said, he wished to make a few observations on the reasons which induced him in the first instance to bring forward this Bill, and on those which now induced him to withdraw it. In the first place, he must observe, that supposing a check on political favouritism towards contractors to be required, he did not think the check which he had proposed to repeal was the proper one; he held that the proper check was the constitutional responsibility of both Ministers and Members, and not a system of penalties. The existing check was notoriously evaded, and any man having a contract with the Government who desired to obtain a seat in Parliament might with the utmost facility get over the difficulty by transferring the contract to persons with whom he was connected. A case in point was that of the late Mr. Soames, who being one of the largest shipping contractors in the country, and being anxious to enter Parliament, transferred his contracts to his nephew. Another reason why he proposed this Bill was, that he considered the present prohibition very unjust towards the mercantile body. He did not see why a Member of Parliament should be excluded from the field of fair competition. The third and main ground was, that he thought the present system detrimental to the public service, inasmuch as it narrowed the field of competition as regarded articles required by the Government. Entertaining those opinions, however, he withdrew the Bill—first, because he found that there was a strong prejudice in the House against it, and because he thought that, by pressing it forward at that moment, he would prejudge the question. He hoped that when the House had bestowed further consideration on the subject, and when the question was brought forward, as he trusted it would be, by some one of greater weight than himself, the attempt at legislation would be attended with a different result. His second ground for withdrawing the Bill was, that his hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent (Mr. J. L. Ricardo) had given notice of his intention to move for a Committee of Inquiry into the whole system of contracts. He would only say, in conclusion, that having watched the proceedings of the Admiralty for about twenty years, he had never seen in them the slightest trace of political favouritism. He should therefore move that the order for the second reading be discharged.

said, he would second the Motion for the discharge of the order with the utmost cordiality. He had intended, if the Bill had been brought forward, to have moved that it be read a second time that day six months. It afforded him great pleasure to find that the Bill was to be withdrawn. So long as it was got rid of, it did not matter how or what was the reason given. The Bill it proposed to repeal had been passed in 1783, after a great struggle; it had been passed by an unreformed Parliament, and if a reformed Parliament thought proper to repeal it, he, for one, should prefer the unreformed Parliament. It had been passed at a time when Fox, Whitbread, and other great men of the day had stood forward as the champions of the measure. The same Parliament which passed the Contractors Bill passed also the Bill for the disqualification of revenue officers. Yet that was in days when the landed interest was in the ascendant; when the great commercial interests, the great commercial towns of Birmingham, Manchester, and Sheffield, were not represented in Parliament. The case, however, at the present time was altered, and, of the two, the commercial interest was in the ascendant in Parliament. Now he thought, that though they might be a free-trade Parliament, they ought not to be a free jobbing Parliament. But where the counting-house was in the ascendant, it struck him that speculation would not be in abeyance; and surely, if it was not in abeyance, it would be much assisted and fostered by the recognition and countenance of Government. For the sake, then, of the public, and for the sake of Government themselves, he would deprecate any change in the law. Men holding contracts, if in Parliament, who might be unable to finish their contracts by a specified day, would come to the Government, demanding only a few days' delay, and if that request was refused them, they would tell the Government—"Here we are, dragged through the mire, night after night, in your service, and yet you refuse us the smallest favour."

said, he quite concurred in the observations of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. It would never do for that House, while it was endeavouring to solve the difficult question of getting rid of the corrupt influences exercised upon electors, to enact a law abolishing a check upon corrupt influences that might be exercised upon the elected. Unless the House of Commons kept itself perfectly free, not only from corruption, but from every suspicion of corruption, it would sacrifice its independence and in a great measure lose its utility. There was one point, however, to which he wished to call the attention of the Government. The subject had been brought forward in consequence of what took place last Session, in reference to a particular species of Government contracts—namely, loan contracts. The hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. T. Duncombe) was a member of that Committee, which arrived, although not unanimously, at the conclusion that engagements for loans to the Government did not come within the statute of George III. The Government, however, would remember that their own Attorney General, and, he believed, his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stamford (Sir F. Thesiger) took a different view of the subject, and as the Government were now actually con- tracting a new loan, he thought it would be right and proper for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to bring in a declaratory and enacting Bill to decide the doubt, by providing that contracts for loans made to Government were not, while open to public competition, within the provisions of the statute of George III. He was as eager as the hon. Member for Finsbury that the law with respect to all other species of contracts should remain in its present condition, but he would beg to press upon the Government the expediency of introducing a measure such as he had suggested with regard to that particular species of contracts.

Sir, I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Bridport has, in the exercise of his discretion, withdrawn the Bill, as I came down to the House prepared to vote against the second reading in the event of its being pressed to a division. I quite concur with my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Walpole) in the opinion that it is not desirable to make any alteration in the existing law with regard to contracts between public departments and contractors for the supply of goods, or the rendering of different sorts of services to the Government. Those contracts are entered into by the simple authority of the different departments, such as the Admiralty, the War Department, or the Stationery Office; no Resolutions with respect to them are submitted to Parliament, and the departments have power to vary their terms after they have been entered into, and to grant indulgences to the contractors while they are pending. The departments have, therefore, the unquestionable power, if they are disposed to use it, of influencing the conduct of the contractors—and I think that Parliament, in 1783, exercised a wise discretion in passing a measure imposing that disability upon contractors which the hon. Gentleman, by his Bill, proposed to repeal. The provisions of the Act of 1783 are liable to two objections—one is, that the law is often rendered inoperative by being evaded by persons who, although they are Members of this House, hold contracts, but execute them in the name of a partner or some other individual; the other is, that a person sometimes inadvertently enters into a contract while a Member of this House without considering the effect it will have, and forfeits his seat unknowingly. I admit that each of these objections has a certain degree of force; nevertheless, they apply equally to almost all penal Acts. Almost all those Acts admit of evasions, and are occasionally applied to persons who are not aware of their existence; but if objections of this sort were allowed to prevail against them, our criminal code would be reduced to a very small shred. It does not, therefore, appear to me that there are any sufficient reasons for overthrowing the policy with regard to the disqualification of contractors which has been adhered to since 1783. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole) adverted to that part of the Act which relates to loan contracts. Now the Committee which sat last Session investigated very fully the law of that subject and its history, but not its policy, and I confess that anything more perplexing than the history of that law it never fell to my lot to examine. The proceedings that took place when the Act was under discussion, and the manner in which it has been acted upon, render it extremely difficult to arrive at the intention of the Legislature with respect to loan contractors; but one thing, however, is undoubted—the subject received great attention at the time, as it was taken up by the Whigs as a sort of party trial at the end of the American war. The Act has been well known to Parliament, to the Executive Government, and to all persons likely to take contracts for loans; and, from the date of its passing to the present time, it is well known that Members of Parliament have entered into engagements in a variety of loans, without any attempt being made to apply it to them. No one until last Session ever raised the question of its applicability. The conclusion to be derived from all this appears to me, although not particularly obvious, to be very simple. It was seen from the beginning that a contract for a loan was of a totally different nature, both as respects the law of the case and the character and essence of the contract, from a contract entered into for the supply of articles or the rendering of services to a public department. A loan contractor is merely a go-between, not a contractor, in respect of the nation represented by Parliament on the one hand, and certain persons who wish to purchase perpetual annuities on the other. The national faith with regard to perpetual annuities is engaged by the Act of Parliament, but Parliament delegates no power of pledging it to the Executive Government. Nevertheless, it is impossible for Parliament to make a contract with the public for a loan without a preliminary proceeding. A proposition by an individual Member of this House to make a loan must end in nothing, for he would be unable to say, "I am in a condition to prove that there are persons who will enter into the contract with you upon certain terms." In order, therefore, that there may be some basis upon which to found the action of Parliament, it is necessary that a preliminary proceeding should take place, and Parliament wisely—I may almost say, necessarily—has intrusted the Executive Government with the power of entering into preliminary negotiations for the purpose of ascertaining that there are persons ready to lend a large sum of money to the public upon certain terms. Now, this is, in effect, nearly all that is done at the meeting at the Treasury between the First Lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and certain capitalists from the city. The parties agree upon certain terms, which are then submitted to Parliament for approbation and ratification; if Parliament think that this preliminary engagement, made with certain contractors, representing a large number of subscribers, consists of terms favourable to the public, they ratify it, while if, on the other hand, they think the terms are unfavourable, they repudiate it. This is the nature of the transaction which is laid before the House in the shape of Resolutions. If the House agree to those Resolutions a Bill founded on them is introduced, defining in precise terms the engagement into which the public enters, and to which subscribers to the loan bind themselves. Thus, the contract entered into upon the public and national faith is embodied in an Act of Parliament, and the Executive Government have no power of varying the terms of that contract. They can grant no favour to any individual subscriber; they cannot place one person in a more favourable position than another. They are as much bound by the terms of the Act as any one of the public, and, therefore, with regard to contracts of this class, no question of corruption can arise. As far as I am able to understand the subject, the decision of the Committee of last Session is well founded in point of law, but, admitting that there is a doubt as to the interpretation of the words of the Act, which are not very clear, there can be no doubt as to the question of policy, or as to the entire distinction in essence and in character between contracts for loans and contracts for the supply of coal, timber, and other articles to public departments. My right hon. Friend opposite suggested that, as the question of law is not quite clear, it might be desirable to bring in a Bill declaring and enacting that loan contractors are not subject to the penalties of the Act of 1783. It appears to me, however, that the decision of the Committee of last Session is founded upon very strong reasons, and I should be much inclined to allow the case to rest on that decision, and not to attempt further legislation. But, looking at the authority of the advice of my right hon. Friend, who presided over the Committee, and who is a thorough master of the subject, the question shall receive my most careful consideration, although I hope he will excuse me from giving him a definite answer with respect to it at present. I have only to add that the opinion I have now expressed agrees exactly with that which has been expressed by my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, who was also a Member of the Committee.

said, that as a Member of the Committee which sat last year on this subject, he had no hesitation in declaring that his opinion quite accorded with the decision of the majority, although, in consequence of his having to proceed to Dublin, he had been obliged to content himself with putting his views on paper. He held that the negotiation of the Government with the contractors was entirely a preliminary proceeding, as the whole thing, after the conclusion of the contract, came under the review of Parliament. There could, however, be no doubt that the opinions of highly competent persons did not coincide in that view; and, therefore, he thought the introduction of a declaratory Bill was highly desirable, as making that perfectly conclusive which seemed to him to accord with the spirit of the law.

said, that there was another question, though of small character, which he considered required the attention of Her Majesty's Government. At present the Government often required sureties for certain individuals in its employment. Now, who would be surety in such a case? The moment any person became surety to the Crown, he was recorded in the public courts as a Crown debtor, and could no longer sell a yard of his land. Why not alter the law, so that persons might be security without being recorded as Crown debtors, and unable to sell their land? That state of the law prevented the Government, in many cases, from obtaining the best securities.

said, he was very glad the Bill had been withdrawn. He gathered from what had fallen from his right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole) and the right hon. Baronet the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it was their opinion that persons contracting for a loan of money were exempted from the provisions of the present law relating to contractors, but at the same time it was also desirable to make the law on that point more clear. Whenever any Bill for such a purpose should be introduced the whole question would of course come under discussion, but in the meantime he must say that he did not recognise the distinction so elaborately drawn by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who said that whatever took place between himself and the loan contractor was provisional and conditional on the assent of Parliament. That might be true technically, but in practice the Parliament invariably confirmed the bargain made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman went on to draw distinctions of two kinds between the different cases. He laid down, with regard to ordinary contracts, that there might be variations in the making of a bargain, or in varying the conditions subsequently; while with regard to a loan such a condition was impossible, as all the terms were settled by Act of Parliament. But the right hon. Gentleman had not ventured to say that favouritism in issuing the bargain might not be possible. Now, it appeared to him, for instance, to involve quite as much corruption on the part of the Government to allow the minimum price of Consols which they were willing to offer to leak out previous to the contracting of a loan, as if they offered one contractor a higher price for his goods than another. He rose, therefore, to express a hope that, if the law was not to remain as it was, but was to be made more clear and intelligible, tthey should not be precluded on the occasion from sifting the whole principle at stake. He had some recollection of the old loans made in the days of the Goldsmids, and he well remembered how, upon the occasion of the terms of one loan proving unfortunate, that family was placed in a most painful position! through not being able for a long time to get discharged from their obligation by the Government of the day. With regard to the statement, that the arrangement between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the loan contractor was only provisional, previous to its sanction by Parliament, he would observe that he was inclined to think that the persons making the bargain were responsible to the Crown for the whole loan.

intimated dissent.

said, he was opposed to the introduction of a declaratory or enacting measure on this question, for he thought a special enactment would have the effect of diminishing the force of the precedent established by the decision of the Committee of last year. It seemed to him that the precedent, relating, as it did, to the privileges of the House and to its special functions, supplied a better safeguard than any declaratory Act of Parliament; for as soon as ever the law was issued disputes might arise as to its interpretation, besides which they would run the risk of having to enact in the case of each loan a separate declaratory Act for the regulation of that loan.

, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, that the alterations which he proposed to make in the existing law were very small ones. He was not seeking to repeal any existing qualification, save one, and that was the qualification by reversion. That exception had been suggested by a right hon. Friend of his, and he thought with great justice, for if a money qualification was supposed to have any merit, it certainly could not attach to a person who merely held a reversionary interest in property. According to the present law all justices of the peace were required to possess £100 a year in land; he proposed to extend the right to persons holding £300 a year in personal property, or to the holders of office under the Government or the East India Company with salaries to that amount. He thought that thereby a class of persons eminently fittted by their previous habits as well as acquirements to fulfil the duties of magistrates, would be open for selection to the office of justice of the peace. There were four Acts of Parliament—three of them being obselete—which he proposed to repeal, the surviving Act being the 18 Geo. II. cap. 20. And his object here was to embody all the Acts relating to justices of the peace in one Statute. With the same view, therefore, he would repeal two sections of two other Acts—namely, that which disqualified attorneys and solicitors in England and Wales from acting as magistrates, and also that giving to County Court Judges the right of acting as ex officio magistrates. The only further extension which he proposed was, to render eligible for the commission of the peace the eldest sons of all persons qualified to sit as Members of Parliament—the provision to embrace the new law of Victoria; whereas at present it only extended to the law of Anne. In thus extending the qualification for the magistracy from landed to personal property he was only copying the example many years ago set by Parliament in recognising the possession of personalty as a sufficient qualification for a seat in that House. In no instance had that alteration of the law been found to work badly; and certainly the class of representatives at present were not less respectable than they used to be. And should the House consent to adopt the alteration of the law relative to the magistracy which he now ventured to suggest, he had no doubt but that it would work equally successfully as the change relative to the constitution of the House of Commons. It should be borne in mind that, under the present law, persons not possessing an acre of land contrived by a sort of hocus pocus—by getting a rent-charge of £100 from a friend, or by some other means—to procure a qualification for the commission of the peace. He thought it would be more creditable to magistrates to have, instead of such sham qualifications, a real qualification from personal property. If it should be objected that under his Bill persons not contributing to the county rates might be justices and have a voice in the disposal of the county revenue, he would observe that that was the case to a certain extent at present, as a justice in one county might have his qualification in another.

said, he was sorry he could not give his unqualified approbation to the Bill, and that regret was heightened from having seen the names on the back of it. One of those names was that of the right hon. Member for Dorsetshire (Mr. Bankes), upon whose judgment he placed the greatest reliance. The object of the Bill was to substitute personal for property qualification. He was aware that in many parts of the country there was some difficulty in obtaining magistrates, but he thought that the extension of the qualification to personal property was likely to be productive of greater evil than had existed under the present system. Magistrates who were obliged to qualify by landed property were much more likely to discharge the duties of their office with greater satisfaction to the public than those who had been appointed upon the qualification of some situation yielding £300 a year, who might be, in other respects, strangers to the locality, and who had no knowledge of the district. The Bill, instead of giving facilities to lords lieutenant to supply the wants of districts by the appointment of magistrates, would increase their difficulties by the pressure it would put upon them by candidates for the commission of the peace. When this Bill was brought forward last year it proceeded to a certain stage and was then withdrawn, with the view of extending it to Ireland. The representatives of Ireland, however, objected to such a proceeding, and the measure was not pressed. Now, if it were good for England he did not see why it would not be equally good for Ireland. If the measure should ever reach Committee, he would certainly feel it his duty to press for some very great alteration in it before he could assent to its passing into a law.

said, the Bill now before the House was introduced for the purpose of substituting personal for property qualification to the office of justice of the peace. Last year he had not opposed the second reading of a similar Bill, and he proposed to take the same course this year. He thought that many of the clauses would be productive of good. It had been objected that the qualification ought to depend on personal property, as it was personal property that now paid rates and taxes. But even now persons might vote in respect of rates and taxes who had very little interest in those rates and taxes. The same objection as to the appointment of persons to the magistracy who would, perhaps, be strangers to the district in which they would have to discharge their duties, would equally apply to the present system, for the property from which they were qualified might be situated in a different district altogether. Such persons, therefore, might have by law no interest whatever in the funds of which they would have the administration as justices of the peace. There was, however, a salutary check to any abuse in the hands of the lord lieutenant, who, no doubt, would hesitate to appoint any gentlemen to the magistracy but such as had a direct interest in the county where they were to exercise their functions. In that respect he confessed he did not think that the proposed alteration in the law would work badly. It was, however, doubtful to him whether a mere qualification of £300 arising out of a salary should be held sufficient. He would offer no objection to the main principles of the Bill, reserving to himself the liberty of proposing some alterations in Committee.

said, he objected to the principle of the measure, which was, in his opinion, altogether subversive of the representative system hitherto generally recognised in all their institutions. As regarded his own county (Berkshire), he believed that the appointment of persons to the magistracy who had no property nor any direct interest in the district, would create the greatest possible annoyance and heart burnings amongst the ratepayers. He thought that the present subject ought to be considered in connection with the establishment of the rural police, as the one was more or less dependent on the other. Although he admitted that in some instances the lords lieutenant exercised their power in a reckless manner, nevertheless he contended that, generally speaking; they made most just and judicious appointments to the magistracy. He also objected to a measure of this kind being introduced by a private Member and not by the Government. If the Bill passed, a lord lieutenant might appoint any number of persons he pleased to the magistracy, who, though utter strangers to the district, would have the administration of the ratepayers' money without a proper control.

said, he must declare himself in favour of the principle of the Bill. No measure that could be brought forward but would be open to some objection. The question here was, whether the advantages of the present, meaasure did not outweigh any disadvantages that might be supposed to arise from it. He was decidedly of opinion that it would effect a great improvement in the present system. No doubt the Bill gave additional power to lords lieutenant to appoint improper persons, but they could equally do so at present. The check was in public opinion over the lords lieutenant. Persons who opposed the Bill were not aware of the difficulty of finding magistrates in some districts. Objections were raised to clerical magistrates, but very often no other were to be had. We were a travelling people—magistrates were travellers all over Europe—and in certain seasons were not to be found in their respective districts. In his own experience he knew an instance where in one of two consecutive petty sessions no magistrate attended, and in the next only one. It had been said that the lords lieutenant might appoint further magistrates when necessary, but it was not stated by what means it was proposed to carry out that proceeding. With reference to what had been said by the right hon. Baronet the Home Secretary as to the unfitness of East India officers for the position of justices of the peace, he could only say that he knew many of those officers, and he had every reason to believe that they would be perfectly fitted to discharge such duties.

said, he thought that the Bill would give great scope to the appointment of proper persons. He could confirm from his own experience the statement that had been made as to the want of magistrates in certain districts. His chief objection to the measure lay in its exclusion clauses. By the proposed Bill, attorneys and solicitors were prohibited from acting as justices of the peace. They were a most valuable class of men, and he could see no reason for their prohibition. It was well known that they were not precluded from acting as justices of the peace for boroughs, and he found it difficult to conceive why that which was good for the boroughs should not be equally good for the county. He admitted that attorneys practising at quarter sessions should not be allowed to sit on the bench at sessions. But as regarded the numerous class of attorneys and solicitors not practising at quarter sessions he could see no reason whatever for their disqualification.

said, that while admitting the policy of appointing such professional gentlemen to the magistracy, he certainly thought that they should be disqualified from practising at petty or quarter sessions.

said, he did not see why attorneys and solicitors should be excluded from the magistracy, but he would not permit them to practise in the courts in which they acted as magistrates. The profession of a solicitor eminently qualified him for the discharge of judicial duties, and he could see no valid reason why they should be excluded.

said, he was willing to admit that the Bill would require much consideration in Committee. The duties of the magistracy were most important in every respect. The point raised as to the admission of attorneys and solicitors he considered was well worthy of attention. If that class of persons were still to be excluded from the commission of the peace, that exclusion should be based upon grounds that would east no reflection upon such gentlemen, for it was well known that the magistrates derived the greatest assistance from those who had acquired a knowledge of the legal profession. He trusted that the House would assent to the second reading of the Bill, with a view of considering those details in Committee.

said, he was about to state that which would be almost high treason in him to say, seeing that he was surrounded on all sides by the "great unpaid," but, in his opinion, it was the duty of that House to insist upon a stipendiary magistracy being appointed. It was said that in some districts there were not magistrates enough. That might be so, but certainly in others, judging from the results of their doings, there were too many. In many places the unpaid magistracy were actually sitting in judgment on their own cases. They might, perchance, decide justly, but under such circumstances it was folly to expect that their decisions would give satisfaction. How much a system of stipendiary magistrates was needed in the north of England! In the manufacturing districts cases frequently occurred of disputes between masters and men, when it was considered that the decisions of the magistracy were generally influenced by interested feelings. If, however, such questions were always submitted to a stipendiary magistracy, the results would be considered much more satisfactory by the working classes. Questions arising from poaching were also left to the decisions of the "great unpaid," when it was felt that the poachers had no chance whatever of an unbiassed decision. The judgments of stipendiary magistrates would always be viewed in the light of equity and justice. On the whole he would be disposed to vote against the present Bill, as tending to increase the evil of which he complained.

said, he viewed the Bill as far as it went as one of the requirements of the age. In Scotland no qualification at all was required, and the magistrates, as well as the representatives of that country, formed a most respectable and efficient body. He fully concurred in the suggestion for the admission of attorneys and solicitors to the magistracy as being persons peculiarly qualified to discharge the functions of such an office. He would also urge the establishment throughout the country of an officer similar to that of the sheriff in Scotland. He would give his cordial support to the Bill.

said, he thought the only object of the House should be to obtain efficient county magistrates, and he thought solicitors well qualified, especially those who merely practised in Chancery suits, and who were possessed of large fortunes. With regard to clerical magistrates he was enabled to say, that in the districts with which he was most intimately acquainted, if clergymen were disfranchised, there would be no magistrates at all.

said, that there were some things very good in the Bill, while there were other things most objectionable. He had often witnessed cases in which the clerks had really acted as magistrates, and the magistrates had acted as clerks. He concurred to a certain extent with the observations made by the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. T. Duncombe); but there was one serious objection he thought to the appointment of a stipendiary magistracy, and that was, that it would be opposed to the great fundamental principle of our liberties—namely, our representative system. A stipendiary magistracy would also extend the centralisation system, and would inflict a blow upon the principle of local government. As to the objection raised in respect to a magistrate sitting in judgment upon a case which he was personally interested in, he (Mr. Muntz) was confident that no man having any pretensions to the character of a gentleman but would retire from the bench under such circumstances.

, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, he would take that opportunity of stating the course which he should propose to pursue in reference to the observations made on the other side of the House on the subject of the liability of contractors under this Bill. Individually, he entertained no doubt as to the rectitude of the decision arrived at by the Committee of last Session, and he should be very sorry, if the matter rested merely on his own judgment, to take any step which could be construed in any way as throwing a doubt upon that decision. Nevertheless he could not shut his eyes to the fact that some gentlemen of great weight and authority thought that the law on the question was open to great doubts. He therefore thought it desirable that some course should be taken to clear away those doubts by legislation or otherwise. He was unwilling to press the House to a decision upon the question of the liability of those contractors to incur penalties for sitting in that House. He fully admitted the force of the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), although he did not think that they fell within the meaning of the Act relating to Government contractors. The course, then, which he proposed to take was, to introduce in Committee upon the Bill an indemnity clause for the subscribers to the existing loan—a clause simply declaring that subscribers to the loan should not be liable to any penalties under the Contractors Act. Such a clause would, of course, have the effect of exonerating all those subscribers, and, at the same time, it could not be held to throw any reasonable doubt upon the decision of the Committee. It could not, therefore, reopen the question. If the House should agree to the suggestion, he would undertake to introduce a clause to the effect he had described.