said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War when the arrangement for improving the condition of Barrackmasters will be carried into effect?

said, that the scheme, if carried out, would be for the benefit of barrackmasters. They would be divided into classes, and would be promoted from one to another. The whole subject had received great attention from his predecessor in office, and he would announce the decision of the Government in a few days.

said, he rose to ask the Lord Advocate, whether it is the intention of the Government to include any provision in the Estimates of the present year for the Sheriff Courts in Scotland?

said, he understood that in the Estimates of the present year there was no such Vote, and without an Act of Parliament it would not be possible for the Government to include a sum in the Estimates for that purpose.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether any information has reached Her Majesty's Government to the effect that more than two-thirds of the provincial and local Standards of Weights and Measures have been used more than twenty years without reverification, and that the same are defective and unjust, and cannot be relied on as tests of accuracy; that such Standards nevertheless furnish the legal means and evidence by which the integrity and accuracy of the Weights and Measures used by the tradesmen for commercial purposes are ascertained and tested; that legal convictions take place and penalties are enforced for non-conformity to such Standards; and, if so, whether Her Majesty's Ministers intend to take any steps for the prevention of so great an injustice.

said, that the Question of his hon. and learned Friend, was founded upon a Report of the Astronomer Royal which was laid before Parliament last session. That Report stated that besides the standards of weights and measures deposited in the Exchequer, under the custody of the Comptroller of the Exchequer, there were certain provincial and local standards of weights and measures, which might be called secondary standards, as to which there had been a deficiency of reverification of late years. The process had been very irregularly repeated; and, in answer to his hon. and learned Friend's question, he would beg to remark—first, that there was no need of the process of reverification being repeated very often, as the Standards, having been once verified, were subject to very little wear and tear and to little or no change; and, secondly that the law did not provide a fund for the payment of the costs of such reverification, which must fall either upon the public purse or upon some local fund.

said, he wished to in- quire whether the Act of Parliament was not defective as to the subject of verifying these Weights and Measures; and, if so, whether the right hon. Gentleman intended to bring in a Bill to remedy the defect?

said, he should have no objection to the introduction of a measure on the subject, if the question of how the expense of the reverification should be borne could be satisfactorily settled.

said, he desired to have some further information on this subject. It was very important that leave of absence should not be unnecessarily extended at this period of the Session, otherwise there would be a very unequal pressure upon Members serving upon Election Committees. He thought that those who moved for leave of absence for other Members should ascertain whether the grounds were really such as to justify the indulgence.

said, he could assure the right hon. Gentleman that he had ascertained the facts in this instance. Mr. Tottenham met with an accident a short time ago, and was suffering from a slight concussion of the brain, and he (Sir W. Jolliffe) had in his pocket a doctor's certificate upon the point.

said, he rose to ask whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer can now fix the day upon which he will make his financial statement?

Sir, I cannot, I am afraid, give an absolute answer to the question of the hon. Gentleman, as it is uncertain what time will be occupied by the Naval and Military Estimates; but if those Estimates should happily be concluded by to-morrow night—and perhaps the House will be disposed to sit a little later than usual in order to get through—in that case I will make the financial statement on Monday.

said, he wished to inquire whether it is intended to proceed with this Bill without giving an opportunity of discussing it? The Bill had only been in- troduced on the 4th of July, and stood for a third reading that evening.

said, the reason why the Bill had been pressed on was, he believed, because the Commission would expire on the 1st of August, and if it was to be renewed, the Bill must be passed at once.

said, he thought a continuance Bill for one year would be sufficient; so that the subject might be discussed next year.

pointed out the enormous number of officers on the active retired list. Out of 100 Admirals on that list there were 39 between 70 and 87 years of age. Why, he asked, should they continue to be rated as active? In like manner there were 315 Captains on the active list, of whom 41 were above 60, whilst only 90 were in active service. A similar proportion held good of the Commanders' list. So that we were retaining upon the active list a number of gentlemen who were not active or fit for service, and who themselves felt that they were not fit for service. Again, out of 2000 officers on the active list 214 were between the ages of 60 and 85, although, curious to say, upon the retired list there were not less than 290 below the age of 60. Now, the retired and reserved list was in a most unsatisfactory state. It cost the country upwards of £700,000 a year; and if it were unsatisfactory to the country it was not less so to the officers themselves—for they could not obtain active employment in consequence of their number being so great, and not obtaining active employment of course they could not get promotion. He knew that it was utterly impossible to employ them all in time of peace, and that it was necessary to retain a very large number to meet the exigencies of war; yet it happened that if we were now to engage in war we should be very far short of the number of officers requisite to man our ships. What he wished to impress upon the country was that there must be a complete change in the whole system; but to maintain sufficient officers for the emergency of war would increase the half-pay list to a still greater amount than its present cost; consequently we ought to look to some other source. Now, in the merchant service, and especially on board those magnificent steam-ships which belonged to the great navigation companies, there were a large number of active and intelligent officers. Since the passing of the Mercantile Marine Act those officers had been obliged to undergo an examination before public Boards with regard to their acquirements in seamanship and navigation quite as strict as that to which officers in the navy were subjected. And he thought that, by adding to that course of examination a further examination in gunnery, officers in the merchant service might make a very efficient body of men, who would be ready, willing, and able to serve the country in the hour of need. If ultimately it should be determined to form a reserve of merchant seamen these officers might be called out with them, and having undergone a month's drill annually with the men he had no doubt they would be found as valuable in fighting our ships as the permanent officers of the navy. The effect of such a measure would be that we should encounter no difficulty in finding reserves; we might reduce the number of naval officers, give them more employment, and at the same time diminish that heavy amount of taxation which we were annually called upon to vote for the half-pay list.

said, that some of the lower grades of officers in the navy were in a very unsatisfactory state, the late First Lord having stated that mates and midshipmen were 400 short of the required number. On the other hand, there was quite a redundancy of Admirals. We had not less than 341 Admirals, of whom only eleven were employed in the fleet and three in the dockyards, making together fourteen. In his opinion the system of increasing the number of Admirals, which had been going on so long, ought to receive a check. It did not look well, to say the least of it, to have thirty times as many Admirals as were wanted, whilst they were short of the younger officers, whose services were so essential to the manning of the fleet.

said, it could not be wondered at if, after a war of nearly forty years, the list of Admirals was very large. In fact, it could not be helped, though he admitted that the promotions had been too extensive. The reason of the list being in its present state was that successive Lords of the Admiralty had failed to carry out the intentions of Lord Melville. From 1815 to 1830 Lord Melville allowed the promotion to go on just in the same way as in time of war. It was evident, therefore, that there could have been no reduction in the list, and men did not die off so fast during peace as during war. But in 1830 Lord Melville, seeing the error he bad committed in making promotions on that scale, issued a Minute of the Admiralty restricting promotions to one in three. From 1830 to 1846, a period of sixteen years, there were various First Lords of the Admiralty, and one succeeded another with tolerable rapidity. The consequence was that the Minute of Lord Melville was ignored. From February, 1830 to September, 1846, 245 flag officers and 316 captains died; and there were altogether 909 removals from the list by death and promotion; but whilst, according to Lord Melville's Minute, the promotions ought to have been only one in three; instead of one promotion in three, almost as many were promoted as were removed. The case was just the same with the commanders and lieutenants. But the lists of admirals, captains, commanders, and lieutenants were now fixed, and that not too high, and he believed that in a short time they would be all reduced to a proper level. The evils of the system of promotion, from the age of the officers, became very great, and he suggested to the late Sir Robert Peel, who was then in office, a plan for removing a certain number of officers from the top of the list with their own consent. Some years afterwards Sir Robert Peel consented to give a retirement to a certain number of captains, who were allowed to take the rank of admirals at 60 years of age, and if that arrangement had not been interfered with the list would not have been in its present state. But succeeding Lords of the Admiralty had allowed junior officers to retire, and so the alteration had failed of its intention. They could not prevent officers from getting old and he was not prepared to deal with them in such a way as that they should feel hurt and degraded. If the list were only allowed to remain undisturbed it would be easily ascertained from an actuary within what period that list would be exhausted. With regard to the recommendation of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) as to employing officers from the merchant service, that would never do. Their education, their manners, and the way in which they had been brought up quite unfitted them for the navy. He admitted that in the event of war, if we had not a sufficient number of officers, it would be absolutely necessary to draw upon the merchant service for a supply, with the understanding, however, that they were only taken up temporarily, though in cases where they distinguished themselves it should be open to them to remain in the navy.

said, he thought it would be admitted by every one that the Question which had been touched upon by the Members who had spoken since this Vote was put into the hands of the Chairman was one of the most important and difficult connected with the whole question of the efficiency of the naval service: and he could not allow the Vote to pass without expressing his anxious hope that the new Board of Admiralty would take into their consideration the present stagnation of promotion in the naval service, and that they will deal boldly and courageously with the subject. He thought he might venture to say that his eighteen months' experience in office had shown him that it was absolutely essential to the maintenance of efficiency in the Royal Navy that some measure comprising a comprehensive plan of retirement should be carried; but he had also seen enough to be satisfied that nothing could be done unless the Minister who attempted, to deal with the subject was prepared to approach it in a bold and determined spirit, not to be deterred by slight difficulties from effecting his purpose. The hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Southwark (Sir Charles Napier) on a previous occasion had adverted in unfavourable terms to a plan he (Sir John Pakington) had conceived, while he was at the head of the Admiralty, for correcting the existing state of things. He thought he had good reason to complain that the gallant Admiral had chosen to make a paper, which in no sense had ever been made a public document, the subject of public comment. Those who heard that comment had never seen the paper, and were therefore quite unable to form any opinion as to the fairness or propriety of the hon. and gallant Admiral's remarks. Late in the evening the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) expressed a hope that I would take an opportunity of explaining what my plan of retirement was. Now, while he thought it would be very inconvenient that he should enter into details connected with a paper which had not been made public, and which therefore he could scarcely hope to make intelligible to hon. Members, he had nevertheless no objection to state that the principle of the plan he had prepared was this—that retirement should take place at a given age (not necessarily always at the same age), applicable to all ranks in the naval service, and at which officers would be compelled to retire, receiving as compensation for that compulsory retirement a step in rank and an amount of half-pay commensurate with the length of actual service they had given to the country. Then that there should be another age (of course some years younger than that fixed for the compulsory retirement) at which officers should be permitted to retire voluntarily with the same advantages. He would not further enter into the details of his plan. It was perfectly true that although he had never made this plan in any sense public, he had shown it to a very considerable number of officers with the view of ascertaining their opinions upon the matter. Among others he had shown it to the hon. and gallant Admiral himself. The hon. and gallant Admiral seemed to entertain a notion that the plan would bear hardly upon officers of his own rank. He would however say, that either in public or in private he (Sir John Pakington) was prepared to contend that there was nothing in his plan of retirement of which officers of the high and distinguished rank of Sir Charles Napier would have the least reason to complain. It was a difficult task to devise a new plan of retirement for the purpose of remedying the great evils that now pressed so heavily upon the navy; and he admitted that any one undertaking that task would fail in his duty if he did not show the utmost respect and the utmost possible regard to the high claims of such men as the gallant Admiral and others who had risen to their high position by their great services, by their gallantry, and a long and successful career in a noble profession. But, on the other hand, he felt with equal force, and he was glad to have that opportunity of stating it, that any man who volunteered to undertake that difficult task would fail in his duty equally if he limited his regard to those officers who had risen to high stations in the navy. The poor lieutenant was as much entitled to consideration as the Admiral; and he begged to state to the House that while he was at the Admiralty nothing was more painful to him than the cases that had come crowding before him of men who had served their country well, but who had failed in the difficult race for promotion merely from want of "interest." It was too true, and he must repeat it, that they failed only from want of interest—from want of that mode of getting advancement which everybody knew was necessary. In saying this, however, he did not impute blame to any one. Everybody knew the difficulties with which a Government was surrounded; they were compelled to make selections from largo bodies of men, and let them make those selections ever so honestly there must remain a large residuum unemployed and unpromoted. At this moment there were cases of men who had been lieutenants for years and years, until they had become old men, and who were now struggling to maintain themselves as officers and gentlemen upon pittances wholly inadequate. No man could hold the position he had held, as First Lord of the Admiralty, without having his feelings continually wounded by the sight of numberless such cases—they came crowding upon him. And he did think—and he said it with no disrespect—that it behoved men like the gallant Admiral, who had been more fortunate, who had risen to great distinction and obtained high positions, not to stand out with too much of punctilio about their own position, but to show some consideration towards their less fortunate brother officers, and be willing to make some sacrifices in order to relieve such men from the great difficulties and privations they had been for so long a time suffering. The plan of retirement he proposed had been so far developed that he had consulted his colleagues in the Cabinet concerning it; and it was most cordially and thoroughly adopted by them; and if he had remained at the Admiralty he would have exerted himself to the utmost to carry it into operation—of course with such modifications as fairness might suggest. Its details throughout were prepared with the most anxious desire on his part to avoid its bearing hardly upon any class of officers. But the gallant Admiral had said on a previous occasion that it was strongly opposed by many distinguished officers in the service, and further that the naval officers of his (Sir John Pakington's) own Board were also opposed to it. [Sir CHARLES NAPIER: Hear, hear!] He thought this was a very strong statement, and one that could not be passed without notice. But he would tell the hon. and gallant Admiral that so far as he knew, disapprobation of that plan was confined mainly—he would not say exclusively—to a very small number of officers at the head of the list—of the gallant Admiral's own rank—who took a view of the plan which he thought was a very mistaken one, and one that he deeply regretted to find was entertained. True it was that the professional members of the Board of Admiralty were divided upon the subject; but it was equally true that he did not limit his inquiries for opinions respecting it, either to the members of his own Board or to the distinguished men who stood at the head of the navy. He had consulted officers of all ranks, without knowing their previous bias, and solely regarding their competency to give a disinterested and a fair opinion upon the subject; and an overwhelming majority were most cordial and decided in their approbation, and he had received most urgent communications from naval officers of all ranks and in all directions, expressing their approval of the scheme, and their hopes that he would carry out the plan to a successful issue. As a proof that it was necessary to agree upon some alteration of the existing system he would mention that during the first twelve months, from April, 1858, to April, 1859, that he had held office, he was able to promote only five lieutenants to be commanders, and two commanders to be post captains. He excepted extraordinary cases of promotion in consequence of transactions in China, because they had nothing to do with the general accuracy of the statement he had made as to the very limited amount of ordinary promotion which occurred between April 1858, and April 1859. Was it to be supposed that in a great profession like the navy satisfaction or contentment could exist under such a system of stagnation? Was it likely that officers could be obtained of the right age, active and willing to perform their duties, if such stagnation in the system of promotion were allowed to continue? The gallant Admiral had alluded to the army, and had said that no evils of the kind existed there—that the general officers were not asked to re- tire at a certain age for the purpose of providing room for promotion for their younger brethren. But in using that argument the hon. and gallant Member clearly lost sight of the fact that the two professions were governed upon totally different principles. The General remaining in the army did not stop promotion; but the Admiral remaining in the navy did stop promotion. Every year there were numbers—he might without exaggeration say hundreds—of officers who left the army by sale of their commissions. Who left the navy? Nobody. Year after year young gentlemen were constantly pouring in; hitherto perhaps not to a sufficient extent, for he believed it was true, as had been stated, that the number of entries was so restricted that Her Majesty's ships in commission were short some 300 or 400 of the junior rank of officers. But while pouring in these young men at the bottom who was going out at the top? Nobody. The gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) had talked about those of his own rank growing old. It really seemed as if our Admirals were immortal; they seemed to be always growing old, and never to get so, for such was their tenacity of life it really would appear that unless they happened to get knocked off by a cannon hall, they were exempted from the payment of that debt of nature to which it was the general belief that we were all liable. He hoped that the worthy Admiral would long enjoy his apparent exemption; but in any profession, if new members were constantly pouring in at the bottom, and none going out at the top, it could not be matter of surprise if stagnation were to result. That stagnation existed in the navy; and it certainly embarrassed, and he might almost say endangered, the naval service. Successive Boards of Admiralty, attempting to reduce the evil, had adopted new retiring lists until the alphabet itself was exhausted in supplying distinguishing initials. But those lists only relieved the system temporarily; in a few years it was again choked up; and it was impossible to devise any remedy that would prove effectual and lasting, unless it were made self-acting, clearing the way at the top as fresh blood was poured in at the bottom. By this means we should always have a due succession of officers who would not be discouraged by want of promotion, and who would reach the different branches of the navy at that time of life when they could do good service to their country. It was his anxious wish, by the adoption of a simple mode of retirement, with a fair compensation for the disadvantages it created, to afford a permanent remedy for the existing state of things. He hoped he should have been able to carry out his plan of retirement before he left office, because he believed the leading principles of that plan to be perfectly fair and sound, and that it would have effected the desired object. He had, however, left it to his successor. It was now in the hands of the Duke of Somerset, and he had implored the noble Duke to consider it impartially—not to view it as a question between one Admiralty Board and another, but as one deeply affecting the welfare of the British Navy. He should be glad to hear from his noble Friend opposite, the Secretary of the Admiralty (Lord Clarence Paget) that it would be taken into consideration, and that the new Board of Admiralty would devise some plan by which that great and growing evil—the existing stagnation of promotion—might be effectually remedied.

said, he had hoped that after his explanation the right hon. Baronet would not again have found fault with him for having mentioned his plan of retirement. That plan was not furnished to him confidentially, and he appealed to the House to say whether a document which was handed round to almost every old Admiral resident in London, and which formed the subject of a petition to Her Majesty, could properly be called confidential. It was true that the petition to which he referred was not presented to the Queen, but the reason of that was that the right hon. Baronet left office before the requisite arrangements could be completed. The petition, however, was signed by himself and several other admirals, and one of those who attached their names to it took the liberty of tolling the right hon. Baronet that an experience of fifteen months at the head of the Admiralty did not seem to have taught him to respect the feelings of naval officers. It would be perfectly fair to offer compensation to the lower ranks of officers for voluntary retirement; but to force old officers to retire from the service was degrading; and he could never forget that the death of his own father, a captain in the navy, who had not had an opportunity of serving, was caused by his being passed over in promotion. He never held up his head after it. The truth was that the right hon. Baronet did not know, and never would know, what the feelings of naval officers were, and fortunate it was that he was driven from office before he could bring forward his nefarious system of retirement. It was, no doubt, true that the right hon. Baronet obtained the assent of a number of officers to his plan, but the probability was that those officers were young men who would profit by the change; at all events he could state with certainty that the plan was disapproved by the senior officers. His own first naval Lord disapproved of it. The first civil Lord might have approved of it, but he knew nothing about it. But the right hon. Baronet had not told the House all. In addition to the other objectionable features of his scheme, the right hon. Baronet actually wanted to take into his own hands, with the view of increasing the patronage at his disposal, the haul-down vacancies belonging to flag officers, as well as those special vacancies which were given to the Board of Admiralty for the purpose of rewarding officers for distinguished services. It was quite true that various Boards had made retirements. That was quite right; for it brought forward a sufficient number of young officers, and at the present moment there were more young Admirals in the service than there were during the war. But the proposal of the right hon. Baronet went much further, and he could only say that he hoped the present First Lord would find something better to do than going out of his way to hurt the feelings of old officers, and that the House of Commons would not vote a single shilling except for the purpose of assisting old commanders and lieutenants who had not sufficient interest to make their way in the service.

said, that the observations of the hon. and gallant Admiral afforded an additional exemplification of the inconvenience of discussing a plan the details of which were not before the House. Not one of these observations applied to the plan as it at present stood. The hon. and gallant Admiral complained of the cruelty of compelling old and distinguished officers to retire. Perhaps the House would be surprised to hear that his (Sir John Pakington's) plan did not compel any flag-officer to retire. It applied to officers in junior ranks, but it did not deprive any flag-officer of any privilege that he now possessed.

said, he did not know how the plan stood now: his observations applied to the plan as it stood when he had cognizance of it.

agreed in thinking it very inconvenient that a plan which was not before the House should form the subject of discussion. He thought, however, the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakington) had very considerably understated the effect of the plan of retirement proposed in the "confidential" document. He should certainly disapprove of any plan by which compulsory retirement at the age of sixty years would be enforced. If such a regulation had been in force, the country would have been deprived of the eminent services of the late Lord Lyons. There had certainly been a difficulty with regard to the tardy promotion of post captains to the higher rank; Lord Lyons himself had continued for thirty-six years in the rank of post captain, and he doubted not that there were other distinguished officers who had the same story to tell. But regulations had been adopted to meet this admitted evil shortly before he himself had quitted the Admiralty, and the beneficial effects of these, by which captains would become admirals, generally speaking, in less than twenty years, were only now beginning to be felt. He could not therefore agree with the right hon. Gentleman when he spoke of the utter stagnation of the service as regarded promotion; and he believed that since Lord Howe's time there had never been, comparatively speaking, so many young admirals in the service as at present. At the period when he succeeded to the office of First Lord of the Admiralty there were only nine admirals under sixty years of age, and from a Return which he held in his hand there were now upwards of thirty under that age upon the active list. This was certainly effected by the system of retirement to which he had alluded. He certainly did not believe that retirement by age would be an improvement of the present system. He thought every one would admit that Lord Lyons was one of the most efficient officers we had had for many years, and yet Lord Lyons would have been disqualified years ago if retirement at the age of sixty had been compulsory, for Lord Lyons, he believed, was seventy when he died. [Admiral Walcott: Sixty-eight.] He did not say that every man above or below sixty would be able to command a fleet, but he thought it would be a great mistake to debar themselves of the services of such a man as Lord Lyons because he was above sixty years of age. He said this without any reference to the plan of the right hon. Gentleman. The number of superior officers being much less than those of the inferior officers, it was impossible to hope that by any plan of retirement promotion could be given to all the inferior officers. Suppose that 1,200 lieutenants to be the number on the list, and that there were 350 captains and 450 commanders, it was obviously impossible that the whole number of lieutenants could be promoted to commanders. He was not in possession of the exact proportion of the commanders, but he was aware that the actual number exceeded the authorized limit; thereby showing that promotion to that rank had gone on more rapidly than in any other, and consequently the delay was not, as was supposed, in the grade of lieutenant. By increasing the retired list they removed officers who had attained an age which rendered it almost impossible for them to serve, and it was to the interest of the county that the list of officers in the lower rank should be relieved of such as are incapable of serving in that rank. He thought that the present rules of retirement had answered, to a great extent, the purpose for which they were instituted. No scheme that could be invented would be agreeable to all classes of persons.

said, if the country and the House would only exercise a little patience these grey-headed officers would soon disappear from the reach of their bounty, or the hearing of their regrets; the broken spirit and the wounded heart will be beyond recall. The House had not, however, been made acquainted with the circumstance under which the large list had been produced. It owed its origin to the war, which lasted from 1792 to 1815, during which we had at one time nigh 1,000 pendants flying. There were at the same time no less than 147,000 seamen and marines in the service—we were at war with almost the whole world. Russia, Denmark, Holland, France, Spain, Turkey and lastly the United States of America; and it was absolutely necessary to have fleets blockading the ports of the enemy, and protecting the commerce of the country. The number of officers was consequently very large, and that was the cause, as he had always said, of the number of officers on those lists. If an actuary were applied to, he would tell them that officers of the navy did not live longer than other men; but the more favourable state of the public health of late years accounted for the average of life being greater. All the lists, whether of admirals, captains, commanders, or lieutenants, were crowded with old men, and they had only to exercise the little patience he had entreated of the House and they would see them thinned by the natural effect of time. In regard to the sum required it was a debt of honour, the fulfilment of an ancient and just engagement, upon the part of the country; these officers demanded only this moderate requital in their age and compulsory retirement for activity, energy, and fidelity, the aggregate of which ennobles the national history. Since 1815, appointments, promotions, and recommendations for marks of honour at the hand of the Sovereign had gone, in very many instances, by favour. Every First Lord had his own friends to provide for, and then he probably took the advice of the First Naval Lord, who knew certain officers with whom he had served, and naturally recommended them. It was impossible there could be any confidence in the service until the colleagues of the First Lord were made responsible with him for appointments, promotions and rewards. During forty years of peace the proportion of captains employed was 80 out of 600, and few therefore could rise to the rank of admiral on the active list without friends at the Admiralty. In peace a captain must have been six years, and in war four years, in command of a post ship, before he was entitled to rise to the rank of admiral on the active list—consequently, if he were not employed this list was barred to him; if he had no interest he could not get employed. There were ninety-nine admirals on the active list. They had more young admirals than they could employ or did employ. If an officer could not reach the ear of the First Lord he remained without employment, and was put upon the reserved list. He was one of those who was displaced when he had a fair right and title to be employed. he never could obtain employment sedulously as he had applied for it. Captains who had been six, nine, and ten years afloat were able to get ships, while other captains could not serve the time necessary to keep on the active list. When the experienced captains died the country lost their services, and in addition the advantage of the survivors having shared the experience. Until some great consideration was shown for merit the evil must continue. If it were known that the only road to employment, promotion, and recommendation for marks of honour at the hands of the Sovereign was by zeal, energy, and gallant good conduct, there would be a very different feeling in the service—officers who had no influence saw First Lord after First Lord succeed to office, and just when they expected that the First Lord had provided for his friends and could give encouragement to merit, a change, came, and with the change disappointment. They had rolled the stone up hill with the greatest difficulty when it fell and crushed them, and they had to begin over and over again. That was his case for thirty years, and hundreds of others who had spared no effort to get employment never could get a command. His heart had been almost broken, and he had been thrust upon the reserved list when he had energy and ability to have done his country some service. Officers who had not used every effort to get employment were unworthy of the profession, and should be thrust aside; but those who offered for any command and any station were entitled to some consideration. He was glad that the Admiralty had given some advantages to chaplains and surgeons, but the same was equally duo to masters and lieutenants. He suggested that to those lieutenants no longer available for active employment, the rank of commander and some small pecuniary consideration, probably an increase of a shilling a day, would remove discontent and afford encouragement to young officers who were just entering the navy.

said, that he quite agreed with the hon. and gallant Member in the propriety of encouraging good and efficient men. In the year 1848 the average age of those officers whose names stood upon the admirals' list was seventy, and that there were only six of them whose age was under sixty, while there were at the present moment thirty- one admirals who were below that age. The complaint now was that we had too many young admirals rather than too many old ones on the list. The consequence of the state of things which formerly prevailed was that when he, being then at the head of the Admiralty, communicated with two gallant admirals, with the view of sending them out to take command of the East Indies, the answer he received was that they were too old to perform the service which was required at their hands, and he was eventually obliged to appoint an officer to the command whose age was seventy-two years. There were at the period to which he referred, about 100 officers in the captains' list who were incapable of service, and on that of the lieutenants', which embraced 2,300 names, about 1,000 in a similar position. Under these circumstances he found it impossible to leave matters as they were, and he therefore introduced a measure which, in conjunction with other measures in the same direction by which it was followed, brought about the present efficient state of the Navy list. There were on the list many gallant officers who were able and would be delighted to serve, and who would feel their removal from the active list as one of the greatest calamities that could befall them. The question of the ago of naval officers was one which had been over and over again taken into consideration at the Admiralty; but, however well any scheme for dealing with it might look upon paper, to strike distinguished and historic names, such, for instance, as that of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, off the list was by no means a pleasant task for a first Lord of the Admiralty to discharge. With regard to the complaints which were made by those officers who occupied the lower ranks in the service, he could only say that it was impossible to make every lieutenant an admiral—there must always be more subordinates than chiefs—and, in his opinion, the best mode of dealing with them would he to open a dour which would admit of their retirement from the service with honour and satisfaction to themselves. To deal with the lower grades in a liberal spirit would, be believed, be the truest economy. So far as the question of promotion was concerned he thought that, instead of promotion having been slow, there had been a considerable flow of it for the last few years.

said, it would be found on looking at the matter from a practical point of view that the number of junior officers was too small for the service, How was that difficulty best to be got over? The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) had recommended that the officers of the superior class of merchants' ships should be made available for the navy; but he should remind the Committee that it would not be easy to secure the services of such men. For his own part, he should not, when he was in the East India Company's service, have thought of entering the navy, in as much as the former service was much preferable on the score of pay, and in con- sequence of the rapidity with which promotion might he obtained. Those who served in the superior classes of merchant vessels were generally the sons of mercantile men who had the prospect before them of becoming partners in some mercantile house, or of settling down comfortably in some other capacity, and it was not therefore probable that many would be lured into the navy from that service. As to the manner in which the officers in the lower ranks of the navy might be provided for, he could only say that in his opinion the best mode of dealing with them would be cither to raise them to the rank of commanders or buy them out, as had been done in the East India Company's service, in which a man on leaving the service received a certain sum of money according to the rank which he filled, and a small premium. If a similar practice were to be adopted in the navy the lieutenant's list would soon be cleared. He might add that when a man had served as a midshipman for eight or nine years, and afterwards a lieutenant for thirteen or fourteen years, making in all a period of from twenty-one to twenty-three years' service, he generally became, owing to the wear and tear of constitution to which he was subjected, practically unfitted for duty as a quarter deck officer. What, then, under these circumstances, was to be done with him? He could not be made an admiral; but then he might have conferred upon him the privilege of writing Captain So-and-So on his door, together with a small addition to his pay if he remained in the service, and by that means the list might be cleared. There was at the present moment in the navy a largo number of officers who were discontented, because they saw, as it were, no daylight before them, and because their youth had passed away, leaving them to spend the rest of their days in the endeavour to live on a pittance which was a disgrace to the country, He might also observe that the navy, instead of being a cheap was in fact an expensive profession, and consequently it was only right that an officer in his old age should be entitled to receive something from his country for his past service. As to the admiral's list, he did not think it much mattered how many names stood upon it, as long as there was a power of selection.

wished to remove a misconception which appeared in the speeches of the hon. and gallant Member for Christchurch (Admiral Walcott), and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring), in regard to the scheme that had been incidentally alluded to in the present discussion. There was no attempt made under that scheme to crush the feelings and break the hearts of any of the gallant men of the profession. The hon. and gallant Gentleman was quite under a misconception on that point. The intention of the scheme was to secure to every officer his fair chance of promotion without hurting the feelings of any one.

said, it had been currently stated that the officers who were consulted by the late First Lord in this matter, one and all disapproved of the scheme. Surely, if such men as Lord Dundonald, Sir George Seymour, and others disapproved of the scheme, it could not be said to bear the construction just put upon it by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Tewkesbury (Mr. Lygon).

declared, that to neglect old officers was not calculated to encourage the present or provide for the future, and that the scheme of the late First Lord of the Admiralty had given infinite pain to many old and gallant officers who were the pride and ornament of the navy, and whom every young officer might look up to as an example. The hon. Member for Tewkesbury, and the late First Lord of the Admiralty, had no fair knowledge of the profession, or they would not in intention have adopted any such system. True it was they had denied by their speeches any such infliction, but, nevertheless, by some unfortunate misunderstanding, it had been created, and the late First Lord must have been sensible this had been produced, because he admitted he had modified his first proposition. Naval officers should be encouraged to improve themselves in the various branches of their profession, and they should be made to feel that this was the only road to employment, to promotion, and honours. In the case of the gunnery officers, however, no such encouragement was held out, and he thought their case was really deserving of consideration.

said, the observations of the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Duncombe), showed the extreme inconvenience of discussing a matter that was not actually before the House. From what had fallen from the hon. and gallant Of beer, it was evident that he did not hear the fieginning of the discussion. [Admiral DUN COMBE said, he was present all through the discussion.] The gallant Admiral has stated that which he (Sir J. Pakington) could understand if he were not in the House at the beginning of the discussion; but he certainly could not understand his observations when he said that he had been listening to the debate throughout. The hon. and gallant Admiral said, that all the officers in his (Sir J. Pakington's) confidence disapproved of the plan. Now, his gallant Friend, if he were present, must have heard him state that he thought it his duty to consult a great number of officers in the navy as to his scheme without any knowledge of their previous bias, and that an overwhelming majority had given a cordial assent to his proposition.

had referred to the old flag officers, all of whom objected to it.

said, he had understood the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) to say, on the subject of the present rate of promotion, that he had only during one year the opportunity of promoting two commanders to be captains, and five lieutenants to be commanders. It was therefore, but fair, that he (Lord C. Paget) should state what the promotions in the year were during the year 1858; when the right hon. Gentleman was in office, there were nine admirals made from captains, twenty-two captains made from commanders, sixty-two commanders made from lieutenants, and fifty-one lieutenants made from mates. He (Lord C. Paget) did not say that even that was sufficient promotion, but it made up a very different figure from that which the right hon. Gentleman put before the Committee.

had, in his previous observations referred to Board promotions only, and not to promotions from the retired list; and he repeated that in the first twelve months that he was at the Amiralty, he had only made two commanders and five lieutenants.

said, he wished to direct the attention of the Committee to the scale of payment of seamen in the navy. He would be the last to oppose unnecessarily any increase of that pay, for he had been a sailor himself; but he asked if that increased pay—and a bounty was only increased pay in another form—was necessary, and, if so, would it effect the object in view? The right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord, in a time of peace, but taking alarm at rumours which had not the slightest foundation, thought it necessary to hurry on the work of manning the navy. It was extraordinary that, while the pay of the seaman and his position in the navy wore better than in the merchant service, while his work was less severe, and that he was not only provided for in sickness, but in old age—when we wanted men to enter the navy they could not be got. There must be something wrong to account for such a state of things. Excessive drill was alleged to be one reason, and flogging another. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Lambeth had told them that no less than 2,100 lashes had been inflicted in one Queen's ship in a single year. What a degrading position it was to strip a man and flog him before his shipmates, and that not after any trial, but from the mere impulse of the moment! It was so degrading that it was enough to deter men from entering the service. He (Mr. Lindsay) did not advocate the doing away with corporal punishment; it might be necessary; but let a man, before being punished, be tried by a court-martial composed of his officers, under the presidency of the Captain, and then if he was held to have deserved punishment let it be inflicted under the authority of that tribunal. He had heard also of excessive drill. A removal of these causes of complaint might induce seamen to enter the navy; but the bounty of £10, while it increased the pay of the Royal Navy, ended with increasing the pay of the merchant service from £2 10s. to £3 10s. per month; and yet, after saddling an important and depressed interest with a heavy additional burden, the bounty did not effect the object that the Government had in view. The shipping interest of this country were running a great ocean race with all the countries in the world, and anything that raised the rate of wages paid in British ships made the ship owner less able to run the race prescribed for him by the law. The £10 bounty created dissatisfaction among the old hands serving in the navy. The seamen asked why they should not get £10, as well as the men of the merchant service. Well, the Government now proposed to vote £5 to able seamen. Would that satisfy them? They would say that if it were just to give them £5 it was equally just to give them £10. He had no doubt it would be necessary to vote another £100,000, and still the Government would not be able to gain their object. He certainly thought the offer of a £10 bounty a mistake on the part of the late Government.

said, he had always understood that it was the custom of the House to allow the mover of a Vote an opportunity of explaining it; but the hon. Gentleman was so anxious to speak that he had debarred him from that chance. He was now enabled to give an explanation of this Vote, which he was unable to do on Friday. At that time the Order in Council was not issued, and he preferred to wait until he was in a position to propose this Estimate. He wished to repeat the opinion he had before expressed, that nothing but the most urgent necessity could justify a recourse to bounties, especially to bounties of so large an amount as that lately offered. A system of bounties might be compared to those opium draughts which were common in Eastern countries: each dose must be stronger than the former. In like manner, if our seamen were taught to expect that at the least cloud in the west, or approach to a political difficulty, a bounty would be offered, the Admiralty would never be able to get a seaman without a bounty. The wisdom of giving a bounty ought therefore to be very carefully considered by any Government before they proposed it, and the bounty ought never, in his opinion, to be adopted without the sanction of the House of Commons. The bounty offered by the late Government had certainly rapidly increased our force of seamen. But another question then arose. The Government had to consider the position of those seamen who had been serving their country faithfully, who had learnt in the Royal Navy the whole of the duties of a seaman, and who had come to be efficient men-of-war's-men. Now extending a portion of this gratuity to men who had five years to serve or who were willing to continue in the service five years longer was a step he was perfectly prepared to defend. The gratuity proposed to be given to each such man was £5, or one half the bounty offered by the late Board to new entries. He did not mean to say that those men had any claim to any gratuity whatever; but he wished to bring this matter home to his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) as a personal question. He would suppose that his right hon. Friend and himself were captains of line-of-battle ships, and that instead of a scarcity of seamen there was a scarcity of captains of line-of-battle ships. That had happened before, not in the English, but in the French service, for in France during the Revolution the captains of merchantmen were taken out of their ships and put in command of men-of-war. They wore the uniform and enjoyed all the privileges of captains of men-of-war. Now, suppose that some respectable merchant captain, who was a very good seaman, but utterly unacquainted with the duties of captain of a man-of-war, were put upon an equality with his right hon. Friend and himself. That would be unsatisfactory; but what would his right hon. Friend and himself say if this captain of a merchantman had given to him a large sum of money in hand beyond what they had received? If he obtained his epaulettes, sword, cocked hat, and all the paraphernalia of rank, and all the furniture of his cabin? Would his right hon. Friend and himself be satisfied that men, uneducated in the service, should thus come among them, with vast advantages over them in the shape of the rewards given to the new-comers for becoming captains in the navy? He thought they would not like it at all. But that was precisely the case of the seamen of the Royal Navy at the present moment. The bounty of £10 was nearly half a year's pay. Though the seamen in the Royal Navy had no legal claim to any participation in the bounty, their position was such that the Government had to consider how they ought to be treated. He must say for these men that, so far as he was aware, they had never uttered a word of complaint. But was that a reason for not considering their claims? If the Government thought they had a just demand for some consideration justice ought to be done at once and spontaneously, and without waiting for complaints. He thought it was best that the seamen already in the service should have no cause of complaint. Although one-half of the bounty was to be given to men already in the fleet, it was upon certain conditions that a man who had less than five years to serve should enter for an extension of that period to five years, and one month after the receipt of the Order in Council on board each ship should be allowed to the seamen to elect whether they would accept the gratuity or not upon those terms. Supposing that those conditions were accepted by a majority of the men, we should, as it were, have our fleet manned for five years to come. Under these circumstances he submitted that the Government was justified, upon grounds of public policy and fair consideration towards the men, in asking the Committee to vote this sum of money.

said, he was sorry to have to state that what had fallen from the noble Lord had not affected in the least degree the opinion he had expressed upon a former evening. He had heard nothing which he could call a reason for the extraordinary course proposed, which was a deviation from all precedent in the past, and establishing an embarrassing and inconvenient example for the future. He could only hope that by the immediate adoption of a better system of reserves we might escape being placed in the critical position in which the late Government were placed when they were compelled to resort to the system of a bounty. The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) and the noble Lord had both touched upon the general policy of a bounty; but that question was not now before the Committee, and, indeed, it was settled last week, when the House voted the sum necessary for that bounty. All he would say as to the general policy of the bounty was, that a great national object was at stake, and that object had been accomplished by it. The question before the Committee was a different one—whether, because Parliament had voted £31,000 to get seamen, it was right to spend £100,000 more in malting a voluntary gift to men who were already in the navy. He thought nothing could justify such wanton expenditure but the most urgent necessity. If any complaints had been made, if there had been any great exhibition of dissatisfaction in the fleet, that might have been an excuse for such a proposal, but nothing of the kind existed upon the noble Lord's own admission. The whole case of the Government turned on the possibility that there might be dissatisfaction amongst those men. He had said the other evening that if there were discontent upon that ground, it was a case in which the Government were bound for high reasons of high policy to take a bold attitude and declare the demand unreasonable. But, to the honour of the sailors it must be said, they manifestly saw the unreasonableness of the demand. The Committee must remember what had been done for those men recently. In the Supplementary Estimates they were now considering, in the first Vote, were three items to which he begged to call their attention. The first was to meet the increase of extra pay allowed to seamen gunners, £13,000; the next was to provide for good-conduct pay to petty officers for badges awarded to them after promotion to that rank, £7,657; and the third was for gratuitous issues of bedding and clothing to seamen and boys, £38,000. Those were boons just granted for the first time, and it was unreasonable that a bounty which was only granted upon an emergency to induce sailors to enter the Royal Navy, who would otherwise have remained in the merchant service, should be extended to all the men who were already in the service. Considering the increased pay and advantages enjoyed by men engaged for continuous service, there never was a moment when there was less excuse for dissatisfaction. Nothing had fallen from the noble Lord which would not have been applicable to the three former occasions upon which bounties had been granted, and which were not paid to men already serving. At some future time, not with standing all improvements, a day might come when the Government of this country would be embarrassed by this unreasonable proposal to throw away £100,000 just now, when, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer would probably soon tell the House, our national finances were in a condition in which it was peculiarly desirable that no unnecessary public expenditure should be incurred. He (Sir John Pakington) believed that there was no amount of money which the House would not vote and their constituents sanction if that money was to be judiciously and properly expended to secure our national defences. But, on the other hand, he was equally persuaded that public opinion ought to condemn and would condemn any gratuitous, unnecessary expenditure of the kind now proposed, which was not justified by past precedent nor existing facts, and which must prove most embarrassing and inconvenient for future Administrations. However, approval of the proposal was one thing, and opposing it when proposed was another, and while he disapproved of the proposition of the Government, he believed it would not now be possible for the House to refuse its sanction to the arrangement into which they had entered. Such a refusal would indeed be productive of discontent in the Royal Navy where two months ago there was none. The late Government attained their object, got the men they wanted, and there was not a whisper of discontent heard. The noble Lord had talked about the policy of treating the British sailor with generosity; and so he should be: but the fact was that never was the sailor treated with so much generosity and consideration as at the present time. Now, for some motive which he could not understand, and which the noble Lord had certainly not explained, he found the Government at a moment of financial difficulty embarking in this most unnecessary expenditure. Having protested against it on these grounds of public policy, he must leave the Government the responsibility of the course they had adopted, for they had embarrassed the question and placed it on a totally different footing from that on which it stood before.

asked the House to consider, as the right hon. Baronet said the present Government had adopted an inconvenient precedent, whether it was not the late Government who had set the example of inconvenient precedents by giving a bounty to seamen on enlisting? Could any one hope that henceforward men would readily engage in the service without a similar inducement? The right hon. Baronet referred to the success of the bounty in obtaining a certain number of men, and said that a great national object was to be gained by it. So likewise it might be said of the recent act of the present Government, that a great national object was to be gained by it; and he thought that object would be accomplished by the prevention of any discontent arising among the seamen, as well as in securing the services of the flower of the fleet for many years to come. He believed, notwithstanding what had fallen from an hon. Member, that this gratuity would satisfy the seamen, for they knew that they had no legal claim to it, and they would be pleased and gratified by having it offered to them on a principle of justice. It was maintained by the right hon. Baronet that, as no discontent had been heard of hitherto, none was ever likely to arise, even if this gratuity had not been offered; but discontent did not arise in a moment. The men whom this question affected lived not like other people in the midst of society composed of all sorts of professions, but entirely in the company of persons like themselves. All their interests and feelings ran in one way; and was it not certain, when the propriety of the late Government's act was questioned in such an assembly as that House that it would be questioned by them? It was impossible to conceive, unless the present proposition were acceded to, that the seamen would not think that, having made a bargain with the country, the country had got the beat of it, and was determined to keep to it. He thought it might safely be maintained that by the step now taken the Government had not only secured to this country the services of the most efficient body of men for the fleet for five years to come, but had also impressed on the minds of those men—and this was a result of far more value than the money at present asked for—the conviction that they were dealing with a just and generous country.

approved of the bounty which had been given, inasmuch as it had obtained for the fleet a considerable number of men; and what could the country have done without them? He would remind the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sunderland, who so much disapproved of the bounty, that some years ago, when our fleet was in danger from the superiority of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, we had a fleet lying at Spithead for which the Admiralty could not procure seamen. Now by means of the bounty, we had got 6,000 out of 8,000 men voted. Was that nothing? The noble Lord said that ameliorations had taken place in the service. He knew that that was the case, but he did not thank the Admiralty for it, because, had it not been for the Motions brought forward by himself and others none of these ameliorations would have taken place. Corporal punishment had been alluded to; but he did not think that the men generally were averse to it, as they knew that the discipline of the navy could not be carried on without it. He should like, however, to see the men brought to a court-martial before punishment was inflicted. Such a course would give great satisfaction to the seamen, and would not destroy the discipline of the navy one iota. He gave the late First Lord of the Admiralty the greatest credit for offering the bounty, and he did not see that the present Government had a right to find fault with that measure, since it had proved successful. He believed the men would feel grateful for the gratuity granted to them. They knew that they were not legally entitled to it, and they would receive it all the more gratefully on that account. The late First Lord of the Admiralty said he had heard of no discontent among the men; but he (Sir Charles Napier) was often at Portsmouth, and heard loud expressions of discontent. If an experienced sailor got no gratuity and a man who had not experience equal to him got the bounty of £10, was there not likely to be discontent? Would the House like to see the fleet lying at Spithead in the present state of Europe without hands to man it? The war was said to be finished; but was it really finished? In the present position of affairs no effort should be spared to place the country in a state of safety. There was not a man in that House or a Peer in another place who did not read or hear with pleasure the speech of Lord Lyndhurst the other evening; he should like to see the same spirit that he displayed exhibited in that House. Let Gentlemen forget for a time that they had constituents, and let them boldly approve all that could be done for the defence of the country, so that they might be able to point to the British fleet and say. "There is our fleet, ready to do all that it ever did in former days."

Sir, I am very unwilling to prolong this discussion, and it is desirable that we should get through the Navy Estimates as soon as possible; but like the hon. and gallant Admiral who has just sat down, I have for a long period taken a deep interest in the question of the manning of the navy, and am therefore desirous of saying a very few words. I will not discuss questions that are not before the Committee—questions of peace or war, and of the state of Europe, the subject of corporal punishment, and other topics that have been introduced. The question of a gratuity consequent on the bounty that has been granted is the matter now in hand, and to that I shall address a few observations. On a former occasion I expressed at some length my decided opinion against a bounty in time of peace. I then stated my objection to it in detail, and to those objections I still adhere. I think they are conclusive against the precedent set for the first time by the late Board of Admiralty of offering a bounty in time of peace. I think that bounty ought to be the last resource of a Government in the last extremity of war, or when war is imminently pending, and I fear that to have had resort to this last resource now will be found to have established a precedent that will add to our diffi- culties in manning the navy in future in time of peace. But it is needless to argue that question at any length on this occasion, because the bounty has received the sanction of Parliament, and I must assume, therefore, that such a bounty was necessary. But if that be the case, I can have no doubt whatever with respect to the Vote now before the House. I think this gratuity is the inevitable consequence of the bounty which we have granted. The late First Lord of the Admiralty says, there has been no discontent on the part of the men now serving in the Royal Navy. There are two important occasions on which a bounty has been offered in this country. One of these was in 1793, at the commencement of the revolutionary war. We had then only about 14,000 seamen, and just one-half of the amount now offered in time of peace was offered as bounty by the Government. The effect was, that in six months the number of men rose from 14,000 to 60,000. The other occasion was in 1803, at the commencement of the second French war. A bounty was then offered of £5 for able seamen, and £2 10s. for ordinary seamen—or exactly half the amount of that now offered in time of peace. At that time there were about 20,000 men serving in the navy, and the effect of the bounty in six months was to raise the number again to 60,000. Now, what is the case on this occasion? If I mistake not, there are more than 30,000 men now serving. But, besides that, a new system has been adopted—namely, that of continuous service. I believe that is a system which ought to be cherished as the foundation of an effective navy, and as one likely at all times to ensure the service of disciplined men. It is a system which, either in peace or war, promises to be of the greatest benefit to the nation. The right hon. Gentleman says there is no discontent; but let the House reflect on what is the inevitable effect of this bounty. Supposing a ship arrives in port from a foreign station to be paid off. There are five continuous-service men on board and five non-continuous-service men. The five continuous-service men are obliged to go to the flagship, in order to be employed in some other ship. The non-continuous-service men can the next day take the bounty of £10 and enter into service in another ship; but the continuous-service men, though of equal merit in every respect, are bound to serve five years longer without any bounty whatever. But the advantage to the non-continuous-service man does not end there—he gets a suit of clothes, bidding, and kit, complete, worth £6, while the continuous-service man gets nothing.

The continuous-service man has more than an equivalent for the bounty.

He will, at the end of ten years, have received an equivalent; but it will be doled out to him in small driblets, at each monthly pay; while the non-continuous man gets £10 in his hand and £6 worth in clothes.

The non-continuance man will receive £40.

At the end of ten years he will have received £40 I admit; but still, when one man receives £10 in hand and clothes worth £6, and another gets £40 in small sums at the expiration of ten years, I appeal to the House whether the immediate effect is not likely to be discontent? Then the right hon. Gentleman says, no demand has been made for this gratuity. But can any doctrine be more dangerous than that? Why wait for demands? What was the cause of the mutiny at the Nore? The men made demands, but no attention was paid to them till those demands assumed a most dangerous and formidable shape; and then concessions were made in a manner most degrading to the State, and that produced no salutary effect. It is said this is great generosity on the part of the State. Let there be such generosity. I think the wisest possible course at the present moment is to treat our sailors with kindness, generosity, and due consideration. The hon. and gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) takes to himself exclusively the merit of everything that has been done in favour of the sailor for the last thirty years; but, setting aside that claim, it has been the object of Governments for the last thirty years to improve the condition of our sailors, and the concessions of the late Government, founded as they were upon justice, seem to me to have been based upon sound policy. I think the question is not one of generosity, of discontent, or contentment, but of justice. The hon. and gallant Admiral referred to a measure which I introduced in 1832, when I had the advantage of the advice of the late Sir Thomas Hardy, who was better acquainted with the feelings, the habits, and the prejudices of sailors, and the motives by which they are actuated, than any officer I have ever known. With the view of averting the necessity of impressment I introduced that measure, giving Her Majesty, at the commencement of a war, or when war was imminent, or when invasion was expected, the power of issuing a Proclamation calling for the service of seafaring men within a short period—six or twelve days—and of offering to all men who volunteered within that limited time double bounty. By the advice of Sir Thomas Hardy I included in that Bill a provision which, after debate, received the sanction of this House, that a bounty being given to new-comers an equal bounty should be given to all men then serving in the fleet. The object of that Act was to abolish the system of impressment. The hon. and gallant Member for Southwark, in a pamphlet published in 1840, referred to circumstances which had occurred in the Mediterranean, and pointed out what appeared to him the disadvantages of the enactment. I thought, upon mature consideration, that the objections were well founded, and in 1853 I introduced a measure materially altering the Act of 1832, and enabling the Queen to issue a Proclamation, not to all seafaring men, but to classes between certain ages, and leaving the question of the gratuity to the advisers of the Crown. So the law now stands; but I am bound to say that upon every principle of equity, and upon every consideration of policy, I am convinced, in the first place, that no Proclamation for compulsory service can be issued without the concomitant offer of a bounty, though I think the offer of a bounty ought to be reserved for that great emergency; and secondly, that whenever a bounty is offered to new recruits a gratuity must be given, not perhaps of an equal amount, but of a considerable amount, to all men already serving in the fleet. I think you cannot avoid the risk of serious discontent without taking that step, and in my opinion it, is demanded by strict equity. I deny that it is impossible to man the fleet quickly without a bounty. On this occasion a bounty has been offered in a time of peace. It was my duty to man a fleet in time of war without a bounty, and I succeeded in doing it; not I, but an officer of the highest merit, who was associated with me—Sir Maurice Berkeley—who was entirely opposed to a bounty, and who, in the extremity of war, and amid all the difficulties of manning the fleet at that time, steadily resisted the offer of a bounty. The gallant Admiral (Sir Charles Napier) says, that the fleet on that occasion was manned by tinkers, tailors, and Lord Mayor's men. Well, Sir, there may have been tinkers, and there may have been tailors, in every ship on the station; but there were captains in that fleet who, satisfied with their crews, were ready to follow with their men into any action and into any danger in which the gallant Admiral was prepared to lead them. I can appeal to Sir Henry Keppel, who commanded the St. Jean d'Acre—to Admiral Elliot, who commanded a screw line-of-battle ship, and to the present Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Clarence Paget), who commanded the Princess Royal, and I would ask them whether those "tinkers and tailors" were not men in whom they placed such confidence that they were ready to encounter any fleet that might have dared to engage them. So much, then, for the experience of manning the fleet without a bounty in time of war. I say, again, that in time of peace I consider the bounty to have been a rash and an inexpedient measure. I hold, however, the gratuity to be an inevitable concomitant to the offer of the bounty; and if the result should be to render future Governments more cautious in offering a bounty in time of peace, with reference to the inevitable expenditure occasioned in the shape of a gratuity, without which gratuity they would run the risk of creating discontent in the fleet, I, for one, shall be extremely glad that that salutary effect of greater caution has been produced. The bounty having been given, I cannot object to the necessity and prudence of voting the sum now demanded.

The right hon. Baronet says I took credit for all that has been done for the sailor during the last thirty years, I did no such thing. I say so distinctly. It is untrue. [Cries of "Order!"] What I took credit for was obtaining the appointment of the Committee which was the means of doing much that has lately been done for the good of the service. The right hon. Baronet says he manned the fleet. He man the fleet! Prettily the fleet was manned. There never was a fleet sent to sea in such a disgraceful state as the Baltic fleet. He refers to Sir Henry Keppel and to Admiral Elliot. Why does he not refer to other officers? He knows how the ships were manned as well as I do, and every officer in that fleet knows that it was shamefully and disgracefully manned. The fleet was a disgrace to the British Navy. And I will tell the right hon. Baronet further that if he will allow me to produce his own letters, and Sir Maurice Berkeley's private letters to me, referring to the way in which that fleet was manned the House will be astonished. I am not sure that I am doing my duty in not producing those letters; and I ask the right hon. Baronet now to let me come down to the House with them on another day, and they will show how the fleet was manned.

The gallant Admiral has already taken that liberty by producing my private letters without my consent.

Not all of them. Will the right hon. Baronet allow me to produce the rest of the letters?

explained, that though the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty commanded the Princess Royal in the Baltic, he was not captain of that ship when the abominable flogging of which he had complained took place.

At this late hour of the night I think that the Committee will be of opinion that the more I condense my statement in moving the Army Estimates the better it will be. There is the less necessity for my going into much detail because the greater part of the effective Votes for the army were taken in the last Session of Parliament. Only one Vote was taken on account, and only the non-effective ones remained to be voted. After the very frequent discussions which we have had during the last two or three days upon the subject of the force now in England I need not enter into particulars upon that question. My gallant Friend who preceded me in office (General Peel) has already in the course of the evening explained the exact amount of the military force in Great Britain, and my right hon. Friend has accurately stated that we have now in England, if we include the Indian depots, 110,000 men of all ranks. Of that number 23,000 men belong to the embodied militia. The hon. Member for Invernessshire (Mr. Baillie) objects that the militia ought not to form part of the permanent and first force of England; it was properly a reserve force; and that if it were necessary to make use of that reserve in time of peace we should have nothing to fall back upon in time of war. I entirely concur in that opinion; but then it must be remembered that my gallant Friend had to administer the army in times of singular difficulty. He had suddenly to raise our forces by several battalions, and to send to India, to meet an unprecedented emergency, all the troops upon whom he could lay his hands. Under these circumstances I think he acted wisely in calling upon the militia to afford by embodiment a substitute for the battalions of which England was necessarily denuded, and also in maintaining these regiments embodied until the return of a portion at least of these troops from India would enable him to dispense with their services. I am sorry to say that since the late Government determined to take a Supplemental Estimate for this purpose we have been prospectively deprived of the return of two or three of these battalions by the mutiny which has broken out in the local European army. In spite of that, however, there are coming from India six battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a large portion of the military train which has been used as a cavalry force in that country. We have also a battalion coming home from Canada. It would not, however, I think, be advisable to disembody a corresponding force of militia upon the arrival of these troops. Next year, if we get a large force from India and can count a large army—a fair army—of regular troops in this country, it may be wise to disembody the regiments of militia, and to trust to that force as a reserve, and as a reserve alone; but before that is done it will be necessary for the Government to look most carefully and anxiously into the state of the disembodied militia. I do not wish to enter into that question now, because it must necessarily come under our consideration upon the Vote for the disembodied militia; but there is no doubt that at present that force to a great extent exists only upon paper, and that the training now coming on will show a lamentable deficiency in its ranks. I will not, therefore, at present allude to the measures which the Government may, with the sanction of the House, take to mitigate this evil, but I think it fair that the country should know what are its real resources, and should not rely upon that which upon paper may appear extremely formidable, but in reality is very weak. Our Ordnance force, small as it is, has of late years been admirably administered. We have now got what we never had be- fore, 180 guns completely horsed and equipped and ready for service, and, I think, 100 in reserve. This is a great improvement, for which we are, I believe, greatly indebted to the zeal and excellent administration of the gallant Officer who preceded me at the War Office. A few years ago there was a great deal of dissatisfaction in this House at the formation of the camp at Aldershot, and the Gentlemen who moved the Army Estimates had frequently great difficulty in obtaining the Votes which were required for carrying out that scheme. There were great complaints that it did not answer the purpose of a camp; and there is no doubt that the English army, admirable as it is as a combatant army, has for years been extremely deficient in those auxiliary services upon which the efficiency of an army depends. Until late in the Crimean war our commissariat, military train, and medical staff were exceedingly deficient. I believe that of late years great pains have been taken with these services, and a great improvement achieved, and that nothing has more contributed to this result than the establishment of the camp at Aldershot. Within the last few days I have read a report from the General commanding at that camp as to how the troops have been engaged during a certain period. He says that the drill is good, that the second battalions, consisting of course of young recruits, have made remarkable progress, and that the embodied militia is in a state of efficiency which has astonished military men. It used to be said that at this camp nothing was done which would enable the soldier really and practically to learn camp life. I believe that much has been done to answer that objection. Earthworks are now thrown up by unpaid military labour—a very wise arrangement—and the engineers are making fascines, and instructing others in their manufacture. The General says that brigades of infantry and artillery have been sent out to encamp at a distance of fifteen miles off, and that under the hot sun which we have experienced during the last month these marches have been effected without a single man falling out of the ranks; that the men show the greatest aptitude in encamping, erecting temporary ovens and so on; and that there is a marked improvement in the facility with which these operations are conducted. The commissariat corps has been practised in the field. It accompanies the troops and purchases animals, slaughter-houses are esta- blished under the management of the troops, and all the operations for victualling the force are conducted as they would be in war. I frankly admit that there are in this country facilities for purchasing food and conducting every operation which would not exist in the case of actual warfare; but you cannot create difficulties for the purpose of overcoming them, and, as far as possible, the commissariat corps is exercised in the duties which it is intended to perform. Lastly, I may mention that crime has greatly diminished at Aldershot. During the last few months there has been a marked diminution in the number of deserters from the army. It is also stated that the health of the troops at Aldershot is something unequalled in the annals of the British or any other army. I do not think that so much importance ought to be attached to this as we may at first sight be disposed to attribute to it, because it must be borne in mind that while the ages of many of the battalions at Aldershot range only from 18 to 25, those of the men in an army on actual service generally vary from 18 to 40. I have no doubt, however, that a great improvement has taken place in the sanitary arrangements of the camp. Having said thus much with regard to general questions, I will now proceed to explain the Votes to which it is my duty to ask the Committee to assent. For the purpose of keeping up the Embodied Militia we ask for a sum of £410,000. Vote 8, for Wages, amounts to £108,000. A great portion of this expenditure, it must be remembered, is not for purely military purposes. For example, there is taken for the Royal Laboratory a sum of £49,000 for a sup ply of shot and shell to put the garrisons in the Mediterranean in complete order for three years. There has been a revision of the armaments at Gibraltar and Malta, and it is also necessary to keep up a large stock at these places for the use of the fleet. This sum is to be partially employed in making a provision of shot and shell at those places for no less than 15 line-of-battle ships, 30 frigates, 30 sloops, and about 60 gun vessels and gunboats. The Vote for the Royal Gun Factories is £4,842, which is taken merely for the purpose of hastening work already ordered, and completing work required for putting our garrisons in a proper state of defence in as many weeks as it would otherwise occupy months. The Vote for the Royal Carriage Department includes ten new batteries of 18-pounders, to be employed as a moveable force along the coast. This was recommended by the secret Committee which sat to inquire into the national defences. Perhaps the House would like to know what are the probabilities with regard to the delivery of the guns in course of manufacture by Sir William Armstrong. If the new buildings and machinery should be completed by the 1st of October, then I believe we may expect to have the delivery of 100 guns by the end of the year, and I hope we shall have something like 200 more in the course of the present financial year. After that the delivery will continue at a rate which will I hope soon enable us to have, both on board ship and for our land defences, a very great number of these formidable instruments of war. The next Vote, No 9, is merely for the clothing of the embodied militia, which of course would not have been necessary had this force been disembodied. The items for provisions, forage, fuel, &c, are necessarily proportionate to the number of men you intend to maintain. Vote 11 is for warlike stores for land and sea ser vice. Under this head there are several large items. First there is a sum of £60,000 for the purchase and repair of small arms; then comes £61,000 for iron ordnance and for the shells and fuses requisite for the service of Sir William Armstrong's guns. I need hardly mention the other items, but there is one of £225,000 for miscellaneous stores, of which I was not aware till a gallant Officer told me that complaint had been made of so large an amount being asked with so little specification of details in the Estimate. Some of the particulars, however, I can state. Among the articles hero included are various kind of metals, comprising copper, iron, and other materials necessary for store. But I will endeavour, before the Vote is again passed, to have all the particulars printed on a separate sheet, In this way a large sum has accumulated, and before the Vote is again taken I shall ascertain whether more information cannot be afforded in reference to it. I next come to a Vote of a very important character, namely, £123,500 for fortifications. It is most essential that some of these works, which have been sanctioned after long deliberation and much criticism, should be pushed on as rapidly as possible, and on that account we ask for some additional sums with which to expedite them. I need not now explain the general plan of the fortifications at Devonport, because it is not new, and has often been discussed in this House. We only propose to expend a larger amount this year to hasten on those works of defence. It is clear that if they are to be executed at all, they should be executed as speedily as possible. I take it that if England were attacked an unfinished fortification would be a much worse thing for us than none at all, because it would not only be incapable of defence in itself, but if taken by an enemy it might, perhaps, be easily turned against us. Then there is the case of Alderney. The item for that is very small, great progress having already been made with the work, and all that has now to be done being to complete the payments on Fort Touraille, and also for scarping some part of the island, which is now accessible, and can be made inaccessible by a simple process. Again, we have Portsmouth, where there are very extensive defences which have been for some time in course of construction, and large sums for which have already been voted by Parliament. Under this head items are included for the citadel, the South sea line of defence, the Stokes Bay line between Fort Monkton and Fort Gomer, and also some additions on the eastern side of Portsmouth. By these works, and the additions to be made to them, which will be as much as the engineers are likely to get through during the year, we shall have at a future and I trust not distant period formidable means of defence. At Portland there is a necessity for carrying out works which have not yet stood upon the Estimates at all. Portland is one of the finest harbours in the world, and is at present utterly defenceless, and if an enemy were to take possession of the island of Portland, he would have facilities for establishing himself on that island, from which it would be extremely difficult to dislodge him. It so happens that the work there can now be executed very economically, and at a great advantage, because it is proposed to form a citadel on the island by scarping the rock, and the materials obtained in forming it will go at once into the sea, and will thus create part of the great breakwater. It is also proposed to guard the principal entrance into the harbour by a large tower at the end of the mole carrying eighty or ninety guns, with another similar battery on the south of Weymouth Point. Smaller batteries will also be constructed for the lesser entrances. These defences will be so strong as, I hope, to make it quite impossible that Portland should ever fall into the hands of an enemy. At Milford Haven it is only proposed to continue the works now in progress. Large guns are to be put on the principal islands within the haven, so as to guard the approach to the dockyard. At a future time it will be necessary there to build some works inland to the south of the harbour, in order to repel any attack that might be made on the land side at Tenby, or some other part of the coast; but that does not yet appear in the Estimates. There is one thing which I have omitted to state with regard to Portsmouth. It is, that the defences there are at the entrance of the Solent, while there are none at the entrance at Spithead, and there is a difficulty in making them. I wished to take a large sum to commence the works with at the Horse-shoal, as it is called, at Spithead, opposite St. Helen's; but it is impossible that any outlay can under present circumstances be made on this work. We have got a very accurate survey of the whole of this position, and experiments are now about to be made with regard to the nature of the soil. I believe Sir Charles Pox is to give his assistance, in order to ascertain where the best foundations are on which to place the batteries, or whether it will be more advisable to have recourse to floating defences. I attach the greatest importance to these works; but it is impossible to proceed with them until the ground has been most carefully and accurately examined. The next Vote is for civil buildings. This includes, first, the school of gunnery at Shoeburyness. The House will not, I am sure, grudge anything which improves the skill of the army, and renders that great arm, the artillery, more efficient; and this school is absolutely necessary to afford that branch of the service the means of practice. Then comes the Storekeeper's department at Woolwich; and here there is a new magazine to be built, which will be attended with great economy to the country. The powder is now kept in old men-of-war, which like all floating wooden structures are very expensive. The annual cost of the floating magazines at Woolwich is £3,092; but for a total outlay of £12,000 you will have a solid, substantial building, saving the charge for watchmen, &c, and obviating the inconvenience of conveying the powder backwards and forwards from the vessels. There are also some alterations to be made at Chatham, several rooms to be added to Fort Pitt, and the medical school at Chatham to be reconstituted. There is also a Vote for the salaries of the teachers of the last-named institution. The present practice in the Medical Department of the army is, when candidates are wanted for that service, to advertise for them, and those candidates are examined by three officers selected for the purpose, or as more frequently happens to be the case, by three officers who can most conveniently be obtained. Before the Royal Sanitary Commission, of which I had the honour to be chairman, we had the most clear evidence from Sir Benjamin Brodie and other men of the highest eminence that the existing system is entirely nugatory and theoretical; and so little confidence has the Medical Department reposed in its own examinations that it sends the successful candidates to Chatham to receive fresh instruction in the very branches of science in which they are supposed to have already proved their proficiency. We wish to improve the system, first of all by adopting the plan pursued with great success by the East India Company, of having practised examiners, and afterwards, when the candidates who have passed go to Chatham, by teaching them not those general branches of medical knowledge which they can acquire at the civil schools much better than in the army schools, but only the specialties of army medical practice. Thus you will get the best young general practitioners from the civil schools, and will convert them at Chatham into excellent army medical officers. There they will learn the habits of troops and the diseases to which they are more particularly liable; they will learn how to treat gun shot wounds and study all the precautions required by different climates, especially by that of India, against ill-health, besides many other things which I am sorry to say army practitioners have hitherto never been instructed in previously to having to deal with military patients. I have to thank my hon. and gallant Friend opposite (General Peel) for the manner in which he adopted the suggestions of the Royal Commission, and it only remains for me now to carry out the scheme, as the Committee see the Vote for this purpose is by no means extravagant. In Vote 14 a small sum is taken for contributions to a railway station, for the convenience of embarking and disembarking troops at Aldershot. There is also £1,500 for a rifle range at Hythe, and £17,000 for a rifle range at Chatham. The only other item is for the erection of huts in the Ionian Islands, which is rendered necessary by the inability of the barracks there to accommodate the increased garrison. Vote 15 relates to the subject which I have already explained—the Medical School. I have now gone through the whole of these Votes, and I trust have made them as clear to the House as I can. At the same time I must frankly confess that, most of the great manufacturing establishments to which I have had occasion to refer have come under the War Department since I was connected with it; the press of business has prevented me seeing them with my own eyes, and I am not so well acquainted with the details as I ought to be, and I have therefore to crave the indulgence of the House in this respect. I beg to conclude by moving the first Vote, £410,000 for the expenses of the embodied militia.

So far from having anything to complain of in the manner in which my right hon. Friend has introduced these Estimates, I have only to thank him for the very complimentary manner in which he spoke of my services in the War Department; and I should not have had a word to say, but that these Supplementary Estimates are almost precisely those which it would have been my duty to propose to the House had I remained in office. These Supplementary Estimates do not arise from any increase in the original Estimates which I had the honour of submitting at the early part of the year, but they are rendered necessary by the circumstances which have arisen since the original estimates were framed, and it is now in the power of the Committee, if they do not approve of the items, to disallow them. If, for instance, they do not think it necessary that the embodied militia should be retained, they have only to strike out that item, and the proposal will fall to the ground. I thought it was absolutely necessary to retain them, and I am glad to see the present Government are of the same opinion. I perfectly agree with my right hon. Friend that the embodied militia, as a general principle, ought to be counted only as part of our reserve; but, of course, they will be perfectly useless even' in that capacity, unless they are well drilled, and I think it would be of great advantage if arrangements were made by which a large portion should be embodied by turns, so that every regiment may get a year's training in every five years. In that way you would render them much more efficient than by calling them out for twenty-one days every year. It is impossible that regiments so trained should be so efficient as those which have been embodied, and it is now acknowledged by the general commanding at Aldershot that most of our embodied militia regiments who have gone through this training are equal in efficiency to any regiment of the line. I also agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the state of the disembodied militia is not satisfactory. I expressed that opinion when I came into office, and one of the first things I did was to appoint a Commission to inquire into the reasons. I have not seen the Report of that Commission, but I believe it will be found that most of the regiments of disembodied militia are deficient in strength by at least one-third. I concur altogether in the testimony which the right hon. Gentleman has borne to the advantages of Aldershot Camp, and, so far from complaining of the expense, I think the country has cause to look upon the money expended there as very well spent. For defensive purposes it is the most beneficial outlay that has yet been made. The greatest advantage has been conferred by it on our Commissariat, Military Train and Medical Staff, and the system which has been adopted there of making the soldiers do everything for themselves has had the most beneficial effect upon their health. With respect to the Vote for fortifications, I observe that my right hon. Friend has adopted the same course that I myself proposed; and I wish the hon. Member for Lambeth to understand that the Vote is not an increase, but simply an advance for this year of Votes already sanctioned by Parliament. The Inspector General of Fortifications informed the Government that it would be a great advantage if a certain sum of money could be spent this year, and I thought it my duty to ask Parliament for it. Most of these items of expenditure have been occasioned by circumstances which have occurred since the original Estimates were framed. The additional number of line-of-battle ships built, and increase of the armaments of our great garrisons have made it necessary to increase the manufacture of stores at Woolwich; and, as it was discovered that the ammunition served out to the troops in India had been injured, the heat and damp having so affected the lubricating matter in the cartridges that the ball would no longer fit the rifles, all that ammunition has had to be withdrawn and fresh manufactured and sent out. We have also had to manufacture ammunition for the new Armstrong gun, for without ammunition of course the guns, would be useless. There is also a sum for the gunnery school at Shoeburyness, which is rendered necessary by our new ordnance, for, of course, without trained men our new guns would be of comparatively little service to us. That school will, I believe, be found of the utmost benefit to the country.

was of opinion that the only mode by which the occasional panic with which England was afflicted was to put the defences of the country into such a state as would inspire everybody with confidence. A little irritability with France now and then would be a small penalty to pay for putting our armaments into a perfect state of efficiency. It was no doubt very agreeable to find business was being transacted between the Secretary for War and the gallant General (General Peel) on such amicable terms. But he thought there could be no harm in questioning some of the very favourable statements that had been so pleasantly agreed on between them. One of these statements was that the number of men available for home service was 110,000. Now he had already shown that this force included recruits and many other men unavailable for the public service. On turning to the Votes already passed he found our infantry was put down at 62,200 rank and file, besides 5,600 Foot Guards, making a total of about 68,000 men. That 62,200 rank and file were, however, not in the country. They had to furnish all the garrisons from Hong Kong to Quebec, and from New Zealand to the Mediterranean. He believed he was within the mark in taking 30,000 men for these garrisons; which would leave only 38,000 for the defence of this country. The recruits at the Indian depôts might be added to that number, but they could not be relied upon to meet the disciplined troops of France; while it should be recollected that only a limited portion of the militia had been embodied for any considerable length of time. We had not the power, in fact, to bring a respectable force into the field, and he maintained that until we could do so, taking care always that at least one-half were troops of the line, justice would not be done either to the officers who commanded, to the troops themselves, or to the interests of a great country like this. He did not advocate extravagant Estimates, but he thought there was an increase wanted in the bone and sinew of the English army—the rank and file was the cheapest addition that could be made to the army. Again, as to the strength of individual regiments, he thought that the number of 950 men was sufficient neither for peace nor for war. It was expensive in peace, because the establishment of officers was out of proportion to the number of men; while in time of war each regiment could furnish only 800 men fit for duty. Even that number was exclusive of men employed on recruiting service. But, leaving it at 800 men, they could not be relied on to be sent abroad, as some portion of the men should be left at home to form a depot. It was often urged as a good thing to have "skeleton" regiments. Skeleton regiments might do very well on the Continent, where no difficulty was found in filling them up when an emergency occurred; but the case was different in this country. On this subject he would mention an anecdote he had heard in Italy a few days before. Shortly before the war an Austrian regiment stood at 3,000 men. That regiment got orders for service, and it became necessary to increase the men. Well, what was done? Within eight days the rank and file of that regiment was increased to 6,000 men, and it came down to the gates of Vienna, waiting in arms to know what part of the empire it was to go to. Those new men were not mere recruits, such as we were forced to pick up in our fairs and market towns; they were all of them men who had served their two or three years in the service, and who had been sent home until called on to finish their full time of service. That was the system which was adopted, and could only be adopted in despotic countries. But he was not aware of any means by which in this country men could be so sent to their homes, and obliged to wait until again called on for active service. Therefore, in his opinion, the skeleton system was not adapted to this country. He hoped also that recourse would not again be had to the stop-gap system which was adopted during the Russian war; he meant the system of volunteering from one regiment to another. The consequence of that system was that one regiment was gutted of its men in order to bring another up to a war establishment and that the recruits who were sent out to join their regiments in the Crimea did not in many cases know how to load their muskets. The objections to the present mode of reinforcing the infantry were equally applicable to the cavalry. The yearly expense of the regiments as they now stood, including all ranks, was £26 per head, but by adopting the system that he recommended they could add men to the rank and file at rather less than £20 per head. In the one case they could get for a given sum of money 14,000 men added to the army, but in the other case about 20,000. The system of expansion might be perfectly well provided for by dividing the regiments into two wings and throwing the recruits upon them. They could add to their army much more rapidly by dividing one regiment of 1,200 men into two wings and adding recruits to it, than by raising a 2nd battalion upon a weak depôt. The regiments should have twelve companies of never less than 100 men each. The expense of adding to all the regiments in the manner he suggested would be about £400,000. The hon. and gallant General (General Peel) had alluded to some remarks made by an hon. Member (Mr. Baillie) early in the evening with respect to the embodied militia. His hon. Friend however did not object to an embodied militia, but to that militia being allowed longer than absolute necessity required to be a substitute for regular soldiers. An embodied militia cost as much as new regiments of the line.

thought it was to be regretted that we lost many of our soldiers just at the time that they had become efficient, and suggested that with the view of inducing the ten years' service men to remain in the army a small addition should be made to their pay. Those soldiers were the most healthy who were the most employed in garrison, and less crime was committed in those garrisons in which the men were well employed than in those in which they were idle. In the barracks in France the men themselves made almost every article of clothing that they required. Why could not the men in our own barracks be similarly employed? In every French company so many men were employed to cook, others to purchase food or other duties. The French soldier was taught to do everything for himself. Why should not our men be taught to do the same as far as practicable?

said, the clothing and accoutrements in the French service were not made by each man for himself, but a company in each Regiment was employed for that purpose. In his opinion, with reference to our coast defences, he thought we did not act in a business-like manner with respect to them. The Estimates for the defences at Devonport were £320,000, but only £10,000 had been asked for this year. That appeared to be trifling with a very great subject. If these works of defence were needed at all why were they not undertaken boldly and at once? It was more injurious than beneficial to deal in a paltry way with great works. Then when all these defensive works now in contemplation were completed he wanted to know where the garrisons were to come from? He thought that there ought to be a Commisson to settle what our defences ought to be, and to settle the matter once for all. There were two or three other items which he wished to notice. "For examination of sites of works of defence of St. Helen's passage." Now, he knew that five years ago Sir Charles Fox gave in a special plan for the foundation of the works, but what had been the cause of the delay he did not know. Then, as to Portland, the right hon. Gentleman had justly said that it was one of the finest harbours in the world, but it was a harbour without defence. Though he was not one of those who thought this country would be invaded by the French, he considered that they ought to put it in a state of defence. If they were to defend the country at all they ought not to leave a harbour like that without as much as a battery to protect it. No time was to be lost. It was the advanced post. It was opposite to Cherbourg, and it was the right wing of the navy as Dovor was the left. Large works were proposed at Dovor, and small sums were taken. No military man believed that if we were invaded it would be at Dovor. There were abundance of places which would be preferred by an enemy, and yet they were laying out hundreds of thousands of pounds upon Dovor, which would never be a point of attack. Having made these few observations, he should leave the Motion in the hands of the Committee.

said, he understood the late Secretary for War to recommend that the regiments of militia should be embodied for one year, and that the training for twenty-one days should be dispensed with. His opinion was that no regiment of militia should be embodied for a less period than two years, and that the period of training of the disembodied mili- tia should be increased to at least one month. His reason for considering the period of one year too short was, that no regiment could so learn its duties in that time as not to forget them. In a military point of view two years was the least period which he should recommend. He also thought that with respect to the officers, who had given up other occupations, they should be kept together for at least two years.

said, there was a chorus of compliments to one another from Under Secretaries on the perfect state of defence and the perfect army which they asserted we possessed; but if they mixed, as he did, with military men, they would have a very different opinion. Every man would allow, at least in theory, that if we were to have an army we ought to have it at the least possible expense. But we paid more for our 110,000 men than any nation in the world for its whole military force, and far more than was necessary. The system of administration was faulty. Generally men were appointed to preside over the war departments who were not military men and who knew nothing about the army. They had lately had a general officer as Secretary for War, and praise was justly due to that gallant Gentleman; but if he possessed twice the powers of mind and twice the physical powers which he did he would defy him to perform all the duties which devolved upon him. He could not be responsible for half that was to be done. The Ordnance and half-a-dozen offices had been abolished, an admirable system had been broken up; it had not been replaced by any system whatever; a civilian, ignorant of military matters, was placed at the head of this confused and over-loaded Department, and the persons who assisted the Secretary knew nothing of soldiers' wants and requirements. There was a statement of the force on paper which every military man knew was not available. There was a great difference between the number of men on the muster roll and the number of men who could take the field. He believed that with all our expenditure of £10,000,000 or £11,000,000, it would be impossible to concentrate on any part of the island more than 30,000 men in case of emergency. He also thought it wrong that the military departments, beyond a limited extent, should become manufacturers. The system of small manufactories might be justified, but large es- tablishments were a great error in a country where the work could be equally well done by private enterprize. They had 28,000 militiamen effective, and they were a better class of men physically than even the men at present enlisted in the line. But they were obtained at the expense of the line, and the Secretary of State for War must know that there was a large number, from 4 to 6,000 wanting to complete the regiments of that service. They might vote as much money as they chose, but they did not get the men. Thus they were much under the nominal strength. And what were the line regiments recruited with, if not with boys not half formed? The system of recruiting was also, he thought, defective, because they had several different establishments for recruiting, which, by competition, defeated the object. They had the ordinary recruiting establishment, then the militia staff, and finally the pensioner staff, each bidding against one another for recruits and often in the same town. With respect to our fortifications, he should only say that the highest authorities pronounced them to be comparatively useless while left in the unfinished state they are at present. A work, which it was estimated would cost £200,000, was sometimes adopted by the House, while there was annually voted for its completion perhaps only £20,000, or even £10,000: what a time, then, must it take to finish such a work, and during that time it could not be considered a useful defence. Why not, if these defences were to be made, finish them at once? He found that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not forgotten to extend the income tax to Ireland, but it seemed the Government did not attach much importance to the defence of that country or repose unbounded confidence in the loyalty and warlike ambition of the Irish, for he did not find in these Estimates a single shilling voted for Ireland, yet in Ireland many of the forts were fast going to decay. He should, therefore, recommend the Government seriously to direct their attention to the defences of the country. There were several other topics to which he should wish to advert, but at that late period of the night (a quarter to 12 o'clock) he should abstain from trespassing at greater length on the time of the Committee.

thought the observations of his hon. and Gallant Friend (Colonel Dunne) must apply to the state of things which prevailed when he had been connected with the Ordnance Office, rather than to that which at present existed. He had, at all events, made statements in reference to the manufacturing department, which by no means tallied with his (Mr. Monsell's) experience. He, under those circumstances, wished to ask his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War whether, in the principal manufacturing departments for small arms, only one stock arm—the Minie rifle—was made? and whether it was the fact that the influence of their manufacture on the trade generally was such that the Minie rifles made in the Enfield factory were purchased at a lower proportionate rate than those which were obtained by contract? If that were so, that disposed of some of the objections of the hon. and gallant Officer Colonel Dunne. Then, as to Alderney, after expending £190,000 upon the fortifications of Alderney, besides £10,000 upon the citadel, it had been said that there was a hill in the neighbourhood which commanded the works and he should like to hear if any statement had been made on the subject by any official personage. Again, it was said that much money had been expended on the works at Gibraltar and Malta, which, he believed, had been carried out through the recommendations of a Commission sent out by General Peel. He would further ask upon whose authority the right hon. Gentleman relied for the construction of fortresses? The Director General of Ordnance was formerly the official adviser in these matters; but that office had now been abolished, and it was therefore desirable to know on what authority the Government proceeded.

said, he willingly bore testimony to the success by which the erection of a camp at Aldershot had been attended—a success which was, he must say, to a great extent attributable to the gallant officer who filled the post of commandant, notwithstanding that observations depreciatory of his merits had found their way into the public prints. It was owing to the exertions of that gallant officer that the raw levies which had been sent to the camp had been so soon transformed into well disciplined soldiers, and that the review which had taken place there a few days ago was as perfect as anything of the kind could be expected to he. His object in rising, however, was not so much to bear testimony to the success of Aldershot as to put a question to the Government with respect to the disallowance of forage to a certain extent to the officers of Militia and Staff generally. The sum originally allowed fur the keep of a horse to particular officers was 2s. a day, but that allowance had since been reduced to Is. 6d. Great complaint, however, was occasioned by the reduction, and the amount allowed had subsequently been raised to 1s. l0d. Now, he believed the forage contract for the whole army was at the rate of Is. 9d. a day; and if that were so, he should like to know how the sum he had mentioned could be supposed to be adequate in the case of the officers to whom he referred?

complained of the inadequate accommodation of the barracks at Dovor and the want of a school-house there?

hoped he would be allowed to answer the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for Bedfordshire (Colonel Gilpin) with respect to the forage for horses. There was 1s. 6d. a day allowed for forage, with the addition of 6d. for the stable to those officers who had no stables. Those who had stables had been, however, receiving 2s. a day likewise. Finding that the latter were receiving more than they were entitled to, the allowance to such officers was reduced to 1s. 6d. It having been represented to him that that sum was insufficient, he added 25 per cent to the contract price, which made it 1s. l0d. Those who had not stables received 6d. in addition, which made the allowance to them 2s. 4d. In respect to the school near Dovor, the hon. Gentleman would find that there was a Vote taken for it in the general Estimates.

wished to call attention to the want of harmony in our military arrangements, which operated as a great impediment in the Administration of the War Department. During the Crimean war, when the attention of every one was directed to the efficiency of the service, he paid a visit to one of the camps in this country, and found that though the huts were erected the means of access to the camp by roads were quite neglected. The next thing which struck him was the fact that a regiment of cavalry was ordered there, although there was not a stable to receive the horses. Such an oversight could not arise if proper communication was maintained between the different departments. He paid a visit to the camp at Shorncliffe last week, and although it had been established four or five years there had been no drainage whatever, and it was only now that they were laving down pipe-drains, although any person with the slightest knowledge or foresight would have done so before he began to build. The House was now voting money without stint for the two services, but unless these practical questions were grappled with there would never be that efficient direction of affairs which would be necessary upon any emergency. Now, his engagements upon public works in Sardinia had led him to observe the admirable administration of the French army during the war just happily ended, and anything more opposite to our Crimean experiences he could not conceive. The reports of his agents and the result of his own observation showed that the administration of the French army was characterized by just that sort of conceit and forethought which would be displayed by any mercantile firm; and unless our military authorities would put aside the routine which only enabled them to walk in a certain track, and unless they would deal in a businesslike way with the questions which came before them, depend upon it when another time of crisis came there would be the same difficulties and the same disasters as were experienced in the Crimea. He recollected perfectly well that during the Russian war a member of the Government who went on board of one of the steamers going out to the East for the formation of the Balaklava railway inquired the use of a quantity of tarpauling that was on board. When told that it was quite impossible to have huts ready for the use of the large number of workmen directly on landing, and that the tarpauling was therefore allotted among them so that they might at once have shelter while their huts were building, it was thought an admirable arrangement, and he (Sir Morton Peto) was asked if it was possible to make the same provision for the army. His reply was that as his influence with the railway companies would give him the command of all their stores, he would undertake to provide any quantity during the next two or three days. Immediate application was accordingly made to the War and Ordnance Departments; but they were referred to the Tower, and it was found so impossible to get through the routine which was interposed that he went to the Duke of Newcastle and asked him to break through this routine, the result of which was that a great quantity of tarpaulings was sent out. In making these observations he did not intend to impeach the conduct of this or any Government, but there was evidently a great fault somewhere in our military organization, and he repealed that unless the authorities transacted their business in the simple and practical manner of mercantile firms, their administration, when another emergency arose, would be found as much wanting as it was in the Crimea.

said, the hon. Baronet's praise of the French military organization was perfectly well deserved; but was not the perfection of that system due to the fact that the office of Minister of War was always held by one of their most distinguished military commanders. He did not refer to his right hon. Friend, because under no Administration had the army benefited more largely than under his. But according to our system the army, generally speaking, was in the hands of men who probably did not know whether a soldier wore his pouch over his left shoulder or his right. In this country, where the War Secretary must be in Parliament, it might be difficult to carry out such a system; but he believed that the reason the French and Sardinian armies were in so efficient a condition was because those armies were administered by officers of experience and distinction, and not as in England by civilians, who knew nothing of the feelings and the prejudices of the soldier.

said, that nothing could be more lamentable than the administration of the army during the Crimean war—the horses eating off each other's tails, while there was plenty of hay on board the ships in Balaclava harbour. He was sorry to see distinguished persons, who had served their country with great distinction, rising up in that House and making alarming speeches about the intentions of the Emperor of the French. He thought we should do well to imitate the administrative ability of our powerful neighbour, and put the country at once into an efficient state of defence without talking so much about it.

said, the gallant Officer opposite (Colonel Herbert), who observed that the whole of the force which the War Department enumerated as being in England was not directly available. He was ready to admit there was some truth in that statement, and that the men composing depots could not be reckoned on the same footing of efficiency as trained men serving in battalions of the line. As to the remark of the gallant Officer that the constitution of the battalions had been altered for the worse, there were now 950 men in the battalions, and nothing was so easy as to augment the number at a comparatively small cost, should circumstances render such an increase desirable. Again, it had been said we were losing the ten years' men. It was not, however, the fact that we were losing them from any unwillingness to re-enlist them. He might be permitted to say that some years ago, when in office, he proposed to constitute a reserve of such of those ten years' men as did not wish to continue in the service, by offering them some annual payment. Circumstances prevented that arrangement being carried out, and during the war the Government exercised the power of continuing the service of the men beyond the ten years. The result had been to give rather an additional inclination to the ten years men to leave the service than to continue in it. A measure, however, was now under consideration by which the Government hoped to be able to secure the services of those men. With respect to the complaint as to the number of manufactories carried on by the Government, he admitted that he himself had a bias against those establishments, for it was asserted that in many of the departments in which the Government were their own manufacturers they could get contracts from the trade at a cheaper rate, but at the same time no doubt that cheaper rate was obtained by the check which the Government manufactories had upon the private establishments. In particular branches of manufacture where there was no civil demand running concurrently with that of the Government it might be advantageous to have recourse to a Government establishment. He would remind the hon. and gallant Member for Queen's County (Colonel Dunne) with a view to correct a misapprehension he appeared to be under, that our army was scattered all over the world, that we had 90,000 in India, for instance; and, of course, there must be a certain interval between the creation and supply of vacancies, but there was not so great a deficiency in the number of effective men as the hon. and gallant Member seemed to suppose. The Parliamentary Vote was for 229,000 men in round numbers. We had got 220,000 as the number of effective men, and considering how large a part of the army was employed in our distant possessions, he did not think 9,000 men consti- tuted a very great deficiency. His hon. friend (Sir M. Peto) had referred the Committee to the Crimean war; but he thought it was not quite fair to refer for examples to a system excessively cumbrous in itself, and which had grown rusty, against one that had entirely supplanted it. The various departments of the army were not then under one head, and there was no doubt that the system was inapplicable to the purposes of war. It might be true that our existing system was faulty; but if it was faulty, he was ready to learn, and, having learnt, he should be ready to propose the necessary changes. He advised the Committee to lose no time in getting the best information they could from the most competent witnesses to enable them to come to a practical conclusion as to the best organization of the War Department. He had recently served on a Commission which had visited many of the barrack establishments in England and Ireland, and he might say he was almost appalled at the amount of work to be done in order to place them on a satisfactory footing. They were not only deserving but having the most earnest attention of the Government, and he hoped he might count upon the support and assistance of the House in carrying the work forward to completion. He trusted the Committee would now allow the first Vote to be taken.

said, he wished to draw attention to one great fact—that they were about to vote £12,000,000 upon the Army Estimates, and out of that large sum only £3,500,000 went towards the fighting men. The whole of the rest went to the Staff and such like, and thus the mere fighting men only received l–27th of the whole. The home Staff cost £131,951; the foreign Staff, £180,326; the total Staff, £312,287. The department of the Secretary of Warcost £101,000; of the Commander-in-Chief, £185,000. The supplemental Staff cost £4,241 for services which could be just as well performed by the district Staff. He could point out a good many Staff appointments that were not very useful, and he trusted that the Secretary for War would look into this subject, and endeavour to reduce the enormous expenses of the Staff of the army.

said, it was too late at that hour (past two o'clock) to discuss this question, and if the Motion were pressed he should move the adjournment of the debate. If the measure was to be referred to a Select Committee, it was important to determine what parts of it were to be made the subject of inquiry. He decidedly objected to all the clauses which would have a retrospective action.

said, it would be in the power of the Select Committee to amend or even entirely to remodel the Bill.

condemned the measure as vicious in principle, and opposed its being sent to a Select Committee.

thought the question ought to be discussed by the House, before they were asked to refer it to a Committee.

did not oppose the measure, but to think of discussing it at that hour was absurd.

denounced the second clause of the Bill.

assented to the adjournment of the Debate till tomorrow.