said, he wished to propose as an Amendment, that the salary should be £500 a year, which was the remuneration agreed upon in 1853, when the question was debated at some length. No difficulty has been found in obtaining the services of competent persons at that salary. He did not think that fifteen Coun- cillors could be employed during the whole of their time in managing the affairs of India, and they would have a great deal of patronage, which was an important element in the consideration of the question.

observed, that he could not assent to the reduction. It was desirable that they should have the very best men upon the Council, and as the members would be required to reside during the greater part of the year in London, he did not think the remuneration proposed was too large. He might add that, in pursuance of a suggestion which had been made on the previous evening, he had prepared a proviso to the effect that if Parliament should hereafter deem it desirable to reduce the number of Councillors, no member should be entitled to compensation on that account who had not served for ten years.

(who had also given notice of a Motion to reduce the salary to £500 per annum) said that he should support the Amendment. Previously to 1853 the salaries of the Directors had been only £300 a year, and he apprehended that an attendance of two hours a day for once a week would be ample. If so, £500 a year would be an adequate remuneration; but if the whole of their time should be taken up by the nature of the duties reposed in them, £1,200 would not be sufficient.

said, that the hon. Member was under a mistake as to the time which would be occupied in discharging the duties of members of the Council. No doubt the Council would only sit once a week; but it was anticipated that the duties devolving on the members, in their capacity as members of committees, would require their daily attendance for a considerable time during the day. The Council would therefore not come under the category of Boards where attendance once a week was the general routine of duty. On the whole, the Government considered that £1,200 was a just and proper salary for the members of the Council. They had fixed it at that amount, as there were many eminent individuals whom it would be desirable to have in the Council who were not in the habit of residing in London, and a less allowance would not meet their extra expenditure.

said, he thought that it was high time that the duties of the Councillors and the way in which they were to perform them should be clearly defined. His own belief was, that fifteen members were too many to have upon the Council, and that at least half of these offices would be complete sinecures. The proposal would exactly double the expense of the home Government of India, and as to the new Councillors devoting the whole of their time to Indian affairs, he did not believe that they would do anything of the sort. He would ask the Committee to take the Indian register, to look at the first four names upon the direction, and to say whether it was possible to expect that men who were at the head of great commercial establishments would give up all their time to serve upon the Council. The gentlemen who were to be elected by the Directors of the Company could not be expected to give so much time to this business as the members to be nominated by the Crown, and if they were required to do so they ought to have a larger salary.

said, that it would be very invidious to establish a different scale of salary for the elected and the nominated members. It was not proposed absolutely to bind the members of the Council entirely to abandon all other employment; but he considered that the duties of this office would be so heavy that a great deal of their time would be required, and they would be bound to give as much of their time to the duties of their office as might be necessary. He could not pretend to say what the difference in expense would be between the existing and the proposed system of direction; but his belief was, that if there were an additional expense in one respect, there would be a saving in another. For instance, of all those voluminous documents which were now sent over from India in duplicate for the use of two offices, one copy only would in future be required, and this alone was not an insignificant item.

said, that his difficulty was, that he was called upon to assess a salary for services of the nature of which he was ignorant. If he knew what the duties of the Councillors were to be he should be able to decide without hesitation upon the salary; but the members of the Government differed so much that it was impossible to discover from their speeches what the duties of these gentlemen were to be. The Solicitor General stated last night it would be competent for them to undertake other duties; while the noble Lord the President of the Board of Control stated there would be an honourable understanding that they should devote themselves exclusively to their duties. According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer there was to be a difference in the two classes of members—the nominated members were to give up all other engagements, but not so the elected members. On what basis, then, were they to fix the salaries? If the Solicitor General was right, £500 would be quite enough; but if the noble Lord was correct £1,200 was not too much. On the other hand, if the case was to be as represented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and if one, set of Councillors were to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water," and the others were to be gentleman at ease dropping in to the Council whenever they pleased and just as it suited themselves, then he contended, however invidious it might be, that there ought to be a difference in the remuneration. In the absence of any intelligible explanation from the Government, he should vote for the Amendment, and he would earnestly warn the Committee against squandering away money which might make whole districts in India happy and prosperous, which might spread education, and might mitigate the evils resulting from a perverted religion and a false faith.

said, that if the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mr. Gregson) knew anything whatever of the business of the East India Company, and if his right hon. Friends the Members for Northampton and for Kidderminster knew a little more about it, they would not have spoken as they had done. What were these Councillors to do? Why, they were to assist in the Government of India, which comprised no fewer than thirteen distinct departments of State. He could only wish that those who thought the duties of the present direction were light would visit his room at the India House. These Councillors would be men of position, to whom salary would be no object. He should wish the amount awarded them to be considered rather as an honorarium than a salary, and he, for one, would object to take £1,200 a year, and should say that £800 or £1,000 merely as a recognition of their services, would be ample.

said, that the Committee should not forget that by the vote of the previous evening they had deprived the members of the Council of all political hopes and aspirations, and he thought, if they reduced the salary below that of a Lord of the Treasury, that they would unduly derogate from the importance of the office. In spite of the able appeal of his right hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) he did not think that the future welfare of India would be advanced by any petty parsimony; and he doubted even whether the expense of the direction would be increased by the Government proposal, because there would be a considerable saving from the consolidation of offices which was to be effected under the Bill.

said, he had a strong opinion that the work would be quite as well performed if the salary were £500 as if it were £1,200 a year. Indeed, the influence and patronage of these gentlemen would be so great, and their personal dignity would be so much enhanced by being made Councillors, that he doubted whether we should not get quite as good men if they had to pay £500 a year for holding the office, instead of receiving £500 a year for discharging the duties of it. On the other hand, he feared that if they adopted £1,200 as the salary, he thought that many persons would be placed in the Council whose only qualification would be that of being hangers on of the Ministers for the time being.

said, the Committee ought to recollect that the members of the Council would have great patronage. In 1853 the patronage of an East India Director was estimated at £6,000 a year. Therefore, considering their patronage and the not very onerous character of their work it would be wholly unjustifiable to give them large salaries.

said, he considered the question was one of considerable difficulty. That difficulty was increased by the large number of the Council, and the fact that they were to retain the patronage now vested in the court. With regard to the patronage, he entertained so strong an opinion on the subject that he intended to move a clause to deprive the Council of it. The principle that the patronage was to be considered as part of the emolument was a most dangerous one to introduce, as it would justify any member of the Council in disposing of this patronage to the benefit of his own family The experiment of this Council being a new one, he thought the Committee ought not to withhold from the Government any means which they might think necessary to render it less hazardous, and therefore, if the Government felt that £1,200 was the proper salary he would not be disposed to reject their proposal. There were many Indian officers who would be highly competent for the office, but unless the salary was such as would enable them to reside in London, they would not accept it. He thought some regulation should be made to the effect that the members of the Council should be bound to devote their whole time to the duties of their offices. Many of the present directors held offices which would render it impossible for them to make such an engagement, and he did not think they would be proper members of the new Council unless they undertook to give up their other duties.

said, he believed that the occupation of the members of the Council would be daily, as power was taken under the Bill to enable the Secretary of State to divide the Council into Committees. Reference had been made on a former evening to Captain Shepherd; but he was authorised to say that if that gentleman was appointed a member of the Council he would give up all his other posts. This showed his estimate of what the duties would be. It was now settled that the Councillors were to be excluded from Parliament, and as they would be consequently precluded from attaining the highest object of the ambition of an Englishman, they were entitled to an increased remuneration. He admitted that patronage was the worst possible mode of remuneration; but after this Bill passed the amount of patronage left to the Council would be very small, comprising only the first appointment (subject to a strict examination) to the more scientific portion of the military service. On the whole he really believed that if a great change in the home government of India was to be made it could not be carried out in a better manner than was proposed by the Bill as it now stood; and although he did not wish to squander a single rupee of the revenues of India, yet, considering the duties to be imposed on the Council he did not think the salary of £1,200 was at all too much. He did not think it would be expedient to lay down a rigorous rule in an Act of Parliament binding the members so to devote their time; but there should be an honourable understanding that the daily occupation of the Councillors at Leadenhall Street would be expected, subject to the control of the Minister of State.

said, the Goverment expected the members of the Council would place their time at the disposal of the office; but they did not think it advisable to introduce words into the Act which would rigidly prevent them from performing any other business whatever. The understanding on this point to which his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) had referred was not intended to be a more verbal understanding, but would be placed in such a form, by regulation or otherwise, as would leave no doubt on the subject. Any positive clause in the Act would only give rise to constant difficulties and misunderstandings. The power given to the Secretary of State to define the duties of the Councillors would sufficiently ensure that their time would be fully occupied. If any member found he could not fully discharge these duties, he should resign; but the Government did not think it necessary to insert any clause which would prevent a member of the Council forming any relations which would not interfere with his duties, but which might render him a much more valuable member of the body. It was very easy to urge what might be called the sentimental argument, and ask how many wretched Hindoos might be made comfortable with the £10,000 a year of the increased expenditure. The same argument might be applied to any office. They might take any Minister of State, and ask how many starving families his salary would feed. He might as well ask a member of the administration which had engaged in a Persian war without the authority of Parliament, and spent £1,000,000 in it, what benefit that sum would not have produced if distributed among the population of India. With regard to the salary, he admitted he could not adduce any irresistible arguments to show that £1,200 was the exact sum required. The noble Lord the Member for London appeared to be in favour of a higher sum. The hon. Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) told them £800 a year would be a compliment, but £1,200 would be an insult. The Government thought the sum they proposed would be a fair equivalent for the services to be performed, judging by the analogy of the salaries attached to other offices of the State.

said, the main difficulty arose from the large number of the Council. If it had been eight or ten, the Committee would have had very little hesitation in fixing the amount of salary. He should vote in favour of the Government proposition; but, as the clause fixed the salary absolutely at £1,200, the Government would have no control whatever over the amount, and he would suggest that, as there was considerable difficulty in determining beforehand the amount of duties to be discharged, words should be inserted to the effect that each member of the Council should have a yearly salary not exceeding £1,200 as Her Majesty by Order in Council might from time to time direct.

said, the Government thought that the independence of the Council would be best secured by allowing Parliament to deal with the question of their salary, and thus to prevent the Minister of the day from having any control over it.

said, he wished to be informed by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General whether he was to understand, from what he said on the previous night, that the Government would have power to remove any member of the Council whom they might suppose to devote too little time to the Council. If so, the Council would be in the position of clerks.

said, there could be no doubt that it would be misbehaviour on the part of a member to neglect to devote such portion of his time to the Council as the Secretary of State might require, and that for such misbehaviour he might be removed.

said, he was entirely in the hands of the Committee, and was perfectly ready to withdraw his Amendment if such was their wish.

said, the statement as to Captain Shepherd's intention to resign two offices which he now filled, if he should be elected a member of the Council, was most satisfactory, and, if it was intended that the Council should devote their time to the business of the Council, in the manner indicated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it would be wholly unnecessary for him (Sir E. Perry) to move the Amendment of which he had given notice on that subject.

vindicated the character of Captain Shepherd from an imputation which he imagined had been cast upon it by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster, and bore testimony to the high sense entertained by the East India Company of the services of that gentleman. He hoped that he would form one of the new Council.

said, he must disclaim any intention of disparaging the gentleman referred to. Indeed, he was perfectly ready to agree in passing an eulogium on Captain Shepherd.

thought, if the name of one candidate was to be mentioned in that House, the others ought to be brought forward too. The Directors of the East India Company had been eulogized by all parties, the late Government and the present. And, therefore, as they received only £500 a year, that was an ample payment for a member of the new Council.

said, he wished to propose the words, "providing that the salaries shall be paid out of the revenues of India."

said, he had no objection,

said, he had given notice of his intention to move to add the words "each member shall give his entire time to the duties of his office;" but, in consequence of the explanation of the Government, he would not move his Amendment.

said, that the pension of any member who might have served in India would not be deducted from the amount of his salary.

said, he wished to ask what was the object of making the pensions dependent upon the Government, and of requiring the warrant to be signed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This was an unusual course, and he would suggest that the pensions of the Councillors should be placed on the same footing as those of the Judges, so that a Councillor on retiring should be entitled to his pension as a matter of course. With respect to the increased pension after fifteen years, would not that afford a temptation to men to continue in office after they were unfit for their duties in order that they might have a title to the larger pension? Of course the object of every one must be to get rid of incompetent men; but this clause only induced men to "dawdle on," sticking fast to office when they ought to retire. Let the Committee fix the retiring allowance at a fair sum, and let it not be increased for length of service. Perhaps the logical inference would be, that the longer a man remained in office the smaller the retiring pension should be. He did not propose that, however, but he suggested that one uniform rate should be established.

said, he had an Amendment on the paper for carrying out the object which the right hon. Baronet had in view.

said, he agreed generally in the observations of his right hon. Friend who had just sat down, and with a view of giving effect to them he would move, as an Amendment, that no pension should be allowed under a service of fifteen years. He believed that this was the period of service required from the Judges, who were taken from the most lucrative profession in the world; and, considering the handsome salary which the Councillors were to receive, he contended that his Amendment would fully meet the justice of the case. Why should these men not be placed in the same position as the other public servants under the Civil Service Superannuation Act?

said, that the wording of the clause was adopted from the Act which granted the retiring pensions to the Judges, and the counter signature of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was required to bring the matter under the cognizance of the Treasury, which was necessary, as the expenses were to be paid out of the revenues of India. He admitted that there was a good deal in what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman opposite, but it was open to argument whether there was not as much danger in inducing men to retire too early as there was in leading them to remain too long upon the Council. Originally he had intended to give no pension under fifteen years, but he feared that the effect would have been to retain men on the Council when it would he for the advantage of the public that they should retire.

said, he was disposed to support the Amendment, because he looked with apprehension on such an innovation of the law as was proposed by these pensions. The only cases in which he thought pensions could be justified were when you had obtained all the virtue and strength out of a man; but if persons were to be appointed to this Council who had spent the most effective part of their lives in India, and who enjoyed pensions for their services there, and if they were now to be put into a new office for a short term, and were to receive cumulative pensions, he should look with the greatest aversion upon such an arrangement. He should prefer to get rid of the system altogether, but in default of that he should support the Amendment as a mitigation of the evil.

said, the reason why pensions were introduced in the Bill was not to give compensation for energies exhausted in the public service, but rather to give some security against persons who had become disabled holding office after their services were no longer of use to the public.

said, he though a retiring allowance ought to be given; but any pension to which the parties were already entitled should be deducted from it.

said, the retiring allowance was merely a plan to get rid of the old gentlemen when they got unfit for the office.

said, he wished to know whether these salaries and allowances were to be accumulative on any previous pensions.

said that, on reconsidering the question, he had no objection to stop the clause at the words "five hundred pounds," so that the effect would be to grant an uniform pension of £500 after ten years' service, and to give no increase for a more lengthened tenure of office.

said, he would now propose the addition of the proviso to which he had referred in the course of the discussion, the effect of which would be to give the Councillors no claim for compensation for loss of office under ten years' service in the event of Parliament deciding at any future period to reduce their number.

said, he thought it was desirable that the Government should have the power of removing a member on the ground of inability.

said, there would be no difficulty in carrying an address through both Houses of Parliament in any case where a member's incapacity was notorious and such as to justify his removal.

remarked, that an Address of the House was intended not for such a case, but for cases of flagrant misconduct. The House would not stigmatize a man by agreeing to an Address to the Crown against him when his only offence was infirmity.

said, he objected to the Government having the power of removing members of the Council, because they might avail themselves of it to get rid of a "cantankerous" member£that is, one opposed to their views.

said, a case recently happened of an Address for the removal of a person from high office merely for physical inability£he meant the Address with regard to an eminent Irish Judge.

That Address was not carried.

You cannot provide by an Act of Parliament that an Address shall be carried.

said, in France incapable men could be got rid of by very admirable superannuation rules. A man could be walked out of his office in France the moment the Government thought he was incapable. The House had agreed to give the members of Council a very absurd tenure£namely, one for life, and the Government ought to have the power of superannuating any member whom they might deem incapable. He thought the words "or shall be incapable by reason of infirmity" should be inserted in the clause.

said, he fully concurred in the views expressed by the right hon. Member for Oxford University (Mr. Gladstone), and the hon. Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry).

said, he wished to ask how it was possible that Parliament could judge of things going on in India when it had so much difficulty in judging of what was under its own eyes£namely, the Council proposed by the Government.

said, the House, of course, did not intend to bring a Member to the bar that he might there undergo an examination to enable them to judge of his mental and bodily health. An Address to the Crown was not the remedy, but a removing power on the part of the Government in such a case.

All these suggestions strike at the Independence of the Council.

I should have thought that the first object of the Government would have been to get, not an independent, but an efficient Council.

said, he was opposed to the suggestion of the right hon. Member (Mr. Gladstone).

. observed, that as he believed that £1,200 a year was more than a sufficient salary, he must object to the grant of any pensions to the Council, and insist that the sense of the Committee should be taken on the clause.

said, he understood the object of Clause 15 to be that the plan of the first establishment of the Council should be framed by the Secretary of State, and submitted to the Government for their approval, and also to Parliament. If Parliament should approve it, the establishment was to be created by an order of the Queen in Council. But it would seem by the wording of the clause that all future alterations in the establishment would require only the approval of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State. That was the first time that it was proposed to set aside an order in Council by the mere consent of two Ministers of State, and he must therefore, object to the proposal.

said, he fully agreed with the right hon. Baronet. His official experience convinced him it was desirable to provide that no change should be made without the sanction of an order in Council.

said, he rose to move to insert after the words "Secretary of State," the words "in Council."

said, this Amendment was one of a series of which the noble Lord had given notice, and which would alter the entire action of the Council, and prevent the Secretary from doing any act unless in Council.

said, such was not the case. He would consider the suggestion of the right hon. Baronet.

said, that by the clause as altered by the Government the Secretary of State, like the "Governor-General in Council," would have to act in conjunction with his Council.

doubted the truth of the assertion that no addition could be made without an order in Council. Salaries, at all events, could be increased without such an order.

said, he would admit that such was the fact with regard to salaries, but no alteration in any establishment could be made without an order in Council.

remarked that he concurred with the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth in thinking that, especially as they were dealing with Indian revenue, in the prudent expenditure of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not feel so much interest as he did with respect to English revenue, no important increase in the establishment of the Indian Minister should take place without the consent of Parliament.

said, he wished to know whether it is the intention of the Government to establish a Commission to inquire into the best mode of transferring the Indian army to the direct control of the Crown?

said, he had stated, on the second reading of the Bill, that it was the intention of the Government to appoint such a Commission, and that it would consist of three Officers of the Indian Army, three Officers of the Queen's Army, three Civilians, and the Secretary of State for War, the Commander in Chief, and the President of the Board of Control.

said, with regard to the business for that evening, he had to suggest that the House should go into Committee on the India Bill as soon as possible; and if they did not conclude that night, as he hoped they might, that they should sit tomorrow morning for that purpose. Under these circumstances, he would not make the usual Motion for the adjournment of the House till Monday.

said, he had a question to put to the Chief Commissioner of Works, which he had intended to ask on the usual Motion for the adjournment.

said, his noble Friend would be happy to answer the question if he could.

replied, that that was all very well, but he had wished to preface his question with a speech, which would be out of order unless a Motion were made. He should, therefore, move that the House at its rising adjourn till Monday.

rose to order. He had merely made a suggestion, without wishing to force its adoption upon the House, contrary to any general feeling. The hon. Member would, he was sure, frame his question with his usual ability, and the Government would be happy to answer it.

said, it was perfectly impossible that he could be content with merely asking the question on the paper.

said, in order to place himself in a proper position for making a few remarks in reference to a question of which he had given notice, he would move that the House do now adjourn. He wished to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether Mr. Wyatt, who has lately been appointed Superintendent Registrar of the parish of Islington, is to retain his office of Assistant Clerk at Somerset House; and whether any other Clerk in the Registrar General's Office holds the appointment of Superintendent Registrar of a large Metropolitan Parish. Mr. Wyatt was eighth Assistant Clerk in the Registrar General's Office, and his appointment to the important office of Superintendent Registrar of Islington, without resigning his former office, was unjust to a parish containing 130,000 inhabitants. A similar appointment was made in Clerkenwell some time since, and it created great dissatisfaction in the district.

said, the hon. Gentleman was quite right in saying that the office of Superintendent Registrar was one of importance. He found, however, that most of the duties of the office could be discharged at other hours than those usually allotted to official business—namely, between ten and four. The Registrar General, who took immense interest in everything connected with his department, and who was one of the most deserving public servants that he knew, had thought right in this instance to reward a meritorious clerk in his office by appointing him Superintendent Registrar of Islington. In so doing, he had followed one or two precedents, and the appointment being a good one it would not be right to disturb it after it was made, though it would have been better had the reward of meritorious service been given in some other shape than an appointment to an additional office. Three years ago a similar appointment was made at Clerkenwell, and was confirmed; but the right hon. Gentleman who preceded him intimated that he did not consider such appointments as a general rule desirable. In that view he (Mr. Walpole) concurred, and he had written to the Registrar General requesting that no such appointments might be made in future, except on special grounds, and having been previously sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

said, that before he put the question of which he had given notice he was anxious to take the first opportunity he had of correcting a charge of inaccuracy brought against him by the Secretary to the Treasury on Tuesday night, in reference to the discussion on Hainault Forest. On that occasion the argument on which he founded his case was that an excessive expenditure of £67,000 odd had been made upon an estate of 3,000 acres. The Secretary to the Treasury had contradicted him—

said, he rose to order. He must put it to Mr. Speaker whether the hon. Gentleman could refer in the manner he was doing to a former debate.

said, he understood that the hon. Member had an explanation to make of a personal character. But his reference to a former debate, and the length to which he had already gone, appeared to him to transgress the rules of order.

He had been about to say that he must ask the indulgence of the House, as the question was one involving his personal accuracy in regard to a statement of some importance which he had made to the House. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury had used these words:—"The truth was that Hainault Forest comprised an area of 17,500 acres." Now, his own statement was, that the expenditure had been confined to an area of 3,000 acres. He now held in his hand the documents. ["Order!"] If it was out of order for him to produce these documents to prove the accuracy of his statement, he must only rely on the forbearance of the House while he said that which he had not had the means of doing at the moment. He had now beside him the map of the Forest—

said, he rose to order. He was the last person in the world who would wish to prevent an hon. Member from entering into any explanation which he might think necessary in his own vindication, but if the hon. Gentleman went into the explanation he was now about to make, it would be necessary for him also, in his turn, to enter into a similar explanation, establishing the accuracy of the statement that he had himself made.

said, he again rose to order. He had no desire to interpose between the hon. Gentleman opposite and any personal statement which he wished to make to the House under any circumstances. But he thought the hon. Gentleman misconceived the position in which he had placed himself. His personal honour was not concerned simply because a statistical fact might not be correctly appreciated by the House, either one way or the other. This was really a statistical question, which might lead to a lengthened controversy, involving much delay to the public business, and it in no degree affected personal character.

said, that that being the case he would take another opportunity of referring to the matter. He would now proceed to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the question which he had given notice with reference to the Peruvian guano monopoly. At present the English farmers have to pay very much more for their guano than had the farmers of America; but since he had given notice of this question the agent of the Peruvian Government had reduced the price £1 a ton. Still, however, there was a large difference between the price here and the price in America. He was aware that the Peruvian Government could charge what price they pleased, and all he asked was that the Government should point out to them the unfairness of placing the English consumer under a disadvantage as compared with the consumer of America. There was now a very large quantity of Peruvian guano in the docks, and if there was a proper combination against this gigantic monopoly the price would be brought down to what it was in America, if not to the old price of £9 a ton.

said, the question was doubtless one of importance, and he was not surprised, considering the deep interest which the hon. Gentleman took in agricultural matters, that he had turned his attention to it. He was glad to say that he had received a communication from the agent of the Peruvian Government, which he hoped would be found satisfactory. There were certain circumstances affecting the consumption of this article which ought not to be forgotten, especially that the interest of the whole bonded debt of Peru was charged on the produce of the sale of guano. In the communication he had that day received he was informed that in the first place the price of guano would be reduced to £13 15s. to £12 a ton, and in the second place, the same price would in future be charged in this country as was charged in America. This would produce a saving to the agricultural interest of something approaching £400,000 a year.

said he wished to ask the Chief Commissioner of Works whether he has received any communication from the Metropolitan Board of Works respecting the Main Drainage of the Metropolis—and, if so, to request that he will state whether the outfall of sewage be proposed to take place on the north side at Barking Creek, nearly opposite to the Warren at Woolwich, or where? During a long Parliamentary career the present was only the second instance in which he had availed himself of discussing a question on the Motion for the adjournment of the House. He did so now because a very strong opinion prevailed out of doors that on the very important question of the state of the Thames there existed great apathy on the part of the House, and on the part of the Government, who ought to have come down to the House, have taken the initiative, and have asked for plenary powers, and grappled with this great evil. If the matter were not dealt with before Parliament rose, it would no doubt be hung up in red tape, and perhaps not dealt with at all. He was surprised at the silence of the metropolitan Members, and still more surprised at the opinion of those hon. Members, who seemed to think that the matter should be dealt with locally and not nationally. He differed from that opinion toto cœlo. His opinion was that it was a great national question, and ought to be so dealt with. Committees and Boards sitting in different places would be of no advantage; the proper plan was for the Government to act upon the centralizing principle and ask for dictatorial powers. The House would be the more bound to concede such powers, because it was it own legislation which had principally led to the creation of this gigantic nuisance. A few years ago the Members of both Houses found their olfactory nerves much affected by the nuisance of night carts; that was about the time of the reign of Mr. Chadwick, who was considered an authority for everything. Among the powers entrusted to him was that of preventing night carts from coming

"Between the wind and their nobility."

What was the consequence? Why, that the ordure of this great city was conveyed away not in carts, but Chadwick and the House of Commons plunged 100,000 cesspools into the Thames. The stuff was there out of sight, and the House of Commons and the House of Lords never for one moment fancied that there were poor inhabitants on the banks of the Thames who could not get away from the nuisance. If extraordinary heat had not prevailed, and the noses of hon. Members been affected, the matter might never have been considered. When they were affected it was astonishing to see hon. Gentlemen who had been parties to throwing this filth into the river, turning round and saying, "God bless me, where can it come from?" And then they said, "What is the Board at Westminster doing; what are they doing in the City of London; has the Lord Mayor got into Petticoat Lane?" It was necessary that they should give full power to counteract this evil. He appealed to them on behalf of the inhabitants of the banks of the river whose noses were forced to be continually in the smell, who could not go to their country houses and to the moors. There were also the merchants and bankers who were tied down to their places in the city. He trusted that the Government would give some promise that before the House rose they would ask for those powers which they ought to be proud on this occasion to demand. It was a question which the Government should be ready to meet. Let them prove their utility. They were a weak Government, but they would strengthen themselves immensely if they met this evil. If they did not do so, they would deserve the contempt they would meet with from every class of the community.

observed, that he could not help saying a few words with regard to the arrangement of business in connection with this question. A short time ago an hon. Member who represented an important metropolitan constituency gave notice of his intention to submit a Motion with the view of ascertaining what was the opinion of the House upon the question from whence the funds should come by which this great change was to be effected. The hon. and talented Member (Mr. H. Berkeley) had said he had heard hon. Members asking from whence the vile smell could come; but he (Mr. Gladstone) had never heard that question asked on the contrary, he had never met a single person who was at all sceptical on the subject. But a question which he had often heard asked was where the sum was to come from by which the vile smell was to be cured. He would put it to the hon. Member who had given that notice of Motion (Mr. Cox), to Her Majesty's Government, and to that House, that it would be convenient to have an early day fixed for the consideration of the subject, which was to the full as important as the hon. Member had represented it to be. Her Majesty's Government would confer a great service on the country if they would deal resolutely and definitively with the whole question—but at the same time it would not be fair to press it upon them as if it was the duty of the Executive, as a matter of right, to be prepared at once with a complete solution. There were several important considerations connected with the subject. First, there was the important question of the mechanical and material means to be employed for curing the evil; secondly, the source from which the funds were to be raised, upon which he (Mr. Gladstone) held a very strong opinion and one not in unison with that of the hon. Member for Bristol. And, thirdly, the important question arose, if it should be the opinion of that House that London, the richest city in the world, should not bear the cost of draining its own river, as was done by less wealthy and less important places, what would be the future position of local government in London if that House interfered to do that which ordinarily, ought to be done locally? He thought it would probably aid the progress of business if they would fix an early day for the Motion of the hon. Member for Finsbury.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary to the Treasury when Copies of all the Documents submitted to the right honourable Sir John Patteson as arbitrator in a cause wherein the Attorney General is the Plaintiff and his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, as Duke of Cornwall, a Defendant, together with a Copy of the Arbitration Award thereon will be laid on the Table of the House. It had been stated, he had withdrawn the Motion he brought forward a short time since with reference to this cause at the instance and suggestion of Lord Vivian, and he wished to say that he had had no communication whatever with that noble Lord on the subject.

said, he believed the papers to which the hon. Gentleman referred would be presented to the House in the course of the next week.

said, he wished to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether that perfect identity of sentiment still exists between the Government of Her Majesty and the Court of France, with regard to the future government of the Danubian Principalities as announced in his declaration on the 4th of May last. The announcement made by the right hon. Gentlemen the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 4th of May gave unqualified satisfaction to a great majority of the Members of that House; but re- ports had since been circulated which might lead to the supposition that the Governments of France and England were not in such perfect accord upon this subject as might have been anticipated from the former statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and he therefore begged to put the question of which he had given notice.

requested the Chancellor of the Exchequer to inform the House, for the convenience of hon. Members, what business would be taken on Monday.

said, that with reference to the business of the House, it would probably be necessary to proceed on Monday with the Committee on the India Bill. As the suggestion he had made had not been complied with, he could scarcely hope that such progress would be made with the India Bill to-night as to justify him in asking the House to go into Committe again to-morrow. He did not propose a morning sitting on Monday, as he believed it would be very inconvenient to many hon. Members; and, as the Government had been compelled to appeal to the courtesy of hon. Gentlemen so far as the frequency of morning sittings was concerned, he was anxious, as far as was consistent with the progress of public business, to consult their convenience. He proposed, therefore, that there should be an evening sitting on Monday, when they would proceed with the India Bill, and when he hoped they would pass the measure through Committee. With reference to the question of the hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. White) as to the statement made by him (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) on the 4th of May, that perfect identity of sentiment existed between the British and French Government with regard to the future Government of the Danubian Principalities, he begged to remind the House that the Conference of Paris was still sitting, and that the first Resolution at which the Members of that conference arrived was that the strictest secrecy should be observed with respect to all that took place at the conference. So far as he could form an opinion that secrecy had not been violated, and he was sure the hon. Gentleman would not expect him, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to set the example of violating such a Resolution.

said, that the noble Lord had acted very wisely in putting into the hands of the Secretary of State everything to be done as regarded war and peace, and concluding treaties. The words, however, of this clause, providing for the carrying on of the secret correspondence, were not, in his opinion, very definite. He thought that the noble Lord ought to adopt the words of the existing Act defining what that correspondence should be.

said, that the part of the Bill which dealt with the powers heretofore exercised by the Secret Committee was the 27th clause, where the business to be transacted through the Secret Committee was defined. This clause merely defined what were to be the relative powers of the Secretary of State and the Council with regard to correspondence. All that was meant by this clause was, that the Secretary of State was to be the person by whom all despatches were to be written, to whom they were all to be addressed.

explained the mode at present adopted by the Court of Directors with respect to despatches, and added that those Directors who were inclined to work had attended daily. He thought the noble Lord ought to expect a similar attendance from the majority of the new Council. He wished also to ask whether despatches going to India were to be signed by any of the Council.

said, that they were to bear the signature of the Secretary of State only.

observed, that he feared that this mode of proceeding would give rise to great inconvenience.

said, that this clause would give the Secretary of State great power over the conduct of the Indian business by the division of the Council into Committees. He hoped that the Secretary of State would draw up such regu- lations as would secure that the members of the Council elected by the Court of Directors should give up the whole of their time to the duties of their office.

As much time as is required.

said, that many of the present Court of Directors were engaged in most complicated business transactions, and he thought there was no rule more clear than that persons engaged in administrative government, and paid a large salary, should cease to be engaged in trade, and give up the whole of their time to the duties of their offices.

said, that this question had been discussed two or three times before. The Bill did not lay down an absolute rule, because the Government believed that it would be both impossible and inexpedient to lay down with precision any fixed rule. How could they say that no member of the Council should follow any other occupation? What was meant was, that he should give up as much time as was required for the duty he had to discharge, and as much time as the Minister should call upon him to give up. The clause before them did not mean more than to express the intention of the Legislature in passing this Bill, that the Minister should have the power of calling on the members of the Council for their services and time.

remarked, that the Government had never said distinctly what duties were to be performed and what time was to be given up to the public service by those gentlemen. He thought that they had a right to have a clear explanation as to what time really was to be given up to their duties by the Councillors. He wished to know what steps were to be taken to secure the adequate discharge of their duties. Was it proposed to insist upon their regular and daily attendance upon the Committees into which the Council was to be divided? If so, that would secure their attention to their duties. But if it was mainly intended that papers should be sent to them to look over at their leisure—in addition to the weekly meetings of the Council—he thought that that would afford no security for the devotion of a sufficient time to the public business, which was likely in future to fall into the same languid course which had in a great measure marked the transaction of business in Leadenhall Street, from the circumstance that many members of the direction were engaged in other business, and did not give sufficient time to the discharge of their public duties. Perhaps the noble Lord would lay upon the table a draft minute of the regulations under which the business of the department was to be conducted, and by which the object to which he had referred was to be attained. He understood that the noble Lord had on a former occasion stated that it was probable that the Council would be divided into six Committees. He thought it would be better that it should be divided into three, which was the present number of deparments into which the business of the Board of Control was divided, although he could not say that that division was made in the most convenient way. The clause gave the power of dividing the Council into Committees to the Secretary of State. He thought the power should be given to the Secretary and Council.

said, that to take the last point first, he thought that the first formation of the Council was the very time when it was desirable to have some one authority to direct in what way the arrangements for the conduct of business should be made. Of course the Minister would consult the Council, and defer to the wishes of those by whom the business was to be transacted. He had sketched on a former occasion what he thought might be the probable division of business, but he admitted then, as he did now, that without some experience it would be impossible to regulate them beforehand. If he wanted further proof of the impossibility of doing this, it would he found in the admission of the late President of the Board of Control, who had had much more experience of the office than he (Lord Stanley), that the arrangements for the conduct of its business were not so perfect as he wished and could suggest. If a minute was laid on the table as a condition of the Act being passed, no doubt the Government would hold themselves bound in some degree to the arrangements there indicated. That would, it appeared to him, be undesirable. They could not, he thought, usefully now lay down regulations for the working of a body which did not exist, and which had not a precise parallel in any public office now in being. Undoubtedly, it was the purpose of the Government that correspondence should initiate in these Committees, and that all business, with but slight exceptions, should pass through them; and, if the business of India was anything like what they were told by those who at present conducted it he did not think the members of Council were likely to have cause to complain that they did not find work enough.

said, that he thought the Secretary of State would have a right to expect that the members of the Council should, as a rule, attend daily.

said, he thought it advisable that the Council should have the power of appointing their President in all cases in the absence of the Secretary of State. It might happen that the Council and the Government might come into collision, and in that case he thought the Council should have the power of selecting their own mouthpiece. He would therefore propose to omit all the words of the clause after the word "Council" in line 4, for the purpose of inserting —"and in the absence of the Secretary of State a member of the Council chosen by themselves."

said, that nothing could be so mischievous as to deal with the Council in their collective capacity with their own chairman. The object of the Bill was to bing the Secretary of State in communication with the individual Councillors acting on their individual responsibilities. He wished to know what would be the position of the Under Secretary of State for India? He ought at least to stand on an equal footing with one of the Councillors.

observed, that he thought a larger quorum than five should be fixed for meetings of the Council. He would suggest seven.

said, that five was the ordinary quorum of a Committee of that House consisting of fifteen Members, which was the number of the proposed Indian Council.

said, he approved of the hon. Member (Mr. Lyall's) suggestion, for in the Court of Directors they required a majority of the Members as a legal quorum.

said, he would suggest the propriety of omitting that portion of the clause which authorized any one of the Council to record, not merely his dissent, but the reasons of it, from any decision of the Secretary of State and Council. If Mr. Princep were to be a member of Council, and to dissent from the Secretary for India, he had such a ready pen that he would himself fill several folio volumes with his protests. If a member of the Council had any reasons for dissenting, he should simply hand in those reasons to the Secretary of State.

said, he thought that nothing could be more harmless than to allow a member of the Council the power of recording his protest. The protests were to be entered in a book kept for the purpose, and there was nothing in the Bill to compel either the Secretary of State or any one else to read the reasons adduced in support of them.

said, that he did not see anything in the Bill to determine what part of the Indian business was to be transacted in Committee and what in full Council, or to point out who was to regulate this.

said, that the 20th clause gave the Secretary of State power to direct in what manner the business should be transacted.

said, that this clause renewed in a new shape the powers of the Secret Committee. If the House thought that such powers were useful, they would of course agree to the clause, but if not they would reject it. The powers of the Secret Committee were of considerable antiquity in the history of the East India Company. Before the Act of 1784, when the East India Company was completely independent, they were in the habit of appointing a Secret Committee of three persons, who communicated with the Government on all matters of peace and war and of a political nature. In Mr. Pitt's Act of 1784, there was a clause enacting that a Secret Committee should be appointed consisting of not more than three persons. In 1793, Mr. Dundas's Act organized the Secret Committee in substantially its present form, and empowered the President of the Board of Control to send through it to India any orders with respect to the making of peace or war, or to the negotiations with Native Princes, which he might deem desirable to keep secret. The powers of the Secret Committee were limited by a clause in the Act to questions of war, peace, and negotiations with Native Princes, so that legally the Secret Committee was not the proper channel through which Lord Ellenborough should have sent his despatch, as Oude was then an integral portion of the dominions of the East India Company. If the Council were smaller they might dispense with those secret powers. By the present Bill the Secretary of State would have power to send despatches to the Governor General on these three subjects without at all consulting his Council. If they were to be more upper clerks that arrangement might be satisfactory, but if they were to have a more potential authority they should not, he thought, be excluded from all interference in matters of such importance. The power of making war in India from this country was of a peculiar nature, and nothing in the Bill derogated from the power of the Crown to declare war regarding Indian or other Oriental Power; but, when the Crown directed an Indian war to be carried on, it was for an Indian object, and to be paid for out of Indian revenue; and, if there was any question upon which the advice of an Indian Council ought to be taken, it was a question such as this. He should be glad if these clauses could be omitted—and if the Council could be consulted upon questions of peace or war, or negotiations with Indian Princes. At all events, the powers of the Secret Committee ought not to be strained, as he feared they had been on some recent occasions, and he hoped, if the clauses were retained, the Government would never have recourse to the powers of the Secret Committee, except in extraordinary cases, on which it was impossible for the Council to be consulted.

said that, unfortunately for the good government of India, the powers of the Secret Committee were, both legally and practically, much more than his right hon. Friend seemed to imagine. Under the Act of 1793, the Government of India had power to write home to the Secret Department upon any matter they pleased; and, unless the President of the Board of Control chose to communicate such despatches to the Court of Directors, they must be answered—as the Earl of Ellenborough answered the despatch of Viscount Canning—through the Secret Committee. By the Act of 1833, the sub- jects on which the Home Government might transmit despatches through that Committee were extended to negotiations with Princes or States out of India, or the policy to be observed with respect to such Princes or States. For many years after the conquest of Scinde the whole government of that province was conducted by the Secret Committee, and the Court of Directors knew nothing about it. He believed that much mischief had arisen from the Secret Committee undertaking to transact business with which it had no right to interfere. The real fact was, that nine-tenths of that which came before the Secret Committee, might with safety be communicated to the whole world. He desired, therefore, that there should be no Secret Committee in future. It was a more delusion and snare, for they might as well call the General Post Office a Secret Committee, as all the business the latter had to do was to sign despatches; and even if there were matters which it was thought desirable to keep secret, those matters often oozed out through the Board of Control. On the other hand, the Court of Directors had shown themselves to be as competent to keep a secret, when there was one, as the Cabinet of Her Majesty; and he had no reason to think otherwise of the proposed Indian Council if properly selected, while the Secretary of State would reap the same advantage from the advice of the Council in those matters as he would in all other matters.

said, the question for consideration was the power of the Government to send out orders to India.

remarked, that it was very desirable that the House should reconsider the question of a Secret Committee; and at the same time that the powers of the Secretary of State with respect to sending out orders on questions of peace or war should be clearly defined in the Bill. He regretted that the recent despatch of the Earl of Ellenborough, which many thought a very admirable document, should have been used as an illustration of an abuse of power on the part of the Secret Committee. His own opinion was that there was no case, except that of a declaration of war with some European Power which had possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope, where the Secretary of State should be allowed to send a despatch to India without communicating it to the Secret Committee within the period prescribed in a previous clause. He sub- mitted, therefore, that instead of passing this clause in general language, giving an undefined power to the Secretary of State, the noble Lord ought to bring up a new clause more strictly defining under what circumstances he might transmit despatches without giving the notice to the Council referred to in the previous clause.

said, he was very anxious, on principle, that this clause should pass as it stood. What was the officer they were dealing with? A Secretary of State and a Privy Councillor, bound by his oath to secrecy, and yet it was proposed to oblige him by an Act of Parliament to communicate everything he did or heard in his capacity of a Privy Councillor to a Council who were not Privy Councillors, and therefore not within the category defined by his oath. That was a matter which the Committee must leave to the discretion of the Secretary of State, as this clause now left it. While it was said, there were very few things which could not be communicated, there were yet a few things which ought not to be made public. Orders might be sent out to India, or received from, bearing immediately on European transactions, and not on Indian interests, and it would be both inconvenient and injurious that such information should be given. He quite agreed with the hon. Member for Guildford that the Court of Directors kept secret the recall of the Earl of Ellenborough. and well they might, until it was all complete, in order to avoid trouble and inconvenience. Their prudence was quite as much in that matter as their secrecy. As for saying that a man who could not keep a secret ought not to be made a Councillor, it was too late after he had been made a Councillor for life, and only removable upon address from both Houses to the Crown.

said, this clause was the keystone of the very trumpery arch which this Bill was intended to erect. Although there was a pretence of limiting the power of the Secretary of State, the real object was to enable him to do as he liked; and the Bill as it stood, and especially by this clause, created a double Government. If this clause was struck out, the Secretary of State would have always to act with the knowledge of his Council. They knew that India could not be governed in that way. He had proposed that the whole government should be given to the Secretary of State; but they had created a Council, and, like Frankenstein, they were afraid of their own creation—they feared lest their own Council should turn and rend them. If they did away with this clause, the Bill would be unworkable, and prove nothing better than waste paper.

said, that he had put an Amendment on the paper to leave out this clause, and he was disposed to take the sense of the House upon it. He agreed that only in rare instances the matters which came before the Secret Committee were other than such as might not be laid before the public at Charing Cross. These rare instances could be met by the Secretary making his Council secret for the time being. It often happened that the Court of Directors were made a secret body. When matters of finance or exchange came before them the Chairman merely said the Court was made secret, and gentlemen were immediately on their honour and did not divulge anything that occurred. There might be a similar arrangement in the Council. He did not think it safe to lodge such a power in the hands of a single man as that possessed by the President of the Board of Control by means of the Secret Committee. The Affghan war was originated through the Secret Committee, and it ended in leaving the bones of 15,000 of our countrymen bleaching in the sun, and costing fifteen millions of money. The first Burmese war was the work of the Secret Committee, which cost nine millions and half the army. The second Burmese war and the war in Scinde were originated without the legal knowledge of the Court of Directors. All those disasters arose from the powers vested in the President of the Board of Control which the noble Lord wished to perpetuate.

said, two important questions had been raised with reference to this clause—first, whether the power of the Secretary of State with reference to treaties and questions of peace and war were sufficiently defined; and secondly, whether such a power should exist at all. He thought it was advisable to define rather more clearly the powers of the Secretary of State with reference to the Secret Committee. He thought that the letter of the Earl of Ellenborough on the subject of Oude was within the rule, as it was written in answer to secret despatches. His previous despatch as to the treatment of the mutineers might, perhaps, have been different, The hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles) and the hon. Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) said that they hardly remembered anything of consequence that passed through the Secret Committee. Those gentlemen were the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Secret Committee when he (Mr. Vernon Smith) was President of the Board of Control, and he was glad to hear them say that he did not make much use of that Committee. [Mr. MANGLES: What you did, did not matter a straw.] He was glad to hear the hon. Member say that nothing occurred which signified a straw, as that did away with the notion that he was opposed to the Persian war. He hoped, however, that the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) would not abandon the principle, that the Secretary of State ought to deal with treaties and questions relating to peace and war without the interference of the Council. That was a material point in the Bill, and its maintenance would give the Secretary of State real power; for if he were to submit to his Council every question relating to negotiations, to treaties with foreign States, and to peace or war, he would be placed completely in the power of the Council, and the government of India would be vested not in the Secretary of State but in the Council for India alone. Suppose the most of the wars in India had some European as well as Asiatic elements in them. Therefore, if the Secretary of State should have reason to believe that some aggression was contemplated by Russia upon our Indian territories, and he were required to consult the Council, they might say, "How are we to decide upon the necessity of this war? You say it is not merely an Asiatic but an European war, and we call upon you to communicate to us the secret information which you possess." There would be this absurdity, moreover, that after he had obtained the consent of the Cabinet, the major authority, he would have to obtain the consent of the Council, the minor authority. On these grounds, then, he entirely agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield that it was absolutely necessary to retain this clause in its integrity, and he should accordingly support it.

said, that the power in question had been hitherto limited and defined, and yet Presidents of the Board of Control had often gone beyond it. He thought such a power was in some respects objectionable; but was the Committee prepared to say that there was no case in which a Secretary of State might issue orders for peace or war in India? He shrank from joining those who wished to put such a limitation on the power of the Crown, though he would admit the evils which existed in connection with the Secret Committee. The evils which had hitherto existed had arisen mainly from the negligence of Parliament in not demanding a strict account from the Ministers who were responsible for the conduct of Indian affairs, and it would be most dangerous to transfer such responsibility to the Council. He would support the clause, although it might be possible to define more clearly the power of the Secretary of State.

said, he was of opinion that it would be absurd to surround the Minister for India with an able Council if, in dealing with matters affecting foreign States, and with questions of peace and war, he was empowered to act entirely without their advice or knowledge. On the other hand the House had determined on establishing a Council far too large to be entrusted with the duties performed by a Secret Committee. It would be impossible that there should be that entire confidence between the Minister and the individual members of a large Council, which would warrant his disclosing to them all the secrets of Indian policy. He had given notice of a clause providing for the appointment of a Secret Committee, consisting of the Vice President of the Council for India and of two other Members of the Council, to be selected by the Secretary of State in Council. He proposed that the Minister should not be able to send out a secret order without first laying before the Secret Committee a certificate, signed by two at least of his colleagues, that the public interest required secrecy to be observed in that particular case; and further, that with regard to such a communication, the Secret Committee should have the power of advising and of placing its opinions on record, and if the Minister differed from the rest of the Committee, then he should be required to place his reasons on the minutes. Such a secret committee as that would increase rather than diminish the responsibility of the Minister, making him more careful and cautious in entering upon a war in consequence of the warning he would receive as to the ultimate results of such a course of policy.

said, he would refer, in the first instance, to the proposition of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, and he confessed that he did not think it would attain the object the hon. Gentleman intended. No effectual check would be placed upon a Minister by requiring him formally to communicate his intentions to men who had not the power to prevent him from carrying out those intentions. As to the authorization of his two colleagues, that also would be a mere matter of form, and would act rather as a screen from responsibility than as an actual check on the actions of the Minister. On the general question he had not much to add to what had been already said, and especially by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton. He could understand the feeling which existed against investing the Minister with a power of this kind. In fact the Secret Committee was a necessary evil, and he thought that when you had a Council of fifteen members—elected for life, and not politically united with the Minister—that the arrangement now proposed was the best. For every purpose it would be easier to consult the Secret Committee than the whole body of the Council. If in every case you were to say that the whole Council was to be consulted it would diminish the authority and responsibility of the Minister to a point below what it had been at any time. As to defining the powers of the Secret Committee in the Act under which it was at present constituted, its powers were very accurately defined, as extending to questions relating to peace and war, treaties and negotiations. The powers of the Secret Committee might have been exceeded and abused, but excess or abuse ought not to militate against its utility. He could not consent to give up a power which for seventy years had been exercised by the Minister for India.

said, he wished to make a practical suggestion. The noble Lord had referred to the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton as conclusive, but the only argument he had heard, from the noble Lord, and he admitted its force, was that there might be cases in which European politics were mixed up with Indian questions, and that such matters could not be properly laid before a purely Indian body. Why then should not the Council of India be fully informed of all Indian matters and be restricted in their information in relation to all matters which involved European politics either di- rectly or indirectly. The noble Lord did not say a word against the Council being informed on Indian matters. The Government had always allowed their secrets to leak out, but the Court of Directors on the contrary had always managed to keep theirs, so that he thought there was no fear of any being divulged by the Council.

said, that he could imagine cases where, under the apprehension of European wars, the Secretary of State for India might act without consulting the Council. But that rather belonged to his power as Secretary of State than to any function as his of Indian Minister. But the question here was totally different. The question was this. They had been now for months endeavouring to supplant the double Government of India by something more simple and direct, and they had established a Council competent to advise the Minister for India. Then came this 27th clause of the Bill, which enacted that, with regard to all the most important affairs of India, the Council was to know nothing, but everything was to be conducted by the Secretary of State. The noble Lord, at the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle and others, proposed a clause that the Secretary of State should not be able to dispose of the revenues of India without the consent of the majority of the Council. The hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen had said that the Burmese war cost £9,000,000, and that the expense had been incurred in consequence of an order of the Minister for India alone, and yet it was said that £10,000 was not to be spent without the consent of the Council. The clause, it seemed to him, would of necessity do away with all the efficacy of the Bill. It had been said that such power had been sometimes abused; that might have been the case, but questions of war and peace, of treaty or negotiation, and of the policy to be pursued towards the Native Princes, were questions of such importance that they ought to be deliberated on in Council, and if not he agreed with the suggestion that the whole power should be vested in a Secretary of State, and that there should be no Council. What, however, he wanted to see was a real and effective Council. It was urged that fifteen was too large a number for that purpose. Who made them that number but the noble Lord himself, though at first he was satisfied with twelve. But he (Lord J. Russell) did not think that the number was so large that it could not be trusted with a secret. For many years the Cabinet of the Sovereign consisted of fifteen, and therefore it was not number alone on which secrecy depended. Those composing the Council would be experienced men, not rash. He thought that if in 1853 such a Council existed, and the Secretary of State went to them and said, "Government have under their consideration insults and injuries and the violation of treaties which have been made by Persia, we wish to consider it as a question of policy whether an expedition should not be immediately sent out and hostilities commenced," he believed very great good would have resulted from the advice of such a Council, and that their proceedings might have been very well kept secret. In fact, if financial questions were to be submitted to this Council, he did not see, inasmuch as questions of war always involved those of finance, how discussion in the Council could be avoided. Such questions affected the welfare of many millions of the people of India, and he could not believe that they ought to be taken from the cognizance of the Council. Even if every man in the Council were opposed to the policy of the Government, the Secretary of State ought, after all, to say it was their policy, and as such he adhered to it; that the reputation and honour of the country could not be maintained without it. He could easily imagine cases in which long afterwards it would be desirable to know the opinions of the Council with respect to the origin of wars which had taken place. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford was so impressed with the importance of the question of peace and war, that he had given notice of an Amendment that the forces of Her Majesty should not, without special causes, be employed beyond the frontiers of the British possessions in India without the consent of Parliament. An effective check, he thought, was necessary, and where could there be a better one on the Secretary of State than through this Council, to whom he should submit his reasons for going to war? After such wars had been entered into Parliament had no remedy; they must pursue them and the nation was saddled with the cost. He should, on these grounds, vote most cordially with the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen against the clause. The fact, as it appeared to him, was, that in all routine business the Council were to be consulted, but on all great questions which con- cerned the welfare and happiness of the people of India and the permanence of the empire they were to be ignored.

said, he rose to move the insertion, after the word "India," line 5, of the following:—

"And the appointments of Lieutenant Governor of provinces or territories, and the appointments of Members of the Council of the Governor General of India and of the several Presidencies."

The question he wished to raise was whether, now that they were introducing a new form of government with new emoluments, it would not be better to remove the great blot upon the existing system—namely, the remuneration of the governing body by means of patronage. Let them take care not to split upon the same rock as that on which they had made shipwreck for the last sixty years. The remuneration of the members of the governing body ought entirely to consist of salary, and of the high powers with which they were entrusted for the improvement of the condition of India. Forty-five years ago Lord Granville, in a statesmanlike speech, recommended the very course he was now proposing, and suggested that the choice of the young men destined for the civil service should be made by competition, and by examination in the great schools and Universities of the country; while the nominations to cadetships should be given to the sons of Indian officers. Why should the Government not throw a portion of the appointments to regiments of the line, as well as to the scientific branches of the army, open to public competition? And why should not the various public schools have each a certain number of nominations. But whatever mode of disposing of this patronage might be adopted, it ought, at all events, to be placed in the hands of the responsible Minister of the Crown, and not in the hands of a majority of the Council.

said, he did not think that the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman had much to do with his speech. The question of first appointments in the Indian services did not arise upon this clause. When they came to that subject he should be quite prepared to discuss it.

said, he regretted that the noble Lord, in the Amendment he was about to propose in this clause, had abandoned the plan contained in the Bill of his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, and in the first Bill of the present Government, that the nomination of the Councils of the Presidencies should rest with the Governor General and the respective Governors, as they would be much better able to choose the best men than the Council here. No doubt it was intended that the Secretary of State should take the advice of the Council with regard to the appointment, but it was to be regretted that he had departed from the design of the original Bill.

said, he must admit there was a good deal to be said in favour of the proposition. At the same time he believed that no proposition could be more unpalatable to the whole service in India than such an arrangement, inasmuch as it would destroy in a great measure the independence of the civil service by putting it absolutely under the control of the Governor General. It was supposed that such a measure would have the effect of making the officers of that service mere tools in his hands.

said, he wished to remind the noble Lord that the appointment of Lieutenant Governors of provinces and Members of Council was dealt with in this clause. He would also observe, that that there ought to be no distinction in the mode of appointing Governors and Lieutenant Governors. One office was almost as important as the other, and the appointments, in both cases, ought to be made by the Secretary of State absolutely.

said, he thought that these officers could most satisfactorily be appointed by the Council.

remarked, that of all the Amendments which the noble Lord proposed to introduce into the Bill that which took the appointment of the Councillors from the Governor General and the Governors of the Presidencies was the most deserving of support.

said, that in reference to the noble Lord's observation, that it would be more agreeable to the Civil Service to have the appointments made here rather than in India, the intelligence conveyed even by the last mail from India proved that the very reverse was the fact. From that it appeared that the wish among the Civil Service in India was that the appointments should be made by the Governor General, so as to increase and consolidate his responsibility; and although the Governor General might not, on his first arrival in India, be able personally to judge of the merits of particular individuals, he would at once have the advice of those upon whom he could rely, and would afterwards be able to decide upon his own experience.

said, he fully agreed with the opinion expressed by his hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Willoughby), in favour of the alteration of the clause proposed by the noble Lord. He could not conceive whence the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Wilson) could have derived his information that the feeling in India was against it. He could assure the House that the opinion of all those who had recently come from India, as well as of the Court of Directors, was that the alteration proposed by the clause would be a very great improvement.

said, that mention was made in the clause of the legislative member of the Council. Had the noble Lord ever considered whether that office might not be abolished, now that by the Act of 1853 the Chief Justice was admitted to the Council? A saving of £10,000 a year would be realised to the public by the abolition of this office.

said, he would consider the point.

said, he would propose an Amendment to the effect that appointments to the Presidential Councils, instead of being with the Governor-General and the Governors of Presidencies, should rest with the Indian Minister and his Council.

said, he thought it better that the appointments of Lieutenant Governor of Provinces should be made on the sole responsibility of the Governor General.

said, that the Governor General would have the power of appointment. The Council would only have a power of veto, which would, no doubt, only be exercised in cases of decidedly objectionable appointments.

said, this clause related to the Civil Service, and it appeared by it that the Government meant to continue the present system of competition, for which he offered them his thanks. But the clause referred to the Act of 1853, and that Act contemplated the course at Haileybury, which was now abolished, and therefore he suggested that as this clause was really impracticable, the noble Lord should take into consideration the clauses which he had brought up on this subject.

read the section of the Act of 1853, and showed that the clause before the Committee was only meant to bind the Secretary of State to the same extent as the Court of Directors new were with regard to this particular subject, and stated that he saw no reason for not adopting the clause as it stood.

said, that the Earl of Ellenborough, when President of the Board of Control, had made a most excellent change on this point, by abolishing the former regulations, and putting himself in communication with the Civil Service Commissioners. Did the Government mean to continue that course under this Bill?

said, he did not mean to pledge the Government on the subject, but their object of course would be to offer the widest opportunity to those who wished to compete in the examinations.

said, he was clearly of opinion that this patronage should be placed in the hands of the Secretary of State, instead of the Council.

said, that he was glad that the admission to the scientific branches of the Indian army were to be thrown open to competitive examination. He should be glad, however, if the Government would go a step further, and deal in a similar manner with nominations to commissions in the other branches of the Indian army. He should at the same time prefer, if the system of patronage was to be preserved with respect to these branches of the service, that patronage should be vested in the Minister, rather than shared with the Council.

said, he could not but think that the House and the country would view with great jealousy the transfer of the whole patronage of the Indian army to the Secretary of State. No charge of the misuse of the patronage of cadetship had been substantiated against the Directors of the East India Company before the Committee of 1853, and he would ask whether the services of any part of Her Majesty's forces had surpassed the Indian army. Would they, then, pronounce a condemnation upon the system which had produced such men as had fought and fallen in our service in India? It had been said that the distribution of this patronage had occupied too much of the time of the Board of Directors, and would occupy too much of the time of the Council. But it would occupy as much of the time of the Minister. The Directors of the East India Company had never used the patronage for political purposes. Was it likely that the same thing could continue to be said if this patronage was transferred to a Minister of the Crown? They should maintain the patronage in hands that would not be likely to be affected by such influences; and they should look to the working of the system that now prevailed. No doubt the Directors of the East India Company had given cadetships to their friends. But had the system worked ill? He believed that no deserving civil or military servant of the Company had ever been refused a cadetship for his son. And, while by the present Bill it was proposed to reserve one-tenth of the cadetships for the children of such persons, it was in evidence that under the old system they received one-fourth of the applicants. He believed that competition was not the best test with regard to the service of the country. They ought to have more experience of the competitive system in the civil service before applying it to the military service, and they ought to guard against promotion in India being placed in the hands of any Ministers for political objects.

said, that the question raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon would be better discussed on other clauses.

wished to know what the position of the Indian creditor would be under this clause?

said, that he apprehended that the Bill would not effect any change whatever in the position of Indian creditors. There would be merely a change of trustees. The Directors of the East India Company had never been personally liable for the Indian debt; the members of the Council would not be personally liable for such debt; but the general liability of the property of which they were trustees would remain precisely as it was at present.

said, he would move after "India" in page 12, line 5, to insert, "subject to the debts and liabilities mentioned or referred to in the last preceding clause of this Act." His object was to secure to existing creditors a lien over the assets of the Company.

said, he did not think the words proposed would secure the object of the hon. Member, and suggested that the Amendment should be postponed.

said, he would propose, after the words "chargeable on the revenues of India," in line 26, to leave out "alone." The insertion in the clause, of the word "alone" raised the important question whether the Consolidated Fund would be liable, in case of a deficit in the revenue of India. The answer given to that question in the discussion on the East India Loan Bill was unsatisfactory. Indeed, the point was left in doubt, but it was very desirable that it should be cleared up. In his opinion, when the Crown took the Government of India it should also take upon itself the liabilities of the East India Company, and it was desirable that the position of the public creditor should not be altered. There was no analogy between an Indian loan and a Canadian or an Australian loan, for in the case of these colonies representative bodies could secure those loans upon the colonial revenues; but in India the Executive did it. The present liabilities of the East India Company were as follows: — First, the capital of the Company, £6,000,000 stock, redeemable at 100 per cent; or £12,000,000, partly secured by the guarantee fund; called partly secured, because when they came to pay off the stock they would have a deficit of £745,000. The next item was the old bonded debt of £3,894,000, bearing 4 per cent, and quoted at from 18s. to 20s. per cent premium, and payable upon twelve months' notice from either party. The next item was a sum of £1,970,000 borrowed from the Bank of England. Then there was the last East India loan of £4,421,000 and the public or territorial debt of £56,518,000, which bore 4 per cent interest, a proof of how high the credit of the Company stood in India. The latter was the debt to which this clause more particularly referred, and he wished to direct the attention of the Committee to the nature of the promissory note issued by the Company to the creditor on account of their loans. It made no mention of the revenues of India alone being answerable. The Company borrowed in its corporate capacity, and not only the revenues of India but every farthing of the property possessed by the Company was liable for the discharge of the money borrowed. The next class of obligations was the railway stock and debentures to an amount of £34,000,000, which might be demanded at any time within six months' notice, and which, of course, must then become a charge upon the revenue. By what means were the East India Company to be released from these heavy responsibilities? The straightforward course of the Government would be to declare the Imperial revenue answerable for the Indian deficit. The territorial debt was secured, not only on the Indian revenue, but upon the general revenue. The question of India bonds would become a very serious one after the transfer of the Government took place; and the only way out of it would be to give the public creditor Government security. The question was one which affected the public credit in the highest degree, and it ought to be remembered that three-fifths of the territorial obligation had been lent upon the guarantee of a settled trade, and a great part of the remaining portion had been advanced to carry on wars for Imperial purposes. Thus the war in Affghanistan alone added £15,000,000 to the territorial debt, the Persian and other wars being also charged on the revenue. The fact was, that the whole of the real and personal property of the Company was liable for the liquidation of the debt, and it would be incumbent, when they abolished the Company, upon the Government to provide some other adequate security, It might be said—indeed it had been said—that the security of public creditors would not be damaged, but he could not admit any such principle. The value of the security held by creditors depended upon the good administration of India, and if the present change were an improvement, there would be no risk in Her Majesty's Government undertaking the obligations of the Company. Sir Robert Peel was clearly of opinion that if the credit of India was shaken through disturbances, the credit of England must be brought to its aid. On these grounds he thought this Amendment ought to be agreed to.

said, that, divested of technicalities, this was a simple point, and had been amply provided for in the Bill. He could quite understand the desire of creditors of the East India Company to have better securities than they already possessed. He would not enter into any controversy whether such could be found; but when the hon. Member asked what was the remedy, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would reply by demanding what the Indian creditor would have done supposing that this great change had not been proposed, and that the Indian revenue became deficient? He could only repeat what he had said on a former occasion with reference to this subject, though his statement did not seem to carry conviction to the mind of the hon. Gentleman—that the security of the Indian creditor remained identical with what it was before, the only difference being, to express it in the popular way, that the trust was changed, and that whereas before the Indian creditor looked to the Directors, he would now look to the Council. The hon. Gentleman had entered into a catalogue raisonée of all the Indian securities, and, reading a railway bond, said, "See the engagements under which the Directors are to the holders of these bonds, which they are bound to liquidate within a certain notice; and when you destroy the Direction, to whom is the creditor to look?" Let the hon. Gentleman look to Clause 16, which, in the first place, provided that the Council was to stand in the place of the Company in relation to all suits; and then, turning to Clause 61, he would find that it was provided that engagements as against the East India Company might be enforced against the Council in like manner as against the said Company; while Clause 62, which completed that group of clauses, provided that the Council, like the Directors, should not be personally liable. The hon. Gentleman, therefore, would find that the point he had raised as to where they should find a remedy was amply provided for in the Bill, and that every contract into which the Company had entered the Council should in like manner be liable for. Whether, therefore, they looked to the security or the remedy, the case was equally provided for. He trusted that the Committee would support the clause before them, and not put the East Indian creditor in a different position to that in which they were now placed.

said, he wished to point out what he considered an ambiguity in the clause. The principal of the debts incurred by the East India Company was charged on the Indian revenue alone, but nothing was said as to the interest.

said, it was a legal maxim that if they secured the debt, they also secured the interest that might be due on such debt.

said, he could not regard the answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as satisfactory. The creditor had now the collateral security of the hereditaments, chattels, stores, and personal property of the Company in this country. The question was, did not this Bill restrict the security for the bond debt to the Indian revenues alone?

said, the hon. Member would find words in the clause to make all moneys, arising from any property transferred to Her Majesty under the Bill, applicable in aid of the revenues of India.

said, the bonds rested on the original stock of the Company.

said, he rather thought that the bonds were receiving a better security under this Act than they rested on before; for, by the Act of 1833, he believed they were thrown entirely on the revenues of India; but here they were cast also on the real and personal property transferred to Her Majesty.

said, he thought the language of the Bill ought to be made clearer on this point. As he read it, the security was limited to the revenues of India alone.

said, he rose to congratulate the Committee upon the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had completely negatived the position of the hon. Member for Leominster, that the debt of India was a charge upon the taxpayers of this country, and that no hon. Member who had supported the Amendment had maintained that position. He had no doubt that the difference as to verbal construction between the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bute (Mr. Stuart Wortley) and the Solicitor General might be arranged before the Bill was reported.

said, he rose to move the following proviso:—

"Provided that no such general letter of attorney or order shall be executed or signed, except the same has been first authorized by a resolution passed in Council,"

his object being to take precaution against the commission of fraud.

said, he thought that ample security would be provided in a clause to be brought up on the Report.

suggested, that it would be inconvenient to require every warrant to be signed by three members of the Council. At present warrants were only signed by two Directors.

said, he did not know on what ground the noble Lord intended to appoint a separate auditor for the accounts of the Company. The audit of the East India Company had met the full approbation of the noble Lord the late President of the India Board. He did not see, therefore, why they should be put to the expense of another auditor.

would move to leave out the clause.

said, he thought it introduced a great improvement. It would introduce a better system of audit than now prevailed. It would not necessarily lead to any increase of expense.

proposed the insertion of words providing that no pension or gratuity beyond a certain amount should be granted by the Secretary of State, out of the revenues of India, without the sanction of that House.

said, he thought that the check which a majority of the Council would possess over all appropriations of money would be a much more effective control than a mere appeal to the House of Commons.

proposed to add to it these words:—

"And the transfer of any person to the service of Her Majesty shall be deemed to be a continuance of his previous service, and shall not prejudice any claims to pension, or any claims on the various annuity funds of the several Presidencies in India which he might have had if this Act had not been passed."

said, that these words were the same that were inserted at the end of the clause in regard to the servants on the establishment. There could, therefore, be no objection to their insertion here.

said, he understood that this clause was intended to give the same power of suing the Secretary of State and Council that now existed with reference to the East India Company. He thought, however, that that intention was not adequately expressed or carried out by the clause. He would propose to add these words:—

"And all actions, suits, and proceedings which, but for the passing of this Act, might have been brought against the said Company, may from henceforth be brought against the Secretary of State in Council; and the property vested in the Crown as aforesaid shall be subject and liable to the same judgments and executions, in the same manner and form respectively as if this Act had not passed."

said, this clause only related to pending suits. The addition of his hon. and learned Friend would more properly be proposed at the end of the 61st clause.

said, he intended to move the omission of one of the new clauses on this point.

said, he proposed to insert the new clauses pro forma to-night, and to have the Bill reprinted, so that the Report might be brought up on Monday, when it would be competent to any hon. Member to move the omission of any of the clauses.

said, the subject of the clause could not well be considered, except in Committee. He moved the Chairman report progress.

said, he could not consent to the clause. It was impossible to go on at that late hour with the discussion of one of the most important questions involved in the Bill.

merely wished the House to agree to the clauses pro forma, and to take the discussion of them on the Report on Monday.

wished to get through the Bill with as much speed as was consistent with decency, but there was no occasion for hurrying it through the House. There was a material difference between discussing the details of a Bill in Committee and on the Report. In Committee an hon. Member might speak more than once, whereas on the Report he did not possess such a privilege. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would allow the Chairman to report progress, with the view of going on with the Bill in Committee on Monday.

said, that on the Report every hon. Member would have an opportunity of dis- cussing the clauses, and of making at least three speeches on each of them. Ample opportunity for discussion would, therefore, be afforded by the course he proposed.

said, it was clear that the right hon. Gentleman in the early part of the evening contemplated going on with the Bill in Committee on Monday. There was a most important clause to come, which could only be properly discussed in Committee.

said, that if it were the wish of the Committee he would not press the matter.

said, he did not propose to prolong the discussion on this measure; but in justice to the many classes of men, and particularly of women, who from the highest to the lowest throughout England looked with horror and dismay to this Bill—a Bill which would produce confusion, jealousy, and heart-burning in thousands of families now happy and contented—a Bill which owed the support it had received to an agitation got up by a few paid agents, and to a system of petitioning the dodges and shams of which were even more transparent than was the case with most petitions — he could not allow the third reading to pass without taking the sense of the House on the subject.