said, he rose to beg the attention of the House for a few minutes upon a private Bill of great local and public interest. The Mersey Conservancy Bill received the sanction of the House, upon the second reading, without a division. It was referred to a Select Committee, over which he presided, and the inquiry before them occupied twenty-five days. Two principles were laid down: 1. That the management of the Liverpool Docks should be transferred to a trust, elected by ratepayers; 2. That all dues levied for harbour purposes should be applied to the purposes of the harbour. The amount of harbour dues last year was £150,000, and the great question in the transfer of the management from the Corporation of Liverpool quâ. Dock Trustees to the new trust, was the extent to which the council should be relieved from the debt upon the dock fund. The Committee of this House, after grave consideration, thought fit to award a sum of £750,000 as the portion of debt to be transferred to the Dock Trust, and, on the third reading of the Bill, the recommendation was affirmed by the House. The principle of the Bill was discussed in the other House, and affirmed upon the second reading. It was then sent to a Committee, and there, while the principles he had mentioned remained unchanged, the Committee, thinking that, under all the circumstances, the amount of liability transferred was too small, had made an alteration in the details, which increased the sum transferred to the Dock Trust in the shape of debt from £750,000 to nearly £ 1 500,000. He had not had an opportunity of consulting his colleagues of the Committee; but such was the unanimity which existed among them, that he was certain, in their absence, he could express their opinion as Chairman. In point of strict equity, he thought the arrangement proposed by the Commissioners satisfied just demands; but, considering the length of time the Corporation of Liverpool had enjoyed the advantage of managing the docks, and the partial recognition of it in the Municipal Act, the view was justified that a larger sum than that awarded by the Commissioners should be transferred. This transfer, however, could not be carried into effect by the Bill sent up to the other House, as the alteration involved a question of privilege. He was happy to say that, after much litigation, the conflicting parties were now entirely agreed. It was of the last importance that a year should not be lost. The existing state of the works was inadequate to the growing trade of the port. It was most desirable that, on the Cheshire shore, an extension of works should immediately take place. Without the concurrence of Parliament in the proposal he was about to submit, a most inexpedient delay would be rendered necessary. He was, therefore, strongly of opinion that it would be wise to introduce a new Bill, giving effect to the arrangement which had been settled by the Committee of the House of Lords—and which was satisfactory to all the parties concerned—and authorizing the immediate prosecution of a great work which it was of the last importance should not be postponed. He begged to move that a Select Committee be appointed to inspect the Lords' Journals relative to the Mersey Conservancy Bill, and to make a Report thereon to the House. That Report would be that the Bill was at an end, and at six o'clock; upon the presentation of the Report, he would more that a new Bill be introduced and passed through all its stages without delay.

seconded the Motion, which was agreed to.

said, the Committee would recollect that in Clause 25 there were five offences enumerated, any one of which, if added to adultery, would entitle a wife to apply for divorce. Supposing, then, a woman to present a petition alleging adultery combined with bigamy, and the Court to find that adultery had been committed but not bigamy, in that case, under Clause 28, the Court would not have power to dismiss the petition, while under Clause 29 it would not have power to make a decree. He should be glad to hear some explanation of its actual meaning and force.

said, that the 27th and 28th clauses had been introduced with this particular view—to ascertain, in uncontested cases, that there was no suspicion of collusion. The clauses were put in, not as defining or limiting what the Court was to do in certain cases, but as imposing upon it an obligation in all cases. The clause gave the Court the power, and enforced the duty, of ascertaining that there had been no connivance or combination on the part of husband and wife to obtain a divorce. It did not give the Court power to dismiss an uncontested petition which had merits, but it imposed the duty of ascertaining, by any possible means, whether or not there had been col- lusion. The clause was directed specially to the crime of adultery, because there was no fear or danger of Collusion in cases involving the other grounds of divorce pointed out in Clause 25. The effect of Clause 29 would be to enlarge the area of defence, and at the end of the clause a discretionary power was given to the Court to refuse the decree in cases of unnecessary delay or cruelty. The three Clauses, 27, 28, and 29, were to be taken together, and were intended to provide for the various contingencies connected with uncontested petitions.

said, that, in order formally to raise a discussion upon the point, he would move to leave out the words "alleged adultery," and substitute "facts alleged." He perfectly understood that the intention of the clause was to govern the Court in the dealing with uncontested cases; but it was necessary to look beyond those intentions, and to ascertain what would be the effect of the words contained in the various clauses of the Bill. It appeared to him that the new Court would have no jurisdiction but the statutable one given by this Bill, and therefore, as one clause recited the causes for which the Court should dismiss a petition, while another defined the cases in which the Court should make decrees, it would seem that these two clauses would rather restrict the notion of the Court.

said, if any material facts were alleged in a petition, and not proved to the satisfaction of the Court, it would be in the power of the Court to dismiss the petition. The clause only defined what things the Court should absolutely require to have proved in cases where there was no respondent, He thought the clause as it stood was intelligible, and did not require amendment.

said, he wished to point out that in the case of a wife's petition, where the adultery complained of must be combined with some other offence, the latter might not be proved, but the Court could not dismiss the petition if the adultery were proved. He thought such a provision might tend to encourage collusive proceedings.

observed, further that he thought the point deserved consideration.

remarked, that he did not feel the difficulty experienced by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henley), for there was an inherent power in any Court to dismiss any case that might come before it.

observed, that the effect of the clause would be to render adultery, committed during marriage by the petitioner, an absolute bar against obtaining a divorce. It would be better, he thought, to make it a discretionary bar—namely, to give the Court discretion to say whether such adultery should be a bar, thus enabling it to take into consideration the circumstances under which it had been committed, and whether it had been condoned or not. He proposed that the words "or shall find that the petitioner has during marriage been guilty of adultery," should be struck out of the clause.

said, he had no objection to the Amendment.

remarked, that he preferred the clause as it stood.

said, there had been cases in the Ecclesiastical Court where a condoned act of adultery on the part of the husband had not been held to be a bar to divorce.

said, that in order to avoid collusive suits, he would move the insertion of the words, "or that the petition has been presented or prosecuted in collusion with either of the other parties."

observed, that he should offer no objection to the Amendment, and it was agreed to.

said, he would propose an Amendment, prohibiting a man or woman from petitioning the Court more than once in five years in the same case. If parties who disagreed were allowed to go perpetually before the Court, the worst passions would be engendered and domestic peace be wholly destroyed. On the other hand, in an interval of five years evil passions might cool down and a chance would be left for reconciliation.

said, that as the Bill stood, if a petition were dismissed, it would not be competent for the petitioner to present it a second time.

said, he should move the omission of the words "or has committed adultery," in order to assimilate the clause to the preceding clause.

said, he was not disinclined to support the proposal.

said, he could not but express his regret that Amendments were introduced in such a way that they could not receive proper consideration. For his own part, he believed that the act of adultery alone, on the part of the petitioner, ought to form a complete bar to a divorce being granted; and, therefore, he was opposed to the omission of the words.

said, that with regard to the hurried consideration bestowed upon the Bill, the blame must rest with the Government, who called upon that House to sit, at the end of August, from noon to midnight to consider a question of such vast importance.

remarked, that he had no objection to take his share of the blame which was laid upon the Government; but he hoped that the Committe would in future support him in opposing Amendments brought forward without notice, and which the Government thought it would not be desirable to introduce.

said, that he objected to the omission of the words, as their omission would alter the whole of the existing law, which made adultery on the part of the petitioner a bar to a divorce. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Butt) had spoken of venial adultery, but it would, he thought, be very difficult to find a definition of venial adultery.

said, he was of opinion that it was absolutely necessary, after the alterations which had been introduced into the preceding clause, that some change should be effected in that which was under discussion. If, therefore, the hon. and learned Member for Youghal would withdraw his Amendment he should move the omission from the clause after the word "petitioner" of the words "has committed adultery during the marriage or," and the clause would then run thus:—"In case the Court shall be satisfied upon the evidence that the case of the petitioner has been proved, and shall not find the petitioner in any manner accessory to the adultery complained of, &c."

said, that in acordance with the suggestion of the hon. and learned Attorney General he would withdraw his Amendment.

contended, that if they were to pass the clause in the shape which was proposed they would be violating all principle and making the decision, in the single case which had been cited by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton), and which was quite an exceptional case, the general rule.

said, it was not proposed to lay down any general rule upon the subject, but to give to the new Court a discretionary power in dealing with exceptional cases, such as that to which the hon. and learned Member had alluded.

said, he was of opinion that it was desirable a discretionary power of that nature should be conferred.

remarked, that he thought that if the words were struck out a greater alteration would be made than the Committee contemplated. Discretion would then be given in all cases of adultery committed by the husband. That was very different from giving discretion when the adultery had been condoned by the wife.

said, he now proposed to leave out the words "such marriage to be dissolved," for the purpose of inserting the words "sentence of judicial separation for life." He thought it the best way of raising the important question, that had not been considered by the Committee or the House in connection with this Bill, whether they would give to the Court about to be constituted the power of granting divorce a vinculo, with power to the parties to marry again.

said, he rose to order. He doubted if it was competent to raise the question after the Committee had passed the 25th clause.

said, that the Committee having decided to give the new Court power to grant divorce by the 25th clause, the question could not again be raised.

said, his object in wishing to take a discussion on the question of divorced parties then, was to save time.

then stated, on behalf of his right hon. Colleague, that as the Amendment which stood in his name referred to the Amendment which he proposed to make in the 53rd clause, he would not press it at present.

said, he would now move to add as a proviso, words "which would prevent the Court from pronouncing such decree where the petitioner is shown to have committed adultery which has not been condoned." Such a proviso would maintain the existing principle of the law, which laid down that a person guilty of adultery, which, on the part of the husband, was the cause, in nine cases out of ten, of the fall of the wife, should not be able to obtain a divorce.

said, that he had no apprehension that a Court of justice, in granting divorce a vinculo upon the application of either the husband or wife, would not, where there was a counter charge of adultery proved, hold that fact to be a bar to the divorce. The words proposed by the right hon. Gentleman would apply only to cases of continuous adultery. Supposing the case of a young man married twenty-five years ago, who then, without the knowledge of it ever reaching his wife until now, had committed a single act of adultery, it would surely be very hard at such a distance of time to dig up that remote circumstance. He thought it would be better to leave the matter as it was. The Court would be bound to net upon the general principle, but not to give effect to a single transgression, such as he had mentioned. He would have no objection to insert in the clause the following words:—"If it shall be found that the Petitioner has, during the marriage, been guilty of adultery."

said, he wished to call the attention of the Committee to the fact that the Attorney General had put a particular case as a reason for opposing the Amendment. A Bill of this kind could not be framed without leaving some cases of peculiar hardship; but it appeared to him (Lord J. Russell) that, if the proposal of the Attorney General were agreed to, the law would be that, if the husband had gone on for five years in a course of open and continuous adultery, and in the sixth year the wife, misled by his bad example, should become forgetful of her marriage duties, and also commit adultery, then the Court would be at liberty to give a divorce at the suit of the husband, but not at the suit of the wife. The hon. and learned Gentleman said the Court would probably not act in that way, but they were framing an Act of Parliament on which the grounds of granting divorces were to be set out. He (Lord J. Russell) had been always apprehensive of enlarging very much the facilities for divorce; but this clause would enlarge them very much indeed in favour of the husband, while, at the same time, it was very restrictive in the case of the wife. It might be, that the new Court for a few years would follow the practice of the Ecclesiastical Court, but after a time the practice would change, and there would be nothing in the Act to prevent the Court from saying that it could not take into consideration any previous adultery on the part of the husband—that it was an unimportant circumstance, but that any adultery on the part of the wife should be a ground for granting a divorce to the husband. Such a course would be an encouragement of profligacy, and would lead to a disruption of the proper conditions of married life most fearful to contemplate. He regretted that the Bill did not stand in the same shape as it had come down from the House of Lords, and thought the best thing they could do was to agree to the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, he should oppose the Amendment, and would beg leave to suggest a case in which, under the influence of intoxication, or any other equally palliating circumstances, a man might once in his life be seduced into a house of ill-fame. Twenty years after, his wife, totally ignorant of the fact, might commit adultery; and on his seeking redress would, by the aid of spies and informers, who were always called into requisition in such proceedings, rake up the hitherto forgotten fact, and defeat his petition. Here he thought was a case stronger than that which had been supposed by the noble Lord.

said, he had always regarded with alarm the proposed increased discretion to be given to the new Court, but his alarm had been much increased by a statement which had been made, that the Amendments to the Bill should be so shaped as to give to the new Court the same amount of discretion in granting divorces which the Legislature at present of necessity arrogated to itself.

said, the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Walpole), and the observations of the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), showed a mistrust of the Court, as if it were not fit to be charged with any discretionary power. He would leave all such cases as had been raised by the right hon. Gentleman and the noble Lord the Member for London to be inquired into by the Court and decided upon according to their merits. He did not himself think the Court would be so regardless of its duty as to refuse to entertain the question, whether the husband seeking a divorce had committed adultery at any period during his marriage, especially as the 27th clause imposed upon it the necessity of inquiring into counter charges.

said, courts of justice went very much by precedents. Indeed, they were often the creatures and slaves of precedents, and there was, therefore, danger lest the period that might elapse after the adultery of the husband might be brought down step by step from nine years, for which there was a precedent, to one year. There might be some difficulty in limiting the case as proposed by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole), but there were still greater difficulties on the other side, and, therefore, he should divide with his right hon. Friend.

said, he would remind the Committee that no judicial separation could be given if there was uncondoned adultery on the part of the husband, and the same principle ought to be extended to cases of dissolution of marriage.

said, he would support the clause as proposed by the Attorney General. The Court should be left to deal with all these questions as they arose.

said, he believed it would be impossible to get three Judges to grant a divorce in the circumstances stated by the noble Lord the Member for London—namely, where a husband had been living in open adultery for a period of five years. He thus far agreed with his right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole) that where it was proved a husband had been guilty of adul- tery which the wife had not condoned divorce should not be given.

said, that on further consideration he must still oppose the Amendment. Notorious profligacy on the part of the husband would, of course, be a bar to divorce; but it was absurd to say that one act of adultery, which had always remained unknown to the wife, and which had been atoned for by long years of repentance and fidelity, should act with equal force.

said, that in adopting the suggestion of the hon. and learned Attorney General the Committee would be sanctioning an alteration of the law of great importance, which would work for the husband against the wife, and would deprive her of a sort of security which she at present possessed, against the commission of adultery by the husband. It must be assumed that the House of Lords had shaped the clause in accordance with their present practice, and that if there had been adultery on the part of the man a divorce would be refused by them; but the suggestion of the hon. and learned Attorney General, if carried out, would leave the new Court at liberty to exercise its own discretion.

thought this a case in which a discretion might be left to the Judges, as it was quite impossible that any Judge could grant a decree in the teeth of such an extreme case as that cited by the noble Lord. In the case of manslaughter, the Judges had a discretion either to fine a man sixpence, or to transport him for life. Did any man suppose that under any possible circumstances they would combine to fine all persons proved guilty of manslaughter sixpence?

said, he could not accept this Amendment, but he would have no objection, instead of these words, to add to the clause words limiting this ground of refusal of a divorce to "such wilful neglect or misconduct as has conduced to the adultery."

said, he would accept this suggestion.

said, he had further to move the insertion of words providing that the Court should not be bound to pronounce a divorce "where the parties should have been living separate and apart from each other by consent before the adultery." This would only be to carry out the existing law, because the House of Lords by a Standing Order refused to grant a divorce in all such cases.

said, he thought that the existing law would be better carried out by the insertion instead of the words proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Guildford (Mr. Bovill), of the words "or have deserted the other party, or have wilfully separated from the other party." Although by a Standing Order of the year 1798 the petitioner for a divorce might be examined at the bar of the House of Lords as to whether his wife was at the time the adultery was committed living with or apart from him, their Lordships had granted divorces in several cases in which the parties before the commission of the adultery had been separated by deed.

remarked that he would suggest that the hon. and learned Member for Guildford (Mr. Bovill) should withdraw his Amendment in favour of that proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt).

withdrew his Amendment, and the words proposed by Mr. Butt were inserted in the clause.

said, he would now propose, in order to give the widest possible discretion to the Court to refuse a divorce, to add the words "or where the petitioner could not have heretofore obtained a divorce."

suggested that the Amendment should run, "or under any other circumstances in which it shall appear to the Court unfit or improper to grant a divorce."

said, he should oppose the Amendment, which was negatived.

said, he rose to make some remarks upon the general character of the clause. The Court about to be esta blished would have the power of absolutely dissolving marriage, and allowing the parties to be married again. The importance of that principle everyone must recognise. He might safely say that no hon. Gentleman present ever pronounced an opinion before on a question involving such great social consequences. It was quite clear that this clause made marriage dissoluble for the first time in ninety-nine out of every 100 families in the country. Whether it altered the existing law of the land or not he would not say; but this was quite evident that, as regarded the great mass of the population, it made marriages for the first time dissoluble. He asked the warmest supporters of the Bill whether the people had had a fair opportunity for pronouncing an opinion on such a subject. He gathered from the discussions which had taken place, that even the Members of that House themselves were at sea on the subject of marriage and divorce. They seemed to be unable to fix upon any principle which they could fairly and logically carry out in the different limitations which they themselves had proposed to the Bill. Were they certain, he asked, that they were right when they were opposing what had been the law of all Christendom for many centuries—and if they were wrong, had they calculated till the consequences that would follow? In Prussia there had been a constant addition to the grounds of divorce a vinculo, and the results had been frightful, holding out a warning to us which we ought not to despise or neglect. The result was that those persons who were most desirous of improving the tone of morality in Prussia were anxious to revert to that principle with reference to the dissolubility of the marriage tie, from which they had departed; while in the case of France it was notorious that its inhabitants had found cause to repent the doctrines upon the subject which had been legalized at the time of the Revolution, and had therefore, in 1816, deemed it advisable to return to their ancient law of marriage, by that means saving themselves from those unhappy consequences which might be anticipated to follow in this country the passing of the Bill under the consideration of the Committee. With regard to Scotland it was distinctly proved by the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) that power of obtaining divorces was in the hands of but a small portion of the community. As it was near the hour (ten minutes to four) when further discussion on this Bill must for a time be suspended, he should offer no further observations in opposition to the clause, but should content himself with moving that it be omitted from the Bill.

haying brought up the Report of the Select Committee, which had been appointed at the morning sitting, said that in consequence of the decision of the Committee it became necessary for him to invite the House to suspend the Standing Orders and read the Bill a first and second time that evening, and refer it to a Committee to be nominated by the Committee of Selection. That Committee might sit on Wednesday, and thus afford an opportunity for the parties who were opposed to one or two clauses to have their objections fully heard. He was sorry to say that having an important engagement elsewhere, he should not be able to take part in the ulterior proceedings with respect to the Bill. He would wish to have the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman in the chair as to the course he had suggested being consistent with the practice of the House, and at the same time he begged to state that if unhappily the arrangement, which was in the nature of a compromise arrangement, were not carried out, he should consider the whole question re-opened, and that the settlement of the present Session was not binding on any one.

said, he hoped the House would agree to the suggestion of the right hon. Baronet, for he could assure them the Liverpool Corporation were decidedly in favour of the Bill.

remarked, he could understand the suspension of Standing Orders to allow an arrangement made in the House of Lords to be carried out; but if any parties wanted to be heard, the question assumed a different shape, and he would therefore suggest that the right hon. Baronet might take the course he proposed, with the understanding that the Bill should go no further if there were any petition.

said, the question raised by the right hon. Baronet seemed to be one for the House to decide rather than for him to give any decision; but, for himself, he thought there could be no objection to the course proposed by the right hon. Baronet—namely, that the Bill should be brought in, rend a first and second time, and then referred to a Committee appoint-on by the Committee of Selection. The party claiming to be heard would in that case have a hearing, and it would then be for the Committee to decide what was the nature of the objection, and whether there was any serious difficulty to the Bill making further progress. After the decision to which the House had come in the morning, the magnitude of the case seemed to be such as called for the suspension of the ordinary rules of the House.

said, he thought no other state of the case than that of all parties being agreed could justify the House in departing from its usual course, and was afraid that a contrary proceeding might form a very inconvenient precedent.

said, he considered the House ought to be very much on its guard, if the Bill was not to be an unopposed Bill. It occurred to him, however, after what had passed at the morning sitting, that no inconvenience would result from reading the Bill a first and second time that evening; but even if a single petition were presented against the Bill, the House ought to pause there for fear of doing an injustice to any of the parties concerned, by too rapid a course of proceeding.

said, that after what had passed, he felt justified in moving for leave to bring in the Bill, to suspend Standing Orders, so as to read it a first and second time, and to refer it to the Committee of Selection.

said, he hoped the Bill would not be allowed to proceed if a bona fide opposition should arise. He would not give a decided opinion, but he thought there was no precedent for suspending Standing Orders in the case of an opposed Bill. The House could not prejudice the interests of any party by reading the Bill a second time; but if the Dock Committee were prepared to introduce Amendments they ought to be allowed an opportunity of making their statements. He therefore hoped that means would be taken to register the opinion of the House, that in the event of a bona fide opposition, the Bill should not be pressed beyond the second reading.

said, the Dock Committee did not oppose the principle of the Bill, but were anxious to be heard on some of the clauses.

said, the safest course would be to read the Bill a second time, and then refer it to a Select Committee. He hoped that the parties before that Committee would come to an amicable arrangement; but if no such arrangement should be made, and the schedule of the Bill should be altered, he thought justice required that all the parties who had been heard before, and who might dissent from the proposed alteration, should have an opportunity of making their statements. At this period of the Session that would be impossible, and therefore the Bill ought not to be proceeded with further.

said, he would almost go the length of saying that not a single alteration ought to be allowed to be made in the Bill. He was ready to consent to the present course in order to get rid of a technical difficulty arising from the forms of the House, so that an arrangement known to both Houses of Parliament might be carried out; but if alterations were to be made in the Bill before the Select Committee, they might be quite contrary to the decision of the House of Lords. To send the Bill before a Committee with the view of having any of its clauses changed or modified would be to establish a very inconvenient precedent, and therefore he hoped the Bill would not be altered in any particular.

said, he would willingly admit the great importance of settling the long-disputed question which had arisen in regard to the conservancy of the Mersey in the present Session; but, on the other hand, it was of the utmost consequence that they should not depart from their usual mode of conducting private business. If the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, whose great experience in the business of that House, both public and private, and whose thorough acquaintance with the subject of this Bill all must acknowledge, could attend the meetings of the Select Committee, they would then have an assurance that their intentions would be properly carried into effect; but, unfortunately, the right hon. Baronet had stated that he was obliged to leave town, and therefore the House would not have the advantage of his services. For his own part, he was desirous that no technical difficulty should be thrown in the way of a satisfactory settlement of this question, but he thought that no substantial alteration should be allowed to be made in the Bill without the full cognizance of both Houses.

said, that the probable absence of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle was not the only circumstance which ought to be taken into account. The hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Ewart), had intimated that a portion of his constituents wished to be heard by counsel on some of the clauses. Now, if that were to be the case in agreeing to the present proposal, he thought they were taking a step which might lead to very inconvenient consequences. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would state to the House whether he had the consent of his colleague to the proposed arrangement, and also give an assurance that if the House agreed to the second reading, the Bill would go before the Committee as an unopposed Bill, and no attempt would be made to introduce Amendments.

stated, that the opinion of his colleague was quite in accordance with his own. He had not said that counsel were to be heard, but merely that the Dock Committee wished to state to the Select Committee some objections which they entertained to two or three of the clauses.

said, he had engagements at a distance from London to-morrow, which he could not postpone, and he was afraid, therefore, it would be quite impossible for him to take any part in the further progress of this measure. He had come to the conclusion, after what had been said, that, upon the whole, the safest course would be to follow the advice of the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), and let the Bill go before the Select Committee as an unopposed Bill. The House had gone very far in marking its desire not to obstruct the progress of the measure. If the parties could not come to an arrangement he was afraid the further progress of the Bill, with a due regard to the interests of those concerned, must be arrested. The responsibility of so arresting it would devolve upon those who had been heard fully before two Committees, and who were yet dissatisfied with the result: and he hoped the House would let it be understood that in a future Session this question would be regarded as entirely open, and the arrangement now suggested as of no force whatever. In the meantime he would rest satisfied with having moved the second reading, and would not proceed to move that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee, hoping that it would be allowed to go forward as an unopposed Bill.

said, he would remind the right hon. Baronet that the course he proposed was impossible, because as soon as the Bill had been read a second time a petition would be lodged against it, thus bringing it under the category of opposed Bills. As soon as any petition was presented the Bill became at once an opposed Bill.

said, that no petition had been presented, nor did he believe that any would be presented. If the Bill were opposed it must be lost, and the responsibility for that would rest upon the opponents of the Bill.

suggested that some precautions should be taken to limit the time fixed for presenting petitions.

said, that in order to give effect to the suggestion of the hon. Baronet he would move that Wednesday next, at two o'clock, be the latest period for receiving petitions against the Bill.

said, he thought that was a fair arrangement. He should move that the Bill be referred to the Committee of Selection to appoint a Committee to consider it, and that the Committee should meet on Wednesday next, at three o'clock.

remarked, that he believed the members of the Committee of Selection had all disappeared. If so, it would be difficult to get a Committee appointed.

said, he did not think the point was material. If the same parties chose to oppose the Bill upon this occasion they must understand that they had not the slightest chance of carrying their points, although they might succeed in defeating the Bill. Under existing circumstances, those Gentlemen would have no chance whatever of carrying their points before this or any other Committee, and if the Bill was lost the responsibility rested with them.

said, he would beg to ask the Vice President of the Committee of Council on Education whether Mr. F. O. Ward has been correctly reported to have said, at the International Congress at Brussels, in September last, that the application of the Public Health Act to two hundred houses in England has diminished the mortality by fifty per cent, and has in their vicinity quadrupled the fertility of the soil? In consequence of the quotations made the other night by the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. Cox) from the speech supposed to have been delivered by Mr. Ward at the Congress alluded to—that gentleman being a friend of his—he (Mr. Coningham) was anxious to clear his character from any erroneous impressions which such quotations might have conveyed.

said, that Mr. Ward was not officially connected with the Board of Health, but as he had with great zeal and ability supported the adoption of certain sanitary measures which he (Mr. Cowper) believed had been the means of saving the lives of many thousands of the population, he had shared in some of the misrepresentations which had been lavished on the Board of Health. He had before him a copy of the speech made by Mr. Ward at the International Congress held last September at Brussels, and could deny the correctness of the quotations made. The fact was that the extracts referred to were wholly disjointed—one half of the gentleman's meaning being conveyed without the remainder. Mr. Ward did not rate the mortality in the whole town nor that arising from all causes in the way alleged; he only spoke of the mortality in certain wretched portions of the metropolis, and as arising from the effects of impure air and putrid water. And Mr. Ward's state- ment was fully supported by the returns of the official authorities on the subject. In respect to the other subject to which Mr. Ward alluded, that gentleman was speaking of the increase of fertility occasioned by an improved distribution of the sewage, and was only alluding to what was well known to have taken place in Edinburgh, Ayr, and other towns. If the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. Cox) were in his place he would no doubt confirm that part of the statement, at all events.

said, he wished to ask the President of the Board of Control, on what day he proposes to make the usual annual statement on Indian Finance.

said, that the practice of making an annual statement upon Indian Finance had arisen from a desire on the part of the House to direct its attention during one day in the Session to the state of affairs in India, and the wish to hear the President of the Board of Control explain the prospective Estimate of Indian Revenue and Expenditure. During the present Session the unfortunate events that had occurred in India had awakened the attention of Parliament, and upon two or three occasions the House had been occupied in discussing the affairs of India, Owing also to the confusion that had taken place in the north-western provinces any estimate of Indian Finance prepared before the recent mutiny must of course be perfectly fallacious. Under these circumstances, and considering the lateness of the Session, and the unlikelihood that hon. Members would remain in town to hear any statement he could make, the Government had determined not to bring forward this year the usual financial statement with regard to India.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether any steps have been taken or any Order in Council has been issued to remove from the Legislative Council of Malta any Priest or other Minister of Religion, and to prohibit them in future from being elected or sitting as Members of the said Council.

said, the Crown had been advised to issue an Order in Council declaring Priests of any persuasion ineligible to sit as Members of the Legislative Council of Malta. The Order in Council was not retrospective in its operation, and would not disturb those who now held seats in the Council. When the next general election should take place, however, the rule would be observed that no Priest of any persuasion whatever, would be eligible to a seat in the Legislative Council.

said, he wished to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, whether it is the intention of Government to appoint a Stipendiary Magistrate for the district of Kilkenny, in the room of Mr. T. Green, who has been physically unable for many months to attend his magisterial duties.

said, he could not say that it was the intention of the Government to make an immediate appointment, as there was no acknowledged vacancy in the office to which the hon. Gentleman had alluded. A statement had, however, been made to the Government that Mr. Green was unable to attend to his magisterial duties. If this inability seemed likely to be permanent, the Government would be prepared to take steps to remedy the inconvenience.

I wish, Sir, to make an inquiry of Her Majesty's Government respecting an Act of the Legislative Council of India, which has been lately passed (I believe it is number fifteen of the year 1857), restricting the liberty of the press in the dominions of the East India Company. I wish to know of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control, whether he would object before we separate to place a copy of that Act on the table?

Sir, I have not the least objection to place a copy of that Act on the table. I may say that it has been only passed for one year.

There are two other documents which I wish to have laid on the Table of the House, and if there is no objection to produce them, I will make a Motion for their production. One is a copy of the Despatch of the Governor General of India, explaining the reason why he has extended this law of restriction to the loyal European subjects of Her Majesty, as well as to the Natives; and I also wish for a copy of a Memorial addressed to the Governor General on the subject by the European population. If there is no objection to the production of these papers I will give notice of a Motion for their production as unopposed returns.

I have no objection to the production of such papers as we have. The Despatch of the Governor General is in the possession of the Government, but I am not sure that we have the Memorial; if we have it, it shall be produced.

Will there be any objection to lay on the table a copy of the Friend of India, for which a warning was given to that journal?

If the hon. Gentleman will communicate with me in private, I will endeavour to meet his wishes.

said, that in Clause 16, provision was made that in all suits other than for a dissolution of marriage, the Court should proceed on the principle now acted on in the Ecclesiastical Court, and so grant alimony and the means of carrying on a suit to a wife pendente lite; but he did not find in this clause any provision of that kind applicable to divorce a vinculo.

said, he should move, in the first line of Clause 30, to substitute the word "shall" for the words "may if it shall think fit," the effect of which would be to render it obligatory instead of discretionary in the new Court, on pronouncing a decree dissolving a marriage at the instance of the wife, to make it a condition that the husband should secure the payment of alimony to her, either in a gross sum or an annual one.

said, that in Divorce Bills hitherto, the House of Commons had always been in the prac- tice of awarding some means of maintenance to the wife when the husband only was concerned. He thought, however, for the future that the power to grant alimony had better be discretionary in the Court, as the clause as it now stood provided it should be, for otherwise it might operate very inconveniently in many cases where the wife might not be entitled to such consideration from the Court. He would say, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henley), that it was undoubtedly true that the Bill as at present worded, would not, in a suit for a dissolution of marriage, throw on the Court the obligation of adopting the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts. In a suit for judicial separation the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts might possibly be adopted by the new Court; but it was a matter for grave consideration whether that practice, which was extremely anomalous, was or was not a desirable thing to maintain. He thought where a wife applied for a divorce a vinculo it would be desirable to leave the Court unfettered, because otherwise there might be, as at present, many cases where the wife might fall into the hands of an extortionate legal adviser, who would subject the husband to a grievous amount of expense.

said, he would remind the hon. and learned Attorney General that, according to Clause 16, the Committee had already decided in effect that the Court should be guided by the rules and principles of the Ecclesiastical Courts; and he thought it was not asking too much that in a suit for dissolution of marriage the wife should not be left without reasonable means of carrying on that suit, which might otherwise be denied her by a profligate husband.

said, it was a common law liability on the husband to maintain the wife; but it was a rule peculiar to the Ecclesiastical Courts to make him liable to assist her in carrying on a legal proceeding against him. He should, however, take the point suggested by the right hon. Gentleman into consideration, and endeavour to provide for it.

said, he thought some consideration should be given to the fact that the wife might be abandoned by the husband and left without any resources at all, even in cases where she had brought him a fortune on their marriage.

said, as the clause proposed to take away the property of the husband for the wife, he thought it was only fair that there should be also a power given to the husband to take away the property of the wife in order to prevent the adulterer having the advantage of it, and that it should be settled on the children.

suggested, that the clause should be altered to meet the views put forward by the hon. and learned Member behind him (Mr. Malins), inasmuch as he believed that such cases had really occurred.

said, such cases as those alluded to had been actually provided for by the 47th clause. The case, however, brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) was not provided for by the Bill. The House of Lords was always in the habit, when a husband petitioned for a divorce Bill, of ordering a sum of money to be set aside for the wife, to enable her, if she could, to defend herself. The point, however, could be more conveniently raised on the 32nd clause. He had given notice of an Amendment, which he thought was but justice to the parties concerned. It would be observed that the clause provided that "the Court may, if it shall think fit, make it a condition that the husband" should secure alimony to the wife. He thought these words would be inadequate to insure a provision for the wife, and he would propose a substitution of the words "absolutely order" for the words "make it a condition."

said, he was willing to consent to the substitution of the simple word "order" for the words "make it a condition."

said, he had given notice of his intention to move that instead of the words "whenever in any such petition presented by a husband the alleged adul- terer shall have been made a co-respondent and the adultery shall have been established," the words "whenever in any such petition presented for the dissolution of a marriage, of for a decree of judicial separation on the ground of adultery" be inserted in the clause. It would be necessary, as a preliminary Amendment, that he should move the substitution of the word "on" for the word "in." Up to the present time adultery had not been treated as a crime by the law of this country, but had been dealt with as a sin by the Ecclesiastical Courts. This clause, however, proposed to abolish the action of crim. con. and give the Court the power of imposing a fine upon the adulterer, and also of ordering him to pay the whole or any part of the costs of the proceedings. It appeared to him that this was a most inadequate mode of dealing with adultery. The Bill did not call adultery a crime or a misdemeanour, and he thought that was quite right, because, if adultery had been so described in the Bill, offenders might have been indicted by discarded servants, or by utter strangers, without the consent of the injured husband or wife. Substantially, however, adultery was constituted a crime by the Bill, and it was for the Committee to determine whether the mere imposition of a fine upon the adulterer was a satisfactory mode of treating such a crime, the offending wife being left wholly untouched. With the view of giving the Committee an opportunity of expressing their opinion upon that point, he intended subsequently to move the insertion of words which would enable the Court "to order the respondent, and also the co-respondent, if any, to be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by fine and imprisonment, as if convicted of a misdemeanour." Having stated reasons last Friday why this change should be made, be would not now repeat them, but would move his first Amendment in line 20 to insert the word "on" instead of "in."

said, that the clause, besides the question raised by the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Puller), involved another very important consideration, whether in these proceedings it should be competent for the Court to impose on the adulterer any pecuniary penalty to be applied for the benefit of the husband or the children of the marriage, or as provision for the unfortunate wife. The present Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Hertfordshire involved the question, if question it ought now to be considered, whether adultery should be criminally punished. He did not mean now to go into the question at any length, because he believed that the testimony of all persons, who had directed their attention to the subject, combined in condemnation of the principle of making adultery criminally punishable, and history showed that that principle, when attempted to be put in practice, had signally failed. On the occasion of different divorce Bills passing the Legislature the principle had, more or less, been brought under discussion, and there were three solemn debates, which took place in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons on the subject, and which were reported in the Parliamentary Journals. They occurred, he believed, Jin 1781, in 1800, and again in 1812; and on all occasions it had been the opinion of that House that to treat and punish adultery as an offence against the State, would not tend to advance the interests of morality, and that to do so, was not required by the principles of criminal legislation, but rather overstepped the limits of criminal jurisdiction. He did not intend to detain the Committee by a repetition of the arguments drawn from those sources, where every argument which could be brought to bear on the subject was urged, because he believed that the distinction between those things, the repression of which must be left to religious and moral education, and what properly belonged to the laws of offended society to punish, must be obvious to every one who bad considered the question. He trusted that the Committee would adhere to that which on every occasion was recognized as the true principle, that it was not by any law, making an offence like adultery a crime, that it could be repressed, for it was not by such means that people could be made more religious or moral. He should, therefore, oppose the proposed Amendment. It would no doubt be observed that the Bill, as brought down from the House of Lords, did embody in a limited form, the principle of criminal punishment, so far as the imposition of a fine upon the adulterer went. That was not, however, the provision of the Government, and he had given notice of Amendments to alter altogether the character of that Enactment; and in the discussion on those Amendments the question would arise whether it was right and fit, under any circumstances, to permit the injured husband either to recover from the adulterer pecuniary damages, or to make the adulterer amenable in money to be applied for the benefit of the husband, the protection of the children, or as a provision for the wife. When these Amendments came under consideration he should endeavour to explain his views, but, at present, confining himself to the immediate Amendment of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, he must, on the part of the Government, state that he was prepared to resist altogether any attempt to make adultery the subject of criminal punishment, and to add it to the list of offences amenable to the criminal law.

said, that so far as he had studied the question, it appeared to him that the universal testimony of history was rather against than in favour of the view taken by the hon. and learned Attorney General. The homily against adultery contained a list of the different nations which, in different parts of the world, and at different epochs, had treated adultery as a heinous offence against society. From the statement there contained, it appeared that the Jews, the Egyptians, the Arabs, the inhabitants of the north of Germany, had all treated it in the same manner, that is, punished it with death; and the laws of Scotland were nearly as severe. In no part of the world had the law in this respect been more considered than in France; and what, he asked, was the state of the law there? There the guilty persons were subject to imprisonment extending from three months to two years. He did not say that the object of the Bill was to encourage and reward the commission of the crime of adultery, but he must say that that would be the effect of the measure, when he found that adultery would not be punished as an offence against social order, and that permission was given to the adulterer to marry the guilty woman as soon as she should be divorced. He did not understand whether or not the hon. and learned Attorney General intended to leave in the Bill that provision—he could hardly call it punishment—which would impose a fine on the adulterer. But even if the hon. and learned Gentleman consented to retain that provision, he contended that without some such Amendment, as the one under discussion, the tendency of the Bill would be to encourage, and not to discourage, the adulterer and adultress. It was said that until the time of the Commonwealth the idea never occurred of making this great crime a subject of punishment. Now, on other occasions they had heard a great deal about the Reformatio Legum, and the opinions of Cranmer and his associates, on the subject of divorce. Did Cranmer look upon adultery as a private injury with which the public law ought have no concern? On the contrary, the Reformatio Legum condemned the adulterer or adultress either to perpetual banishment or perpetual imprisonment, thus not only inflicting a most severe punishment, but rendering intermarriage impossible. The present Bill, as sanctioned by the hon. and learned Attorney General, however, treated this great question with a lightness, a favour, and an encouragement which you would search the records of history for in vain, and would not find imported into any code either in ancient or modern times. Let them see how this clause would operate on the different classes of society. With regard to the pecuniary fine, it was quite clear that the wealthy seducer of his neighbour's wife, if he only paid the money, might marry or discard the woman as he chose, and then nothing more would be said about it; while the poor man would be sent to prison, not because he had committed a great offence, but because he had not the money wherewith to condone it. They were told that this was a Bill to put the poor and the rich on an equality; but where was the equality in this case? It appeared to him a mere mockery of justice to imprison the poor man while the rich adulterer escaped on payment of a fine. The Committee should remember that Lord Lyndhurst and other high authorities declared that adultery ought to be regarded as a crime, and to be punished as such. Could any offence be conceived which struck more at the peace of families and at the welfare of society? And he augured the worst social consequences from a system of law which would teach the rich that the payment of a sum of money, not larger perhaps than the fee payable for taking out a patent, would allow them to commit this offence with perfect impunity, so far as the law was concerned. If the Committee desired to discourage the commission of adultery in this country, he entreated them to support the Amendment of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Puller).

said, that the Committee would involve themselves in considerable difficulty if they attempted on the present clause to discuss the question whether adultery should be made a criminal offence. Nothing would be more objectionable or unprecedented in English law than to allow a man to be convicted and punished for a criminal offence upon a civil suit. The mixture of civil and criminal process, as proposed by this Amendment, would be a mongrel kind of proceeding, the only effect of which, he believed, would be to introduce endless confusion. Did the hon. and learned Gentleman mean that if, as was quite possible, the act of adultery was committed in ignorance, the party should be visited with imprisonment, though in such a case he might be civilly liable, and the sentence of divorce would follow? So much was he (Mr. Butt) opposed to a proceeding of this kind that he even intended to object to the words imposing a fine on the adulterer. It was said that this fine was a substitute for the action for criminal proceedings. He might be uttering a very unpopular sentiment, but he must say that he thought it a very inefficient substitute. The fine imposed was only given to the person who possessed the means of instituting proceedings for a divorce in this high court, while the Bill abolished an action which might have its faults and its scandals (though these, he believed, had been exaggerated), but which certainly had been and now was the means of protecting the poor man. If, however, adultery was a high criminal offence, he objected to their deciding that question at all upon a clause of this sort. Then again, was the possibility of punishment to depend upon the accident of proceedings being taken in a civil court? Suppose husband and wife to be both guilty, the remedy given by this Bill was taken away, and no suit could he instituted. It would be productive of bad effects to say the adulterer ought to be punished with imprisonment, but at the same time to throw a shield, so to speak, around him by declaring that he can only be punished provided a suit for divorce were instituted. He contended that if adultery was a criminal offence it ought to be dealt with by the proper criminal tribunals of the country, with such safeguards as the wisdom of Parliament might see fit to enact, and not by a civil court; and such a question would best be raised by the introduction of a distinct clause containing a provision of that kind.

said, he thought it was better to reserve this question until they reached the 54th Section. He would observe, however, that inasmuch as the Bill would put an end to actions of crim. con., it would almost induce parties to commit adultery unless it were made a misdemeanour. In so doing they would merely follow the example of other countries. In Scotland adultery was still punishable as a crime. The law of France punished both adulterer and adultress by fine and imprisonment. In nearly every American State adultery was punishable as a misdemeanour. The hon. and learned Attorney General said, that in 1800 the Legislature repudiated the idea of treating adultery as a crime. But in that year the House of Lords agreed, with the sanction of Lord Eldon, to a Bill rendering adultery a crime; and when this Bill came to that House it had the support of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Erskine. It passed the second reading by a large majority, and was eventually rejected on account of a provision being added preventing the guilty parties marrying. Were they then to encourage adultery by taking away the action of crim. con., at the same time abstaining from imposing any criminal punishment upon the offence? They did not even leave the matter as it stood at common law, by which he thought it was very doubtful if adultery was not an indictable offence.

said, he would suggest to the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Puller) that a division merely upon the question whether "on" should be substituted for "in" would not accomplish his object, and that he had better withdraw his Amendment, with the view of taking a division upon an Amendment to the effect that imprisonment should be inflicted for adultery.

submitted that the question of imprisonment of the adulterer was fairly raised by this clause. He was, however, quite willing to take any course the Committee might think fit; and if they thought the object he had in view could be better accomplished by his bringing in a new clause than by amending this, he would do so.

said, he was afraid that the mere substitution of "on" for "in" would not enable the Committee to get rid of the difficulties connected with the clause. It was quite plain that the hon. and learned Attorney General had completely thrown over the whole clause, at which he was not surprised. The Amendment suggested by the hon. and learned Attorney General changed altogether the object and aspect of the clause. The clause would in its new shape introduce a very anomalous state of things, for it would enable a Court to impose a fine without any crime having been proved. It would be impossible to know for what the adulterer had been fined. The hon. and learned Attorney General argued that it was alike at variance with history and with social advantage to make this a crime, and that hon. and learned Gentleman had given notice of an Amendment declaring that the fine should be applied in the discretion of the Judge for the benefit of the husband, of the children, or of the divorced wife. If, however, there was to be an inoculation of the compensation principle in the Bill, all the analogies of our law required that the amount should be fixed by the jury, not by the Court. None of the Amendments which stood in the name of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire would exactly raise the question intended to be raised—namely, whether adultery should be made punishable by fine and imprisonment. If the Court was to impose a fine the offence ought to be constituted a misdemeanour. On the other hand, if the mulct was to take the shape of compensation they would be re-enacting the scandal attached to the odious action of crim. con., by which a man put the wages of his own dishonour into his pocket. The hon. and learned Attorney General would perhaps favour them with some explanation on these points.

said, he understood that the question to be decided by the hon. Member's verbal Amendment was whether they should introduce into the Bill a clause making adultery punishable by fine and imprisonment. If in any case they determined to impose on the adulterer the obligation of paying a fine, in his opinion it ought to be assessed by a jury—not by the Court; and the money should be applicable either to the relief of the husband, if he claimed it and the tribunal deemed him entitled to it, or as a provision for the children who had sustained irreparable loss in the cessation of maternal protection; or for the support of the wife herself. In the meantime, however, they had first to determine whether adultery should be punishable as a crime.

said, this was a most inconvenient form of raising such a question, and he would suggest that it would be more intelligible if the hon. Member for Hertfordshire were to take the sense of the Committee on another of his Amendments.

suggested that the Committee should at once decide whether they should insert such words as "order the adulterer to be punished by fine or imprisonment."

said, before they decided; on the question "in" or "on," he would wish to know how the numerous body of hon. Gentlemen who would be sure to come in when the division bell rang were to be guided in arriving at a conclusion on that very nice point?

recommended the hon. Gentleman not to raise his issue on the word "in."

said he would withdraw his Amendment.

said, his objection to the Amendment now before the House was, that the hon. and learned Gentleman was not raising the question whether adultery was a crime which ought to be punished by fine or imprisonment, but whether it ought to be punished by the operation of this particular clause. He (Mr. Butt) was satisfied that adultery ought to be punished by fine or imprisonment; but he should vote against the Amendment now before the Committee, because he could not allow the guilt of the party to be decided by such an anomalous tribunal as that contemplated by this clause. The hon. and learned Gentleman (the Attorney General) thought that the fine ought to be imposed by the jury; and he (Mr. Butt) considered that the adulterer ought to be made to pay the whole cost of the proceeding. He should, therefore, presently move to strike out the words giving power to the Court to impose a fine, and leave in those giving it power to impose on the adulterer the whole or any part of the costs.

said, in accordance with his promise he now rose to move the omission of the words empowering the Court to impose a fine upon the adulterer.

said, he entirely agreed in the Amendment proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Youghal.

observed, that he trusted the Committee would bear in mind that the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt) would be the first step towards restoring the condemned action for criminal conversation. If it were the intention of the Government to make that restoration it would be well that the Committee were at once acquainted with the fact. He begged to move that after the word "order" there be inserted the words "the adulterer be punished by fine or imprisonment, or fine and imprisonment."

said, he must again protest against the noble Lord raising in a most inconvenient form the question whether adultery was to be made a criminal offence. He (Mr. Butt) was not saying that it should not be made so; but he objected to a man being pronounced a criminal by such a tribunal as this without conviction by a jury. In an incidental proceeding—one mixed up with several other things—it would be very objectionable to give a Court the power of ordering fine and imprisonment.

said, that the main question the Committee had to consider was, whether a disgraceful offence, when proved, ought not to be visited with some punishment or the other. Pillory was unfortunately abolished, and whipping was out of fashion, and he saw no other means of punishing the offence except by the means proposed by the noble Lord. He could see no impropriety in the course of procedure, as the accused would have the benefit of a trial by jury. He should, therefore, support the clause.

said, he fully concurred with the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt). If adultery was to be made a criminal offence it should be done by an alteration of the criminal law, so that the person charged might be proceeded against by indictment and tried by a jury. Let the criminal enjoy at least the same safeguards which every other person in this country enjoys when charged with a criminal offence. Having done that, power might then be given to the Court to direct a prosecution. The question was one of great importance and ought not to be hastily decided, because a variety of questions would arise in reference to it that would require serious consideration, and amongst others whether seduction should not be treated in the same manner. The question before the Committee was not whether adultery should be made a crime, but whether under this Bill the Court, without the intervention of a jury, and the ordinary process of a criminal court, should pass sentence on a man for an offence of which he had not been convicted according to the forms of our criminal law.

said, he would quite admit that the subject was one full of difficulty. He thought, however, that the difficulties were incidental to the nature of the proceedings, for, put it as hon. Gentlemen would, there must be something criminal in these proceedings. This mixture of civil and quasi criminal procedure was not altogether unprecedented in the law; the two sometimes ran into each other, as in the case of the law of insolvency. He saw nothing unreasonable in proposing that the Court should not be obliged to confine the punishment to the weaker party, but that it should have the power of extending that punishment to the adulterer, who would otherwise escape scot free; and he should, therefore, support the Amendment.

said, he begged to offer a remark in reply to what had fallen from the right hon. Baronet (Sir George Grey). He quite agreed in the importance of not too hastily making this offence the subject of criminal jurisdiction. If this offence were called a crime, it would sometimes be in the power of a discharged servant to bring to public trial a case of the kind, no matter how long ago it had happened, or whether it had been condoned or not. There must in all cases be a compromise between public justice and private feelings. The offence should be made discreditable for the sake of public morals, yet there were cases in which it would be intolerable to drag to light the private affairs of individuals. But when safeguards were spoken of, it was desirable that the Committee should know what these safeguards really were. The right hon. Baronet had spoken of trials by jury and indictment; yet a trial by jury was provided by this Bill; and what was an indictment but a setting forth of the nature and particulars of the offence charged against the prisoner? Now this Bill provided that every petition was to set forth the circumstances as fully as the nature of the case would admit, and adultery must be proved—that was essen- tial. Therefore they already had before them the only safeguards that had been mentioned. He thought, moreover, they should not hesitate to compromise in some degree their prejudice in favour of established customs, when the object in view was to punish a violation of public morals.

said, he would beg to remind the Committee that one of the principal objects of the Bill was to consolidate the jurisdiction of three separate Courts, and to substitute one inquiry for the three which at present must precede a divorce. That object, however, would be defeated if there must be a criminal trial as well as the inquiry before the Court.

observed, that it was an essential ingredient in the crime of adultery that the man should have knowledge of the fact that his partner in guilt was married. Now, what protection would a jury be, in the case of a man's ignorance of this fact? The only question the jury would have to try would be whether the act of adultery had been committed or not. This would reduce the Amendment, if not to an absurdity, at least to a nullity.

said, that every step they took showed the difficulty of proceeding in the course recommended by his noble Friend (Lord J. Manners); for he (Mr. Henley) thought the mere accident that a man happened to have a suit brought against him for a divorce should not afford a reason why he was to be punished by fine or imprisonment for that which no party was liable to be punished for, except such suit had been instituted against him. If parties wished that adultery should be punished by fine or imprisonment they should raise the major proposition first—namely, that adultery was a crime, and that all parties who committed it should be punished for the offence whether a divorce were attached to the proceeding against them or not. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Puller) had spoken of the hardship of allowing a servant to commence a prosecution for matters which had been condoned; but did not that show that adultery was a private wrong? They must also recollect that by the law of England it was not competent for a private person to compound a private offence.

said, he did not think there was any force in the objection that a third party—say a discarded servant—might raise a case against offenders long after the adultery had been com- mitted. The case could only be raised by the parties themselves. A person aggrieved would seek the remedy provided by the Bill, and then the penalty for the adultery would follow as a consequence. He saw no incongruity in this. Such at least was the case in France and other countries.

said, he should vote against the Amendment of the noble Lord, because he did not think that the time or place to enact that adultery should be a crime. If the Committee were of opinion that it should be, the most consistent and best course would be to make a direct addition to our criminal law, and not interpolate a criminal proceeding in such a clause as that now before them. In saying this, he wished not to be understood as saying that adultery ought not to be dealt with as a criminal offence.

said, he should now move that the clause be struck out altogether, as it was inconsistent with Clause 48, which enacted that the Court might order any costs it thought proper.

said, it was far better to leave the law clear as stated by the clause.

said, that by the common law the father had always the guardianship of his children vested in him, except under circumstances where it was absolutely necessary to deprive him of it. But in order that the clause should not leave this point in doubt, he would move to add a proviso to that effect to the end of the clause.

said, the introduction of those words would be most inconvenient. Generally speaking, the Court of Chancery would give the custody of the children to the innocent parent; but there might be cases where the wife, being the innocent party, could not exercise the power of protecting the children. Consequently, if the proviso of the noble Lord were adopted, the Court would be bound by an inflexible rule, and then be deprived of the power of consulting the interests of the children.

promised to consider the point before bringing up the Report.

said, he rose to move an Amendment, the effect of which was to provide that in all cases, unless the Court shall otherwise order, the contested fact shall be tried in the county in which the alleged offence is committed.

said, he thought that before the proviso would be applicable the clause itself should be altered. It had already been decided by the Committee that there should be other tribunals for granting judicial separations besides the one Court then proposed to be established; and it seemed to him that the clause as it now stood, as well as the proviso of the hon. Member, would apply only to proceedings as they were intended to be taken with only one Court in existence.

said, that it was now too late to make any Amendment in the language of this Section, but when they came to discuss the clauses with respect to the local jurisdictions of which he had given notice, it would be open to the hon. and learned Member to introduce words which would attain the object that he had in view. The proviso moved by the hon. and learned Member for the county of Wexford (Mr. M'Mahon) he thought both unnecessary and objectionable. It was objectionable, because, while the questions of fact referred to in the clause might be with respect either to cruelty, desertion, or misconduct, as well as to adultery, the words of the proviso would limit them to the latter offence. It was unnecessary, because the 37th section of the Bill the Court would have power to direct one or more issues to be tried in a court of common law, and in the exercise of this power it would, unless there were good reason to the contrary, act in accordance with the usual practice of Courts having such powers—namely, have the issue tried where the offence or cause of action was alleged to have arisen.

said, he was satisfied with this explanation, and hoped that the Court would act upon it.

said, that when a petitioner came into court, and was asked whether he himself had been guilty of adultery, it would be unfair to allow him to refuse to answer the question. He thought that this clause should be postponed until the Committee had decided whether adultery should or not be considered a misdemeanour.

said, he should move the omission of the latter part of the clause; as in point of fact, the Bill did deal with adultery as a criminal matter.

said, the hon. Baronet had not present to his mind the circumstance that by the law of evidence established in this country, and under a very recent statute, an exception had always been made, and still existed, that in actions in which an issue touching adultery was raised the husband and wife should not be examined one against the other. The proviso had nothing to do with the ordinary rule adopted in the criminal law, that no man or woman should be compelled to criminate himself or herself; but it was framed with reference to the special law of evidence, which had always been deemed applicable to the case of the husband and wife.

But did not the clause introduce the petitioner to be examined, notwithstanding that law? He understood the Attorney General to say that the law of evidence, as settled by Parliament, prevented the husband or wife being examined in actions of civil procedure affecting the other. But this clause stepped in and said, that the petitioner should be examined; it was therefore, taken out of that rule. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL: With that qualification.] Precisely so; and if the husband or wife were introduced as a witness at all there seemed to be some absurdity in excluding from his or her evidence that particular answer which was most vital to the subject in reference to which he or she was examined.

said, that at present in matrimonial causes in the Ecclesiastical Courts the husband and wife were examined, but they were not called upon to answer upon oath as to the act of adultery. The present proviso, therefore, proceeded upon the same principle, as its only intention was to get rid of the documentary evidence upon which those Courts proceeded.

said, that if the petitioner were allowed to be questioned as to his having committed adultery he would be put under the strongest possible temptation to commit perjury. He (Mr. Butt) thought it a wise principle of the law.

said, the principle was settled by the Act of Geo. III., which rendered it obligatory to answer, even if penalties and forfeiture were in question, with the exception of criminal indictment.

said, that no person was bound to answer a question which might subject him to ecclesiastical censure, which would be the case if he were compelled to acknowledge that he had been guilty of adultery. The penalties and forfeitures referred to were the consequences of qui tam actions or indictments.

said, that no legal penalty attached now-a-days to adultery, and therefore there were no grounds for a refusal to answer.

said, he wished to learn from the hon. and learned Attorney General whether, in his opinion, the clause vent far enough. Let him suppose, for instance, that a man were to bring a petition against a woman upon the ground of adultery, and that she should plead as a counter charge that the husband had been guilty of bigamy, would the latter, he should like to know, be obliged under the operation of the clause to answer that question?

said, that the clause was intended simply to provide that when a husband or wife was a petitioner for a divorce a vinculo either party should be subject to be examined by the Court as to all those facts which it was the duty of the Court to ascertain for its own information before it could come to a decision in uncontested cases. In giving that power, however, it had been deemed advisable to place a guard upon its exercise by not conferring upon the Court authority to institute an inquisitorial examination into the fact of adultery. It did, however, express a general rule. With respect to the question of the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) he need not only say that bigamy in the ordinary interpretation of that word would always be found to include adultery.

said, he should not object to the omission of the words in question, but for an opposite reason to that assigned by the hon. and learned gentleman. The clause was intended only to apply to cases where the husband was an applicant, but as it was worded it gave rise to a doubt whether it was limited to cases where the husband applied for the dissolution of the marriage. He could imagine a case where the husband applied for a judicial separation, and it might be right in such a case that the property of the wife, or some portion of it, should be applied for the benefit of the husband and for the maintenance of the children.

then proposed that the word "divorce" should be omitted.

said, he thought the effect of the clause would be to preserve the settlement made on the wife even in the case of reconcilement subsequent to judicial separation.

said, that there was no difficulty. The Court would only authorise such an arrangement of the property as would meet the case, whether of divorce or separation.

said, a serious question was involved in this clause. Suppose the case of a woman whose property was settled on herself to her own use; it seemed rather a violation of justice that her husband should be able to make an ill-used wife of her, and thereby obtain the use of a large portion of her property as guardian for their children, in the event of her being compelled by his had treatment to sue for a separation or divorce.

said, he should move to leave out the whole proviso. The affidavits on one side might contradict those of the other, and then recourse could be had to examining the witnesses vivâ voce. He was counsel lately in a case in which, after affidavits had been taken at a great expense, they were so contradictory that no less than six days were subsequently occupied in examining the witnesses vivâ voce.

decided that the hon. and learned Gentleman could not move the omission of the proviso.

said, he thought that the Court should have the discretion of compelling the witnesses to appear in court, and that it should not be left in the power of the opposite party.

remarked that it was highly desirable that in these matters the witnesses should appear personally.

said, he thought there was nothing more pernicious to public morals than the publication of the proceedings in actions of criminal conversation and in cases of divorce before the House of Lords, and he would therefore ask the hon. and learned Attorney General to consider whether it might not be left in the power of the Court, with the consent of the parties, to order that the proceedings under this Bill should take place in private.

said, there was a clause giving the Court such a discretion.

said, that as he believed this clause would entail great expense and occasion some confusion, he would recommend its omission. As he understood its operation the parties would be at liberty to verify their respective cases by affidavit, but either party would have the right of requiring that the deponents on the opposite side should be brought up from a considerable distance to London to be examined orally in court, and, after all, the question might be submitted to trial by a jury. It would be more advisable to leave it to the Court to regulate the procedure.

said, he thought it advisable that the proviso should be omitted.

said, the mode of proceeding proposed by the clause certainly appeared to be exceedingly complicated, and he was anxious to hear from his hon. and learned Friend whether the hon. and learned Gentleman was correct in his view of the effect of the clause.

observed, that if the Court directed a trial by jury, the 45th clause provided that at such trial the rules of evidence acted upon by the Courts at Westminster Hall should be observed; but there might be many questions which need not necessarily go to a jury, and this clause provided that in such cases evidence might be taken by affidavit, the attendance of the deponents to be cross-examined orally in open court being only required on the demand of the opposite party. He thought the proviso was sufficiently guarded.

said, that the fact of the adultery would not be tried by a jury, unless either of the respondents demanded it; and they would have that power even after the petitioner had verified his case by affidavit, and been cross-examined in court.

said, that according to the clause the parties might verify their respective cases in whole or in part by affidavit, but subject to cross-examination on the application of the opposite party, and in another part of the Bill there was a provision that contested matters might be referred, at the instance of either party, to be tried by a jury. What he wanted to know was whether both these processes could be applied under the Bill to the same matter?

said, that no one acquainted with the ordinary procedure in Courts of Justice could entertain any doubt on the point. The Court would inquire whether it was intended to have the matter tried by a jury, and, if so, would not then permit the deponent to be cross-examined in open court.

observed, that he thought words should be inserted, declaring that a discretion was left to the Judge on this point.

said, he wished to propose a proviso, to the effect that where contested matters of fact were tried by a jury the costs should abide the event of the verdict, unless such verdict should be set aside by the Court. A man might be acquitted of adultery, but ruined by costs at the caprice of the Court.

remarked that he could not assent to the proviso. The question tried by the jury might be only one part of the contested matter, and that might be found in favour of one party, while another matter might be decided against him. It would, therefore, be wrong to make the costs go in one direction, while the real merits of the case might be in another.

said, it would be necessary to alter the clause if a provision was to be brought up by the hon. and learned Attorney General constituting any Court of Assize or Sessions a Court for making decrees in any proceeding under the Bill; therefore, instead of the words "by the said Court," he proposed the words "by the Court before which any cause under the Act might be brought."

said, he thought, that, with a little alteration in the wording the Amendment might prove a very useful addition to the Bill; but it was an addition contingent upon the House hereafter adopting the principle of investing local Courts with jurisdiction under the Bill. The only difficulty he had in acceding to some Amendment of the sort now was that, should the House hereafter not adopt that principle, then there would be nothing to which the words could apply. He would, therefore, recommend the noble Lord to withdraw his Amendment for the present, upon the understanding that he quite assented to its principle.

said, he rose to move the insertion of words for the purpose of rendering more clear the authority of the Court to hear any proceedings under the Act in private. Cases occasionally occurred where the publication of the proceedings was productive of such injury to public morals that it was most advisable to empower the Court to hear them privately.

said, he would submit that the words proposed were unnecessary, because the new Court, like the Court of Chancery, would possess an inherent jurisdiction to determine whether a case should be heard in public or in private. But though he admitted that there were occasional advantages in private hearings, very great disadvantages also attended them. Justice was never so well administered in private as it was in public, and therefore he should be reluctant to introduce any words into the Act which should give a legislative sanction to private hearings. Although there were great objections to the publication of the disgusting details which occasionally appeared in print, still it must be remembered that the liability to have these matters thus brought before the public served as a great check upon those who were inclined to conduct themselves improperly.

said, he wished to point out that by the 43rd clause it was provided that all the evidence should be taken in open Court, so that unless specific words were inserted in the Bill it was quite plain that the proceedings must be in public. He agreed that public policy was in favour of trial in open court; but if the parties agreed he could see no objection to the power being given. He should not object to the provision being limited to the case of parties agreeing to such course.

said, he should support the Amendment. It appeared to him that they could not secure the advantage which might be derived from the abolition of crim. con. actions if they did not provide that the proposed new Court should have the power to hear causes in private.

said, it had been attempted to get into the four corners of this Bill the greatest curse of the Court of Chancery and the greatest curse of the Ecclesiastical Courts—that of the form of procedure. He trusted that the Court should be allowed to decide upon its own power of procedure, and he should move as an Amendment to strike out from the clause all the words which related to that subject.

said, that the words in question had been added to the Bill at the suggestion of what might fairly be considered the right hon. Gentleman's own side of the House of Lords. He (the Attorney General) had no objection to make a sacrifice of those words.

said, he thought a provision ought to be inserted in the clause, to the effect that the Judge who had first heard the case should not be a member of the Court to which the appeal from his own decision was made.

said, it appeared to him that the time within which the appeal might be brought ought to be extended beyond the proposed period of three months. An appeal could not be made from our most distant colonies within that time.

said, he could not adopt either of the suggestions made by the hon. and learned Gentleman.

said, that all these cases of divorce for adultery turned mainly upon questions of fact, and yet the clause proposed to confine the appeal to questions of law. The whole status of the woman was thus liable to be taken away without her having the opportunity, as a matter of right, to carry the case to a higher tribunal. The question to come before this Court included, besides the mere fact of adultery, the facts connected with connivance, recrimination, and other pleas in bar of the petition for a divorce. Moreover, a previous clause in the Bill enabled the Court to deprive a married woman of her property, though settled upon her for her separate use, and to dispose of it for the benefit of the husband or the children. Thus, in a question affecting not merely the personal status, but also the property of the wife, she would have no right of appeal, however much she might deem herself aggrieved. He would therefore move the omission of the words of limitation contained in the clause—namely, "but no such appeal to the House of Lords shall be had on any matter except on a question of law, to be stated m a case to be prepared by the party appealing, and approved by the said Court."

said, upon matters of law there could scarcely be any appeal; and upon matters of fact appeals now formed a regular feature of our jurisprudence. Still appeals could not be allowed from decisions of a jury. Perhaps it would be best to shape the clause so as to allow of no appeals except upon questions decided by the Court.

said, he entirely concurred in the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, who had anticipated him in the observations that he had just made. In conceding the right of appeal it was very difficult to draw the line between questions of law and questions of fact. The process of reasoning, by which conclusions as to the facts were arrived at was the most frequent source of error, and therefore questions of fact ought, above all others, to be submitted to appeal. The provision requiring the approval of the Court, from whom the appeal went up to be previously obtained, was also vicious in principle.

said, he now proposed to take the opinion of the Committee on the question, whether the guilty parties should have the right to re-marry. Upon the decision come to on this clause it depended whether the Bill should be known hereafter for good or for ill. Merely harmless the measure could not be. Potent it must be, either to elevate or to depress the sanctity of the marriage obligation. He could not agree that the principle of the Bill was merely to maintain the existing law, and to create a new Court for its administration. On the contrary, yielding to the principle affirmed by the House on the second reading, the true end and aim of the Bill might yet be taken to be to sustain and promote the sanctity of that obligation in the minds of the many, and, at the same time, to afford, as far as was consistent with that end, but no further, redress to the few, in whose case that sanctity had been violated. To enable the guilty parties to marry as freely as if the first union had been dissolved by death was incompatible with either of those objects. The result of so doing would be to give relief and encouragement to those by whom the sanctity of marriage had been outraged. It was idle to say that adultery was to be regarded only as a sin against the Divine law, and to be left for its redress to religious sanctions merely. They were clearly entitled, in legislation like the present, to deal with it as an offence against the law of the country. The right to remarry was treated by the Bill as a privilege and a boon, and adultery as an offence giving that privilege by way of redress to the injured party. But this clause as it now stands with monstrous inconsistency confers the privilege also upon the wrongdoer. Let the House apply the clause to those cases in which, from defects of temper and other causes not criminal, mutual unhappiness had followed marriage. At present there was no remedy except in mutual sacrifices of temper. But this clause, taken with the rest of the Bill, would teach these persons that if one of them would add to their defects of temper the guilt of adultery, it would be open to the innocent party to apply for a divorce, and when it was obtained they would both be relieved from their unhappiness and might marry again. The commission of the offence of adultery certainly did not give the adulterer the right of divorce, but the guilty party would calculate upon the other obtaining a divorce, and then they were on an equal footing. The result would be that the Bill by giving the right of remarriage to both parties would hold out a reward and an inducement to the guilt of adultery. It might be said that you could scarcely adopt any legislation which would be free from anomalies. No doubt that was true; but let them not carry anomalies further than was necessary. It was also said that considerations of justice, morality, policy, and expediency required that the right of remarriage should be given to those who had committed adultery. He took issue upon this assertion. If the punishment of the offender were necessary to prevent the spreading of the offence, then no consideration of expediency could be alleged against his punishment. When the Committee remembered that our whole social system was built up on the maintenance of the marriage contract, and when they considered how few incurred the guilt and how many were tainted by the consequences, they would agree with him, he hoped, in denying that any considerations of justice, morality, or policy could be alleged in defence of such a clause. The justice to be thought of was justice to the public. The morality to be regarded was the morality of the thousands and millions who might be tainted with the guilt of the few, and not especially or exclusively the morality of those whose conduct rendered legislation necessary. He contended that Parliament ought to protect the many, and not sacrifice them to the few who fell into crime. Far be it from him to arrogate to himself any peculiar sanctity or morality, or to show himself deficient in pity or sympathy for the weaknesses of our nature; but he thought that if men erred they should bear the consequences as they might, and reconcile themselves to their God as they could. Parliament, at least, must leave the consequences of guilt upon the wrongdoer. If they examined the law of other countries they would find that it had never yet been positively enacted in the written law of any country that divorce should be granted by reason of adultery, and that the adulterer should be at liberty to marry again. These results might have been unwittingly the consequence of legislation, but to pass such an enactment was unheard of. Mr. Macqueen's abridgment of the codes of other countries referred to France, Sweden, and Scotland. In France the law distinctly prohibited the adulterer from marrying the woman with whom he had committed adultery. The hon. and learned Member for Cambridge (Mr. Wigram) proposed this exact remedy, and he should be glad if that hon. and learned Member's Amendment were adopted, and his own proposition which went further be rejected. In Scotland the law was the same as in France. In Sweden the law forbade the adulterer to marry at all, except with the consent of the spouse and the King. What had been our own law? It had been said that the result of our special legislation had practically been to allow the adulterer or adultress upon divorce to marry again. It should be recollected, however, that they were trying an experiment, for this clause introduced to the mass of the people for the first time the proposition that the party against whom a divorce was obtained for adultery was to be at liberty to marry again. The special Acts of Parliament that had hitherto been passed had all, without exception, referred to cases drawn from a small portion of the community. The middle and lower classes had hitherto supplied no instances of such legislation. The Legislature had been lulled to sleep by the bringing forward of isolated cases from time to time, and they all knew the influences that had been brought to bear in many individual instances. If they established local tribunals and if within a year it became known through the length and breadth of the land that persons dissatisfied with one another, though perhaps not having fixed their affections elsewhere, might both be at liberty to marry again, upon either party committing adultery, the result must be to sap and weaken the notions of conjugal fidelity to an extent which could not be calculated, but which, judging from experience of human nature, would certainly be very large. In a debate in the House of Lords, Lord Erskine said that thirty years' practice at the bar convinced him that the inter-marriage of offenders tended to the commission of the offence. In 1809, in a debate upon a Standing Order, the Bishop of Durham and the Bishop of Rochester gave the same evidence. If they were about to leave the lessons of experience and enter the field of experiment and speculation, those who advocated the clause were bound at least to demonstrate to a certainty that the change would not be open to the objections which he had stated. In private divorce Acts care was taken to enact that the innocent party should be at liberty to marry again, but they had never yet dared to say that the guilty party should be al liberty to marry again. It might be that the law enabled the guilty party to marry again, but Parliament had never given its solemn sanction to such a proposition by a declaration to that effect. Though attempts to prohibit such marriages had failed, yet when they were called upon to pass a law which was to extend over the whole community there was no reason why the subject should not be reviewed and that course taken which would best maintain the sanctity of the conjugal relation. He would now call attention to the various modes in which the clause might be altered, and to the several propositions before the House on this subject. He should hereafter move absolutely to prohibit the party against whom the divorce was obtained from marrying again during the life of the person obtaining the divorce. The hon. and learned Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Wigram) had given notice of an Amendment to prevent the guilty parties intermarrying. His right hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Napier) had given notice of another Amendment to leave the law exactly as it was in private divorce Acts; but this could not be conveniently moved after his own Amendment had been submitted to the Committee. He would, therefore, first submit the Amendment of the right hon. Member (who was unfortunately absent) by moving to omit the words "the respective parties thereto," and insert "the party on whose petition the marriage shall have been dissolved." Amendment proposed, in line 15, to leave out the words "the respective parties, and insert the words "the party on whose Petition the marriage shall have been dissolved."

said, the hon. and learned Member intended to follow up the Amendment of the right hon. Member for the University of Dublin, (Mr. Napier) which he had now moved, by the Amendment of which he had himself given notice. The Motion of the hon. and learned Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Wygram) to prevent the remarriage of the guilty parties, raised a distinct question., What he should deal with now was the substantial proposition of the hon. and learned Member for West Gloucestershire, (Mr. Rolt) that the guilty person should ever after be debarred from remarriage. It was altogether a new principle to establish a kind of penal celibacy.

said, he wished to explain that he would have moved his own proposition first if the rules of the House would not then have prevented the consideration of the Motion, of the right hon. Gen- tleman the Member for the University of Dublin.

said, the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman would leave the law in precisely the same state as if the clause were not altered. It was admitted that in ordinary divorce Acts, though permission only was given to the innocent party, there was no prohibition of the marriage of the guilty party, and such marriages were valid in law. It was therefore a mere matter of form whether they adopted the Amendment or left the Bill as it now stood. The Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman was tantamount to a sentence of penal celibacy. Let them take the case of a woman who had been guilty of a breach of the marriage vow. Was that woman, if divorced, never to have an opportunity of reformation or repentance? Her husband having married again, the band of matrimony being entirely dissolved, she being in the eye of the law a single woman, was she to be condemned to a life of what the hon. and learned Gentleman had himself called degraded celibacy? He hoped that such a proposition would not meet with the approval of the Committee.

said, he would confine himself to the Motion which stood first—namely, that of which the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Napier) had given notice. The advantage of adopting that Motion would be, that by so doing they would really be keeping the law as it at present stood. Now that, he thought, was the great principle of the Bill. Suppose that a woman had violated her marriage vow, and that a divorce ensued, what was likely to be the feeling of the great mass of her neighbours on the subject? She would, no doubt, be exposed for a little time to their just indignation; but he maintained that the general feeling of the neighbours would be that it was a great pity the man should not be enabled to offer to the woman the only reparation which he had then in his power to render. They would be acting wrongly if they attempted to make this Bill a reflection of the Divine law. No doubt it became them to bear that law in their consciences; but they must remember that they were then exercising their legislative functions with regard to a civil right. On the one hand, they ought not to give to guilty parties a right to claim religious sanctions to a second marriage; but, on the other, it did not become them to take away from a guilty woman a locus penitentiœ. He thought it most desirable that the Bill should be made to correspond as far as possible with the existing law, and this object would be in a great measure gained by adopting the Amendment of the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Napier.)

observed, that he did not understand the hon. and learned Member for West Gloucestershire to wish to reduce the guilty party to compulsory celibacy through life. What he believed the hon. and learned Gentleman meant to say was, that the adultress should be compelled to remain single during the life of her former husband.

said, he thought that if they prevented the intermarriage of the guilty parties, so far from promoting morality, they would simply encourage seduction, by freeing the seducer from the obligation which society imposed upon him of compensating by marriage the woman whom he had wronged.

said, as the Amendment of which he had given notice had been virtually negatived by the division just taken, he did not feel justified in pressing it upon the Committee.

said, he had an Amendment to propose which would require him to make a statement of some length. He should therefore desire not to commence it at that late hour) half-past twelve.)

observed, that the objection of the right hon. Gentleman was reasonable, and he would therefore consent that the Chairman should report progress.

said, he had assented to the second reading of this Bill believing that its professed object—to relieve innocent trustees from the liability of acts into which they had been led by misapprehension—was one worthy of being considered. He, however, found that the details of the Bill were so inconsistent, so obscure, and so inadequate for the object contemplated, that it would be useless to go into Committee unless they were prepared to spend at least three days in reducing it to a practicable shape. He would undertake next Session to introduce a measure which should be better adapted to the end sought, and he therefore hoped the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Walpole) would not press the one now before the House.

said, that as the Bill had received considerable alteration in the other House, and at the hands of those who were perfectly acquainted with the subject, he might well be permitted to demur to the description given by the hon. and learned Gentleman of its details. At the same time, as the hon. and learned Gentleman engaged to introduce a more complete measure next Session of Parliament, and although he scarcely believed the discussion of the Bill in Committee would occupy the time stated by the hon. and learned Gentleman, he should consent to its withdrawal.

said, he felt obliged to oppose this Bill as being against the fundamental principles of liberty in this country. He thought that it trenched on the principle that private dwellings ought not to be interfered with, except on very grave causes. The Bill itself was most imperfect, and the second clause could be understood by no one, nor could it be referred to common lodging-houses. There was no machinery for carrying out the Bill, and he thought that it ought not to be proceeded with at so late a period of the Session. Unless the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cowper) would consent to its being withdrawn, he should move that the House go into Committee upon it that day three months.

said, he also should oppose the measure as being one of a most imperfect character. The 2nd clause might be read by itself for a week, and magistrates could not make anything of it; but if they read it in connection with the preamble, it gave the police power to enter the house of any poor man. Why should the police have power to enter a poor man's house more than that of a rich one? The Bill also gave power in the 3rd clause to enable the London police to act for the whole kingdom in the most objectionable manner, for it empowered them to set in motion the local authorities, when it must be remembered the Nuisances Removal Act expressly provided against such interference by the London police. It had been said that it was to be confined to common lodging-houses, but in point of fact the preamble extended it to all the dwellings of the poor.

said, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not listen to the arguments urged against proceeding with the Bill, for whenever they had any measure of public advantage brought forward, they found hon. Members oppose it upon the old hackneyed political ground—a regard for the liberty of the subject. If London were polled, the vote of every poor man would be given in favour of it. The state of the lodging-houses in London was terrible. Not long ago he went with one of the police to visit some of these lodging-houses, when he was surrounded by persons who begged that the provisions of the existing Act might be extended to houses which did not now come within their operation. There were many places which, though not technically, were practically lodging-houses, in which several families were crowded together. In one tenement he saw thirty or forty miserable Chinese so crowded together as to breed all kinds of filth and abomination. The crowding of 3,000,000 of persons into a single city was a highly artificial arrangement, and it required some special enactments like those now proposed to get for the poor some measure of air, water, and other matters required for healthful and convenient living.

said, he felt bound to give this Bill his most decided opposition. Instead of being a beneficial and popular Act, it would render the Nuisances' Removal Act a most unpopular one. If they passed this Bill they would be taking the same course as they did upon the Beer Bill last year, and they would be obliged to amend it by a measure next year. The definition of relationship in the Bill was most absurd.

said, that he was not responsible for the framing of this Bill, but he should not be doing justice to those who introduced it into the House of Lords if he were now to withdraw it. If they went into Committee he could show that the measure was not open to the objections which had been raised to it. The 2nd clause did not, as had been alleged, apply to private dwellings, but only to lodging-houses or parts of dwelling-houses. In the 3rd clause it would be desirable to introduce words limiting the authority of the Police Commissioners to their own district.

said, he would beg to remind hon. Members representing places north of the Tweed that the Bill did not apply to Scotland. Speaking as a Metropolitan Member, he maintained that this Bill was a step in the wrong direction; and that it interfered injuriously with the freedom of the poor in the management of their own dwellings. The poor were not more anxious than the rich to live in overcrowded dwellings, but they were compelled to do so by the improvements, which, while constructing large and fine streets for the rich, had driven the poor to reside in districts which consequently became overcrowded. He did not think that it was just to drive the poor out of their present dwellings until they had pointed out were they were to go to, and had provided other dwellings for them.

said, that the House did not appear clearly to understand the nature or the principle of the Bill. Hon. gentlemen got up and said that the Bill proposed an interference with the dwellings of the poor, but the fact was that it was not with the dwellings of the poor that the Bill proposed to deal. The fact was, that the unfortunate wretches for whose welfare the Bill provided did not live in their own houses. A number of capitalists had built tenements which were occupied by the poor as lodging-houses, and from a sordid love of gain they kept the inmates of those tenements in a state of misery, of dirt, and disease. The main object of the Bill was to compel these monopolist builders to provide the means of common decency and cleanliness, in which he believed, so far from being damaged, they would ultimately find their account. The Bill might require amendment, or it might not; but that was a question to be settled in Committee. He trusted, therefore, that the House would not be lead away by misrepresentations, and retard the progress of a measure which would be productive of great benefit to the labouring classes.

said, he would not at that late hour trespass long upon the attention of the House, but there were certain facts with which he thought hon. Members ought to be made acquainted. The condition of the lodging-houses did not regard the poor alone, but being, as they were at present, nuclei of disease and pestilence, they affected the whole community. A Report which had been drawn up for the Statistical Society of London, and part of which had been prepared from his own personal experience, disclosed a state of things with regard to the condition of the poorer classes almost incredible. He would not trouble the House by quoting many passages from that Report, but there were one or two which he thought that it would be advisable to refer to, and he would confine himself to London. There were, however, many cases mentioned in that Report illustrating the deplorable condition of the working classes, with regard to lodging accommodation in the manufacturing districts. It appeared, from the Report, and he could confirm it from personal observation, that in Church Lane, St. Giles', in London, the population examined was 463, the number of families 100, and the number of bedsteads amongst them ninety, the average being above five souls to a bed, and many rooms were inhabited by as many as twenty-two souls, without water, or drainage, or privies, while in one of the rooms containing twenty-two souls there was a dead body. The condition, in fact, of those people was so revolting that the committee of the Statistical Society of London concluded a Report, which they were called upon to make as follows:—

"Your Committee have thus given a picture in detail of human wretchedness, filth, and brutal degradation, the chief features of which are a disgrace to a civilized country, and which your Committee have reason to fear, from letters that have appeared in the public journals, is but the type of the miserable condition of masses of the community, whether located in the small, ill-ventilated rooms of manufacturing towns, or in many of the cottages of the agricultural peasantry. In these wretched dwellings all ages and both sexes, fathers and daughters, mothers and sons, grownup brothers and sisters, stranger adult males and females, and swarms of children, the sick, the dying and the dead, are herded together with a proximity and a mutual pressure which brutes would resist; where it is physically impossible to preserve the ordinary decencies of life; where all sense of propriety and self-respect must be lost, to be replaced only by a recklessness of demeanour which necessarily results from vitiated minds; and yet with many of the young, brought up in such hotbeds of mental pestilence, the hopeless, but benevolent attempt is making to implant, by means of general education, the seeds of religion, virtue, truth, order, industry and cleanliness; but which seeds, to fructify advantageously, need, it is to be feared, a soil far less rank than can be found in these wretched abodes. Tender minds, once vitiated, present almost insuperable difficulties to reformation; bad habits and depraved feelings gather with the growth and strengthen with the strength."

said, that the report of the Police Commissioners, on which this Bill was founded, expressly claimed for the police the right to interfere with every poor man's residence. If it did not mean that, it meant nothing, for common lodging-houses were already dealt with by the existing Act. That, however, was a claim to which he could not assent, and he hoped, therefore, that the House would not assent to this measure.

said, in spite of what had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for Southwark, he would maintain it to be his right as an Irish Member to take part in the discussion of a measure by the operation of which a large number of the poorer classes of his fellow countrymen would be affected. He should give his hearty support to the Bill.

said, that if the Bill had been introduced here, instead of in the other House, a perfect storm would have been raised against it. The Bill handed over the Metropolis bodily to the police. It gave them the power to break into any house with which they might choose to interfere,

said, the discussion with regard to the Bill, had as yet been mainly directed to the question of its operation within the Metropolis. He should support it on the ground that it was required, no less for the rural districts than for the towns. The evils of crowded dwellings prevailed equally in both, and in each case required a legislative remedy.

moved the adjournment of the House.