said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to carry out the recommendations of the Commissioners, appointed in 1846, for the Reform of the Criminal Laws of the Island of Jersey, and to abolish the Royal Court in that Island, which the said Commissioners, in said year, declared not to be deserving of public confidence? Whether it is their intention to issue a Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Laws of Jersey, and the mode of administering them, in accordance with the declared intention and promise of Government in the year 1846, by the then Home Secretary? or, whether it is their intention to take any measures for assimilating the Laws of Jersey to the Laws of England?

said, the question put to him by the hon. Gentleman was one of no inconsiderable importance. His answer to the first question, however, was that there were only two ways in which the recommendation alluded to by the hon. Member could be done, either by an Order in Council, emanating from the Crown, or by proceedings to be taken in that House. The recommendations of the Commissioners which they made in their Report were in three respects sought to be carried into execution by Order in Council upon the suggestion of the Governor and the law officers of the Crown in Jersey. On the 11th February, 1852, they proposed three Orders in Council in pursuance of recommendations contained in the Commissioners' Re- port. The first was to establish a Court of Summary Jurisdiction for Criminal Procedure in small cases. The second was for the establishment of a Small Debts Court; and the third was for the establishment of a better system of Police. The States in Jersey resisted these Orders in Council, appealed to the Crown, and the matter was heard before the Privy Council, which came to the conclusion that it was doubtful whether the prerogative of the Crown exercised in that manner was consistent with the rights of the States and the people of Jersey, and accordingly they recommended that those Orders in Council should be revoked. At the same time, the States in Jersey proposed of their own accord six Acts, which embraced some of the points contained in the three Orders of Council, and those six Acts had become now the law in Jersey, and had been put into operation. More than that unquestionably, for the sake of the administration of justice in Jersey, both criminal and civil, required to be done; but it was clear from the statement he had made that no amendment in that respect could be made by Orders in Council emanating from the Crown, but the matter must be left more or less to the States and people of the island. The other mode by which it could be done was by legislation. He did not know whether the hon. Gentleman was aware, but he ought to be aware if he was not, that no Act of Parliament could have any operation in the Island of Jersey until it was duly registered by the States. Consequently, if the Legislature were to attempt to pass an Act of Parliament to carry into effect the recommendations of the Commissioners, they might bring themselves into collision with the authorities of Jersey; jealousy would arise between the two countries, and he was pursuaded that less would be done by means of attempted coercion than by leaving it to the legislature of the island. The second question of the hon. Member was, whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to issue a Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Laws of Jersey and the mode of administering them. He (Mr. Walpole) had great doubts whether the issuing of such a Commission would not, by provoking the jealousy of the island, do more harm than good. The answer to the third question, whether it was their intention to take any measures for assimilating the Laws of Jersey to the Laws of England, was in fact involved in his answer to the first. He would say in conclusion, that having taken the liberty of answering the questions with more detail than usual, because it was a matter of great importance with which the House was perhaps not familiar, he could only add that the attention of Government had been for some time called to many grievous defects in the administration of justice in Jersey, and he had himself since he had been in office taken some means to remedy those defects, but he believed that more would be done by suggestion than by any attempted force on the part of the Crown or of Parliament.

said, he wished to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if his attention has been directed to the commercial inconvenience likely to be caused by Bankers refusing to honour checks when drawers have omitted to write their initials on adhesive stamps, but which are otherwise cancelled, sufficiently to accord with the intention of the Act; and if it is contemplated to enable persons who have given valuable consideration for such cheques to attach, or to cancel, adhesive stamps in lien of the drawers. He had intended to ask whether the Government proposed to amend the Law relating to crossed cheques, so as to make the crossing to a Banker an essential part of the cheque. The right hon. Gentleman, however, by giving notice of a Bill on the subject, had rendered this question unnecessary.

I am glad to infer from the question of the hon. Gentleman that the commercial inconvenience to which he refers is not au absolute but only a probable inconvenience. I have not yet heard that any inconvenience has occurred, and I will inform him of the practice of the Bank of England, trusting that every other establishment will follow its example. At the present time if a cheque is presented to the Bank of England without the stamp being cancelled payment is refused, but if that stamp is virtually cancelled so that it cannot be used again, payment is always made. Therefore I do not think that time inconvenience to which the hon. Member refers is likely to occur. The Government do not contemplate proposing, at present, any alteration in the new Act, or any further conditions to meet the difficulty, which is probably one that will settle itself in time.

said, he would beg to ask whether there is any truth in a statement which has appeared in the Irish Journals to the effect that a person named Burke, the principal evidence in the case of the Cormacks, lately executed at Thurles for the murder of Mr. Ellis, has since confessed, while in the hands of the authorities, that his evidence upon their trial had been false, and given under coercion; whether any investigations had taken place into the circumstances, and what had since been done with Burke?

in answer to the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, said, that he believed the man Burke had made no such confession. In reply to the second part of the question, he had to say that an investigation had taken place. The witness was about to leave the country, as was, unfortunately, not uncommonly the case with such witnesses in Ireland, and it was reported to the Government that he had made some statement to the driver of a car, who drove him from Roscrea to Nenagh. His (Mr. Whiteside's) colleague, had investigated the matter, and found that there was nothing in it. The man had given his evidence in a manner that was satisfactory to the Court. As to the third part of the question, he could not tell where the man was, as he was free to go where he liked; but if he knew where he was he would not tell it.

wished to inquire if the man had not been under the care of the police?

said, he was disposed to think that Burke had been under the protection of the police after he gave his evidence, and before he left the country.

said, he would beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether Drafts or Orders on Bankers in the form of "Debit my account £10," or "Pay myself £10," but not including the words "Bearer on demand," may be drawn at and paid over the Bank counter without a penny stamp; and whether, notwithstanding the recent Act, such unstamped cheques are legal?

said, that Drafts or Orders on Bankers in the form of "Debit my account £10," or "Pay myself £10," but not including the words "Bearer on demand," were liable, as the Government were advised, to the same stamps which were provided for by the old Act, and not at all affected by the new one. At the same time, the Government were also advised that if the drafts were really paid to the person who drew them over the counter, they were legal without any stamp.

said, he would beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether if it is the case that several merchant vessels belonging to the United States, engaged in the trade with Havannab, or with the West Coast of Africa, have been fired into, boarded, searched, and detained by British, Cruisers, and if so, by what authority, or under whose instructions, did the commanders of these ships so act?

regretted that he could not give a satisfactory answer last night to the question of the hon. Gentleman, as he was aware the hon. Gentleman was anxious that some answer should go out by the mail which left this evening. He begged to say that in reference to the cases which the hon. Gentleman stated to the House last night the Government had no official knowledge of them whatever. The statement, merely cut from a New York newspaper, had been forwarded to the Government by the British Ambassador at Washington. With regard to one case, that of the Cortez, he (Mr. S. FitzGerald) had come to a different conclusion from that of the American newspapers, and was inclined to think that the capture was properly made. With regard to the other cases, he could only say that Her Majesty's Government would deeply regret that any such occurrence should have taken place, and that they were as anxious as the Government of the United States that no such occurrence should take place. The real difficulty arose from the fact that slavers almost invariably hoisted the American flag. Her Majesty's Government had signified to the Government of the United States that they were ready to adopt such pleasures as the latter might suggest to meet that difficulty. Orders had been already sent out by the Admiralty, giving peremptory instructions to our officers to observe the utmost caution, and those instructions would again be carefully repeated.

said, he would now beg to move that Mr. Wilks be discharged from the custody of the Serjeant at Arms. He had heard that there were some objections to release Mr. Wilks, but he was not aware exactly what they were; and he should, before entering into any explanation on this petition, desire to hear what these objections were. He made the Motion because he conceived that Mr. Wilks had in his petition withdrawn the particular imputation of corrupt motive which caused the House to pass the Resolution for committal. There might be other parts of the article condemned which might give displeasure to hon. Members, but they were not parts which came under the consideration of the House, and caused the procedure to be taken against Mr. Wilks. He considered that Mr. Wilks having made an apology, and withdrawn the particular imputation of which the House had taken notice, he was in a condition to make a Motion for his discharge.

said, he did not think his right hon. Friend (Mr. M. Gibson) would be in a position to move for the discharge of Washington Wilks till that gentleman had apologised, not only for the particular charge made against the hon. Member for Hereford, but also for his general charge of corruption. He (Mr. Roebuck) wanted to know distinctly whether Mr. Wilks withdrew that general charge of corruption as well as the personal charge against the Chairman of the Committee. Until he received an assurance that Mr. Wilks did that, he should refuse his consent to the Motion of his right hon. Friend.

said, that he would treat this matter as one affecting any other Member of the House, although it was not easy for the friends of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Clive) to mistate the temper and moderation which that hon. Gentleman had exhibited. Indeed, every Member of the House must feel that it was a matter affecting each individual of it. The libel complained of, though contained in several paragraphs, divided itself into two heads: the first was a charge of open and notorious partisanship—and so open that the hon. Member's partisanship for the Caledonian line had frequently been made the subject of allusion in his presence; the second was the more grave charge of being influenced by corrupt motives. He need not say anything as to this second part, because that particular charge had been withdrawn. As the hon. Member (Mr. Clive) had done him the honour to consult him upon the subject, and to a certain degree placed the conduct of the matter in his hands, he hoped the House would bear with him for entering somewhat into an explanation of what had taken place. He had sent a gentleman well known to Mr. Wilks to say that, assuming his professional honour prevented his giving up the name of his informant, or the names of the authors of the various stories, if he would furnish such details of those stories as would enable the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Clive) satisfactorily to disprove them, he (Mr. Clay) would undertake to furnish Mr. Wilks with evidence of their utter falsehood. It was said, for instance, and more or less repeated by Mr. Wilks when he stood at the bar, that the hon. Member (Mr. Clive) had been seen with a stockbroker known to act for the Caledonian Railway, or had been seen in his office, or in communication with him. He undertook to show that this gentleman had never seen or known the hon. Member (Mr. Clive), and to get the most solemn declaration that in no way, either directly or indirectly, had he been either a seller or buyer for investment, or for what was called time bargains, of any railway stock for some years past. He undertook to get a declaration from his own stockbroker to the same effect, in terms as distinct as the ingenuity of man could devise. As regarded the open partisanship, which was said to be patent to the counsel as well as to the audience, he hoped to be able to prove with regard to all of the learned counsel—he knew that he could with regard to one of them—that up to the moment of the decision being given it was uncertain to which side the bias of the Chairman's mind inclined. The statement that the hon. Member was frequently rallied on his partisanship was very easy of proof, but not very easy of disproof; but if there were any gentlemen who had rallied the Chairman, either in or out of the Committee, they might very easily be found, when, no doubt, they would repeat the statement they had formerly made. His (Mr. Clay's) proposal therefore was that he should, upon his own responsibility, establish the falsehood of all the charges made, but only upon one condition, namely, that the retractation of the whole of those charges should be made at the bar of the House, and should also be published in the paper of which this gentleman was the printer, in a form of words with which he (Mr. Clay) would not trouble the House, but such as any gentleman might sign under the circumstances. This proposal was made verbally to Mr. Wilks before he appeared at the bar, but was not accepted. He (Mr. Wilks) might have conceived that the evidence upon which some of the charges were made was stronger than he had since found it to be. Since that proposal was made, he had seen a letter addressed by Mr. Wilks to his right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton, expressing his desire to inquire further into those charges. He was not now laying any blame upon this gentleman; he merely mentioned this to show to hon. Members that this inquiry having been made, and requiring a very short time to carry out, there would be no excessive hardship, if Mr. Wilks should persist in not retracting the whole of his charge, in his further confinement for a time sufficiently long to enable him to put himself in possession of this evidence, and thus leave him without a shadow of an excuse for not retracting the whole article. With regard to the present petition, he would only remark that it contained but a partial retractation. It retracted, it was true, what was the gravest of the charges, but it left wholly untouched that which was a very grave accusation against any hon. Member of that House acting in his judicial capacity. Why was one-half of the imputation to be retracted and not the other? The charge was that the Chairman had exhibited open and notorious partisanship, and that he was frequently rallied in the Committee for his partisanship. He (Mr. Clay) did not see why that charge should not be retracted. It had been denied that any one ever rallied the hon. Member either inside or outside the walls of the House; and if the statement were not established, he thought that Mr. Wilks must retract it. He (Mr. Clay) would leave it to those hon. Gentlemen who led the decisions of the House to take the steps which would be necessary to carry out the view to which the House might arrive, and would content himself with observing that this apology, as it stood, could not be wholly satisfactory to his hon. Friend—could not be wholly satisfactory to his friends, to whom his honour was dear, and hardly satisfactory to the House, which was very properly jealous of the fair fame of every one of its Members.

said, he was sorry to say that he did not think the House could at present arrive at a conclusion which he was sure they would be most willing to arrive at—namely, to accede to the Motion of the Right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ashton (Mr. M. Gibson). The House would remember how the question had been dealt with on the last occasion. A paragraph had been published in the newspaper which the House declared to contain grave and libellous accusations against the Chairman of one of their Committees. The printer and publisher of that newspaper was called to the bar, and one of two alternatives was offered to him, either to retract his statement or to state that lie was prepared to substantiate its truth. He declined to retract, and he also stated that he was not prepared to substantiate its truth; and, therefore, according to precedent an order was made for his committal to the custody of the Serjeant at Arms. He (the Solicitor General) could not see how the fact of this Gentleman's committal into custody could make any difference in the terms which had been offered to him—namely, that he should either unqualifiedly withdraw the charges or should state that he was prepared to substantiate them. He should be very glad, if it were shown to be possible, to come to the conclusion that the form in which this petition was drawn was either owing to inadvertence or to the want of a due consideration of the nature of the charges made. In the article complained of in the petitioner's paper there were two distinct charges against the hon. Gentleman the Member for Hereford, one no doubt graver than the other, but both of a most libellous character. The one charge was, that, while sitting in a judicial character as Chairman of a Select Committee, the hon. Gentleman had acted as a partisan—that he had shown a clear animus in favour of one party and against the other; and that in consequence of that improper bias it was notorious that the Bill which was rejected was thrown out. The second imputation was a suggestion that improper conduct was connected with certain corrupt dealings on the part of the hon. Gentleman in Caledonian stock. These being the charges, what was the retractation proposed? The petitioner said that "he humbly submits to the House that he was not the author of the article condemned, and that in causing the publication of that article he was influenced solely by a conception of public duty, which was perfectly compatible with the profound respect for the House which he had ever professed." Then he went on to say, "that he was not at the time of publication aware of what had since been stated to him, that hon. Members before serving on railway Committees made a declaration of entire disinterestedness." Now he (the Solicitor General) could not help remarking in passing that this statement was in his opinion perfectly irrelevant, and that whether such a declaration was or was not made by the members of Committees on private Bills, the charges remained exactly the same. Mr. Wilks proceeded as follows:—"That he unreservedly retracted the imputation of corrupt motive conveyed in the sentence Does he (meaning the hon. Member for Hereford) stand quite clear of any transactions in Caledonian stock while the case was pending? that imputation having been solemnly denied, and the information on which it was founded having been misunderstood by the author of the statement." That was a retractation which, as far as it went, he should submit to the House was satisfactory; but it was a retractation carefully and markedly confined to one point only—the imputation of corrupt motives contained in one out of several sentences. if the petitioner were discharged on this retractation it would be perfectly competent for him to turn round afterwards and say, "I retracted the imputation of corrupt motives because it was denied, but the hon. Member for Hereford still remains under the other imputation which I made against him, and with regard to which the House of Commons has professed itself perfectly satisfied." Mr. Wilks added, "That in making this retractation he was influenced not only by respect to the Resolution of your honourable House, but also by the desire natural to an honest man to withdraw an imputation which he was not able to substantiate, and which he regretted had been made." That again was satisfactory as far as it went; but then came this further passage which com- plicated the matter still more:—"That in refusing to make this retractation when at the bar of your honourable House on Friday last, your petitioner was actuated by the impression that he was called upon to withdraw the entire article, and thereby to confess that there was no ground for the dissatisfaction which he knows to prevail very extensively in the districts affected by the Bills rejected." So that in point of fact he re-affirmed the whole of the charges except the one which he had specifically withdrawn. Finally, he said:—"That the article, published by your petitioner on the 25th of May, parts of which your petitioner is informed were read to your honourable House, was not intended as a reiteration of the charge denied by the hon. Member for Hereford, but simply as a general answer to what your petitioner felt to be a harsh and arbitrary proceeding." Now he (the Solicitor General) hoped that the House would not adopt harsh or arbitrary proceedings against a person who, from ill advice or from want of knowledge, had made a charge of this description; but he thought that the course which had been taken with regard to Mr. Wilks could not be called either harsh or arbitrary. Mr. Wilks declined at the time to retract the charge or to prove it, and under the circumstances he certainly regretted that the petition had not been couched in different language. The matter concerned, not only the hon. Member for Hereford, but the honour of the whole House; and he thought that they should either give up the practice of taking cognizance of libels of this description altogether, or take care, after entering upon an examination of them, not to render the whole thing a mockery by releasing a person from the custody of the Sergeant at Arms upon an illusory and insufficient apology. For these reasons he was afraid that it was his duty to move as an Amendment to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman, "That the order for the consideration of the petition of Mr. Washington Wilks be discharged."

said, he did not wish to make a martyr of any man. He therefore would beg to suggest that Mr. Washington Wilks should be called to the bar again, and, if he re- tracted the rest of the charges he had made, that he should be discharged; if not, that he should remain in custody.

said, he agreed with his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) that no retractation would be satisfactory that did not withdraw the general charge of corruption; and he felt as strongly as any one that the hon. Member for Hereford was justified, both as a duty to himself and to the House, in taking notice of a charge imputing corrupt motives to him as Chairman of a Railway Committee. He understood, however, that Mr. Wilks had withdrawn or meant to withdraw any charge of corruption. The Solicitor General, however, said that there was something more than a charge of corruption involved—there was the charge of partisanship. It might be that particular expressions in newspaper articles were calculated to give offence, and that unjust decriptions might be published of the conduct of hon. Members; but did those articles constitute charges of such gravity that the House would be prepared to commit the persons making them to Newgate? Where they prepared to commit any editor to Newgate—whoever he might be—who stated that the Chairman of a Committee was partial or biassed? If so, there was no gaol in this kingdom that would be large enough to hold the editors who would have to be committed. Now, did the charge of partiality necessarily imply the charge of corruption? Not at all. A man might be partial because he had opinions of a particular character that inclined him to look with favour on one scheme rather than on another, and not be corrupt. Moreover the hon. and learned Solicitor General was in error when he described the Chairman of a Committee as sitting in a judicial capacity alone, because the fact was that in his case the judicial and legislative capacities were combined. Upon this point Mr. May, in his able work upon the practice of Parliament, said—

"The union of the judicial and legislative functions is not confined to the form of procedure, but is an important principle in the inquiries and decisions of Parliament on the merits of private Bills. As a Court it inquires and adjudicates on the interests of private parties; as a Legislature it is watchful over the interests of the public."

Suppose that the Chairman of a Committee, entertaining general views of railway policy, were opposed on principle to competition between railways. With those antecedent views upon railway policy he would naturally not look with much favour upon a scheme which violated his previous convictions. It might be correct to say that such a person was partial, but it by no means inferred that he was corrupt. Was it required of Mr. Wilks that he should appear at the bar and declare his belief, that the hon. Member for Hereford was an impartial Chairman? How could he say that unless he positively knew that there were no feelings with reference to a general railway policy in the mind of the hon. Member? The only paragraphs with which the House had to deal were those that had been taken down at the table; and Mr. Wilks was perfectly ready to withdraw the passage in those paragraphs which implied a charge of corruption. Any reflection upon a man's judgment, or a charge imputing bias, or partisanship even, was not, he submitted, such a charge as the House should take cognizance of. Why, they were all partisans. He had himself recently been charged with being a partisan of the Earl of Derby, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and it was said that be discharged his legislative duties under the influence of that partisanship. What would they say, however, if he were to propose to call an editor to the bar, and to commit him to Newgate, for making an accusation of that sort? And yet the essence of the charges was the same. They must draw a line somewhere and he would submit that no charges which fell short of attacking the moral character of a Member should be entertained by the House as constituting a breach of privilege. If they pleased, let Mr. Wilks be called to the bar again. He had no objection; but his opinion was, the charge of corrupt motives being withdrawn, that there was nothing left of which the House ought to take cognizance.

said, he was inclined to think that his right hon. Friend who was so skilful in drawing Amendments, had had a hand in framing this petition. His right hon. Friend, however, had endeavoured to lead the House away from the real question, which was simply whether that part of the statement which Mr. Wilks had published, and which he had not retracted, was libellous or not of the character of a Member of that House. They all knew pretty well what a libel was. Did that statement tend to injure the character of the hon. Member for Hereford? Was it not a distinct imputation upon his character and conduct as a Mem- ber of that House in discharging the important functions of the Chairman of a Committee? He thought that was a question which might be very safely left to the common sense of the House: and Mr. Wilks had distinctly and apparently guardedly, refrained from withdrawing that imputation. He therefore entirely concurred in the views which had been so ably and clearly expressed by the Solicitor General and thought that the order ought to be discharged.

said, his Right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton had said that he had been accused of being a partisan of the Earl of Derby because he was a bad politician. With the latter proposition he (Mr. Roebuck) might agree. The withdrawal of that proposition would be a withdrawal of the former. But here was a very different affair. The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Clive) was accused of being a partisan because he was corrupt. What he (Mr. Roebuck) wanted was that the whole syllogism should be withdrawn by the person who might soon be at the bar of the House. Until this man withdrew both parts of the syllogism—its premises and its conclusion—he ought properly to be held in custody. They heard a great, deal about the press. He (Mr. Roebuck) was not alarmed at the press—not a bit. if the press accused him tomorrow of murder he did not care. He should not care a farthing about the accusation, because he should know it was untrue. But it behoved that House to consider whether it was allowed these impudent persons to come forward and make accusations of which they had no proof—because at the bar this man was given the power of saying he could prove his accusation. The press was a powerful instrument. There might be people not so thick-skinned as he (Mr. Roebuck), who cared not about the press. But the press came forward and said that the hon. Member for Hereford in his character of Chairman of a Committee of that House had been a partisan because he was corrupt. That was a grave offence, unless the accusation could be proved. Suppose you charged a man with being a thief and you had no ground for the accusation, was it not right that an action should be brought against you? This man had been morally guilty—and he (Mr. Roebuck) hoped that he would state in his paper to-morrow that he had said so—of an accusation against an hon. Member of that House of which accusation he had no proof. He was therefore a coward as well as a malignant calumniator.

said, he thought that the case was assuming a very serious aspect, and he would frankly own that he did not agree with his hon. and learned Friend that they would simplify this matter by instructing the public in the nature of syllogisms. He ventured to think that the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Bouverie) had misapprehended and misstated the case. It was not the question whether the imputation of partisanship which was not withdrawn was a libellous charge or not. There were many such charges continually made against them. He had read a charge made against himself that very day which he firmly believed to be libellous, and most of them had the satisfaction on most days of reading such charges. But did it follow that although those charges could be noticed in a court of law, where, at all events, their antagonists would meet them on equal terms, and could appeal to an impartial jury, they were to invoke the arm of the House of Commons, and, without affording him the privilege of a trial, commit one of their fellow subjects to custody? He granted it was difficult strictly to lay down the limits within which this House must defend its own honour and the character of its Members; but the question was not what they would be justified in doing—the question was, what it was prudent for them to do. Let him say, in passing, that he had never heard any Gentleman who had been made the subject of a libellous attack conduct himself with so much moderation mid prudence as the hon. Member for Hereford. He was perfectly justified in the course he took, because certain definite acts of corruption were charged against him, and it was therefore fitting that that charge should be challenged in the face of the House of Commons. But as to the question of partisanship, the hon. Member for Hereford had given his own answer, and no person could have listened to that answer without being satisfied that it was complete and conclusive. What was the principle on which they regulated their conduct in the House? Was it their practice to bring comments of a libellous nature before the House? No. They passed them over in silence, trusting to the good sense of their countrymen to do them justice; and if the comment was of a nature that re- quired an answer, they gave that answer in their place in the House, and were satisfied to abide by the verdict of the House and the country. Now, what was the question of which Mr. Wilks had made a partial retractation. He had retracted the charge of corrupt acts—that had entirely disappeared, but there remained the charge that the hon. Member had showed a certain animus—was a partisan, in fact, and that his partisanship was open and patent. That was now the whole charge. Well, it was a material point to consider carefully and deliberately, whether they would undertake to call to the bar and commit to prison every person, who through the medium of the press, chose to say of one of themselves that in the exercise of his duties in Parliament—duties not specially performed on oath but general duties—he was under the influence of notorious and patent partisanship. It appeared to him that the power of arbitrary, or rather of discretionary, imprisonment which the House possessed could only be exercised when it was necessary to defend the House of Commons from reproaches that would weaken their power to discharge their legislative duties. Those powers were not in harmony with the constitution or the safeguards which it provided for the preservation of personal liberty, and were consequently of no value to them except up to the precise point where their exercise was supported by general public opinion. It was not for them to commit themselves to doubtful issues. It would not do for them to take the language of Mr. Wilks and endeavour to extract from it something beyond its plain meaning. It would not do to say that there was a syllogism in the proposition. It would not do to say that there was a "therefore" in the case, and that there might be some fragment or shred of the accusation still remaining. It might be the opinion of the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock that it was a prudent thing to commit everybody who charged them with being partisans to Newgate. He differed from him entirely. Such a course might be easy enough in the first step, and perhaps in the second; but they would find themselves involved in increasing embarrassment at every step. He had ventured to declare those opinions because, with all his respect for the high authority of the hon. and learned Solicitor General and of others who had spoken in that debate, he was convinced that they ought to limit their interference to extreme cases, such as where corruption was clearly charged, and that it would be unwise to claim those exceptional powers, when the licence, though it might be outrageous, still did not exceed that which was exercised in ten thousands of instances by the newspaper press—exercised without sufficient regard to reason or justice, exercised in a way that was a source of great pain to themselves and to their friends, but still exercised upon the whole for the benefit of the country.

said, there could be no doubt that an impression had prevailed in the Committee-room throughout the inquiry that the Chairman was in favour of the Caledonian line. He did not mean to say that the hon. Gentleman intended to encourage such an impression, but he did believe that the hon. Gentleman was acting upon the principle not unknown to many hon. Members of that House, that where an old established railway came before a Committee, it was the duty of the chairman of such Committee to prevent, as far as he could, the establishment of a new line which was likely to compete injuriously with the old. The great bulk of the evidence was in favour of the line which was rejected by the Committee, and which line was supported by petitions from every town, with one exception only, in the district through which it passed. When the line was thrown out, therefore, no doubt it created an extraordinary amount of disappointment and irritation, and many people felt that they were greatly injured by the decision of the Committee. Still, he believed the hon. Member for Hereford was in no respect influenced by improper motives, although he might have been by an improper principle.

said, he wished to recall the attention of the House to the question which was really before it, and which was a very simple one. He quite agreed with the opinion that had been expressed, that it would be a most unwise expedient for Members of that House whenever they found a statement affecting themselves personally, and which they believed to be libellous, to bring the matter under the consideration of the House. He believed every one would coincide with that opinion, and if in the present case only partisanship, or even violent partisanship, had been imputed to the hon. Gentleman, it would not have been a discreet act to call upon the House to assert its privileges. The charge, however, which had been made against the hon. Gentleman was not one of partisanship alone, but it was one alleging corrupt motives as the cause of the partisanship imputed. Well, then, the printer and publisher of the paper in which the libel complained of appeared were summoned to the bar, and the person who had been declared guilty of what had been characterized by the House as a false and scandalous libel had an opportunity of substantiating or retracting the statement which he had made, both of which alternatives he refused, and he was then committed to the custody of the Serjeant at Arms. His next step was to present a petition in which he withdrew, though grudgingly, the most painful portion of that which had been declared a libel; but there was another portion, which, if it had been brought forward alone, perhaps would not have been declared a libel, but which, in conjunction with the other portion, had been declared a libel, which he did not withdraw. The House could not allow such conduct to pass unnoticed, nor could it abstain from requiring that fair and decent apology which he should have thought any person would, under the circumstances, have been prompt to offer. There was no course in life more unwise than for an individual, whatever his position might be, if he found it, necessary to make an apology, to make it grudgingly. Now, Mr. Wilks had been in the wrong, not only as regarded that portion of the charge which he had retracted, but wrong in that portion which he had not. What said the petitioner in his petition? He said—

"That, in refusing to make this retractation when at the Bar of your honourable House on Friday last, your petitioner was actuated by the impression that he was called upon to withdraw the entire article, and thereby to confess that there was no pound for the dissatisfaction which he knows to prevail very extensively in the district affected by the Bills rejected."

Now, no doubt he had a right to confess that there was dissatisfaction prevailing in the district, but he had no right to refuse to confess that there was no ground for that dissatisfaction, unless he was prepared to offer evidence as to what was the ground of that dissatisfaction. In his opinion there was only one proper course open to the House. The House had declared that a certain individual had published a certain paragraph which was of a libellous nature, and of which a certain portion was now withdrawn, leaving a certain portion unretracted, which, perhaps, the House would not have deemed libellous had it stood alone. Now, the House could not, he thought, recognize the principle that a person might make a grave accusation against a Member of that House, and then, if it were noticed, escape scotfree by the withdrawal of a single sentence. The question was one not affecting the hon. Member for Hereford alone, but it was one relating to the conduct of tribunals of the House in the transaction of the business of the country, and it was of great importance to induce the public to have continued confidence in those tribunals. Mr. Wilks had had the advantage of the advocacy of a most ingenious and able Gentleman, and one who took a very amiable and genial view of human conduct, and he could not help thinking that the right hon. Member for Ashton (Mr. M. Gibson) would, upon reflection, consider that in this, as in all other cases where a person was really in the wrong, and had behaved unjustly to another, he should make a full apology. and that Mr. Wilks ought to come forward and express his regret for the whole of the libellous matter which had been read at the table of the House, and then they would be able with great willingness to free him from the imprisonment in which he then found himself. At the same time it would be a very inconvenient course to allow Mr. Wilks again to appear at the Bar. The proper way of communicating with the House was the established mode of petition, and he hoped that by to-morrow this person would present a petition containing an unqualified retractation of a charge which every one felt to be most unjust, and then they would be able to do that which every Member of the House would be most willing to do, namely, to order him to be discharged from the custody which he at present found himself.

said, the right hon. Member for Ashton had distinctly stated that Mr. Wills was ready to withdraw every charge of corruption which he had male against the hon. Member for Hereford. When that had been done there, would remain nothing but the general strictures on the conduct of that hon. Gentleman contained in the article in question, land surely it could not be the wish of the House to compel the petitioner to retract not only the paragraphs which had been complained of, but the entire article of which they formed part. Libellous comments on the conduct of Members of Parliament were so frequent that it would be quite absurd to bring the publishers of the newspapers in which they appeared to the bar of that House. Mr. Wilks ought to be allowed to amend his petition by withdrawing every charge of corruption against the hon. Member; and it was wholly unnecessary to keep him in custody from day to day while the House was criticising somewhat hypercritically the language of his retractation.

remarked, that if the person in custody was permitted to withdraw his petition, in order to present an amended one to-morrow, in which he retracted generally all corrupt insinuations, such course would satisfy the honour both of the hon. Member for Hereford and of the House, and would also obviate the evil so well pointed out by the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gladstone). It was not desirable that the House should evince too great an eagerness to rebut every charge of partisanship or unfair leaning that was brought against it.

said, that the proposition of the Solicitor General, if agreed to, would attain the exact result desired by the hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last. The petition having been presented the day before, and ordered to be taken into consideration that day, it was too late now to withdraw it. As that document was now found to be only a partial recantation of what the House had declared to be a scandalous libel, it would be wise to discharge the order for the further consideration of the petition. It would then be open for Mr. Wilks to present another petition containing a complete and sufficient retractation, when the House would doubtless be prepared to set him at liberty.

, in explanation said, he could not even now clearly understand what it was that Mr. Wilks was required to do. If he withdrew the charges of corruption, would that be sufficient?

said, it was obvious that, although the House could not call on Mr. Wilks to retract his opinions, still if that gentleman had alleged certain facts on which he grounded his imputations, he ought to be required to retract those facts. Now, Mr. Wilks had not only asserted that the hon. Member held stock of the Caledonian Railway, and had evinced notorious and patent partiality in the Committee, but that he had been rallied for such conduct both in the Committee-room and out of it. If these assertions were withdrawn the conclusions based upon them would, of course, fall to the ground with them.

I understand the question of the hon. and gallant Member to be, whether any special information has reached the Admiralty with regard to the melancholy death of Sir William Peel. My answer is, that my only intelligence of that lamented event is derived from the telegram which reached the Government early yesterday morning, and which has since appeared in the newspapers of to-day. The Admiralty have received no special information on this painful subject.

said, he had to claim, the indulgence of the House while he called his attention to a question of vast importance, involving the system on which the whole military organization of this country rested. In bringing it forward he had no desire whatever to embarrass Her Majesty's Government. Indeed, he could not conceive how such a discussion could be embarrassing to any Ministry of which his right hon. Friends the present Secretary of State for War and the present First Lord of the Admiralty were members. During the last Session of Parliament the hon. and gallant General at the head of the War Department deemed it his duty to bring under the notice of the House the necessity for clearly defining the relative duties and responsibilities of the various military departments. On that occasion the right hon. Gentleman the present First Lord of the Admiralty spoke strongly in favour of the views urged by the gallant General; and he found also that on a previous occasion—namely, in March, 1854, the right hon. Gentleman, speaking on the subject of military expenditure, expressed his opinion that the administration of the army would be carried on more efficiently if it were conducted under one responsible authority. This subject had been repeatedly debated in the House, and had been submitted to the consideration both of Committees and Royal Commissions. In 1837 there was a Commission to inquire into the civil administration of the army, which in its Report made several very important suggestions, and laid down distinctly the principle of consolidation. The Report of that Commission was signed by Lord Howick, (the present Earl Grey), Viscount Palmerston, Lord J. Russell, Lord Strafford, Sir John Hobhouse, and Lord Monteagle. It might be considered extraordinary that the Minister of that day, Lord Melbourne, did not attempt to carry into effect the recommendations of the Commission. That Minister, however, was so forcibly struck by the expressions of opinion contained in the Report that he was desirous to embody their suggestions in a Minute of Council; but unfortunately he did not possess such a majority in that House as encouraged him to make changes that were sure to give rise to discussion, and therefore, from motives of expediency, nothing was done. Warnings had been subsequently given to several successive Ministers that on the first outbreak of a great war we should inevitably suffer serious disasters in consequence of the unsatisfactory state of the military departments. The war with Russia came, and those predictions were verified, for he might safely say that the greater part, if not the whole, of the misfortunes that occurred in the Crimea were mainly to be attributed to the maladministration of the military departments at home. As matters then stood there were no fewer than five distinct heads of departments in the army, all of them more or less independent of each other, and exercising a part of the functions of a Minister of War, but none of them invested with sufficient authority to enable them to carry out satisfactorily or efficiently the duties of their respective departments. A few short months of war showed that a system so cumbrous and complicated in its machinery could not be carried out, and raised so strong a feeling both in that House and the country against the administration of military affairs that the Government of the day was compelled to make the changes that soon after took place. He need scarcely say that changes made at such a moment and under the influence of a panic were hastily gone about, ill digested, and ill conceived. A Minister for War was hurriedly created, and the office of Master General of the Ordnance, the oldest military institution of the country, listing existed from the time of Henry VII I., was abolished. The duties of the Ordnance Office were divided between the Minister for War, to whom was intrusted the civil administration of the army, and the Commander in Chief. The Secretary at War was put under the Minister for War in an inferior position, and the Commissariat was transferred from the Treasury to the office of the Quartermaster General. The great office of Commander in Chief was left untouched; and, considering that we were then engaged in a war which was taxing to the uttermost the military resources of the country, he thought that it was wise and prudent not to attempt to interfere with the head of the executive of the army. Great inconveniences, if not great misfortune, might have resulted from such a change at such a moment; but, at the same time, it was felt very strongly that they were leaving two great functionaries in such a position as necessarily to create and perpetuate rivalries between them—one a civilian, the other a soldier, both of them obtaining their authority directly from the Crown, but one of them responsible to that House for his acts, while the other was nominally responsible to the Crown, but virtually independent and irresponsible. It was felt that the position of the Commander in Chief would in a great measure depend on the character of the Minister who presided over the War Department, and that if the Minister for War was a man of strong mind and originality of character, the Commander in Chief might sink into a cipher. That differences might arise between the two functionaries intrusted with the military discipline and financial administration of the army had been felt so early as the year 1813, for they formed the subject of a Minute in Council, signed by Lord Liverpool, and issued by the command of the Prince Regent in that year. His Royal Highness in this Minute declared that, various representations having been made to him of differences existing between the two offices of Commander in Chief and Secretary at War in regard to their respective public duties, he was pleased to command that the line of separation between the duties of the aforesaid offices, which either usage or the provisions of an Act of Parliament had introduced between the financial and account departments on the one hand, and the military discipline of the army on the other, Should continue to be observed. His Royal Highness further commanded, that no new order or regulation should be issued by the Secretary at War without previous communication with the Commander in Chief. Owing to the good feeling and tact of those who had presided over the Horse Guards and the War Office since the alterations of 1855, there had been none of those jealousies which might otherwise have arisen. He felt such respect for the Royal Prince who now presided over the Horse Guards, and for the right hon. Gentleman the present Minister for War, that he was confident none of these differences would arise, so far as they were concerned. Nor, as far as the public knew, had any such arisen; but was it wise to leave two great departments so entirely dependent upon the good feeling of their heads for the state in which they found themselves? He would admit that in some respects the alterations of 1855 were great improvements, but in other respects they were the reverse, because they stopped short of the point at which they were directed. Altogether there was a strong feeling that the changes of 1855 were only a small instalment of that military reform which the country desired. The control of the Artillery and Engineers was taken away from the Master General of the Ordnance, the civil administration of these arms being given to the Minister of War and the military administration to the Commander in Chief. A Commission had inquired into this subject some years ago, and among those who had given evidence before it was a relative of his, Sir Hussey Vivian, who had accurately foretold the consequences of dividing the civil and military administration of the Engineers and Ordnance corps. Sir Hussey Vivian said there would be great difficulty in separating the civil and military duties of these officers, and he did not see how they could carry on their duties under two masters. In Ireland and the Colonies these officers, besides their civil and military duties, had the superintendence of barracks. If they were to discharge their civil duties under one officer and their military duties under another, Sir Hussey Vivian said they would be subject to receive conflicting orders. He thought it would puzzle Sir J. Burgoyne to say under whose orders he was at present. He believed that Sir J. Burgoyne administered the patronage of his office, but that all his orders were issued in the name of the Commander in Chief. As regarded the engineer officers, they were left in such an amphibious condition that it was impossible to say to what element they belonged. The letters patent issued when the office of Minister for War was created set forth that Her Majesty granted to him the administration of the army, except as related to its military command and discipline. The whole military control and discipline of the army would therefore appear to be vested in the irresponsible Commander in Chief, while the Minister for War had nothing to do with the military administration, and was only concerned with its financial and civil administration. Viscount Hardinge said before the Sebastopol Committee that the power of the Secretary of State entirely overruled that of the Commander in Chief. Lord Panmure said in the House of Lords that in his opinion the whole patronage and discipline of the army were under the irresponsible control of the Commander in Chief. He thought the opinion of Viscount Hardinge the more correct of the two, and he believed he should be able to show that the Secretary for War interfered with the discipline of the army which the Commander in Chief carried on a large portion of its civil administration. In short, he should be able to show that the whole of the duties of the two departments were so confused and jumbled up together that if they were left in their present position there would be no safeguard against a recurrence of the disasters which in the last war, as he maintained, were almost entirely attributable to the maladministration of military affairs. With regard to promotions, he believed the form which was gone through to be this:—The Commander in Chief submitted to the Secretary for War certain names of officers whom he recommended for promotion. The Secretary for War gave his approval. The names, having received the approval of the Secretary for War, were then submitted by the Commander in Chief to the Sovereign. When the Sovereign's approval had been given, they were returned to the Secretary for War who gazetted them, and who signed the commissions, which were also signed by another subordinate officer. If the Commander in Chief had to obtain the sanction of the Secretary of War to all promotions, he thought that the Secretary for War should accept the whole responsibility, and that he, and not the Commander in Chief should submit the names for the Sovereign's approval. With regard to the land forces for the year, the number was settled at a Cabinet Council, and the Secretary for War, as the mouthpiece of the Cabinet, obtained the approval of the Sovereign. In due course he sent to the Commander in Chief the number of men, and requested him to take the approval of the Sovereign on that number: so that the Commander in Chief had to go through the ridiculous form of asking the approval of the Sovereign to that which had already been decided on, perhaps weeks before, between the Sovereign and Her Ministers. The only object of these idle forms was to give an appearance of independence to the Commander in Chief, which, in reality, he did not possess. If a general officer were required for command in the Colonies or in India, the Commander in Chief submitted the name of some general to the Secretary for War, and if the Secretary for War approved, it was then submitted to the Sovereign. He did not approve this divided responsibility. On the other hand the civil administration of the army was in a great measure carried on by an irresponsible officer, the Commander in Chief. The Quartermaster General, for instance, moved troops at his pleasure from one part of the country to another, and put the country thereby to great expense. The education of the army was one of the greatest anomalies of the present system. It was divided between the two departments, for the control of the military schools at Woolwich and elsewhere was entirely in the hands of the Secretary for War, while the Commander in Chief was in fact, President of the Council of Education. The Commander in Chief appointed a Vice President, and received the reports of the Council; although, if questions were asked in the House, the Secretary for War would be supposed to be responsible for the acts of the Council, over which he had no control whatever. It was a state of things which the Duke of Newcastle had described in the Sebastopol Committee as involving the Secretary for War in a legal responsibility, though he could not be held morally responsible for acts with which he had nothing to do. What the public wanted was direct moral responsibility for all public acts in all the public departments. Last year a Committee was appointed and was still sitting to inquire into certain proceedings connected with the Land Transport Corps. That Committee stated in their report of last Session "that they felt it their duty to call attention to the want of unity and combination which appeared to have characterised the relations of the Secretary of State for War with the Commander in Chief with reference to the formation of the Land Transport Corps." Great hardships occured from the want of a proper understanding between those two great departments. Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the Medical Department, when examined in 1856 before the Sebastopol Committee, was asked whether the change which had been made in 1855 had had any other effect than to give him one master less; and, he replied, there might be one master less certainly, but not more than one. If we were to be involved in another European war there was no doubt that the same confusion would again arise. In the Contract Committee now sitting evidence was given daily which showed the most extravagant and useless expenditure of public money for want of some controlling power over the different departments. For their own protection the Secretary of State's Department and the Commander in Chief's Department were obliged to keep themselves perfectly separate, and responsibility was made a shuttlecock between them. He did not wonder at the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton saying on a former occasion, "You cannot raise up a wall of brass between the two offices." The fact was that each department was obliged to raise up a wall of brass for themselves. If such were the present state of the two departments, it was important to consider what was the correction needed. It was a saying of the First Napoleon. "One bad General is better than two good ones," and in this sentence was contained the whole pith of the remedy to be applied. The advocates of the Secretary of State's office and the Commander in Chief's, both agreed in the expediency of concentration, each wishing to see the full powers centred in their own office. The question, then, was in which office the concentration was to be made. Now, he thought, an irresponsible Minister was not one that was likely to find much favour with the House of Commons. He thought, therefore, that the supreme head of the War Department ought to be an officer responsible to Parliament, who would be ready to answer all questions and reply to all criticisms. He did not wish to go into details; but different plans had been proposed from time to time and maturely considered. Earl Grey, some years ago, had made a Motion in the other House on this subject, very much in the same terms as those of the present Resolution. On that occasion Earl Grey quoted from a Report made to him by the late Sir Willoughby Gordon, a military authority of great weight, in which it is stated that the first step towards a reconstruction of the department ought to be to place the Secretary for War, the Commander in Chief, the Secretary at War, the Master General of the Ordnance, and the Paymaster General in one office—each officer transacting his own departmental business, but the whole conferring together under the presidence of the Secretary of State. The right hon. Member for Wilts (Mr. Sidney Herbert), in a memorandum left at the War Office, and in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee, also spoke strongly in favour of this view of the pre-eminence of the Secretary of State. He suggested that a Board should be formed of all the officers through whom the army was governed, presided over by a Secretary of State, who should have the control of the Commissariat. The right hon. Gentleman and others did not desire to trench on the authority of the Commander in Chief, but to place him in the position in which he ought to stand, and to secure for the public direct responsibility for all matters connected with the administration of the army. The position of the Commander in Chief over the army should be something like that of an engineer of a steam ship; who has the care and superintendence of a great deal of delicate machinery, but is under the control of the captain, who in turn is answerable to the owners for the safe navigation of the vessel. It was said, however, that the result of the arrangement which he proposed would be to change our Royal Army into what some persons were pleased to call a Parliamentary Army, and to diminish the prerogative of the Crown. But what was the position of the Crown at present, with regard to the army? The most that could be said, was that it got a yearly lease of the army, for it was the House of Commons which passed the Mutiny Act, under which, discipline in the army was enforced, and voted the Estimates by which that branch of the public service was maintained, and there was scarcely a day on which questions were not discussed which directly related to the patronage and discipline of the army. Again, he was told that it would bring the patronage of the army under the control of the Minister of the day, and that it would open the door to Parliamentary and political corruption. He did not think that this was an objection which would bear investigation. At present the system of competitive examinations was adopted in the scientific branches of the service, while the patronage which still remained in the hands of the Commander in Chief might be divided under the three heads of first commissions, brevet appointments, and staff appointments; and he did not apprehend, after the public attention which these matters had excited, that that patronage was likely to be abused. He hoped that he had said nothing in the course of his remarks that could give offence to any person. He admitted, if the present system of military administration were to be continued, that it could not be intrusted to safer hands than those which at present wielded it. If he might say so without presumption he should say that his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief had won public favour by the great personal courage which he had evinced in the Crimea; that he had gained the flattering title of "the soldier's friend" by the attention which he had shown to the wishes and requirements of the soldier; and that since he had been at the head of the army he had shown administrative powers of the highest quality, being always ready to listen to suggestions for reform, and to adopt them if they were practicable. It was unnecessary to say anything of the great abilities of the distinguished officer who now held the appointment of Secretary for War; but, great as were the talents of those two persons, if the old vicious principle of duality were allowed to continue, it would be impossible for them to administer the duties of their departments with satisfaction to themselves or advantage to the country. He begged to move:—

"That although the recent consolidation of the different Departments of Ordnance, Commissariat, and Secretary at War has to a certain extent improved the general administration of Military Affairs, a divided responsibility still exists; and that, in order to promote greater efficiency, the Departments of the Horse Guards and War Office should be placed under the control of one responsible Minister."

said, he fully admitted the great importance of the subject which his hon. and gallant Friend had brought forward, and the able and temperate manner in which he had treated it. His hon. and gallant Friend stated that on former occasions he (General Peel) had himself called attention to this very question. That was quite true, and he had no hesitation in saying that no one could be more convinced than he was of the great importance of defining the duties of the different departments; but, at the time that he brought forward the question, he stated that he was perfectly satisfied with the definition of those duties which had been given by Lord Panmure in a speech in the House of Lords, and by the then Commander in Chief in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee. In both those cases the duties and responsibilities of the several offices were clearly defined, and all that he stated then was that he thought there should be some more official record of those duties than was contained in speeches in the House of Lords and in evidence before Committees. On acceding to his present office, however, he found that the patent by which he held that office, and which had been already read to the House, did, in a general way, clearly lay down the duties and responsibilities of the department over which he had the honour to preside. The duties of the Commander in Chief were laid down with equal precision and clearness in the patent of his appointment. He had also a memorandum drawn up by his noble predecessor, which clearly defined the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of State for War, and, he must say, that he never found any difficulty in learning what his duties and responsibilities were, although he had great difficulty in performing those duties. But, as the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton had truly said upon the occasion to which his hon. and gallant Friend had alluded, by far the best security for the effectual performance of the general duties of the Secretary for War and of the Commander in Chief would be found to consist in a cordial co-operation between the heads of those departments. He could bear full testimony to the truth of that remark; for having been almost every day in personal communication with his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief, he could safely say that no difficult question as to the limits of these duties had arisen between them—that nothing had occurred to produce any differences between them. The duties of the Commander in Chief embraced the discipline of the army, the patronage of the army, entrance into the army, and the ordinary promotion in the army. It was, however, the duty of the Secretary of State for War, when an army was about to take the field, acting as the organ of the Cabinet, to appoint the person who was to command that army. On that subject the Secretary of State for War always had a communication with the Commander in Chief, with the view of securing the services of such a person as might be most fit to take that command. The appointments of all the superior and staff officers were recommended, in the first instance, by the Commander in Chief. The Secretary of State for War had the power of approval, and after that approval he must become responsible for those appointments. That, he believed, had been the case in every instance. As to many of the ordinary appointments and promotions in the army, the only duty of the Secretary of State for War, he apprehended, was to take care that, whenever a proper opportunity offered, the list of officers on half-pay should be reduced with the view of lightening the burdens of the country; but the selection of those officers rested entirely with the Commander in Chief. The Secretary of State for War never exercised any discretion in the selection of officers brought in from half-pay. Everything connected with the management of the army, with the exception he had mentioned, was left in the hands of the Minister for War, acting in conjunction with his colleagues in the Cabinet. When an army took the field it was the duty of the Secretary of State for War, the Cabinet having, in the first instance, mentioned the number of men to be engaged, and the nature of the services to be performed, to communicate upon the subject with the Commander in Chief, who then took the pleasure of the Crown as to the different regiments to be employed. In the same way it was the duty of the Secretary for War to communicate with the Commander in Chief respecting the extent and nature of the equipment of the army. These things having been arranged between them, it became the duty of the Secretary for War not only to furnish the required supplies, but also to be answerable afterwards for the keeping of the proper reserves and everything needful for the army engaged in the field. He believed that the greatest benefit possible had accrued from the recent concentration in one establishment of the different departments of war. Whenever anything was required it could be obtained at once and on the spot, without sending requisitions, as heretofore, from one war department to another. There could be no doubt now as to what were the respective duties of those employed in the War Department. The Resolution of his hon. and gallant Friend stated that there were divided responsibilities in that department, and recommended that the different offices should be placed under the control of one responsible Minister of State. Now, he could not assent to that. At present, the command, discipline, and patronage of the army were controlled by the Crown through the Commander in Chief. If they were to place that control in the hands of a person who was to be a Member of that House and a Minister of State, he must, of course, become a member of the Government of the day. He must be a political partisan, and change with every Administration; and therefore, just as soon as the Commander in Chief had become acquainted with the character and capabilities of the officers over whom he presided—just as soon as he was able to exercise some discrimination in the selection of those officers, he would most probably have to retire from the Ministry and from the War Department in favour of a successor who would have all that knowledge to acquire. But, what was still worse, he would always be liable to the suspicion, although perhaps without foundation, that he had made the patronage of the army subservient to certain political purposes. The country, instead of having the advantage of a person at the head of the army not connected with any party, would merely have a person connected with the Administration of the day. The difficulty in that case would be to find a person duly qualified to fill the important situation of Commander in Chief. for his own part, he thought it would be found to be the most difficult thing possible to place the office of Commander in Chief in a better position than that in which it now was. Everybody must admit that his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge Performed the duties of that office in a most able and satisfactory manner. His practical knowledge of service in the field and the great interest in which he took in everything connected with the army were well known to everybody. It was a great advantage to have a person in his high position at the head of the army. As to the particular duties of the Secretary for War, he believed those duties to be clearly defined. Everything relating to pecuniary affairs, to the establishment and maintenance of the army was committed to the Secretary of State for War. All matters relating to the administration and government of the army were vested in the Commander in Chief. He was aware that there was no person directly responsible to that House for the manner in which the duties of the Commander in Chief are performed. He was only responsible to the Crown, and it was not impossible that if a complaint were made of the manner in which he exercised his patronage or managed the discipline of the army there would be no means of bringing his conduct under the control of the House. But he would deprecate it as the worst possible change that could be made, should the discipline and command of the army should be subjected to constant discussions in that House. Discussions of that nature had already been carried to the full verge of propriety in that House. Questions were often put respecting this or that promotion. The due prerogative of the Crown was thereby interfered with. His hon. and gallant Friend had alluded to various points, as to the clothing of the army and the different departments now placed under the control of the Secretary of State for War. He (General Peel) was not going to defend the administration of the clothing department as it existed when he entered upon office; but he would observe that the very first thing that he did upon entering on office was to alter that system altogether. A new plan had been devised and would be speedily carried into execution, by which he trusted that the evils which had been complained of would at once be removed; and he might make the same observation with regard to the commissariat and other departments. Nothing could be so difficult as to organize in times of peace any establishment which upon the breaking out of war had to become suddenly expansive. He might state, however, that gentlemen had been appointed to consider the present organization of the Commissariat Department, with the view of ascertaining what improvements could be made in it. The ground upon which he objected to the Resolution of his hon. and gallant Friend was that it proposed to place under one head the two departments of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary for War. He objected to the discipline and command of the army being placed under a Minister of State for War. That Minister of State might be either Commander in Chief or Secretary for War. It would be equally difficult to find a proper person in either of those offices to discharge the duties of such consolidated office. It would be difficult for any Government to find any mere partisan capable of properly discharging the duties of Commander in Chief; and it was perfectly impossible to submit the duties of the command and discipline of the army to a civilian. Perhaps he had not been long enough in office to form even an opinion as to what improvements might be made in the administration of the numerous departments. The complaints which his hon. and gallant Friend had referred to as having been laid before the House long ago by means of blue-books had been remedied long before the recent alterations. All the evidence taken by the Committee which sat in 1837 had led to the desired improvements. [Captain VIVIAN: What as to the evidence taken before the Sebastopol Committee?] With regard to the evidence of the Sebastopol Committee he could only say that a Committee had been appointed with the view of remedying all the evils of which evidence was given before it. His right hon. Friend the Member for Wiltshire (Mr. Sidney Herbert) had presented two reports upon the medical establishment. Those reports had only recently reached the Treasury, and as Dr. Smith had recently resigned his post of Director General of the medical department of the army, which he had filled with great zeal and ability, he would take care to have appointed in his place a gentleman under whose guidance the recommendations contained in them would receive full consideration and be acted upon. For his own part he had no objection to the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend, except that portion of it which proposed an amalgamation of the offices of Commander in Chief and Secretary for War.

said, that whatever might be the result of that discussion, he thought that the House and the country owed a debt of gratitude to his hon. and gallant Friend for calling attention to the subject, as well as for the ability and temper with which he had introduced it. One part of the Resolutions of his hon. and gallant Friend admitted the advantage which had arisen from the consolidation which took place under the arrangements of 1855, but expressed the opinion that much yet remained to be done. Now, there was no one connected with the army or interested in its welfare who would not give a cordial assent to that proposition. As regarded the next part of the Resolution, which proposed to consolidate the offices of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary for War, he was somewhat inclined to agree with the opinion expressed by the right hon. and gallant General. It was true that the secret of the efficiency of the French army arose in a great degree from the fact that every individual connected with the army, from the Minister for War to the hospital orderly in a distant station, was an army man, and in the army were all his interests and sympathies. A system of rigorous military centralisation of this nature was no doubt productive of efficiency, but it was unsuited to a country like this, in which a jealousy of a powerful standing army prevailed, in which the feeling of individual liberty had taken deep and strong root. The public in England would not be debarred from interference in military matters, which was sometimes carried to unfortunate results when writers in the press were in the habit of offering empirical proposals for the improvement of the service, which they had not the courage to endorse with their own names. Under the circumstances, he felt it would be impossible to obtain the consent of the House of Commons to placing the whole administration of the army under the control of a military man; and therefore the fact that, if the two offices were consolidated, the whole army would be under the control of a civilian, was an insuperable objection to the proposal of his hon. and gallant Friend. There were, however, many reasons why it would be of advantage that the whole administration of the affairs of the army should be examined into, with a view of defining the responsibilities and duties of each department. The right hon. and gallant General had told them that the most cordial co-operation existed between the illustrious Duke, the Commander in Chief and himself. This was not to be wondered at, for they were both distin- guished officers, and had only the interests of their profession at heart; but there might occur instances in which an individual might be placed at the head of the War Department, not on account of ability or knowledge, but for the sake of the supports be might bring a Government on account of his influence or debating powers. He had beard a report which he believed to be true, that when a gallant General was appointed to a command in China, of whom no one could dispute the fitness, although, indeed, a certain powerful journal was pleased to attack him with insult and vituperation, the Commander in Chief first learned from the columns of The Times that General Ashburnham had been appointed to command the Chinese expedition. The evils of which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield complained, as being caused by the double government of India, were also caused by the double government of the army, and that hon. and learned Gentleman would add to the debt of gratitude which the country already owed him if he were to exert his eloquence to procure the placing of the army under a Board presided over by a Minister responsible to Parliament. In former times there were five persons concerned in the administration of the army—the Master General of the Ordnance, the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief, the First Lord of the Treasury, and the Secretary for the Colonies. In 1855 the office of Master General was abolished, and the Artillery was placed under the Commander in Chief; but up to the present day it was undecided under whose control were the Engineers, or from whom Sir J. Burgoyne received his instructions. In former days the Commander in Chief had a considerable control over the transport, the victualling, and the clothing branches of the army, and the Secretary at War, who was the representative of the army then in that House, occupied a position comparatively inferior to that of the present War Minister. Now, however, if we had a civilian at the head of the army, his power and authority as a Cabinet Minister, would enable him to overrule the Commander in Chief. An example of this occurred during the Crimean war. Viscount Hardinge having sent out an order directing a regiment to leave the Cape, the Governor of the colony refused to allow the regiment to leave until he had received an order from the War Minister. Instances of this kind showed that the administration of the army was not what it should be; and though that administration might be satisfactory while the gallant General held his present position, it could not be satisfactory with a civilian at the head of the War Department. The jealousy entertained towards military men would not admit of the adoption in this country of the French system, which was the most efficient, and under which the whole control of the army was placed in the hands of a military man, assisted by other military men at his council board. Therefore a compromise must be sought in order to secure a representation to the civil element; and the best arrangement under the circumstances would be to assimilate the administration of our army to that now so successfully adopted for the navy. A Board should be appointed, composed of the Minister for War acting as President, the Commander in Chief, and representatives from the different branches of the service. The patronage of the army ought, however, to remain entirely in the hands of the Commander in Chief. Our army would no doubt always maintain the high reputation it now enjoyed, but in the event of another war, our military system, unless it were placed on a better footing, would again inevitably break down, as it had done before, not as regarded our regimental system or the character of our regimental officers, but in regard to the departments at home. He had long witnessed and deplored the evils of the present complicated and anomalous arrangements, and he was earnestly anxious that that discussion might lead to the adoption of a better constitution for our War Department, which, while maintaining the control of the Commander in Chief, and abstaining from infringement on the prerogative of the Crown, would yet, by the introduction of judicious reforms, increase and improve the efficiency of the British army.

said, that, after the able and conclusive speech of the hon. and gallant Mover, those who were in favour of his Motion had little left them but to express their general concurrence in his views, and their hope that they would receive from the House the attention they so well deserved. The question of the administration of the army was no longer a mere military one, because both as legislators and civilians they must all feel a deep interest in it. They must all feel that their Votes for the army expenditure—an item that was the heaviest brought before the House—imposed on them as great a responsibility as that which they had to sustain in regard to the efficiency or inefficiency of any other department. Formerly the army was not a popular institution in England. It was supposed to have been an arm which might be relied upon in resisting the advance of popular rights; but recently the gallant exploits of the army in the Crimea, and elsewhere, had brought about a change in public opinion, and unpopularity had given place to universal pride in its achievements and universal sympathy with its sufferings. Its officers had to endure more than any other class from time system of maladministration which the noble Lord who spoke last had deplored. Their most distinguished services were not adequately rewarded, nor were the ablest men raised to those posts which the public interest required that they should fill. The gallant Officer who had brought forward this subject had referred to the consolidation of the military departments which occurred in 1855, tending, as it had done, to increase the efficiency of the army and to concentrate responsibility; and he now asked the House to extend the same principle somewhat further. In 1855 they were led to expect that there was to be a system of clear and intelligible responsibility, to attain which the power was to be concentrated under one head. The reasons which previously existed for not carrying those improvements further were no longer in operation. The relative duties of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary for War might appear clearly defined to the right hon. and gallant General (General Peel), because he was perfectly familiar with the subject; but so far as this House and the country, or even the army generally, were concerned, there was no reason to suppose that any more distinct definition of those duties existed now than last year. On that occasion, when the present Secretary for War brought this subject under notice, he was followed by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the President of the Board of Trade, who thought the division of power so indistinct, the duties so obscure, the authority so undefined, that they called upon the then Government to put the two offices on a clearer and more intelligible footing. This was all that was now asked for. He agreed with the noble Lord who had just spoken that the real test of the efficiency of the present system would be another war. The old system might have gone on for years had it not been for the Crimean War, which exposed all its rottenness and weakness. There was not the smallest desire to impugn the administration of the army offensively as regarded any individual. But it was contended that the worst form of double government was here maintained; and a general feeling pervaded all classes that our present military administration was a most unsatisfactory one; that it gave us an inefficient army, and that it was not creditable either to Parliament or to the country. "Leave the Commander in Chief," was said, "with all his military authority; let his discipline and patronage be untouched; but let us have no double government, no divided responsibility, but a Minister who is responsible to Parliament and who has commensurate power; let him be the responsible head of the military department, and all others be subordinate to him." That was the old constitutional system; and the "duality of administration," as it had been called, was of very recent introduction. What were the arguments, time facts, and the authority on the other side? The right hon. and gallant Gentleman resisted the Motion because he understood the distribution of the duties in question, and because between him and the Commander in, Chief no difficulty was likely to occur. But the system could not depend on the accidental event of the nature of time individuals in temporary occupation of office. They wanted a sufficient degree of responsibility, on the part of army officials, to that House; but where was the House to look for remedy, and where was it to attach responsibility? He hoped the Government would complete the consolidation commenced in 1855. The Resolution of his hon. and gallant Friend was a reasonable one, and the opposition to it could not be substantiated by any sound argument. It invited the House of Commons to endeavour to rescue the army from the inefficient administration under which it had so long been suffering. The country, he believed, felt it was time that some interference should take place; that it was necessary for the sake of the army itself, for the national interests, for the character of the House; and he trusted the Government would not persist in their opposition to the Motion.

remarked, that no one had yet stood up to say anything with regard to the manner in which the militia had been treated. However, as an independent Member of Parliament and a country Gentleman he felt bound to declare his opinion that no useful body of men had ever in England been treated worse than the militia. He had had occasion to seek an authority to whom he could make some statements relative to matters with which that body was concerned, but he had been unable to find out his master. He had been referred from the Horse Guards to the War Office, and from the War Office to the Horse Guards. He believed that the services of that force would soon be required again, but he was afraid that if the present system continued the men would not be forthcoming when they were wanted. He should have therefore, great pleasure in giving his support to the proposition of the hon. and gallant Member for Bodmin, for he thought that divided responsibility was an evil, and more particularly in military affairs. He could not see why 10,000 militiamen should have been disbanded and sent to their homes, many of them to starve.

said, he regretted the difficulties experienced by his hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. H. B. Johnstone), but if his hon. Friend's business related to military matters he should have gone to the Commander in Chief, while if his business had reference to departmental business he should have sought the Minister for War. He (Sir Frederick Smith) thought that the existing arrangement of a Commander in Chief and a War Minister was working well and that the imperfections that were to be found in the details of the departments would disappear as the existing system developed itself. The Commander in Chief regulated all matters relating to dicipline, and they had in Parliament a Minister responsible for all the departments, including that of finance, and who brought forward the Estimates. He was somewhat surprised to hear his right hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) speak of the bad administration of the army; for surely there were no complaints that the management and the discipline of the army were not what they ought to be. He could not understand what was the object of the hon. and gallant Member for Bodmin (Captain Vivian). Did he wish to place the whole army under the Minister of War or under the Commander in Chief? In the naval department there were four or five officers who seemed to work harmoniously together in a Board, but the duties to be performed differed materially from those which devolved upon the heads of the army. He (Sir Frederick Smith) considered that the changes recently made were substantial and good changes, and that it was desirable that time should be allowed for them to operate, while he had no doubt that any slight defects which might still exist would soon be remedied. He believed that the affairs of the country, so far as the army was concerned, were under both the late and present Secretaries for War in very safe hands, and he would therefore vote against the Motion.

said, it was a matter of great difficulty for independent Members to make up their minds how they ought to vote upon incidental Motions brought forward on Tuesday nights, but he thought the best course to pursue with regard to administrative questions such as that now under discussion was not to support a Motion if they did not feel confident that were they in office they could at once carry it into effect. He bad heard with very great pleasure the able speech of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bodmin (Captain Vivian), but it appeared to him that the speech was directed to one object and the Motion to another. The hon. and gallant Member spoke of an alteration by which the different military departments might be consolidated, and which in his opinion would materially increase their efficiency. He (Mr. S. Herbert) had stated in a memorandum, which had been published, the views he entertained on the subject, and he still adhered to those opinions. There was some time ago a great cry for "consolidation;" indeed many people seemed to be consolidation-mad; but his own opinion was that if such consolidation had existed before the commencement of the Crimean war there would have been a loud cry for division of labour. He did not think the disasters in the Crimea were attributable to any deficiencies in the military Departments, but the want of efficient men to work them. Good men were more important than any system, while military operations on a large scale could only be successfully conducted by men of great ability and experience, and if after half a century's peace, war should break out, men whose only experience had been gained during a period of peace would under the control of consolidated departments be as unsuccessful as they had been under the system in existence at the time of the Crimean war. Let them look at the ques- tion as it was propounded in the Resolution. It was then asserted that there was at present a divided responsibility. For his own part, he thought there was too much consolidation, but it appeared that the responsibility was complete. The Secretary of State was responsible for everything done by the Commander is Chief; the Commander in Chief was, in fact, his subordinate officer. He (Mr. Sidney Herbert) was not making this assertion without book. When Viscount Hardinge was examined before the Sebastopol Committee he said, "The Secretary of State's authority is supreme; he over-rides me in every respect." When he (Mr. Sidney Herbert) held an office very inferior in authority to that of the Secretary of State for War,—when the difficulties of divided responsibility were much more acutely felt,—when the Secretary at War had for time out of mind been at issue with the Commander in Chief, and when he (Mr. Sidney Herbert) had occasional differences with the Commander in Chief for the time being, although not in the position of Secretary of State, but holding the purse strings, he generally succeeded in carrying his point. In one instance, when a somewhat serious difference occurred between himself and viscount Hardinge, he (Mr. Herbert) was obliged to yield; and why? Because Viscount Hardinge brought to bear against him a direct order of the Secretary of State, of the existence of which he had not been aware, and he was obliged to succumb. But now there was occasion for no arbiter, the Secretary at War was now likewise the Secretary of State; he was himself the supreme authority and his word was law. It had been proposed to render his responsibility still more distinct by abolishing the office of Commander in Chief, and substituting a chief of the staff, who should discharge for the Secretary of State the duties now performed by the Commander in Chief. He (Mr. Sidney Herbert) thought, however, it would be revolting to popular instincts that a civilian (for it was a mere accident that the present Secretary of State was a military man) should govern the Army and have the control of arrangements affecting its discipline. In what respect was the authority of the Secretary of State over the Commander in Chief incomplete? It had been said that the patronage of the army was not in the hands of the Secretary of State; but what was that patronage? Why, officers in the army pro- moted themselves; the senior officer bought out the man above him, and the Commander in Chief had nothing to do with the matter. He merely registered the fact, and—unless there was any marked unfitness in the case of the Purchaser—he gave a formal assent to the transaction. Then, what was the case with regard to first Commissions? The present Commander in Chief had given up the first commissions entirely for public competition through Sandhurst. He (Mr. Sidney Herbert) would express no opinion as to whether that was a wise arrangement or not, but he thought it was very doubtful, because, although competition might be a very good thing after education, competition before education seemed to him indefensible by any logical reason. The patronage of the Commander in Chief was therefore nil; and it might be safely given to the Secretary of State, for there was nothing to give. As to appointments of a higher description—those upon the staffs and appointments of Generals to colonial and other military commands—they had never been made without the previous sanction of the Secretary of State, who possessed a check which enabled him, even with regard to the smallest promotions, if the regulations had been evaded, or if there were financial reasons for declining to sanction them, to stop them at the very last moment, because the names were always sent to the Secretary of State to be inserted in The Gezette, and without his sanction they could not be gazetted. He thought, therefore, the responsibility of the Secretary of State was complete. He must say it was an awkward responsibility, for the Secretary of State was sometimes obliged to answer questions about matters of which he knew little, and to defend acts of which he had not complete cognizance; but what Minister of the Crown was not hi the same position? Take the case of the Colonial Minister. He might question and rebuke acts of his subordinates who were scattered over the world; but, unless their conduct had been so flagrant that he deemed it his duty to recall them, or publicly to reprimand them, he supported the officers who were responsible to his department. He (Mr. Sidney Herbert) concurred in the opinion of his gallant Friend with regard to the manner in which the War Department had been consolidated. He thought the mistake had been in consolidating it so much, and that its authority should have been extended to the Ordnance without abolishing the office of Master General. In abolishing the office of Master General, and continuing that of Commander in Chief, they had abolished an office which was infinitely more important than that which was retained. The department of the Commander in Chief dealt mainly with the personnel of the army, and consisted principally of routine, but the Master General of the Ordnance had under his control the manufacturing department of the army—the preparation of arms, stores, accoutrements, fortifications, defences; and the duties of his office were far more difficult and responsible, and required certainly much higher qualifications than were necessary in the case of the Commander in Chief. The office was also a great prize, which, he thought ought, in fairness, to have been available to the army, and he confessed he had seen its abolition with regret. Formerly the Secretary of State had two military advisers—the Commander in Chief and the Master General of the Ordnance. They had now as Commander in Chief a Prince of the Royal Family, a very gallant soldier, a very upright man, and one who deserved high credit for the manner in which he discharged the duties of his office. It had been considered by the late Duke of Wellington, who, it was said, exaggerated very much in his own mind the unpopularity of the army, that it was requisite that a man of great renown, like himself, or some person of illustrious birth, should occupy the office of Commander in Chief to preserve the army against democratic attacks. There was no fear of such attacks now, for he believed that the army in all its branches was thoroughly popular. By the abolition of the office of Master General of the Ordnance, the Secretary of State had been deprived of one important source of military advice. The Secretary of State was now a check, and a most powerful check, upon the Commander in Chief; but with regard to the Ordnance he was the only check upon himself, and they had, therefore, lost the advantage of an extraneous check on that department. He thought the better course would have been to place all the personnel of the Ordnance under the Commander in Chief, leaving the matériel under the control of the Master General, and he believed public business would have been greatly facilitated by the existence of two such departments. He knew that complaints were made of the cumbrous sys- tem now existing at the Horse Guards, and it was said that it now took three times longer to answer a letter than under the old system. Many of the duties formerly performed by the Master General were now discharged by clerks, and questions were answered and decisions were given by persons to whose opinions on such subjects military men had not been led to attach any weight. With regard to the Motion itself, he must say he did not think there was now a division of responsibility. He believed the Commander in Chief was thoroughly subordinate to the Secretary of State, and that the Secretary of State was thoroughly responsible for every act of the Commander in Chief. He could not, therefore, vote for the Motion, because it seemed to him to contain statements incompatible with the facts.

said, he should have no objection to the Motion if the Minister for War could be, as was invariably the case on the Continent, a military person, and not liable to be changed with every change of Government. But if the head of the army was to he a civilian—a Member of the Cabinet, and going out of office with every change of the Cabinet—he was sure it would end in the total break-down of our military system. He would vote against the Motion, because he was opposed to the very possibility of what might be called a Parliamentary Army; for that he felt assured would prove the destruction not of our army only, but of the honour and glory of the country.

said, that there were two views of the question, one theoretical and the other practical. No doubt that, theoretically, one undivided responsibility was what was wanted by the public in all the institutions of the country, more particularly in reference to matters of finance, and therefore, according to theory, the whole of the army should come under one undivided responsibility. As, however, the management of the finance would never be given up to the executive of the army, what, in a practical point of view, was the alternative that presented itself? Why, that the army must he placed either under a civilian inexperienced in military matters, or under a Board, similar to the Board of Admiralty, and he thought that, in either case, the change would be disadvantageous. Would it not lower the position of the Commander in Chief, and make him less looked up to by the rest of the army, if his decisions on matters of military detail were overruled by a civil authority? Neither did he think that the desired responsibility would be attained by the formation of a Board for the government of the army, and he asked whether, under the present Board of Admiralty, many things did not happen in the navy with respect to which it was difficult to fix the individual responsibility? Therefore, he desired to see the army remain under the Commander in Chief, though he agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Vivian) in thinking it desirable that the responsibility should be more defined, if not in words, at all events in practice. He conceived that to the Commander in Chief should specially be given the command of the army and the control of its discipline, and that it would be a farce to hold the Secretary for War, a civilian, having many other things to attend to, responsible for the details of the army. Let there be an understanding, either tacit or expressed, that the Commander in Chief should be responsible for all those details which naturally fell within his office, and the Secretary for War responsible for the finance of the army; but to put the Commander in Chief under a civilian would entirely do away with that cordial feeling which enabled two men to act harmoniously together more effectually than any regulation that could be adopted. Though nominally the theory of the hon. and gallant Officer who made the Motion was very good, and though the House of Commons would greatly wish to bring everything under its own ken and control, yet he thought that to bring the office of Commander in Chief and the patronage and rewards of the army into discussion in that House would be a proceeding injurious in its effects, not only to the army, but also to the House itself. To the second part of the Resolution he could not agree, because it would give rise to many evils, and bring within the scope of mere party discussions what had much better be kept beyond their range.

said, that though he fully agreed with those who had paid high compliments to his hon. and gallant Friend for the very able and dispassionate manner in which he had handled this important subject, he could not concur in the Resolution which he had proposed. Those who argued in its favour had had objects which appeared to him to be, to some extent, incompatible with each other. His right hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) for instance, argued very strongly in the early part of his speech for a more accurate definition of the duties of the Commander in Chief and of the Secretary for War; but at the conclusion of his observations he urged the union of these two offices, and therefore the abolition of any distinction between the duties of the two officers. A great deal had been said with respect to the complications of our system, the subdivision of offices, and the breakdown which in the earlier part of the Crimean war resulted therefrom; and they were told that the same thing would occur again whenever war broke out, and therefore it was necessary to make the change which was now proposed. That argument was like saying to a man, "Four or five years ago you had a very ill-put-together carriage, and it broke down with you; since then it has been repaired and rebuilt, and therefore it will break down the moment you attempt to make another journey in it." Hon. Gentlemen forgot that the system which produced the destitution and the other evils which afflicted the army in the early part of the Crimean war was abolished in 1855, and that the result of the consolidation of the departments which then took place was, that when the army came under the command of his hon. and gallant Friend who had just addressed the House (General Codrington) it was, as regarded all that concerned its well-being and good condition in the field, a model army. Therefore hon. Members ought to dismiss from their minds all the arguments which had been founded upon the mischances which resulted from the former subdivision of offices, and to look only to those military arrangements which now existed. It was quite true that formerly we had the Commander in Chief, who controlled the discipline of the Line; the Master General of the Ordnance, who was charged with that of the Artillery and Engineers; the Secretary at War, who was at the head of the accountant branch of the army; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was also Secretary of State for all the great arrangements of war; the Treasury, which controlled the Commissariat and the Ordnance, which had an office of account separate from that of the Secretary at War. The Secretary at War was frequently not a Member of the Cabinet: there were, therefore, a multitude of authorities, and it was not at all surpris- ing that among them there should be conflicting opinions, independent action, and confusion. In the year 1855 we put the whole discipline of the army, including the Engineers and Artillery, under one head, the Commander in Chief; the office of Secretary of State for War was separated from that of Secretary for the Colonies; that of the Secretary at War was merged in the office of Secretary of State for War, who had transferred to him the Commissariat and the entire management of the militia, and acquired the superintendence of all the civil departments connected with the supply of the army. As matters now stood, as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary for War had shown by reading his patent, everything that related to the civil service of the army, to supplies of all kinds, whether of stores or other matériel, was under the control of the Secretary of State for War; while the Commander in Chief had the sole arrangement of the discipline of every branch of the military service. If there was to be any division—if we were not, like continental nations, to have a Minister for War who should be paramount over everything, he could conceive none which would be more proper and more advantageous than this. It had been urged against the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Secretary of State for War that last year, when out of office, he advocated the drawing of a more accurate line of distinction between the offices of the Secretary of State for War and the Commander in Chief, but that now that he was in office and knew practically what that line was, he was satisfied that it was sufficient. This was no proof of inconsistency on the part of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman; it only showed that, being now more intimately acquainted with the real state of things, be found that it was somewhat different from what he imagined it to be when he only looked at it from without. If, however, any evils of detail, such as that affecting engineers to which his hon. and gallant Friend had referred, arose from the operation of the present line of distinction, he had no doubt that those who were at the heads of departments would find no great difficulty in remedying them, and that they would feel it to be their duty to do so. On all these grounds, therefore, it appeared to him that, generally speaking, the line of division between the functions of the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief was now sufficiently established. Then came the main question as to whether you should merge the two offices and place them under one chief. What had been stated in the course of the debate showed that that could not be done consistently with a due regard to the public interests. Every military man would tell you that you could not place a civilian at the head of the discipline of the army. The army would not pay respect to a civilian as Commander in Chief; they would not value his praise, they would not care for his censure. They would say, "He is a civilian, and knows nothing of these things; we know much better than he does whether we deserve praise or Censure." The spirit of the army would be destroyed, and the emulation to obtain the approval of the superior which now exists would cease. Then, again, a civilian would change with the changes of Government; there would be no permanence, no unity of system; one Secretary of State would undo what another had done, the army would be in a state of perpetual change, and thus great inconvenience and great detriment to the military service would be caused. "Oh! but then," it was said, "you could have a military man in this office." If you did, he would change with the Government, and there would be all those evils of instability to which he had already referred. Further than this, he must observe, without intending any disparagement to military men, that their habits and employments generally withdrew them from public life, and that it might not be easy for a Government to find a military man who should combine with high military qualities and long standing in his profession that general knowledge of public affairs which would make him a useful Member of the Cabinet. It therefore seemed to him to be essentially for the interests of the service that you should not have one man to be what in foreign Governments was called the Minister of War, who combines in his own person the control of the civil departments of the army and also of the military discipline and patronage. It was then said we might have a Board; a Secretary of State changing with successive Governments, but who should have under him as subordinate members of a Board, the Commander in Chief, the Master General of the Ordnance, and so forth. He was not one of those who thought a Board a very good instrument of administration. It had undoubtedly answered in the navy, and although his hon. and gallant Friend might wish for its abolition in that case, he certainly did not. Nevertheless, he did not think that as a rule a Board was a good instrument of administration, and certainly if the Commander in Chief was to be only the subordinate officer of a Board presided over by a civilian—if he were to be reduced to the condition of a Lord of the Admiralty, he did not think that the army would feel for him that respect which it was essential that the person who was at the head of the discipline and patronage of the army should command. The conclusion to which he came, therefore, was that the present arrangement was in principle the one which it was most desirable to maintain. Hon. Gentlemen spoke of the Commander in Chief as an irresponsible officer. He was irresponsible in so far as he was not represented by any person in that House, but he (Viscount Palmerston) could not constitutionally admit that any person who gave advice to the Crown upon the public service was an irresponsible officer. The truth was, that the Cabinet—the Ministry of the day—were the parties who were responsible for everything that was done in any department of the State, and though they might not and ought not to interfere in the daily and ordinary administration of the office of the Commander in Chief, yet on any material points affecting the interests of the army there would always be previous communication between the Commander in Chief and the responsible advisers of the Crown, and in case of difference their opinion, if deliberately, fully, and firmly expressed, was sure to prevail. It was true that House ought to have a control and superintendence over every department of the State; but the functions of the House were those of control, not of administration, and if there was one department of the public service more than another in regard to which it would be prejudicial for the House of Commons to take upon itself the administration of affairs, that department was the army; for, if the officers of the army had to look to friends and supporters in that House to have their interests promoted, their advancement accelerated, and their faults and errors screened, the army would cease to be that efficient body that they were proud to know it was, and would fail into a state of anarchy and confusion, by which the public interest could not fail to suffer. The result of these views was, that he could not agree to the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend. He thought the union which he proposed of the offices of the Commander in Chief and the Secretary for War would be a union incompatible with the interests and efficiency of the army, and that it would be better to maintain, as at present, a division between the two—having a Secretary for War directly responsible for the administration of the civil branches of the service, and a Commander in Chief who was also responsible—for he could not admit that he was not—for his administration of its discipline and patronage.

in reply said, the Secretary for War, the right hon. the Member for North Wilts (Mr. S. Herbert), and the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston), had altogether misinterpreted his intention in introducing this Motion. They held that he was desirous to place the Commander in Chief in a very inferior position to that which he now held, and to bring the control and patronage of the army under the House of Commons. Now, he had carefully guarded himself in the remarks which he made on these points. He stated that it was not his intention to trench on the authority of the Commander in Chief as regarded the control and discipline of the army, and that he had no desire to bring the patronage of the army under Parliamentary influence. He simply wished that the Commander in Chief should be placed before the public in the position which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) said he now held, and, if in reality he did not hold that position, then it was for the House to say whether he should or should not. He hoped the House would gave its sanction to the Motion which he had thought it his duty to bring forward.

, in rising to call the attention of the House to the subject of the Suez Canal, said that the Motion he had to put upon the paper apparently concerned only a canal, but in reality there was bound up with it the honour and interest of England. He believed it would be found on investigation that the honour of England had been sacrificed, that her great name had been dragged in the dirt, and that we had behaved in a selfish and base manner in regard to this affair. In order that he might snake out these assertions he would, with the permission of the House, introduce a short description of the state of things connected with the canal. At the time when this matter was first broached the Turkish empire was in the process of dissolution. It was in that state that the great feudatories of that empire were one by one becoming independent, and among them one of the most formidable was the Viceroy of Egypt. This great feudatory of the Turkish empire very nearly united Turkey to Egypt by destroying the independence of Turkey, and becoming himself the Sultan of Turkey. This country prevented that result, and the name of Suzerain remained to the Sultan, the Viceroy of Egypt continuing to be called his feudatory. While the relations between Turkey and Egypt were in this unsatisfactory condition there arose the question of making a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, and one of the conditions required to enable parties to carry that project into execution was the assent of the Sublime Porte. Thereupon came the interference that he deprecated. The power and influence of England were employed to induce the Sultan to withhold his assent to the project, and it was on the fact of our influence having been so employed that lie asked the House to pronounce an opinion. He would begin by laying down two or three general propositions, which he trusted would be distinctly answered by those who opposed him. The first was that facility of transport from one part of the earth's surface to another was for the benefit of mankind at large. His second proposition was that a canal across the Isthmus of Suez would facilitate the intercourse between Asia and Europe. If his premises were correct his conclusion could not be denied, and it was that the formation of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez was for the happiness of mankind. Now, the proposition he deprecated was, that what was for the interest of mankind was not for the interest of England. He contended that the House of Commons had nothing to do with the physical difficulties lying in the way of this project, or with the commercial circumstances connected with it. If those who proposed its construction would persuade capitalists to lend their money for a canal it was no part of the duty of the House of Commons to act as the protector of the capital in private hands. Let capitalists do what their prudence suggested. All that the House of Commons had to do was to consider the political aspects of the question. He might be told that the House had to do with the physical and commercial features of this question, and that, in agreeing to a railway from one part of England to another, Parliament did inquire into the commercial circumstances of the project. That was true, and Parliament acted wisely in so doing, because a railway was not made without conferring powers upon individuals which they would not otherwise have possessed, and Parliament had a right to consider whether it was for the interest of the country that those individuals should possess those powers. But no such inquiry come before the House in regard to the canal across the Ithmus of Suez. All that they had to consider was whether the formation of such a canal would be for the interest of England. He was prepared to maintain that the interest of England herein was entirely identical with the interest of mankind. The traffic with India had always been a matter of concern with the people of Europe. Before the passage round the Cape of Good Hope was discovered our commercial transactions with India were carried on overland and through the Mediterranean. After the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope the commerce with India was transferred to that route, thus showing that, although the passage was so much longer, the merchant was repaid the cost of the longer voyage by the ability to send his produce in a ship that was not obliged to discharge her cargo. A lesson might be derived from this fact that was applicable to the present question, because they were now told, that although the canal would aid the merchant in carrying the produce of Europe to India without transferring the cargo, yet that the railway across the Isthmus was a better mode of transport than the canal. His answer was that this had nothing to do with the question. The railway might be a better mode of transit, but that House had only to consider the political interest of England, which could not be injured by a safe and easy transit from Europe to India. If there were one thing that distinguished man and gave him almost Divine attributes it was when he conquered Nature to his own uses, and made her power minister to his wants. Among the most marvellous of his conquests was his ablity to make the very globe he trod upon minister to his happiness, and if by his art and science he could do away with the difficulties which the formation of the world threw in his way he was placed in a position almost Divine. He then showed himself worthy of the position he occupied on earth, and exercised the faculties God had given him in a worthy manner. If, however, in this race for supremacy petty jealousies, a little crooked policy, and mean passions were elicited, it was little for the glory of the nation in which they were displayed. The people of England had a greater traffic to India than all the rest of the world put together. If any one were to be benefited, they would be benefited; but, at the time when, by the improvements of art and science, they were able to conceive the project of cutting through the Isthmus of Suez there came a Minister who told the people of England that it was not for their interest that the project should be carried out. The Minister who counselled the people of England to throw in their weight against the scheme was the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton; and to support that view the hon. Member for Whitby (Mr. Stephenson), altogether travelling out of the province of an English legislator, said, that, scientifically speaking, it was a mad project. [A laugh.] He heard a laugh; but it only convicted the author of it of utter ignorance of his duties as a legislator, which were to consider the political interests of England. The noble Lord put it on that ground. He did not say that the project was physically impossible, but he distinctly said it was not for the interests of England that the canals should be made. He would grapple with that point. Our dominion in India depended on our maritime superiority. The moment we ceased to be the ruling maritime Power, that instant we lost our dominion in India. Did we, by making a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, lose our maritime superiority? No; but it was said that there were times when the Mediterranean was in possession of a French fleet. So it was; and one of the most remarkable instances of the result of that state of circumstances was the expedition of Napoleon Bonaparte to Egypt. The consequence was that our naval superiority was vindicated, and we shut up Napoleon and his army like rats in a trap. If for a moment the French were superior in the Mediterranean, no doubt they could, if they pleased, go through the canal. But so they could round the Cape of Good Hope, if they were superior in maritime force. But let the House consider the consequence of a French fleet going through the Isthmus of Suez and a superior English fleet pursuing them, they would be caught in the Red Sea like rats in a trap, and our maritime superiority would be vindicated. The danger arising from the expectation that at some moment France or some other Power might be superior in the Mediterranean was altogether illusory, and, in fact, we were sacrificing the interests of England and of mankind to a wholly imaginary danger. The traffic of India within a very few years had doubled, and the traffic of England with India was greater than that of all the rest of the world combined. If any one, then, would derive benefit from the easy transit of goods to India it was England. Our mercantile enterprize would be benefited more than that of any other part of the world. We should make India what we wished to make it—namely, an integral part of our own empire, and it would be as if we had brought India so many thousands of miles nearer England. Upon all the broad principles of policy, both as regarded England and as regarded the world, the proposition which he maintained was true. What he wished the House to declare was

"That the power and influence of England ought not to be employed in order to induce the Sultan to withhold his consent from the formation of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez."

He could not help thinking that a great part of the opposition which had been raised to the canal had arisen from the fact that it originated with Frenchmen. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said last night that when he came into office the relations of England and France were such that we were upon the eve of a war—that the policy which the Government was obliged to pursue was so different from that of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, that there was danger of raising the ire of the French people, and bringing on war. He would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, with that notion, he was at all aware what was the state of feeling in France in consequence of the opposition to the formation of the Suez Canal—whether he was aware that there was a feeling in France that we were an insolent, an insular, a grasping, and a selfish people, and he would then ask whether our interposition to prevent a great work which was for the benefit of mankind did not justify that feeling on the part of the French people. He might be told that this was a matter in which the House of Commons ought not to interfere. That was a favourite argument with many hon. Gentlemen. He had seen the House of Commons quiescent in matters in which if it had only moved its little finger great injury would have been prevented. He had seen war declared, war carried on, peace concluded, and no mention made of the matter in the House of Commons. Those who represented the people of England would do well to represent to the nations of the earth, that the people of England did not partake of the selfishness of their past rulers, and that those rulers had mistaken the feeling of the people of England, and misrepresented them. If there were one thing more than another which would conciliate the people of Europe, and among them the people of France, it was showing that the English were a magnanimous people; that they did not oppose that which was for the happiness of their brethren, and that they were willing as a nation to assist in enabling man to conquer nature. In that point of view the work contemplated by the Viceroy of Egypt did him honour. They were very much in the habit of talking of the Egyptians and their ruler as barbarians. Barbarian if he were, he had set us a bright example. He had said, "My country stands in such a way that it is an obstacle in the facility of transport from one part of the earth's surface to another. I will, to the utmost of my power, lend my aid in order to get rid of this difficulty. I will not consider my own private interests. I am told that I have railways and canals which will suffer, but, notwithstanding, I am prepared, for the benefit of mankind, to give the nations of the earth means of transport across my country." There was another part of the earth's surface placed in the same circumstances—namely, the Isthmus of Panama, and at this moment they found the people of the United States, of France, and of England, taking a great interest in making a canal and railroad across it. But if it were to the interest of mankind that the obstacle of the Isthmus of Panama should be done away with, it was ten times more important that the Isthmus of Suez should be cut through, because the Continent of India would be reached much more rapidly, China would be got at much more easily, and the greater part of the commerce of the world would be greatly facilitated by such a construction. The route across the Isthmus of Panama would certainly open up the western shores of America, and perhaps our distant possessions in Australia; but our distant possessions in Australia would be brought nearer by the formation of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez than ever they could be by a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. In fact, by the Suez project Australia, the Indian Archipelago, China, India, the eastern shores of Africa, and all up the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal, would be brought nearer, and he thought that no one could doubt that a very much larger proportion of the earth's surface would be opened up to commerce by a canal across the Isthmus of Suez than across the Isthmus of Panama. He sought in vain for any tangible argument against this project. He could not imagine what was the reason of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton for opposing the scheme, for anything more puerile, he had almost said anile, than such a course could not be conceived. Some people said it was a crotchet of the noble Lord's; but was a crotchet to stand in the way of the execution of the greatest physical work ever undertaken since man was upon the face of the earth? If this canal were cut, not only would Asia, Africa, and Australia be brought nearer to the rest of the world, but a great highway would be established which would be the civilizer of mankind. Men talked of our institutions here for civilizing mankind, of our combinations for christianizing the world, but all of them sank into insignificance in comparison with the means of spreading civilization, which the formation of this canal presented. Intercourse between man and man was the true mode of civilizing mankind. It was said that this canal might be the means of separating Egypt from Turkey; but that idea was entirely opposed to all the lessons of history. Mountains might separate nations, but rivers never; they had invariably been the means of uniting mankind. He thought, then, that the proposition he had laid down, in the commencement of his speech, was true, that to facilitate transit from one point of the earth's surface to the other was for the happiness of mankind; that the formation of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez would greatly promote that object; that, therefore, the formation of such a canal was for the happiness of mankind, and that what was for the happiness of mankind could not be contrary to the interests of England. Before resuming his seat, he would call the attention of the House to the circumstances under which this canal was brought before the world. The present Government called themselves great friends of the French alliance, and they would find, if they came to talk with their own Ambassador, or with any intelligent Frenchman, that this matter had a very important bearing on the alliance. The conduct of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton on this question had excited universal attention abroad, and he hoped that the present Government would not follow the example of opposing in office what they had supported on the other side of the House. The Viceroy of Egypt, when first this scheme was suggested, had taken the most impartial means of ascertaining whether the physical difficulties were insurmountable or not. He had employed a Commission of Engineers from France, England, Prussia, Austria, Spain, and Sardinia, to survey the route and to re- port on the project, and the concurrence of these eminent men in the feasibility of the plan was not to be upset by the mere ipse dixit of one Member of the House of Commons, however eminent. Common sense must tell every one that the cutting this canal was for the interest of mankind, and he hoped the House, therefore, would give its sanction to his Resolution, which he would now conclude by moving.

seconded the Motion.

said, he could not understand how it could be the policy of this country to oppose any obstacle to a project which would facilitate the commercial intercourse of the world. With regard to the facts of the case, from being well acquainted with the locality, he was very much inclined to agree with the views of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, as to the physical and engineering difficulties of the scheme. No one could be more sensible of those difficulties than himself. In the first place the works would have to be upon a gigantic scale, extending eighty miles from one sea to the other, and constructed under a burning climate, through a country devoid of the means of sustaining life, and altogether destitute of a supply of water. At each end of this long track through the desert they would have to run a channel into the sea, from two to three miles in length, by means of an artificial prolongation of piers to protect the Channel from the action of the waves. On the side of the Red Sea these difficulties might not perhaps be overpowering. But on that of the Mediterranean you would have to bring every stone for the proposed piers from long distances, to deposit which in a shallow and exposed coast would be a work of great danger and difficulty. He, therefore, agreed with the noble Lord, that it was very improbable that this scheme could prove to be a successful commercial speculation. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton stated one of his objections to this measure to be that it would be extremely dangerous and injurious to our interests to afford such a means of transit to our great rivals in the Mediterranean. He (Mr. Griffith) could not appreciate the value of that objec- tion, inasmuch as the advantages to each would be coequal. He need scarcely remind the House how, during the past year, great numbers of people in this country had trembled for those who were near and dear to them in India, and on the arrival of the news of the mutiny, when it was determined to send an army out to the relief of the English troops there, how great was the public anxiety throughout the kingdom to have those gallant men conveyed as speedily as possible to the scene of action. If at that time we could have embarked the troops in our large steamers, and conveyed them right on to India by the Red Sea, without any break in the transit at the Isthmus of Suez, how much of anxiety would the country have been spared, while the mutiny might have been divested of many of its horrors. It would be in the recollection of the House that at an early period after the arrival of the intelligence of the mutiny it was suggested that we should send our troops by the overland route, and that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton on that occasion dwelt on the extreme difficulty of establishing adequate means of transit for the troops on the other side of the Isthmus. No doubt that was a subject for grave consideration; but eventually the noble Lord, when at the head of the Government, did adopt that very mode of carrying the troops on to India which he had deprecated in that House as being impracticable. If, therefore, the opinion of the noble Lord had not been found infallible in that case, why should it be held to be so in respect to another manner of crossing the Isthmus. The difficulties had vanished in practice, and in point of fact we were now regularly sending troops in that direction to India. It was unquestionable that if we could have done that from the very beginning of the struggle the people of this country would have been relieved from much of the deep anxiety with which they have regarded it, and incalculable advantages, in point of time especially, would have been gained. Indeed, whether for the purposes of war or commerce, there could scarcely be a more valuable boon to England than the construction of a canal across the Isthmus. The noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), on some recondite and far-fetched political ground, thought that such a project would be injurious to the interests of our communication with India; but the objections of the noble Lord were so wholly opposed to the liberal and commercial spirit of the age that he (Mr. Griffith) really could only consider them as the remnant of an obsolete and exploded policy. The noble Lord held that a canal of that kind would tend to a separation between Egypt and Turkey; but he contended, that the facilities of access it would afford to the ships of war of the Sultan and his allies could only confirm his authority along the inner coasts of Egypt and the Red Sea. He (Mr. Griffith) contended that a great industrial work of that description could never by any possibility be injurious to Turkey. Adverting to the Amendment which he had placed upon the paper, he might remark that although the Pasha of Egypt had, co nomine, abolished slavery in his own dominions, he had not prohibited the use of forced labour among his subjects, which, in fact, amounted to slavery. From the remotest ages down to the present time all the public works in Egypt had been executed by forced labour, and in dealing with this question it was essential that the House should be careful not to sanction the employment of the power of a despotic Government to procure labour for the execution of a work of this kind at inadequate remuneration. The pay proposed by the promoters to be given to the labourer was that of about ten pence a day, to induce them to go out to labour in the burning desert, finding their own sustenance. He put it to the House, whether such pay was likely to obtain that labour on voluntary terms. He hoped that the House would take care that they did not inadvertently sanction the system of slavery under the guise of labour. He begged, therefore, to move as an Amendment that in any course that this House may sanction in furtherance of the construction of such canal it is expedient that care be taken that the despotic powers of the Egyptian Government be not allowed to be made use of by the promoters of such project to obtain the required labour from the "fellah" at an inadequate remuneration by those compulsory means familiar to the practice of that Government, so as to produce the effects of slavery under the guise of paid labour.

said, he had heard with surprise the unfavourable remarks that had been made respecting the Egyptian Government, and he thought that, whatever opinion might be entertained with regard to the Suez Canal, the words of the Amendment were hardly consistent with that courtesy which was due to the Egyptian Government from that House. There could be no doubt that the Viceroy had acted in a very liberal, enlightened, and public-spirited manner, and that he had shown a noble ambition of employing the resources of his country, not upon objects of a personal nature, as had too often been the case with his predecessors, but in a work which claimed the merit of great permanent advantage and of extensive public utility. The present ruler of Egypt had undoubtedly done more to abolish slavery in his dominions and to improve the condition of his subjects than any Mahomedan, and probably any European prince during an equal space of time; and, though we often heard of French influence in Egypt, he ventured to say that to no country had a more friendly disposition been shown, or more frequent proofs of goodwill been given on the part of the Egyptian Government than to England. He had himself witnessed the passage of two English regiments through Egypt on their way from India to the Crimea. They were detained for several weeks at Cairo owing to the want of transports, and during the whole of their stay they were entertained in the most munificent manner at the English hotels, together with the families of officers, at a cost of many thousand pounds. More recently, as a mark of regard for this country, both the Governor General of India and the ambassador to China received the utmost attention and hospitality during their stay in the dominions of the Pasha. He made these the remarks because he was sure that the prosperity of Egypt and the disposition of its ruler, on whom so much of that prosperity depended, were matters of deep interest to England, and he felt convinced that it never could be the intention of the House, whatever might be the decision arrived at with regard to the advantages of the Suez Canal, that any apparent want of courtesy should be shown to the present ruler of Egypt, who in carrying on the improvements of his country had shown an en- lightened regard to the good opinion of Europe and to the approval of this country.

said, as the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) had made special reference to himself in the course of his observations, he begged to occupy the attention of the House for a few minutes. The hon. and learned Gentleman in the commencement of his remarks said that they ought to draw a broad line of distinction between the political and the physical question. Now, with all due respect for the acumen of the hon. and learned Gentleman, although there was no doubt a great difference between the two questions, yet they were both so intermingled together in the present case that the merits of one could hardly be considered without the other. The speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman was so full of generalities, that he found it almost impossible to deal with them. He did not bring before the House a single absolute fact with which they could attempt to argue. He had told them for example, that it was very desirable to facilitate the intercourse between one portion of the globe and another. No one doubted that, but the hon. and learned Gentleman had not satisfied them that this canal would accomplish that object. The hon. and learned Member had assumed that it would, but he (Mr. Stephenson) believed that it would not do so. On the contrary, even supposing its construction to be physically possible, which he, for one, denied, he was prepared to show that the engineering difficulties and the moral difficulties (to which the hon. Member for Devizes' Amendment in part referred) would render the scheme impossible. The hon. and learned Gentleman, in attempting to prove the feasibility of the project, had quoted many authorities, but he had omitted to refer to the opinions of the three gentlemen—one from Austria, another from Paris, and himself from England—who first investigated the subject in 1847. They examined the physical features of the country, and deliberated over the matter in the most cautious manner, basing their observations upon the erroneous supposition that it would be possible to establish an artificial Bosphorus between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, such as existed naturally between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. They proceeded upon the assumption that the French levels were accurate which showed a difference of 30 feet in the level between one sea and the other, by means of which a constant current would be maintained through the channel, supposing it to be made sufficient to keep the harbour of Pelusium free from the mud which was deposited by the Nile. Instead of there being a difference of 30 feet in the height, however, it turned out that the two seas were on a dead level, and that no current whatever could be established. The hon. and learned Member, therefore, was almost guilty of a misapplication of terms when he spoke of a "canal," because if this channel were cut, and the water let into it, it would not be a canal, but a ditch. The hon. and learned Gentleman had quoted the late Mr. Rendel as a supporter of the scheme which was now advocated; but he (Mr. Stephenson) could say positively that Mr. Rendel did not support the scheme as now proposed, and he might mention as a proof of this that he did not sign the Report. Mr. Rendel must have been known to every hon. Gentleman in that House, and his authority in such matters was very great. Mr. Maclean, another high authority in matters of this description, also denied the feasibility of the project. As far as the English engineers were concerned, he believed they all agreed with him to a man. With respect to the difficulties in the way of carrying out the scheme, he would only point out the difficulty of cutting a canal through a desert eighty miles in length, with no fruits, no fresh water to be found within that space. He had travelled on foot the whole distance, at least over all the dry land, and consequently felt justified in what he stated. He did not desire to enter upon the political part of the question, but he could assert that as far as the transit of passengers and mails was concerned the proposed scheme would be productive of no saving of time in our intercourse with the East, for, while they could be conveyed from Alexandria to Suez by railway in eight hours, it would require, even if the most perfect canal possible were constructed, at least double that time for vessels going to India to pass through it, for vessels must coal either at Alexandria or Suez. It was said that they had nothing to do with the physical difficulties of the scheme, but he thought the House had something to do with them, or at least he had. If he had sat silent it would be said he had acquiesced in the Motion, and had tacitly admitted that the Suez Canal was a feasible project, whereas his opinion was that if it were attempted at all, which he hoped it would not be, or, at least, he trusted it would not be with English money, it would prove to be an abortive scheme, ruinous to its constructors.

said, the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) was mistaken as to the grounds upon which he felt it his duty to oppose the Motion. He certainly did not object to the Motion, because the question was not a fit one for the House of Commons to consider. It had been represented as one of great importance to the commerce of this country—to the prosperity, in fact, of the civilized world—and, if so, it was certainly a matter with which the House of Commons was well entitled to deal. If the only objections were to the impracticability of the scheme, or, as the last speaker had stated, the ruinous results that would ensue to those who undertook its construction, he should not oppose the Motion, believing that it was the business of those who entered upon such speculations to take care of themselves. But at the same time those were not considerations to be kept wholly out of sight when they were considering a question of doubtful policy, and certainly the objection did not come well from the hon. and learned Gentleman who had based his support of the scheme entirely upon the grounds that it would be productive of the greatest commercial advantage.

I did not ask the House to assent to the scheme, but to abstain from influencing the Sultan against it.

said, if the hon. and learned Gentleman did not in terms support the Motion upon the ground of the commercial advantages to be derived from the Suez Canal, yet all who had heard his speech must agree that from beginning to end it was a studied laudation of the scheme; and yet, while it was urged upon them as a desirable scheme upon commercial grounds, they were now told it was of no importance whether or not it would be ruinous to those who undertook to carry it out. The hon. and learned Gentleman said the opposition to the canal had been based upon considerations which were base and selfish. He (Mr. S. FitzGerald) differed from the hon. and learned Gentleman, for it appeared to him that the opposition to the scheme had been conceived in a far different spirit, on reasons and arguments which could only be called selfish and base, inasmuch as they related to the maintenance of the prosperity and greatness of this country, but in no other sense. The hon. and learned Gentleman said the question was first mooted at a time when Turkey was in a state of dissolution, and that advantage had been taken of the support which we afforded her to influence her action upon this matter. He did not think that was a just representation of the position of the Turkish Government, and the hon. and learned Gentleman was not justified in leading the House to believe that the opposition to this scheme proceeded solely from this country. He believed the position of the Turkish Government in reference to this question to be as follows:—The Turkish Government might perfectly rely upon the loyalty of the present Pasha of Egypt, but it could not but regard with feelings of jealousy, if not distrust, a project that must, if carried out, lead to a material, if not a political, separation of Egypt from the Turkish empire. And, moreover, the Turkish Government, regarding the scheme as expensive, and, if not impracticable, at least unprofitable, and thus likely to withdraw that capital which they were so desirous of attracting for the completion of public works, naturally were not favourable to it. The hon. and learned Gentleman laid down certain principles, that the formation of the canal would facilitate the transport of mails, would be for the benefit of commerce, and the happiness of mankind, and therefore it was the duty of the House to support the scheme. [Mr. ROEBUCK: I did not put the "therefore."] Every word of the hon. and learned Member's speech bore upon the benefit which mankind would derive from the construction of the canal, through the facilitation of the commercial intercourse between Europe and the East. On that point, however, he would refer the hon. and learned Member to the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, and who had satisfactorily shown that this project, so far from greatly improving and facilitating the commercial intercourse between this country and India, would not add to it in the slightest degree. But, assuming that the project was practicable, he (Mr. S. FitzGerald) did not think that the commerce of mankind would be benefited by it. Would this be a desirable result, that the whole of our commerce to India should have to pass through a narrow channel some 300 feet wide, which might be easily fortified, so that at a moment's notice, on the outbreak of war, the whole of that commerce might be stopped by a single battery? The hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to consider that the only light in which this question could be viewed was that of giving increased facilities to intercourse and commerce. But there were other important and political considerations attached to this question, and it was impossible to deal with it solely upon the ground of increased facilities to commerce. To give increased facilities to commerce and intercourse might greatly augment the happiness of mankind by developing prosperity, but there were other not less important considerations. In that House, at least, it might be asked whether the result of such a project as this might not lead to enterprises on the part of other nations, to war and to such events as might be the very reverse of benefits to mankind. What, in fact, was this scheme? He believed the hon. and learned Gentleman knew that at the present moment the coast of Egypt was fortified in such a manlier that it would be almost impossible to land upon it. At present it was proposed to make a canal; but the making of that canal involved the concession of a strip of land from sea to sea. If that strip were conceded it was proposed to make a channel 300 feet wide and thirty feet deep. The bank on either side would be in possession of the proprietors of this canal. Now, could anything be a greater obstacle than such an artificially raised impediment as that between the Turkish territory and Egypt? But when the hon. and learned Gentleman talked of giving increased facilities to our intercourse with India, he (Mr. S. FitzGerald) might ask, was it not perfectly clear that this which was to be the channel of that intercourse might, without the slightest difficulty, come into the hands of the enemies of this country? Therefore, so far from improving our intercourse with India, it would be the greatest impediment to it imaginable. Even taking the hon. and learned Gentleman's own view of the question, was it not evident that, for the purpose of keeping that channel out of the hands of those nations who had the start of us in that region, we should be obliged to keep constantly on foot armaments necessarily great, and therefore expensive? He did not desire to be understood as for a moment implying anything like a distrust of our allies; but although we might at present have the greatest confidence in them, it would be the height of folly in us to imagine that our relations with them would never change. We should, therefore, not look with complacency upon a scheme which would give other Powers the most ready and easy access to our Eastern dominions. The hon. and learned Gentleman said, that this project had been taken up with the greatest interest in France, end that nothing would tend so much to cement the good feeling between this country and France as our giving an assent to this project. On that point, he thought the hon. and learned Gentleman had obtained his information from newspapers rather than from any person intimately acquainted with the facts. He had reason to believe that France had ceased to take in this project that interest which the hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to suppose. If this were a vitally important commercial question, one which so much concerned the commerce and prosperity of this country, he thought it was a matter not unworthy of remark that this was not a scheme which had originated in commercial circles in this country; that it had not met with that support which it certainly would have met with, if the merchants and traders of this country thought it was so commercially important and valuable as the hon. and learned Gentleman represented. It was a matter worthy of some remark, that that which had been represented by the hon. and learned Gentleman as a most important commercial enterprise, had been undertaken for years without having received the support of the most commercial nation. Was it not surprising that it had not been undertaken by the most commercial nation, but had received its principal support from the principal military Power in Europe? He did not intend by that observation to make any covert insinuation whatever against that Power; he merely used it as an argument, to show that the hon. and learned Gentleman had greatly overstated his case, when he stated that this was a project which ought to receive the undivided support of this country, because it was one which must greatly contribute to our commerce and prosperity. He had very shortly put before the House the grounds upon which he thought it was his duty to ask the House not to assent to the proposition of the hon. and learned Gentleman. This was not the first time that this question had come before the House of Commons. It was one upon which a very decided policy had been adopted by the Government of this country. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton had expressed his opinion in no unintelligible terms upon it. It was therefore a question with which the present Government had to deal, not as one of first impression, but one on which it was their duty to pursue the policy adopted by those who preceded them. It was one which they must consider not only with reference to its own merits, but also with reference to the course which this country had for a considerable time adopted. He would put it to the House whether, merely for the sake of those commercial considerations to which the hon. and learned Gentleman had alluded, they would run the risk of those political dangers to which he (Mr. S. FitzGerald) had adverted. He hoped, therefore, that the House would not assent to the Resolution.

said, he wished to know whether Her Majesty's Government had any objection to lay on the table of the House the correspondence that had passed between the Government of England and other Governments in reference to the project of the Suez Canal. They were informed that for fifteen years the Government of England had been employed in preventing the Sultan from yielding to the wishes of other Powers, and from granting a firman for the making of this canal. Now, he should ask for the despatches between England, France, and Turkey on this subject, because then the House could clearly understand what had been going on, and whether the Foreign Office had been pursuing a policy really consistent with the true interests and welfare of England. He was sorry to find that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had taken up the policy that he found ready made for him at the Foreign Office, probably in the pigeon-holes in that office, in company with all the stereotyped arguments each successive Government used upon these questions. He thought his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield had done a public service by bringing before the Parliament of England this important question, for it was only by such Motions as the present that the Government could be induced to depart from a policy of long standing. The hon. Member for Whitby (Mr. Stephenson) had made a speech which, coming from so high an authority, must necessarily have great weight with the House; but all he should say with respect to it was, that it would be an admirable speech if it were addressed to a person who was about to take shares in a canal to be made from Pelusium to Suez. That, however, was not the question which the House was called upon to consider, inasmuch as hon. Members were not asked to express their opinion as to the physical possibilities of making the proposed canal or of the commercial advantages which were likely to flow from the adoption of the scheme. Of the particular project which had been indicated by the Commission which had inquired into the subject in 1855, the hon. Member for Whitby did not, he believed, even upon engineering grounds, express his disapproval; that disapproval being confined to some other project which the Commission itself had condemned. [Mr. STEPHENSON: My opinions upon the question apply to the most recent scheme.] The opinions of his hon. Friend were no doubt entitled to great weight, but he was sure he would not differ from him when he stated that the most eminent engineers were liable to be deceived when dealing with questions which were both new and difficult. The hon. Gentleman himself, for instance, was mistaken in his opinion with respect to a certain bridge across the Niagara. But, be that as it might, the expediency of entering upon the proposed scheme as a commercial speculation was not the question before the House. The Motion of his hon. and learned Friend sought to affirm that the power and influence of this country ought not to be used in the endeavour to induce the Sultan to withhold his assent to the proposition of making a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, and he (Mr. Gibson), as one who was in favour of the independence of the Ottoman empire, which he understood to be one of the most cherished objects of the statesmen of England, should give his support to that Motion. He desired to see the Sultan left to the exercise of his own free will in the matter, and he could not help thinking that that was a wiser course to pursue than by undue interference with his policy to bring him, as would probably be the case, into collision with the other Powers of Europe. He trusted some Member of the Government would answer his question with respect to the production of the correspondence to which he had referred, while he might be permitted to remind his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that he laboured under a mistake in supposing that the commercial interests of England had not viewed the proposed scheme with favour. To his own knowledge the contrary was the fact, and in corroboration of that assertion he might state that at meetings which had been held in London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Leith, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Belfast, Cork, Birmingham, Hull, and Bristol, Resolutions had been passed encouraging the promoters of the project. The principle that such a project was contrary to the interests of England had found no favour at those meetings, and he could not help feeling, under those circumstances, that it was very desirable the House should, by the decision at which it should arrive, prevent all undue secret interference with the free action of a foreign Power. He did not ask the House to encourage the Sultan to grant a firman, or to say a word in favour of the canal, but simply to leave him to the exercise of his own unfettered judgment in a matter with respect to which he, so far as the interests of his own country were concerned, must be the person best able to decide. As to the separation of Egypt from Turkey as a consequence of the proposed scheme, he should only say that it would, in his opinion, be as well to speak of the separation of England from Scotland by the Caledonian Canal. Indeed, he was prepared to maintain that the separation between Egypt and Turkey was at present rendered more complete by the existence of the desert than it would be if a canal were constructed along the banks of which a considerable population would be sure to spring up, reducing to a state of cultivation, land which was now barren. Such a result as that would be a clear gain both to Egypt and Turkey, and would benefit materially the general interests of the Ottoman empire. Under these circumstances, he hoped the spirit of the policy of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton would not continue to influence the Foreign Office; that he would be held to have permanently retired from that quarter; and that Her Majesty's present advisers would consider themselves free to act on their own judgment, and be induced to take a policy more conducive to the advantage of the country.

Sir, I beg to assure the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. M. Gibson), that I don't mean to retire so quietly as he seems to imagine, and although I do not pretend to continue to be the Foreign Minister of this country, yet as the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), has more than once alluded to me in the course of the speech which he has made this evening, I trust I may be permitted to state again to the House the opinions which I entertain upon this subject. The hon. and learned Gentleman has stated that he has endeavoured to ascertain what the reasons are which induced me to object to the proposed scheme; that he has made inquiry of everybody upon the point, and that no one could give him the information he sought. Now, I may, I think, very naturally ask the hon. and learned Gentleman why he has not addressed his inquiries to me? His mode of proceeding reminds me of the old story of the man who told another that he had been looking for him all the world over for the last two years, the simple reply to which remark was, "Why did you not come to Swansea? I have been there the whole time." If the hon. and learned Gentleman had consulted me, I should been happy to inform him why his scheme is one to which I have been unable to give my support; and I may, perhaps, add that I last year stated in detail the reasons why I was disposed to arrive at that conclusion. The most charitable view which I can take of the scheme, the most innocent light in which it can be regarded is, in my opinion, that it is the greatest bubble which was ever imposed upon the credulity and simplicity of the people of this country. Setting aside, therefore, all considerations of a political and commercial nature, my firm opinion, founded on the engineering and geographical reasons which have been so ably stated by my hon. Friend the Member for Whitby (Mr. Stephenson) is, that although perhaps it may be too bold to say that this is a project which could not be carried out at an enormous sacrifice of money and human life, as a remunerative commercial enterprise it is, as I said before, in reality nothing more than a mere bubble. The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, however, has stated that the project has excited great interest throughout the country, and has mentioned towns in which meetings have been held and resolutions passed approving the scheme. Anybody who listened to the observations of the right hon. Gentleman might very naturally suppose that those meetings were spontaneous movements on the part of the inhabitants of the towns to which he has referred. But is that the case? Nothing like it. Those meetings have been got up by foreign projectors for their own purposes, and although they have passed resolutions, I should very much wish to know by what amount of subscriptions those resolutions have been followed. The hon. Member for Whitby (Mr. Stephenson), as well as the hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment to the present Motion (Mr. Griffith), has very clearly explained the great physical difficulties which lie in the way of cutting a trench, such as is proposed, through fifty miles of desert, with all the obstacles which have to be surmounted in procuring labourers, and the means of affording them subsistence when you have secured their services. Taking into account, also, the shallowness of the sea at each end, and the necessity of having recourse to a large outlay in order to provide the requisite means of access for seagoing ships, I am quite satisfied that it will be impossible to make this work pay the expenses of its construction. With respect to the commercial advantages of the scheme, the hon. Member for Whitby has shown that the delays necessarily incident to the passage of steamers through the canal would be such that there is every reason to suppose progress by railway would be more rapid, while it must be borne in mind that steamers are the only class of vessels which could with advantage be employed, inasmuch as the winds, which during a great part of the year blow steadily down the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, would render the passage of sailing vessels through the canal inconceivably slow, while at the same time such passage would be attended with much danger on account of the coral reefs, which line each side of the Red Sea. We are told now that for fifteen years we have been exercising a moral constraint upon the Sultan of Turkey to prevent him giving his sanction to this scheme. Now, I can assure those who hold that opinion that they are entirely mistaken. No doubt the British Government did at the outset express its opinion that the project was one which ought not to receive the sanction of the Sultan; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ashton is mistaken if he supposes that his Imperial Majesty has not since then been perfectly at liberty to act and judge for himself in the matter. It is a mistake to suppose that the Turkish Government are not quite as much opposed to that scheme as any English Government could be, for it is a matter which concerns them much more nearly and much more deeply than it concerns us. We felt it our duty to explain to the Turkish Government, when we knew that other influence was at work in favour of the scheme, what dangers it involved. The right hon. Gentleman says that he is as much prepared as any man in England to maintain the independence of the Turkish empire, but he forgot to say anything about its integrity. Now, to maintain the integrity of the Turkish empire is of as much importance as to maintain its independence, and to maintain the connection between Egypt and Turkey is of at least as great importance as regards English interests as it is of importance to some other powers to maintain the connection between Turkey and the Principalities. Why, Sir, every one who hears me will recollect the importance that was attached to maintaining the connection between Turkey and Egypt when we sent an expedition to Egypt to restore that connection, which had for a time been disturbed, and the reasons which led to the expedition being sent out are as cogent now as they were at the time to which I refer. Every year which passes, ever communication which we receive through Egypt, must show us the importance and the advantage of maintaining a connection between Egypt and the neutral State, and of preventing her falling under the influence of any preponderating Power which might at some time be hostile to us. I believe that, as has been well stated by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. S. FitzGerald) has said, people in general are ignorant of what has been taking place in the Mediterranean frontier of Egypt in late years. At the time of the battle of Alexandria great difficulty was felt in effecting a landing in that country, but that exploit, and a great military exploit it was, was accomplished. Since then every place where a landing could be effected has been scientifically fortified, not according to Egyptian plans, but according to plans laid down by scientific men of other countries, carried out by engineers of another country, and I believe, although I cannot positively assert it as a fact, expedited by means of funds supplied by another country. I am afraid to say how many guns those fortifications mount, but I believe three or four thousand, and those fortifications, manned by an army of 20,000 men, would in all probability render Egypt incapable of being overcome by any Turkish forces, or by the forces of any other country. Then, again, under the specious pretence of a work for agricultural purposes, the barrage of the Nile has been completed, which, while it pretends to be for the purpose of controlling the inundations of the Nile, would, in reality, be found to be a work available in no slight degree for military and defensive purposes. There is one quarter, however, by which an army might march—nay, has repeatedly marched—on Egypt, and that is along the coast of the Mediterranean, and this project has for its obvious purpose the barring of that passage to any Turkish army which might be employed to restore the empire to the Sultan, by opening a great military canal 300 feet broad, and 30 feet deep, laid with batteries. The right hon. Gentleman says that waters join countries. Well, so they do, countries which are in harmony with each other, and also districts of the same country; but should this canal be constructed, and should the Pasha of Egypt at any time wish to sever the connection between Turkey and Egypt, and to erect Egypt into an independent State, the possession of a barrier such as I have described, defended by foreigners who might side with the Pasha, would render any attempt upon Egypt most precarious for the Sultan of Turkey, and would render much more probable that event which I think it is the interest of England to prevent—I mean the detachment of Egypt from Turkey. That was the argument which we urged upon the Sultan, and he himself seeing the force of it, has acted upon it. But, Sir, I say also that we have an interest of our own in this matter which we cannot disregard, and to which the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has adverted. It is not to our interest that there should be open between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean a water-passage at the command of other Powers, and not at ours. If the passage which we at present have were taken from us, we should be obliged to go to India round the Cape of Good Hope, and it would be absurd to shut our eyes to the probable damage to our interests if a sudden rupture should take place, and to the facility which, if this scheme were carried out, might be afforded to an enemy in case of war. Such an event may not happen for a long period of time, but when we have been recently told that within the last three months we have been on the verge of war without any one knowing anything about it, I do not think that we ought, to the danger of the interests of the country, to indulge in philanthropic reveries, or be led away by a too generous wish to promote the prosperity of the human race. I do not say that the hon. and learned Gentleman, who has brought this question before the House, has stated that the national interests of the country ought to give way to philan- thropic schemes; on the contrary, he founded the whole of his argument upon the question of the political interests of England, and I think that I have shown that this scheme is contrary to those interests. We are told that all we are asked to do is to abstain from interference; but can any man shut his eyes to the fact that this scheme has practically been scouted by the wiser commercial men of this country? ["No, no!"] I beg pardon, it has been damned with faint praise. That is, it has met with words of favour from those who were most unwilling to put their money in it. The object of the Resolution appears to me to be to obtain a Parliamentary title for a scheme the shares of which arc not marketable, and I trust that the House will not lend itself to a speculation of that kind, and agree to a Resolution which I maintain is at variance with the interests of England. I hope that the House will have sufficient confidence in those who have had, and who have, the direction of affairs in this country to believe that there would not have been a continued opposition to this scheme on the part of the successive Governments unless they had been satisfied that it was a scheme at variance with the political and national interests of the country.

observed, that the originators of the scheme had come to Liverpool, where they had held a public meeting, which was not very numerously attended, although the merchants of that port were always anxious to hear of any project for the advancement of trade. Resolutions had been passed in favour of the scheme, it was true, but at a public meeting the Resolutions were sure to be passed out of courtesy, and that had, he believed, been the case as regarded the present scheme. The general feeling in Liverpool was that the whole affair was nothing more than a bubble, and he did not think that many persons in that town would be willing to take shares in the undertaking.

In my opinion the House would be much misled if it were induced by what has just fallen from my hon. Friend (Mr. Ewart) to attach any serious importance in the consideration of this question to the remarks of the right hon. Member for Ashton (Mr. M. Gibson) upon the holding of public meetings. I do not think my right hon. Friend (Mr. M. Gibson) intended to urge this upon the House as a reason why we should adopt the Resolution of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield; but he urged it, if I understood him aright, as an answer to the objection taken that the scheme of a canal was universally condemned here by commercial men. I must say it was a matter of courtesy that the public feeling of foreign countries should be set right on this point; and, in answer to my hon. Friend (Mr. J. Ewart), who says it is so easy to get up public meetings in this country, I must remind him that there are limits upon those facilities. About a year or two ago, shortly after the peace, we had announced in this country very widely, and probably with some powerful influence to back them, extended schemes for railway communications in Russia. Was there any movement in Liverpool to support those schemes? If it is so easy to get up public meetings in Liverpool, why did not the promoters of the Russian railways go down there, and in this way endeavour to excite public feeling in favour of those schemes? I think my hon. Friend (Mr. J. Ewart) has very considerably exaggerated his case when he says that it is so easy to induce gentlemen in a place like Liverpool to come forward and pass Resolutions in favour of any scheme whatever. As a Liverpool man myself I don't think this is so, and—

I did not say for any scheme whatever. I merely observed how easy it was to get up public meetings.

Yes, public meetings in Liverpool on commercial projects. Well, I don't wish the fact to be exaggerated, but my hon. Friend must admit that it was right in the right hon. Member for Ashton to controvert the absurd statement that the scheme was not universally condemned by the people of this country. That, however, is a matter entirely secondary and irrelevant to the question we are to-night discussing. Nor has the point now before us been justly stated by the noble Viscount. That point is not whether we are to give our sanction either to a bubble scheme or any scheme at all; it is simply whether we are to protest against the use of the political influence of this country for the purpose of preventing the making of the canal across the Isthmus of Suez. The Resolution of the hon. and learned Member does not ask the house to take any part whatever, direct or indirect, small or great, in giving favour, countenance, or approval to the scheme of this canal. What is asked is that you should put an end to the vicious system of which I am afraid my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) has been the main author—the system of arbitrary and gratuitous interference for the purpose of preventing the execution of this canal, on grounds which are either null or valueless, but which are in reality much worse, because they go to place England at issue with the world, and to commit us to a contest in which we must necessarily fail. That is the question; and that is the allegation which I make in answer to my noble Friend. If he says that the effect of the Resolution will be to give encouragement to the scheme, I really must answer that it gives no other encouragement than naturally ensues from the withdrawal of an improper, an undue, an illegitimate opposition by illegitimate means to this project. The hon. and learned Gentleman does not intend that the House of Commons should, in any form or degree, make itself responsible for supporting the scheme. The question is, whether the House of Commons, being now challenged on the point, shall make itself responsible for that which it has never yet done—namely, for countenancing the opposition to this project, which has been conducted from time to time by the executive Government without the sanction and without the approval of this House. One word as to the nature of the opposition by the executive Government. That opposition was not originally founded upon the absurd pleas and pretexts which are now alleged for its justification. It was originally a question, not of obstructing the means of communication between Europe and India—not of denying that there was an advantage in bringing them together if you could—but it was a question of competition between the railway and the canal. The canal was in the main a French, the railway was in the main an English scheme. For the moment there was a competition between these two projects, and naturally enough the English Government—having greater confidence, as it was bound to have, or as it was natural it should have, in the engineers of its own country—recommended the railway in preference to the canal. The objections now urged by the noble Viscount, if they are good for anything, are good against the railway as well as against the canal. The possession of the railway would be an advantage to hostile Powers in sending troops to India almost as great as the canal. Is there any doubt at all about that? Has not the noble Viscount told us that one of his great reasons for resisting the formation of this canal is, because it will be used by other Powers in hostility to this country for the purpose of sending hostile armaments to India. Well, the railway likewise offer facilities for sending hostile armaments to India. The plain state of the case is this:—Here is a scheme which upon the face of it is beneficial to mankind. I am quite sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Whitby (Mr. R. Stephenson) will be the last to deny this. My hon. Friend is perfectly in his province when he gives us his reasons why he is led to conclude that the scheme is impracticable. He is perfectly justified, with his reputation and knowledge of the subject, in stating here, as a scientific man, that having considered this scheme he regards it as physically impracticable. Nothing can be more fair and just than the part thus taken by my hon. Friend. For my own part I only feel obliged to him for his opinion, and every Englishman will be prejudiced in its favour, for it appears that this is becoming, in a considerable degree, a question between English and continental engineers, the authority of the former being generally against, and of the latter generally in favour of, the project. Let that controversy be fought out, but fought out in the proper form, in the proper place, and upon the proper grounds. Do not let us have Governments and ex-Governments coming down to instruct us here upon the nature of bubble schemes. The noble Viscount says that any one who has listened to the observations of the hon. Member for Whitby must feel that this is a bubble scheme. Now, I must say that I have too much respect for the judgment of my hon. Friend, to think that he, as a scientific man, would feel his opinion on a scientific question strengthened one jot by a vote of the House of Commons. Such a vote would not add one jot to the value of a scientific judgment upon the practical merits of the scheme. Let us, therefore, dismiss from our minds the notion that we must declare this to be a bubble scheme. If it is a bubble scheme, allow the bubble to burst. How arc such projects best cured? What did you do with the Thames Tunnel, which even now remains unfinished? Why, invoke the influence of Government for the purpose of protesting against bubble schemes? I protest against the judgment of the noble Viscount and of the Under Secretary for State as irre- levant when they talk about a bubble scheme. As a commercial project, let the Suez Canal stand or fall upon commercial grounds. But the noble Viscount is not satisfied with denouncing the scheme in this way. He alleges political reasons, and has transmitted some of his own views to the present Foreign Office on this point. What are those reasons? He has announced two. One of them is, that the canal will tend to the dismemberment of the Turkish empire by the separation of Egypt from Turkey, and the other is that it will tend to the dismemberment of the British empire by separating India from England. My noble Friend when First Minister of the Crown—with, I should have thought, very questionable prudence sent forth into the world these two reasons. Now this is a matter upon which whatever may be done in Liverpool and other places, a deep interest is felt in France and on the Continent. That is not to be denied. When you isolated and separated yourselves from France on the question of the Principalities you fell back on Austrian support. I do not ask you the value or the comfort of that support when you come to require it in the day of need. But have you that Austrian support at all on this point? No! There is not a State in Europe which does not declare the opposition of England to this project—which I say is not the opposition of the English people, or (until to-night) of the British Parliament, but is only the opposition of the executive Government, in secrecy and in darkness—there is not a State on the Continent of Europe which does not denounce the policy of this opposition as unwarrantable, and as a selfish policy. But the noble Viscount sends forth his two reasons. We are to oppose the Suez canal scheme because it will dismember Turkey, and have a tendency to dismember the British empire. He gives the first place in his speech in this House to the dismemberment of Turkey. In his mind that is the first reason, and the dismemberment of England is the second. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] I beg pardon; I am stating strictly what fell from my noble Friend, and I hope therefore that the time of the House may not be wasted by compelling me to enter into an explanation. That is the order of precedence in which my noble Friend states his reasons, but other countries will not view these reasons in the same light. Is it not, on the contrary, perfectly plain that all Europe will conclude the real ground of your opposition is because you suppose the canal to be injurious to the British empire, and that the alleged interest of Turkey is hypocritically thrust in for the mere purpose of justifying your policy? Those who have examined the question cannot fail to be aware that such an opinion is extensively propagated upon the Continent at this moment; and it is, after all, better that the House of Commons should be told what is actually thought and said abroad about English policy, while there is still time to consider our course, rather than that we should allow ourselves to get involved deeply in controversies upon false grounds, and commit the honour of the country to the maintenance of propositions which are permanently untenable. Is it really true that either one of those reasons constitutes a bona fide political ground for offering political resistance to a project essentially commercial, and which apparently promises great benefit to the whole world? Is it true that this canal is to effect the dismemberment of Egypt from Turkey? Does the connection of Egypt with Turkey really rest on the power of the latter to march armies across the Isthmus of Suez into the former? Is the House of Commons disposed to adopt that view? Do you think that at this moment the reason why Egypt is subordinate to Turkey is because, if she refused to pay tribute or violated the Sultan's rights, the Sultan could send troops across the Isthmus to put down and conquer the resistance of the Pasha? That may be the noble Viscount's opinion, and if he or any other Member of this House entertain it, I grant they may consistently act upon it. I think, however, that that opinion cannot be supported. Egypt is subordinate to Turkey, not on account of the strength of the Sultan, but on account of the interests of Europe and the guarantee of the European Powers; and the means of maintaining the connection between the two are precisely as strong and as efficient whether this canal is made or not. I will say this in regard to the Turkish empire. In my mind no method could be more unwise or more suicidal of attempting to uphold either the independence or the integrity of the Turkish empire than the making the connection with that empire irksome and burdensome to the provinces of Turkey. And if you really want to strengthen the connection between Turkey and Egypt, or between Turkey and the Principalities—for the principle is just the same—pursue that object by the methods of prudence and conciliation, endeavour to unite those countries in the bonds of affection; but don't go to Egypt and say, "Here is a scheme which we admit, if it can be executed, would tend powerfully to the development of your material resources, but we shall prevent you from reaping its advantages because we think they would weaken your connection with Turkey." So that you lead the Pasha and the people of Egypt immediately to the conclusion that their connection with Turkey involves comparative poverty and degradation to them, because it interferes with their pursuit of the means which are calculated to promote their own strength and prosperity. So much for the noble Viscount's first reason. As to his second reason, I must confess that it is with a sentiment of pain that I advert to it. My noble Friend and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs both say that the opening of this canal will be dangerous to the British empire in India, because it will enable Foreign Powers to get the start of us in sending hostile armaments to India when they have occasion to quarrel with this country. Sir, I enter a respectful but most serious protest against the whole spirit and tenor of this language. I can conceive nothing more unwise with respect to the maintenance of a good understanding with the nations of Europe, and nothing more ill-judged with respect to the interests of England. In the first place, I am unwilling to set up the Indian empire of Great Britain in opposition to the general interests of mankind, or to the general sentiment of Europe. And I say that is what you do if, in reference to a question properly commercial, you insist on taking it off the commercial ground, and on dragging it into the political arena, opposing the execution of a commercial work, while you declare it to be impracticable, because you think it will open new dangers for the British empire in India. I deprecate altogether the system of insinuation and innuendo involved in the allusion to these dangers. I hold it to be an ungenerous, a most unwise and imprudent system. But I deny altogether the existence of these dangers. I say that if this canal had been open last year, had it been practicable—a question not now before us—we should have had the deepest reason for gratitude to those who might have executed it. What would the difference have been with reference to the great struggle which you have been carrying on in India if, twelve months ago, instead of the dilatory route by the Cape of Good Hope, you had been able to send your troops direct to India? Why, the benefit of this canal, if practicable, great as it would be to the rest of the world, would be greatest by far to England. Who would have the control of the Red Sea? Who has now got the control of that sea at its southern issue? Who has occupied Aden on the one side and Perim on the other? And who has given great offence to foreign countries by the occupation of the latter station? Who have yet, perhaps, to render some account to this House for that proceeding, to state the reasons which may have justified it, and the policy which may have rendered it both necessary and right? But, naturally enough, very considerable soreness was excited abroad when it was seen that England undertook to occupy first of all the one side, and next the other side of the Red Sea by fortified posts, and then opposed herself, partly on the ground of danger to her Indian empire, to what is apparently a commercial project for the benefit of mankind. What is the Power that would really possess this canal if it were opened? Is it not a canal which would necessarily fall within the control of the first maritime Power in Europe? It is England, and no foreign country, that would obtain the command of it. I know well that on subjects of this kind it is hardly fair to expect a majority of the Members of this House either to take the pains or to have the opportunity to acquire extensive information. But the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) has challenged the expression of your opinion upon it. He asks you whether you will declare yourselves parties to the policy which has been pursued for a certain time by the executive Government—a policy founded on resistance to a project viewed by Europe as commercial in its nature. The political reasons which you advance are, I believe, as regards Turkey, utterly unsatisfactory to the whole public opinion of Europe—I don't say whether or not it is unsatisfactory to English public opinion. The reasons with regard to India are of a kind calculated to create in Europe a sentiment of irritation, of jealousy, and even of hostility to the existence of British power in India. And, further, I must say, whatever may be the judgment pronounced to-night, I am convinced, from the state of opinion which prevails on this subject that the policy which has been pursued is not only a false policy, but is so diametrically opposed to the first principles of prudence, and I will even say to the comity and courtesy of friendly nations; it has such a tendency to isolate us on these questions from the rest of civilized mankind,—and this fact will come to be increasingly felt from year to year by the British people, that you will not be able permanently to maintain it. If, then, you are to recede from this policy, the sooner it is done the better. At any rate, for my own part I shall have so hesitation in giving my vote in favour of the hon. and learned Gentleman's Motion, because I feel that the principle on which he invites us to act is both a wise and indispensable principle for the treatment of all such questions; and in this particular case before us it is intimately associated with the interests both of this country and of the other nations of Europe.

As this is a question of considerable importance, I trust the House, before coming to a decision upon it, will at least take a calm and dispassionate view of the circumstances which it involves. The Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman declares—

"That in the opinion of this House, the power and influence of this Country ought not to be used in order to induce the Sultan to withhold his assent to the project of making a Canal across the Isthmus of Suez,"

Now, what evidence have we that the power and influence of this country are at this moment or have been exercised in a manner to call for a Resolution of this nature? I should suppose, were I not acquainted with this matter, either that the hon. and learned Gentleman had received some intimation that Her Majesty's Government were on the point of negotiating a treaty with the Sultan binding hint to withhold his consent from the execution of this project, or that papers had been laid on this table which prove that there has been on the part of the Government of this country constraint applied to the Sultan of Turkey for this object. But I am in possession of no evidence to that effect, and the hon. and learned Member has alleged no reasons to make us accept this Resolution. The noble Lord who has addressed us (Viscount Palmerston) said, indeed, that his Government had recommended the Sultan to adopt a certain policy, but the noble Lord, as I understood him, and as I know from my own acquaintance with the facts, can only have enforced on the Sultan the pursuance of a policy which the Government of the Sultan had already professed. From all that I have been able to collect on this subject the Government of the Sultan entertains opinions regarding it of a decided character, and certainly I am ignorant of any conduct of the present Ministry, and I know of none on the part of the late Ministry, which shows that there has been any undue constraint exercised towards the Sultan either now or at any former time by this country to justify the use by the Right hon. Member, for the University (Mr. Gladstone) of the terms an "improper, undue, and illegitimate opposition" to this scheme. If there is any project going forward in the world which we think injurious either to the interests of England or to the general interests of nations, an opposition to it is surely not an improper, undue, and illegitimate opposition. And I am of opinion that before we are asked to assent to a Motion of this description there ought to be some colourable proof placed before us that there has been some secret or open conduct pursued such as would warrant this House in stepping in, and by such a Resolution as this preventing either the negotiation of a treaty or the adoption of a policy which it believes to be contrary to the interests of the country. What must be the consequence of the House coming to this Resolution? The consequence must be that this project will be, in fact, sanctioned by the House of Commons. Now, whatever may be the ultimate opinion of this country, or indeed of this House, upon the subject, certainly it is a most unwise proceeding that we should impliedly commit ourselves by a Resolution to an approval of a project unquestionably of a doubtful, and in the opinion of many persons of great authority even of a pernicious nature. I therefore trust the House will hesitate before they adopt this Resolution, whatever may be the general opinions upon the subject. Certainly it is of the utmost importance in coming to the candid consideration of this case that we should not throw out of our sight, as seems to be the habit of some of those who have preceded me in this debate the feelings of the Turkish Government themselves. It has been assumed throughout that the Turkish Government are either neutral or favourable to this project, and that it has been only upon the powerful and urgent interference of England that the Turkish Government have upon any occasion expressed their opposition to it. We have likewise been told by the Right hon. Member for Oxford University that, in inducing Turkey, as it were by force, to adopt our views upon this question, we are placing ourselves in opposition to the united sentiment of all other countries, and outraging the comity of nations. But what evidence have we—that is what I want to know—that this project has the approval of all other nations? Throughout these discussions, from the moment this Resolution was launched to the last speech to which we listened, we have heard on the part of the Supporters of this Resolution a series of assertions. It is assumed that Turkey is constrained by force to oppose tins project. It is assumed that England is using force. It is then assumed that all other countries are in favour of the scheme. Now, Sir, I am in possession of no evidence that establishes any of these propositions, and certainly least of all the last. There was, however, more than a year ago, information which never reached me in any official shape, but which I shall assume was authentic, that the French Ambassador at Constantinople had expressed himself favourable to ties project. Well: we have had many allusions to-night, especially by the hon. and learned Gentleman who introduced the Motion, to the feelings of France upon this subject, and warnings to us who wish to cement the alliance between the two countries not to take a course which would be hostile to the wishes of France. Now, we have had frequent communications with the Government oft France, and we have received expressions of their opinions and feelings certainly much more recent than that report of the advice given by M. de Thouvenel to which I have referred. I may be permitted to say that in those expressions of feeling there was nothing of that decided character which has been mentioned by the right hon. Member for Oxford University and others; but, on the contrary, a very candid sense of the difficulties of the whole project, and a very frank confession that the Government of France wished to interfere in no other manner than as every Government would wish to interfere in favour of an opinion, trusting to fair argument and the ordinary mode in which the public sentiment of the world is formed. With regard to Austria, I must say to the right hon. Member for Oxford University that he is entirely mistaken if he supposes that the Government of that country have expressed any unqualified opinion, or, indeed, any opinion at all, in favour of this project. All we know for certain is, that, after having previously expressed a very different sentiment, Austria had stated that this project ought not to be accomplished, while admitting that it might be accomplished if all the Powers of Europe consented to it. Now, Sir, what I say is, that we ought to leave plans of such great importance to the fair influence of public opinion. I do not object to that; but you do not leave them to the fair influence of public opinion when you ask the House of Commons to pledge itself to an expression of its views, an expression which will announce to the whole of Europe that our conclusion is foregone, that our opinion is settled, and that we are for ever prevented from forming that mature judgment and taking that wise course which time and experience may justify. Again, Sir, whatever hon. Gentlemen may say, and however they may endeavour for the moment to depreciate them, there are grave political considerations connected with this question both as regards Turkey and as regards England. I do not say that their gravity is such that they may not yield to other considerations, if in time those other considerations are deemed more powerful; but, as at present advised, I think it would be a most rash and precipitate step at once to pledge this House to change the course of policy which it has long pursued, and which has been sanctioned by high authority, and to ask us to place ourselves in a position which will prevent us hereafter from adopting that line which we may deem wisest and most prudent. I shall not enlarge now upon the political considerations, which must be obvious to all. I shall not lay down as a principle that political considerations are not to yield, and even frequently to yield, to moral considerations. If I could be persuaded, for example, that the formation of this canal would be a means by which the universal happiness of the human race would be certainly and greatly increased—if I had no doubt that it was an enterprise which, if successfully accomplished, would contribute to the felicity of all the communities of the civilized world—I would at once admit that political considerations, however weighty, should give way to such more powerful reasons. But, after all, these speculations, though they may be reduced to practice, are still speculations only, while the political considerations are realities, and must have great weight in deciding the course we take. Hon. Gentlemen deceive themselves if they suppose that the integrity of the Turkish empire would not be materially affected by the completion of this great work, and they deceive themselves still more if they fancy that the Government of Turkey are not keenly alive to that part of the subject. I agree with the right hon. Member for Oxford University that if the tenure of our Indian empire is to be maintained by a course of policy hostile to the interests of the rest of the world it is in a state of very great danger; but if I am asked to assent to a project the certain consequences of which must be vastly increased armaments on the part of this country, and very doubtful results of a cosmopolitan and philanthropic character to the world, I am bound to consider, before yielding to that scheme, what must be the cost of those armaments, what will be their influence on our taxation, and what may be the general effect upon the distribution of power, as well as our increased chances of becoming embroiled with foreign nations. These are considerations which ought to influence the House of Commons on the present occasion, and which, I think, ought not to be treated in the offhand manner in which they have been dealt with this evening. These are the general feelings which influence me in the course I am prepared to take. I think this Resolution has been brought forward without authority. I think the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has no right to assume that the power and influence of this country have been, or are now, used to constrain the Porte to oppose this project. I think, also, that if this House is induced to adopt the Resolution it will fetter itself in its future course, and hastily and rashly quit the path which it has been hitherto pursuing, which it has pursued in some degree under the influence of grave political considerations, but which, at the same time, may be departed from at some future period, if time and experience should show that such a course may be taken without injury to the public interests.

Notwithstanding what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said, I cannot but consider, and indeed it has been admitted, that for many years the power and influence of this country have been used to induce the Sultan to withhold his assent from the project of making a canal across the Isthmus of Suez. It has always been acknowledged by the noble Viscount who was at the head of the late Government, and it has not been denied by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the present Government: I think, therefore, we may accept it as an admitted proposition. In considering this question I am ready at once to dismiss three parts of the arguments which have been advanced this evening. It has been held that this is a bubble speculation; that the physical obstacles to the construction of this canal are almost insuperable, or at least enormous; and that the Turkish Government have such an interest in preventing the completion of the work that they are certain to use all their efforts and influence in order to impede it. Taking all these things for granted, I ask, if this be a bubble speculation, if the natural obstacles are almost insuperable, and if the Turkish Government has reasons of its own for withholding its assent, does it not follow that there is no need for the exercise of the power and influence of England? It is said, however, and it has been often urged, that there are reasons why England should for her own interests endeavour to prevent the formation of this canal. Now, any injury that we might sustain in consequence of its formation must occur either in peace or in war. I cannot conceive that during a period of peace the establishment of additional means of commerce—the formation of an additional highway between different parts of the world—could be injurious to England. If I am told that certain ports of France and other continental countries are nearer to Egypt than England, and that they will gain commercial advantages over this country by the formation of a canal, I answer that our principle is to render commerce as free as possible. This has been our policy of late years. It is a just and generous policy, but at the same time I believe it is a policy most beneficial to England to subject ourselves to any competition by which the commerce of the world can be increased, and I feel confident that England will not suffer in such a competition. But if goods of any description can be exported from France, Switzerland, or Italy, and can be supplied to the Queen's subjects in India at a cheaper rate than English goods of the same or an inferior quality, what right have the executive authorities in England to prevent Her Majesty's subjects in India from enjoying the advantages which they might thus obtain? It is not in peace, however, that the most danger is feared. The greatest danger is apprehended in case of a war. It seems to me that the question simply resolves itself into the consideration whether or not England is to have the command of the seas if, unfortunately, a war should occur. If England were to lose the command of the seas, no doubt troops would be conveyed through Egypt if any project for the invasion of India were entertained. But could they not be conveyed by railway? Is that not a mode of transit of which we have availed ourselves during the past year, and is it necessary to form a canal in order to effect the transport of troops across Egypt? If, however, we possess the command of the seas the danger at once vanishes, and we should be no more exposed to it in consequence of the formation of a canal than we are under existing circumstances. I may remind the House that the mouths of the Nile and the neighbourhood of Alexandria arc places where demonstrations of British prowess have been made, the results of which need not lead us to fear for the future. I feel the force of the argument which was urged by the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford, that our opposition to this scheme confirms the idea which is very generally entertained on the continent of Europe, that for our own selfish interests, and prompted by a narrow-minded commercial jealousy, we are ready to sacrifice or to injure the commerce of all other nations. I believe that charge is not a true one, but I am unwilling that there should be any just grounds for it, and I trust, therefore, that the House will assent to the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, for by doing so we shall show that with regard to this subject at least we are ready to meet all the world, and that we have no selfish objects in view.

said, that having heard the speech of his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, and knowing that the policy he had announced was the policy which had been pursued by every Government of which the noble Lord had been a Member for several years past, knowing also that the noble Lord who last spoke had been a Member of the same Cabinet, he could not admit a divided responsibility or a limited liability, but must hold that the noble Lord the Member for the City of London was responsible for what he (Mr. Drummond) regarded as the true British policy on this question which had been declared by his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton. A right hon. Friend of his had said, truly enough, that in his view this was a commercial question, and with those who looked to mere money interests it was a purely commercial question; but if they looked to the intelligence of France, if they looked—not to these abstractions—but to the acts of the French Government, which did not waste its time in idle talk in the Chamber of Deputies, but went at once to work to establish the policy it meant to pursue, they would see that this canal was, as his noble Friend opposite had said, nothing more nor less than a chain of forts—a bar to the access of England to India by that route, and they had to choose upon this and many other questions whether they would prefer cotton to the honour of the country and the integrity of the empire.

said, be would express no opinion upon the general question; but he thought that if the House was to come to any satisfactory decision they ought to have before them the correspondence which had taken place on the subject. He understood from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that there were no documents in the Foreign Office bearing on the question; but he thought there must be some mistake about the matter, unless the Foreign Office business had been transacted by private letters which had disappeared. He wished, therefore, to ask whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer would lay upon the table any correspondence which would inform the House as to the proceedings of the Government, the noble Member for Tiverton having intimated that during the last fifteen years some correspondence had been in progress. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had, however, spoken as if there were no documents is the Foreign Office indicating what course his predecessors had pursued. He (Mr. Bright) thought the House was in a very unsatisfactory position, and he would be glad if his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield would not press his Motion to a division, should the Government consent to lay the correspondence on the table. He (Mr. Bright) did not ask for any favour for those who wished to engage in bubble speculations, but he was desirous that the House should know how far the honour and true interests of England had been supported or misrepresented by past Governments.

said, that the hon. Gentleman had quite misapprehended what he had said if he supposed he had stated that he found no trace of the opinions of his predecessors on this subject. He had said that he could find no evidence of the constraint which had been mentioned. It would be quite impossible to produce any correspondence which would influence the division to-night, but if the hon. Gentleman repeated his question to-morrow he would give him an answer.

said, if papers were to be produced it would be necessary to lay any information in the possession of the Government respecting the origin and progress of the railway on the table, as well as that relating to the proposed canal, as it was impossible the two subjects could be separated. In 1842, or about that time, Mohamed Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, determined to make a railway from Alexandria to Suez. As soon as the preliminary arrangements had been completed, the agents of the French Government set themselves to work to retard an undertaking which involved such important advantages to Great Britain, and with that view the project of a Suez canal was set on foot and agitated with considerable success, inasmuch as it delayed the construction of the railway for many years. That project was, in itself, perfectly impracticable, and the Government of the day were perfectly right to discourage a scheme which was, in itself, perfectly chimerical, and tended to delay the construction of a railway which formed the only rational and practical means of transit through the country. In 1838, or about that time, an examination of the coast of Egypt was made by Captain Glasscock, then in command of Her Majesty's ship Tyne, and that officer's Report of Pelusium and the neighbourhood left no doubt in the mind of any practical person that the entrance from the Mediterranean was impossible.

, in reply said, he had been asked what evidence he had that there had been any opposition to the Suez canal scheme on the part of the British Government. He answered, that on the 17th of July last year the noble Member for Tiverton stated in that House that for the last fifteen years Her Majesty's Government had used all the influence they possessed at Constantinople to prevent the scheme from being carried into effect. That was sufficient evidence of opposition on the part of the Government. He must be permitted to say that he had viewed this debate with feelings of great concern, especially in respect of the speech of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were anxious to state on all occasions that the alliance with France was an honest and cordial alliance, but throughout the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech, fear, suspicion, doubt, and distrust were evident. [Mr. S. FITZGERALD: No!] No! Did the hon. and learned Gentleman suppose that the French people would draw that conclusion? They would assume that this alliance with France was a hypocritical pretence. ["Oh, oh!"] No doubt that was a very unpleasant statement. He had always regarded the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. S. FitzGerald) as an astute Irishman, and he never felt so fully persuaded of the strength of a case as on the present occasion, in consequence of the complete failure of the hon. and learned Gentleman, notwithstanding his ability, in opposing the Motion. The hon. and learned Gentleman had, unintentionally no doubt, misrepresented the proposition before the House from beginning to end. The proposition simply was, that the influence of England should not be employed to induce the Sultan to withhold his consent to making a canal across the Isthmus of Suez. He did not ask the House for any opinion with respect to the canal; but did any one pretend that England had not coerced the Sultan? The power of England, exercised through one of the most imperious Ambassadors, could not be properly designated otherwise than as coercion, and all he asked was, that the Sultan should be left to himself. If the hon. and learned Gentleman believed that the Turk was against the project, he would not oppose the Motion; but he knew that the Turk was under coercion. If the Motion should be rejected, France and Europe would, for the first time, learn through the representatives of the people of England that this country had given its sanction to a policy which, in France and on the continent of Europe, was considered to be selfish, narrow minded, and thoroughly unjust.

objected to proceeding with the Bill at that late hour (half-past One), and moved that the debate be adjourned.

said, he hoped the hon. Member would not persist in his Motion for the adjournment. The Bill had been amply discussed, and if it was not brought in now another opportunity of passing it would not be easily got.

said, hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House seemed determined to send as many measures as possible of this kind to the other House—their object being to put down the independence of that assembly. They intended by the sheer force of numbers and by brute force to invade the independence of the House of Lords, and he, for one, would use every means in his power to oppose them. He, therefore, trusted that hon. Members on that side of the House would claim their right to express their opinions on that the last and most important stage of the Bill.

said, he did not want the House to decide without discussion; as long as he had sat there he had never tried to put down any hon. Member. Tuesdays and Wednesdays were the only days now open to private Members, and there was no chance of their being able to get much business through on either of those days. He would not press this question forward now, if there was any chance of their being able to get another day. He therefore hoped the hon. Member for Surrey would not persist in his Motion for an adjournment.

intended to vote for the adjournment of the debate, thinking that such an important measure as that ought not to be read a third time at Two o'clock in the morning, especially as a number of hon. Members were anxious to express their opinion. He would suggest that an early day should, if possible, be fixed for the third reading.

said, he would have been quite ready to vote for the Bill without any further debate, but he thought the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) was not an unreasonable one. He must say he very much regretted that those who had charge of the Bill had shown so little disposition to accept the suggestions that had been made for a settlement of this question. The matter, however, would probably come before the House in another Session, as it was little likely that the House of Lords would pass the Bill in its present shape.

remarked, that he saw plain indications of a great anxiety on the part of hon. Members to go to bed.

said, he wished to know whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not give a day for the Bill.

said, he was anxious that the opinion of the House should be taken on the Bill, but thought it rather unreasonable to propose the third reading at Two o'clock in the morning. He regretted that he could not offer a day for the Bill in the present pressing state of public business. There, however, was only one order for Wednesday, June 9, the Tenants' Compensation (Ireland) Bill, and if by some arrangement that could be determined early in the day, the third reading of this Bill might be then taken.

said, he must stigmatize the opposition to this Bill as factious, and hoped that his hon. Friend would persevere.