said, he rose to move that these Estimates be referred to a Select Committee. He wished to advert for a moment to the cause of the merriment which he had created the other night, no doubt by his being too late to get to his place. The House was so full that there was no seat vacant. He had consequently to go into the gallery. He hastened down when the House went into Committee; but being unable to find a seat, he attempted to address them from another part of the House, which he understood was contrary to etiquette. He thought that a very strong case for granting the Committee for which he moved had been made out by the noble Lord the Member for Sandwich (Lord C. Paget) when he said that, out of an expenditure of £19,000,000 in eleven years there was a sum of £5,000,000 which could not be accounted for. The First Lord of the Admiralty had said that he would lay papers on the table giving an account of the expenditure or waste of the£5,000,000. He (Mr. W. Williams) had no doubt of the light hon. Gentleman's ability to do so, for it had never been suggested that the money bad been disposed of in any dishonest or dishonourable way. He had gone through the Estimates since 1816, and found that since that period the astonishing sum of £281,000,000 had been voted for the navy, or, with the additional Votes, nearly £300,000,000; and yet now they were told that they had only twenty-nine efficient ships of the line, and that their navy was inferior to that of France. This arose from great neglect and mismanagement in naval affairs. There could be no proper investigation of these Estimates in. a Committee of the whole House, for the Votes were passed so rapidly that there was hardly time to turn from one Vote to another before they were passed. The other night, when the House went into Committee, he went to fetch his copy of the Estimates, and before he returned, in about a minute, four important Votes were passed; and upon one of them he had intended to take the opinion of the Committee. On the other hand, a Select Committee could deliberately investigate the Votes, He did not intend the Committee to be appointed in the usual way—in which case the Government would of course have a majority in it—but to be selected by the Speaker, and to consist of only five Members. Such a Committee as he proposed could finish their labours in ten or twelve days, so that there would be no delay in considering the Estimates. The right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had made an able speech on the subject of the Navy Estimates, but without being acquainted with all the facts, and had obtained his information from various departments where the red tape system more or less prevailed. These Estimates were double what they were in former years. When the right hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham) was at the head of the Admiralty he reduced the Estimates to £4,500,000, without impairing the efficiency of the navy. The expenditure remained at that point for about seven years, but it had gradually increased since, and the Estimates for the present year amounted to the enormous sum of £9,800,000 odd, exclusive of an addition of something like £1,000,000 for the proposed increase of the navy. It was admitted that the French had as large a navy as we had, and yet their Estimates last year amounted to little more than £5,000,000. He found from the report of the auditors of public accounts that there was an expenditure of 800,000 more than was voted, and that in the case of stores there was an expenditure of £600,000 more than was voted. If the House would not inquire into this useless and wasteful expenditure, it was useless to bring them forward in separate Votes. The econo- mists of the House were charged with the dilapidated state of the navy, but he did not think that during the last twenty years there had been any Motion to reduce one man from the Estimates proposed by the Government, or a reduction of 1s. in their pay. The Estimates that had been voted from time to time by the House were sufficient to secure the most efficient navy in the world. During the time of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle at the Admiralty stock was taken of the various stores and materials in our dockyards, which ought to be done annually, and this tended to a reduction in the Estimates, and prevented useless accumulation. It had been stated that several ships were waiting to be manned, and yet last year the House had voted 59,380 men, and this ought to have equipped an efficient Channel fleet. He (Mr. W. Williams) had been told by an eminent naval officer that one great cause of the want of men was the system of flogging which still prevailed in the navy. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that there was a deficiency in the lower class of officers, such as mates and midshipmen; but looking at the higher class of officers in the navy, he found that there were 341 Admirals on pay, or rather more than one Admiral and a half to every ship and cockboat afloat; whereas in 1846–7 there were only 153 Admirals; in 1851–2, 232; and, in 1857–8, 316 Admirals; which caused an increase in the list of half pay to £55,000. When the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle was First Lord of the Admiralty there were two Generals of Marines and six Colonels of Marines, costing £4,740; now there were thirty-four Generals of Marines and ten Colonels, all sinecures, and costing £24,000 a year. Of the Admirals, he believed that not more than four or five of them were commanding, and others held comfortable sinecures as Port Admirals. The House ought to insist on the Navy Estimates being placed on the table at the commencement of the Session, and at once referred to a Committee. There should be a fair Committee of Inquiry into the whole structure and management of this voracious department of the public service. Had this system of referring the Estimates to a Committee been adopted many millions of money would have been saved since the termination of the French war.

seconded the Motion, and said, that never since he had had a seat in that House had he heard such an account given of the navy, and it was a matter of the deepest regret, if not of shame, to find that our navy had been reduced to such a state as that which had been described. The right hon. Gentleman had objected to lay on the table an estimate of the future repairs and public works for each year, but was there any objection to doing the same as regarded the past? It would very much facilitate the performance of the duties of the House, in giving them an accurate account of the various sums that had been expended. The right hon. Gentleman had shown the wretched condition of our navy, and especially of our dockyards; but when he took office he struck out of the Estimates 1,300 men that had been placed there by his predecessors, and now he came forward and complained of a want of men and of want of efficiency in our navy. He (the hon. Member) would support the proposal for a Committee. It was not against the Admiralty, or its representatives past or present, but against the system that he supported the Motion.

said, he was very much disposed to concur with the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams). At the same time he thought the inquiry as proposed would be rather too extensive, and that it should be confined to the salient points, and one of these points to which inquiry should be directed was, the extraordinary and unsatisfactory manner in which the Estimates were prepared and laid before the House. A Vote was taken the other night irregularly in the middle of the Army Estimates of £133,000 for an excess of expenditure in 1857–8; but was the House aware that in that year there was an expenditure over the amount of money granted by the House to the extent of £790,000? The sum granted was £9,172,000, and the sum spent was £9,962,000. It was clear that Her Majesty's present Government had nothing to do with these expenses, but he did feel surprised that some of the items had not appeared in the accounts for the year 1858–9. Of course emergencies would arise, and he was not the person to quarrel with the fair discretion of the Executive; but this House had nothing to do with the Executive. All it had to do was first to vote the money, and next to see that it was properly applied. That was the true function of the House, and it should never allow that duty to be mixed up with the duties of the Executive. But he would ask the House to look at Vote No. 10—" Naval stores for the building, repair, and outfit of the fleet," and observe what had taken place under that reading in the course of the last six years. They now talked of the extremely dilapidated state of the fleet, yet during the six years the House of Commons had voted for naval stores alone not less a sum of money than £13,587,000. So far as voting the money was concerned, no doubt this House had done its duty; but where he must say it had been lax was, that after voting the money it had not looked sufficiently close to see how it had been applied. What was really wanted was that a little more confidence should be reposed in the House on the part of the Executive. They should let it know what was required to be done, and what they proposed doing, and then come down the next year and show that they had done it. He was quite sure that if a Committee were appointed who directed their attention to the question of how the Estimates should be prepared, they might render inestimable service. And he thought that the recommendation which had been made, and which had been alluded to this evening, that the Speaker should nominate a Committee at the beginning of every Session, was a very good one. That Committee might prepare their report, and on the question that it be now received, a financial debate might at once ensue. Such an arrangement would, in his opinion, be a very good check, and conduce to a wise economy. He was the last man to attempt to starve the public service, but he had a strong conviction that there had been a considerable waste of the public money in all departments, but more especially in the department of the navy.

said, that if the hon. Member for Lambeth had moved for a Committee to inquire into the naval expenditure in the dockyards he should have voted with him. He could not, however, support the present Motion for referring the Naval Estimates to a Committee, be- cause that would be to take the responsibility of the Estimates from the Executive, upon whom it ought to rest.

said, that the people of this country were lavish in their expenditure to support the natural defence of the country—tho navy—in the most efficient manner, but they expected that the money which was voted for the purpose should be expended in the most efficient way. By the accounts which he held in his hand he found that the amount voted for the navy in 1835 was £4,245,718, manned by 26,500 seamen, and that for every successive year there had been a gradual increase, until for the present year it had risen to £9,839,859, or more than 100 percent, with 48,000 seamen. Of course the country expected that there had been a proportionate increase in the force, in the number of men and the number of ships. Let them see if that were so. In 1848 the expenditure had increased from £4,245,000, in 1835, to £7.764,020; the number of seamen was 40,500; the ships of the line built were, none; converted, none—total, none. Frigates built, 1; corvettes, 2; tenders, 1, total—4. The next year the number of seamen voted was 42,000; ships of the line built, none; converted, none—total, again none. Frigates built, 2; corvettes, 4; tenders, 1—total, 7. The following year the Vote was £6,883,747, and the number of seamen was 40,000; ships of the line built, none; converted, none—total, again none. Here, then, were three successive year3 during which there was not a single case of increase in the ships of the line, either built or converted, or addition made to the weight of metal and strength of the navy. Well, did facts like this demand inquiry or did they not? No doubt the money had been spent; but the question was, had it been spent to the most advantage for the country? The first year in the period to which he had referred, that a ship had been built at all, was in 1851, but he believed that even that was a "convert." Still it was an addition of one ship of the line. In 1852 there were two ships of the line built; in 1853 six were converted; and in 1854 five; but in neither year was there an absolute increase. In short, it was not until the year 1854 that any great increase took place in the numerical force of the navy. Then four gun-boats were built, and thirty-eight purchased; and in 1853 eight gun-boats were built, and 100 purchased, but no ships of the line were built, and only two converted. The navy began then to cut a figure in numbers, but not in power. Such craft would not do for a Channel fleet; and the result was, that after doubling the Estimates, we were at this moment destitute of a sufficient Chan- nel fleet, and yet it is to be supposed that the Navy of England in 1835, costing only £4,245,718, was deemed capable of protecting the honour of England.

I entertain a very decided objection to a proposition which would refer the Naval Estimates to a Select Committee, because it would remove from the Executive power a responsibility which, I believe, it is most important to retain and enforce. If there be one man who would rejoice more than another, if the accounts for buildings and repairs of ships were so submitted, it is the present Surveyor of the Navy. For commanding ability and untiring zeal no officer more efficient could be found, and, I must Bay, his position requires that he should occupy a permanent seat at the Board of Admiralty. At no time could any argument, even on the plea of additional expense, be alleged against such an appointment; at the present moment, one most worthy of consideration, when the construction of ships, so as to ensure the highest qualities of speed under sail or canvass, was of the utmost national importance, and. every first-rate ship cost between £200,0p0 and £300,000. While I give full credit to my noble and gallant Relative (Lord C. Paget) for the highest motives, I would divest both him and hon. Members of some wrong impressions conveyed in his speech on the 11th instant. The noble Admiral referred to the instance of the San Fiorenzo frigate, and the First Lord of the Admiralty declared his ignorance of her very existence. He might well say as much, for there never was such a vessel; she was, indeed, laid down as a sailing ship, and it was found advisable to discontinue further building in that character, and her scantling being found unequal for a screw, her conversion into a steamer was impracticable, the portions which had been framed were carefully taken to pieces, and employed in building a sloop-of-war. Some amusement was also at the same time created by a remark of a similar kind, with regard to the lengthening of the Immortalilé, which conveyed an impression that the ship had been sawn in sunder to admit of the process, whereas it actually occurred when only her keel and ribs were in frame. The addition of fifteen feet was made in the length of her bow at the cost in labour work of about £200; and I would ask what is such an inconsiderable sum when the beauty and efficiency of such a ship is at stake? My noble and gallant Relative alluded to the expansion of another vessel, from 450 to 750 tons. Let me ask, could any improvidence be greater than rigid adherence to certain lines of construction, which the advance of science demonstrated to be ill designed? The Surveyor of the Navy would have been unworthy of his position had he neglected to advise the Admiralty that the change was indispensable. The ship, therefore, certainly grew, but the enlargement was productive of no loss, and was that which alone rendered her valuable to the country. Comment has been made by the hon. Member for Lambeth, that there is a very large number of admirals, captains, and commanders, on the Navy List, whilst, to my regret, the First Lord of the Admiralty informed us that there was a deficiency of mates and midshipmen. The number of admirals was the inevitable consequences of the protracted war, which lasted with scarce intermission from 1794 to 1815; at one period there was 965 vessels wearing the Royal Pennant, which the return of peace reduced to about 200; the officers whose services were no longer required were sent on shore, and this country continues to support them. It is a debt of honour contracted by the nation which every year diminishes, and the cold hand of death will entirely cancel. The House will pardon me if I remind hon. Members that in my person is felt the hardship of removal to the Reserved List; for a period of thirty years my untiring efforts for active service, with offers to undertake any description of service of command or station, were all to no purpose, while by favour or interest the same officers were constantly re-appointed to command, a system injurious in effect to the country, and a death-blow to the hopes of the most enterprising and ardent spirit, displacing a large number of naval officers from serving at sea. Sir, it is under this chilling award that the whole service languishes, gallant men fret and chafe under this injustice, every door of advancement is closed upon them; they are condemned to inactivity on shore, while their hearts burn to serve their country afloat, and they learn with sorrow, and might I not add indignation, that this their heavy misfortune is visited upon them as if it were a crime. No man, Sir, can exceed me in a heartfelt desire to see the navy raised to the highest state of efficiency; but let me observe that in achieving an object so important, no language should be permitted which conveys acute sorrow to the breasts of those men who jeopardize their lives and fortunes to uphold the honour of that profession, the compulsory deprivation from whoso service is a pang which will go down with them to the grave.

said, no man was more desirous than he was of exerting an effectual supervision over the public expenditure, and he thought it very important that there should be an inquiry, but it was impossible for him to vote for the Motion of the hon. Member for Lambeth, because he did not think it advisable to transfer the consideration of the Estimates from the House to a Select Committee. He thought the preferable course was that the Estimates should be brought forward and discussed in the House under the superintendence of the Government. He deemed this course the more advisable on the present occasion because time was pressing, and as they heard statements which were not of a very comfortable nature, he thought the House of Commons ought at once to give the Executive Government the supplies which would enable them to proceed with such preparations as upon their responsibility they might deem necessary for the defence of the country. With regard to inquiry, he had no doubt they would ultimately have one. Some hon. Gentlemen demanded an investigation on the part of the country, but in his opinion another strong reason for inquiry was that accusations had been made that evening against different members of successive Boards of Admiralty. It was impossible that all those gentlemen could enter upon their defence on that occasion, but he thought that in justice to Sir Baldwin Walker, and others whose conduct has been impugned, an opportunity for a searching inquiry into the truth of the accusations ought to be afforded. He had no doubt it could readily He shown that there was the greatest misunderstanding with regard to some of those accusations. A charge had been made against him that he had not ordered the building of steam line-of-battle ships when in office. That subject was carefully considered by the Committee of 1848, and if the Report of that Committee were referred to it would be found that at that time we had four block-ships and were considerably in advance of France with regard to a steam navy, but it was also shown that, in consequence of the scientific improvements which were constantly made, the probability was that if a screw line-of-battle ship were then built, she would before long be perfectly useless. Under these circumstances, it was thought advisable, in consonance with the advice of nearly every witness examined before the Committee whose opinion was worth having, not to proceed too rapidly at that time with the building of large screw ships for the navy. One was built by way of experiment—the Sanspareil—and, he believed, did not turn out very fortunately. As an instance of the changes which took place, he might state it was stated in evidence in 1848 that scientific men had come to the conclusion that it was advisable to have full lines for screw ships, while it was found practically that fine lines were absolutely necessary; so that if the original opinion had been acted upon, they would have had screw line-of-battle ships which would have proved totally inefficient. When it became necessary he had proceeded to build screw line-of-battle ships, and he did not think the acts of the Admiralty, of which he was a member, had in this respect been unfortunate in their results. The first line-of-battle ship they built was the Agamemnon, and he believed it would be admitted by naval officers that she had not proved a bad ship. A great deal of ridicule had been thrown upon the "conversion" of ships. He would mention an instance of what had happened when he was at the Admiralty. A ship was laid down called the Windsor Castle, which was intended to be a sailing vessel, but when it was seen that screw ships were superseding sailing ships, it was determined to endeavour to turn her into a screw ship, The Windsor Castle was accordingly cut in two, and many hon. Members would remember the ridicule with which the Board of Admiralty were covered for their decision, which was pronounced by the newspapers to be foolish and absurd. Well, the Windsor Castle was launched on the very day upon which the Duke of Wellington died, and her Majesty was pleased to direct that her name should be changed to that of the Duke of Wellington, and the Windsor Castle, about which so much ridicule was thrown upon the Admiralty, was now the Duke of Wellington, one of the best ships, he believed, in Her Majesty's Navy. He did not suppose he would now be told that the Board of Admiralty had acted unwisely because, instead of building a sailing ship, which would have been useless, they had, at an expense he believed of about £12,000,con- verted the sailing ship into one of the largest and best screw ships in the navy. He had seen articles in the public journals in which the writers blessed their stars that there were no longer at the head of the Admiralty persons who cut ships in two, while they were quite ignorant that the Duke of Wellington was the very ship respecting which the Board of which he was a member had been so unsparingly ridiculed.

said, he thought the remarks which had fallen from the right hon. Baronet were most valuable with regard to the expediency of going into Committee. But he wished to set himself right with the House on one point. He had always argued, and he thought justly—[An hon. MEMBER: Hear, hear!]—he thanked his hon. Friend for that cheer—that the present constitution of the Admiralty required great alteration. But, having made that statement, he would add that he thought no course could be adopted by the House more prejudicial than that suggested by the hon. Member for Lambeth. He could see nothing calculated to be more detrimental to the well-being of the country than the appointment of a Committee—even were that Committee presided over by the hon. Member for Lambeth—and he hoped the House would negative the proposal in so decided a manner as that on future occasions such Motions would not be interposed to delay the business of the country.

said, he rose to express a hope that it would not be considered that those hon. Gentlemen who dissented from the views of the hon. Member for Lambeth did not therefore entertain a desire for inquiry on the subject of the navy. He believed it was undeniable that the statements which had recently been made on the subject of the navy had produced an extraordinary effect upon the public mind, and his decided opinion was, that it was absolutely essential that the public feeling should be satisfied by means of an inquiry. He thought it absolutely necessary that the present, or any other Government, should consent to such an investigation; but at the same time he conceived that it would be highly injurious to the interests of the navy and of the country if the Executive were allowed to divest themselves of responsibility, and to throw it upon a Committee, which was the course proposed by the hon. Member for Lambeth.

said, he wished to protest against the idea that he had, either directly or indirectly, intended to attack an old and valued friend and brother officer, Sir Baldwin Walker. So far from considering that Sir Baldwin Walker was responsible for the shortcomings to which he had called the attention of the House, he believed he was wholly irresponsible for them; but, at the same time, he (Lord C. Paget) would not hesitate for a moment to find fault with Sir Baldwin Walker, were he his best friend, merely because he was not a Member of that House, if he considered that his public acts exposed him to criticism. His (Lord C. Paget's) remarks had been addressed to the First Lords of the Admiralty and to other hon. Members of that House who were, or had been, officially connected with the Admiralty. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated on a former occasion that Sir Baldwin Walker was not interfered with, but that he was regarded as an almost supreme director with respect to ship-building. He (Lord C. Paget) could inform the House, however, that so completely had Sir Baldwin Walker been in the hands of the Lords of the Admiralty, that, until within a very short period, he had not been empowered to give an order for the alteration of ships in the dockyards, even in the slightest degree. It was therefore impossible that he could have applied his observations to Sir Baldwin Walker.

Sir, I hope the House will think the view taken by my hon. Friend (Mr. Bentinck) and by the right hon. Baronet (Sir Francis Baring) a sound one, and will not accede to the Motion. I hope also that the House will not forget what has fallen from the right hon. Baronet with regard to that noble and magnificent ship the Duke of Wellington, Those remarks were most apposite to the present occasion; and when we hear charges made—whether against Sir Baldwin Walker, or against the Admiralty—of reckless and extravagant expenditure because certain ships have been altered, let us bear in mind the testimony of so competent a witness as is the right hon. Baronet to the fact that these alterations have in some signal instances tended to the public service and have given us some of the finest ships we possess. I shall not detain the House by discussing at any length the Motion of the hon. Member, but I think it will be admitted that the speech in which that Motion was introduced was one of a very discursive character. In the first place the hon. Member stated that I had admitted the existence of great mal-administration in the dockyards. [Mr. WILLIAMS: Hear!] Now, I beg to say that I never admitted anything of the sort, and I was not at the time in a position to make such a statement. What I said was, that on taking office I found a gigantic expenditure going on in the dockyards; that I did not feel satisfied that the public had their money's worth; that I thought it my duty to endeavour to ascertain if such were the case, and that I therefore appointed a Committee of Inquiry. I may add, that that Committee have most diligently attended to their duties for the last six months, and that their investigation has been of the most minute character. I am now awaiting their Report, and I am informed meanwhile by the Chairman that he believes their recommendations will tend to promote both efficiency and economy; but I never stated—and I should have been acting very unjustly if I had stated—that I had satisfied myself of the existence of any mal-adiministration in our dockyards. Then the hon. Member informed us that since the great war with France £300,000,000 have been spent in our dockyards. Why not go back to the time of the Commonwealth? Why not tell us how much has been spent since the days of Oliver Cromwell? I am certainly not in a position to say what the expenditure on the navy has been during the period to which the hon. Gentleman has referred, but this I can say that such statements, whether true or un- true, have really no bearing upon the question now before the House, which is, whether the Estimates for 1859–60 shall be referred to the consideration of a Committee. The reference made to the Motion of the noble and gallant Lord (Lord C. Paget) was equally inapposite. The hon. Gentleman dragged in that Motion as a reason for the inquiry now suggested. Why it has nothing to do with the question. Let me here remind the hon. Member, who may not have been in the House at the time, that I this evening gave notice of my intention to wait for no Committee of Inquiry on the subject of the noble Lord's Motion; that in justice to the building department of the Board of Admiralty, as well as to past Boards of Admiralty for the last eleven years, I intend shortly to lay upon the table a full statement of the appropriation of the moneys which have been voted by this House during the last eleven years for dockyard purposes; and that that statement will contain the greatest amount of detail which the office of the Surveyor of the navy can supply. That is the effect of the notice which I gave to-night, not out of the slightest discourtesy to the noble Lord, but simply that justice may be done to those who have been gravely attacked by him. I believe it will be shown that the noble Lord is mistaken in saying that there is a balance of £5,000,000 unaccounted for, and I am also ready to state that the noble Lord has been misinformed in what fell from him as to particular ships. This is not the right moment to revive the subject, but I am sure nobody will be more satisfied than the noble Lord himself to learn that he is in error on these points. I repeat, however, that his statements afford no ground for the Motion of the hon. Member (Mr. Williams). The hon. Baronet who seconded this Motion (Sir Harry Verney), has asked whether I have any objection to furnish retrospective information. If I remember rightly, when I replied to the noble Lord I stated that the form which he suggested could not be complied, with, and that his proposal for information should rather have a retrospective than a prospective bearing. I will not commit myself to any promise, but I can assure the House that I do not wish for concealment, that I have no objection to furnish information, and I think I have proved on previous occasions that I have no such objection, provided only that the inquiry is so shaped as not to impede or injure the public service. I must now glance at one or two remarks of the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir Henry Willoughby.) My hon. Friend alluded to a supplementary Estimate which I proposed the other night, and stated that that Estimate had been taken in a very irregular manner in the middle of the Army Estimates. Let me remind him, however, that that supplementary Estimate was taken after full and ample notice given in the usual way, and that it therefore came on in a strictly regular manner. My hon. Friend went on to say that that Vote of £133,000 ought to have appeared in the Estimates for 1858–9; but it was part of the expenditure of 1857–8, and could not therefore have appeared in the Estimates of 1858–9. The hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Sykes) represents me as having said that we were destitute of a Channel Fleet. Now I never said anything of the sort; on the contrary, I have exerted my- self, not I hope without some success, to establish a Channel Fleet; and the hon. and gallant Member must, therefore, have entirely misunderstood me. But the question before the House is, are we or are we not to appoint a Select Committee? I earnestly hope that the House will reject the Motion of the hon. Gentleman, for I believe that if acceded to it will tend to the injury of the public service. I repeat that I have no objection to any investigation which is consistent with the public interests; but when hon. Gentlemen are pressing for inquiry, I hope they will recollect that I am going to present a Report bearing on the statements of the noble Member for Sandwich (Lord C. Paget.) On this point I appeal more especially to the right hon. Baronet (Sir Francis Baring) who has himself held office at the Admiralty, to consider whether, at a moment of unusual pressure and of unusual exertion there, it is possible to institute such an inquiry as he has suggested, without so burdening the Department as to render it very difficult to carry on the business of the country. At this moment every nerve is strained almost beyond its power; it is difficult for the existing establishment to perform the duties which press upon them; and, considering the great amount of additional work which has now to be performed, I do hope the House will pause before it further taxes the Department to provide the means of carrying on the inquiry proposed.

said, he hoped the hon. Member for Lambeth would not press his Motion to a division, as there seemed to be a general feeling that it would be inexpedient to refer those Estimates to a Select Committee. He would not go into details on the subject; but after the serious charges which had been brought by no common Member of the House, but by an admiral of great distinction in Her Majesty's service—one not only distinguished on his own element, but having peculiar opportunities of knowing all the arcana connected with ship-building—when that Member got up in the House and accused a Department of having wasted £5,000,000 of money of which there was no account, he thought it could hardly be expected that that House would be content with the offer of the right hon. Gentleman. He knew that he, as one of its Members, and having been connected with a former Board of Admiralty, should not be content by the offer of settling the question by producing a paper of accounts. However inconvenient it might be for the Admiralty to have the time of their clerks taken up by an inquiry, he considered that that Department had been so damaged by the statement of an Admiral—one, too, who had possessed rare opportunities of knowing all the peculiarities of ship-building—that the House was bound to appoint a Committee to inquire into the circumstances; and he (Mr. Osborne) for one should not be satisfied—inasmuch as he disputed the noble Lord's figures, challenged his facts, and dissented from his conclusions—he should not be satisfied unless he had an opportunity of showing before the Committee how very badly that gallant Admiral had been informed, and that however great he might be on the water he was a very lame duck on the land. He would not take up the time of the House by going on this occasion into the gallant Admiral figures; the time would arrive for this. He would only give an instance to show how possible it was for even the frankness of an Admiral to lead away the House by a clap-trap assertion. The noble Lord cited the case of the Immortalité, and the expense of lengthening her by 14 feet, as constituting one of the particulars in his list of charges with reference to the squandering of £5,000,000 of money. But would the House believe that the extra expense thus incurred was in reality somewhat under £200? He could also account pretty satisfactorily for the case of the San Fiorenzo, were it not that he was unwilling to weary the House by entering into details at that moment. He entreated the House, however, to grant the inquiry for which he asked into the shipbuilding expenditure in our navy, and he pledged himself, should it do so, to controvert the statements which had been made by the gallant Admiral. However great the inconvenience to the Admiralty might be—and he admitted it would be great—the inconvenience was greater that a statement damaging to the efficiency of a Department should remain uncontradicted; and neither the House nor the country would be satisfied unless here was an inquiry into the ship-building department and expenditure.

said, he was of opinion that a Committee should, both. in justice to the noble Lord the Member for Sandwich, (Lord C. Paget) as well as to the Admiralty, be appointed, and he might also observe that, as a notice of Motion for inquiring into the state of the Navy stood upon the Paper for Thursday next in the name of the hon. Member fur Newport, the hon. Member for Lambeth had better not press his Motion that evening. As an instance of the mismanagement which prevailed at the Admiralty, he might mention that shortly before his right hon. Friend near him (Sir Charles Wood) left that department he had ordered efficient vessels to be placed at different ports. The captain of the Duke of Wellington had accordingly been ordered to put her in commission for that purpose, while directions had been issued that the St. Vincent was to be paid off; but the moment, however, the succeeding Board of Admiralty had come into office the order had been countermanded.

said, his experience as a shipowner led him to the conclusion that the hon. Member for Dovor (Mr. B. Osborne) must be labouring under a mistake if he supposed the Immortalité could have been lengthened 14 feet at a cost of £200. Indeed, if a cipher were added to the figures he thought they would be nearer the mark. But be that as it might, it was, he thought, absolutely necessary that steps should be taken to inquire into the expenditure of the money under the control of the Admiralty. One circumstance had come within his own knowledge which tended to show how essential it was that such investigation should take place—he alluded to the cost and quality of the anchors which were employed by that department. The subject was one into which a Committee had been appointed to inquire, and eight different qualities of anchors had been tested, the worst being that which had been found to be used by the Admiralty. But not only was that the case, but the cost of the Admiralty anchors was 75s. per cwt., while the cost of Trotman's, which were the best quality of anchor, was only 35s. per cwt. Now, if that were a fair specimen of the way in which things were managed in the navy it was no wonder that the expenses in connection with it were greatly and to no good purposes increased. He was therefore prepared to maintain that his noble Friend the Member for Sandwich, having brought forward the charges which he had made, was bound to substantiate them, and ought to have the opportunity of doing so afforded him. There had been an inquiry into the system of army contracts, and an investigation into the affairs of the Admiralty might also bring its Weedons to light. The country. at all events, was determined that the public money should be properly laid out, that it should receive 20s worth for every sovereign which was voted by Parliament, and that no Government should be suffered to exist which did not render a just and accurate account of the national expenditure. He should, under those circumstances, recommend the hon. Member for Lambeth to withdraw his Motion.

said, he fully agreed that the Amendment was not convenient at this period. But he rose to offer an observation or two. The last; speaker had expressed his conviction from his experience as a shipowner that the lengthening of the Immortalité by 14 feet must have cost more than £200. [An Hon. MEMBER: He said £2,000.] The hon. Member must admit that the cost must depend on the state of the vessel at the time of the alteration. He (Sir Charles Wood) was responsible for that lengthening of the Immortalité. The ship was simply in frame at the time the alteration was determined on. It was necessary merely to unfasten a few bolts, to put in new bow timbers, and to move the stem a few feet forward. The alteration was very simple, and the cost very small. Last Friday night he asked the Surveyor of the Navy what was the cost of the alteration, and on Saturday morning he was assured that the cost, being for labour only or for labour mainly, could not by any possibility have exceeded £200.

said, he rose, pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the destruction of the 26th Native Infantry at Ujnalla on the 1st of August, 1857, as detailed in a work entitled The Crisis in the Punjab, by Frederick Cooper, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Umritzur. In calling their attention to the massacre of those unhappy men, he (Mr. Gilpin) believed that he was calling attention to almost the very blackest page in the emphatically black book of the Indian rebellion. He was as unwilling as any hon. Member to call in question the conduct of any absent man, or to pass a condemnation upon an individual who had not had an opportunity of speaking for himself; but in this case there would be, he believed, no dispute as to the facts, because he intended to confine his account of this terrible affair to the report which appeared in Mr. Cooper's own boob. He might say by way of preface that it was not now his intention to call in question the conduct of any of the Military authorities, or remarking on a Military execution. As a civilian he was about to call in question the acts of a civilian, as an Englishman he felt himself called upon to blush for the shame which had been brought upon the character of his country. He had just received a long letter, dated from the United Service Club, from a gentleman who appeared to think that he was going to find fault with the doings of the military in India; but he did not feel himself competent, and it was not his intention to undertake any task of the kind. In order that there might be no mistake he repeated that he would quote as briefly as he could from Mr. Cooper's own account, in order that he might not be accused of misrepresenting circumstances which he regarded as atrocious, but which Mr. Cooper justified, and not only justified, he had placed himself at the bar of public opinion, jauntily claiming for his acts the approbation of the public and the sacred sanction of the Highest. The regiment to whose annihilation he was calling attention had, according to Mr. Cooper, "served with great distinction at Arracan, Cabul, Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon, and was disarmed at Lahore on May 1st. 1857." The men of this regiment were disarmed in the month of May, 1857. He did not find that they had previously been charged with any overt act of rebellion. The disarmament had taken place, as he understood, as a measure of precaution, and in the then state of India he had no complaint to make of such an act. They fled from their cantonments on the 21st of July, after having killed two of their officers. They had themselves, however, been first fired upon by the Sikhs levies. They were, as he understood, engaged at that time in cooking a meal; a storm of dust arose which darkened the light of the sun, and under these circumstances the Sikhs fired on the regiment amounting to upwards of 500 men. Two officers, one of them a Major Spencer, a man he believed of unusual humanity, and the other a sergeant-major, had rushed in among the Sepoys, who supposed they were in some way connected with the firing, and who then killed them. It was not wonderful that such a panic had arisen among the Sepoys; and Mr. Cooper mentioned in his book cases of panics having taken place among the English during the rebellion. The murderer of Major Spencer was well known. He (Mr. Gilpin) respectfully asked the attention of the House to that fact. Mr. Cooper gave his name, and stated that he was a fanatic. The regiment, consisting of 500, fled; they were first of all attacked by the Sikh villagers, who were, as it were, natural enemies of the Sepoys; and those villagers were further stimulated by the promise of large rewards for the bodies of the Sepoys, dead or alive. The result was that 150 of the fugitives were destroyed by the villagers, and the remainder of the body escaped across the river to an island, to which they were pursued by Mr. Cooper with a very inferior force. Under the impression, if not with the promise, of a fair trial, they gave themselves up without any resistance, as many as sixty-six stalwart Sepoys having allowed their hands to be tied by a single man. Without a trial of any kind 237 of them were shot by the direction of Mr. Cooper, forty-five were stifled, 41 were subsequently blown from guns; and thus within forty-eight hours 500 human beings, without any trial, were ruthlessly and mercilessly butchered. Those were the facts he had to lay before the House; and he believed he could prove that they had taken place from Mr. Cooper's own book. According to the narrative of that Gentleman:

"The 26th Native Infantry, stationed under surveillance at Meean Meer, was disarmed on the 13th of May last. Whether there had been any preconcerted scheme among the disarmed regiments for a general attempt to escape from their unpleasant position, is not known; though it has been generally understood that lots had actually been drawn, and that had the 26th succeeded in. any measure the 10th Grenadiers had engaged to follow in their wake. Some say that the noonday gun was to be the signal of a general rise. Society, on the 30th of July, was, however, shocked to hear of another foul murder of a commanding officer, Major Spencer, and the rise of the 26th regiment. Lieutenant Montague White narrowly escaped, he was enticed into the lines by some Sepoys, who affected sorrow at the murder, and was about to dismount, when a warning voice in his ear told him to beware. He galloped off; but not before some hand had aimed a felon stroke at him, and wounded his horse. The sergeant-major was also killed, and the regiment precipitately fled; a dust-storm (as was the case at Jullundur when the mutiny arose) raging at the time, favouring their immediate escape, and concealing its exact direction. They were not, however, unmolested; and it is feared that the ardour of the Sikh levies, in firing when the first outbreak occurred, precipitated the murders and frightened all, good, bad, or indifferently disposed, to flight, From subsequent statements, since taken down, it is concurrently admitted that a fanatic of the name of Prakash Singh, alias Prakash Pandy, rushed out of his but brandishing a sword, and bawling out to his comrades to rise and kill the Feringees, selected as his own victim the kind-hearted Major." … "Another panic arose at Anarkullee, and the thundering of cannon at Meean Meer into the then empty lines of the fugitives spread the utmost alarm. It was taken for granted that the fugitives must flee southwards, and accordingly Captain Blagrave proceeded with a strong party from Lahore to the Hurriki ghat (near to which Sobraon "was fought): and from Umritzur was detached in the same direction, a force (150 Punjab Infantry and some Tawana Horse) under Lieutenant Boswell, a rough and ready soldier, superior to all hardships. They had to march in a drenching rain, the country nearly Hooded. Sanguine hopes warmed their hearts amid the wretched weather. But, alas for their hopes! Intelligence reached the Deputy Commissioner that the mutineers had made almost due north; perhaps in hopes of getting to Cashmere, perhaps to try their luck, and by preconcerted plan to run the gauntlet of those districts in which Hindostanee regiments, some with arms, some without arms, still existed. Suffice it to say, that it was reported at midday, on the 31st of July, that they were trying to skirt the left bank of the Ravee, but had met with unexpected and determined opposition from the Tehseeldar, with a posse of police, aided by a swarm of sturdy villagers at a that twenty-six miles from the station. A rapid pursuit was at once organized. At four o'clock, when the district officer arrived with some eighty or ninety horsemen, he found a great struggle had taken place; the gore, the marks of the trampling of hundreds of feet, and the broken banks of the river, which, augmented with the late rains, was sweeping in a vast volume, all testified to it. Some 150 had been shot, mobbed back into the river and drowned inevitably, too weakened and famished as they must, have been after their forty miles' flight to battle with the flood. The main body had fled upwards and swum over on pieces of wood, or floated on to an island about a mile from the shore, where they might be descried crouching like a brood of wild fowl. It remained to capture this body, and, having done so, to execute condign punishment at once." …. "There were but two bouts, both ricketty, and the boatmen unskilled. The presence of a good number of Hindostanees among the sowars might lead to embarrassment and 'accidental' escapes. The point was first how to cross this large body to the main land, if they allowed themselves to be captured at all (after the model of the fox, the geese, and the peek of oats). This was not to be done under two or three trips, without leaving two-thirds of the mutineers on the island, under too scanty a protection, and able to escape, while the first batch was being conveyed to the main bank; nor also without launching the first batch, when they did arrive, into the jaws of the Hindostanee party, who in the first trip were to be left ostensibly 'to take care of the horses' on the main land. From the desperate conflict which had already taken place, a considerable struggle was anticipated before these plans could be brought into operation. The translation of the above fable to the aged Sikh Sirdar, who accompanied, and to the other heads of the pursuing party, caused intense mirth, and the plan of operations after this formula elicited general approval. So the boats put off with about thirty sowars (dismounted of course) in high spirits; most of the Hindostanee sowars being left on the bank. The boats straggled a little, but managed to reach the island in about twenty minutes. It was a long inhospitable patch, with tall grass; a. most undesirable place to bivouac on for the night, with a rising tide; especially if wet, dispirited, hungry, without food, fire, or dry clothing. The sun was setting in golden splendour, and as the doomed men with joined palms crowded down to the shore on the approach of the boats, one side of which bristled with about sixty muskets, besides sundry revolvers and pistols, their long shadows were flung far athwart the gleaming waters. In utter despair forty or fifty dashed into the stream and disappeared, rose at a distance, and were borne away into the increasing gloom. Some thirty or forty sowars with matchlocks (subsequently discovered to be of very precarious value) jumped into shallow water, and invested the lower side of the island, and being seen on the point of taking pot-shots at the heads of the swimmers, orders were given 'not to fire.' This accidental instruction produced an instantaneous effect on the mutineers. They evidently were possessed of a sudden and insane idea that they were going to be tried by court-martial, after some luxurious refreshment. In consequence of which sixty-six stalwart Sepoys submitted to be bound by a single man deputed for the purpose from the boats, and stacked liked slaves in a hold into one of the two boats emptied for the purpose. Leaving some forty armed sowars on the island, and feeling certain that after the peaceful submission of the first batch (or peck of oats) the rest would follow suit and suit, orders were given to push off. On reaching the shore, one by one, as they stepped out of the boats, all were tightly hound; their decorations and necklaces ignominiously cut off; and under a guard of a posse of villagers, who had begun to assemble, and some Sikh Horse, they were ordered to proceed slowly on their journey hack, six miles to the police-station at Ujnalla. Meanwhile the Hindostanees (the geese) had been despatched to the island back in the boats with an overawing number of Tawana sowars; and it was gratifying to see the next detachment put off safely; though at one time the escorting boat got at a great distance from the escorted, and fears were entertained that escape had been premeditated. However, by dint of hallowing, with threats of a volley of musketry, the next invoice came safely to land, and were subjected to the same process of spoliation, disrobement and pinioning. At any moment, had they made an attempt to escape, a bloody struggle must have ensued. But Providence ordered otherwise, and nothing on the side of the pursuing party seemed to go wrong. Some begged that their women and children might be spared, and were informed that the British Government did not condescend to war with women and children. The last batch having arrived, the long, straggling party were safely, but slowly, escorted back to the police-station, almost all the road being knee-deep in water. Even this accident, by making the ground so heavy—not to mention the gracious moon, which came out through the clouds and reflected herself in myriad pools and streams, as if to 1ight the prisoners to their fate—aided in preventing a single escape. It was near midnight before all were safely lodged in the police station. A driz- zling rain coming on prevented the commencement of the execution; so a rest until daybreak was announced. Before dawn another batch of sixty-six was brought in, and as the police station was then nearly full, they were ushered into a largo round tower or bastion. Previously to his departure with the pursuing party from Umritzur, the Deputy Commissioner had ordered out a large supply of rope, in case the numbers captured were law enough for hanging (trees being scarce), and also a reserve of fifty Sikh levies for a firing party, in case of the numbers demanding wholesale execution, as also to be of use as a reserve in case of a fight on the island. So eager were the Sikhs that they marched straight on end, and he met them half-way, twenty-three miles between the river and the police station, on his journey back in charge of the prisoners, the total number of which when the execution commenced amounted to 282 of all ranks, besides numbers of camp followers, who were left to be taken care of by the villagers. As fortune would have it, again favouring audacity, a deep dry well was discovered within 100 yards of the police station, and its presence furnished a convenient solution as to the one remaining difficulty which was of a sanitary consideration—the disposal of the corpses of the dishonoured soldiers. The climax of fortunate coincidences seemed to have arrived when it was remembered that the 1st of August was the anniversary of the great Mahomedan sacrificial festival of the Bukra Eed. A capital excuse was thus afforded to permit the Hindostanee Mussulman horsemen to return to celebrate it at Umritzur, while the single Christian, unembarrassed by their presence, and aided by the faithful Sikhs, might perform a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature (and the nature of which they had not been made aware of) on the same morrow. When that morrow dawned sentries were placed round the town to prevent the egress of sightseers. The officials were called; and they were made aware of the character of the spectacle they were about to witness."

Mr. Cooper, it would be observed, called himself "the single Christian." He (Mr. Gilpin) would ask the House to look at the representative of Christianity as described by himself. Mr. Cooper went on to sav.—

"Ten by ten the Sepoys were called forth. Their names having been taken down in succession, they were pinioned, linked together, and marched to execution; a firing party being in readiness. Every phase of deportment was manifested by the doomed men, after the sullen firing of volleys of distant musketry forced the conviction of inevitable death; astonishment, rage, frantic despair, the most stoic calmness. One detachment, as they passed, yelled to the solitary Anglo-Saxon magistrate, as he sat under the shade of the police station performing his solemn duty, with his Native officials around him, that he, the Christian, would meet the same fate; then, as they passed the reserve of young Sikh soldiery who were to relieve the executioners after a certain period, they danced, though pinioned, insulted the Sikh religion, and called on Gungajee to aid them; but they only in one instance provoked a reply, which was instantaneously checked. Others again petitioned to be allowed to make one last 'salaam' to the Sahib. About 150 having been thus executed, one of the executioners swooned away (he was the oldest of the firing party), and a little respite was allowed. Then proceeding, the number had arrived at 237, when the district officer was informed that the remainder refused to come out of the bastion, where they had been imprisoned temporarily a few hours before. Expecting a rush and resistance, preparations were made against escape; but little expectation was entertained of the real and awful fate which had fallen on the remainder of the mutineers; they had anticipated, by a few, short hours their doom. The doors were opened, and, behold! they were nearly all dead! Unconsciously, the tragedy of Holwell's Black hole had been re-enacted. No cries had been heard during the night, in consequence of the hubbub, tumult, and shouting of the crowds of horsemen, police, tehseel guards, and excited villagers. Forty-five bodies, dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat, and partial suffocation, were dragged into light, and consigned, in common with all other bodies, into one common pit, by the hands of the village sweepers. One Sepoy only was too much wounded in the conflict to suffer the agony of being taken to the scene of execution. He was accordingly reprieved for Queen's evidence, and forwarded to Lahore, with some forty-one subsequent captures, from Umritzur. There, in full parade before the other mutinously disposed regiments at Meean Meer, they all suffered death by being blown away from the cannon's mouth. The execution at Ujnalla commenced at daybreak, and the stern spectacle was over in a few hours. Thus, within, forty-eight hours from the date of the crime, there fell by the law nearly 500 men"

That was the statement he (Mr. Gilpin) had wished to bring before the House, and he thought it was one which would thrill the heart of every hon. Member who heard it. Be knew in the army the punishment for mutiny was death—a severe punishment, no doubt. He had spoken to not a few military men on the subject of this massacre—men who had seen a great amount of service, and whom he knew to be devoid of all cruelty, for the very reason that they were brave. One of them, a distinguished Polish officer, had written to him thus:—

"The execution of the 26th, as detailed by Mr. Cooper, is truly such a cannibal affair that I am relieved to find that it was not a military man who commanded the massacre. Such a deed would stain the escutcheon of any civilized army in the world with indelible disgrace. Taking the facts upon the perpetrator's own showing, the wholesale murder was wholly unnecessary, inhuman, and unjustifiable. I say this as a military man."

There had been a recent war, in which rebellion and mutiny on the part of soldiers had occurred. In January, 1848, some soldiers in Hungary mutinied, cut their major to pieces, and threw his mutilated corpse to the dogs. After a trial a court-martial pardoned the men and ordered three officers to be shot. In the late war in Hungary, where the passions were inflamed to a terrible extent, and where as many atrocities were committed by the Austrians as had been committed by the Sepoys, a Wallachian regiment also broke out into passive mutiny. The regiment was brought to court-martial, who ordered them to be decimated, and one in ten to be shot. It was easy to see what Mr. Cooper would have done; he would have shot them all. When the decimation was about to be made, an officer arrived from the general, with a free pardon. These men remained brave and faithful throughout the war. Sir F. Currie, late Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors and now a member of the Council of India, spoke of this act as a "cruel massacre." He never heard of Mr. Cooper's name until his book was put into his hands. He now took his leave of him, recommending him before be left India to build a pyramid of human skulls in imitation of Tamerlane, and then, remembering his constant reference to Providence and his inclination to ascribe such events to Providence, he would no doubt inscribe upon the ghastly structure Non nobis Domine. He could not believe that the approval of Sir John Lawrence, as conveyed in the following letter, had been given to Mr. Cooper with a knowledge of all the facts of the case:—

"Lahore, August 2, 1857.

"My dear Cooper.—I congratulate you on your success against the 26th Native Infantry. You and your police acted with much energy and spirit, and deserve welt of the State. I trust the fate of these Sepoys will operate as a warning to others. Every effort should be exerted to glean up all who are yet at large.

"Roberts will, no doubt, leave the distribution of the rewards mainly to you. Pray sec that they are allotted with due regard to merit, and that every one gets what is intended for him. Yours sincerely, "JOHN LAWRENCE."

"Frederick Cooper, Esq., D.C., Umritzur."

Another letter he had read with deep pain, for he felt that if a man who could write such a letter represented the British power in India, it ceased to be a matter of wonder that there should be a rebellion there. It was rather a subject of wonder that rebellion should ever abate. Mr. Robert Montgomery, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, wrote to Mr. Cooper as follows:—

"Sunday, 9 A.M.

"My dear Cooper,—All honour to you for what you have done, and right well you did it. There was no hesitation or delay, or drawing back. It will be a feather to your cap as long as you live. [It must be a bloody feather]

"Get out of the wounded man all you can and send him to Lahore, that he may himself proclaim what has been done. The people will not otherwise believe it.

"Better write an official report, and place the whole on record. Bring forward all persons who did well. Do this judiciously. I mean discriminate between the medium, the good, and the super-excellent.

"Primâ, facie, the Tehseeldar deserves apparently great praise. Were they baulked in getting the boats, and how? Had the Tehseel people knowledge that the 26th Native Infantry had broken our, or did they first ascertain it on seeing them?

"You will have abundant money to reward all, and the (executioners) Sikhs should have a good round sum given to them.

"I congratulate you very heartily on your success. There will be some stragglers; have them all picked up, and any you got send us now. You have had slaughter enough. We want a few for the troops here, and also for evidence. Believe me, yours sincerely, "R. MONTGOMERY.'

"F, Cooper, Esq., D.C."

"P.S. The other three regiments hero were very shaky yesterday, but I hardly think they will now go. I wish they would, as they are a nuisance; and not a man would escape if they do.—R. M."

Now, if there was any meaning in language, Mr. Montgomery wished that 2,000 men would mutiny and fly, in order that he and his soldiers should have an opportunity of butchering them. His friends said that these atrocities were exceptional cases, and he had been asked, "Why bring them forward?" A noble Lord, not a Member of that House, but who had had much to do with India, had asked, "Why not let them rest?" and added, that the less said about them the better. But had they the power of commanding that an act of this kind should be buried in oblivion? It was written with a pen of iron upon the rock, and they could not bun the remembrance of such acts if they would. They ought to learn a lesson from these deeds. It was not that he claimed a character for humanity above that of other hon. Members; but he appealed to the Government, represented by the noble Lord, whoso head and heart were so full of Indian concerns, for an emphatic declaration that he had no sympathy with such atrocities, and such a declaration on the noble Lord's own part and that of the Government would do more to consolidate Her Majesty's power in India than a large addition to her troops. These 500 Sepoys relied for their safeguard on British honour. They might have resisted, but they believed they were promised a fair trial. They trusted to the honour of England, and they were deceived; and he called upon the noble Lord to say that such deception would receive no apology from him and those who acted with him. The House and the country felt just now a great interest in missions and in education for India, but one such atrocity as this would do more to excite burning hatred to our power and to our faith, everything multiplied a hundred fold, than the missionaries could eradicate in the next century. A throne could not be permanently established on injustice, nor could authority be perpetrated by wrong, and it was his earnest desire that the rule of our Queen should be in the hearts of her subjects in India as in England. He knew that the noble Lord the President of the Council for India and the Right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) the late President of the Board of Control, would with himself deprecate such atrocities as those he had condemned, and desire with him that the throne of the Queen should be established on justice, and her power directed by the principles of truth, mercy, and humanity.

had been much conversant with public assemblies, and had been used to boast to himself that he could follow any man. But he could not follow the speech they had just heard, or add a word that would not weaken the effect of the statement their pacific Friend had made. He could not add to the colouring, but he might make some naked addition to the facts. Neither he nor his hon. Friend was present in India at these scenes; he wished they had, because then they could offer themselves as evidence. But the public papers would enable the House to form a judgment, and he would 'appeal to them as the best and only evidence they had. He gathered from them what had not been mentioned—namely, that this regiment had been disarmed, and it was boasted that any of the men who in small bodies attempted to escape were destroyed by the hostile population. Orders were despatched that these men should be sent off in small bodies, to take the fate it had been boasted must befall them. He did not blame the Governor General, and he did not blame the Indian Government; for neither Queen, nor Parliament, nor Governor General ruled in India, but the race of abandoned men who had usurped the powers of them all, and left upon record the blackest page that history could produce. No act of Pagan or mediaeval times could match it. He was once present where an armed populace broke in, and proposed to slaughter some prisoners—at Buenos Ayres—of whom he was one. A quartermaster of Horse Ar- tillery of the name of Hay—perhaps he was still alive—drew his sword, and cried—"Let us have one tussle for our lives!" That was what these Sepoys had done. They seized brickbats, staves, and such instruments as were within the reach of disarmed men, and tried their chance. It was what you, Mr. Speaker, would have done, and I, and every soul that hears me. They had therefore one tussle, and then came the massacre. He was ashamed of being an Englishman, and being obliged to own himself this man's countryman. The men were endeavouring to save their lives by the only means in their power, when the Sikhs were set to murder them. They had been subjected previously to every kind of insult. A low reprobate, writing to the public prints about the Sepoys, said—"We have great fun in making faces at the Sepoys, and throwing things into their lines." Throwing things into their lines, meant throwing carrion and things supposed to convey ceremonial pollution. He (General Thompson) never knew an Irishman who was afraid to speak the truth when appealed to; and he would now ask every Irishman in the House whether, if the Con-naught Rangers had been in the position these Sepoys were, they would not have done the same; and then he would turn to the Scotch Members and ask them if they believed the 42nd would not have done so too. One chance there was. He had stood up in that House to speak of the murder under trust, of the Princes of Delhi. He had since fallen in with a glimpse of hope—a glimpse only, but which might at some time be valuable to the country—that the unhappy man who with his own hand had done that horrible deed, was labouring under that heaviest dispensation of Providence, constitutional insanity. He hoped the same might prove the case with the man who had inflicted this other deep dishonour on his country. It was a charitable hope, and he wished it might be fulfilled; for England, the world, and mankind, would be rid of a stigma, if it could be proved that this wretch—for so he could not but in conscience call him—had acted under a disease which made him free from moral responsibility. He could not believe that any man in that House would defend this horrible massacre. There was a massacre once which the world had never ceased to talk of—the massacre of St. Bartholomew. And there was a Frenchman and Catholic, who, when the order to continue that massacre was sent to him, replied, "Your Majesty has here brave soldiers, faithful subjects, but not one executioner." He (General Thompson), wished that a little of that spirit had been manifested in India. He wished it the more because he had worn epaulettes, and they had been worn by executioners. May I (continued the hon. and gallant General) make a clean breast of it? You, Sir, did me the honour of inviting me to your hospitalities. It would have been grief and pain to me to do anything that could be construed into insensibility to your kindness. But I could not don epaulettes that had been worn by hangmen. A beggar came to Mr. Wilberforce's door, and was given some remnants of vermicelli soup. The man said, "Indeed I am very hungry, but I cannot eat soup with maggots in it." So I, Sir, cannot wear epaulettes that have been worn by hangmen, without giving them at least some time to sweeten. Those Gentlemen who dislike the combination, will have plenty of opportunities of showing their zeal. Meantime, he left the ease to the good sense, the loyalty, and humanity of that Assembly.

Sir, I have no reason to complain of the course which the hon. Member who brought on this discussion has taken in using what is, no doubt, a fair opportunity of bringing before the House an important subject; but I cannot help regretting, that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has followed him has thought fit to mix up with what is undoubtedly a serious and painful circumstance, some old stories from newspapers which are probably untrue, and which, if they were true, would be utterly unimportant. It is impossible to deny that these transactions to which reference has been made are such as cannot be heard or read, even at this distance of time and place, without great pain and regret. And I will go further, and say that that pain is greatly increased by the tone and the spirit in which these transactions have been described, both in the despatch written at the time and in the book subsequently published by the gentleman who gave instructions to the Sikhs engaged in this affair. There is a tone of flippancy, and an appearance of exultation at that great sacrifice of human life—a sacrifice of life made not in the heat of action, nor after a judicial process—which is utterly at variance with good taste and good feeling. Making all allowances—and we are bound to make the very largest allowances for the circumstances of time and place—it is impossible not to condemn the language in which. Mr. Cooper has written of these transactions. But what the House has to consider is, not the tone in which Mr. Cooper has written, but the circumstances which took place at Meean Meer. Now, what were the circumstances? The regiment in question—the 25th Native Infantry—was stationed at Meean Meer, and being strongly suspected of an intention to join in the mutiny, was placed under restraint. It remained under restraint for a period of about six weeks. I think it was on the 30th of July that the attempt to revolt was made. It has been said, in vindication of that attempt, that it was merely an effort on the part of these troops to escape, and that that effort was made because they were to be sent in small parties among a population that was hostile to them, which was tantamount to committing them to inevitable destruction. Now, I apprehend that that is simply a mistake in fact. It is quite true that at a later period regiments were disarmed and discharged in small parties, but no general disarmament of troops had taken place when this outbreak arose. Escape, then, is not the word to apply to such a transaction; and oven if it had been a movement of escape on the part of the troops, though a single fugitive may possibly avoid detection, when a large body of men attempt to escape they must be prepared to resist force by force, and the attempt, therefore, on the part of a regiment under these circumstances to escape from the place where they were kept under surveillance would, in fact, on their part, lead to the inference that they were prepared to meet any force that might resist them. It is said that at the time of this outbreak these troops were not armed, That is undoubtedly the case; but every one who knows India knows that arms are not difficult to be obtained there. They were then not fugitives, but insurgents. And when did they make the attempt? Why, at a time when Delhi was not taken. Every man of them, if they had escaped—and they were men for the most part belonging to Central India—would have gone to swell the ranks of the insurgents. At the time of the attempt there was already arrayed against the Imperial forces an enormously disproportionate force of Sepoys. I say, then, that whatever may have been their inspiring motive at the moment of this out break, it is impossible to treat it as anything but mutiny and an insurrection at a moat critical time. Then, it is said that the Sikhs fired upon these troops before the murders were committed. Now, we have not, and probably we never shall have, full and circumstantial evidence of what occurred at the time. But we know this—we know that an outbreak was expected for some days before. We know that an outbreak actually took place upon that day—the 30th of July, and it is only reasonable to suppose that as English officers were present, or, at least, at no great distance, any attack made upon them by the Sikhs was owing to a previous outbreak on their part. But was this outbreak a mere result of panic, and was it merely by way of self-defence? If that was the case, how came those attempts at the murder of two European officers to take place? It may be said that the murder of Major Spencer was the work of an individual only. We do not find that any attempt was made by these Sepoys to give up that guilty individual, or that they endeavoured to disconnect themselves in any way from the crime which he had committed. But, admitting that the murder of Major Spencer was the work of an individual only, what was the case as regards the attempt on the life of the second officer Lieutenant Montague White? A plan was laid to entice him within the lines, and when they had brought him there, an attempt was made on his life, with which he narrowly escaped. The object in this case could not be to get rid of an inconvenient witness, for the facts must have been public and notorious; nor was it any immediate danger to which the regiment was exposed. It appears to have been, as far as we can judge, a premeditated and treacherous murder, and this must be borne in mind in coming to any decision on the facts. It is unfortunately true that out of 700 men nearly 500 suffered death, some on the spot and some afterwards at Lahore. But all these facts were known, and are referred to in a despatch addressed by Viscount Canning to Sir J. Lawrence, in which the Governor General states that "great credit is due to Mr. Cooper for his exertions," We have evidence then, that every authority in India, regarded this punishment as necessary. Two officers had been murdered by these men without any purpose; the result of the escape of the regiment would have been that it would have joined the insurgent forces; and a severe example was doubtless considered to be necessary, to prevent similar risings elsewere. Reference has been made to a note addressed to Mr. Cooper by Mr. Montgomery. The note is couched in hasty language and such as could not have been deliberately employed, but I submit that whatever vindication the case allows of is furnished by its terms. In that note it appears (as indeed we know from other sources) that there was a largo force in the neighbourhood; they were troops of the same garrison; they were similary disarmed, but under the same temptation to rise and not unlikely to yield to it. Probably Sir J. Lawrence and those in command thought, if a severe punishment were inflicted on the first body, as an example, it might prevent a similar mutiny by other regiments, and, in the end, be the saving of many lives. I have now stated what I apprehend may fairly be urged in vindication or palliation of the course pursued; but I am bound in sincerity to add, I cannot but wish that an indiscriminate execution of these men had not taken place, that some selection had been made, that there had been some previous investigation, and that some punishment short of death had been inflicted on the great bulk concerned. But it is one thing to wish that an act of this kind had not been done and another thing to pass a formal censure upon it. Only by great exertions—by the employment of force, by making striking examples, and inspiring terror, could Sir J, Lawrence save the Punjab; and if the Punjab had been lost the whole of India would for the time have been lost with it. Sir J. Lawrence has declared this act was necessary; and the Governor General has confirmed the opinion. Taking all this into consideration, and remembering that we, at this distance of time and place, are hardly fair judges of the feelings of men engaged in such a conflict, I hope the House will—I do not say oppose—I cannot ask its approval of the act in question; but I hope it will pass over the transaction in that silence which is sometimes the most judicious comment.

said, he hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty would give some explanation of what he intended to do in reference to the Coastguard. It included two descriptions of men,—old civilians not available for the sea service, and seamen. Some of the seamen had served in ships of war, had been discharged with a good character, and, as a reward, had been employed in the Coastguard. But there were a certain number of men employed who had not served in the navy. It was obvious that the most valuable men were those who had been trained; in case of need they would serve as the nucleus of the crews of ships of war. It was most desirable to increase the number of the Coastguard men as much as possible, and the Manning Commissioners recommended that this force should be raised from 10,000 to 12,000. This augmentation could only be made gradually year by year, as the class of men whom they required could not be obtained at once. When he was at the Admiralty he took a vote for 10,000 men, though he only expected to raise 9,000 of them at once, and that number was nearly obtained; and he thought that subsequent events had proved that he had formed a correct idea of the value of this class of men. This year, however, there was no increase proposed in the Coastguard seamen, and it was to be hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty would explain why he had not followed the course which it was understood was to be pursued when this force was established,—namely, to increase it as rapidly as circumstances would permit.

said, he entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman as to the value and importance of the Coastguard, and felt great satisfaction that the Manning Commission had recommended that this excellent reserve should be increased. The reason why he had not asked for a larger number of men for this force was, because they were at present many hundreds short of the strength granted by Parliament, and therefore any increase for this year would have been merely nomimal. The deficiency throughout the year ranged between 700 and 800 men.

said, he wished to ask why the number of Coast Volunteers was not given in the Estimates? All the particulars that the Committee was furnished with were the sums of money which were required for this branch of the service. There were at present rather more than 7,000 Naval Coast Volunteers. He was also anxious to know whether it was true that men had been drawn from the Coastguard to man the ships in commission.

said, it was true that a few men had been allowed to volunteer from the Coastguard ships, but they were very few. They had manned two ships of the line and two frigates recently with a rapidity which was very uncommon. In fact they were deriving the advantages of the continuous service of the men of the fleet, and of experienced sailors, who had recently come home from foreign ships in Her Majesty's service. The number of Volunteers was about 7,000.

said, he had been informed that nearly 600 men had been taken, from the Coastguard to man the ships in commission. If that were so, it would seem to indicate that there was a difficulty in getting seamen for the navy.

said, it appeared from the statements made that the Coastguard was 700 or 800 below the number voted. It was evident, therefore, that there was still something wrong, and that we had not that reserve which was necessary in case of an emergency.

said, if the Coastguard were to be rapidly raised either to 10,000, at which it stood under the Act of Parliament, or to 12,000, which the Commissioners recommended, it would be necessary to relax the present rule with regard to admission to that service. Men were anxious to obtain situations in the Coastguard, and when the Government began to make their reserve from the merchant service he would suggest that they should admit to the Coastguard men who had volunteered for the reserve. They would thus fill the Coastguard, and give a valuable stimulus to the merchant service to form a reserve for the navy.

said, he had always thought it to be of the greatest possible importance to keep the greatest possible number of old men-of-wars men in the Coastguard. This would show the merchant service what good things the navy led to. He wished to receive an answer to the question he had put to the right hon. Baronet. As he understood, the best men were employed ashore, and the inferior class on board ship. He wanted to know why the increase of the men on board ship was caused by a diminution of those on shore.

said, that the revenue cut- ters in the present year were supplied by men from the Coastguard service afloat, which was not the case last year. The fact was that we had on shore a larger number of men this year, and we were short of the number afloat.

said, he wished to ask whether the number of Coast Volunteers had increased since last year.

said, that the number last year was about 6,000; at present it was between 7,000 and 8,000. He might also state that the number of men who had entered from the west coast of Scotland was between 400 and 500.

Was it true that only about 200 men had accepted the short-service pension of 6d. a day?

Yes. The number was small; it was about that number.

said, he had been told that the fitting-out and changing of the nine block-ships had cost £164,000. He could not understand where the money had been put. The operation upon a single ship could be accomplished in forty-eight hours. He could not understand where the money could have gone.

said, it was generally acknowledged that the men of the north of Scotland were extremely fine men, and, indeed, it had been said of them that they were a race of giants, but they were found to be very averse to going far from their homes, and were not to be relied upon as a naval force. The restrictions existing, especially with regard to their not serving more than 100 leagues from the land, rendered such a force one which it was not desirable should be absorbed in the reserve proposed to be created.

said, he had come to a different conclusion. It was true that the Volunteers were not to go more than 100 leagues from the shore, but there were many services in which they would be able to supply very important aid. Still there was one great defect in the volunteer system, and he wished to ask the right hon. Baronet if he could state how many of them were absent from drill last year. He understood that out of 7,000 only 3,000 or 4,000 could be relied upon.

observed, he was surprised at this, because in the first year only three or four men out of 300 or 400 were absent from drill.

said, he could not exactly state the proportion, but he believed that about one-tenth did not appear when they were called upon. He thought that with some slight encouragement a very fine class of men called "wreckers," who at present were idling about the coast, might be made very efficient crews for the gun-boats.

said, he thought if some extra inducement were offered to the men of the Coast Volunteers they would be more willing to serve, such for instance as a dinner on a Sunday, and that if more organized they would be found an efficient force.

said, he ought to mention that though it was the opinion of the Committee who sat on this subject that the Coast Volunteers might be superseded by a more efficient force, yet, as far as it had gone, great benefit had resulted from the institution of that corps. It had habituated the men of the north to the discipline observed on board men of war, and thus paved the way to the creation of a large and useful force in cases of emergency. Among other suggestions made, it had been proposed that a gun should be placed at each port, under the direction of old mariners, and that the inhabitants should be practised in the use of the gun, the best shot receiving a shilling reward, or some encouragement of a similar nature; this would induce the attainment of a great knowledge of gunnery among such men.

was of opinion that, when it was well understood the old system of impressment would not be again resorted to there would be no limit to the number of volunteers that the country might obtain. It would, however, be better to discuss the whole subject on another occasion, and in a more formal manner.

, who had given notice of a Motion condemnatory of the practice of billeting in Scotland, said, that after the changes in that system which had been made by the gallant General the Secretary of State for War, and especially after the increase of the rate of remuneration which had to a great extent remedied the evils which were complained of, he should not move his Re- solution. At the same time he must urge upon the gallant General the propriety of diminishing this practice as much as possible, and, if might be, abolishing it altogether.

said, that in reply to what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman, he had great pleasure in announcing that it was the intention of the Government to raise the allowance from 1½d. to 4d. a day. But that alteration did not extend to innkeepers who had to find provisions for troops on the march. In addition to the former proposal, it was intended to make a further allowance of 2½d. a clay to them; thus increasing the present rate from 10d. to 12½d. The attention of the Government had been anxiously directed to the suggestions of the Billeting Committee of last year. There were several grounds of objection brought forward by the Committee. Amongst them was an objection to the arrangement by which the militia were billeted. But the fact was, that in all instances in which the militia had been called out of late years, they had been quartered in barracks, and had not been billeted. It had also been observed that some districts suffered more severely than others from the system of billets. He was happy to say that he had received intimations from several towns from which the greatest complaints had proceeded, such as London, Liverpool, York, &c, and he had been informed that the innkeepers would be perfectly satisfied with the proposed changes, and that persons were to be found who would be not unwilling to provide quarters for the troops at the increased rate. He hoped the House would allow the Bill to pass this year to see how the proposed changes would work.

said, he was glad of an opportunity of testifying to the extreme courtesy and kindness of the right hon. Gentleman in listening to the complaints that had been made upon this subject, and to the conciliatory spirit in which he met the objections which had been made to the present system.

said, he could corroborate the remarks of the hon. Member who had just spoken. In his opinion the proposals of the gallant General were perfectly just and fair.

said, that having called the attention of the House to this subject about two years ago, he also wished to express the gratitude felt by those persons who had been aggrieved by the old system.

said, he wished to ask whether or not the recruits raised in Sunderland, Shields, and other towns of Yorkshire, would be removable at once to barracks in York.

said, he thought it would not be practicable to remove recruits immediately to the barracks at York.

asked whether the practice of giving money to soldiers to buy them out, as it was called, whereby a separate bargain was made with the innkeeper was to be continued?

said, that with every desire to adopt the proposal that the payment should be made by the billet-master, it had been found necessary to postpone any alteration in that respect till it had been seen how the new system would work.