said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, how soon the New Barracks at Colchester are likely to be commenced, and within what period he hopes to have them completed; whether he intends to put in order and arm the Twenty-one Towers between St. Osyth's Point and Aldborough, not one of which is at present armed; and, generally, what steps he proposes to take for the purpose of rendering more efficient the armament and defences of that part of the East Coast?

said, that the greater portion of the money taken this year for the erection of barracks at Colchester would be absorbed in the purchase of land. The barracks would, however be commenced in the course of the present financial year, and he hoped that in about eighteen months from their commencement they would be in a habitable state. As regarded the other question, there was in the Estimates a sum for the repair of Harwich Harbour, and the other defences on the coast were being gradually put into repair. Of course, the Government did not undertake to erect fortresses all round England, so as to prevent the possibility of an attack on any part of the coast.

I wish, Sir, to address the House for a few minutes with regard to an answer which I gave to the hon. Gentleman yesterday. That answer was correctly reported in substance, and it having reached the Envoy of the Neapolitan Government, he has addressed to me a letter complaining that I did not accurately represent his statements to me. Those statements were entirely verbal; and I certainly meant to represent accurately both his proposition and my answer to it. His letter is as follows:—

"London, July 27.

"My Lord,—The reply which your Excellency gave yesterday to the question of Mr. Griffith, on the subject of the war in Sicily and of a truce to be established, not having correctly represented my intentions and those of my Government, I beg you to be kind enough to rectify your statement in the House of Commons. What I requested of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty was, to be good enough, in concert with France and Piedmont, to exercise a pressure upon Garibaldi with the view of obtaining a real truce for six months, so that the negotiations for an alliance with Piedmont might be brought to an issue, and that the meeting of the national representation might take place. The idea of directly employing force against Sicily by the abovementioned Powers did not at all enter into my mind, nor into that of the Government which I have the honour to represent, assured as I am that the means of attaining the object would not have failed without the necessity of having recourse to extraordinary expedients.—I have, &c,

"A. LA GRECA."

I do not wish to add a word to that statement, of which I am anxious that the Neapolitan Envoy should have the benefit.

said, he rose to ask the Secretary of State for India, how far the claims of Mr. T. H. Kavanagh upon the Government of India for important services rendered during the Mutiny of 1857 and 1858, evidencing, as those services did, great zeal, intelligence, and courage, and exposing Mr. Kavanagh to great personal risks, has been acknowledged by the Government?

said, that Mr. Kavanagh had been appointed to a much higher situation than that which he held at the time he performed the services referred to, he had received the Yictoria Cross, and had been allowed to come home upon furlough with half-pay, an advantage which had not been allowed in any other case.

said, he rose to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether a Bishop of the Episcopal Communion in Scotland can legally perform any episcopal functions in any diocese in England on behalf of the Bishop thereof? The Bishop of Exeter had very recently employed a Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Scotland for the performance of his duties. As he understood the law it was illegal for a Scotch Bishop to be so employed continuously, and he should be glad if the right hon. Gentleman would inform the House how the law really stood.

said, he wished to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, what steps have been taken to carry out the unanimous Resolution of the House in regard to a Maritime Treaty with France, and what measures, if any, have been prepared to carry into effect the Resolution of the House respecting Harbours of Refuge? He wished to know with regard to the first part of the question whether any representation had been made to the French Government that while we admitted the ships of France to all the privileges enjoyed by our own vessels in British ports we were still precluded from carrying the produce of our colonial possessions to France, and that the commercial treaty would not produce the results which both countries anticipated unless some material change was made in the French navigation laws. He also wished to know whether, if any correspondence had passed on the subject between the Governments of France and England, the noble Lord would have any objection to lay it upon the table? As to the other part of the question, it would be recollected that some weeks ago the House, after a full discussion, by a clear and decided majority, adopted a Resolution that the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Harbours of Refuge should be carried into effect. He wanted to know what steps the Government had taken in consequence of that Resolution. A Resolution of that House was a very grave matter, and the Government were bound to act upon it, or to give substantial reasons why it was impossible for them to do so. He might be told that there was no money available, but such an excuse could not be accepted at a moment when the Government were about to embark in an expenditure of £9,000,000 or £12,000,000 for land fortifications. He believed that Harbours of Refuge would not only save many lives and much valuable property, but would add materially to the defence of the country against aggression.

stated that when the House passed the Resolution respecting the maritime law of France, Earl Cowley was informed that Her Majesty had agreed to the Address, and his Excellency was empowered to negotiate with the French Government on the subject. It happened that at that time there was great excitement in France, owing to the concessions which had been made to Great Britain with respect to the introduction of British manufactures. The manufacturing interests, who were afraid of losing their protection, had raised a considerable clamour on the subject of the commercial treaty, and the Resolution of that House respecting the maritime laws of France created great alarm in the French ports. Addresses were presented from all quarters to the French Government imploring them not to make any change in the navigation laws. Earl Cowley said that at such a moment he could not obtain any success in negotiating a maritime treaty, and in a conversation with M. Thouvenel he discovered that the French Government were not disposed at that time to entertain the question of an alteration in their navigation laws, in consequence of the change we made in 1848. Under these circumstances Earl Cowley, exercising a wise discretion, resolved not to press the negotiation, but to defer it until some more favourable opportunity.

said, that with reference to the second part of the question of the hon. Member for Sunderland he had to observe that at the time the Resolution with respect to the Harbours of Refuge was under consideration it was not very clearly explained what precise meaning was to be attached to it. He (Mr. Gibson) had asked the question whether it was intended by that Resolution that all the recommendations of the Commissioners should be carried out, and he was informed that that was not understood to be the meaning of the Resolution. On the other hand, he was led to believe that all that was meant by the House was a general indication that something should be done in the sense of carrying out the recommendations of the Commissioners [Mr. LINDSAY: No, no!] Putting, therefore, that construction upon the Resolution—which, he admitted, ought to have weight with the Government, it would no doubt be their duty to submit a plan to Parliament next Session—if it should be in their power to do so—such as they could conscientiously recommend to the adoption of the House.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what measures have been taken to bring about a convention with the Government of the United States to remedy the impunity with which crimes are committed oh board vessels trading between the United States and this Country, and to call the attention of the House to some recent circumstances bearing on the question? It would be recollected that about that time last year he called attention to the horrible atrocities committed on board American vessels trading between England and the United States, the perpetrators of which atrocities, in consequence of the defective state of the law, were able to escape with entire impunity. At that time the Foreign Minister undertook to do everything in his power to remedy that great evil, and to communicate with the American Government on the subject. At the beginning of the present Session, however, the noble Lord informed the House that he had handed the matter over to the Home Secretary, considering the question to be one of domestic legislation. Since that period the House had not heard one word of the matter, although the atrocities were still frequently committed. A sailor lately died in an hospital in Liverpool in consequence of injuries received on board the Ocean Monarch. An inquest was held upon his body, and the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter against the second and third mates, but the men escaped under the extradition treaty during the inquest, and were now free from the consequences of their brutality. "What rendered the case worse was that the parties in question were the very same men, who three years ago were found guilty of manslaughter, on board a ship bearing the pacific name of John Bright. It seemed that the crime of manslaughter did not come within the terms of the extradition treaty. If that sort of proceeding was to go on, he would ask what quantum of murder would be sufficient to induce the Governments of this country and of the United States to put a stop to such transactions? Was the great Atlantic to be a place where every kind of outrage might be committed with impunity, and did not the Government of this country and the Government of the United States see that, as regards two civilized nations, such a state of things was a great calamity and opprobium to humanity?

said, that with respect to the question put by the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. A. Smith), he would state as distinctly as he could, what he understood to be the law with regard to Bishops of the Scotch Episcopal Church performing episcopal functions in England. The Act of 32nd Geo. III., cap. 63, sect. 9, contained this enactment:—

"That no person exercising the function or assuming the office and character of a pastor or minister of any order in the Episcopal Communion in Scotland, as aforesaid, shall be capable of taking any benefice, curacy, or other spiritual promotion within that part of Great Britain called England, the dominion of Wales, or town of Berwick-upon-Tweed, or of officiating in any church or chapel within the same, where the Liturgy of the Church of England as now by law established is used, unless he shall have been lawfully ordained by some bishop of the Church of England or of Ireland."

On examining the rest of the Act, it appeared to him to be clear that by "pastor" was meant parochial clergyman, and the words "unless lawfully ordained "seemed to limit the application of the enactment to parochial clergymen. With regard to the words" or minister of any order, "on which no doubt his hon. Friend relied, as the expression followed the word "pastor" it must be as illustrative of the word it followed, and must signify, according to the ordinary rules of construction, an inferior, and not a superior, order to "a pastor." Therefore the Act, according to obvious and fair construction, was limited to parochial clergymen, and was not applicable to Bishops. There was a subsequent Act, the 3rd and 4th of Vict., cap. 33, by which the prohibition was partially removed; but the question was, whether the prohibition referred to the exercise of episcopal functions, and it appeared to him, as far as he was able to form a judgment, that it did not so refer. He had been favoured by the Bishop of Exeter with a communication in which that right rev. Prelate stated certain facts, together with his view of the law of the case. What the right rev. Prelate contended for was, that, according to the law of the Church, a Bishop of the Scotch Episcopal Church could exercise episcopal functions in the Church of England, inasmuch as he assented to the doctrine of that Church. It was well known that if a Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church conformed to the Articles of the Church of England, he was ipso facto a Bishop of the Church of England; and in like manner, if a Roman Catholic priest conformed, he was ipso facto a priest of the Established Church. Hon. Gentlemen would recollect that Mr. Blanco "White preached before the University of Oxford, and he was never ordained in the Church of England, but had been in orders as a member of the Church of Borne. The Bishop of Exeter in his communication observed:—

"And what has been the practice of our own Church? Has Bishop Trower's recent exercise of the episcopal function by holding confirmations in Cornwall for the Bishop been a solitary or new case? So far from it that for many years diocesan Bishops in England have availed themselves of the aid of Bishops consecrated in Scotland. Bishop Maltby, of Durham, was repeatedly assisted in his old age by Bishop Eden, of Moray, having first satisfied himself, as is understood by inquiry, that there is no lawful impediment. Bishop Trower himself has confirmed in Kent for the present Archbishop of Canterbury; so has another Scotch Bishop (Forbes) of Brechin. More than this, Bishop Trower has himself received commissions as a Bishop from the late Bishop of London, and from the present, to confirm for them (whose special office it has always been considered to be) members of the Church of England on the Continent. And, so far from his so acting as Bishop, or the commission of the Bishop of London, under which he so acted, being esteemed the assumption of a power which does not belong to him as a Bishop, that on the last of these occasions, notice was sent from the Foreign Office to our Ministers abroad desiring them to aid and countenance his so acting."

These were precedents bearing on the case, and, so far as he was able to form a judgment on this rather delicate question of ecclesiastical law, it appeared to him that there was no statutory prohibition or rule of canon law by which Scotch Bishops could be prevented from exercising functions, with the consent of the Bishop of the diocese, within a district of the Church of England. In regard to the question put by the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes), he had to say that the Government in the course of last autumn entered into negotiations with the American Minister, Mr. Dallas, and, after consideration, prepared a draught of convention, which was transmitted to the American Government. It had not yet been returned, and he was not aware what decision had been come to on the subject.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether he can, on or before Monday, lay upon the Table a Statement specifying the works towards which the £2,000,000 proposed to be voted for Fortifications are to be applied, and showing the probable cost of completing such works?

said, the reason why the Government had asked for the money in the mode they had done, was that, if they had asked for it in the Committee of Supply it would be necessary to include the moneys in the Appro- priation Act, which would close their operations by the 31st of March next, instead of which they wanted to go on with the works for a year, taking advantage of the following summer. With regard to the detailed statement asked for, he had already drawn up such a statement, which had been laid on the table of the House, and would, lie hoped, be printed and circulated to-morrow morning.

said, he trusted that whether he could induce any hon. Member to take the view he held on the subject he was about to bring before the House or not, the importance of that subject was a sufficient excuse for his bringing it forward. Whatever might have been the apathy of the people of this country during many years on the subject of the national defences, he believed that within the last few years that apathy had entirely ceased to exist. Indeed, the amount of interest now taken in the subject was one of the best safeguards they had for the security of the country. Whatever had been the anxiety of the country with regard to our defences, he believed that during the last year it had very materially increased. That anxiety had increased, not only from the different aspect of affairs abroad, but also from opinions expressed and statements that had been made by persons of high authority on the subject. Those opinions and those statements had tended to create throughout the country the deepest possible interest in the question. The country, whatever it might have been formerly on the subject, was now made aware that the question was one which must be dealt with in the clearest and simplest possible terms, and was no longer to be considered unimportant. He believed that the fact of those opinions being promulgated would have a beneficial effect on the mind of the country. The people formerly looked on the question of the defences of the country as wild, chimerical, and childish; but now they looked on it as one of the most important to which attention could be called. The nation had heard, from a source on which it was accustomed to place the utmost reliance, that the aspect of European affairs has changed, that as far as we were concerned the invention of steam had altered our position for the worse by bridging over the Channel; and it has been taught from the lips of the First Minister of the Crown to recognize the startling truth that a Ministry which did not devote its best energies to the defence of the country was worthy of impeachment. Little as he had ever been disposed to doubt the possibility of an invasion, he was still less inclined to do so after the statement which had gone forth on authority. Was it wise, then, to confine their discussions or their views to a single branch of the subject of national defence? Ought they not rather to inquire whether there were means by which an enemy, attempting a descent on this country, might embarrass the proceedings of the defenders, and so gain for the enterprise material advantages, and a probability of success? Under present circumstances, he maintained it would be extremely easy for means to be taken which would not only facilitate the landing of troops on the coast at a point where the country would not be prepared immediately to collect the force requisite to repel the attempt, but which would to a great extent paralyze our means of repelling the assault. The noble Lord at the head of the Government, on a recent occasion, as well as in former debates, had taken the manly and straightforward course of stating frankly and without mystification, that in talking of the defences of the country, the danger which these were intended to guard against was the possibility of invasion by Prance. It would be undignified and evasive if the House were for a moment to attempt to avoid that issue. He himself did not believe in the probability of any such invasion, and he felt convinced that if the attempt were ever made it would end in the destruction of every individual who landed. He was not actuated by any hostile feeling in making these remarks, nor did he believe that it was the wish or intention of France to invade us; but it was no less true that she had placed herself in a position in which she was not at all times and under all circumstances a free agent. Warfare was conducted now on wholly different principles and with different weapons from those in use thirty years ago, and England, in availing herself of what he still regarded as her too limited resources, would be forced to rely, in a great degree, on modern inventions of a very useful character, but so fragile in their nature that almost a breath would destroy them. In the event of invasion electric wires and railways must form important elements in our means of conducting internal operations. It was under such circumstances that the view suggested by his Motion became important. Within the limits of the Metropolis and spread about the country were thousands of foreigners, of whom a large proportion were of doubtful—he might even go further, and say of the worst character. He was by no means to be understood as uttering any general condemnation of the foreign residents in this country; but no one could deny that thousands of persons such as he had described were to be found, mere adventurers, who had been driven in many cases by misconduct from their own country, and, not being very susceptible on the point of honour, would readily lend themselves to any proceeding for which they were to be pecuniarily rewarded. In the event of a sudden attack on this country, the able tacticians by whom the movement would he directed would naturally seize the obvious advantage of employing these men as spies within the camp. If the class to which he had referred should not prove available for this purpose, the most unlimited facilities existed for conveying to this country, without attracting any observation, whatever number of persons might be requisite for the purpose of collecting information, and for destroying simultaneously the telegraphic wires and railways, which at the critical moment would be indispensable to the defences of this country. He wished to ask the right hon. Baronet whether, if intelligence reached him that persons with mischievous designs, such as he had referred to, had landed in this country, he at this moment possessed the power of adopting such summary measures as would under the circumstances be needed for the national safety. It was no use garrisoning a city if the gates were left open and any number of the enemy allowed to enter simply because they were unarmed when they presented themselves. That was the exact position in which this country was placed. The facts he had stated were a sufficient justification for his calling the attention of the House to the question, and unless the Government were able to say that they did not believe in the existence of the danger to which he had referred, or that they had full power and authority immediately to deal with it, he thought that he had made out his case, and that he was entitled to ask the Government in what way they were prepared to deal with the matter. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary might say that if we got rid of all foreigners there would still be disreputable people in the country, and therefore the danger would not be removed; but such an argument would not be an answer, because at all events as the number of dangerous persons decreased the danger would be materially diminished, and the Government would have the satisfaction of knowing that everything that could be done had been done. He might very likely be told that he was endeavouring to introduce an alien Bill, and it was perfectly true, if the case he had submitted were not listened to, that he, for one, should be prepared to meet the difficulty by legislation. If it were indispensable, it would be downright insanity not to pass such a Bill. The proposal he should make would in no way affect those foreigners who had left their own countries on account of their political opinions. The powers with which he wished to see the Government invested were such as would enable them, if they thought it necessary, to take stringent means for dealing with certain classes of foreigners in this country. If they left the Government without such powers all their other attempts at defence were a perfect farce; and they would be stultifying themselves by attempting in broad daylight to defend their coasts, whilst they neglected any defence against secret and most mischievous enemies who were living within their own capital. The notice which he had placed on the paper was—

"To call the attention of the House to the necessity, in the present aspect of the affairs of Europe, for conferring on the Government more stringent powers for dealing with foreigners of suspicious character resident in this country;"

And in conclusion he would ask the Home Secretary whether he would not admit the truth of the statement which he (Mr. Bentinck) had made, and whether he had powers that would enable him to deal in an efficient manner with such an emergency as had been spoken of if it should occur; and, if he had not such powers, whether he did not think that it would be conducive to the safety of the country that he should have them.

I entirely differ from the hon. Gentleman in the construction which he has put upon the speech of the noble Lord at the head of the Government—

I rise to order. I believe the right hon. Gentleman has already spoken.

It is so. I intimated to the right hon. Baronet when he rose that it is only by the indulgence of the House that he could again address it.

I have no wish to intrude myself on the House, but if it is not objected to I will go on. I was saying that I entirely differed from the hon. Gentleman in the construction which he has put on the remarks attributed to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. I did not at all understand my noble Friend to represent to the House that he entertained any expectation or fear of any imminent invasion of this country either from France or any other part of Europe. On the contrary, his argument went to show—

The right hon. Gentleman is entirely out of order in referring to a previous debate.

The hon. Gentleman made a distinct allusion to that speech, but, however, I will only say that, in any statement recently addressed to the House, I did not understand that it was wished to create any impression that the shores of this country were likely to be immediately invaded. What I understood lo be meant was that, in consequence of political changes which had taken place since the peace of 1815, in consequence of the changes which had taken place in the art of war, and with respect to communications, we were placed in a position of inferiority with regard to our defences to that in which we stood some years ago. That had no relation to any immediate danger, it was permanent, and it was proposed to meet it by a permanent system of defence. The question with regard to our defences was whether we should expend a greater sum. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE—Order, order!] Well, then, I will proceed at once to answer the hon. Gentleman's question; but it was difficult to meet his remarks without explaining my reasons for differing from the very ground on which he based his question. I will only say that I do not concur with him in thinking that we are exposed to any immediate danger such as his question refers to. If war should arise at any time be-teen this country and any foreign country it will be competent to this House to entertain the question of an Alien Act. During the war which ended in 1815 the Government was armed with the powers of an Alien Act, though they were rarely-exercised. I confess that my own opinion of the security derived from an Alien Act, even in times of war, is by no means an I exalted one. In time of peace I do not believe that any material benefit would arise from arming the Government with powers such as those which existed during the French Revolution of apprehending persons—who, as Lord Macaulay describes them, I think in one of his Essays, were "suspected of being of a suspicious character." It is that power of dealing with persons of a suspicious character with which it is now sought to invest the Government. Then, how are they to be dealt with? It must either be by deportation from this country or by imprisonment within it. I much doubt whether, without some stronger reason than any that has been presented to the House, Parliament would be disposed to grant the Government such powers even if we thought it necessary to ask for them. I shall not follow the hon. Gentleman into his remarks upon the character of a large number of the foreigners resident in this country. I can only say that I do not at all assent to the description which he gave of them. I believe the great majority of those foreigners are persons who are peacefully pursuing different branches of trade and industry, and by no means likely to engage in such projects and machinations as the hon. Gentleman has sketched to us. There are, no doubt, a certain number of persons who have taken refuge in this country on political grounds; but they surely cannot be accused of entertaining any very strong sympathy for the Governments by which they have been proscribed. I can hardly conceive any class of persons who would be less likely to aid any invading or hostile Power in the plans to which the hon. Member refers. Under these circumstances I can only say that I myself have no desire to see the Executive Government at the present moment armed with any discretionary power of dealing with aliens of either a suspicious character or of any character whatever; and it is certainly not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose any measure of the kind.

said, that on rising to call the attention of the House to the impolicy of raising money by Loans payable in Terminable Annuities, he would begin by thanking the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary for his courtesy in answer- ing the question arising out of this subject which he had put to him the other evening. He would now endeavour, as briefly as possible, to bring before the House the circumstances connected with the usual means by which public loans were raised for the service of this country. And first as to Consolidated Annuities. In 1855 a loan was made upon the sale of no less than £16,000,000 in Consols. The price of that loan was valued by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer at 88, and that right hon. Gentleman thought the contractor would be fairly entitled to a difference of 2 per cent for his profit and to cover his risk. He entirely agreed with that basis of calculation, and starting from that point they there had an instance in which a loan of about 14½ millions sterling was raised by the sale of 16 millions of Consols at a difference of only 2 per cent on the market price of that stock. The Consols so created enabled the country to obtain money at a rate of interests of £3 8s. per cent. The next case of a considerable loan in Consols occurred in February, 1856, when a loan of £5,000,000 was contracted at the price of 90. The saving of interest on delayed payments reduced the price to the contractor to £89 13s. 8d., and the market price of the day was 91. The interest on that loan paid by the country was £3 6s. 8d. On the 19th of May in the same year there was another loan of £5,000,000 in Consols at 93. The absolute gain to the contractor over the price of the day was £1 13s. 3d., and the interest at which the country borrowed this money was £3 4s. There were thus three instances in which over £25,000,000 had been raised in Consols at an average deviation from the market price of the day of less than 2 per cent, and at a rate of interest to the nation of about £3 7s. 6d. He submitted that that was an exceedingly moderate rate of interest; and no one would suppose that there was any other stock through which at the present moment an equal sum could be borrowed at so small a charge to the country. It might be said that if they resorted to Consols they would make a permanent addition to the national debt. That, however, depended upon whether they ever paid those Consols off again; that was to say, whether they applied their surplus revenue to the redemption of a portion of the debt. Now, between the 5th of April, 1845, and the 5th of April, 1846, no less than £4,600,000 was used in the redemption of the national debt, and within the year following £2,700,000 was used for the same purpose. These were rather large sums to be employed in that manner; but the House was aware of the very admirable machinery through which these operations were effected. The amount of the quarter's surplus revenue being ascertained, the Government broker received instructions under which an equal portion of the national debt was paid off; and it was remarkable that these redemptions had a very small influence on the price of stock, as might be seen by looking at the variations in Consols from quarter to quarter. It would be found that concurrently with the purchases for the Government there was sometimes even a decline in price; so that whatever may have been the cause of the decline, it was obvious that these purchases had not even the effect of sustaining the market in the face of unfavourable circumstances. He passed over the two or three years of the Irish famine as unsuitable for illustration, and came to 1849–50, when £4,000,000—and to 1850–51, when also £4,000,000—were redeemed from the stocks forming the national debt. During those two years the variations in the price of stock were not at all noticeable, the price at one time being 95, at another 97, and another 96. Therefore, as in the creation of Consols, they submitted to a disadvantage in the first instance of something less than 2 per cent, so in redeeming the same debt they paid nothing more than its market price, and the Government made no sacrifice in the operation. The merits of Consols as a means of raising money were, that they could borrow in them at a low rate of interest, and incur a very small charge through what was called the turn of the market between the buying and selling. Now, allowing 2 per cent to be lost in the first instance by the turn of the market, and assuming 2 per cent more to be ultimately lost before they replaced the Consols through the medium of the National Debt Commissioners, that would give 4 per cent, which, spread over a period of thirty years, would be equal to ¼per cent added, to the interest. Taking, therefore, the average interest through a period of years at £3 7s. 6d., and adding ¼ per cent as the disadvantage by buying and soiling, they would have £3 12s. 6d. as the entire cost to the country of raising money by means of Consols. It was notorious that Exchequer bills could not be thrown in large quantities on the market at any one time without diminishing the value of the large amount already there, and therefore he assumed that Exchequer bills were not suitable for the purpose, although the low rate of interest which they bore—only 2 J per cent—made them a remarkably cheap medium of raising money. With regard to Exchequer bonds, he regretted that apparently the feeling of the country, or, at all events, the feeling of the House, was unfavourable to the continuance of that form of security, and he had even heard the Chancellor of the Exchequer reproached for not having prepared to pay off the £1,000,000 of Exchequer Bonds which remained of those which were put in circulation some years ago. Having been in a position to know the idea which the right hon. Gentleman attached to them at the period of their first issue, it was his conviction that those bonds were created in order to become a convenient and permanent mode of representing a portion of the national debt, by increasing the attraction of public securities for a large number of investers, and so serving the public interest. He thought that Exchequer bonds only required to be in larger numbers to obtain a permanent standing and an easy market circulation, and that if a larger number had been issued, or were issued now, it would have that effect. As an individual he should deem exchequer bonds to be a perfectly legitimate and convenient mode of raising any large sums which, by hypothesis, the country might hereafter have to raise. Leaving those securities, he came to a class of which the use was very questionable—namely, terminable annuities. The annuity to which the noble Lord the First Lord of the Treasury alluded the other day, and which was called the dead weight, was for £585,745. That annuity was taken by the tank in 1823, at a time when the Funds were exceedingly disturbed—in fact, so disturbed that he confessed he had been unable to do more than make an approximation of the value when comparing the rate at which it was taken and the rate then receivable on Consols. But, seeing that the rate of interest which was derived from the investment at that period was £4 2s. 1d., he assumed that the annuity yielded a return somewhat more advantageous than would have been derived from an investment in Consols at the same period of the year. With regard to this annuity, he wished to mention a circumstance in proof of the inconvenience of using terminable annuities as a means of investment. When the security was first acquired by the Bank it yielded, as he had said, £4 2s. 1d. per cent. In 1842 an income tax was for the first time imposed, and it was imposed through the medium of an old Act of Parliament full of the most grievous defects, one of which was that it indiscriminately taxed capital and interest. The effect of the imposition of the income tax on the dead-weight annuity in the hands of the Bank was that instead of receiving £4 2s. 1d., which they had done up to 1842, they were obliged to recast the whole schedule of their affairs, and to rate the annuity as producing only £3 18s. 2d. In April, 1847, a further change, and an aggravated change, in the income tax, forced the Bank again to recast the value of their property, and to rate the annuity at £3 15s. 6d. In 1854, from a similar cause, they were obliged to reduce it to £3 9s. 1d., and in 1855 they were again obliged to reduce to £3 1s. 9d. Then he was happy to say the grievance was slightly relieved, and the annuity acquired a more promising aspect. But when the House observed that the value of that security was reduced from £4 2s. 1d. per cent to £3 1s. 9d. per cent through the confiscation of capital, they would see how grievous was the income tax, and how utterly impossible it was for capitalists to look with favour upon a security which was subject to an operation such as he had described. The next annuity to which he had to draw the attention of the House was one which in the year 1834 was created and left in the hands of the Bank of England. The history of it was very remarkable. In that year the Bank of England had to receive from the Government one-fourth of their capital which they had lent to the Government. The sum was £4,080,000, and they in the first instance agreed that it should be paid in Reduced Three per Cents at 90. From some cause, the origin of which he could not trace, instead of receiving those Reduced Three per Cents the Bank received ultimately an annuity of twenty-six years, that annuity being calculated at the same rate of interest as the Three per Cent Annuities would have returned. An annuity of £212,783 l2s. was inscribed as representing the repayment of the debt to the Bank. Not only was the interest of that annuity seriously affected as he had described by the imposition of the income tax, but during the last six years and-a-half of its existence, a sum of not less than £60,000 was confiscated from the capital of the Bank, that was to say, a sum of £60,000 was never paid at all, having been confiscated through the medium of the income tax. The next annuity to which he should call attention was what was known by the name of the Long Annuities, and the Long Annuities were created at various times from 1780 to 1860, and in 1860 they all expired. He had no means of tracing the precise terms upon which they were created, but when the income tax was enforced, the investors being frightened, they were subjected to a diminution in price considerably exceeding the immediate pressure of the tax itself. The investors protected themselves not only against the tax of which they knew, but against the tax which they apprehended and knew was just possible. He next arrived at the last instance more recently before the House—the annuity which was incorporated with the £16,000,000 of Consols as the consideration for the loan of £16,000,000 made in 1855. He here again referred with acknowledgment to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department, whose answer he had already noticed, but he was obliged to state some particulars at variance with the right hon. Gentleman's calculations. He entirely agreed in the estimate of the deduction which the contractor might fairly take for his risk and profit, and he found even that the estimate was corroborated by the state of the price current in the month following. The loan was contracted on the 20th of April, 1855, and on the 20th of May, 1855, while Consols were precisely at the same price, 90 ¼, the annuity was quoted at 2 per cent premium. The fact might be taken as established, and if so, they had these data to go upon. The value of Consols on the 20th of April, 1855, the day the loan was made, was 90. The allowance for the contractor's risk and profit was 2 per cent. That left 88 as the value of Consols, under the arrangement for the loan, but the money was not given by the contractors immediately. They had the indulgence of deferred payments through the whole of the remainder of the year, some instalments becoming due as late as December, and the allowance of interest which the Government made, through these deferred payments, amounted to £1 2s. That being deducted from £100 left £98 18s., and the value of Consols being £88 the actual price given for the annuity was £10 18s. He was obliged to state that these figures led to a result widely at variance with the result which the Secretary for the Home Department gave to them. All that the right hon. Gentleman stated on his own knowledge and his own estimate was perfectly accurate, but the computation, which he supposed was prepared for him at the Treasury, was excessively erroneous, for the right hon. Gentleman informed the House that the annuities yielded an interest of only £3 15s. per cent, whereas the real interest which those annuities yielded, or in other words the rate of interest paid by the Government in the thirty years annuities, was no less than £5 4s. 2d. per cent. That was the last instance of the sale of annuities by the Government, and he put it to the House whether that was at all a satisfactory operation, or one which they would desire to see renewed? Why was the bargain so bad? Not merely because the form of an annuity was adopted, but because people were afraid of the income tax, which was then leviable, and of which they apprehended the continuance, notwithstanding the pledge of the Government that it should cease in 1859. One thing, however, was perfectly clear that the Government then sold these annuities at an extraragantly bad rate for the finances of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had referred to the latest price of the annuities as affording a better test of the excellence of the bargain than the price at which they were originally taken, but the present price had really nothing to do with the question. The managers of the Patriotic Fund had invested largely in the purchase of annuities, because they ran over a period of years covering the ages of the pensioners, and Government institutions did not suffer from the pressure of the income tax. The great bulk of the holders of the same stock held only very small portions, and were anxious chiefly for obtaining a certain amount of income during their lives from a safe investment. The price now quoted in the Stock lists was the price at which the dealer would supply the very slender demand which now and then occurred for very small amounts, and afforded no clue to the price at which the Government could place any important quantity. He had thus endeavoured to bring before the House the main features of the question which appear- ed to him to be interesting at this moment—namely, the funds which, on the hypothesis of a necessary loan, it would be most advantageous for the country to adopt. He must remark, however, that the argument that terminable annuities presented an advantageous mode of raising money, because they formed a limited engagement, was a pure delusion. The circumstance that specific liabilities must be discharged at a certain period did not prevent the creation of fresh liabilities in another shape. In discharging its covenanted obligations, the country might be compelled to have recourse to some other means of raising money. The experience of the period he had been reviewing illustrated this state of things forcibly, because, although £10,000,000 of their liabilities in the shape of terminable annuities had expired and £10,000,000 more had been redeemed by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt—in all, £20,000,000—they had borrowed £30,000,000. Thus theywere£10,000,000 in debt more than they were before. In fact, it was impossible to bind the House or the country to discharge their debts positively unless there was a surplus for the purpose. It should be borne in mind, too, that in changing our liabilities from one form to another, there was always a certain waste of means. Another argument had been used in favour of terminable annuities, which was not very complimentary to the House of Commons. It was said that, unless bound down by obligations, such as terminable annuities constituted, the House of Commons would never agree to levy the taxes which were required to discharge the debt. He protested against any attempt to deceive the country through false terms as unwise in itself and unworthy of the Government. He denied that it could ever be desirable to call a portion of the capital debt interest in order to cajole the country into redeeming so much of it. To sum up the disadvantages of this mode of raising money, it appeared to him that it confounded things which were in their nature entirely distinct—capital and interest, wasted the resources of the country and cast a stigma on the intelligence and patriotism of the House. On these grounds he expressed the strongest disapprobation of that mode of obtaining funds. There was another and a simpler method, which was far preferable, and which experience and. necessity had forced on every large capitalist since the income tax was invented, and that was to make a loan payable by periodical instalments over a series of years, each payment being divided into capital and interest. The great vice of the terminable annuity system was its complexity. If they wanted to make a loan on the most advantageous terms, they should simplify the transaction as much as possible.

said, he would beg leave to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he intended to bring on the question of the Excise duty on hops?

That is a question to which a great deal of interest is, no doubt, attached, but, considering that it has once been fully discussed during the present year, it can scarcely be regarded as having an urgent claim on the attention of the House. Consequently it must take its chance till other more urgent questions are disposed of. As to the question of terminable Annuities, we have heard from my hon. Friend (Mr. Hubbard) on that subject a lucid and able statement, as all his statements are. I do not wish to appear disrespectful to him in allowing it to pass in silence; and yet I fear I may appear so, in making but a single comment upon it. I cannot help expressing my great regret at the occasion which he has taken for making his interesting speech. My hon. Friend has made a speech bearing on the financial part of the proposition of my noble Friend at the head of the Government for providing for the erection of fortifications. I think it would have been more advantageous for the common purpose we have in view had my hon. Friend brought forward this question on a special occasion, instead of introducing it on the Motion for adjournment, when there are few hon. Members present, and when it is mixed up with a number of miscellaneous subjects. I shall certainly not attempt to follow my hon. Friend in the details of his statement. I must say, however, I think he has understated the effect to the public of borrowing on Consols, if you are to include in the estimate of the cost of the operation the full charge which is incurred by the public before the debt is repaid, because he has made an allowance of only ^ per Gent to cover the profit of the contractor, and the average difference of the rate at which the public borrow and at which they pay. In my opinion that average difference is enormously understated by my hon. Friend. My hon. Friend has overlooked the whole argument which is advanced by those who advocate the borrowing of money by terminable annuities—namely, the spontaneous action of the repayment of the loan. That is not a matter for discussion at present; but it is one which we shall have ample opportunities of discussing. My hon. Friend has not dealt with that portion of the case. I am sure that the House is obliged to him for the light which he has thrown upon the subject; but we should have been still more obliged to him, and he would have contributed still more to assist us in our discussions, if he had availed himself of the regular and legitimate opportunity, and treated the subject when the proposition of my noble Friend is before the House.

When will that opportunity occur?

On every stage of the Resolution of my noble Friend, and of the Bill which will be founded upon it.

in rising to call the attention of the House to the state of Public Business, especially in regard to Indian Legislation, said, the last observation of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggests a repetition of the question whether we are to expect the Session to be eternal; and that is the point to which I wish to direct the attention of the House, because, unless we are prepared to look the condition of public business in the face, and take stock of it, we are likely not only to suffer great embarrassment, but also to incur no small amount of responsibility. Parliament has been sitting since the month of January, and we are now arrived at the 27th of July. The business is in an unusually backward state, and that which is most backward is the financial business. We know that after the last Supply day Parliament cannot rise for ten days. We were to have gone into Supply to-night, but Supply has been indefinitely postponed, and with it the termination of the Session. I will tell the House shortly what is at this moment the position of its financial legislation. We have passed the Navy Estimates, but a considerable portion of the Army Estimates remains. We have still to consider the Educational Vote, which may or may not create discussion. We have still to consider the question of fortifications irrespective of the Vote of £430,000, which may possibly give rise to a good deal of discussion, and all the Votes for the non-effective service. We have still £2,000,000 to vote for the army. Of the Civil Service Estimates, which include seven classes, besides Civil Contingencies, we have almost all to vote. The whole amount to be voted was £7,492,000, and we have still £6,152,000 to vote. In those Estimates there are no less than 194 Votes, many of which will cause considerable and some lengthened discussion. Notice has also been given of many Motions upon going into Committee of Supply, the discussion of some of which will occupy a whole evening. On Monday next we go into the discussion of the question of fortifications, and it appeared to be the opinion of the House last night that that discussion would not terminate in one evening. I do not know whether the Government are likely to have Tuesday. It was stated by the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes) that that is not probable. If they do not obtain that day, next week will be mostly taken up with the question of fortifications. On the following Monday we have the discussion on the paper duty, which is likely to be a prolonged debate terminating with a division, and may take more than one night. On the next night we have the consideration of the spirit duties, upon which notice of an Amendment has been given, and we have that interesting question of hops which was raised just now, and also the malt duty to consider. Therefore we may fairly conclude that these financial questions cannot occupy less than at least a fortnight to come, and that we are not likely to have an evening for an ordinary Committee of Supply until towards the middle of August. Then comes the question whether we are likely to have a Committee of Supply in the morning. Although fifteen Bills upon the Paper and two Notices of Bills have recently been withdrawn, there are still upwards of forty Bills with which the Government are going to proceed, and which are to be discussed and passed by this House. There are many Amendments to these Bills, some of which are long ones, and one contains upwards of 300 clauses. I think that after this statement the House will feel that, even if we were in a condition for business, and everything went as smoothly as we could wish, he would be a very sanguine man who expected Parliament to rise before the month of September. The House, however, is now in a very unsettled state as to its legislation; and I venture to say that no man who looks into the state of business can safely predict on what day, even in September, it is likely to rise. I am not speaking carelessly upon this question. I have looked very minutely into it. I have consulted high authorities, and those who are most likely to be informed upon the subject, and I believe that there is a general opinion among them that it is now very difficult to say on what day Parliament will rise. A short time ago we did hope that we might get up on the 20th, 24th, or towards the end of August. That hope is now receding very rapidly, and the mere fact that Supply is so indefinitely postponed, and that we cannot rise until ten days after the last day of Supply, show how distant is the prospect of our adjournment. It is a very serious thing that so much of the most important legislation—especially the financial legislation—of the country should be put off till the last week or fortnight, or three weeks of the Session. It is a great public injury and wrong, and I do not hesitate to say that if it had been the practice of Governments in former times it would of itself have produced a cry for reform which could not have been resisted. I know no greater injury that can be inflicted upon the country than that you should have four or five months wasted upon measures which are not passed, and that all the most important financial and other legislation should be hurried over in the last two or three weeks of the Session. Then, as if this was not enough, we have now before us—what is an entirely new sphere of legislation—five Bills on Indian subjects, and are expecting two more. [An hon. MEMBER: The Indian Budget.] Yes, and the Indian Budget, of which no notice has been given. This is a point upon which I do not wish to touch on this occasion in any spirit of criticism or hostility towards the Government. I wish to place before them exactly the facts which are deserving of consideration, and if the noble Lord at the head of the Government will have the goodness to listen to me, without prejudice as without partiality, I think that I can convince him that he will consult the honour of the Government as well as the convenience of the House by not pressing those measures. I wish to stow the noble Lord that the Government is in a false position upon this question of Indian legislation, because I think I can prove to the common sense of every man in the House, that whether from inadvertence or from whatever cause it may be, they have not complied with the requisitions of the Act of 1858. If that is so, I am sure that they will do best at once to acknowledge their mistake and withdraw the measures which they have introduced. The House must remember that in the Act of 1858, hasty and imperfect as that measure was, Parliament showed its sense of the magnitude of the question and of the difficulties and responsibility which attached to the administration of our Indian Empire, and endeavoured to establish securities for making that administration in time to come effective. The great security which it endeavoured to establish was giving to the Secretary of State the assistance of a Council of experienced men, who might aid him in the administration of Indian affairs. Parliament looked forward to the possibility of a Secretary of State being appointed without previous knowledge of Indian affairs, and who might be chosen rather from political considerations than on account of his fitness for the office, and it therefore thought it wise to provide that he should have the assistance of a Council of able, experienced, and distinguished men who were sure to possess the knowledge which very possibly he might lack. But the views of Parliament were so much better stated by the noble Lord the Foreign Minister, who took a prominent part in the legislation of that day, than I can hope to do, that with the permission of the House I will read his remarks. The noble Lord said:—

"No one flan overrate the benefit to be derived by the Government of India if the Secretary of State were assisted by eminent men intimately acquainted with Indian affairs."

And he states in another place:—

"I cannot imagine that the Secretary of State should be so unwise as to restrict the members of his Council to mere routine duties, burying them beneath the load of papers which arrive from India, setting them to work which might be as well performed by under-secretaries and clerks, and not consulting them on all points of Indian policy. The Secretary of State who acted in such a manner would ill discharge his duty. I think the Secretary of State may derive most valuable assistance from his Council with regard to important questions of policy, revenue, administration of justice and war. The Council ought to be independent. The Bill, therefore, contains these two elements of a good measure—a Secre- tary of State who is supreme when he chooses to be so, and an independent Council who can give him advice."

That was wise and sound doctrine, and in that Act Parliament carried out the views so clearly explained by the noble Lord. The Act of Parliament, when it comes to the duties and procedures of the Council, says:—

"The Council shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, and subject to the provisions of this Act, conduct the business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the Government of India."

There can be no doubt as to the meaning of that clause, which is, that in all matters of Indian administration the Secretary of State shall act with the assistance and advice of the Council. The Act goes on to say:—

"All powers by this Act required to be exercised by the Secretary of State in Council, and all powers of the Council shall and may be exercised at meetings of such Council, at which not less than five members shall be present. … Meetings of the Council shall be convened and held when and as the Secretary of State shall from time to time direct; provided that one such meeting at least be held in every week."

It goes on further to say:—

"In case of difference of opinion on any question decided at any meeting, the Secretary of State may require that his opinion, and the reasons for the same, be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, and any member of the Council who may have been present at the meeting may require that his opinion, and any reasons for the same that he may have stated at the meeting, be entered in like manner."

The House will observe how careful Parliament was that everything that was done by the Secretary of State and by the Council should be recorded, and recorded, moreover, expressly for the information and subsequent judgment of Parliament. The Act goes on to say:—

"Every order or communication proposed to be sent to India, and every order proposed to be made in the United Kingdom by the Secretary of State under this Act, shall, unless the same has been submitted to a meeting of the Council, be placed in the Council Room for the perusal of all members of the Council during seven days before the sending or making thereof, except in the cases hereinafter provided; and it shall be lawful for any member of the Council to record in a minute-book, to be kept for that purpose, his opinion with respect to each such order or communication, and a copy of every opinion so recorded shall be sent forthwith to the Secretary of State."

Then comes the 25th clause, to which I beg the special attention of the Government and the House. It is a clause with which I think the House will agree with me in saying the right hon. Gentleman, I the Secretary of State, has not complied. It is as follows:

"If a majority of the Council record, as aforesaid, their opinions against any Act proposed to be done, the Secretary of State shall, if he do not defer to the opinions of the majority, record his reasons for acting in opposition thereto."

The House will see the peculiar importance of these provisions, and the excessive care with which Parliament at that time entered them in the Act. The reason is obvious. We felt the responsibilities, difficulties, and dangers of Indian administration. We appointed a Secretary of State who should have the assistance of a Council. When they differed the Council were on their part to record the reasons of their difference from the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of State was on his part to record the reasons for his not acting in accordance with the opinions of the majority of the Council. The object was that when any measure was submitted to Parliament, Parliament might see the reasons on the one side and on the other; and, exercising its own power of review, it might upon that full information, form its own judgment as to the course which the Legislature should adopt. I do not think that, upon these points, there can be any difference of opinion. But now I shall show the House the very false, embarrassing, complicated, and inconvenient position in which we are placed by the recent Indian legislation, or attempt at legislation. I think it is manifest, considering the difficulties of the subject, that Indian Bills should be brought before us after due consideration, and with ample time given to the House for the discussion of all their principles and details. What has happened in the course of the present Session? We have at the present moment five Bills before the House. Notice was given of two others, which have, however, subsequently been withdrawn. There is another Bill coming down to us from the other House, and we have found it impossible as yet to extract any answer as to when or whether there is to be a financial Budget submitted to us, although I understand it is intended to raise an Indian loan. What are the dates of the Bills actually before us? The Indian Army Bill, which, in my opinion, is the greatest change that has been made in any part of Her Majesty's dominions within our recollection, was read the first time on the 21st of June. The East India Stock Bill was introduced on the 10th of July. Notice was given of two Bills, of which it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance, especially of the one regarding the Civil Service. Those Bills were to have been introduced on the 23rd of July; but from the opposition which was threatened, and the objections which were made, the Secretary of State withdrew that notice. The Superannuation Bill was introduced on the 24th of July, and the Senior Member of Council Bill, and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Bill, were brought in on the same day. So that six of the Indian Bills were intended to be introduced after the 23rd of July. We have asked whether there is to be a financial Bill. I have repeated that question twice, but we cannot get it answered, and when the financial Bill is introduced, if it is to be introduced, it will be at a time when three-fourths of the Members of this House will have left London, and when they will not have an opportunity of even seeing the Hill The Secretary of State stated the other night the reason why he had introduced his Bills so late. He said there was a great deal of business going on in the early part of the Session, and he waited until the paper was somewhat cleared. That a Gentleman of his official experience should believe that as the Session lengthens the bill of fare is shortened, is, to say the least, rather curious. My experience of the House tells me that the nearer we approach August, the Orders of the Day become more numerous and more difficult to get through. But, as a proof of the obscurity in which Indian legislation is involved, I may cite the Bill which I hold in my hand, and as to which I gave notice to the Secretary of State that I would to-day ask a question. I learn from the Minutes of the other House, that a Bill has there been introduced under the extraordinary title of the Coast of Africa Amendment Bill. What does the House think this Coast of Africa Amendment Bill is? It gives power to the Secretary of State to transfer the whole of Her Majesty's dominions in India to the Colonial Department. It is a Bill ostensibly to amend an existing Act for the government of our settlements on the coast of Africa and in the Falkland Islands; but it is so framed that it will have the effect I have stated. After reciting that—

"Whereas by an Act passed in the 22nd year o the reign of Queen Victoria, entitled, an Act for the better government of India."

And that—

"Whereas it is expedient to withdraw some of the said territories in India from the operation of the India Act."

It enacts—

"That it shall be lawful by an order to be by Her Majesty made, by the advice of her Privy Council, to order that any of the said territories mentioned in such order shall be withdrawn from the operation of such Act."

The meaning of the Bill so far I do not think will he very clear to the House. But it goes on to say that the provisions of the said first Act (namely, the Coast of Africa Act) shall be extended to all territories so withdrawn as aforesaid, and to all the possessions of Her Majesty, not having been acquired by cession or authority, &c. So that in fact power is given in this Bill to transfer the whole of Calcutta and our Indian empire to the Colonial Government. I believe the fact to be that some time ago it was considered desirable to transfer an outlying part of the Indian dominions, on the Straits near Singapore, to the Colonial Government, and this Act was brought in for that purpose; but, instead of taking power to transfer that territory only, the Secretary of State for India proposes to make away with the whole of our Indian empire. I believe I am correct in stating that this Act has not yet been submitted to the Council of India. I will only ask when all these Bills are introduced so late in the Session, whether the responsibility of the Secretary of State is not immensely aggravated by the fact that the most important of these Bills has not been submitted to the approbation of the Council of India. Is not that another reason for asking the Government to postpone legislation of this kind? The real point, however, is whether the Secretary of State for India has complied with the provisions of the Act in having neglected to produce the recorded reasons of the Council of India, and his own recorded reasons for acting in opposition to their opinion. The Secretary of State in a previous debate said he did not feel that under the provisions of the Act it was necessary to consult the Council. He said, "I am only bound to consult them in the acts I perform as Secretary of State, but this amalgamation is not the act of a Secretary of State, but of the Cabinet, and therefore I am not bound to consult my Council upon it."

said, that a reference to a past debate, and an attempt to answer it, was directly contrary to the rule of the House.

The right hon. Gentleman has published his reasons.

said, he had understood that the right hon. Gentleman was replying to the reasons given by the Secretary of State in a former debate.

The right hon. Gentleman has published his reasons. He has avowed them in writing, and they are on the table of this House. [Sir CHABLES WOOD: Hear, hear!] The distinction he draws is that if he does an act as Secretary of State he is bound to consult the Council, but not if he, does an act as a Member of Parliament. But what is the common sense of the Act of Parliament? Does it not intend that the Secretary of State for India shall be the adviser of the Cabinet on Indian affairs? And does it not also intend that the Council of India shall be the adviser of the Secretary of State? Above all, if a question be so important as to be raised to the rank of a Cabinet question, does it not obviously follow that the more important the question the more essential it is that the Secretary of State shall have the advice of the Council? The intention of the Act was that every Act of Indian administration—still more every important Act—should be submitted by the Secretary of State to the Council, and that he should obtain their advice and communicate it to the Cabinet. The Secretary of State may, no doubt, override the Council, but in that case Parliament has provided that he should record his reasons, so that Parliament may judge of their sufficiency. It is said that the right hon. Gentleman introduced this Bill, not as Secretary of State, but as a Member of Parliament. That, however, is a most untenable doctrine. We never heard of a Chancellor of the Exchequer bringing in a Budget merely as a Member of Parliament, or of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary making a speech on foreign affairs as Member for the City of London. Every separate departmental act is done on the responsibility of the Minister who is the head of that department, and the Secretary of State is bound to comply with all the provisions of the Act of Parliament. I say that the right hon. Gentleman has disregarded the provisions of the Act. He has evaded the intentions of Parliament, and as he stands before the House in the position of not having complied with the law, that is a good ground for refusing the legislation he proposes, and also affords a ground to the Government for withdrawing the Bill. At the late period of the Session at which we have arrived, when it is impossible for a full consideration to be given to a tithe of the business on the table, I put it to the House whether we ought not to urge the Government to clear away this large branch of Indian legislation which has been hastily entered upon, and cannot now be satisfactorily settled.

I have to thank the right hon. Gentleman, in the first place, for having given me notice of his intention to allude to the subject of Indian legislation; and, in the next, for the calm and temperate tone in which he has made his remarks. Before I advert to the more serious part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, I hope I may be permitted to dispose of the matter relating to a Bill now in the House of Lords, the account of which excited, not unnaturally, the amusement of the House. I must disclaim any responsibility for the preparation of any portion of that Bill, which I never saw until I received a copy, sent to me by the right hon. Gentleman this morning. The fact is, the Colonial Office proposed to introduce a Bill for the purpose of amending the Law relative to the Governments of the coast of Africa and the Falkland Islands. A question has been pending for some time as to the advantage of transferring the Strait settlements from the Indian Government to the Colonial Office, and a petition had been received from the inhabitants of Singapore in favour of that island being so transferred. So far as the Government of India were concerned, we were quite willing to accede to that arrangement; and after taking the opinion of the Governor-General, we intimated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies our approval of the transfer. To that letter we have received no answer. However, it seems that the Under Secretary for the Colonies prepared this Bill, and inserted in the draught certain words to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, thinking it might be a convenient opportunity for taking Parliamentary power transferring Singapore to the Colonial Office. The Bill was brought to the India House, and the Assistant Under Secretary, Mr. Melvill, sent an answer back that it was impossible that those provisions could be admitted into the Bill. The copy sent to the India House was a mere draught copy; but by inadvertence, as it appears, the Bill was introduced into the House of Lords containing the words in question. The India Office, however, had nothing to do with it. With respect to the other four Bills to which the right hon. Gentleman has alluded, two are of pressing necessity, the object of the first being to remove doubts as to the authority of the senior Member of Council, which have only recently arisen in consequence of Sir James Outram being obliged to leave Calcutta for ill-health; and that of the other to make provision for the payment of the superannuation allowances of persons who have served both in England and India. The purpose of a third Bill is to provide a great convenience to the public by transferring to the Bank of England the payment of the dividends of the East India Company; and I do not think that these are Bills of a nature requiring a great deal of discussion. But the main and more serious part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech referred to my conduct in introducing Bills to Parliament without the concurrence of the Indian Council, and he quoted the words of the Act of Parliament correctly enough on this point, though he appears to have misapprehended their effect. I perfectly agree that as Secretary of State for India, I must, except in a particular case, act with the Council; but the 23rd Clause prescribes the course of proceeding. It declares that at a meeting of the Council, at which the Secretary of State shall be present, his determination is, in certain matters, to be decisive, and the members of the Council, as well as the Secretary of State, may record their opinions whether they dissent or assent. But there is no obligation upon them to record their opinions unless they like. The words of the clause are these:—"And in case of difference of opinion on any question decided at any meeting." It follows, therefore, that the question must be submitted to and decided at the Council, in which case, if any difference of opinion arises, the Secretary of State and any members of the Council may require that their opinions and reasons should be entered in the Minutes of the proceedings. The 23rd Clause comprehends all that relates to the proceedings which take place in the Council. Any matter brought before the Council must be dealt with in the way prescribed by that clause, and in no other way. The 24th Clause provides for cases in which the Secretary of State takes a step without submitting it to the Council. It declares that every order or communication proposed to be sent to India, and every order proposed to be made in the United Kingdom by the Secretary of State shall, unless the same has been submitted to the Council, be placed in the Council Room for the perusal of the members during seven days before the sending or making thereof; and all the members of the Council may record in a minute-book their opinions with respect to such order or communication, and a copy of every opinion so recorded shall be sent forthwith to the Secretary of State. Nothing is more clear than that it is in the power of the Secretary of State to address a letter to India without submitting it to the Council. But, before he sends the letter, he is bound to place it on the Council table for seven days previously, and every member may record his opinion, a copy of which is to be sent forthwith to the Secretary of State. That is to provide for many cases which might arise, such as the absence of the Secretary of State; and in these cases the opinions of the Council must come before the Secretary of State before any such letter could go out. The 25th Clause also prescribes what is to be done by the Secretary of State in such last mentioned case; a majority of the Council record their opinions against his proposal, namely that if he does not defer to their opinions, he shall record his reasons for acting in opposition thereto. Thus it will be seen that the 23rd Clause points out the course of proceeding where a measure is brought before the Council. The 24th and 25th Clauses prescribe the modus operandi where a measure is not brought before the Council. And this is the first time I have heard the interpretation put upon the Act by the right hon. Gentleman, for in the Council itself, as far as I am aware, no one has entertained such an opinion. It has never been claimed by any member of the Council that I am bound to record my reasons, in the event of my overruling the majority of the Council, provided the discussion takes place in the Council.

The dissents of the Council have been presented to Parliament.

That is perfectly true. When the Council disapprove any step taken by the Secretary of State in Council they are empowered to record their dissent; and, in like manner, the Secretary of State may require that his opinion should be recorded, but he is not obliged to do so. Well, I proposed to send a letter to the Commander-in-Chief to suspend recruiting. That was an executive act of the Secretary of State. Some of the Council objected to the letter, and all of them had a right to record their opinions. The case is clear enough. If the matter is discussed in Council the members may record their opinions or not, as they choose; if it is not discussed in Council, then, supposing that the Secretary of State acts by himself in opposition to the majority of the Council, he is bound to record his reasons. I am speaking in the presence of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), who will, I think, concur in what I have said; and this is an answer to the legal question raised by the right hon. Gentleman. In my executive capacity I am bound to consult the Council; but in bringing forward a measure on the authority of the Government I maintain that I am not bound to consult the Council. I am speaking of the obligation to consult them, and to do so in such a way that they may record their opinions. The question of the Indian army, on which this matter arises, was not a question which the Council could deal with. It was a question to be decided by the Government and by this House, and in a matter of the kind I was not fettered by the obligation of consulting the Council. I confess that I think it would have been wrong if the Act had contained any such obligation. On a former occasion I held the office of President of the Board of Control, and as such I constantly introduced Bills without consulting the Company; and the change effected in the government of India, in 1853, was brought forward by me on the authority and responsibility of the Government. As I have always understood it, the Act of 1858 was to give more direct action, and to impose greater responsibility on the Minister for India; yet if the construction put upon the Act by the right hon. Gentleman were adopted, the Secretary of State would be more fettered than the President of the Board of Control was. Such a construction, therefore, is in utter contradiction to the whole spirit of the Act. Upon this question of the Indian army allow me to observe that there is no difference of opinion between the two great leaders of party in this House. In a speech delivered by the right hon. Gen- tleman (Mr. Disraeli) in 1858, I find him expressing this opinion:—

"A few nights ago I announced that it was our intention to ask for a Royal Commission to examine into the whole question of the reorganization of the Indian army, and when the result of their labours has been submitted to the Government, the Government will come to a conclusion which, no doubt, the new Indian administration in England will be most useful in carrying into effect, but we cannot leave a subject of that magnitude to the mere domestic Government of England or India, and that, and other questions of the like importance, must be dealt with by other means, and provided for by different machinery."

The clear meaning of these words is that the question must be decided upon by the Government. The Government would have introduced a Bill, and the right hon. Gentleman said, as I do, that the Indian administration in England would be most useful in carrying it into effect. My noble Friend acted in precisely the same way. The late Government came to a decision on the subject of the Indian army. It was never brought before the Council; and, as I read the Act, I do not think it contained any obligation to do so. As the late Government proposed to act, so have we acted, and in doing so I think we have taken neither an illegal course nor one contrary to the spirit of the measure of 1858, or the intentions of those who introduced it. I did not act upon my own responsibility, but in conjunction with the whole of my Colleagues in the Government, and I say that it would have been contrary to the whole scope of the Act of 1858 to have done otherwise. When the right hon. Gentleman counsels delay I beg him to bear in mind the fact of the case. If we are wrong, reject the Bill. I quite agree that this is a most serious and important Bill. The gallant Member behind me (Colonel Sykes) says the safety of India depends upon it. So say we. But he considers the safety of India is involved in the maintenance of a local army, while we think it would be promoted by the adoption of one uniform army. The subject is of vast importance. We, of course, feel it, and we feel also our responsibility. We have as an act of public duty introduced this measure, or we should not have involved ourselves in this course, and I should not act, as I regret to do, in opposition to the opinions of the noble Lord who preceded me in office, and against the wishes of many members with whom I have to act in the Indian Council, but I have been actuated by an imperative sense of duty. The question has been asked who requested this measure—who wants it? My answer is that the great majority of this House approve it. 282 Members voted for it, 51 against it. The right hen. Gentleman may have a contempt for majorities, and may consider his wisdom superior to the collective wisdom of the House; but as the only mode I know of taking the collective opinion of the House is by majorities, and when we have a majority of five to one in favour of this Bill, I am justified, despite the right hon. Gentleman's sneer, in saying that the collective wisdom of this House has approved the course we have taken. I have heard no one who is acquainted with the posisition and feelings of officers in India who does not deprecate delay above all things. Decide the question in one way or another, but decide it, for there is a perfect stagnation in the army in India, and a feeling of discontent has arisen, which will certainly not be lessened by any protracted delay. They say, "Decide against us if you will, but decide at once, and let us know what our prospects are for the future." I will conclude by quoting the words of Sir Bartle Frere, a distinguished Indian servant, and a member of the Council of the Governor General, whose opinion is adverse to the course we are taking, but who, above all things, desires that some decision should be come to. Sir Bartle Frere says:—

"The feverish uncertainty as to their position and prospects of any large body of public servants is, under any circumstances, a great evil, and I believe in the present case that, unless it be allayed by a settlement of the questions now pending, which so vitally affect the officers of the army, it may prove the root of national calamity."

I will only further beg hon. Gentleman who appear here as the advocates of officers in the Indian army, whose position and emoluments we do not propose in any way to injure or diminish—I would beg those hon. Gentlemen to bear in mind that delay is the great evil. Reject the Bill if you will, but let us not have protracted discussion and delay. I believe an adverse decision would be ten times better than, continued suspense.

If this measure be of the high importance which the right hon. Gentleman attributes to it—and I,; too, believe it to be of that importance—I then I must say we could not discuss it under more unfavourable circumstances. If Her Majesty's Ministers attach to the safety and good government of India that importance which they now allow it to possess, why was this measure introduced so late? The noble Lord has told us that he considers this question of such importance, that he will sit here until Christmas to dispose of it. I have no doubt that in such agreeable company all here would be willing to sit until Christmas. But whether we sit till Christmas or not, I trust that we shall sit long enough to consider and understand a measure the great importance of which the right hon. Gentleman allows. But if they believe it to be so important, has the conduct of the Government been consistent with that belief? "When did they first feel a sense of the importance of this subject? Was it in June, when they introduced the measure? Was it in July, when they gave information about it, or when they gave the successive details demanded by this House? Let the House remember, if this measure possesses the importance now attributed to it, it was the duty of the Government to anticipate its introduction by giving every possible information. "We should have had information as to its necessity, as to the opinions of those who were conversant with the state of India and the sentiments of those who had long experience in that country, as well as of the details by which this measure will be carried out. I never believed that the right hon. Gentleman, nor any one in office, would conceal information; but I do believe that the Government of India now do not attach that importance to the duty of giving information to this House which the change in the mode of administration of Indian affairs has rendered necessary. Recollect how India is now governed. It is governed by the House of Commons. Perhaps it is not so easy to govern it thus, and possibly my right hon. Friend feels the difficulty of governing it in that manner. "What do we see now? In all that relates to the ordinary government of India this House takes little apparent interest, for it is usually almost empty when these matters are disposed of, and we shall only have a full House when some subject which agitates the public mind and excites public feeling is brought under discussion. "We find now a measure of the greatest importance to India introduced in the month of June or July, at the latest period of the Session. The financial measures relating to India are only intro- duced when there is no one here to listen to them, or to question their correctness. But, if this House is to govern India, it is incumbent upon the Secretary of State to furnish us with ample information as to the necessity for the measures he introduces. But has that course been pursued here? We have had tardy information, we have had the reasons for dissent on the part of the Council but lately laid before us, and when my right hon. Friend talks of his majority of five to one for the second reading, let me ask what has been the effect of those reasons for dissent upon the minds of many hon. Members who formed a part of the majority? Let me ask whether all those hon. Gentlemen are now convinced of the necessity for what the right hon. Gentleman calls a uniformity of organization of the army, or that a mere question of symmetry justifies this great measure. The country will ask why did you do this, and how will you carry it out? "We now know nothing of the system of organization and regulation to be adopted in India. "We have this Bill brought in in July with very imperfect information as to the motives of the Government in introducing it in opposition to the unanimous opinions of the Council. My right hon. Friend says that technically, by the Act of Parliament, he is not bound to express his reasons for dissenting from the opinions of his Council. In point of fact, he says he is not bound to pay attention to his Council. But the House has more right to say, if he does not give answers to his Council, he ought at least, at an early period of the Session, when there is time for consideration, to record his own opinions in his place in Parliament. He says the Council can state their opinions, but he is not bound to answer them; but if there ever was a department of the State in which it was incumbent upon him who is at the head of it that he should clearly expound his opinions and state the reasons on which he introduces a Bill in this House, and in time for full discussion, it is that over which my right hon. Friend presides, and particularly so as you have excluded from this House the members of the Council. "When you have debarred those who could give information on the subject from this House—when he is the sole organ of that Council, it is the more incumbent on him to afford every information. I ask any one who reads these papers, has any information been afforded to the House and country in time to allow us to legislate fairly on this subject? Is the state of the House and public business such as enables us to perform our public duty to India? Is it fair to India that you should change a system, which has lasted so long and achieved so much, and against which so few charges can be brought—the sole blame being that they believed in the noble Viscount, as to the demand for fresh enlistment money? Is it, I repeat, fair to India, is it honest to England, is it just to this House, at this period of the Session, when hon. Gentlemen and the public at large are but gleaning the crumbs of information the Government have thrown out to them, that we should be called upon to adopt a measure in haste, which, if it passes this House, must pass not, I trust, owing to the ignorance of hon. Members, but through the scanty information afforded to them, and which must pass through "another place," where it can hardly be fully discussed, but where information will be given which will not tell to its advantage? Is this the moment to ask the House to legislate on a matter which the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles Wood)—which the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston)—which everybody who knows anything of India must be aware is a question vitally affecting the maintenance of our Indian Empire? Why, if there be any danger in delay that danger rests on the Government. Why did they bring in this measure so late? But we are told adjournment is worse than rejection. We know well by experience that is not the case. Adjournment brings reflection. We know it is not by a hasty decision, it is by the consideration of every question, by stating the reasons for every measure—not by adopting any proposal merely because it is the offspring of this or that Government, but by a system of legislation which is the child of knowledge, of statesmanship, that you can alone maintain the empire and promote the welfare of India.

Sir, I concur with the right hon. Gentleman who brought this subject under our consideration in regretting that so much business, so much important business, has accumulated so late in the Session; but at the same time I would repudiate the accusation which by implication he has made against Her Majesty's Government of being the cause of that accumulation.

I avoided saying anything about that.

Just so. Everybody knows, and therefore it is needless to refer to it, that in the early part of the Session questions undoubtedly of very great importance and interest, which it was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to bring under the consideration of the House, tended to produce the result which in common with the right hon. Gentleman I certainly regret; but when lie goes a step further and endeavours to make out of that state of things a reason why measures of great importance now pending should be thrown over and postponed till another year, I cannot acquiesce in the conclusion he thus draws. It is true, no doubt, that satisfactorily to dispose of the bulk of business which still remains to be transacted, it may be necessary for the House to sit till a later period than perhaps is the usual course of business in this House; but, at the same time, we have only to look back to former years to see that it is not unexampled that the business of the House should not be concluded till nearly the termination of the month of August. The moral I should draw from the statement of the right hon. Gentleman is, not that the House should fly from its duties, and from lassitude or impatience to get away neglect to dispose of matters which it is competent to deal with, but that hon. Gentlemen should set their shoulders to the wheel, devote their minds really to the transaction of business, and abstain—I do not mean anything disrespectful or disparaging—from taking up more of the time of the House than is necessary for the useful and practical enforcement of the opinions which they entertain, and of the arguments by which those opinions are to be supported. But now I must say that what has passed this evening is rather a departure from the course which I should join the right hon. Gentleman in recommending, because we have as the first Order of the Day, after disposing of the Motion of adjournment till Monday, the India Army Question. Well, that has been the subject of discussion for now a considerable period of time upon the Motion for adjournment. The hen. Gentleman who has just sat down has made an animated speech, not specially on the question of the Indian army amalgamation; but he even went back to the I question settled two years ago, the abolition of the East India Company. A great portion of that speech was occupied in en- deavouring to show that Parliament ought not to have made the change the did make. I submit that that question would have been infinitely more appropriate if the hon. Gentleman had waited till the Speaker left the chair on going into Committee on the Amalgamation Bill, and that discussing by anticipation the measures which are coming on in the regular order is not a practice which tends to the despatch of business, or to bringing the Session to a termination at an early period. Having said this much, Sir, I should be really acting against my own opinion if I went at any length into the statement which has been made; but I must take leave to say that I think much of the argument used on this Indian question rests on what appears to be an entirely false conclusion—namely, that there are to be two Governments in this country, one the responsible Government, responsible for the conduct of all the affairs of the empire, and the other an irresponsible Government, to be established peculiarly for the government of India. Because if it is not true, as quoted by the right hon. Gentleman from a speech of my noble Friend last year, that the Secretary of State for India is to be supreme in his Council, if the Council is to be a co-ordinate authority, not responsible to any human being, then that Council being appointed by the Act—very unfortunately, I think—for life, you are establishing an imperium in imperio, you are establishing a Government totally at variance to the fundamental principles of a representative Government and free constitution. There cannot he a more unconstitutional doctrine entertained than to contend that the opinion of an irresponsible Council is to be taken against the opinion of the responsible Government of the country for the time being upon questions of this Imperial and extensive character. I quite concur that the amalgamation of the Indian army is a most important measure. Important it is in one sense. That is to say, my opinion is, and always has been, that the creation and maintenance of a large local army in India is pregnant with the utmost danger to the maintenance of our Indian Empire. I have been asked whence I derived that opinion. My answer is, I derived it from my own convictions. It is an opinion I entertained very strong from the moment the subject was first mooted. That opinion has been strengthened every day—strengthened by what has been said in its favour—strengthened also by much that has been uttered against it. It is all very proper to have a local force of a small amount in a particular colony. You may have a small local force at Malta, or at the Cape, or in Canada, but to constitute, as it is now proposed, a local army of 40,000 men in India, irremovable from that country, would he, I say, to deliver the destinies of India into the hands of a praetorian band, a course pregnant with the utmost danger to the Imperial authority. And I contend that there could not be a more fatal proposal adopted by this House with regard to that great and important empire. Therefore I meet the question as one of the utmost importance, but important in quite a different point of view to that in which hon. Members opposite regard it. However, I will not go into that question now. We have been discussing the question of adjournment for four hours, only twice as long as the time occupied by my right hon. Friend, in explaining at full length all the reasons upon which he founded his proposal. My right hon. Friend, on the 12th of June, stated here at full length all the reasons, and I never heard a more masterly speech than he made on that occasion, taking as he did a general and comprehensive view of every bearing of the question and now he is reproached by hon. Members opposite, who probably did not hear the speech, with not having stated the full grounds for his measure. I should merely entreat the House to permit us to get rid of this Motion and go into Committee on the Bill, when every hon. Member will have a most appropriate occasion for expressing his opinion. We think the measure so important that if the House is not able to come to a decision on its merits to-night, I shall think it my duty to postpone the Motion on the Fortifications, which stands for Monday, to go on with this question instead. I hope, however, that the House will come to a decision to-night.

Sir, there have during this discussion been some observations made on the general state of business in this House, and the causes which have led to it, which it would not be consistent with my duty that I should pass over in silence. In rising to notice them I am unwilling to refer in any way to the past, or to rip up anything like old grievances, and I am sure the House will acquit me of any wish to adopt such a course. I cannot, however, help feeling that the remarkable—I may almost say the unprece- dented—condition in which the House finds itself, summoned, as it was, to meet at an earlier period than usual, and with the prospect before it of sitting to a later date than the experience of any of us can recall to our recollection, renders it necessary, if justice is to be done to the subject, that I should advert to those which I believe to be the real causes of a state of things so eminently unsatisfactory. Those causes it is impossible for me to avoid tracing to the circumstances under which the present Government acceded to office, and I hope I need not assure the House that I refer to that event quite in a statistical, and not in a political spirit. The noble Lord who has just spoken admitted the great importance of the question under our notice, but contends that it could not have been brought before the House at an earlier period of the Session because other business, of great importance also, occupied our attention. Now, what, let me ask, was that business? Her Majesty's Ministers on the eve of their accession to office laid down two principles in politics, if I may so call them, the one being that there should be a reform of the House of Commons upon a scale more democratic than that which the late Government had introduced, and that if the Earl of Derby were allowed to hold the reins of power after the general election, our friendly relations with France would be endangered. Events have, however, I think, proved that the late Government did not err in the conclusion at which they arrived as to how far a more democratic measure of reform than that which they introduced would correspond with the wishes of the country; and the House of Commons which had sanctioned a contrary opinion, upon reflection, after due consideration, and after a prolonged debate, has recurred to the opinion which the late Government had entertained. It did not prove the peculiar discrimination of the present advisers of the Crown that they took a contrary course. The Government are not, therefore, I maintain, entitled to plead the importance of their measure of Parliamentary Reform as an excuse for permitting a great portion of the Session to be occupied in discussions which led to no practical result. But it was, as I already stated, urged as a principal ground for want of confidence in the late Government that their remaining in office would tend to endanger the continuance of amicable relations between this country and France. It has, nevertheless, I think, transpired that our policy with reference to France was not of that character which would have precluded the maintenance of a good understanding between the two nations. Indeed, I think it will be pretty generally admitted, particularly after the speech with which the noble Lord favoured us a few nights ago, that the relations subsisting between France and England at the present moment are not of a more amicable nature than when we quitted office. In referring to these two points, the only ones, I may observe in passing, upon which the Vote of want of Confidence in the late Government was based—I do not seek to reproach any man or body of men, nor to find fault with the decision at which the House upon that occasion arrived; I simply allude historically to two pregnant facts. But what, let me ask, was the consequence of that vote of the House of Commons? In the first place, the present Government, who acceded to office as a consequence of that vote, and who ought, in my opinion, if they were really entitled to the confidence of Parliament, to have possessed sufficient discrimination to recognize what sort of measure of Parliamentary Reform. was adapted to the necessities of the times and the inclination of the people, introduced a Bill upon the subject different in principle from that which had been brought forward by their predecessors. That Bill was no doubt a lamentable failure, and a source of grievous disappointment to both sides of the House. But that is not all; this lamentable failure occasioned great loss of time, and to that loss of time much of the unsatisfactory position in which really important business now stands is. in my opinion, to be ascribed. Now, in the case of the second ground upon which the expediency of our expulsion from office was based—namely, that our friendly relations with France would be imperilled if we were to continue to hold the reins of power,—it became necessary for those who held that view, and who succeeded to the Government of the country as the result of a decision of this House—which I do not wish to challenge and which I merely refer to historically—to prove that there existed between France and England under their auspices an unusual degree of sympathy, and that they were the only statesmen who could produce and carry those measures which would be the happy consequence of that extreme and extravagant friendship be- tween the two countries. We had accordingly laid before us at the commencement of the Session that most extraordinary treaty which was concluded between this country and France, which was, I admit, in the first instance, received with acclamation by the House, but upon which almost every man among us now in his calmer moments looks with regret and apprehension. The carrying out the provisions of that treaty has entailed on the House of Commons immense trouble; it has been the cause of intense mortification, and is likely in the course of a few days, and at the fag-end of a laborious Session, to give rise to another great Parliamentary conflict. Now, I contend that it is in consequence of the Government having been formed on the two principles to which I have adverted, and of the ill-considered, ill-timed, unfortunate, and unhappy measures—whether in the shape of a Reform Bill or of a commercial treaty—which they have, because of their determination to act up to those principles, introduced, that we have wasted a whole Session in the discussion of propositions which have either totally failed and been withdrawn, or have partially succeeded, and while only partially successful, are in a great degree disastrous. The Reform Bill, to carry which Her Majesty's Ministers assumed the reins of office, they have been obliged to abandon, under circumstances on which I care not to dwell. The treaty with France, which they laid before the House with acclamation, is followed by a project for expensive fortifications. And against whom, let me ask, are these fortifications to be erected? Against our only and acknowledged enemy—according to the statement of the Prime Minister—France. To the formation of a Government on false principles, then, and to the necessity for introducing measures to vindicate those false principles, the waste of public time and the almost scandalous position in which the Legislature of England now finds itself are, it appears to me, to be attributed. I will not dwell, in dealing with this question, on matters of comparatively trifling importance. I will not occupy the attention of the House by travelling back to the period when we met in January, and enumerating days and weeks since allowed to pass away to no purpose. I take the measure before us, one of an important group of measures which affect the fortunes and the destiny of our Indian empire, and in dealing with it I may be permitted to observe that I wish to offer no unfair opposition. I say frankly it is my wish and disposition to support the Government in the policy which in this case they seek to carry into effect. I do not shrink from expressing my adherence to the opinions set forth in the speech which the right hon. Gentleman opposite has quoted. I exhibited no desire since this Bill was introduced to avail myself of any unexpected opposition to the Government upon it with the view of contributing to their embarrassment; but this I must be permitted to say—that I think they would have acted more wisely if, instead of wasting our time by the introduction of moonshine measures of Parliamentary Reform and phantom treaties of commerce, they had come forward when Parliament met, and stating that as by the Bill which was passed two years ago, abolishing the power of the East India Company, you had effected a great revolution in the Imperial relations with India, the necessary consequence was that the House of Commons had assumed and must not shrink from there sponsibility of governing that country with intelligence and an adequate knowledge of those countries; and then if they had come forward with their measures I do not think it would have been a mean Session of Parliament if they had passed measures adequate to the occasion. If the country might have felt a lingering admiration for the glorious career of the East India Company—yet England would have felt, after all, that it was a wise and statesmanlike decision understanding the spirit of the time which had resolved that there should be unity of Government, and that that empire should be no longer found under different rules and different policy—that the Parliament had incurred a great responsibility—that the ministry, sensible of that responsibility, had shown on the first occasion that they were equal to it, and had appealed to the knowledge and thought of Parliament. I say it would have been no mean Session of Parliament; and if we succeeded, after mature and statesmanlike consideration, in passing a measure equal to the occasion, we should have done something to prove that we are not unworthy of ruling that magnificent empire in the East whose destinies have been committed to our care. That is not our condition. No, weeks, long months, have been wasted in attempting to carry out that illusory programme, which was the pretext by which a change of Government was carried. That is the real cause, that is the sole cause, of the position in which the House of Commons is placed, and which, I cannot conceal from myself, has rendered it lower in the opinion of the country than it otherwise would be. At the end of the Session we find ourselves, with exhausted energies, called upon to fulfil the highest and most important duties, and we are obliged to submit to a lecture from the Treasury Bench, telling us that we must talk as little as we possibly can. We may say, of course, what is useful and practical, but we are not for a moment to diverge into any of those considerations which so colossal a theme as India must naturally be supposed to create in the minds of English statesmen. In my mind, Sir, this is not by any means a satisfactory position. This has been, or probably will be, the longest Session of Parliament that has occurred for the last twenty years. We may sit, in all likelihood, to the end of August, and there is very little hope now that we can pass any measures—I will not say of importance, because it is possible that some of these Indian measures may be adopted—but we shall not pass any important measures with that maturity of thought, with that adequate and sufficient debate, which bills of that kind require. The cause is obvious to all why so little time is left for the real business of the country. I do not feel that I am justified in this House of Commons, that has placed the present Government in office on the conditions to which I have referred, in making any invidious comments oil those conditions. Although the House of Commons made, no doubt, a great mistake on the subject of Parliamentary Eeform—although it was equally mistaken on the subject of our relations with Prance—I do not think it is the House of Commons that ought to rise up and accuse the Government that has been framed in accordance with those principles which practice has proved to be utterly illusory and fatal. It is ourselves, the minority on these benches, who might prefer these claims and these pleas and objections. We do not. We regret very much the time that has been wasted; but the time thus wasted has been the inevitable consequence of a majority—a bare majority, but still a majority of the House of Commons, choosing to form a Government on principles which every human being knew could not be practised. We knew very well that it was utterly impossible the country could tolerate a measure of Parliamentary Reform, such as was shadowed forth in the programme on which you destroyed the late Government. We, at least some of us, who from our position were obliged to be acquainted with the facts, knew very well that nothing in the history of political misrepresentation could be more false and flagitious than the misrepresentations which pretended that the late Cabinet, in the management of our foreign relations, were false to the interests and the honour of England. We knew very well that when you chose to displace a Government on such pleas, and to form another Administration on such grounds, you were building a house upon the sand, and we knew what must occur. But we are not going to take advantage of your inconsistency or your distress. The government of this country is not to be made a mere game of shuttlecock between parties. You determined, you solemnly determined to form, to establish, and to maintain the present Administration; and they are not to be charged with waste of time by you—you who voted for impossible Reform Bills—you who sanctioned accusations respecting our foreign policy, which, if you had knowledge, you must have known to be false, and which if you were ignorant you were not justified in putting forward as the grounds of your vote. We may have suffered from the course which you have taken, but our business now is to determine what is the best course to adopt in order to maintain the reputation of this House, and to satisfy the fair claims of the country. As far as I am concerned, I shall give an impartial consideration to the measures which Her Majesty's Government may bring forward, even though they are brought forward at the end of July. I shall support them when I think they are consistent with sound principles of government and the true interests of the country. Nor should I have risen on this occasion, when this controversy was taking place between Her Majesty's Government and their general supporters—controversies to which we are now accustomed—had it not been that not once nor twice, but frequently in this discussion, with a composure to which I could not submit with any feeling of self-respect, others besides the noble Viscount, and afterwards the highest authority, the noble Viscount himself, spoke of the present scandalous position of public business in the House of Commons as to be attributed merely to the fact that very important business had engrossed the attention of the House for the first months of the Session. Important business, which really never had any real existence, brought forward merely to fulfil the pledges of faction! I should not have murmured even at this had they not wasted the precious time of the nation; but there is one topic on which I must address an inquiry to the noble Lord. "We heard to-night that the well-considered programme of public business which was announced last night is now to be changed. Now, on this subject I wish that there should be no misapprehension on the part of the House. I ventured to say last night that there was a general disposition to assist the Government—and I believe in the House of Commons, whoever may be the leader, there is always a disposition to assist him, as far as possible, in the convenient management of public business—I ventured to add that I thought we had a right to expect from the Government a spirit equally frank and confiding. Last night the noble Lord made an arrangement at this time of the year still more important than at another, though everything that falls from the lips of a Minister relating to the conduct of public business is at all times important, and that arrangement, though with hesitation, was finally accepted with cheerfulness and confidence by the House. I understand from the noble Lord that on the 6th of August—if the Government proceeded with that measure—the contemplated change in the paper duties would certainly be proposed. I take it for granted, notwithstanding the change the noble Lord has made with respect to the debate on fortifications, the arrangement with regard to the paper duties will under all circumstances be adhered to. [Viscount PALMERSTON: Certainly.] I am glad to receive that assurance from the noble Lord, which I am sure will give satisfaction to hon. Gentlemen at both sides of the House. We shall now enter into the discussion of the question which awaits us, and I shall take the course I think consistent with that which I have previously followed, and with the opinions I have always expressed. I have only risen because when the state of public business has been referred to, the position of the House of Commons has been so treated, that a general impression might go abroad that it was to individual Members, who were only doing their duty to their constituents by expressing their opinions on public matters in this House, that our present mournful condition was to be attributed. It was only because that assertion has been more than once repeated that I have risen to protest against it.

said, he rose with the view of prolonging the discussion.

I trust the House will once more permit me to put the question that the House at its rising do adjourn till Monday next. I wish to take this opportunity of saying that not the last, but two or three of the later speeches have passed into the question which is waiting to be discussed; and, if this debate is to go further, I must request hon. Gentlemen who address the House, at all events not to fall into that error.

said, that he gathered from what had fallen from the noble Lord that he objected to the postponement or continuation of this debate. He himself, however, had no difficulty in coming to a conclusion as to what should be done in this important matter. The noble Lord, too, would find that the House was not to be forced to a conclusion so rapidly as he fancied. The majority by which the second reading was carried was, no doubt, large, but there had been a considerable change of opinion since that time, and the continuation of the debate would lead to a still greater change, and the noble Lord and his colleagues would find rather more difficulty in carrying this stage than he had found on the second reading. The question before the House had been lost sight of. It was, in reality, one of administration. The House had chosen to take on itself the Government of India, and the Secretary of State now brought in a Bill of one clause only, which would entirely revolutionize the whole principle of the Government of India. The question to be asked was—what would be the effect of the Bill, first, on the army of India, and secondly, on the Government of India? The two cases required to be accurately distinguished, but in both his own opinion was that it would be most mischievous. It was not the Government of a small colony which was under discussion—the destinies of 200,000,000 people which were at stake—and the House had to decide whether the Government of India should be placed in the hands of persons who had been brought up in that country, and who knew the feelings and habits of the people, or whether it should be entrusted to men who were not sent there on account of their ability for the purpose, who were selected without reference to anything but party considerations, and who might be said to be persons incapable for the duty. Although we had assumed the Government of India, still the important question remained whether the administration should be confined to persons sent to India, and whether the army should be under their control or that of persons in this country. The House had to inquire into the capability of the persons who had to govern the army, and next as to the particular quality of the army to be governed. There were two sets of persons proposed as governors of the army; first, those who, by Providence, were placed in power in this country, and next those who had a knowledge of India from their having been residents in that country, and who, knowing the feelings of the people of India, knew how they ought to be governed. The question lay between those two parties. Now under our present system—and he was putting it merely hypothetically—the Secretary for India, who was primarily responsible for the Government of India at home, might have no qualifications for the office; in place of knowledge and experience lie might merely have audacity; to use the language of a Gentleman on the Treasury Bench the other evening, he might have gone through life "with a silver spoon in his mouth," and by some political chance ho might be called to the Administration of India, without ever having shown the slightest capacity for the government of mankind. He did not say that such a thing had happened, but it might. How little Parliament was qualified to control that officer was shown by the state of that House during the dis- cussion on this Bill. When the hon. and learned Member for Marylebone got up to complain of the taking away of a few yards of Kensington Gardens the benches were full—Gentlemen rose eagerly to address the House until they tired both themselves and it; but when India was concerned there was a wonderful calm—a philosophical air in the manner—he would not say in the ideas of the House—an utter absence of all passion, and even interest. It was most difficult "to get up the steam," as it was called, on Indian subjects. Even at this late period the Indian Budget, affecting the interests of 200,000,000 people, still remained to be brought forward. It would be discussed, probably, with something less than the requisite number of Members present, and it would be carried without opposition. There was a limit to human patience and forbearance, and those Members who had none of the responsibilities of office to keep thorn would naturally go away. If they did not, probably they would have to take to their beds ill. As to the Indian Council, he had always maintained from the first—and experience had proved the truth of his prediction—that it would be made a screen—that its advice would not be-taken, that it would be a sham—a means by which the Secretary of State would govern India without any real responsibility. If the right hon. Gentleman had stood alone, without a Council around him, he never would have dared to bring in this Bill. It might be said that the Council were against him; but still they supported him by the fact of being his Council. He could but wish that the right hon. Gentleman stood entirely alone, and that on his head was concentrated all the mischief which would arise from this mode of legislation. It was said that the Council would have the carrying out of this Bill when it was passed, and again ho could but wish that the sole carrying out of it would fall to the right hon. Gentleman, without the shelter of a Council. Public opinion then would be so directed against him that he would tremble to do that which he now did with audacity. Now, if this were the difference between the two governing parties, what would be the constitution of the army if the Bill passed. The local European army was composed of men whose lives and fortunes were spent in India, who went out there while their minds were yet un formed, and who acquired that knowledge of the habits and prejudices of the people which made them fit instruments for the government of that country. For that force it was now proposed to substitute a body of men who would have no interest in and no acquaintance with India, who would be mere birds of passage there, intent on getting home again, and who would have all the insolence of domination combined with an utter ignorance of the feelings and usages of the Natives. Such would be the effect of the change upon India. What would be its effect upon England? The whole patronage of the Indian army was to be handed over to the Government of this country. It was said it would be transferred to the Horse Guards, but there could be no doubt the real influence would be exercised by the Treasury Bench. He wanted to know whether that Bench had shown such a wonderful capacity for governing that the government of 200,000,000 of people should be confided to them. While our Colonies, instead of being self-governed, were ruled over by that Bench, there was no part of the world so ill-administered as those Colonies. When the system of double Government was applied to India, very eminent statesmen thought it a great discovery. It was, however, merely a means of giving the whole power to the Government of the day, and screening them from all responsibility. No doubt atrocities were committed and things done in India that were the shame of England during the old East India Company's exclusive rule; but then there was a body on whom the public censure could be affixed. Immediately the double Government was introduced there was an end to all Parliamentary check or condemnation. The right hon. Gentleman wished to maintain his Council as a screen, and yet to be able to rule India exactly as he pleased. Everybody in power, or likely to obtain power in England, was for supporting this measure; whereas those who did not expect power, and who therefore looked solely to the good Government of India, entirely opposed it, as did also the persons most versed in Indian affairs—namely, the right hon. Gentleman's own Council. He could not tell what might be the consequences of this vast change, but he was sure it ought not to be hurried through the House in this manner. This was by far the most important Bill propounded this Session. It was a measure which the Treasury Bench intended to carry if they could. He was not at all sure that their intentions had ever been the same with their Reform Bill. As far as his influence went they should not be permitted to carry this measure. He implored the House by every means at its command to prevent so direful a result. That House was now the ruling power in the State. It might, as was said long ago, be governed by the patronage of India, They talked about introducing Bills to prevent bribery and corruption. If ever there was a Bill in aid of bribery and corruption it was the one now proposed by the right hon. Gentleman. Believing that it would be injurious alike to England and to India, and thinking that it could not possibly do any good to any living person except the Treasury, he felt bound to vote against it.

The argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman, Sir, although very ingenious, appears to me entirely fallacious. While the last' Act for the Government of India was under discussion in this House, the hon. and learned Member opposed a double Government, because it was a screen to the Minister; and wishing to concentrate responsibility, he was, I think, altogether against having an Indian Council. Now, however, he adopts a very singular line of reasoning. He says my right hon. Friend, desiring to get rid of his responsibility, has used his Council as a screen. And how? Why, by stating this matter to his Council, and then finding that they one and all entertained opinions exactly the reverse of his own. My right hon. Friend having acknowledged to the House that the views of his Council were opposed to his own, he is now accused of screening himself behind that Council, and thus escaping his share of the responsibility attaching to him as a Minister of the Crown. Everybody must see that that is contrary to common sense and experience. Surely, if you want to get a Council to shelter you from responsibility, you would get it to back your own opinions, and give you some authority for what you propose; the last thing you would think of would be to elicit its opinions when in antagonism to your own. With regard to this question itself, it is one not only of great importance, but of the greatest difficulty, and one requiring the most anxious consideration before an opinion can be formed upon it. The Cabinet had for a long time considered this question, and had delayed coming to a decision upon it, in order to be enlight- ened as much as possible by all the opinions which they could obtain from India. When they had to govern a great empire of 200,000,000 people, and when they had to govern it by opinion supported by force, the main point was not what the civil Government should he, but what should be the army of India. Lord Metcalfe said that the Government of India did not rest entirely upon opinion, nor entirely upon force; but they must have opinion with them, and they must have force to sustain the Government against disturbance. There should be unity of command, efficiency of discipline, and a homogeneous character in the military force, on which they must chiefly rely. The European local army was brought into existence entirely and unavoidably by the manner in which the Indian Government was acquired. It was acquired by a company of merchants, and they naturally formed their own army. But when you made the change from the government of the Company to the Government of Royal authority, and when you have to consider the question of what the army should be, you cannot forget that every man of military reputation is of opinion that they never could have the same discipline in a local as in the Queen's army. I have heard the late Duke of Wellington say, at least ten or twelve times, that the local force of India was deficient in discipline, and perhaps that great commander carried his opinion to an extreme in the objections which he made to officers of the Indian army. But with regard to the maxim, that in point of discipline you will gain by having one army, it is, I believe, undeniable—and it is equally clear that you will gain in unity of command—by having all the officers with the like expectations and under the same regulations. Until very lately there remained the difficulty that there was a local army existing which had won glory in the field in repeated battles and repeated wars, but partly by accident and partly by unfortunate events that army consists now of no more than 13,000 men. The question, therefore, is rather whether you should recreate a local army than whether you should destroy one already in existence. Upon the whole I have come to the conclusion, contrary to my previous impression, that the Queen's army ought to be the only European army in India. Another question upon which the hon. and learned Gentleman laid a good deal of stress—and it is most important— was whether the former army was not a link between the inhabitants and the Government of India. There is no doubt that that has been the case, and it was one of the causes of difficulty present to my mind; but I do not think that it is a matter which is incapable of solution by various modes by which you can connect the army existing in India with the local Government of India. Of course, among the officers who go out with their regiments there will be many young men who might look to an honourable career in India rather than returning to this country. I think that will be a natural consequence. But it must be recollected that without your legislation, and totally independent of it, there has been a total change since Bengal was first conquered by Lord Clive. It then took about a year to come home and go back again. Men who went out directed their whole thoughts to India, spent their whole lives in India, and only retired in their old age to enjoy the competence which they had acquired. But now, when communication is so rapid that the journey may be made in six weeks instead of six months, men's associations remain so connected with England that it is quite impossible, even if you wish it, in 1860 to restore the habits which in 1760 were the common habits of the country. I come, therefore, to the conclusion that, although there may be some inconvenience on this account, yet, as the great objects of unity, efficiency, and discipline, can be most certainly obtained, it is desirable to adopt the plan which the Government proposes. One word as to the Question before the House. It is that it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to make provisions for the future regulations, discipline, and patronage of the European forces serving in India. Can any one hope to carry such a Resolution? If you mean to have the Queen's army, of course the Resolution is incompatible. If you mean not to have the Queen's army, then the Bill should be rejected, and a Bill of a totally different nature introduced. But the notion of attempting to introduce in this Bill a number of clauses of which nobody has even given a sketch, to provide for the whole regulation, discipline, and patronage of the European forces serving in India, is the most impracticable which I have ever heard of in my life. The conclusion which I draw is that the hon. Gentleman is adverse to the plan of the Government, and then I say with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India, if the House agree with the hon. Gentleman let them reject the Government Bill, and carry a Bill for a local force in the course of the present Session. Of all things the greatest evil will be to postpone this question to another Session, to leave it open to be a matter of dispute in India and of fresh debates here. If the House disapprove the plan of the Government let them not pass an ambiguous and obscure instruction, but vote against going into Committee, or when in Committee refuse to agree to any clause and desire the Chairman to leave the chair. That will be a plain and intelligible declaration that you mean to have a local army. Let any one who has the confidence of the House frame a measure for the purpose, and let it be carried in the course of the present Session. The civil authorities and army in India would not then be left in doubt, but would know what you mean and what your intentions are.

said, he thought that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India had placed this question on a false basis. The right hon. Gentleman had declared that delay was dangerous in the extreme, and that his measure must be passed at once. Any one would have supposed from such language that the Government had really laid before the House a complete and well-matured scheme for the military administration of India. But so far was that from being the case that the measure was not even an empowering Bill. Its object was simply to divest the Government of certain powers which they now possessed—those which were to be substituted depended on some supposed project of the Government dimly shadowed forth in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. Was there any one in the House who professed clearly to understand the consequences which would follow the passing of the Bill, not only to the local army, but to the general administration of England and India? The necessity for the measure had been created solely and voluntarily by the Government. No one had asked for it. Every authority in India had solemnly deprecated it, and none more strongly than the Governor General and his Council. Her Majesty's Government had themselves started the question, and were alone to blame for the agitation and disturbance which it had occasioned in India. The House had not the means of coming to a proper decision on the question, because they did not know what plan the Government proposed to adopt. The measure was really not of an urgent nature; and the only reason which could be conceived for pressing it through the House was, that the Government were anxious during the recess to do something which Parliament would not be able to supervise and examine, and which they would, next Session, be told was a, fait accompli not to be disturbed. That was a contingency which he wished to prevent. There could be no practical danger in allowing the question to stand over till next year, when he trusted they would have better information on the subject. The only argument which the Government could use was that immediate action was demanded in consequence of that unfortunate mutiny of a portion of the European local army. He found, however, that the military authorities who were brought forward to support the Bill were themselves among the first to acknowledge that much excuse was to be made for the mutineers, and that, under the circumstances, their conduct was not only natural, but even pardonable. The mutiny was an event of an accidental and temporary character, which ought not to influence their decision on this great question, which rested on far deeper and more important grounds. He trusted the Government would at length perceive what was the feeling of the intelligence of the House, and understand that, as the question had grown in interest, so the measure had grown in unpopularity. He hoped they would not be misled by the result of the division on the second reading, which arose simply from the respect which the House very properly entertained for the decision of the Executive Government on a subject which they had not had time to master.

said, he could not join in the condemnation of the Secretary of State for India for having originated this proposal. It was, he held, the duty of the right hon. Gentleman, and of his colleagues, to initiate measures of this kind. The Bill certainly ought not to have been introduced so late; still he thought that, considering that the real question was whether the Queen should have authority by her officers over all the troops in India, it was a subject which might be well discussed, and he should not hesitate to give his vote in favour of having one army. The argument as to the accli- matizing of troops, and that they would be connected with the Natives, were arguments telling far more strongly against a local army than an Imperial one. He was the last person to say a word against the discipline of an army which had so long sustained its character for bravery and good conduct; but the discipline certainly was not such as to secure a proper state of efficiency. Even our own army could not be maintained in a proper state of discipline in India. He was sorry to hear the argument brought up about patronage, as if it were managed without thought or care, but only for the purpose of promoting private interests. There could be nothing worse than to interfere with the exercise of authority when it had been placed in hands where it bade fair to be wisely administered. He hoped the Government would proceed with this Bill at once, for nothing could be worse than delay, and he should be glad to give them his cordial support.

said, he then rose to move:—

"That it be an Instruction to the Committee that all appointments to military commands in India (the commands in chief alone excepted), and all Staff appointments, whether military, or medical, be vested in the Governor-General in Council, and other constituted authorities in India."

His object was to provide that the army to which the defence of India was intrusted should be subordinate to the authority of the Indian Government. He proposed this instruction in no spirit of hostility to the military authorities in this country, nor did he entertain any fear that the influence of the Horse Guards would be destructive of the English Constitution. He believed that the Horse Guards, the Secretary for War, or whoever administered the patronage, would do so to the best of their ability, but they would be liable to error on account of their want of knowledge. The disastrous consequences of injudicious appointments from home were felt both in the Affghan war and during the late mutiny in India. Earl Canning had himself said that if the Governor General was not allowed to be paramount in the government of the army in India, he would lose the greater portion of the authority by which he held that country in subjection, and a divided authority would be introduced, the consequences of which must necessarily be disastrous. The extent of In- dia, instead of being, as the noble Lord at the head of the Government appeared to think, a reason why there should be no local force in that county, was the main cause which rendered necessary the localization of a large portion of the army to which its defence was intrusted. It had been calculated that if India was to be held solely by troops sent from England, we should have to pay for the passage of 30,000 men annually. Was that expenditure to fall upon the revenue of India or upon that of England? Mr. Willoughby stated in the strongest manner that the revenue of India was not capable of bearing the additional expense which this plan would cast upon it, and that the advantage which would be derived from a frequent change of regiments would be as nothing compared with the enormous expense to which the revenue of this country, or that of India, would be put in order to attain that object. For the Indian service a different class of men were required from ordinary English military officers, whose ideas were not sufficiently of an Indian character. It could not be said that the government of India had been unsuccessful hitherto. If they respected the memory of those who rescued India during the late rebellion, how could they seek to break up the system under which the salvation of India had been secured? The subsidiary English force in India might be increased without the introduction of this Bill. He believed that, if the local army in India had not existed during the late crisis, no human power would have preserved our dominion there. He trusted that the Government would either abandon this measure, or that the House would continue their opposition to it until they compelled them to do so.

moved the Adjournment of the debate.

moved the second reading of this Bill, the object of which, he said, was to do away with the expenses incurred by charities for the administrative relief received from the Court of Chancery and other tribunals. A public charity, unlike other institutions, constantly required some assistance from courts of law. Endowed with perpetuity, it had a tendency to fall into disorder, unless corrected by some power outside itself. Since 1853 that duty had been performed by the Court of Chancery, the County Courts, and the Court of Bankruptcy. The County Courts and the Court of Bankruptcy were put in motion by the Board of Charity Commissioners, and their jurisdiction extended to the sum of £30. Above that amount the jurisdiction was placed in the Court of Chancery. The three main provisions of the Bill were—first, to raise the jurisdiction exercised by the County Courts from £30 to £50; secondly, to give the Charity Commissioners power to give the same relief as County Courts up to £50; and, thirdly, to enable the same parties to administer equitable relief above £50, but only on application by at least a majority of the trustees.

said, he wished to remark that between £500,000 and £1,000,000 of the money belonging to charities had accumulated in the hands of the charitable Commissioners since the passing of the Act by which they were appointed. That money had been taken charge of without any remuneration, and therefore without any responsibility. He would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that some person should be appointed with a salary to take charge of the money belonging to these charities.

said, it was extremely desirable to give the charities full opportunity of considering the provisions of this Bill.

said, that the Bill contained a principle to which the House had on various occasions refused to give its assent. It gave the Board of Charity Commissioners absolute power to turn out all or any of the trustees of the small charities in the kingdom, without any public inquiry. The Charity Commissioners were struggling to obtain a great and irresponsible power, and he moved that the Bill be read a second time that day three months.

seconded the Amendment, and expressed his dissatisfaction with the character of the Bill.

said, he should support the Bill on the principle of giving the Charity Commissioners something to do. The charities of the kingdom would be in quite as good hands when in theirs as in the hands of the Attorney General and the Court of Chancery.