said, he rose to call attention to the effect of selection of Lieutenant-colonels of Regiments upon the relative positions of the Guards and Line in cases of Exchange; and to ask, Whether the grade of salaried full Colonels might not be abolished (as regards the future) without disadvantage, and so as to effect a considerable saving; whether Aide-de-Camps are subjected to adequate examination (as in a certain foreign service), and whether they have regimental pay when not on regimental duties; whether there is any ground for a difference between Guards and Line as to the necessity of certain officers going on half-pay before they can go on the Staff; and whether it is true that any Guards' Officers have as much as eight months' leave for the year? It appeared to him that such a system of selection, as the first part of his question referred to, would inevitably lead to difficulties and complications. It was in the power of an officer in the Guards, by exchange, to acquire the position of the selected officer in the Line, without any guarantee being afforded that he was fit to discharge the duties of so responsible a post. There were a great many Lieutenant-colonels in the Guards; and this was, therefore, a very important question. The next point related to the abolition of the salaried Colonelcies. The manner in which one of these places had recently been filled up was universally held to be so indefensible, that it had excited suspicion as to the propriety of maintaining these sine- cures. It was understood that they were intended as rewards to be conferred on Officers for distinguished military services, and as such were justifiable, although he thought the reward might be bestowed in a more direct and satisfactory manner; but no excuse could be offered for the appointment which had just been made, and which could be characterized only as a most iniquitous job. His next question was as to the examination of Aides-de-Camp. This class of Officers enjoyed very high pay, and important duties, and he thought they should be required to pass through the Stall College. His next Question was, Whether it was true that Officers of the Guards had eight months' leave of absence in the year? The expense of maintaining the Guards was very considerable. There was a Colonel-in-Chief of the Grenadier Guards with £2,200 a year; another for the Coldstreams with £2,000; and another for the Fusileers with the same pay. He was satisfied that on the three regiments of Guards alone as much money could be saved, without any difficulty, as would provide Her Majesty with more than one complete regiment of the Line. The extra allowances of the Guards were very large, in comparison with those of the Line, and might well be reduced. He was told that, by some sort of underhand arrangement, it was possible for an Officer in the Guards to obtain leave for eight months in the year; and as the rule was that after five years' service he became a Colonel, he might attain that position by actual service for only twenty months. He wished to know whether that report was true?

My object in rising is to call on those hon. Members who have expressed the opinion that these Estimates are extravagant to come forward and state upon what grounds they consider them to be extravagant; and I especially address myself to the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to the hon. Member for Birmingham, if they happen to be in their places, because the right hon. Gentleman, in introducing his Budget, spoke of them as enormous, though he trusted only temporary, and the hon. Member for Birmingham has been going through the country denouncing them as extravagant and useless. I invite all hon. Members who agree with the hon. Member for Birmingham who may be here to come forward and state the grounds on which they consider them extravagant, and how they propose to reduce them. For my own part, I have no hopes whatever that a reduction of expenditure can be accomplished by a reduction in these Estimates. There is one point on which we should all be perfectly agreed, and that is that it would be a great advantage if it were possible to fix some permanent peace establishment, which would not be subject to these sudden augmentations and reductions, and squaring of the Estimates, which are not only detrimental to the service, but must always lead to great uncertainty as to the amount of money to be voted and variation in the Estimates. By the peace establishment I mean the number of men necessary to perform the ordinary duties of the army in time of peace, including the garrisons and colonies abroad, and sufficient to protect this country from any attack that would be made upon it. I am aware that the House of Commons labours under a great difficulty in forming a correct opinion upon the subject, because they are not yet in possession of the same information which the Government and the highest military authorities possess. I might have had some hesitation in alluding to the confidential Report of the Secret Committee appointed by the late Government, to which I belonged, if two of the Members of that Committee had not been examined before the Organization of the Army Committee — namely, his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief and Sir John Burgoyne. I know that I am not in order in referring to evidence which is not before the House; but, as it is shortly to be presented, it would be affectation in me to pretend ignorance of the fact that it is the opinion of the highest military authorities that there is not a sufficient amount of regular forces in the country, and that every means should be taken to increase it; and I take it for granted that the present Government coincide in that opinion, because they immediately proceeded, without waiting for the authority of Parliament, to augment the army by the addition of 6,456 men, raising the total amount of Her Majesty's forces from 229,356 to 235,852. In addition they proposed an army of reserve of 20,000, of which we have heard very little. This augmentation had no reference whatever to the requirements of India, because at that time a large number of men were returning from the East. The number of men on the Indian establishment last year was 92,490, and I have on a former occasion pointed out that it is a far larger number than any one could anticipate the Indian Government would require or could be prepared to pay for during the whole of the financial year. Neither could the augmentation have any reference to the war with China, because with the exception of one battery of Artillery and one regiment of the Line, all the troops in China have proceeded from India, and have been transferred from the Indian establishment. There are also 4,600 Native troops in China, who are not included in the troops voted by Parliament, and will be an additional augmentation of our army. There is no provision for them in these Estimates, but they will be paid, I presume, out of the China Vote of credit of £500,000, which is supposed to be sufficient to cover the whole expenses of the Chinese war. I think I am justified, therefore, in saying that the Government must be of opinion that an addition to the regular army is required for the proper defence of the country; and, indeed, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, in his able speech in introducing the Estimates, fully succeeded in proving by comparison with the armies of other countries, and the proportion of troops to population, and considering the duties that they had to perform, that the number he asked was extremely moderate. He also proved, and I think very clearly, that the addition he proposed to the Engineers would be actually an act of economy. Then comes the squaring of the Estimates to which I have alluded, which was rendered necessary by the introduction of the Budget before the Estimates were voted, a proceeding which has rendered the revised Estimates, not the Estimates of the Secretary for War, but of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The proposed augmentation of 6,456 men vanishes, and the total number is reduced below what was voted for the previous year; that is to say, that instead of a larger number, the total number is less than it was last year. [Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: Not less than last year.] Yes, upon the whole army. We have got an additional provision for pay and allowances of £257,000, equal to the pay of 8,500 men; although I shall show there is only a nominal increase of 1,900; and of those 1,900, not one more will be available for the defence of this country than last year. They were all present in this country before in depôts of the regiments in India. The only difference is, that they are transferred from the Indian to the British establishment; and we have to pay for them, instead of the Indian Government. I am perfectly satisfied that this re-adjustment of the account for pay and allowances was necessary; otherwise there would have been, as I pointed out when the first Estimates were laid upon the table, a large excess upon these Votes. Then there is the embodied Militia—and I quite agree that it is necessary to take all the Votes together. There is £320,000 for the embodied Militia, or pay and allowances for 10,000 men. The return of the British regimental establishment for 1860–1, of ail ranks, exclusive of the Staff, shows 140,000; so that together there are pay and allowances for 150,000 men. On the 1st of April last the return of the number of effectives on the British regimental establishments, and of embodied Militia, was 153,195; or 3,195 in excess of the number voted by Parliament. I know that that excess may be met by the disembodiment of Militia, but you of course reduce in proportion the number of men you have hitherto thought necessary to keep in this country, and unless the Indian revenue bears the expenses of a larger number of men than is fixed for their establishment, which I do not think they are likely to do if they can help it, you will have an excess upon the Vote for the regular army. You have got, as I have said, upon that Vote money for 140,000 men exclusive of the Staff—you have deducted the pay and allowances of 4,000—from the 145,269 as pay of men wanting to complete the establishment, but they are only wanting because they have not yet been transferred from the Indian establishment. They are all raised, and on the 1st of April, instead of men being wanted to complete, there was an excess upon the numbers voted by Parliament in the whole army— namely, effectives in British Establishment 133,962; Indian Establishment 94,829; Staff 1,121; total 229,912, against the number voted 228,854, or an excess of 1,098. Now, I am not finding fault with the number of men you have provided for. I think 150,000, exclusive of the Staff, would be sufficient for the British Establishment, although it would not supply the number of men considered by the military authorities, to whom I have alluded, as necessary for the defence of the country. The amount of regular troops necessary for the defence of the country must always depend upon the amount and efficiency of the Militia and Volunteers, who must be looked upon as the Reserve. Now, it was my opinion from my first entering office, that the Militia, as at presented constituted, is a very expensive and, comparatively speaking, very inefficient force. The quota of the regiments are no indication whatever of the real strength that might be relied upon; and I think further, that twenty or twenty-eight days' training in a year is not sufficient to make them soldiers; it would be quite sufficient in the case of those regiments who have been embodied, and who have only to practise what they already have acquired, but I believe the larger portion of the Militia have only lately been supplied with the Enfield Rifle, and that many of the regiments have never had an opportunity of learning the use of them. Now I quite agree with the Secretary of State that the Militia should be what it is intended to be, an army of reserve, and not to be embodied in time of peace, unless under very particular circumstances; but I think that if one-third of the Militia were sent every year to the camps of instruction, and kept out for a much longer period than the usual time of training, then the ordinary period of training for the next two years would be all that is necessary. Now do not let it be for a moment supposed that I am underrating the services of the Militia, or underrating the services they have performed to the country. Without the Militia we should have been unable, in my opinion, to put an end to the Indian mutiny, as a sufficient number of regular troops could not have been spared if the Militia had not supplied their places, and also supplied their ranks by the number of volunteers they furnished to them. I must also bear testimony to the efficiency which these regiments attained, rendering them equal to regiments of the Line, and it is because I wish to see the numbers of the Militia kept up, and more opportunities given them of becoming efficient when not embodied, that I make these remarks. I appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the organization of the Militia, which had not reported when I quitted office; but I trust that upon their recommendations the Secretary at War will be able to make great improvements. I have to congratulate the Secretary of State on the success of the Volunteer movement, and I am sure that every Englishman must look with pride and satisfaction to the magnificent army that is growing up for the defence of the country, composed of men whose zeal, assiduity, and intelligence, will speedily secure their efficiency. Still I trust that the Volunteers will ever be looked upon as auxiliaries to and not substitutes for a regular army, and that constitutional army of reserve—the Militia. There is another force also to which I think the country is greatly indebted, and which I sincerely regret it is not proposed to call out for training during the present year, I mean the Yeomanry, to which my hon. Friend (Major Edwards) has called attention. I fear that our not doing so will interfere with the power of officers to keep up their numbers, and must also interfere with their efficiency. If the period of drill given to the Militia is not sufficient to form an infantry soldier, still less is that accorded to the Yeomanry sufficient to make a cavalry one; and unless you keep up these corps, to at all events a certain standard of efficiency, you had better abandon them altogether. You are only going to useless expense in maintaining them. Now in stating that I consider the number of men to be voted for the regular army sufficient to perform the duties required from it in time of peace, I am making ample allowance for the assistance that is to be expected from all these forces in defending the country. The number of the regular army in this country will still fall far short of those considered necessary by the military authorities I alluded to, and are only sufficient to perform those duties which none of these other troops can be called upon to do. The system of relief laid down as necessary for our regiments on foreign service has never been able to be carried into effect, and one of the greatest boons and benefits that ever was promised to the British army has been hitherto unavoidably denied to them. It was laid down that for every ten years' of foreign service, each regiment should have five years at home—but what has been the practical result? I take regiments without any selection whatever, and by mere accident I met an officer belonging to a depot battalion, and asked him to give mo the period of services, at home and abroad, of the regiments composing it; and this is the result. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Foot had served 24 abroad and 6 years and 8 months at home. The 1st Battalion of the 6th Foot had served 33 years and 8 months abroad and 5 years at home. The 54th Foot, 34 years and 3 months abroad and 6 years and 5 months at home. The 56th, 40 years and 10 months abroad and 11 years and 11 months at home. The 66th, 26 years and 7 months abroad and 13 years and 2 months at home. The 88th, 26 years and 9 months abroad and 8 years and 9 months at home. It appears by this that only one regiment out of the six I have referred to has been at home one-third of its time. I think I have stated sufficient to show that there is no hope of any reduction being made in these Estimates dependent upon a corresponding reduction in the number of men. On the contrary, there is an element which will create a great increase in the expenditure which does not appear in the Estimates. With regard to the Votes themselves, that for the Volunteer Corps it is quite evident must be increased. The sum set down this year towards the payment of their expenses is only £15,000. Clearly, you will have to take a much larger sum next year. I think that you must also provide for calling out the Yeomanry next year on permanent duty. You have saved some £40,000 by not calling them out this year. Although you propose by the Estimates to increase the number of men, you have reduced the Vote for clothing by £18,000. This is owing to a God send of £233,000 due from the Indian treasury for clothing furnished and paid for out of last year's Estimates. With regard to the barrack accommodation there is no probability of any diminution being made in the Vote under that head. We are building new barracks in Chelsea, in Nottingham, and in Glasgow. In future years, instead of a diminution of expenditure under this head, I think there will be rather an increase of it for the purchase of adequate sites for those buildings. With regard to the fortification Votes, it is perfectly impossible to say what the expense in that particular will be until all the plans are before yon. Any addition to this Vote for fortifications must naturally lead to a large increase in other Votes. You cannot have fortifications without men to occupy them, guns to mount on them, ammunition, stores, &c. All these considerations have I nothing to do with party questions, and my only motive for calling the attention of the House to them is, that we should fully understand what is the exact amount of defence for the country which is proposed by the Government. With regard to the Motion of which notice has been given by my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley), I am of opinion that it is much too important a question to be discussed incidentally in a debate on the Army Estimates. I hope, therefore, that it will be brought on separately in the shape of a substantive Motion for a Committee to inquire into the subject.

said, he wished to call the attention of the House to the Army Promotion Warrant of October, 1858, in respect to the position of certain General Officers who accepted promotion on half-pay, in accordance with the terms of the General Order of the 25th day of April, 1826, and are now receiving only the half-pay of their former Regimental Commissions. It was necessary to explain how unattached pay arose. Formerly there was no unattached pay to General Officers at all. The system, so far as it regarded officers of that rank was commenced in 1814, and in 1822 was placed upon the basis on which it had remained down to the year 1854. It was then established that there should be, besides colonels, 120 General Officers receiving at the rate of 25s, a-day; the remaining General Officers beyond that number were to receive the full pay of their last regimental commissions. It was provided, however, that they should have served six years in the regimental position of a field-officer. If not, they were not to be entitled either to 25s. a day or to the full pay of their last regimental commission. The next move with regard to unattached pay was made in 1823, when half-pay commissions were introduced into the Ordnance Corps, with the view of promoting young officers. That system worked well in the Ordnance Corps, and in 1825, it was introduced into the Line. It worked well in the Line up to a certain point, but there it stopped. The large class of brevet field-officers serving in inferior regimental ranks became inconvenient to the service, and an order was brought out making an arrangement to relieve the regimental ranks of those officers, many of whom were very old. This was the account Sir Herbert Taylor, then Military Secretary, gave of the matter in his evidence in 1828. He described the inconvenience which the regimental ranks suffered by brevet field-officers serving in the rank of captain, and brevet lieutenant colonels serving as majors, and the necessity of getting rid of these officers by placing them on half-pay. He would now call attention to the General Order of the 25th of April, 1826. It had received the sanction of Lord Liverpool, then First Lord of the Treasury, and Lord Palmerston, then Secretary at War. It declared, with reference to brevet field-officers, that it was most desirable to relieve regiments of them, and spoke of conferring some boon upon them for their service. The boon they received was being placed on half-pay, for nearly 34 years, of 9s. 6d. a day, while they were in the actual receipt of 13s. 7d. a day. These officers, therefore, had received is. 4d. 1d. a day during 34 years less than they were formerly in receipt of, making a sum of £2,400 which they had lost. It might be asked why they did not avail themselves of the provisions of the Order of the 25th of April, 1825. The answer was simple. Being brevet field officers they would, if they had gone out under that Order have been obliged to purchase a field officer's rank; but having get that already there was no object in paying for it. It would not have been worth their while to do so merely for the purpose of availing themselves of the Order of the 25th of April, 1825. The Government, finding that these officers would not go on half-pay by purchase, under the Order of 1825, were at last driven, to bring youth into the ranks, to issue the Order of 1826, and pledged themselves if these officers accepted half pay under the terms of that Order for the good of the service that they would neither forfeit for themselves or families their future claims on the service. With respect to the six years' rule, it lasted only while these officers were in the regimental ranks; it expired when they accepted the terms offered. No less than three of the number who accepted this unattached pay were senior captains of their regiments, and a death vacancy or a movement of the staff would have given them the substantive rank they got on half-pay; others were second and third captains; with one exception they were all high up. When this Motion was formerly introduced by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North), it was attempted to be shown that the only claims these officers did not forfeit were those for their wives and families, but the General Order distinctly stated that they did not forfeit "for themselves" "or families" their future claims on the service. What claims had these general officers ever been able to make for themselves? One of those claims, if it could be called a claim, was, that they had immediately endeavoured to return to full pay by exchange. But the exchange to full pay depended on whether the authorities gave them an opening for that purpose, and also on the state of the list at that time. He held in his hand letters from four of these General Officers, all declaring their extreme disgust at the treatment they had received, and stating that they never would, under any circumstances, have accepted this substantive rank on half-pay if they had had the slightest idea that such would be their treatment. They expected to have been employed, and to return again to full pay, whereby they would have served the six years as field officers; or, if they did not return to full pay, they distinctly understood, from the terms of the Memorandum and General Order of 1826, that their claims would have been recognized. If it was really to be held that the claim for their widows was the leading feature in that General Order, it was a curious fact that no fewer than four of these officers had never been married, and they had informed him that in 1826, when they accepted this half-pay, they had not even the slightest intention of marrying. The benefit of their widows could hardly, therefore, have been any inducement with them in accepting the position that was offered to them for the convenience of the service. He had the authority of the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) for his reading of the General Order—namely, that under its terms these officers were fully entitled to receive the pay of General Officers, and that a distinct pledge was given them that their claims should not be forfeited by going on half-pay. The only claim they had had an opportunity of putting forward was the one which he now assorted on their behalf—namely, that they should be placed in the position of General Officers, receiving General's pay, instead of receiving, as at present, only the half-pay of captains. The manner in which these officers were gazetted, totally differing as it did from the usual form, also showed that the offer of substantive rank made to them by the Government was made for the convenience of the service, and for that only. A binding contract had been entered into with them on the part of the State which had never yet been fulfilled. The correspondence between the Treasury and the War Department on this subject proved that the matter had not been sufficiently explained to the Treasury, whose answer was given without a full knowledge of the circumstances. He trusted, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Sidney Herbert) would now be able to state that these claims would receive a fair consideration at the hands of the Government. Another point to which he wished to call attention related to a warrant issued on the 1st October, 1858, placing surgeons in the army, on completing the age of fifty-five, upon half-pay. This rule, having a retrospective action, had operated with extreme hardship and injustice upon a body of most valuable men. If these officers were really too old for their work, or had been ruined in health by a foreign climate, it would doubtless be the duty of the Secretary of State to supersede them. But he knew that many of them were in the full possession of all their faculties and every way efficient for the service. Yet, having attained the age of fifty-five, they were arbitrarily removed from their positions, and deprived of the rank and pay to which they looked for ward at the close of their career. The Order was the more severe upon them, be- cause, if they had obtained the rank next above that which they occupied they would have been entitled to remain ten years more in the service. A warrant had lately been issued for the navy, under which medical officers, of equal rank to the army surgeons, whose case he advocated, were not obliged to retire till they reached sixty. One of the officers to whom he alluded had been thirty years in the service, twenty-one of which had been passed in the Colonies; he was a man of great vigour and activity, and he had been told that if he had not been serving in a more distant part of the empire he would have been employed in the Crimea, where he would have had a chance of rising to high rank. The only compensation these surgeons had received was simply 1s. 6d. a day —an amount that was no equivalent for the great sacrifice they had been called upon to make. They had, indeed, also obtained honorary promotion to the rank above them; but of what avail was the mere rank of Deputy Inspector of Hospitals without the substantive advantages attached to it? A medical officer, who sat upon the Sanitary Commission over which the right hon. Gentleman opposite presided, had fully acknowledged the hardship inflicted on these officers, and stated that he scarcely suspected they would have suffered so much as it now turned out they had done. The warrant had pressed with great severity on men who had faithfully served their country in distant parts of the globe, and it would have been only a graceful act to grant them some compensation for the loss entailed upon them by the retrospective effect of an Order which they could never have contemplated when they entered the service.

in rising to draw the attention of the House to the recent appointment of General the Hon. Sir Charles Grey to the Colonelcy of a Regiment, observed:— A Notice stands in my name respecting the recent appointment of General the Hon. Sir Charles Grey to the sinecure Colonelcy of a Regiment. That Notice has been caused somewhat accidentally. In the Committee on Military Organization I took the liberty, a few days since, of asking the Secretary for War, in the course of his evidence, a question, which is reported in the following words: —

"In the highest appointments (for which you are responsible) you include, do you not, nominations to colonelcies of regiments?—Yes.

"There has been an appointment (to a colonelcy) which attracted a good deal of public attention; did that appointment come under your notice?—Certainly; I am responsible for it.

"I do not wish to press the question, but it might, perhaps, be agreeable to you to state the reason for that appointment?—I would sooner you put that question to me in the House of Commons."

Now, I consider this invitation as leaving me no option but that of submitting the question, which I now do, on the present Motion. And, considering the very serious principle involved in this recent appointment, I am very glad that it has thus devolved to me to bring it to issue; for, if it be to be regarded as a precedent, it is but right that the fact should be made known to the army and to the public. In 1833, a Select Committee was appointed to inquire into the grounds of similar sinecure nominations. In the evidence of the late Lord Raglan (then Lord FitzRoy Somerset) before that Committee, the following questions and answers are recorded:—

"Do you not consider it essential to the good of the service that the Commander-in-Chief should have the power to select the most meritorious officers for those which are appointments of reward, and not exactly appointments to which duties are attached?—Yes; I consider that the just reward of individuals in all ranks, but particularly in the higher ranks, is a very important duty for the Commander-in-Chief to discharge, not only as it affects the officers of the King's service, but the credit of the country and the honour of His Majesty himself."

"Supposing (his Lordship was asked) that there was a general officer who had had short service, but who had had an opportunity of distinguishing himself in the field, and that there was another officer of a longer service, but who had performed that service in the Colonies and had not had the same good fortune in distinguishing himself,— which of those two classes would, as the general principle, the Commander-in-Chief prefer in recommending for Governments?—I should say that the general officer whose service has been shorter, but who had the greater opportunity of distinguishing himself in the field, has been repeatedly exposed to danger, and has been wounded,—one, in fact, who has been in a situation of higher responsibility,—would be the first class of officers to be considered."

His Lordship went on to say, that—

"The next officer to be considered would be one who had accompanied his regiment to the Colonies and had acquitted himself well in command of it."

Then the general officers, he added, who had performed very respectable service, chiefly at home, would certainly come in the Inst of the three classes. Again, in the Report of the Royal Commission of 1854, of which the present Secretary of State for War was Chairman, there is the following recommendation to Her Majesty, namely: —

"That the command of battalions In the Ordnance corps be given without reference to seniority, in the same manner as the colonelcies of regiments, to the officers whose services appear the best to entitle them to such a distinction."

In mentioning the name of General Sir Charles Grey I have not the remotest intention or wish to undervalue the services of that officer. On the contrary, I have no doubt that the gallant officer has rendered very important services as Private Secretary to his Royal Highness the Prince Consort; but the impression on my mind is that they are not important military services. I have heard that General Sir Charles Grey has commanded with great propriety a regiment on home service, and far be it from me to diminish the gallant officer's claim on that account; but to that description of claim Lord FitzRoy Somerset has given the last place. Upon looking over the Army List it appears that there are fourteen general officers senior to Sir Charles Grey who have seen a great deal of service in the field and in the Colonies, some having been wounded; and again, there are several Generals who have commanded brigades, or even divisions, during the Indian mutiny or in the Crimea, who are without regiments. Then there are a great number of other officers less fortunate in arriving at the rank of General, but who have served longer than Sir Charles Grey, and have performed distinguished services; yet the General officer selected for the recent appointment has never, if I am rightly informed, served out of the United Kingdom. I do not com- plain of the appointment of such a young general as Sir John Inglis to a regiment, for he rendered distinguished service at Lucknow but when generals of longstanding in the service, who have served in all parts of the world, find their claims totally overlooked and their services set aside in favour of an officer who has never been out of the United Kingdom, I must say I think it very extraordinary. I have no doubt that General Grey commanded a regiment perfectly well on home service. Perhaps he may also have gone to the Colonies. If so, the Secretary for War will not fail to state it. But according to Hart's Army List, General Grey virtually quitted the army eighteen years ago to take a high and confidential appointment in the Palace, I am far from wishing to undervalue or depreciate the important services which he may have rendered, and no doubt has rendered, in that capacity; but again I say they were not military services. I believe only two or three officers have been promoted above him; but on this question of seniority I wish to draw the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the Report of a Commission which sat in 1854, and of which he himself was the Chairman. This Commission recommended "that the command of battalions in the Ordnance corps be given without reference to seniority, in the same manner as the colonelcies of regiments, to the officers whose services appear the best to entitle them to such a distinction." It will be seen from this that the right hon. Gentleman totally disclaims the principle of seniority, unless in addition to seniority there is distinguished service. In the public prints, eight or ten names of really distinguished officers have been mentioned who have been set aside on this occasion, some of them having held high commands. In short, I can hardly help believing that the whole of the matters connected with this case have not been brought under the notice of the right hon. Gentleman as they ought to have been, because I am satisfied, with his high sense of justice and his strong desire for the good of the service, that he would have hesitated before giving his assent to or accepting the responsibility of this appointment. The right hon. Gentleman on the occasion to which I have referred volunteered the statement that he was expressly responsible for this appointment. Probably there is some little omission here, for the Commander-in-Chief must surely have recom- mended the appointment to him, and he would not make it without such a recommendation. On speaking of this matter to some persons they said that the readiness of the right hon. Gentleman to meet the question in the House of Commons probably arose from his being aware of the fact that General Grey had offered to serve in the Crimea. Well, I believe that all the general officers in the army offered to serve there. But with regard to offers of service in the Crimean or other wars let me draw attention to a passage in the letters of the Duke of Wellington, just now published, which is very decisive on this point. He was Secretary for Ireland in 1809. It was reported that an expedition would sail to the Peninsular. His appointment produced large emoluments—I believe some £6,000 or £7,000 a year; but he wrote directly to Lord Castlereagh, somewhat to this effect: —"I hear it reported that an expedition to the Peninsula is being prepared. I am determined not to abandon my profession. I hold a very lucrative post. Whether you have the opportunity of appointing me to this expedition I cannot say, but this I have to say—you must be so good as to provide a substitute for me in the office of Secretary for Ireland, for I will not stay in that office, whether I go to the Peninsula or not. I should risk my character with the army if they could say that I had preferred a lucrative position at home to serving in the field." And on another occasion he said:—"There shall be no mistake about it. I won't continue to hold this office, whether yon give me a military command or not. Provide another Irish Secretary, for I won't stay here." The result was that he was appointed to command the expedition; but his language showed how strong was the feeling which he entertained in reference to the position of an officer who continued to hold an emolumentary office during time of war. I think, therefore, that the mere offer of service in the Crimea, unless it was followed up with the vigour which Sir Arthur Wellesley evinced on that occasion, hardly furnishes an adequate ground for the present appointment. These preferments are 135 in number, and really, unless it is found that that they are distributed on some satisfactory principle as rewards for military services, I doubt whether the country will acquiesce in the continuance of this definite number of them. I have never seen this House unwilling to reward active and approved services, and I cannot help sharing in the opinion which many entertain that several of the officers who have recently distinguished themselves in India are entitled not only to this kind of preferment, but to a great deal more; while I believe, on the other hand, that some officers have succeeded to such appointments without having seen any service which could give a right to them. I said before there were not less than fourteen general officers senior to General Grey, whose claims were not considered upon this occasion. Several of them went through almost the whole of the Peninsular War. Then, again, there is a list of other officers, not, indeed, senior to General Grey, but far superior to him as soldiers, who performed signal services in the Crimea and India, but who were also passed over. A few days since an old general officer called upon me while this notice was on the paper. He is one of the officers named in a recently-established military publication, The Army and Navy Gazette — General George Bell. I knew that he was a very old officer, and had served most honestly and gallantly, and I asked him how his services had been rewarded, and whether he had received the command of a regiment. He replied, that his services had not received the slightest word of encouragement, and that he despaired of any requital for them. "Have you any objection to my referring to them in the House?" I asked. "Not the slightest," he said. He is a gallant old officer, and does not care one straw for anything which may be said, seeing that he speaks nothing but the truth. He has served for about fifty years, which is much longer than General Grey's military career. Of these fifty years, forty were passed upon active service in the Peninsula (where he was present at a great number of battles), in the East and West Indies, the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, Nova Scotia, the Canadian rebellion, the Burmese war, and in the Crimea. General Bell says, that, undoubtedly, there were others who, perhaps, served longer than he did in the Peninsula, but who afterwards retired; but he has served up to the present time, and asks to serve again. During eleven years he commanded his regiment (the Royals), and he was wounded more than once at the head of it. He was wounded also while commanding the troops (3,000 men) in the trenches before Sebastopol, and he also commanded a brigade in the Crimea. Surely such an officer as this, who has seen forty years of active service, is unfairly neglected when a general officer, twelve years younger in the army than he is, receives the command of a regiment, while he gets no encouragement even to expect such an appointment, I presume that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to make out a good case. He appeared to have not the slightest doubt of doing so. I remember that when the question of the purchase system was brought under the consideration of the House some time ago, the great obstacle set forth in the way of removing that dishonour and disgrace to the British army was said to be the difficulty of making a selection. It was then given out by some very high authorities— by Lord Panmure and the Commander-in-Chief amongst them—that to make selections would be most invidious. But the present is one of the most complete cases of selection that can be imagined, and I believe that it has caused more dissatisfaction among the officers of the army than can well be conceived. Many other subjects have been adverted to this evening, and a very important statement has been made by the late Secretary for War (General Peel). In some of his opinions I concur, but from others I certainly must dissent. He seemed to think that there could be no further economy in the present military establishment. If he means that no economy can be effected as regards the numerical strength of our forces, I agree with him. But if he means that there is no possibility of effecting any saving in the administration of the army, I can assent to no such proposition. I believe that the military Estimates which are presented to us from year to year are in a state of great confusion. They do not satisfactorily ex plain the state of the administration. The object of them must he to make clear what is the expense of each officer in the service and in every department; but I will venture to say that few men, whether civilians or military men, are able to discover that distinctly. Almost every staff officer has three or four different items of pay, and unless they are traced out with great care in different parts of the Estimates it is impossible to find out what is the amount each officer is really receiving. I must do my hon. Friend (Mr. Laing) and also the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford North-cote), the justice to say that the Treasury has several times remonstrated with the War Department upon the confusion of the accounts, and the expediency of simplifying them. I will just state one instance of the delusive character of these accounts. Take the first item in these accounts. The salary of the Commander-in-Chief is stated broadly at £3,300 a year; but if we look through the Estimates we shall find that there are three or four other items, which increase his emoluments to upwards of £6,000 a year. I do not mention this in any invidious spirit, but simply because it is the first item which presents itself. Then, again, in my opinion, the Staff ought to be paid in accordance with the importance of the duties which the officers have to perform, and toe payment should appear clearly in the Estimates. I believe if this matter were looked into, we should find that a very considerable percentage of saving could he effected. I know that there are parties who would be prepared to offer opposition to such a change. The right hon. Gentleman has a large body of clerks who, having been brought up on the old system, would be very disinclined to adopt a new one. I will not dwell further upon that point, but I must say that some improvement must he made in the present practice if the army is ever to be administered in an economical and efficient manner. I think there is some extravagance in the cost of our Staff. I do not wish to select individuals, but in order to do any good one must refer to particular cases. Until lately there was no such thing as a General officer on the Staff in the Guards, that duty being generally undertaken by some officer at the Horse Guards. Then, again, there are some corps which have more officers than they require. There are also certain items in the payment of Staff officers which I think it would be for the comfort of those officers themselves should be inquired into. There are also other appointments of considerable emolument which it would be well to inquire into. I find there are some General officers who receive from £5,000 to £10,000 or £11,000 a year. Now, I think that as £5,000 or £6,000 a year is a very handsome allowance for a Bishop, it is enough for a General officer. I know it may be considered invidious to make these remarks, but unless some one does it we shall do no good. An hon. and gallant Gentleman (General Peel) has stated that we have 150,000 effective men upon the establishment, exclusive of India. I wish we had 150,000 available men in the United Kingdom—but unfortunately that figure includes the troops in the Colonies, which amount to 30,000 or 40,000 men. We must of course keep garrisons in certain fortresses, but the question of keeping troops in the Colonies has been treated of in an able Report recently laid before Parliament, drawn up by three civilians, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Elliott, and Mr. Godley. Among the contents of that Report—which contains some very just observations—a maxim is laid down, that the real defence of the Colonies is in the people themselves, and not in paltry detachments of troops disseminated through the colonies. That is no new thought, however, for I recollect when I was much younger I lamented the erroneous system which prevailed of having garrisons in almost all the places in our possession. That was at a time when the French had no large fleet; but whether she has a fleet or not, I hope the Government will always bear in mind that the real defence of the country is best cared for by having a great mass of troops concentrated near the heart of the empire and taking the chance of some little island being attacked; our best plan is not to garrison all posts, but to mass our troops upon a central point. Even at the commencement of the tremendous mutiny in India, we had nearly 12,000 men, nearly 10,000 of the Line, at the Cape of Good Hope. The Governor of the Colony bad such great regard for good troops, that although he received orders from the Colonial Office to detach troops, he did not do so he was first instructed to send troops to the Crimea, but he declined to comply; and subsequently he received more than one order, as has been proved before a Committee of the House of Commons, from the Colonial Department, to send troops to India, but he held back. The fact was we were spending nearly a million a year for the advantage of the small population of the Cape of Good Hope. That is one instance of the effects of the old system. Except in the fortresses which must be held by garrisons, and with the great exception of India, I do not see that there need be any considerable number of troops in any other posts. A very important communication was made to the different Colonies by the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Minister in Lord Derby's Administration (Sir John Pakington), pointing out to them that they were all greatly increasing in population and wealth, and ought to develope their own means of local defence, without expecting any assistance from the mother country except in case of war. That point has also been ably dealt with in the Report to which I have before referred, and I hope the present Government will follow up those suggestions and say to the Colonies that they must place themselves in a position for self-defence. Some have, indeed, done so; Australia has commenced, and Canada has made considerable progress. The two Provinces of Canada, I believe, have a militia amounting to about 200,000 men, a force far greater than our own militia. The hon. and gallant General opposite has referred to a most important point, the Reserves of the army. When Parliament was prorogued at the end of last Session there was one paragraph in the Royal Speech which attracted my attention and gave me much pleasure. Her Majesty congratulated Parliament that measures had been taken to form Reserves both for the army and the navy, and that the national defences were a paramount object in the policy of the Government. I think still that ought to be a paramount consideration; but I am sorry to say the Reserve for the navy has proved most insignificant in numbers, and the Reserve of the army hardly exists at all, or at most only to the extent of a few hundred men. We have, no doubt, a considerable force in the shape of Volunteeer Corps, which we owe entirely to the public spirit and patriotism of the country. The Government are entitled to very little credit in respect of that force, for the truth is, that for a time they seemed to doubt whether they should encourage or discourage the movement. I am sorry to see that an hon. Baronet (Sir R. Peel) has thought it necessary to give notice of a Motion that the Vote on the Estimates for the Volunteer Force should be reduced. I can only say that I believe the movement has been, on the whole, very satisfactory, and I was happy to see the amount of the force lately stated authoritatively to amount to 120,000 or 130,000. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War will give to that important force all the encouragement it so well deserves. I rather regret, however, that steps have not been taken to enlarge the basis of the force. I am afraid that in some quarters there is a little jealousy felt as to allowing the people at large to join in this movement. I will only remind such persons that one of the great Powers of Europe—Poland— fell and disappeared from the rank of nations through the jealousy of the aristocracy towards the great mass of the people. very much regret that nothing has been done to establish a volunteer force in Ireland. I know very well that an idea exists that the people of Ireland are disaffected, and that those who profess the Roman Catholic religion are not so loyal to the British Crown as they ought to be. It appears to me, however, that the sympathy which many of the Irish people have evinced for the Papal cause ought not to excite the least apprehension. There is no reason to suppose, because sympathy has been manifested towards the Pope, that they are, therefore, disloyal to the British Government. It is a complete mistake to think so, and one that ought to be rectified. We are told that the law does not admit at present of the embodiment of volunteers in Ireland. If such be the law, I say, as I have said before, that it ought to be altered without delay. In the Letters of the Duke of Wellington, just published, and to which I have already alluded, I find that in 1808, when there was infinitely greater cause than now of disaffection towards the British Throne, the Duke writes with much satisfaction to say that he has organized a volunteer force of between 40,000 and 50,000 men; and the population was considerably less at that time than it is now. We have had Irish militia regiments in this country, and I should like to know if any one ever thought of distrusting those troops? There are, too, the Irish constabulary, almost all of whom are Roman Catholics; but I never heard that disloyalty was imputed to that fine body of men. These, in my opinion, are all arguments to prove that we ought to have a strong volunteer force in Ireland as well as in this country. With regard to the feelings of the people of Ireland on this subject, I would refer with much pleasure to an excellent speech lately delivered by the Catholic Bishop of Kerry, in which he answered some statements said to have been made rather too favourable to the French Government. He said such statements arose from a want of consideration; that he did not believe his fellow-countrymen or the priesthood would be so wanting in common sense as to desire to have a species of despotism in Ireland such as existed in France; and he reminded them that they would not have been allowed in France to make such speeches as had been made in reference to this subject. The late Secretary for War (General Peel) has spoken of the exact force now in this country, and has declared it as his opinion that that force is quite inadequate. In that opinion I entirely concur. The nominal force in this country at the present moment is quite inadequate, and I am not satisfied with its composition. Let us economize as far as we can. No one will be readier to do so than myself; but the possession of a numerical force that will enable us to fight in the field is the great object that we ought to aim at. We are told we have 150,000 men, but we have no such number in the United Kingdom. [Mr. WILLIAMS: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member for Lambeth no doubt knows all about it. We may have 150,000 to pay, but this includes men for the Colonies, and some of them are highly garrisoned. I do not believe we have more than 30,000 troops of the Line at home; there are 20,000 in the depots, and these depots are in a most unsatisfactory state, because they are made up of recruits assembled together without amalgamation. A speech was lately made by a noble and gallant Lord (the Earl of Lucan) in "another place" on this subject, and he recommended that second battalions should be substituted for depôts. This is a matter worthy of serious consideration, and I hope it will receive the attention of the Government. At any rate the present system should be altered, for it was far from producing satisfactory results. I have to apologize to the House for the length of the observations I have ventured to make; but my excuse is the vast importance of the subject.

in calling the attention of the House to the Report of the Committee on the Military Defences of the Colonies, said, he thought it was essential to a proper discussion of the Army Estimates that the expenditure of the country upon colonial defences should be brought before the House. He was induced to introduce the subject now because he might not have another opportunity of doing so, and because if it were to be discussed at all it ought to be before supply was granted for the army. They were about to vote £15,000,000 for the Army Estimates, and of that sum upwards of £4,000,000 was disposed of in colonial defences. He could show that a great deal of this money was unnecessarily voted—that it was uselessly thrown away; while at the same time the resources and rightful obligations of large portions of the Empire in men and money were refused, although both could be readily enlisted in Her Majesty's service. A Committee had sat upon the subject of the Colonial Defences, and he wished now to know whether the Government intended to act upon their Report, and if not, what was going to be done. It was in March, 1859, that the gallant General (General Peel) then at the head of the War Office, communicated with the Colonial Office and the Treasury his sense of the immense inconvenience and mischief produced by the existing system, and urged upon them the necessity of coming to some definite principle as to the distribution of the expenditure on colonial defences between his own and the Colonial Department. General Peel then laid down, as the basis of an equitable arrangement, the double principle that the Home Government ought to contribute to the defence of the Colonies from invasion, but that the colonists should provide wholly for their own internal defence, and that any expenditure by the mother country for that purpose ought to be reimbursed from the colonial funds. The gallant General then proposed the formation of a Committee formed of representatives of three offices—the War Office, the Colonial Office, and the Treasury—to consider the best means of devising better arrangements. That Committee was formed and consisted of Mr. Hamilton (the Secretary of the Treasury and formerly a highly respected Member of that House) as representative of the Treasury; Mr. Godley (a man of the highest ability and worth, and one whose opinion upon a question like this was of the greatest value because of his vast acquaintance with colonial matters) from the War Office; and Mr. Eliott (also a man of eminent ability) from the Colonial Office. Mr. Godley was one of the founders of the Colony of Canterbury, in New Zealand, one of the most successful colonies this country had ever established. He (Mr. Adderley) could himself bear testimony to its success, having been one of the original adventurers in the scheme with Mr. Godley, and being in the receipt of large and ample dividends arising from the unexampled and unchecked prosperity of the colony. That Committee made its Report. To that Report he desired the particular attention of the House on various grounds. Questions of considerable import were involved in its consideration. It was important on the ground of economy; it had an important bearing upon the efficiency of the army, which, as the hon. and gallant General (Sir De Lacy Evans) had just stated was now scattered over the globe; but thirdly, it was important because it showed that the safety and vigour of our colonies were materially impaired by the present system. He intended, first, to state the principles laid down by the Report; secondly, the objections advanced by Mr. Elliott, in an appendix, to some of those principles; and thirdly, to show the fallacy of those objections. The Report showed, first, that the colonies of England contributed to the expense of their own defences about one-tenth part only, and it stated that such a state of things was quite novel in the whole world's history and an entire innovation on the former treatment of her Colonies by England. It was absolutely unparalleled in the history of the world that any portion of an empire—colonial, provincial, or otherwise—should be so exempted, both in purse and person, from the cost of its own defences. He did not believe that, there was one Englishman in a thousand who was well acquainted with the history of our earliest colonies; but those who knew it would remember that for a century and a half the original American colonists had maintained their own defences without any assistance from the mother country, and had not only maintained peace within their own borders, but had even defeated the regular armies of Spain, France, Holland, and other countries repeatedly with their own Militia troops. Graham, the historian of the early American colonists, showed how England used to go to war in those days, and the zeal with which the colonists readily supplied not only money but troops. In 1710, when England was engaged in a contest with France, the American militia, being disappointed in the arrival of the English regular army, obtained permission to take the field alone, and added Port Royal and Acadia to the dominions of the Crown. A far more memorable instance was that of the taking of Louisburg in 1745, when the young English colonies, exposed to danger on all sides, absolutely themselves, unaided by a single man from England, raised a force, both military and naval, and took Cape Breton, the Gibraltar of America, and added it to the dominions of the Crown. The Mutiny Act of England was never extended to America until 1740, and it was then that the introduction of English troops began there, never censing until the emancipation of those colonies, produced mainly by the interference of the mother country. The present sysem was not only an innovation, but one of the most inconsistent and anomalous description. No definite rule existed; for some colonies which as Imperial stations had a right to have Imperial garrisons, contributed most, and those which had no claim for assistance contributed least. Another aggravation was the treatment of the troops in regard to colonial allowances. In some rich colonies Her Majesty's troops received allowances in addition to their pay. The consequence was, that the pay of the troops stationed in less liberal colonies where no such allowances were made was necessarily increased out of our Treasury beyond the regular pay of our army; and where this was not done continual grumblings and discontent prevailed. When Earl Grey was at the head of the Colonial Office, be suggested that all that England should undertake to maintain in each colony was that amount of force which might be considered necessary for Imperial purposes. Very ample reasons were given in the Report for not adopting that proposition. He thought the Report sufficiently disposed of the proposition and principles laid down by Lord Grey. What was sufficient for Imperial purposes? He suspected hardly two Gentlemen in the House would give the same opinion on that point; some would say that no force at all, others that a very large one, was required. This proposition, in fact, left it to the discretion of the Government to determine what force was required, which was the cry practice at present found so mischievous, that a Committee had been formed to get rid of it. The force which might be deemed sufficient dining peace would, of course, prove insufficient in time of war; but that was just the time when the mother country could least spare any troops. The Report laid down the only principle which appeared to him capable of application to the case, and that was the classification of all English dependencies into Imperial stations and self-governed Colonies. It recommended that the cost of those posts which were established by the Imperial Government for their own purposes, whether warlike, as at Gibraltar and Malta, or philanthropic, as in West Africa, should be defrayed out of the Imperial Treasury. The Report included in the second class the territories of Colonies which had each a Government of its own, and declared that there was no reason whatever why this country should contribute a farthing towards the defence of those Colonics, or that they should be exempted from bearing their full share of the cost, except that the Imperial Government had the power to determine the questions of peace and war, or, in other words, that the Colonies were not represented in the Imperial Parliament. He would next come to the objections raised by Mr. Elliott to portions of the Report. Mr. Elliott acknowledged that there were gross anomalies in the existing system, and that it was impossible that England should undertake to defend all her Colonies throughout the world, and be illustrated that position very tersely in his Appendix. He said, when the Emperors of France and Austria went to war in Italy it was immediately proposed to construct new batteries at the Cape of Good Hope. That was a proposal to strengthen this country in the event of her being involved in a European war, by locking up 100 artillerymen on the most southerly coast of South Africa. It was an illustration of the system of England with regard to all her Colonies. Mr. Elliott, however, denied the soundness of the principle laid down by the Committee, that the non-representation of the Colonies in the British Parliament constituted the only reason for their exemption from paying the cost of their own defences, and insisted that mere self-interest ought to induce us to defray some part of that outlay, because the Colonies consumed more of our produce than other countries, he also objected to the recommendation of the Report that a fixed rule and rate of aid should be laid down on which England should assist the Colonies. He (Mr. Adderley) thought be should have little difficulty in showing the utter fallacy on which Mr. Elliott based his objections. He would not accept the position that the Colonies should bear their full share of their own expenses, even if they were represented in Parliament. He would still have some reason why they should be exempted, even though they were represented as much as Scotland; on what ground such partiality should be exercised towards portions of the Empire, he utterly fails to show. As to Mr. Elliott's reason that the Colonies had other claims on this country and that self-interest induced us to contribute to the expense of the Colonies, because they imported more of our produce than foreign countries, that was simply the old fallacy which existed before the principles of political economy were so well known as now. Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, had recently expressed the same opinion in a speech in London, in which he said that upon every article the colonists imported from this country they paid something towards the Imperial taxation. Why, if that was contributing to their own defences then every country in the world that took our produce did the same thing, and we ought to pay for the local expenses of every foreign country dealing with us on the same ground of self-interest. But absurd as his inference is, he is still less sound in his premises. Mr. Elliott pointed to Australia as consuming per head a larger amount of the produce of Great Britain than the United States, and drew the conclusion that therefore a dependent country consumed more than an independent one. That argument was completely exposed by Mr. Godley, who showed that the opposite conclusion might be supported by the same logic, because Canada imported less per head than the United States, and the United States themselves imported more largely after they became independent than before, even in rate of importation per head. There are, therefore, more data for expecting importation from independent, than from dependent, countries. Of course all these arguments were fallacious, because countries did not import produce from this country from political motives but from commercial requirements. With regard to Mr. Elliott's second objection to a fixed rate of aid towards the defences of our Colonies, the Report recommended that the rate should he laid down, from which there should be no deviation, save by way of exception. Mr. Elliott would have no such rate laid down as a rule, but would keep the matter still in the discretion of the Colonial Office, to say what amount of contribution this country should be charged with—the amount of money and the number of troops Her Majesty should contribute towards each of the Colonies. What Mr. Elliott proposed was simply to retain matters as they are. It was trusting to the discretion of the Colonial Office that had led to the present state of things. His proposition was to amend the present system by retaining the present system. The proposition of the Report was to lay down a fixed rule, and rate of aid. There could be very little question which of those two propositions was the wiser. Alteration was at least more in the way of amending a vicious system than simple retention. Mr. Elliott endeavoured, by way of some change, to classify the Colonies under four heads, instead of under two; but it would be found that the four resolved themselves into two, and he did not think that any mode could be devised of varying or increasing the classification under the two heads proposed in the Report. Mr. Elliott classified colonies according to the amount of European clement in their populations. Mr. Elliott said that from the number of coloured population the West Indies required a large contribution in men and money from this country; yet, singularly enough, the troops which protected those colonists from the coloured population were coloured troops. The case of the West Indies best illustrated the advantage of a fixed rule, because if any deviation from a fixed rule could be justified, it would be in their case where the Imperial policy had interfered with the local government, interrupted their command of labour, and embarrassed the relations of the colonists to their population, and where their policy being exceptional, the treatment might also be justly exceptional. How much bettor to treat exceptional cases exceptionally, than to have no rule, because there must be exceptions! He concluded that Mr. Elliott, having been so long connected with the Colonial Office, gave a fair example of how the discretion which he advocated would be used. Mr. Elliott said of Ceylon that they contributed more than other colonists to their own defence, and there was some question whether they should not contribute still more, but at this moment they were engaged in making a large outlay on railways and other works, and it was clear that whatever was taken extra for defence would be deducted from those very useful public works. People in England were engaged in railway undertakings and other remunerating enterprises, and yet every poor man was taxed for national defence; but according to Mr. Elliott, colonists who were undertaking public works ought to be exempted from the usual liability of citizens, and all the cost of their defence be added to the taxation of this country. The Government have stated that the present state of things could not be allowed to continue; they had asked for a Committee; they had formed a Committee representing three Departments of the Government. This most important Report was before the House, and he wished to know how the Government intended to deal with it. The Report proposed material changes in the system, and changes which he thought would be of very great benefit to this country, by improving the efficiency of the army and diminishing taxation, and to the colonies by insuring their vigour and safety. If the Government were not prepared to act upon it—he did not mean hastily, but by declaring that they would gradually carry the principle recommended in the Report into effect,—would they suggest some plan of their own, or would they refer the subject to a Committee of the House? Before going into Committee of Supply upon £15,000,000 of Estimates, £4,000,000 of which he disputed as involving many useless items and still more mischievous principles, the Government ought to let them know what they were about to do upon this important subject.

thought it a matter of regret that this departmental paper should have got into their hands. He did not think that the practice of substituting for a speech of a Minister the printed opinions of his permanent subordinate was likely to be attended with advantage, and in this instance the only result was to show that three officers of the Government had a serious difference of opinion upon the subject. There seemed to him no other way to settle the controversy than to refer the matter to a Committee of the House; and a further reason for doing so was, that he thought these three Gentlemen—especially Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Godley had exceeded the limits of the reference in their Report. The direction of General Peel was that they should examine into the best mode of saving to the country the expense of defending the Colonies and maintaining order within them; instead of which, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Godley had gone into a metaphysical inquiry as to how best to promote patriotism and self-reliance, which was clearly beyond the purview of their duties. The right hon. Gentleman said that the fact that Mr. Godley had been a colonist and was in the War-Office gave a combined value to his report; he had a very high opinion of Mr. Godley, but having been in the same colony with that Gentleman he knew that' these opinions were there openly professed by Mr. Godley, and had, therefore, nothing to do with his tenure in the War-Office. He felt bound to dispute the statement that Canterbury was the most successful of all our colonies. It was a scheme which failed entirely in those points in which it differed from other schemes, and although it was perfectly true that 4,000 Englishmen, placed upon most fertile land, succeeded in supporting themselves, and rising to a flourishing condition, he could not allow the claim of Mr. Godley to be the leader of the most successful band of colonists which had ever left these shores. His right hon. Friend disputed £4,000,000 of those Estimates as useless; but the total amount for the Colonies was only £3,000,000, and half of that must be deducted for military garrisons, which it was necessary to maintain for Imperial purposes in different parts of the world—such as Malta and Gibraltar. That could not be charged as part of the expenses of the Colonies. His right hon. Friend had passed over very lightly the objection to the views of which he was the advocate, which was to be found in the fact that the Imperial Government was wont to make wars, for the cost of the prosecution of which the Colonies were compelled ultimately to provide the funds. It was indeed doubtful whether they would in many cases be put to any but the most trifling military expense were it not for the consequences which their connection with Great Britain entailed. When there was an impression that there might be a war between England and France there was a great panic in Australia; but it was solely upon this ground, that if the Imperial Government went to war the trade of Australia might he harassed by the enemy. So in the instance of Canada. If she dreaded the breaking out of hostilities with the United States she was apprehensive of that result chiefly because some dispute might arise between this country and the latter with respect to the Isthmus of Panama, the subject of recruiting, or for some similar reason. If we had to maintain a large force in Ceylon, it was simply because our Government of India might possibly create a ferment in the Native mind which might run on to Ceylon and render the services of troops necessary. So it was also with the other colonies; while in the case of the Cape of Good Hope and New Zealand a considerable force was required to keep the large native population at bay. It was true, indeed, that the Dutch needed hardly any assistance to keep the Caffres at bay; but then that was because they shot them as they would wild beasts, which our feeling would not permit us to do. Again, it had been our policy to plant two Republics which were rapidly growing in power to the north of the Cape Colony, presenting a constant source of danger, which, inasmuch as the establishment of those colonies was the direct act of the Imperial Legislature, it was bound to fur- nish the funds to meet. So it was in all cases, that wherever there was a necessity for troops that necessity arose simply from the connection of the Colonies with England, and from the danger of the Colonies being involved in England's quarrels. Now, Mr. Godley, in his paper which had been circulated the morning before, expressed it to be his opinion that it was desirable to reduce to a minimum the dependence of the Colonies; but it was perfectly obvious from the observations of his right hon. Friend that the object of those who supported that view was to destroy the dependence of the Colonies altogether. But if those opinions were carried into effect, and that the Colonies in the event of a breaking out of a French or Russian war were plundered by our enemies, the result would be that they would seek, as soon as possible, to put an end to a connection which they found to cost them extremely dear. His right hon. Friend had referred in support of his views to America, while Mr. Godley drew attention both to America and the Greek colonies of old, contending that in neither of those cases was it the custom to pay for colonial defence. But it should be remembered that in America the militia, which a spirit of patriotism and self-reliance had called into action, had been hardly so formed when it had been turned against England herself; while the Greek colonies could not be held to be colonies in our sense of the term. Corcyra, for instance, was no more a colony of Corinth than England was of Saxony, from which source a large amount of its population was derived, but upon which it was in no way dependent. The population, it was true, went from the old country to the new, but the dependence was merely nominal; and this was the state to which it was wished to reduce our colonial empire, at least it was a state of things which would be brought about by the policy recommended, whether it was wished or not. He did not think that there was any necessity for him to argue in favour of the continuance of our colonial system, for he believed that any proposition to abandon our Colonies would be hooted out of the House. He believed, however, that though our colonial empire could not be overthrown in that way, yet that it might be undermined; and he therefore most earnestly trusted that the Government would not take any action upon the recommendations in the docuuments in question—recommendations which had been made by a department unconnected with the Colonies—without submitting the matter for further consideration.

said, he was very glad the noble Lord had risen to address the House, inasmuch as he concurred in nearly the whole of the observations which he had made. He must, however, express his regret that the subject of those observations had been brought forward that evening by his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Adderley), inasmuch as, in the present state of the House, it was impossible that any satisfactory discussion with respect to it could take place, and as some hon. Members had left under the impression that the question would not be introduced. He regretted particularly the absence of the right hon. Gentleman who lately filled the office of Secretary for the Colonies (Sir E. Bulwer Lytton), who, he had reason to believe, would not lend his powerful aid in support of the views of which the right hon. Gentleman was the advocate. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Adderley) asked what course the Government intended to take in reference to the Report? It must not be forgotten that there were virtually two Reports, which were incompatible with each other. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to object very much to the classification of the Colonies made by Mr. Elliott, and to prefer that made by Mr. Godley. The latter gentleman, however, had really made no classification of the Colonies, as one of his classes contained them all, while the other comprised those military posts which are not Colonies. It appeared to him (Mr. Fortescue), on the other hand, that Mr. Elliott's classification was adapted to the state of things as it stood, and to the various and varying circumstances of the several communities which owned our sway. He found a number of communities differing in almost every respect; some, like Australia and America, of English origin, and others not, some young and growing, and others firmly established; he found islands which comprised the most extraordinary collection of races that had ever been brought together under any Government; and a number of dependencies with savage tribes on their frontiers or within their borders;—finding these circumstances existing, he adapted his advice to the facts with which he had to deal; and this circumstance very much recommended Mr. Elliott's Report to consideration. Now, the first of the Reports, to which the right hon. Gentleman had called the attention of the House, (Mr. Godley's), which had been sent in at the suggestion of the gallant General, who was then at the head of the War Department, was a very able document. But what did this Report do? Instead of preparing a scheme adapted to each Colony, according to its respective needs and capabilities, it attempted to lay down one rigid, uniform rule, as applicable alike to every one of our various and widely differing dependencies. It took away the whole of that discretion now exercised by the department of State concerned with these Colonies, and sought to supply the place of the judgment and discretion of the Secretary of Slate, by a kind of agency which was certainly simple enough—and, if possible, might be very convenient—but which he thought was an utter impossibility. It proposed to hand over to the Colonies the entire responsibility, management, and initiative in all matters relating to their military defences—a greater revolution could not well be conceived;—and, having handed over that power to the Colonies, this country was to contribute towards the expense of that military defence, not according to the wealth, danger, or necessities of the Colonies, but in one fixed and uniform proportion. Such a proposal, however ably defended, he could hardly believe any responsible Colonial Minister would undertake to carry into effect. It entirely disregarded the numerous differences that existed between our several Colonies, whether they were wealthy or poor, young or old, secure in their position, or exposed to internal or external foes. In short, it would be in practice entirely unworkable. The right hon. Gentleman had dwelt a good deal on what he considered the main motive and reason why this country should contribute in any degree to the protection of her dependencies—namely, that these were not represented in the Legislature, and that the power of peace and war was not in their hands. It was impossible to overrate the importance of that consideration; but it was not the only reason. Many of these dependencies could never have come into existence; and could not continue in existence now as separate and independent communities. It was only under the protection of this country, which sent them forth, that they could be maintained at all. Many of them were so small, that it was perfectly futile to speak of them as independent communities—if we chose to abandon them, they must attach themselves to some other State. A great part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman referred, not to the proper mode or amount of our military contributions to our Colonies, but to the question whether we should maintain our Colonies at all. Now, hon. Gentlemen had undoubtedly a right to their opinions on that subject; but representing, as be did, the Colonial Office, he did not think it his duty to discuss such a question; he thought the business of that office was to keep the Colonies; and therefore he did not enter into any question of the value to us of the commerce of Australia and Canada, as compared with that of the United States. With respect to the motive for keeping up a force in our Colonies, it did not arise mainly from the problematic risk of a great European war; it was of a more pressing and immediate nature. In some of them, where any considerable amount of force was kept up, the danger arose not from any chance of a European war, but from the risk of hostilities with formidable Native tribes. Great as our expense had lately been at the Cape, it bad saved us the still greater expense of another Kaffir war; and that expense was already greatly lessened; for at present the force of all arms at the Capo was not much more than 4,000 men; whereas, when the Report was made, it was double that number. In Now Zealand, again, these charges were daily diminishing. While that was so, he entirely admitted that it was the duty of the Government to examine into the condition of every Colony, and endeavour, by every means in their power, to reduce the amount and cost of the force in each; and obtain from each the largest and fairest contribution towards its support. But the bead of the Colonial Office was not prepared to adopt the very simple but impossible scheme to which the name of Mr. Godley was attached. Mr. Godley rather taunted Mr. Elliott with not having proposed a rival scheme; but he entirely denied the justice of that accusation. It was Impossible by one stroke of the pen to unite all colonial and Imperial interests, and to produce one uniform self-acting scheme which would supply the place of the judgment, sagacity, and firmness of the Secretary of State in settling all those difficult and complicated questions, involving both colonial and Imperial interests. It was the duty of a Colonial Minister to take the case of each colony or group of colonies into separate consideration, dealing with it according to its special circumstances and requirements, and, while reducing its demands upon the Imperial Exchequer to the lowest practicable limits consistent with safety, also to foster and stimulate the feeling of self-reliance in the minds of the colonists. The right hon. Gentleman had passed very lightly over the military spirit which undoubtedly existed in the great colony of Canada. In our Australian colonies, likewise, there was a rapidly growing spirit of self-defence—a sentiment which it was most desirable to cultivate to the utmost. Those colonies were most favourably situated. Separated from the great Powers of Europe by thousands of miles of ocean, and with no formidable tribes on their frontiers, their need of the protection of Imperial troops was reduced to very narrow limits. He would not, however, say that they should be wholly divested of that protection, because he should be sorry to see any great dependency of the British Crown entirely denuded of a certain number of English redcoats. Feeling and reason went to a great extent together in this matter, and it would be undesirable that these colonial communities should be left unprovided with a moderate body of the mother-country's military force. The colonies of Australia already contributed a large portion of the expenditure upon their own defence—one of them considerably more than half the entire amount. And let him remind the House that if, following out the recommendation of the Report, one fixed and uniform rule were applied indiscriminately to all our Colonies, we should be driven to this absurd result—that we should have to reject a portion of the sum now contributed by these rich and growing communities. Such an uniform rule must be adapted to the circumstances of the weakest and poorest of our Colonies, which could not be expected to pay more, perhaps, than one-third of the cost of its defence—a proportion much below that which was derived, and properly derived, from a wealthy colony like Victoria. The subject was, however, a very large and complicated one, and it was impossible on an occasion like the present to treat it as it deserved. With respect to the question put by the right hon. Gentleman to the Government, he could now only answer, speaking for his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Department, that he would use his best endeavours to restrict the Imperial expenditure upon colonial defence within the smallest possible compass—to induce, and if necessary compel, certain colonies, New Zealand for example, to contribute more than they now did towards their own protection. But at the same time his noble Friend could not undertake to carry out one rigid uniform scheme, which it was impossible to adapt to all the varying exigencies and capacities of our different dependencies.

said, it was not the pre-per time on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply to discuss so important a question as the military expenditure of our Colonial Empire, and he expressed a hope that the Government would consent to its being referred to a Select Committee. The Report on our colonial defences, to which allusion had been made, was a very valuable document, and he placed great reliance on Mr. Elliot's opinion. The recommendation made by the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) with regard to colonial military expenditure was deserving of consideration, because, as the Estimates were now framed, there was great difficulty in ascertaining what was paid by the Colonies, and what by the Imperial Government. He was inclined to think that the amount of our colonial expenditure was exaggerated; and though it was not to be denied that England should frame her colonial policy on the model of that of France, yet it was worthy of remark, that the single colony of Algeria cost France more in one year than the whole Imperial expenditure of England in the fifty Colonies of her Empire. He looked upon the charge for fortifications for the Colonies as an extravagant one, and he doubted if we got value for it in the event of any contingency arising. Large works for fortifications had been carried on at Quebec. We had spent there two millions, and a quarter of a million at Halifax. The only value those works were to us was in the event of the United States making a descent on Canada; but for it to be successful they must suppose sympathy on the part of the colonists and determined aggression on the part of the United States. If such a contingency were to arise it would not be by fortifications or by any conceivable military preparations, that our North American Colonies would be preserved to us, and therefore it was that he desired the expenditure with reference to our colonies should be so judiciously expended that we should get a corresponding benefit from it. The absence of any great military road through Canada was an illustration of the illogical character of our policy in this matter. The only access for troops into the interior of Canada during seven months of the year was through the State of Maine, by way of Portland, and yet we spent vast sums in fortifying colonial cities, to which, in the hour of danger, we should be unable to send succour. He (Mr. Mills) repeated the expressions of his hope that the Government would allow the whole subject of colonial defences, the revisions of which was a necessary corollary to the adoption of the principle of colonial self-government, to be referred to an impartial Select Committee of the House of Commons.

said, he rose to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether it be the intention of Government to recommend to Her Majesty a revision of the Warrant dated the 1st July, 1848, with a view to its improvement, and especially to increase the rates of Pension of Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers discharged the service in a helpless condition. The hon. and gallant General said that his object in desiring the increase of these pensions was not only to improve the condition of the soldier, but also to facilitate recruiting for the army. His principal objection was to the temporary pensions granted to men who had been disabled in the service. Those pensions were now 6d. a day for from twelve to eighteen months if a man had served seven years, for from one to two years if he had served ten, and for from three to five years if he had served fourteen years. Would any one say that it was creditable to the country to discharge men with pensions so small as these? He also complained of the insufficient pensions varying from 9d. to 1s. per day, granted in cases of total blindness. That was most unjust, and he hoped the Secretary for War would be of his opinion.

said, at that hour (half-past eleven) he would state the differences between the first and the present revised Estimate as shortly as possible. There was a difference in the first Vote of 1,907 additional men, which arose from the fact that six battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry were coming home from India. In Vote No. 2 there was a corresponding addition in consequence of those regiments coming home. In Vote No. 3 there was a diminution of £54,000, in consequence of a reduction in the number of men to be raised, as well as a reduction of £15,000 in the purchase of horses for the Artillery. There was also some diminution in consequence of the postponement of the erection of a military prison in Canada. In the Works Department there was a reduction of nearly £76,000, chiefly in the carriage department, owing to the carriages having got ahead of the guns. As to the reduction in clothing to which an hon. Member referred, that arose on the free kits, which of course were not required by the men coming home from India, but would have have had to be given if the men had been newly raised.

said, it was unsatisfactory to see a reduction of the regiments at home. The nominal increase was 8,000 men, and that hardly compensated the force sent to China. There was a Vote of £322,000 for Embodied Militia, but the amount would supply the pay of 16,000 additional regular soldiers. It was most unsatisfactory to see the regular regiments so weak and ineffective.

reminded the right hon. Gentleman that he had not answered his question respecting the new purchase system.

begged pardon for having overlooked the gallant Member's question. He adhered to what he had stated on a former occasion that the new system would require considerable deliberation. He had in nowise departed from the views which he had previously announced on the subject.

said his question had not been answered.

could not hold out any hope that Government would increase the pensions in the way the gallant General proposed. Pensions might be desirable under the old system, when a man enlisted for life; but with the present short periods of enlistment he thought it was better to benefit the condition of the soldier by increasing his pay than his pension. The case of disabled men certainly deserved consideration.

asked for an explanation of the discrepancy between the strength of the Indian depôts, as given in the Returns and in the Estimates. In the former the number appeared as 15,000, in the latter 12,000.

said, the numbers of men at these depots were constantly changing; but in the Estimate he had taken 12,000 as the average. He might state also that the cost of these depots was borne by the Indian, and not by the English Government.

called attention to the increase that had accrued in the good-conduct allowances this year, and asked if that was owing to any change of system.

said, the amount for good-conduct pay was annually increasing. There was also an increase in consequence of a recent alteration by which the first badge would be acquired in three years instead of five.

said, the army was extremely indebted to the right hon. Gentleman for the last good-service warrant. On the old warrant, when a soldier completed eighteen years' service, and sixteen years' service clear of the defaulters' book, he was entitled to get a fourth good-conduct mark. The number of years was now reduced by which a soldier could gain a good-conduct mark, but he thought the period might with advantage be still further reduced. He thought that two more years might be taken off. He rose, however, principally to call attention to the position of field officers placed upon half pay on their removal from Staff appointments on the expiration of five years' Staff service. On the Staff an officer was usu- ally on half-pay of his regimental rank, but his Staff pay was altogether distinct from that of rank; in the case of lieutenant-colonel it would amount altogether to £400 a year. But when his five years' of service on the Staff were up, he was removed and fell back at once to the half-pay of his regimental rank—about £200. This he thought a great hardship. They wished to encourage their best officers to go upon the Staff, and they also compelled them to go through a very scientific education before they were appointed, and therefore it was a hardship to remove those officers and make them fall back upon what was perhaps a paltry pittance. If they really desired to encourage their best officers to go on the Staff they should not remove them on the ordinary half-pay, but give them some increased half-pay—something between regimental half-pay and the pay of Staff officers, in order to make their position at all palatable or agreeable to them. There was also another hardship to which they were liable. When a sudden emergency arose, like the Indian mutiny or the China war, a number of officers educated at the Staff College were placed on the Staff; the difficulty was suddenly arranged or got over; and these officers, being removed from the Staff before their five years were up, were liable to see junior officers to themselves passed over their heads.

said, that as this Vole included the case of General Grey, he was diposed to say "No" to it, in order to enter a protest against its being supposed that the defence set up by the Secretary for War was at all satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman said that General Grey's being connected with the Court was no reason for his not being a fit man for the appointment; but what he ought to satisfy the House of Commons of was, not only that he was a fit man, but that there was nobody available at the time more fit.

said, that on a former occasion the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War bad said that Staff appointments would shortly be closed against all who had not passed the Staff College. He wished to ascertain from the right hon. Gentleman how persons were to obtain appointments on the Staff, and what use for the benefit of the army he proposed to make of those officers who had received their education in the Staff College. The right hon. Gentleman said it had been proposed to form a separate Staff corps, but the objection to that course was that it might create jealousy amongst the other officers of the army. That jealousy might be created if the officers were selectd without reference to their qualifications; but if the best officers were selected then no jealousy could arise. Did they wish to have able officers on the Staff or not? Did they intend to adhere to the rule of five years' service, and then send the officers back to their regiments? If so, the effect would be merely to make a set of bad regimental officers. Who were to do their duty in the regiments while they were at the Staff? If they could spare officers from their regiments, it was a proof that they had too many. Adverting to the subject of the recent appointment conferred upon General Grey, great confusion had arisen from describing appointments to colonelcies of regiments as the reward of distinguished service. That was a mistake. They were given for distinguished services when the officer, upon whom the appointment was conferred, had not attained the seniority, which would, otherwise, entitle him to it. General Grey having served for the time required by the existing regulations, he (Lord Hotham) had nothing to say in opposition to his appointment. It was a perfectly just rule that in those cases in which officers had long and efficient foreign service to adduce in their favour, a preference should be given to them over those who did not happen to be so fortunate; but then the claims of the latter, though they might be somewhat postponed, should not, he contended, be altogether ignored. It was not granted to every officer to be afforded an opportunity of performing distinguished military service, and those, therefore, ought not to be shut out from reward who, although they might not have had the advantage of such opportunity, yet discharged with credit the duties which devolved upon them in the position in which they had been placed. While that, however, was the view which he took on the subject, he should wish to call the attention of his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War to the statement which he had made, to the effect that nothing less than six years' service as a field-officer could entitle an officer to receive the full pay of a General officer. Now, his right hon. Friend had not alluded to an important exception to that rule, and he would, therefore, take the liberty of asking him whether he thought it was fitting that an officer who had passed, say five years and nine months amid the and plains of India, or in some still more unhealthy climate, should not be held entitled to receive a General officer's pay, and that a person holding office about the Royal household—for instance, the office of Principal Equerry—altogether a political officer, and changed on every changes of Government, who, perhaps, had not passed a single day on foreign service, should have open to him the same reward as Sir John Inglis, or any other officer who had done active duty, and had gained the highest distinction abroad, while the regulation requiring six years' service as a field officer was administered with such strictness against those who had nothing but their own services to recommend them. He had always felt that the exception made in favour of those holding offices about the Court was a great scandal, and he alluded to it now because he feared, from what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, that an extension was about to be given to the principle that in future the honour of being an Equerry for a certain number of years would be sufficient to put such an officer on the same footing for promotion as long and faithful service in defence of his country.

inquired if the Vote now before the Committee included, besides the ordinary pay, the colonial allowances to the troops in Australia, for instance?

was understood to reply in the affirmative.

asked if it were true that the pay of the officers of the Royals at Hong Kong had been reduced after being voted by the House? He wished also to know whether any Roman Catholic chaplains had been sent out for the benefit of the soldiers in the 1st Regiment and others forming the China expedition?

said, that the reduction referred to had been made in mistake. He would ascertain the number of chaplains that had been sent out, both Protestants and Roman Catholics.

thought it much more convenient that the whole provision, including extra allowances, should appear in the Estimates, and that a deduction should be made of the contribution by the several Colonies, which, in the case of Victoria, was very considerable. In fact, that colony had for three years borne the entire expense.

would be very sorry to follow the example of the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Trelawny). He was an old Guardsman himself, and he was sure they would always be found doing their duty. But he would ask what was the use of a general commanding a brigade of the battalions of Guards? He believed there was no such appointment for forty years before the return of the army from the Crimea, and it appeared to be made for a particular individual. He should like to know, when the five years had expired, would that appointment be continued?

said, the Vote for the Staff was £18,687 more than last year, and there were several items which required explanation, having been charged for the first time.

wished for some explanation with regard to the troops employed in China, which exceeded the number estimated, and were to receive extra pay and allowances. As there were eight or ten battalions of these, besides Artillery, the sum must come to a very considerable amount.

with reference to the ease of the General officers unattached, brought forward by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wigan, must say, after the admission of the right hon. Gentleman that the question was one of doubt, this was the first instance in which the petitioners had not received the benefit of the doubt. These officers merely asked what they were entitled to, and it was extremely hard, it was pitiful, paltry, and mean, that seven General officers who had done their duty to their country should thus be bandied about between the Treasury and the War Office on a question of this sort in the richest country in the world.

did not wish at that late hour to raise a question as to the accounts of this country and the Indian Government, but there was a discrepancy in the Estimates which he wished to have explained. The number of men borne on the establishment last year was greater than the number voted. How was it that the deduction for the pay of men wanting to complete the establishment had been reduced from £267,000, the original sum proposed, to £126,000? Were they likely to have any statement of accounts as between this country and the Indian Government?

said, that the whole increase on the Staff was only £7,000—a sum which did not amount to the Staff employed on the expedition to China. As regards the giving of regiments, the rule that had obtained was that the officer who had seen colonial or even home service was entitled in his turn to have his regiment, although, certainly, with regard to the appointment of General Grey, officers distinguished by war service had frequently passed over his head. That had been the case with General Grey. He had never intended to say anything that would in the least degree bear the construction that had been put upon his words. With regard to the question put to him by the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote), that hon. Member, from his cognizance of these mysterious transactions as Secretary to the Treasury, was a much better authority than he could be upon this matter. It was not usual to include in this Estimate the allowances to British officers serving in China. The ordinary pay and allowances only were taken in this manner, the rest being provided for by Votes of credit. In the first instance Indian allowances were paid from the commissariat chest, and the accounts were ultimately sent home to the Treasury. The process was a very complicated and cumbrous one. The hon. Baronet asked why a smaller deduction from the pay of men deficient from the establishment appeared in the revised Estimate from that which appeared in the original Estimate. The answer was, it had turned out that too small a sum was taken in the first Estimate. The local European troops disbanded in India had returned to England. Recruiting for the army fluctuated greatly at different periods of the year. At harvest time it was very slack, but it revived again during the winter; and he had therefore made a smaller deduction for the pay of men deficient from the establishment. Undoubtedly officers put upon half-pay on the expiration of their Staff service were thrown upon their backs, and their future career much interfered with. The Commander-in-Chief was now engaged in trying to make some arrangement that would at least mitigate this evil.

said, he could not alter his opinion with reference to the justice of the claims of the officers alluded to by his gallant Friend behind him. They were justly entitled to what they claimed.

said, the officers bad acted for their own advantage, and must abide by the consequences.

denied that they had done so for their own advantage—they got 14s. 7d. less pay than before, and no advance of rank. They had not enjoyed single advantage that had been promised then. It was one of the hardest cases he had ever heard of.

asked, why medical officers serving in India had not received the benefit of the Royal warrant improving their rank.

replied, that these gentlemen were paid according to the Indian rate, which was much higher than that allowed for home or colonial service.

assented, and, in reply to an hon. Member, stated that the Army Estimates would be proceeded with to-morrow evening.