asked if it were true that Colonel Harness, Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications, had been removed from that military office, in consequence of departmental misunderstanding with the Chief of the Civil Staff of the Ordnance?

I regret to state that the line Colonel Harness thought proper to adopt with reference to myself in the discharge of his civil duties as Deputy Inspector General of Fortifications has induced my noble Friend, Lord Panmure, to consider that it was not for the interest of the public service that Colonel Harness should continue to hold that office. It is nevertheless only just to Colonel Harness that I should add, that both Lord Panmure and myself entertain the highest opinion of his ability as a military engineer, and my noble Friend has, in consequence, recommended to the Commander in Chief to appoint him to one of the most important offices in the service, namely, the command of the Royal Engineers at Malta.

inquired what was to be done with the senior engineer officers at Malta?

said, that was not a question that came under his cognisance; but he could assure the hon. and gallant Officer that no point of etiquette of that sort would in any case be allowed to stand in the way of the appointment of the most able men to fill military offices of high responsibility and trust.

inquired of Sir George Grey, whether his attention had been directed to the circumstances which are alleged to have occurred at the execution of T. Bousfield on Monday last; and, if so, whether he would undertake to institute an immediate inquiry into the case?

said, he had seen with great regret, in the morning papers that day, the statement to which the noble Lord referred, and immediately on reading it had directed a communication to be made to the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex, the persons upon whom the law imposed the duty of carrying the sentence of death into effect, calling upon them to make a report of the whole circumstances of the case. He had not received that report; and indeed he could hardly have done so, as there had not been time enough to prepare it.

inquired whether there was any intention on the part of the Government to substitute private executions within the walls of the prison, as was the practice in the United States, for the present mode of executing criminals in public?

replied that Government had no such intention.

referring to a memorial presented sometime ago to the Treasury from the Australian Society on the above subject, observed that attached thereto were certain statistical statements and plans which the memorialists were anxious should be in the hands of the Members. He wished to know whether there would be any objection to lay them upon the table.

said, he did not think there would be any objection to the memorial and the plan which accompanied it being laid upon the table, though such a proceeding would, he considered, be injurious to the object the Australian Colonies had in view. It would not be convenient, or facilitate that object, that the Government having published to the world that they were ready to receive tenders up to a certain day, should reopen the question in order to receive a fresh scheme after the time at which the tenders were to be sent in had expired.

asked what steps had been taken with regard to the conveyance of the mails to the Australian Colonies?

said, that in accordance with the Resolution of the House, tenders had been advertised for by the Admiralty, and six offers were the result. These applications were at the present moment under the consideration of the Postmaster General, and when the subject had been fully deliberated upon, the result would be made known to the House.

in rising to move an humble Address to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to give directions to the Lords of the Treasury that hereafter, in order to maintain the dignity and independence of the County Court Judges, they shall cause to be paid to the said Judges a salary equal in amount to all, and permanently fixed at £1,500 per annum, expressed a hope that this important question, which was one in which the public generally were interested, would not suffer prejudice from the unpopularity of the humble individual who had undertaken it. The interests of justice were deeply involved in the adoption of the Resolution he intended to move; and if it were supposed that he had any personal object in bringing it forward, and was following it out by seeking his own personal interest, the House would probably be disabused of that impression by the course he would adopt before he resumed his seat. It was fit that he should begin by briefly recounting the pregnant history of our County Courts as they now existed. The person who first propounded to Parliament the establishment of these tribunals was Lord Brougham, to whom the country was greatly indebted for his valuable labours in the cause of juridical reform. That noble and learned Lord, when Lord Chancellor, proposed to introduce a Bill into the other House for the purpose of establishing County Courts; but the opposition he then encountered was too great for him, and it was reserved for the right hon. Gentleman the present Chairman of Ways and Means Committees in that House (Mr. FitzRoy) to carry that desirable object into effect, and it was ultimately achieved by the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. That Act gave these Courts a jurisdiction up to £20, and directed the payment of fees to the Judges, with power for the Crown to grant salaries not exceeding £1,200 in lieu of fees. By the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 102, jurisdiction in insolvency and protection cases was transferred from the country commissioners to the Judges of County Courts in the country circuits; and the Judges of those tribunals were declared incapable of sitting in Parliament. The 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, extended their jurisdiction to £50, and even, by the consent of the parties, to any amount, including the trial of title to real estates; and it also transferred to the Lords of the Treasury the power originally given to the Crown to direct payment of the salaries of these Judges. The 14 & 15 Vict. c. 52, authorised the Judges of country circuits to grant warrants for the arrest of absconding debtors, on affidavit, for debts of any amount above; £20. The 14 &15 Vict. c. 100, empowered the County Court Judges to direct the prosecution of witnesses for perjury, and to commit for trial in default of bail. The 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, while debarring these Judges from practising in their profession, provided that they should receive salaries not exceeding £1,500 nor less than £1,200. He cited these facts to show how year by year the business went on accumulating in the County Courts, until, in fact, a great part of the civil litigation of the country devolved upon them. The 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51 (the Succession Duty Act), gave a power of appeal from assessments to those Courts where the sum at issue was not above £50. By the Customs' Consolidation Act a similar power of appeal was given in cases of conviction up to the amount of £100 penalty; while by the Charity Trusts Act jurisdiction in charity trust cases, where the income did not exceed £30 per annum, was likewise vested in Judges of County Courts. The Common Law Procedure Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, also authorised the Judges of Westminster Hall to refer causes involving questions of account to the County Court Judges. By the Friendly Societies' Act Judges of County Courts were empowered to wind up the affairs of friendly societies. The House would see from this statement that there was hardly any subject involving civil procedure which might not be brought before the County Courts. There was also, it must be remembered, this peculiarity in the jurisdiction of these Courts, that they were very seldom aided by juries, and not often by counsel; that they adjudicated alone upon various matters of law; that there was not, in the majority of cases, any appeal against their decision, and that they exercised powers which were not always possessed by the Judges of Westminster Hall. The Resolution he intended to submit to the House, proposed, in the first place, to make the salaries of County Court Judges equal. There was, he believed, a singular opinion held in some quarters that the merit of a Judge was to be measured by the number of cases he decided, and the amount of money which those cases involved; as if the great laws of this country were not dependent very often upon cases involving a very small amount. Why, the great question of ship money turned upon a case which involved only 20s., and that, perhaps, was the greatest case that had ever occupied our tribunals. If, therefore, you made the measure of a Judge's capacity the amount of money involved in the cases he decided, you might find that the man who was called upon to decide in cases involving only a few shillings had been called upon to exercise greater judicial knowledge, greater judicial acumen, and greater powers of mind and of temper than the Judge who decided cases involving thousands of pounds. A series of Judges having, then, been appointed throughout the country to try certain cases, they ought to be men of equal ability, and if it was determined to have men of equal ability the country was bound in honour and in justice to remunerate them equally. In his opinion the salaries of County Court Judges ought in all cases to be fixed and equal, because the cases you called upon them to decide were of the same relative amount. He would, however, pass by that and proceed to the next point, which was still more important—namely, that the salaries of the Judges should be permanently fixed. He was sure it would be universally admitted that, ever since the Revolution, the judicial officers of this country had been distinguished for their independence. By a law passed in the reign of William III. the Judges were rendered independent of the Crown; and so great was the jealousy entertained lest the Judges should be in any measure subjected to the influence of the Crown, that it was now the custom for Judges to go to Court to pay their respects to the Sovereign only once, and that was upon their appointment. This was in itself a small matter, but it was significant. But the County Court Judges were brought hat in hand to the Treasury. One of the Acts of Parliament to which he had before referred provided that the salaries of those Judges should not be less than £1,200 or more than £1,500, the apportionment of the amount being left in the hands of the Treasury. The County Court Judges—the most important Judges of this country—were therefore required to bow down to the Treasury benches for the increase of their salaries from £1,200 to the maximum of £1,500 a year. As an illustration of this he would mention what had occurred to himself. It happened to him once, in the days when Lord Melbourne was Prime Minister, to have a grievance. He went to Lord Melbourne, and he should not easily forget the observations of that noble Lord:—'It 's all very fine," said Lord Melbourne, "to call me Prime Minister; but why don't you go to Johnny?" He (Mr. Roebuck) had no desire to "go to Johnny;" he made his application to Lord Melbourne, and the accuracy of that noble Lord's opinion was proved by the fact that, as he never made his application to "Johnny," his grievance remained unredressed. It was all very well to say that these questions of salary were decided by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the First Lord of the Treasury, but the man who really settled those matters was the Secretary of the Treasury. He would ask the House what they would think of the honour and independence of the Judges of this country if the Judges of any court should have to bow down to the Secretary of the Treasury? He would presently have to charge that hon. Gentleman (Mr. Wilson) with something like a dereliction of duty, and he would make the charge in plain terms, that neither the hon. Gentleman nor the House might misunderstand it. Before he stated the charge, however, he would entreat the House to consider what honourable and learned men would be likely to undergo before they would go cap in hand to the hon. Gentleman. It was his (Mr. Roebuck's) fate to have a brother-in-law who was a County Court Judge, and who received the appointment, without any application or solicitation of his own, from the late Lord Truro. That gentleman came within every rule laid down by the Treasury, or rather by the hon. Member for Westbury (Mr. Wilson), which would entitle him, as a County Court Judge, to the maximum salary; but he was carefully passed over. He (Mr. Roebuck) put a Motion on the Notice-book, which he was told by the Speaker he could not move, as it was contrary to the rules of the House. Well, the hon. Member for Westbury came to him one day and said, "What becomes of your Motion to-morrow?" He (Mr. Roebuck) replied, "You know as well as I do that I cannot move it." "Well," said the hon. Member for Westbury, "that being the case, now I will tell you something. Your brother-in-law"—he (Mr. Roebuck) had never spoken to the hon. Gentleman about his brother-in-law—"has been for some time within the rule by which he is entitled to the maximum salary, but as your Motion was on the books he has not been appointed to that salary." Now, what did this case show? It showed clearly that in the apportionment of the salaries of County Court Judges circumstances were regarded which ought to have no influence upon such arrangements. What had the fact of his (Mr. Roebuck) being brother-in-law to a County Court Judge to do with the salary that Judge should receive? Why, the miserable self-complacency of the hon. Member for Westbury was hurt, and therefore justice was not done to a County Court Judge because he was his (Mr. Roebuck's) brother-in-law. But that was not all. In a Treasury Minute of the 23rd of August, 1853, with reference to the principle upon which the maximum salary should be allowed to County Court Judges, he found the following passages:—

"The number of causes tried cannot be considered as a criterion of the labour which falls on the Judge, as the amount of labour required in country districts in travelling from court to court must be set against the greater number of causes tried in the metropolitan and other urban circuits. It is, therefore, only by considering the amount of the different labours peculiar to each circuit that the labour of the Judge can be estimated, and, when such an estimate of each circuit is made, the difficulty remains of determining which of the labours required by the Judges should be considered as the most laborious, so as to be able fairly to decide in which of the different circuits the duties are the heaviest."

In a Treasury Minute dated October 6, 1854, there was the following very remarkable statement:—

"The statement annexed to this minute shows the plaints entered, the causes triad, the Judges' fees, and the amount sued for in each circuit for the years 1852 and 1853, and the average for such years; and, these elements of the business done in the Courts having been aggregated in each circuit, as the best test which my Lords can adopt, the different circuits stand in relation to each other in the following order with reference to the aggregate amount of such elements in each."

Then followed a list of circuits, and the maximum salary was awarded to the Judges of the fifteen circuits first named. The Judge of the sixteenth circuit was his brother-in-law. It might be said that there was good reason for stopping there, and he did not accuse the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury of dealing with the interests of the country as if he were influenced by feelings against men who were unpopular in themselves. He did not say so. But it should be remembered that the County Court Judges were placed in a certain order for appointment to the maximum salary, and that the first fifteen were appointed, Well, it might have been supposed that the next Judge to whom the maximum salary was awarded would have been the sixteenth on the list. No such thing. No. 17 was the next, 19 the next, 28 the next, 37 the next, and 49 the next. So that, in fact, after the first fifteen, the appointments were made like the occurrences of a sickman's dream. Could it be said that No. 16 was passed over by mistake? He apprehended not. Was not the number of causes entered larger in the case of No. 16 than in that of No. 49? Certainly it was. There was also more travelling, and the amount of fees was greater. Upon what ground, then, was No. 16 passed over? It could not be said that the Treasury authorities were not acquainted with the facts, for Mr. Falconer, the Judge to whom he alluded, made frequent applications to the Treasury, feeling that there was a slur cast upon him. He knew Mr. Falconer well; he had great affection for him, and knew that the paltry sum in question was not that which agitated his mind, but the conviction that he was a marked man among his brethren. His brethren knew him to be a distinguished Judge; they knew that he did more work than almost any other Judge in the country, and yet they saw him passed over by the Treasury. Why? There must be some reason. The world at large did not know the reason. He could guess it, and the Secretary to the Treasury knew that he could. It was not that the hon. Gentleman was told by his superiors to do so and so, but there were certain minds so constituted that they easily found out what their superiors desired, and no matter what the dirty work might be, they were ready to do it. He held in his hand a letter addressed by Mr. Falconer to the Lords of the Treasury on the 19th of February, 1855. It passed in review every one of the grounds which the Treasury authorities had assumed as those upon which they were to determine the right of a Judge to a larger salary, and the writer showed that on each particular point he was better entitled to an increase than many of those who had been promoted. Such being the case, what opinion would be formed out of doors? If a man in his position, with a full knowledge of all that was passing before him, came to the conclusion that the Secretary to the Treasury had passed over a worthy Judge from political reasons, what would be the opinion of the public on the subject? Did anybody believe that it would be I supposed that the Judges were beyond corrupt influences? Would it be supposed that the Office of the Treasury, which was peculiarly interested in the dirty work of Parliamentary elections, and which could be proved to have slighted a Judge for political reasons, and to have mixed itself up with that which was most degrading to human nature, could be corrupt in one case and pure in another? Not at all. It would be supposed—it was supposed—that Parliamentary influence governed its conduct in all cases, and that Judges were appointed and promoted, not on account of their merits, but upon political considerations and the connections they possessed. But he had another case to state to the House. A certain Mr. Morris was at one time sole County Clerk for the circuit of Glamorganshire, and he was also a great electioneering man in the same district. He was clerk to all the Courts in the Glamorgan district. He grew tired of his work as clerk, and went up to the Treasury and there entered into certain terms, the result of which was as follows:—For the sum of £400 a year he resigned his office, and the Treasury—such was his own statement—gave him authority to appoint full, not assistant clerks for the different courts in Glamorganshire, although the right to make such appointments belonged to the Judges. Mr. Morris exercised the power thus given to him; and when, some time afterwards, the Government expressed a wish to divide certain of the districts to which he had appointed clerks, one of those functionaries remonstrated, asserting that he had bought his situation from Mr. Morris, who, not content with the £400 a year from the Treasury as compensation for giving up his clerkship, had actually been paid by the clerks for appointing them to their offices. The first time that Mr. Falconer heard of the transaction was, when he was told that one of the clerks objected to have his district divided, because he had paid Mr. Morris for it. Here, then, was a clear case of corruption, and of selling judicial offices somewhere. He wanted some explanation of it, and he asked whether, if these facts could be clearly proved, it was so very plain that the House had done wisely in giving to the Treasury the power of fixing the remuneration of County Court Judges? He called upon the House to do away with this mischief, by at once fixing the salaries of the Judges and rendering them permanent. Thus he got rid of the second part of his Resolution. He would now come to the third point, which was to the effect that the salary of County Court Judges should be fixed by Act of Parliament at £1,500 a, year. He had stated his belief that County Court Judges were the most important Judges in the country. His reason for saying so was, that they decided upon the cases of the poor; that they disposed of a multitude of causes; and in many of the circuits had reduced the business of the other Judges to almost nothing. On the last Welsh circuit the Judge had one case, which engaged his attention the greater part of one day, but he could come to no conclusion, and at last the question was referred for decision to a County Court Judge. A County Court Judge tried cases not by hundreds, but by thousands, and if he were right in supposing that the interests of the country were bound up, not with the amount of money involved, but with the number of causes tried and the class of persons engaged in litigation, then there could be no doubt that County Court Judges, whose peculiar duty it was to administer justice to the poor, were the most important judicial officers in England. They had almost utterly excluded from business the courts of Westminster upon circuit; they decided now in insolvency cases, in Admiralty cases, and, if parties chose, in cases of title. They did so at much less cost than the Judges of Westminster Hall. It was true that they did not surround themselves with troops of javelin-men, and that they could not fine a sheriff £100; but they attended to the business and interests of the country, and, high qualifications being demanded of them, we were bound to pay them liberally. A very curious observation—more curious as coming from the Treasury bench—had been made upon this subject. ''Oh," said the Secretary to the Treasury, "we can get as many men as we like, to fill the office of County Court Judge—men quite up to the mark—for £1,200 a year." Let him apply the argumentum ad hominem. Did the hon. Gentleman suppose that many men could not be found in that House and elsewhere to do the dirty work of the Treasury for less than £2,500 a year? So in the case of the Lord Chancellor, who had made a similar observation in the other House. Did anybody believe that scores of lawyers could not be discovered in Westminster Hall quite as capable as Baron Cranworth to perform the duties of Lord Chancellor for one-half of £10,000 per annum? And did the Chancellor of the Exchequer imagine that there were not hundreds of men, as able financiers as himself, ready to do his work for much less than £5,000 a year? That, then, was not a criterion. The criterion was the custom of the country. Now, County Court Judges were expected to mingle with country gentlemen—to take a position in society—and they were esteemed for the station they held. It was of the highest importance that those who administered justice to the poor should be above the very breath of suspicion. He had himself heard on circuit a prisoner object to being tried by any Judge but one in a red gown. The man fancied that justice would not be done to him if a "real Judge," as he called him, did not try him. What was the meaning of that? Why, the prisoner, like all his class, felt that a Judge in a red gown, occupying a high and distinguished position, which he had attained by his talents, would be sure to do him justice, and he could not place the same confidence in a man with a short wig and black gown. Hence it was of the greatest importance that County Court Judges, who were emphatically the Judges of the poor, should hold a high position in public estimation. It was of the utmost importance that the Judges should be above the cares of this world, that their minds should be clear and competent for business, and that they should not be troubled by the anxieties of life, but should be really happy and comfortable while doing the service of the State. To that end, he contended that the maximum salary appointed by Parliament was not more than sufficient; and he asked the House, in justice to those men, and in consideration for the country, to apportion to them such a sum as would place them above suspicion, above the breath of calumny, and above the anxieties and the meanness of the world. When the County Court Judges were first appointed with the maximum salary of £1,200 a year, they were permitted to practise their profession; but when the maximum of £1,500 a year was given, they were deprived of the liberty of undertaking private practice. That was a very proper provision, if the Judges were otherwise adequately remunerated, because he thought that no man in the position of a County Court Judge should exercise his profession at the bar. If that was so, the County Court Judge should be placed in such a position as to be able to mix in the society of the gentry of his country. Now he would ask what was the ordinary income of a country gentleman? Perhaps it was difficult to fix it; but he would ask whether £1,500 a year placed a Judge in a position above that which he ought to hold? He should be placed not only above the anxieties of the world, but above the meannesses of the world. He should not be obliged to watch his expenditure too narrowly, but then he should not be doing injustice to his children and his family. He therefore appealed to the House to support the Resolution he had brought forward, and which he now begged to move.

said, that he had not much to add to the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down; more particularly as it was his intention to deal simply with the general question at issue, and not to enter into details of a personal or private character. He would briefly state to the House the manner in which Parliament and the Government had dealt with the question of the payment of County Court Judges. When the office was first created in 1847, it was determined that the Judges should be paid by fees; but so soon as it was found that the fees amounted to a larger sum than had been anticipated, the Treasury took them into their own hands, and adopted the principle of payment by salaries. In 1848, the salary was fixed at an average of £1,000 a year in all cases, leaving still to the Judges the power of private practice. In 1852, consequent upon the popularity of the courts and the confidence reposed in them, an addition was made to the amount of salary, and, upon the allegation that the remuneration allowed was not proportionate to the labour performed, an Act was passed, changing the salary from an average of £1,000 a year in all cases to a varying scale, of which £1,500 was the maximum and £1,200 was the minimum. This increase, however, was more nominal than real, because the same Act which augmented the official salary of the Judge took from him his private practice, which had hitherto been a source of emolument. The consequence of the Act then passed was, that the salaries were made to fluctuate at the arbitrary discretion of the Treasury, because, although various attempts had been made to adopt something like a uniformity of proceeding, yet, when the system of fluctuating salaries was once admitted, it became extremely difficult to adopt any principle upon which the amount to be paid in different cases should depend. The Treasury, in their Minute, had themselves repudiated the idea at first suggested, that the amount of fees should form the sole measure of the salary to be given. The next test proposed was the number of causes tried; but the mere number afforded no test of the relative importance of the causes. Again, it was said that the collective amount involved in the causes tried should be taken as a guide; but it by no means followed that those causes which were pecuniarily of the most importance should be so in a legal point of view; because cases of a comparatively small amount might turn upon very complicated arguments, and furnish important precedents, while others of a large amount might be easy of solution, and involve no legal difficulty. The only remaining test was the number of days which each Judge sat, and the amount of travelling which he had to do. It was evident, however, that that of itself must afford a very insufficient criterion of the amount of work done, and of the value of a Judge's services. Taking all these tests together—the amount of fees, the number of causes tried, the number of days that a Judge sat, the amount of travelling that he did, and the aggregate sums sued for—some kind of vague and rough estimate might, perhaps, be formed of the importance of the labours of the different Judges; but, in any case, that estimate must necessarily be so vague and so rough that it could not altogether take from the judgment of the Treasury that character which now attached to it of being arbitrary in its application. He did not say that favouritism and partiality actually prevailed; but the suspicion of them was almost as bad; and that would always exist so long as the principle of graduation was persisted in. Under these circumstances, he thought that the power of arbitrarily raising these salaries should not be left to the discretion of the Treasury, but that the salaries should henceforth be fixed by Act of Parliament, and should be equal in amount. Then came the question what that amount should be; and that was one which might be better answered by an appeal to common sense and a reference to the salaries given in analogous cases than by argument. The present state of things was this—that, while of the sixty Judges the great majority received only £1,200, there were some to whom £1,500 was allowed, besides two receiving intermediate sums. It was clear that the highest paid could not be reduced; the alternative was to raise the rest to their level. If authorities on the subject were required, however, he might cite the opinion of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, who, when Home Secretary, said that he was inclined to think that the application of the rule proposed was by far too narrow, and that the maximum salary should be much more extensively granted, if not extended to all cases. Lord Brougham, again, had expressed his opinion that it was most inconsistent with the character of the judicial office and with the due administration of justice that the Judges should be paid, as it were, by "piece-work," for it was manifest that the same high qualifications, the same talent, the same industry, integrity, and high sense of honour were required in all Judges alike. In that I opinion Lord Campbell and the Lord Chancellor had concurred; indeed there appeared to be among the heads of the legal profession but one opinion with regard to the propriety of laying down some definite rule on the subject, of adopting a uniform rate of payment, and of raising that rate to the maximum now granted. The business of the County Courts was increasing daily, the tendency of their legislation was to throw fresh duties on these Courts, and it was desirable that nothing should be left undone to increase the public confidence in them. The question was, not whether men might not be found to take the duty at a lower rate, but whether those men were fully qualified to discharge it. The duties of the Judges were onerous, and involved an amount of physical labour which rendered it injurious to select men advanced in years. But if they chose comparatively young men, they must compensate them, not only for the practice which they actually relinquished, but for that increased practice which they would expect if they remained longer at the bar; and every professional man was apt to overrate his chances of success. The County Court Judges sat in most cases without appeal; they had no long vacation; many of them sat from 180 to 200 days in the year; the labour of their office was not inferior to that of a barrister in large practice, and they had no promotion to look to. Under these circumstances, £1,500 a year was not too much, especially as the physical labour of travel was generally greatest in those districts where the amount of business was least. Upon those two grounds, then—first, that in his opinion the salaries of the County Court Judges should be fixed and certain, and, secondly, that they should be uniform, he had great pleasure in seconding the Resolution.

I very much regret, Sir, that the discussion of this subject should have been mixed up with questions of a personal nature, not indeed by the noble Lord who has just sat down, but by the hon. and learned Gentleman who has proposed this Resolution; and I wish, before my hon. Friend rises to give that satisfactory answer which I am certain he will be able to give to the charges which have been made against him with so much bitterness by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, to state the course which the Government has thought it to be its duty to adopt with regard to this subject. In so doing I shall carefully abstain from saying one word with regard to those personal charges, and I will simply state the decision of the Government after a careful consideration of the question upon its own merits. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) has correctly stated that upon the establishment of County Courts the Judges were paid by fees; but he was not so accurate when he stated that the Government, when they found that the fees exceeded the amount anticipated by them, put an end to that system of payment and substituted salaries. The fact is that the original Act contemplated payment by salaries rather than lay fees; but, as at that period there existed no experience as to the amount of fees which might be received, it was arranged that the Judges should receive fees at first, and it was provided that the Treasury should have the power of afterwards commuting them for salaries. After a, time it was evident that the incomes of the Judges from the source of fees were very unequal, some receiving an amount that far exceeded due remuneration, while others received amounts totally inadequate; the payment by fees was therefore commuted into payment by salaries of £1,000 a year. At that time I held an opinion—and I have never since seen reason to alter it—which is embodied in the Resolution now before the House, namely, that the rate of payment should be uniform. At a subsequent period, namely, in 1852, by the Bill for amending the County Courts Act, introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the present Chairman of our Committees of Ways and Means, it was proposed that the salaries of the Judges should be raised to a maximum of £1,500 a year and a minimum of £1,200, and that proposal was assented to by Parliament and by the Government of that day (the right hon. Gentleman the present Member for the University of Cambridge being Home Secretary), on the express understanding that there should not be an uniform payment of £1,500, but that £1,500 should only be paid in those cases in which it might seem to those persons in whose hands the decision was left that that salary was fairly earned by the labour performed; so that Parliament imposed upon the Treasury the duty of making the distinction in the salaries of the Judges; and that department did not, as assumed by the hon. and learned Gentleman, take it upon themselves. I think that it would have been better to have at first absolutely fixed the amount of the salaries, because, notwithstanding the care and trouble which may be taken in considering, not the merits of the Judges—because in merit all ought to be looked upon as equal—but the labour imposed upon them, it is impossible to avoid creating dissatisfaction in the minds of those whose salaries may be fixed at the lower rate. Owing to the complaints which have been made by Judges who have felt, and not unnaturally, that they were wronged by being placed in a category different from others, the subject is one which has been fully considered by the Government, and we have approached the consideration of it with no narrow feelings of prejudice against the County Court Judges, for we fully recognise the value of their services—a value proved by several years of experience; and I can also say that the Government are of opinion that it would be ill-judged economy to pay those gentlemen in a manner that would not be adequate to secure the services of men of sufficient qualification, or which would not place them in that social position which they ought to occupy. A Commission was appointed some time ago to inquire into the operation of the County Courts, and a Bill embodying many of the recommendations contained in the Report of that Commission has been laid before the other House of Parliament. In considering that Bill the attention of the Government has been directed to the question of the salary, and in the Bill to which I have referred we do recognise the principle that the salaries of judicial officers should be fixed and secure, and not varying or dependent on the discretion of the Treasury, and we have therefore proposed that the provisions of the Act of 1852 should be altered. The next question which arises is, whether or no these salaries should be all equal. Now, to say that they should all be made equal at once, is tantamount to saying that every County Court Judge shall receive £1,500 a year. But, looking at the nature of the duties performed, the question as to what would be a fair salary if we were to commence de novo has been fully considered by the Lord Chancellor, whose opinion from his position is entitled to the greatest weight, and he has arrived at the conclusion that £1,200 a year, in addition to travelling expenses, is a salary sufficiently large to secure the services of the most competent men from Westminster Hall, and to ensure to them the social position proper to them. We propose, therefore, in that Bill to fix the salary at £1,200 a year, in addition to travelling expenses; but we do not propose to take away from those Judges who have now a larger salary the sum above £1,200 which they may possess during their tenure of office. I have now stated the course which the Government have felt it their duty to adopt, and the reasons which have actuated us. If we have been mistaken, it is for this House to correct the mistake; but as there is a Bill before the other House of Parliament upon this subject, which will come down to this House at no distant period, and as there is also another Bill before the House imposing additional duties on the County Court Judges, I think that this House will be better able, when those Bills come to be considered, to deal with the subject than upon a consideration of the question as now presented, and I hope that the House will be induced to take that course, and not hastily pledge itself to giving to all the County Court Judges a salary of £1,500 a year, in addition to travelling expenses, but to postpone any decision upon the subject. I should, perhaps, slate here that the expenses of these Courts have hitherto been defrayed from the fees; but, in accordance with the recommendation of the Commission, the Bill now before the other House proposes that the fees paid by the suitors should be very largely reduced, the effect of which will be to throw a considerable burden upon the Consolidated Fund. The Government had, therefore, to consider what, under these circumstances, would be a fair arrangement with regard to the salaries of the County Court Judges, and they came to the conclusion that they should not be justified in proposing to impose upon the public an additional burden of £15,000 a year, which would be the case if the salaries were raised to the uniform rate of £1,500. No doubt, it would be far more satisfactory to the Lord Chancellor, within whose patronage these appointments come, if the County Court Judges should all receive £1,500; and the Lord Chancellor could therefore have no motive in proposing an inadequate salary for these gentlemen; but the Government were actuated solely by a consideration of what was due to the public. I do not pretend to say that we may not have been mistaken, but I will ask the House not hastily to assume that the payment to the County Court Judges is inadequate, but to decide only after due consideration of the case. Not asking the House to negative the proposal of the hon. and learned Gentleman, by asserting that £1,500 ought not to be given to all the Judges, but only to suspend their judgment until the Bill to which I have alluded comes before them and they are in a position to decide satisfactorily, I beg to move the previous question.

said, he wished to offer some explanation of the case of the late clerk of the Glamorganshire County Court, who was not any relation of his, though he bore the same name with him. Mr. Morris, to whom the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck) had referred, was a gentleman of high character and respectability, at the head of his profession in that locality. The pension or annuity which he enjoyed for relinquishing the office was not sought for by himself; but the Government enabled clerks of County Courts to retire upon an annuity, and Mr. Morris consulted with him (the hon. Member) as to whether he should avail himself of that retirement. He (the hon. Member) accompanied Mr. Morris to the Treasury, where they met the hon. Member for Westbury (Mr. Wilson), who offered him a retiring allowance of £400 a year. Mr. Morris at that time had another allowance or pension of £600 a year, which had been given to him upon another account, and he wished to be allowed the £400 a year in addition to retaining that; but the hon. Member for Westbury was inexorable, and would not listen to it for a moment, but showed in that so much vigilance on behalf of the public interests, as fully maintained the character which he bore. There was not the semblance of a job, or of anything like corruption in the whole transaction, and he (Mr. Morris) believed that Mr. Falconer, the Judge of the Court, himself rendered to Mr. Morris considerable assistance in carrying it out.

said, he was extremely sorry to intrude upon the House in a personal matter of this kind, but he hoped hon. Members would feel that this Motion savoured much more of a private than of a public character. Perhaps, too, the House would be astonished to hear that he had received no intimation of the course which the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Roebuck) intended to take on this occasion; but, probably, after the frequent experiences of other hon. Gentlemen as to the course usually taken by the hon. and learned Member in this House, he ought not to feel surprised, or to complain of this. He (Mr. Wilson) was, however, able to give at once so simple, and, he hoped, so satisfactory an account of this matter, that he thought the hon. and learned Member would find he had taken nothing by his Motion. The speech of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) had shown the extreme difficulty of the task which had been imposed upon the Treasury by the Act of 1852. There was an erroneous impression that such functions were undertaken at the desire of the Treasury itself, because, wherever discretionary powers were given by Act of Parliament in such matters as this, they must necessarily be reposed in the Treasury. But, in fact, such a discretion imposed upon the department a most onerous and difficult task. According to the County Courts Act of 1852, the salaries of the Judges, as had already been stated, were raised from £1,000 to £1,200 as a minimum, £1,500 being fixed as a maximum. About the end of the year, or in 1853, a pressure was put upon the Treasury, through the Home Office, by Judges, both metropolitan and county, who thought, from the amount of business transacted in their respective Courts, that they were entitled to the maximum salary. In March, 1853, the Home Office addressed the Treasury upon the subject, forwarding fourteen memorials from metropolitan and county Judges. Upon looking into this matter, his right hon. Friend the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gladstone) and himself felt it to be one of such extreme difficulty, involving so many elements of consideration in judging of the duties of the various Judges, that they were disposed in the first instance to refer it to the County Court Commission, then sitting. The Commissioners, however, did not consider that the salaries of the County Court Judges came within the scope of their duties. They (the Chancellor of the Exchequer and himself) then attempted to induce the Lord Chancellor to ask the Commission to take the subject into consideration, but in this also they failed; so that, as they could not obtain higher and better authority than their own in deciding upon this professional question, they were themselves forced to undertake to discover a principle upon which the difference made between the respective salaries should rest. He would state, however, that throughout the investigation he (Mr. Wilson), and he believed the Chancellor of the Exchequer also, were not even aware of the names of the County Court Judges. For himself, he could say truly that, except one single Judge, Mr. Pollock, who presided over the Court at Liverpool, whose case stood out prominently from the ethers, he did not at that time know the name of one of the Judges with whom they were dealing, because the practice was to deal with the sixty circuits by numbers, so that the names of the Judges never formed a subject of consideration. The whole of the various elements upon which the question of the respective salaries depended was drawn out in great detail. The first element of the comparison was the number of plaints; but it was open to the objection that in populous districts a great number of plaints were opened merely to obtain a settlement of accounts, and did not come to trial. Then the number of trials did not necessarily indicate the importance of the business. The number of days' sittings might be taken; but some of the Judges possessed a greater facility for disposing of business than others, and some, again, willingly underwent the labour of sitting more hours in a day than others did. Again, the amount of the fees did not furnish a satisfactory means of deciding; it was rather an indication of the amount of business entered in the Court, than of the amount of work done by the Judge. The course taken, therefore, was that all these elements were aggregated together, and represented by numbers, in the different cases, and that a list was made of all the Judges, placing at the head of it those who had the highest numbers, representing the aggregate of such elements of services and duties performed, and the fifteen Judges who appeared to have the largest amount of business, tested in this way, were to have the maximum of salary. When the elements he had described were thrown together, the highest was represented by 89,000, and the lowest by 16,000, so immense a difference was there between the amount of business respectively performed by the Judges. The numbers which represented the work done by the first fifteen came down gradually to 49,697, at which point there was a sudden fall of 5,000. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, therefore, decided that the number of 49,697, representing the services performed by the fifteenth Judge on the list, was the point at which the maximum salary of £1,500 a year should cease. He (Mr. Wilson) believed the right hon. Gentleman had no idea who the sixteenth Judge was, and certainly he had, himself, not the slightest conception that it was any relative of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck), nor did he even know that the hon. and learned Gentleman had a brother-in-law in such an office. The Treasury was soon, of course, inundated with communications from those excluded, and amongst them one from Mr. Falconer. In passing the Minute raising the salary of the first fifteen, the Lords of the Treasury felt that there might be some cases which, from individual circumstances, might require further consideration, and a passage was therefore inserted in it directing that, if any such case arose, its claims should be considered. The hon. and learned Member had stated that very soon afterwards more Judges were added to the list of those who were to receive the maximum salary; and he said that No. 16 (being that of his brother-in-law) was passed over, and others below that number were selected. When the hon. and learned Member attempted to make the House infer that Mr. Falconer was passed over because he was his brother-in-law, he did not make the statement in ignorance of what the circumstances really were, because the papers in his possession showed why Mr. Trafford, the Judge of the Birmingham County Court (who was No. 17 on the list), had had his salary increased. After the first Treasury Minute was issued, it was discovered that, in consequence of the abolition of two local Courts, Mr. Trafford's duties had been greatly augmented. Had that fact been known at the time his name would have been included in the first Minute which assigned the maximum salary. The hon. and learned Member further observed that three other County Court Judges had since been advanced to the highest salary—namely, Mr. Addison, Mr. Serjveant Dowling, and Mr. Dinsdale. But why? Since their appointment insolvency cases had been superadded to their duties, which in number had far exceeded those which had come before any other of the County Court Judges. The insolvency cases disposed of in 1854 by Mr. Addison were 714; by Mr. Serjeant Dowling, 294; and by Mr. Dinsdale, 123. Referring to these facts, and to the amount of other business performed by Mr. Addison and Mr. Serjeant Dowling, they were considered entitled to the maximum salary of £1,500, and, considering the extra business done by Mr. Dinsdale, the Treasury assigned to him an intermediate salary of £1,350. The hon. and learned Gentleman had no excuse for making the charge on the ground of No. 16 having been passed over, because several other numbers lower in the list were also passed over before arriving at the circuits of Mr. Addison, Mr. Serjeant Dowling, and Mr. Dinsdale. The charge of personality, therefore, was entirely unfounded. With regard to Mr. Falconer, he begged to say that he had never seen that gentleman in his life; but, from all he (Mr. Wilson) had heard, he believed him to be a man in the highest degree efficient for discharging the duties of a Judge. Mr. Falconer, like others who felt themselves to have a claim to be paid at the maximum rate, was not to be baulked by the first refusal, and once every six months the Treasury received a voluminous communication from him, as well as from other County Court Judges, urging his claim to the maximum salary. In 1855 he made a renewed application to be placed on the maximum scale, urging as the ground of his appeal that the business of his Court had materially increased. A Treasury Minute was passed on the 23rd of February, 1855, the concluding passage of which was in these terms:—

"My Lords have given very careful consideration to the claims which, apart from any other special circumstances, have been made on account of increasing business. My Lords are prepared to admit that this is an element which cannot in future be lost sight of, but that any increase of the kind which applies to only one, or even two years, would not be sufficient to justify a change; and that, before an increase of the salary of any Judge should take place on this ground, it should appear that the requisite increase of business to justify it has extended over an average of at least the preceding three years,"

At the close of 1855 Mr. Falconer again applied to the Treasury, representing that his duties had still further increased during the period since his former application, and in January of this year that gentleman addressed a memorial to the head of the Government, to the Home Office, and to the Lords of the Treasury, calling attention to the fact that his business had continued materially to increase, and that he thought he might be considered to come within the rule laid down by their Lordships of having attained that average of business for three years which would entitle him to be put upon the maximum salary. In 1849 the number of plaints in his Court was 5,000; in 1855 they amounted to 13,000. In 1849 the amount sued for was £7,000, and in 1855, it increased to £17,000. Mr. Falconer had represented this to the Treasury in December last, previously to his sending the memorial to the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) and the Home Secretary. At that time he (Mr. Wilson) had to look into the whole matter, and to draw up a memorandum upon it, and rearrange all the tables for the past year; and he closed that memorandum with the observation that there were now two Courts which he thought might be raised to the maximum salary, one of which was the Court of which Mr. Falconer was the Judge. This at least showed that there had been no negligence on the part of the Treasury as to what was going on with regard to these Courts. When Mr. Falconer's memorial of January came before the Treasury, it had been almost decided that his circuit should be added to the list of those receiving the maximum salary, on the very ground on which he himself put his claim—namely, that his duties had, upon an average of three years, come up to the point fixed by the Treasury Minute. Thus matters stood in the middle of January last. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck) had very frequently brought charges against the Government, and particularly against himself (Mr. Wilson), for having excluded Mr. Falconer from the maximum rate of salary on personal considerations. The hon. and learned Gentleman had stated that, because Mr. Falconer was his brother-in-law, he had been precluded from receiving the maximum salary of a County Court Judge. When Parliament met, this matter was brought under discussion in consequence of the Home Office having forwarded to the Treasury a letter which Mr. Falconer had addressed to Sir G. Grey. But when the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield put a notice on the books that he should move for leave to introduce a Bill for revising the salaries of the Judges of the County Courts, and of fixing them at the uniform amount of £1,500 a year, it was impossible that the Government could proceed any further in the matter until that Motion should have been disposed of. If the Government had given Mr. Falconer the maximum salary, any one would perceive that they would have been open to the charge of having done so in consequence of the pending Motion of the hon. and learned Member, it having gone forth a fortnight before that Mr. Falconer had been previously excluded from receiving that salary because he was the brother-in-law of the hon. and learned Member, and that the Government were anxious to conciliate that hon. and learned Gentleman. Under these circumstances, the Government took what they thought to be the right course. They did not alter the intention which they had previously entertained; a Minute was drawn up embodying the purpose they had in view; but they allowed the matter to remain in a state of suspense until the hon. and learned Gentleman should have made his Motion; because, if the Motion were lost, the Government would still have the power to carry out its intention and assign to Mr. Falconer the maximum salary; and if it were adopted by the House, why, then, the Government would only be compelled to do what it had of its own will previously determined to do. When, the day before the Motion was to come on, he (Mr. Wilson) asked the hon. and learned Gentleman—and this affair would be a caution to him how he should communicate with the hon. and learned Gentleman in future—what he intended to do about it; the hon. and learned Gentleman told him that the Speaker said he could not bring it on; upon which he (Mr. Wilson) replied, "I knew that; but I thought you would make a speech on the subject, and I am now at liberty to state to you, with regard to the memorials which Mr. Falconer has sent, and which you yourself have personally supported with the Prime Minister, that the Treasury has passed a Minute, giving him the maximum salary to which he is entitled by the amount of business he performs." Indeed, there was another reason why Mr. Falconer should have the maximum; because the Government were about to add two more Courts to his circuit, on account of the increasing population of the district, besides the amount of business done in Mr. Falconer's Court having come up to what the Treasury considered to be the proper limit. From that conversation till now, he (Mr. Wilson) never had the slightest communication with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, and he thought, in common courtesy, the hon. and learned Gentleman ought, if he had intended to put such a complexion on the matter, to have given him some notice. He could only repeat that, in the whole of these transactions, they had been guided by returns made by the proper authorities appointed to preside over this particular part of the business of the Treasury, and he believed that his right hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) knew no more than he did the name of any gentleman to be affected by the decision until some agitation was got up with regard to Mr. Falconer's case. He would now make one observation with regard to Mr. Morris. He was charged, or, rather, the Treasury were charged, with some unusual and irregular proceeding with regard to compensation being given in that case. The circumstances were these. By the Act of 1852, it was enacted that in future every Court should have its own resident clerk. Formerly the clerks travelled with the Judges, and that was found to be inconvenient. It was, therefore, proposed that any clerk who was desirous of giving up any of the existing Courts and keep to one should have compensation for such Courts as he gave up, with the privilege of appointing the persons to succeed him in those places. The Treasury consented to that. Mr. Falconer was a party to the arrangement—nay, more, the arrangement could not be made without Mr. Falconer's consent, because it was for him to appoint fresh clerks, and it was only by his consenting that Mr. Morris was enabled to perform those acts, and therefore it was by Mr. Falconer' s own action that this arrangement was made. He was bound to say that something had come to their knowledge within the last week or two that Mr. Falconer would have done well to have informed them of before. They had been informed that money had passed between Mr. Morris and these clerks. They had written for information regarding it, and, when they received it, should act as circumstances might require. He would only add upon the present occasion that he hoped the hon. and learned Gentleman would not retain the idea that the Treasury had been influenced by personal motives in adopting the course which they had.

said, he did not propose to enter upon the personal differences between the hon. and learned Gentleman who made the Motion and the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down—his more immediate object was to suggest to the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield whether, after the speech of the right hon. the Secretary of State (Sir G. Grey), it would not be unnecessary to press the Motion to a division? The speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman was very properly addressed to two distinct branches of the question—one as to the propriety of equalising the salaries of the Judges, and the other as to the amount at which they ought to be equalised. The first was, as he (Sir J. Pakington) believed, the more important of the two points, and the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary had distinctly announced the intention of the Government to put an end to the difference which had hitherto existed, and to withdraw the invidious distinction now made between some Judges and other of their learned brethren. That was a concession wisely made, and one that was much required. The Secretary of the Treasury in his speech had dwelt upon the variety and number of plaints, and the difficulty of deciding upon the principle of distinction to be adopted. He (Sir J. Pakington) conceived there was not only difficulty in drawing such distinctions, but that positive injustice ensued from them. He had taken the case of four Judges who had been selected to receive the higher salary of £1,500 per annum, and had compared it with that of four other Judges who had been excluded from that maximum salary. He found that while the four Judges with the highest salary had sat in the aggregate 522 days and 2,460 hours, the four Judges not so favoured had sat 671 days and 3,926 hours, and in many more different Courts. That statement proved the unjust results of the course which had been pursued by the Treasury. One of the proudest boasts of this country was the high character for independence of its Judges; but that independence would be jeopardised if the Treasury were allowed to possess a power of drawing distinctions and of exercising patronage of such a nature. Upon those grounds he thought it essential that the present system should cease. With regard to the second point—the amount at which the salaries should be equalised—he would submit to the hon. and learned Gentleman whether, in the present state of the question, it would be worth while to take a division on that point? As there was a Bill before the other House having for its object the equalisation of the salaries of County Court Judges, but at the minimum amount, he would submit that it would be as well to wait until that measure came before them, when it would be competent for the House to increase the amount to £1,500, a step which he was quite prepared to take. He would remind the Government that in the original Act there was not only a power to pay the Judges by salaries instead of fees, but also an indication of what those salaries should be in the provision that they should not exceed £1,200 per annum. At that time the Judges were allowed to retain their private practice, a privilege withdrawn in 1852, when the salaries were increased to £1,200 as a minimum, and £1,500 as a maximum. It had been stated that the Lord Chancellor was of opinion that £1,200 was a sufficient remuneration; but against that opinion he (Sir J. Pakington) would appeal to the noble Lord the First Minister (Viscount Palmerston), who, through the Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. FitzRoy), had avowed his belief that the maximum salary ought to be more extensively granted, if indeed it was not granted to all County Court Judges. However, prepared as he was to vote with the hon. and learned Gentleman if the Motion were pressed to a division, he thought, under the circumstances, it would be advisable to await the measure which had been announced as coming from the other House of Parliament.

explained, that the concession referred to by the right hon. Baronet was not now made for the first time. The Bill which he had mentioned proposed that all the Judges should be paid fixed salaries of the minimum amount now given, excepting only those Judges who were now actually in the receipt of the increased salaries, from whom no deduction would be made.

disputed the accuracy of the distinction drawn between metropolitan Judges and their brethren in the rural districts. They were not nearly so hard worked as some of the provincial Judges, who were paid lower salaries. He found that while the Judge of the Whitechapel County Court had sat only ninety-eight days, the Judge of the Sussex Court had sat 191 days. He conceived the time had arrived when all such invidious distinctions should be abolished.

had derived great satisfaction from the result of the discussion, because he thought the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had succeeded substantially in the objects of his Motion. He entertained the strongest opinion that there ought to be uniformity of salary, and that the distinction made by the Treasury, though from the best possible motives, was an error of judgment. The Secretary of State for the Home Department having fully assented to the principle that there should be equality of salary, the only other point on which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield could desire to divide was, the amount of salary. In his opinion £1,500 a year was not too much for the duties required; and when the Bill came down from the other House he should certainly move that the salary be fixed at that sum if the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield did not do so. He concurred in recommending the hon. and learned Gentleman not to press his Motion at the present moment, and he trusted the noble Lord, when the subject was again before the House, would accede to what he was warranted in saying was the general feeling, that the County Court Judges should not receive less than £1,500 a year.

I feel compelled to say a few words on this subject in consequence of what has fallen from the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Malins); because, as it appears to me, he has delivered views upon the question entirely contradictory of one another. In the course of his speech he has insisted that the amount of the salaries shall be understood to be a perfectly open question; and if he had stopped there I should have entirely concurred with him. But, so far from leaving the question open and leaving it free to us to express our opinions upon it, he congratulates the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield upon having virtually closed the question and completely succeeded in all his points, including the increase of salaries to the maximum of £1,500 a year. I hope it will be understood that the amount of salaries does remain an open question; and I confess I think it most inexpedient that we should enter upon the arguments with respect to the amount of maximum salary, unless it be clearly understood that those who entertain an opposite opinion from the hon. and learned Gentleman are at liberty to enter, with all details, upon an exposition of the grounds of that opinion. I shall not now enter upon any such exposition, but shall content myself by saying in the most summary terms, that it appears to me the great question is whether, with a reconstruction of offices and an addition of other functions, we ought to make an alteration of salary? But perfectly well knowing as I do the facility of finding fit men to occupy the position, fit men who eagerly seek it, fit men who are delighted at obtaining it—and that, too, when there was no prospect beyond the minimum salary of £1,200 a year—I think the question ought to be kept open for discussion, particularly when it is understood an early opportunity will be afforded, by the introduction of a measure on the subject, of arguing that which is a matter of no inconsiderable importance either to the Judges or to the administration of justice, or to the public, or to the whole body of public servants, every class of which is, of course, powerfully influenced by the steps which the House takes in reference to the salaries of one class. I am desirous that the House should understand clearly the position of the Government with regard to this question. It is assumed that by an arbitrary act the Government introduced the principle of variation into the salaries of County Court Judges. I would join in condemning any such proceeding if that were a true representation of the case; but in point of fact the principle of variation was not adopted by the Treasury; it was distinctly laid down by Act of Parliament. It is perfectly plain, that when Parliament said the Treasury should fix the salary of each Judge at not less than £ 1,200, and not more than £1,500 a year, Parliament distinctly expressed an opinion—which I confess I think upon the whole an unfortunate opinion—that there were to be variations, and that the Treasury was to attempt to adapt gradations of salaries within those limits to the gradations of duties to be performed. One other word I am desirous of saying upon the only painful part of this discussion—that part of the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield in which he did not hesitate to impute corrupt motives and conduct to my hon. Friend the Secretary for the Treasury. It appears to me that nothing can be deeper than the interests of this House in the character of its Members, and that charges of this kind are not to be dealt with lightly, thrown out in speeches of hon. Gentlemen and then brought to no issue whatever—neither retracted nor supported. A Gentleman who, making such charges, is prepared to support them, does a public duty in thereby exposing criminal conduct on the part of those in office. I cherish the hope that the words of the hon. and learned Gentleman are hasty words, and that he does not intend to adhere to such charges as he has made. I cherish the hope that he will express himself to that effect in the reply which he will make. Whether he fulfils or disappoints that hope, I am quite certain I express the general feeling of the House when I state my conviction, that there are no grounds for such charges against the hon. Gentleman the Member for Westbury. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield seems to think it quite easy to find numbers of men fit to perform the duties of the hon. Member for Westbury. With his magnificent notions, the hon. and learned Gentleman disclaims the idea that the public has the right to be served at the rate of remuneration which belongs to the services it wants. I hold that principle to be the basis for the remuneration of all public officers. Where you do not apply it strictly it is a great misfortune and if you abandon or throw the slightest discredit upon it you commit a gross injury to the public, under the pretence of liberality to individuals. The hon. and learned Gentleman says it would be easy to find men to perform the duties of the hon. Member for Westbury at one-half the salary which he receives. I accept the challenge. I do not think it an easy thing to find a man fit to perform those duties, although I know it is not difficult to find many who will say they will do it. I think it would not be easy to find a person who could discharge those arduous duties, and especially in the manner in which they have been discharged by that most upright and most able public servant.

explained: He meant to say that the House would be free to discuss this question when it was brought forward, although he believed there was a general feeling in favour of the maximum.

I think there is nothing more objectionable than that the feeling of the House relative to the appropriation of the public money should be left to be collected by a desultory debate of this kind. Upon the personal question I have nothing to say, but I believe I express the general feeling of the House when I state that I think the hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Treasury has answered satisfactorily the charges brought against him. It is fair to suppose also that no hon. Member would make those charges unless he conceived himself justified in preferring them. I think that when an officer of the Government can give so satisfactory an answer to such charges, he has no cause to complain that he is labouring under a great grievance when he is subject to such allegations. I rise, however, entirely and solely with reference to the tone which the debate has taken in regard to the amount of these salaries. Considering the state of the finances of the country at the present moment—considering that we are just terminating a great struggle which has called for great sacrifices and great exertions—and considering that the first duty of the House will be to consider the financial position of the country, I do not think it will be wise, after a debate of this kind, for the House to allow that it is pledged to increase these salaries. I do not pledge myself to any opinion that £1,200 is not a sufficient allowance, and, on the other hand, I do not mean to say that it is sufficient; but I think the House ought not at present to express any opinion on the subject. It may be a legitimate subject to consider whether the County Court Judges ought not to have fixed salaries for a certain number of years, and then increased salaries after a certain length of service. I do not give any opinion on that subject, but that may be worthy of consideration in discussing the salaries of public servants I only wish to guard myself against being supposed by my silence to give my adhesion to the assertion that the general feeling of the House is in favour of the increase. The state of our finances will necessarily occupy the most anxious consideration of Parliament; and. as we are about to witness, I hope, a reduction of the public expenditure to meet the reduction in the resources and revenue of the country caused by the war, I think it would be most unwise for the House, without due consideration, to pledge itself at the present moment to increase the salaries of public servants. After due consideration, the House may think the claim now preferred to be just; but the House must not be considered pledged to the proposition which my hon. and learned Friend appears to think has been adopted by the House.

in reply, reminded the House that when the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gladstone) was Chancellor of the Exchequer he had pointed out fifteen County Court Judges as persons deserving of the maximum salary of £1,500 a year. If those learned gentlemen were entitled to that salary, and if no one was to be appointed to the office who was not equally deserving, it followed, therefore, that all were worthy of the maximum salary. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire had said that we were just at the end of an expensive war, and that it behoved us to be careful of our finances. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman was in the House yesterday, when the Committee of Supply was engaged in sowing broadcast the money of the public, and squandering it on parks, roads, and matters of mere ornament. Yet here was a great question involving the due administration of justice, and the right hon. Gentleman expressed his opinion that it was a case in which the interests of economy ought to be consulted. Surely the right hon. Gentleman could not have been in the House last night. ["Yes."] Well, if he was, it was so much the worse. He (Mr. Roebuck) believed that the House and the country would go with him in favour of the Resolution; but as the Government had expressed their intention to deal with the subject, and make all the salaries uniform, he would withdraw the Motion.

in rising for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the law relating to the removal of Scotch and Irish paupers, said, in 1854 a Select Committee of that House was appointed to inquire into the operation of the existing law upon that subject. Arising out of the discussion of the general question, or of the removal and settlement of the poor, came the preliminary difficulty of the removal of Irish and Scotch paupers, which was referred to that Committee. The Committee sat during the Session of 1854, and was reappointed last year; they took a great deal of evidence, and finally came to a Report, upon the recommendations of which the present measure was generally founded. The House was, no doubt, aware of the general principle on which poor removals were conducted. Every poor person, whether born in England, Ireland, or Scotland, when he claimed relief from the poor rates on the ground of destitute circumstances, if he were not settled in England, or if he had not resided for five years in the parish where he claimed relief from the rates, was liable to removal—if an Englishman to the parish where he had a settlement, and if an Irishman or a Scotchman to the country of his birth. The Act of Parliament—the Act 8 & 9 Vict. c. 117—which dealt with Irish and Scotch removals, was passed eleven years ago, and pointed out a mode of proceeding with that class of paupers totally different from that which was pursued with regard to English paupers, When a Scotchman or Irishman became chargeable to the poor rates, and applied for relief to a relieving officer or an overseer, he was liable to be taken before two justices of the peace without summons. Their duty was to ascertain that he was born in Scotland or Ireland, that he had not obtained a settlement in this country, and that he had not resided for five years in the parish where he claimed relief. They then made an order for his removal, and the pauper was committed to the charge of the officer to whom the warrant of removal was given. In this metropolis, from which, exclusive of Liverpool, the largest number of these removals took place, he was taken to a sort of depôt upon the banks of the river, near Wapping, and periodically, once or twice a week, a lot of these poor persons were shipped off to Scotland or Ireland. Paupers so removed were taken to particular ports specified in the Act, eight in Ireland and nine in Scotland, and there deposited and left to shift for themselves. There was no practical appeal against the decision of the magistrates as to the removal of these paupers, for the nominal appeal given by the Act was so ineffective, that the only attempt which had ever been made to take advantage of it had broken down. The process he had described was not only unnecessarily cruel to the paupers, but was also unjust to the places where they were disembarked; because, in a very large number of cases, the port at which they were landed had no more obligation to maintain them than the parish from which they were sent away. The pauper, necessarily in destitute circumstances, was tumbled out of the steamboat at a place where he probably was as much without the means of obtaining relief as he had been in the parish from which, he had been removed, and he therefore had to be relieved at the cost of the ratepayers of that place. It appeared from the last return, that upwards of 5,000 Irish removals had taken place in the year ending in March, 1854, and the evidence taken before the Committee showed, that out of this number about 1,200 applications for relief had been made at the workhouses of the ports in which the paupers had been deposited. The remainder must, therefore, either have begged their way to their homes, or have remained in those parishes in a state of destitution. He did not mean to assert that all Irish and Scotch paupers who applied for relief in England were treated in this manner, for it was right to say that a very large number of Irish poor were relieved by the English parishes without being removed, and it was stated before the Committee that many of the London parishes had made a rule of never applying for orders of removal in such cases. But no doubt the law gave rise to great injustice and hardship, for which the Committee in their report endeavoured to provide a remedy. There seemed to be no reason why an Irish or a Scotch pauper should not be treated in the same way as an English pauper who had no settlement in the parish where he applied for relief, and he accordingly proposed to assimilate the procedure in the manner recommended by the Committee. When a pauper was liable to removal from one parish in this country to another, the parish where he was receiving relief was obliged, before he could be removed, to send a notice to the parish where he had a settlement, together with a statement of the grounds of removal. The pauper could not be removed until twenty-one days after that notice had been given, and the parish to which it was sent was entitled to examine the evidence taken before the magistrates, who had granted the order of removal, and then, if they thought fit, they had an opportunity of appealing to the quarter sessions of the district in which the removing parish was situated against that order. If an appeal were prosecuted, the pauper could not be removed until it had been decided. This system, mutatis mutandis, he proposed to adopt in reference to Scotch and Irish paupers. He proposed that if, after investigation, the magistrates should adjudicate that a pauper was a native of a parish or union in Scotland or Ireland, or had resided there for five years before coming to England, notice of his chargeability should be sent to such parish or union; that such parish or union should then be entitled to give notice of appeal, within thirty days, and also to examine the depositions upon which the order of removal was founded; and that if an appeal took place, the pauper should not be removed until it was decided. The pauper would not be turned out at the first port at which the vessel conveying him happened to arrive and left to shift for himself, but would be sent to the workhouse of the union upon which he was chargeable. He had, in substance, embodied the recommendations of the Committee in this Bill, and he trusted that it would get rid of the hardship and cruelty to which the present law sometimes gave rise, and effect a substantial improvement in the administration of the law respecting this branch of the administration of relief to the poor. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Laws for the removal of Poor Persons, chargeable in England, who have been born in Scotland or Ireland.

said, that having had much experience in the removal of Irish poor, he thought the right hon. Gentleman would have much difficulty in finding out the places in Ireland to which paupers belonged. They seldom bad any difficulty with English poor, but with regard to Irish they had generally to obtain other evidence. There was, of course, seldom any mistake as to the country; but the difficulty of finding out to what part of Ireland persons ought to be sent would prove almost insuperable. He should not, however, oppose the introduction of the Bill.

thought that the right hon. Gentleman the vice President of the Board of Trade might place English and Irish paupers upon the same footing with respect to removal, without the qualification of the words mutatis mutandis. He must also remind the right hon. Gentleman that he would find some difficulty in introducing—as his speech implied that it was his intention to do—the law of settlement into Ireland. Such a law would be an entirely new feature hi the system prevailing in that country. With reference to the application of the Bill to Scotland he should merely say, that its operation would be very partial, inasmuch as very few Scotchmen were found to be destitute in England, whatever they might be in their own country, nor would he find many instances of a destitute Englishman in Ireland.

said, he thought that the Bill was of a somewhat more extended character than the speech of his right hon. Friend would lead the House to anticipate, inasmuch as it was evident from that speech that the right hon. Gentleman meant to introduce the law of settlement into Ireland. With respect to the question of appeal, he should like to know in what way Irish and Scotch appeals were to be tried in this country? He might also observe, that the measure was one of such great importance that it was extremely desirable it should be submitted to the investigation of a Committee of that House. It was only by that means that the complicated details of the subject with which it proposed to deal could be satisfactorily disposed of.

wished for an explanation as to the effect which it was proposed to give to a five years' residence, to which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bouverie) had referred.

said, he understood his right hon. Friend to say that, unless an Irishman had, by five years' residence in this country, obtained the privilege of irremovability, he was liable to be removed to Ireland; and that that was the law there would, he believed, be no question. As to the observations of the hon. Baronet (Sir W. Jolliffe), that this Bill would introduce a new principle into the Poor Law in Ireland, he (Mr. Baines) apprehended that such would not be the case. As the law now stood, and had stood since 1845, it was the duty of the justices, before making an order of removal, to ascertain, as far as they could, from what place in Ireland the person to he removed came, and to order his removal to the port nearest to that place. It was, therefore, perfectly clear that it was the object of the Legislature that the pauper should be put in the way of getting as near as possible to that which was the natural place for the relief of his destitution. As to appeals, they would be tried in the same way that English appeals were now tried—at the quarter sessions of the districts from which the paupers were removed; the only difference would be that Irish unions would be the appellants, and English unions the respondents. Some such right of appeal existed under the law as it stood; but at present there were many practical difficulties in the way of working these appeals, and the object of this Bill was to remove those difficulties and to render efficacious what had hitherto been only a nominal remedy. He did not anticipate that the Bill would be of so complicated a nature as to render necessary its reference to a Select Committee. On the contrary, he hoped that its provisions would be very simple, and that it would remedy a great amount of injustice to which Scotch and Irish poor were at present subject.

approved the Bill, as far as its provisions had been indicated by the right hon. Gentleman, but thought that it would not remove all the evil which was complained of. Something ought to be done to render the acquirement of a settlement in England by Irish paupers more easy. It was very hard that an Irishman or a Scotchman who had resided in England for twenty-five years, during nearly the whole working portion of his life, should not, as regarded the relief of his distress, acquire the same rights in this country as were enjoyed by Englishmen. No measure would do full justice to the Irish poor which did not provide them with a ready means of acquiring a settlement in England. A certain duration of residence— say five years—should be held to confer the right of irremovability; and anything short of tins would be inadequate as a measure of relief.

while commending the Bill and expressing his gratitude for its introduction, denied the accuracy of its description as an embodiment of the recommendation of the Committee which sat last year. That Committee suggested a diminution of the period and an enlargement of the area of residence, two principles which might with great propriety be recognised by the present measure.

in moving for leave to bring in a Bill for the better regulation of the Corporation of the City of London, said: Sir, I hope it is scarcely necessary for me to assure the House that Her Majesty's Government approach this subject with no unfriendly feelings towards that great body which will be affected by the provisions of the measure which I now ask permission to introduce. On the contrary, we arc sensible that from its great antiquity—from its connection with the metropolis of this country—from its historical associations—and from the services it has at various periods rendered to the cause of civil and religious liberty and of constitutional government, the Corporation of the City of London is entitled to every respect and consideration. The object of the present Bill—an object with which it is to be hoped its effect will correspond— is not in any degree to diminish the importance nor to impair the dignity of the Corporation, but by amending defects in its constitution and in the administration of its affairs, and by bringing it more into harmony with the spirit of recent municipal legislation, to increase its usefulness, to enhance its influence and efficiency, and to render it better adapted to fulfil all the legitimate purposes of its existence. In dealing with this important question, we have had the advantage of two elaborate Reports—that presented in 1837 by the Commissioners appointed two years previously to inquire into the condition of the municipal corporations in England and Wales, and that more recent one for which we are indebted to the Commissioners to whom, in 1853, was assigned the duty of inquiring into the existing state of the London Corporation, with a view to ascertain whether any measures might be necessary to make better provision for the future government of the City of London, The latter Commissioners were my right hon. Friends the present Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Labouchere) and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir G. C. Lewis), with whom was associated a learned and eminent individual, who, having for many years occupied, with equal credit to himself and advantage to the country, a seat on the judicial bench, felt it his duty, though then in the full enjoyment of his intellectual powers, to retire when unfortunately afflicted with a physical infirmity. I allude to Sir John Patteson. It is due to the Corporation to observe that these Commissioners put on record at the beginning of their Report their testimony to the readiness which had been evinced by all the authorities of the City to give them the fullest information in their power, and to facilitate the inquiry with which they had been entrusted. Information, both oral and documentary, was most liberally tendered. They say

"We think it right to state that we found the utmost readiness in all quarters to assist us in the execution of your Majesty's Commission by the communication of facts and suggestions. This readiness was manifested, not only by independent witnesses, who were unconnected with the Corporation, but also by the governing members of the Corporation and by its officers, all of whom willingly came forward to describe their several duties, and to state the facts respectively falling under their cognisance."

I have much satisfaction in believing that the authorities of the City of London and those who represent them in this House will be ready to entertain this Bill in the same spirit in which the Corporation met the Commissioners of 1853. I do not mean to say that they will readily acquiesce in all the proposals of the Bill, but I cherish the hope that they will give to the measure a full and dispassionate consideration, and that they will meet it fairly, with a view to apply such a remedy to the defects in the constitution of the Corporation as may render the body more efficient for the purposes it was originally designed to fulfil. The Commissioners also state in their Report—

"That, though they have found much which, in their judgment, calls for amendment, they had discovered nothing which could affect injuriously the honour and integrity of the officers to whom the affairs of this great Corporation had been confided."

The Commissioners refer to the Report of 1837 for a description of the constitution and administration of the governing body of the City of London, and call attention to the fact that that Report recommended no legislative measures, but simply pointed out that, as to many of the defects, the remedies could be applied by the Common Council itself. The last Report adverts to the various Acts subsequently passed affecting the Corporation, and to various changes made by the Common Council since the date of the previous Report, in order to carry into effect several improvements; but states that "no substantial or systematic reform of the Corporation had been accomplished" since 1837. With regard to the recommendation they have offered, the Commissioners state that they have taken the leading provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act for a guide, making, of course, due allowance for the peculiar circumstances which distinguish the City of London from other corporations. They state in general terms that the object of the Municipal Act was twofold—contemplating, first, reform of constitution; and, secondly, enlargement, in many cases, of boundaries. As to boundaries the Commissioners give at great length, and with much clearness, their reasons for not recommending that the Corporation should be extended over the whole metropolis, in accordance with the provisions of the Municipal Reform Act in respect of other corporations; but it will not be necessary to quota that portion of their Report, inasmuch as Parliament had already expressed its opinion on the subject by passing the Metropolis Local Management Act of last year. With respect to the constitution of the Corporation, it is right to notice an important distinction between the Corporation of London and the other municipal corporations before they were reformed. The Commissioners of 1853 cite the opinion expressed in the Report of 1837, that—

"The most common and most striking defect in the constitution of the municipal corporations of England and Wales is, that the corporate bodies exist independently of the communities among which they are found. The corporations look upon themselves and are considered by the inhabitants as separate and exclusive bodies; they have powers and privileges within the towns and cities from which they are named, but in most places all identity of interest between the corporation and the inhabitants has disappeared."

Such was the description by the Commissioners of 1837 of the general state of the corporations previous to their reformation. The Commissioners of 1853 go on to say—

"From the defect described in this passage the Corporation of London has for many years been exempt. The manner in which the Common Council is elected has produced to a great extent an identity of interests between the governing municipal body and the existing municipal community, and has secured to the latter a council representing their general opinions and feelings. The Municipal Commissioners particularly advert to the Common Council of London as distinguishing that Corporation from the close corporations which then prevailed throughout the country."

I shall now shortly state what is the present constitution of the Corporation of the City of London, taking as my guide the Report of the Commission of 1837, since which date that constitution has undergone no material alteration. The existing governing bodies are—first, the Court of Aldermen; secondly, the Court of Common Council; and thirdly, the Court of Common Hall. The Court of Aldermen is composed of twenty-six members, including the Lord Mayor, twenty-five of whom are elected for life, twenty-four being chosen by the freemen householders of the different wards, rated at the annual value of £10 or upwards. Each of the twenty-four wards elect one Alderman, two other wards of a smaller size being joined together for the purpose of electing another, and the twenty-sixth Alderman is not elected at all, but represents, in a nominal sense only, the borough of Southwark. The Court of Common Council consists of the twenty-six Aldermen, and 206 Common Councilmen, the latter being elected periodically by the ward constituencies. The Court of Common Hall is composed of the freemen, who are also liverymen of the several companies; ten Aldermen also forming part of it. The Lord Mayor presides over each of these three courts. Having stated the composition of these bodies, I must next describe their functions. The Court of Aldermen forms the magistracy of the City of London; but, independently of its magisterial character, it tries the validity of certain elections, including those of the Aldermen and Common Councilmen, has the power of expending money, appoints functionaries and licenses brokers—thus uniting magisterial, judicial, and legislative authority, the last being exercised by them as members of the Court of Common Council. The Common Council, which is the legislative body of the Corporation, dispenses money, manages the lauded property, and elects most of the officers of the Corporation. The Court of Common Hall is chiefly confined to the election of certain officers. The Lord Mayor is elected in the Common Hall from such Aldermen as have served the office of sheriff, the Common Hall returning two names, and the Court of Aldermen selecting one. The sheriffs are elected in the Common Hall. There are twenty-six wards of very unequal sizes in the City. There are sixty-nine municipal companies or guilds, admission to which constitutes a freeman; but the freedom may now be obtained directly without the intervention of the companies. The freemen are divided into liverymen and non-liverymen: freemen enjoy exemption from certain tolls and the exclusive right to exercise certain trades—liverymen enjoy privileges which other freemen do not possess, the former alone being members of the Common Hall. Having thus explained the existing constitution of the Corporation according to the Report of the Commission of 1837, I now come to the provisions of the Bill which I shall ask leave to lay on the table. Those provisions arc mainly, though not I exclusively, founded on the recommendations of the Commissioners. The general scope of the Bill is, first, to reform the I constitution of the Corporation and of some of the courts and jurisdictions within the City; secondly, to abolish certain customs now in force within the City which are injurious to trade and industry—customs which have been abolished in other corporate cities and towns by the Municipal Corporations Act; thirdly, to divest the corporate body of anomalous powers, of which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, some should cease altogether, while others should be transferred to bodies better qualified to exercise them. The main governing body of the City will still remain as it now is—that is, it will consist of the Lord Mayor, the Aldermen, and the Commons in common council assembled, in other words, the Common Council, the Lord Mayor, and the Aldermen being members of it. But the numbers and constitution of its several parts it is proposed to alter materially. In the first place, we propose, in conformity with the recommendations of the Commissioners, to reduce the wards from twenty-six, their present number, to a maximum of sixteen; and also to render them more nearly equal in area and population. We further propose that one Alderman and five Common Councilmen shall be elected by each of the sixteen wards, making altogether ninety-six members, instead of 232, the existing number. Sixty-four, I believe, is the largest number allowed for any council constituted under the Municipal Corporation Act. The Commissioners appointed in 1837 concur with those appointed in 1853 in the decided opinion that the present Common Council of the City of London is far too large for the purposes for which it exists, and ought to be considerably reduced. An important change is also contemplated in regard to the Aldermen. In lieu of their being elected for life, we propose that they shall be elected for six years, and that one-half of the entire body shall retire at the end of every three years. By the Bill the Common Councilmen will continue, as at present, to be elected annually; and the qualification of Common Councilmen will be the same as in other corporations—that is, possession of real or personal estate worth £1,000, or rating to the annual value of £30. The existing qualification of freedom of the City, as now acquired, will be dispensed with. The constituency of the Common Council will like wise be materially altered and extended. The voter in a ward election must at present not only occupy a tenement in the ward rated at £10, but he must also be a freeman of the City, and on the Parliamentary register of voters for the City, which makes it necessary that he should reside within seven miles; the condition of residence for three years within the borough or within seven miles of it is also required by the Municipal Corporations Act; but, as the Commissioners observe, the condition of residence is unsuited to the special circumstances of London, and it is proposed to dispense with it, as well as with the condition of freedom of the City, which, in the words of the Commissioners, has the effect of "narrowing the constituency without elevating its character." The franchise which we propose for the wards agrees with that contained in a Bill which originated with the Corporation itself, and was presented to Parliament in the year 1852, but was opposed by the livery companies, and thrown out by the Select Committee of the House of Commons. The Commissioners propose that

"The Common Council, with reduced numbers, and an enlarged and improved constituent body, be entrusted with the election of all the superior paid officers of the Corporation. This, they say, is in accordance with the scheme of the Municipal Corporations Act as applicable to other corporations of the General Municipal Act, and we see no reason for thinking that it is unsuited to the circumstances of the City."

In accordance with this general recommendation, the Commissioners recommend, and the Bill proposes, that the Lord Mayor, the sheriffs, the recorder, and other officers, now elected by the Court of Common Hall or Court of Aldermen, shall henceforth be elected by the Common Council. It is further proposed that the choice of Lord Mayor shall not be restricted to Aldermen who have served the office of sheriff, or even to Aldermen at all or to members of the Common Council; but that any person shall be eligible for the office of Lord Mayor who is qualified to be a Common Councilman. An opportunity, as the Commissioners justly observe, will be thus afforded of electing persons of commercial eminence and influence connected with the City, although they have not obtained an alderman's gown. It is also proposed that the qualification of the sheriffs shall be the same as that of the Common Councilmen. The Commissioners recommend that the election of auditors should be amended. The auditors are now four in number, and are elected in common hall by persons qualified to be Common Councilmen, and must be freemen. They hold office for two years, there being an annual election of two, the two who have been longest in office retiring. Under the Bill three auditors will be annually elected from among the persons qualified to be Common Councilmen by the persons entitled to vote at the ward elections, but no Common Councilman can be also auditor; and provision is made for the audit of the cham- berlain's and the bridgemaster's accounts half-yearly, and for the transmission of statements of the same once a year to the Secretary of State, who is to cause an abstract of such statement to be laid before Parliament. These enactments as to election of auditors and as to the accounts correspond with the Municipal Corporations Acts. The provisions of the Municipal Corporations Acts restraining the charging or alienation of the corporate property are by the Bill extended to the City of London. As to the Court of Aldermen, it is proposed by the Commissioners, and the Bill carries that recommendation into effect, that the Court of Aldermen, as distinct from a magisterial court, shall be abolished, and its multifarious powers transferred to the Common Council. With regard to the City courts, the Bill proposes substantially to carry into effect the recommendation of the Commissioners. This is a part of the subject which, I believe, provokes little, if any, difference of opinion. One of these courts is the Court of Hustings, which the Commissioners say is practically obsolete, and can be made available for no good purpose. This tribunal the Bill will entirely abolish. The Commissioners also recommend the consolidation of the Lord Mayor's Court and Sheriffs' Court into one Court. This the Bill in effect does—except as to the jurisdiction which the Sheriffs' Court has under the City Small Debts Act—by abolishing the ancient jurisdiction of the Sheriffs' Court. It also abolishes the appeal to the Court at St. Martin's-le-Grand, in pursuance of the Commissioners' recommendation. This Court, the Commissioners say, "is very seldom called into existence, and is a very cumbrous and inconvenient tribunal." It is a Court called into existence, pro hâc vice, by application to the Court of Chancery, whence a commission issues to certain persons, usually Judges of the Superior Courts of law at Westminster, to review the judgment of the Lord Mayor's Court. For this proceeding a simple appeal to the same Courts—that is, the common law Courts at Westminster—and of the same nature as that given from decisions of County Court Judges, is substituted. The Bill also provides, in accordance with the Commissioners' recommendation, that the Recorder shall be the sole Judge of Lord Mayor's Court, instead of being, as now, merely the assessor of the Lord Mayor. It enables the Common Sergeant, however, to hold the Court in the absence of the Recorder, or when the office of Recorder is vacant. With regard to the Central Criminal Court, it is proposed that the Lord Mayor and the Aldermen shall cease to form an essential part of that tribunal. I now approach a most important branch of the subject, where, again, the Bill follows pretty closely the recommendations of the Commissioners. I allude to the exclusive rights of trading possessed by freemen of the City. In treating of this question the Commissioners advert to the principle established by the Municipal Reform Act, namely—

"That not with standing any custom or bylaw of a Corporation, 'every person in any borough may keep any shop for the sale of all lawful wares or merchandises, by wholesale or retail, and use every lawful trade, occupation, mystery, and handicraft, for hire, gain, sale, or otherwise, within every borough.' "

The Commissioners proceed to say—

"We propose to extend this enactment, both in its letter and its spirit, to the Corporation of London. It appears to us that if the Legislature has thought fit to abolish the trade privileges and monopolies which were possessed by the country corporations, the same measure is applicable, on still stronger grounds, to the same class of privileges and monopolies in the City of London; inasmuch as the latter is the great centre of English commerce, and it is therefore peculiarly important that all the operations of trade should be freed from needless and vexatious restrictions within its limits."

And they recommend that all laws and acts of the Common Council prohibiting persons, not being freemen of the City, from carrying on any trade, retail or otherwise, or from using any art, occupation, or handicraft within the City, be repealed and abolished. In this recommendation, it would appear from the resolution they have lately passed with regard to reform in the City, the Common Council have expressed their concurrence; and, in accordance with that recommendation, the Bill proposes to abolish all exclusive rights of trading, or, in other words, all rights prohibiting persons, not freemen, from trading within the City. It is also proposed to abolish other rights which, though they do not come within the letter of the Municipal Reform Act, are yet within its spirit, the abolition of which is likewise recommended by the Commissioners. The first of these is the right of metage of all grain, fruit, wares, and merchandise brought into the port of London. This right is exercised by usage confirmed by a charter of James I., and it is not confined to goods landed within the limits of the City, but extends to all goods landed on either side of the river from Staines, in Middlesex, to Yantlet Creek, in Kent. The claim of the City to this right has been disputed, but the suit has never been brought to an actual decision. Something in the nature of a compromise, I believe, took place, by which the exercise of the right was made less onerous to the parties interested. The Bill also proposes to abolish the monopoly of the porterage of grain and other measurable articles within the port of London, at present exercised by the fellowship of porters. It is also proposed to abolish all tolls on carts not belonging to freemen passing through the City; and here, again, I may say that the Common Council has been beforehand with Parliament in concurring in this recommendation; and even before the issue of the last Commission, I believe, it was stated to be the wish of the Corporation that this toll should be abolished. It is proposed, further, to repeal all enactments requiring brokers to be admitted by the Court of Aldermen, and payment by them of £5 annually to the Corporation; and also to repeal the restriction on the grant by the Crown of any market within seven miles of the City. These are all rights which it is proposed to abolish which interfere with trade; and looking to the spirit of our recent legislation—to the course which has been taken with regard to other municipal bodies, and to the great advantage which must be derived by all persons trading in the City of London from the abolition of these rights—and looking, moreover, at the spirit evinced by the Corporation of the City not to insist upon these rights, but to abandon such, of them as are felt to be onerous, I think we may fairly anticipate that these provisions of the Bill will meet with the approbation of the House. It is further proposed, as recommended by the Commissioners, to regulate certain rights at present existing between the City of London and the borough of Southwark. There is one matter of difficulty and importance connected with the tolls levied by the City of London to which I must now call the attention of the House—it is the coal duties. In page 19 of the Report of the Commissioners, will be found a very elaborate and clear statement of the nature of these duties, of the terms for which they are levied, and of the charges to which they are subject. It is too long to read now, but I will briefly state its substance. These duties are three. There is, first of all, the 4d. duty, which now consists of a duty of 4d. per ton, but which, in 1862, will become a duty of 4d. per chaldron, in which form it would be a permanent duty, having been conferred on the Corporation in exchange for a right of metage of coal now abandoned by them. It amounted in 1852 to a net sum of £54,141. I should state that that duty is very heavily charged; for while the Corporation has collected these duties it has devoted them to metropolitan improvements—not metropolitan merely as applied to the narrow limits of the City, but spread over the whole area of the metropolis; it does not appear in any way that the Corporation has shown a disposition to make a bad use of these coal duties. This 4d. duty is now charged with a principal sum of £580,000 for the Cannon Street improvement, together with a compensation allowance to sea-coal meters of some £7,000 or £8,000 a year. The second of these duties is the 8d. duty, the net produce of which, in 1852, was above £113,000. This sum, together with an annual payment of £11,500 from the City's estate, a small duty on wine, and some other petty sources of income, constitutes a fund denominated the "London Bridge Approaches Fund." This fund is subject to an annual charge amounting to about £12,200. The 8d. duty is not a permanent duty. It will expire in 1862; but it is calculated that before that period the charges to which it is liable will have been discharged from its proceeds. There remains the 1d. duty, making a total of 13d. per ton levied by the Corporation on coals. This 1d. duty amounted, in 1852, to £14,397, and the whole of this sum, subject to a small charge for collection, is payable to the Commissioners of Works for Metropolitan Improvements. This duty also expires in 1862. In considering these duties, one material fact must be borne in mind; they are not levied upon coals brought strictly into the City of London, but on an area very far beyond it—upon all coals brought either by land or by water into a district extending twenty miles in all directions from the General Post Office—

"The coal duty district," say the Commissioners,"exceeds in size the metropolis of the Registrar General, the district of the Commissioners of Metropolitan Police, of the Metropolitan Commissioners of Sewers, and the metropolitan district of the Postmaster General, and its extent would be great even if the limits of the London Corporation were conterminous with those of the existing metropolis."

They then go on to say—

"The collection of all the three classes of duties is conducted by the Corporation; but, inasmuch as the Corporation directly represents only a small portion of the metropolis, Parliament has made it a mere trustee with regard to 9–13ths of the amount, and this portion is applied by it to specified purposes of general metropolitan utility."

They state that, for reasons similar to those which induced them to recommend the abolition of the metage dues, they think that the present arrangement, by which the Corporation levies a duty on coals over a district extending twenty miles from the General Post Office, ought not to be continued. In a subsequent part of the Report will be found other recommendations with respect to these duties; but in this instance the Bill will not correspond with the recommendations of the Commissioners. The Commissioners recommend that these duties should be taken away from the City altogether, and placed in the hands of the Metropolitan Board of Works, to be applied by that Board to the same general purposes to which they have been applied in the hands of the Corporation, subject, of course, to the charges which already exist, and which have been created with respect to these metropolitan improvements. In dealing with this subject the Government have come to the conclusion that simply to transfer these taxes from the Corporation of the City to any other body within the precincts of the metropolis would leave untouched the great grievance of the imposition of this tax upon persons who derive no benefit whatever from the manner in which it is appropriated. It should also be remembered that, in sanctioning the appointment of the Metropolitan Board of Works, Parliament has given to that Board the power of raising money to defray the expense of any improvements it may undertake in the usual way in which other Boards of that nature raise money—by means of rates imposed on the persons who are to benefit by these improvements. The decision to which the Government has come, then, with respect to these coal duties is, not to propose any renewal of the 8d. and 1d. duties, which will expire in 1862, it being calculated that the charges to which they are liable will be liquidated by that time, and to keep up the 4d. duty only so long as may be necessary to liquidate the charge of £580,000, and the other charges upon it, and then to allow it to expire. The next point to which I come is the conservancy of the river Thames, which is at present vested in the hands of the Corporation. The duties of conservancy extend from Staines to the waters of Yantlet, at the junction of the Thames with the Medway. They are divided into two branches—those above and those below bridge—and both branches are exercised by a Committee of the Common Council, called the Thames Navigation Committee, and are regulated by various Acts of Parliament. It is proposed in the Bill to place the conservancy of the river in the hands of a Board, consisting of the Lord Mayor, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the President of the Board of Trade, one of the Commissioners of Woods, and the Deputy Master of the Trinity House, who would have power to employ persons having the requisite professional knowledge for performing the duties of the conservancy under their general direction. I should say that no net revenue is derived by the Corporation from the conservancy of the Thames. There is now a question at issue between the Corporation of the City and the Crown with regard to certain rights along the banks and shores of the river; but the Corporation themselves state—and I believe with perfect truth—that the proceedings now pending in Chancery are not at all connected with the exercise of rights of conservancy. Those proceedings refer to rights claimed by prescription, independently of any rights of conservancy; and the claim is disputed by the Crown. I believe the questions which are the subject of litigation will be determined by the courts of law at a very early period, and it is not proposed by this Bill to touch those questions. If the City succeeds in the suit, it will be left in the possession of its rights and property. If the Crown succeeds, it will obtain possession of those rights and property as if this Bill had not been passed. All that the Bill proposes shall be transferred in respect of the conservancy of the river are, those tolls and dues which are now collected by the City, not as a source of revenue to themselves, but to meet the expenses of the conservancy, and these will be handed over to the body in whom the conservancy of the river will in future be vested. The Bill further proposes to abolish the exclusive rights of the Company of Watermen to navigate the Thames between Yantlet Creek and Windsor, but prohibits persons not now authorised to carry passengers from doing so without a licence from the Board of Conservators established under the Bill. The next subject to which I shall advert is that of the police; and here, again, the Government have determined not to act upon the recommendations of the Commissioners, not from any doubt as to the general expediency of those recommendations, or the correctness of the theory upon which they are founded, but from considerations which I will briefly explain. The Commissioners recommend that the City police should be incorporated with the metropolitan police; and they found that recommendation on considerations of efficiency and economy. If there were no police force now existing in the City of London, I think there can be no doubt that it would be right for Parliament to adopt the recommendation of the Commissioners, and not to except a small portion of a large metropolitan district from the general superintendence to which the police force of that district is subjected. There is no doubt an anomaly, as the Commissioners point out, in leaving the police of the small area within the limits of the City under a separate management and control from that of the metropolitan police force, which is spread over a very large area, completely embracing the City; but the anomaly applies to the existence of a municipal corporation within that limited area, rather than to that which may be considered as the almost necessary consequence of the existence of such a Corporation—the possession of those powers with regard to a police force which it is proposed to leave in the hands of the Corporation of London. If this were a new claim made by the City of London, I think there would be no reason for entertaining it; but we find that, under the powers of an Act of Parliament passed some years ago—in 1839—a most efficient body of police was established, which has since been in operation under the control of a very able and efficient Commissioner; and, although I will not say that no inconvenience has arisen in practice from the existence of the City police as altogether distinct from the metropolitan police, I will say, from the considerable experience I have had, that no inconvenience of a serious character has been felt. Harmony and co-operation have existed between the metropolitan and the City police, and between the Government and the authorities of the City of London. The utmost readiness has always been displayed by the authorities of the City to listen to any suggestions which have been made by the Government with regard to the employment of the police, and, whenever it has been thought necessary to strengthen the police force within the City by reinforcements from the metropolitan police, the arrangement has been readily acquiesced in by the authorities of the City, and perfect harmony has existed between the two bodies. While I admit, then, that in theory it would be far better to place the whole police force of the metropolitan districts under one general system of management and control, still, as there exists within the narrow limits of the City a Corporation of great dignity and importance, and possessing great influence and power, I think a strong case of practical inconvenience should be established—stronger than any which I am prepared to say has yet arisen—to induce Parliament to leave that Corporation in a position in which no municipal corporation in the country is placed—namely, without any police force under its own management. We do not, therefore, propose to make any alteration with regard to the City police, which will be left as it now stands. I must say, however, that this is no precedent for an appeal which, as I learn from the newspapers, is to be made to me at an early period by public bodies created under the Metropolitan Management Act of last Session, who desire to have the control of the police within the limits of their respective jurisdictions. I think the greatest inconvenience would arise from breaking up the metropolitan police into small sections, and placing them under the control of these local bodies. In conceding to the City of London the retention of a power which it has hitherto exercised, and which of late years it has exercised well and efficiently, we are constituting no precedent whatever for a claim which I think the Government could not for a moment entertain, and which I do not believe that Parliament would be disposed to concede. There is one other point with regard to which the recommendation of the Commissioners is not strictly adopted in this Bill. I have alluded to the Court of Aldermen as a court of magistrates, the duties which they perform under the title of the "Court of Aldermen" being not, strictly speaking, magisterial. There is no doubt that the magisterial duties of the Aldermen of London have hitherto, generally speaking, been extremely well performed. The Commissioners themselves refer to the manner in which the Aldermen have discharged the duties connected with the inspection of prisons. While Aldermen were elected for life, there could be no objection to their acting as magistrates during the whole period of their tenure of office; but, if it is deemed necessary, in accordance with the general principles applied to other municipal corporations, to reduce the term during which Aldermen of the City hold office from life tenure to a short period of years, and if Aldermen arc eligible for reelection at the expiration of the six years for which they are originally appointed, I think it would be most objectionable to allow them to act as magistrates—using the term in its fullest sense—during their tenure of office as Aldermen. The Commissioners of 1837, alluding to this subject, observed, that the continual re-election of magistrates by a popular constituency was a violation of a principle hitherto almost universally recognised in this country. I am not aware of any case in which such election of magistrates now occurs, except in the case of the mayor of a borough, who is a magistrate during his year of mayoralty, and during the year following his retirement from office; but none of the aldermen of municipal corporations are necessarily magistrates. The Commissioners of 1837 did not contemplate the permanent retention by the Aldermen of the City, under a new constitution, of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, but they proposed that the City of London should be empowered to apply to the Crown, as is done by other corporations, to appoint a stipendiary magistrate, who should exercise police jurisdiction within the limits of the City. The Commissioners anticipated that if one or more police magistrates should be appointed, the Aldermen would retire from the discharge of police duties, and would confine themselves to those duties which may be termed civil duties, similar to those which are performed by the aldermen of other corporations. I do not wish, however, to leave the matter in this position. The City of London might not think it right to apply for the appointment of police magistrates, or, if police magistrates were appointed, the Aldermen, retaining their magisterial character to its full extent, might not be inclined to retire from the exercise of their functions, and might insist on exercising a police jurisdiction co-ordinately with the stipendiary magistrates. After fully considering the subject, we propose in this Bill that the Aldermen of the City shall be magistrates only for the discharge of that civil business to which I have adverted; that the City shall be thrown into the metropolitan police district for the purposes of the Police Courts Act, though not for purposes of police; and that either a new police district shall be created consisting of the City, or that the City shall be thrown into the general metropolitan district, so that criminal police jurisdiction may be exercised by stipendiary magistrates, as throughout the metropolitan district. The Aldermen of the City will be placed by this arrangement precisely on the same footing as the magistrates of the county of Middlesex, who are excluded from criminal police jurisdiction, but who perform with great advantage to their fellow-citizens and to the public civil duties—such as the care and inspection of prisons, asylums, &c., similar to those which have hitherto been so well discharged by the Aldermen of London. There is one other subject with regard to which the recommendations of the Commissioners are not carried into effect by this Bill—I allude to their recommendations with reference to the Irish Society. Those recommendations are rather general and indefinite. The subject is one to which a good deal of attention has been paid, but which requires much more consideration than it has yet received before we can propose to Parliament arrangements respecting the Society. It does not necessarily form part of the present Bill, and I think the affairs of the Irish Society may more usefully be dealt with in a separate Bill, and we therefore propose to reserve the subject for future consideration. I have now stated the principal provisions of the Bill which I shall ask leave to introduce. I am sure the measure will receive the calm and dispassionate consideration of Parliament; and I anticipate, from the communications I have had with gentlemen connected with the City of London, that they will give fair consideration to the different proposals which it involves. I shall afford ample time for considering the details of the Bill, for I felt it my duty to refuse a request that the Corporation of the City might be allowed to see the measure before it was submitted to Parliament, because I thought it right to follow the ordinary course, and in the first instance to explain the measure proposed by Her Majesty's Government to this House. With the disposition which the City have hitherto evinced, and which I hope they will continue to evince—with the disposition which I doubt not will be entertained by Parliament to give a fair consideration to the whole of its provisions, and with that attention which is due to the importance of the subject—I trust its result will be to give greater efficiency to the Corporation of the City of London, to strengthen its influence, and to increase its usefulness. I may, in conclusion, express a hope that the anticipations of the Commissioners, in the concluding paragraph of their Report, will be fully realised:—

"That the changes in the constitution of the Corporation which they have indicated, and which are founded upon the recognised policy of the country with respect to municipal boroughs, will place it on a more solid and enlarged basis, and that the Corporation will continue, under an amended system, to possess abundant means, not only for purposes of public usefulness, but also for the exercise of a decent hospitality and splendour."

I move for leave to bring in a Bill for the better regulation of the Corporation of the City of London.

fancied that any one who heard the speech of the right hon. Baronet might have supposed that he was proposing to confer a great extent of privileges on the Corporation of London. He did not, however, rise at present to make any objection to what the right hon. Baronet had stated, but he wished to know when it was likely that the Bill, relating to a matter of so much importance, and involving the rights of the Corporation and the rights of property, would come on for a second reading? One part of the right hon. Baronet's statement—that relating to the coal duties—he thought was not characterised by the right hon. Baronet's usual frankness, for he ought to have told the House that the Corporation acted in the capacity of mere trustees for the public, in reference to the 8d. and the 1d. duties. The Corporation collected the money, and handed it over to the Government. [Sir G. GREY intimated that he had said so.] He (Sir J. Duke) did not hear the right hon. Gentleman say so. With regard to the appointment of magistrates, the right hon. Gentleman did not say whether it was to be in the hands of the Crown or the Corporation. [Sir G. GREY: The Crown.] He (Sir J. Duke) would only further say, that the Corporation would give the most anxious consideration to the measure, but they ought to have fair time to consider its provisions.

said, that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down seemed to have, expected that the Bill would confer some benefit upon the Corporation of London. The right hon. Baronet had stated that it would be of the greatest benefit to the citizens of London, and that, ought to be considered a benefit to the Corporation. It was a measure which would make the Corporation what it was in days of yore—the most important body in the kingdom next to the Houses of Parliament—and would enable it to execute its functions in the most efficient manner, so as to form an example, if necessary, to all the corporations in the country. He thought the greatest praise was due to the Commissioners for their examination into the affairs of the Corporation, which at one time thought itself too strong for Parliament to deal with, and had boasted that, if the House of Lords agreed to any measure of City Corporation Reform, that hereditary branch of the Legislature would place itself in imminent danger. He did not, however, think there was much danger to the House of Lords even if the Bill should be carried. As an old citizen, he thanked the Secretary for the Home Department for having attended to the excellent suggestions of the Commissioners.

said, he did not rise to make any objection to the introduction of the Bill, which, he had no doubt, would be considered by the Corporation of the City of London in a fair spirit. All that he would add was his hope that ample time would be given for due deliberation on the provisions of the measure, and he should therefore like to know for what day the second reading would be fixed?

said that, with the permission of the House, he would bring in the Bill that evening. He had no wish to press the Bill forward with undue haste, but at the same time he should not like to propose any delay which might be attended with risk to the passing of the measure. He should fix the second reading for the 21st instant, or three weeks from the present day. With respect to what had fallen from the hon. Baronet the Member for the City of London, in reference to the coal duties, he wished to state that he thought he read a passage from the Report of the Commissioners, in which they stated that the City acted as trustees for the public.

called the attention of the House to the very large increase of the Civil Service Estimates voted last night as compared with former years, and expressed a hope that when the House again went into Committee of Supply a closer scrutiny of the Votes would be made. The increase upon the three heads of Supply granted last night, amounted to no less than 11 per cent as compared with the Votes of 1854, or something like £5,000,000 on the whole revenue; and reverting to particular items he found one of £60,000 on the sum voted for the maintenance of public buildings in the metropolis and an increase in like proportion on other Votes. He very much feared that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would find it an easier task to get the House of Commons to vote the money than to collect it from the people.

submitted a Resolution the purpose of which was to remedy a defect in the law relating to fire insurances. As the law at present stood, the only offices subject to the stamp duty imposed upon fire insurances were those established expressly for transacting that kind of business, but it was held that the word "office" did not include an agency; and therefore, if a foreign company established an agency in London or in any other part of England, that agency could effect insurances without paying the tax. That want he acknowledged to be a manifest defect in the law; but up to the present time no foreign company had attempted on a large scale to effect fire insurances in London. It seemed, however, that a foreign company had now established an agency here with that view, and it is alleged that a considerable number of insurances had been already effected. In order to prevent the unfair competition to which the London offices would be thus subjected, he proposed to found a Bill upon the Resolution which he had placed in the hands of the Chairman with the view of removing the defect in the existing law.

said, he regarded the proposition which had just been made as not only reasonable, but necessary. He regretted, however, that his right hon. Friend had not taken the course of reducing the duty upon fire insurances, because he was confident that the Exchequer lost money by the high duty which was at present imposed. The Government which ran no risk, got 3s. for every 1s. 6d. which the Company got, who ran all the risk; and the result was that insurances were kept down in this country. He gave notice that on sonic future occasion he should move the reduction of the duty from 3s. to 1s. per cent.

thought the alteration only just; but he also agreed in opinion with the hon. Member for Sheffield that a reduction of the duty was the real remedy, because, with the increased facilities and intercourse which now existed with foreign countries, persons would insure abroad in order to escape the high duty which the Government here required. He considered that the present duty pressed with special severity upon the poorer classes of insurers.

considered that it was perfectly just that foreign agencies should be placed under the same restrictions with respect to the payment of duty as English companies, but he did not think that at the present moment the right hon. Gentleman would be justified in giving up two-thirds of the duty; neither did his experience teach him that to lessen the duty would tend to increase the amount of property insured or the number of insurers, for he recollected when the duty was only 1s. 6d. per cent, and it did not produce that great addition of business to insurance offices which hon. Gentlemen opposite seemed to think would result from its reduction.

admitted the propriety of placing foreign agencies on the same footing, but was convinced that the only way of remedying the evil was to reduce the amount of duty, which was a tax upon the more provident portion of the community. At present no more than one-third of the property in the United Kingdom was insured, while in France seven-eighths of the whole property was insured. This he attributed mainly to the restrictions under which insurers laboured in this country.