Sir, it is with much reluctance that I obtrude myself on the attention of the House for the purpose of objecting to your leaving the Chair, and of moving that tins Bill be referred back to the Select Committee, who have reported it to the House, and that the Petition recently presented by the Corporation of London on this subject be referred to the same Committee, with instructions for them to hear the Corporation by their counsel and witnesses thereon. Sir, my reasons for making this Motion are founded on a conviction that the House is about to establish a dangerous precedent, without having before it all those facts which, are necessary to enable the House to conic to a proper decision. The Bill purports to be a Bill "for the better regulation of the Corporation of the City of London." It may be, for the purpose of my argument, divided into two parts, the one political and the other financial. With the former I do not propose to deal, nor will I enter in any way into the consideration of those provisions of the Bill which purport to alter or amend the constitution of the Corporation. I propose only to call the attention of the House to the way in which the property of the Corporation is dealt with by the Bill; and, if I understand its provisions on this subject rightly, the Bill simply takes away from the Corporation a considerable portion of its property without compensation, and without hearing the parties who are to be so deprived of their property. The 55th section of the Bill provides:—

"All such rights of Metage of any Grain, Fruit, Wares, or Merchandise as the Corporation is entitled to by custom, charter, or otherwise, and all exclusive right of Porterage of any Grain, Fruit, Wares, or Merchandise which any Porters of the City of London have, or claim, under any such custom or charter, or otherwise, shall cease after the 31st day of December, 1858."

These rights, therefore, whether acquired by charter, or by custom, or by purchase from the Crown, or howsoever acquired, are simply abolished. The 71st section gives compensation to every officer of the City whose office may be abolished by the Act, and as the Bill was originally framed the City was left to pay this compensation out of its remaining property not taken away by the Bill; but the Select Committee appear to have thought this rather too severe, and have consequently provided, by the 74th and following sections of the Bill, as amended, a fund for this compensation to officers by continuing a small metage due for a short period, and expressly limited in amount to this purpose; but there is not in the Bill a single provision for giving compensation to the Corporation itself. Now, Sir, we naturally turn to the Preamble of the Bill for some reason that should justify so novel an enactment, but we find there nothing relating to this subject but this, "that it is expedient that provision should be made for the abolition of such customs and privileges of the City as injuriously affect trade and industry." What is proposed, therefore, by the Preamble, is not the reconstitution of a charitable or public trust, because it is effete—it is not restoring a corporation or trust to its original bounds or character, leaving its property untouched; nor is it a Bill of Pains and Penalties, working a forfeiture of property, because of the malfeasances or misdemeanours of the owner. The Preamble does not even venture to assert that it would be expedient that provision should be made for the abolition of such rights of property of the City as injuriously affect trade. It asserts only that it is expedient to abolish customs and privileges of this character. Now, it is my intention to demonstrate—I use the word advisedly—that you propose by this Bill to abolish rights of property; and I would suggest that if you do so, at least it should be done openly and avowedly, and that the preamble should assert that it is just to abolish rights of property when they injuriously affect trade and commerce. Sir, the moment that is done, the moment you put that in the preamble, the Bill is lost, because I am satisfied the House will not consent to the abolition of rights of property on any such grounds, or indeed on any grounds without providing some compensation for those whom you propose to deprive of those rights. It is in reference to this Bill that the Corporation of the City of London have presented a Petition, and I think it material to call the attention of the House to the allegations of that Petition. It begins by informing the House, that the Petitioners did, upon a former occasion when the Bill was first introduced, petition to be heard by their counsel, agents, and witnesses, against its several clauses, and it then states—

"That by divers clauses of the said Bill, it is proposed to deprive your Petitioners without giving them any compensation of various sources of revenue of which they have been possessed for a period extending beyond the time of legal memory, and their right to which has been repeatedly confirmed by charter, statute, and judicial decision, and by divers other clauses of the said Bill, the rights, interests, and privileges of your Petitioners are prejudicially affected. That large sums of money have been borrowed by your Petitioners for public improvements on the credit of these and other revenues of your Petitioners and are still charged thereon."

The Petitioners then proceed to state that they were heard before the Committee upon one clause, and one only of the Bill, and were not permitted to be heard upon other clauses prejudicial to their interests by some of which it was sought to deprive them of their property, and that they consider it unjust that their revenues should be confiscated without any malversation being proved or alleged against them, and without their being heard in support of their rights and property; and after further stating that the Petitioners view with alarm the establishment of a precedent which may be pleaded to justify an arbitrary interference with rights of property which have hitherto been held sacred, the Petitioners pray that the Bill may be referred back to the Select Committee, and that they may be heard upon the allegations of their Petition. From this statement the House will gather that my main objection to this Bill in the form in which it now stands, is that it is an interference with the rights of property. Sir, that is my case. I do not say it is the only case of the Corporation, but it is my only case, and I do not intend to present to the House a rag of a case beyond. I intend to stand upon that ground alone—I shall not attempt to make more of the case, but I will defy ingenuity or sophistry to make less of it. Stale pretext of the rights of property! some friends of this measure may perhaps exclaim. Sir, I admit the antiquity of the argument, and upon its antiquity and upon the benefits we have so long and so uninterruptedly received from the maintenance of those rights I greatly rely. It will be expedient to define in the outset in what sense I use the words "rights of property." By that expression I mean rights established by the positive and arbitrary law of the country—rights of ownership to or in anything which can be enforced in a court of justice—rights of ownership in respect of which, if any wrong be done to them, redress may be had in the legal tribunals of the country. In this sense one man may have a right of property in or against that which in other respects is the property of another. This is my definition, and I trust that those who object to it will, when dealing with the rights which they propose by this Bill to abolish, at least give their own definition of the expression. These, then, being the rights of property, what, I would next ask, are those metage and other dues which the Bill proposes simply to abolish? This will necessarily depend upon a statement of facts which will require to be proved by evidence—by oral or documentary testimony. At this sitting, of course, I am not in a position to prove them. I state them as facts, which the Corporation is ready to prove; and in this argument you must accept them as facts if you refuse to hear those who pledge themselves to their truth. These facts are, that these dues were originally a portion of the hereditary revenues of the Crown, and from time immemorial—from a time lost in antiquity so entirely that we cannot trace its origin, these dues have been in possession of the City of London. After their original acquisition, but still at a time we may deem very remote—at a time with respect to which we should say we had gone very far back, if any other person or body of persons than the Corporation of London were concerned, that is, in the reign of King John—these rights, or a portion of them, were seized and taken from the Corporation by the Crown. At the time when this attempt—which is sought to be repeated to-day—was thus first made, the power employed was, of course, the military power of the Crown. These revenues were then seized into the hands of the Crown, upon the pretence that they had formed part of the revenues of the Queen Dowager; and being so seized, they were afterwards granted to the King's brother, the Earl of Cornwall. The City submitted to the seizure to the extent of re-purchasing them from the Earl of Cornwall, and they paid the sum of 20,000 marks—in those days a very large sum—for what had been so seized. But in the interval the Earl of Cornwall had granted a rent-charge of fifty marks per annum upon the property. For six centuries that rent-charge has travelled from hand to hand, and there is to this day an owner of that rent-charge, not now before the House, but whose rights must be affected by this Bill, who receives the amount annually from the Corporation, and the Corporation are bound at present by law to pay it. These rights so acquired and so re-purchased were afterwards confirmed by Parliament, and from that time the Corporation remained in undisturbed possession till we come to the reign of James I. Arbitrary power now played its fantastic tricks in another shape. It was not now military force that was to be applied, but it was hoped to find subservient Judges and unprincipled law officers. The hope, however, was not at this time realized. But the attempt was made to seize the property through a court of law. An information was brought in the Court of Exchequer, inquiring by what warrant the City of London claimed their rights. The record is somewhat musty, no doubt—perhaps that may be an objection—but it is both legible and intelligible. I have here a copy of the record: it states that the City of London claims (amongst other things) to have the office of Meter of all coals and grain of whatever kind, and of all other merchandises, goods and things whatsoever sold by measure, and the metage of the same whatsoever, in or to the port of the said City of London, coming, brought, or carried on the water of Thames, in any ship, boat, barge, or any other vessel whatsoever, and also to have and take to their own proper use, the wages, rewards, and fees, to the same office of Meter appertaining and belonging; and the City is then called upon by the Attorney General to answer by what warrant they claim to have use and enjoy these liberties, privileges, and franchises; and thereupon there is a plea that the City of London is, and from the time beyond the memory of man hath been, an ancient city, and that the Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens of the said City from the whole time aforesaid, whereof the memory of man is not to the contrary, have had and exercised and have been accustomed and ought to have and exercise the said office of Meter and the other privileges and dues before mentioned; and that all the customs, liberties, privileges, and franchises of the City aforesaid were by the authority of the Parliament of the late King Richard the Second, after the Conquest holden at Westminster in the seventh year of his reign, ratified and confirmed to the then Mayor and Commonalty and Ci- tizens of the City aforesaid and their successors and by that warrant they claimed. The Attorney General admitted the facts as stated; the City prayed judgment, and the judgment of the Court was that "the aforesaid Mayor and Commonalty and Citizens of the aforesaid City of London and their successors should have, perceive, enjoy, and use all and all manner the offices, privileges, liberties, franchises, wages, rewards, and fees aforesaid, and other the premises in their plea claimed." After this the City remained safe until the time of Charles the Second, when by the wellknown quo warranto proceedings all these dues and tolls were again seized into the hands of the Crown, and so they continued in the possession of the Crown until the accession of William and Mary, when one of the first Acts of the Parliament was to reverse the judgment in the quo warranto, and to restore these dues and all other rights and privileges to the Corporation. I cannot think that the Parliament of Victoria will destroy and take away without compensation these rights which the first Parliament of William and Mary, in vindication of the rights of the people and of property, restored to the City of London. Having thus defined the rights of property, as I understand them, and having explained the history of those dues and rights which this Bill proposes to take away, I think it sufficiently appears that these rights of the City of London are held as rights of property upon the strongest and clearest of titles, a title acquired or confirmed by purchase and payment of the price, a title supported by prescription, immemorial possession, charters, decrees of Courts, and Acts of Parliament. Each and all of these are elements of their title, and such rights founded upon such a title are undoubtedly, as I insist, entitled to protection as rights of property. I do not intend to assume that the argument is exhausted when it is proved that these are rights of property which you are abolishing without compensation. It may not be exhausted in the minds of some, but I trust and believe that in the minds of a large majority in this House, when they are satisfied that that is the effect of this Bill, the argument will be at an end. There may be some individuals whose views are, as they say, more advanced, and who will tell us they are not to be frightened by such stale pretexts, and they would probably admit that the right in question is a right of property without argument. The contest with them would probably only be as to the expediency of interfering with the right, but it will be useful to clear the way by showing distinctly what we are about to do; for as far as the progress of this Bill is concerned with this 55th clause as a part of it, there is, as I believe, an end of the matter, if the House shall be satisfied that that clause will simply confiscate a right to property legally vested in the Corporation. Now, there are but two grounds on which any objection can, as it appears to me, be raised to the position that these metage and other dues of the City are entitled to protection as rights of property; the first, the nature and character of the alleged owner of the property—namely, that it is a Corporation; and second, the nature of the property itself,—namely, that it is a toll, or tax if you please, on the goods or property of others. It is said that it is not an individual being who is the owner of this property, but a Corporation, a thing created by the law; and then that the property itself is not land or goods and chattels, but dues and tolls; in short, property in the property of another. Let us consider these arguments separately. In order to ascertain the value of the objection that the owner of property is not an individual, but a corporation, let me ask the House to consider what is the position of a corporation with respect to the ownership of lands and goods or chattels. I ask upon what principle can you draw a distinction between lands or goods and chattels in the hands of a corporation, and lands or goods and chattels in the hands of an individual? Is not the one property as well as the other? Is it not so in the very nature of things, and is it not so in the positive or arbitrary law of the country by which all questions of property are to be determined? That there is a distinction between individuals and Corporations I admit, but that has nothing whatever to do with the question. God, it is true, made the one, and man the other; one is the individual element of which society in the aggregate is composed; the other is the creature of and creation of society. But that is not the question we are dealing with. We are dealing with the question of the constitution of rights of property in either. The same power creates and regulates the rights of property in each case. There is no distinction in that. The same power which gave the right of property to individuals gave it also to Corporations. It is true that we create Corporations, but we also create and regulate the rights of property in individuals just the same as we do in Corporations. We are not satisfied with—

"The Good old rule, the simple plan,

That they should take who have the power,

And they should keep who can."

Such a rule would not suit us in the present day, any more than it did when law and order first prevailed. Some of us under such a rule might, perhaps, get more than we now have, but some would certainly get a great deal less; and the same laws which create and regulate, as a substitute for this rule, the rights of property in individuals also create and regulate them in the case of corporations. In creating the corporation we endow it with the faculty of enjoying property, and give it the right to this enjoyment. Why cannot an aggregate of individuals (and a Corporation is nothing more) have as substantial or beneficial an enjoyment of property as a single individual?—and in creating the corporation we have given it this right. In the case of the individual also, the right is his only by our gift, though the faculty of enjoying the gift may be from a higher source. If we were dealing, then, with tangible property, the right to lands and tenements, or goods and chattels in a corporation, the right would be as clearly a right of property as would a corresponding right in individuals. Now let us look next at the particular nature of the property in question, and consider these metage tolls and dues as though they were in the hands of an individual. The right of property may exist in an absolute, unqualified, and unconditional manner, as in the case we have been considering, of property in lands or in goods and chattels. But with equal certainty from the nature and necessity of the case, and also from the positive law of the country, a right may exist in my favour against the right of property in another. It is a most crude and undigested proposition to say that I cannot have a right of toll or right to other benefit in the property of another. Is not my right of way over the land of my neighbour a right of property in and against his property Is the parson's right to tithes, payable out of the property of his parishioners, not as good a right of property as that out of which it is payable? Is not the right to a rent charge upon the property of another as much property as any property that can exist? It is idle to go back into the origin of property or to inquire into the reasons of its institution in the form in which it now exists, or to discuss whether this or that species of property is unjust, or whether any particular lawful tenure of property is inconvenient, with the view of deriving from that discussion an argument for its confiscation. The mode of enjoyment, if the present mode of enjoyment be prejudicial to the public interests, may no doubt be modified. We do that every day. I have the property in a piece of land or a house. My property in it is inconvenient—it stands in the way of some public improvement. I must give it up for making a railway, or carrying out some other work which is supposed to be conducive to the public good. But upon what terms? You must pay me for it, compensate me for taking it from me. In precisely the same manner, if these tolls and dues were the property of an individual, and were inconvenient and prejudicial to the public interests, would their abolition be effected. And the right to such or similar dues and tolls is asserted by individuals every day. It is a peculiar kind of property no doubt. It originally existed in the Crown. The Crown granted rights of this kind sometimes to individuals, sometimes to corporations. There is no question that from the first institution of the rights of property in this country, such rights have been recognized as existing in the Crown, and as having been granted to others by the Crown, and there is scarcely a year passes in which such rights are not insisted upon in courts of justice on behalf of individuals. In their hands these rights are rights of property, and that which is simple property in the hands of individuals is, I contend, equally property when in the hands of corporations. I must leave to the ingenuity of others to point out how it is possible, when you combine the two considerations upon which I have dwelt, that there should be a difference between individual and corporate rights of property. I am not able to suggest a difference. If you are satisfied that lands and goods and chattels are entitled to protection, as property in the hands of a corporation, and that tolls and dues in the hands of an individual are also entitled to the same protection, why such tolls and dues are not equally property in the hands of a corporation I must, I say, leave to others to point out. It being then esstablished that these tolls and dues are undoubtedly entitled to protection as property in the hands of the corporation, I say that this right is a different thing from the customs or privileges to which the preamble refers. The objections to this Bill is not that you are abolishing some inconvenient custom or usage of trade, or that you are destroying some claim to precedence or priority, or that you are removing some feudal privilege inconsistent with the freedom or the liberty of the people; but that you are taking away, without compensation, property which (wisely or not is immaterial) has been legally granted to, and has been for centuries enjoyed, and now is enjoyed by the corporation. This right is something very different from anything like a custom or privilege. It is therefore untrue to say that you are merely abolishing customs or privileges. If that be so, let me invite the House to add in the preamble of the Bill the words—

"Whereas, it is expedient that provision should be made for the abolition of such rights of property in the Corporation as are injurious to trade and industry."

It is a question of fact. Does this Bill propose to abolish these rights of property or not? I ask that the truth should be told in the preamble, and that it should go forth to the world openly, that the British Parliament is willing, without hearing the parties and without compensation, thus to take away such rights. I say, that if you do so decide, you should let it be simply asserted in the preamble, and the moment you come to insert that in the preamble, I think there will be an end of the Bill. But, Sir, the question may still remain in the minds of some, whether interference with the rights of property in a Corporation may not be justified upon principles short of those which will justify interference with the right of property in individuals. I feel satisfied that there are many in this House who would not desire to discuss that question, and who would say, that when put upon such grounds the question was really at an end; but there are, no doubt, others who take a different view of the subject. Sir, the right of property can only be successfully and permanently maintained by maintaining it in its universality. There is no right of property which does not press hard in some direction or another. The whole value of the principle is endangered if you break in upon it, or if you allow yourself to speculate upon its utility in some particular instance. In some point of view or other, the right of property which is in me will press hard upon some other portion of the public, or the right that is in others, will press hard upon me; and it is only when I reflect on the necessity of maintaining for the whole community the right of property, that I am content to bear the burdens this right in others imposes upon me, and am driven to insist that the right is one which shall not be touched. It is only, I repeat, by its universality that you can maintain this right of property. I do not propose to discuss with the House its right to deal or interfere with property; for the purpose of this argument I am content to say, that its might shall be the measure of its right. I only ask the House to consider whether it is either just, wise, or expedient to interfere with the right of property in the Corporation in the mode and manner proposed by this Bill. What are the arguments hitherto brought forward to show that you may interfere with the rights of property in Corporations and not in individuals? As far as I can understand them, they are something to this effect—that there is no individual who has a vested interest in such rights—it is a question of public concern only. You cannot point to any member of the community who is immediately concerned—no individual has any right of disposition or of transmission to his heirs—the rights may be taken away without injuring individuals, as no one can claim a particular interest in the specific property. I am putting the argument as strongly as I am able to understand it against myself. But has this argument any just foundation? Are there not elements of vested interests in common in the two cases? The aggregate body of individuals forming a Corporation can enjoy property and can transmit it to their successors equally with individuals, though the mode and course of transmission may be different. The faculty of enjoyment and the right to the enjoyment by the rules of law apply in either case. A Corporation does not always make a wise use of its property. Do individuals always do so? A municipal Corporation is but an aggregate of people living in the same locality and possessing property in common, and enjoying the benefits of that property in common in such modes as are consistent with law, and as are open to such a community. What is there (if we but generalize justly and sufficiently) in the way of enjoyment of the rights of property open to individuals, which does not also apply to such communities of individuals? That the inci- dents of the right of property are different in the two cases has nothing whatever to do in the matter. The law imposes certain fetters on the enjoyment of the right in the case of the individual, as in the case of the Corporation, though the fetters may not be the same in specie. To the individual it is of the essence of the case, with small exceptions, that the enjoyment of the right of disposition of property by each succeeding individual shall be open, and you shall not make the right inalienable. With the Corporation there is also a fetter imposed, though different in character. The law prescribes the quantity and description of property it shall hold and sometimes makes it inalienable; but subject to such fetters as the law has imposed, the right is complete in each case. Is the right or faculty of geting into debt limited to individuals? Cannot a Corporation get into debt equally? If so, ought not the first enjoyment as well as the first duty of property in each case be the payment of your debts? This Corporation, of the City of London, owes a million of money. Are we to trust ourselves with the question, was it wisely incurred? or any question but this. Has it been legally incurred? If we do, it so happens that in this particular case the answer will be satisfactory. Half a million is charged upon (amongst other property) the property which you now propose to take away from the Corporation, and you propose to do this without hearing the creditor, and without telling the debtor how he is to discharge his obligations to the creditor. But what is the next enjoyment of the right of property possible to a Corporation? The Corporation must maintain its roads and its public buildings, and provide for its administration of justice, and may it not also provide for the rites of hospitality or festivity, if you please? I want to know, if we come to that, why a Corporation or community of individuals, an aggregate body which has accumulated property, if the law has allowed them to accumulate and transmit their property from one time to another continuously—why, I want to know, even with respect to a surplus available for the luxuries of life, there should be any difference between the right of an individual and of an aggregate number of individuals? It is untrue to say that you cannot point to an individual who has any personal vested interest in the property. Each corporator has a vested interest in having the property applied (subject only to such fetters as the law may have imposed on its enjoyment) in saving him from the county, parochial, or other rate which must otherwise be personally levied upon him for the public objects of the locality, and in such other purposes of enjoyment as are open to the aggregate community. When you consider the various modes in which Corporations can and do enjoy property, how can we propose to deal with their property in the mode proposed by this Bill? First, there is the payment of debts already incurred, then the many great and much-needed improvements, the necessity for which is constantly arising, additions to the luxury and splendour of your public buildings and streets, and the various other provisions for all the requisitions of communities living in large numbers together, all tending ultimately to the general good as the community may think fit. A Corporation may become effete and extinct, or an individual may die without heirs, and in either case the state may step in and claim the property. But, I want to know why, while both exist, there should be any distinctions between individual and corporate rights, when the law allows to each substantially the same enjoyment of them. I think it is clear that there can be no such distinction made as has been attemped to be set up. The law has given to Corporations as well as to individuals the right of the enjoyment of property, and, so far as I can judge, you cannot assert that it is wise, just, or expedient to do in the one case that which is not equally so in the other. The case may be put of a Corporation not extinct—not effete—having a sufficient number of corporators, but practically not adequate for the purposes for which it was originally designed, and for which it was originally endowed with the power of possessing, and with the actual possession of the property it claims. But should such a case arise, the remedy is not by forfeiting its property. With a municipal corporation the purposes for which it was called into existence must continue so long as the community of the locality hold together for any municipal or common purposes, and the remedy, if any, must be found in regulations for the Corporation adapted to the present exigencies of the community. Or, again, the question may be asked, what, if a Corporation should become possessed of an estate beyond all manageable bounds, and beyond anything which is required for public purposes, or that any aggregate body of individuals can properly expend—what, then, could you do? I would answer the question by another. What will you do, in the like case, if a private individual were to accumulate and obtain possession of such an amount of property as he could not, with any safety to the State, be left in the enjoyment of? Suppose one individual to hold two or three counties, and to make it his business to go on adding estate to estate till he became a landed proprietor too powerful for the State. To speculate on what is enough for the owner is dangerous in any case; but this I know, that the time has not yet arrived for putting such a question with respect to the Corporation of London. There are here no such considerations. The Corporation is lawfully in debt, and is still bound to borrow, or, at least, will be justified in borrowing money from time to time to provide for the convenience and advantage not only of the Corporation, but also of the public at large. There is no surplus whatever which has to be dealt with in the present case. I submit, then, that this is undoubtedly property in the hands of the Corporation, the right to which is established and regulated by the law precisely as property in the hands of private individuals, and that it would be unjust and inexpedient in the extreme to deal with it in the manner proposed by this Bill. It will not, perhaps, be useless upon this part of the case to call the attention of the House to the finances of the City of London. I have had put into my hands this morning a Return, for which we are indebted to a Member of the Select Committee; but it is greatly to be regretted that this Return, which contains some most valuable and important information, was not moved for before the Committee closed its labours. Upon examining the Return, it will be found that there is no surplus or unnecessary income in this case. Speaking in round numbers the property of the Corporation may be stated to yield £100,000 annually from the income of land, houses, and funded property, and £100,000 annually derived from market and metage and other dues and tolls. With respect, however, to the £100,000 annually from realized property, there is to be borne in mind the fact that a very large portion of that income will expire in a few years by the falling in, or expiring of a lease held by the Corporation, and the Corporation have very prudently put by for many years, and are still putting by annually, a sum of £20,000, in order to meet this contemplated falling off of revenue. The collection of the market dues and tolls is attended with great expense. There are also large sums, as much in the aggregate as £10,000 a year, paid in drawbacks in cases where, upon exportation, the tolls and dues are liable to be returned, and this with the charges of collection and the like on this portion of the revenue, amounts to a sum of £30,000—so that the revenue of the year is not really more than £70,000 from one source, and £80,000 from the other. There is a debt of £1,000,000 upon these, the revenues proper of the Corporation. I am not including here the whole of the coal dues, by far the greater part of which is levied and raised by authority of Parliament for specific purposes, and does not belong to the City. A portion only of the coal dues belongs to the Corporation, and is included in the revenue I have stated. Upon this—the proper revenue of the Corporation—they have borrowed upwards of a million of money, and I believe I am accurate in saying that half of this sum has been devoted to the improvement of the streets and thoroughfares of the Metropolis, in paying for the land dedicated to the public in making these improvements. Every stride you take in these new streets costs a large sum of money, and this half million has been devoted entirely to the benefit of the public in these improvements, and the other half of the debt, if this were the occasion for going into details, could be shown to have been incurred on equally sufficient grounds. At any rate a legal debt to this extent exists in fact, and you have the interest of this debt to provide for; one item for interest alone, therefore, amounts to £50,000 per annum or thereabouts. Next, with respect to a great portion of this property, it was obtained by the City originally upon the terms of supplying the cost, and is consequently subject to the charge of a portion of the police and administration of justice in Middlesex, as well as the police and the administration of justice in the City itself. The citizens of London are, therefore, saved from any county rate, and each citizen has here a definite and specific vested interest in the corporate property. This forms a charge of £50,000. You have thus £100,000 disposed of out of £150,000 of revenue I have spoken of. Then there are various incidental charges; there is a Metropolitan improvement fund, there are charities and pensions, and extraordinary and incidental expenses annually occurring, which together absorb considerably more than £20,000 of income. If you ask the character of these extraordinary charges, the answer will be, that in one year they have some hero to honour; in another, a foreign prince to entertain; in another, their own Sovereign to entertain; and sometimes a monument to erect to a great public man. Items of this character will show that the Corporation believes that it has public duties to the country to discharge in the expenditure of its income, and that it does attempt at least to discharge those duties. These charges exhaust so much of the revenue of the Corporation as not to leave so much as £30,000 for the civil government of the City. That is not a sum, surely, too large for such a Corporation as this. But if it were, the remedy is not to deprive them of their property. If their expenditure is inordinate under any of these heads, any saving that might be effected is undoubtedly wanted for other most legitimate corporate purposes. There are yet many new streets and public buildings wanted—many large improvements are required, but the City has not the revenue necessary for their execution. You who attempt to judge what is necessary for the citizens to possess, by determining what is proper for them to expend, may say there will be enough for feasting and hospitality when the dues dealt with by this Bill are abolished. I am not of that opinion. I doubt whether more is expended even in luxury than is due to the splendour and position of the City. It is possible, nay probable, that some of their expenditure may be injudicious. Where is the large expenditure of which the same may not be said? But, be this as it may, there are undoubtedly many purposes for which, if their revenues were larger, they could be most beneficially and legitimately employed; and even the lowest grounds of expediency are wanting to justify you in depriving the City of any of its rights of property. But, again, I appeal to this House to take up the question on higher grounds, and to look upon these rights of property as sacred, and to believe that the value and importance of the principle requires that it should be universally maintained. But, Sir, I would ask what precedents have you for the course which is thus proposed? Has it ever been attempted before? Can anybody pretend that anything of the kind has been done since law and order were supreme in the land? In early times, no doubt, the strong hand of power has attempted to deprive us of our most sacred rights, and in later times similar attempts have been made through the instrumentality of corrupt and servile lawyers; but now, in the reign of Victoria, we have to meet for the first time the danger threatening us from a House of Commons. I have referred to the military instances of early times, and to the instance of the time of Charles II. I now turn to the history of the Municipal Corporation Reform Act, in the time of William IV. What was done upon the occasion of passing that Bill when dealing with rights of property identical with those of the Corporation of London? The word "dues" was not originally introduced into the Bill, in the description of the property which was to constitute the Borough Fund, but was added in Committee expressly and in order that there should be no doubt upon the subject. It was in substance enacted that the tolls and dues of Corporations should be preserved. The 92nd clause of the Municipal Corporations Act provides that the rents and profits of all corporate hereditaments, and the interest, dividends, and annual proceeds of all corporate monies, dues, chattels, and valuable securities, should be paid to the treasurer of each borough, and should be carried by him to the account of a fund to be called "The Borough Fund," and such fund, subject to the payment of debts contracted before the passing of the Act, should be applied towards the payment of the salaries of the mayor and of other city authorities and officers, and also towards the payment of various expenses connected with corporate elections, and with the administration of justice; "and in case the borough fund should be more than sufficient for the purposes aforesaid, the surplus thereof should be applied under the direction of the council for the public benefit of the inhabitants and improvement of the borough." The surplus revenue, if any, is to be applied for the public benefit of the inhabitants and improvement of the borough. Here is the true definition of the beneficial ownership in the view of the legislature of that day. Will anybody assert that the money expended by the Corporation of London, borrowed upon security (amongst other property) of these dues and tolls, has not been for the benefit of the inhabitants? Will anybody say that there is no scheme for the benefit of the inhabitants of London, for which the proceeds of these dues can be laid out? Will anybody say that the individuals who form the aggregate of that community can receive no benefit from these revenues or have no vested interest in them? I challenge inquiry upon that point, and I ask that before you pronounce on the wisdom and expediency of abolishing this property, you should inquire in the words of the Municipal Corporation Reform Act, whether after the payment of all ordinary municipal expenses, there is no purpose for the benefit of the inhabitants to which the surplus revenues, if any, can be applied. The property exists at present in the Corporation; it belongs to them, by purchase, by prescription, by charter and by statute. Is it not capable of being applied for the purposes contemplated by the Municipal Corporation Reform Act? It may be inconvenient in its character; if so, alter its character or abolish the tolls or dues, if necessary, but compensate the owner. Let simple abolition or deprivation proceed only for legitimate cause, or, at least, on proof that there is no purpose remaining for the public benefit of the inhabitants of London, to which the property can be applied. Let that be asserted openly and clearly, and you will find that you will have difficulties of fact to contend with that are insuperable. I ask hon. Members who contend for the simple abolition of these dues to assert and to prove that there is no public benefit for the citizens of London to which the surplus can be applied; for if there be, then, I say, the course you propose is one of spoliation. But this clause in the Municipal Corporation Act contains other most instructive matter. It was a fact then, as now, that Corporations were capable of getting into debt, and it was well known that some of the Corporations dealt with by that Act were in debt. What was done in that case? The debtor was left by that Act in the full enjoyment of his property, but fearing he might, perhaps, be too liberal with his property to the prejudice of his creditor, there was introduced into the Act a proviso to the effect, that it should not be lawful for the town council, in any borough in which the body corporate before the passing of the Act should have contracted any lawful debt chargeable on any corporate tolls or dues, to alter or reduce the amount of such tolls or dues, or to grant for any consideration any remission of, or exemption from such tolls or dues, or any part thereof, unless with the consent of the creditors, until after such debt, and all interest due thereon, should have been fully paid and satisfied. So that in that case, Parliament. instead of abolishing rights of property of this character, thought it wise to enact that Corporations being indebted should not be at liberty to surrender their tolls in order that the rights of the creditors might be protected. The Act recognized the principle that even Corporations themselves, being indebted upon security of their tolls, should not be at liberty to surrender or reduce them, however objectionable their character. If there had been no such proviso, Corporations within that Act, like other owners of property might have abandoned any toll or due deemed objectionable. But in giving to Municipal Corporations the more popular constitution then provided, it was deemed expedient to enact that they should be just before they were generous with their property, and that their creditors having a charge on such tolls should be paid or should be called on to consent before the Corporations could themselves exercise their right of remitting them; while in the present case the singular inconsistency is proposed that the Legislature shall ignore the existing claims of creditors, and shall abolish the tolls and dues of the City of London under circumstances identical with those which induced the Legislature in 1835 to say that the Corporations then dealt with—the actual owners of the tolls—should themselves be deprived of the power of surrendering them while such circumstances existed. Sir, the next legislative proceeding, bearing upon this question to which I shall refer, was the proposal to abolish local dues on shipping. That attempt proceeded no doubt upon very much the same principle as that contained in the 55th clause of this Bill. It was an attempt to take away from numerous Corporations property to which they had a legal right on the ground that its existence was inconvenient to commerce. The attempt was an entire failure. It is right, however, to say that one important circumstance of difference exists between that case and the present. It was there contended that it was at least highly probable that these local dues on shipping had originally some trust or duty connected with them, which was no longer discharged, and that the levying of the dues was therefore no longer just. That argument, however, does not apply in this case, because this property has always been held in the same manner by the Corporation of London as it is now held, and it is certain that the produce of the toll was never subject to any special trust or duty whatever. It was in vain that the Government of the day endeavoured to press the Bill for the abolition of the local dues on shipping upon the attention of the House. It is true it addressed itself to very many of the Corporations in the country who had property of that nature, but I do not think the House will be disposed to permit one Corporation to be singled out for the purpose of establishing, as against it, that which you could not establish as against many Corporations combined. Look again at the way in which this attempt was followed by the Act for the regulation of the Mersey Docks and Harbour. The material part of that measure as applicable to the present discussion will be found in the preamble and 40th section of the Act. The preamble, shows that the Corporation of Liverpool possessed (amongst other property), 1st, shipping dues; 2nd, harbour and light dues; and 3rd, town and anchorage dues. With respect to the first and second, they were held not for the benefit of the Corporation at all, but upon trust for certain specific purposes; the third was the property of the Corporation in the same manner as the metage dues are the property of the Corporation of London. The House reconstructed the trusts to which the first and second properties or dues were subject. There can be no objection to that; if there be an old and effete trust you can re-construct it; a Court of Equity will do it in certain cases, and this was what the House did in reference to the shipping dues and the harbour and light dues in the case of the Corporation of Liverpool. If the trust is no longer a trust capable of being executed—no longer capable of answering the ends for which it was originally constituted—a Court of Equity will remodel the trust, or the Legislature, if the case be of sufficient importance, will do so. But a distinction was, in the case of Liverpool, drawn between the Trust estates and the absolute property of the Corporation; and, by the 40th clause of the Liverpool Act, the rights of property of the Corporation in the town and anchorage dues were recognized, and compensation was secured, and Parliament thereby declared the rights of property in corporations to be as sacred as in individuals, and that, when found inconsistent with the public good, such rights could only be abolished upon granting compensation. I will not fatigue the House with precedents for compensation. The House has, up to the present time, gone to the extreme in making compensation, rather than in falling short of the necessities of the case. When dealing with legal rights, you proceed to compensate even for offices of all descriptions—first for freehold offices, and then for those short of freehold, but which have some analogy to it. For any interference with property you always amply compensate, but here you are proceeding, without a single precedent in your favour, to interfere without compensation. In the case of these metage dues, the sums received by the Corporation are not the ordinary rights of payment for work, if, and when, done. It is the right to attach a certain toll, on goods sold, by measure in a certain locality. The decree of the Court of Exchequer, which I have read, is conclusive upon that point. You may call it unjust in its origin, and inconvenient in its present consequences, if you please, but that will not affect the force of the argument. The decree of the Court of Exchequer is this—"Bring your corn and grain by water of the Thames to London, to sell by measure, and a toll shall be paid." Then arises the legal obligation on the one side, and the legal right on the other. I believe that the argument in this particular case is not open to the objection that the right is inconvenient in its nature, or that it was originally founded in injustice. But that is a question of evidence upon which I will not enter. What, I will ask, was the origin of many of our established rights of property. What is the present nature of some of our tenures? Test the argument by a case in which the tenure or right is now most inconvenient and unjust, and let the same principle be applied to this case. This is not, I say, a right of payment for work if and when done, with a right to the person against whom the claim is made to employ the officers of the Corporation or not, as he thinks fit. He has no such right. If he brings his goods for sale by measure into that locality, he is bound, by law, to pay the Corporation. It is not for him to choose to have the work done or not by the Corporation, and so to escape the payment if he pleases. This condition of things may or may not be very inconvenient. Let that, if necessary, be ascertained, and if it be found to militate against the public weal, abolish the right, but compensate the owner. Upon these considerations, the sound con- clusion is, that according to reason, law, and precedent, it is not wise, just, or expedient, to interfere with these rights thus vested in the citizens of London. Bat even if this be doubtful, ought they not to be heard? They, at least, claim these dues as a right of property, and they have not been heard in defence of that right. On the 10th of April last there was a Motion made in the Select Committee that the Corporation should be heard by their counsel and witnesses against this clause. The application was refused. The Committee said to them, "You shall not be heard; true, you say it is a right of property, but we say it is not, and we won't hear your reasons; we decide on a question of property without evidence, and without hearing the party conceiving himself to be aggrieved." I say on the contrary, "Strike, but hear." Do not establish a precedent which will disregard a claim to property, presenting at least a prima facie case of right without hearing the persons who assert the claim. The House may be strong enough to do what this Bill proposes, but the thing has never yet been thought of by any Parliament, except in the memorable ease of the threatened abolition of the local dues on shipping, and I do not know that even then it was proposed to decide without hearing the parties. It is said that the course I propose would lead to delay which would be fatal to the passing of the measure this Session, and that the object of the opponents of the Bill is delay. There are three simple answers to that objection, each of which will be found very sufficient. First, the reconsideration of the metage tolls and dues need not delay the passing of the general measure for one moment; next, the opponents of the measure are not responsible for such delay, if any, as may arise; and lastly, the consequences of delay are not to be compared with the risk involved in hasty legislation on the question at issue. If I am at all right in my notion of the importance of the question, delay, as compared with the importance of interfering with rights of property only after you have heard the parties claiming to be owners, is nothing. The measure before the House contains, no doubt, many useful regulations for the Corporation of London, and that part of the Bill is unquestionably important. Still let us not affect to act as if we thought there existed some gross abuses in the constitution of the City of London, some feudal rights and privileges in the hands of the few which were pressing heavily upon the mass of the people, and which could not brook a moment's delay. There is really nothing of the kind here. The thing had better be done if it can be done this year, but it is not an affair of overwhelming consequence for which everything else must be sacrificed. The consequences and conveniences of immediate and of deferred action may here safely be balanced and considered. Again—delay of the more important parts of this measure is not necessary at all, as a consequence of sending back to the Committee the question I have discussed. Carry the rest of the Bill in its integrity if you please, and enlarge or amend the political constitution of the City at your discretion, but reserve the financial part, or that portion of it which is connected with these metage tolls and dues, for further consideration. If you say this is a wise and just measure—so important for the City of London that you cannot postpone the political regulations for twelve months, I will yield to the suggestion; but then, I say, let this part be considered separately and no delay will arise. But is it not fair, also, to inquire who has occasioned the delay that is now sought for? Upon whom rests the responsibility of that delay? Has the City of Loudon occasioned it? Did they not come here the first moment that they saw this clause was in the Bill, and ask to be heard? They were referred by the House to the Committee, and there they again asked to be heard, but were refused a hearing. I believe that if the Committee had condescended to hear them, the Bill would not have contained the clauses now objected to. They have now again come here, and they will by every constitutional means insist on their rights, and I believe in so doing they will receive the aid of every one who is interested in the preservation of the rights of property. Grant them a hearing. If you had let them be heard in the first instance, there would have been no delay. The Bill is, in my opinion, fraught with injustice to the individual members of the Corporation and with danger to the general interests of the community, even greater than its particular injustice, and it is the duty of those who agree with me in that opinion to oppose its progress by every constitutional means. Delay is of secondary importance; but delay is not the necessary result of yielding to the substance of my Amend- ment, and I am not responsible for the delay, even should it arise. Sir, I submit that I have made out my case. This Bill proposes to interfere with the rights of property; those rights in a Corporation are created and regulated by the same legislative authority which creates and regulates the rights of property in individuals, and are held as sacred by the law. You cannot interfere arbitrarily with rights of this kind in Corporations aggregate without endangering the security of property in Corporations sole, and in individuals. You cannot safely trust yourselves to inquire into the wisdom, justice, or expediency of transferring property in municipal Corporations from one hand to another; if you do so, you will first peril the rights of property in Corporations sole, and next, similar rights vested in individuals. The moment you begin to speculate upon the abstract justice of the rights of property, in particular instances, separately and apart from the wisdom of maintaining the right as extensively and universally as the law recognises it, the universal right is in peril. I entreat you, therefore, not to go into this speculation; but if you do, I believe that if you will hear the Corporation they could make out a better case for their particular claim than could be made out by many individuals; and I have confidence enough in their case and in the wisdom and justice of the House, to believe that the House would not, after hearing the citizens of London, deprive them of that property which, for six centuries, has been devoted to their common benefit. There is no ground whatever for saying that the property cannot still be usefully devoted to their common benefit, and to deprive them of it under such circumstances is confiscation. For these reasons, I move the Amendment of which I have given notice, that this Bill be referred back to the Select Committee, that the Petition of the Corporation of London against the Bill, which was presented on the 28th of May last, be referred to the same Committee, and that the Corporation of London be heard by their counsel, agents, and witnesses, before the Committee, on the allegations of their Petition.

said, that in seconding the Amendment, it was not his intention to throw any obstacle in the way of the passing of the measure. He wished to see whatever anomalies that might exist, with regard to the Corporation, removed, and the Corporation itself placed on a foot- ing more consonant to the spirit of modern times than that on which it at present, in some respects, stood. The hon. and learned Gentleman on the other side had so fully and so truly stated the case that it would be idle for him to discuss it at any length. He had risen to direct attention to one statement which was contained in the petition of the Corporation, and which he thought was very material in considering the Amendment which had just been moved. That statement was that an understanding had been arrived at between the right hon. Gentleman who had charge of the Bill under the late Government and the officers of the Corporation to the effect, that the Bill should be read a second time on the understanding that the Corporation should be heard against it before the Committee. He believed that the right hon. Gentleman did not admit that there had been any such understanding. But when it was stated, on the part of the Corporation, that such an understanding had been arrived at, it was only reasonable to suppose that the Corporation had some grounds for the view which they had taken of it. Speaking for himself, he might state that when the second reading was proposed he had asked what course was proposed to be taken with the Bill. He was told that the Bill was to be referred to a Select Committee. The meaning of that could not be that those who were entitled to be heard against it were willing to allow it to be sent to a Committee sitting with closed doors. Hon. Members were quite justified in supposing that in agreeing to refer the Bill to a Select Committee they were giving the Corporation an opportunity of being heard before it. The merits of the case had been so fully stated by the hon. and learned Member for West Gloucestershire, that he should not enter further upon them, but content himself with seconding the Amendment.

said, that on the part of the late Government, who originated the Bill, and before the House was addressed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite on the part of the present Government, who had adopted it, he wished to make a few observations on the Motion before the House. He was ready to admit the ability with which the hon. and learned Member for West Gloucestershire had argued this question; but he could not help being forcibly reminded by his speech of the arguments which had been addressed to the House many years ago, when the Municipal Cor- porations Act was under discussion, by hon. and learned Gentlemen of equal learning and reputation, who had endeavoured to induce the House to reject that measure on the same grounds that the hon. and learned Gentleman now asked them to agree to his Amendment. Those hon. and learned Gentlemen, however, failed to convince the House in that day that that Act ought not to pass, and he believed that there was no one now who would contend that that was not a most important measure of municipal reform, or that it was one which ought to be repealed. He thought that it was quite unnecessary to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman through all his arguments as to whether these rights of metage were or were not property which could be dealt with by the House, without any compensation in the event of its being taken from the Corporation for the benefit of the public; because it appeared to him that those arguments were wholly out of place on the present occasion, especially considering the Amendment with which the hon. and learned Gentleman had concluded his speech. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not want any inquiry to satisfy his own mind. He stated his opinion as a lawyer that the House had no right to deal with these metage dues, which the City of London levied for its own benefit, and yet he asked the House to refer this Bill back for the consideration of fifteen hon. Gentlemen sitting upstairs in order to settle the question. But the question of whether those dues were property or not was one which the House, being in possession of all the facts to enable it to form a judgment, was alone capable of deciding. It was impossible that a Select Committee should have that principle referred to them, or that the House should consent to be bound by their decision if it were, and he ventured to say that, in the event of their opinion being that Parliament could touch those rights without compensation, the hon. and learned Gentleman himself would be among the first to repudiate their decision. There were, however, two courses open to the hon. and learned Gentleman, neither of which he had adopted. He might either have moved that the Bill be committed that day three months, thinking that it contained principles so objectionable that it ought not to be agreed to; or, approving a certain portion of the Bill, he might have consented to go into a Committee of the whole House, and when they arrived at Clause 55 he might have addressed to them the arguments which he had just submitted to the House. In the latter case he (Sir George Grey) should have been prepared to justify the Bill as it stood; but he hoped that the House would not agree to be led prematurely into a discussion upon an issue which could decide nothing, that issue simply being whether the Bill should or should not be referred back to a Select Committee. The Motion was in fact one for postponing the Bill to a future Session. He admitted that on the 24th of June—and especially in the present state of the Thames, of which the City had been so long the conservators—much might be said in favour of delay; and he agreed also that no great injury to the public might arise from such a course. But it must be remembered that great concessions had been made to the City, in the hope and expectation that the questions which had been raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman would not be again raised; and considering those concessions, and the departure made in the Bill from many of the important suggestions of the Commissioners, he doubted whether the result of delay might not be to produce a better Bill—not in the sense in which the Corporation of London wished to see it amended, but in the sense in which the public wished to see it improved. He should have been prepared to stand by the Bill in all its main features as it had come down from the Committee, but if it should be put off for another Session he should hold himself absolved from any such obligation. The police, the coal duties, and other important questions were not settled in the Bill in the manner that many ardent reformers wished, and if the Bill were postponed in the hope of further concessions he should consider himself quite at liberty to support on another occasion those more advanced views which he believed to be most in accordance with the public interest. With respect to the statement of the hon. Member for the City (Mr. Crawford), which was contained also in a petition which had been presented in favour of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman, that there was an understanding between him and the officers of the Corporation that the Biil should be read a second time, without opposition, and that the Corporation should be fully heard before the Select Committee, he must give to it a most unqualified contradiction. Not one word had fallen from him which could by possibility lead to that construction being placed upon his intentions; and that he had never consented to such an arrangement was best proved by the fact that the question of allowing the Corporation to appear by counsel and to call witnesses was raised and discussed in the Committee itself, when, with the exception of two worthy aldermen, every Member of the Committee, including the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, voted against that proposition. The Committee, in deciding not to allow the Corporation to appear by counsel, were very much influenced by the consideration that the House had obtained all the information that was necessary in order to enlighten them and to lead them to a right conclusion, and that the Corporation had been fully heard before a tribunal at least as competent as that Select Committee. The hon. and learned Gentleman said, "Strike, but hear;" implying, of course, that the Corporation had not been heard; but the hon. and learned Gentleman appeared to be totally ignorant of the fact that in 1853 a Commission had been appointed to inquire into all those very questions which had formed the staple of the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech. The Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Patteson, a sound constitutional lawyer, his right hon. Friend the Member for Radnor (Sir G. C. Lewis), and his right hon. Friend the Member for Taunton (Mr. Labouchere), and they were directed to collect information respecting the rights, privileges, duties, jurisdiction, civil and criminal, and generally to inquire into everything which could affect in any degree the rights or constitution of the Corporation. They discharged those duties in the most careful and conscientious manner; they examined first witnesses who complained of the constitution or impugned the administration of the Corporation; and they then examined every officer of the Corporation with respect to those complaints. Reporters of the public press were admitted, and copies of the evidence taken were supplied to the City officials, so that there could be no pretence for saying that the inquiry had not been of the fairest and most ample description. This being so the Committee felt that they were in possession of sufficient information to guide their decision and to influence their judgment, and they therefore refused to hear counsel on the part of the Corporation. For the same reason he trusted that his hon. Friend the Member for West Kent (Mr. W. Martin) would not propose his Amendment with respect to the coal duties. That was not a subject which a Select Committee could decide, and besides the House possessed already all the requisite information on the subject. He trusted that this discussion would not be prolonged, but that they might be allowed to go into a Committee of the whole House upon it without delay, and then, when they reached the 55th clause, let them determine whether there were sufficient grounds for maintaining in the City of London a tax upon corn for the benefit of that Corporation, when it had been abolished universally elsewhere. That was the question which they would then have to decide. It was a mere waste of time to enter into a discussion respecting the difference between private property and Corporation property, and he therefore trusted that the House would at once decide whether any advantage was to be gained from sending this Bill back to a Select Committee. He believed that no possible advantage would result from such a course, and he should therefore vote against the Amendment.

said, that the reason why the hon. and learned Member for West Gloucestershire (Mr. Rolt) had been requested to propose the Amendment, instead of some hon. Member connected with the Corporation, was evident. No one connected with the Corporation would have ventured to bring forward as facts the statements with which the hon. and learned Gentleman, who could not be supposed to know the facts, had been furnished. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the Corporation had enjoyed the right of this metage tax upon corn from time immemorial, but Messrs. Combe and Delafield, the well-known brewers, had many years ago refused to pay that charge; and although the Corporation had taken proceedings against that firm, they had abstained from going on with the case, and had never attempted to produce any charter giving them a right to make such a demand. Surely this circumstance showed that they had no such right. Again, the hon. and learned Gentleman said that the Corporation had borrowed large sums of money upon their right to this property; but with the exception of £92,000 expended in the building of Holloway Prison he denied that the Corporation had borrowed a shilling without their having either the most ample means of paying good interest for it, or of liquidating the whole of the debt by means of taxes on the metropolis at large. To talk of the poverty of the Corporation, as the hon. and learned Gentlemen had done, was really a farce. The only true document with respect to the financial condition of the City that had ever been published was one that was obtained by a Committee of the Common Council in 1835, which showed that the officers of the Corporation absolutely received, in the shape of fees and other emoluments, upwards of £74,000 in one year, which did not appear at all in their accounts. It also appeared that in the year 1833 twelve officers of the Corporation—one of them being a corn meter he believed—actually received a larger amount than the twelve Cabinet Ministers, the former receiving £48,435, and the latter £45,480. In that same year the administrative cost of the Corporation amounted to £2 12s. 6d. per head for every inhabitant of the city; while the whole of the administrative cost of the Government of the country, including its armies and navies, its permanent debt, and its great colonial and other expenditure, amounted only to £117s. per head of the population. With respect to the precise question before the House, he should have no great objection to the measure being delayed, if the effect should be, as he believed it would, to produce an other Bill more in conformity with the re-commendations of the Commissioners; but as he did not see any great prospect of that, he should support the Motion for going into Committee.

said, he had a suggestion to offer to the House, which perhaps might shorten their discussion of this question. He was quite aware that there were opinions current in these days that property, or rather hereditaments of this description, such as rights of metage and the like, were not to be regarded strictly as property, more especially when they were in the hands of public corporations; and he remembered that it was contended, with great force in the Liverpool case, by the right hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), that all that kind of property was held in trust for public purposes, and was at the disposal of Parliament. That doctrine was strongly combated at the time, and some hon. Members went so far as to characterise it as revolutionary. He (Mr. Wortley) did not at all shrink from avowing that there was a distinction between property of this descrip- tion in the hands of corporations and in the hands of individuals. He admitted that Parliament had the power to deal with such property in the hands of corporations, but at the same time they must do it tenderly and with the greatest caution. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) who took a great interest in financial matters, was quite wrong in his figures upon this occasion, because, instead of the £92,000 expended upon Holloway Prison being the only sum that had been borrowed upon the general revenues of the City, of which the corn metage formed a part, there had been £450,000 borrowed and expended upon the new cattle market. The majority of the members of the Corporation were of opinion, when the option of undertaking or of declining that work had been left to them, that if they were to engage in it, it must entail upon them a loss, but the actual loss in the case had been greater than they had anticipated. He had himself, as the law adviser of the Corporation at the time, told them that if they wished to maintain their station and their influence, they ought not to decline that task; and upon that view of the matter they had acted. The work was a magnificent one, and his only objection to it was that it had been executed on too costly a scale. He had certainly not expected at the period when he had given his advice upon the subject, that it would entail, as it had done, an expenditure of upwards of £450,000. Another debt charged on the corporation property was the cost of erecting New Cannon Street, amounting to £540,000. He believed that that thoroughfare, when completed, would be one of the finest in Europe, and that even Paris itself presented no work of the kind calculated to reflect more credit on the energy and the capacity of its originators. There were, then, these enormous sums charged upon the revenues of the City, of which the metage dues in question formed a part. He thought, however, that it was very desirable that this discussion should cease, and if any arrangement could be made by which compensation should be given—not to the Corporation but to the creditors—he should advise the Corporation at once to accept it. He would suggest, then, that these metage clauses should stand over for the present, and that in the meantime the Corporation should be communicated with to see whether some understanding might not be come to. Or another course would be, inasmuch as these clauses had nothing to do with the constitution of the Corporation, to put them in the same category with the coal duties, and to deal separately by Act of Parliament with all the financial part of the case. If this were done he was sure it would be found that there was every disposition on the part of the City to treat the House fairly. With respect to the coal duties he could not help saying that he thought that any Government which parted with those duties would be guilty of a gross error, and would be really betraying their duty to the Metropolis. Out of the 1s. 1d. per ton charged upon coal, only 4d. went to the Corporation, the other 9d. going to the Government, which represented the whole nation. The tax really was very trifling and was scarcely felt. It was only ls. ld. per ton, and the price of coals now was not above 17s. or 18s. as compared with 56s. a ton, which it used to be when he was a student in the Temple. Notwithstanding the great activity of the hon. Members for Westminster and Lambeth, and Marylebone, and their efforts to persuade people that this tax was a great hardship, so little was it felt that not a petitition from the Metropolis had been presented for its repeal. He admitted that it was a hardship upon the inhabitants of Kent and Hertfordshire, who were no more interested in improving the Metropolis than the inhabitants of more distant counties; but the tax might very well be modified in that respect without being abandoned altogether. He was satisfied that the Metropolitan Board of Works never would be able to raise a rate sufficient to carry out the great works intrusted to it, and he suggested that the 9d. a ton on coals which now went to the Government should be transferred to that Board. As for the 4d., it clearly belonged to the City, and as an evidence of the way in which they expended it, he appealed to Cannon Street—a more important street improvement even than had been undertaken by the vigour and taste of the French Emperor; to Holloway Prison, which was only too handsome and too fine; and to the New Cattle Market, the only objection to which was that the expenditure upon it had been too extravagant. But, if extravagance had been a sin of the Corporation, this Bill which reformed the constitution of that body would remedy it, and under a freely and popularly elected corporation there would be no chance of the recurrence of such a fault. If the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home De- partment would hold out any hope that some arrangement could be come to with regard to these duties, which at the same time would respect the rights of property, and would advance the public interests, he thought that this discussion might very well be shortened, and that they might at once proceed to consider what should be the future constitution of the Corporation.

said, that if the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for West Gloucestershire (Mr. Rolt) were adopted, he should move,

"That the manufacturers of the Metropolis and the adjoining districts be also heard by their counsel, agents, and witnesses, before the said Committee, with reference to the metage of coals;"

and if, on the other hand, the Amendment should be negatived, he should feel it his duty to avail himself of some other opportunity of pointing out the injustice to which his constituents in West Kent and the people of other districts were subjected under that corn metage system.

said, that filling the office which he held, he was bound to express his opinion upon the Bill, and also to state the course which he meant to take after having given the greatest consideration to the Bill. He must say that no Committee could have acted more fairly or dispassionately, or have given more ample consideration to the subject before it than the Committee which sat upon this Bill. They had taken every pains to sift every question and to arrive at a just conclusion. As to the coal dues, he thought they had better be left out of the present discussion; they formed no part of the present Bill, and were indeed purposely excluded from it. This was a question which ought to be dealt with independently and separately. His hon. and learned Friend who brought forward this Amendment said this was a question affecting the rights of property belonging to the Corporation of London, and that the rights of property, as regarded corporations, were the same, or nearly the same, as those which regarded individuals; that we were not entitled to take any of those rights of property in the manner proposed, and that we should reconsider the whole question up stairs before asking the House to come to a decision upon it. Now, he must say he entirely agreed with the observations of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey), that no Select Committee could determine such an issue as that which his hon. and learned Friend proposed. It must be determined, if at all, not by a Committee up stairs, but by the House itself. Now, if that were so, would it not be a mere loss of time not to go into Committee on the Bill at once? As to the question raised by his hon. and learned Friend, in reference to the right of property, he agreed with him that it was of immense importance, nor would he shrink from discussing that question when they came to discuss in Committee that clause upon which the question fairly arose. At the same time allowing the full force of the argument that corporate property ought to be protected almost in the same way and to the same extent as private property, it would not be difficult to show that this principle did not arise in the case of these metage dues. Not one tittle of evidence had been adduced to show that they had been granted to the Corporation as their absolute property for the purpose of raising a revenue for themselves. In the evidence taken before the Commissioners it was shown that the Lord Mayor, as representing the City, had been in negotiation with the corn-factors on this very point, and was prepared to make considerable concession, which he would not have done if the right of the Corporation bad been clear and undoubted. He agreed with his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bute (Mr. S. Wortley) in most of the principles he had laid down, and thought there was much force in what his right hon. and learned Friend had said. He agreed that this was a matter in which they ought to deal leniently and liberally with the Corporation. The charges upon the Corporation were heavy, and they ought to satisfy themselves that the revenues of the Corporation were not unduly impaired to the injury of their creditors. Probably it would be worth consideration whether a certain revenue from metage ought not to be continued to the Corporation for a specified purpose and for a limited period. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Gloucestershire had accused the Committee of having dealt rather hastily in that case with the question of property. But, in reply to that charge, he (Mr. Walpole) should observe, that the Committee had reserved the coal dues as a matter for separate consideration, and that they had carefully inquired into the question of the claim to compensation which might be put forward on behalf of those officers of the Corporation whose present offices should be abolished. Still he must admit there was one point which, in his opinion, they had not fully considered, and that was a paper laid before them on the last day they sat relating to the question of corn metage—[Sir J. SHELLEY: That was the last day, they say.] Yes; he had said so, and must repeat that this paper had not received the consideration it demanded. When they came to Clause 55 they might consider what would be fair and just to be done—at all events, he trusted they would address themselves to it in an impartial frame of mind, whether it would not be better to increase the amount of metage now allowed so as to enable the Corporation to pass with safety through their transition state. This he was prepared to consider in Committee; but on all the other clauses of the Bill, he thought the Committee had arrived at a sound conclusion and he should be prepared to support it, at the same time reserving to himself the fullest privilege of deciding as to whether they might award a fuller measure of justice in reference to the compensation which the Corporation should receive in consequence of the abolition of the corn metage. This, however, was a mere question of amount. For these reasons he was of opinion that the Speaker ought now to leave the Chair, and the House to go into Committee on this Bill. He wished to see justice done to the Corporation as well as to the country, but he had great doubts whether the predictions of his right hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) would not prove true as regarded this question, that if this Bill were not passed, there might be a pressure brought upon them which might perhaps lead to the introduction of a measure less favourable to the Corporation of London than that now before them. He thought the House was quite prepared to come to an immediate decision upon the question before them.

explained, and reiterated his opinion that be thought it was better to postpone the question of compensation.

said, he wished to ask the hon. and learned Gentleman who moved the Amendment whether upon the whole he did not think it would be more desirable to allow the House to go into Committee on the Bill, and there deal with his proposition when the proper time arrived for its consideration?

said, he felt so satisfied that the matters he had stated could be estab- lished by evidence, that unless it was understood that the clause depriving the Corporation of its property be withdrawn, or sufficient compensation made—[Cries of No!] Well, then, he felt bound to press his Amendment.

was in hopes the hon. and learned Gentleman would have acceded to the suggestion put to him; but as he did not he would offer a few observations. His right hon. Friend (Sir G. Grey) had alluded to what took place on the Municipal Corporation Bill, and he (Sir B. Hall) quite agreed in those observations. The remarks made many years ago by Sir C. Wetherall as to the Municipal Corporations Act were exactly those which had been reiterated to-day by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. The only ground upon which he could wish to see the measure rejected was that a larger and more comprehensive one might be adopted—one founded strictly upon the provisions and recommendations of the Committee of 1853. The Corporation of London had up to the present moment resisted in every manner every attempt made in Parliament to reform it. Looking at the constitution of the Commission, and the Report which was laid upon the table of the House in 1854, he felt no doubt that if the Bill were rejected the provisions and recommendations of the Commission must be adopted. He regretted that many most useful suggestions in the Report of the Commission were overlooked or materially modified in this Bill. The right hon Baronet then entered at some length into the recommendations of the Commission of 1853, and compared or contrasted them with the provisions of the measure before the House. As to the tax which was levied for the exclusive use of the Corporation by a metage on corn, Messrs. Combe and Delafield had successfully resisted it, for the Corporation were afraid, as his hon. Friend stated, to proceed in Court. And with regard to the improvements in the City in Cannon Street, to which his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Wortley) referred, those improvements were carried out by duties levied on the whole kingdom, by duties on corn and coal imported into London. He thought the coal duty was not abolished, it ought to be handed over to the Metropolitan Board of Works in aid of the rates that must be levied for carrying out Metropolitan improvements. He again regretted the measure was so small in the way of reform. What fell from the right hon. Gentlemen (the Home Secretary) rather alarmed him, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not consent to the imposition of a larger amount of compensation in the loss of the metage dues than was suggested by the Select Committee on this Bill. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would consider this most carefully before making any such concession. He was exceedingly sorry the hon. and learned Gentleman had not allowed them to go into Committee on the Bill, where the principle of his Amendment could be quite as well discussed on the 55th clause. But he was quite sure that if the opposition was persisted in the Corporation would regret that they had not accepted the present Bill, which, after all, was a poor measure of a much-needed reform.

It is with great pain that I find myself obliged to differ, on the present occasion, from my right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole), but I cannot resist the arguments so ably and powerfully urged by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Gloucester. I am perfectly satisfied that the matter before us is not ripe for legislation, at all events, during the present Session. My hon. and learned Friend to my right (Mr. Rolt) insists on the Bill being sent back again to a Select Committee, in order that the Corporation of London may be fairly and fully heard again, and with the assistance of counsel, in defence of their rights to the large property now enjoyed by them, and offer evidence, if necessary, to serve as premises from which this House may safely draw a sound conclusion. I think this the course which, in common justice, ought to be taken. Sir, my hon. and learned Friend the Memfor West Gloucester says that the Bill, in its present form, rests on a principle of undisguised confiscation; and I, too, am of that opinion, and do not hesitate to say so. The Bill strikes at the very root and foundation of the tenure of property; it menaces the sanctity of that right everywhere, and in whatever shape and for whatever length of time it may have existed, whether in the hands of a private individual, a corporation sole, or a corporation aggregate. Now, Sir, some of the leading members of the present Government happen to have given expression in this House, on an occasion which we have not quite forgotten, to opinions slightly at variance with those which they must act upon, if they persist in supporting this Bill in its present form. I allude to the debate which arose not long after I had the honour of a seat in this House, on the second reading of time Bill introduced by my right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Lowe), for abolishing passing tolls and local dues on shipping. Several leading Members of the present Government spoke on that occasion, and strenuously protested against the extraordinary doctrines then advocated by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Lowe). He had quoted a passage from Mr. Hallam's Constitutional History, for the purpose of establishing the distinction he tried to draw between the right of property in the case of individuals and in that of corporations, and spoke contemptuously of "the musty charters" by which corporations held their property. Now, what was said to that, first of all, by my noble and learned Friend, then Sir Frederick Thesiger, now Lord Chancellor?

Read the passage from my speech.

I really have not got it.

If you will refer to it you will find that you are mistaken.

I did not expect to be challenged in this way, or I should have been prepared to verify my statement. I should be exceedingly sorry to misrepresent my right hon. Friend in any, the slightest particular, but I heard him deliver the speech, I heard him quote Hallam for the purpose I have mentioned, and am under the strongest possible conviction that I also beard my right hon. Friend use the two words "musty charters," and in the manner I have stated; for I distinctly recollect, besides, a succeeding speaker catching bold of the expression, and commenting on it long and forcibly. Surely this cannot be all a dream of mine. Well, what said, on that occasion, the present Lord Chancellor? Thus he spoke of a Bill founded on exactly the same principles as the present. He said:—

"It is a measure which I believe to be fraught with the greatest injustice, and to be founded on principles which, if sanctioned by this House, would tend to shake the security of all corporate property throughout the kingdom. The right hon. Gentleman has based the measure which he has proposed to the House upon the principle, that the corporate towns of this kingdom have no property which they can call their own; that they hold all they possess at the will of the public, and that they may be stripped of their possessions at its pleasure. And upon these principles, and without condescending to assign any other reason, he proceeds to his work of confiscation. When, Sir, I heard such doctrines propounded, and saw them illustrated so strongly by the measure before the House, I was forcibly reminded of those disgraceful periods in the history of our country, when as- saults were made on the charters of corporations, and their forfeitures obtained as a ready means of extortion. I recognize a great difference between public Corporations, and a Corporation composed of an aggregate of individuals, associated for their individual benefit under a common name. This latter class of Corporations may be considered as public bodies, with reference to the individuals of whom they are composed; but with respect to the public at large, they are merely separate communities, having separate rights, and interests, and properties, which they are entitled to maintain as exclusively as individuals are to maintain inviolate the property which they possess. So far from its being true, in the unqualified manner in which the Vice President of the Board of Trade asserted it,—that there is a distinction between the property of Corporations and that of individuals, I contend, on the contrary, that where individual Corporations possess rights which belong to the whole body, and to each individual as a part of that body, no distinction can be made between their property and the property of individuals."

Thus much for the present Lord Chancellor; but he was not the only eminent Member of the present Government who expressed similar opinions. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer thus characterized the speech of my right hon. Friend, time then Vice President of the Board of Trade: he said—

"It was a speech more calculated than any to which I have ever listened in this House, to disturb and alarm the public mind and to unsettle that deep-rooted confidence in prescriptive right which has hitherto been one of the most considerable sources of the stability and security of property and order in this country."

But two other members of the present Government, my hon. and learned Friends the Attorney and Solicitor General also took part in that debate. The former (Sir F. Kelly) began his speech by saying:—

"I am satisfied that Her Majesty's Government are not aware of the real principle which the Bill involves, and which is neither more nor less than one which would take away from any Corporation in the kingdom all the property which they possessed of this description—property which belonged to them in trust for the inhabitants of the towns, and which was to be taken away without any charge of maladministration on the part of the Corporation which would entitle the Legislature to confiscate their property."

The Solicitor General (Sir Hugh Cairns) made a vigorous and able speech on that occasion, foreshadowing the still greater ability which he has since displayed in this House, and he said:—

"To the second part of this Bill, which deals with local dues, I object altogether, as I believe it to be wholly unjust. There is no doubt that these dues were originally granted by those who had a right to grant, and that their grants had been confirmed by charters, by Acts of Parliament, and in every way by which it was possible to give them a solemn sanction. 'But,' says the right hon. Getleman, 'what matters your musty charters?'"

And here, Sir, I must pause for one moment to point out to the House how completely I am confirmed by this reference of my hon. and learned Friend at the time to the remarkable expression of my right hon. Friend, which I vouched for having heard myself.

"The right hon. Gentleman the Vice President of the Board of Trade," the Solicitor General went on to say, "is accustomed to the habits of a country not quite so old as ours; but I beg to tell him that the tenure of the property of every hon. Gentleman in this House depends upon 'musty charters.' If he rails at 'musty charters,' he rails at the tenure of all the property in the kingdom."

Well, Sir, thus much for the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the two law officers of the present Government, and the opinions which they deliberately expressed in this House, on a feature of the Bill then before it exactly corresponding with the one under consideration in the Bill now before us. I am confident that the members of the present Government are incapable of expressing one set of opinions in office, and a different set out of office—

We don't intend to do so; we have not thought of such a thing, as my hon. and learned Friend well knows.

Well, I say so. I believe my right hon. Friend, as everybody does, implicitly; I believe that the opinions which I have just read to the House, expressed by so many leading members of the Government when out of office, are their opinions at the present moment, on which they are prepared to act.

To be sure we are.

But let me point out to my right hon. Friend that, in taking up and supporting this Bill, not their own, but of the late Government—or at least this particular important clause in it—they will, in fact, be giving effect to opinions of a diametrically opposite character; and to such a grave charge of inconsistency I cannot and do not believe my right hon. Friend and the other members of the Government liable. Sir, other eminent Members of the House, belonging to the Liberal party—I allude particularly to the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring)—expressed opinions entirely in unison with those which I have quoted. He said, among other things,—

"I recognize throughout this Bill what is even more important—I mean a carelessness of private rights, and a sacrifice of public and Parliamentary faith, which it would be most mischievous for the House of Commons to sanction."

Well, Sir, what have we at this moment before us? Here is a Bill dealing with the Corporation of London, that ancient and magnificent Corporation, in itself one of the prominent institutions of the country, one no doubt possessed of great resources, but subject at the same time to commensurate liabilities and responsibilities. Now, the object of the Bill is to place this Corporation on an entirely new footing; and the first thing done is, to strip it of its property in the most arbitrary and undistinguishing manner, regardless of protecting those who may have claims on that property, or the rights of any one who may be injured by this summary and sweeping procedure. And more than that, Sir, without the preamble containing the faintest hint of any such intention—a circumstance which had not escaped my notice, any more than that of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Gloucestershire, and who dwelt on it so forcibly in the early part of his speech. Sir, common candour requires that we ought to insert words into the preamble indicating this purpose of the Legislature—what it is, in fact, that we are going to do. There is another point to which I cannot refrain from adverting, and with some concern. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) warned the Corporation that if they did not like this Bill, it might be followed by one which they might like still less; and my regret is that this warning was re-echoed, as it appeared to me, by my right hon. Friend below me, the Home Secretary. Now, Sir, I must be permitted to deprecate this appearance of holding out a threat—for such it was—to coerce the Corporation into accepting this Bill. I do not think that the great Corporation of the City of London is a body which deserves to be dragooned in this way. For aught I know, this House may deem it a proper and legitimate course thus to proceed by way of threat—that if they won't take this, the Corporation shall get something much worse next year; but if that sort of argument is to be made use of on such an occasion, do not let the House forget that it may be made use of on other occasions, and that not long hence either, and in a way not dreamed of by those who now use it. I do hope, therefore, Sir, that we shall hear no more of such threats during this discussion? Sir, I have ventured to occupy the attention of the House, on this occasion, solely because I do believe that in the decision of this question is involved the maintenance or subversion of the great principle lying at the foundation of social order—the sanctity of the right of property. Give your sanction to the Bill as it now stands, and you will, I maintain, give your sanction to confiscation and spoliation. Accede to the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Gloucestershire, and the House will escape from a position of great difficulty, and, at the same time, be under no necessity of retarding legislation. Sir, if I thought this latter the object of the Corporation, I would not give them my support. I have no connection whatever with the Corporation of London, either directly or indirectly, any more than my hon. and learned Friend, who made, as I do, a disclaimer I feel to be so unnecessary. I stand here solely on the ground of strict justice. The rights for which the Corporation of London are at this moment contending are identical with those of every other corporation, be it great or small, and of every individual proprietor in the kingdom, whether within this House or without it. What is the real question at this moment before us? This Bill proposes to strip the Corporation of a vast amount of its property, without even a shadow of compensation, and we are asked to go at once into Committee—to affirm the principle, and proceed to the work of spoliation, before hearing those so seriously affected, and hearing them by their counsel and witnesses. Leaving out of sight the vastness of the interests involved, such a course is utterly subversive of the plainest principles of legislation, of jurisprudence, and the ordinary administration of justice. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, with that candour which illuminates everything he says and does in this House or out of it, has just acknowledged that the Select Committee to which this Bill had been referred, and which has sent it down to us in its present form, did not deal with it—I am far from saying, not with perfect fairness, but—in his own words, if I recollect them—with sufficient attention and consideration, in respect of the petition presented to them on the last day of the Committee's sitting, by the hon. Alderman near me, the Member for Andover, (Alderman Cubitt) setting forth, as my right hon. Friend admits, their claims in respect of the corn-metage dues, and of the compensation of those whose offices were to be abolished, with greater distinctness and fulness than the Committee had before had an opportunity of seeing set forth. Why, Sir, how strong a reason that is in favour of the course now recommended to the House. The practical question is—whether, supposing we now go into Committee on the Bill, and get as far as Clause 55, at the present period of the Session—I should rather have said the present state of the sewer which runs by our walls—we shall really be able to enter on these elaborate and protracted discussions which must then take place—into all those details from which we cannot escape, if we would arrive at a safe and just conclusion on this most important question—important in itself, and important as a precedent. This is all that I understand the Corporation to ask at our hands. Sir, as I said before, if I thought their object was merely to "Burke" the discussion—merely to put off the evil day, and procrastinate an equitable adjustment of the matters at issue between them and the Legislature, I should be ashamed of them, and of myself for supporting them; I repeat that I should scorn to support them in such a course, and I believe they would scorn it themselves. They ask, on the contrary, only what they have a right to have—a fair deliberate hearing; they say the interests involved are vast, and the exigency is not pressing. Why are we to be influenced by the conclusions of a Select Committee which it is now admitted has not had sufficient materials before them for drawing those conclusions? Why is the Corporation required thus suddenly to encounter an attack, the time and manner of which they had no opportunity of considering and preparing against? Their title to their dues as cornmetage is attacked. Well, they say that title has never yet been tried before any tribunal competent to form a judgment on the subject; and is this House to tell them that one of its own Select Committees is not competent for that purpose, assisted, too, by council, and enlightened by all necessary evidence? Oh, it is answered—a Committee of the whole House will answer the purpose, and gain every end that could be attained by a Select Committee up stairs. Sir, I beg to deny that. A Committee of the whole House would not have sufficient time, nor patience, nor temper, nor is it armed with the necessary machinery. I was almost going to say that it had not adequate powers—but, at all events, it could not perform the duty half so satisfactorily. Suppose the House resolved itself into Committee, we all know how quickly matters could be forced to a close—how impatient of delay and intolerant of perplexing detail hon. Members would become—they could then say, what the Corporation now says, those details ought to have been referred to the only suitable tribunal, a Select Committee—and a division would be clamoured for. Again therefore, and most earnestly, I urge on my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who has chosen to take charge of this Bill, to reconsider the course he proposes. The Corporation of the City of London has deserved far too well of this House, and of this country, to admit of being treated in the old quo warranto spirit of the lawless days of King Charles the Second. Never let it be truly said hereafter, that when this great Corporation sued to this House for justice, it was treated without due respect and consideration. Rather let it be said that this House refused to legislate against any body whatever, behind its back, unheard—and above all in the case of this famous corporation, proceeded with fitting and special caution. Acting in that spirit, we may fairly hope to produce a Bill which will satisfy both the Corporation of London and the country at large—and which will form a creditable incident to be recorded in the annals of the City of London and of this Parliament. Sir, if my hon. Friend the Member for West Gloucester presses his Motion to a division, I shall go into the same lobby with him.

said, he did not quite understand the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department in the same sense as his noble Friend seemed to have done. He should regret if the right hon. Gentleman had so far departed from the views of the Committee. But if it be really the opinion of the Government that the metage dues involved the rights of property to such an extent as to debar the House from abolishing them without providing compensation, he feared that the Bill must be altered, not only to meet that case, but to meet the case of the "city toll" also. [An hon. MEMBER: That has been abolished.] No doubt it had been abolished by the City authorities themselves; but at present there was nothing to prevent them re-imposing it to-morrow if they pleased. He trusted that the House would bear in mind that all these rights of property, as they were termed, were given, not to the City of London as it now was, but to the City of London as the metropolis of England; not to the 200,000 inhabitants who lived within the city walls, but were given as an important trust to the great emporium of British trade—the great metropolis of the British empire. Both as a Commissioner and as a Member of Parliament he had never had any other desire than to deal liberally and generously with the City of London; but to ask Parliament to consider this vast property as if it had been given for the individual benefit of those men who lived within the precincts of the City was a proposition so monstrous that he was sure the House never would entertain it. It was quite absurd to say that rights which were granted for general purposes of utility stood on the same foundation as the right of private property. To adopt such a doctrine would be to work out the maxim of summum jus summa injuria to its full extent. He trusted the House would not act on the principle laid down by the hon. and learned Member. He was afraid from the disposition which had been shown to throw obstacles in the way of the Bill—a very ill-judged disposition on the part of those who professed to be the friends of the Corporation—that there was very little hope of the measure becoming law in this Session. He owned that he regretted such a result, and he could only be reconciled to it by the reflection that the longer the public dwelt upon this question, and the more they considered it, the more disposed they would be to exact more stringent terms from the Corporation than were contained in the present Bill.

said, he was anxious that a Bill should pass for the better regulation of the City of London, but he was not prepared to purchase that benefit by accepting the confiscation clauses which this Bill contained. The House could not without injustice, and abandoning the rights of property generally, take away from the Corporation of London those duties on which they raised £1,250,000. It was most unjust to deal with such a vast amount of property in the manner proposed, and abstract from the security of creditors for the payment of their debts without investigation and without even hearing the parties most concerned. This was not a time hastily to go into questions for the taking away of the power of local taxation for local purposes. They had beneath their own noses a most offensive proof of the absolute necessity of fixing the power of taxation somewhere, and having it clearly defined. The Metropolitan Board of Works was crippled for want of means to carry on the necessary works of the Metropolis; and did they want to see the City in the same condition? Debate adjourned till this day.

(in the absence of Mr. Powell) said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether Government intend to publish a new and more liberal Table of Allowances to Witnesses at Sessions and Assizes, and whether such Table will be published so early as to be made use of at the approaching Assizes and Sessions; also whether Government intend to propose a more liberal Scale of Fees for Solicitors who are engaged in conducting prosecutions?

replied, that the present scale of allowances would be adhered to until the Commissioners reported, or some reasons were laid before the Government sufficiently strong to induce them to alter it.

said, he hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not object to an alteration in the Bill which he now intended to propose. The object of the Bill was to transfer the whole of the site at Kensington Gore to the Commissioners of 1851, with the exception of twelve acres, which Government was to retain for a specific purpose. The land to be retained was a small outlying corner at the south-east, towards Brompton, which in no way interfered with the projects of the Commissioners. According to the Bill, it was provided that it should be retained for the sole and specific purpose of science and art. Now, he agreed with what had been said the other night by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone), that it was highly improvident to tie up the hands of Government in regard to the future disposal of this land. The effect of his Amendment would be that so long as they might retain the land, the sum supposed to represent its value should be kept back. He knew that many hon. Members entertained a strong opinion that it should be made the site of a new barracks. It was quite clear that ere long they would want ground on which to erect three barracks; but he did not wish to close the question of how the land should be applied, but would leave it with the Government of the day to decide. All, in fact, that he asked was that the House should not bind the hands of Government in the matter, as it might hereafter be found convenient to remove the Department of Science and Art to some more central situation—and the ground might be required for other public purposes. When he remembered the jealousy which Parliament had always shown in not tying the hands of the Government with respect to the disposal of similar purchases, he thought it would be acting inconsistently if it were in this case to make an exception. With this view he should move the omission of the words, "in the occupation of the said Department," and the insertion of "for the use of Her Majesty's Government," the effect of which would be to allow the Government to dispose of the land for any public purpose.

said, that this ground had been purchased with a distinct understanding that it should be applied alone to science and art. On no other terms could they have obtained it, and it would be a gross breach of faith to apply it to any other purpose, such as that which had been suggested the other night, of erecting barracks on it. He would, however, meet the hon. Gentleman so far as to enable the Government, if the Department of Science and Art was removed, to use the land for some other purpose connected with science and art. Therefore, if the hon. Member would consent to add the words "for the purposes of science and art," he would consent to the Amendment; otherwise he must oppose it.

asked, if the Commissioners were under any special covenant on this point, from which they could not free themselves?

said, the case stood exactly as had been stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Commissioners were under no legal obligation to the original vendors, but from the correspondence between the two parties it was clear that the moral obligation upon the Commissioners, not to apply the site to any purpose unconnected with science and art, was as strict as possible, for they had given the vendors the strongest assurance to that effect.

said, he had anticipated that the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) would open the question of the National Gallery. He trusted that a distinct intimation would be given by the Government that they did not intend to devote the ground to the purpose of a National Gallery by removing the pictures from Trafalgar Square.

said, he thought his hon. Friend's Amendment a very reasonable one, and upon this ground. There appeared to have been an understanding between the Commissioners and the parties from whom they purchased the land. Into the precise nature of that understanding he would not enter; but it clearly appeared that it originally sprung out of the voluntary consent of the Commissioners on the one hand and the vendors on the other. Now, although that understanding might and ought to continue, he could not see the necessity for making it the subject of statutory restrictions, and that more particularly as regarded a mere outlying part of the property. It appeared to him that it would be both objectionable in principle and inconvenient in practice if this honourable understanding were thus made the subject of restrictive legislation. The effect of the Amendment would be to leave that understanding upon the footing upon which it was originally placed.

said, he thought it was due to the vendors and incumbent upon Parliament to recognize in the Bill the undertaking given by the Commissioners. When the land was purchased the question of the erection of barracks had been raised, but it had been clearly understood that no building should be erected upon the land except for purposes connected with science and art, and it was only upon that understanding that the vendors consented to sell the land.

said, he should support the Amendment. The House was perhaps not aware that at present the barrack accommodation was 1,000 short of the number of men actually in London. The question of the Amendment, however, did not depend merely on the barracks. The partnership was now about to be dissolved; and ought the Government to preclude themselves from using the land for any public purpose unconnected with science on art? It was said that they were under a moral engagement to do so; but he should like to know if there was any such legal specific engagement, for he could not quite understand the meaning of a moral engagement in such matters. He apprehended that the object of the vendors was not so much to provide for an establishment connected with science and art as to put money in their own pockets, because, if they were merely desirous of disposing of it for purposes of science and art, they might have given it instead of selling it.

said, he entirely concurred in what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert), and he thought that if the Commissioners were about to enter upon building speculations on the land in question, which could not but prove advantageous, he was of opinion that the arrangement was extremely improvident with reference to our national interests. He still adhered to his opinion that they ought to retain a portion of the land for national purposes, as they would never again have an opportunity of holding land on terms so advantageous. He hoped his hon. Friend would take the sense of the House on the subject.

said, he did not consider that the question had been fairly stated to the Committee. Twelve acres were given up to the Government for the specific purpose of erecting a certain class of edifices—namely, museums and schools. It would not be fair to give the Government power to employ the land for a different purpose. That would be a breach of the understanding which had been come to with the Commissioners, and would give one party to the agreement an unfair advantage over the other. He should therefore prefer the modifications of the hon. Gentleman's Amendment, suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

said, that on the second reading of the Bill he had expressed an opinion that the clause was too restrictive, and that the Government ought to be allowed to retain the land for any national purpose whatever. Subsequent reflection, however, had led him to think that such an application of the land could not be made, and he now thought that if the Government were allowed to keep the land for any purposes connected with science and art, it would meet all the expectations of the country. For these reasons he should oppose the Motion of the hon. Gentleman opposite.

said, he thought that it would be carrying a tacit understanding very far indeed if they consented to put the land in mortmain ever after. At the same time he could see nothing to prevent the Government from endowing schools and museums for the purposes of science and art with the rents of the premises, and thus they might, if the proceeds were so applied, let the land to the War Department.

said, that such a proceeding would be a breach of faith, because the understanding was distinctly that the land was to be devoted to the purposes of science and art.

Sir, considering that this House has been engaged from the beginning of February up to the present time, though not quite without interruption, in discussing, not indeed an India Bill, but all the leading questions which are involved in any measure for the future government of India, I think it will as gladly dispense with hearing as I shall with offering any protracted comment upon the measure which I now bring under its notice. I entertain that opinion the more confidently because, although it is impossible to hope or even to desire that any measure involving interests of such vast importance should pass through this House without ample discussion and full inquiry, I think it will be conceded that most of the points upon which difference of opinion is likely to arise can be more properly discussed when the Bill is in Committee than now upon the second reading. The details are for consideration in Committee; the principle of this Bill is that which the House has already on several occasions agreed to, and from affirming which I think it is not likely to recede, notwithstanding that appeal against the danger of legislation at a critical period, and in favour of the postponement of any permanent measure, which we have just heard urged by one who has so much right to speak on this question. The principle of this Bill I understand to be the transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown, the administration of Indian affairs by a responsible Minister, with a proviso that that Minister shall be assisted by a Council. As to the details of the plan by which this transfer is to be effected, it seems to me that I had better go through them very briefly, and in so doing I shall simply explain what it is that we propose, and shall not stop to vindicate it by any long or elaborate arguments. The point on which it is likely that the discussion will mainly turn is the constitution and functions of the Council. In this Bill we propose to adopt the number of members which was the other day approved by the Committee, namely, fifteen. Besides the fact of that number having met the approval of the Committee there are various reasons why it should be sanctioned by the House. The number of those who at present discharge somewhat analogous functions—I mean the Court of Directors—is eighteen. We propose in some degree to reduce that number. If at any future time it should be deemed fitting to reduce it still further—if it should be found that the business which devolves upon these gentlemen can be equally well performed by a smaller number, it will be easy to come to Parliament for a further limitation, and to carry it out by the simple expedient of declining to fill up the next few vacancies which may occur in the Council. It would not, however, be so easy, and would certainly not improve our reputation for consistency if, after having reduced the number from eighteen to twelve, or even a fewer, we were afterwards to find that the business was too heavy for them to get through, and were to be compelled to retrace our steps, to reverse our decision, and to revert to a number which we had previously declared to be unnecessarily large. There is also a circumstance connected with the tenure of office by these gentlemen which renders it desirable not to keep the number down to the lowest point. On considerations which have already been partly discussed, and which it will be my duty again to submit to the House to night, the Government has decided to propose that the members of Council shall hold their offices for life. Now, it is clear that under those circumstances you must make provision for the possible event of a small proportion of them being at some future time no longer as well fitted for the active performance of their duty as they were at the time of their appointment. Further, I conceive that if the independence of the Council be, as this House has hitherto during these discussions held it to be, a matter of no slight moment, that independence will be more effectually secured when the Council is so extended that even of those members nominated by the Crown no Minister can probably have recommended the appointment of a majority, or of more than a small portion. Therefore, in order to secure efficiency and an additional guarantee for independence, and in consequence of the vote of the Committee the other night, we propose that the number of Members of which the Council shall consist shall be fifteen. To the manner of their choice, which was explained on a former occasion, I will now only briefly revert. We propose that in the first instance seven out of the fifteen shall be elected by the Court of Directors from those who are or have been members of their own body. In adopting that course we are following, or rather extending, a precedent which was set in the Act of 1853; and, considering the inconvenience which arises in the conduct of any business, more especially in the conduct of business so important and so extensive as will devolve on the future Governors of India, from any break or defect of continuity in official tradition, considering the difficulty which must arise if there be new machinery to be worked, and new men to work it, at the same time, I think that the House will feel that on that ground, as well as on account of their personal ability and efficiency, it is desirable that in any Council to be constituted hereafter there should be included a considerable portion of those who now form the Court of Directors. In the clause which deals with this part of the subject there is a provision that the process of election shall precede that of nomination; that the election of these seven members by the Court of Directors should take place within fourteen, and the nomination of the remainder within thirty days after the passing of the Act; so that it may rest with the Crown to decide whether, after the election has been made, there remain any other members of the Court of Directors who ought to be selected as its nominees. There is another reason why it seems convenient to take that course. I think the House is inclined, and justly so, to share in that jealousy of the power and patronage of the Crown which has been expressed by the right hon. Member for Oxford University. I can well understand an objection being entertained by many persons to the creation by the Crown alone of fifteen officers of high dignity and considerable emolument. Now, if the election of half of the Council is left in the hands of the Directors, the amount of patronage at the disposal of the Crown is so far limited, and the danger to which I have referred is avoided. With regard to the manner in which vacancies should be filled up, or, in other words, the permanent constitution of the Council, we propose to adhere to the proposition which we laid last week before the Committee—namely, that of nomination by the Crown and election by the Council for alternate vacancies. I have heard that described as a complicated mode of proceeding. I cannot presume to judge what is considered to be complicated by some hon. Gentlemen, but it appears to me that a more simple mode, or one more free from that complication and embarrassment which certainly would arise if there were what I may call a double election—a submitting of names by one authority and an acceptance of them by another,—could hardly be conceived. Although my object at present is, as I have already intimated, rather to explain than to vindicate the propositions which we have ventured to submit to the House, yet we have heard so much of the danger of self-election, and of the abuses which have arisen from it in former times and under different circumstances, that I think it right to state that every argument to which I have listened upon that subject has borne a reference not to the principle of self-election as applied to the constitution of some one part of a particular body, but to the principle of self-election when regarded as the only means by which entrance into such a body could be obtained. If you were to open only one door into the Council—if you were to say that no person could enter it except by the pleasure of a majority of that body as it was already constituted, and consequently that no person could enter it who did not share the opinions of that majority—I could well understand that under such a system the grossest abuses would be likely to arise, and that the opinion which once gained the upperhand would be likely permanently to retain its predominance. But in the present case we propose a mutual check, a mutual control; we propose that the Indian knowledge and experience of those who constitute a majority of the Council should be brought to bear in the selection of new members, while at the same time, the Crown will exercise that check which it ought to possess upon the inconvenience which would arise if every vacancy were filled up according to the principle of self-election. It is said, again, that what we call election is really nomination in disguise. If I entertained that view, the present is not a scheme which I would propose to the House. Let me say, however, in the first place, that I do not think because men are themselves nominees, therefore they are to be taken as having no will, no judgment, no independence of their own, but as willing, whatever their term of office, whatever their personal eminence or character, to fulfil the pleasure of the Minister by whom they were first appointed. I do not think that is a danger likely to arise in any case, but it is a danger still less likely to arise when, as in the present instance, even the nominated members of the Council will be the creation, not of one, but of many successive Ministries. If I am told that the proposed self-election is virtually an abandonment of that elective principle which the House has sanctioned, my answer is, that we were willing—we are willing—to introduce the elective principle upon a wider scale if it were only possible to find a fitting and satisfactory constituency. I believe that recourse to the method of election as a way of appointment to the Indian Council is the first idea which has entered the mind of every person who has considered the subject. The difficulty which all persons on further consideration have felt is that of constituting a constituency which would answer the purpose. We have been told that we might have retained matters as they are, and gone back to the Court of Proprietors. I have nothing to say against the ladies and gentlemen who constitute that proprietary body; but I do say that they do not possess any special Indian knowledge, and that even their interest in the good conduct of Indian affairs is indirect and remote. Although it might possibly be expedient to continue them when they were found in existence as part of a system which you wished to modify by degrees, yet it is a different thing to say, when you are recasting the system altogether, that you will reintroduce into it that which has always been considered, and justly considered, as one of its most anomalous elements. We take the Resolution to which the Committee came the other night as conveying the sense in which it was undoubtedly understood by many of those who voted for it. We believed that those who supported the Resolution did so, not having reference to any special constituency which was in their minds, but from a desire to protest by their votes against the exclusive and uncontrolled right of appointment being vested in the Crown. I was always of opinion that if the Court of Proprietors were to be retained at all, it should be so with large additions and extensions. I am free to confess, however, that every day's experience in the business of a large department has convinced me more and more that the creation of a constituency composed of those who are connected with works of an industrial character in India—for example, the shareholders in railways and other undertakings of a similar character—would be to introduce into the Council an element which would be liable to great objections. I say so upon this ground, that whereas a constituency for the election of an Indian Council should in its essence be an elective body only, and should not involve any idea of repre- sentation, there is a danger that persons connected with particular undertakings in India would bind those whom they elected to act as the representatives, not of India or of England, but of the particular concerns in which they were interested, and to push forward those undertakings often, no doubt, to the disadvantage of other works equally pressing and important, but by which the Natives of India alone would benefit, and in which no European interest was immediately concerned. Such, Sir, are the reasons which have induced us, objecting to the principle of exclusive nomination, and desiring to carry out the Resolution to which the Committee came the other night, to do so by the particular machinery which we now propose. With respect to the proposal of ten years' service or residence in India as a qualification for a majority of the Council, I have heard it objected to upon two grounds. In the first place, the complaint has been made frequently and publicly, but by those who cannot have read the Bill, that the practical effect of it will be to limit the Council to the Indian civil and military services. Now, that is obviously not the case. Opposite, on the other hand, I have heard the objection raised, that to introduce into the Council to the extent of nearly a half, men who have no special Indian knowledge or experience, would be to turn it to purposes for which it was not intended. My reply is, that in stating that a majority of the Council ought to be men having Indian experience, our object is, in the first place, to lay down a general principle, and then to establish a maximum beyond which the number of members not connected with India should not in any case extend. We have no objection to the introduction of even a larger proportion of those who have special Indian experience. I have received a communication from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, stating that if the principle of self-election be approved of by the House, the number of those qualified by service or residence in India should be two-thirds instead of one-half. We are ready to entertain that proposition, and to discuss it fairly in Committee; and my own belief is that, whether it be expedient to embody such a proviso into the Act or not, an Indian Council, to be properly constituted, ought to contain that proportion of men having Indian experience and knowledge. There is one provision which has been much canvassed, and on which, no doubt, there is room for great difference of opinion—I mean the prohibition against Members of the Council serving in Parliament. No doubt it may be to many men an object of ambition to fill at the same time the position of a Member of Parliament and that of a Member of the Council, and there may ever be some who will, if the two be incompatible, prefer the former occupation to the latter. So far I admit that the rule is open to objection. Nor do I think that the plea that the whole time of a Member of the Council is required is one which ought to weigh with us in deciding that point; because, if it applies to a Member of the Council, it ought, a fortiori, to apply to a Secretary of State and to all those who are carrying on, with much more labour to themselves, the administrative business of the country. That is not the argument, therefore, upon which I shall rely in defending the prohibition to which I have alluded. But it seems to us, considering the close and confidential relation in which these gentlemen will be placed to the Minister of the day, considering also the frequency of Indian discussions in this House, that any Gentleman who by his office was a colleague and councillor of the Minister in the Council, who in that capacity was conversant with all the secrets of Indian affairs, and who might at the same time be an opponent of the Minister in Parliament, would stand in two situations inconsistent one with the other, and singularly unsatisfactory as regards himself. The exclusion from Parliament, moreover, will in some degree check that tendency on the part of all Governments to use these appointments for political or electioneering purposes, which is almost a necessary evil of our Parliamentary system. The tenure of office we propose is a tenure for life. We have considered what inconveniences might arise from various hinds of tenure. I do not deny that all are liable to souse objections. If a short term were proposed, with the power of re-election, then the independence of at least the nominated Members would be entirely destroyed; and if the Members were appointed for a long term without being re-eligible, then, though the difficulty I have just mentioned would be got rid of, another would arise, for men advanced in years and infirm in health would be retained too long, while others, their juniors, would be dismissed from office without power to re-employ them, just when their services were becoming most vauable. On the whole I think that the objections against a tenure for life are less considerable than against any other tenure. We propose, with a view of facilitating retirement, that retiring pensions shall be allowed on a large and liberal scale. The salaries of the Members of Council will be £1,200 a year each, and we propose that after ten years' service the retiring pension shall be £500 a year, and after fifteen years' service £800, or two-thirds of the whole salary; after which no further increase will take place. In the matter of a retiring pension it is clear that there are two opposite dangers against which it is necessary to guard. If retiring pensions are granted after a short term of years, then you run the risk of what may be called jobbing—namely, of Members being induced to retire after a very short service to make room for others. If, on the other hand, the retirement is only to take place after long service, then you induce men to hold on when no longer fit for official duty. It is necessary to strike the balance, and we propose to strike it in the manner I have explained. Again, whatever retiring allowances should be allotted to the Members of the Council, it is desirable that they should be entitled to claim them as a matter of right, and not as a matter of favour. With respect to the salaries, we do not desire to measure the importance of the office by the amount of salary assigned to it. Most of those who serve in India and retire from that service, retire upon au allowance calculated upon a liberal scale; and the amount of the salary assigned to the Members of Council is intended much more as a compensation to those gentlemen for the additional expense consequent on the necessity of permanently residing in London, than as an equivalent in money for the services they are asked to render. In the clauses which follow, questions arising out of the amalgamation of the two offices in Cannon Row and Leadenhall Street are dealt with. It may be convenient to mention, though it could not well be inserted in the Bill, what is the course of proceeding we intend to adopt with respect to the transaction of business. We think that the whole Indian business may be divided among six Committees with two Members of Council serving in each, assisted by a head clerk and the establish- ment. We propose that all correspondence, with an exception hereafter to be named, shall originate in these Committees, and be sent up to the Secretary of State. If the correspondence is judged by the Committee, in the first instance, or subsequently by the Secretary of State, to be of sufficient importance to be laid before the whole Council, it will be in the power either of the Committee, or of the Secretary of State so to submit it to the whole Council; which, we think, ought not to be encumbered with a mass of routine details, as it would be if all business, important or unimportant, were brought before it. I have heard a complaint that no provision is made for the meeting of the Council at regular and stated periods. I think that that is a reasonable objection, and therefore, when the Bill goes into Committee, I propose to insert a clause to the effect that the Council shall meet once a week, unless prevented by urgent necessity. That is to say, we intend that the rule shall be that the Council shall meet at least once a week; and the only reason why I did not at first put this provision in the Bill was, that it appeared to me, that by attempting to settle matters of detail by Act of Parliament we run the risk of tying ourselves down to minute arrangements, which practical experience might afterwards show the convenience of altering. The question has been put, how far and in what sense is it intended that this Council shall act as a check on the Minister? I think that on that point the debates which have taken place in this House sufficiently show the intention and desire of the Government. The object is, that the Council should have a moral influence and control; that the Minister's decision should be, as it is practically now, final on all matters, but that all the Members of Council should be empowered to publicly and formally protest, and if they disapprove of the course taken by the Minister they may compel him to record his reasons in writing. But I am convinced that there is much more danger of a Minister leaning too much on his Council than of his neglecting their advice. All the habits, tendencies, and ideas of English public life are such as utterly to restrain public men from desiring to assume to themselves authority and responsibility beyond that which is imposed on them by the law. A far more probable danger is that of their desiring to shift responsibility and to throw it on others. And this is the more likely to happen, where by the nature of the case, the advisers of the Minister are possessed of departmental knowledge, in which he will almost certainly be deficient, I do not therefore admit the necessity of providing machinery by which he shall be compelled to consult his council on all occasions, I believe that he will in general be willing to do; and if willing, that no administrative arrangements can compel him to do so, without destroying his responsibility. I have referred to a single exception, which, after much doubt and hesitation, we thought it necessary to make, and it consists in that which relates to the business now nominally transacted by the Secret Committee. 1 say "nominally," because we have heard it again and again publicly asserted that the Secret Committee is a delusion, and that the real power is vested in the President of the Board of Control. As regards this part of the question there were three courses which might have been adopted—either to throw open the whole business, without exception, to the whole Council, or to elect two or three members to constitute a Secret Committee, or to vest a power in the Minister to deal with certain matters on his own responsibility. The difficulty attendant on the first course is, I think, obvious. The practical effect of throwing open all the business to the Council would be to produce considerable delay in cases of emergency; to diminish the chance of secrecy, and, in fact, to create a double Cabinet. The second course, that of creating a Secret Committee, who, without the power of controlling, should have the right of being consulted by the Minister, appears very objectionable. If the Minister were to choose the members of the Secret Committee, then the check on him would be practically illusory; and if the Secret Committee were to be appointed by the Council, then there would be this inconsistency—that the Minister would be compelled to accept as colleagues those with whose selection he has nothing to do. The plan we propose is to vest the right in the Minister, in case of necessity, to deal with a certain class of business on his own authority. This is really a continuance, with little modification, of that which has for two generations past been the state of things. It seems to be an anomaly and something worse, if you greatly increase the responsibility of the Minister, at the same time greatly to diminish his power. Though the Bill does not make it compulsory on the Minister to create a Secret Committee, it is optional for him to do so; the Bill leaves him the power to trust those in whom he has confidence, though it does not compel him to trust any one against his will; and surely any man, however reckless and rash, would shrink from that vast increase of responsibility which would necessarily devolve upon him, if, knowing that he is provided with councillors in whom he might confide, he in any great emergency acted without reference to them. In one word, though we think there may be occasions when it may be necessary for a Minister to act on his own authority, and though, therefore, we have thought it right to provide for such occasions, yet, in my judgment, they ought to be rare and exceptional. Undoubtedly if a Minister were habitually, and in cases not urgently requiring secrecy, to act upon his own authority, and without consulting his Council—that is to say, if he were to extend his authority beyond what it is at present, as exercised through the Secret Committee—that would be not only a gross abuse of his power, but a violation of the spirit and meaning of the Act. With regard to the question of finance, it was provided in the Bill of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) that no increase of expenditure should take place without the consent of four members of the Council. In omitting that provision we certainly did not do so from ignorance of the perils which may arise if an uncontrolled discretion of increasing expenditure be conferred upon a Minister, nor from any desire to assume that power to ourselves. But it appeared to us that such a provision was totally inadequate for the purpose aimed at. We thought a check of that nature would be illusory rather than real, and that, being illusory, it would only serve as a screen, and would prevent the application of that other and more efficient kind of control upon which we rely. It seemed to us that the object would be better attained by that on which I think Parliament has a right to insist, and which Parliament has it in its own hands to secure—namely, the regular, the periodical, and the minute publication of Indian accounts, and the submission of them to this House. Moreover, it will be borne in mind that both by the Bill of the noble Lord and by that the contents of which I am now stating, any Member of the Council has the power of protesting formally against any measure to which he is opposed—unless it be a "secret" one. Now, undoubtedly, finance would never be comprised in the class of business which would require secrecy. The Council must be consulted upon it; any Member, as I have said. has the power of protesting; if Parliament chooses to call for such protest, it may easily be made public; and in that manner there is, as it seems to me, a far more real and effectual control than could be given by a mere provision in a Bill that no increase of expenditure shall take place unless the Minister has the support of four Members of a Council, some of whom are named by himself. With regard to those important provisions in the Bill which deal with the Indian army, there is one point on which I think it right to make a clear statement, because I am afraid it is not clearly set forth in the Bill. I noticed only to-day that one of the clauses relating to this subject was drawn in rather an obscure manner. We propose that the civil service of India shall, as before, remain open to competition; and in addition to that we propose wholly and unreservedly to open to competition what are called the scientific branches of the military service. As to the other cadetships—those in the non-scientific branch of the service—we propose that a small proportion, one-tenth, should go to the sons of civil or military servants in India who may be considered deserving of that privilege. To the remaining military patronage we have applied as nearly as possible the precedent of the state of things which now prevails. In dealing with this branch of the subject our general wish was to continue for the present, with as few modifications as possible, the system which now exists. I say "for the present," because it appears to us, as it has probably appeared to all who are interested in Indian affairs, that circumstances wholly independent of those measures which are before the House—wholly independent of the course of legislation which we have been pursuing during the present Session—independent, I may almost say, of the question of the continuance of the Company—may require an entire reorganization of the Indian army, or at all events of the Native portion of it. Now, any attempt to deal in the Bill with this military reorganization would be for the present premature; and we therefore propose that the whole subject shall be investigated by means of a Commission, to consist of twelve members—three of these members to be officers of the Indian army, three of them officers of the Queen's army who shall have served in India, three to be civilian gentlemen of eminence, and the remaining three official personages who are principally concerned in this matter—namely, the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of State for War, and the President of the Board of Control. To that Commission, so constituted, we intend to refer an inquiry, the heads of which include the relative proportions of the European and the Native force; the question whether the European army in India should be a local army or one for general service; whether exchanges from one branch to another are possible; and generally on what terms the transfer of the Company's army to the Crown should take place. Pending that inquiry it is not our wish to anticipate the result which may flow from it; but this I say plainly and earnestly, that I am certain Parliament will consent to no arrangement—and I can answer for the Government that they will consent to none—which, however, plausible or convenient it might appear, should have the effect of rendering entrance into, or promotion in, the Indian army more difficult than it now is to talent and to merit unaided by patronage, or which should introduce into that army Parliamentary or other influences injurious in its efficiency. The whole question, however, must necessarily come before Parliament again, until it does, our object is to maintain things nearly as they are at present, with such modifications only as may relieve us from the necessity of making further changes without full and ample time for consideration. There is one clause in the Bill, the 29th, which we find both in the noble Lord's Bill and in that which was introduced by the present Government at the beginning of the Session. I refer especially to the provision in that clause which vests in the Governor General the appointment of the Members of Council in India. I cannot but admit that that proposition, although capable of defence, and not lightly put forth, has been received with apprehension and alarm by many persons whose opinions on such a subject are entitled to the highest consideration. They argue that a Governor General or the Governor of a Presidency even at present has a very large power in his hands, and that it would be dangerous to increase that power by making his colleagues in the Council dependent on his will. I do not propose to abandon the clause; but I wish to say distinctly that I have retained it in the Bill only in order that it may receive a full and fair discussion, we holding ourselves at liberty, if the sense of the House and the judgment of those best conversant with the subject should be adverse to our proposal, to reconsider, and, if necessary, to alter or omit it. With respect to the question of finance, as I apprehend that will be fully discussed in Committee, I shall say nothing more at present than that I have heard and read nothing which has led me to believe whose that those whose fortunes depend upon the security of Indian finance will have that security in any the slightest degree diminished. There is a provision in the Bill for sending out a Commission to investigate the financial state of India. Now, I believe that such an inquiry is expedient and even necessary; but it has been urged with great force that any investigation of that kind ought to come through the Governor General; that it ought to take place with his sanction, to be conducted under his authority, and not to be, as it were, a power set up to check and control him. On that ground I shall withdraw the clause in which it is proposed to appoint this Commission, and communicate with the Indian Government as to the best method by which the same end may be attained. These, Sir, are the provisions of the Bill. I will only say in conclusion, that I think we run some risk of exaggerating and overrating the importance for good or for evil of legislation o this kind carried on in this House. What we call a Bill for the future Government of India is really only a Bill to provide what we believe will be an effective supervision and control of the Government of India. No doubt effective supervision and control are valuable and even indispensable; but, do what you will here, the real stress, the real pressure will be upon the Government in India; and even there, where the pressure is greatest, I believe the government of India must depend, not upon any ingenious machinery which you can contrive for its working, but upon the living energy of able and well-chosen men whom you must, to meet the varying and unforeseen circumstances which will from time to time arise, invest with large authority, and to whom you mat give an ample and a generous confidence. I do not propose this Bill as a measure to remedy all the abuses and grievances of which complaints have been made with regard to our Indian administration. I propose it simply for what it is—as a reform which, I believe, will lead to other reforms, and without which those other reforms could not be so easily or conveniently carried out. I propose it as a necessary and desirable simplification of a system of government which all persons acknowledge to be complicated and cumbrous, as the rectification of an anomaly which has endured too long, and which at the present day can serve no useful purpose. I propose it as the substitution for a provisional form of government—for surely the government of a commercial company, which has ceased to carry on commerce must be provisional—of a more permanent, and, I believe, more salutary form of administration, by which the government of the greatest dependency of England will be vested directly in the English Crown, and will be conducted by a Minister responsible to this House and to the public opinion of England. I now move that the Bill be read a second time.

I do not rise for the purpose of opposing the second reading of this Bill—on the contrary, if any hon. Member thinks proper to divide the House upon it, I shall vote with the noble Lord. I must say, however, that there are many clauses in the Bill to which I entertain serious objections. Some of them will, I hope, be amended as the Bill passes through Committee; but if that is not the case, I can only hope that, as the Bill of 1853 is abandoned in 1858, within the next five years the House of Commons will take some further steps with regard to this question, with the view of simplifying the Government of India as carried on in England. I wish to take this opportunity of making some observations upon the general question of Indian government, which it might have been out of place to have made during the discussion of the various Resolutions which have been agreed to by the House. I think it must have struck every hon. Member that, while two Governments have proposed great changes with regard to the Government of India, no good case has really been made out for such changes in the speeches of the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman by whom the two India Bills have been introduced. That opinion, I know, will meet with a response from two or three hon. Gentlemen on this (the Opposition) side of the House. It occurred to me when the noble Lord at the head of the late Government (Viscount Palmerston) introduced his Bill—and I made the observation when the present Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward his measure—that if the House knew no more of the question than they learned from the speeches of the Ministers they could not form any clear notion why it was proposed to overthrow the East India Company. The hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles) has expressed a similar opinion several times during the progress of these discussions. The right hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham) has also said that the East India Company was being dealt with in a manner in which animals intended for sacrifice were treated in Eastern countries and in ancient times,—they were decked with garlands when they were led out for immolation. That is true; but it does not therefore follow that the House is not quite right in the course it is taking. It must be clear that the moment the House of Commons met this Session there was only one course which the then Government could adopt with reference to this question. A feeling existed throughout the country—I believe I may say it was universal—that for a long time past the Government; of India had not been a good Government; that grave errors—if not grievous crimes—had been committed in that country. I think the conscience of the nation had been touched on this question, and they came by a leap, as it were—by an irrepressible instinct—to the conclusion that the East India Company must be abolished, and that another and, as the nation hoped, a better Government should be established for that country. There was a general impression, arising from past discussion in Parliament, that the industry of the people of India had been grievously neglected; that there was great reason for complaint with respect to the administration of justice; and that with regard to the wars entered into by the Indian Government, there was much of which the people of England had reason to be ashamed. It has been said by some that these faults are to be attributed to the Board of Control; but I have never defended the Board of Control. I believe everything the East India Company has said of the Board of Control—to its discredit; and I believe that everything the Board of Control has said to the discredit of the East India Company is perfectly true. There was also a general impression that the expenditure of the East India Government was excessive; and that it had been proved before more than one Committee that the taxes imposed upon the people of India were onerous to the last degree. These subjects were discussed in 1853, at which time, in my opinion, the change now proposed ought to have been effected. Subsequently the calamitous events of 1857 and 1858 occurred; and the nation came at once to the conclusion—a conclusion which I think no disinterested person could resist—that it was impossible that India and its vast population could any longer be retained under the form of government which has existed up to this period. If, then, a change was inevitable, the question was how it should be accomplished and what should be done. I think it is quite clear that the course the noble Lord has pursued is right—namely, that of insisting that during this present Session, and without delay, the foundation of all reform ill the government of India should be commenced at home, because cannot take a single step with regard to any real and permanent improvement in the Indian government until we have reformed what I may call the basis of that government by changes to be effected in this country. What, then, is the change which is proposed, and which ought to be made? For my own part, in considering these questions, I cannot altogether approve the Bill now before the House. What we want with regard to the government of India is that which in common conversation is called "a little more daylight." We want more simplicity and more responsibility. I objected to the scheme originally proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer because it did not provide these requisites; that scheme so closely resembled the system we were about to overthrow that I could not bring myself to regard it favourably. In considering the subject before Parliament met, I asked myself this question:—"Suppose there had never been an East India Company or any such corporation,—suppose India had been conquered by the forces of the Crown, commanded by generals acting under the authority of the Crown,—how should we then have proposed to govern distant dominions of vast extent, and with a population that could scarcely be counted?" I believe such a system of government as has hitherto existed would never have been established; and if such a system had not existed I am convinced that no Minister would have proposed the plan now submitted to the House. I think the government would have been placed in the hands of a Secretary of State, with his secretaries, clerks, and staff of officers, or of a small Board, so small as to prevent responsibility from being diffused and divided, if not actually destroyed. I suspect that the only reason why the country or Parliament can be disposed to approve the large Council now proposed is, that they have seen something like a Council heretofore, formerly of twenty-four, and subsequently of eighteen members, and I believe there is something like timidity on the part of the House, and probably on the part of the Government, which hinders them from making so great a change as I have suggested to the simple plan which would probably have existed had no such body as the East India Company ever been established. I am willing to admit candidly that if the government of India at home should be so greatly simplified it will be necessary that very important changes should be made in the government in India. I agree with the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) that the representatives of the Crown in India must have power as well as responsibility; that they should be enabled to deal with emergencies, and to settle the hundred or the thousand questions that must arise among 100,000,000 of people, without sending 10,000 miles to this country to ask questions which ought to be settled at once by some competent authority on the spot. There are two modes of governing India, and the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Willoughby), who has been a very distinguished servant of the East India Company, has publicly expressed his views upon this question. I have been very much struck with a note attached to the published report of his speech, referring to the multifarious duties discharged by the Directors of the East India Company. That note states that—

"A despatch may be received containing 60, or 100, or 200 cases; and the despatch, in itself voluminous, is rendered more so by collections attached to it, containing copies of all former correspondence on the subject or subjects, and of all letters written thereon by various local officers, and all papers relating thereto. There has not long since been in the Revenue Department a despatch with 16,263 pages of collections. In 1845 there was one in the same Department with 46,000 pages, and it was stated that Mr. Canning, some years since in the House of Commons, mentioned a military despatch to which were attached 13,511 pages of collections."

The hon. Gentleman did not say in his speech that anybody at the India House ever read all these things. It was quite clear that if the Directors were to pretend to go through a waggon-load of documents coming to Leadenhall Street every year it must be only a pretence, and if they want to persuade the House that they give attention to only one-tenth part of these papers they must think the House more credulous than it is in matters of this kind. That is one mode of governing India. It is the mode which has been adopted and the mode which has failed. If we are to have the details settled here I am perfectly certain we can have no good government in India. I have alluded on a former occasion to a matter which occurred in a Committee upstairs. A gentleman who was examined stated that he had undertaken to brew a wholesome beer, and quite as good as that exported for the supply of the troops, somewhere in the Presidency of Madras, for one-sixth of the price paid by Government for that exported to India from England; that the experiment was completely successful; that the memorandum or record with regard to it was sent home, no doubt forming part of the thousands of pages to which reference has been made; and that it was buried in the heap in which it came, because for years nothing was heard of a proposition which would have saved the Government a very large amount annually and opened a new industry to the population and capital of India. I believe this system of government is one of delay and disappointment—one, actually, of impossibility—one which can by no means form a complete theory of government as held by any persons in the House; and that the other, the simpler system, which I wish the House to undertake, would be one of action, progress, aad results, with regard to India, such as we have never yet seen and never can see until there is a complete simplification of the Indian government in this country. I come now to the question—and it is for this question that I have wished principally to address the House—if at any time we obtain the simplicity which I contend for with regard to the government at home, what changes will it be desirable to make in the government in India? And I would make one observation at this point, that in all the statements and arguments which I hope to use, I beg the House to believe that I use them with the greatest possible deference, with the feeling that this is a question upon which no man is at all entitled to dogmatize, that it is a vast question which we all look at as one we are scarcely capable of handling and determining. I submit my views to the House because I have considered the subject more or less for many years, and I believe I am actuated by the simple and honest desire of contributing something to the information and knowledge of Parliament with regard to its duty upon this great question. What is it we have to complain of in India? What is it that the people of India, if they spoke by my mouth, have to complain of? They would tell the House that, as a rule, throughout almost all the Presidencies, and throughout those Presidencies most which had been longest under British rule, the cultivators of the soil, the great body of the population of India, are in a condition of great impoverishment, of great dejection, and of great suffering. I have, on former occasions, quoted to the House the Report of a Committee which I obtained ten years ago, upon which sat several members of the Court of Directors; and they all agreed to report as much as I have now stated to the House—the Report being confined chiefly to the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras. If I were now submitting the case of the population of India I would say that the taxes of India are more onerous and oppressive than the taxes of any other country in the world. I think I could demonstrate that proposition to the House. I would show that industry is neglected by the Government to a greater extent probably than is the case in any other country in the world which has been for any length of time under what is termed a civilized and Christian Government. I should be able to show from the notes and memoranda of eminent men in India, of the Governor of Bengal, Mr. Halliday, for example, that there is not and never has been in any country pretending to be civilized a condition of things to be compared with that which exists under the police administration of the province of Bengal. With regard to the Courts of justice I may say the same thing. I could quote passages from books written in favour of the Company with all the bias which the strongest friends of the Company could have, in which the writers declare that, precisely in proportion as English courts of justice have extended, have perjury and all the evils which perjury introduced into the administration of justice prevailed throughout the Presidencies of India. With regard to public works, if I were speaking for the Natives of India, I would state this fact, that in a single English county there are more roads—more travelable roads—than are to be found in the whole of India; and I would say also that the single city of Manchester, in the supply of its inhabitants with the single article of water, has spent a larger sum of money than the East India Company had spent in the fourteen years from 1834 to 1848 in public works of every kind throughout the whole of its vast dominions. I would say that the real activity of the Indian Government has been an activity of conquest and annexation—of conquest and annexation which after a time has led to a fearful catastrophe which has enforced on the House au attention to the question of India, which but for that catastrophe I fear the House would not have given it. If there were another charge to be made against the past Government of India, it would be with regard to the state of its finances. Where was there a bad Government whose finances were in good order? Where was there a really good Government whose finances were in bad order? Is there a better test in the long run of the condition of a people and the merits of a Government than the state of the finances? And yet not in our own time, but going back through all the pages of Mill or of any other history of India we find the normal condition of the finances of India has been that of deficit and bankruptcy. I maintain that if that be so, the Government is a bad Government. It has cost more to govern India than the Government has been able to extract from the population of India. The Government has not been scrupulous as to the amount of taxes or the mode in which they have been levied; but still, to carry on the Government of India according to the system which has heretofore prevailed, more has been required than the Government has been able to extract by any system of taxation known to them from the population over which they have ruled. It has cost more than £30,000,000 a year to govern India, and the gross revenue being somewhere about £30,000,000, and there being a deficit, the deficit had to be made up by loans. The Government has obtained all they could from the population; it is not enough, and they have had to borrow from the population and from Europeans at a high rate of interest to make up the sum which has been found to be necessary. They have a debt of £60,000,000; and it is continually increasing; they always have a loan open; and while their debt is increasing their credit has been falling, because they have not treated their creditors very honourably on one or two occasions, and chiefly, of course, on account of the calamities which have recently happened in India. There is one point with regard to taxation which I wish to explain to the House, and I hope that, in the reforms to which the noble Lord is looking forward, it will not be overlooked. I have said that the gross revenue is £30,000,000. Exclusive of the opium revenue, which is not, strictly speaking, and hardly at all, a tax upon the people, I set down the taxation of the country at something like £25,000,000. Hon. Gentlemen must not compare £25,000,000 taxation in India with £60,000,000 taxation in England. They must bear in mind that in India they could have twelve days' labour of a man for the same sum in silver or gold which they had to pay for one day's labour of a man in England; that if, for example, these £25,000,000 were expended in purchasing labour, that sum would purchase twelve times as much in India as in England—that is to say, that the £25,000,000 would purchase as many days' labour in India as £300,000,000 would purchase in England. [An Hon. MEMBER: How much is the labour worth?] That is precisely what I am coming to. If the labour of a man is only worth 2d. a day, they could not expect as much revenue from him as if it were 2s. a day. That is just the point to which I wish the hon. Gentleman would turn his attention. We have in England a population which, for the sake of argument, I will call 30,000,000. We have in India a population of 150,000,000. Therefore, the population of India is five times as great as the population of England. We raise £60,000,000 taxation in England. We raise in India, arguing by the value of labour, taxation equivalent to £300,000,000, which is five times the English revenue. Some one may probably say, therefore, that the taxation in India and in England, appears to be about the same, and no great injury is done. But it must be borne in mind that in England we have an incalculable power of steam, of machinery, of modes of transit, roads, canals, railways, and everything which capital and human invention can bring to help the industry of the people; while in India there is nothing of the kind. In India there is scarcely a decent road, the rivers are not bridged, there are comparatively no steam-engines, and none of those aids to industry that meet us at every step in Great Britain and Ireland. Suppose steam-engines, machinery, and modes of transit abolished in England, how much revenue would the Chancellor of the Exchequer obtain from the people of England? Instead of £60,000,000 a year, would he get £10,000,000? I doubt it very much. If the House will follow out the argument, they will come to the conclusion that the taxes of the people of India, are oppressive to the last degree, and that the Government which has thus taxed them can be tolerated no longer, and must be put an end to at once and for ever. I wish to say something about the manner in which these great expenses are incurred. The extravagance of the East India Government is notorious to all. I believe there never was any other service under the sun paid at so high a rate as the exclusive civil service of the East India Company. Clergymen and missionaries can be got to go out to India for a moderate sum—private soldiers and officers of the army go out for a moderate remuneration—merchants are content to live in the cities of India for a per centage or profit not greatly exceeding the ordinary profits of commerce. But the civil service, because it is bound up with those who were raised by it and who dispense the patronage of India, receive a rate of payment which would be incredible if we did not know it to be true, and which, knowing it to be true, we must admit to be monstrous. The East Indian Government scatters salaries about at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Agra, Lahore, and half a dozen other cities, which are up to the mark of those of the Prime Minister and Secretaries of State in this country. These salaries are framed upon the theory that India is a mine of unexhaustible wealth, although no one has found it to be so but the members of the civil service of the East India Company. The policy of the Government is at the bottom of the constant deficit. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has twice recently declared that expenditure depends upon policy. That is as true in India as in England, and it is the policy that has been pursued there which renders the revenue liable to this constantly recurring deficit. I have come to the conclusion, which many hon. Members probably share with me, that the edifice we have reared in India is too vast. There are few men now, and least of all those connected with the East India Company, who, looking back to the policy that has been pursued, will not be willing to admit that it has not been judicious but hazardous—that territories have been annexed that had better have been left independent, and that wars have been undertaken which were as needless as they were altogether unjustifiable. The immense empire that has been conquered is too vast for management, its base is in decay, and during the last twelve months it has appeared to be tottering to its fall. Who or what is the instrument—the Cabinet, the Government, or the person—by whom this evil policy is carried on? The greatest officer in India is the Governor General. He is the ruler of about one-fifth—certainly more than one-sixth—of the human race. The Emperors of France and Russia are but the governors of provinces compared with the power, the dignity, and the high estate of the Governor General of India. Now, over this officer, almost no real control is exercised. If I were to appeal to the two hon. Gentlemen who have frequently addressed the House during these debates, (Colonel Sykes and Mr. Willoughby), they would probably admit that the Governor General of India is an officer of such high position that scarcely any control can be exercised over him, either in India or in England. Take the case of the Marquess of Dalhousie for example. I am not about to make an attack upon him, for the occasion is too solemn for personal controversies. But the annexation of Sattara, of the Punjab, of Nagpore, and of Oude occurred under his rule. I will not go into the case of Sattara; but one of its Princes, and one of the most magnanimous Princes that India ever produced, suffered and died most unjustly in exile, either through the mistakes or the crimes of the Government of India. This, however, was not done under the Government of Lord Dalhousie. As to the annexation of Nagpore, the House has never heard anything about it to this hour. There has been no message from the Crown or statement of the Government relative to that annexation. Hon. Members have indeed heard from India that the dresses and wardrobes of the ladies of its Court have been exposed to sale, like a bankrupt's stock, in the haberdashers' shops of Calcutta—a thing likely to incense and horrify the people of India who witnessed it. Take, again, the case of the Burmese war. The Governor General entered into it, and annexed the province of Pegu, and to this day there has been no treaty with the King of Burmah. If that case had been brought before the House, it is impossible that the war with Burmah could have been entered upon. I do not believe that there is one man in England who, knowing the facts, would say that this war was just or necessary in any sense. The Governor General has an army of 300,000 men under his command; he is a long way from home; he is highly connected with the governing classes at home; there are certain reasons that made war palatable to large classes in India; and, he is so powerful that he enters into these great military operations almost uncontrolled by the opinion of the Parliament and people of England. He may commit any amount of blunders or crimes against the moral law, and he will still come home loaded with dignities and in the enjoyment of pensions. Does it not become the power and character of this House to examine narrowly the origin and the misfortunes and disgraces of the grave catastrophe which has just occurred? The place of the Governor General is too high—his power is too great—and I believe that this particular office and officer are very much responsible—of course under the Government at home—for the misfortunes that have taken place. Only think of a Governor General of India writing to an Indian Prince, the ruler over many millions of men in the heart of India, "Remember you are but as the dust under my feet." Passages like these are left out of despatches, when laid on the table of the House of Commons:—it would not do for the Parliament or the Crown, or the people of England to know that their officer addressed language like this to a Native Prince. The fact is that a Governor General of India, unless he be such a man as is not found more than once in a century, is very liable to have his head turned, and to form ambitious views, which are mainly to be gratified by successful wars and the annexation of province after province during the period of his rule. "The services" are always ready to help him in these plans. I am not sure that the President of the Board of Control could not give evidence on this subject, for I have heard something of what happened when the noble Lord was in India. When the Burmese war broke out, the noble Lord could no doubt tell the House that, without inquiring into the quarrel or its causes, the press of India, which was devoted "to the services," and the services themselves, united in universal approbation of the course taken by the Governor General. Justice to Pegu and Burmah, and the taxes to be raised for the support of the war were forgotten, and nothing but visions of more territory, and more patronage floated before the eyes of the official English in India. I contend that the power of the Governor General is too great and the office too high to be held by the subject of any Power whatsoever, and especially by any subject of the Queen of England. I should propose, if I were in a position to offer a scheme in the shape of a Bill to the House, as an indispensable preliminary to the sound government of India in future, such as would be creditable to Parliament and advantageous to the people of India, that the office of Governor General should be abolished. Perhaps some hon. Gentlemen may think this a very unreasonable proposition. Many people thought it unreasonable in 1853 when it was proposed to abolish the East India Company; but now Parliament and the country believe it to be highly reasonable and proper; and I am not sure that I could not bring before the House reasons to convince them that the abolition of the office of Governor General is one of the most sensible and one of the most Conservative proposals ever brought forward in connection with the Government of India. I believe the duties of the Governor General are far greater than any human being can adequately fulfil. He has a power omnipotent to crush anything that is good. If he so wished he can overhear and overrule whatever is proposed for the welfare of India, while, as to doing anything that is good, I could show that with regard to the vast countries over which he rules, he is really almost powerless to effect anything that those countries require. The hon. Gentleman behind me (Colonel Sykes) has told us there are twenty nations in India, and that there are twenty languages. Has it ever happened before that any one man governed twenty nations, speaking twenty different languages, and bound them up together in one great and compact empire? [An hon. MEMBER here made an observation.] My hon. Friend mentions a great Parthian monarch. No doubt, there have been men strong in arm and in head, and of stern resolution, who have kept great empires together during their lives; but as soon as they went the way of all flesh, and descended, like the meanest of their subjects, to the tomb, the provinces they had ruled were divided into several States, and their great empires vanished. I might ask the noble Lord below me (Lord John Russell) and the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn has not as yet experience on this point), whether, when they came to appoint a Governor General of India, they did not find it one of the most serious and difficult duties they could be called on to perform? I do not know at this moment, and I never have known, a man competent to govern India; and if any man says he is competent, he sets himself up at a much higher value than those who are acquainted with him are likely to do. Let the House look at the making of the laws for twenty nations speaking twenty languages. Look at the regulations of the police for twenty nations speaking twenty languages. Look at the question of public works as it affects twenty nations speaking twenty languages; where there is no municipal power and no combinations of any kind, such as facilitate the construction of public works in this country. Inevitably all those duties that devolve on every good Government must be neglected by the Governor General of India, however wise, capable, and honest he may be in the performance of his duties, because the duties laid upon him are such as no man now living or who ever lived can or could properly sustain. It may be asked what I would substitute for the Governor-Generalship of India. Now, I do not propose to abolish the office of Governor General of India this Session. I am not proposing any clause in the Bill, and if I were to propose one to carry out the idea I have expressed, I might be answered by the argument, that a great part of the population of India was in a state of anarchy, and that it would be most inconvenient, if not dangerous, to abolish the office of Governor General at such a time. I do not mean to propose such a thing now; but I take this opportunity of stating my views, in the hope that when we come to 1863, we may perhaps be able to consider the question more in the light in which I am endeavouring to present it to the House. I would propose that, instead of having a Governor General and an Indian empire, we should have neither the one nor the other. I would propose that we should have Presidencies, and not an empire. If I were a Minister—which the house will admit is a bold figure of speech—and if the House were to agree with me—which is also an essential point—I would propose to have at least five Presidencies in India, and I would have the governments of those Presidencies perfectly equal in rank and in salary. The capitals of those Presidencies would probably be Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Agra, and Lahore. I will take the Presidency of Madras as an illustration. Madras has a population of some 20,000,000. We all know its position on the map, and that it has the advantage of being more compact, geographically speaking, than the other Presidencies. It has a Governor and a Council. I would give to it a Governor and a Council still, but would confine all their duties to the Presidency of Madras, and I would treat it just as if Madras was the only portion of India connected with this country. I would have its finance, its taxation, its justice, and its police departments, as well as its public works and military departments, precisely the same as if it were a State having no connection with any other part of India, and recognized only as a dependency of this country. I would propose that the Government of every Presidency should correspond with the Secretary for India in England, and that there should be telegraphic communications between all the Presidencies in India, as I hope before long to see a telegraphic communication between the office of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) and every Presidency over which he presides. I shall no doubt be told that there are insuperable difficulties in the way of such an arrangement, and I shall be sure to hear of the military difficulty. Now, I do not profess to be an authority on military affairs, but I know that military men often made great mistakes. I would have the army divided, each Presidency having its own army, just as now, care being taken to have them kept distinct; and I see no danger of any confusion or misunderstanding, when an emergency arose in having them all brought together to carry out the views of the Government. There is one question which it is important to bear in mind, and that is with regard to the Councils in India. I think every Governor of a Presidency should have an assistant Council, but differently constituted from what they now are. I would have an open Council. The noble Lord the Member for London used some expressions the other night which I interpreted to mean that it was necessary to maintain in all its exclusiveness the system of the civil service in India. In that I entirely differ from the noble Lord. [Lord J. RUSSELL here indicated dissent.] The noble Lord corrects me in that statement, and therefore I must have been mistaken. What we want is to snake the Governments of the Presidencies Governments for the people of the Presidencies; not Governments for the civil servants of the Crown, but for the non-official mercantile classes from England who settle there, and for the 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 of Natives in each Presidency. I should propose to do that which has been done with great advantage in Ceylon. I have received a letter from an officer who has been in the service of the East India Company, and who told me a fact which has gratified me very much. He says—

"At a public dinner at Colombo, in 1835, to the Governor, Sir Wilmot Horton, at which I was present, the best speech of the evening was mule by a Native nobleman of Candy, and a member of Council. It was remarkable for its appropriate expression, its sound sense, and the deliberation and case that marked the utterance of his feelings. There was no repetition or useless phraseology or flattery, and it was admitted by all who heard him to be the soundest and neatest speech of the night."

This was at Ceylon. It is not, of course, always the best man who can make the best speech; but if what I have read could be said of a native of Ceylon, it could be said of thousands in India? We need not go beyond the walls of this House to find a head bronzed by an Indian sun equal to the ablest heads of those who adorn its benches. And in every part of India we all know that it would be an insult to the people of India to say that it is not the same. There are thousands of persons in India who are competent to take any position to which the Government may choose to advance them. If the Governor of each Presidency were to have in his Council some of the officials of his Government, some of the non-official Europeans resident in the Presidency, and two or three at least of the intelligent Natives of the Presidency in whom the people would have some confidence, you would have begun that which will be of inestimable value hereafter—you would have begun to unite the Government with the governed; and unless you do that, no Government will be safe, and any hurricane may overturn it or throw it into confusion. Now, suppose the Governor General gone, the Presidencies established, the Governors equal in rank and dignity, and their Councils constituted in the manner I have indicated, is it not reasonable to suppose that the delay which has hitherto been one of the greatest curses of your Indian Government would be almost altogether avoided? Instead of a Governor General living in Calcutta, or at Simla, never travelling over the whole of the country, and knowing very little about it, and that little only through other official eyes, is it not reasonable to suppose that the action of the Government would be more direct in all its duties and in every department of its service than has been the case under the system which has existed until now? Your administration of the law, marked by so touch disgrace, could never have lasted so lung as it has done if the Governors of your Presidencies had been independent Governors. So with regard to matters of police, education, public works, and everything that can stimulate industry, and so with regard to your system of taxation. You would have in every Presidency a constant rivalry for good. The Governor of Madras, when his term of office expired, would be delighted to show that the people of that Presidency were contented, that the whole Presidency was advancing in civilization, that roads and all manner of useful public works were extending, that industry was becoming more and more a habit of the people, and that the exports and imports were constantly increasing. The Governors of Bombay and the rest of the Presidencies would be animated by the same spirit, and so you would have all over India, as I have said, a rivalry for good; you would have placed a check on that malignant spirit of ambition which has worked so much evil—you would have no Governor so great that you could not control him or who might make war when he pleased; war and annexation would be greatly checked, if not entirely prevented; and I do in my conscience believe you would have laid the foundation for a better and more permanent form of Government for India than has ever obtained since it came under the rule of England. But how long does England propose to govern India? Nobody answers that question, and nobody can answer it. Be it 50, or 100 years, or 500 years, does any man with the smallest glimmering of common sense believe that that great country, with its twenty different nations and its twenty languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible. We must fail in the attempt if ever we make it, and we are bound to look into the future with reference to that point. The Presidency of Madras, for instance, having its own Government, would, in fifty years, become one compact State, and every part of the Presidency would look to the city of Madras as its capital, and to the Government of Madras as its ruling power. If that were to go on for a century or more, they would have their five or six Presidencies of India built up into so many compact States; and if at any future period the sovereignty of England should be withdrawn we should leave so many Presidencies built up and firmly compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its own Government; and we should be able to say we had not left the country a prey to that anarchy and discord which I believe to be inevitable if we insist on holding those vast territories with the idea of building them up into one great empire. But I am obliged to admit that, mere machinery is not sufficient in this case, either with respect to my own scheme or to that of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley). We want something else than mere clerks, stationery, despatches, and so forth. We want what I shall designate as a new feeling in England, and an entirely new policy in India. We must in future have India governed, not for a handful of Englishmen, not for that Civil Service whose praises are so constantly sounded in this House. You may govern India, if you like, for the good of England, but the good of England must come through the channel of the good of India. There are but two modes of gaining anything by our connection with India. The one is by plundering the people of India, and the other by trading with them. I prefer to do it by trading with them. But in order that England may become rich by trading with India, India itself must become rich, and India can only become rich through the honest administration of justice and through entire security for life and property. Now, as to this new policy, I will tell the House what I think the Prime Minister should do. He ought, I think, always to choose for his President of the Board of Control or his Secretary of State for India, a man who cannot be excelled by any other man in his Cabinet, or in his party, for capacity, for honesty, for attention to his duties, and for knowledge adapted to the particular office to which he is appointed. If any Prime Minister appoint an inefficient man to such an office, he will be a traitor to the Throne of England. That officer, appointed for the qualities I have just indicated, should, with equal scrupulousness and conscientiousness, make the appointments, whether of the Governor General, or (should that office be abolished) of the Governors of the Presidencies of India. Those appointments should not be rewards for old men simply because such men have done good service when in their prime, nor should they be rewards for mere party service, but they should be appointments given under a feeling that interests of the very highest moment, connected with this country, depend on those great offices in India being properly filled up. The same principles should run throughout the whole system of government; for, unless there be a very high degree of virtue in all these appointments, and unless our great object be to govern India well and to exalt the name of England in the eyes of the whole Native population, all that we have recourse to in the way of machinery will be of very little use indeed. I admit that this is a great work; admit, also, that the further I go into the consideration of this question, the more I feel that it is too large for me to grapple with, and that every step we take in it should be taken as if we were men walking in the dark. We have, however, certain great principles to guide us, and by their light we may make steps in advance, if not fast, at any rate sure. But we start from an unfortunate position. We start from a platform of con- quest by force of arms extending over a hundred years. There is nothing in the world worse than the sort of foundation from which we start. The greatest genius who has shed lustre on the literature of this country has said, "There is no sure foundation set on blood;" and it may be our unhappy fate, in regard to India, to demonstrate the truth of that saying. We are always subjugators, and we must be viewed with hatred and suspicion. I say we must look at the thing as it is, if we are to see our exact position, what our duty is, and what chance there is of our retaining India and of governing it for the advantage of its people. Our difficulties have been enormously increased by the revolt. The people of India have only seen England in its worst form in that country. They have seen it in its military power, its exclusive Civil Service, and in the supremacy of a handful of foreigners. When Natives of India come to this country, they are delighted with England and with Englishmen. They find themselves treated with a kindness, a consideration, a respect, to which they were wholly strangers in their own country; and they cannot understand how it is that men who are so just, so attentive to them here, sometimes, indeed too often, appear to them in a different character in India. I remember that the Hon. Frederic Shaw, who wrote some thirty years since, stated, in his able and instructive book, that even in his time the conduct of the English in India towards the Natives was less agreeable, less kindly, less just than it had been in former years; and in 1853, before the Committee presided over by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. T. Baring), evidence was given that the feeling between the rulers and the ruled in India was becoming every year less like what could be desired. It was only the other day there appeared in a letter of The Times correspondent an anecdote which illustrates what I am saying, and which I feel it necessary to read to the House. Mr. Russell, of The Times, says:—

"I went off to breakfast in a small mosque, which has been turned into a salle à manger by some officers stationed here, mid I confess I should have eaten with more satisfaction had I not seen, as I entered the enclosure of the mosque, a Native badly wounded on a charpoy, by which was sitting a woman in deep affliction. The explanation given of this scene was, that'—[the name of the Englishman was left blank] had been licking two of his bearers (or servants), and had nearly murdered them.' This was one of the servants, and, without knowing or caring to know the causes of such chastisement, I cannot but express my disgust at the severity—to call it by no harsher name—of some of our fellow-countrymen towards their domestics."

The reading of that paragraph gave me extreme pain. People may fancy that this does not matter much; but I say it matters very much. Under any system of government you will have Englishmen scattered all over India, and conduct like that I have just read, in any district, must create ill feeling towards England, to your rule, to your supremacy; and when that feeling has become sufficiently extensive, any little accident may give fire to the train, and you may have calamities more or less serious, such as we have had during the last twelve months. You must change all this if you mean to keep India. I do not now make any comment upon the mode in which this country has been put into possession of India. I accept that possession as a fact. There we are; we do not know how to leave it, and therefore let us see if we know how to govern it. It is a problem such as, perhaps, no other nation has had to solve. Let us see whether there is enough of intelligence and virtue in England to solve the difficulty. In the first place, then, I say, let us abandon all that system of calumny against the Natives of India which has lately prevailed. Had that people not been docile, the most governable race in the world, how could you have maintained your power for 100 years? Are they not industrious, are they not intelligent, are they not—upon the evidence of the most distinguished men the Indian Service ever produced—endowed with many qualities which make them respected by all Englishmen who mix with them? I have heard that from many men of the widest experience, and have read the same in the works of some of the best writers upon India. Then let us not have these constant calumnies against such a people. Even now there are men who go about the country speaking as if such things had never been contradicted, and talking of mutilations and atrocities committed in India. The less we say about atrocities the better. Great political tumults are, I fear, never brought about or carried on without grievous acts on both sides deeply to be regretted. At least, we are in the position of invaders and conquerors—they are in the position of the invaded and the conquered. Whether I were a native of India, or of England, or of any other country, I would not the less assert the great dis- tinction between their position and ours in that country, and I would not permit any man in my presence, without rebuke, to indulge in the calumnies and expressions of contempt which I have recently heard poured forth without measure upon the whole population of India. There is one other point to which I wish to address myself before I sit down, and in touching upon it I address myself especially to the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) and his colleagues in the Government. If I had the responsibility. If I had the responsibility of administering the affairs of India, there are certain things I would do. I would, immediately after this Bill passes, issue a Proclamation in India which should reach every subject of the British Crown in that country, and be heard of in the territories of every Indian Prince or Rajah. I would offer a general amnesty. It is all very well to talk of issuing au amnesty to all who have done nothing; but who is there that has done nothing in such a state of affairs as has prevailed during the past twelve months? If you pursue your vengeance until you have rooted out and destroyed every one of those soldiers who have revolted, when will your labour cease? If you are to punish every non-military Native of India who has given a piece of bread or a cup of water to a revolted trooper, how many Natives will escape your punishment and your vengeance? I would have a general amnesty, which should be put forth as the first great act done directly by the Queen of England in the exercise of Sovereign power over the territories of India. In this Proclamation I would promise to the Natives of India a security for their property as complete as we have here at home; and I would put an end to all those mischievous and irritating inquiries which have been going on for years in many parts of India as to the title to landed estates, by which you tell the people of that country that unless each man can show an unimpeachable title to his property for ninety years you will dispossess him. What would be the state of things here if such a regulation were adopted? I would also proclaim to the people of India that we would hold sacred that right of adoption which has prevailed for centuries in that country. It was only the other day that I had laid before me the case of a Native Prince who has been most faithful to England during these latter trials. When he came to the throne at ten years of age he was made to sign a document, by which he agreed that if he had no children his territories should be at the disposal of the British Government, or what was called the paramount power. He has been married; he had has one son and two or three daughters; but within the last few weeks his only son has died. There is grief in the palace, and there is consternation among the people, for the fact of this agreement entered into by the boy of ten years old is well known to all the inhabitants of the country. Representations have already been made to this country in the hope that the Government will cancel that agreement, and allow the people of that State to know that the right of adoption would not be taken from their Prince in case he should have no other son. Let the Government do that, and there is not a corner of India into which that intelligence would not penetrate with the rapidity of lightning. And would not that calm the anxieties of many of those independent Princes and Rajahs who are only afraid that when these troubles are over, the English Government will recommence that system of annexation out of which I believe all these troubles have arisen? I would tell them also in that Proclamation, that while the people of England hold that their own, the Christian religion, is true and the best for mankind, yet that it is consistent with that religion that they who profess it should hold inviolable the rights of conscience and the rights of religion in others. I would show, that whatever violent, over-zealous, and fanatical men, may have said in this country, the Parliament of England, the Ministers of the Queen, and the Queen herself, are resolved that upon this point no kind of wrong should be done to the millions who profess the religions held to be true in India. I would do another thing. I would establish a Court of Appeal, the Judges of which should be Judges of the highest character in India, for the settlement of those many disputes which have arisen between the Government of India and its subjects, some Native and some European. I would not suffer these questions to come upon the floor of this House. I would not forbid them by statute, but I would establish a court which should render it unnecessary for any man in India to cross the ocean to seek for that justice which he would then be able to get in his own country without corruption or secret bargain. Then I would carry out the proposition which the noble Lord has made to-night, and which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer made when he introduced his Bill, that a Commission should be issued to inquire into the question of finance. I would have other commissions, one for each Presidency, and I would tell the people of India that there should be a searching inquiry into their grievances, and that it was the interest and the will of the Queen of England that those grievances should be redressed. Now, perhaps I may be told that I am proposing strange things, quite out of the ordinary routine of Government. I admit it. We are in a position that necessitates something out of the ordinary routine. There are positions and times in the history of every country, as in the lives of individuals, when courage and action are absolute salvation; and now the Crown of England, acting by the advice of the responsible Ministers, must, in my opinion, have recourse to a great and unusual measure in order to allay the anxieties which prevail throughout the whole of India. The people of India do not like us, but they scarcely know where to turn if we left them. They are sheep literally without a shepherd. They are people whom you have subdued, and who have the highest and strongest claims upon you—claims which you cannot forget—claims which, if you do not act upon, you may rely upon it that, if there be a judgment for nations—as I believe there is—as for individuals, our children at no distant generation must pay the penalty which we have purchased by neglecting our duty to the populations of India. I have now stated my views and opinions on this question, not at all in a manner, I feel, equal to the question itself. I have felt the difficulty in thinking of it; I feel the difficulty in speaking of it—for there is far more in it and about it than any man, however much he may be accustomed to think upon political questions, and to discuss them, can comprise at all within the compass of a speech of ordinary length. I have described the measures which I would at once adopt for the purpose of soothing the agitation which now disturbs and menaces every part of India, and of inviting the submission of those who are now in arms against you. Now, I believe I speak in the most perfect honesty—I believe that the announcement of these measures would avail more in restoring tranquillity than the presence of an additional army, and I believe that their full and honest adoption would enable you to retain your power in India. I have sketched the form of government which I would establish in India and at home, with the view of securing perfect responsibility and an enlightened administration. I admit that these things can only be obtained in degree, but I believe that a Government such as that which I have sketched would be free from most of the errors and the vices that have marked and marred your past career in India. I have given much study to this great and solemn question. I entreat the House to study it not only now, during the passing of this Bill, but after the Session is over, and till we meet again next year, when in all probability there must be further legislation upon this great subject; for I believe that upon this question depends very much, for good or for evil, the future of this country of which we are citizens, and which we all regard and love so much. You have had enough of military reputation on Eastern fields; you have gathered large harvests of that commodity, be it valuable or be it worthless. I invite you to something better, and higher, and holier than that; I invite you to a glory not "fanned by conquest's crimson wing," but based upon the solid and lasting benefits which I believe the Parliament of England can, if it will, confer upon the countless populations of India.

said, he had listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) with much interest and no little instruction. The hon. Gentleman had ably and eloquently delivered to the House his sentiments on what, he agreed with him, was one of the greatest and grandest subjects which could occupy the human mind, and that was how they were to decide to govern great nations. The flatterer of Augustus told his imperial master, and with some truth, that to establish communities, to frame wise and wholesome laws, and to govern with equity was a godlike task. The hon. Gentleman said, that they ought to approach the subject of the Government of India with hesitation. He doubted whether the hon. Gentleman was ever found hesitating at anything. While he threw out that wise and prudent remark, that the affairs of India were to be discussed with hesitation and caution, he straightway proceeded in his own peculiar fashion to demolish everything that existed in that country in the shape of government, and told them they might proceed to erect, what he did not very distinctly explain, as a remedy for the evils which existed. He asked a pertinent question; but he (Mr. Whiteside) did not think he answered it. "What," said he, "would have been your condition if you never had an East India Company?" Why, he (Mr. Whiteside) should answer that by asking him, "Could we have had the East Indies to govern or to misgovern?" It was very easy to put that question, but it was not so easy for the hon. Gentleman to give a satisfactory answer to this great fact, that we had an empire which had been obtained by a body of individuals through a chain of the most surprising actions which were recorded in history. He confessed his disposition was not to take leave of the East India Company as the hon. Gentleman had done, in terms of severe sarcasm, but rather with an expression of admiration and respect. There were two views to be taken of the Government of the East Indies. One could point to India, with some truth, as a country in which there had been actions done at which we ought to blush—in which there had been exhibited the worst passions of human nature; but, on the other hand, he maintained that the very historian whom the hon. Gentleman had quoted, but to whose authority he would not defer—because the hon. Gentleman yielded to no human authority—he meant the historian, Mr. Mill, himself afforded the best vindication of the character and general policy of the East India Company. The hon. Gentleman had asked how India was to be governed. Now, that was a question which had been asked centuries ago by one of the greatest men the world had ever seen. Alexander the Great had discussed that question with Aristotle, and the philosopher advised the warrior to act upon the principle of Greece, to look upon all other nations as barbarians, and to govern India according to the rule which prevailed in his own country. Alexander, however, was a man of sense; and he replied that Greece was too small a country to hold a mighty empire upon an exclusive principle; that if India were gained by force of arms, the next step was to establish a Government which would be acceptable to the people of the country; in fact, that they must be governed but not coerced. Now, that reply contained a sound principle of Government, and he was prepared to maintain that the English rule in India, although, of course, open to some censure, had during the period for which we had held that country—a conquest and a holding which had been described by a distinguished foreigner as a modern miracle—had been more just and more beneficent than any rule to which the people of India had been before subjected. The hon. Gentleman had touched upon every conceivable subject in reference to India—education, the cultivation of the land, the administration of justice, the finances and revenue of the country, and a great number of other subjects. Now, it was not his intention to enter into such details, and he was willing to confess that he should feel himself incapable of at once grappling with those great questions. To attempt to do so would be, as had been described by his eminent countryman, Mr. Curran, to attempt to grasp a sphere where each attempt caused it to roll further from one's grasp. As regarded the mere question of the tenure of land, there were various opinions. Some persons approved the settlement of Lord Cornwallis, and others approved the mode of settlement in Madras and the North-Western Provinces, and he thought that even the hon. Gentleman himself in dealing with the question would do so with a feeling of respect for those persons who had made those settlements. The hon. Gentleman had laid down a grand principle, that the Government of India should be based upon the principle of action and progress. Now, he could understand that those principles should be adopted in the construction of roads, the supply of tanks, irrigation of lands, and the mitigation of taxes, in the reduction of expenditure, and in every measure calculated to promote the welfare of the people; but if the hon. Gentleman by action and progress meant the introduction of a mixed system of law, he made as great a mistake as it was possible for a public man to commit. In turning over a book on the rise and progress of the Sikh nation he (Mr. Whiteside) found it stated that the ceremonies observed at the funeral of Runject Singh were precisely the same as those which were observed in the time of Alexander the Great. That proved that the customs and manners of India were immovable, and when a go-a-head politician came to attempt to apply his system of policy to the Government of India, he might by a stroke of his pen be doing a great and irreparable injury to the cause he wished to promote, the peace and prosperity of the country. It was a mistake to say that all the conquerors of India were only bent on rapine and plunder. There was not a nobler page in history than that which recorded the opinion of Sir W. Jones to Lord Cornwallis upon the mode of governing India. That distinguished scholar and eminent man undertook, with the assistance of certain learned Brahmins, to examine into the system of laws and institutions of the people of India, for the purpose of endeavouring to govern them by means of those laws and institutions, and not by those of the West; and when that great work was completed, Sir William Jones laid down the same principle which Alexander the Great had laid down before him—namely, that a nation which meant to hold the East must beware how it touched their laws or system, or attempt to apply its own system of governing to them. They will be faithful, obedient, and docile, provided you act on the principle of not interfering with their customs and habits. Look at what the East India Company did by the aid of that great man, and let him ask any one to point out anything which had been done in the West which was equal to that work. The people of the East believed their laws to proceed directly from the Deity, and in the East the code of law and a reference to the Divinity were inseparably connected. Would it be wise then, to entrust to an uncontrolled Secretary of State, whose mind was imbued with Western politics, the power of arbitrarily interfering with or altering laws and customs which the people of the East suppose to emanate from the Deity? Why any imprudent attempt at change might cost the lives of 100,000 men. The idea of the hon. Gentleman, that the Government of India should be intrusted to a Minister uncontrolled in any way, and unassisted by the advice of learned and experienced men, could not be too strongly deprecated. Indeed, it filled him with terror. Why, such a Minister, if he were possessed of a mind and body as active as that of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham, if he saw anything in the Indian system which he thought an absurdity, if he saw anything contrary to Manchester notions, would most probably forget all about ancient habits and customs, and would proceed at once to attempt to bend the habits of the East to his ideas, and thus undertake a task which had baffled the greatest conquerors and the greatest lawgivers that the world ever saw, and do that which would give rise to most serious difficulties. But, let the House observe the inconsistency of the argument of the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman complained that the Go- vernor General of India was uncontrolled, and yet he wished to confide the management of Indian affairs to a person subject to the control of nobody. If it were so difficult to find a proper person to act as Governor General of India without control, where was an uncontrolled Secretary for India to be obtained? Much had been said in reference to Parliamentary responsibility, but, after all, what did that amount to? A Secretary for India might lose that empire, but when he had done that, of what use was his Parliamentary reponsibility? The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield might probably move a vote of censure upon such a Minister, and might carry it, but what use would that be when our empire in India was destroyed? The House might agree to take the head from the shoulders of such a Minister, but what would be the use of that when he had clearly shown that there was nothing in it? In his opinion that House had shown great wisdom in agreeing to the principle of a Council which would exercise a certain control over the Indian Minister; and if his hon. Friend would, during the recess, study books upon the laws of the East he thought that he would take the first opportunity which offered itself of withdrawing all the speeches which he had made upon the subject. The hon. Gentleman had proceeded upon the assumption that it was not for a small State to undertake to permanently govern twenty or thirty nations; but the fact was that the people of India had nearly always been subject to a foreign Power. Akbar Khan had so governed her. In point of fact the principle of the hon. Gentleman not only was not sound as regarded India; but it did even not hold good as regarded European politics, for in Europe, Austria was strong and powerful, and yet held various peoples under her sway. He admitted the force and good sense of what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman on the subject of wars in India. But let us be just to the East India Company. There could be no stronger protest against that system than was taken in Mr. Tucker's note on the subject of Affghanistan. He would not trust Parliament with regard to a war. He had known a Parliament to condemn a particular war, and then another Parliament was called which approved of it. Where then was this boasted Parliamentary responsibility? When his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward a Motion con- demnatory of that pulley, why did not Parliament support him? He would rather prefer to this notion of Parliamentary responsibility a Council of experienced and sensible men who would endeavour to avoid such a policy and such errors as the hon. Gentleman had spoken of. He did not understand that we were less likely to get into troubles by having an uncontrolled Secretary of State for India; for in the course of a Parliamentary recess we might have a war, with which all that Parliament would have to do would be to pay the Bill. The hon. Member for Birmingham had spoken with much good sense when he referred to the way in which several of the Native princes had been treated. He (Mr. Whiteside) had read the papers connected with the taking possession of Sattarah, Nagpore, and several other states which had been taken possession of, and he agreed with the hon. Gentleman that with regard to many of them the principles of legality had been altogether set aside? and, as he had before pointed out the danger of interfering with the manners and customs of the people, he believed that interference had been signally manifested in those annexations; and he believed further, that this disregard of the customs of the people would not have taken place if they had been laid before a responsible Council. Many of those states wore annexed on the pretext of a failure of heirs. But that was a violation of the Hindoo custom with respect to the law of adoption. That law was developed in a remarkable chapter of his work by Sir William Jones. He traced, by a masterly induction, the laws of adoption which prevailed in Rome and in Greece to the Government as their source. That law, however, had been sot aside by more than one Governor General, and by none more than by that great man to whom allusion had more than once been made, the Marquess of Dalhousie, who had committed, he (Mr. Whiteside) believed, as great mistakes on that point as any Go General before him had ever committed. The true policy to pursue was to respect all the customs of a people, whether in the East or in the West. The laws of inheritance and of marriage had also in many instances been dealt with rashly and unwisely in India. Did hon. Members suppose it was calculated to produce no effect upon the Native army? The evidence of General Briggs went to show that changes of that description thrilled through the army, and if, therefore, the new Secretary of State were acting under some sudden influence to introduce such changes, he would, in accordance with the testimony of that gallant officer, be taking a step which would, in all probability, eventuate in revolt and bloodshed. The task, therefore, of governing India required the exercise of the greatest caution and ability, and in the proposed Council he trusted those qualities would be found. The hon. Member for Birmingham had dwelt very properly upon those principles in accordance with which he deemed the administration of the affairs of our Indian Empire ought to be conducted and he had spoken, too, of a proclamation which ought to be issued; but the thunder was not his own. To the views upon that point which the hon. Member had put forward, his (Mr. Whiteside's) right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, upon a former occasion, given substantial expression. His right hon. Friend had, however, accompanied the changes he propounded by the sketching out of a cautious prudent policy; whereas the object of the hon. Member for Birmingham appeared to be to make sudden and sweeping changes—changes, which he, believing as he did with Lord Bacon that sudden changes of laws were the causes of revolutions, feared would bring about the very revolutions which the hon Gentleman deplored. From the sweeping censure which the hon. Gentleman had passed upon the East India Company he beg to express his entire dissent. Still, he had listened to the speech of the hon. Gentleman with great interest, and he trusted that the picture which the hon. Gentleman had sketched of a future glorious empire in the East, where the people were peaceful and happy and the Government just and benevolent, would be realized. But he believed, at the same time, that the task was one of the most difficult that was ever undertaken by man; that it would require the utmost judgment and caution, the most delicate and watchful care, to do it wisely and well. He was of opinion, therefore, that Parliament had shown themselves to be sensible and practical men by adopting the proposition of a Council. From the scheme of his noble Friend near him he argued the happiest results, and he trusted that its operation would be to contribute to the prosperity of our Indian Empire, for he most sincerely concurred with the hon. Member for Birmingham in thinking that, not for the granduer or the false glory of conquest, but for the happiness and good of the people, ought the Government of that country to be conducted.

said, that a question embracing so great a matter as the happiness of 160,000,000 of people was not one that ought to be confined to English and Scotch Members, but that an Irish Member might also fairly express his sentiments upon it. Therefore it was that he ventured to rise to offer a few observations as to how they ought to administer the affairs of so great a population. He thought the question they had to consider was not as to whether the East India Company had properly conducted the administration of India, but to express their opinion that what was required in the East was that the rights of the people, whether Hindoo, Mussulman, or Christian, should be respected. He wished to see a responsible Minister with a responsible Council to advise him in matters affecting the interests of India. He could not help remarking that the tone in which the right hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) had spoken of the East India Company struck him as somewhat strange, considering the totally different language he had heard from the same quarter upon former occasions, and more particularly respecting their policy of annexation. One thing he earnestly hoped would not be lost sight of in any Bill passed for the government of India—namely, that the principle of thorough religious freedom should be recognized; this he regarded as of the last importance for the welfare of that great empire.

said, the noble Lord who had introduced this Bill had made a statement in which probably the House would generally agree—namely, that after having so frequently discussed these questions since February last,—and sometimes as had been admitted, in a rather confused manner—it was not advisable that they should at this advanced period of the Session travel all over the same ground again. For his own part, however, he had deprecated at the time, and he deprecated still, the course which the House had pursued in proceeding with Resolutions, his opinion having been that it would have been more expedient to take the discussion upon the second reading of the Bill, involving, as it did, important principles. The only conclusions at which the House had arrived were—first, that in which the Bill of the late Government and that of their successors both agreed—namely, that the Crown should resume the trust in respect of the Government of India which it had heretofore committed to the hands of the East India Company; and next, that there should be some kind of Council to assist the Minister for India in administering the affairs of that country. The hon. Member for Birmingham had deviated from the course prescribed by the noble Lord by entering into important questions of principle. The speech of the hon. Gentleman was highly interesting, and very remarkable for the great acuteness and wide range of information on Indian affairs which it displayed. But it applied infinitely more to the future than to the present discussion. In many, though not in all of the observations of the hon. Member as to the future relations of our Indian empire he entirely concurred; and the whole of them were well worthy the consideration of the House. No doubt, the appointment of the Governor General was one of the most important duties which an Indian Minister had to perform; and certainly, having regard to the various qualities which the hon. Gentleman had indicated as being necessary for such an office, the selection of the right man to fill it would be a task of no common difficulty. It was a grave question whether, in transferring the whole of India directly to the Crown, they were not, in fact, creating a sort of second Colonial Office; and he quite agreed with the hon. Member for Birmingham that India ought to be divided into an increased number of Presidencies. Even with that alteration, however, they must have some central authority, which could only be secured either by making the Governor of one of the Presidencies paramount, or by appointing a Governor General. The course to be pursued towards the Native Princes was, no doubt, a matter of great difficulty, but it ought to be speedily grappled with, and the first question should be, "How were they to reward those Native Princes who had stood by us in the present emergency." But for their valuable assistance the efforts of Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone in collecting troops together would have been comparatively useless. The Nizam, for instance, had stood by us throughout the whole of this struggle in the most extraordinary manner, for which we were indebted to his Minister, Sola Jung, and yet no reward whatever had been offered to him. Then there was the Minister of Scindia in the North, who had also given us great assistance. Major Macpherson, the President at Scindia's Court, had done the most extraordinary act that was performed by any of our countrymen, civil or military. No man could tell how he had contrived to perform it, but the fact was that the Contingent of Scindia, which revolted in July, was, through the tact and management of Major Macpherson, assisted by the Minister of Scindia, kept inactive till October, for four important months. He believed that circumstance had saved India; for, had the Contingent marched down at the first, many of our troops would have been slaughtered, and the relief of Lucknow would have been impossible. Yet that Minister had received no reward any more than the Minister of the Nizam. He would recommend that whatever reward was sent should be conveyed to them directly from the Queen, on whose approbation the Indian Princes set a high value. The hon. Member for Birmingham said this Bill ought to have been introduced in 1853. Well, he (Mr. Vernon Smith) was much of that opinion, and in 1853 he did his best, along with the hon. Member, to introduce some such system. One of the improvements which he had himself supported in that year contemplated the placing the Board of Control under the same roof with the Court of Directors. The truth was that this change ought to have been effected not in 1853, but as early even as 1833. When the powers of trade were taken from the East India Company, he held that their powers of Government ought to have been taken from them too. One misfortune of not having a debate upon the second reading of this Bill was that the great principles of this subject had not been properly discussed, but had been frittered away in the debates upon the details of particular Resolutions. The speech of the noble Lord himself, though able and lucid, was entirely confined to details. He regretted that with regard to the Members of the Council, the noble Lord told the House that he had adopted in this Bill the number which was sanctioned by the Resolution; but, in making that statement, the noble Lord went rather beyond the correct version of the Resolution, which stated that the number was not to be less than twelve or more than fifteen, whereas he had adopted the maximum number in his Bill. If they did not create a better Council than the one they had hitherto had in the Court of Directors, he did not see what advantage was to be gained by the transfer; and, if in establishing a Council, they established one which would be equally inconvenient and irresponsible, no way would have been made towards improvement. He, therefore regretted that the noble Lord, instead of adopting the maximum, had not adopted the minimum number fixed by the Committee—namely, twelve instead of fifteen, as he was afraid that a Committee consisting of the larger number would be cumbrous, inconvenient, and dilatory. The noble Lord also proposed to divide the Council into six Committees, because, he presumed, there wore six departments in the Board of Control; but, in his opinion, it would be better if each of these departments were represented by an individual than by a Committee, so far as responsibility was concerned, which was one of the main objects of the Bill. The fact was that, as regarded the Council, the responsibility established by the Bill would be a sham, because the Secretary of State when called to account for any particular measure would be able to shelter himself behind the opinions of the old Indians who might be members of the Council. He was glad, however, that the noble Lord proposed to abolish the Secret Committee, and thought he acted wisely in suggesting that the powers which were entrusted to that Committee should be placed in the hands of the new Secretary of State. As to the production of the Indian accounts they had been produced to Parliament with the greatest minuteness for years past, and he believed that whilst not a half-dozen Members in the House ever read them, not one of these had ever taken notice of them. To obviate that his predecessor at the Indian Board (Sir C. Wood) revived the system of producing an annual Indian budget; but he found that to attract the attention of the House to it was next to impossible. His right hon. Friend did, he believed, secure an audience of twelve on one occasion; and he (Mr. Vernon Smith) had felt proud when he found that he was listened to by fourteen. The noble Lord stated that he meant to introduce the system of competition in the examinations for the artillery and engineers; but he had not stated whether he contemplated the maintenance of the college at Addiscombe, which he (Mr. Vernon Smith) would recommend him not only to preserve, but, if possible, to extend and enlarge. He was extremely glad to find that the noble Lord had been persuaded to go the length of abandoning the system of election to the Council, at least by constituencies. What he had substituted for it was nothing more than nomination by another body. It was in no sense of the word election, unless it were self-election by the Directors, instead of nomination by the Crown; and he hoped that in the course of the discussion in Committee they would be able to persuade the noble Lord to go a little further, and secure from him a system which was altogether one of nomination by the Crown; for he did not think that in the principle of self-election he would find anything to console him for the absence of that responsibility which must necessarily follow nomination by the Crown, and under the guise of self-election the most objectionable appointments might be made. With regard to the re-organization of the Indian army, the issue of a Commission of inquiry at home would, in his opinion, prove a most dilatory mode of proceeding in a case which was of pressing importance and admitted of no delay; and he thought that there were persons at the India House who might perform all the ditties of that Commission, and that men like Sir James Outram and General Jacob might furnish all the information requisite to enable them to perfect a scheme for re-organizing the Indian army. The appointment of a Council to the Governor General and to the Governors of Presidencies could be entrusted to no safer hands than to the Governor General and the Governors of Presidencies themselves. He did not think the Company had always made the best selections, for their rule had been, as it appeared to him, to go on the principle of seniority. Another Commission which the noble Lord proposed to issue was a finance Commission. That also should be done here, and with all possible rapidity. The Commission which had been sent out to inquire into the expenditure had reported already, but unluckily, like most Commissions which were instituted to reduce expenditure, they had ended by recommending a slight increase—a thing which was much to be avoided. Still, he had no doubt that by active men setting their shoulders to the wheel considerable reduction might be effected in the expenditure of India. In the second reading of the Bill he cordially agreed. The fact was, that they had now brought the measure very nearly into the same shape as that of his noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston), the only difference between the two being, in the number of the Council, in calling the new Minister for India Secretary of State instead of President, and the substitution of the principle of self-election, so far as one-half the Council were concerned for that of entire nomination by the Crown. His only regret was, that Her Majesty's Government had not gone one step further and taken up the Bill of his noble Friend, passed it on a second reading, and then, in Committee, have introduced the alterations proposed by the Bill which they now asked the House to agree to. He should regret anything that interfered to prevent the Bill being passed during the present Session; and he trusted they would be enabled to carry such a measure as would hereafter contribute to the increased prosperity of India, and lead no one to repent of having put an end to the present cumbrous and dilatory system of the double Government.

said, he should support the second reading, although the noble Lord had entirely ignored the decision of a majority of sixty-five in favour of the elective and representative principle, a majority given to the noble Lord by the independent liberal Members. He must give an emphatic denial to the statements of the hon. Member (Mr. Bright), that the normal condition of Indian finance was one of insolvency, and that the administration of justice was as unsatisfactory as the hon. Member represented. Only one per cent of all civil suits was decided by European Judges, and against the decisions of Native Judges in the remaining 99 per cent there were fewer appeals pro rata than against the cases decided by the European Judges. If the Government of India were conducted by the authorities in India, as the hon. Member for Birmingham proposed, what would have become of the 5,300 appeals which in five years had been made to the home Government against the decisions of those authorities? The Council was to be formed of persons the best informed on Indian subjects, and therefore the best qualified to instruct the House; and yet they were to be excluded from Parliament, as the noble Lord proposed. If such an exclusion were insisted on, would there not be a suspicion that the Secretary of State was afraid of having his Councillors there. For the last seventy-five years Directors of the East India Company had been allowed to sit in the House, and their presence had never operated to the public disadvantage. He approved of the Council having a deliberative power without binding the Minister by their decisions, and he hoped the members of the establishment for carrying on business would be in a position subordinate to the Council, so that there might not be any question of the control of the Council over them. He was happy to find that the noble Lord fixed the meetings of the Council periodically, and he hoped that in the same way the noble Lord would fix the meetings of the Committees, and that the quorum for the Council would be eight. The Secret Committee, as proposed, would be in fact the Secretary of State; but he trusted the Secretary of State would not have the uncontrolled power of sending orders to India for the payment of money. Some restriction on his power in reference to the finances of India was indispensable; otherwise, he might be exposed to dangerous importunities similar to those of Ali Mourad and others. He did not rightly understand whether the noble Lord considered the mischief of the Governors of India appointing their own Councils a privilege which would engender favouritism and occasion universal dissatisfaction. He denied that the Court of Directors appointed the members of those Councils solely by seniority, the appointments being always made according to the merits and claims of the individuals, without regard to seniority, and it was open to any member of the Court of Directors to propose for ballot the name of any qualified person he thought proper. With respect to scientific examinations he wished to know whether the noble Lord meant that there was to be a competition to enter directly into the Engineers and Artillery without going through a military college?

said, he would explain the matter when the Bill should be in Committee.

trusted, that it was not intended to set aside Addiscombe, which had sent out men to India, whose exploits graced the annals of the country. He (Colonel Sykes) could not approve of the proposed commission to India, which would be mischievous in paralyzing the authority of several governments in India. The noble Lord had omitted to mention the treaty engagements in his Bill, and had also left out any guarantee assuring the people of India of the preservation of their rights, privileges, and customs, nor was mention made of an Imperial guarantee for the Indian debt.

said, he understood that a very important communication had been addressed to the Government on the subject of the present Bill by the Court of Directors, and he wished to know whether the Government had any hesitation to lay a copy of that communication on the table, together with a copy of the reply of the Government.

said, that he intruded with reluctance on the House. He knew full well he was in a small minority on the question of India, and nothing he said would change the opinion of the House; but he would not shrink from stating what he believed to be the truth. This, however, was the last occasion on which they could discuss the principle of the Bill, and he hoped the House would bear with him for a short time while he gave expression to his views, in order that they might be placed on record. He believed that this Bill was not destined to have a long existence. It had been brought forward under pressure; it had been brought forward by persons unwilling to do so, and who, out of office, had taken a course the very opposite to that which they had adopted in office. When in opposition, in their judgment, the proper course was that there should be no legislation; but when they were in office they found themselves coerced by the majority of the House to do that which they were now doing. He would briefly state the progress of our East Indian empire. Something more than a century ago a company of merchants began to trade in India. By degrees they acquired a footing there, and they acquired also power over the people of India. As time progressed the Government of England encroached upon the governing power of the Company, and in reality absorbed all the political power over India. The next step was to take from them the right of trading; and the consequence was, that it was called a body of traders, when, in fact, it did not trade at all. Then the power of ruling was taken from them; and lastly, it was proposed to take away as well the name as the power of the East India Company. The first great step was taken by Mr. Pitt. He introduced the Board of Control, which, in fact, overruled the government of India by the East India Company. When this was done, there was introduced a power that governed India without responsibility, and from that had arisen, he believed, all the mischief that had followed from the government of India. The real Government of India was the President of the Board of Control, while the ostensible rulers were the Board of Directors, with an irresponsible power. When he brought forward a Resolution condemning the Board of Control on the occasion of the Affghan war, the members of the Board of Directors in that House voted against him; and yet they professed to condemn the Affghan war. As the hon. Member for Birmingham had said in that wonderful speech of his, to which the House had listened that night, they ought to judge of the Court of Directors by the effects of their government. He (Mr. Roebuck) did so judge of them; and he said they had built up the most wonderful empire that the world had ever seen, followed by a revolt such as mankind had never witnessed before. The House was resolved to pass a measure, and what had occurred? The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton brought in a Bill, and he (Mr. Roebuck) certainly expected more efforts from the weakness of hon. Members opposite than from the insolent strength of the other side of the House. He was disappointed; because he believed the noble Lord's Bill was a far better one than that which was then upon the table of the House. Then the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) brought in a Bill under pressure from every side of the House, a Bill made up of shreds and patches, with an obvious endeavour to catch votes, embodying a principle which violated every principle of good government, and which he was certain was doomed to a sure and rapid death. What occurred when the rebellion broke out? The House rushed into legislation upon India. The noble Lord brought in his Bill and was driven from office. Then it became the duty of hon. Gentlemen opposite to prepare a measure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer brought in a Bill, which common report said was concocted by the late President of the Board of Control and the present. The Bill was so received in this House that hon. Gentlemen opposite were glad to catch at the proposition of the noble Lord the Member for London, to proceed by Resolution. Those Resolutions, in fact, embodied the Bill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a second time the House manifested its determination not to pass the Resolutions; the Government then brought in the present Bill. This was the cork thrown out to keep them afloat. It first proposed to take power from the East India Company, and vest it in the Crown. Upon that all were agreed. It next proposed that a Minister of State should be responsible for the government of India. That also was acceded to by common consent. But then came the point. Some persons said, you ought to have a Council, not only to advise, but also to check, the Minister. Others said, you ought to have a Council not to control, but only to advise, the Minister. Let the House mark what had been done. They wanted a Council, because they wanted independence. How was that obtained? The noble Lord's Bill proposed to get persons in the Council for life, and to have, in fact, a self-elected senate. Of the fifteen members some were to be for life, others were to be elected by the Council themselves, and in order that the choice might be restricted, it was provided that the major part should be taken from persons who had been in India for ten years. Thus they had a body of men who were responsible to nobody. This was the wonderful scheme laid before the House. But that was not all. The noble Lord would confess that a love of ease was one of the most powerful passions that could actuate men, and no one more than the governors of mankind. The Government of India was to consist of a Secretary of State and a Council; and they provided that if the Minister differed from the Council he was to assign his reasons. Then there was another case in which the Minister was to do just as he liked without any Council whatever. Was that a Council to control? Again, the Council were elected for life, and the Minister would go out with the Government of the day. The persons who remained were to be persons utterly responsible to nobody, and they would virtually be the governors of India. The only way of escaping that difficulty was to give the Minister of the Crown the power to do as he liked. The House could not have read the Bill. By the 27th section he found that all orders and communications now sent out by the Secret Committee might, if this Act passed, be addressed to Governors of Presidencies, and officers and servants of Her Majesty in India, by the Secretary of State for India, without consulting the Council or recording his reasons for the adoption of the correspondence. If the Minister was to be checked at all he was not checked there, but his safest and most agreeable course was to go with his irresponsible Council. He (Mr. Roebuck) was quite sure that upon this rock the Bill would eventually be wrecked. The real government of India was vested in a Council which was utterly irresponsible; and, if this Bill were passed, it would be followed by the rising up of the House and pulling down the measure. This would be the result. He (Mr. Roebuck) might not live to see it; but so sure as this Bill passed, this would be the result.

said, that throughout he had strongly objected to legislation on this subject at the present moment, both because India was passing through such a fearful crisis and because the information possessed by persons both inside and out of the House, with reference to the condition of India, was not such as to justify immediate legislation. Although he believed it would have been wise and expedient to defer legislation and to postpone the inauguration of the new system of Government until the authority of Her Majesty had been so far established as to enable them to proclaim a general amnesty, he should not, after the repeated decisions of the House on the subject, oppose the second reading of this Bill. The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Roebuck) said that the great fault of the Measure was that it did not give to the Minister uncontrolled power over the Governor of India. But what had been the case when our Colonies had been confided to a Minister of the Crown under the influence only of Parliament? Experience showed that we could not keep our Colonies under such a system and would they apply a similar system to India? Would they assert that Parliamentary Government could be applied to so vast an empire at such a distance? He must, therefore, enter his decided protest against the principle affirmed by the hon. and learned Member. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) had been pleased to say there was no difference between the Bill of the late Government and the one now submitted to the House; that it was a mere question of eight or fifteen members of the Council. Now, to his mind there was the widest difference between the two measures. The Bill now before the House would establish an independent Council appointed for life, instead of one nominated by the Crown, the Members of which were appointed only for short periods of service. The great advantage of the present arrangement was that they would avoid infusing into the Council the spirit of each successive Administration. The vacancies would be filled up by the fifteen members themselves, men conversant with the affairs of India, independent of party, and animated only by a desire to appoint the individual whom they thought best qualified for the office. The right hon. Gentleman said in effect "You had better have taken our Bill." Now, he (Mr. T. Baring) rejoiced that the Government had not adopted the measure of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), and that they had taken their own course. He had heard with much pleasure some of the observations of the President of the Board of Control, and only regretted that they had not been embodied in the Bill. He thought it would have been more expedient if the measure shadowed forth in his speech had been inserted in the Bill instead of being left to the discretion of the Committee, to be decided according to the number of hon. Members who at this late period of the Session might be left in town. He wished, however, particularly to observe that it was desirable, if any communication had passed between the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) and the Court of Directors, that such communication should be laid upon the table before the House went into Committee. Into that Committee he was sure they would enter with a wish to discuss everything on its own merits, and to decide without any needless delay. With regard to the position of the Governor General, he could not agree with those who thought that that functionary ought to be left with but little or no control. In such a case, what security had we for the good Government of the teeming population of India? No Government, perhaps, was better than that of a wise beneficent dictator. But it was by a happy accident only that we got a good Governor General, able to rule the people wisely and well; and if a man were appointed, as unfortunately there might be—not now, perhaps, but in future time,—who had been sent out for private reasons and party purposes, how could the good government of India be secured, except by some effective control exercised in England? In this consisted the importance of the home Government administered here, and for this reason it was that an independent Council was so necessary.

said, he would move the omission of this clause as he thought, that it would enable persons to commit frauds by going to the Court to obtain a declaration of title. At the same time he wished to give notice of his intention, if the clause were rejected, to move the substitution of another clause which would enable a man bonâ fide desiring to mortgage his property to obtain a declaration of title for the satisfaction of the mortgagee.

said, that as an Irish proprietor and not as a lawyer, he hoped the Committee would not agree to the Motion of his hon. Friend. In fact, he considered that this was one of the most important clauses in the Bill—its object being to place an unencumbered property on an equal footing with a property that was encumbered. Moreover, he believed that the apprehensions which his hon. Friend had expressed with respect to the commission of frauds through the medium of this clause were entirely groundless.

observed, that without this clause the Bill would be not only defective but positively unjust.

said, that the principle embodied in the clause was quite a novel one. They had already affirmed the principle, that unencumbered as well as encumbered estates might be brought within the operation of the new court for the purposes of sale; but this clause went much further. It proposed to confer upon any owner of an unencumbered estate, not contemplating a sale, the power of obtaining a judicial declaration, which would enable him at any future time, in ease he should be about to sell his estate, to show a conclusive title. This alteration would affect the title of every man in the kingdom to his property, for the present Bill was, they were told, the forerunner of a similar measure for England. He would entreat the Committee to pause before they agreed to it, for he could assure them that a Parliamentary title was not without its dangers. Where a sale was contemplated there was publicity, and the real owner of a property was advertised of the intention of the wrongful possessor to sell it; but where that possessor merely went before the Court to obtain a Parliamentary title, which with all its power the same Court could not recall, a wrong was done to the party justly entitled to the estate.

said, there were four reasons conclusive in favour of the clause. The first was that where an encumbered estate was sold a Parliamentary title was given with it, and unless they went further and gave unencumbered owners in fee the same class of title, they would themselves obtain it by means of fictitious sales. The second reason was that a man might have a portion of ground which he might wish to sell to different parties. He might require it for building purposes. A Parliamentary title to the whole would enable him to sell each portion by itself; whereas otherwise he would have to go through a formal proof of title for each particular sale. The third reason was somewhat like the second, for were he to let the same ground on building leases he might have to prove his title to each lessee; whereas the Parliamentary title to the property would be a guarantee to them all that they were dealing with a competent party. The fourth reason was that they should not leave those estates which never changed hands—but where the title was complicated by reason of marriage and other family settlements—in a worse position than those estates which were encumbered.

said, he thought the Committee ought not to sanction the new principle contained in the clause. They had given a Parliamentary title to unencumbered estates which might change hands in sale; but what was now asked was tantamount to the extinction of every other kind of title, and would injuriously affect both the encumbrancer and the tenant. The class of lessees or tenants might be very seriously affected by this Bill, as well as the class of claimants and incumbrancers on property. He earnestly asked the Committee to pause before they agreed to the extension of the principle involved in the Bill.

declared his conviction that of all the Bills or measures which the people of Ireland had to thank the Government for pressing forward, this was the most important. He believed the first clause gave benefits of a most material character to all classes of Her Majesty's subjects in Ireland.

said, he thought that nothing could be better for the country generally than the adoption of this clause. He was not at all afraid there would be any want of publicity, and he most cordially supported the clause.

said, he would rather see the Bill abandoned than this clause struck out.