acquainted the House, that he had this day received a Letter from Messrs. Baxter, Rose, and Norton, as Agents for Henry Dann and Richard Marks, informing him that it is not their intention to proceed with their Petition complaining of an undue Election and Return for the Borough of Bodmin:—Letter read, as follows:—

"3, Park Street, Westminster,

June 29th, 1857.

"SIR,—As Agents for Henry Dann and Richard Marks, in the matter of their Petition delivered in on the 20th day of May last, complaining of an undue Election and Return for the Borough of Bodmin, we hereby beg to inform you that it is not intended to proceed with the said Petition.

"We have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your very obedient Servants,

"BAXTER, ROSE, and NORTON.

"To the Right Honourable The Speaker of the House of Commons."

said, that the petition was withdrawn altogether contrary to his wishes. It was a gross libel against his conduct and integrity, and against that of his constituents, which the forms of the House prevented him from punishing. He should, however, at the evening sitting, call the attention of the House to the matter, and ask Mr. Speaker to place the documents connected with it in the hands of witnesses that he might proceed against the parties in the courts of law.

said, he rose to move that this Bill be ordered to be read a third time. It was not until the previous evening he had ascertained that there was any intention to oppose the measure. A Committee had, for fourteen or fifteen days, sat upon it, and unanimously recommended it to the House. The opposition took them completely by surprise, else the Members of the Committee would be present to defend their decision. Under these circumstances he thought it would be a monstrous thing for the House to set their decision aside by rejecting the Bill.

said, he would move as an Amendment that the Bill be considered that day three months. As a general rule the House ought, he admitted, to abide by the decisions of its Select Committees, unless when those decisions were founded upon erroneous principles, as he thought he could show was the case in this instance. In 1853 the House of Commons sanctioned the formation of a line from Stroud to Dovor, thereby connecting the arsenal of Chatham with the most important of the Cinque Ports; and so important did they consider the project, that they dispensed with the Standing Orders in favour of the measure authorizing it, and released £50,000 to enable the East Kent Company to make the extension from Canterbury to Dovor, exacting a pledge from the South-Eastern Company not to interfere in the matter. In consequence of the East Kent Company being so encouraged, the works were undertaken, the tubular bridge put across the Medway at Rochester, and a large portion of the line proceeded with. In 1857 it was discovered that the traffic upon the North Kent line was crowded, of which they had a proof in the lamentable accident which had happened the other day; and hence the application for the present Bill, contrary to the pledge that the South-Eastern Company would not interfere with the East Kent Company in the construction of an independent line, with a terminus in the west end of London. The Bill had no clause authorising the construction of such a terminus; but the Committee in deciding in favour of the South-Eastern Company, had required a pledge that it would come before Parliament next Session for power to construct one. As that was the case, he did not see how it would act as a hardship upon them if the Bill before the House were postponed to next Session, especially as the Committee had decided in its favour, because they considered the construction of the East Kent Company's line would be prejudicial to the South-Eastern Company. In that they had clearly outstepped their province, as he contended that that was a question with which the Committee had nothing to do. It was not for them to say whether there should or should not be competition between the South-Eastern and the East Kent in the face of the principle asserted by Parliament, which had already declared that there should be competing lines between London and Dovor totally independent of the South-Eastern Railway. The question which they had had to try was the respective merits of the Bills submitted to their consideration, and they had passed the present Bill though they admitted it to be a bad Bill; for the Chairman himself said, and these were his own words, "that they had come to a decision, he must say rather reluctantly, that they would grant the green (the South-Eastern) line; at the same time he must say that it did not satisfy them in all respects as to what ought to be done for the accommodation of the public." Considering, then, that, by the adoption of this Bill, the whole of the continental through traffic, as well as the whole county of Kent, would be handed over to the South-Eastern Company, that the policy of establishing an independent line would be reversed, he begged to move as an Amendment, that the further consideration of the Bill be postponed to that day three months.

, as the only Member of the Committee, said that they had considered the rival schemes for fifteen days, and after hearing all the evidence had decided in favour of the present Bill. He therefore considered that it would be a flagrant wrong to set aside their decision.

said, he wished the hon. and gallant Member for Weymouth (Colonel Freestun) had given the House some of the reasons which induced the Committee to come to their decision. He had no doubt all the Members of the Committee were actuated by the best intentions, but they had, he thought, proceeded upon false and mistaken grounds. Indeed, it would appear that the South-Eastern Company were themselves the committee, so completely were their interests attended to. As to the flagrancy of setting aside the decision, what, he asked, would be the use of the House of Commons at all if it were not to control whatever might be done by five or seven Gentlemen above stairs sitting in Committee? The House was told that the Committee had sat for fifteen days, and he verily believed that during that time the Members of it had become completely obfuscated, as they put the public convenience altogether out of the question, and recommended the present Bill in one of the most extraordinary Reports ever presented to the House, the public having been entirely thrust out of sight, whilst the South-Eastern Company was put forward in everything. The Chairman, speaking for the Company, stated that it was with reluctance that they decided as they had done; so that their unanimity was, after all, a reluctant one, and he added that they were not satisfied that it would be for the accommodation of the public, but because they thought the East Kent project would be prejudicial to the interests of the South-Eastern Company they determined to recommend the present Bill to the House. If the House were now upon such a Report to confirm the decision they had arrived at, it would shake the public confidence in Select Committees altogether. He hoped, however, none of the railway directors, one of whom he saw behind him, would vote on the question. As to what they might say upon it, he did not care two straws.

said, he was one of the directors of the South-Eastern Railway, and might be looked upon as having a personal interest. Still he was of opinion that when companies petitioned for powers to carry out any great undertaking, the House had serious and important duties to perform; and one of those duties was, to see that the public weal was first considered. But the public weal could never be properly considered if a total disregard was shown to the interests of the companies which were conducting works that would tend to the promotion of the public weal. ["Oh, oh!"] The hon. Member might cry out "Oh!" at that; but the principle was as clear as the sun at noonday to every hon. Gentleman who had fairly weighed the rights and privileges of these great companies. The decision to which the Committee had arrived was founded upon the relative merits of the two lines. His hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty had asked the House if they were prepared to hand over the whole county of Kent to the South-Eastern Company in preference to having an independent line. His hon. Friend had shown his bias in favour of his constituents, for it was from Dovor that this opposition proceeded; but he would ask his hon. Friend whether he believed that the East Kent Company would give them an independent line? Did he not know as well as that he was then sitting in that House, that the question was one of barter—that the East Kent Company had for years—aye, from the time of its creation, been endeavouring to negotiate the sale of its line to the South-Eastern Company—that, in short, the question had come to this, how much they could screw out of that company? [Sir E. DERING: No!] His hon. Friend did not know. He (Mr. Rich) could show him documents to prove it. If, then, they had obtained the additional line, they would only have had a heavier screw, and been able to insist on a better bargain. [Sir E. DERING: No!] His hon. Friend said "No." He repeated he was ready to show him the papers to prove it. The East Kent Company had been got up by its late deputy chairman, the late Mr. J. Sadleir, of dishonourable notoriety, and its contractor had failed. Legitimate competition was to be encouraged, but not that got up by interested attorneys, stockjobbers, and contractors. He, therefore, called upon the House, then, to pause before it determined to throw out a Bill which had received the unanimous approval of its own Committee.

contended that the East Kent Company had been called into existence by the demand of the nation for a direct line of railway to Dovor with a west-end terminus. The public convenience was undoubtedly the first thing to be considered; and it was rather a peculiarity in the present case, that they were engaged in discussion at a moment when, through the wants of the public not being met and satisfied by the South-Eastern Company, one of the most terrible accidents on record had taken place. Ten or twelve lives had been lost within a few hours of the time he was then speaking; and upon what line? Why, upon the very line which the East Kent Company was endeavouring to relieve of some of its over-crowded traffic. Even if the South-Eastern Company carried out their proposed line, the traffic would remain quite as great at the point where that accident had occurred as it was now. The necessity for the East Kent line was also made manifest during the time of the last war, as for military purposes the South-Eastern line was too much exposed to an attack from an enemy. He did not ask the House to give a preference, at this moment, to one line over the other; all he contended for was that the line which did not give the public the security which it had a right to demand should, at all events, be deferred for another year.

said, that there were times when the House should feel no hesitation in setting aside the decisions of a Committee. He had been twenty-five years a Member of that House, and had never seen such a Report as the one upon the table. If it meant anything it meant that the Committee had been undecided as to the course which they ought to pursue. He was of opinion, therefore, that the Bill should be allowed to stand over for another year, in order that the matter might be reconsidered by the competing companies, and some line presented to Parliament which would satisfy the public at large. He spoke solely on behalf of the public, as it was his duty to do in his official capacity, and in connection with the great improvements which were now going on in the metropolis. According to the Bill the terminus of the line was to be at London Bridge, and everybody knew how over-crowded that was already; whereas the competing line, instead of making a turn to that point, proposed to go to the west-end, and have another terminus on the other side of the water, which would draw away some of the immense traffic which was now concentrated at London Bridge. It was, therefore, better that the Bill should stand over until the next Session, and that Parliament should not allow itself to be dictated to by the great railway companies.

observed, that he agreed with the right hon. Baronet that the House should not sanction the principle that the decisions of the Select Committees were not to be subject to the review of the House. After reading the Report and listening with the utmost attention to the various remarks which had been made, he must say that there appeared to be the strongest possible ground for the postponement of the Bill. Indeed he thought the House would be neglecting its duty if, after the lamentable accident which had just arisen from the over-crowded state of the North Kent line, it did not refrain from sanctioning any other scheme until it had time to consider whether the recurrence of such a catastrophe might not be prevented by the construction of a railway arriving at a different terminus.

said, that as a director of the South-Eastern Railway Company, he wished to say a few words in defence of the Report of the Committee, and to assert that if the line now sanctioned by them had been carried out no such accident as they were then deploring would have occurred. It was not necessary for an hon. Member to sit on a Committee in order to have his wits "obfuscated." The language of some of those who had opposed the Bill that day created a presumption that their own minds were in that unfortunate condition.

said, competition might be allowed in Kent if it were a large manufacturing district. He had never held a share in the South-Eastern Company, nor did he ever intend to do so, but he lived in a district which that Company amply accommodated, and, therefore, he did not wish to see its powers of providing for the public accommodation crippled, as the setting up of a rival shop would do by drawing away their profits, and preventing them keeping up the number of pointsmen, guards, and other servants whom they at present employed to take care of the public safety. He must also protest against the late accident being used as an argument ad invidiam against the Bill. All the opposition offered to the measure by the people of Dovor arose from their eagerness to get to London an hour or two sooner. He did not blame them for that, but this was a poor reason for sanctioning a competition that would ruin both of the rival companies, and disable them from providing for the safety and comfort of the travelling public.

said, he thought that the interference of the right hon. Baronet the Chief Commissioner of the Board of Works, in his official character, was quite uncalled for in this matter, and, although he would admit that the House had full power to overrule the decisions of its Committees, yet no single argument had been adduced of sufficient weight in the present instance to induce him to disregard the Report of the Committee, which appeared to have been arrived at after considerable care and investigation. He should, therefore, vote in favour of the original Motion.

said, that looking to the public interest he also concurred in the propriety of postponing the Bill until next year.

hoped the House would pause before it enunciated the doctrine, that having once given to a particular railway company the privilege of making a line from one point to another, it was prepared to encourage speculators to come forward and depreciate the property of those to whom the country alone looked for the necessary accommodation. It was not the Chief Commissioner of Works or the Secretary of the Admiralty that they must ask for the authoritative opinion of the Government upon a question like the one before the House. If they wanted advice as to railway policy they must turn to the Board of Trade. And where was that Board to-day? Surely if it had considered that there was anything in the Bill that was inimical to the public interests, the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Board of Trade would have been there to tell them what were the bonâfide opinions of the Government about the matter. But, so far from that being the case, that Board was not represented in the House on the occasion. A good deal of stress had been laid by the hon. Member for Dovor (Mr. B. Osborne) upon certain words which he had read from a paper before him, and which he gave the House to understand was the decision of the Committee—he meant the statement that the Committee had arrived at their decision "rather reluctantly." Why, there were no such words as these in the whole of their Report. The House had nothing before it of the kind; and it could not be called upon to act on what might have fallen from the Chairman of the Committee, and which had been printed since by hon. Gentlemen opposed to the Bill. He would express his hope that the Resolution of the Committee would be affirmed, as the line which they had recommended was necessary to the convenience as well as the safety of the South-Eastern Company's traffic. The system of canvassing hon. Members to vote, whether for or against private Bills, which had been resorted to in this instance, was disgraceful.

remarked, that he thought that there appeared to be some very extraordinary concert and canvassing among the representatives of the Government present, and some misstatements had been made, that the Committee had in their Report stated that they had come to their decision with extreme "reluctance." Now, the Board of Works might do many great things, but they could not find such a word as "reluctance" in the Report of the Committee. He had never been connected in any way with the railway interest, and having heard no sufficient reason for repudiating the report of the Committee, he should give his vote against the Amendment.

said, that the course proposed, of throwing overboard the Report of the Committee without any evidence, was one in accordance with neither law nor justice, and was, he could hardly help thinking, somewhat insulting to the Committee. At all events the House ought not to overrule the decision of the Committee until the hon. Members of the Committee were present to take part in the discussion. He referred more especially to the hon. Chairman who was at present absent at Quarter Sessions.

said, that although the question had been discussed for a considerable time, not a single fact or feature had been brought forward to show that the Report of the Committee ought to be rejected. If the present Bill were passed, there was nothing whatever to prevent the East Kent line from bringing forward its own Bill in another Session. That Company had not even thought it necessary for its own protection to petition against this Bill. The East Kent line was to go by St. Mary's Cray and Bromley, coming into the western part of the Metropolis. The scheme now proposed was to make a branch from Dartford to a point on the Greenwich line, in order to avoid Woolwich and Greenwich, and thereby relieve that portion of the South-Eastern Company's line on which the late accident had taken place, by avoiding the crowded site of that deplorable occurrence. He would grant that the Committee had stepped out of the usual course in presenting such a Report; but the House must have something more practical—must have proof that upon the merits of the question the line ought to be rejected—before it resolved on adopting the Amendment of the hon. Baronet the Member for Kent.

remarked, that he also must complain of the conduct of the hon. Member the Secretary of the Admiralty, in imputing motives to the Committee.

denied that he had imputed motives. He only said that they might have been "obfuscated" by the heat of the weather.

proceeded: as he had not heard any grounds for rejecting the Report, he should vote against the Amendment.

said, the Metropolitan Board of Works had accepted the Vote of the House, on the last occasion this Bill was discussed, as a refusal to grant the £50,000 towards the construction of the park; but that the Board had, nevertheless, determined to proceed with the Bill, and to tax the whole of the metropolis for the expenses. He hoped, therefore, that as the present Bill had nothing in it respecting the grant of the £50,000, the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams) would withdraw his opposition.

said, that the feeling of the House appeared to be decidedly against the grant of public money for Finsbury Park. Under present circumstances, however, he would ask leave to withdraw his Amendment.

said, he was glad the matter had been so arranged, but he would take the liberty of suggesting that in the case of these improvement Bills a graduated scale of taxation might be adopted, so that those parts of the metropolis which received the greatest benefit should bear the larger amount of the burden.

suggested that a clause should be introduced to the effect that where an insolvent Joint-stock Company was to be wound up, if proceedings were first taken in the Court of Chancery, other proceedings which might be taken in the Court of Bankruptcy should cease after the appointment of assignees until the proceedings in the Court of Chancery were Concluded; and, on the other hand, if proceedings were first taken in the Court of Bankruptcy, proceedings in the Court of Chancery should not be taken until those in the Court of Bankruptcy were concluded.

agreed that insolvent companies should be wound up by one tribunal, and he thought the best was the Bankruptcy Court.

proposed to strike out certain words, and to insert the following:— "No action, suit, or other proceeding, shall be taken by any creditor of a company without leave first had and obtained." An act of bankruptcy committed by a Joint-stock Company ought to have the same effect as a bankruptcy of partners, and the right of the creditors to sue individual shareholders should be limited. The ruinous consequences of the opposite principle had been painfully exemplified in the case of the Royal British Bank.

said, he preferred striking out the clause altogether, and introducing another clause on the Report restricting the right of a creditor, in a case of bankruptcy, to sue any member of a Joint-stock Company without leave of the Court, but at the same time giving the Court certain powers to prevent a shareholder from either removing his person out of its jurisdiction pending an inquiry in bankruptcy or parting with his property. He hoped, therefore, his hon. Friend would not press his Amendment, but allow the clause to be struck out.

withdrew his Amendment.

said, he proposed to strike out the "arrangement" clauses, extending from Clause 347 to 357, both inclusive. He much preferred the "arrangement by deed" clauses, which were contained in the English Act. The clauses to which he objected, though always extant in the Irish Bankruptcy Act, had never been brought into operation, owing to the great dislike entertained of them by the mercantile community, and the privacy with which the whole matter would be conducted under them. He had placed on the paper an Amendment to expunge them; but in the present state of the benches—(there were seven hon. Members in the House, of whom three were English and the rest Irish)—he would not press the Amendment.

said, it was perfectly true that the arrangement clauses in the Irish Act had not worked, only six petitions altogether having been presented under them. The reason was that there were so many difficulties and technicalities in the way that it was found impracticable to work them; and the clauses as they stood in the Bill would simplify the proceedings, at the same time that they would preserve the safeguards which prevented fraud.

said, he would beg to ask the Attorney General, whether he proposes to introduce a Bill during the present or the next Session of Parliament, for the Registration of Titles to Property in Land; and whether any such Bill will be in accordance with the Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider that subject, which has lately been submitted to Parliament; and also, whether provision will be made for continuing the benefit of a Parliamentary Title to purchasers from the Incumbered Estates Court in Ireland, and for adopting the maps of the Ordnance Survey, now completed in that country, as an index to the register of titles in Ireland?

said, that the Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider the subject of the Registration of Titles to Property in Land was not presented to Her Majesty until, he believed, four or five weeks ago. It was thought desirable that that Report should be circulated, and that the criticisms of the profession thereon should be obtained, before any steps were taken to embody the recommendations of the Commissioners in a Bill. If he had seen the probability of passing a measure of such great importance during the present Session, he should have been more eager to bring the subject before the House. He trusted, however, that there would still be time to bring in a Bill before Parliament was prorogued, not with any belief that it could be adequately discussed during the remainder of the Session, but merely that it should lie on the table for consideration until next year, when it would be formally presented to this House. The measure would be in accordance with the Report of the Commissioners.

said, he would beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether it is true that previous to the intelligence of the late disaster in India reaching this country, the East India Company had applied to the Admiralty for transports to take out troops, and that that application had been refused? He also wished to know, whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send out reinforcements in sailing vessels, or in steam vessels belonging to the navy, which at present were lying idle.

said, it was not true that any application had been made by the East India Company for transports, and consequently it was not true that any such application had been refused. It was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send out Queen's vessels with the reinforcements, as hired vessels were more speedily prepared for the conveyance of large bodies of troops.

stated that, inasmuch as the House did not seem disposed to give proper protection to the character of its Members, it would be his duty, at another time and in another place, to avail himself of the ordinary forms of law in order to clear his own character, and that of his constituents, from the stains which had been cast upon them by a certain election petition.

said, he rose to ask leave to introduce a Bill to cause the votes of the Parliamentary electors of Great Britain and Ireland to be taken by way of ballot. He knew not how this Motion might be met to-night; he knew that the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government was absent; but he knew, likewise, that that noble Lord had said to many hon. Members, some of whom desired to bring forward measures of electoral reform, "Wait, for I have a Reform Bill. Lo, it looms in the distance! Behold, it is a great Reform Bill; and it shall, like Aaron's rod, which devoured up all the other rods, devour all your smaller measures of Reform." Hon. Members, accordingly, had waited for that event. Now, those who advocated the ballot had not the least objection to wait, but they had an objection to do so without knowing what they were to wait for. They objected to seeing Her Majesty's faithful Commons treated somewhat after a nursery fashion—to be told that "they must open their mouths and shut their eyes, and see what the noble Lord would send them." He repeated that they were willing to wait; but in order that they might know what they were waiting for he begged to propose a question to the occupants of the Treasury Bench. He saw two hon. Members opposite who were probably the noble Lord's locum tenentes this evening, so he begged to ask them this specific question, "Is it the intention of Her Majesty's Government to adopt the ballot as part of the Reform Bill next Session?" That was a very plain and straightforward question, and he trusted that he might have a plain and a straightforward answer, without any of those little flowers of diplomacy which were generally sprinkled upon Ministerial replies. If this question were answered in the affirmative he had nothing to do but to sit down, and he thought the cheer with which such an announcement would be received in that House would be echoed from every part of England. If, however, on the contrary, the answer was in the negative, then he had simply to lay his case in the best form he could before the House. He now paused for a reply—

said, If my hon. Friend is really serious in asking—but then resumed his seat.

presumed, after the little preliminary flourish of the right hon. Gentleman that the answer he had to give could not be plain "Yes," or "No." He supposed, then, that in default of such an answer from the right hon. Gentleman, he must take it for granted that silence meant dissent. It was not, he presumed, the intention of the Government to adopt the ballot in their Reform Bill of next year. He thought, then, that he was perfectly justified in bringing this important question before the House tonight, and he trusted that he should not be met with the objection of, "Why did you not wait? Why did you not do as other hon. Members have done and postpone your Motion?" He should not upon this occasion urge any additional arguments in support of his Motion, but he should content himself with taking the objections which had been last put upon record by hon. Members and he should endeavour to give some reply to them. Nothing could be more beautiful in theory than our electoral system, and nothing could be more hideous in practice. It was perverted, it was disorganized, and all that the promoters of the ballot sought to do was to re-establish it upon a proper basis. The advocates of the ballet were not now put on the proof of the failure of our electoral system, for that was plain, palpable, and indisputable. An elector was appointed to do a simple duty—to vote as be pleased, freely and indifferently; but he could not do that by voting in public, and "Therefore," said the supporters of this Motion, "let him vote in secret." That would seem to be a very simple proposition, yet it was met with the most strenuous opposition, and the governing body refused to protect people at the polling-booth from those malign influences which beset them and which gave so many seats to a favoured class in that House: they would go any length, and would assent to any measure of reform rather than that. One of the best writers on the ballot had justly said that—

"The aristocracy or governing classes of this country would rather yield universal suffrage, and retain the control which open voting gives them at elections, than the most moderate extension of the franchise with the ballot."

He (Mr. Berkeley) believed that to be the case, and he warned the country to beware of that spurious liberality which would extend the suffrage but refuse the ballot, because he believed that the alleged desire for an extension of the suffrage was frequently only a pretence to got rid of the ballot. He had always maintained that the ballot was the alpha of all Parliamentary reform, and he asserted that if they would only give the elector protection, at the polling booth, they would soon be able to run through the entire alphabet of reform down to its omega. It was said that there was a very general agreement in favour of the extension of the suffrage. Now, he would endeavour to grapple with and to show the fallacy of the speeches of some hon. Gentlemen on the hustings who had attacked the ballot and had at the same time given in their adhesion to that extension. He had before him an extract from The Times of April last, which contained the report of a speech made by Mr. Disraeli at Aylesbury. The great talent of the right hon. Gentleman, his eloquence, his powers of reasoning, and the high position which he held in that House must render every word that he said upon that subject as important as it was interesting. Well, Mr. Disraeli started with this proposition,—"That everybody must agree that the ballot, without an extension of the suffrage, was an impossibility." Now, he (Mr. Berkeley) was an humble individual in comparison with the right hon. Gentleman, but he most peremptorily denied that proposition, and he asserted that he was backed and supported in his denial by some of the first authorities, both of the past and of the present day. Such, for example, had not been the opinion of Lord Durham, who was in favour of a very great extension of the suffrage; such had not been the opinion of Mr. Charles Buller, who was also iu favour of a great extension of the suffrage; and such had not been, and was not now, the opinion of Mr. George Grote, who also supported an extended franchise. He (Mr. Berkeley) went as far as Lord Durham did touching the extension of the franchise. He believed a very great extension to be necessary, but he was of opinion that the elector, whatever his franchise might be, had a right to demand of the Legislature which enjoined upon him the performance of a certain duty that he should have adequate and full protection afforded him in the discharge of that duty; and he contended that they had no right to impose any duty upon an individual by law without effectually guarding that individual in the performance of such duty. He next came to an equally bold, and, as he thought, equally incorrect assertion by the right hon. Gentleman, "that the vote by ballot would be an intolerable tyranny over the non-electors." In attempting to refute these fallacies, which were, of course, admirably put forward by the right hon. Gentleman, all their weak parts being carefully concealed by most excellent words, it was necessary that they should look to first principles. Now, the laws carrying out the intention of what was called the representative constitution of this country had defined the qualification of an elector; and his duty was also defined with equal clearness—it was to select and to vote for such candidate as he might think proper without fear of punishment, without hope of reward. Nobody, therefore, had a right to question his vote, or to visit him with after consequences. He (Mr. Berkeley) was strongly of opinion that they could not contravene that self-evident proposition, but if he wished to strengthen himself in the eyes of the House, he would call into court the late Sir Robert Peel, who said upon this subject:—

"To whom is the constituent body responsible? Is there any responsibility of any conceivable kind, except the responsibility to God, to their own consciences, and to an enlightened deliberate public opinion?"

That was the opinion of the late Sir Robert Peel, and upon it he (Mr. Berkeley) was prepared to take his stand. Since, then, the elector had the undoubted privilege of voting as he might think proper, for what purpose was open voting required? For what purpose did they want a record to be kept against every man of how he voted? What were they to gain by it according to the electoral principles of our constitution? Was there any conceivable thing which they could gain by open voting which was fair, honest, and above-board? Did open voting afford any test of an elector's having sold his vote or of his having been intimidated? Did it afford any means of punishing a corrupt elector which secret voting did not equally confer? He said that it did not, for he would undertake to prove that a conviction for bribery would be as attainable, if it took place, under secret voting as under open voting. Indeed, he should be very sorry to bring in a Bill for the adoption of the ballot into that House if he thought it would screen, bribery. He would define open voting as the ratification of a treaty between dishonest men; while secret voting was the prevention of the ratification of that treaty, because it compelled one scoundrel to depend upon the word of another. In open voting the poll-book was the record by which the intimidator convicted and crushed his victims. The knowledge that that record was kept against the electors induced thousands of men fully competent to be electors to refuse to be placed on the register. The knowledge of the existence of that record compelled thousands of men who were electors to refuse to go to the poll; and the knowledge of the existence of that record also compelled tens of thousands of our countrymen to go to the poll, there to falsify their consciences and to tell a lie, to the great detriment of their country, and in the face of their God; or, to use perhaps the better phraseology of that brilliantly-written paper—The Examiner—it compelled the electors to go to the poll, there to tell a lie and to send the incarnation of that lie to Parliament. Mr. Disraeli told the Buckinghamshire farmers that to allow the electors to vote in secret—and that he (Mr. Berkeley) contended was to vote without intimidation as enjoined by law—would be intolerable tyranny upon the non-electors. Now, this was assuming covertly that which no hon. Member, however audacious, dared to assume openly in that House—namely, that there was a body of men in this country under whose control the electors ought to be. It meant that or nothing. When it was said that electors would turn tyrants over the non-electors if this secret voting was given them, that might be an argument for universal suffrage, but it was no argument whatever against the ballot. It was an argument for universal suffrage, because if the non-electors were to have the power to control the electors, why make tyrants of them—why not rather give them the franchise? He did not think that that could be got out of. Mr. Disraeli, of the manor of Hughenden, in the county of Buckingham, could vote for whom he pleased—he was perfectly independent of everybody; but John Brown, of High Wycombe, was not independent enough to go against his tyrant. John Brown, therefore, naturally turned to Mr. Disraeli and said, "You are a man of great importance in the House of Commons—an ex-Minister and a Privy Councillor; assist an humble man like me, and free me from my tyrant." "Go away, John Brown, go away," the right hon. Gentleman would say; "you would become a tyrant and bully, and tyrannize over the tyrant you have, if you were allowed the only remedy against the grievance of which you complain." John Brown naturally said, "Good Heavens! what a position to place me in! You recollect, Sir, the time when you stood for High Wycombe and told us that we were Buffering under unparalleled tyranny, and were subject to little knots of tyrants, and now when I bring the facts before you you say, 'John Brown, I shall no longer assist you.'" The right hon. Gentleman, or any other hon. Gentleman, had a right to change his opinion, but he could not change facts, and could not help being a witness as to the terrorism which prevailed, and as to petty tyrants who existed, and whom he desired to put down. Consequently, however much the right hon. Gentleman might choose to change his mind, the right hon. Gentleman was a witness still on the side of those who advocated the ballot, and he thought there was no possibility of the right hon. Gentleman showing how the non-electors became tyrants by the simple fulfilment of that which the law enjoined. Now, he found that during the last Middlesex election a noble Friend of his indulged in what he considered an unconstitutional maxim. He found that Lord Robert Grosvenor said that the electors ought to be responsible for the discharge of their duty. To whom, he asked, were the electors to be responsible but to God, their own consciences, and to an intelligent deliberate public opinion? [Lord Robert GROSVENOR: Hear, hear!] He was glad to hear his noble Friend cheer him, but his noble Friend seemed to have fallen, into the delusion which the noble Lord the Member for London indulged in. It appeared that the noble Lord thought that an intelligent, deliberate public opinion could only exist under open voting. There he joined issue with the noble Lord. He maintained that it could not exist under open voting, but only under secret voting. As his noble Friend had treated him with that good-natured ironical cheer, let him ask his noble Friend to consider what effect public opinion had on the mind of a man under secret voting, and what effect it had under open voting. With the ballot the elector could carefully weigh the opinions of public men, the merits of great public measures, and the arguments in the public press, and then, after getting the best information he could, and deliberating upon it, he went to the poll and gave a conscientious vote in secret. Now, take the case of open voting. Under that system of what use was public opinion to the 500 dependents of my Lord This or That? The press might write by the yard, public men might talk by the hour; all that could make no practical impression on their minds, for when they went to the poll our great national engine, the screw, was at work, and they could not vote but as their landlords commanded! It was the same all through the country wherever men were placed in the power of others. Take the case of any set of men—the workmen at the mills, for instance. Of what use was public opinion to them? They were not called on to form their opinions by public opinion, but by the wills of their masters, and nothing could be easier than to give an illustration of this by referring to any great question of reform. Let them take the abolition of the corn laws, for instance. How long was that abolition postponed because the electors dared not carry out public opinion at the polling-booths? How long was public opinion set in for the abolition of the corn laws before it was accorded? How long did public opinion notoriously wage war against the corn laws in vain?—until at length something very like a great and powerful conspiracy was called into existence to overcome the duresse put on the electors; and that it was which was the cause of the abolition of the corn laws. Two very eminent men, acknowledged to be authorities on the question of the corn laws, Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright, had often declared that if the electors had had the ballot they would have stood by public opinion, which was with the non-electors, and the corn laws would have been abolished fully thirty years before they were. He had now attempted to answer some of the latest arguments against the ballot. The usual mode of attack had been by guesses and surmises. When Gentlemen had nothing practical to offer in defence of open voting they had recourse to guesses and surmises, prophesying that such and such things would happen if protective voting were adopted. But if the House turned to examples it would see that where the ballot existed the best results had followed. Hon. Members might take Hansard, and look through it from one end to the other, and they would find no instances in the speeches against the ballot of the failure of the ballot wherever it had been established. In England the ballot was perfectly successful. Whoever heard of the ballot failing in England? Whoever heard of it failing at the clubs? It procured safety for those who voted under it, and preserved the peace, and the election made by secret ballot was correct and true. He found the same was the case in all other countries. It was so in Holland. There the ballot acted peculiarly well; and so it did in Belgium. It might be said, perhaps, that the priests in Belgium exercised an influence over the electors. That was an evil which could not be coped with. If a body of men submitted their consciences to another body of men that could not be helped, but so long as men were enabled to vote according to their will, that was all that could be attained. In Sardinia the ballot was regarded as the keystone of liberty. Many hon. Members—and probably the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell)—might be acquainted with Signor Valerio, one of the senators of the Sardinian Chamber of Deputies, who had expressed his opinion that "without the ballot the Legislature (of Sardinia) would be returned by the aristocracy, the bishops, and the priests." This country had received a somewhat useful lesson with regard to the conduct and equipment of an army in the field from little Sardinia, and he thought that with respect to civil government it might also learn a lesson from the absence of intimidation on the part of the priests and aristocracy at the Sardinian elections. He (Mr. Berkeley) would ask the House to compare the absence of intimidation in Sardinia with the intimidation exercised by the priests and aristocracy in this country. In America the ballot was perfectly successful in all States where due attention had been paid to the secrecy of the voting. In all those States where intimidation or corruption had crept in, it was found to be the result of a loose mode of balloting, but wherever the strict secrecy of the ballot had been maintained, it had been attended with the best effects. He had on former occasions brought the case of America before the House at such length that he would not now have said anything more on the subject but for a paragraph in The Times which was very likely to be quoted, as anything which was supposed to tell against the ballot was eagerly snatched at. That paragraph appeared under the pompous heading—"An Election Contrast." Now, a residence of many years in America, and a knowledge of the national character of the people of that country, led him to doubt whether this paragraph had been written by an American. The paragraph commenced by assuring its readers that the London Times was the proper authority with regard to the English representative system, and the writer then proceeded to draw a comparison between the mode of election in England and the mode of election in America, declaring his preference for the English system. He (Mr. Berkeley) certainly thought, with regard to America, that, considering the system of centralization which prevailed there, the secret committees, the absence of the candidates from the electors, the wheels within wheels which existed, and the general complexity of the system, the ballot worked infinitely better in other countries than in the United States. He might instance Sardinia, and the Canadian and Australian colonies of Great Britain. But when he found a writer in an American paper thus asserting the superiority of the English system over the American system of ballot, he would not believe the author was an American, for he would evidently prefer a legitimate and anointed King to an elected President, and there were not ten men from Maine to Alabama who would frank such an opinion. One fact was worth any amount of speculation on a subject of this nature, and he might therefore inform the House that no State in America which had originally commenced with the ballot had ever changed it for open voting, while those States in which open voting was originally established had gone over one by one to the system of ballot, with the exception of two slave States, and one of those States (Virginia) had at the last election rendered itself infamous, for the voters who went to record their votes openly for Colonel Fremont were attacked, hunted, and obliged to fly for their lives. It happend that an American gentleman of great respectability, an advocate of New York, Mr. Compton Williams, had lately visited this country, and had very kindly given his opinions touching the American system of election to a society with which he (Mr. Berkeley) was connected, the Ballot Society. At the request of that society Mr. Williams attended a public meeting at Haverfordwest, his ancestors having been Welshmen, where he expressed opinions some of which he (Mr. Berkeley) begged permission to quote. That gentleman said that in his own country he had never heard any expression of hostility to the ballot, or of a desire to resort to such a vivâ voce system of voting as existed in England. In his own State, New York, the only mode of voting was by ballot. All the electors were furnished with slips of paper stating the number of representatives to be elected, and these slips, which were called "the ballots," were either printed or written. It was unnecessary for a voter to make a candidate an enemy by telling him he would vote against him, for the ballot afforded protection to the elector. He (Mr. Williams) expressed his surprise to find that unsuccessful attempts had been made in England for twenty-five years to obtain the ballot. The object sought to be secured in America was, that the elector should vote for himself, and not somebody else for him, and that object was effectually secured by the ballot. He regretted to be obliged to admit, however, that intimidation and bribery were not totally unknown to America. There were in that country great political combinations; there were political captains of tens, and fifties, and hundreds, who boasted that they could compel their followers to vote as they pleased; but those were mere words, for they had no power to control the votes of the electors. The votes were secret, and although electors might give promises, it could not be known whether those promises were fulfilled or not. It was, therefore, perfectly useless to extort such promises. He had heard it said that men might watch the box, and see how their tenants and employés voted; but he defied them to do so successfully. It was, for example, exceedingly important to know how the State of Maine voted, for that gave the cue to the elections generally; and last "fall," the Democrats were determined to expend their whole strength on that State, with the view to insure the return of their party. They had also made arrangements to have the news of the election in the State of Maine sent by telegraph to New York, and, on the receipt of it, 50,000 men were ready to form a procession in that city in honour of the victory; but when the telegraphic message arrived in New York, it stated that the Republicans had gained the election in the State of Maine by nearly two to one against the Democrats, and that result (Mr. Williams said) was entirely due to the ballot! He (Mr. Berkeley) would now call the most serious attention of the House to Her Majesty's Australian dominions. There the ballot was adopted as the law of the colony of Victoria. It had been tested there, and, as a necessary consequence, the result had been, that all the evils which sprang up under the system of open voting—intimidation, violence, and corruption—had received their death blow. He would crave the permission of the House just to draw a comparison. Let him lay before them a sketch of some of the proceedings at our late general election in England under open voting, and then a brief sketch of the elections in Australia with the ballot. Having done that, he would then simply ask the House to "look on this picture, and on that." The general election in 1852 was a regular old Whig and Tory fight; but the election of 1857, though less of a party struggle, presented the same appalling features of the malversation of the franchise through open voting. And first, he would speak of intimidation, which he had always said was the great malady of our electoral system. Look to the counties. There political freedom was a perfect farce. To make this plain, he would refer the House to the mode of registration. They all knew that, in the counties, their registration agents simply divided the great mass of the electors into classes, according to the political views of the landlords. On the one side the agent put A. B. on the register under the class of "yellow," because he was a tenant of Lord So-and-So, or Squire This-or-That; and, on the other he took C. D. off the register because he was a tenant of Lord T'other-thing. The feelings of the elector were never for a moment regarded. He was simply treated in the matter as the tenant of So-and-So; and it was well known that, in counties, it was thought a want of etiquette for one landlord to canvass the tenantry of another. That, in fact, had led to duels on more than one occasion in the old times: but now, when people were a little more peaceably disposed, it ended in a "cut;" and yet out came the county gentlemen at an election with a flowing placard addressed to "the free and independent electors." "Free" to do what? Not to vote as they pleased; but "free" to go to the poll, and "free" to be turned out of their farms if they did not vote at the bidding of their landlord. When Sir Henry Ward brought forward this question, he cited the case of an estate which had changed hands three times in a very few years. It first belonged to a Tory, then to a Whig, and then to a Tory again; and, at every election during that time, the tenantry upon it invariably voted in accordance with the politics of the landlord for the time being. Again, in Lanarkshire, during the life of the late Duke of Hamilton, who was a Whig, his tenantry there always voted for a Whig; but when the present Duke, who was a Tory, succeeded to the title, they turned round, and voted for the Tory candidate at every election. In Sussex, too, it was well known that the Cowderay property always returned the Member for Midhurst. He (Mr. Berkeley) had before him a specimen or two of the extent to which intimidation flourished in the counties. In The Times of the 20th of April last, there appeared a memorial addressed by the Londonderry tenantry of the Marquess of Waterford to his Lordship, in reference to the then forthcoming election for the county, together with the reply of the noble Marquess, which he would read to the House. Let the House remember that the memorialists belonged to a class of gallant men who, as the late war abundantly proved, were ready to die on the hill side, and shed the last drop of their blood for their country. The petitioners say:—

"That they are inclined to believe your Lordship is warmly attached to the tenantry on your Lordship's estate, and that you respect their feelings and conscientious convictions; that, acting under that belief, they respectfully approach your Lordship to request you will be graciously pleased to permit them, at the approaching general election, to record their voles according to the dictates of their consciences; and that you will give directions to your agent and representative here to protect them in the religions and faithful exercise of their electoral rights. Several landlords in this county have already done so. This favour being so reasonable a request on their part, your tenants do not anticipate a refusal, and have nominated Messrs., &c., a deputation to wait on your Lordship, and they, as in duty bound, will ever pray."

What was the answer to that communication?

"Ashbrook, April 3.

"Sir—I am directed by the Marquess of Water-ford to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, together with a Memorial from some of his tenants in this county, and to say that he would wish them to vote for Mr. Clark and Sir H. Bruce at the coming election. Yours faithfully,

"J. B. BERESFORD.

"Rev. N. M. Brown."

He (Mr. Berkeley) supposed that if the noble Marquess had not been pleased to be sweetly tempered they would have had a still rougher reception. He would now, by way of antithesis, present an extract from the speech of a great landlord in this country, and an hon. Member of that House, which formed a pleasing contrast to the document he had just read. Mr. Robartes, in the course of an address to his constituents of Cornwall at the last election, called on them to reflect on the position of a poor but honest voter who was compelled to vote against his political convictions; and he (Mr. Robartes) declared that, putting himself in the position of such a man, if he were asked if he desired to have the franchise, he would rather be without it if he was to hold it on the understanding that he was to vote in opposition to his conscience. He further said he should like to see the ballot to-morrow, because he should then feel more at liberty to speak to his tenants on political subjects, and to try to win them over to his own convictions. He was afraid to do so now, because if he spoke strongly there was always an idea that some unfair means would be used to compel them to vote in a particular way. He should therefore continue as before, to support the Motion of the hon. Member for Bristol. A more noble specimen of the conduct of an English gentleman was not to be found. That man need never fear the ballot. His sentiments were founded upon the sentiments of one of the finest characters ever drawn by Steele and Addison—Sir Roger de Coverley. The old knight said, "I love to enjoy my own opinion, and consequently I never constrain the opinions of those who depend upon me." In The Tablet of May 15, under the head of "Freedom of Election in Ulster," he found a statement that twenty tenants of the Marquess of Hertford had received notices to quit on account of their votes at the Lisburn election. He found in a Woolwich paper a paragraph having reference to the election preceding the last for west Kent, in which it was stated that a holy man of the Church of England who resided in Essex, but had property in Kent, having intelligence that a tenant was about to vote for Mr. Martin dispatched to him this letter—

"I hope in a few days to fix the time for coming down to receive the rent. The object of the present letter is the West Kent election. I hope you are, like myself, a good Conservative, and will vote for Sir Walter Riddell at the approaching election. Landlord and tenant should always vote upon the same side, and if we proceed to a new lease that will be one of my stipulations."

The rev. gentleman had strange ideas of the rights of conscience. The paper stated that the "screw" would not work, and that the tenant retained his independence. Another instance of intimidation had been the subject of legal proceedings under the Corrupt Practices Act in the case of "Queen v. Barnwell," and that was a failure. The House would do him the justice to recollect that he had lifted his voice against the Corrupt Practices Act, and that he had branded it as a disgraceful specimen of insincerity. It was enacted for the benefit of candidates, and not for the interests of electors. The legal expenses were carefully cut down and the illegal expenses were left untouched. The cases which could be specified were cases which could be specified were cases of unsuccessful intimidation, and they were few in comparison with those which, being successful, passed unknown. In South Wiltshire a noble lord contested the country against the present hon. Member, and he was celebrated by a county poet in heroic verse—

"Without a fault, and with lots of tin,

The best of the three is Lord Henry Thynne."

He did not Know how such a man could fail to win an election, but tin like virtue, did not always meet with its reward, and Lord Henry Thynne did fail, and in his parting address attributed his failure to intimidation, or what was commonly called "the screw." At South Northampton-shire, Lord Althorp was charged by Mr. Carter with intimidation, and he retorted by making the same charge against the other side. In Cumberland, threats were made of publishing the pollbook, and in Bedfordshire it was actually done, in the form of a newspaper supplement. In West Sussex there was no opposition to the return of Lord March and Captain Wyndham, and both hon. Members inveighed against the ballot. The gallant Captain said that the non-electors had as much right to know how the electors voted as the electors had to know how he voted. But the non-electors had not to control, to reward, and to punish the electors, as the electors had to control, to reward, and to punish their representative. If a Member of Parliament voted in secret it destroyed the very essence of the representative principle. He left the gallant Captain to reconcile his view with that of Mr. Burke, who said, "The House of Commons never could control the functions of Government, unless the Members themselves were controlled by their constituents." Lord March took up the old song, and said the ballot was unmanly and un-English. Within a very few weeks, however, both he and his noble Father, the Duke of Richmond, gave a notable example of the difference between practice and precept. It chanced that a chief constable had to be elected. In the western division of Sussex eight out of nine members voted against the ballot. It was understood that the votes in that division for the constable were not to be taken openly. Everybody supposed that the Duke of Richmond would have appeared with the ballot-box of the Conservative Club under his arm; but his Grace, to avoid countenancing expedient. He appeared with an old hat and a pack of cards. He deposited the old hat in a corner, and dealt names of the candidate on the cards, and deposited the cards in his Grace's hat What was the difference between voting by ballot and voting in an old hat? Why should the one be called unmanly, un-English, and cowardly, and the other brave, manly, and British? He could see no difference between the two things. He called both voting by ballot; at all events the mode adopted by the Duke of Richmond carried out the principle, if not the letter, of the system of voting, which he wanted the House to sanction by its approval. So much, then, for the elections in counties. With regard to the boroughs, the Committees now sitting upstairs would show the scenes that were enacted at the last elections. Those precious disclosures the House would have an opportunity of considering, and he trusted it would lay them to heart. He had stated that in 1832 Mr. Disraeli spoke of an intolerable terrorism as then prevailing. That system produced a terror of two kinds—in the first place, a terror of ruin; and in the next, a physical terror of loss of life or mutilation. Of the latter, he had admirable example before him in the right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Board of Trade, and he could not help saying that it was a very hard case when candidates were compelled to look for the protection of their brains to the thickness of their skulls. The broad handkerchief of The Times was now waving in the air, still wet with tears for the right hon. Gentleman. That journal not only mourned for him, but actually embalmed his broken head in three or four leading articles. How came it, he asked, that The Times did not look to the other cases of violence that occurred during the last elections? The treatment received by the right hon. Gentleman was bad enough, and much to be deprecated; but why did not The Times direct its attention to those cases of violence that took place in Ireland? Not a word was said about them; but the right hon. Gentleman, somehow or other, enjoyed the favour of The Times, and all its sympathy was reserved for him. He thought that his noble Friend the Member for the City of London was a good deal to blame for the acts of violence and intimidation that disgraced the recent elections. In more than one part of the country the noble Lord had been cited as a great authority under whom those who committed the violence had acted. The noble Lord had told the people over and over again that the elective franchise was a trust. [Lord John RUSSELL: Hear!] He very much doubted the soundness of that proposition, because if an elector discharged his duty by voting for whom he pleased without let or hindrance, he defied the noble Lord to show him in what the breach of trust consisted. Supposing, however, that the franchise was a trust, that argument told as much in favour of the Ballot as against it. But what he wished to say was, that the noble Lord was responsible for much of the violence perpetrated at elections. Two or three Sessions ago he brought forward the case of the Cork election, at which the supporters of a gallant Friend of his, General Chatterton, were brutally used, although, he admitted that the two representatives of Cork were hon. Gentlemen of the highest respectability, who would be the first to set their faces against such violence. Nevertheless some disgraceful things were done, and, according to the evidence, they were instigated by the priests, who said to the people, "Lord John Russell tells you that the elective franchise is a trust; now, boys, all who vote for Chatterton are guilty of a breach of trust." If such arguments were addressed to ignorance or malignity there could be no mistake as to the result, for a mob was not able to discriminate between what the noble Lord really meant and what they believed him to say. He held in his hand a polling-book, got up by a society of non-electors, in Rochdale, with a view to exclusive dealing, and a more complete instrument of tyranny he never saw. The electors were designated under their various trades or crafts, the supporters of Sir Alexander Ramsay being distinguished from those of Mr. Miall, and, although there could be no doubt that the book had been got up against the former, he was sure that Mr. Miall would scout the very idea of such a publication, for a man more fond of liberty and of freedom of voting in elections did not live. Here, again, the noble Lord the Member for the City was cited as an authority for these shameful and tyrannical proceedings. "The theory of the present representative system," said the compilers of the Rochdale polling-book, "according to a great constitutional authority—Lord John Russell—is that £10 householders hold their votes in trust for the class who do not possess that property qualification, as well as in their own right, and this vindicates the practice of publishing a list of the voter's names." If the doctrine that the election franchise was a trust, bore such fruit as this, the sooner they got rid of it the better. He would not trouble the House with any more details regarding the violence and intimidation perpetrated at the last elections. The scenes that occurred at Drogheda, at Lisburne, in Galway, and in other parts of Ireland were perfectly shocking, and it was very interesting to read the truthful accounts given by the reporters of the malversation of the franchise, and compare them with the mendacious statements of interested parties. But, instead of dwelling upon the Irish elections, he would proceed to reverse the picture and direct the attention of the House to the elections which recently took place in the colony of Victoria. The establishment of the ballot in Australia was mainly due to the exertions and ability of Mr. Nicholson, the member for North Burke in that colony, and, though opposed by the same arguments as in this country, the system had operated in the most satisfactory manner. He would not quote paragraphs from the Australian newspapers which he had before him, but would merely refer to a compendium of them contained in a speech delivered by Mr. Nicholson, in which that gentleman, referring to the recent elections in that colony, showed that in no case had there been any violence or disturbance, and stated that the ballot had imposed a decided and welcome check on the noisy and turbulent demonstrations which had hitherto been inseparable from a contested election. In addition to the tranquillity with which they had been conducted, these elections had been characterized by great completeness of polls—a fact which was an answer to the objection that in this country it was not from terror, but from apathy, that persons abstained from voting. Hitherto the Australian elections had exhibited the same paucity of voters compared with the number of electors that was to be found in England; but at the last election the number of voters polled in some of the districts was within one or two of the whole number upon the register. The expenses, too, had been greatly diminished; and such had been the effect produced, that many of those who were formerly opposed to the ballot were now to be found in the ranks of its supporters. Among others, the Attorney General, who before the election was particularly hostile to the ballot, had announced his determination in future to support that mode of election. Sincerely thanking hon. Gentlemen for the attention which they had given him while he brought before them these details, without which he could not establish his case, he submitted that he had now proved to the House by facts that wherever the ballot had been tried it had been productive of none but the happiest results, and that there was nothing to be set against it except suppositions, guesses, and calculations that it would not do in England what it had done elsewhere under precisely similar circumstances. A Liberal Government never appeared to him to such disadvantage as when it opposed a Liberal measure, and was forced to seek protection under the gabardine of Toryism. That was a position in which he was sorry to see his hon. Friends, and it was matter of great regret to him that in this matter he stood against his Friends and was defeated by them. It was now, however, practically understood that the ballot was opposed by the aristocracy and landocracy, because they would not give up the power over the constituencies which was given to them by open voting. But why should not they give up that power? They lived in a loyal country—the only country in which the aristocracy was beloved by the people, and a country which was essentially anti-democratical. Then, why did they not seek to gain from the love of the people that which they now compelled by an usurped authority? Depend upon it they would stand much better with the people if they did so. It was unmanly, and showed moral cowardice to adhere to the existing state of things, not to trust to the people in whom they might confide, and rather to compel obedience from their fear than to obtain it from their love. He had ever seen that it was impossible that any Reform Bill should be final unless protected votes were one of its provisions, and he now entreated the Government, at the last moment, to adopt the conviction arrived at by their friend Sydney Smith, whom they had so often quoted, and who wrote the most brilliant pamphlet, but unsound, as it was brilliant, in favour of open voting and against the ballot. What said Sydney Smith? In a recently published letter, written in reply to a correspondent who had complimented him upon his able writing, he said with regard to the ballot, "But it will come, though I write never so wisely." He (Mr. Berkeley) told them that it must and would come, and that therefore it was infinitely better that they should give to the people that which they would at the present moment receive as a precious boon rather than wait and be compelled to surrender to them that which they would demand as a right. In conclusion he begged to move for leave to introduce a Bill to cause the Votes of the Parliamentary electors of Great Britain and Ireland to be taken by way of ballot.

said, he rose to second the Motion, but in so doing he should content himself with adding very little to the able and instructive speech of his hon. Friend. He would, however, congratulate the friends of the ballot that from the appearance of the House there was a prospect of there being at least a debate upon this important question. On the last occasion on which it was brought forward, with the exception of a speech from an hon. Gentleman opposite, there was no debate, and no one on or near the Ministerial bench addressed the House. Now, considering that this question had the support of a large portion of the Liberal party, he thought that Her Majesty's Ministers might at least have condescended to justify their conduct in refusing to entertain it. It was very difficult, on all subjects, when very little was said against you, to argue the case—but he never remembered that his hon. Friend had done so well—indeed he had outdone his former arguments. The ballot had generally been opposed on two grounds—one that it was un-English, of which his hon. Friend had disposed, and the other that it would not stop bribery and corruption. It was impossible to say what would be the result of a system until it had been tried, but for his own part, he believed that nothing could be worse than the existing state of things. Certainly, he feared that so long as there were persons in this country bad enough to offer bribes there would be found others weak enough and poor enough to take them. There was, however, one thing worse than bribery, and that was "the screw," to which his hon. Friend had referred. A bribe might enable a poor man to pay his rent, or might confer some other benefit upon him, but from the exercise of improper influence by a landlord or a customer no good could result. He represented one of the largest constituencies in this country, and so far as he knew there was no question upon which the great body of the electors felt more deeply than that of protecting the voter by the ballot. There was no doubt that from some cause or another a very small proportion of the electors recorded their votes. In Westminster he had seen ladies driving from shop to shop canvassing the tradesmen, a large number of whom were consequently compelled to make themselves practically non-electors, in order to avoid the difficulties they would otherwise be placed in. To show how the system worked, and the feelings that existed with regard to it, he would mention a case which had recently occurred. He held in his hand the particulars of a conversation between a political friend of himself and his gallant colleague and a tradesman in that borough, who had a most flourishing trade. This man, whom he would designate as C., for that was the initial of his name, had strong political opinions, and had congratulated him and his hon. and gallant colleague on having gone to the right lobby on the question of the ballot. His friend remarked that that was a question which he supposed that tradesmen wished settled, and that he did not suppose that C. split his vote. The gentleman went on to say that his business was so good that he could not afford to vote at all. He was a house decorator, and his trade lay principally with wealthy people. He had never voted against his conscience, but if he were to vote in accordance with his conscience it might be the ruin of his wife and children. He had once voted, he said, for General Evans when he stood against Captain Rous, and for his pains he lost three of his best customers; consequently he had never given himself any trouble to be on the registrar, and was, in fact a non-elector. There were hundreds and thousands of electors, he added, in Westminster who were in the same position as himself. In the debate of 1838, Mr. Grote showed, in his own admirable manner, that open election was tantamount to the disfranchisement of hundreds and thousands of electors, seeing that a considerable number of electors declined to exercise their franchise, as they would damage themselves by exercising it conscientiously, and he went on to argue that thus to deny to electors the means of voting conscientiously and safely was, in fact, to disfranchise them altogether. It would be difficult to show that the protection of the ballot would not tend to enable men to give their votes conscientiously. He (Sir J. Shelley) had made an analysis of the divisions on the ballot in the last two years, and the results shown by that analysis threw a curious light on the position of the Liberal party on the question, for he found that in 1855 there were 166 Members present who voted for the ballot, two tellers, and thirty-six pairs, making in all 204, while 218 Members present voted against it, which, with two tellers and thirty-six pairs, made 256, leaving a majority of fifty-two against the Motion or fifteen more than in the previous Session, but eight less than in 1853. This majority consisted of thirteen Members of the Government, ten Whig Members, and 233 Tories, so that the main body of the Liberal party were opposed to the Government on that occasion. But if the Liberal Members were sincerely of opinion that no Reform Bill would be of any effect without the ballot, they had only to stick close together, and, though a change of Government might be the consequence—which none would deplore more than himself—yet the evil would only be temporary, and probably a fusion of parties might be brought about which would result in the formation of a Government—including, perhaps, the right hon. Member for Bucks and the hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire, whom he saw opposite, who had both at one time been ardent supporters of this proposition—with the ballot as a fundamental and Cabinet question. In the division of 1856, 111 Members present voted aye, which with two tellers and forty-three pairs, made 156 for the Motion: while there were 151 Members present, two tellers, and forty three pairs against the Motion, leaving a majority of forty against it. Now in that majority there had been twenty-seven Liberals and Peelites, of whom thirteen had been Members of the Government; so that only fourteen independent Liberals and Peelites had opposed the Motion. He should add that among the Members of the Government who had supported the Motion were to be found some of the most able and popular men who had of late years been engaged in the Administrations of this country, such, for instance, as Lord Duncan, Sir B. Hall, Admiral Berkeley, Sir Alexander Cockburn (the late Attorney General), Sir R. Bethell (the present Attorney General), Mr. Bouverie, Mr. Villiers, Mr. Horsman, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Massey, and Mr. Osborne. The fact was, that as regarded that question the Government, instead of being a support, were an incubus to the Liberal party. In conclusion, he had to state that he felt much pleasure in seconding the Motion.

After the direct appeal which has been made to the Members of the Government, couched in catechetical form, by the hon. Member for Bristol, I should be wanting in courtesy to the House and to the hon. Gentleman if I did not take an early opportunity of expressing the views which I have formed upon this question. I regret to find that those views will not, from what I hear, coincide with, the opinions generally entertained on either side of the House. I am unable to adopt the views so clearly stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bristol. I cannot form that sanguine estimate of the beneficial effects of the ballot which the hon. Gentleman has sketched out in his address; and, on the other hand, I do not share in the alarm with which the ballot is generally regarded on the other side of the House. I hope the House will afford me the opportunity of stating as briefly as I can the grounds upon which I have formed my opinion, after the best consideration which I have been able to give to a question difficult in itself, and on which there exists such great discordance of views. When a question is brought under the consideration of the House for the first time, it often happens that the hon. Member who brings it forward argues in favour of his own opinion in a general and discursive manner, somewhat in the form of an essay, with a view of introducing the subject to the House, and showing the arguments upon which his proposal rests. Such was the state of this question when it was first brought forward in this House by my Friend Mr. Grote. No one who reads the speeches which he delivered annually in this House during a series of years will deny that it is impossible to state the arguments in favour of the ballot with greater clearness, or in language more elegant and precise. In his hands this question passed through what I may call its didactic period. From his hands it passed into those of the hon. Member for Bristol, and the stage which it reached under his auspices may, I think, without offence to him, be termed the humorous stage. He has for some years annually brought this subject under the consideration of the House with great command of facts and great play of imagination and wit, and he has made a favourable impression on his hearers by the diverting manner in which he has placed it before them. I do not undervalue the remarkable powers of my hon. Friend in agreeably illustrating this subject, but having passed through these two stages, the question of the ballot has now arrived at what I will take the liberty of calling the practical stage. Not being able to rival my hon. Friend in his powers of imagination, I am desirous of examining the question practically, and consider whether or not the ballot is adapted to the wants and circumstances of this country. In order to arrive at a practical result upon this question, the natural course is to consult history, and to see how this ballot has operated in other countries. If we look to the Continent, we find a state of things totally different from anything which exists in this country. It is difficult to profit by the experience of the Continent, where no powerful State has hitherto been able to consolidate a Parliamentary Government, and where the only States that have Parliamentary Governments are those of a second rant. But as to the operation of the ballot on the Continent, I would take the liberty of referring to the statement made by a distinguished statesman and writer on politics—who was examined by a Committee of this House, I think, in the year 1837—I mean M. de Tocqueville, the author of a work on democracy in America, as well as of another on the French Revolution. He was examined by the Committee on Bribery at Elections. Being interrogated on the subject of the ballot, he stated to the Committee that the object of secret voting in France was to protect the voter against the power of the Government—that voters on the Continent dreaded that omnipotent being, as he denominated it—namely, the Government—and that secret voting was, therefore, regarded in France as a shield against the Executive Government. He admitted that it was not difficult to ascertain any person's vote; still, he said, that was the view taken on the subject of the ballot in France. That being the case, I think I need scarcely say that the experience of France and of other continental States is of little value with respect to the working of the ballot in this country, where there is no overwhelming influence of a centralized bureaucracy to overawe the elector, and consequently the privilege of vote by ballot, or secret voting, would, in that respect, be of little avail to him. Neither do I think that the examples of this institution in some of our colonies—those new societies in which this mode of voting has lately been introduced—can be of much assistance to a country whose social and political condition is so different as that of the mother country. The country to which we must look as furnishing really important lessons upon this subject, and which I apprehend is always in the minds of those who recommend the establishment of the ballot in this country, is the United States of America. I believe that I shall not misrepresent the feeling of those who originally recommended the ballot to this country, if I say that their object was to introduce into England the mode of voting generally practised in the United States. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. H. Berkeley) in his speech this evening distinctly referred to the example of the United States. He said that the working of the Ballot there had been perfectly successful, and nearly in all cases he held up the practice of the United States as a model for our imitation. [Mr. H. BERKELEY: The principle,—not the details of the practice.] I certainly understood the hon. Gentleman to say that he recommended the United States to us as an example for our imitation. My hon. Friend now says that he does not approve the details, but merely the principle of the institution; but I really do not very well know how to distinguish between the principle and the details of an institution. I will, however, endeavour, with such lights as I possess, to ascertain what are the principles and the mode of voting established in the United States, The Motion which we have under consideration is this—that leave shall be given to bring in a Bill to cause the votes of Parliamentary electors in Great Britain and Ireland to be taken by way of ballot. This Motion assumes that we know what is the meaning of the word "ballot" as applied to elections. Ballot is not a mode of voting known to the law or constitution of this country, and I do not know that I can ascertain the meaning of the term in any more authentic manner than by inquiring in what sense it is used in the United States. I presume that that use represents the principle, and not merely the details of its working. With the permission of the House I will read the following extract from a work by a gentleman who has travelled in the United States, Mr. Tremenheere, being a work on the constitution of that country, which he states to be founded upon the best native authorities—namely, the jurists; and let me remark that they are writers of very high authority. He says:—

"There is another subject which requires to be noticed under this head of the elections in the United States—namely, the mode of giving the votes, which, as has been seen, is in some States appointed to be vivâ voce, in others by ballot."

Now, we come to the explanation of the ballot:—

"It is necessary to repeat that this word never means in the United States 'secret ballot,' unless in the instances, which are rare, when the word 'secret' is expressly added to it."

In this country we invariably associate with the word 'ballot' the mode of giving a secret vote by dropping a "ball" into a covered box, in the manner too well known to need to be described, but in the United States I apprehend the ballot is never taken in the same manner as we vote in our private clubs, and does not at all turn on the principle of secret voting. He goes on thus:—

"In the United States the word 'ballot' has, in its general acceptation, nothing to do with the word 'ball,' but means 'a piece of paper, with the names of the candidate or candidates written or printed upon it.' In the Southern and Western States generally the voting is entirely open, and usually vivâ voce. At all elections in the other States the friends of the different candidates stand round the voting places, with the written or printed voting papers (called tickets) in their hands, and as each voter approaches he takes from the hands of one of the agents of the candidate or candidates for whom he intends to vote one of these lists, openly before all the world, and delivers it, folded or unfolded as the case may be, to the persons taking the poll. The tickets are now universally, I believe, printed; and being printed upon coloured paper—the colour or some distinguishing device indicating the party to which the candidates belong—the very fact of presenting a paper thus coloured or marked, though it might be folded up, in itself at once shows which side the voter takes at the election."

That I apprehend to be a correct description of the process of voting in America, and I will only say that it entirely accords with a description which I have myself heard from American gentlemen. I never heard any American gentleman with whom I conversed on the subject describe the ballot as being secret voting. They have always described it to me to be what it is described by Mr. Tremenheere to be—namely, a system of voting by ticket, which may be, as it generally is, put into a box, or whatever other receptacle may be prepared for it. The distinction, therefore, between the ballot and the mode of voting practised in this country is this—that in the one case there is an authentic register of the voters kept, whereas in the other there is no such register. No doubt, where the mode of voting by ballot prevails in the United States it is not possible to obtain an authentic printed list of the voters such as is commonly known in this country as the poll-book. Such register does not exist; but if any person would stand by the polling-booth as each voter comes upon the scene he would be able to ascertain the side on which each person votes. Lest it may be thought that I quote doubtful or partial witnesses, I am fortunately able to adduce testimony which I think my hon. Friend himself cannot challenge. In the course of his speech he referred to the Society for Promoting the Adoption of the Ballot, of which he himself is chairman. That society has issued several tracts for the purpose of recommending the ballot. I have before me two of those tracts, and, as they appear to be under the patronage of my hon. Friend, assisted by a numerous and highly respectable committee of gentlemen calling themselves "the Friends of the Ballot," I can hardly be doing wrong in quoting them as evidence of the practice of the ballot in America. The first of those tracts (of which I hold before me a second edition) is called The Ballot in America. After giving a description of its working in several States, it says—

"A most extraordinary system of optional secrecy obtains. In one or two States the secrecy is compulsory, but the general practice is what is called optional secrecy."

The next passage is a description of the mode of voting in the important State of New York, which, as it is not long, perhaps the House will allow me to read—

"Where there is, on the one hand, no register of electors, and, on the other hand, a system of printed tickets, it is perfectly clear that, for some local reason, the inhabitants of the State are not really desirous to secure secrecy in voting either for themselves or others. This may be called ballot, but it is not secret voting."

It ends with this summary—

"The result generally may be said to be this—that while in the various States above-named different forms of ballot are made use of, one great purpose has been kept in view—that of securing to every elector the option of secrecy with regard to his vote. In short, as has been well expressed by an eminent Statesman of our own country, In none of these States is any record kept against any man of the manner in which he votes.' In a country where the suffrage is almost universal, and where great inequalities of condition among those who possess it do not generally prevail, it is not surprising that many should appear individually indifferent as to the observance of secrecy in its exercise. But protection is afforded by law to all who feel its want, and choose to avail themselves of it."

That is the description given in this tract, and the House will see that it accords with what I have read from the work of Mr. Tremenheere. It shows that when we speak of the ballot as a secret mode of voting, what we are to understand, so far as the American practice goes, is, that if a voter chooses to conceal his vote he has the power of doing so; but that if he does not think fit to conceal his vote he may give it openly; and that therefore secrecy is confined to those only who are desirous to obtain it. I wish the House to be fully in possession of that fact, inasmuch as I think it has an important bearing on the practical working of the system. The next tract to which I shall direct the attention of the House is one of the same series, published under the direction of my hon. Friend. It is No. 5 of that series, entitled The Test of Experience as to the Working of the Ballot in the United States, and I am the more desirous of quoting from it because it is to the practical experience of the system that I am anxious to call the attention of the House. The society for promoting the introduction of the ballot having become aware that some important transactions had taken place on this subject in the State of Massachusetts, Mr. Wickham, the hon. Secretary, wrote in April, 1855, to the hon. Amasa Walker, Secretary of State for Massachusetts, requesting from him information as to those transactions, and especially as to some recent changes of law on the subject of vote by ballot. Now, I wish particularly to direct the notice of the House to this correspondence, and to the facts disclosed in the letters and documents transmitted by Mr. Walker. He describes the state of the law in Massachusetts, where, it may be observed, vote by ballot was in existence, and where, therefore, there already was to be found that perfect security against electoral evils against which my hon. Friend says the ballot is sure to provide. Though the ballot existed there, however, it did not produce all the results that the friends of the system in this country seem to expect. It appears to have been there decided in a court of law that a printed as well as written vote was within the meaning and intent of the constitution. This decision (says Mr. Walker)—

"Made a great change in the character of the ballot. It destroyed a great part of its secrecy, for as soon as the legality of printed votes was admitted, each of the different parties would have something in the size or appearance of its ticket, by which it could be readily distinguished from those of other parties. One, for example, would have tickets printed on yellow paper, another on blue, another on pink, &c. Oftentimes, moreover, such tickets were ornamented with some pictorial representation, so that a man's vote could be recognized almost as far as the man himself. Hence, very soon after printed votes were introduced, complaints began to be heard from all parts of the State, especially from the large commercial and manufacturing towns, that the secrecy of the ballot was impaired, that intimidation and coercion were used at the polls, and the independence of the voter greatly lessened."

This was the state of matters in one of the Northern States of the Union dealing with the ballot, preserving during the whole time the name of the institution, and therefore, so far as I understand, the principle of the ballot. The writer goes on to say—

"The evil had now become so great, that many people felt anxious for a change in the mode of voting, and various improvements were suggested. But the great practical difficulty seemed to be, to get a method which should be perfectly secret, and at the same time afford perfect security against fraud."

Now, this difficulty occurred in 1840, at a time when vote by ballot was an established institution of the State, and embodied in the constitution. The great practical difficulty seemed to be to combine secrecy with perfect security against fraud. Mr. Walker adds, "the two objects appeared for a long time incompatible." Now, I wish the House to observe that at this time Mr. Walker thought that secret voting and security against fraud were incompatible, and that no means were known in the United States of reconciling these two things, showing that in the United States secrecy was not essentially a part of vote by ballot. Throughout the speech of my hon. Friend he assumed that secrecy is an essential part of vote by ballot. He contrasted vote by ballot with open voting, to show, as he said, that open voting was a ratification of a treaty between two dishonest men, while the ballot was a secret mode of voting by which that ratification was frustrated. So that the whole of my hon. Friend's argument falls to the ground if secrecy is not a part of the ballot. I feel quite sure that a large number of people in this country are in favour of secret voting, because they believe it has been the practice of the United States and has succeeded there, both of which things are shown by the very publications of my hon. Friend's society to be inconsistent with the fact. Mr. Walker, after saying that the difficulty was to find some means of reconciling secrecy with security against fraud, proceeds to say—

"While thus thinking upon the subject, it suddenly occurred to me (for I had never heard it suggested) that the true method was to enclose the ballot in an envelope, and then, having sealed the same, place it in the ballot-box."

Now, it is of importance to observe that he speaks of this idea as one never heard of before, as having flashed suddenly upon his mind for the first time as a means by which secret voting could be carried into effect without fraud. The result of this sudden inspiration was that Mr. Walker prepared a Bill which he presented to the Senate; but the Bill being rejected the former mode of voting continued. In the following year, however, 1851, the Liberals (he says)—

"Consisting of the Democrats and Free-soilers united, came into power, and the Bill for the Better Security of the Ballot was again introduced into the Legislature, and passed by a handsome majority."

For the first time, therefore, and under the influence of the Secretary of State for Massachusetts, secret voting was established in that State by law in 1851. [Mr. H. BERKELEY observed that it existed in the State of Michigan also.] Mr. Walker tells us that the mode of voting by enclosing the vote in a sealed envelope occurred to himself for the first time—that it was a new discovery—and, therefore, no similar system could have existed in any State. The law that was now passed remained till 1853. He says—

"In 1853 the Conservative party came again into power, and not daring directly to repeal the Ballot Law, so popular had it become, virtually destroyed its efficacy by enacting that 'any voter might use the envelope or not as he should choose."

Now, this alteration of the constitution took place under the system of secret voting by means of a sealed envelope, and therefore we must suppose that the views of the electors of Massachusetts were faithfully represented, and that the wishes of a majority were carried into effect in repealing that system of secret voting. The end seems to have been that secret voting was made optional with the people, and Mr. Walker goes on to say—"This emasculated the law, as every man who voted under envelope would be presumed taken to be hostile to the dominant party." He then says that very soon after the virtual repeal of the ballot law an election took place for delegates to the Convention, called for the purpose of amending the constitution of the State. This election resulted in the return of an overwhelming majority of the Liberal party, and in the Convention which met in 1853 the sealed ballot was proposed as a part of the constitution of the State. The amended constitution was submitted to the people for their adoption in the succeeding fall, and all the amendments rejected by a small majority. By the defeat of the amended constitution the people were thrown back upon the existing law; a new party, calling itself "American," took the field, and carried the State by a triumphant majority; and Mr. Walker concludes this narrative by saying—

"The Legislature elected by this party is now in session. The restoration of the sealed ballot law was proposed in the popular branch, and carried by a good majority; it was, however, lost in the Senate, the more Conservative branch, by a majority of one vote. So that the law now stands that the voter may deposit his vote in a sealed envelope, or not, as he may choose."

That brings the history of this law in the State of Massachusetts to a close, and it shows that the ballot there having been, in the first instance, practically an open one, in which every person exhibited his vote, if he thought fit to do so, a system of compulsory secrecy was introduced; that it remained in force for two years; that it was then repealed, and has not since been reintroduced. Therefore, as far as any inference is to be drawn from my hon. Friend's publication, it appears that there is now no State of the American Union in which the system of compulsory secrecy in voting exists. I infer this partly from Mr. Walker's narrative and partly from the Report of the Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives of Massachusetts, which is appended. They describe the evils of voting very much in the same sort of way as my hon. Friend described them in this country as existing in full vigour under a system of ballot, and then they go on to say—

"The use of letter envelopes, which has within a few years been introduced into this country, has, it is believed, suggested a very simple, cheap, and efficacious remedy for all the evils which have heretofore been complained of."

I am afraid I have wearied the House by reading so many passages, but I was desirous of placing before them in an authentic form evidence which I think cannot be disputed, of the true nature of the working of the ballot system in America. Now, we have nothing to show that at this moment there is a single State of the American Union in which the system of compulsory secrecy exists with regard to voting. In the majority of States, undoubtedly, the system of vote by ballot exists, probably engrafted in most of the State constitutions, but the practice appears to be this:—The voter places his ticket in a box; there is no poll-clerk, no person to record his vote, and therefore no list of votes is published after the election; the votes are ascertained by counting the number of tickets deposited at the polling places, but each person is fully at liberty; to exhibit his vote if he thinks fit to do so, and the general practice is, in fact, to, exhibit them. Well, in considering what would be the effect of acceding to the Motion of my hon. Friend, we must, before we can fully understand what we are about to do, ask what the system is which he recommends. Does he recommend the sealed envelope system, or does he recommend the system of optional secrecy? Now, all his arguments are founded on the assumption that the secrecy is to be compulsory, and I would therefore, in the first place, venture to call the attention of the House to this material fact,—that the whole experience of the United States is against the system of compulsory secrecy; that that system has only been tried recently as an experiment, so far as I know, in a single State; that it there remained in operation only two years, and that it has not since been re-established. It is clear, therefore, using the language of the title-page of this tract, that if we appeal to "the test of experience," the experience of the United States is against compulsory secrecy and in favour of optional secrecy. Now, just let us consider what would be the result of an attempt to introduce compulsory secrecy into this country. At present the whole of our electoral proceedings are founded on the assumption that the opinions of the candidate are avowed, that he has certain supporters among the voters, and that they come forward and vote for him on public grounds. Perhaps they form a committee; they appear as his friends, as the advocates of the political system which he espouses; he puts forward addresses declaring his opinions; he canvasses electors on the ground that he holds certain opinions; he hopes that they will support him as entertaining similar opinions; the whole conduct and course of an English election is, in fact, a publicity of opinion on the part of the candidate as well as of the electors. Sir, no person in this House has a greater objection to intimidation at elections than myself. I fully sympathise in everything which my hon. Friend has said against this practice. I object, quite as strongly as he can do, to the illegitimate influence of landlords or others with a view to the coercion of their tenantry or their dependents at the poll. There is nothing he can say on that subject to which I am not prepared to give my assent. But, having made that statement, am I prepared to adopt his remedy, or to think that that which he proposes as a remedy would in fact prove to be such? On the contrary, my firm conviction is, that to attempt to introduce a system of compulsory secrecy in voting in this country would be an attempt to row against an irresistible current—that it would be an endeavour to force on the people of this country institutions thoroughly repugnant to their habits and their nature. If my hon. Friend were to bring in a Bill, not in the ambiguous phrases which he has chosen, but distinctly enacting the sealed envelope system, by whatever name he chose to call it, making it compulsory for an elector to conceal his vote at an election, I believe he would find that the general feeling of the country was against it. If you are to subject a man to a penalty—because to this extent you must go—for showing his vote at an election, how can you allow the system of canvassing? Will it be possible, then, to allow a candidate to visit an elector and to ask him for his vote? If no person is to be permitted to declare his vote, and if an election is to be as secret and silent as a funeral, it seems to me that it would be a gross inconsistency to promote any intercourse whatever between a candidate and the electors to permit a candidate to address the electors, or, indeed, to allow of electoral meetings at all. You must be prepared to go the whole length of prohibiting all preliminary expressions of opinion on the part of the voters, unless you allow them to express their opinions, if they think fit to do so, when they give their votes. My own belief is that my hon. Friend has been indulging in general phrases, extracts from newspapers, stories about coercion, for a series of years, without very minutely considering the details of the measure which he wishes us to adopt; and I am rather inclined to think that he never actually faced the enforcement of compulsory secrecy, but that what he has in his mind is a system of optional secrecy—that is to say; a law which should permit any person who wishes to vote secretly to give his vote in that way. If I do not misinterpret the-views commonly entertained upon the subject, my belief is that that is the kind of ballot which most persons have in their minds when they hold it forth as a panacea for all electoral evils. Suppose, then, the measure for the adoption of the ballot were embodied in such a form as I have described—namely, that of optional secrecy—allowing a person either to conceal or to exhibit his vote as he thought fit. Now, I must be permitted to express an opinion, though it may not perhaps meet with universal assent, that the great majority of the voters at one of our elections are prepared to avow their votes—that, in fact, they are desirous of doing so. My hon. Friend, in a manner derogatory, in my opinion, to the mass of the electors throughout the country, has pictured them as driven to the poll like flocks of sheep. The experience, however, of most hon. Gentlemen who have canvassed a constituency, I think, will tell them that, though the bulk of the electors may be of no very exalted station, they in general entertain decided political opinions in favour of one party or another, and that a very large number of persons on both sides are desirous of proclaiming their support of one candidate or the other. If the vote by ballot were introduced in the optional form, and if every person were permitted to display his vote, I think that the result would be that the great majority of the electors would exhibit their votes. What, then, would be the consequence of such an institution with respect to protecting voters against whom intimidation is sought to be practised? The only effect would be, that those who desired to coerce a voter would give him notice that he would be watched at the poll, and that, if he did not display his vote, it would be assumed that he had voted contrary to their wishes. The only result of such a law as could be practically worked in this country would be that, where persons were resolved upon intimidation, the mode of intimidating would be changed, while no effectual protection would be given to the dependent voter. Now, I will put a case in illustration of this. Suppose—that which I hope may never occur again in this country—a division between the different classes of society on the subject of the laws of food, and that the agricultural interest were arrayed against the rest of the community; suppose a rural parish in which resided, say a blacksmith and a wheelwright, who were small freeholders, working for the neighbouring farmers, and earning their livelihood by such employment; suppose that these neighbouring farmers meet, and that they inform the two freeholders, who are suspected of wishing to vote in opposition to them, that, unless they exhibit their votes at the polling booth, it will be assumed that they have not voted in the manner prescribed, and that their custom will be taken from them in consequence—in what respect, I ask, in such a case, would the law of optional secrecy afford any protection to those men? Clearly it would give no protection; and, in order to afford effectual protection by means of secrecy to voters, you must, by law, make secrecy compulsory. In other words, you must do that which has not been done in the United States; you must introduce a system of which you have no experience; you must change the whole character and conduct of our elections; you must alter the very habits of the people, and you must attempt to do by legislation that which I feel confident legislation in this country will be powerless to accomplish. It is for these reasons, then, Sir, that I oppose this Motion—not because I think that voting by ballot is un-English or unmanly—not because I share any of those popular objections to the vote by ballot which my hon. Friend treated with so much contempt—but because I believe that, in one form it is utterly inapplicable to, and irreconcilable with, the habits of this country, and that it is not recommended by the experience of those countries which are held up as the models which we should imitate, but which, having tried it for a short time, have rejected it. I oppose this Motion because, in the form of compulsory secrecy, I believe that it is not possible to introduce the ballot into this country; I oppose it, also, because I believe that, in the only form in which it could be introduced, that of optional secrecy, it would be perfectly ineffectual for the object in view, and because it would not afford that protection to the voter which my hon. Friend thinks it would afford, but would leave us in the state in which we now are, in which we must look to the cultivation of public opinion, to the diffusion of sounder views on the relations of electors and those who are able to control their votes, and to the gradual diminution of that most objectionable system of electoral intimidation and coercion. It is, I say, to those moral influences, and not to the influence of the law, that we must look, and look with confidence, for the amendment of our present practice. In support of the view, that public opinion tends gradually to correct all the worst descriptions of intimidation, I would appeal to the last election. With regard to bribery, I do not believe that the ballot would provide any effectual remedy, although, with regard to coercion and intimidation, no doubt, if we suppose compulsory secrecy, and everybody faithfully keeping his secret, protection might be afforded; but we are not entitled to anticipate that there will be any such alteration of the law so long as the opinions of this country remain unchanged. The other system, which is practically the one pursued in the United States, would leave us where we are at present, tending gradually, and more and more in each successive election, to the exercise of an independent judgment by the electors, such as I believe they exercised at the last general election. Judging from such means of observation as I possess, it is my firm belief that, even if the votes at the last election had been given under the shield of any form of ballot which my hon. Friend could devise, the result would have been substantially identical with that which the open voting of the country has produced.

said, that, following the example of the right hon. Gentleman who had last addressed the House, who had eschewed the didactic style, and had certainly not lingered long on the humorous, he should endeavour to attempt the region of the practical, and in the first place he would express his content that the right hon. Gentleman had rested his arguments on the results of experience, as the advocates of the Ballot were perfectly prepared to rest their case on that ground. The right hon. Gentleman had principally dwelt upon the case of the United States, and had stated that in certain parts of America compulsory secret voting was the rule, and that in other parts the voting might be secret or not, at the option of the voters. Now, he asked, was the right hon. Gentleman prepared to concede even the latter modified system? would he give optional secret voting to such constituencies as wished it, and would he give compulsory secret voting so soon as it could be shown that compulsory secret voting was practicable? If the right hon. Gentleman wished to see the details of the Bill of the hon. Member for Bristol (Mr. H. Berkeley), why would he not vote for the first reading, and then argue the measure itself at a later stage? The experience of the United States was, he thought, particularly valuable to this country, inasmuch as the people were of the same habits and language as ourselves, and, therefore, better adapted for our guidance than that of continental nations. The United States, however, differed from this country in this material respect, that there secret voting was not so necessary as it was in this country, in order to arrive at the real feelings of the electors. What had been the experience of this country with regard to open voting? The principle of the constitution of this country was that every elector had a right to exercise his franchise freely and without control, but ever since the time of William III., down to the Reform Bill of 1832, he found that attempts had been continually made, but without success, to protect the voter in the exercise of his franchise. Even lately there had been an Act of Parliament passed expressly to suppress corrupt practices at elections, and yet at the recent general election it was notorious that those corrupt practices had been as rife as ever. It was because all former attempts to suppress those evils had failed that an application was now made to the new Parliament to pass a law which would have the effect of protecting electors in the exercise of their constitutional right. [Cries of "Divide!"] He called upon hon. Members who were so anxious to declare their opinions by their votes to stand up and support their votes by arguments. Many of them had extinguished popular opinion amongst the constituencies they represented; but he hoped they would not be allowed to put it down in that House. If the ballot was such a bad thing, why did hon. Gentlemen avail themselves of it in their clubs, and yet deny it to the unfortunate elector? To oppose the ballot upon the simple ground that it was secret and cowardly was sheer hypocrisy. He knew well that undue influence had been exercised in Ireland to a great extent, and in that part of the island with which he was particularly acquainted he could state that tenants, in coming forward to vote according to their convictions, but against the wishes of their landlords, exposed themselves to the very severest penalties, because they were mostly tenants at will, holding their farms at the pleasure of their landlords. He was, however, happy to assure the hon. Member for Bristol, who had referred to the correspondence between the Marquess of Waterford and his tenants, that although the letter of the tenants was not couched in quite such sturdy terms as the hon. Member appeared to desire, yet many of them had faced the trial, and had voted according to their consciences.

Sir, although I might well claim as an excuse for not addressing the House upon this subject, that I have often done so on former occasions, yet, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, considering this to be a new Parliament, has thought it necessary to make new, and, I must say, greater exertions to prove his case than ever he has done before, I will venture to trouble the House with some of the views which I entertain in opposition to his measure. It is not to be denied that the hon. Member and the Ballot Society have made considerable impression upon a large portion of the public, and therefore I have felt it my duty, carefully to consider and reconsider the various arguments which are urged for and against the ballot. It appears to me that my hon. Friend, and those who act with him, rest their case upon three assumptions of fact and of opinion, all of which I believe to be erroneous. The first assuption is, that at the present moment there prevails so much of intimidation, that it is impossible that the opinions of those, to whom the elective franchise has been intrusted, can be fairly ascertained. The next assumption is, that the voter has a right, an indefeasible right, to give his vote without reference to the opinions of any other person but himself, and without being brought before any tribunal of opinion to answer for the vote. The last assumption is, that there prevails a very general opinion throughout the country in favour of secret voting. Now, Sir, I will treat of these several assumptions in their order. The first is, as I have already said, that intimidation prevails to such an extent as to prevent the opinions of the electors from being fairly ascertained. If my hon. Friend relies upon particular instances, I will allow that no general election takes place without some particular instances of intimidation being brought forward in this House. But, when my hon. Friend passes from the proofs which on several occasions he had brought; forward of different instances of intimidation, such as that of the agent or steward of the Marquess of Waterford, which he has adduced this evening, and proceeds to say that the electors do not fairly represent the opinions of the constituent body, then I conceive him to be grievously in error. My hon. Friend referred, in support of his views, to the elections for counties. If we look at the elections for the counties, let us look at them for the last quarter of a century. I remember when I the Reform Bill was first proposed there were about eighty Members representing the counties of England and Wales, and no less than seventy-six were elected to vote in favour of the Reform Bill. I remember, too, afterwards, that when there came the question of the repeal of the Corn Laws, when protection was the banner on the one side and free trade on the other, the Liberal Members for counties, who formed so vast a majority at the time of the Reform Bill, lost their advantage and became a minority. I believe that upon both those occasions the opinions of those who elected those Members were truly represented. I believe the great majority in favour of the Reform Bill faithfully represented the opinions of the county electors in favour of the measure, and I believe no less than the majority of county Members, who resisted free trade, truly represented the opinions of the farmers and others who returned them, and that the feeling in favour of free trade did not prevail then. I must say, in contradiction to the hon. Gentleman who says, that if general opinion had been allowed to prevail at the elections, the Corn Laws would have been repealed at a much earlier period, that I remember a very particular and detailed statement of Mr. Cobden, in which he said, that when he and Mr. Bright—and there could not be two more powerful and eloquent advocates of any cause than those two gentlemen, whose loss from the House I regret every day—when they first arrived at Leeds to hold a public meeting, there was some difficulty in filling the room with the supporters of the total repeal of the Corn Laws, and, as they passed through the streets they were totally unnoticed, proving evidently that they were not much in favour with the working classes. Mr. Cobden went on to state that, in the year when the Corn Laws were repealed—namely, a short period before the famous declaration of Sir Robert Peel, was the first occasion when the working classes were in favour of the abolition of those laws, and that when he and Mr. Bright went down to Leeds, at that time, they were received with acclamation. I believe that to be a true representation of the state of things. I remember that in 1841, when Parliament was dissolved, and when the working classes were told on the one hand that the repeal of the Corn Laws would bring them cheap bread; and, on the other, that the repeal would bring lower wages, which, would more than compensate for the cheapness of bread, their minds were a good deal divided between those representations, and I believe that they were rather of the opinion that the diminution of wages would make their position worse, on the whole. At all events, there was a great division of opinion on the subject, and my belief is, that the elections at that time fairly represented the state of opinion in the country. Adverting to the question of the influence of landlords, I must say that it is my opinion that the tenants, generally speaking, prefer to vote on the same side with their landlords rather than against them. In proof of this, I will give an instance which I heard from the late Earl Spencer, then Lord Althorp, who advocated the ballot, was against the corn laws, and was a liberal landlord, so liberal, indeed, that he would never have thought of disturbing a tenant in his occupancy on account of the manner of his voting. I asked him whether his tenants in general were, like him, for the repeal of the corn laws, or whether they were for protection. He said that he believed they were generally for protection. I then asked him whether, in case of an election, they generally went with him, or voted for protection, and he replied that they generally voted on the same side as he voted on. That is a strong instance of what I believe to be the disposition of the tenantry of England to vote with their landlords, whom they respected; for he was sure they did not think that if any one, or all of them, had voted in favour of protection, there was the least chance that a man like Earl Spencer would disturb any one in his tenancy. When I am told, therefore, of tenants voting with their landlords, I admit that there are certain cases of intimidation, disgraceful to those who practise it, and very hard on the intimidated; but I deny in general that it is the truth that tenants in voting in the same way as their landlords vote otherwise than according to their own wishes. To give another instance—when the question between protection and free trade was in agitation, the counties generally sent Members to that House to represent protection, who therefore sat on the Conservative side of the House, and yet we have seen at the late election, when there was no longer a question of protection, but when we were all free traders, there was exhibited no longer the same disposition, and we have seen where contested elections have taken place, the Liberal candidates come again into the places they formerly occupied, and enjoy the same favour with the electors as they did before this question of protection arose. There, again, I do not see that the intimidation of landlords prevented the election of Liberal Members for the counties. The change took place at the late election, and I believe and hope that it will take place to a greater extent at the next election. I shall not have any fear that the electors who vote in that way will be punished by Conservative landlords in consequence of their vote. I come now to the next proposition or assumption of my hon. Friend, which is the general assumption always made, but which I must always protest against—namely, that in contradistinction to every other class in this country the electors—the freeholders, leaseholders, and £10 householders—are to be accounted infallible, without sin as without error, and therefore there is to be left in their hands the complete and despotic power of voting according to their pleasure without any control whatsoever. The right of voting is a trust and a similar trust is held by all who exercise power—from the Sovereign on the throne downwards—for the benefit of the people. Those who sit in the other House of Parliament hold their seats and the power of legislation as a trust for the public benefit. It is the same thing with the Ministers of the Crown and the Judges of the land, and with the electors, who are invested with the power of sending Members to this House to dispose of the property and maintain the liberties of the people of this country. Is that a wrong principle? Is there any class that ought to be free from this inspection and this control of public opinion? Take the case of a person in one of the highest positions in this country—the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench. The late Lord Ellenborough, the Chief Justice, was a person of great talents and eminent learning, and exceedingly well qualified to hold that high position. We are told in a recent biography—a work calculated to delight and instruct all who read it—the Lives of the Chief Justices, by Lord Campbell—that Lord Ellenborough felt extremely hurt at the public comments made by the press and by the public in general on his conduct on the bench. Will the hon. Gentleman—will any one say that it was wrong that the public should make these comments? I believe that, highly qualified as Lord Ellenborough was, those who made the comments were right, and that his bias and inclination in favour of authority and power made him justly liable to censure; and shall I say, when a man, learned and able like him, was subjected to the censure of public opinion, when his words and acts as a Judge in a high court of justice were to be scrutinized and examined, that the freeholders and £10 householders are to be free from examination and scrutiny altogether in respect to the manner in which they exercise their power, and that they alone are to be deemed irresponsible? I will not say so, for I hold it to be contrary to the spirit and principles of the British Constitution to make such a concession. My hon. Friend might make out some case for this irresponsibility, as he seemed to imply, if he were to maintain that there should be universal suffrage, or manhood suffrage, as it is called, and that all persons of full age should have the vote. But that would be a new theory. It would be the theory, not of the British constitution, but of some other constitution. What the British constitution does is to give to certain persons with certain qualifications certain conditions of power, and then to leave the public in general to control, criticize, and check the exercise of that power. Such is the case with the power of the Judge on the bench. He is a person of a certain career and eminence at the bar, with qualifications which cause him to be placed in that high position; and then he is subject to be controlled by public opinion. The same is the case with the Ministers of the Crown. Suppose any question arises—such as the China question, the Italian question, or the present unhappy state of India. The Ministers may adopt any measure they please, for they are the executive and chosen councillors of the Crown; but they must afterwards be subject to public opinion and to the censure of this House, if in the opinion of the public and of that House they should be deemed to have acted hastily or in error. Then, with respect to the electors of this country, whose power is as important as that of the Judge on the Bench, or of the House of Lords, or of the Ministers, I am but bringing them under the control of public opinion when I say let us know how they vote, and how they exercise their power, and let them be subject to censure if they do wrong in the exercise of that power. Well, but it is said that it is impossible they can err. Now, I think I have known instances in which the voters have acted in a way which would excite the indignation and blame of any one. I think I have heard—and I believe I need go no further than the table of this House for an example—of a candidate standing for a place, and of persons in the town coming round him and expressing their willingness to form his committee and canvass the voters, and yet when the election came on all these members of his committee accepted bribes for their votes, and voted for his opponent. That is conduct which no one could approve; but then my hon. Friend says, "Do not let them be subject to any censure for it. Let them go and vote in secret." Therefore these members of the election committee might have gone to the candidate and told him that they had used every exertion in his favour, that they considered it most unfortunate that the election should have gone against him, and that they could not imagine how it happened, while every one of them had got £10 or £20 in his pocket as an inducement to vote contrary to their professions. That is the sort of change which my hon. Friend recommends. My hon. Friend states that he has a high moral authority for saying that a voter may very well give his promise to a candidate, and yet be at liberty, according to the rules of a very sound morality, to break that promise and vote another way. I suppose I must accept that as sound morality. It may be so, but I can only say that it is strange and new to me. My hon. Friend put the case of Brown, who was very much intimidated. I beg leave to bring Jones and Robinson into court, and ask them what they have to say of Brown's conduct. Brown, being a principal tenant, is asked by his landlord to canvass with him for a candidate who is going to stand for the county. The landlord says, "The election won't take place for some time, but we are going to have a dinner in favour of Conservative principles; you are, I am sure, a very good Conservative; if you will take the head of the table and give the toasts and lead the way it will be a very great advantage to us." Well, Brown says, "Oh, to be sure," because if he does not do so he will let out his secret. Now, this is not an illustration of mine. My hon. Friend will know whence I draw it. Brown presides at the dinner; he gives the wrong toast; he makes the wrong speech; he sings the wrong song; and after thus persuading his landlord and all the gentlemen at table that he is an excellent Conservative, on the day of election he goes with another ticket and votes scretly for the Liberal candidate. [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear!] My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield would think that a very fair proceeding. [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear!] I am not now disputing its morality, but I believe that is the sort of conduct to which people refer when they say that the ballot would be un-English. They mean that that sort of deceit, of treachery, and of promise-breaking is un-English, and they come to the conclusion that secret voting is an un-English proceeding. I do not wonder at it. I am very much inclined to be of their opinion. I next come to the assumption of my hon. Friend that this proposal of the ballot meets with very great favour in the country. Now, although there is a considerable party in favour of the ballot, although there are a great many of the electors, particularly those who feel sore after a general election that in their cases intimidation has been exercised, who urge its adoption, and who excite their neighbours on the subject, I do not believe that the general opinion of this country is in favour of secret voting. I have had occasion to address large bodies of persons, numbering, perhaps, 3,000 or 4,000, and to state my objections to the ballot, and I always found that the meeting was at least equally divided in opinion, if, indeed, the majority did not approve of my views. I entirely believe the statement which has been made with so much ability and clearness by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He has gone into the details of the American elections and has shown what I have constantly heard stated by Americans—that the ballot in America is by no means synonymous with secret voting. [Mr. ROEBUCK: Hear!] But that in many cases you may know by the form or colour of the ticket a man takes in what way he votes. A man may take a blue ticket or a yellow ticket, which represents the interests of particular candidates, and then there is an end of secrecy and of security against intimidation. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, quoting the opinion of one who has written on this subject, if you provide that secrecy shall be optional, you at once give a customer, or a landlord, or whoever wishes to intimidate, the means of defeating secrecy altogether. The customer, or the steward, or the landlord may say to an elector, "If you vote secretly, and your voting paper is not in an envelope of a particular shape or colour, we shall at once conclude in what way you have voted, and we shall regard you as much an enemy as if we had heard you give your vote vivâ voce to the opposite party at the poll." This, I imagine, is perfectly clear, and the only resource is one against which the English blood of the Americans has revolted, and which is adopted in only one State—namely, the establishment of compulsory secrecy, precluding every man from divulging the manner in which he has voted, or what his disposition may be. Does any one believe that such a regulation would be tolerated in England any more than it has been in America? Does any one believe that, in the case of an election, the frank and truth-telling feeling of the people of this country would not prompt nearly every man to say, "I am anxious for the success of Mr. So-and-so, or Sir Thomas So-and-so; I shall certainly give him my vote, and I hope my neighbours will do likewise"? That is found to be the case generally. Secrecy, therefore, would be confined to a few, and being confined to a few, it would not benefit that few. It may be said, "What mischief could result from introducing a system which would not completely change the habits of the country?" Well, I think it would be mischievous to introduce a new mode of voting which, so far as it goes, would tend, as I believe, to take away something from the frank and open character of Englishmen. There would also be some mischief in introducing what appears to be a considerable innovation that is not likely to succeed. I cannot believe that the adoption of this new mode of voting would produce a complete change in the character of Englishmen; but I do think the evils it would introduce would far counterbalance the good it would effect. I do no believe that the elections in this country are generally marked by intimidation and corruption, and I cannot agree with my hon. Friend when he says that an open vote is a corrupt agreement between one rogue and another. We have gone on a long time with this imperfect, and, as it appears, corrupt mode of voting, under which we have gained great liberty, and the system of secret voting has only been proposed, or even thought of, within late years. Liberty has made greater advances in this country than in any nation of Europe, and I venture to say that there is more freedom in this country than exists even in the United States of America. Without wearying the House with details, I will only ask them to look at the triumphs of liberal measures during the last twenty-five or thirty years, all gained under a system of open voting. Parliament has been reformed, the corn laws have been abolished, corporations have been opened, and an infinite number of liberal measures of a similar nature have been adopted, all this having been accomplished under a system of voting which my hon. Friend says consists entirely in a corrupt agreement between one rogue and another. On behalf of this much maligned House, and our much maligned constitution, I must demur to the statements of my hon. Friend. My hon. Friend said, "Only consider the case of Australia; why, in the colony of Victoria you have had a most wonderful instance of the success of secret voting, and even the Attorney General has been convinced of its value." I believe the constitution of Victoria was adopted by the House of Commons at my recommendation two years ago, and when it is held up as the great object of our imitation I am reminded of the exclamation of one of the characters in that amusing play The Rover, "Glorious news! the barons have been successful. The venerated and inestimable inheritance of Britain, Magna Charta, was signed last Friday week, the 3rd of July." The veneration of my hon. Friend for the new constitution of Victoria appears to me very much of the same kind. For my own part, I should prefer waiting a few years before we follow the example of the Assembly of Victoria. It may be a very good example; but I think we, the older, and therefore the more cautious assembly of the two, may afford to wait a few years in order to see whether this triumph of secret voting proves so satisfactory as it is presumed to be at the present moment. I cannot refrain from noticing one statement of the hon. Baronet the Member for Westminster (Sir J. Shelley). He said—and he made it out well enough by figures—that the great majority of the Liberal party voted in the last Parliament in favour of the ballot, and that there were only twenty—or perhaps not more than ten or fourteen—Liberals out of office who voted against the ballot. I do not know why hon. Gentlemen who have been elected by large constituencies should be excluded from the right of voting because they have accepted office. But the hon. Gentleman proceeded to say that as the great majority of the Liberals are in favour of the ballot they have only to go to the noble Lord at the head of the Government and to tell him they will not support his Administration any longer unless he and the Cabinet carry the measure of the ballot. I think this coming from a determined adherent of my noble Friend is the most degrading proposal I ever heard. I can understand Sir Robert Peel saying at one time that the state of Ireland was such that he had been induced to abandon the views he once held with respect to Roman Catholic Emancipation. I can also understand Sir Robert Peel saying, that the course of the discussion on the corn laws, and the state of those laws were such as to lead him to think that the best course for the welfare of the country, and one which would not be injurious at the same time to Conservative institutions, would be the repeal of those laws; but, to tell hon. Gentlemen who are not convinced—to tell members of the Cabinet, that because the great majority of their supporters vote for the ballot, they are not to entertain the views which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has expressed to-night, would be a most mischievous innovation, and I must say it is a most disgraceful proposal. This, too, is the language held towards a Minister of the Crown whom the hon. Member professes to respect, a Minister of the Crown who deserves that respect, and I am sure he will show to-night that he is still more worthy the respect of this House by scornfully rejecting such a proposal. It has been said that a vote given by a tenant, or a tradesman against his conscience is a lie, and that a Member who is sent to this House in consequence of that vote is the incarnation of a lie. I should say that the Members of a Cabinet voting in favour of a Bill for the ballot, against their opinions, and against their convictions, would also be to pronounce a lie; and that, for such a measure to be passed by this House as expressing their deliberate opinion in favour of the ballot, would be but the embodiment of that lie. In using this strong language, I am but following the example, and using the language of my hon. Friend. My hon. Friend certainly deserves success for the perseverance and ability he has evinced in this matter. For my own part, I will only further say, that if Parliament should decide that the ballot is to be the law of the land, I, like others, must bow to that decision; but, until that is made the law, so long as I am permitted to give a vote on this subject, that vote will be recorded against secret voting, and in favour of the ancient mode of open and deliberate voting.

in reply, said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had assumed a false position, and argued the question upon it. But the case he assumed was not his (Mr. Berkeley's) position at all. He confessed he was greatly astonished and not a little amused at hearing papers read against the ballot, which he himself had but two years ago urged upon the House in favour of the ballot. He had never contended for a sham ballot, or said that anything like open voting was what he desired. By "ballot" its supporters meant secrecy at the polling-booth, and nothing else, and the use of open voting papers, or boxes or urns open to public inspection were, in effect, the same as vivâ voce voting. And when he quoted America, it was in support of the position that though there had been irregular elections of open voting in some States, there the votes were open, and the evils were such that the Americana were altering it, and were adopting the system he desired to see established; namely, the system of close and secret ballot. The only case where the ballot was successful was, when the voting was perfectly secret. The right hon. Gentleman set up America as that which he (Mr. Berkeley) believed to be perfection; he could only say that was not his opinion. The American was not a model system; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer had addressed himself entirely to prove that open voting in America was not successful, and he (Mr. Berkeley) made him a present of that fact. He had ignored the case of Australia and the Colonies, and so had the noble Lord, rather ungratefully, as it seemed to him, being, as he was, the parent of the constitution of that colony. But in that constitution he left out the only way which experience showed was necessary to secure free voting. Since the ballot was adopted that constitution, which failed before, had proved perfectly successful. But the noble Lord said, that in England some isolated cases of intimidation might have crept in. Had he forgotten the Committee of Mr. Grote, and the 900 pages they had on the malversations of elections? Where did he find improvement now? He must say that he was disappointed that his noble Friend did not support the ballot. Even at the last London election his language was such as to lead him to suppose that the noble Lord had no strong opinion against it. The noble Lord, had, indeed, never pledged himself to the ballot; but he had often raised the cup to the lip of its supporters, and then cashed it away; indeed, a relative of the noble Lord, a distinguished officer of that House, had publicly made such a statement as was well calculated to raise the hopes of the London constituency that the noble Lord had seen and eschewed the error of his ways. After the indulgence the House had shown him, he would not occupy further time, but he must express his astonishment at the noble Lord the Member for London again attempting to rely on the exploded fallacy that there was immorality in breaking a constrained pledge to do an improper act. Had the noble Lord forgot Paley? did he not remember the words of Milton—"Ease will retract vows made in pain as violent and void." And ought they not to be retracted? Although he confessed that his noble Friend had disappointed him, yet he never expected anything but opposition from the noble Lord at the head of the Government, nor did he think that anything would change the opinion of that House but a strong manifestation of opinion from without.

in explanation, remarked, that what he had said was, that although in America vote by ballot prevailed generally, yet that in only one State was it ever accompanied by compulsory secret and that in that State this state of things only existed two years, and that the measure enforcing it had been since repealed; so that as far as the publications of the Ballot Society went, it did not appear that in any State of the United States the vote by ballot was now accompanied by compulsory secrecy.

, in rising to move for a copy of the case submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown respecting the Registration of Newspapers and other printed Papers, and their opinion thereon, said, that as he understood his Motion was not to be assented to by the Government, he would briefly state the grounds upon which it was based. By the 60th of George III.—one of those Acts which were passed at a time when legislation for the benefit of the subject was not so common as now—it was provided that no publication, whether a newspaper or a pamphlet, should issue unless the publisher gave a recognizance to the Crown to the extent of £400, with two sureties to the like amount, in case the printed paper should contain any seditious or blasphemous libel. Shortly afterwards, when the unreformed Parliament was endeavouring to contend against public opinion, and to put as many fetters as possible on the liberty of the press, that law was extended so as to require security not only against seditious and blasphemous libels but against every possible conviction for libel that might take place. He need hardly say that this Act was a gross obstruction to the establishment of any public journal, and the publication of any pamphlet or other literary production; but some time afterwards, when an Act was passed for regulating the stamp duty on newspapers, provision was further made that every person desiring to publish a newspaper should register himself, his printer, and his publisher, in the office of the Commissioners of Taxes. The main object of that Act was to protect the revenue by regulating the collection of the stamp duty; but it would be recollected that two Sessions ago the duty on newspapers was repealed, and, in his opinion, the securities which the law provided for the due payment of the duty ought to have ceased at the same time. When the Act was under discussion, however, great opposition was raised to its entire repeal, and the provisions affecting registration remained in force. The Government were disposed to modify those provisions, while many hon. Members at that time desired that the law should be wholly abrogated; but, in order to avoid any opposition to so desirable a measure as the repeal of the newspaper duty, they were content to accept a Bill confined to that one object, leaving untouched those restrictions, which had been introduced merely to facilitate the collection of the stamp duty. Whatever might have been the views of Parliament, it was quite clear that the moment the duty ceased to be paid, the public regarded the whole statute as obsolete; and, in point of fact, several newspapers had been published from time to time without any regard to the provisions of the law touching registration. No notice was taken of these publications by the officers of the revenue until a very recent period, when a circular was sent by the Board of Inland Revenue to many publishers, the concluding sentence of which was to the following effect:—

"The Board, on finding that several newspapers were published without registration or the required security since the passing of the Act, rendering optional the payment of stamp duty on newspapers, have thought it right to consult the law officers as to whether, the Act having ceased, it remained incumbent on the Board to enforce the provision regarding the registration of newspapers, and the opinion given by the law officers upon the question is, that that duty is still imposed upon the Board."

Now, what he complained of was, that the Board of Inland Revenue had submitted an unfair and partial case, touching only a small part of the question, to the law officers of the Crown, who, if the whole matter had been put before them, would doubtless have given a much more comprehensive opinion than that ascribed to them in the circular to which he had referred—an opinion which would have rendered it incumbent upon the Board to prosecute, not only the publishers of newspapers, but every person who should issue any literary production in contravention of the statute. It was an abuse of power to single out a certain class of persons and punish them for violating provisions of the law which were equally disregarded by other portions of the community. The statute in question, one of the six Acts which were now universally condemned, was a disgrace to this country, and its enactments were so stringent and extravagant that no Government would venture to enforce them. It provided that any person who should print or publish for sale any newspaper, pamphlet, or other paper containing news, intelligence, or occurrences, or any remarks thereon, or upon any matter in Church or State, without giving recognizances in £400, with two sureties, to meet any charge of libel, would subject himself to certain penalties named in the Act. He did not think it possible that the Government could really intend to enforce all the provisions of such a statute, and in that case nothing could be more unfair than to apply the law to the publishers of newspapers, and exempt all other persons from its operation, and he considered the conduct of the Government in connection with this circular such an abuse of power, that he now asked the Government to lay the whole case before the House, in order that they might be able to judge whether they had dwelt with the whole subject or with only a small portion of it, with the view of making certain individuals the objects of persecution. In conclusion he might observe that he had received several petitions complaining of the manner in which the Government acted in regard to this question, and which he would lay on the table at the proper time. The hon. and learned Member concluded by moving for a copy of the case submitted to the law officers of the Crown respecting the registration of newspapers and printed papers, and their opinion thereon.

said, he confessed he did not very clearly comprehend the object of the hon. Member's Motion. The hon. Gentleman moved for a copy of a case submitted to the law officers of the Crown on the subject of the registration of newspapers, and the opinion given thereon. It was well known to hon. Members that it was not the habit of the Government to produce the opinion of the law officers of the Crown; they were confidential opinions, given for the guidance of the Government, and the value of such opinions, the freedom of counsel between the Government and their law officers would be at an end, if they were liable to be called for by the House. With regard to the object of the Motion, therefore, he did not think he was justified in acceding to it, and he hoped the hon. Gentleman, having had an opportunity of making his statement, would not expect that it should be granted. He would, however, proceed to answer the substance of the hon. Gentleman's remarks. Two years ago, when the stamp duty on newspapers, the compulsory stamp, was abolished, care was taken that the Act which was passed should not interfere with the registration of newspapers. He himself proposed the measure to the House, and he distinctly stated that it was intended simply to relieve the newspapers from the stamp duty, and not to touch any of the other parts of the law, one of which parts was the registration of newspapers, which was intended not merely for the convenience of the Government and the public, but to provide individuals who might be libelled with facilities for obtaining proof of the publication of such libels. The opinion of the law officers of the Crown was that the present law, as regarded registration, was not affected by the Act which removed the stamp duty. He did not know whether the hon. Gentleman had any doubt on the law, but if he had, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could only say that the law officers of the Crown had no doubt on the subject. If any complaint was made against the exercise of the discretion of the Government with regard to the use of the registration, that was a matter which might fairly be brought before the House; and if the hon. Gentleman would state to him any case of that kind, he would have it investigated; but, so far as he was aware, there was no such case.

said, he would take another opportunity of bringing the subject before the House.

, in rising to move for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal the 27th section of the Superannuation Act of 1834, said he must claim the indulgence of the House for a short time even at that late hour (a quarter past eleven) while he laid before them a case worthy of attention, involving, as it did, the interests of a large number of some of the most devoted and most able servants of the Crown, and involving also a very serious grievance, which called for the immediate interference of the House. He approached the question with considerable diffidence, not from any doubt of the justice of his cause, but because he spoke in the presence of many who were better informed than himself upon the subject, and of others who were the authors of the Act of 1829, from which this system dated. The history of the superannuation of the Civil Service dated from 1810. Before that time no general system of superannuation existed, but various modes prevailed of providing retiring pensions for civil servants of the Crown. Life offices were created, the salaries of successors were frequently charged with pensions for the payment of their predecessors, and sinecures were created and pensions granted. In 1810 a general Act was passed, which dealt with the whole question of superannuation. In the Customs and Excise Department an old system of superannuation which had been the subject of various Treasury Minutes and Acts of Parliament still remained, but in 1812 a Bill was brought in by which the sum of £334,000, the amount of the old superannuation funds in the Customs and Excise, was swept into the Exchequer, and a general superannuation was granted to these civil servants on a liberal scale. That system continued up to the year 1820. A considerable period had then elapsed since the termination of the war, and the country was alarmed at the great expenditure upon various departments of the service. In that year Mr. Hume made his celebrated Motion in Parliament upon the subject, and an Amendment proposed by Mr. Bankes, to the effect that an Address be presented to the Crown, praying that an inquiry might be instituted into all the branches of the public service, political as well as military, with a view to economy and retrenchment, was carried. Upon that the Treasury, adopting the course which had always since that time prevailed upon similar occasions when Parliament had been attacked by paroxysms for retrenchment, set to work in earnest, and made their first foray upon the salaries of the clerks in the Public Offices, and a Treasury Minute passed in the year 1821 laid down the principle that all persons in the civil service should pay a certain percentage upon their salaries, in order to form a superannuation fund, and fixing a scale of allowance for retiring officers; and in 1822 an Act was passed to carry the provisions of that Minute into effect. But in the Report to His Majesty, made by Lord Sidmouth, then Secretary of State for the Home Department, his Lordship said it appeared to him to be much more rational to assign to civil servants such unencumbered salaries as might be thought just for them to receive, than to resort to the complex and illusory system of ostensibly giving them a certain salary and then deducting a portion of it for compensation. That was Lord Sidmouth's opinion of the very system which was prevailing at the present day. However, notwithstanding this and similar remonstrances from various quarters that Act was passed. It provided that all civil servants should contribute to a superannuation fund by a deduction at the rate of two-and-a-half per cent from all salaries between £100 and £200, five per cent from all salaries above £200, and ten per cent from all salaries above the regulated amount—that was to say, beyond the amount which might be fixed as the future permanent salary of any civil officer. It was at the same time provided that in case of the death of any civil servant, or of his resignation or removal from office, without his having received any retired allowance, the whole amount of his contribution should be repaid. The principle of that Act, however, appeared to be so unjust that in the year 1824 it was repealed, and an Act was passed which provided that the whole charge for superannuation should again be placed on the public revenue, and that the amount of the deductions received under the previous Act, which amounted to the sum of £90,000, should be returned to the contributors. He had, therefore, in favour of the proposition which he intended to lay before the House, the strong fact, that the system of charging public servants for the superannuation allowance to be made them, was during its trial between the years 1822 and 1824 so universally condemned, that the Government felt bound to bring in an Act to repeal it after its trial for that period. Well, the new system continued for some years, until again the attention of the Legislature was directed to the heavy charge for superannuation, and in 1828 Sir Henry Parnell's Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure, in their third Report, recommended the readoption of the system which existed between 1822 and 1824. They proposed, however, to make a distinction as to the scale of superannuation between the then existing civil servants and those who should be afterwards appointed, and they recommended that in the case of future appointments the scale should be so regulated that the whole charge should be provided out of the fund raised by deductions from their salaries without any cost to the public, while, at the same time having regard to vested interests, the scale prescribed by the Act of 1822 should be maintained in the case of existing civil servants, and if there should be any deficiency in the fund that that deficiency should be made good from the public revenue. A Bill had been introduced by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer to carry those recommendations into effect, but after meeting with a strong opposition, headed by Lord Glenelg, that Bill was withdrawn. He had thus brought the history of the matter up to the year 1829, and from that year the system which at present existed dated. Up to that year there existed a system of superannuation to which the clerks in the public offices were not called on to contribute. This was the subject of such discussion in Parliament, and though the Bill of 1828 was withdrawn the Government in the following year showed that they had not given up the idea, for in that year a Treasury Minute was passed for the purpose of reducing at a future period the heavy charge for superannuation, and by that Minute deductions were imposed upon the salaries of all civil servants who might be thereafter appointed, at the rate of 2½ per cent on salaries not exceeding £100, and of 5 per cent on salaries exceeding that amount. A subsequent Treasury Minute, passed in 1831, regulated the mode of awarding retiring allowances, and in 1834 an Act was passed which carried those arrangements into effect. By that Act the scale of retiring allowances was fixed to commence at one-fourth of the salary after ten years' service, with a septennial increase until it ended at a maximum of two-thirds of the salary after forty-five years' service. It was easy to guess what the object of the Government was in 1834 in passing that Act. It was simply to reduce the public expenditure under the guise of a Superannuation Fund. The avowed object was, provision for civil servants; but, looking to the circumstances of the time in which that Act was passed—to the fact that public charges for effective servants had reached the amount of £21,000,000, and for non-effective £5,000,000—there could be no doubt that the bonâ fide object of the measure was the reduction of expenditure, while the Government endeavoured to persuade the country that in forcing the civil servants to contribute to the Superannuation Fund they were granting a boon to those servants. It might be asked why that Minute of 1829 was not protested against? The fact was, there was no one to protest against it; because as the Minute of 1829 was not retrospective, there was no one concerned in opposing it at the time. That legislation was for children unborn. Having thus sketched the history of the superannuation system, he would now show the manifold inequalities and anomalies which existed in it. The Royal Commissioners, who had presented their report in the spring of the present year, divided the civil servants as regarded superannuation allowances into five classes. The first class included the higher political and judicial offices and the diplomatic service, and to the persons in this class pensions were granted without deductions. In the second class were civil servants who received their appointment before the 4th of August, 1829, to whom superannuation allowances on a very liberal scale were given without any deductions. To the third class belonged civil servants appointed subsequent to the 4th of August, 1829, and those connected with the departments which, since the passing of the Act, had been brought under the operation of the Treasury order, their salaries were charged with deductions. The fourth class included those who were neither subject to abatements nor entitled to superannuation allowances; and the fifth, those who were not brought within the Act but obtained superannuations from the Treasury. Out of 56,740 employed in the civil service, at salaries amounting in the aggregate to £5,595,000, only 15,311 were subject to abatements; the other 41,429, whose salaries amounted to £3,172,000, were guaranteed their pensions, but suffered no abatements. This was one of the monstrous inequalities by which the system was characterized. But there was another anomaly to which he wished to call the attention of the House, and that was, the unequal operation of the tax on the different classes. To show the inequality between the second and third classes, suppose that A entered the service in 1828 at the age of twenty. He might after fifty years' service be entitled to a pension of £100 a year for which he would have suffered no abatement. If B entered the service in a similar capacity in 1830 he would after fifty years' service be entitled to a pension of only £66 13s. 4d., and would have suffered abatements to the amount of £1,049. The inequalities were not, however, confined to differences between classes, they were to be found in the treatment of different members of each class. For instance, in the Post Office, letter carriers, messengers, and mail clerks paid no abatements, but were entitled to superannuations. [Mr. WILSON made a gesture of dissent.] Superannuations had been granted to letter carriers who had served the country for a length of time. The officers in the higher departments of the office, however, were liable to abatements. In the same branch of the service the chief officers at London, Dublin, and Edinburgh suffered abatements, while those at Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow neither paid for superannuation nor received it. Some time ago it was discovered that the officers of some of the hulks at Portland and similar places suffered abatements, while the officers who were at Millbank, Dartmouth, and other prisons did not; but this inequality was removed by a Treasury Minute, passed in the year 1851, which abolished the deductions from the salaries of officers of the hulks, and granted them superannuations on a different scale of allowances. These were a few of the inequalities and anomalies which existed, and which might be multiplied almost ad infinitum. If different classes were differently treated, it amounted to this—that public servants were differently remunerated for the discharge of the same duties. So unsettled and so fluctuating had been the conduct of both the Government and the Legislature upon this question, that the civil servants could not consider that Act of 1834 as a final settlement of the question. In addition to these inequalities there were weighty objections to the whole system of the civil service. These objections might be divided into three classes. The first objection was that the civil servants were not altogether sufficiently remunerated. Into that question he did not propose to enter, and with it his Bill would not interfere. At the same time he might be allowed to state, that of 16,000 persons included in the second and third classes the average pay was only £141 per annum, and of two-thirds of that number the average salaries amounted to but £86 per annum. It could not be said that those amounts were exorbitant. Sir Charles Trevelyan had stated in his evidence before the Commissioners that the Treasury had lately, in fixing salaries which were not to be subject to deductions, fixed them at the same amount at which they would have stood if no abatements were to be made from them for superannuations. This was another proof that the civil servants were not overpaid, and that the question of superannuation ought not to be mixed up with that of the salaries. The second objection which they took was, that many of those who contribute to the fund do not get any benefit from it. Cases of this sort involving great hardships had come to his knowledge. In some cases men had died having contributed to the fund for a great part of their lives, and their wives and families had received no benefit from it. It was calculated that only one in seven of those who paid ever derived any advantage from the fund. It might be said that the amount of superannuation allowances fairly represented the amount of the contributions, but he felt convinced that the most delicate calculations of all the actuaries in the world could not persuade the six out of the seven who never received any allowance that they were fairly treated. The system partook of the nature of a tontine, and was liable to all the objections urged against tontines. It was, in fact, a species of gambling. The third objection was that the amount of reduction was more than equal to the whole superannuation paid. The tax at present amounted to upwards of £66,000 a year, and the allowances paid were only about £11,000. During the twenty-seven years that the Act bad been in operation the civil servants had paid £900,000, of which £80,000 only had been returned to the contributors in the shape of allowances, leaving a balance of £820,000, which if it had been funded would have amounted to £1,000,000. Such were the imperfections of the superannuation system, and so great were the objections felt to it that in the beginning of last Session the Government brought in a Bill to amend it. That Bill was satisfactory so far as it went, but it did not deal with the question of the deductions. It was referred to a Select Committee, which went very deeply into the subject and agreed to several important Resolutions. The first Resolution, proposed by the noble Lord the Member for Lynn (Lord Stanley), and carried by a majority of nine to two, was neither more nor less than a condemnation of the whole system of reductions. It was as follows:—

"That in the opinion of this Committee it is desirable to do away with the system by which a portion of the salaries of civil servants is deducted on account of superannuation allowances."

The second Resolution was proposed by the hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. FitzGerald), with the exception of the words at the end, which were proposed by the hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich), and only carried by a majority of one. It was,—

"That, as a condition of such deductions being done away, the rates of payment in the various branches of the civil service shall at the earliest possible period be revised, with due regard to the amount of deductions remitted."

The consequence of the Report of that Committee was that at the end of the Session the Government brought in a Bill which was founded on the Report; but, besides proposing to remove the deductions paid by the civil servants, it also proposed, in consequence of that remission, to reduce the salaries to the amount of the deduction remitted. It also proposed to calculate the superannuations which the civil servants were to receive upon the reduced scale of salaries, so that if it had passed into law the civil servants would absolutely have been in a worse position than they were now. The Bill consequently did not meet with general approval, and, owing partly to that cause and partly to the advanced period of the Session, it was withdrawn. In the recess the Government took the very wise and proper step of referring the whole matter to a Commission. That Commission was composed of Lord Belper, Lord Monck, Sir Alexander Spearman, the hon. Member for Southampton (Mr. Weguelin), and Sir Edward Ryan. Considering the high position and experience of the Commissioners, and the long time that this question had been debated, he was justified in looking at their decision in the light of an arbitration between the civil servants and the Government. On their decision he rested his whole case, and he craved the attention of the House to this very important passage of their report:—

"It has not been without much anxious consideration that we have arrived at the conclusion that it is our duty to recommend the total abolition of deductions for the purpose of superannuation, without any corresponding reduction in the salaries on which such deductions have been charged. Our first impression in entering on the inquiry referred to us was adverse to this arrangement; but on a careful review of all the difficulties of the case we became satisfied that, with a view to public interests alone, we could recommend no other settlement of the question as likely to be permanent and satisfactory. We are aware that the present system of deductions has had high authorities in its favour, and at the time when it was introduced it may have been considered a convenient mode of carrying into effect the unpopular measure of a general reduction of salaries. Nevertheless, for the reasons which we have already stated, we believe it to be unsound in principle; and we think that its inherent defects have developed themselves in difficulties of administration, of which the effect has been to create a mass of anomalies and inconsistencies most injurious to the public service. In this, as in other similar cases, it may be found impracticable to escape from a vicious principle and to establish a reasonable and uniform system without some temporary pecuniary sacrifice. But, believing that there is no other satisfactory solution of the difficulty, being confident that the ultimate advantage of the public will be much more than a compensation for any possible temporary loss, and having regard to the importance of maintaining the character and efficiency of the civil service, we are of opinion that by the recommendation which we have made we shall best discharge the duty which has been assigned to us."

A recommendation more strong or more forcibly expressed he never met with. One word with regard to the pecuniary loss which his proposition might occasion to the Exchequer. That loss, he believed, might be amply compensated if this question were sincerely taken up, and a thorough revision made of the salaries of all the civil servants. By selecting such of them as were thoroughly efficient and giving them to understand that they would be treated well and liberally paid a great reduction might be made in the present number of the civil servants. Moreover, the superannuation allowances granted several years ago were much more liberal than the present scale, and of course as the present recipients died off there would be a reduction of expenditure in that respect. But even if a slight addition were made to the national burdens by his proposition, he believed that it would be amply compensated by converting a discontented into a contented and cheerful class of men. There was a precedent for the course which he recommended. He alluded to the measure adopted in 1847 with regard to the Chelsea pensioners on the Motion of Lord Panmure, then Mr. Fox Maule, and which was regarded as just, notwithstanding the addition which it made to the public burdens. Up to that year the pensioners were subject to a deduction of 5 per cent from their pensions, on account of their being paid in advance. This, however, was remitted to them, and thus a charge of £60,000 a year was thrown on the country. The Government had no reason to justify them in refusing to deal with this question. They had been asked several times this year whether they intended to bring in a Bill on this subject, but they merely replied that until the question which the Committee had put to the actuaries with regard to the deductions under the Act of 1834 had been answered, they could not undertake to submit any proposition to the House. But, as the system established by that Act had been unequivocally condemned by the Committee itself, and also by the Commission, the answer to that question could not at all affect his proposition. He thought he had shown that there was a sufficient reason for the immediate abolition of the Superannuation Tax, and as the Government declined to do anything in the matter, he called upon the House to support his Bill. The remedy which he proposed was sharp and decisive, it was to introduce a Bill containing but one clause, repealing the 27th Section of the Act of 1834 which authorized the deductions. This course, however, would not prevent the Government from imposing such conditions as they might deem necessary. Those conditions might be discussed hereafter. The merits of the civil servants had been admitted from time to time by every eminent statesman. The civil servant was seldom rewarded by popular applause. He worked generally in retirement and often in obscurity. The only reward which he could hope to receive was his small salary and the consciousness that he had faithfully discharged his duty. If the Government admitted that the grievances of which the civil servants complained ought to be abolished, he hoped that they would support his Bill, and endeavour to carry it through Parliament. If, however, they should refuse to give him their support, he hoped that they would state frankly what course they intended to take. The noble Lord concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal the 27th Section of the Superannuation Act, 1834.

said, he rose to support the Motion. He did not deny that the civil servants were bound by the terms of the Act of Parliament which was in force in reference to the civil service when they received their appointments, but the question was whether it was right to enforce an Act which had been found to work with grievous injustice towards them. It was a sound principle, acknowledged by all the highest authorities who had considered the subject, that the proper way of paying the civil servants was to give them a moderate salary, and to hold out to them the expectation of a moderate retiring pension when no longer able to discharge their duties. If the salaries were fixed on a fair and equitable scale then it was unwise and unjust to impose a tax upon them such as they were now subjected to. It was said that notwithstanding this tax there were always plenty of candidates for these offices. He believed that if a tax of 20 per cent. were employed, the Government would still find an abundance of applications; but that would not prove the system to be a wise one. Was it a wise provision to make a man put by a certain amount of his daily earnings, when he might prematurely die, and his wife and family derive no benefit from it? The House had no right—it was not morally honest to call on the clerks of the civil service to make such a sacrifice. They could make a much better and safer use of their money themselves in providing for those who had a claim upon them than any Government or Parliament could possibly do. Where was the fund to which they were said to contribute? It had no existence. He defied any hon. Member to show that the amounts paid by those clerks were credited to them in any of the public accounts. He must say he regretted that the noble Lord had felt it his duty to bring forward this Bill, for it was derogatory to the character of the Government of this country that there should be quarrels and disputes between them and their servants. That House never could enter into the question truly, or settle it in any satisfactory manner. Nevertheless, the movement was in the right direction, and he would give it his support. He would prefer, however, to see the Government take up the question and settle it in a manner satisfactory both to the civil servants and the country.

Notwithstanding the late hour at which we have arrived (twenty minutes past Twelve o'clock), I shall feel it my duty to follow the noble Lord through the statements which he has laid before the House. The subject is too wide, the questions involved are too large, the civil service, whose interests are affected, is so important, and the sum of money which the noble Lord proposes to vote away is too great, to allow me to be silent on this occasion, or to pass the Motion by without putting the House in possession of what I consider to be the material facts of the case. I can assure the House that the task is not one that I have any desire to undertake; but I feel that it is a task from which, in the discharge of my duty, I ought not to shrink. The noble Lord has given a very clear, and, with one or two exceptions, which I shall presently notice, a very fair account of the origin of the present law with respect to superannuations. The true origin of the present state of things is this:—In the period immediately after the peace, the feeling in the House and country ran strongly in favour of economy, and one of the objects to which economy was directed was a reduction in the Civil Service Superannuations—"the dead weight," as it was called. I have before me the work of Sir Henry Parnell on financial reform, which embodies the general view held at the time, and in which he expresses a decided opinion against all superannuation pensions whatever. He says the salaries of the civil servants are unnecessarily high, so high as to afford every person adequate means of making provision for himself, and speaks of it as being undesirable that Parliament should grant them any superannuation pensions whatever. I do not coincide in that opinion. I only mention it to show the opinions in which this legislation began, and which there are in the House hon. Members old enough to remember. The Finance Committee at that time appointed recommended that reductions should be made from the salaries of the civil servants sufficient to create a fund out of which superannuation pensions might be paid, and an Act was passed embodying that recommendation. But when they came to apply the system to the salaries of existing civil servants, the strongest objections were made to it by them and by their friends in the House, on the ground that it was an undue interference with vested interests; that persons who had entered the service on certain conditions ought not to have those conditions disturbed by the interference of Parliament and by the imposition of an annual tax on salaries for the creation of a fund out of which superannuation pensions should be paid. The result was that the Act which enforced that system was repealed, and the sums actually received as abatements from the civil servants were, by the order of this House, repaid. In consequence of the failure of that attempt, the Treasury, on the recommendation of the Finance Committee in 1829, introduced the system at present existing, namely, that all persons entering the civil service after a certain day should be subject to a deduction from their salaries. Inasmuch as that regulation did not interfere with existing interests, and as everybody who accepted office had full notice of the deduction, it was thought a fair one, and was first embodied in a Treasury Minute, and afterwards, in 1834, in an Act of Parliament. Every civil servant who entered the service since 1829, and, subsequently, since 1834, has had full notice that he accepted office upon these terms, and knew that the full salary voted by this House was not the sum which he would receive, but that in case his salary was under £100 he would receive it subject to a deduction of 2½ per cent; and, if above £100, of 5 per cent. That regulation, as I have said, was embodied in an Act of Parliament; everybody had full notice; and there is not the smallest pretence for the assertion that any breach of contract has taken place with any portion of the civil service. The same Act of Parliament also introduced a certain scale of pensions, and, in like manner as each civil servant knew that he was liable to the annual deduction, so he knew that he would only receive a pension under the terms described by the Act. The question of a fund never arose. Neither the Treasury Minute nor the Act of Parliament contained a word about a fund. The Treasury made no fund; they merely accounted for the deductions, which were in the nature of a tax laid upon the salaries of the civil servants, and these deductions were annually stated in the papers presented to Parliament. There never was the smallest pretence for saying that the whole matter was not fully within the cognizance of Parliament. Remember, I am not now justifying the system, but describing the way it arose. That system has continued from 1834 down to the present time under the operation of an Act of Parliament, but as the number of civil servants who were liable to the abatement increased, which they did in successive years, and as the operation of the war income tax made itself felt, the deduction from the salary of 5 per cent under the superannuation tax, and of 6 per cent under the income tax, no doubt pressed very hardly upon them. Their complaints gradually increased, owing to the joint operation of these two causes, and on succeeding to the office I now hold, I found that many representations were made, that the question had been brought forward in this House, and I was also informed that a Bill had been prepared in the Treasury which dealt with the subject to a certain extent, making no alteration in the abatements, but introducing an improvement in the scale of pensions. In the beginning of the Session of 1856, I introduced a Bill which brought the subject under the notice of the House, and at the same time, wishing to treat the question in the fairest manner, I moved for a Select Committee, in order that the measure which I had introduced should undergo consideration by it, but principally for the purpose of enabling the House to hear the complaints of the civil servants and examine the foundation upon which the existing system rested. The complaints in question turned very much upon the opinion as to the existence of a fund to which the noble Lord has adverted, and also upon the circumstance that, as it was alleged, the civil servacts paid more than they received, that the bargain between them and the public was an unfair one, that the public gained more than it was entitled to, and that the deductions were, in fact, an unjust arrangement between the two parties. This matter was very fully gone into, and during the course of the investigation, the Committee desired that the opinion of two eminent actuaries should be taken upon a question which involved the equity of the case of the civil servants—that is to say, whether or not they paid more than they received. The matter was accordingly referred to by two actuaries, who found it involved such a vast quantity of numerical details, that they were unable to complete their report before the Committee terminated its sittings; and, therefore, the Members of that Committee were not assisted in their decision by the opinions of these two gentlemen. The Committee, however, came to an important Resolution as affecting the subject of the noble Lord's Motion. They resolved, upon the Motion of the noble Lord the Member for Lynn (Lord Stanley), "that in the opinion of this Committee, it is desirable to do away with the system by which a portion of the salaries of civil servants is deducted on account of superannuation allowances." They, therefore, condemned the system of annual abatements. When this Resolution was under the consideration of the Committee, a noble Lord not now in the House, but who then represented Portsmouth (Lord Monck), at my suggestion (for I was Chairman, and could not myself propose it) moved the addition of these I words:—"With respect to all persons who may enter the civil service after a future day to be named." The proposal which seemed to me an equitable one was, that we should leave all those persons now in the civil service in their present positions, without varying the terms upon which they accepted office, but that the system of deductions should be abolished with regard to all future civil servants. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) acceded to that Amendment, but the majority of the Committee were hostile to it, and therefore the Resolution was carried simply as a condemnation of the system of annual abatements. However, the Committee felt the difficulty they had to encounter in making an indiscriminate addition to the salaries of the existing civil servants without any corresponding increase of duty on their part, without any claim on the ground of merit, but simply because this tax had been imposed, and it was now thought advisable to remit it. The Committee, on consideration, felt the difficulty of adding £60,000 or £70,000 a year to the salaries of the civil servants without any apparent reason, and therefore they came to this additional Resolution, which, as they thought, would meet the difficulty. They resolved:—

"That as a condition of such deductions being done away with, the rates of payment in the various branches of the civil service shall at the earliest possible period be revised, with a due regard to the amount of deductions remitted, as there is no ground for an indiscriminate augmentation of salaries, which would otherwise result from the change proposed; that the revision now referred to shall be made previous to the 1st of April, 1857, when the abatements shall cease."

I certainly understood this Resolution to mean that the Treasury should revise all the salaries of the existing civil servants, and that, except in some special cases which might require peculiar consideration, they should reduce all the present salaries to an amount equivalent to that of the abatements, so that, although the abatements themselves should be abandoned, the total amount of the salaries received should be unchanged. That was the effect of the Resolution come to by the Committee, and it was embodied in the Bill, which, however, came under the consideration of the House too late in the Session to be passed into law. I was pressed to abandon it, and having done so, in deference to what appeared to be the opinion of the House, there the matter ended for that Session. During the recess, it appeared desirable to Her Majesty's Government that this matter should undergo further investigation, and, accordingly, a Commission was issued, composed, as the noble Lord has with great candour admitted, of very able and competent persons, who produced a Report, the ability of which must be generally recognized. But the question which now arises is, whether the House shall at once proceed to repeal the clause in the Act of 1834 without any further legislation on the subject, merely upon the suggestion of the facts brought under their notice to-night. The noble Lord did not state to the House that the recommendations of the Commissioners involved a great number of questions which do not belong strictly to the subject of these abatements, and if he founds his case upon the Report of the Commissioners he is bound to give effect to the whole of their recommendations. The noble Lord said that it would be competent for the House, if they gave him leave to introduce his Bill, to accompany it with conditions which might restrict its operation. In answer to that, I beg leave to say that such a proposal does not meet the case. The recommendation of the Commissioners refer to many subjects quite independent of the conditions for the abolition of the abatement. In the first place, they recommend a new scale of pensions. Well, that can hardly be considered a restriction upon the abolition of the abatements; it is a separate subject which requires careful consideration. They further recommend an alteration with regard to the age of retirement, a provision respecting compulsory retirement, another respecting gratuities to be allowed to public servants, another with reference to compensations. They also make a recommendation respecting political pensions, another as to the pensions of judicial officers, to be arranged on a separate scale; and other recommendations refer to dockyard officers, the department of the Post Office, and the class of extra clerks. Those are the matters which, if the House be inclined at this moment to take up the subject, it will be absolutely necessary in some way to deal with. Another part of the question which must be considered is the great magnitude of the sum involved, and the importance of not taking a hasty step or legislating on imperfect information on account of the large pecuniary interests which are at stake. I will just state what is now the entire charge for pensions and superannuations of the civil service, and the House will see how large a sum we have to deal with. The diplomatic pensions amount to £25,718; the judicial and legal pensions and compensations for loss of office or fees amount to £240,551; the civil service pensions under the Superannuation Act amount to £867,295; and the pensions granted to artificers of the navy and ordnance amount to £74,700, making a total of £1,208,264 per annum now payable in respect of superannuation allowances to the civil service, and with a large portion of which we are asked to deal according to the Bill of the noble Lord. At present the Act is in this form—that all the departments which are brought under its operation are subjected to annual deductions, and that those departments which are not brought under its operations are not subjected to annual deductions, and are not entitled to the superannuation pensions. The present rule, therefore, with regard to deductions draws a line in some measure between those offices which are entitled to superannuation pensions and those which are not; and if that clause of the Act of 1834 were simply abolished without any further legislation, a large class of salaried officers would immediately come upon the Treasury, and would apply for superannuation pensions, on the ground that they were now equally entitled with the rest, inasmuch as the system of deductions was abolished. The salaries of civil servants, subject to deductions under the Act of 1834, amount to £2,426,699 per annum, and the salaries of civil servants not subject to deduction amount to £4,910,602. Officers of the latter class are not now entitled to superannuation pensions; but if we simply abolish the present abatements, without taking a general view of the subject, and adopting the precautions which such a change in our system necessitates, we shall find a heavy permanent charge added to the expenditure of the country. I am perfectly willing to concede to the noble Lord that the present system, under which superannuation allowances are granted, is full of anomalies and inconsistencies, and that the present rule with respect to the abatements is far from satisfactory. I cannot admit, however, that the creation of a fund was ever promised either by Parliament or by the Government; neither can I admit that there has been any breach of a contract by any Government. The Commissioners themselves distinctly state their opinion that no such breach of contract has taken place, and that the civil servants have no claim on the ground of equity for the proposed change. The Commissioners recommend the change on the ground of expediency. They say, "the system is a bad one; you must pay forfeit for the abolition of it; you cannot get rid of it without surrendering £60,000 or £70,000 a year, and we think the system is so bad that we advise you to abandon it even at that cost." I admit, then, that the system is a bad one, and I regret that it was ever introduced. Still, it was deliberately introduced by Act of Parliament in 1834; that Act of Parliament has been in force ever since. All persons who have entered the civil service since that time have been perfectly cognizant of its provisions, and all the salaries of the present officers have been received subject to those deductions. Moreover, most of the great departments of the Government have been repeatedly revised since 1834; the salaries have been fixed with the knowledge that they were subject to these abatements; they have been received with that knowledge; and, I may add, that though the salaries of the political officers have in many cases undergone reduction during the last twenty years, yet that the alteration of the salaries of the general body of the civil service has been in the shape of increase, and not of diminution. Under these circumstances, I cannot admit that there is any equitable ground for the claim of the civil service. It is a matter, no doubt, for the consideration of this House whether they will make such an alteration in the law as will confer this immediate and indiscriminate increase of salaries upon the civil service. It is a mistake to suppose that this is a matter which is within the competency of the Executive Government. The Executive Government has no power to make the change that is suggested. The provision is included in an Act of Parliament; the present abatements are a tax upon salaries which is levied upon the authority of an Act of Parliament like any other tax; the Treasury is merely ministerial in the matter, and an Act of the Legislature will be necessary to effect the proposed alteration. Looking, then, to the extensive consequences of the simple alteration of one clause which the noble Lord proposes, and considering the necessity of legislating upon this subject—if it is to be legislated upon at all—in a more comprehensive manner and with a wider regard to consequences than is now proposed, it is not in my power to vote in favour of the Motion of the noble Lord. I would also say, that I do not see how the Government would be justified in undertaking to do anything with regard to this question until the Report of the actuaries has been received. The subject is now under the consideration of the actuaries, and the Commissioners promise the result in a supplementary Report. Under all the circumstances, then, and looking at the position in which the question stands, I do not see how it would be possible for me to accede to the Motion of the noble Lord. It is for the House to say whether the question can be decided in this summary manner, and whether, as guardians of the public purse, considering the large sum of money involved in this Motion, they think themselves justified in deciding in favour of it.

said, this was a question of so much importance as concerning the whole Civil Service, that the House ought not to come to a conclusion upon it without the fullest discussion. As that was impossible that evening, he hoped his right hon. Friend would waive his objection to the introduction of the Bill and allow the discussion to be taken on the second reading.

said, he was willing to assent to the introduction of the Bill, provided that it was fully understood that the object of such concession was merely to give an opportunity for fuller discussion, but the noble Lord must not be misled into believing that the Government would agree to the principle of the measure which was proposed.