reminded the Committee that on Tuesday last he had moved an Amendment to the clause, that after the words "officer thereof" there should be added the words "or any body corporate or public body, or any part thereof," and he would now again move it. The effect of the Amendment would be to take away from the town council of Edinburgh, or any other public body, the right of appointing University professors.

said, he did not think that any sufficient ground had been alleged for their taking the strong step of depriving the Town Council of Edinburgh of the right of nomination they had hitherto exercised in that matter. They had, as far as he could learn, used the right in a manner which had given rise to no complaint on the part of the public. He was aware, however, that the present practice was open to the objection that a Town Council was not the fittest body in the world to which that patronage could be committed; and, after having given to the subject the best consideration in his power, he had arrived at the conclusion that the best thing they could then do would be to adopt an intermediate course by which they would partially recognize the claim of the Town Council to be continued in the possession of a right which they had hitherto probably used, while some partial restriction would be imposed on the unchecked power which they had hitherto enjoyed upon that subject. He believed that the adoption of the Amendment of the hon. Baronet the Member for the Wigton Burghs (Sir W. Dunbar) would enable them to effect a compromise of that description, and he trusted that that Amendment, or some similar proposal, would receive the sanction of the Committee.

said, he did not believe that the House had a right, under any circumstances, to deprive the Town Council of Edinburgh of the patronage they had exercised so long and in so judicious a manner. He should, however, be ready to give his best consideration to any compromise that might be proposed for the settlement of that question; but he would not offer an opinion upon any particular suggestion until it should have been brought under the notice of the Committee.

said, that the proposal he had made was one of a general character, but it would, no doubt, chiefly effect the patronage of the Corporation of Edinburgh; but it would also have the effect of abrogating that small amount of patronage which was possessed in the University of Aberdeen by the Town Council and by the Synod of that city. He was ready to acknowledge that, as regarded the patronage of the Town Council of Edinburgh, the proposal put on the paper by the hon. Member for the Wigton Burghs, possessed some advantage over that he had himself submitted to the Committee, inasmuch as it would be much less sweeping in its operation. In the abstract he preferred his own Amendment, but for the sake of peace and in order to conciliate his hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh, he should not be indisposed to substitute for it the Amendment of the hon. Baronet. He should add that he thought the Committee, in any measure they might adopt, ought not to have the patronage of the Town Council and of the Synod of Aberdeen restricted, while they interfered with similar patronage in Edinburgh.

said, he should enter his protest against the abolition of a patronage which had existed for so long a time, unless it could be proved that from the manner in which it had been applied, or from some other cause, it had failed in securing the objects for which it had been instituted. As far as he could judge, there had been no such failure in that case; and he did not see why any change should be made in the matter.

said, be thought it would be unwise and unjust on the part of the Committee to adopt the sweeping proposal of his right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Bouverie). There were two public bodies in Edinburgh which exercised patronage of that description, and which manifestly ought not to be deprived of the right. He alluded to the Faculty of Advocates, which virtually, by means of their recommendation to the Town Council, nominated the Professor of Law, and the Writers to the Signet who nominated the Professor of Conveyancing. It was easy to see that these two bodies were better qualified to make a proper choice in those cases than any University Council. He was not indisposed to be a party to some compromise upon that subject; but he should offer his most strenuous opposition to the proposal of his right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock.

said, he was somewhat unwilling to take any part in that discussion, which seemed to have originated in a desire on the part of the representatives of the various parties into which Scotland was divided upon this subject, to arrive at a settlement of the question by means of a compromise, which they stated all consider more or less satisfactory. If they could succeed in that point, he should be most happy to give his assent to any suggestion for carrying into effect their wishes. He was anxious, however, to observe that the proposal of his right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock was clearly open to the objection which had been made to it by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Greenock (Mr. Dunlop). It should be observed that the Bill as it stood dealt with no large patronage, except that which had hitherto been exercised by the Senatus Academicus, or some portion of their body, and that it left all their patronage untouched. He understood that neither his right hon. Friend nor any other Member of the Committee wished to interfere with what was called private patronage—that was to say, the right of presentation to chairs vested in individuals who represented the founders. The right so acquired was considered too sacred to be abolished. But the Amendment of his right hon. Friend would invade rights of a similar kind, although they were vested not in individuals, but in corporate bodies. For example, in one of the cases to which his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Greenock had referred, the Writers to the Signet in Edinburgh nominated to the Professorship of Conveyancing in the University of that city, and members of their body, had contributed funds for that endowment; so that it would manifestly be unfair to deprive them of that patronage. He could not, therefore, support the proposal of his right hon. Friend; and with regard to the patronage exercised by a corporation of Edinburgh, he would only say that he would not then enter into that subject, because it had not yet been brought formally under the consideration of the Committee.

said, he was much gratified with the statement of the Lord Advocate. In these days people seemed to aim too much at merely Utopian perfection. If his right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock could prove that any of these bodies had abused the power which had been vested in them, he should willingly join him in any attempt to remedy the evil. He would go further, and say, that if he were then asked for the first time to vest that patronage in corporate bodies, he should most probably refuse his assent to such a proposal. But as it had not been shown that any abuse had arisen in that case, he was not prepared to deprive men of a privilege which they had enjoyed from remote times, and which they had exercised to the general satisfaction of their fellow-countrymen. He was very happy to find that the Lord Advocate was prepared to adhere to the principle laid down in the Bill; and he would ask his right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock to consider the position in which they were then placed. They were making a great experiment for the improvement of education in Scotland. He entirely approved of that experiment; but he thought it was desirable that, in carrying it out, they should conciliate as many interests as they could, consistently with the attainment of the object which they had in view.

said, that the Town Council of Edinburgh were not the founders of those professorships. The fact was, that they were merely trustees for royal grants given in the time of James VI. They could not, therefore, be at all placed in the sumo category with private individuals who had given, or whose ancestors had given, their own money for the purpose of creating educational endowments. Then, again, as regarded the mode in which the patronage had been exercised by the Town Councils, he entirely differed from those gentlemen who had spoken upon that subject in terms of such unqualified approval. He was prepared to maintain, that in many cases that patronage had been exercised in a manner which had given very great dissatisfaction; and that the public felt no confidence in the ability of those to whom that trust was committed to appoint the fittest men. He did not mean to say that all the appointments were bad; but he believed that many of them were open to great objection; and he should, therefore, be very sorry to see that patronage continued in the Town Council of Edinburgh.

said, that he too could not admit that the Town Council of Edinburgh had never abused that patronage; but he believed that that question was not then formally before the Committee.

said, that after what had fallen from the Lord Advocate and from his hon. Friends around him, he would not put the Committee to the trouble of dividing on his Amendment. He should say, however, that he drew a broad distinction between the rights of private patronage and of patronage vested in a public body such as the Town Council of Edinburgh. Private individuals had an absolute right in such a case, and could use it as they might please without a responsibility to any parties. But corporations, on the contrary, were mere trustees acting in behalf of the public, to whom they were responsible for the mode in which they discharged their duties; and the Legislature could transfer those duties to other hands at any moment they might think proper.

said, that when the members of a corporation were mere trustees for the public, Parliament might take away their right. But the case of the Writers to the Signet who nominated to the Professorship of Conveyancing in the University of Edinburgh was of a different character. That body had a special interest in the nominations to that professorship, which had been founded for the benefit of the profession to which they belonged.

said, he entirely approved of the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kilmarnock; but he could not of course prevent the right hon. Gentleman from withdrawing it. He did not see how they could take away the patronage in this case from any existing body, unless all the holders of the privilege, including the Corporation of Edinburgh, were to be regarded as mere trustees for the public.

said, he could not help regretting that any attempt was made to interfere with the patronage at present exercised in the appointment to professorships in the Scotch Universities. He found that the Bill, as it had been framed by the Lord Advocate, sanctioned no such interference. There was a proverb in the North, that "a man ought not to put his foot farther than he could draw it in again." He thought it would be well if the lesson conveyed in that maxim had not been forgotten in the present instance, and if the main experiment proposed in the Bill were allowed to have a fair trial, without any attempt being made to alter the mode of making appointments to the Scotch University chairs, he could afford the House a most satisfactory illustration of the admirable manner in which the patronage in that case was at present exercised. Not later than Monday last a Professor of Chemistry had to be nominated in the University of Edinburgh; there were three or four candidates, and the one chosen—and chosen by 25 to 9—was Dr. Lyon Playfair, with whose professional reputation they were all acquainted. He had to state, however, that if it was the feeling of the Committee generally, that the compromise proposed by the hon. Baronet, the Member for the Wigton Burghs, ought to be adopted, he would not stand in the way of its acceptance.

said, that as he believed the Committee generally were disposed to adopt the proposal of his hon. Friend the Member for the Wigton Burghs, he should not press his own Amendment.

said, he believed there was nothing to justify their adoption of the proposal of the hon. Baronet the Member for the Wigton Burghs; but as the Committee generally were manifestly of a different opinion, he should, under the compulsion thus placed upon him, cease to oppose it.

said, that the arrangement proposed by the Amendment of the hon. Baronet, the Member for the Wigton Burghs, appeared to him to be one of a very admirable character. Before the proposal of the hon. Member for Perthshire was withdrawn, he should be glad to know what was the opinion of the other Member for Edinburgh upon the subject.

said, he wished to state the exact position in which he was placed. He felt lie was like a captain of a ship in a storm, and in danger of being totally submerged; and he was prepared to save as much as he could out of the wreck. He believed he could not obtain more than was proposed in the Amendment of the hon. Baronet, the Member for the Wigton Burghs.

moved an Amendment, providing that it should not be competent to elect any member of the University Court to any office in the University while a member of the said Court, or within twelve months after he had ceased to be a member thereof. He thought some check ought be imposed of that description.

could not conceive the grounds on which such a proposal was made; and if there had been any reason for depriving the members of the Court from offices in the University during the time they remained in office, there was no reason to continue such restriction twelve months after they had ceased to be members of that Court. He should oppose the Motion.

proposed to fill up the blank left for the names of the Commissioners with the following names:

"His Grace JOHN GEORGE DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, Duke of Argyll; the Right Hon. GEORGE HAMILTON GORDON, Earl of Aberdeen; the Right Hon. WILLIAM DAVID MURRAY, Earl of Mansfield; the Right Hon. DUNCAN MCNEIL, Lord Justice General and Lord President of the Court of Session; Sir WILLIAM GIBSON CRAIG, of Riccarton, Baronet; JOHN INGLIS, Esquire, Lord Advocate for Scotland; JAMES CRAUFURD, Esquire, one of the Senators of the College of Justice; WILLIAM STIRLING, Esquire, of Keir; JAMES MONCREIFF, Esquire; ALEXANDER HASTIE, Esquire."

expressed a doubt whether the state of the Earl of Aberdeen's health would allow him to devote his attention to the subject. He thought it would be very desirable to have some man of in- fluence among the Commissioners connected with the north of Scotland.

suggested, that the name of Earl Stanhope should be added to the list of Commissioners. Although his Lordship was an Englishman, he was much respected in Scotland, and he was sure it would give great satisfaction if he were made a Commissioner. He thought, however, it would be better to leave the whole question to the learned Earl, in whose judgment he had the most perfect confidence.

concurred in that suggestion; but, at the same time, he might take the opportunity of stating that the name of Earl Stanhope would be received with the greatest respect in Aberdeen.

moved the insertion of a provision, that any such alterations should be in consonance with the main design of the founder.

thought, that more power was conferred upon these Commissioners than the Home Secretary would be allowed to confer upon any similar body in England. Many of the endowments were very small; and if the Commissioners, in the exercise of the powers granted them by this Bill, choose to say that a larger sum of money than was now paid was necessary to enable the young men to subsist with dignity and comfort at college, the effect might be very detrimental. The small bursaries at these Colleges had been of great assistance to the sons of farmers, country ministers, and others, and if they were interfered with, great danger would be done.

said, there were similar powers given in both the Oxford and Cambridge Acts; but, by subsequent clauses, restrictions were placed upon the arbitrary exercise of those powers; and that the Lord Advocate would insert similar restrictions in this Bill on bringing up the Report.

said, that as they had now come to the end of the powers of the Commissioners, this was the time at which he ought to submit to the notice of the Committee a point which a friendly interest in the welfare of the Scotch Universities induced him to believe was one of the greatest importance. As a person connected immediately with one of the English Universities, he ought perhaps to make some apology for introducing himself on this question. He had felt great reluctance in interfering in matters which were sharply contested by persons belonging to, or interested in, the Scotch Universities, and had felt it to be rather his duty to abstain from entering on the discussion; and the only reason he did so now was, because lie felt a desire to place the Scotch Universities in a position of greater prominence than they had hitherto occupied. The proposition he had to submit to the favourable consideration of the right hon. Gentleman was this. The Lord Advocate had framed, with great care and ability, a Bill for improving the present condition of those Universities. He quite concurred in the general eulogium bestowed upon the Bill; but, at the same time, he wished to make a remark upon its effect—not in the way of hostile criticism, but as an instance of what he thought could not be denied—namely, that up to the present day there had been a great distinction between the value, in public estimation, of the degrees conferred by Scotch and English Universities. The principal functions of Scotch Universities had hitherto been to ascertain qualifications, and that of the Colleges to operate as teaching bodies. This Bill, undoubtedly, tended to obliterate what remained of the distinction between the Colleges and Universities. Up to the present time it was doubtful whether, in law, the University of Edinburgh was a University at all, and whether a proper view of it was not that it was a College which had acquired a prescriptive right to grant degrees. On the other hand as respected the University and the Colleges in Glasgow, the distinction could be undoubtedly traced in the records between those portions of the machinery which belonged to the functions of a University, and those which belonged to the functions of a College; while, of course, it was very marked as regarded St. Andrews. He did not allude to this as a mere matter of antiquarian interest, but as one in which he had for many years felt a deep interest; mid it being his duty, in common with other Members of the House, to take into consideration whatever tended to advance the interests of literature, and to produce high intellectual qualifications, he could not help asking himself whether by this Bill they were doing all they could do to produce a high class of education in the Universities of Scotland. He owned frankly that he wanted to see the degrees conferred in Scotland—not merely on medicine, or any particular school dependent upon their excellence upon any favourable circumstances like those existing at Edinburgh—but the Scotch degrees generally, brought fully up to a par in point of dignity and social effect with the University degrees granted in England. The question was, how could they ensure that? He had a strong impression that that could not be done effectively so long as Scotland maintained four Universities. He fully admitted his belief that no other country upon the face of the earth, the population and natural advantages being equal, could show such an amount of intellectual power as could Scotland. At the same time, he did not think that it was possible it could maintain four Universities, and in his opinion, so long as it did, do what they could to encourage and foster them, it was not possible that the degrees which they granted could be brought up to the point he desired. The very effect of what they were doing now was to some degree adverse to the permanent elevation of Scotch degrees, for it was most essential that the examining and certifying power should be as distinct from the College machinery as possible. The more closely they united the College machinery and the University certifying power, upon which the value of the degree depended, the more they were trying to assimilate functions which were not alike in kind. Their object should be not to bring the University and the Colleges as nearly together as possible, but to keep them clearly and widely apart, in order that those who taught the young men might teach them subject to the supervision of an independent power which was not mixed up with the teaching machinery. With that view he was anxious that they should do everything for the ultimate consolidation of the four Universities of Scotland into one great national University; leaving them to rule themselves under that national University as a central body, at which they should be duly represented; but essentially maintaining the character of Colleges, and discharging the functions of Colleges in educating and teaching. He could not help thinking that, presuming a willingness was found to combine in this way, it was most desirable that such a combination should take place. There need be no cry of surrender to be made, for the Universities would be deprived of nothing which was of the least value to them. What they required was the efficiency of their teaching staff; and the sending young men up to a central University for examination would be a positive advantage instead of a loss. The real question was, whether there was an anxiety among the population in the Universities of Scotland to attain this end. If they were disposed to enter into such an arrangement he should not understand that any serious difficulty in carrying into effect could arise. He Was sure it would be a great encouragement to the authorities that now existed, and which were to be set in action by this Bill, if they could do something in the measure which should indicate the view it entertained upon the matter. Perhaps that could best be effected by making some addition to the powers of the Commissioners. The first point would be to give them a new object. They might be directed to inquire into the desirability and practicability of constituting one national University in Scotland. That would make it the duty of the Commissioners to inquire and report to the Crown, and so far the direction would be a positive one. But beyond that he would authorize the Commissioners to proceed and take measures for the purpose—dependent upon—dependent upon consent of parties—of constituting such national University. If the present Universities, and the parties connected with them, were desirous to array themselves as Colleges under a central University, who would be the examining body in Scotland, then he said, let the Commissioners, with the consent of the Universities, and subject to the restrictions provided in the ordinances proceed to the accomplishment of this object. He was persuaded that it would be a great work for Scotland, and that the whole business of education and learning in Scotland would derive advantages greater than they had ever yet possessed. He had put the proposition into words in order to convey the clearest idea of it which he possibly could. It would be presumptuous in him to press the proposal on the Committee, unless it met with such support, especially from hon. Members for Scotland, as would induce Her Majesty's Government to give it a favourable consideration. It was therefore not his intention to challenge any discussion upon the question until he was backed up with greater authority than his own in the matter. The form of words which he thought best suited to carry out this suggestion, and which might come in at the end of the powers of the Commissioners, would be,—

"That the said Commissioners also have power to inquire and report to Her Majesty how far it would be practicable or expedient that one University should be constituted, to be called the National University of Scotland; and in case Her Majesty should be pleased at any time within the duration of the Commission to grant a charter for the creation of such University, it shall be lawful for the Scottish University named in this Act, or any of them, to surrender the powers of examinations for and granting degrees with or without the exception of theological degrees, and become Colleges, one or more as the case may be, of the said National University. And it shall be lawful for the Commissioners, by and with the consent of such Universities respectively, to make arrangements for such conversion into Colleges, mid for the representation of such Colleges in the governing body of the National University. No such surrender or consent to be valid unless such consent is signified in writing from the Chancellor of the repective Universities, nor except it shall be declared by him that such surrender and consent has the approval of the Senatus Academicus. And any such scheme for converting such University into one or more Colleges shall be subject, before taking final effect, to the same conditions and forms as other statutes and ordinances."

acknowledged with great pleasure the exceedingly friendly spirit with which this Motion had been introduced by the right hon. Gentleman, and was glad to hear that his (the Lord Advocate's) humble efforts in the cause of high-class education in Scotland were considered entitled to have the praise of the right hon. Gentleman. What be had now said was worthy of great consideration; but it was obvious that the insertion of such a clause as this would involve a great Many considerations which, even if the Committee agreed upon the general principle, would so delay the proceedings, that it would have the effect of throwing over the Bill. He suggested that the right hon. Gentleman should withdraw his Motion for the present, and bring it up on the presentation of the Report.

said, that be had no objection to the adoption of that course; at the smile time, as he believed that many Iron. Members took a deep interest in the proposition, he hoped they would give some expression of opinion upon it.

said, that he had long entertained the same idea upon this question, which had been enunciated by the right hon. Gentleman, but he wished to reserve anything which he had to say on the subject until it was brought up on the Report.

thought, that it was not right that so important a proposition should be passed over without discussion. He rejoiced that the right hon. Gentleman, who was entitled to speak with so much authority upon this subject, had brought it forward. He had a strong opinion that if in England they had committed the error of almost sinking the University in the Colleges, in Ireland they had fallen into the opposite one of sinking the Colleges in the University. He thought the course which had been suggested of having the Motion printed and brought up on the Report was the proper one, and he hoped upon that occasion it would be fully discussed.

then moved an Amendment.

"In page 8, Clause 15, line 33, to leave out from 'provided' to 'approved,' in line 41, and insert and all statutes and ordinances to be made by the Commissioners shall be laid before Her Majesty in Council without any unnecessary delay, and be forthwith published in the Edinburgh Gazette; and it shall be lawful for every University, or any College thereof, and for the trustees or patron of any foundation, mortification, bursary; donation, or endowment, and for any other person directly affected by such statutes or ordinances within one month after such publication as aforesaid, to petition Her Majesty in Council, praying her Majesty to withhold her approbation of the whole or any part thereof, and every such petition shall be referred by Her Majesty by Order in Council for the consideration and advice of five Members of Her Privy Council, of whom two, not including the Lord President, shall be Members of the Judicial Committee, who shall be named in such order, and such five members may, if they think fit, admit any petitioner or petitioners to be heard by Counsel in support of his or their petition."

said, as the clause now stood, the Committee would observe that it contained two excellent checks upon the proceedings of the Commissioners. The one was the obligation of publishing all the ordinances in the Gazette, and at the same time the necessity of laying them then before both Houses of Parliament. The other was the fact that they should be approved of by Her Majesty's Council before they could be acted upon. The effect of the latter requisition would be to make the Government responsible for them. It appeared to him that those were in themselves most important checks, and were quite sufficient to prevent any abuses on the part of the Commissioners, who would thus be restrained from exceeding their powers, or of misunderstanding the nature of their functions. When the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the precedent of the Oxford and Cambridge Act, he should recollect the great practical difference that existed between the subject with which they were now dealing, and that which the Oxford and Cambridge Act legislated for. If the right hon. Gentleman had proposed to establish a Court of Appeal in Scotland itself, he thought such a course would have been a great deal more consistent and far more analogous with what was done in the Oxford and Cambridge Act than the Amendment he had just moved. To say the least, he was of opinion that the system of appeal suggested by the right hon. Gentleman was wholly unnecessary, and that it would only have the effect of adding to the Bill a piece of useless machinery.

concurred in the principle of the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Kilmarnock. He could not understand when it was considered that the powers to be given to the Commissioners under this Bill were even greater than those allowed under the Oxford and Cambridge Act, and why those gentlemen should not be placed under the same checks as those enacted with regard to the English Universities.

said, if his proposition did not meet with the approbation of the Committee, he would be unwilling to detain them with further discussion of it. But he looked upon the so-called checks in the present Bill as a perfect farce; and for all the good they could effect, he thought they might be struck out of the measure altogether. What was the use of requiring those ordinances being placed before Parliament, if Parliament were not to have the power of saying that they ought not to be approved of?

said, the right hon. Gentleman seemed to have forgotten this important fact, that if those matters were to be laid before Parliament, it would be competent for any hon. Member to call attention to the particular subject; and it would be quite open to him, when those documents were laid upon the table, to object to them, or to call the attention of the House to the subject, or to make an address to the Crown in relation thereto.

said, it appeared to him that the Bill contained no real or proper check over the Commissioners, and seeing no reason why these parties should be placed upon a different footing than those discharging similar functions under the Cambridge and Oxford Act, he should certainly support the Amendment of his right hon. Friend.

was of opinion that the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman would not, if even adopted, carry out the objects which be had in view. The clause, as it stood, he believed would operate most effectually in preventing any abuses that might arise. The Crown must be consulted as to their ordinances, before they could become valid; and Her Majesty would, of course, be advised by the members of Her Privy Council, upon any points of a doubtful or objectionable character.

agreed in the few observations made by his right hon. Friend opposite upon this question. He could bear testimony to the fact of the provisions in the Oxford and Cambridge Act being framed with the greatest care and attention to the great interests involved. He was quite certain that those provisions had, up to the present time, worked exceedingly well, and that they imposed the most salutary checks upon all parties. The functionaries under the English Universities Act conducted all their proceedings with a full knowledge that they were working, as it were, in the open day, and that their acts could be brought before the special Motion of Parliament. It was true that those ordinances in the Oxford and Cambridge Universities had never as yet been brought before that House; but he took that fact to be a strong proof of the great success of the particular provision in question. The object of imposing those cheques upon the Commissioners was not to require information of their proceedings for the purpose of making them the subject of any contested or noisy discussion; but, in fact, that all parties should be induced to work to the best of their powers in the spirit of conciliation. Well, then, the object of the provision was thus carried out, and therefore the House had never considered it necessary to interfere. The question now was, whether it was also desirable to reserve in this Bill the power of interference by both Houses in extreme cases. He must confess he thought, with great submission, that it was desirable. They were now creating by this Bill a body of functionaries in whom a large amount of confidence would be reposed, and who would have to deal with a multitude of questions involving a variety of interests; and, therefore, in his opinion, it was the more important to establish the cheques provided for by the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, it might be convenient for him at that time to state the alteration he proposed to make in this clause. As regarded the first subdivision of the clause, he proposed to insert certain words to make it clear that the Commissioners should have the power, in such cases as they deemed necessary, to have a double chair in any of the branches or faculties prescribed. After the word hereby, in line 13, he should propose the insertion of certain words, giving the Commissioners such a discretion, and also the power of determining when and where the said professors shall assemble. Then again, in line 26, after the word "professorships," he would propose the insertion of the words "making full compensation to the owner or owners of such for the loss of their emoluments by such abolition," &c.

expressed his opinion that the propositions of the learned Lord would not remedy the mischief, especially in the colleges in Aberdeen. In the Marischal College it had been found that the most useful course of education had been the joint education in mathematics and physics. The learned Lord's proposition would probably establish single professorships, whereas he thought there ought to be double professorships for each college.

thought the learned Lord Advocate was going rather too fast, and was putting the cart before the horse.

then moved an Amendment, namely, in line 26, after the word "professorships," to insert "making full compensation to the holders of such offices for all losses of emoluments," &c.

proposed to omit the words from the clause "the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom." He said he had strong objections, on principle, to such charges being placed upon the Consolidated Fund. He objected to any body of Commissioners, however respectable they might be, having it in their power to dispose of the funds of the United Kingdom without the direct sanction and control of Parliament. He might be fold that everything that would be done by the Commissioners might be brought before Parliament, and that any hon. Member might even propose an address to the Crown, condemnatory of any objectionable act upon their part. He did not, however, think that this was at all a sufficient check or control to have over them; and, therefore, in order to test the House or the opinions of Members generally upon this subject, he would move the insertion of the words in place of "the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom,"—"to be granted from time to time out of monies granted by Parliament for the purpose."

said, he would at once disarm all opposition by stating that it was not the intention of the Government to place the charge upon the Consolidated Fund.

said, that as the Government did not propose to charge these payments on the Consolidated Fund, he would move a clause providing that the sums necessary should be laid before Parliament and voted in the Estimates.

said, that under this clause the Commissioners were authorised to accept the resignation of Principals and Professors, and to give reasonable compensation in the shape of retiring allowances, to such persons for the loss of their emoluments by such resignation. What he wanted to have clearly understood was, whether the proceedings of the Commissioners would be entirely conditional on Parliament, subsequently to voting the money to carry out their measures, or whether the proceedings of the Commissioners would take effect first, and then the Government would come to Parliament and take a vote of money in consequence of those proceedings. As he understood the Bill in its present form, the proceedings of the Commissioners would take effect immediately, and then, when the Government afterwards came to Parliament to ask for a vote, those who wished to oppose it would he told that it is of no use to do so; that the Professors had resigned on the faith of the arrangements which the Commissioners had made as they were authorised to do, and that there was nothing remaining but for that House to vote the money necessary to carry out those retirements, and to pay the retiring pension which the Commissioners had awarded to the Professors who had resigned, for he wished it to be clearly understood that, when a Vote is proposed, that House would have full freedom to say "aye" or "no" to it; and that they would not be embarrassed in their decision with respect to it, by the proceedings of the Commissioners appointed to regulate these matters.

said, that it was quite clear that the Lords of the Treasury could not pay money until Parliament had voted it. Of course it is quite competent fur Parliament to deal with any Vote that came before them in the Estimates with perfect freedom. According to the previous provisions of the Bill, these and all other arrangements were to be laid before Parliament, and it would then be competent for Parliament to deal with them as they thought fit.

seconded the Motion. He hoped that the House would support this Amendment, and prevent any portion of the public money being expended in the endowment of Theological Professors. The Free Church had now three Colleges, and thirteen Professors of Theology; the United Presbyterians had five Professors of Theology; the Independents had two Theological Professors of their own. While these bodies, possessing two-thirds of the population of Scotland, paid their Theological Professors out of their own pockets, he did not think that the Established Church ought to receive out of the public funds additional endowments for their Theological Professors.

said, that he hardly thought that the hon. Gentlemen who had moved and seconded the Amendment understood the necessary consequences of what they were doing; because, if the House inserted in this Bill an enactment to the effect that no portion of the public money voted by Parliament could, under any circumstances whatever, be applied either to the formation of new Professorships, or the improvement of existing Professorships in Theology; the legitimate and consistent course would be to direct the Commissioners so to remodel the Universities of Scotland, as there should not be in any one of them a Professor of Theology at all. Now, he (the Lord Advocate) could not consent to anything that led to such a consequence as that. He could not conceive anything more inconsistent with the nature and constitution of these institutions than to suppress that faculty which of all others was the most distinguishing feature of every University with which he was acquainted. Was there any of the ancient institutions of Europe which did not teach theology, not only as a faculty, but as the first faculty—the faculty of greatest dignity and importance? Was it not notorious that, as regarded the Universities of Scotland in particular, they were founded originally, mainly for the purpose of teaching theology, so that it would be subverting the primary objects for which they were founded if the faculty of theology were taken away. Such would be the necessary and legitimate consequence of the proposal which had been made; for, of course, when his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) proposed to tie up the hands of the Commissioners and Parliament from hereafter giving any money for the endowment of new professorships in that faculty, or in improving existing chairs, he must contemplate this, that the Commissioners might find in the course of their inquiries that some one or more of the theological chairs in the Universities were inadequately endowed? Were they, then, to go on keeping up that half professorship in the University, and would not the more consistent course be to say, "It is insufficiently endowed, and therefore let it be suppressed." The two propositions appeared to depend on the same reasoning, and he opposed one for the same reason as he should the other. The Motion of the hon. Gentleman, and those who agreed with him, appeared to be, that by assenting to the endowment of the professorships they would be compromising their principles in regard to an Established Church or to an establishment for religious purposes out of the public funds. This, however, was quite a different thing from supporting an Established Church or a religious establishment, properly so called, out of the public funds. The institutions which he was now discussing were institutions for teaching a branch of learning—a branch of learning surely the most important of any, a branch of learning taught in all institutions that professed to diffuse a higher education; and the proposal now before the House would strike at the very foundation of the Scotch Universities, for it would destroy that religious teaching which was an essential part of every University—which had always been a constant part of a Scotch University—and without which the maintenance of a University would stand on a different ground from that on which it had ever before done.

feared that unless they agreed to the proposal of the hon. Member for Montrose, they would have a renewal of those acrimonious theological discussions which were so painful. It might be said that the grant to Maynooth College in Ireland stood on the same ground on which it was now proposed to grant additional endowments to the theological chairs in the Scotch Universities. But that was not so; for the Maynooth grant was supported on the ground that there is a highly-paid Established Church for the minority of the people, therefore a great minister endowed Maynooth for the majority. But that state of affairs did not exist in the present case. He did not know, indeed, whether, if it were now proposed to begin the Maynooth grant, he should support it, notwithstanding the argument to which he had alluded. That grant now existed, and it is one thing not to seek to disturb it, and another to ask the British Parliament, for the first time, to vote additional endowments for the Professors of Theology in the Scotch Universities. It did not follow, then, the Theologians would, after all, be teaching what is true, or, at all events, what they believed to be true in that House. It might be truth of the wrong kind, and he must say that he did not think it fair to call upon the inhabitants of the United Kingdom to pay for teaching that which a great portion of them must believe not to be true. There is, moreover, a great danger of their Theological Professors inculcating views which were opposed to science. But admitting that it is right that theology should be taught, he questioned whether it is right to tax the people of this country for the inculcation of a particular kind of theology. He should, therefore, support the proviso.

thought the hon. Baronet had misunderstood the question before the House. He had not made any proposal whatever. This is an Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Montrose, to tie up the hands of Parliament on the question.

said, it was true that there was nothing in the Bill to say that money should be appropriated for professors in theology; but there was a clause in it directing the Commissioners to have great regard to the Report of the Royal Commissioners who had inquired into the state of the Scotch Universities. Now that Commission had recommended that the salaries of the Professors of theology should be increased, and it is most probable that that recommendation would be carried into effect. It is also recommended that the theological professors, including those of Hebrew and of the Oriental languages, should be ordained ministers of the Church of Scotland. Now, it should be recollected that other religious bodies, quite as numerous as the Church of Scotland, had theological professors, and were able to maintain them. Why, then, should that church seek assistance from the State? It is true that the salaries of their professorship were not large; but, nevertheless, one of them reached between £500 or £600, nor did he see why these salaries should not be augmented by students' fees, as is the case with other professors.

was opposed altogether to State grants for religious purposes or to religious bodies. The bitterest opponents of the Maynooth grant were the people of Scotland, and they should be the last persons to put their hands into the public purse for the support of religion.

appeared at the Bar, and read the following Reply to the Address moved for [28th June] praying an inquiry into that establishment:— "I have received your Address, praying that a Royal Commission may be appointed to inquire into the system upon which the Books and Stock have been respectively kept at Weedon, as well as the general mode in which the business of the Establishment at Weedon has been conducted, the result of such mode of conducting the business, and the state of the Books and Stock of Stores. "And having taken your Address into consideration, I have directed that a Commission shall issue for the purposes which you have requested."

said, he rose to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland whether, since the Visitation lately held at Trinity College, Dublin, a Queen's Letter has been issued by the Government to the College Board, carrying out certain reforms in Trinity College, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners; and whether he has any objection to state to the House the nature of the proposed reforms.

said, that communications had lately taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Board of Trinity College, Dublin, and a conference had also been held between the Senior and Junior Fellows of that institution, in consequence of which he was happy to say a scheme had been agreed on by which considerable improvements were proposed to be effected, having reference to both educational and financial questions. He was also informed that the Draft of the Queen's letter would be submitted to the Government forthwith. There was every hope from the course which proceedings had taken that the most favourable results would be obtained, and such improvements would be effected in the College itself as would remove the unfortunate differences which had lately occurred as well as promote, to a very great degree, the general efficiency of the establishment.

said, that in consequence of the answer which he had just received he should not bring forward the Motion of which he had given notice relative to this subject.

said, he would beg to ask the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. Sidney Herbert) whether it is a fact that the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the operation of the Warrants of 1854 have declined to receive verbal evidence; and whether it is the case that no minutes are made of the proceedings of the Commission, or the opinions of the individual Members of that Commission; whether, should the above be the case, he has any objection to state the reasons that had influenced the Commission to adopt such a course?

said, he had no objection to answer the question. It was perfectly true that the Commission did not think it right to take oral evidence. Many matters referred to were only matters of opinion, not of fact, and they did not think it necessary to receive evidence upon them. Another reason was that many of the questions affected not only the Warrants of 1854, but fresh interests which were rising up every day. Commissions, as the noble Lord must know perfectly well, differed very materially from Committees. No record was taken in Commissions as to differences of opinion amongst the Members, but those Members who dissented from the Report could put in a Report of their own, as was done by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry (Mr. Ellis) on the subject of the purchase of Commissions, and in another in which he (Mr. S. Herbert) presided. On both those occasions objections were put in in the way he had mentioned. He believed the Report from the Commission would be in the hands of the Secretary of State early next week.

said, he wished to inquire whether the course adopted by this Commission was the same as had been taken by Commissions in which the right hon. Gentleman had previously acted?

replied, that it was exactly the same in every respect.

said, he would beg to inquire whether the evidence the Commission did take would be published, or any of the letters they received bearing on the subject would be appended to the Report.

said, the Report would be in the hands of the Secretary of State next week, and no doubt he would deal with it in a judicious manner. The Appendix to the Report would contain all the information which the Commissioners thought necessary to justify the conclusion at which they had arrived.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of state for War, for an explanation of the circumstances under which the Victoria Cross was withheld from the late Lieutenant Salkeld?

said, he regretted very much that his hon. Friend had not communicated with him before he placed his notice on the Paper. So far from the Victoria Cross being withheld from the gallant Officer, such a proceeding was never for a moment contemplated. On the contrary, he and Lieutenant Home were to have been the very first who should receive it from Her Majesty. Unfortunately he never lived to receive it, and that cross which, if he had lived, would have been presented to him, the Government now proposed to present to his relatives.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he has made any fresh arrangements for the gratuitous supply of bedding and clothing adapted to the climate, to Her Majesty's Troops in India.

replied, that the gratuituous supply of bedding, &c., must rest with the East India Company. He had made application through the proper channel to endeavour to reduce, as far as possible, the expenses of our soldiers in India. He was happy to say that in future the expense of the soldier's kit on going out would be considerably reduced.

said, he wished, on behalf of the shipping interest, which was greatly interested in the matter, to know why the Commission upon lighthouses has not, as yet, been appointed?

said, that there was no intention of delaying the appointment of the Commission upon Lighthouses, but that, in consequence of the press of public business, it had been difficult to bestow that care upon the Commission which it deserved, but there would be no unnecessary delay in appointing it.

said, he wished to have a definite answer with respect to the intention of Government in regard to the Bill for the reform of the Corporation of London?

replied, that he would take the earliest opportunity of stating to the House the course which Government would adopt with respect to the several Bills at present before Parliament; he therefore hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton would not press his question.

said, he rose, in conformity with an intention he had expressed the other evening, to propose an Amendment in clause 7, in reference to the constitution of the council, by proposing to insert at the end of line 20 the words, "and it shall consist of the following persons." His intention was, that the first members of the Council of India should be nominated in the Act of Parliament. He had himself no intention of proposing the names of its members, for it was not to be supposed that any private Member would assume such a responsibility. If it were the view of Parliament that the Council should be nominated in the Bill, then by the insertion of those words the function of naming them would devolve upon the Government; but, of course, the names would be subject to the review of Parliament, and any hon. Member could object to any name he thought proper. If the names so recommended were ultimately accepted, the new Council would possess all that weight and authority which must accrue from the names of its members having been submitted to the judgment of both Houses of Parliament. When he first made this proposition he was not at all aware that the Government entertained any objection to it. He would state his reasons for the proposition. The first reason was derived from the recollection of what occurred in 1853. By the Act of that year, it was provided that the number of the Directors of the East India Company should be reduced, and the duty of making that reduction was imposed on the Court of Directors. The Directors accordingly had to exclude several of their own body. He had always understood that that was felt to be a peculiarly invidious and painful duty. Though he himself was a party to the enactment, he thought it was done hastily and not well. It was obvious that there was an objection on the score of feeling to such a mode of proceeding; but of course, there was no weight in his objection if the Court of Directors themselves said that there was no objection to such a mode of selection on their part. His object in making this Motion, however, was to clothe the Indian Council with all the moral weight and influence that was consistent with retaining intact the responsibility of the Secretary of State. So long as they did not fetter the Minister, everything they could do to increase the moral weight of the Council was so much good done. He submitted to the Committee, therefore, whether they would not add to the weight of the Council if they named them. He did not, of course, mean to say that the Council twenty years hence would enjoy any particular weight or influence from the fact of Parliament having made the first nomination; but, still a good start was calculated to secure for it a good character hereafter. At a moment of transition from one form of government to another, like the present, it was important that the Council should have all the weight they could give to it. There was also a series of precedents for this course. It had been the practice of Parliament to follow this course when it was constituting bodies which were to be invested with subordinate functions of government of an arduous nature; and the more onerous the duties to be discharged, the more weight would be given to those who were intrusted with them if their appointment received the express approval of Parliament. The Commissioners chosen to carry out the reform of the two Universities were specifically named in the Act of Parliament relating to that subject, and the same remark applied to the case of the Charity Commissioners. That very day they had added a third to the number of precedents of that class by inserting in the Scotch Universities Bill the names of the gentlemen who were to form the Commission to legislate for those Universities. He would go further back, and, at the same time, come nearer to the subject in hand. When Mr. Fox proposed his India Bill, he proposed to intrust the Government of India to two bodies of Commissioners, one a superior Commission of seven members, and the other an assistant Commission of nine. Both in the case of the seven and nine he submitted to Parliament the names of the persons to whom he proposed to entrust that duty. It was true that that Bill did not, for other reasons, become law, and that Mr. Pitt did not adopt a similar course; but then Mr. Pitt altered the whole framework of the Bill and did not call on Parliament to appoint a Commission at all. He submitted to the Committee that both on the ground of precedent and on the ground of reason, it was desirable that to do all they could to add to the weight and influence of those who would have to discharge the difficult duties of supporting and advising the Secretary of State at this critical juncture in carrying on the Government of India; and he would not have made such a proposition if it could lead to any interference with the functions of the Secretary of State; but that would not be so, for the functions both of the Secretary of State and the Council would remain exactly as they were. This proposal was not for the purpose of overriding the Secretary of State, for the Members of the Council would still have to submit their judgments to his and give him all the advice in their power. One merit of the proposal, if adopted, would be that it would rid the Court of Directors of that which must be an invidious and irksome task, namely, the choice of a portion of their Members to act on the Council, to the exclusion of the rest; at the same time that it would give satisfaction generally by showing that the name of every individual Member of the first Council had been submitted to Parliament and open to their approval.

said, he thought that it would not be convenient to accept the proposition of the right hon. Gentleman. He proposed to do away entirely with the principle of electing part of the Council by the members of the Court of Directors. Instead of their doing so, the effect of the Amendment would be that the Government should take on themselves to nominate the whole body under a Parliamentary sanction. In constructing a new machinery for the government of India Her Majesty's Government wished to avoid making needless changes, and be guided as much as possible by analogy to existing circumstances. They now found a Council composed partly of nominees and partly of members elected by the Court of Proprietors. They proceeded upon the same basis, only they proposed to increase the number of nominees and reduce the number of those elected, so as to bring the two to very nearly equal proportions. In reducing the number of the elected members, they had preferred to leave in the hands of the Court of Directors the choice of those who were still to continue members of the new Council. The right hon. Gentleman observed that this principle, which was proposed in the measure of 1853, was very reluctantly adopted by the Court of Directors. From the communication which he (Lord Stanley) had had with the representatives of the Court of Directors, he had heard nothing to induce him to believe that if they were called upon to peform this public duty they would shrink from the performance of it for any such reasons as had been alleged. This proceeding was by no means as invidious as was represented. If they were called upon to exclude a certain small number from those offices, retaining all the rest, the proceeding, he admitted, would be invidious; but when they would only have to choose about one-third or one-fourth of their number to act as members of the Council, the process would be one not of exclusion, but of selection. It was obvious that where election was the rule and exclusion the exception the proceedings would be very invidious; but when the contrary was the case, when the great majority was excluded and the small minority returned, there could not be the same expectations on the part of every member that he should be appointed. As to leaving the other appointments in their own hands, that course was adopted simply because they were a body who had acted well together, who were acquainted with each other's powers and capacity for the public service, and it was naturally considered that they were much better qualified to make the proper selection from among themselves than Government could acting on second-hand information. If these provisions of the present Bill were accepted by the Committee—he meant particularly that provision which excluded the Members of the Council from sitting in Parliament—the new body would be placed upon a different footing to the old. As to the suggestion of placing the names of the first nominees in the Bill, such a proceeding would necessa- rily retard the progress of the Bill. The Government could not make the choice in two or three days. They ought to have a much longer time allowed them to do so. The period allowed after the passing of the Act for making that choice was thirty days. And even a week or ten days' delay, at this period of the Session, would be very inconvenient as regarded the general progress of the public business.

said, he was sorry to find the proposition opposed by the noble Lord, since he thought its adoption would give a better character to the Council. The Court of Directors consisted, not of twenty-four members, but only of eighteen; and as members of the Council could not sit in Parliament, and as it was understood that members of the Council were to give their whole time to the Government—and there were many merchants and men of business now belonging to the Court who could not do so—the number from which the Court could choose would in reality be a very limited one. It was said by some that it was the intention of the Court not to elect their seven members of the Council from among the nominated members of the Court, who were so well able to transact the business, but from the number who had been elected, and if so they were just as likely to elect the worst men as the best to sit upon the Council. The only objection he had heard was that it would be difficult to elect fifteen good men, and with that he agreed, for he could not select more than six or eight men of marked ability.

said, he thought that some amendment was necessary in this clause. He wanted to know what was the meaning of the words "Directors of the said Company, or having been theretofore such Directors," and whether it was proposed that the elected members might be elected from men who had ceased to be Directors.

said, it was intended to leave that option to the Court of Directors, hough probably they would elect them from their own body.

observed that made their duty more invidious still. He should therefore propose to omit the words "or having been theretofore such Directors."

said, that the other night the Motion of the hon. Member for Nottinghamshire (Mr. Barrow) raised a somewhat general discussion on the 3rd clause. He had himself, then, ventured to call the attention of the Committee to the unlimited transfer of the power over the expenditure and patronage of India to the Government. That discussion had been censured. He was, however, glad to say that that discussion had been productive of great advantage; for the noble Lord, during that discussion, was enabled to ascertain the views of hon. Members in different parts of the House, and, in consequence, had given notice of extensive Amendments, which, in his humble judgment, removed all the objections which he had entertained in reference to patronage and expenditure. It would be quite premature to enter further into details. His object in rising was to state that he should wish, immediately after the words which they had just passed, to insert the words "not to be nominees of the Crown." If this were not done, it appeared to him that the elective principle of the measure would be much impaired. Of the entire body of the Court of Directors five were nominees of the Crown, and it was supposed that out of the seven members of Council which the Court of Directors were to choose, they would elect the five nominees of the Crown. The Crown would then appoint eight nominees to the Council; and the first vacancy would be filled by another nominee, so that fourteen out of the fifteen members of the Council might soon be nominees of the Crown. He thought that that would be reducing the elective principle to its minimum. He wished, on the contrary, to avoid that chance. He wished that the choice of the Court of Directors should be limited to those who had been elected. His principle would be no hardship on the five nominees of the Crown, for after the election had taken place the Crown was to exercise the prerogative of nominating eight members of Council, which was a majority of the whole body.

said, he cordially agreed with the right hon. Baronet that the discussion the other evening upon the 3rd clause, so far from being premature, had been productive of much advantage, inasmuch as it had shown the necessity of providing some further security than existed in the Bill against financial abuses. The Government would be ready at all times to receive any suggestion from the right hon. Baronet with that respect to which it was entitled; but the proposition which he had now made did not seem to be calculated to carry out the object for which it was intended. It was said that if this Bill passed in an unaltered state, the Council, though nominally elective, might contain fourteen out of fifteen nominees. The answer was, that if any of the five were elected they would cease to be nominees from the moment of their election. Because a man had been once nominated by the Crown to a certain office it did not follow, if he were subsequently elected by an independent constituency to fill the same office, that he would remain for life a nominee of the Crown. He would sum up what he had to say briefly thus—that if the Government had not thought that the Court of Directors were to be trusted with the exercise of this power, if they had not thought that, irrespective of any preference they might have for elected over nominee members, they would choose those whom they thought fittest to perform the duties of councillor—if they had not thought that, they would not have given them the power. Having that opinion, they thought it right to give them the power and to leave it as unfettered as possible.

said, he could not but express his regret that the Government had not adopted the proposition of his right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham), providing for the election of three names by the Council, and the nomination of one of the three by the Crown, subject to certain rights of the House of Commons. That proposition would have given them a more homogeneous, and therefore more harmonious; body, and moreover would have prevented that mass of abuses which were likely now to grow out of this Council, not the least of which was the number of vested interests and retiring pensions which it would create. Perhaps the best thing would have been to take the short term proposed by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, as there would then be time and opportunity to settle the conditions of retirement. It appeared to him that the tenure of good behaviour, although it might work well in the case of the Judges whose whole conduct was before the country, would hardly do for men who were constantly employed in the recesses of their own offices. In the case of the latter, he feared the tendency would be, unless they were carefully watched and guarded, to lapse into sinecure. The theory they were now proceeding upon seemed to assume that there was a balance in the Council between the elected and the nominated members; but the plan adopted in the Bill might tend to the appointment of a large preponderance of nominees, since vacancies were to be filled up alternately by nomination by the Crown and by election by the Council, in which the nominee members constituted the majority. To regain something like the balance referred to, he should propose that instead of seven members elected by the Directors, the number should be ten; and if that proposition were agreed to, he should afterwards move that five members should be nominated by the Crown instead of eight.

said, that they could not properly consider the proposition without remembering the peculiar nature of the system by which the vacancies were to be filled up. If the right hon. Gentleman's Amendment were agreed to they would have comparatively a very small minority nominated, and the great majority elected by a process of self-election. The right hon. Gentleman said, that as matters stood at present they would have always a majority of Crown nominees. No doubt that might be so, as far as the first appointments went; but as years went on it would be difficult to say whether mortality would be greater amongst the nominees or the elective members. The ultimate proportions of the two branches of the Council would depend upon the accident as to which would live the longest. But when those nominees of the Crown were once nominated, and their nomination being for life, there was no ground for supposing that they would not be as independent in their position as the elected members. The object of the Bill was to strike a balance between the nominated and elected members, and he did think that object would be attained by the division of the Council into ten elected and five nominated members.

observed, that of course the desire of the Committee was to have, as far as possible, an independent Council. Now there were two modes of rendering the Council independent, either by election or by making the tenure of their office for life. The system of self-election adopted by the Government could scarcely he called the elective principle, controlled very much as it was by the Ministers of the Crown. For his own part, he thought that seven was too large a number to be elected; but as so large a number was to be appointed upon the principle of election, he thought the best protection that could be afforded was the tenure of office for life. He should support the Government upon this part of the Bill, his only regret being that so large a proportion of the Council was to be elected.

said, that being in favour of the principle of nomination by the Crown, he trusted that the Committee would not consent to increase the number of the elected members. Indeed he did not understand why the noble Lord retained this fragment of the principle of election.

said, he hoped that the noble Lord would clear up the doubts arising from a statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to the effect that the members of the Council were to devote their whole time to their office. There was no provision for it in the Bill, and many of the present members who were to be eligible were otherwise engaged in various occupations.

said, that the members of the Council would receive a large salary, each £1,200 a year, together with a considerable amount of patronage. It was therefore reasonable to expect that they should devote their time to the performance of the public duties assigned to them. With that understanding, he should not propose to insert anything in the Bill restricting the choice of the Directors. With regard to the members to be nominated by the Crown, their nomination would rest upon the understanding that they would give up their whole time to their duties.

suggested a mode by which the intentions of the Government and of Parliament in this respect could be effected—that the Government should take power in the Bill of reducing the vacancies that might occur in the Council, in case they thought that the business to be done would not require so many hands.

observed that most of the Directors had some other business to attend to, either being bankers or connected with public companies. With regard to the salaries of Members of the Council he thought those Members who were nominated, and who devoted their whole time to the duties of their office, would fully deserve £1,200 a year, while the elected Members, who would probably be engaged in commercial occupations, would be overpaid if they received that amount. In his opinion some rule should be laid down as to the time which the elected Members should devote to their duties, instead of leaving the matter entirely to the honour of individuals. He wished to know, if two or three Members of the Council died, how the vacancies were to be supplied? because under the system proposed the proportions of the Council might for a time be disturbed.

said, he believed that there was no statutory regulations which prohibited persons in public offices from engaging in other occupations, and his impression was that the only influence which could be brought to bear, in case of any misconduct in this respect, was that which was exercised by Parliament upon the Government, and by the Government upon the persons who held public offices. If an attempt were made to prohibit persons in official positions from engaging in other pursuits, it might be held that a man who wrote an article for a newspaper was violating the rule, and he thought the better plan would be to have the Members of the proposed Council upon the same footing with other officers employed under the Crown. This Bill would confer extensive patronage upon the Government and he thought it would be satisfactory to the House and to the country, if Her Majesty's Ministers would declare that none of the appointments at their disposal would be bestowed upon Members of that House, with the exception of hon. Gentlemen who were Directors of the East India Company, but that they would be conferred upon individuals who were acquainted with the affairs of India, or who were otherwise, by their personal qualifications, fitted for official positions. He believed that by pursuing such a course they would best provide an efficient and independent Council for the Secretary of State for India.

said, that he thought, that the Act should contain some clause compelling the Councillors to devote their whole time to their public duties. If that were not so, they might have gentlemen who received these appointments becoming directors of half a dozen companies; and in that case the salary of £1,200, which a Councillor was to have under the Bill, would be excessive. He thought it would be well if after Clause 13 a clause was introduced declaring that no Member of the Council should be capable of engaging in any trade or profession.

said, that the number of offices under the Crown held during good behaviour was very small. The principal class of officers were the Judges, with respect to whom it was quite absurd to suppose—from their exalted position, the character of their duties, and the fact that they were performed in the presence of the Bar—that they would engage in other occupations to the neglect of their offices. The other civil servants held their offices during pleasure, and if they engaged in other occupations they would be quickly brought to a recollection of their duties by a hint that if they did not devote their whole time to the performance of their duties they would be discharged. But now that they were going to appoint a new class of officers who were to hold the offices during good behaviour, but with respect to whom we had not the same guarantees as they possessed in reference to the Judges, he thought it might fairly be doubted whether they ought not to take some further guarantee than a mere understanding for their sedulous devotion to the discharge of their duties.

said, that the understanding would be that those who accepted these offices did so on the implied condition that they were to devote their whole time to the performance of their official duties. He should not object to put such a provision in the Bill if he could satisfy himself of the possibility of framing a clause that would cover all that was wanted and nothing more. There was, however, a well-known case not merely of a subordinate officer of the Government, but a Minister holding an important position, who was a partner in a mercantile establishment. He probably took no active part in the management of the concern; the partnership was no doubt nominal, but he was a partner in such an establishment and he (Lord Stanley) did not know what right that House would have to say that such a nominal connection should not exist in the case of a Member of Council, while it might exist in that of a Member of the Government. But he apprehended that there was already in the Act a remedy for evils that might be expected to arise in this respect. Those who entered the Council would do so on the under, standing that they were to give to the duties of Councillor their whole time, and if they notoriously and openly violated that understanding, they could be removed for official misconduct; for he had no doubt that such conduct, being a breach of faith with the Government, would be held misconduct under the terms of the Act. A suggestion had been made, that if hereafter the number of the Council should be found too large, power should be given to the Government to reduce it; but he thought it would be better to leave the subject in the hands of Parliament. Nothing would be easier than for the Government at any time to propose the reduction of the number of the Council. They had been also told that they ought to insert a proviso in the Bill, or, at any rate, make a declaration that the appointments of Councillors under this Act should be limited to those not Members of that House. That was not necessary on the one hand, while on the other it would be an inadequate security against the abuses which it was intended to guard against. Assuming that there was an intention on the part of the Government to use these appointments for the purpose of patronage, it was not only, or perhaps mainly, in that House that that kind of patronage was likely to be used. There had at all times been within the walls of that House many men of great ability and Indian experience, well qualified to be members of such a Council, and to whom any Government, on which ever side they sat, would be glad to look for assistance in the formation of a Council. He (Lord Stanley) wanted to be free to choose the best men for the Council. No Government could do otherwise without suffering in the opinion of the public and of that House, and, as a mere matter of political loss or gain, the loss by such an abuse of patronage would be greater than the gain. As to the objection that no provision had been made for nominated and elected members of the Council dying alternately, all he could say was, that the Government had secured that their numbers should be as nearly equal as possible in the outset, and that, supposing the present arrangement should be permanent, they would again become equal on the death of the last of the original members of the Council. The arrangement was fair at the outset; it would be perfectly fair some years hence. And he did not know a way to provide, nor did he think it important to provide, for the numbers being equally balanced in the intervening time.

said, he understood clearly that it was the understanding and desire of the Government that those who accepted the office of Councillor should not engage in any other business, and that a breach of faith on that point would be considered such a violation of official duty as would subject the offending party to a loss of office. [Lord STANLEY: Hear, hear!] It had been said that it was impossible to draw up an account securing the devotion of the whole time of the Councillors to their duties; but a similar object had been pursued and attained with respect to the servants of the East India Company by the Act 33 Geo. III., which forbade any one connected with the administration of the affairs of India, from the Governor General down to the lowest officer, from engaging in a trade or traffic.

Yes; but that provision was intended to apply to the company as a trading company.

Yes; but that statute is in force to this day.

repeated that the Act to which the hon. Member referred applied merely to the officers of the company as a company of traders. If any provision were inserted on this point in the present Act of Parliament, it would be better to employ something like the language of the orders of the Poor Law Commission, which required not that every union officer should abstain from trade or traffic, but "should give his whole time to the union." Those words had proved effectual for the attainment of the object in view.

said, he would submit whether it would be wise, expedient, or practicable to exclude any member of the Council on account of transacting "any other species of business whatever." The end of such a provision would be that they would be obliged to select men who could do nothing else. Another important question was, whether the members of the Council were to be excluded from Parliament or not. He had entertained some doubts, but upon the whole thought it was better they should be admitted. But if they admitted them to the House, then they would have other business to transact besides that of the Council. The great object ought to be to have a Council of intelligent and independent advisers, and not a mere Council of clerks. Would they exclude men because they wrote for the public papers or reviews? They would not be able to carry into effect any such provision. If they would have none but men who must give up their whole time for £1,200 a year, then he must say, they were going in a very fair way to emasculate the Council. His own opinion was, that it was better to leave it to the sense of honour of the members, and their sense of duty, than to impose any such rigid restrictions.

said, that in the course of the discussion two things essentially distinct had been confounded. It was one thing to say that the whole time of the person appointed should be at the disposal of the Council, and another that he should not engage in any trade or traffic whatever. The two things were quite distinct. What his noble Friend had said was simply this—that it was expected that the time of every person who joined the Council should be at the disposal of the Council. But to frame a clause by which every member of the Council would be bound to be engaged in no trade or traffic whatever was a very different matter. Such an arrangement with regard to the Government would have deprived the country a few years ago of the services of one of its most able men, inasmuch as he was a member of a mercantile firm at the same time that he was a member of the Government. If it should be found that a member of the Council did not devote sufficient time to the Council the Government could take steps to remove him for misbehaviour. Then, again, it was always in the power of Parliament to address the Crown for the removal of any Councillor who did not perform his duties, so that there was a double check—one in the hands of the Executive, and the other in the hands of Parliament. Every one must desire to see the Council formed of men of the greatest experience and practical ability, and it might in some cases be that their very connection with some other pursuit was a guarantee for the possession of those qualities, and he could not therefore consent to the proposal.

said, he could not understand the application of a principle to members of the Council which it had not been considered necessary to apply to Ministers of State. Speaking with accurate knowledge, he had known Cabinet Ministers in both Houses of Parliament, and hon. Members holding high position, who were partners in breweries or insurance companies, or who were connected with some commercial pursuit. He saw no reason for introducing any such principle as absolutely to prohibit members of the Council from being engaged in any other occupation. They would be always under the review of that House, and they would be actuated by a sense of duty, and any such restriction would probably interfere to prevent persons of the highest qualification from undertaking the duties of Councillor. The duties of the office need certainly not occupy the whole of a man's time, and he should certainly deprecate the insertion in the Bill of any such provision as that members of the Council should be absolutely bound down not to follow any other occupation. If a Councillor neglected his duties, that would be a gross offence, amounting to a misdemeanour, for which he might be removed from his office.

said, he wished to point out that the hon. Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry) had placed a very strange construction upon what had been said by his noble Friend. His noble Friend had stated, what was the unanimous opinion of his colleagues, that those Members of the Council appointed by Her Majesty would be expected to place their whole time at the disposal of the Secretary of State, but he did not at all intend to say that the whole of their time should be devoted to the duties of their office, or that they should not be allowed to do anything else. As regarded those Members of the Council appointed by election, his noble Friend would not for a moment lay down the principle that they should be required to spend the whole of their time in the fulfilment of their duty as Councillors. It was very possible that persons might be elected from their connection with the Court of Directors, who at the same time would be occu- pied with public or private interests, but he did not think that any disadvantage would result from that; but, on the contrary, the election of such men might be the means of introducing into the Council a great deal of practical knowledge and experience. In effecting a transition from a Government of an anomalous character to one which in time would assume a more regular form, it would not be wise to adopt a principle which would negative a practice which had in the Government that was about to be abolished been productive of beneficial results, and it would be highly impolitic, in his opinion, to define by a clause in an Act of Parliament what time the members of the Council, who would of course be bound by their own sense of duty, should devote to the duties of their office.

said, he understood from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that an East India Director carrying on the business of a banker in the city might be appointed a Councillor by the East India Company; that while he so acted he would have £1,200 a year; and that after doing some occasional duties for a few years he might retire on a pension of £500 a year. He thought that if the Committee sanctioned that arrangement they were entering upon a most prodigal expenditure.

intimated, that the discussion which was going on was most irregular, the real question before the House being whether ten or seven Members should be appointed by election.

on the ground that the East India Company and stockholders would still have important rights, involving £110,000,000 of money, which might be influenced by the acts of the proposed Council, urged the importance of appointing persons upon it who would command their confidence. With that view he should support the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman.

said, he thought it would be better to have two-thirds of the Council elected and one-third nominated, instead of the proportions fixed by the Bill. If the nominated were to the elected members in the first place as eight to seven, the former, if they hung together—which, however, they were not likely to do—might secure a continued preponderance of nominee members. He certainly thought also that when a person accepted an office, who himself intended to do his duty, he would not engage in multifarious occupation which would interfere with the performance of those duties, but at the same time he would not bind persons by a strict rule in an Act of Parliament. It was absurd to say that men engaged in literary or scientific pursuits should not be eligible for the Council. Such a rule might exclude some of the best men. Moreover, he thought it would be most unwise to exclude the business element. There were many subjects, as finance, exchanges and other matters, which came before the Secret Committee of the Directors, with which he confessed he was not competent to deal, and he thought it would be most injudicious in the proposed Council to debar the Government of the assistance of those who particularly understood those questions.

remarked, that both the noble Lord the President of the India Board and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle were beginning to show signs that they thought the Council too numerous; and he did wish the noble Lord would at once act upon his better judgment and reduce it. He had no objection to gentlemen engaged in literary occupations being Councillors, but it would be most improper that persons engaged in trade or traffic of any kind should be so, as they would have to deal in public contracts. At present the Court of Directors expended £4,000,000 of the public money annually upon contracts in the City of London, and therefore it was that although all the great towns had petitioned against the continuance of the Company, the City of London had at all times upheld it. When the proper time arrived he should move the insertion of the words.

suggested the propriety of confining the discussion to the question before the House, namely, whether the number of elected members should be ten or seven.

said, he would move to add the following proviso at the end of the clause:—

"Provided always that if the Court of Directors of the East India Company shall refuse, or shall for such fourteen days neglect to make such election of such seven persons, and to certify the names of such persons as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, by warrant under Her Royal sign manual, within thirty days after the expiration of such fourteen days, to appoint from among the said Directors seven persons to make up the full number of the said Council."

said, he wished to inquire what provision was contemplated in the event of those elected refusing to serve.

thought it was scarcely necessary to provide for what was so unlikely to occur.

said, he would propose that the words "or other duly qualified persons," should be added to meet the difficulty.

explained that the Court of Directors were required to certify the readiness of their members to serve as well as to elect, and the proviso gave power to the Crown to appoint if Members were not ready to serve within the time. He would, however, undertake to introduce words to obviate the objection, in case any member, who might be elected, should unexpectedly refuse to serve.

suggested that it would be better that vacancies occurring in the number of the nominated members should be filled up by the Crown, and those occurring among the elected ones by the Council—a course which would keep the proportions as originally constituted.

said, he regretted that the Amendment he was about to propose had not fallen into abler hands; but having waited for a long while to see whether any other hon. Member would place anything of the kind upon the Paper, and finding that no one else did so, he felt compelled to do so himself. The Amendment was strongly in accordance with the sixth Resolution, to the spirit of which it had been understood the Government would adhere; and he could not understand how it was that the spirit of that Resolution had come to be departed from; nor upon what principle it had been decided to form the Council in a way which must result in the Council—at first, partly elective and partly nominative becoming completely nominative. It was desirable that such a Council should neither be the tool of the Treasury bench by being completely nominative, nor the tool of the Opposition by being completely elective; and to secure the complete independence of the Council his Amendment had been framed.

said, that this question had been several times argued at great length, and he did not wish to re-open it. If a constituency could have been obtained which would have efficiently discharged its duties, he should have preferred an election by such a body to the plan proposed in the Bill; but no such constituency could be obtained, and therefore he should oppose this Amendment.

said, that when he voted that a portion of the Council should be elected he certainly intended, and he believed most other Members intended, that there should be a constituency. It would, no doubt, be difficult to obtain one, but he thought that a Government which set itself seriously to work might effect that object. The constituency provided for in this Amendment was too numerous. He should prefer one of about 1,000 persons, to be divided into panels in the mode sketched out by the Earl of Ellenborough.

said, that although the right hon. Gentleman in the chair had not observed him, he had said "No," when the question was put on his Amendment on clause 9, as he wished to take a division, in order to test who were in favour of an independent election of the Council.

said, he wished to propose the insertion of words providing that the major part of the persons nominated by the Crown, to form the first Council, as well as those elected by the Court of Directors, should have resided or served for ten years in India. With this view he should move as an Amendment in line 2 to insert the words "or major part" after the word "and;" and also in line 7 to omit the word "eight," and insert "nine."

said, he should move to leave out the words "good behaviour," in order to insert the words "five years, and to be eligible for re-election."

said, that the Amendment raised the whole question of the dependence or independence of the Council, which had been discussed on the Resolutions, and with regard to which the opinion of the House was decidedly expressed for the longer term. He thought that by the tenure laid down in the Bill the best guarantee for the independence of the Council was obtained.

begged the Committee to observe the effect of the clause as it stood. It had been determined to have a Council for India now, but some few years hence, when the present state of things in that country had subsided, the House might come to the conclusion that it would be better to have no Council, and the consequence would be that those gentlemen who were elected during good behaviour, that is for life, would hold vested interests, and could not be dispossessed without burdening the revenues of India with an intolerable amount of compensation. If the hon. Gentleman divided, he would support his Amendment.

said, that some explanation was wanted from the Government on this subject. Suppose that the noble Lord thought it right hereafter to diminish the number of the Council from fifteen to twelve, were the gentlemen who were reduced to have compensation for the loss of a life office. It was advisable, at this stage, to look to this possibility. He was opposed to a Council, for he could not understand that it would be of any assistance to the Minister. If members were appointed for life, a man who was appointed at thirty might live to be eighty, and every one knew how invidious a task it was to deal with an official who had outlived his capability. What good advice could a man give the Minister who had not been in India for fifty years? The best plan for the Minister to adopt would be to take as Council the men who returned from India year by year, who were well acquainted with the local circumstances of the country, and who were uninfluenced by Parliamentary intrigues.

said, that it had been urged that if it was considered hereafter advisable to abolish the Council, there would be a difficulty in knowing what to do with members who had been appointed for life. But it was thought that the best security for the independence of the Council was that the members should hold their office for life and during the continuance of the Council. If the Government thought that the Council would exist only for two or three years they would not appoint the members in the manner proposed; but in their opinion the establishment of a Council was the proper mode of governing India, and would be permanent. All that the noble Lord, the President of the Board of Control, had said was that, if hereafter the Council should be considered too numerous, certain vacancies would not be filled up.

said, that he should vote for the Motion of his hon. Friend, to omit the words "good behaviour," as that would be consistent with a subsequent Amendment which he (Viscount Palmerston) intended to propose, "that the members of the Council should be appointed for ten years." This was a very important question. The point at issue now with regard to the Council was of the greatest importance in reference to the whole Bill. If he understood the object of the Committee, it was to make the Council independent. They were all agreed that there was to be a Council. He regretted that it was so numerous, and he believed that out of fifteen members holding the office of Councillor one-half at least would hold sinecures, but as the House had determined on that number he should not ask them to re-consider it. Nevertheless, he was sure that it would turn out that they had created seven or eight sinecure offices, with salaries of £1,200 a year, and retiring pensions. That was what he wished the Committee not to do. What was the object in view in reference to the formation of the Council? It was that it should be independent. Very good. Independent, not for action—no one maintained that; for when he, on a former occasion, used the words "Executive Council," the Chancellor of the Exchequer de- nied that it was an "executive," but simply an "administrative" Council. It was to be a Council of advice. The principle was, the Secretary of State was to be responsible; and the members of the Council should be independent enough to give him honest advice. He thought that the Government had taken a cumbrous way to obtain that. In order to make them independent it was proposed to make them hold their offices practically for life; or if they should become incapacitated by age or infirmity, they were to have retiring allowances varing from £600 to £800 a year. He (Viscount Palmerston) proposed a shorter and cheaper method of getting an independent Council, and that was by causing them to hold their offices for a fixed period of ten years, and that they should not be capable of being re-elected or reappointed. Surely a Councillor holding office in that way was as independent as he could well be, for he had no hope by currying favour with the Government of getting re-elected or re-appointed. Could anything be more objectionable than appointing Councillors for life? The main object was to have the advantage of Indian experience, but as his hon. Friend (Mr. D. Seymour) had said, Indian experience, if it was to be of any value, must be experience of the India of the day. Experience which had become obsolete would be worse than useless, for it might lead to error. India was in a state of transition and advancement from its present condition, and the experience of a man who left India ten or fifteen years ago would be of little value compared with that of a man who had recently left that country, and knew the changes that were going on and the matters that were in progress. He knew he should be met by the objection that the Council would get more knowledge of India by transacting the business of that country at home than they would get in India itself. If that were so, why tie up the choice of the Government to persons who had Indian experience? In fact this came to the adoption of the principle of the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), who, instead of a Council, would have permanent Under Secretaries of Indian experience. By making the office for life they would get men of obsolete experience of India, and of growing age and infirmity; and it would become an effete Council, many members of which would hold sinecures. Let the Committee consider how, in this way, they would debar the Government from taking advantage of the services of men of ability) who would be constantly coming home from civil or military service in India, in possession of all the current knowledge, but whose advice would be unavailable, because the Council would be full of old men whom you could not get rid of, and who would prefer their full Salaries of £1,200 a year to a retirement on £800. Then look at the question of the accumulation of retired allowances. It might be said that that was nothing to their constituencies, as it would only be a charge on the Indian revenue; but he trusted that no such argument would be urged in that House. If they wanted independence in the Council, it would be equally secured by fixing a final limit to the service of the Councillors, say ten or twelve years, while the Government would have from time to time opportunities of infusing fresh blood and recent experience into the Council, and thus making it more valuable and useful. There was another question to be considered. It was stated, and it was admitted by the noble Lord the President of the Board of Control, that in course of time such improvements would be made in the transaction of business, that fifteen members might be found too large a number for the Council, and that a smaller number could do the business required of them. According to the plan proposed, however, every member would have a vested interest and a Parliamentary title to compensation or a retiring pension. If he might be allowed to use the expression, without meaning anything offensive, but which really designated the proposed Council, he would say that it was the most gigantic job which was ever proposed for the sanction of Parliament. There were hon. Gentlemen in the House who prided themselves on being administrative Reformers. He claimed their votes, for he was sure none of them could agree to such a Council as the Bill proposed to create. He also claimed the support of the Government; for surely, as a body, they could not think this a proper arrangement, and the strength they had gained in recent divisions ought to make them feel independent of the support they had hitherto been so solicitous to catch. In the short voyage which they had hitherto made they had trimmed their sails to catch every breeze which might fill their sails from whatever quarter it might blow. But now they ought to feel themselves strong enough to act upon their own opinions. He was sure they could not suppose that the best mode of securing the independence of the Council was that proposed by, the Bill, but that they must admit such an object would be more certainly and cheaply attained by limiting the period of service to ten years, without re-election or reappointment. At all events, if he could not claim the support of the whole Government, he would claim that of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, for he recollected a few years ago that that right hon. Gentleman, in his desire for economy, wished to reduce at one fell swoop, the salaries of all the hardworking clerks in the public service by 10 per cent. He was sure, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman could not support such an unncessary expense as this plan would cast on the Indian revenue, and which would be an obstacle in the way of the future retrenchment which the Government and Parliament would have to consider. He should support the Motion of his hon. Friend for striking out the words "good behaviour," in order to insert the words "for ten years, without being capable of re-election or re-appointment."

said, that the example of the noble Lord afforded a good argument against turning away men who had faithfully served them. The noble Lord had served the public a great many more than ten years, and he afforded a signal instance of the fact that vigour often remained to considerable age in gentlemen who were engaged in the public service. He thought that it would be a most ungracious thing to turn out the Councillors after they had served ten years.

said, the question raised by the noble Lord was a difficult one, but on the whole he was in favour of the proposition of the Government. The object desired was to obtain the independence of the Council combined with the complete efficiency of its members. That object might be gained either by the proposition of the Government or of the noble Lord, but he thought it could not be obtained by that of the hon. Member (Mr. Gregson). It might be possible that Members of the Council might be prevailed on to give up their emoluments as Councillors, but they might not be so ready to give up their patronage.

said, it was most unfair of the noble Lord to call on Administrative Reformers to support this Amendment. The question of expense was not before them, and it was a little remarkable that members on the chief Opposition benches were always asking hon. Members below the gangway to vote on something else than that which was under discussion. When the financial question was before them it would be time enough to consider it. The real question they had now to consider was when the Council were to retire. He thought it would be highly inexpedient to be constantly shifting the Council. The noble Lord had said he hoped to see great changes in India in fifteen years, but a great nation which had remained unchanged for 2000 years was not to be changed in fifteen years, and it was the attempt to change India in one man's life time that had caused the destruction of the present system of government. He believed that the most likely change they would see in India in the next fifteen years would be the expulsion of the British from it. It was the want of a Council of advice which enabled the Government to carry on a war with Persia through the Indian army which was a main cause of the insurrection. An executive Council was a phantom which had long flitted before the eyes of the noble Lord, and had reduced him to the pitiable condition in which he now was. By the course he had pursued his majority of 400 had given place to a minority of 149 on Indian questions. He would suggest to Her Majesty's Ministers to consider whether they could not provide that after a certain period one member only should retire from the council in a year, so that no violent change should take place, while at the same time new blood would be constantly added.

said, that in order to have an efficient Council it should be subject to renewal. He could not agree with the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton), that no change should be looked for in India. Education, the diffusion of intelligence, and the introduction of railways, had already produced a great change, and it was an antiquated and antediluvian notion that there was to be no further change. He strongly adhered to the proposition of the hon. Member for Lancaster, for he thought that in five years the Councillors would have every opportunity of qualifying themselves for renewal of office; but if they accepted the Council proposed by the Government the members would be so long in office that it would become effete. He should support the Amendment.

said, the question was how they could ensure steady progress in the government of India by providing a scheme for the periodical admission of new blood into the Council. A Council elected for ten years, and not re-eligible, would have all the elements of independence. Those persons who held office for a certain term of years generally showed more zeal and energy than those who held office for life. He believed, upon the whole, it would be found that the duties of the Council would be light. If the Council were appointed for life it would not be so independent as if appointed for a definite period. But it was said they would not be able to procure the services of such good men. Now, no one could deny that the gentlemen who had been nominated under the Act of 1853 were not eminently qualified for the duties they had to perform, and yet those gentlemen only had £500 a year, and held office for five years. It was proposed by the Government to nominate the Council for life, with salaries of £1,2000, with retiring pensions of from £500 to £800, and leave them a large patronage. The present inducements which they offered were quite sufficient, and why, therefore, should they run into this wasteful extravagance?

said, he would merely ask whether, if the Amendment or the Motion was carried, there ought not to be a proviso to prevent the Council claiming compensation?

said, he would suggest the propriety of omitting all the words in the clause after the words, "upon an address of both Houses of Parliament," on the ground that nothing ought to be inserted in the Bill that would imply a stigma or reflection upon the character of the Council. If any Member of the Council were guilty of criminal conduct the criminal law would be sufficient to deal with him; and with regard to "disgraceful conduct" he would not define the meaning of the phrase.

said, that as the Committee had determined that the Members of the Council should hold office during "good behaviour," he wished to direct attention at the words which were adopted in the Act of 1853 with respect to the nominees of the Crown, who under that Act held their offices for a much shorter period. This matter was then very carefully considered, and in Section 11 of that Act, regulating the tenure of the nominees of the Crown, these words were inserted, "that they should be removable by Her Majesty from inability or misbehaviour." He would suggest to the Government, therefore, whether they might not adopt the recommendation of his right hon. Friend (Sir G. C. Lewis), and use these words in the 11th section of the Act of 1853.

said, if he remembered rightly, certain persons were, on the occasion referred to, appointed by the Crown, not to be servants of the Crown, but Directors of the East India Company. If special power had not then been reserved to Her Majesty the Crown could not have removed such parties under ordinary circumstances. The present case, however, was very different from that. Those Members of the Council were only to hold office upon the tenure of good behaviour and they were removable upon an Address to the Crown from either House of Parliament. He proposed to omit all the words after "Houses of Parliament," believing them to be wholly unnecessary.

said, he must express his opinion that some other words ought to be adopted, so as to give power for the removal of Members of the Council who were ineligible for their office by misconduct or otherwise.

said, that the case referred to by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle was not parallel with the present. In the former case the Directors were not removable by the Crown nor by an Address of either House. They held their offices independently as Directors. The present case resembled rather that of the Judges, and consequently, if any Member of the Council misbehaved in his office, it was competent for any Member of that House to come down and move an Address for his removal. The same rule would also apply to cases of inability.

wished to know how the noble Lord intended to treat the case of a Member becoming bankrupt or insolvent.

said, that the County Court Judges were removable on the ground of inability or misbehaviour.

in reply to the hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) said, if any Member was guilty of any conduct disgraceful or discreditable, the Bill gave power for the removal of such party by means of an Address from either House of Parliament. As to any removal on the ground of inability, there would be a great difficulty in putting such machinery in force, as there was an indisposition to take harsh proceedings under such circumstances. He apprehended that in the case of ineligibility the removal of a person might be effected by negotiation.

said, he apprehended that some individuals occupying the position of Judges might be induced to remain for a much longer time than they ought, if they were not induced to retire from an apprehension of an Address being moved in Parliament for their removal. He apprehended in the present case that the same feeling would exist among the Members of the Council.

said, there was nothing so difficult to punish as incapacity. By making an attempt to define incapacity, they would be raising an obstacle to the independence of the Members, which it was the object of the clause to secure. He therefore hoped that the Committee, on consideration, would not sanction the view which the right hon. Baronet, who had offered so many suggestions worthy of their attention, had taken in respect to this matter.

said, it was desirable that the members of Council should not be engaged in trade. He had understood that this was the opinion of the Government; if so, a provision to that effect should be introduced into the clause.

said, if a member was appointed on the understanding that he should give the whole of his time to his duty, and if he did not do so, it would be a breach of the understanding, and would come under the definition of misbehaviour.

said, that notwithstanding what had been said, he must still urge that the words "or concerned in any trade or traffic whatever" should be introduced into the clause. It was well known that a late President of the Board of Control had been engaged as a sleeping partner in a large commercial concern; and he wished to prevent anything of this kind occurring with the new Council.

said, he had a prior Amendment to make, which was in line 22, to leave out the word "no," and to add the letters after the word member. He thought that the members of Council ought to be allowed to sit in Parliament. The presence of the Directors of the East India Company had been found most valuable in times past, and surely in future it was to be expected that the presence of the members of Council would be eminently conducive to the success of their deliberations, especially on matters connected with Indian finance. They had laboured for months to establish the independence of the Council, and he asked them to give to that independence one more bulwark, by allowing to the members the liberty of a free statement of their opinions in Parliament. He might add that in the course of nearly three-quarters of a century there had been only one instance of a conflict of opinion between a member of the Court of Directors in Parliament and a President of the Board of Control.

said, that they wanted information as to what had been going on for years back in India, and they could not get it from any quarter so well as from the members of Council who were employed daily in transacting business connected with the subject. Great benefit would result to the House from the presence of some of the members of the Council, and he hoped they would not be shut out as was proposed in the clause.

said, he thought that the proposition made by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Liddell) was well worthy of consideration. Now that the House was about to assume to itself so large a share in the management of Indian affairs, the knowledge and experience of those gentlemen who were to be members of the Council would be very valuable to the Legislature. No doubt the same arguments as those Gentlemen would use on any particular question could be conveyed by them second hand, if the clause passed in its present shape, but not at all with the same force or the same amount of responsibility as if they themselves had seats.

said, he also thought that the matter was well deserving of the serious attention of the Committee. For his own part he thought that it would prove advantageous to have in that House—and the benefit would also be experienced in Committees up-stairs—Gentlemen practically acquainted with Indian affairs. It would also add weight to the newly constituted body, and give them strength, in which he was sure they were likely to prove very defective.

said, he was far from undervaluing the advantages that might result from the presence in that House of gentlemen thoroughly conversant with Indian affairs; but at the same time, from the number of gentlemen of position who were continually returning from India and obtaining seats in Parliament, he believed the House would never be without hon. Members capable of giving them advice on Indian questions. There were classes of people whom that House always had excluded, and always would exclude from sitting among them; and there could be no class more justly excluded than the members of the new Council. He did not in the abstract defend the principle of exclusion, but he thought that to admit members of the Council into that House would have the effect of renewing those discussions which had taken place elsewhere, and that the House would, in point of fact, be called upon to review the proceedings of a deliberative body. He would therefore oppose the Amendment.

said, it was difficult, perhaps, to support a proposition that had been condemned by two Governments, but nevertheless he thought it right that the Committee should have fully before it the whole question before they decided the matter. It had been said that generally speaking it was not desirable to restrain the choice of electors. Without a strong necessity they would not say, "Here is a man you desire to elect, but there is a law which restrains you from so doing." There had, however, been an inclination to press the principle of exclusion too far, for some years ago there was a proposition before the House which would have deprived them of the advantage of the experience and knowledge of a man like Sir W. Grant. A similar thing was now urged against these Indian Councillors; for it was said, "If you accept of office, you shall be excluded from Parliament," and that would probably deprive the House of the greatest experience they could acquire in Indian affairs. The hon. Gentleman who had last spoken appeared to be afraid that if the members of the Council were admitted to that House there would be a renewal of discussions which had taken place elsewhere, and that it would be better that the conduct of Indian affairs in that House should rest in the hands of the President and Vice President of the Council. Now, he had heard a story in which it was related of a Welsh magistrate, that after listening to the statement of counsel on one side he stopped the statement of the opposing advocate, telling him that he had made up his mind upon hearing one side, and if he heard the other it would only confuse him; and the hon. Gentleman appeared to think that that House would be in the same position if they heard both sides of the case upon Indian affairs. Even if the Minister for India should find a member of his Council taking a different view from him in that House on an Indian question, no doubt that Minister would be able to maintain his own opinions, and to enforce them with his eloquence and the weight due to his authority. But, appealing from mere hypothesis to actual experience, it was found that the members of the Court of Directors who had seats in that House generally lent their influence in favour of the Government. It tended to temper the heat of discussion in that House, that in the chances and changes of parties any man might in his turn be called upon to assume official responsibility. But under this Bill the most violent Indian agitator who might sit in that House would know that, by virtue of his seat there, he was excluded from the Council, and would thus have no motive for moderating the force of his invectives. No doubt, in questions of this kind they had to balance the probable advantages of any particular course against its disadvantages; but it seemed to him that, though the presence of a particular member of the Council in that House might be inconvenient to the Government, the public benefit that would accrue from certain members having seats in Parliament would more than counterbalance any such inconvenience. An eminent Indian statesman, on returning to this country, might have a preference for a seat in that House, and at the same time be willing, if allowed to do so, to promote the welfare of a distant country, to which he was heart and soul attached, by acting as a member of this Council. His exclusion would be most inexpedient, and abhorrent to the general spirit of our law.

said, he quite agreed with the noble Lord that in this case they had to balance opposite benefits and opposite inconveniences; but he could not admit that the preponderance of advantage was in favour of members of the Council sitting in that House. He was, however, quite ready to allow that there was much to be said in favour of that proposition. But when the noble Lord told him that it was not desirable to restrict the choice of the electors, he (Lord Stanley) would remind the noble Lord that already many classes—classes of high consideration too—were excluded from that House, for no other reason than the supposition that the duties which they performed out of the House were incompatible with the duties which they would be called upon to perform in it. The Judges and the permanent officials of the various public departments were now excluded from that House; so was the whole clerical profession; and therefore the extension of this exclusion to the fifteen members of this Council involved no new principle, and no considerable extension of the one existing. As a matter of personal inconvenience, there was no class on which it would press less harshly than on men who had passed their lives in India, and were bound by no political tie to any constituency. The object of the House in framing such a Council as that which had been agreed on was, that gentlemen who had resided in India, and who might therefore be considered most competent to deal with Indian affairs, should sit on the Council; but if they were admitted to that House, was there no fear of the patronage put into the hands of the Government being abused for political purposes? Might not the fittest candidate be rejected in favour of an inferior man on an understanding that he should obtain a seat in that House, and give his support to the Government, though such understanding might never come before Parliament or the public? He did not affirm that any Government would take such a course as that, but they ought to keep the Indian Council not only free from a transaction of that nature, but free from even a suspicion of the kind. Again, what was to be the relative position of the Council with the Minister with which it was to deal? With seats in that House, the Councillors of the Indian Minister would be his critics rather than his colleagues. Association with the Minister in office and criticism of his conduct in Parliament were functions necessarily incompatible. The Minister might consult with great advantage a member of his Council whose views were opposed to his own; but if the former knew that whatever passed between them in confidence was likely to be afterwards used in that House, and for his disadvantage, the mutual confidence which might otherwise be perfectly reconcilable with differences of opinion would be wholly destroyed. He did not imply by this argument that the supposed member of the Council would make an improper use of his information. If a man were to argue at all he must make use of all the information he possessed, no matter in what manner he might have acquired it. The result would be, that a member of Council having a seat in Parliament, knowing that he was about to differ with the Minister upon an important question, would decline to argue it at the Council table, but would say when the matter came before Parliament he should there oppose the views of the Minister. There would be a risk of the duties of one character or the other, as members of Council or Members of Parliament, being performed in an unsatisfactory manner. He admitted that those who had acted in a somewhat analogous character, as Directors of the East India Company, had generally maintained very fair relations with the Minister with whom they acted, but those relations had arisen from accident; but, in creating a new Council, he did not think it was advisable that the system should be continued.

said he thought that this was one of the most important clauses in the Bill, and that it would be a great misfortune if the very limited Indian information which the House possessed should be still further contracted by the disqualification of members of the Council. There had always hitherto been a standing Council for India, in the shape of Directors who were Members of the House. He had never known a case in which a Director had been guilty of an indiscretion in the discharge of his Parliamentary duties. He should therefore support the Amendment.

said, although something might be said in favour of this Amendment, the preponderance of the argument was against it, for what the House required in the Council was indepen, dence and non-obstruction. But the Members, if introduced into Parliament, would either be dependent on the Minister or obstructives. Surely it was a small amount of independence they were looking for, if they were to be satisfied with a gentleman who committed no indiscretion in debate. He was sure the result of such an experiment would be an unseemly and inconvenient opposition to the President of the Board of Control by members of his own council in that House. And as for Indian information in that House, there would be no want of gentlemen returning from that country who would be found in Parliament. The adoption of the Amendment would be to make the House and subserviency to the Minister the high road to the Council on the part of members of the House.

said, he had heard nothing on the opposite side which at all weighed with him against the arguments of the noble Lord the Member for London.

said, he could not see why if Members of the House of Lords were eligible, Members of this House should be disqualified.

said he wished to suggest that the wording of the clause should be so altered as to admit of persons who received peerages for services in India serving on the Council.

said, there was no necessity for the provision alluded to, as it was very unlikely that persons who had obtained peerages for services in India would seek seats in the Council.

said, that an instance in support of the proposition might be found in Lord Elphinstone, who would on his return from India be a valuable member of Council if not legally excluded.

said, he must decline to accede to the proposition.

said, he thought it was understood that no opposed business was to be taken after twelve o'clock.

said, he should propose that the Bill be then read a second time, on the understanding that the discussion be taken at a further stage of the measure.

said, the Amendment had been rejected under rather peculiar circumstances. Three weeks ago the subject had been debated, and on that occasion it was evident that a large majority were opposed to the measure. The debate was then adjourned on the understanding, as he thought, that the Bill was to be abandoned; yet now, at past midnight, when the House did not well know upon what question they were dividing, the second reading had been carried. He believed that the more the measure was examined the less it would be liked, and he hoped, therefore, it would be thrown out on going into Committee.

said, he rose to move the addition of the following clause:—

"That nothing herein contained shall render valid any marriage with the sister of a deceased wife, if either of the parties to such marriage shall, after having contracted such marriage, and before the passing of this Act, have married any other person."

suggested that the Motion should not be pressed at that late hour.

remarked, that the clause should be differently worded, for as it stood it contemplated that which could not take place by law—the marriage of a man with his deceased's wife's sister.

said, that the case contemplated by the clause had arisen, and that was the reason why it was proposed. The matter was fully discussed yesterday.

said, he should move that the debate be adjourned.

said, that if a debate were to arise on the clause it could not be proceeded with at that hour, and suggested that the Government should give a morning sitting for the purpose of the discussion.

said, he thought the matter lay within the smallest possible compass. The object of the clause was to meet the particular case of a man who, having married his deceased wife's sister, and afterwards presuming on the illegality of that marriage, married another woman. It would except the second marriage from the operation of the Act.

observed, that if the question was fully debated yesterday it would be hardly gracious to prevent the noble Lord going on with his Motion, especially as private Members had cheerfully given up to the Government every night in the week.