House Of Commons
Monday, April 4, 1859.
MINUTES]. PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Debtor and Creditor. 3a East India Loan; Savings Banks (Ireland) Act Continuance.
County Courts—Question
said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether any steps have been taken to regulate the imprisonment of persons who are now subjected thereto by County Court Judges; and, if not, whether any inconvenience would arise from rescinding that portion of the order for prison discipline which subjects parties to imprisonment in a recusantward?
stated, in reply, that no such order was in existence as that to which the hon. Member referred. Soon after the passing of the County Courts Act the Law Officers of the Crown, upon a question being submitted to them, gave it as their decided opinion that such persons as those to whom the hon. Member alluded should be treated as misdemeanants. They had accordingly been so treated, and, although he admitted that great hardship was suffered in many cases, he was not prepared to say that any alteration should be made in the present practice. He would be glad, however, to receive any suggestion which the hon. Member might have to make on the subject.
The Foreign Secretary—Stamps On Patents Of Appointments
Question
said, he rose to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the statement is true which has been publicly made, that the Earl of Malmesbury has, up to the date of this Notice, refused to pay the £200 Stamp Duty required by the Act 55 Geo. III. c. 184, to be paid on the Patent of appointment to the office of Secretary of State; and whether, in consequence of such refusal, the Patent of appointment of the Earl of Clarendon to the office of Foreign Secretary does not now exist unrevoked.
said, he believed there was a point of law involved in the question of the hon. Member. His noble Friend the Foreign Secretary had consented to pay the fees in question provided he could be satisfied that they had been paid by those who preceded him. The appointment did not depend upon the Patent, but upon receiving the Seals from Her Majesty, and therefore no question could arise upon the point mooted by the hon. Member. As it was his interest that as many payments should be made into the Exchequer as possible, he had submitted the question to his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General, and now awaited his report on the subject. If the opinion of the Attorney General was that these fees should be paid, he would certainly lose no time in claiming them, not merely from his noble Friend.
The River Bann—Question
said, he would beg to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury are disposed to permit the repayment of the sums due by certain Irish Counties for the improvement of the navigation of the Lower Bann to be spread over ten years, or some longer term than five years, the period now prescribed for that purpose?
replied, that memorials from the Grand Juries of some of the Counties referred to, pray- ing that the payments should be spread over a longer term than five years, had been received at the Treasury, and remitted to the Irish Board of Works for their report. The Treasury, he apprehended, had no power to grant any extension of time without vitiating the whole of the transaction.
Ministerial Statement—The Vote Of Thursday Night
Mr. Speaker, I shall commence the few observations which I have to make by moving the adjournment of the House, in order that any hon. Gentleman who may wish to remark upon my statement may have an opportunity of doing so. I took the liberty on Thursday night, after the vote which the House had arrived at upon the Motion for the second reading of the Reform Bill, to move the adjournment of the House until this day, because I thought it but respectful to the House that in the course which the Government might think fit to adopt in consequence of that vote there should not appear to be even the semblance of precipitance. After that vote—after the observations made by myself towards the close of that debate—and after the declarations made by several Members of the Government, the House, I am sure, will not be surprised when I announce that it is not the intention of the Government to proceed with that Bill for amending the Representation of the People which I introduced exactly five weeks ago. It is also due to the House to state that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose any other measure with the same object. On their part, however, I protest against the doctrine, which seems to be held by some, that the question of Parliamentary Reform is to be the appanage of any individual or the privilege of any particular party. I cannot hold that a body of public men professing the opinions which Her Majesty's Government do upon general politics—professing Conservative opinions—are not quite free to deal with the question of Parliamentary Reform, or indeed, with any other public question in that manner which they may deem most expedient for the public welfare and most conducive to the public interest. Indeed, I would say—not to provoke any controversy, which on this subject on the present occasion I studiously desire to avoid, but to prevent misconception—the question of Parliamentary Reform is the one of all others which may be viewed in two lights. There is the Conservative view of the question, and there is—not to use the epithet in the least degree offensively—the revolutionary view of the question. That is to say, there is that Conservative view which in any changes it recommends would wish to preserve and maintain the present character of the House of Commons, which is a representation of the various interests and classes of the country; and there is the revolutionary principle, which attempts to change that character, and to make the House of Commons a representation merely of the voice of a numerical majority. But, Sir, reserving to ourselves under all circumstances our right to deal with that question, we feel that at present we have fulfilled our pledge. We have fulfilled our pledge to the House and the country at a great personal and party sacrifice, and we are not prepared to enter into any specific engagement on that subject. The vote at which the House of Commons arrived the other night has rendered it necessary for the Government to consider their position in this House. I am bound to say, because I think it best always to deal frankly with the House, that before the House arrived at that vote the Government had seen fit to consider their position here. Ever since the commencement of the present Session of Parliament the Government has found itself frequently in minorities, and that, too, in many instances on subjects of no mean importance. Our position has been a painful position, and we have had before this to consider whether it was not our duty to make a communication to the House; but we have hitherto refrained from doing so for three reasons. In the first place, notwithstanding the array opposite to us—however numerous might be the force marshalled on those (the Opposition) benches—we could not perceive that there was any principle of cohesion in those ranks or any unity of policy and purpose more evident than when, in consequence of the distracted state of the Liberal party, the Earl of Derby was summoned by Her Majesty to place himself at the head of affairs. Under these circumstances, we felt that we were bound as men of honour not lightly to relinquish a post which we had acceded to in the spirit of the constitution, and which we had knowingly accepted with all those conditions and consequences attaching to it. In the second place, the state of our foreign affairs was very critical. Her Majesty, under our advice, had consented to become the mediator between two great military monarchies, with a view of thereby preventing, if possible, a war occurring in Europe. It was, therefore, highly expedient that there should, if possible, be no change of Ministry, and that Her Majesty's Government should, as far as possible, appear at that moment to have the general confidence of Parliament. There was yet a third reason which induced us to take this course. After the frequent promises and procrastinations which had taken place on the subject of Parliamentary Reform—remembering that for ten years it had been acknowledged in this House that that subject ought to be dealt with—and after the triple recommendation of the Crown, after the triple pledge of this House, after the triple promise of successive Ministries—it did seem to us that it would be a very heavy blow to the character of public men and to Parliament if we, in our turn, seemed to evade the engagement which we had made and the requirements of the country in that respect; and, remembering that the House had pledged itself to give a careful and patient consideration to that subject, we thought that, even if we did not succeed in our general endeavour, it was a good and beneficial thing that an honest and earnest, even if unsuccessful, measure of Reform should be brought forward in this House by us. Influenced by these three powerful considerations we retained our seats upon these benches, under circumstances which, I admit, involved a degree of mortification, and which we bore from a feeling that on the whole we were doing our duty to our Sovereign and the country. But the vote at which the House arrived on Thursday rendered it impossible for us any longer to be quiescent. That was a vote of censure on the Government. It was intended as a vote of censure. [Cries of "No, no!"] It was acknowledged as such by the principal promoter, and as such it was accepted by Her Majesty's Ministers, and the House having arrived at that vote, we felt the Government of the Queen was deprived of all authority. I may be permitted for one moment to offer to those hon. Gentlemen who sit on these (the Ministerial) benches the deep expression of our gratitude for the manner in which they supported us during the late struggle. I am perfectly aware that no Minister can bring forward a measure to amend the representation of the people, which from its vast and various character, can meet with the general and entire concurrence of his supporters. I know well that many amongst those with whose confidence we are honoured made no little sacrifices in supporting us on that occasion. But I am sure they did so because, whatever were their opinions on matters of detail, they felt convinced that nothing but a sense of duty, nothing but a belief on our part, that the measure we proposed was advantageous to the country, and was in strict consonance with those Conservative principles which we uphold—nothing but a conviction of that kind on their part would have induced them to give us the generous and never-to-be-forgotten support we received on that occasion. During the debate an eminent Member of this House announced it as his opinion that the rule of party was over in this country. If that observation be true I should deeply regret it, because I have always held the opinion that if party rule is over Parliamentary rule will soon cease. I am quite convinced that in a popular assembly so numerous as the House of Commons there can be no guarantee for its independence and authority but political connection among those who sympathise generally on the same points of public affairs. I do not at all agree with the right hon. Gentleman who gave that opinion during the late debate, and I think I can appeal with some pride to the conduct of the Conservative party on this occasion. I think they showed a high spirit and consciousness of duty as a great political connection, which will be appreciated in the country, and which will redound to the credit of this House. What has occurred to the Government is an event which it would be affectation to say has come upon us altogether unexpectedly. It is, indeed, a result which, more or leas, we have contemplated from the moment we accepted office, under the severe and difficult conditions on which we agreed to carry on the conduct of affairs. Last year the blow was averted by the support we received from a large party opposite composed of hon. Gentlemen who sit below the gangway. On this occasion I feel it my duty to tender the thanks of Her Majesty's Government to them for the support which, during last Session, we received at their hands. It was a support given without solicitation—it was a support given without conditions—it was a support given by hon. Gentlemen, who, on all constitutional questions, entertain opinions diametrically opposed to those which we profess, and I believe it was a support given because they appreciated the peculiar position in which the House was placed by the state of parties; and, therefore, I am bound to believe, and I do believe it was a support given from a pure sense of public duty. If I might—having offered the thanks of the Government to those to whom it was due—if I might for a moment refer to something personal to myself, I would offer to the House generally, and especially to all hon. Gentlemen opposite, my thanks for the courtesy and kind feeling with which they have supported me in my attempt to carry on the business of the House. That has happened to me which probably has never before fallen to the lot of any public man. I have been twice called upon to lead this House without the advantage of a numerical majority of supporters. The task of conducting the business of the House is, under no circumstances, a light one. But the burden was necessarily aggravated by the circumstance to which I refer; and I feel that, however imperfectly I may have done my duty, even that imperfect fulfilment could not have been accomplished had it not been for that courtesy and general good feeling which I have experienced on all occasions, not only from friends, but also from those who sit opposite to me in this House. Having touched upon these points, it now becomes my duty to inform the House of the step which Her Majesty's Government have thought it their duty to take. I had to ask myself, first, whether that evidence of want of cohesion on the benches opposite, to which I have already alluded, still existed. I had to ask myself whether there is there that unity of purpose and policy on questions domestic and foreign which were so essentially wanting when we acceded to power, and which was the cause of our acceding to power. I had to ask myself whether there is any evidence of that unity of feeling being restored, and that political cohesion being established. With regard to the late division, a Resolution of censure was certainly carried against Her Majesty's Government. But this was remarkable, that the two most eminent leaders on that occasion of the Opposition indicated that at the moment that Resolution, which almost anybody might have voted for, was carried, they should both of them recommend exactly a contrary policy. The noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell), declared that the mo- ment that Resolution was carried he should exert his utmost energies to defeat the measure of the Government, as a noxious and pernicious measure; but the noble Viscount the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) declared that as soon as that Resolution was carried he should, on the contrary, support the measure of the Government, as a measure containing a great many good things, and as one which, subject to some modifications, it was of the utmost importance should be passed. Even after the division was called a scene took place in this House which certainly showed no great degree of unanimity on the part of hon. Members opposite. An hon. Member (Mr. Wyld) rose and proposed to append to the Resolution of the noble Lord a recommendation to the House that we should sanction vote by Ballot. Although, Sir, every attempt was made to prevent that addition from taking place and that proposition from being made, it is a fact that a division did occur upon the question, notwithstanding the most active modes of repression, and nearly one-third of the majority supported a policy which was certainly not recognized by either of the noble Lords on the other side of the House. Sir, under these circumstances, not seeing that there is on the part of hon. Gentlemen opposite more ability to form an Administration than existed when they found it necessary to retire from these benches last year—seeing that the Opposition consists of a number of sections, which no doubt can at any time combine and overwhelm the Queen's Government, whoever may happen to form it—seeing, from the present state of affairs, that there is no security, but almost a certainty that every February there will be a Ministerial crisis, and perhaps its consequences—and believing that this state of affairs is prejudicial to the repute of Parliament and injurious to the best interests of the country, and believing, too, that it is of the utmost importance at this moment that the authority of the Government should be supported by the authority of Parliament, and not being conscious that during the time we have exercised power we have done anything to forfeit the good opinion of our fellow-countrymen—we have thought it our duty to advise Her Majesty to exercise her prerogative and to dissolve this Parliament. Recurring to the sense of her people, a state of affairs may be brought about which may be more conducive to the public interest. Under these circumstances, Sir, it is my duty to inform the House that so soon as the urgent requirements of the public service are satisfied this Parliament will be prorogued with a view to its immediate dissolution. Sir, there are some Votes which must be taken—there are some Acts which must be continued—there are some measures before us, such as that which concerns the finances of India, which must under all circumstances receive attention. The other measures of the Government I shall not, of course, presume further to advance, unless the House expresses its wish that the Superannuation Bill should pass. I leave that matter entirely to the consideration of the House. I have now stated to the House the course which Her Majesty's Government have thought it their duty to advise, and which indeed Her Majesty has been pleased to sanction and adopt. I have now only on the part of myself and my Colleagues to express our sincere and even solemn hope that, whatever may be the result of this appeal to the country upon our personal position, it will be at least conducive to the convenience of Her Majesty, to the honour of Parliament, and to the best interests of the country.
Motion made and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."
Sir, the right hon. Gentleman, towards the conclusion of his address, tendered to the Members of this House his thanks, and the thanks of his colleagues, for the courtesy which they have received in the performance of their duties, and I am sure I am not doing otherwise than expressing the general feeling of the House when I say that they acknowledge in return the courtesy of bearing with which the right hon. Gentleman has upon all occasions conducted the affairs and performed the duties which belong to his position, and that whatever difference of political opinion may have arisen between any portion of this House and the right hon. Gentleman, as representing Her Majesty's Government, no personal feeling otherwise than can be agreeable to himself has been entertained. We have been informed, Sir, by the right hon. Gentleman that Her Majesty's Government, having understood the vote of last Thursday as a vote of censure, deliberated, in the first place, whether they should or should not retain the offices which they now hold, and that upon consideration they came to the conclusion that it was their duty still to retain them. The right hon. Gentleman stated that the Government while retaining that position felt that the state of parties in this House was such that it was not for the interest of the public service that they should continue to perform their duties with the present House of Commons; but, believing that the people at large entertain a more favourable opinion of them than the majority of this House appear to do, they have advised the Sovereign—and the Sovereign has accepted the advice—that She should recur to the sense of the people by a dissolution of Parliament. Now, Sir, I am not about to taunt Her Majesty's Government with having come to this determination for the purpose of maintaining themselves in power. I was not one of those who considered that the Resolution which was carried by so large a majority of this House was to be understood and accepted as a vote of censure upon the Government. It was not in that sense that I supported the Resolution. I looked upon it as a fair Parliamentary, and I think convenient, mode of expressing the opinion of the House upon two leading features of the measure which the Government had submitted to our consideration, and I voted for that Resolution as an expression of opinion upon the measure of the Government, and not in any way as implying censure of the Government. For it cannot be maintained in these times and in this House that whenever a majority of the House of Commons object to a particular measure, or to a portion of a particular measure, which the Government of the day may propose, they are, by expressing that objection, censuring the Government in such a manner as to render it necessary for the Government to consider whether they should or should not resign their offices. If that doctrine were to be laid down in the present state of Parliament—since the Reform of Parliament in 1832—I maintain that it would be utterly impossible for any Government, unless it were far wiser than any that has yet existed, to carry on for twelve months the administration of affairs in this House. Such was not the doctrine which obtained even before the passing of the Reform Act. There are many instances upon record of measures of great importance having been proposed by the Government of the day which were not acceptable to Parliament, but the Administration did not therefore think they were required to abandon their position as advisers of the Crown. Well, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman has stated the grounds upon which Her Majesty's Government, consisting of men who had up to a certain time been adverse to any change in the laws affecting the representation of the people in Parliament, nevertheless deemed it their duty to bring in a Reform Bill. I think that in doing so they only acted with a proper sense of the duty which they had undertaken to perform. I think, after what had passed with regard to a Reform of Parliament, that they ought not to have undertaken the Government as they did in February last year, unless they were prepared to bring in a measure of Parliamentary Reform. My opinion is that if they had brought in a measure founded upon principles which have appeared in the course of the debate to be in accordance with the general feeling of the majority of the House—a measure in which plainer and more practical views had been embodied—a moderate measure founded upon plain and ordinary principles, it would have passed this House, it would have received the concurrence of the other House, and might have become law. The Government, however, acted otherwise, and proposed a measure which was objected to by a majority of this House. It then became the duty of the Government to consider what course they should take. My own opinion is, that if they deemed it their duty—and with them undoubtedly rested the responsibility of determining that question—to retain their offices after that adverse vote it would have been in conformity with the engagement they had undertaken when they accepted the administration of affairs, and in accordance with the language they placed in the mouth of the Sovereign at the beginning of the Session, either to have withdrawn the Bill and to have brought in another differently framed, or so to have altered the present Bill in Committee as to adapt it to the opinion of the House. I think that was their duty, and I don't consider that to have pursued such a course would have been any disparagement whatever to their personal and political honour. They would have simply done in this instance that which I think they properly did last year with respect to the India Bill. They then brought in a Bill which was the result of their own consideration and decision. That Bill was not acceptable to the House, they then yielded to the opinion of the House, and they brought in another Bill, which ultimately passed. In the same way I think they ought on the present occasion to have submitted to the conditions on which alone a minority in this House can continue in the possession of power—namely, by adapting their views upon questions of great national importance to that which may appear to be the view and the opinion of the majority of the House. The Government, however, have determined to advise the Crown to recur to the sense of the country. Undoubtedly that is advice which it is competent for any Government on its own responsibility to give to the Sovereign. I certainly shall not oppose any obstacle whatever to prevent that advice from being carried out. But this I will say—that I think it very unwise advice. I think that, in the present state of affairs, both at home and abroad, it is very little to the national interest that there should be a dissolution. The Government may say that the question put to the country is, whether it has entire confidence in them, or whether it prefers any other combination of men; but every one understands that the question put to the country upon this dissolution is, what shall be the Reform Bill which the Ministry, if they continue in office, will be compelled by public opinion to bring in, or which any Government succeeding the present must propose to the consideration of Parliament? The question upon every hustings will be the details of the Reform Bill. I won't enlarge upon the public inconvenience which this course is likely to entail; but I would warn those who are the advocates of a moderate measure of Reform that the course which the Government is about to pursue is not the course calculated to further their cause and to procure the passing of such a measure. Hon. Members will return pledged beyond their own intentions; and if I may venture to prophesy the result, so far from the next Parliament being more disposed to support the present Government, I think the House of Commons which will be called together will be far more likely to be of opinion that political power ought to be transferred to other hands than those which at present possess, it. That, however, is for the Government to consider. Again, with regard to the state of affairs abroad, we are told that this country is engaged in negotiations bearing upon the peace of Europe. Questions of peace and war of the gravest consequences to the great Powers of Europe are being discussed. War of the most extensive range, peace upon a solid basis—these two conditions of things are pending in the councils of Europe. Is it not of the utmost importance, then, that while such questions are pending the Government of England should inspire confidence in those with whom it is in negotiation—confidence not only as to the views which it entertains, but as to the permanence of its authority; because we all know that a Government whose existence depends on an event which is to happen six weeks hence is not a Government which the Powers of Europe will consider as permanent, or look to with much deference. With regard, therefore, to the state of things both at home and abroad, I think the course which the Ministry have adopted is not one calculated to promote the interests which they, I honestly believe, have at heart, and which it was in their power to have advanced. I say they would have done better if, feeling it their duty to retain office, they had, without a dissolution, brought in another measure of Reform likely to satisfy the just expectations of this House and of the country; and then, that measure passing, as I think it would have passed, they would have had not only the satisfaction of avoiding the disturbance at home which must arise from a dissolution now, to be followed possibly next autumn or next winter by a dissolution after the Reform Bill, but they would also have had the advantage of going to the Congress—if to a Congress they must go—with all the weight and authority of a Government resting, as far, at all events, as this was possible for them, upon a permanent foundation. I do not understand, cither, the grounds upon which they announced their intention not to bring in a Reform Bill. I do not know whether I am to understand that as implying that when the next Parliament assembles they will consider their pledge to the present Parliament as null and void—whether they propose to carry on the Administration of the country without bringing again under the consideration of Parliament the question of Reform. If that be their intention, I think they will find themselves unable to carry it into practice. But that is a matter for them and for the future House of Commons to consider. I understand from the right hon. Gentleman that it is the intention of the Government to take an early moment for proroguing and dissolving Parliament. I entreat them to take the earliest opportunity of doing so. I am sure they will find no impediment offered to them by any Members of this House. We recognize the right of the Crown upon any occasion to appeal from the House of Commons to the country. We may think it more or less advisable to make that appeal, but when such an intention is announced, I am persuaded that this House will concur with Government in accelerating as much as possible the moment for dissolving. It is needless, I am sure, to point out to the Government the great embarrassment and inconvenience which must arise to hon. Members on both sides of the House by a prolonged interval between the announcement of that intention and its fulfilment. There can be no motive whatever for any delay, and I trust that, at all events before Easter, the Government will be able to pass those measures which are absolutely necessary for the public service, and that no time will be needlessly lost before the dissolution is brought about. I shall only say, therefore, that I presume Parliament will meet at the earliest moment at which the writs are returnable. I consider this to be so natural and necessary a course that I need hardly ask the Government whether that is their intention. It will be most unconstitutional—in fact, it will be impossible—for them to avoid it, for whatever votes and arrangements are now made will be only provisional, and therefore it is needless to point out that Parliament must meet at the earliest moment at which the writs are returnable. In conclusion, I can only express my regret—not that the Government have retained office, because it is for them to consider whether it is their duty to do so, and I will not enter into the question—but that having deemed it their duty to retain office they have not felt it equally their duty to go on immediately with a measure of Reform. I do not say that they should have gone on with this Bill or that Bill, but that they should have proposed to Parliament some measure of Parliamentary Reform, and I regret that they have resolved, instead, to put the country to an inconvenience which I hope will not be so full of evil as I may be disposed to anticipate—the inconvenience of a dissolution possibly to be followed with in a few months afterwards by a second dissolution, as the consequence of that measure of Reform which either they or some other Government may be obliged by a sense of public duty and in deference to public opinion to introduce.
I feel, in common with a great many Members of the House, that the course taken by the Government is one which subjects us to a large amount of personal inconvenience. It is just possible that some of us who are now assembled here may, after the coming event, never find ourselves together under this roof again. At the same time, I think, considering all the circumstances of the case, and leaving out of view any personal interest that we may have in it, it is impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the Government have taken the course which, acting upon the well-known rules of what is understood to be the constitutional or Parliamentary practice of the country, they were bound to take. We must bear in mind that the question which was decided last week was probably the greatest question that could possibly be submitted to us; that this Government were defeated by a majority of votes exceeding one-half of all the Members of this House—a vote very unusual when the existence of a Government is at stake. We must bear in mind, too, that the question before us was not one entirely for Parliamentary settlement, but one which, I believe, in every country where a Parliamentary system prevails it would be considered right to send back to the constituencies for their discussion and for their decision, before Parliament came finally to adjudicate upon it. What was said by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton on a former occasion, as well as by some other Members in the House, with regard to the terrible consequences of asking the constituencies their opinion upon this subject, was a kind of observation which I should scarcely have expected to hear. If you cannot trust the existing constituencies to express their opinion upon this question, why should you deliberate whether you should increase the popular power in these constituencies for the future? You ought rather to limit the power of the present constituencies than endeavour to extend it, if you are afraid to ask their opinion upon a question in which all of them are so vitally interested. But the right hon. Gentleman, with his colleagues, having taken this course—and I applaud it; excepting their immediate and instantaneous resignation, I believe it was the only course which was at all possible for them—has cleared the ground a little for himself and his friends, and has endeavoured to get up a little political capital against some of us on this side of the House. I understand the right hon. Gentleman to clear himself, his colleagues, and his party from all concern in the question of Parliamentary Reform for the future. ["No, no!"] I understood him to state that the pledge which they gave in the last Session of Parliament had been redeemed, and that we are not to expect that the Government would run their vessel against a similar rock when they should put to sea again after a general election. Now, to an announcement such as that I have no objection what so ever. I believe that it was a foolish pledge which they made last Session to introduce a Reform Bill, and I am, moreover, of opinion that it is a pledge which the Government, leaning on the support of hon. Gentlemen opposite, cannot fulfil to the satisfaction of the country. But the right hon. Gentleman tells us this—and it is on account of the observations which he made upon that point that I have ventured to trespass for a moment on the present occasion on the attention of the House—the right hon. Gentleman, I say, holds up to the country this option:—"We," meaning himself and his friends, "offer you a measure of Reform Conservative in its character. You have no other alternative, if you do not take this, than a measure of Reform which will be revolutionary in its nature." The right hon. Gentleman knows very well—indeed, it is not in his speeches in this House that we have heard of it for the first time—the value of a cry. In one of his earliest works he sets out by teaching Tadpole and Taper in what its value consists. In that day the cry of his friends was "Our young Queen and our old Constitution." The cry now, however, is that he and his friends are Conservative, and that they offer to the country a Conservative Reform Bill, while their opponents—meaning, I presume, the noble Lord the Member for London and all who sit on this side of the House, and who are the friends of Reform—are favourable to a measure revolutionary in its character. Now, it strikes me as a very odd thing that the Bill which the right hon. Gentleman introduced, and which he says is a Conservative Reform Bill, has, if possible—allowing for the difference of numbers—actually met with more determined opponents on that than on this side of the House. It docs not seem, therefore, that the measure was, in the opinion of hon. Gentlemen opposite, very Conservative in its character, while there are some among them who, if I am not deceived, deemed that some of its provisions actually tended in the direction of revolution. Now, Sir, I, for one, am not at all afraid of the tribunal before which the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are about to bring this question. I presume that if the language which the right hon. Gentleman had used refers to anybody more distinctly than to another, that individual is myself, because among the various definite propositions on the subject of Reform—if there be any—which have lately been discussed before the country, that with which my name is connected is, perhaps, the most definite, and that which has been most fully discussed. Well, then, that being so, I undertake to say that in any proposition of reform which I should propose, defend, or support, I should proceed exactly upon the lines which were laid down by the Bill of 1832, and in accordance strictly and rigidly with all the landmarks which the most gifted and capable statesmen of this country for the last sixty years have set up for our guidance upon this question. If I make the constituencies of the country larger and freer,—if I take seats from a handful of people spread over small and inconsiderable and decaying towns and give them to the large populations who form the great centres of your commerce, your industry, your taxation, your public opinion, and your power—if I do all this, and to do so, be revolutionary, then I have to unlearn the meaning of the word. The right hon. Gentleman must attach to it some meaning which I am not accustomed to give it. I am perfectly satisfied that the hon. Members of this House and the people of this country who are anxious that your House of Commons should be a fair—I do not say a mathematically exact—representation of your great populations and their great interests, of the intelligence, and industry, and wealth, and virtue of all classes of the community,—I am, I repeat, perfectly satisfied that they are the very last persons who can fairly be charged by the right hon. Gentleman with any attempt to revolutionize the English constitution. I rose for the purpose of making this declaration. I make it in all truthfulness. I believe it to be as I say in my conscience. I am of opinion, moreover, that the sentiments of which I speak are those which are entertained by the great body of the constituencies throughout the country. I am delighted that the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues have had the courage to remit for settlement to the constituencies of the United Kingdom the question at issue between us; but I warn the right hon. Gentleman and his friends against making when they go to the hustings,—when their committees send out placards, when they make speeches, and when their press writes—charges such as those which I take it for granted they are about to hurl against the great party of Reform. If you choose to adopt that line you must take the consequences. You know on which side the power of numbers will be ranged, and you must be perfectly well aware that if you dare the contest to the utmost it is your party and not ours which will come off second best in the strife. Now, I wish that we should enter upon this great contested election which is so near at hand, and on which so much as regards the interest of this great country depends, as far as possible in a spirit of calmness. I should like that hon. Gentlemen opposite should lay all the bearings of the case before their friends and constituents. I would say to them, "Discuss it fairly, and do not charge me with revolutionary designs. I do not charge you with fostering such designs. I simply charge you with what I should call an unacquaintance with the opinions of your countrymen, and an ignorance of what is requisite for the good of your country;" and, having said thus much, I shall say no more, but that I entirely approve of the course which the right. Gentleman and his colleagues have taken. It is, I think, a wise course in the emergency with which they have to deal, and I trust that when the new Parliament meets there will be enough of decided opinion in this House to enable some Government which may then be formed—if the present Government should refuse the task, as I presume they will—which will bring forward and pass a moderate, but substantial measure of reform, such as will place it in our power to say to every man, every malcontent—if, indeed, there should be any left—that, although Parliament does not exactly represent the people at large, it is so fair and just a representation of all the great interests of the country that during our lifetime, at least, we may never be called on again to discuss any question connected with the Reform of the House of Commons.
Sir, one observation has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer this evening which I cannot pass over without notice, and which I must be permitted to couple with another observation which fell from him on a former occasion. The right hon. Gentleman says, that he does not consider this question of Reform the appanage of any individual or the privilege of any party, and in that view of the subject I entirely concur. I stated before that, in my mind it was a question which admitted of considerable doubt, whether the Earl of Derby ought to have accepted office last year. My own opinion, indeed, was, that he ought to have refused that honour. But having assumed the reins of office he was, in my opinion, bound to introduce a measure of Reform. Thus far I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But if it be competent for any person or party to introduce a Reform Bill, it is assuredly competent for any other person or party to form a judgment on that Bill, and, if they think it mischievous, to oppose it to the utmost of their power. That right the Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared a few nights ago to refuse me. I took, however, that course which I deemed—if the Bill were, as I believed it to be, of a mischievous character—the most Parliamentary and the most convenient for this House to adopt, because if we were to go into Committee on a Bill which abounded in faults in its main provisions, and which was regarded with disfavour by the great majority of the House of Commons—if clause after clause were to be rejected, and new clause after new clause introduced in their stead, it would have been a question every day and almost every hour, whether the Government should throw up their Bill—whether they should consider the last vote or that by which it was preceded destructive of their measure, or what course they ought to pursue. But the right hon. Gentleman has told me, that in placing my Resolution on the notice paper, I acted in a manner which, in accordance with his judgment, precluded him from declaring the peace of Europe to be secure. Now, let the House recollect that the right hon. Gentleman, in bringing forward his measure, stated it to be a measure of such magnitude, that it was superior in point of importance even to the question of peace or war, because peace or war could be only of limited duration; whereas the passing of a Bill on the subject of the representation of the people in Parliament might influence the country for many succeeding generations. Yet, after having made that statement, the right hon. Gentleman thought it right to endeavour to cast censure upon me because, he having moved the second reading of his Reform Bill, I, in his opinion, In opposing that Bill, took a course which was dangerous to the peace of En- rope. My answer to him is, that if there were any such danger, the responsibility of creating it rests with the Government, and not with me. They have no right to propose a Bill involving such vast consequences, or to press it to a second reading, if they thought that opposition to it might prove dangerous to the peace of Europe. They are not justified in saying to us, "Here is a Bill affecting the present as well as future generations of our countrymen, altering the constitution of the State and placing its representation on a new basis; you must pass it, with slight Amendments, almost in its present shape, or you will be responsible for disturbing the general tranquillity of the Continent." For my own part, Sir, I believe there is no such danger. I cannot bring myself to think that a vote of this House, or the treatment which this Bill has received, can have any influence whatever on the settlement of European peace. Having said thus much, I now proceed to make a few observations with respect to the manner in which the vote of this House has been received by the Government. Sir, I admit there was in the Resolution which I proposed, matter which might have led Ministers to the conclusion, that their conduct was censured in reference to the introduction of the particular measure which they brought forward. It behaved us, on the other hand, to consider the grave interests involved, and the reasons which had induced the Government to introduce that measure. I do not agree with the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) that it is desirable per se that this question should be left to the decision of the constituent body before it is again brought under the consideration of the House. I think it was of great importance that this House should endeavour to settle the question in the present Session. And there was in the late debate, although not agreeing with the Government views, there was so much agreement as to the general principles of any measure that would be likely to pass this House, that I think it would have been in the power of the Government—if they had introduced a reasonable measure—to obtain the sanction of Parliament to its provisions. Considering the state of public business, considering the state of affairs abroad, and considering the danger of the question itself, that parties may become more and more driven asunder, I think it was the duty of the Government to exhaust every means of getting this question settled before they resorted to the measure of a dissolution. With respect to that measure of a dissolution, it is certainly a perfectly constitutional step. There can be no objection upon the ground of its not being a constitutional proceeding the Government tendering their advice to Her Majesty to dissolve this Parliament and to summon another. Whether that was a wise course to adopt is undoubtedly a separate question upon which the new Parliament will probably have to decide. Now, Sir, I have been much taunted, during the last debate with the vagueness with which I, while opposing the Government Bill, spoke of the future measure of Reform which I should he ready to propose or to support. I was vague upon that point advisedly. I knew perfectly well that, if I had sketched out a measure which I thought would be acceptable to the House, the debates upon the other side would naturally have fastened upon my measure, would have discussed all its provisions, and would have endeavoured, under the cloud of objections which they would have raised, to conceal the radical faults of the measure which they themselves had brought in. I rejoice that that measure has disappeared. My belief is that, in the first instance, it must have tended to the creation of a class of close nomination boroughs such as were disfranchised under Schedule A of the Reform Act of 1832. I believe that must have been its first consequence. Its second, I believe, must have been to admit much greater innovations than the Conservative party would like to see. My notions of a Reform Bill are very much more humble, and I have no objection to tell the House what those notions are. In the first place I should not propose any new basis of representation. I would preserve the representation of counties, cities, and boroughs as it has been from the earliest times of the House of Commons. I should propose a £10 franchise in counties. I think the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was sound when he said the Government could hardly have proposed a higher franchise without being reminded of the decision of a majority of the House, and, therefore, besides being of opinion that it is a sound franchise, I should think it the wisest course to propose it to the House. Then with regard to all those franchises which are called "fancy franchises," there were some, no doubt, of that nature in the Bill of 1854. They may require revision and amendment, but, nevertheless, I am disposed to think that those franchises would admit many men well qualified to vote at elections. Now, as to the franchise in boroughs, I am of opinion, notwithstanding all that has been said upon the other side in the course of the debate, that it would be useful, that it would be safe, and even that it would be absolutely necessary, in order to make the representation safe, to introduce another class of voters in boroughs, and that I would do by reducing the present yearly value of £10 to a yearly value of £6. I think there are great advantages in not having the franchise the same as the municipal franchise. In introducing the Municipal Reform Bill I stated the opinion of the Government of that day, that it was desirable to keep the franchises distinct; and I am of that opinion still; and, besides that, the reports which I have received from various parts of the country as to the municipal franchise do not make me think it would be desirable to introduce that franchise for the election of Members of Parliament. But I do believe, contrary to the opinion which has been expressed in such strong terms from the Treasury Bench, that it is desirable to introduce a larger portion of the working body—I should say of the working classes—into the constituent body which sends representatives to Parliament. I believe, Sir, they are a loyal body, that those I refer to, the best portion of the working classes, are a sufficiently instructed body to be able to make a good choice of Members of Parliament. A great political writer has said, their is a vast difference between a judgment with respect to political measures, and a judgment with respect to men who are fit to be entrusted with political power. I believe that is a perfectly true observation, and I do think the addition of a large number of the working classes would form a better and a sounder basis for representation in this House than we now possess. [An hon. MEMBER: The freemen.] As the hon. Gentleman has mentioned freemen, I may say I am strongly of opinion, as matters now stand, it would not be wise to interfere with them at all. In 1832 we left the privileges of freemen as they now stand. We did so deliberately, after much debate in this House, and still more elsewhere. I do not think it would be wise now to make any change in that respect, although in the Bill of 1854 some change was proposed. There is another subject which I think should he dealt with by a separate Bill. I mean the question of disfranchisement and the redistribution of seats. That is a question encompassed by the greatest difficulties, because there is not only the difficulty of disfranchisement in the first instance, but the question of redistribution will raise differences of opinion as to counties and towns, and various other points of the utmost difficulty of solution. My opinion is that if about twenty-six seats were taken from the smaller boroughs now returning two Members each, and to them were added the four seats now vacant, we should have a fund of thirty seats to distribute, which should be given to those new places which are considered to be deserving of representation—such as Burnley, Birkenhead, Staleybridge—and perhaps to some of the largest agricultural counties. Whether that would be an arrangement that would last for many years it would of course be presumptuous in me to say positively, but my opinion is that Bills of that kind, so providing for a reform of the representative system, would settle the question for many years to come. I do not wish to indulge in vagueness upon this subject, and I may say that I think such a measure would be more beneficial than the late Bill of the Government, that it would produce little disturbance in the representation, and would send to the House of Commons men well qualified to discuss the affairs of the country. The right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues have chosen otherwise. They have chosen to make declarations in this House in the strongest terms against any further lowering of the franchise, against any further admission of the working classes. [Cries of "No, no."] Over and over again did the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for the Colonies and other right hon. Gentlemen declare that beyond the franchises in the Bill they could not consent to any further admission of the working classes by a reduction of the £10 franchise. I believe such a declaration, if supported by any Parliament, would be found an exceedingly dangerous one. I believe its tendency would be to make a large class of the very best men in the country, the most industrious and the best conducted, hostile to the very institution of this House. They would no doubt be brought to consider themselves excluded by an arbitrary and invidious line, and I am sure that we should be unable to keep up that line. There is one thing more upon which my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) has touched, and upon which I also wish to make one observation; and that is whether, when this Parliament is dissolved, the new Parliament is to be immediately summoned? In 1841, Sir Robert Peel, when I announced a dissolution, asked me for a pledge that no time should be lost in summoning the new Parliament, but that as soon as it should be elected it should meet. I suppose it is the intention of the Earl of Derby and his colleagues to pursue a similar course. It would be quite unconstitutional if they did not pursue that course, and refrained from meeting Parliament as soon as possible. As Ministers of the Crown they have taken upon themselves the responsibility of advising a dissolution, and I think it is the duty of this House to aid them in every way by passing as quickly as possible such supplies as may be required. [An hon. MEMBER:—The Ballot.] On that subject I can only say, if the present Ministry should introduce any Reform Bill containing clauses introducing the ballot I shall feel it my duty to vote against it.
(who was at first heard with difficulty) said, he attributed the majority of Friday morning last to the combination of three factions, not only discordant with each other, but the Members of each of which were discordant among themselves, and not one of which had dared to produce to the House a Bill of its own. There were three heads to the Opposition. Nobody knew where the tail was, but wherever it was, it was always at variance with the heads. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) seemed very much alarmed at the possibility of his measure being characterized as a revolutionary measure. But if such were not the case, there was no meaning in the English language, for there was not an institution in the country—the Crown, the House of Lords, the whole structure of Parliament—which he would not do his best to destroy. Whenever that Bill was brought forward he (Mr. Drummond) for one should lose no opportunity of exposing its revolutionary character. It was worthy of remark how very different the language of the hon. Member was in that House, where he could be met, from what it was when he was addressing large masses in the country; but that wag not all. There was an association which hired people to go about the country preaching untruth, in common with those persons the hon. Member advocated the throw ing of all the direct taxation on land. Was not that revolutionary? He said, if ever there was a contrivance for preventing the passing of good laws it was the contrivance of King, Lords, and Commons. He was sorry that he had not then got the hon. Member's speeches in his pocket; he generally had them with him; but it was in such terms as he had mentioned that the hon. Gentleman spoke of a form of Government which was the admiration of surrounding nations. It was important that fallacies like these should be exposed, and he hoped that no opportunity would be lost of letting the country know how destitute of foundation they were.
:* Mr. Speaker, the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the course determined on by the Government cannot have taken the House by surprise. Independently of mere party considerations no one can regret that the Government, after the position in which the vote of Friday morning placed them, have taken a course consistent with their own character and with the dignity of the House, especially if, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has stated, it is, of the two courses open to them, the one most conducive to public interests. The condition of the Government and of the House had become critical after the vote of Friday. The question had assumed larger dimensions; complications were thickening—responsibility was growing both at home and abroad; and an anxious public was watching every move in this House with the more jealousy because, on this very question of Reform, Parliament had lately acted with an appearance of levity and insincerity that had left it little character to lose. I am one of those who think that the pledge given by Lord Derby on the subject of Parliamentary Reform, as it was at variance with party traditions, so it was also at variance with sound party policy; and the mere fact alleged by the two seceding Members of the Cabinet, that at the beginning of former Sessions a vague paragraph had been inserted in the Royal Speech promising a measure of Reform, and at the instance of those whose policy the present Government disapproved of—imposed, in my opinion, no obligation on the noble Lord to legislate on the subject. I believed it to be impossible for a Government, situated as they were, to propose a Bill that could be satisfactory to their opponents without displeasing their friends, or palatable to their friends without disappointing their opponents—and so it proved. As the noble Lord, the Member for the City, has just stated the Amendments which he would make in our representation, I may be allowed to remind the House of a statement I made, or, if I may say so without presumption, a challenge I threw out on the first night of the debate, and which to the last remained unanswered. On that occasion I challenged any man in the House, layman or lawyer, to refute my assertion—that the Government Bill was so constructed that it might be made a more liberal and popular Bill than any that we had seen since 1832, by fewer, and shorter, and simpler Amendments than are made in ninety-nine out of every hundred Bills of the same length that pass through Parliament. I gave that challenge, as I have said, on the first night of the debate. Almost all the most distinguished lawyers in the House spoke after me. Every one, with hardly an exception, did me the honour of referring to some portion of my speech. But on this point my opponents observed a most judicious silence; while some of the most eminent legal authorities in the House endorsed my statement. But what did other distinguished men, not professional, say to it? The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton entirely supported me; and the most important confirmation was in the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, who made, I may say without disparagement to others, the most damaging speech against the Bill; and yet, searching, logical, and conclusive as it was, leaving no other weak point untouched, he avoided all notice of this. And the statement did not, when he rose, rest only on my authority. The right hon. Gentleman, the Member for Bute, had just preceded him; he not only adopted and confirmed my statement, but he enlarged upon it—urged it more fully and powerfully in detail—and yet, as to this important challenge, reiterated on the high legal authority of the right hon. Member for Bute, the right hon. Baronet preserved a guarded, and most significant, and most conclusive silence. Then am I not entitled to assume for myself and those friends who voted with me, that if our suggestion had been attended to, all the new provisions which the noble Lord has to-night sketched out might have been inserted in the Bill? We might, for any impediment presented by the struc- ture of the Bill, have had a large extension of the suffrage—a £6 suffrage or a household suffrage—and if the House had so willed it, even the establishment of the ballot. Doubts are now expressed as to the prudence and policy of the course which the Government has determined to take; but the vote of the House had left them no alternative but dissolution or resignation. On their own knowledge of circumstances and their own responsibility, they have selected the former, and we are not in a condition to impeach that choice. For, as to a change of Government, every one must see inconvenience in that course also, at the present moment. My opinion as to the continuance in office of the present Government has ever been this; if I am asked whether the present state of things in this House is satisfactory, with so weak a Government in power, I should reply—certainly not. And if I am asked if the House can have confidence in a Government so placed, that it cannot conduct affairs with safety at home, or power and influence abroad, I reply, as every man in the House will reply, that no Government can have our confidence which does not represent the first law of our constitutional system, government by the will and power of a majority. And if it had so happened that the Cabinet had fallen from its own internal differences or weakness, I should have deemed that, in a constitutional point of view, a great relief; and the new Government would have been entitled to forbearance; and would have received it from a nation that is ever tolerant of men who, conscious of their difficulties and deficiencies, and arrogating to themselves no exclusive title to statesmanship or office, may have been placed in power by the shortcomings of their opponents. But it is a very different thing when a Government is displaced by violent action from without. The succeeding one has then excited irritation, provoked hostility, aggravated responsibility, and would, in this instance, become the substitution of one weak and precarious Government for another. I have desired to see the passing of a Reform Bill this Session, because it would assist in two things which the nation wants—rest, and a strong Government. Rest is incompatible with the agitation that must follow a postponement of Reform. And when I speak of agitation, I do not use that term in the common acceptation, as implying agitation from below—I have no dread of that—to use a phrase that has been lately much bandied about in debate, I have no fear of the people of England. I have no fear of the honest, earnest, hard-working operative class, that have justified by their conduct every privilege that has been granted, and will repay by their loyalty every trust that may be reposed. What I dread is the agitation from above—emanating from those in high places, making Reform a stepping stone to power. I dread not the agitation of the poor man struggling for a vote, but the agitation of the rich, scrambling for office; and that is the danger that postponement creates. And as to the want of a strong Government—the present Government is not strong—the next one, if it be the result of a party struggle on Reform, cannot be strong—and in my conscience I believe that it depends on the proceedings of the new Parliament when it assembles, whether in our generation we shall ever see a strong Government again. That will be a prospect resting very much on the conduct of those who are leaders in this House. It will be a question, when the new Parliament assembles, not of Reform, nor of party, but of the permanent influence and character of our representative system. It will be for our leaders to uphold that character, and maintain unimpaired that influence. But, however they to whom we have a right to look for example in this House, may discharge themselves of their responsibility and duty, I hope that we on these benches shall remember that we, every one of us, have a responsibility and a duty too—that we shall make it known that a political party can have higher ends than office, and that we shall throw back the taunt which has been so frequently cast upon us in these debates, that ours is
"A vulgar party race,
I trust that, on every occasion, we shall affirm by our vote, and prove by our example, that if party combinations have any value, it is when they knit and bind men together in that high mission of vindicating what is right—and repudiating and resisting what is wrong—and subordinating every personal and party end to the triumph of those great principles of patriotism and truth, on which alone we can build the strength or sustain the honour of men, of parties, or of nations.Struggling by dark intrigue for place."
said, he understood the noble Lord the Member for London to say that the Government, in proposing the Bill, themselves put a bar to any possibility of their lowering the borough franchise, and that those hon. Members who had supported the second reading had pledged themselves against lowering that franchise, and were barred in the same manner as the Government. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: No, no; I did not mean that.] He certainly understood that noble Lord to say that those hon. Members who had supported the Bill had precluded themselves from taking any share in lowering the borough franchise.
I alluded to those Members of the Government who spoke from the Treasury bench. I do not hold the same opinion in respect of those independent Members who supported the Government, for I understood them to differ with the Government on almost every point.
said, he was glad to hear this explanation. He had long been prepared to lower the county franchise from £50 to £20, and that he thought the borough franchise might be reduced to a £6 rating, believing that the time was come when there were many men occupying £6 houses who were perfectly worthy to be entrusted with the right of voting. At the same time he was of opinion that it would be a very sound principle that under no circumstances, whether for property in a borough or a county, should a man have more than one vote. He thought that the Government was wrong in bringing in a Reform Bill at all; it was misplaced in their hands; but, having done so, and having found that their measure was one the principle of which was approved neither by their friends nor their opponents, they ought to have withdrawn and introduced another, which would have been consistent with what was expected of them. As to the course which they had now adopted, he could only say that if they felt it their duty not to resign, no other course was open to them. Entertaining as he did a strong feeling that, looking to the state of affairs on the Continent, a change of Government would at the present time be attended with great risk, he was perfectly ready to subscribe to the course which they had taken, and he should go to his constituents without the slightest fear of being obliged to tell them that he had given a vote which required any explanation.
Sir, having in the commencement of the debate on the Reform Bill, expressed in very strong terms my objections to what was then generally understood to be the principle of the Bill—namely, the uniformity of the franchise—I hope the House will allow me to state in a few words my reason for voting against the Resolution of the noble Lord. I agreed with the noble Lord in a great part of that Resolution. I objected to the change proposed in respect of the transference of the freeholders from the county to the borough constituencies, because I represent, perhaps, a larger body of freeholders, and freeholders in a town, than most county Members in the House: I should be ungrateful if I did not object to that proposition. But I wish to state the grounds on which I did so. Those freeholders were to be limited to their boroughs, but no additional representatives were to be given to those boroughs. The freeholders were to be transferred to a large body of voters, while neither to the counties from which they were to be removed notwithstanding the great reduction of the occupation franchise nor to the borough constituencies, to which they were to be added, were there to be any additional representatives given. Again, Sir, I thought it an unreasonable proposition that the county franchise should be reduced four-fifths, while no reduction was to be made in that of the boroughs. Though I might not go so far as the noble Lord in wishing to see the franchise for the boroughs reduced to £6, I thought some reduction ought to be made, and that if the occupation franchise in the counties was to be reduced by four-fifths that in the boroughs should descend proportionately. I have thought it right to make this statement, because, as a Conservative—a firm Conservative—and one who has ever upheld the bonds of party, I, for one, consider myself at liberty to object to any portion of a measure introduced by the Government of the day. In this case I, in the first instance, felt that so grave were the objections against the Bill, it would be my duty to vote against it. Why did I not do so? Because in the course of the discussions I heard Her Majesty's Government repeatedly say that that which I had been led to believe was a principle, was in reality only a detail. It was only after I understood that the Government left unfettered, with respect to these details, every man in the House who voted for the second reading, though urging objections against the Bill, that I voted against the Resolution of the noble Lord. I do not mean to express any opinion on the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government; but I think that, knowing as they did the objections of many of their own supporters to the framework of this Bill, it would have been wiser in them to have withdrawn it, and to have proceeded in another form; but I must warn Her Majesty's Government against this. They may send us back to our constituents. Some of us may not, perhaps, return; but if we do return—others and myself—we shall come here as Conservative representatives, considering that we are sent here to express the opinions of the Conservatives of the country, in no blind obedience to any lender but as much the representatives of Conservative opinions as any any hon. Gentlemen on the other side, the exponents of what are called Liberal sentiments. I may regret the course which Her Majesty's Government have decided on; for though a due sense of their own honour may entail upon them the necessity of a dissolution, that is a course fraught with the greatest inconvenience. I cannot help expressing the satisfaction which I, in common with so many others, feel at the talent and general knowledge which this House has exhibited in the debate which has just concluded. I think it highly to the advantage of the country at large that this most important subject was fully discussed in the House of Commons before being committed to the hands of those who will discuss it out of doors. I therefore regret that the course which the Government have taken should have led to this, as I consider, premature appeal to the country, the more so, since the dissolution of Parliament is to take place at a time when, from what we hear of the position of foreign affairs, the greatest inconvenience may be felt from even the most temporary suspension of the functions of the British Parliament. As, however, the Government have felt it right to appeal to the country in vindication of their policy, I must only hope that constituencies will remember that, in returning Members to this House, they are sending men here to decide, not on the fate of this Government or that or of one Parliament, but on the character of successive Parliaments which are to govern this nation for years to come. I feel very grateful to the House for having allowed me this opportunity of explaining my vote on this Bill. I am a supporter of the ties of party in the sense of a combination for the maintenance of principle; but I am no party man in any sense that would fetter me in respect of my opinions on such important a measure as that recently before Parliament if opposed to the principles I hold; and had I not been informed by my hon. Friends near me that they had received from Government an assurance that they were to be unfettered when the Bill came into Committee, I would have voted against it. As I understood that a vote for the second reading was in no way to fetter any hon. Gentleman if the Bill went into Committee, I felt it my duty to vote, against the Resolution of the noble Lord.
said, he thought that it was very desirable that the House should have some more accurate knowledge than it yet possessed as to what were the intentions of the Government. He understood that Ministers had advised Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament at some early period. It would be convenient to the House to know what they meant by "an early period." There was nothing on the Order book to prevent a dissolution taking place almost immediately, and after the speech of the noble Lord, the Member for Tiverton, he could not believe that any impediment would be thrown in the way of necessary business. When the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton recommended a dissolution, the votes that stood on the paper were passed as Votes on account, and he saw no reason why the same course should not be adopted now. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer would now state more definitely than he had yet done, at what period he thought it likely the dissolution would take place.
remarked that he was glad that no share of the responsibility of recommending a dissolution rested on his shoulders. He rose not to go into the question, but to advert to what had fallen from the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright.) The speech which that hon. Member had made was more suited for the platform than for that House. He had threatened the Conservative party with the pressure—he would not say the violence—of numbers. He (Mr. Bentinck) did not think it was language becoming that House to hold out to Members that they were to be coerced by menaces. Threats of this description grated on his ear and he could not pass them over in silence; but he was not going to bandy menaces across the House. When the hon. Member referred to the large numbers who were prepared to support him in intimidating those who sat on that (the Ministerial) side of the House, he lost sight of the great rural population of the country. That population was as much opposed as any hon. Member of that House could be to the doctrines of the hon. Member, and would be, in numbers and determination, more than a match for the class upon which the hon. Member relied. The hon. Member always seemed to think that the question of Reform could only be discussed with reference to the larger towns, and that the rural districts had no interest in the matter. So inadequately were the rural districts represented, that no Reform could be complete unless it did justice to those districts by giving them a larger share with the representation. It was thoroughly understood throughout the country that the whole question of representation was a question of taxation, and that the object of the hon. Member for Birmingham and his friends was to throw the whole burden of taxation on the rural districts. He did not believe that the menaces of the hon. Member for Birmingham would intimidate those to whom they were addressed, or that his language would gain for him the confidence of the great bulk of the people of this country.
observed that he was glad to find that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton took a very different course on this occasion to that which had actuated him on the occasion of the late debate. The noble Lord had then uttered a somewhat unconstitutional threat that he would not permit the Government to go to the country; now, however, he had intimated that he would throw no impediment in the way of that course. He ventured to think that the noble Lord, on second thoughts, had taken a much better view of things. He also would beg to congratulate the hon. Member for Birmingham upon the moderation of his tone, as compared with his violent language during the recess, and he trusted the improvement would continue during the forthcoming election. The noble Lord the Member for the City had stated that he thought the noble Earl now at the head of the Government ought not to have accepted office under the circumstances by which he was surrounded; but the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) seemed to have forgotten that, before the Earl of Derby took office, he had an interview with Her Majesty, and asked Her to reconsider Her decision, and that it was only upon such reconsideration that the noble Earl at last consented to accept office. He also must express his regret that the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) did not favour the House with a sketch of his own Reform Bill when he proposed his Resolution, instead of reserving it for the present occasion. The scheme which the noble Lord now proposed was a modification of his previous plans, especially as regarded the disfranchisement of small boroughs. He thought that all the points which had been objected to by hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition benches might have been dealt with in Committee, and then the House would have redeemed the pledge made in their Address to the Crown, to give the proposition a calm and impartial consideration. Well, the Government were now about to appeal to the country, and it had been asserted that those sitting on the ministerial benches were afraid of the people. He, as a Conservative Member, elected in a great measure by artisans and freemen, denied the charge; for the people had shown a determination to defend the interests of the country, to stand up for Church and State, and to send to that House as representatives men resolved to do their duty fearlessly.
remarked that he did not think it was of very great interest to continue the present debate, but there was one point on which it was desirable that the House should be informed. A question had been pressed on the Government by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton which ought to receive an answer, namely—when the dissolution was to take place. He did not blame the Government for the course they had adopted in regard to their position in that House. Indeed he was glad that the Ministers for their own sakes had not adopted the advice of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, and consented to be dragged through the dirt. There were only two courses to pursue—either resignation or dissolution; and, if report spoke true, they had resolved at different times upon both those courses, and now adhered to the latter. He did not, however, concur in the reason given by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer for adopting this course, namely—that a strong Government could not be formed from Members on the Opposition side of the House; for he believed that, had the Ministry resigned, a stronger Government than had existed since the Reform Act of 1832 would have been formed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he spoke of an apparent difference between the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) and the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) overlooked the fact that they were perfectly in accord as to what should be done, but differed only as to the when and the how. The noble Member for London would have crushed the Government Bill at once, while the noble Member for Tiverton would have destroyed it by degrees, and converted it into a measure of his own. He thought that the House should now be assured by the Government that the Parliament would be dissolved as soon as public business would permit, and be called together as soon as possible after the elections.
said, he would request the indulgence of the House for a few moments. He would not have occupied the time of the House but for an observation which fell from the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), whom he understood to say that the Government were not disposed to lower the borough franchise, nor were the Gentlemen who supported them. He (Sir Frederick Smith) understood that the Government were willing, if good reason could be shown, to alter and amend any part of their Reform Bill, and certainly it was under that impression that he voted for the second reading. If the noble Lord the Member for London had been solicitous of carrying any Reform Bill this year he might have dropped his Resolution, seeing the willingness of the Ministry to act in a fair spirit, and in that case they would at that moment have been in Committee discussing the clauses of the Bill, which even that able and experienced statesman, the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, admitted had good points in it. However, he (Sir Frederick Smith) was anxious to call attention to that clause which ought to be expunged from any future Bill—namely, the 15th, which disfranchised the dockyard artisans. [A laugh.] Hon. Gentlemen might laugh, but this was a serious matter. Here were some of the best artisans in the kingdom, who, having the franchise, were to be disfranchised the moment they were entered into Her Majesty's service—thus branding them with unfitness when there were no more loyal men in existence. There was no corruption among them; ten years back there might have been, but of late years this had been impossible, for not a single appointment was now made by the Admiralty. When there were vacancies a notice was fixed to the dockyard gates to that effect, and any men might present themselves, and were entered by the superintendent, if qualified. Then, as respects promotion, any men might compete for advancement. They underwent a strict competitive examination, and the names of the best men were sent to Sir Baldwin Walker by the examining officer, and if Sir Baldwin considered that the examination papers bore out the recommendation, he submitted the names to the First Lord of the Admiralty, by whom the appointment was then made. Nothing could be fairer to the men and to the country. He quite agreed in a proposal to lower the borough franchise to £6, as proposed by the noble Lord the Member for London. Since 1832 the price of materials had so decreased that a house which was then of the value of £10 yearly was not so good a house as that of £6 now. With regard to the franchises in the Bill, the Government, he believed, thought the lodgers and the savings bank franchises were both of them calculated to introduce a highly intelligent and deserving class to the suffrage. He hoped that in any future Bill the good points of the Government measure would not be lost sight of.
said, that the noble Lord the Member for London had placed him in a very false position by the course which he had followed. He had been unsuccessful in the late debate in catching the eye of the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair, although he had risen no less than thirty times. Had he then been able to address the House he should have referred to the previous proposition of the noble Lord the Member for London in respect to small boroughs, many of which the noble Lord would have disfranchised. He should have stated that it was because he represented a small borough which the noble Lord would have disfranchised—that he preferred the plan of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to obtain population for the small boroughs by an extension of their boundaries; and on that account he gave the right hon. Gentleman his support, and felt it his duty to vote against the Resolu- tion. There were some other reasons why he took that course. Had the noble Lord allowed the House to go into Committee on the Bill they would have defeated the Government on some main question. How much better a hustings cry would they then have had. They would then have gone with the cry of "Emancipation of the working classes," or something of that kind. Now it would be open to right hon. Gentlemen opposite to take up the cry—they could say that they would have clone something for the working classes but the Opposition would not let them. The noble Lord seemed afraid of the consequence of his own vote, and laboured to show it was not a party vote. Now, when a general laid down a train to blow up a fortress, he meant to blow it up, and did not regret his success. So the train of the noble Lord was, perfectly legitimately, directed to the Treasury bench, and he (Sir Denham Norreys) could not understand why he was now so afraid of his own success. He doubted, however, whether it would be for the advantage of the country, or even of the Liberal party, that the Government should be transferred to the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell). The Liberal party were not sufficiently united. In opposition they managed admirably well. But how was Government to be carried on by a party which was split up into three or four sections? Then, certain personal jealousies were sure to operate, which would render Government from this side of the House so insecure that he did not think its existence would be for the public benefit. Nor were such frequent changes of Parliament desirable with a view to the credit of this country abroad. As far as he was concerned, should he be again returned, whatever Government was in power, so long as he approved their measures, they should have his support; and he did think that the right hon. Gentleman had been most unfairly treated when the House refused to discuss his Bill in Committee.
said, he rose merely to put two questions to the noble Lord opposite (Lord John Russell). The House had had before it several Reform Bills. There was the last Bill of the noble Lord; the Government Reform Bill; and the Bill which had been shadowed out by the hon. Member for Birmingham. Now the noble Lord, when the Government Bill was before them a few nights ago, said that he was willing to enfranchise the great body of the working classes. Again, on that evening he had used that expression, declaring his opinion that the mode in which the Government proposed to effect this object—by means of "fancy franchises"—was inadequate, and that there should be a reduction of the borough franchise from £10 to £6 value, not rating, as was proposed in his Bill of 1854. He (Lord Elcho) wished to ask what the noble Lord meant by enfranchising "a" or "the" great body of the working classes? He presumed that the noble Lord would not have shadowed forth such a measure without considering its effect, and he wished to know therefore what were the noble Lord's calculations as to the number who would be added to the borough constituencies by a £6 franchise, and of that number what would be the proportion of artisans or of the working classes?
Sir, the noble Lord (Lord Elcho) has put a question which his experience in Parliament ought to have taught him cannot ho, answered. But if he had studied the subject, I think he would have seen that by the calculations of Mr. New march the number of voters who would be added to the constituencies by a £6 franchise, and by the suffrage proposed by the noble Lord, would he very nearly a million. [Lord ELCHO: What proportion will there be of the working classes?] I shall not allow the noble Lord to drive me up in a corner by asking questions which it is impossible for anybody here to answer. We all know that the noble Lord is opposed to the admission of the working classes at all; but if he really wants information, I refer him to the paper published by Mr. Newmarch, which will save him from asking any such questions. With regard to the subject of discussion this evening, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Horsman). I am not at all surprised at the decision of the Government. After the speeches made by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India and by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, it was totally impossible for the Government, consistently with their honour, to remain in office without resorting to the constitutional process of dissolving. Directly I heard the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Colonial Secretary, in which he called upon the middle classes to resist any large measure of reform, I wrote to my friends at Dovor, saying, "You may depend upon it we shall have a dissolution soon after Easter, and the Government are getting up a cry to go to the hustings with." I am not surprised, then, at the decision of the Government; on the contrary, it seems to me very natural that they should wish to try the chance of a dissolution; but I warn them that, having set the hall a-rolling, they will find it very difficult to stop it. I may or may not come back to this House; at any rate, I know that hon. Gentlemen opposite will do all in their power to keep me out; but, if I do come hack, I expect to see a very different Parliament from the present, and I rather rejoice at it. I think this is a very had Parliament, especially that part of it which sits on this the Opposition side of the House. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has paid a very just compliment to his party, and I think we might take a leaf out of their book with advantage. I regret that we are not more united; but when the hon. Member for Mallow (Sir Denham Norreys), in consistency with the old air, "The Rakes of Mallow," complains of our want of union, let me remind him that he was one of the thirty-one who deserted the party in the late division, and has done what he could, therefore, to create disunion. Then the hon. Baronet said, we might have altered this Bill in Committee. Why this is directly in the teeth of what we heard from the Ministerial benches, where it was said, "We will accept of no Amendment." ["Oh, oh!"] Yes, it is true the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury was put up one evening, and said, the Government would grant everything, and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Horsman) and the hon. Baronet (Sir D. Norreys), forming on this occasion a party of two, cheered him lustily; but half an hour afterwards the Secretary of the Treasury was contradicted by another Member of the Government. ["No, no!"] Yes, this sort of deathbed repentance can't be accepted. Did not the right hon. and learned Attorney General for Ireland say that the Government would not condescend to sit in the House if the Bill were subjected to changes? and the First Lord of the Admiralty, in stronger and louder language, said much the same thing. The two hon. Gentlemen to whom I have alluded have been making speeches to their constituents deprecating opposition to the Ministry. Now I invite opposition to them from this side of the House. An attempt has been made to throw dirt upon us by connecting us with the hon. Member for Birmingham. I have great respect for the hon. Member (Mr. Bright), though I do not go as far as he does; but some persons seem to think that there are only two parties upon this question—the Conservative and the revolutionary party. The same argument was used in the time of the old Reform Bill. Those who advocated the measure of 1832 were also called revolutionary. This is the old rusty weapon which is always brought out by the Tory party on the eve of a general election. We shall see what execution it will do. Those hon. Members who are now trembling on the verge of a meeting with their constituents must take their position cum grano salis, and, while upon this subject, I cannot help adverting to a speech which was made by a gallant officer who sits on the other side of the House, and who voted with the Government, to his constituents down at Chatham some time ago, in which he told them that he would vote against the Bill. The hon. and gallant Gentleman's conduct, indeed, reminds one of the old paraphrase—
"Sir Frederick, longing to be at 'em,
But, abstaining from all further criticism upon the wide difference between that hon. and gallant Officer's speech and his vote, I would remind the hon. Member for Mallow, whose constituency consists, I believe, at present of a small but select number, that it would be extremely desirable if we on this side of the House were to take a leaf out of the hook of hon. Gentlemen opposite and give up some of those impracticable crotchets which now impede our united action, Having given this advice to the tails, I think I am hound to say something also with respect to the heads of the Liberal party. As long as we have two noble Lords who do not act in unison, but who are constantly striving to know which of them is to smell first at the nosegay, so long will there be hon. Gentlemen on this who will make excuse for voting with those who sit on the opposite side of the House. I should therefore appeal to the patriotism of those two noble Lords to come to some distinct settlement of their differences. I call upon them to do so in the name of their party. How long, I should like to know, are we to go on in this way, not knowing whom we are to follow? I believe the great Liberal party would be united if that question could be satisfactorily solved. Those who sit on the opposite side of the House have a leader—I allude to the right hon. Gentleman—in whom they place confidence. He has been enabled to consolidate his party—a task which, perhaps, if he had a noble Lord to quarrel with him, he would not have been able to accomplish. The consquence is that hon. Gentlemen opposite form an united body, and that they will go united to the hustings. But if we, the great Liberal party, go on Session after Session speculating as to what Lord This or Lord That will do, we shall suffer ourselves to be dragged through the dirt, and I therefore call upon those noble Lords to whom I am alluding to come to some understanding before a general election takes place as to which of them is to be our leader. The noble Lord the Member for London put forward a programme to-night which I thought a sensible and a good one, and which I think every real Liberal will be able to support. I trust I have now given a sufficient answer to the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho) and I shall conclude by expressing a hope that, previous to the general election, the Liberal party will take counsel together, and not act upon the advice of those crotchety politicians who have been so well described by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Marylebone.was speaking to the men of Chatham."
[ At a later period of the evening.]—
said, that the hon. Member for Dovor (Mr. Bornal Osborne) had made a personal attack upon him, and had imputed to him that he had promised his constituents at Chatham that he would vote against the second reading of the Government Reform Bill, and that he had not kept that promise, but had voted for the second reading. He begged to state for the information of the House and of the hon. Member for Dovor that he had never given such a pledge to his constituents, but that what he had told them was, that although he saw some defects in the Bill he should vote for the second reading.
said, he begged to state, in reply to the remarks of the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, that hon. Members on the Ministerial side of the House were not, as he seemed to imagine, indisposed to give a fair consideration to any Amendments which might be proposed in the Reform Bill introduced by the Government in Committee. Their intention, upon the contrary, was to go into Committee, and there so to modify the measure that it might prove conducive to the welfare of the country. When the Bill was introduced, he had felt it to be the duty of hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House to lend their support to the Government in passing it into a law, inasmuch as they were the only Ministry who had the courage to bring such a measure under the consideration of Parliament in a tangible form. He was also of opinion that, when the speeches which had in the course of the autumn been made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), and the right hon. Baronet the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir George Lewis) to their constituents were referred to, they would be found to justify the Government in entertaining the opinion that those right hon. Gentlemen expressed the sentiments of the party to which they belonged on the question of Reform, and he could easily understand how Her Majesty's Ministers should have taken those speeches into consideration in framing their measure, and should have their attention directed by them to the dangers which were likely to attend the adoption of the principles of which the hon. Member for Birmingham was the advocate. He had no opportunity of addressing the House during the great discussion which had taken place on the second reading of the Bill, although he had been desirous of doing so; but he trusted an opportunity would be afforded him of doing so before the dissolution of Parliament took place.
said, he wished to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if it was intended to bring the Report of the Committee that had sat upon the above subject before the House before the dissolution. He thought it was most important that this should be done. Several frigates were then wanting to be manned. The House knew perfectly well that when two large armies were assembled, and a river only dividing them, that a single musket inopportunely fired might bring on a collision which would set Europe in a blaze; and in such a case, England would not know how soon she might require her fleet.
stated, that when a Privy Council was next held, an Order in Council would be issued, in accordance with which the greater part of the recommendations contained in the first part of the Report of the Manning Commission would be carried into effect. With respect to the second portion of the Report, it would, he thought, be hardly right to ask the assent of Parliament to it by submitting any specific propositions to the House.
said, he did not rise to prolong the discussion, but he was anxious to ascertain from the right hon. Gentleman whether the Civil Service Superannuation Bill would be considered further before the dissolution. This was not a party measure; it was prepared in the main by the late Government, and brought in by the present one; the House had already spent a whole evening this Session in discussing the merits of the measure; it was one in which the public service took the greatest possible interest, and he trusted, therefore, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would see the advisability of its being further considered before Parliament was dissolved.
said, he thought the Government had taken the most dignified course open to them in recommending Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament. At the same time he wished to express a hope that in dealing with the question of Reform it should be dealt with as an Imperial measure, and that a stop should be as much as possible put to the practice of exceptional legislation. Ireland and Scotland and this country now formed a United Kingdom, and he did not see why they should be treated in an exceptional and not an Imperial line of legislation. He should also be prepared to include in any Reform Bill which might be hereafter proposed the protection of vote by ballot. He should also be glad to learn from the hon. Member for North Warwickshire whether it was his intention to proceed with his Motion respecting Maynooth on the following evening?
said, he wished to know what course would be taken with regard to Irish business?
replied, that he would state the intentions of the Government upon that point to-morrow.
said, he entertained a strong conviction that the proposed expenditure of £100,000 a year, contemplated by the first portion of the Report of the Committee upon manning the Navy, would be useless, and therefore he hoped that the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty would not give his sanction to that portion of the Report until the whole question had been brought under the consideration of the House.
said, he wished to know what were the intentions of the Government as to the East India Loan Bill, and thought it was desirable that a day should be set apart for the consideration of the important question of Indian finance?
said, he rose to ask whether it was the intention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to move that the Orders of the Day should take precedence of Notices of Motion on Tuesdays and Thursdays during the remainder of the Session, so that public business might go on. He thought it would be very inconvenient for private Members to detain the House on the eve of a dissolution with discussions which could not be brought to any practical end.
Sir, it now becomes my duty to reply to several inquiries that have been made, and to offer some comments upon some observations that have been addressed to the House. I think I ought first to reply to the queries of the noble Lord the Member for London and the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton as to the period at which we anticipate the new Parliament will assemble. I must say I was rather surprised at the inquiry. There was a pomp of patriotism about it, and the inquiry was pressed in such a manner as to convoy the idea that it was supposed the Government were going to prorogue this Parliament and to call a new Parliament together next February. But the noble Lords must have been aware that such a course was utterly impossible with the state of feeling existing in the House and the country upon all subjects in which the rights of the people and the responsibility of Ministers are concerned. We are now going to ask for some Votes in Supply, and that the House, should consent to some provisional arrangements, the influence of which can only extend over a limited period, and even the financial statement which it was my intention to have made next week, cannot in the present state of circumstances be laid before the House. I should have thought it unnecessary to assure the House, but I do to in order that there may be no misconception that the new Parliament will of course assemble at the earliest possible moment. I am asked when the dissolution is to take place. Of course I could not come down to the House to-day with that confidence upon the subject which Ministers in my position usually feel, because, after the extraordinary announcement made in the late debate by the noble Viscount, I was not perfectly confident that I should have received that constitutional support from the House which under the circumstances I might properly have relied upon. But, Sir, I can say this—I think in 1857 it took sixteen days to bring about the prorogation. I have no doubt that upon that occasion every effort was made to expedite business. Of course, it is quite impossible within twenty-four hours exactly to ascertain what the time will be, but I should hope the transaction of the necessary business will not occupy longer than it did in 1857. Every effort shall be made to carry on affairs as expeditiously as possible, and, speaking generally, I anticipate that upon the day upon which probably I should have moved the adjournment of the House for the Easter holidays, the prorogation may now take place, and the dissolution will then be, of course, about the end of the month. Therefore, hon. Gentlemen know now pretty accurately when the event may be expected. I shall propose to-morrow that Government orders shall have precedence over notices of Motion every day during the remainder of the Session. Now, some observations have been made that the Government had not decided to make the announcement which has been made tonight after the mature reflection which such a step demands, but that, in fact, they had at first determined to take a different course, which, upon second thoughts, they had seen fit to abandon, and to make the announcement which I have made this evening. I beg to say, in the most distinct and positive manner, there is no foundation for such a statement. The Government have from the first been perfectly aware of the responsibility attaching to the position they occupied, and of the line of conduct it would be their duty to pursue, and they have never hesitated from the moment when it became absolutely necessary to come to a decision—they have never hesitated as to the decision they should adopt and proclaim to the House. The noble Lord the Member for London, in the course of his observations, made a statement of a very important character. I will not say, as is sometimes said, "important if true," because I am sure the noble Lord, when he stated it, did so with the perfect conviction that he was stating what was actually the fact. But the noble Lord has unintentionally made a grave misrepresentation, and in that misrepresentation is involved really the gist of the present controversy. The noble Lord said that I had declared that "the opposition to the Bill of the Government for amending the representation of the people was dangerous to the peace of Europe." Now, Sir, nothing of the kind ever escaped my lips; I never deprecated opposition to that Bill; and, so far from opposition to that Bill being dangerous to the peace of Europe, I say, had that Bill been fairly encountered—had that Bill even been rejected upon the question of second reading, considering the remarkable character of the subject—Parliamentary Reform—which so many Governments have failed to deal with, I should not have considered that the deliberate opinion of the House upon that matter conveyed any censure or expression of want of confidence in the Government, and I should, under those circumstances—and I speak in the name of all my colleagues—not have felt it our duty to disturb the course of public business. What I complained of was, that the noble Lord thrust himself in between the introduction of that Bill and its fair discussion with a party Resolution, the object of which was understood by the House to disturb the Government. It was the conduct of the noble Lord—the irregular conduct of the noble Lord—which I said had injuriously affected the course of the negotiations—a statement which I deliberately repeat, and not the opposition to the measure of the Government, a measure with respect to which, of course, the Government had always counted on opposition, and the rejection of which they would have accepted from the House with respect. In answer to the remark of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Wilson), I may say that I deem it to be for the advantage of the public service that the Superannuation Bill should pass. I feel, of course, great reserve and delicacy in asking the House to pass any measure in the circumstances in which the House and the Government are placed; but if there be that general concurrence of feeling upon this subject which I believe there is, I shall certainly recommend the House to pass that measure. There is yet one other point on which I shall touch before I ask leave to withdraw the Motion which I have made, and it refers to the statement which fell from the other noble Lord, the other leader of the Opposition—the Member for Tiverton. He said that it was evident from the statement which I had made that no further Reform Bill was to be expected from the pre- sent Government. It is possible that I may have inadequately expressed my opinion; probably it is more possible that the noble Lord should have misunderstood my expressions. I can only say, however, that what I intended, and what I thought I had done, was, to guard those with whom I have the honour to act from the imputation generally circulated among certain hon. Members of this House, that we had no right to deal with this question. On the contrary, I asserted our right—nay, more than our right, our duty—to deal with this question; but what I did say, and what I do repeat deliberately, is, that having fulfilled our pledge to the House and to the country on this subject, at great personal and party sacrifices, I held myself free from any distinct pledge to bring forward any distinct measure; that I should, on the part of my colleagues, feel that we had a right to deal with the question when we thought that the occasion justified it; but that, for example, at the meeting of the new Parliament in Juno or July, I did not consider myself any longer bound to bring forward any measure of Parliamentary Reform. It was to the meeting of the new Parliament alone that my observations were limited, and, generally speaking, I again assert our right to deal with the question, and our intention to deal with it whenever the public interests demand it. At the same time we hold ourselves exempted from any pledge which, as the noble Lord supposes, would render it incumbent upon us in June or July to bring forward any measure of Parliamentary Reform. I thought it desirable that upon this there should be a clear understanding, and having said thus much, I beg leave now to withdraw the Motion which I have made.
You have not mentioned the India Loan Bill.
I have before stated that it was our intention to proceed with the third reading of that Bill to-night. Do I understand the hon. Gentleman to object to that?
No. I only hope that sufficient time will be given for discussion before the Bill passes.
My noble Friend the Secretary of State for India is quite prepared to make a statement now on the subject, and the whole evening is open for the purpose.
Motion by leave withdrawn.
Maynooth
said, he wished to state in answer to a question which had been put to him by an hon. Member (Mr. Cogan), that it was his intention to bring forward the subject of Maynooth to-morrow, and at the same time he would express a hope that his light hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not press his Motion for Orders of the day having precedence of Motions. He (Mr. Spooner) had already given way once to suit the convenience of the House, and if that Motion should be made he would oppose it, and would take a division upon it.
East India Loan Bill
Third Reading
Order for Third Reading read.
I feel, Sir, that on any subject of less importance than this I should owe some apology to the House for attempting to invite their attention to a matter of this nature after those more immediately interesting and exciting discussions in which we have just been engaged; and I am bound, in the first instance, to admit that the brief explanation which it will now be my duty to offer to the House with regard to the present condition of Indian finance will be of a less satisfactory character than that which I submitted to their notice nearly two months ago; but of this I can assure the House, that as upon that occasion I did, so upon the present occasion I shall, keep back and conceal no fact or expression of opinion bearing upon the subject of which I have to treat which comes within my knowledge or belief. Indian questions will always be treated by this House on their own merits; and I feel that at all times; but more especially in times of some public difficulty and embarrassment, it is the duty of the servants of the State to communicate with this House in the frankest and most unreserved manner. I do hot intend to deny that it will be necessary for the Government, on behalf off the Ad ministration of India, to make a demand of this House for larger borrowing powers in the course of the present year than two months ago; it was considered would be necessary; and, of Course, I am prepared to meet that question Which will naturally be asked—How comes it that this difference has arisen; has it been an error, has it been Wing to miscalculation; is it due to an excess of expenditure over what was anticipated, or is it due to any equally unexpected deficiencies in the revenue? I think that I shall be able to show that the increased demand for the Government of India is not due to any one of those causes, and that the difficulty which now presses upon the finances of India is purely of an accidental and temporary character. It may be remembered that in February last I stated distinctly to the House, when asking for power to borrow on behalf of the Indian Government to the amount of £7,000,000, that I had not before me any estimate of the expenses of the Government of India for the year 1859–60, that I had nothing before me but the comparatively small estimate for the home expenses, and that, therefore, my information was necessarily imperfect. If it be asked why, under those circumstances, did we come forward with a specific demand, and why did we venture to name the sum which we required without having received an estimate from India, my reply is, that we had no option in the matter, and that some part at least of the funds to be raised by the Bill were, and are, urgently required for the necessities of the Indian Administration. The estimate has not usually been sent home at so early a period of the year as the present, and even now it is not in my hands. I have nothing except two or three despatches, which have been laid before Parliament, which give the calculation which the local Government in India have formed upon the financial data before them; but I have not the means of checking that calculation by comparing it with the data on which it is founded. It is clear, therefore, that in asking six weeks ago for a specific sum to meet the wants of the Indian Government, I could only act upon calculations which were in a great measure conjectural. The theory on which we proceeded was this—that in the main, India must be left to defray the expenses of its own Government on the spot, and that it ought to be enough, if besides providing for the Home Administration, we had a margin to enable us to meet any sudden exigencies that might arise. Looking, then, at the question with the knowledge we then possessed, I think we were justified in the course we pursued. It will be remembered that in the year 1857–58 and in 1858–59, at the time when the mutiny was still unsuppressed—when an enormous destruction of public and private property had taken place in India—when great expenses for the raising of new levies were necessarily being incurred—at the time when the political confidence of the natives in the stability of the Government was necessarily disturbed—at that time and up to the present year India has been able to meet the expenses which took place there, with the exception of stores sent out from this country, and with the one further exception that in 1857, after the disturbances broke out, £1,000,000 was remitted in bullion from this country. I do not think, therefore, it was unreasonable to suppose that the same amount of assistance which had sufficed at the time of the utmost peril in 1857, and at the time of great military expenditure in 1858, would still be found sufficient in 1859, when political confidence is restored, when the stability of our Government is assured, and when our military expenses are beginning to be decreased. There is no doubt that at present—I will not say the credit of the Indian Government is impaired, but for the time the borrowing power of the Indian Government is considerably diminished. The general rule is, when a Government finds itself unable to borrow to the extent it desires, that that state of things can only arise from one of three causes. It may arise from the actual want of capital in the country itself; it may arise from the want of confidence in the stability of the Government; or it may arise from the community holding back their capital from the belief that by waiting, they make a better investment. I apprehend that any one who is acquainted with the state of India will not allege that the borrowing power of the Government is affected by the first of those causes; for we know that capital is not usually found wanting in India for the promotion of private undertakings by those who offer reasonable terms, and it is the practice of the Natives to hoard largely, as is proved by the extent is which bullion is imported. Nor can we suppose that the difficulty is due to the want of confidence in a political sense at a time when our military ascendancy has been more completely confirmed than at any former period. But if neither of these reasons operate, we are thrown back upon the third cause—namely, that of the capitalists in India holding back, in the hope of procuring some better investment for their money than it is now in their power to obtain. It is enough, in order to verify what I say, to take a general view of the question, and to look at the terms offered within the last three years. In August, 1856, a 4½ per cent loan was opened; in January, 1857, a 5 per cent loan was opened, and since the mutiny began that 5 per cent loan was open to be subscribed for half in cash and half in 4 per cent paper; and now it appears that this resource is beginning to fail, and a new loan has been opened at 5½, one-half of it being in 5 per cents. Now, looking at these transactions, this at least is clear, that the Native capitalist may fairly believe that the wants of the Government are increasing, and that the rate of interest which they are prepared to offer is likely to increase in a similar proportion, and that if he invests his capital in the loan now opened he may possibly lose his chance of a better bargain hereafter. Not only does his chance decrease, but it necessarily and inevitably happens that when a higher rate of interest has to be offered there is some consequent depreciation of existing stock. We all know that the only inducement—or the principal inducement I should say—which Government securities offer to the population of India is the character of safety and permanence which they possess; because, as far as the rate of interest is concerned, it is well known that a higher rate can generally be obtained from private investments. When, therefore, it has been found that the effect of the transactions which have successively taken place has been to depreciate the value and actually for a time to diminish the capital invested in Government securities, that circumstance has operated to deter persons from investing in them. The only remedy for such a state of things is to take two steps, both of which the Government have now taken—namely, to fix a limit to the amount which they are prepared to ask for, and to the rate of interest they are prepared to offer, giving also such assurance as they can that this rate of interest will not be exceeded. But the only condition on which a pledge of that kind can be made good is that some other source should be looked to supply a deficiency, and that the Government here should take upon itself to supply whatever may be wanting after the fixed limit which the Government in India pledges itself not to exceed shall have been reached. That is the explanation of the difficulty in which the Government of India now finds itself. It is not a question of a larger expenditure than was anticipated, or of a smaller revenue than was expected; it is simply a question of having to burrow a larger sum in England than was intended, because less can be borrowed in India. Let us see what, according to the despatches which have been laid before Parliament, are the present requirements of the Government in India. According to the estimate—if estimate it can be called which is drawn from information at present so imperfect—the calculation of the Government in India is, that they want, in round numbers, £11,500,000. Perhaps it may be necessary to explain that the sum which they require involves merely a deficiency of ways and means to that extent, and not a corresponding deficit in revenue. But this sum of £11,500,000 includes payments made on account of railways in progress to the amount of £4.500,000. It includes, also, a proposed increase of the cash balance from a little less than £9.000,000 to £12,000,000. With regard to those railways in progress, the House is aware of the practice that the sums so laid out in India shall be reimbursed into the Home Treasury. With respect to the increase in the cash balance, that amount has to be spread over the local treasuries in India, 400 and more in number, and it represents the sum which is supposed to be necessary for carrying on the local administration, but does not represent a corresponding increase of expense. Deducting those two items, therefore, that deficit of £11,500,000 is reduced to a deficiency of £4,000,000, and that, I am informed, is still further to be diminished by a charge for stores having been included, which is to be met in this country. The amount of that charge for stores is about £1,300,000. That will reduce the deficit to a sum of rather more than £2,700,000 in India, to which should be added that part of the home expenses which is charged on the revenue of India, namely, £5,200,000. I am speaking under some difficulty; but I apprehend, after the minutest examination of the papers, before me, that the actual deficiency for the year 1859–60, including all charges except those for compensation and prize money, and excluding, too, from the other side of the account, the amount which may be expected to be derived from new taxes, is not much above £9,000,000. It was £9,000,000 in 1857–58, but in 1858–59, with respect to which the deficiency has turned out to be larger than was at first estimated, it is found to amount to £13,000,000 instead of £12,500,000. Regarding the question of Ways and Means, this House has to consider in what way the require- merits of the Indian Government for the sum of £11,500,000 are to be met. It is proposed to borrow £5,000,000 in India—the new taxes are estimated to produce £1,000,000. It was originally proposed to raise the cash balances from something less than £9,000,000 to £12,000,000; but inasmuch as the amount in time of war, and when military operations were going on, was only £10,000,000, it is thought that it will be quite sufficient to raise it to £11,000,000 instead of £12,000,000. Deducting, then, the £5,000,000 loan, £1,000,000 new taxes, and £1,000,000 saved by raising the cash balances only to that extent, the sum to be made good is only £4,500,000. Viscount Canning puts it at only £4,000,000, but whether he or we are right it will be safer to take the higher calculation. We shall have also to meet the demands made on us for prize money and compensations. By the Bill before the House it was proposed to raise £7,000,000. That sum would have left us a margin of £1,300,000, but the railway receipts have since that time increased so as to bring that margin up to £2,300,000, so that after sending out £1,000,000 of bullion there would still be a margin left on this loan of £1,300,000. It is improbable that the claims for compensation and prize money should amount to so large a sum as £2,000,000; but, assuming them to come so high, that would leave £6,500,000 to be supplied. I need not say that the payments on account of railways in progress in India are necessarily a very uncertain item (I am told that they are likely to exceed £4,000,000 this year); and there are many elements of uncertainty in other respects which may vitiate our calculations. The opium revenue is precarious, and it is impossible to speak with certainty as to the precise amount by which the military expenditure will be reduced. As accurate an examination as I have been able to give to these papers, in the absence of any precise and detailed estimate, seems to justify the course which we are about to take. I do not intend to ask the House to recommit the Bill, nor to substitute a larger amount for that already agreed to. To take at once the full sum required for the year and thus to give an assurance that no more will be required, might have a favourable effect on the market; but I hope that effect will be equally produced by the announcement which I have to make that the sum named elsewhere—£5,000,000 —as being that which we should probably still have to raise is the highest amount that will be required. I am inclined to hope that £3,000,000 will be sufficient to meet our wants; but the House will see how many points there are upon which it is impossible to speak, except on conjecture, and I should only be misleading the House if I were to attempt to name at the present moment the precise increase in the sum which has to be provided. One advantage of this course will be that the House will have an opportunity of reconsidering and rediscussing this question, which requires the closest attention, at a period and under circumstances more favourable to a minute examination. There is also the advantage that when it is seen in India that Parliament have passed a Bill of this kind, and is ready to conic forward when necessary to meet the emergent demands of the Indian Government, confidence will be restored to the Indian capitalists, and possibly the necessity of further assistance may, to some extent, be superseded. Though far from thinking that the financial condition of India is satisfactory, yet, if we are to judge from appearances merely, we might think it in a much less satisfactory condition than it really is. The estimated gross revenue for the coining year is larger than in any year; hitherto, the requisition for an increase in the cash balances and the expenditure on railways do not imply any falling off in the revenue, but merely a deficiency in the Ways and Means. On a previous occasion I expressed an opinion that the forfeiture of the estates or pensions of the insurgents might come in to meet the demands for compensations, but it must be remembered that these last will probably take the form of a money payment once and for all, while the advantages of the forfeited lands will only be slowly realized. We have impressed upon the Government of India the necessity of making as large a reduction in that immense Native army which is now kept up as is consistent with the safety of the country. Ten regiments of British troops are coming home at present, and I do not doubt that a further reduction may be made to a considerable extent after the hot weather. All the information that I possess as to the now taxes is contained in the papers laid before Parliament. The subject was being considered by the Government in this country, and we were prepared to recommend an increase in the Customs' duties, which I think on the whole is the wisest course, and on which the Indian Government was disposed to place most reliance; but this financial emergency has come rather suddenly on the Government of India, and they have determined in their exigency to take the matter into their own hands. The only two taxes which will be imposed at present are the Customs' Duties and the Stamp Tax. With regard to the duty on tobacco, to which some allusion has been made, I am glad to say it is not proposed to impose it at once, without consideration and discussion. I do not know that in the present state of affairs there is any further explanation I can offer. I can assure the House that every paper and every document except, of course, private letters—every official document in my possession—has been and will be laid before the House; and with these observations I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
remarked that he understood the noble Lord to state that it was not his intention to re-commit the Bill for the purpose of proposing an additional loan, nor to propose an additional loan in the present Parliament. (Lord Stanley assented.) The statement of the noble Lord differed greatly from the statement made in "another place" by the Prime Minister, and the latter statement might require consideration as well as the statement of the noble Lord. He would not enter into the causes which had led to a deficiency of subscriptions by the Natives, nor controvert the noble Lord's explanation that, seeing the difficulties we were in, the Natives were waiting to know if they could obtain better terms. But, at the same time, he thought that the revenue and accounts of India were in a most unsatisfactory state. He did not find fault with anything which had been done recently, but there appeared to him to be a want of financial counsel in the Council of India, such as might fairly he expected to set right this question. With regard to the deficiency of information, it was stated in the papers presented to the House of Lords, that accounts were sent home in January, and, if so, those accounts should have been presented to Parliament. He believed he was correct in saying that before the month of May the regular accounts ought to be laid on the table of the House. He understood the noble Lord to say that not only the sketch estimate, but the ordi- nary accounts had not yet reached England, and that raised an additional difficulty in the way of the discussion of the question, because the accounts could not be presented to Parliament during the dissolution, and a still wider interval of time than usual must elapse before the public would be acquainted with them. The Secretary of State, writing to the Governor General and Council desiring them to do one thing and their writing home requesting him to do another, led to a complimentary and dilatory correspondence, by which the public interests were neglected and nothing done. He would suggest to the noble Lord that during his absence from Parliamentary attendance by reason of the dissolution he would have some leisure, and might devote it to the preparation of a report on the taxation and revenue of India. If a Committee of the House were appointed upon the subject which, had the Session continued, would have been proposed, they might have obtained some information. But, at all events, the noble Lord might institute a committee of his own council. It was improbable from their connections that Gentlemen in India were the best persons to carry out either reduction of expenditure or increase of taxation. What was the object of establishing a Council in England? The noble Lord said the business was continued exactly as it was conducted under the Court of Directors. If so, the whole principle of the India Bill had broken down, because the object of that Bill, as he understood it, was to take away the initiative from the Court of Directors and give it to the Secretary of State. With his power, the Secretary of State ought to say to those gentlemen, "You are meeting in Council every day and you are meeting in Committees. There are among you gentlemen of experience in India. I have also retained in my Council gentlemen of commercial knowledge merely on account of that knowledge, and I charge you to go through tax after tax, and reduction after reduction, and state to me what is the possibility of altering the position of Indian finance and raising the balance of receipts over expenditure." It might be that such a Committee would show it to be possible, and it might be they would show it to be impossible; but, at any rate, some light would be thrown upon a subject which was now more obscure than before the combination for the purpose of increased responsibility of the two authorities. He was sure the noble Lord was anxious to do justice to India, and he could do nothing better than call for a report from such a Committee and present it to Parliament. The Council could not be so overcharged with labour as not to have the time to consider the subject, and if they could not give an opinion upon different points which might be referred to them, such as the reduction of their own number to begin with, the abolition of the office of legal adviser, or the substitution of an accountant, the imposition of an income tax, and the reduction of the salaries of the civil servants, they were not worth their salt. He should have been perfectly willing to agree to an increase in the amount of the loan, as he by no means wished the Government to be put to any inconvenience, and there was no doubt that by loan the necessary funds must be raised, but, as that course would not be pursued, he should not further trespass on the attention of the House.
said, that at the conclusion of the interesting discussion on the dissolution, not expecting the debate on the India Loan Bill to come on, he went away, and penned an address to his constituents, which would be found on the walls of Windsor the next morning. Having performed that duty he accidentally sauntered down St. James's Street, and on reaching his club found from the telegraphic messages that this Bill was under discussion, and therefore hastened down to take part in the proceedings. He found from letters and accounts that he had received from India that it would be necessary to raise £5,000,000 in addition to the £7,000,000 it was now proposed to raise. However, some Gentlemen might be opposed to the system of an Imperial guarantee that subject must come under consideration before long. From what he had heard from India it was at present impossible to borrow there even at 5½ per cent. A loan at 5½ per cent had been opened at Calcutta, but it had failed, and Viscount Canning could not get money on those terms. England, in conjunction with France, had not long since raised a loan of £5,000,000 for the Ottoman empire. Now, what was the Ottoman empire to England compared with India? He thought that India had a fair claim on England at a moment when she had just emerged from so foul a rebellion. He was satisfied that India wanted £12,000,000 at the present moment. The Earl of Derby said so in the other House, and if the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) had done wisely he would have gone boldly into the English market, asked for £12,000,000 at 3½ per cent and then lent it to India, without pledging himself one way or the other on the question of an Imperial guarantee for Indian loans. By such a course the noble Lord would have saved India a sum of £240,000 per annum, and need not have compromised either himself or the House with regard to the Imperial guarantee. There was, however, another great question connected with Indian finance, and he was glad to see the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) in his place, as this was a subject in which that hon. Gentleman took a deep interest. If England refused to acknowledge all responsibility for the public debt of India, it stood to reason that she had no right to dictate to India how she should raise her revenue, and what customs, excise, and import duties she should impose. If that was the case what became of the agitation about the repeal of the opium duty and the salt tax? Until there was an Imperial guarantee, England must not interfere in the raising of money for India. Then as to reduction of expenditure. Indian finance was in rather a shaky state, but he was satisfied that things would right themselves in a few years, if peace were preserved. What he should like the noble Lord to do would be to turn his attention to improve the whole police of India upon the plan introduced by his old Haileybury friend Mr. Robert Montgomery. A great reduction of the Native army would thus be practicable. He knew the Natives in India, and he felt satisfied we could never hold India without a European force. The severity of the revenue laws in some points ought to be relaxed, and the costly and useless Legislative Council ought to be remodelled. That Council was established by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles Wood), and a most awful failure it had been. The noble Lord ought also to expedite the construction of railways and encourage the settlement of Europeans in India. He would recommend the noble Lord to sell the premises in Leadenhall Street. There were five or six acres of land there, which, with the building, would bring in, he was told, £350,000. The next step should be to reduce the Council of India from fifteen members to nine. He would not interfere with the present dear old creatures, but he would not fill up their places as vacancies occurred. He understood that the whole business of the Council was at present transferred to three committees of five each, and if each committee consisted of three members it would be quite enough. Then he would at once amalgamate the Supreme Court and the Sudder Dewannee and Nizamut Adawlut Court. There was a Committee now sitting on India of which he was a member, but they were all at sixes and sevens, and it would be some time yet before they reported to the House. He believed that if the reforms he had indicated were carried out the Natives of India fully appreciating our good intentions, would acknowledge that a wiser, more powerful, and beneficial Government they could not possibly have.
said, it had been his intention, on the Motion of which notice had been given by the hon. and learned Member for Devonport, to have offered some remarks on Indian finance, and he thought the present a legitimate opportunity of doing so. The noble Lord bad stated three grounds on which the supply of money on loan was withheld, and particularly that it was not a want of confidence in Indian finance that prevented the Natives from contributing to raise the loan now asked for, but an impression that the longer they kept off the better terms they would obtain. He (Mr. Crawford) did not think so, but he believed it proceeded from an entire mistrust in the financial policy of the Government originating in the measures taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax, in 1853. He would remind the House of the peculiar nature of the Indian debt. The practice of the Indian Government had always been to maintain what was called an open loan—the officers in charge of the different treasuries receiving from the public such sums as were offered to the Government on loan, at rates of interest uniform at the time, but varying with the state of the market. When the revenue was in excess of expenditure, then money was received by the Government to pay off debt, at a high rate of interest; but when the revenue was deficient, it was necessary to make it up by loans, and the rate of interest was in accordance with the existing state of things. The result of this practice during the last few years had been this. When the new charter was conferred on the 1st of May, 1854, the amount of the public registered debt of India was £30,195,000, and on the 1st of May, 1856, it amounted to £44,028,000. The increase was caused in this way. A sum of £53,940,000 of new debt had been contracted, from which a deduction of £12,000,000 of the old debt was made, and £28,000,000 of the old debt was transferred to the new debt at a lower rate of interest. The interest upon the former sum was £1,541,000, or at the rate of about 5⅛ per cent; that upon the latter was £1,777,000, or at the rate of 4 per cent. While, therefore, the debt had increased about £13,800,000, the charge for it had increased only about £230,000. This might seem to be matter for congratulation, but he believed that the reduction of the interest in, the year 1854 to 4 per cent had occasioned great discontent among the Natives of India—a discontent which had weighed on them ever since, and had been greatly aggravated by the course which had been adopted by the Government since the month of November last. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax on the 8th August, 1854, stated that on his accession to office he had sent out directions to the Governor General to proceed at once to reduce the whole of the 5 per cents to 4 per cent. The right hon. Gentleman also stated that in 1849–50 there was a surplus revenue of £520,000, and that in 1851–52 it was £626,000, but he also said, that in the year to which he was referring there was a deficiency of £1,500,000, and yet he was bold enough to order a reduction on the interest of the debt from 5 per cent to 4 per cent; though at the same time he went on to say that there was no prospect of any material reduction of the deficiency. He (Mr. Crawford) said, therefore, that there was no justification of the reduction of the rate of interest from 5 to 4 per cent. The public, however, necessarily submitted to the great loss occasioned by it. Soon after a notice of a loan was issued called the "Public Works Loan." People it first supposed that the object was really the promotion of public works, but they soon found out that the real object was to supply a deficiency of two years amounting to £1,500,000, and a similar sum to pay off in cash the dissentients to the reduction of the rate of interest on the debt. What he wanted the public to know was this, that in the mind of India there had been created a feeling of great distrust in the financial policy and measures of the Government of India, and that distrust still existed. He now came to the proceedings of last year. In November last the public was informed that the holders of India debt could have it registered in India, and receive the interest in this country; in January notice was given that the permission to subscribe partly in the paper of existing loans would be withdrawn on the 20th of April, and at the same time Treasury bills, similar to Exchequer bills in this country, were offered to the public at an interest equivalent to 5¾ per cent. So that at a time when it ought to have been the policy of the Government to uphold the value of their securities in the market, they adopted measures which had a precisely opposite effect. The only redeeming feature in the matter was the intimation that the Government of India was wisely appealing to the population of India, He regretted that that step had not been taken earlier, and that in the proclamation in which it was made public a higher tone had not been taken. He would himself have stated exactly the circumstances in which the Government was placed, and would then have called upon the Natives to come forward to its assistance. There was another matter connected with 'the management of these affairs to which he wished to advert—he meant the singularly inopportune moments which the Government of India took for arranging its loans. The finance arrangements of India proceeded from the Supreme Government at Calcutta; and they showed great ignorance of circumstances connected with the other side of India. There was a very large number of Natives possessed of money in the market on the western side of India, and yet the finance arrangements were made without reference to the circumstances connected with the western side. The two great commodities in which the funds of the mercantile community of western India were engaged, were opium and cotton. It required three or four millions to set the opium crop in motion in Malwa, in the month of October, and it required no less a sum for the purposes of the cotton crop, and to bring it down to Bombay early in the year, as it must be shipped before June. If so large a sum was required for these purposes, it was evident that any demand on the part of the Government which disturbed these arrangements, must necessarily act on the markets in Bombay, and if loans were called for, the commercial rate of interest was ne- cessarily raised. That was the case now. The rate of discount in Bombay was now 14 per cent, and all this arose from the Government at Calcutta concluding its financial arrangements without reference to the state of affairs on the other side of India. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Vernon Smith) had alluded to the propriety of some person skilled in finance being appointed to an official position in India. He (Mr. Crawford) understood that a suggestion of that kind was made to the Court of Directors two years ago, but was rejected by them. He regretted it, for he believed that an appointment of that kind of some person of large financial experience would he most useful. If it was necessary to have a Governor General at £25,000 a year to represent the policy and the dignity of the Government, a Commander in Chief at £17,000 a. year to represent the army of England, and a gentleman at £10,000 a year as the representative of the legal profession in the Legislative Council, it was equally necessary to send out some person to take charge of financial matters. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton had made a suggestion that a financier should be substituted for a lawyer in the Legislative Council, and he (Mr. Crawford) concurred in that suggestion. With regard to railways, the noble Lord had called attention to this subject, which was of considerable consequence at this moment. The noble Lord seemed to expect that the wants of India as regarded the Government in this country would be met for the present year by a payment of £4,000,000 on account of railways. It might be some satisfaction to the noble Lord if he (Mr. Crawford) stated that tomorrow he would have the pleasure of sending him a cheque for £1,000,000 on that account, and in the course of a few days he would have to send him another, not, perhaps, for so large an amount, but still for a considerable sum. The noble Lord would thus have about half the sum which he expected from the railway companies. He had before him an official statement of the condition of Indian railways up to January, 1859, which was read before the Society of Arts by Mr. Watson. According to his statement, the whole length of railways sanctioned in India was 4,847 miles, of which 559 were now open for traffic, and by the end of 1861 no loss than 3,000 miles more were expected to be opened. The whole amount of capital which the Government of India had guaranteed was £40,000,000, of which £19,000,000 was paid up and £21,000,000 was still required by the different railway companies for the construction of their lines. The two principal lines were the East Indian Railway and the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. The former company had a capital of £10,000,000, and the latter a capital of £8,000,000. Of the whole £10,000,000 of the capital of the former, only 2¾ per cent had been raised on the shares in India, while 97¼ per cent was raised in this country, although the shares were open to subscription in India as well as here. The proportions were somewhat different in the case of the Great Indian Peninsula Company, for 93 per cent had been received here, and 7 per cent in India; while in the case of the Madras Company the whole paid-up capital had been received in this country. It might he said that of the entire £19,000,000 of paid up capital, 96 or 97 per cent had been received in England, and the remaining 4 or 3 per cent in India. But there was still £21,000,000 to be raised, and, assuming that it would he received in the same proportions, no less a sum than £20,000,000 must be looked for in England, and only £1,000,000 in Indian. The expenditure of the East Indian and the Great India Peninsula Companies had been in the proportion of 55 per cent in England, and about 45 per cent in India, and, applying those figures to the remaining £21,000,000, about £8,000,000 or £9,000,000 would have to be spent in India, and the other £12,000,000 in England. The Secretary of State might feel assured that he would obtain from the railway companies a sufficient sum to enable him to meet his charges. The money market of England professed to be able to supply the money required to pay for this expenditure, but not to supply what was required for loans for the Government of India. He had read with great interest and attention the despatch of 19th January, which had been laid on the table, and he had listened with equal attention to the noble Lord on that evening, and he was bound to say that he could not regard the affairs of India with the despondency with which they were generally viewed, but he was bold enough to look at them in a financial point of view with great confidence. The revenue had not diminished even during the troublous times of the rebellion, and it had now rather increased. The whole question therefore resolved itself into one of expenditure, and seeing how largely military expenditure entered into the question, it lay with that House to prevent great burdens being imposed on our Indian finances. There was a feeling of uneasiness in the public mind at hearing that attempts were being made in high quarters to charge Indian revenue with the maintenance of a- great military force. It had been stated that twelve batteries of artillery were about to be sent out; and it was at a time when the war was over, and all the arms of the people in the revolted provinces seized, that this large force was being sent out at a great expense to be saddled on the revenue of India. Plausible reasons however might be adduced for this course, and such had been offered, but he was afraid that the principal object was to increase the influence and patronage of the Horse Guards. He hoped, at all events, that the attempt to increase the European army unnecessarily at the expense of India might not succeed. When it was considered how greatly the exports and imports of India had been increased in the last few years, the condition of the country must be commercially good, and therefore he did not look with any despondency at the future of its finance, believing as he did that the only question was one of expenditure. With regard to an imperial guarantee, he was not prepared at present to give his concurrence to such a proceeding. He could not conceive how this country could become responsible for the debt of India without greater control being exercised over Indian expenditure by vote and estimate in that House; and he hoped the time was not come when that House would interfere so minutely with the affairs of India. There was an item in the despatch of 19th January, of which, perhaps, the noble Lord would give an explanation. Under the head of charges for each Presidency there were items under the head of "profit and loss" which amounted in the whole to £150,000. He did not understand how such an item of charge arose. There was one other subject to which he wished to call the attention of the House. The right hon. Gentleman below him (Sir Charles Wood) in 1854 stated that instructions bad been sent out to the different Presidencies desiring the accounts to be framed upon a now model, and that he hoped in the next year to lay on the table of the House accounts of the trade and navigation of India. Those accounts had not yet been presented, and he thought he might do the public some service by pressing on the noble Lord the expediency of having them regularly laid on the table of the House. He repeated that he looked with great confidence to the future of India. The noble Lord had seen by his statement how much the public in this country must be relied on for means to complete the railways in India; but he must assure the noble Lord that if the practice of the Indian Council to sanction every scheme that comes before them, however desirable it may be in itself, was to continue, they would, to use a homely expression, soon kill the goose that laid the golden eggs. At the present moment the guarantee of the Indian Council was barely sufficient to maintain the stock of the railway companies above par, and as long as that was the case, it would be difficult for the noble Lord to attract towards India the amount of money necessary for large public works.
said, that thinking as he did that there was no more serious question for the consideration of the House and Government than the present state of Indian finance, he was glad to have the present opportunity of stating his views on the matter, because, in his opinion, no time should be lost in taking measures more efficient than had yet been adopted for equalizing the revenue and expenditure of that country. Before he went into that question, however, he must be permitted to refer to what fell from the hon. Member for London with respect to the measure for which he (Sir Charles Wood) was to a certain extent responsible—the reduction of the interest of the 5 per cent Indian loan to 4 per cent. He had not the least objection to take the whole of the responsibility which ought to be on his shoulders in that respect; but considerable difference would be made in the consideration of that question by a reference to the dates at which the orders in respect to the matter were given, and when the subsequent transaction occurred the hon. Member for London had omitted the dates. In looking through the Parliamentary paper, showing the variety of loans raised in India, it would be found that the processes were not quite so simultaneous as the hon. Member seemed to suppose, but that there was a considerable interval between the first and last transactions alluded to. He became President of the Board of Control about January, 1853, and it so happened that the Indian Government, seeing that they had a surplus of £500,000 for three successive years, did in January, 1853, take on themselves the responsibility of commencing the operation of reducing the 5 per cent loan to a 4 per cent loan. It was quite true that, very soon after his accession to office, he sent directions to India entirely approving of what they had done, and urging them to continue the same operation. This reduction was to be carried out in the early part of 1853, and in September, 1853, the 4 per cent. loan was closed, and in October, 1853, a 3½ per cent loan was opened, to which a certain sum of money was subscribed, showing that at that time the prevalent rate of interest in India was under 4 per cent. He could not quite understand on what principle that operation was impeached. Was it to be said that it was not desirable, if they could, to reduce the rate of interest payable on the public debt? At the time this operation was commenced there had been a surplus averaging half a million for three successive years, and there was then no prospect of an increase of charge or a diminution of revenue. The Indian Government, therefore, with the entire approbation of the Home Government, undertook an operation which in this country had always been regarded as a most desirable and advantageous course. It was effected in the spring and summer of 1853, and the decrease of charge consequent upon this reduction of interest amounted to half a million per annum. The state of Indian finance had been a source of anxiety to every Government for the last twenty years; and a saving of this amount in the expenditure of India was a measure surely undeserving of the censure cast upon it in that House. Such a saving had not been made for many a long year before, and he should be glad to see a similar reduction effected in future. It was true that in March, 1855, a change of circumstances occurred in the money market at home and in India, occasioned by the war; and the Indian Government then finding it necessary to raise a loan, were compelled to increase the rate of interest to 5 per cent. That fact, however, did not furnish the slightest ground for impugning an act of the Government two years before, which was perfectly legitimate at the time; and he could see no reason, looking at the large sum which had been raised in India up to January last, for supposing that the credit of the Indian Government had been affected by what was done in 1853. He would not refer to what had just been said with regard to the Indian railways, except to observe that in point of fact that subject had not much to do with Indian finance. Taking all that had been stated on this point to be true, it only amounted to this, that if the sums to be received in this country from the various companies went for the payment of the home charges, the necessity of remittances from India would be obviated. An equal sum would have to be applied from Indian revenue to railroad purposes in India instead of being applied to public purposes, and their payment in England would make no difference in the expenditure and income, the relative balance between which would remain unaffected. The Member for London talked of paying in a million to the Home Treasury; but of this sum one quarter at least would be required to pay the July dividend to the shareholders in this country. He now came to what was the real question of Indian finance. He did not differ from the hon. Member for Windsor as to the reductions which he thought desirable. He had before expressed his concurrence in the opinions now expressed by the hon. Gentleman, but after all they only applied to a reduction of some ten or twenty thousand pounds, and if they were to accomplish any effectual reduction of expenditure in India, they must deal not with tens or hundreds of thousands, but with millions. He had been told not many weeks ago that he had taken far too gloomy a view of the financial prospects of India, but a despatch from the Indian Government, which had been recently published, presented an infinitely worse picture than anything he had ventured to sketch, He had not said one word on this matter that he did not believe to be true, or which could not be demonstrated from the figures before them at the time; but nothing that he had said came near the facts which were disclosed in these despatches. In a recent debate, several Gentlemen had ex- pressed unbounded confidence in the future increase of Indian revenue. He did not quarrel with those who had anticipated a great development of the resources of India, and a consequent further increase of its revenue. All this, however, was mere matter of conjecture, and afforded no certain data on which any calculations could be based. But when hon. Gentlemen, professedly founding themselves upon the experience of the past, had contradicted the noble Lord's statement, and his own also as to the inelastic nature of the Indian land revenue, he begged entirely to differ from them. On hearing the statement, he had at first mistrusted his own judgment in deference to the high authority of the hon. Gentleman who said so. On subsequent examination, however, he found that his previous opinion was perfectly borne out by the facts. In the year 1850–1, the land revenue amounted to about £17,058,000, while in 1856–7 it was £18,658,000. The increase between these two periods was £1,600,000. But the same accounts showed that this result was mainly due to the addition of the land revenue of the provinces annexed since 1851, the item for which was £1,500,000. Taking, therefore, the most favourable view of the case, the augmentation of the land revenue derivable from other sources than the annexation of new territory was only £100,000 between the years 1850–1 and 1856–7. They could not, then, expect any large increase of revenue under this head for many years to come. But, passing now to the statement which they had heard from the Secretary for India, he thought the noble Lord had under-rated—and, perhaps, naturally so—the real gravity of the position of Indian finance. There was another respect in which he had been greatly disappointed by the noble Lord's explanations. He could not understand how it was possible for the noble Lord to make the statement he did, not six weeks ago, on the state of the finances of India, and not even allude to this startling deficit of £11,500,000 which they now heard of for the first time. He could not suppose for a moment that the noble Lord had wilfully concealed that which he knew to be the case; but he must say, that wherever the fault lay, whether with the Government in India or with the Government at home, it was utterly impossible that this serious deficiency should have escaped their notice until it was discovered all at once. It was absurd to suppose, that the probability of a deficit in India should not have been known before the despatch from India of January last. How came it that when the noble Lord asked them for a loan of seven millions there should have been beyond that amount as stated in this despatch, an expenditure of eleven-and-a-half millions in excess of the revenue? Could anybody believe that either the Home Government or the authorities in India could have been so long unaware that it was probable there could be this heavy deficit in the finances of India, to which the noble Lord in his recent exposition never alluded? Having thought it unlikely that there should be no deficit, he had himself put a question a few days ago to the noble Lord. Not a single syllable, however, did the noble Lord say on that occasion on this subject; and it was now incumbent on him to explain why this important fact had been wholly excluded from his previous statement. He would shortly refer to the deficits of recent years. In the years 1857–8, the deficit was £9,304,000. In 1858–9,£12,600,000. The noble Lord had stated the deficit of last year at rather a larger amount than he gave for it on a former occasion; namely, at £13,000,000. For the year 1859–60, the Home expenditure had to be provided for by the loan of £,7000,000, which was the subject of the Bill now before the House; and we had recently learnt with astonishment, that beyond this deficit of £7,000,000, there was a further excess of £11,500,000 in the expenditure in India to be provided for. The noble Lord had said, that some of this excess arose from railway expenditure, but on the other hand it did not include the sum due for prize-money, which was said to be £4,000,000, or the sum due for compensations, and therefore he thought we might be well content to take the statement of Indian finances as the Indian Government gave it. The whole expenditure for 1859 was estimated after the proposed reductions at £53,435,000, and the whole income, including the estimated increase at £45,692,500. (This was taking the rupee at 2s.) The deficiency was therefore £7,742,500. To this sum was to be added £3,135,000 in order to increase the balance up to the amount which the Indian Government thought it right to have in their treasuries, and £562,500 to pay oft some Tanjore debt, which ought not perhaps to be included in the current expenditure. No doubt means must be provided for these demands, but there was a deficiency on the current expenditure alone of £7,742,000 beyond the £7,000,000 that had been already borrowed. How was this deficit to be met? It appeared to him that in its financial operations the Indian Government had been very unsuccessful. It began by announcing in January the closing in May of the arrangement for converting the 4 per cent paper, with an equal amount of cash, into 5 per cent paper, accompanied by an issue of Teasury bills, bearing interest at 5¾ per cent. This did not answer. On the 10th of February it reduced the amount for which Treasury bills could be issued to £20. The consequence of these measures was a complete panic. The 5 per cents fell from 93 to 85, and were unsaleable at 15 per cent discount. On the 22nd of February they announced the opening of a 5½ per cent loan in May, and having failed to obtain money on Treasury bills at 5¾ per cent, they then issued similar bills at 4¾. Having failed to raise money by bills at 5¾of per cent, how they expected to get any on similar bills at 4¾ passed his comprehension. In regard to the revenue they anticipated a probable diminution of that from opium, and no material increase of the existing custom duties. What steps, then, were taken to meet the deficiency. They proposed to raise £1,000,000, by additional customs and stamp duties, they hoped to get£5,000,000 by the 5½ per cent loan, and for all the remainder of the £11,500,000, they threw themselves upon this country. Such was the financial state of India for the year 1859–60. During the present year military operations would be to a certain extent going on, and it was not to be expected but that it would be necessary to raise money by loan to pay the expenses of them, But he must look forward to the period when it was to be hoped that the war would have altogether ceased, and we must see what were the financial prospects held out for 1860? Taking the revenue at what it was estimated to be for 1859–60, and the expenditure at the sum to which it was proposed to reduce it, the account would stand thus:—Expenditure, £53,435,000; income, £46,692,500, leaving a deficit of £6,500,000, exclusive of home charges. The home charges for the last year of peace were £3,500,000, and taking them only at £3,000,000, there would be a deficit in the year 1860–61, of nine millions and a-half to be dealt with after the proposed increase of taxation on the one hand, and the proposed reduction of expenditure in the year 1859–60 had been made. This was the prospect fur a year, as we hoped, of profound peace. What were the prospects of meeting it? He wished to urge the question at this period, because the noble Lord must begin at once to take effectual measures for reducing the expenditure, not by tens or hundreds of thousands, but by millions. At the same time it would be necessary to increase the revenue. In their despatch, the Indian Government reckoned the extra expenses of the military department at about £8,500,000, £2,000,000 of which they proposed to strike out in the course of the present year, which would still leave an extra expenditure under this head of £6,500,000. How was that expenditure to be brought down? It was not by such reductions as were talked of in this country, or by such reductions as had hitherto been proposed in India, that the difficulty could be met. Unless an infinitely greater reduction than now seemed contemplated was effected, there seemed no possibility of bringing the expenditure within the revenue of India. It was nonsense to talk of small economies, of lopping off a Member of the Legislature in India and two councillors at home, or of saving one or two hundred thousand pounds by means of guarantees. All this was quite right, so far as it went, but it was a mere fleabite; and unless the question was dealt with in a, much more comprehensive and statesmanlike manner than the Home Government or the Government in India had yet treated it, a serious crisis was imminent. It was incumbent on the House to press upon the Indian Government the necessity of effecting largo reductions. He concurred in the opinion which had been expressed that a Committee of this House was not the proper mode of taking the subject into consideration, He did not say that the necessary measures could betaken in India; but the Indian Council at home was composed of men bettor acquainted with India than the whole of the House of Commons put together, and if they could not suggest means both of reducing the expenditure and of increasing the revenue, he utterly despaired of the House of Commons being able to do so. The House might know what taxes to impose on the people of England, but they could have no acquaintance with the feelings, the prejudices, and the interests of the people of India, all of which must be considered in dealing with this subject. Some action must, at all events, be taken on the question without loss of time. Mere general orders sent out for a reduction of expenditure would not produce much effect: the Home Government must be prepared to point out and to insist on certain definite reductions. The Indian Government might find a difficulty in revising the salaries of the servants, and of reducing the establishment, military or civil, under their control; this was a duty incumbent on the Council at home. The question was one of the most serious ever brought before the House, and he trusted that it would give rise to speedy and to vigorous action on the part of the Government. He would not now go into the question of guaranteed loans, though he entertained a strong opinion that it would be a great mistake if India were encouraged to look to this country for resources to meet increased expenditure; but he did hope that the Government would look the existing deficit manfully in the face and deal with it by much more effective measures in the way of reduction than by the mere general advice and general exhortation which were contained in these despatches.
said, that such a discussion was calculated to make the House regret the exclusion of the members of the Council, who would have brought to boar upon it a practical knowledge and a local experience which might have corrected some of the statements which had been made, and would certainly have carried more weight than the speeches of mere amateurs in Indian finance. His right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Wood) had thought it necessary to defend his measure for the reduction of the interest, and had said that it was not only successful, but justifiable and expedient. Now, the measure might have been temporarily successful, but it was permanently unfortunate. It did not seem clear what permanent surplus of revenue there was in the treasury when his right hon. Friend attempted it; nor was he aware that there was such a diminution in the general rate of interest throughout India as would warrant such a reduction. His right hon. Friend only followed at that time the prevalent mania for the reduction of the rate of interest, and although his measure succeeded for a time it had had the effect of creating great distrust in reference to the management of the finances of India, and had thus exercised a prejudicial effect on the future conduct of those finances. To maintain confidence in matters of finance it was not only necessary that the Government should be able to meet all its engagements, but that its creditors should feel convinced that it would not avail itself of any temporary events to disturb existing settlements by forced operations, to their prejudice. Now that was what the reduction of the rate of interest did in India. The subsequent financial operations which his right hon. Friend criticised might or might not be judicious. At this distance it was rather unjust to criticise operations undertaken to meet a special exigency. As far as they could judge, the measures taken in Calcutta, constantly changing as they did, were not very wise. For success in finance two things were necessary—simplicity of system and consistency of purpose; the sys- tem must be thoroughly intelligible, and here must then be consistency of purpose in carrying it into effect. This did not seem to have been the case at Calcutta; but it should be recollected that we in England had contributed very much to the distrust which prevailed throughout India. He was not going to raise the question whether this country should not have come directly to the aid of India last year; but he was strongly of opinion that had it done so, credit would have been restored throughout India, and the Natives would have been ready to lend their money freely when they saw we were not distrustful of the resources of India. The view taken on this subject by the right hon. Gentleman last year was, he could not help thinking petty, unwise, and uneconomic. Probably with the support which the House had given to that view, the present Government were obliged to follow in the old track, and could not help adopting the same plan; but by so doing they had prevented the Natives from investing their money in Government securities, and had prevented the restoration of confidence in India. The hon. Member (Mr. Crawford) saw a remedy in the proposal that individuals should be sent from this country to put to rights the finances of India. Now, he had no confidence in the attempts of strangers to regulate the finances of another country; he should not think much of any advice given by Frenchmen and Americans as to the taxes which should be imposed on the people of this country. He should have great distrust of the report even of a Commission composed of Chancellors of the Exchequer who might be sent out to India to pronounce an opinion as to what was the system of finance which ought to be carried into effect in that country. If such an opinion were pronounced without due consideration, it would deserve to be regarded as a rash one, while, if it were the result of mature inquiry, it could not be arrived at for years after the application of a remedy for existing embarrassments in India was required. Surely, therefore, the best plan to adopt was, to leave it to the Governor General to appoint a Commission on the spot, which would be composed of men conversant with the subject which they were appointed to investigate, and not to send persons out from this country who could know nothing of it except from hearsay. But, be that as it might, it was to economy only that we ought, in his opinion, to look with a view to righting the finances of India. He, like the right hon. Baronet, should have no distrust of Indian finance if that country were but well and economically governed. The deficit which had arisen in past years in India had been occasioned by wars carried on not for the benefit of that country, but for objects of Imperial advantage. He might also observe that the small deficit which had occurred previous to the breaking out of the mutiny had arisen from the anxiety which had been evinced to contribute to the prosecution of public works. When therefore great deficiencies were occasioned by wars which, if we were wise, we should avoid, it became more than ever expedient that the expenditure for public works should be regulated in accordance with the means at the disposal of the Government. He, for one, regarded with some anxiety the disposition to guarantee these public works. It was all very well to a certain extent to contend that industry ought to be promoted and improvements carried into execution, but there was a limit even in those cases; and if some positive limit were not imposed there would be such a constant pressure on the Indian Government for further guarantees that it would be impossible to look on the continuance of a system without grave anxiety and fear as to the future. Economy could only be worked out by making India to pay only for what she wanted, and not by forcing upon her a large expenditure for the purpose of adding to our own national establishments, and our military resources. He made that remark because he had heard with apprehension a statement which was made during the discussion on the Army Estimates, and which led him to suppose that there was some intention of throwing upon India in some measure the expenses of maintaining the military establishment of England. Now, the revenue of India could only be gradually and moderately increased, and he could not help thinking that some saving might be effected in the cost of its collection. But we could not, he believed, levy taxes upon the inhabitants of that country without consulting Native prejudices and feelings, and it was in that case difficult, he thought, to say how these burdens could be laid upon them with either wisdom or success. It was after all, then, to retrenchment of expenditure—and that must be effected in connection with the army—that we must look for the adjustment of Indian finance. The system of double government no longer existed to act as a buffer to stop the pressure which from time to time was put upon the Government at home. It now fell upon a Cabinet Minister, who could not always resist it. There was, therefore, great danger that he would yield to that pressure, and throw that expenditure on India which, if borne at all, ought to be borne by England. The only course now open to the House was, in his opinion, to adopt the measure of the noble Lord the Secretary for India, and if for the future economy were practised in the management of the finances of that country he should entertain no fears with regard to the result. He must at the same time observe that he could not help feeling that an opportunity had been lost last year of transferring for a time to India the benefit of the national credit—an opportunity which if it had been seized upon might have been productive of great benefit to that country, while England would have lost nothing by the proceeding.
said, the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, and whose opinions on financial subjects were entitled to the utmost attention, had expressed it to be his belief that a portion of the existing financial embarrassments of India had been occasioned by the adoption of the course which had been recommended by Her Majesty's late Government with respect to the loan which had last year been contracted for the service of that country. Now, he (Sir George Lewis) was, he must confess, totally unable to understand the force of that argument. Anybody would suppose, from the reasoning of the hon. Gentleman, that Her Majesty's late Government had recommended some novel and unprecedented scheme for the adoption of Parliament. So far, however, from that being the case, they had simply pursued the invariable course of practice on such subjects. There never had been a time when the Exchequer of England had come to the assistance of the Exchequer of India. On the contrary, an attempt had at one time been made to exact from India a tribute to the English Exchequer. The expenses of Indian wars, moreover, had at all times been defrayed by the Indian Treasury from money raised in India, and whenever it had been found necessary to raise money for the service of the Indian Government in England, it had been raised by means of Indian bonds, under the authority of an Act of Parliament. The course, therefore, which Her Majesty's late Government had recommended the House of Commons to adopt, was one which up to that time had been uniformly pursued. But, if there had then been any difficulty in obtaining the proposed loan; if it had been obtainable only at a high rate of interest, there would have been some reason for contending that the credit of the Indian Government had been injuriously affected. The fact of the matter, however was, that the bonds, being 4 per cent bonds, had been issued nearly at par; so that it was perfectly clear that the loan was obtained on terms not very far from being as advantageous as those on which even the Imperial Government could borrow. Indeed, he apprehended that if the French or Russian, or any other of the continental Governments, whose credit stood highest were to issue 4 per cent debenture bonds, those bonds would not stand as high as 98 per cent. It therefore appeared to him that the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, so far from proving his case, had failed in showing that any connection existed between the high rate of interest in Calcutta and the issue of Indian debentures last year in this country. So far as the notion that there was any insurmountable difficulty in the way of granting assistance to the Indian Treasury from the Imperial Exchequer was concerned, he could only say that the obstacle was purely imaginary, provided only that it was shown to be expedient that such aid should be rendered. What he objected to, was the principle of confounding the two Exchequers; of granting a loan, in other words, for public works or similar projects for the benefit of India at the expense of the English Exchequer. But, if it could be shown that the late mutiny had imposed upon the Indian Government an expense that might fairly be considered to have been incurred rather for the promotion of the interests of this country than of India, and if it were proved that no additional taxation could reasonably be imposed to defray the current expenses of the Indian administration, then undoubtedly a case might be made out for assistance from the English Exchequer. Let such a case be made out, and there would be no difficulty in treating it in accordance with recognized financial rules; but it was, he should contend, an entire mis- apprehension of the present embarrassment to suppose that it was in any way connected with the loan which had been contracted fur the service of India last year. The existing pressure on Indian finance was the result of the late mutiny, and the real difficulty which now beset it was that of bringing the expenditure of India within its revenue. For his own part, he should not hesitate to express his conviction that it was imperative upon the noble Lord the Secretary for India and his Council, to cause the Government of India to understand that it was incumbent on them, by some means or other, so to shape their administration as to secure that the ordinary revenue would meet the expenditure. Unless the present state of things could be remedied the possession of India by this country would cease to be possible. That House, as the representative of the people of England, could not con- template a state of things in which they should be called upon to vote £4,000,000, £5,000,000, or £6,000,000 annually as a subsidy for the maintenance of that which was called a valuable dependency of the British Crown. He had no doubt that if it could be shown that an extraordinary assistance was required to meet an extraordinary emergency, that House would always be ready to take a reasonable view of the matter, and to do what such an emergency might require. But he must repeat his conviction that it was the duty of that House to enforce upon the Executive Government, in whatever hands it might be, the necessity of its teaching the Indian Government that means must positively be found within no very distant time to bring the ordinary expenditure of India within the amount of its ordinary revenue. It might be desirable that the House should have some more distinct statement than they had hitherto received with respect to the prospects of diminishing the numbers of the European forces in India. He thought there was some misunderstanding in a former debate with regard to the precise numbers of the troops which it was contemplated to keep in India during this year. He did not himself understand precisely the force of some of the remarks which the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Thomas Baring) made as to the danger of an English Minister imposing an unnecessary amount of troops upon India, and the pressure to which the Secretary for India would be subjected from the Horse Guards upon that subject. He could not see how the military department of this country could have any interest in imposing upon India a greater military force than the authorities had asked for, or than was necessary for the maintenance of our power in that country. He could hardly conceive, what- ever might be the patronage to accrue from it, that there would be any disposition on the part of the War Department to maintain such a force, or to force it upon the Indian Government contrary to that Government's inclinations, merely for the sake of increasing the army in India. His own experience assured him that the War Department had great difficulty in recruiting the large number of men necessary to supply the troops in India. He should therefore think that the Horse Guards would be glad to receive information that it would be in the power of the Indian Government to spare some regiments to send to this country. However that might be, it was not desirable, looking at the present state of Continental Europe, and the balance of power in Europe, to maintain a body of men equal to 90,000 of our army in India. It was of great importance that, so soon as the state of India would permit, a considerable portion of that body should be returned to ordinary service. He hoped that the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary for India, who was about to address the House, would state, so far as he was able, the reduction which the Government expected to be in a position to make this year in the number of European troops serving in India.
said, he did not in the least complain of his right hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, (Sir C. Wood), for having drawn what he believed to be a faithful and what was, no doubt, a very good picture, of the present state of the finances of India. Nor did he complain of the exposition made by his right hon. Friend upon a former occasion. Unfavourable as were the remarks made by his right hon. Friend upon that former occasion, he (Mr. H. Baillie) very much agreed in them. But when his right hon. Friend stated that his noble Friend (Lord Stanley) ought, when he brought forward his Loan Bill, to have foreseen that the deficit in the Indian revenue would require a much larger loan than £7,000,000, he seemed to have forgotten that it was only from information recently received that the noble Lord had learnt that £7,000,000 would be inadequate. It must be perfectly obvious to every one that there was only one mode by which a reduction could be made in the Indian expenditure—namely, by a very large reduction of the European army in India. The right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken had asked him what reduction the Government intended to make in that army; but that would depend upon the views of the Commander-in-Chief in India as to the force that would be necessary. However, of one thing we might be quite certain—that unless we could reduce our European army in India to a force of somewhere about 50,000 men it would be impossible for the revenue of India to meet the expenditure required by a larger force. He firmly believed that if India were governed in the spirit of Her Majesty's proclamation, if there were no interference with the religious feelings of the people, it was possible that in the course of time we might maintain India by a European force of 50,000 men, backed up by a well-organized Native army, for we must always depend in a great measure on a Native army, as it was by far less expensive than a European army. If India could not be thus maintained we had much better give up that country. The course pursued by the Government would be to desire the Governor General to ascertain what reduction might be safely made, and to effect such reduction at once.
said, our prospects of Indian finance were, no doubt, at present exceedingly gloomy, and our prospect of improving the Indian revenue was not satisfactory. But to increase that revenue by increasing the land taxes would be to subvert the system we had pursued in India during the last thirty years, which was a system of constant reduction. That mode, therefore, of increasing the revenue was entirely out of the question. It had been said that there was a prospect of the Indian Government losing from £3,000,000 to £5,000,000 per annum of the opium tax in consequence of China cultivating opium for her own population; but inasmuch as about one-fourth of that population had to live upon the waters, as they had no land to cultivate, it was extremely improbable that any part of the soil of China would be devoted to the growth of a luxury. We were in much more danger of losing the opium revenue by the efforts of a body of most amiable philanthropists on this side of the water, He, however, did not think that the good sense of this country would permit those efforts, however well meant, to injure the interests of India. It had been said that the deficiency in the Indian revenue might possibly be remedied by an increased taxation on exports, but all political economists knew that precisely as they imposed taxes upon exports they placed a cheek on the productive power of a country. There was, he thought, very little hope of much increase either from an export tax or an import tax, and the latter would not only be highly unpopular, but would fall from the articles enumerated, beer, wines, tea, &c. chiefly upon Europeans. It was said that an additional revenue might be obtained from the Excise duty upon spirituous liquors and drugs, but that would yield, comparatively speaking, only a trifling amount. Works of irrigation might no doubt in a few years prove productive, but nothing could be expected from that source for some time to come. What, then, was to be done? They wished to diminish expenditure, but it seemed to him that they were continually throwing obstacles in their own way. For instance, while they desired to limit expenditure, the Estimates showed that they were about to send twelve batteries to India, consisting of seventy-two guns, with all their materiel and stores, and requiring 3,000 men, probably, to work them, when there was not a fortress to reduce or an army to meet in the field. Those 3,000 men would have to go into cantonments, for there were no proper barracks to receive them, and they would swelter away their lives in disease. Another obstacle which they placed in their own way was that bugbear about responsibility for the money advanced to India. There could be no doubt that that money was advanced for Imperial purposes, to enable us to maintain our hold upon India. Was it not, therefore, more just, more reasonable and honest, that the country for whose advantage the money was raised should be responsible for it in case of an emergency which was not likely to arise, but which might come. He held in his hand a letter from Sir James Outram, received by the last mail, in which Sir James said,—
What were our prospects for the future? It was quite impossible that the Indian finances could ever right themselves while there was in that country an European array of 106,000 or 108,000 men. Two of the best authorities on Indian subjects had laid it down in official reports, but at present only in private circulation, that 40,000 British troops would be sufficient for the maintenance of our power in India, for India never before was so prostrate as now. That was the usual amount of the European forces in that country before the mutiny. The only way, therefore, was to reduce matters to their normal condition before the mutiny, and meanwhile to let India go into the money market for loans upon the same footing as the Imperial Government, and then it would be found that Indian resources would be still equal to their engagements as they were before the present state of things arose."You will see that they have taken to issuing Treasury Bills, but it is doubtful whether that step will produce any great return. The Natives have got it into their heads that the Queen is not, bound to recognize the Government securities of the late Company, and unless a national loan for India is opened in England our Indian paper will be still further depreciated. That measure will disabuse them of the suspicion that the Indian and the home Governments are not identical, and would at once raise the value of our Indian 5 and 4 per cents."
observed one thing was quite clear, that unless we could limit the military expenditure of India the insolvency of Indian finance was inevitable. At the present moment we had 93,000 British troops in India, the entire expense of which, as well as of their depots in this country, was placed upon the Indian revenue. He thought that having so large a force of British troops in that country, it was scarcely fair that the Indian finance should bear the entire cost of those depots. The military expenditure of India was not less than £20,000,000 sterling, an amount very nearly double the whole expenditure of the British army. How was it possible that such a state of things could last? The best course for this empire to pursue would be to take on itself a fair proportion of the military expenditure, so far as it-might be regarded as an expeditionary force sent out for a particular object. It was all very well to say that England was not bound to provide for the Indian debt, but its Government had authorized the loans, and the expenditure of the money, and, therefore, if Indian finance could not meet the liability, imperial finance should do so. He should be glad to hear from the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) that the idea of sending out twelve batteries of artillery had been given up. There were 7,000 British artillery troops in India already. In conclusion he could not but express his regret that the House had but very limited information upon this question of Indian finance. It was very much in the dark upon the subject; and most of its views of the matter could only be taken as speculative and uncertain.
said, it could hardly be necessary for him to reply to the remarks which had been made, as most of the hon. Members who made them had left the House. The various questions of taxation had been, and were still being, carefully considered in Council here. No doubt their deliberations had been to some extent interrupted and superseded by the independent action taken in the exigency that had arisen by the Governor General in India; but the Government were far from wishing to throw the whole responsibility on the Indian Government. The suggested substitution of a financial for the legislative Members of Council would receive due consideration whenever a vacancy occurred.
Bill read 3a and passed.
House adjourned at Twelve o'clock.