Cabinet of the hon. Member and the Cabinet which it has been my duty to propose to the House and the country. Sir, I am not afraid of the denunciations thus made. I am confident that when the people of this country see a Government constituted upon the failure of two other attempts to form a Government, they will feel that the men who have thus undertaken the conduct of affairs have done so because they thought that the country ought not to be left without a Government. They will consider that those who have formed a Government have acted from a sense of public duty; they will believe that they have undertaken the conduct of affairs from honourable motives, and they will give the Government credit for a desire to perform their duties so as to advance the best interests of the country. It is hardly likely, from what may have been said betwixt Friday night and Monday morning, that the public would change their opinion, if it was an opinion such as the hon. Member says existed only at the close of last week. Sir, the Government presented themselves to the country for the purpose of carrying on to the best of their means, with adequate energy and vigour, a war in which the country found itself called upon to engage. We presented ourselves to the country with an earnest and honest intention of availing ourselves of the opportunity—if the opportunity be real—which has now offered itself of terminating the war by fair and honourable means. We will not present to the country, as a means of that end, a peace which we do not think safe and honourable to the country, which we do not think calculated to secure this country from the recurrence of those events which have compelled us to draw the sword, and which the country would not be glad to accept from any Administration. If we are enabled to accomplish such an end, we shall rejoice at having been the instruments of saving the country from the further efforts and sacrifices which the continuance of war would demand. But if, on the other hand, it should appear that the adversary with whom we are contending has not yet been brought to that temper of mind which will induce him to consent to those conditions upon which permanent peace can for the future be established, why then, Sir, we shall appeal with confidence to the country for support in those greater exertions which a continuance of the contest may impose upon us as a necessity; and, whatever may be said by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, or by others who may rise after me in debate, I feel confident that this country will give its support to a Government which honourably and honestly stands forward to do its duty in a moment of emergency—a Government which has not forced itself upon the country by any vote or Motion in this House, or by any Parliamentary manœuvre—a Government which has arisen in consequence of the failure of others who might, if they had chosen, have undertaken the work, but who shrank from doing it at the time when the offer was made to them. I do not mention this as reflecting blame upon them, but simply as the fact which led to the formation of the present Government. Two endeavours having been made to form a Government, and those two endeavours having failed, I should have thought myself a degraded man if I had not undertaken the task. I feel proud of the support which my hon. and noble Friends have afforded me. I throw myself with confidence upon the generosity of the country and of Parliament, and I am convinced that, if we do our duty—and we shall do our duty as long as we have the support of the country to enable us to do it—if we are enabled by the support of the country to do that which we conceive to be our duty, in spite of temporary reverses, in spite of the momentary aspect of affairs—we shall succeed in carrying matters to a successful issue, be it for peace now, or be it for peace hereafter; but, whether by negotiations now, or whether by force of arms afterwards, we shall be able to place this country upon that proud footing of future security which its greatness and its power so well entitle it to occupy.

said, he could not agree with the opinions which had been expressed by hon. Members that the failures which had taken place were in any way to be attributed to the want of means or resources on the part of this country. He considered that if those resources had been properly managed they were more than sufficient for the purpose they were intended to effect, and he thought the country had a right to demand some explanation of the reason why, when ample stores were accumulated within six miles of the camp, 20,000 of our soldiers had been lost for want of those supplies which might easily have been afforded them. The most ordinary precautions would have sufficed to place those resources which England had exhausted herself to furnish within reach of our army. No explanation had been given of the reason why those supplies had not been afforded; no punishment had been inflicted upon those to whom blame might attach; no inquiry had been made as to the reason why the stores which had been collected remained at Balaklava, while our troops were perishing for the want of them at a few miles' distance. He considered that the country had a right to insist upon some inquiry being made as to the cause of that failure. Not only had there been gross mismanagement in the Commissariat Department, but also with regard to the medical stores. What was the cause of the scandalous insufficiency of medical aid provided for the troops? How was it, when a medical officer was censured by his commanding officer on one day, that the next he was appointed to a situation of great trust? These were matters requiring strict investigation, which, thanks to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, there was a chance they might now receive. He did not concur in the opinion of the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) that a country with a representative Government was ill adapted for carrying on war successfully, for the proposition was contradicted by the experience of European States. The most successful wars had been those in which the energies of free countries had been directed against overwhelming despotism. In- deed, the history of the United Provinces and of this country afforded a direct refutation of the hon. and gallant Member's doctrine. If a free country placed confidence in its Government, the people were entitled to ask how that confidence had been justified, and, when they found that the national efforts were unavailing, they had a right to inquire whether the confidence they had reposed in the Government had been abused. Would any one deny that such a right of inquiry had been exercised on previous occasions most beneficially in this country? What were the calamities of Walcheren compared with those which had recently occurred? Was there ever a time when inquiry was more loudly demanded and was more imperative than at present? He entertained no hostility to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Indeed, there was much in that noble Lord's past conduct which he regarded with respect and admiration. He looked upon the noble Lord as having been for many years the champion of freedom and of representative institutions, but at the same time he could not conceal from himself that, with only one or two exceptions, the Government of the noble Lord was precisely that which the House had already condemned by a large majority. The noble Lord ought not to be surprised if hon. Members felt some hesitation in now reposing confidence in a Government which had been condemned by a large majority of that House only three weeks ago. Notwithstanding that, however, he would give the noble Lord the best support in his power so long as the war was carried on with firmness, vigour, and honesty of purpose, yet, seeing how the offices of the Government were filled, he could not avoid confessing that he could not place implicit confidence in the noble Lord's Administration. The right hon. Gentleman who was Secretary at War in the late Government was now Secretary for the Colonies; but he was still a Member of the Cabinet, and must, therefore, be consulted about the arrangements for carrying on the war. When he (Mr. Phillimore) recollected that that right hon. Gentleman had censured the regimental officers, and had praised the staff—when he recollected his plausible statements and the uniform contradiction those statements had received from facts, and saw him still holding an office of great importance and consideration, he felt it impossible to place full and implicit confidence in the present Government. At the same time, he would not offer any factious opposition to the Government, but would give his best support to any measures which appeared to him calculated to bring about what they all concurred in desiring—a just and honourable peace.

said, he was ready to support the Government in carrying on the war, and the more so because the noble Lord at the head of the present Administration possessed to an extraordinary degree the confidence of the public as a War Minister; but he (Mr. Warner) could not think that the explanations given by the noble Lord the other night and the remarks he had just made would be entirely satisfactory to the country. The unfortunate events which had taken place in the East had caused great excitement throughout the country, and the people had placed confidence in the noble Lord because they believed he was prepared to act with energy, and to cut up by the root whatever in the existing system was found to be defective. The duty of the Government was not to make a few paltry reforms, which was all the noble Lord had suggested, but to reorganise and reconstruct a new army in the place of that which we had lost. He feared that the proposals of the noble Lord would not realise the hopes which the nation had formed upon his accession to power. There were evidently some misapprehensions which existed with reference to the war, and upon which he (Mr. Warner) wished to say a few words. They were constantly told that England was not a military nation, but how was this when the House of Commons every year voted supplies for the army about equal in amount to those by which the French army was maintained? France was one of the first military Powers in the world, and it was not the fault of the House of Commons if England was not a military Power; yet it had been considered necessary to call Parliament together at an unusually early period in order to authorise the enlistment of 15,000 foreign troops; our artillery, which had been the subject of so much boasting, had proved to be inferior to that of other armies; and our cavalry, he feared, had been virtually annihilated by the unfortunate mistake committed at Balaklava. These misfortunes, however, had not been brought upon the army by any false economy on the part of Parliament, therefore he must object to those observations that had been made by more than one hon. Member that the disasters in the Crimea were the fault of Parliament. They were told that the Turks, when well officered, were good soldiers, and he wished to know why, in the midst of all their need of soldiers, they had heard nothing of arming a Turkish contingent, and of placing it under European officers? He considered that the greater part of our misfortunes might be traced directly to the system of patronage and purchase of promotions that prevailed in the army; there was too broad a line of demarcation drawn between the officers and the privates, and no chance was afforded to the men of rising by their good conduct and bravery. If the Government desired to encourage a military spirit among the men, they must do so by holding out the same hopes and rewards of the same kind, though in different degrees, to all men in the army. He had voted for the Committee of inquiry because he believed it was absolutely necessary for some body of men or for some man, to inquire into the causes of the misfortunes and sufferings of the army. From what the noble Lord at the head of the Government had said, it appeared that he would undertake to inquire into those grievances, and the noble Lord was certainly in a better position to do so than the House of Commons could be. Whether he should give his vote in favour of the nomination of the Committee would depend on the promises which the noble Lord might make, who, he hoped, would pledge himself to the House not only to institute a searching inquiry into these grievances, but also that he would endeavour to bring to justice those who had been the cause of them.

said, he had long been of opinion that the whole system at the Horse Guards was rotten throughout, and if anything could render it more disgraceful and injurious to the country, it was the system of purchase that at present prevailed. The jobbery throughout these transactions was disgraceful in the extreme and in many instances they were in direct violation of the Queen's regulations, which stated that only a certain sum should be paid for promotions, but a considerably larger premium was often payed beyond the sum fixed. He considered that so long as this system was carried on—so long as merit and long service were not duly rewarded—they never would obtain efficient officers. He believed that in the ranks would be found men who, though, perhaps, not so well educated, or born with a silver spoon in their mouths, had yet in them sterling qualities which would make them good soldiers, enable them to take a high position in their profession, and to advance the efficiency of the service and the interests of the country more than those men whose only qualification for their positions appeared to be that they were born with handles to their names.

said, that the House had just heard from the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) many strictures on the manner in which the army was officered and affairs conducted in the East; but it appeared to him (Mr. Murrough) that not only there, but at home, the country was in the state of Sinbad—ridden by old men. This was not only the case with the army, but they had a Government conducted by men who were past the age when men were adequate to the calls of public life. When the Ministry was formed only three noble Lords were sent for, as if the monopoly of the talent of the country belonged to noble Lords. He was satisfied a noble Lord might be a man of the same capacity and talent as an ordinary man, when at a mature age, and capable of conducting public business; but when he was passed that age, not only was he an old man, but he was worse, and rendered more incapable when his hands were tied with red tape. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton was three days ago that which he was not now—master of the position; and if he had thrown aside precedents and prejudices he might have formed from below the gangway on either side of the House a better and a stronger Government than they had had in that House for twenty years. There might not, perhaps, have been in it the name of a Russell, an Elliot, or a Cavendish, but they would have had men representing and possessing the confidence of large consituencies. The noble Lord had neglected the chance of having the hon. Member for Aylesbury by his side, and now the hon. Member was at his back. If the noble Lord fell, borne down by a Government which this House had condemned, he had only himself to thank, and he would not be pitied by the country.

Sir, in proceeding to ask the Committee to agree to the votes of money which are necessary to cover what the Government considers will be the probable expenditure on account of the Army in the course of the ensuing financial year, I must beg their indulgence, on account of the very short period which has elapsed since I entered upon the duties of my present office, and which has barely allowed me sufficient time to become acquainted with the more prominent features of the contents of these Estimates, much less with their minor and minuter points. I also feel that it is no easy task for any one to render intelligible to the Committee the complicated details of a service like the army, requiring, even in ordinary years, and under ordinary circumstances, to be kept on foot by the appropriation of a considerable portion of the whole annual expenditure which is authorised by Parliament, and which in these Estimates has been swollen to dimensions unusually large, but not, I believe, larger than are commensurate with the magnitude of the operations in which the country is now engaged. I have further to regret the absence, from indisposition, of my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, under whose superintendence the Estimates have been framed. I need not observe that I had relied very much on the presence of my right hon. Friend, because of his great familiarity with the subject, and because these Estimates had been prepared under his especial direction. The Estimates for the ensuing financial year differ from those of the current year in more than one respect. In the first place, the number of men which the Government ask the Committee to allow to be borne upon the establishment of the army greatly exceeds that which has been voted for the last year. Then, again, there is a very large augmentation in very many of those services which have always formed a part of the administration of the British Army, and have always been included in the Estimates; but, in addition to those causes of difference, the Committee will observe that these Estimates show the creation of new departments which have never before appeared therein, or been submitted to the sanction of Parliament. I will refer, for instance, to such a department as the land transport service, which it has been found from painful experience necessary to establish. The first Vote to which I shall call the attention of the Committee has reference to the number and strength of the army. Setting aside the number of the regiments of infantry and cavalry of the line which are employed in the East Indies, and paid for by the Government of India, not reckoning also the estimated force of the foreign corps which is to be raised under the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed at the commencement of the Session, and further, excluding from the present calculation the number of men who form the militia regiments which have been embodied, and for which provision has been made, the number of men which we propose to be voted for the service of the ensuing year is 178,645. When my right hon. Friend the late Secretary at War introduced the original Estimates of last year, he stated that he was desirous that the House should first have the opportunity of discussing the policy of those measures in which the Government had been concerned previous to the breaking out of the war, and that after such discussion had taken place he would then introduce further Estimates to provide for placing the army upon a war footing, and he introduced two Supplementary Estimates, which, together, provided for an addition to the force of the army of nearly 30,000 men. Comparing the Estimates of the present with the original Estimates of the last year, there is an increase of about 66.000 men; but, as compared with the whole Estimates of the year, there is an increase of but 35,869, exclusive of 14,950 men in the foreign corps proposed to be raised. The manner in which this increased number of men is proposed to be spread over the effective strength of the army is as follows:—In the first place, there will be an addition of 1,950 men to the Foot Guards. The cavalry also will be increased by 3,470 men. The remainder is to be spread over forty-one regiments of infantry of the line. A battalion of 2,000 strong is to be added to the 60th Rifles, making that regiment one of three battalions, and a battalion of the same strength is to be added to the rifle corps, making three battalions also in that corps. In the course of last year, every regiment, exclusive of those in India, was raised from an establishment of 1,000 to 1,200 men, and directions have now been given for further raising the force of those regiments—fortyone in number—now serving in the Crimea, from 1,200 to 2,000 men each. With respect to the distribution of this force, there are ten regiments of cavalry and forty-one regiments of infantry of the line in the Crimea, and the remainder of the regiments, exclusive of those in India, are employed in the Colonies and the military stations in the Mediterranean. It will doubtless be satisfactory to the Committee to be informed that in the course of the past year a considerable reduction has been made in the number of troops maintained by this country in the Colonies. There has been an addition of one battalion to the force in the Australian Colonies, but the Governments of those colonies are called upon to pay for that increased force, and credit is taken in the Estimates for a sum of I2,000l., for the cost of that battalion. The whole sum payable by the Australian Colonies for the military force maintained there, is 30,000l. The force at the Cape still continues very large, and it has not been thought advisable at present, considering the state of the Eastern frontier, to make any reductions in the number of troops at present stationed in that colony. A very considerable reduction has been made in the West India and British North American Colonies. There were formerly three regiments in the West India Colonies; there are now only two. In the British North American Colonies, last year, there were six regiments—namely, four in Canada and two in the Lower Provinces. There is now only one regiment in Canada, exclusive of the Canadian Rifles, and one in the Lower Provinces. It must be satisfactory to know that the reduction was made almost entirely at the invitation of the colonists themselves. The people of Canada have expressed their deep sympathy with this country in the cause in which it is engaged; and with regard to the force in Nova Scotia, the Legislature of that province has presented an Address to the Crown expressing its readiness to undertake the external defence of that country, should the Government find it necessary to withdraw the troops at present stationed there. Of the two regiments in the British North American Colonies, one is now at Quebec and the other at Halifax. The whole amount of reduction in those Colonies is about 3,000 men, representing an expenditure of from 90,000l. to 100,000l. The next Vote to which I will call the attention of the Committee includes the charge for the daily pay and daily allowance, which for the number of men I have mentioned, will amount in the course of the year to 4,500,000l., being an increase over last year, if the Supplementary Estimate of 800,000l. be not taken into account, of about 1,500,000l. I am informed that since last year there has been no alteration in the rates of pay of the different ranks in the army with one exception, namely, that of the colonels of regiments. If hon. Members will compare the rates of pay to be allowed to colonels next year with those allowed last year, they will find an increase ranging from 600l. to the sum of 1,000l. in the instance of the colonels of the Foot Guards. Now, this additional pay allowed to colonels has been granted, I may say, in conformity with the recommendation of a Committee of this House, and has reference to an alteration which has taken place since last year in the mode of clothing the men of the different regiments. This alteration I will explain more fully when I come to the subject of the clothing of the army; but I will merely now observe that it is in consequence of the colonels ceasing to derive a pecuniary gain from the clothing of their men that a fixed addition has been made to their pay of 600l. in regard to the colonels of the infantry of the line; which, however, will be liable to be hereafter reduced, in the event of vacancies occurring to the sum of 500l. I have stated that the force to be maintained for the service of the year ensuing is 178,645 men, and that that is an increase upon the establishment, as voted last year in the original and Supplementary Estimates, of 35,869 men. Now, that force will, of course, require to be recruited during the year; but, in addition to that, seeing that the effective strength of the army is not equal to the establishment as voted by Parliament last year, it is discovered that it will be necessary to recruit 40,000 men in the course of this next year in order to bring the army up to the proposed strength of its establishment. Provision has, therefore, been made in the Estimates for recruiting up to that number. We have also to add about 20,000 men to supply vacancies which are estimated to be caused by casualties in the course of the year, so that provision is required to be made for the recruiting of 60,000 men. The estimated cost of raising this number of men is 513,000l., being an excess over that of the Estimate of the last year, for a similar purpose, of 378,000l. At the beginning of the last year the bounty paid to recruits on joining regiments of infantry of the line amounted to 4l. In order to induce more persons to come forward as recruits in the autumn of last year the bounty was increased to 6l., and, I believe, in the month of January in the present year it has been still further raised to 8l. This circumstance will explain the large sum required to be provided for the recruiting service. In connection with the subject of the recruiting of the Army, I may refer to the Bill which the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the War Department has, in another place, announced it to be his intention to introduce. By that measure it is proposed to authorise the enlistment of men for the army of an age above that at which recruits are ordinarily enlisted, and ranging from twentyfour to thirty or thirty-two. They are to be enlisted for a period of two or three years; and in that way the Secretary of State for War anticipates that he will succeed in obtaining men fit for service in the war, and whose constitutions will be better able to withstand the trials of climate to which our men are exposed than the recruits who have recently been raised. Having referred to the expense of recruiting the army, I will now come to the cost of mounting the cavalry. There is a sum of 322,000l. taken in the present Vote for the purchase of horses. The Government propose to provide for the purchase of 7,500 horses for the cavalry force. Deducting the four regiments of cavalry that are employed in the East Indies and paid by the Indian Government, and deducting likewise the household cavalry, for the mounting of which provision is to be made in a different manner, I find that the establishment of horses for the cavalry of the line is stated to be from 7,800 to 8,000. Now, the Government proposed to obtain 7,500 horses, which will enable them, in fact, to remount almost the entire cavalry force. The necessity for purchasing this large number of horses arises in this way. There has been a considerable increase in the strength of ten cavalry regiments which have been sent out for service in the Crimea; and at the commencement of this year the effective strength of horses for the cavalry did not exceed 4,197, not including the 2,500 horses that were sent to the Crimea, which number in the course of this year have dwindled down to not more than 1,000, and which, in the course of the quarter now current, must be expected to undergo a still further diminution. So that, in point of fact, the Government have to provide for the bringing up of the establishment of horses from 4,197 to the number of 7,800, and likewise for replac- ing the losses that are likely to be sustained by casualties during the next year. Altogether, therefore, they estimate the number of horses that will be required at 7,500. There is also another reason for the large increase proposed in this Vote. The Committee will observe that the estimated cost of each horse is set down in the present Estimates at 40l., whereas, in former years, it has been only 26l. Now, the cause for this increase is as follows: It has hitherto been the practice to purchase horses at the age of three years, and the regulation price for them was 26l. each. I am told that these horses were kept in training for a period of two years, and cost the country altogether about 60l. apiece, and that when about five years old they were fit to be used. Of course, under present circumstances, we require horses that will be immediately available for service, and it is, therefore, proposed to buy horses of the age of from five to nine years. Now, the cost of horses at ages ranging between the years that I have named, and trained and fit for service, is taken to be 40l. each, or an excess of 14l. per horse over the price voted last year. Having now stated the charge for pay and allowances, as well as the sum proposed to be asked for the mounting of the cavalry force, I will now pass on to another item of this Vote—namely, that of clothing, in which there is an increase of something more than 105,000l. Since last year the system of clothing the army had undergone an entire alteration. The practice formerly was this—certain articles of clothing were specified to be issued to each man in the regiment; there was a regular scale of prices, and an estimate was made according to this scale of the cost of clothing the regiment, always reckoning the number of the regiment as being up to the full strength of the establishment, and the sum thus estimated was paid to the colonel. In addition, a further sum was also paid him, generally averaging about 600l., which was, and was intended to be, his profit on the clothing of the regiment. In addition to this, however, the colonel had a further advantage, because, if the strength of the regiment was not up to its full establishment, he was not debited to the Government with the difference, but, on the other hand, if, at any time during the year, the strength of the regiment exceeded its establishment, and he showed that he had provided clothes for the supernumeraries, the colonel was entitled to debit the Government with the extra amount. That system, however, has been changed in consequence of its condemnation by public opinion, although it was admitted that it gave satisfaction to the men, who were fairly treated under it. The manner in which the present Estimate has been formed is by calculating the cost of the clothing for each man in every regiment, making no allowance for the pecuniary profit of the colonels; and by adding to this the cost of the number of men by which the army is about to be increased. This money will still be expended by the colonels; they will be allowed to make contracts with their clothiers, and thus they will still be induced to take an interest in the clothing of the regiment, but as the bills will be sent in to the Government, they will have no pecuniary profit whatever in the affair. There is, also, a considerable increase, amounting to 155,600l., in the charge for general and regimental hospitals. In time of peace, when a man went into hospital, a deduction was made from his pay of the sum of l0d. per diem, and the charge for general and regimental hospitals had, therefore, in former years been very light. Last year, in consequence of the deductions of pay thus made, the net charge of the hospital was only 8,000l. A largely-increased Vote is rendered necessary this year, by the fact that when men became sick in the course of active service the stoppage was no longer 10d. a day, but was reduced to the ordinary stoppage for rations—3½d. a day, and, consequently, though the number of men in the army, and the numbers, therefore, of men who would go into hospital were very much increased, the Government have calculated the stoppages of pay at a smaller sum than last year. The principal reason, however, for the large increase in this item is, of course, the expense of maintaining the hospitals at Scutari, at Balaklava, and in the camp before Sebastopol. The Vote asked for includes the expenses of nurses and hospital orderlies, but not the pay of the surgeons, which is provided for in another Vote. To show the Committee how difficult it is under present circumstances to anticipate beforehand the probable demands of a state of war, I may refer to the fact, that since these Estimates were framed it has been determined to establish a civil hospital at Smyrna, to be placed in charge of medical practitioners taken from the civil branch of the profession. This step has been determined on since these Estimates were drawn up, and consequently the expenses of the proposed hospital are not included in them. It is also intended to establish a line of transports fitted up with every accommodation as hospital ships, with surgeons on board, to run between Constantinople and this country, in order to convey hither invalids whose treatment is more likely to be successful at home, and thus to make room in the hospital at Scutari for the men who were brought down from the camp before Sebastopol. In the Vote for Divine service there is an increase of 9,200l., which is caused entirely by the charge for chaplains appointed to attend the army in the field. The number of chaplains already sent out is forty-two, of whom twenty-four are of the Church of England, eight Presbyterians, and ten Roman Catholics. The rate of pay allowed to these gentlemen is 16s. a day, with the exception of some who, receiving a contribution from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, are allowed an annual payment of 100l. a year. There is an increase in the charge for the pay of schoolmasters of 7,150l., which is owing to the intention of the Government to appoint thirty new schoolmasters who have been trained in the normal school at Chelsea, and to establish and organise schools in each regiment. It is also proposed to appoint schoolmasters in the new depôts which have been established, and no less than eighteen trained schoolmasters have been appointed to schools in the different militia regiments which have been embodied; for it is felt that as these regiments are now being called out for permanent service, it is but fair that they should have the same advantages in the way of schools and schoolmasters as are enjoyed by the regular regiments, whose places they take. The number of schoolmasters at present employed is seventy-four, and it is intended to appoint thirty more, thus raising the whole number to 104. If there has ever been any doubts entertained as to the expediency of educating our soldiers, I think they must be entirely dispelled by the letters which have appeared in the public journals from private soldiers since the commencement of the war. The next item on which I feel it necessary to make any remarks is the miscellaneous charges. There is among these a charge of 156,000l. to cover claims which are likely to be made for losses sustained by officers and men while engaged in active service against the enemy. This estimate, however, is an entirely conjectural one. There is an increase of 65,000l. in the item of field allowances, which are payments made to officers of somewhere about 2s. 6d. a day while engaged on active service, to enable them to provide the means of transport, &c., for their private baggage. There remain now two more items in this Vote on which I have to touch—namely, the charges for the land transport service and for the foreign corps. It is admitted that the land transport service of the army in the Crimea has fallen into a state of inefficiency. It had been placed under the charge of the Commissariat, and, as the duties of that department were sufficiently ample to occupy the whole time of one head, it was by no means surprising that, almost overburdened with its own special functions, the Commissariat had proved little qualified to cope with the difficulties which met it when it attempted to carry on the duties of another department. It must be remembered, however, in justice to the Commissariat, that it had been called on not only to provide means of transport for the rations of the men and the forage of the horses, and for the carriage of the sick, but also for the conveyance to the camp of large quantities of warm clothing, huts, and other articles, although at the time the animals which it had collected together were dying in large numbers from the insufficiency of food, the badness of the roads, and also from exposure to the inclemency of the weather. Certain it is that this service was in a state of admitted deficiency, and the Government have, therefore, determined to organise this land transport corps, under the command of Colonel M'Murdo, which would undertake the whole of the land transport of the army. The number of drivers of the land transport corps will be 8,000, and the Vote will provide for the transport of the animals purchased by Colonel M'Murdo's agents from adjacent countries to the seat of war, where they would be available for the use of the corps. [Mr. BAILLIE: How many horses will there be?] I am unable to state the number of animals that will be collected together, because that will be regulated by the demands of the service. The hon. Member for Aylesbury has said that we have made no provision for the maintenance of the foreign corps; but in that respect he was in error, for I have now arrived at the estimate which provides for that purpose 400,000l. The charge of the foreign corps, as I have stated, will be 400,000l., supposing that they would consist of thirteen regiments of 1,000 strong. The total charge of the land forces proposed to be voted is 7,353,804l., which is an increase upon the Estimates of last year, including under this title the original and two supplementary Estimates, of 2,630,516l. There is no difficulty in accounting for that excess. It is owing to the increased number of men receiving daily pay—the cost of the foreign corps—the cost of the land transport corps—the additional cost of hospital service and of the recruiting service, and the mounting of the men. Suppose I divide the charge for the land forces amongst the men to be maintained, including the foreign corps, I find the cost per man, including officers as well as privates, will be for 1853–54, 35l. 8s.; for 1854–55, 34l. 14s.; and for the present year, 37l. 19s. The increase of the Vote for the staff amounts to 163,600l.; but there was a Supplementary Estimate of 70,000l., which leaves the net increase 93,600l. There is no alteration, I think, in the staff at home; and, with regard to that part of the foreign staff that is employed in the Colonies, I find there is a diminution of about 5,500l. That diminution is owing to the reduction of the military forces in the province of Canada. In consequence of that reduction, we have substituted a major general on the staff for a lieutenant general, and to that substitution this reduction is to be attributed. There is one remark which I wish to make in reference to the pay of the military secretary of the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. The Government have determined that for the future, where there is a civil Governor in the colony, he shall not be allowed any staff by the Imperial Government. The consequence is, that in the case of the Governor of Canada we have taken away the provision that was male for the aide de camp of the civil Governor. But we have made an exception to the rule in the case of the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. We allow him a military secretary, paid by this country, and the reason is partly in consequence of the much larger force maintained in the Cape of Good Hope than in the other colonies, and partly, also, in consequence of the Major General commanding the army at the Cape being at a very great distance from the seat of the civil government, the Major General being at the eastern extremity and the civil Governor at the western extremity of the colony, and it not being desirable that the correspondence between them should pass through the office of the Colonial Secretary. The whole of the increase in the Estimates is to be attributed to the staff employed in the army abroad. It is not necessary to go into details, but I may say that more than one-half of the increase is required to pay for the large number of surgeons and assistant surgeons which it is necessary to employ in the hospitals at Scutari and with the army. The next Vote to which I come is Vote No. 4, for the public departments connected with the army. In this vote there is also a considerable increase—there is an increase of 48,500l. I may state that I shall reduce the Vote when I come to take it by the salary of the Secretary at War, for, that office having ceased to exist as a separate office, it will not be necessary to vote the salary. The increase in No. 4 arises partly from our having included in it the charge for the establishment of the Secretary of State for War, which amounts to a sum of 18,787l. The charge for that department last year was, I think, included in the Civil Estimates; at all events, it was not included in the Army Estimates. There is also a considerable increase in the cost of the office which has hitherto been known as that of the Secretary at War. It has been found necessary to have an additional number of clerks employed in that office. The clerks engaged are temporary clerks, and, of course, will cease to be employed the moment the pressure of business shall be reduced. There is also an increase on account of postage, which is merely a matter of account, costing nothing to the public; and those items added together account for the whole of the increase in this Vote. I shall pass over the filth vote—the vote for the Royal Military College—because that is a self-supporting institution; that is to say, the payments made by the young men who are educated in that college quite cover the cost of the establishment. The payments, however, are made into the Exchequer, and a certain sum is voted in the Estimates for the support of the establishment, An hon. Gentleman has given notice of a Motion on the subject of the payments made by the different classes of students, which will come on in due course, and I may re- serve till then further reference to this matter. There is an increase in the Vote for the Military Asylum, Chelsea, which is Vote No. 6, of 2,611l. I am informed that last year an Act of Parliament was passed authorising the appropriation of 10,000l. for the purpose of enlarging the accommodation in the Military Asylum, and the object of the increased Vote in the present year is to provide for the additional orphans who are to be admitted into the Asylum in consequence of the additional accommodation thus provided. The present number of orphans, as well in the Royal Military Asylum as in the Hibernian School, is 350, and we now provide for the maintenance of 120 additional orphans in the Royal Military Asylum. Passing over Vote No. 7, in which no alteration is made, I come to Vote No. 8, which is the charge for the embodied militia of the United Kingdom. There are 150 regiments of militia to be provided for, and the charge amounts to 3,813,383l. This is the first time that the charge for the Militia has been included in the Army Estimates of late years. The course hitherto has been to take the Militia Estimates separately from the Army Estimates. A Committee was appointed, to whom the Secretary at War submitted the Militia Estimates, and if the Committee approved of them, they were introduced to the House separately, and passed in that form. Last year a sum was taken in those Estimates on account for the several regiments of militia embodied. This year, however, nearly the whole of the militia of the country is placed on a permanent footing, and the charge, therefore, for this service is included in the Army Estimates. Of the regiments embodied the services of three have been accepted for the Mediterranean, and it is intended to send a further number to the same part of the world. With this Vote is concluded the effective branch of the Estimates, and upon the effective branch it is that the whole augmentation takes place. On coming to the other division—the non-effective branch—it will be found that, on the whole, as compared with last year, there is a reduction of 33,000l. The first Vote on the non-effective branch is the charge for rewarding officers and men who have rendered distinguished service to the country. The whole Vote amounts to 22,000l., of which 18,000l. is appropriated to the rewarding of officers, and 4,000l. to the rewarding of sergeants. There is an in- crease in that part of the Estimate that is employed in the rewarding of sergeants of 1,500l. The next two Votes are Nos. 10 and 11, both of which are important, and both of which show a considerable increase. The first of those Votes is applied to the unattached pay of general officers, and there is an increase in the Vote of 18,000l. I will state the manner in which the increase arose. It is owing to the recommendation of the Commission which was appointed last year upon the subject of the retirement and promotion of officers in the Army. The number of general officers receiving payment at the rate of 1l. 5s. per day was fixed some time ago at 120. Supernumerary general officers, provided they had served a certain number of years as field officers, were allowed to receive, not 11. 5s. a day, but an annual allowance of 400l. In consequence of there being no brevet for some time past, the number of general officers in the Estimates of last year had sunk below 120, having fallen to 105. being fifteen below the number fixed, so there was no general officer receiving the pay of 400l. a year. The Commission appointed last year made an entire change in the manner of promoting officers to be general officers with the view of bringing forward younger men where they could be employed in the command of brigades or divisions. It is unnecessary to enter into the details at length, except in so far as they bear upon the Estimate in this Vote. It was stated that the effect of the recommendation, if adopted, would be to bear hardly upon the colonels created by the brevet of 1841 and 1846, and in order to prevent any complaints it was advised that one more brevet should be issued, to include all the colonels of 1841 and 1846. The Commission recommended that the number of general officers receiving 1l. 5s. a day should be reduced to the number of 100; but the effect of the brevet of last year, by bringing forward to the rank of major-general the colonels of 1841 and 1846, has been to raise the whole number of major-generals, excepting always those who are employed and are colonels of regiments, to 148, and the excess over 100 is to be provided for; but it is intended in future to promote only one colonel to the rank of major-general for every three vacancies, until the whole number, which is now 148, shall be reduced to 100. The payment of the 400l. a year to the general officers exceeding 100 will therefore account for the increase in this Vote. The increase on Vote No. 11 is caused by the retirement on full pay of a certain number of colonels, captains, and other officers, and that is owing also to the recommendation of the Commission; for, whereas formerly the sum fixed was 46,000l., in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee it was agreed that it should be raised to the sum of 60,000l., the object being to make provision for certain captains and other officers who did not possess the activity which the exigencies of the present time required. A sum of 5,000l. would be sufficient for the purpose in the course of this year; and next year and subsequent years more Votes would be taken for the same purpose, so as eventually to bring up the whole Vote for retired full pay for officers of the rank of colonel and captain and other officers to the standard of 60,000l. The charge for half-pay has undergone a reduction in the course of last year. The diminution in the number of officers receiving it is not less than 313, and the diminution amounts to 7,721l. A great part of this reduction is owing to deaths in the course of the year, but a portion of it is also owing to the course pursued by the Government in calling out all available captains who would accept employment in the army on active service, the opportunity of offering them employment being afforded to the Government by the augmentation of the forces. I may observe that this Vote, though substantially a non-effective Vote, has to a certain extent, in consequence of what passed in the course of last year, maintained a reserve on which the Government are able to call for officers, and by which the establishment of the army may be increased without at the same time increasing the burdens of the country. I have no remark to make upon Vote 13, which provides for the pay of the disbanded officers of the foreign corps in the late war, which shows, of course, a reduction. I wish, however, to say a few words on Votes 14 and 15, which provide pensions for the widows of officers and for their families. The increase in the Vote for the present year is to be attributed to the probability that there will be an increased number of claims in the course of the year; and it is considered desirable to relax the forms of the warrant under which those pensions are granted. Suppose an officer dies from fatigue or privation while engaged against the enemy, it is considered that his widow and family have as fair a claim upon the country as if he had died in battle. In the Vote for the hospitals there has been a small increase in consequence of the increased price of provisions. The only remaining Vote which it is necessary for me to advert to, is the charge for out pensioners. There is a reduction of the sum of 27,123l. in that Vote, in consequence of out-pensioners dying off in the course of the year, while the present war it is not supposed, during this next year, will exercise any material influence on the number of out-pensioners. Having occupied the Committee so long, I shall now, without making any of those general reflections which the nature of the subject might suggest, at once proceed, Sir, to place in your hand the first Vote for 193,595 officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file for the year commencing the 1st of April, 1855, and ending the 30th of March, 1856.

said, he wished to bring under the notice of the Committee one point connected with the medical department. He found that officers in the navy who had been wounded had, when brought home, asylums open for them, such as the hospitals at Portsmouth and Plymouth, where they received every attention, and had the benefit of all the surgical skill which their cases required. Now, with respect to the army, he was not aware that there was for the officers brought home wounded from the Crimea any receptacle, where they could be received and attended to free of expense. Now, he thought, this was a very great hardship upon the officers in the army, though the alteration made in the deduction of from tenpence to twopence from the pay of the soldiers upon entering an hospital must be regarded as a very satisfactory change. He happened to know a case, which he would state to the Committee as it had been related to him. It was the case of an officer who was wounded in the Crimea by a ricochet cannon ball, a nine-pounder. He saw the ball coming, and saw it enter the ground, and thought it had not sufficient power to rise, but it did rise and struck him in the breast. He (Colonel Boldero) was speaking of facts related to him by the officer's brother. The ball struck him and knocked him from his horse; the medical men in the Crimea saw the wound was of great severity, and he was ordered home. He had seen the individual himself in London, delicate in appearance, but still in pretty good health. The wound turned out badly afterwards, an ulcer formed in his chest, and he was laid upon his back. He went to an eminent medical man in London and stated his case. The opinion of that medical man was, had the ball struck him lower down, in the pit of the stomach, it would have been instant death; that had it struck him higher up it would have caused a lingering death, but, having struck him where it did, he thought he could cure him. He made a deep incision in the chest, and attended him twice a day. That officer was paying two guineas a day to that medical man for attending him, in the hope that he would cure him; whereas, if there was an hospital for officers of the army like those in Portsmouth and Plymouth, he would receive the best medical attendance in the kingdom free of expense. That officer had about 15s. a day, and he had to pay between two and three guineas a day for medical attendance. He stated this case in order to show that there was something rotten in the present system, which compelled our gallant and brave defenders, for whom the country would grudge no needful expense, to spend, when brought home wounded, three times the amount of their pay in order to procure requisite medical attendance. A statement made the other night by the hon. Member for Aylesbury struck harshly upon his ear. The hon. Member said, that the medical men before Sebastopol had signed a "round robin," offering their resignation to Lord Raglan. [Mr. LAYARD: Not a "round robin," but a paper.] Good God! was it possible that such a state of things could occur; that medical men, in the presence of the enemy, and who, being 3,000 miles from the shores of England, could not be at once replaced by other surgeons, should so far commit themselves, when night after night sallies were being made by the Russians, when casualties were continually occurring, and when sickness and death extended from one end of the camp to the other! Was it possible, he repeated, that gentlemen highly educated, scientific men, could have committed such an act? He did not doubt the assertion of the hon. Member; but he had a right to ask whether the Government had received from Lord Raglan any intimation of such conduct on the part of the medical department? If it did occur, it was mutiny to the fullest extent, and why was it not punished? Was it that the noble Lord in command of the army thought the medical men in question were so overworked, that he could not come down upon them, and punish them for their mutinous act. He made these remarks in a pure spirit, for he wished to improve the condition of the officers in the medical department, who had generally performed their duty nobly in the Crimea, and if they had taken the step imputed to them, there must be something, as he had before observed, very rotten in the system, and the sooner that House set to work to amend it the better. In what he was about to say, he should, perhaps, meet with the concurrence of very few in that House. At the end of 1853, seeing war to be inevitable, he had had occasion at public meetings to declare his opinion that the Minister was not born, who would dare to come down to the House of Commons and ask for supplies to land a British army at any part of the continent of Europe. The war, he had said, must be a naval one, for this country was not a military nation. However, when Parliament met, he was amazed at the feeling prevailing in the House of Commons, for there was scarcely a man in it prepared to oppose the propositions of the Government to send out an army for actual operations. He confessed that he was not bold enough to stand up in his place and state his views at the moment, because all the House appeared to be against him. Nevertheless, he was still of opinion that a gross mistake had been committed, and that the Government ought never to have attempted in 1854 to send out an army to the East, to contend against the Russians. This country should have sent out its fleets, and destroyed the Russian trade and fortresses. Instead of this, however, the Government had thought fit to send an army first to Varna, where thousands upon thousands of men were lost by sickness, and afterwards to the Crimea, without the necessary auxiliaries and appendages to meet difficulties. Those men had done their duty in three actions, which history could not equal for the gallantry and bravery displayed; and however much the regimental officers may be condemned, it was they and their men that gained those battles. But in the present circumstances. hon. Members ought to express their opinion without being mealymouthed, for those circumstances were, as an hon. Member had said, of a dangerous character. This country had sent out about 60,000 men, and there were only remaining of that large number 12,000 in the field to undertake offensive operations. What has become of the rest? Their places of course must be supplied by recruits; and every means had been taken to obtain recruits by altering the standard, and the age, and by increased bounty. Well, he understood that the Government now obtained by the system of recruiting 1,000 men a week. But what was the amount of casualties? Why, 1,000 a week. How were they able to supply troops for the Colonies, the East Indies, and the home service, in addition to what they required for the war, by recruiting at the rate of only 1,000 a week? How were they to form their army in the spring for service in the Crimea? They were not to turn tail upon Sebastopol. Having commenced they must go on with this war; and yet, if what he had stated was correct, they were only recruiting at the pace of furnishing supplies to meet their casualties in the Crimea. This expedition to the Crimea had been described as similar to that of the Walcheren, but in certain respects it was different. In the Walcheren expedition they landed their troops in a place most notoriously unhealthy. The loss of men was truly lamentable, and an expense of about 20,000,000l. was entailed upon the country. But in the Crimea they had a good climate, and the loss of their troops arose from various other causes—they lost them from over fatigue, from want of food, from want of clothing, and from lack of medical attendance, and not from climate. Had they given them proper food and clothing and a fair share of work, they would not now have to lament over a tenth part of the number who had been cut off. The Government undertook a work which they were not able to accomplish. They failed in their Commissariat arrangements, they failed in their siege batteries, and in their medical department; in short, they had failed in every operation they undertook. They entered on a war with Russia, a most formidable Power, and what had they accomplished? They sent a magnificent fleet to the Baltic, which came home after doing next to nothing; they sent an army to Varna, where great losses were sustained by disease; and then they sent it to the Crimea, where no doubt most splendid actions were performed by the troops, but, notwithstanding, Sebastopol was stronger at this moment than when they first assailed it. There was not a family in the kingdom that did not mourn over the loss of relatives who had perished in this expedition. All these things were admitted; every blunder was admitted; for when these things were mentioned there was not a point on which the Government were not ready to express their regret. They were sorry that no road had been made—that provisions had not been got up to the troops—that there were not doctors in sufficient numbers—and that the medicines had not arrived in sufficient time. Indeed, it could not be denied that the whole arrangements of this army and its supplies had exhibited a mass of confusion, injury, and neglect, from beginning to end. But notwithstanding all this, he hoped the Government would now put their shoulders to the wheel and carry them through their present difficult position. It was essential to our prestige as a military nation that Sebastopol should fall. That great military fortress was not yet invested. They had only invested seven miles, leaving other seven miles open to the enemy to carry on their supplies, and our own troops, looking through their glasses, could see caravans bearing ammunition, guns, and provisions into the heart of the fortress. If they could name in history a siege undertaken by any Power leaving half the investment open to the enemy, he should like to hear when and where that siege took place. There was one subject which he had not heard touched upon in the course of any of these debates. He recollected last year, in the month of July, walking On the banks of the Thames, amusing himself, after sitting for a length of time in that House on Committee, when he saw a barge loading a quantity of porter, destined, as he was informed, for the Crimea. Soon after he saw it stated that the porter was to be delivered to the troops at cost price—a very praiseworthy proceeding; but he had since been informed that, though the porter was sent out, there was no person to receive it, and no stores wherein it could be placed, so that the porter actually came back. Whether it came bock because there was no one to receive it, or because it was of inferior quality, he knew not, and should like to be informed. In the meantime he would beg to read an extract from a document which came from India, on the subject of porter. It was a letter from an officer of the 94th Regiment, in which he stated that the surgeon had latterly noticed a great improvement in the health of the 94th Regiment. There was a record of the mortality among the troops from 1835 to 1854; and it appeared that in 1840 the mortality was 9½ per cent, while in 1854 it was only 1½ per cent. This reduction in the mortality he attributed to the improved sanitary measures which had been adopted, such as the system of confining men to the barracks in the heat of the day, but chiefly to the introduction of porter to the canteen, the men being thereby induced to give up in a great measure the use of spirituous liquors. Now, there was no difficulty about the porter. It was a wholesome beverage, which could be obtained to any extent that was desired; and he should like to know why the porter to which he had alluded had been sent home from the Crimea, and why an additional supply had not been sent to the troops, seeing the good effect which it might be expected to have upon their health?

said, he would make no objection to the Vote for the number of men proposed to the Committee; but he felt bound to say that, on looking through these Estimates, there were various items on which extensive reductions, he considered, might fairly be made. At the same time he felt that it was useless at the present moment to enter into the various matters to which he might refer, with the view of inducing the Committee to agree to any proposition that he might make. He begged to call the attention of the Committee, however, to the charge for the establishments that were to be consolidated. The establishment of the Secretary for War was put down at 18,787l.; but there was also a charge for the establishment of the Secretary at War of 16.085l. Now, they had been informed that this office was to be merged into the principal office of the Secretary of State for War. Then, the charge for the Commander in Chief's department was 13,989l., the Adjutant General's 8,499l., and the Quartermaster General's 6,618l.; making altogether a sum of 93,978l. Now, he held that if they wished to economise their military expenditure, they must begin by combining the whole of these offices into one. If the Secretary for War had the entire charge, with competent persons under him to discharge the duties of the respective offices, the expense would be reduced one-half and the business would be infinitely better done than it was at present. Only place a proper person at the head of the War Department, as was done in France, and he should have no fears for the result; but in meantime, until they were informed what Government had determined upon, he thought this branch of the Estimates ought to be postponed. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. F. Peel) had referred to the change which had been made in the clothing of the army; he (Mr. Williams) had made it a rule to bring that question before the House for a number of years past, and, of course, he was not sorry to hear that at length the clothing of the army was placed in the hands of the Government, instead of the colonels in command, who were general officers. As far back as 1831, a Committee reported upon this very subject, and at that time the profit to the colonel for clothing the Grenadier Guards was 1,800l., but now he hoped the system was irrevocably changed, and that the colonels were provided for as gentlemen and soldiers ought to be, instead of having to make up their incomes by becoming the tailors of their own regiments. The alteration of the system would be beneficial to the men, who would be much better clothed than formerly, and a considerable saving effected. He had perceived a vast improvement in the clothing of the Grenadier Guards already. Their cloth was of better quality, and the colour a brighter scarlet. With regard to the emoluments of general officers, that had been made a topic of complaint; and no doubt the change of system would reduce those emoluments. Prince Albert, for instance, would lose, perhaps, not less than 1,500l. a year by the change, still there was no good reason why Prince Albert should be paid more than any other general officer. There were three general officers of high merit who had been serving the country in the Crimea—General Sir De Lacy Evans, General Sir Colin Campbell, and General Sir George Brown. These three generals received 1,100l. a year each as colonels of regiments, while Prince Albert received 2,200l. a year as colonel of the Grenadier Guards. He was aware that colonels of regiments were general officers, and as such enjoyed perfect sinecures. The hon. Gentleman had also referred to the promised reduction of the number of general officers. It was a remarkable fact that there were more general officers in the British army than in the French army. In the British army there were 303 general officers, while in the French army there were only 255—that was to say, 5 marshals, 78 generals of division, and 172 gene- rals of brigade. On looking at the Queen's warrant, he found a loophole by which it was possible to place any number of the officers of the Guards on the list of generals, notwithstanding that warrant ["No no!"]; and by virtue of the Queen's warrant any officer who should be removed from the Foot Guards in consequence of being promoted to be a general officer was to receive unattached pay according to his regimental rank—if a lieutenant colonel 600l., and if a major 550l. a year. Now, a general officer in the army would receive only 450l. a year. He wished to know why a major in the Guards should, as colonel, receive 100l. a year more than a colonel holding the same rank in any other regiment? Neither could he understand why a captain in the Guards should hold the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the army, unless it were that the officers of the Guards consisted almost entirely of the aristocracy, or of persons connected with that clique. He considered this distinction between the Guards and the other regiments of the service to be most unjust, the payment of the one being 50 per cent greater than the payment of the other, besides all the privileges that were enjoyed by them, such as an allowance of 5,000l. a year for breakfasts and dinners at St. James' Palace, and the various other advantages which, as an aristocratic body, they possessed,

said, it was not his intention to trouble the Committee with any details of a purely professional character; that task he would leave to military Gentlemen. He simply rose to remind the Committee how frequently they had been told of the enormous expense attendant upon the maintenance of the army. But when he recurred to the Estimates moved this time last year, and coupled it with the state of that army at present, he must say no man could help feeling surprised at the enormous sum of money expended on starving it. However, that surprise would be very considerably increased when it was recollected that that result had occurred under the auspices of a Government which was declared by its supporters to embody the ablest administration of the country. Still it was to be hoped, now that the Government had been re-constructed—or, as his right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) termed it, "re-burnished"—that the House would not be called upon when it met next year to deliberate upon a state of things so sug gestive of sad reflections as that now before them.

said, he sincerely believed that it was the hon. Member for Lambeth himself, and his class, such as his (Mr. Williams's) Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), not now present, who, by the course they had pursued, had brought the country to its present necessity. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, he maintained that those Gentlemen had impaired the efficiency of the army; and then up got the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Williams), and delivered a speech which was nothing more than a tirade against the army, and a tirade against Prince Albert, because he was in command of the Grenadier Guards. Now, he (Colonel Knox) was inclined to think that when an hon. Member got up to criticise the condition of the army he ought first to have learned his lesson. He could, however, inform the hon. Member for Lambeth that in his comments he was most grossly mistaken. Why, what did the hon. Gentleman mean by telling the Committee that while ordinary colonels of regiments only received 1,100l. a year, Prince Albert received 2,200l. a year as Colonel of the Grenadiers? But did not the hon. Gentleman know that the command of the Grenadier Guards, which was composed of three battalions, was equivalent to the command of three regiments. Now, he charged the hon. Member for Lambeth with making remarks on that subject which he knew to be as false as anything could be. The hon. Gentleman, descending to a miserable pettifogging economy, talked of dinners being given to the Guards at the Palace. But just let him look a little further into the army, and see what was the ease—what was the position of the Guards? They drew for neither coals, candles, nor any other of the military allowances which the rest of the army drew. He could only say that, if the Guards were placed upon the tame footing as the rest of the army, there would be no economy to the State. But "oh!" exclaimed the hon. Gentleman, "the Guards are better paid." Well, what was the fact? A lieutenant and captain in the Guards had but 120l. a year, while a captain in the line had rather better than 200l. And yet the hon. Gentleman opposite, knowing all that, had not the manliness or straightforwardness to avow it, but mine forward year after year to reiterate these charges that had been as repeatedly disproved. He would ask the Committee was that the moment to decry the Guards? was that the moment to declare that the Guards had not done their duty, or were unworthy of their hire? He for one, connected as he had been with the Guards for five-and-twenty years, could not remain silent when such aspersions were cast upon that gallant corps. Well, but that was not all; the hon. Member for Lambeth then went on to talk of the clothing of the army. Now, he dared say, the hon. Gentleman might be a very good soldier in Lambeth; for all he knew he might be a most efficient member of the Lambeth militia; still he would like very much to see what kind of clothing he would select for his regiment, if the choice devolved on him. On that point all he (Colonel Knox) would say was, that he should rather be excused from wearing it. The hon. Gentleman spoke, also, of the change which had been made with respect to the clothing. Now, he was quite prepared to admit that that change had been a wise and proper one; but he would not allow that it had been so made at the suggestion of the hon. Member for Lambeth. At the same time he begged leave to tell that hon. Gentleman that he was quite in error in his calculations on this head, for very great doubts were entertained whether the country would more likely lose than gain by the new system. And in point of fact he might mention what a relative of his, who had been in command of a regiment for several years —one of the senior officers of the army— said to him on the occasion of the change, "I am very glad to get rid of the clothing of my regiment, for all I know is, what with the various changes in the uniform, and accoutrements, and what not, I am very much out of pocket." But he could furnish the hon. Gentleman with another sample of the consequences following from the change he seemed to think so much of. He believed that at that very moment a claim was pending against Government on the part of a contractor, because sufficient time had not been allowed him to complete the alterations of the uniform. The contractor, acting in rather a different manner from hon. Gentlemen opposite, had looked a little a-head, and had prepared already for forthcoming seasons. The Government, however, turned round upon him, and said, "No, we cannot take any of these uniforms; we have altered the pattern." But the contractor was not content with that, and claimed 10,000l. as compensation for his losses. He (Colonel Knox) believed the hon. Member for Lambeth had here a capital case, and he would urge him to take it up and claim compensation for the contractor. As a military man he was quite ready to admit that the old system of farming out the clothing to general officers was wrong in principle, and that commanding officers were much satisfied with the change that had been made. He quite concurred in the view taken by the hon. and gallant Gentleman behind him (Colonel Boldero), that the country had rushed into a gigantic war without having adequately provided for it. They had done so with their eyes open, well knowing that the Gentlemen of the school of the hon. Member for Lambeth, by their fighting and quibbling, had entirely crippled all the military departments. He must contend, however, that the responsibility of that state of things rested with the Government. If he was not misinformed, in December, 1853, when war was imminent, a conclave was held at the War Office, at which the Minister of War, the Secretary at War, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Commander in Chief, attended. Now, public rumour had it that the distinguished officer who was at the head of the army was called upon to give a statement as to what number of men he could furnish in case of emergency. Be that as it might, it would be well to know—no matter what might have been the statement of the Commander in Chief as to the number of men he could supply—if he had told the Government that there would be a terrible deficiency in materials of every description. If he had done so, he had only done his duty; but, at the same time, he still maintained that a grave responsibility rested with the Government. He was prepared to maintain that a great deal of the evils of the Crimea had arisen from the fact that there had not been a single military man connected with the Government. If they were to have a Commander in Chief, make him in reality responsible for the condition of the army. He would conclude his observations by again protesting against the hon. Member for Lambeth year after year reiterating his charges against the army, and of giving them currency throughout the country, without assuring himself that they were substantially correct.

said, he rose to say a few words in defence of an absent Member. The hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Colonel Knox) said that the state of the army was, in a great mea- sure, owing to the conduct of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume). Now, in the first place, he (Lord Seymour) should like the hon. and gallant Member to look back at the votes and to find any single instance when the hon. Member for Montrose had proposed a reduction in the number of men when he was in a majority. Whenever such a thing was proposed, the party proposing it had always found himself in a very small minority. He had been in the House very ninny years, and had never seen a Government propose a number of men without carrying it. So far, then, the hon. and gallant Member's charge was unfounded. But, in the next place, he (Lord Seymour) thought it unfounded, because, having acted for three years consecutively with the hon. Member for Montrose, in relation to the Estimates for the Army, Navy, and Ordnance, he had not found the hon. Member ever propose any vote which tended to reduce the efficiency of the service. What the hon. Member (Mr. Hume) always said, and fairly said, was, let me see the money properly spent. This was his great anxiety, and it was a just one. He also took upon himself to object to particular payments, a most disagreeable task. It was always a disagreeable duty to object to payments made on account not only of distinction but of party favour. There was no doubt that the hon. Gentleman did take such objections, and he (Lord Seymour) could not but think that such a course was proper and most useful, not only to the country, but also to the Government, When that hon. Member did allude to any reduction in the Estimates, it was always to the Conservative Estimates of 1834–35 that he pointed. These were his model estimates, and to them he always referred when he wanted to enforce any argument having regard to a reduction. This of course, was a time when no one would propose to reduce Estimates; but if any observation were made, it would be that at this period we ought to maintain a more effective cavalry force. We had a very small cavalry force, even on paper—9,000 in all. That was but a miserable amount with which to enter into a war with Russia. We knew that it would be ridiculous, in speaking of any Continental power, to talk of such a force. But when we came to consider that of these 9,000 men, three regiments were household troops, who, it was now understood, were not to be sent abroad, and were, therefore, a force kept only for orna- ment, like the beef-eaters—we might well doubt whether we should keep so large a proportion of so small a force ineffective for purposes of war. It seemed to him but right, for the sake of the splendour of the Court, that we should have one magnificent regiment, with horses so large and men so heavy that for many of the services of war they would be perfectly useless; but he would suggest that in future years it would be worth considering whether, while we keep up so small a force, we ought to render three regiments out of it ineffective for practical purposes.

said, he had understood that the proposed land transport service was to consist of 8,000 men. The number of horses attached to such a corps could not be less than 12,000. It would be necessary to calculate some such number, for the food of those animals would have to be sent from this country. They had the authority of no less a person than the Earl of Cardigan that the horses composing our cavalry force in the Crimea had been literally starved to death. It was generally understood that the cavalry in the Crimea was to be increased by at least 1,200 men, now on their way from India, and by at least a similar number to be sent from this country. There had never been any explanation why the horses in the Crimea had been starved to death. Barley, it was known, could be procured in any quantity at a distance of only two days' sail. The head of the Commissariat department, however, still retained his place, an therefore it could not be supposed that the Government had any serious cause of complaint against him. It had been stated that recruits were now to be engaged between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-six, and for periods of one, two, or three years. He had never before heard of engaging troops for one year. That, he considered, would scarcely give time for the recruits to be drilled and brought into a condition to be of service. He therefore supposed no man would be engaged for less than three years, and he wished, at the same time, to know whether men engaged for that perriod were to be allowed the same bounty money as those engaged for the ordinary term of years? He also wished to know whether any steps had been taken to enlist the foreign corps?

said, he should be glad to know what were the actual expenses of the army to this country? Those expenses were spread over so many Estimates, and in the case of the Ordnance were so mixed up with charges for the Navy, that it was impossible for independent Members in the country to ascertain the actual amount. If, however, the Government would give the Committee a statement of the total cost of the army, the information would have the effect of throwing much light upon military discussions. They had heard that, by a late order of the Crown, sixty sergeants of the line were to be endowed with commissions. He wished to ask whether, in giving those commissions for gallant conduct in the field of battle, any allowance was made to them to enable them to take up those commissions? Every one knew that a large expenditure would be incurred by the acceptance of those commissions, and it was idle to suppose that a man in the position of a sergeant in the army had the requisite means of obtaining uniform, &c., or, in the case of cavalry, chargers. The army accounts of France gave very specific information on this head; and, if hon. Members would take the trouble of consulting the Budget de Guerre, they would see that all these wants were provided for. If the Government had no intention of accompanying those commissions with some adequate allowance for outfit, the gift of a commission to them would be rather a damnosa hereditas than anything else. Passing over these details, he would proceed to the great question raised by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, and to the mode in which it had been met by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. The noble Lord had said that his (Mr. Layard's) observations were vulgar appeals to the prejudices against the aristocracy. He (Sir E. Perry) denied the truth of that observation. There was nothing in the speech of the hon. Gentleman to warrant such an assertion. That great question respecting the aristocratic interest in the English army must be dealt with by some statesman who was able to read aright the signs of the times. It was no vulgar demagogue who said that "the British soldier fought under the cold shade of aristocracy." That was a sentiment expressed by a member of the aristocracy himself, who could rank with the highest born of the land. When they recollected the gallant deeds of the soldiers in the three glorious battles of the Crimea—when they considered the intelligence that was displayed in their letters that were published, and the high moral tone which was ex- hibited— they must feel that the time was ripe for considering the question of promotion in the army. When he (Sir E. Perry) contrasted the moral condition of the soldiers in the Crimea with the moral condition of the soldiers who fought our battles in the revolutionary war, the last of whom were said to be the outpourings of the streets of London, he felt that the time was come when that great question must be dealt with, and the same open career afforded in the army as was to be found in other ranks of life in this country. It was from no insolent sentiment of ill will to the aristocracy that his hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) had brought forward this question. For himself, his own sympathies and interests were all bound up with the institutions of the country; but in order to make these institutions stable, the statesmen who guided their councils must adapt those institutions to what was growing up around them on every side; and it was because the noble Lord at the head of the Government had the power of effecting such an adaptation, that he (Sir E. Perry) was willing to give a strenuous support to the noble Lord's Government. But although he had this strong desire, what he rose for was to express the dissatisfaction with which he had heard the taunts and ill-deserved sneers which had been levelled at his hon. Friend who pointed out where the blot lay. This question of army reform was so much connected with the Committee to be moved for on Thursday next, that he must make a few observations with reference to it. He had come down to the House the other day with an earnest desire to be able to retract the vote he had given on a former occasion. He had expected that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would have put forward such a vigorous programme of the conduct of the war that he should have been able to reconcile to his conscience and his constituents the change in his conduct; but on hearing the plans which had been adopted, he only felt, in common, he believed, with the greater portion of the House, a feeling of chill and dissatisfaction. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had pointed out the extraordinary fetters placed upon the executive in the field, and the noble Lord had given no answer to any one of those objections. If the Government were not satisfied with their Commander-in-Chief, their course was obvious, and they had ample power, for the whole country was with them; but their mode of shackling a general in the field with Commissioners tied round his neck, and with power almost to displace him, must paralyse the efforts of any man, however skilled he might be in the art of war. His hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) had been taunted with citing the Commission de la sureté publique as an example to be followed; but, on the contrary, the hon. Member had pointed to that as the only instance on record in which such an extraordinary procedure had been resorted to; and that to make that Commission succeed, the Commissioners were armed with an ambulatory guillotine. As au independent Member of the House, and as a supporter of the Government who had no other opportunity to make his opinions known, he had ventured to make these observations. He observed that his calling himself a supporter of the Government called up some smiles on the opposite side of the House; but he could assure the hon. Gentlemen who sat opposite that he had no desire at all to see them sitting in the places of the present Government. Their Chancellor of the Exchequer would, under Lord Derby, probably have been the right hon. Gentleman the leader of the Opposition; and their War Minister would have been a nobleman (Lord Ellenborough) under whose rule he (Sir E. Perry) had lived during a most eventful period; and if Conservative Members opposite wanted to see what sort of a War Minister that noble Lord would have made, let them turn to the last chapter of a Conservative historian, Thornton's History of India. He (Sir E. Perry) believed that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had the power to do anything which his experience and his genius suggested for the conduct of the war; and, as one who wished well to his Government he implored him to wield his great powers with vigour, and to mould his measures according to the desires of the nation and the exigencies of the crisis.

said, he must complain of the deductions made in the soldier's pay for the expense of his clothing and other comforts, in time of war, and thought that if this system went on, between the noble Lord the Secretary for War and the Under Secretary the firm would soon be known by the appellation of Moses and Son. At Scutari he had been told by the medical men connected with the hospital there that there prevailed a deplorable want of proper clothing for the sick and wounded, and very often the only clothes they had were those which the marines and sailors had given them while on their voyage from the Crimea, and very often men were sent thence as convalescents, who, on arriving at their destination, were found to be so ill that they were obliged to be sent back again. He therefore urged on the Government to provide proper clothing in the different hospitals for convalescents going out to the Crimea, and also for those returning to England. He must also allude to the stoppages made from the soldier's pay for hospital allowances. He knew an instance in which several hundred sick and wounded were landed from the Acorn at Scutari, who arrived at the hospital in such a state as to be incapable of taking care of themselves, much less of their kits. The authorities refused to supply them with knives and forks, because, by the regulations, a soldier was obliged to find these articles, but fortunately there were other parties who supplied them. He thought great blame must be attributable to some of the subordinate officers, as he was ready to express his belief that no one could be more zealous or active in the cause of the soldier than the late Secretary at War (Mr. S. Herbert). He wished at the same time to ask why it was that there were so many ships at Beicos Bay lying idle and doing nothing? Why could they not drop down to Scutari, where they might anchor in perfect security, and their crews might be employed in landing the sick and wounded, and assisting to carry them to the hospital, instead of leaving them to the tender mercies of the Turks. Under the kind directions of Lady Stratford the sufferings of these poor men in this respect were greatly lessened. If hon. Members had seen, as he himself had, 450 sick landed in one day, they would acknowledge that there was much cause for this question. He believed that on that occasion a request was actually made that a ship should drop down to Scutari, but was refused; some days elapsed before these poor wretches were landed, and during that time they were lying on the deck in their miserable rags of blankets. He hoped that the Government would require better arrangements to be made for the reception of the sick and wounded at Scutari than had as yet been established. He wished also to call their attention to the staff of surgeons in the hospitals. He understood that they were called upon to perform duties—such as drawing up the diet roll—which should not be thrown upon them. He had seen a letter from a sick officer in which he stated that his doctor had to attend to sixty-nine men and nine officers. Now, by the French regulations there was one doctor appointed to twenty-five wounded men, and one doctor to every fifty malades ordinaires. It was impossible for the medical men of our army to do all the business that was thrown upon them. He hoped that the attention of the Government, would, therefore, be given to this subject.

said, he begged to be allowed to call attention to one point of great consequence — that of the tents. He believed a large number of the tents furnished to the troops for use during the present campaign were old tents that had been used in the Peninsular war, and that it had been truly remarked of them, that they might as well sit under a sieve. In fact, a great part of the misery endured by our men was owing to the insufficient protection they had against the weather. For this purpose the arrangements adopted in the French service were admirable, the troops being provided with small tents, which the men could carry about with them. He had received a letter from Colonel Ellers Napier, who took a great interest in these matters, which acquainted him that a tent had been transmitted to him, divided into six parts or more, of so light a nature as to be carried by a man on foot, which was capable of holding six persons, and was the invention of a private soldier, as he had been informed by General Bosquet was also the case with the tent used by the French. If we entered upon a summer campaign, we might expect great suffering again to be experienced by our army: and he must again urge the adoption of a better mode of covering the troops, especially that a better description of hospital marquees should be chosen. It was remarkable that, during the gale of the 14th November, when every one of our tents was blown down, not a single Turkish tent had been. Another point he wished to allude to was the enlistment of the new proposed corps of cavalry. Government always appeared to do the right thing at the wrong time, and in the wrong place. They were now about to send English officers to raise cavalry in Thessaly, but they might as well send them to Iceland, or any other quarter. If they wanted an excellent and efficient corps of irregular cavalry, they ought to send to Asia Minor, where it would be easy to raise such a body amongst the tribes of Anatolia. That thought was a subject well worthy the attention of the Government.

said, that in spite of the sneers which met him from hon. Gentlemen opposite (on the Ministerial benches), he wished to express his opinions fearlessly, yet briefly, upon the question which had caused so much excitement throughout the country. He wished to say that he had great confidence in the noble Lord at the head of the Government, but that he had no confidence in the Cabinet which the noble Lord had formed, for it was a Cabinet condemned alike by the country, by that House, and, with one exception, by every public paper in London, and by the whole country press. With regard to what had been said, rather disparagingly, of our officers, especially of Sir Cohn Campbell and the Duke of Cambridge, he would state his belief that there was no officer more deserving of our admiration than was Sir Colin Campbell for his conduct in the field; and of the Duke of Cambridge he would, without fear of contradiction, observe, that there was not in the whole course of history a record of more heroic conduct than that exhibited by His Royal Highness at Inkerman. He could not allow that, as to those two general officers at least, there was any want of bravery or of military skill. But then he came to the supplies sent out to our army; and on this subject he would express his belief that there was not a single house of respectability in London, in Liverpool, or Glasgow, that would not be ashamed of the manner in which these supplies had been sent out. Every merchant sent out supplies to their agents in foreign countries in a satisfactory manner. Every article was delivered by their shipmasters to the persons to whom consigned by bill of lading. Take, for example, the house of Green and Co. [Laughter.] Yes, but not "green" in their experience and mode of conducting business. The Admiralty were "green," and the Commissariat were "green." But he was referring to Messrs. Green and Co., the great shipowners in the Indian and Australian trade; and if they examined into the subject they would find that all their cargoes, for the last twenty years, were delivered in proper order, and according to their bills of lading, while, as to our storeships, nobody seemed to know where to find the articles which composed their car- goes. Well, we had a new Government. Yes! But had we new men to carry out the views and the honest designs (as he believed them to be) of that Government? Nothing of the kind. They had found it a matter of ease and comfort to take the actual staff of blundering subordinates already in existence—they went no further. Then they were threatened with a dissolution of Parliament if we opposed their measures—if we voted for inquiry. For his own part, he never could go to his constituents with more confidence than he could now. But he believed that those Members who had voted, or who should vote, in opposition to inquiry would, on going to their constituents, find themselves in a miserable position—that scarcely one of them would have a seat in the next Parliament. Speaking in the full spirit of an independent Member, he deplored the position of the noble Lord, and deplored his choice of a Cabinet which, he repeated, did not possess the confidence of the country.

said, that in reverting to the actual question before the Committee as to the number of troops, he wished to make one suggestion to the Government with regard to the estimate of casualties, which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Frederick Peel) had calculated at 20,000. The hon. Member had stated that an increase of 35,000 men would be required for the addition made to the army this year; that there would be an arrear of 5,000 voted last year, and 20,000 for casualties, making in all 60,000 men. Now, he would put it to the Government whether it was possible for them to put the list of casualties so extremely low? For the year past the casualties in the Crimea had been at least 30,000. God forbid we should have such severe suffering in the ensuing year, but it was impossible, he feared, considering the increased numbers of the army, that the list should not be a heavy one. He was sure that official documents at the Horse Guards would not bear out so low an estimate of casualties upon this number of men as the Government had calculated for. He thought it a most serious subject for the consideration of the Government how they were to raise the requisite number of men. They had already placed the casualties at 20,000, but he thought he should be within the mark when he added 20,000 more to that estimate. It was not for him to suggest how that enormous gap was to be filled up, but he thought the Government ought to state how they proposed to keep up the efficient farce of the army.

said, he was sure there was no objection on the part of any Member of that House to vote certain things for which they had been asked. But they had voted nearly the same sums last year. For instance, they voted a large sum for clothing for the army, but the army did not get it; and he wanted to know how they were in the least more sure now that the clothes for which they were now voting the money would ever arrive in the Crimea? They were also going to vote a certain number of horses. They had horses last year, and they starved their horses to death. They were now going to send horses out to the Crimea, but they had not stated, either to-night or at any other time, that they had altered anything between this day and the last twelve months by which they might assure the Committee that they were not going to starve the horses again that they were now about to send out. He was sure the Committee were not prepared to vote 9,000 horses to be sent to the Crimea to be starved to death. And yet, what machinery had the Government now got? He might ask, with the hon. Gentleman behind him (Mr. Layard), what man had they got to say these things should be done? and if he could get no proper answer, he would turn out every man of them from first to last. They required a man of strong mind to do and to act, and not a mere pack of twaddling red-tapists, who did nothing.

said, he had asked a question of the Under Secretary for the War Department relative to the summer clothing for our troops in the Crimea. This was the 19th of February, and the answer he had received was that the patterns for the clothing had not been decided upon. They had heard something about the advantages of the change which had been made in the mode of providing clothes for the troops. There seemed grave reasons to doubt whether the clothing under the new system would be better than it had been under the former system; but even if better clothing were not produced, he should he satisfied if convinced that the troops would have summer clothing, or even their ordinary clothing before the warm weather set in. There was no assurance given that the pattern for the clothing had been as yet decided upon, or, indeed, that ordinary clothing was ready; and he did, therefore, trust that the Under Secretary for War would be able to show the House that this summer clothing was in progress, for certainly it was not too much to expect that on the 19th of February the summer clothing which was required for 30,000 or 40,000 men should be in progress. The hon. Member for Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford), who had just returned from the Crimea, said the spring came on rapidly in that quarter, and it was not too much to ask that, when the summer arrived, the troops should not be found walking about in sheepskin coats, after having been exposed all the winter in the ordinary clothing in which they went out. In regard to another point, he was told that there was, at present, scarcely any cavalry in the Crimea, and very little in England; that they were buying horses at the rate of 40l. a piece. He hoped they were not taking these horses from hot stables in England to place them at once upon picquet duty in the Crimea, for, depend upon it, if they did, their horses would die like rotten sheep. The Government should take care that the horses they were now hastily buying were put through some course of treatment to prepare them for the exposure they would have to meet. Having been a man of "stable mind" all his life, and having had a good deal to do with horses, he warned the Government that if they took their horses as they bought them, and shipped them in dealer's condition at once for the Crimea, many of them would die like rotten sheep. He understood that several regiments of irregular cavalry in India had volunteered their services; and he did not believe there was a finer or more effective body of men to be found than the irregular cavalry in the service of the East India Company. They were men thoroughly trained for their duty. Such was the evidence before the Committees on the Affairs of India, and their horses were seasoned to exposure. If the Government wanted cavalry, why not avail themselves of the services of these troops? He knew they had volunteered their services, and they were commanded by officers who would do as much credit to the service of Her Majesty as they had done to that of the East India Company. He trusted the Committee would pardon the observations he made, but the matter was pressing. The hon. Gentleman opposite (the Member for Aylesbury) had made an attack on what he called the aristocratic portion of the officers of the army, and on them he chose to visit the misfortunes and calamities which had oc- curred, and had been followed in that strain by other hon. Members on the Government side of the House. He (Mr. Newdegate), on the contrary, maintained that the officers of the British army were as superior to the officers of the armies of other nations as the British soldier was superior to the foreign soldier. They had not shown in the Crimea that they had degenerated. Wherever victory was to be won, had they not won it? Whenever brought face to face with the enemy, they had proved themselves victorious. The noblemen and the gentlemen who were officers in the Crimean army had done their duty. But, it was true, disasters and calamity had befallen that army. Let the House consider where the failure had occurred—it had not occurred in the regimental service of the army, which some hon. Members condemned as being aristocratic—failure had befallen the army for want of food, for want of the means of transport, for want of medical assistance and organisation. Were the duties of the Commissariat, the transport duties, discharged by members of the aristocracy? Was the medical department in the hands of the aristocracy? It was notorious that the conduct of those departments was not in the hands of the noblemen and gentlemen of the army. It was notorious that the failure in the Crimea was attributable to defective commissariat, to the blundering, miserable defects of the transport service, and to the gross inefficiency of the medical department. It could not be said that any one of those departments was in the hands of, or conducted by, the aristocracy. It was to the civil service, to the lapsed state, the miserable confusion consequent on, and engendered by, protracted peace, on those departments that all the suffering and misfortunes that had occurred was to be charged. It was gross injustice, therefore, to attempt to fasten odium on the aristocracy for calamities which had been occasioned by departments with which they were the least connected. He (Mr. Newdegate) merely trusted that hon. Members would speak with common fairness of the noblemen and gentlemen who, as officers of the army, had done their duty, and not attribute to them discredit for calamities for which they were in no way accountable. Recurring to his original question, he hoped the Under Secretary for the War Department would be able to give an assurance that the summer clothing was not only ordered but provided, when he should next week renew his question on that subject.

said, it was to the inaptitude of the Gentlemen who composed the important branches of the service that the failures were owing, and it was from that cause that he had to complain of the inefficiency of the staff, for it was notorious that many of the misfortunes which had occurred were attributable to that branch of the service. As soon as the French army arrived in Kamiesch Bay the staff officers made arrangements for the construction of jetties and wharfs, to facilitate the landing of supplies for the army; but at Balaklava no similar arrangements were made for conveying provisions and stores to the British troops. There was in this country an establishment ably conducted by professors of eminence, to which every officer in the army could have access by applying for it. They might there learn everything necessary to fit them for staff duties; and he believed this establishment sent out annually about thirteen officers fully qualified for every department of the army. Unfortunately, however, these officers were hardly ever appointed to staff situations; and the consequence was, that the staff of the English army was so inefficient that it brought upon it the derision of every foreign officer who might come into contact with it. He had no objection to the present Vote, for he was only surprised, considering the enemy with whom we had to contend, that the number of troops asked for by the Government was so small. He could not, however, help expressing his regret that, considering the deficiencies of the military system, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of the War Department (Mr. F. Peel) should not have inaugurated his advent to the office by expressing his intention of introducing modifications into some parts of that system. For instance, the manner in which commissions were purchased in the service was a most ridiculous arrangement. Some steps had certainly been taken in the right direction, for a commission in each regiment was to be given to sergeants or non-commissioned officers who were recommended by their colonels or commanding officers for such a mark of distinction. That, however, was not sufficient. In the French army a certain number—he believed, one-third—of the commissions in each regiment were conferred on non-commissioned officers or soldiers, and therefore every private who entered the ranks of that army knew that if he conducted himself properly, if he distinguished himself in action, or if he did anything to deserve promotion, he would in due course obtain a commission. He (Mr. Otway) considered it most desirable that a somewhat similar system should be adopted in the British army. Some months ago he had suggested to the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control the expediency of employing some of our Indian troops in the Crimea, but that suggestion was not very favourably received. He (Mr. Otway) had, however, been gratified to learn, within the last month or six weeks, that a regiment of cavalry was on its way from India to the Crimea. They would thus obtain not only efficient men, but also horses admirably adapted for service in the Crimea, for the horses of the Indian army were accustomed to exposure, and yet during the campaigns of Cabul and Affghanistan he believed the casualties among the horses of the cavalry regiments were not greater than those which occurred in regiments upon ordinary service at home. He knew it was the opinion of very distinguished officers that the Sikh and Ghoorka infantry, and the Scinde irregular cavalry, and other similar forces which existed in India, might be employed in the Crimea with great advantage, and he hoped that, at the present crisis, the Government would avail themselves of the services of such men as Colonel Outram, Major Jacob, and Major Edwards, who were experienced in warfare on a grand scale, and who were men of high reputation. He (Mr. Otway) did not, as he had previously stated, approve the system of purchase in the army, but so long as that system continued he thought some modication ought to be adopted with regard to the pensions awarded to the widows of officers who might fall in action, and who might die from disease in the service of their country. They had had to deplore the loss of more than one Member of that House who had fallen during the past year in battle or from sickness in the gallant discharge of their duty. He knew that one of those officers, a gallant and distinguished colonel of the Guards, must have paid 8,000l. or 9,000l. for his commission; and, although he did not know what might be the position of that gallant officer's family, he thought it was only just that the wives and families of officers who fell in battle or died from disease under similar circumstances should have some larger provision made for them by the State. He had been surprised to see that the vacancy thus occasioned had been filled up by the appointment of the eldest son of one of the richest peers in this country, who had received the commission without purchase. Now, he regarded that as an act of monstrous injustice. He considered that that vacant commission ought to have been given to the son of an officer who had fallen in the discharge of his duty in the service of his country. Certainly, so long as the system of purchase remained in existence, that commission ought not to have been bestowed upon any one who did not pay its full price, and the purchase money might have been handed over to the fund out of which provision was made for the widow and family of the deceased officer. It might be remembered that when the Bill authorising the establishment of a foreign legion was submitted to the House, the noble Lord now at the head of the Government urged the adoption of that measure on the ground that the services of such troops were necessary to save the lives of our soldiers in the Crimea. He wished to know how many men had been enlisted in the foreign legion? Also, who was to be the commander of that legion? He asked this question because he had heard, in military circles, that some six weeks or two months ago a very excellent officer, who had held a command in the Schleswig-Holstein army—a Baron Von Stuttenhein, he believed—had been sent for to this country, by telegraphic message from Holstein, or some place where he was residing, in the north of Germany. He understood that the Baron rushed to the railway station in the clothes in which he stood, and at once came to London, considering that his presence was required upon some business of the most pressing urgency; but he was told that this Baron Von Stuttenheim had, every day for the last six weeks, been running about between St. James's and the Department of the Secretary at War, or the Secretary of War, or the Secretary for War, and that he had never succeeded in getting beyond the porter in the hall. This gentleman, who had been sent for by telegraph, and who came away without a clean shirt, had never yet, it was said, seen anybody in the department, nor bad any steps been taken to render his services available. He (Mr. Otway) thought that, as the House had given their assent to a measure dangerous, if not degrading, to this country, on the plea of urgent necessity, which was put forward by the Government, they were entitled to some explanation on this subject.

Sir, the hon. and gallant Gentleman who began this discussion entered into an argument upon the general arrangements which Her Majesty's Government have made in regard to the war. He stated his opinion that, this country not being, as he considers, a military Power, ought not, when it was compelled to engage in war with Russia, to have attempted any operation with a military force, but ought to have confined itself entirely to naval operations by a fleet; and he seemed to think that it would have been sufficient to have sent a fleet to blockade the Russian ports in the Baltic, and another to blockade the Russian ports in the Black Sea, by which means we would have been able so to coerce the Russian Government as to compel them to accede to any terms which we might have pleased to desire. Now I must say that I entirely differ from the hon. and gallant Gentleman upon that point. It is manifest, I think, to everybody that the mere action of a naval force never could have exercised such a coercion upon the Government of Russia as would compel any decisive or peaceful result. But I deny entirely the assertion which he made, that the operations of our navy were attended by no result. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said, "You sent a magnificent fleet to the Baltic, but it came back without having done anything." Sir, I utterly deny that assertion. Why, in the first place, our fleet destroyed that which was the beginning of a great naval position at Bomarsund, intended to be even upon a greater scale than Cronstadt. I say that of itself was something to have accomplished. But does the hon. and gallant Gentleman forget that there were in the Russian ports in the Baltic from twenty-seven to thirty sail of the line; that there were from twenty-seven to thirty frigates; that there were steamers and small vessels in abundance; and that if we had not had in the Baltic a very large and formidable naval force, we should have had the whole of that Russian fleet scouring our seas, ravaging our commerce, threatening our shores, and inflicting danger and disgrace upon the country. Sir, I say it is unjust, unfair, and untrue to assert that we accomplished nothing when we cooped up that formidable naval force in its ports during the whole of the season, and saved our country from the inconvenience and detriment which would have arisen from the escape of even a portion of that fleet. Now, with regard to the military operations which we undertook. It is plain that if you intend to bring Russia to terms you must strike a blow somewhere. Would the hon. and gallant Officer have had us send our army to wander about in the steppes of Central Russia, striking here and there, without being able to inflict any blow that would have had any decisive or permanent result? We might have gained a victory in the interior of Russia, and yet not have been a step further towards the accomplishment of any useful or decisive result. We adopted a different course. We endeavoured to strike a blow where a blow would have been most sensitively felt, and where the effect would have been the greatest if we succeeded. We undertook the war to defend Turkey against the aggressions of Russia. We engaged in it, not—as some people have foolishly said— because we had a preference for the Mahomedans over the Christians, but because we thought it of the greatest importance for the interests of the world that those vast regions now under the sway of Turkey should not fall under the dominion of Russia. That was the object for which we declared war. Well, where did the danger lie? Why, Sir, in the Black Sea. It was perfectly manifest that Austria had such an interest in protecting Turkey from any formidable invasion by land that we might safely leave the protection of the land frontiers of Turkey to the combined armies of Turkey—which, by the by, for a whole twelvemonth stood as a barrier against the forces of Russia—to the combined armies of Turkey and Austria, if the assistance of the latter should become inevitably necessary. It is clear, then, that the aggressive power of Russia as against Turkey lay in Sebastopol. There was the great fleet which had the dominion of the Black Sea; there was that great arsenal under the protection of which that great fleet floated in security, and from which it could issue forth, with the promptitude of lightning, as it were, to fall upon Constantinople; there, in short, was the centre of the power of Russia in the Black Sea; and if we were to do anything, it was there we ought to do it. The difficulties, I confess, have been greater than were anticicipated when the expedition was settled. I will not now enter into a discussion of whether those difficulties were not increased by want of arrangement, or by bad management on the spot. But the Committee ought to look with some indulgence upon the errors and mistakes of men who had not had that experience in the duties which they were called suddenly to perform which might have enabled them to discharge those duties with greater efficiency and success. The hon. and gallant Member for Stafford (Mr. Otway) has said that we have an establishment where staff officers may learn their duties, but it is well known that the learning of them theoretically in an educational institution and the learning them practically by the actual performance of them in the field are two things as different as they possibly can be. The armies of the Continent have a great advantage in that respect over the army of England. The great bulk of those armies is always within their own country. They are assembled in large bodies. They are called out to perform great operations in the summer, and mimic war there teaches them the duties of a real campaign. Our armies have not had that advantage. The first occasion on which anything of the kind took place was in 1853, when a very small number of men were assembled in the camp at Chobham, and, therefore, we ought not to condemn too readily men who have not had practical experience in the performance of those duties which they were suddenly called upon to discharge under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty. So much for the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the conduct of the war. I contend that to have confined ourselves to a naval war would have been perfect imbecility on our part. I contend that if you were to enter into any military operations at all, the point to which those operations were directed was the point, and the only point, at which an effectual blow could be struck at the adversary with whom we were engaged. An hon. Member during the discussion made a suggestion which certainly is deserving of consideration. He stated the hardships that may fall upon officers who, returning to this country suffering from wounds or infirmities contracted in active service, may be unable, as naval officers would, to receive assistance in hospital. Whether the military arrangements would admit of that, I cannot at present say; but, undoubtedly, the suggestion is one fully deserving of the consideration of the Government. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary for War reminds me that when an officer has received a very severe wound, or lost a limb, the regulations of the service give him a gratuity of a year's pay, which is intended for the purpose of enabling him to receive that medical assistance which the condition of his wound may require. My hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams), as usual, condemned the household troops. He thought there was no use in having a body of men like the Guards, with higher pay and greater privileges than the rest of the army. Now, we are often told that we ought to imitate the military arrangements of foreign countries; and that the reason why our operations are not always so successful as they should be, is that we do not follow those examples. But if there is one arrangement which more than another prevails in all foreign armies, it is to have in each some one corps entitled to greater privileges and of greater distinction than the rest; and to so great an extent has that system been carried that recently in the French service the Imperial Guard has been reorganised—it having late years been abolished; and I myself had the satisfaction, the other day, of seeing 13,000 of the most magnificent troops, forming the Imperial Guard lately organised, reviewed in the Gardens of the Tuileries. Therefore, whether you look at the Russian service, or the Prussian, or the Austrian, or the French, you will find a body of troops corresponding with our brigade of Guards. I need not detain the House with any observations as to the manner in which those troops have performed their duty upon every occasion on which their services have been required. If upon any occasion there is a desperate resistance to be made, or a distinguished service to be performed, there you are sure to find a regiment, if not the entire brigade, of Guards in the van. That brings me to the observations of my noble Friend the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour), who thought that the household brigade of cavalry were of no use, that they were merely for show, that they never could be employed, and that both men and horses were too heavy to be of any service. Does my noble Friend forget the battle of Waterloo? Does he forget the magnificent manner in which, by the weight and strength of men and horses, that beautiful force overbore everything opposed to it on the field of Waterloo? Does he forget that, also, in the Peninsula the household brigade were employed with great distinction and success? Of course, they have not been sent to the Crimea, that being too distant a place, and the nature of the ground not admitting of the operation of that particular description of force. My hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth also said he was sorry not to see in the Estimates of the present year that consolidation of departments which we had announced as being desirable. Why, Sir, the fact is, that there is no consolidation of departments which can supersede the necessity of having a great number of clerks for the examination and settlement of the accounts of the army, of the militia, and other forces whose accounts are sent to the War Office, and, therefore, nobody ever imagined that by placing all the civil departments of the army under the control of the Secretary of State for War you could avoid having an establishment for the performance of the different services which were thus to be placed under his charge. Consequently, the House must expect that when that arrangement is completed, there will still be the necessity of providing establishments for the different services the whole of which will be placed under the control of the Secretary of State. The hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Baillie) said we began the war without any plan of transport. Now, there he was mistaken. We began the war without a separate corps, as we now proposed to have it, specially designed to manage the land transport. The land transport was under the Commissariat, and it was found that great inconvenience and inefficiency arose from the combination under one department of two services totally distinct in their nature—namely, the service of procuring supplies and the service of transporting the various articles that were required. But I would remind the hon. Member that we had a large number of animals collected at Varna. There were 4,000 or 5,000 horses and mules at Varna, especially provided for the transport service of the army. It was not possible to carry them over to the Crimea when the troops went, and circumstances arose which prevented their being sent afterwards. But the arrangement we are proposing is not the creation for the first time of the means of land transport. These means have already been employed under the Commissariat department. It is the transferring them to a separate establishment, whose sole duty will be to look after that service, and perform it correctly; and we think great advantages will arise from that concentration of the transport service into one particular department. The hon. Member has also observed upon the calamity which befell a great number of horses which died for want of forage; and he ascribed that to the great neglect on the part of those whose duty it was to provide a sufficient supply of forage. But he is not perhaps aware that the unfortunate hurricane in which the Prince was lost destroyed twenty days' forage for the animals in the camp. Then came the badness and impracticability of the roads, and the great difficulty of bringing anything from the harbour up to the camp—a difficulty which led to this consequence, that, while there were abundant supplies at the port, those who were at the camp, and for whom those supplies were intended, were left in a state of great suffering. The hon. Member for Inverness also asked what progress we had made in raising foreign troops? It was stated, and with great force, that in the early part of the Session we urged the great necessity of passing a Bill to enable us to raise foreign troops, and I especially entreated the House to consent to the passing of that Bill, in order that we might, without loss of time, enlist foreign troops, to give assistance to our troops in the Crimea. It is perfectly true that hitherto we have not succeeded in acting upon that Bill. And why? I must tell the Committee the truth, however unpleasant it may be to some parties to hear it; but the reason why we have not succeeded is the language which—I am forced to say it—the language which was used in the debates in this and the other House of Parliament, which created such a feeling of resentment, of irritation, and of indignation throughout the Continent, that those persons who were before prepared to take letters of service to raise troops in Germany said that, under these circumstances, they were unable to raise a man. The condition, also, which was imposed on the Government, of not giving half-pay to the officers, likewise tended greatly to impede the execution of that Bill. I will undertake to say that if Parliament had not put in a clause prohibiting the grant of half-pay to the officers of the Foreign Legion, and if language of the most insulting kind had not been heard with regard to what were called the "mercenary troops"—German and Belgian "mercenaries," and Heaven knows what—raising the national feeling of the Continent against us, I have no doubt that by this time we should have had a very different story to tell of these foreign troops. It has not, however, altered the feeling on the Continent with regard to the cause in which we are engaged. They still say that England is right, and wish her success; but they say that, after the language which was held with regard to their nationality, they will not take service under our flag. I would not have made that statement, which may be considered a reproach; but having been asked the reason, I am forced to give it. The hon. Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry) asked a very natural question. He said that commissions are given to non-commissioned officers, and that these commissions involve considerable expense, and he asked whether any provision was made to enable the gallant men on whom these rewards were conferred to encounter the expense attending their commissions. My hon. Friend has evidently not studied these Estimates, but if he will look at page 4, he will find the sum of 5,000l. proposed to be voted specially as a gratuity to those deserving men, to enable them to meet the expense of the commissions which are given to them. As a proof that the Government is not unmindful of the services of non-commissioned officers — of those to whom commissions cannot be given—it will be seen that there is a long list of non-commissioned officers to whom gratuities for life are to be given, amounting to 2,000 or more, in the same list in which good-service pensions to officers are given. An hon. Gentleman opposite told us that the soldiers sent to the hospital are frequently, in consequence of the loss of their knapsacks, destitute of knives and forks, things which are really essential to their comfort, and that great difficulty has sometimes arisen in providing them in the hospital. That evil has been, I am happy to say, anticipated; and orders were given to purchase a large number of knives and forks at Marseilles for the use in hospital at Scutari of those soldiers who may come unprovided with these necessary articles. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) made some very proper remarks. He said it was essential that a new supply of tents should be provided for the use of the army in the ensuing campaign. I can assure him that that requirement will be duly attended to, and I trust they will be of a sufficiently substantial description. They will not be old tents, but new ones, perfectly fitted for the service for which they are intended. It is perfectly true that the French have been provided with a tent much more portable than that of the English; but, although it is far more portable, it is by no means so well adapted to protect the soldier against the inclemency of the weather. It is a most convenient tent for light service, but it is not above three or four feet from the ground. It barely affords shelter at the sides. It is easily carried and easily put up, but the French felt so strongly the inferiority of their tent to that of our troops, that the French general sent to France for tents upon our model, feeling that their tent was an insufficient shelter from the weather to which they were exposed. The hon. Gentleman has also made a very good suggestion with regard to the supply of light cavalry. It is perfectly true that in all probability light cavalry might be obtained in Asia Minor. I am sure, if they could be found there, it would be far better, both in point of economy and expedition, to obtain them from thence than to bring them from India, for the transport is tedious and expensive, and probably the cavalry so brought would not find itself so well adapted to the nature of the country and the service to be performed as cavalry obtained nearer the country where the operations are to be performed. With regard to the suggestion relative to bringing distinguished officers from India, such as Major Outram and Major Edwardes, I think my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control would have a word or two to say on that point. These officers are occupying posts of great importance in India, and, I apprehend, the Governor General would not thank the Government at home if they were to deprive him of those able officers, on whose ability and services he counts in the event of circumstances arising which might require India to be defended as well as the Crimea invaded. It is unncessary for me to point out to the Committee that many circumstances may arise in which it would be necessary for the Governor General of India to be in possession of ample means to protect our territories in that quarter of the globe. The hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) wishes to know what better machinery we have established for sending out provisions and clothing to our troops in the Crimea? That is exactly, Sir, one of the arrangements which the Government have felt it to be their imperative duty to give their earliest attention to. We know the great importance of seeing not only that things are sent, but of making arrangements by which the things sent to the army shall reach the men and officers for whom the things are intended. The defect has not been the want of things despatched from this country. Forage, ammunition, and everything requisite has been sent from this country, and, I will venture to say, when the matter comes to be looked into, that it will be found that there never was sent from this country so large a force in so short a time, so fully equipped, so well provided with everything necessary for the comfort of the horses and men, and for the purposes of the service to which they were destined, as the army which was sent to the East in the course of the year that just elapsed. The defects are from the want of arrangement for conveying to the men and the horses the things that were sent out to them. At the same time, I must say there was great truth and force in the observations of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), in answer to the attack made on the aristocracy of the country, in which, I suppose, we must include the gentry, for I hope the aristocracy includes the two. In answer to the charge that our army had not been so successful as it ought to have been, in consequence of the great number of gentlemen who are officers in the army, I think the hon. Member made a most triumphant reply, by showing that where the system has broken down—where the evil has arisen from the want of capacity, want of energy, want of intelligence, want of an accurate and zealous performance of duty—it has happened not where the gentry were, not where the aristocracy were, not where the noblemen were, but where there were persons belonging to other classes of the community—in the medical department, the commissariat department, the transport service, which have not been filled with the aristocracy or the gentry. It is there that the system has broken down—it is there that the service has failed, and produced the suffering which we all so much regret and deplore. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire has expressed a hope that the new clothing will be provided in time for the services in the ensuing campaign. I can assure the hon. Member and the Committee that no effort shall be omitted to secure the prompt and effectual despatch of the clothing, and I entertain not the slightest doubt that the clothing will arrive in proper quantities and in due time. Most of the observations which have been made are perfectly correct. Nobody disputes the importance of having a large and effective army. If any hon. Member has objected to the amount of the force, or to anything which is required to make the force effective, I trust that between this time and the opening of the campaign Government will be able to organise a sufficient army of reserve to en- able it to put into the field an army sufficient to cope with whatever difficulties it may have to contend; and I am satisfied that if that army shall be called upon to vindicate the honour of the country and maintain its interest by the continuance of the war, we shall find that the service has been well performed—that the experience of the last few months will enable us to correct those faults and errors which have been committed, and that by the means which the Government are setting to work to reorganise and to rearrange those several departments of the service, we shall be able to put into the field an army of which the country will be proud—an army whose services will meet the thanks and acknowledgments of Parliament and of the country.

said, he regretted to have heard from the noble Lord at the head of the Government an intimation that an ex-Minister who, one would think, had been sufficiently convicted and condemned by the country, had been set forth to patch up a peace which, from his knowledge of the character of the man, he (Colonel Sibthorp) feared would not redound to the honour or interest of England. He hoped England would never succumb to the Russian, nor to any other country; and he had, therefore, hoped that the noble Lord to whom he referred had retired from public life, never again to return to it. He was surprised to hear from the noble Lord, for whom he had the greatest respect, a hint respecting a dissolution of Parliament. Old birds were not to be caught with chaff; and he (Colonel Sibthorp) would not shrink from appearing before his constituents to defend his public conduct. He was prepared to do all in his power to uphold the honour and security of the country, and would be ready to abide by the consequences of doing his duty.

said, he wished to know whether the Government intended to keep up the corps of pensioners that went out with the army in the East, and the efficiency of which had been greatly questioned?

was understood to reply that the Government had no intention to maintain the corps to which the hon. Gentleman had alluded.

said, he wished to know if any and what provision had been made to supply the 10th Hussars, now on their way to the Crimea from India, with warm winter clothing; and also, if they were to bring their tents with them, or if provision had been made to supply them with tents for themselves and their horses on their arrival in the Crimea?

said, it was not intended to send the 10th Hussars direct to the Crimea. They would remain in Egypt. until the winter was over.

said, he rose to vindicate his hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury from a misrepresentation of his expressions which the noble Lord at the head of the Government had twice put forward in the course of the evening. His hon. Friend had never attempted to draw any invidious distinctions between different classes in this country, nor had he attributed a desire and an ability to serve the country to one class more than to another, but what he had endeavoured to impress upon the Government was, that the only way in which affairs could now be conducted was by recognising and putting forward energy and ability in one class as well as in another. He certainly, so far, had not been able to recognise any disposition on the part of Her Majesty's Government to act up to the wishes of the country on this important point, and he had heard with consternation that they had discovered no better way to remedy the inefficiency which existed in our military departments in the Crimea than by sending out Commissions to inquire and report on the maladministration of affairs there. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had acknowledged that there existed great want of energy and ability in some of the departments in the Crimea; and certainly the correspondence respecting the supply of coffee to the troops proved that at least one officer out there had shown himself utterly inefficient and inadequate to the duties of his position. Of course he alluded to Mr. Commissary General Filder, to whose deficiencies in energy and ability be believed much of the sufferings undergone by our troops was to be attributed. That officer, it appeared, commenced by ordering unroasted coffee to be supplied to the troops, and though the evil effects of such a measure were obvious from the very first, though in most cases the coffee was thus rendered entirely useless, and though, moreover, he had been requested in July to report as to the comparative merits of roasted and unroasted coffee, it was not until the middle of October that he ventured to give a somewhat doubtful opinion that the evidence on the whole was favourable to roasted coffee. This was the only sample which the House had yet been able to get at with respect to the mode in which the Commissariat was mismanaged, but he thought this single sample entitled the Committee to call upon the Government to proceed at once to punish and to remove officers such as this gentleman from positions where they could do such terrible mischief to the public service.

said, he would suggest that, if a man should enlist for five years, and if at the end of that time he were in good health, it should be competent to him to enlist for another term of three years. But if one man enlisted for one year, another for two years, and a third for three years, there would be endless confusion in keeping the accounts of the army. He also gave notice that he should take the earliest opportunity to ask the Secretary at War a question, arising from the frequent complaints which had been made relative to the transmission of money from soldiers serving in the army in the East to their families at home.

said, he hoped, after the numerous remarks which had been made with reference to the supply of coffee, the Committee would indulge him with an explanation of what had really taken place. The Committee would observe by the papers on the table that in the first instance when coffee was sent to the Crimea, it was not sent as rations, but as an article of sale to those who chose to buy it. When it was sent out it was quite uncertain where it would go to, or whether it would be served as rations at all. But on the only occasion in an English war when coffee had been served as rations—he thought it was the Kafir war—it was invariably served out in an unroasted state, which was preferred both by officers and men, because it was more easily carried, and could be had in a better condition than when roasted. It was sent from this country in March, not as rations, but along with other comforts, to be sold to the troops at prime cost. It was not until, he thought, on the 28th of June that a general order was issued by Lord Raglan, which made it part of the ordinary rations of the troops. He believed it was early in July—the 5th of July—that Sir Charles Trevelyan, conceiving it possible that coffee might be served to the troops in a more convenient state, sent, of his own accord, unmoved by any representation from the East, 5,000 lbs. of roasted coffee, with a request to Commissary General Filder to report on the best mode of sending it. He believed that letter did not reach Commissary General Filder till the latter part of September or the beginning of October. The troops were moving and he did not see it till then. In October, early, Commissary General Filder wrote a private letter, and on the 6th of November a public letter was received from him by the Treasury, in consequence of which, on the very next day, the 7th, a minute was made that 225,0001bs. of roasted coffee should be sent out at once, and that a monthly supply of the same article should follow. So far as the officers at home were concerned, they could not have acted better, and, so far as Commissary General Filder was concerned, he appeared to have answered Sir Charles Trevelyan's letter in due time, as soon as an opinion could be got from officers who were qualified to offer a sound opinion. Unfortunately, about that time, there was a large demand for transports both for the French army and our own, and the ships with the roasted coffee did not sail for some weeks. The main supply, in fact, did not sail until December. It was a mistake to suppose that the French army were supplied with coffee in otherwise than a green state; but, fortunately, from their better arrangements, they were supplied with the means of roasting and grinding it. If the coffee for the supply of our army had been sent out ground and roasted, no doubt complaints would have been made of the destructibility of the article.

said, that when returns were ordered by that House, the usual practice on the part of public departments was to give exact answers to exact questions, but when he moved for a return of the coffee roasted and ground which had been sent to the army in the East, the return professed to give the quantity roasted "or" ground. It, however, now appeared that no coffee roasted "and" ground had been sent to the army in the Crimea previous to the 22nd of December. He also moved at the same time for the date of the departure of the ships containing the coffee, but the Treasury did not give that information, alleging that they could not obtain it, and the ships might be at that moment frozen up in the docks for anything they knew. The soldiers never had the means of getting fires when they wanted to roast their coffee, and they had only the fragments of Russian shells to grind it with, when the Messrs. Collier made the offer to roast and grind the coffee sent out to the troops, which was answered by Sir Charles Trevelyan in so off-hand and insolent a manner. People were afraid to go near our public offices because of the insolence of the officials; and he should like to know whether Sir Charles Trevelyan was authorised to write a letter to the Messrs. Collier couched in such exceptionable terms as that in which the offer to assist the Government was declined. There ought to be some explanation given why the Treasury refused to have the coffee ground, and yet neglected sending means for grinding it on the spot. No doubt coffee was better if fresh ground and fresh roasted, and the French were so far in advance of us that they had an efficient establishment close to their camp where the coffee was roasted and ground and issued to the men every morning. If the French could do that, it was perfectly intolerable that our departments should not be able to do the same. He really believed our brave fellows deserved more credit for the patience with which they had borne their sufferings than for their extreme gallantry in the field; and the neglect with which they had been treated was a disgrace to this country, and perfectly indefensible.

said, he could state to the Committee that the coffee was issued in a green state, that the only means of grinding it were the fragments of shells which had burst in the camp, and that, repeatedly, there was no fuel to roast it. He wished to know whether it was true or not that 30,000 barrels of porter had been sent to Constantinople, but, there being no one there to receive it, the ship had been detained and the owners were now prosecuting an action against the Government for the delay? He wished also to know whether it was true that the whole medical profession in front of Sebastopol had, one morning, resigned their commissions to Lord Raglan?

said, with respect to the porter, he could give no answer, but he would institute inquiries and inform the hon. and gallant Gentleman of the result. He was extremely sorry to hear any department charged with incivility, and, as to Sir Charles Trevelyan's letter, he had no reason to believe he was replying upon other than an ordinary matter of business. Messrs. Collier's communication did not read as a gratuitous offer, and there was no ground for supposing it was any other than one of those many applications which the Government was receiving every day. On the 7th of November the Treasury minute was issued directing that there should be ordered immediately 225,000 lbs. of coffee, roasted but not ground, to be followed by three further shipments from month to month of 75,000 lbs. of the same; and it was not until the 15th of December that Messrs. Collier wrote the letter to the Treasury containing their offer. Therefore Sir Charles Trevelyan, knowing that abundance of roasted coffee had been ordered, and that 5,000 lbs. of roasted coffee had been sent out at an earlier period (as the Commissariat Department had been advised on the authority of persons having great experience in the matter that the coffee should not be sent ground, but roasted only), declined the offer of Messrs. Collier. That offer was regarded as one made in the ordinary way of business, and, though the answer given to it was short, it did not contain, in his opinion, any incivility.

said, he thought one of the statements made by the hon. Gentleman hardly consistent with the correspondence laid before the House. The hon. Gentleman stated that the Treasury minute of the 7th of November directed that 225,000 lbs. of coffee, roasted but not ground, should be sent out immediately, but the words of the minute were as follows:—"Write to the Secretary of the Admiralty and request that he will move the Lords Commissioners to direct that early steps may be taken for providing and shipping," &c. Therefore the coffee was not immediately ordered, but simply early steps were directed to be taken for shipping it. The hon. Gentleman said that the application of Messrs. Collier to the Treasury was made on December the 15th, and that several consignments had been ordered by the Treasury to be made before that application of Messrs. Collier, but it would be seen by the 17th page of the correspondence before the House, that great remissness was exhibited in not sending out the roasted coffee as early as possible after the Treasury minute of the 7th of November, for it was not until the 16th of December that the first consignment of it was shipped, and up to the 13th of February the full amount of roasted coffee sent out by that time was not more than 211,000 lbs. It did not appear from these returns that the order for the further supply which was to go out by monthly con- signments had ever been acted upon up to the present moment.

said, the right hon. Gentleman had not sufficiently attended to the explanation which he had already offered on this subject. He had already called the attention of the Committee to the fact that, though the order was given the day after the letter was received, that order was not executed till the 16th of December, and the reason of this was that, after the battle of Inkerman, there was such a demand for ships to transport fresh troops to the Crimea that none could be got to carry the order into effect.

said, he wished to call attention to the fact that the Messrs. Collier, in their letter to the Treasury, offered to assist in roasting and grinding the coffee in any of the Government dockyards. He thought that Sir Charles Trevelyan, in his reply, might at least have thanked them for the offer.