House Of Commons
Thursday, February 28, 1861.
MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1o Labourer's Cottages.
2o Inclosure; Marriages Validity.
3o Bank of England Payments.
Convict Establishment At Bermuda—Question
said, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether any alteration has taken place in the treatment of the Convicts at Bermuda; whether the hulks are still used; and whether there is any truth in the report that a Mutiny has lately occurred among the Convicts at that establishment?
said, no change that he was aware of had taken place in the treatment of the convicts at Bermuda. With respect to the hulks one was not now used owing to the reduction in the number of convicts, but the other was still required, as there was not sufficient prison accommodation for the convicts on shore. No report of anything in the nature of a mutiny had reached the Colonial Office. With regard to the latter part of the noble Lord's inquiry, it would be seen by papers which had been laid upon the table last Session that there was great reason to doubt the accuracy of the statements made by the chaplains—statements, no doubt, well intended, but greatly exaggerated, and derived from information, in many cases not true, given by the men themselves. An intention had been entertained of sending out a special Commissioner, but a vacancy having occurred in the Governorship of Bermuda advantage had been taken of this opportunity to appoint a gentleman who was himself a military engineer, and whose ability was well-known at the Colonial Office, and from him the Government expected to receive at no very distant day a full report of all the circumstances.
Grand Juries (Ireland)
Question
said, he would beg to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce this Session any measure for the alteration and amendment of the Grand Jury Laws of Ireland?
said, it was not his intention to introduce any measure on the subject in the present Session.
The Red River Territory
Question
said, he wished to ask the hon. Gentleman, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether any steps have been taken by Her Majesty's Government to open the territory on the Red River and the Saskatchewan, in British North America, to Colonization, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Select Committee of 1857?
said, he was afraid it would not be found quite so easy a matter to open those regions to colonization as the question of the hon. Baronet seemed to imply. The first proceeding must of necessity be to transfer certain portions of those countries from the rules of the Hudson's Bay Company to the Government of Her Majesty. A Bill had been prepared for this purpose, but before it could be brought in it would be necessary that the negotiations with the Company, which involved many points of a difficult character and included important questions of compensation, should be brought to a close. He hoped, however, that his noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Office would be able to introduce a Bill on the subject in the course of the present Session.
The University Of Durham
Question
said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been turned to the Endowments in the hands of the University of Durham, and the educational results shown by a Return recently presented to this House, and whether it is intended to take any steps in consequence?
said, that his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary had had his attention directed to the subject, and he (Mr. Clive) believed it was under consideration at present with a view to some steps being taken with regard to the matter. What those steps were he could not say; but he would request the hon. Member to repeat his Question to-morrow, when the Home Secretary would be in the House.
Deficiency Of The Harvest
Order for Committee of Supply read.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair."
said, he rose pursuant to notice, to call the attention of the House to the serious deficiency of the late harvest, and the consequent necessity for increased economy in the public expenditure. He was aware that, in taking that course, he was assuming considerable responsibility; but as the question had not been touched upon either in the Speech from the Throne or in the observations which fell from Ministers or the leaders of Opposition, he felt it a public duty to bring the matter under the notice of the House. It would be necessary for him to give a short history of the weather during the last season, and its effects upon the harvest. In October, 1859, we were visited by an early frost more severe, probably, than any in the memory of persons now living. This not only prevented a large breadth of wheat from being sown, but its effects were felt in the almost total destruction of some of the green fodder crops. It was followed by a severe winter, which caused great suffering to the stock farmers; and the cold wet spring which ensued put them to enormous expense in buying fodder and carrying their stock forward to grass. A cold wet summer followed the cold spring, and though there were heavy crops of grass, little progress could be made in getting them in, and very few crops were well saved. The same unpropitious weather continued during the harvest, and, for thirty-five out of the forty days preceding the end of August rain fell, and the temperature was thirteen degrees below what it had been in the previous season. The few intervals of sunshine did not admit of the crops being harvested to any extent, except in the finest and earliest parts of the country, and in some of the later counties—Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Northumberland, and elsewhere—part of the crops remained in the field as late as January. The scarcity in the corn crop was aggravated by a failure in the potato crop, which, although not of as much importance in this country as in Ireland, nevertheless involved an increased demand for corn. He was sorry to say that the prospects of a future harvest were, likewise, seriously affected by the unpropitious weather which had lasted through the autumn seed time, and had rendered it impossible that they could hope, even at the best, for more than an average crop this year. The House would not be surprised to hear that the result of so much bad weather had been highly disastrous. No reliable data existed as to the breadth of corn sowed, and all that they could hope to do was, therefore, to form an approximate estimate. He had frequently pressed on the House the advantage of procuring returns of the acreage of the crops, and the advantage of such a system must now be evident. No objection would be offered by the great body of the tenant farmers, and the returns could be obtained at a very small expense. They had, however, no accurate data of that kind with regard to England. With regard to Ireland they had; and from them it appeared that the wheat crop in that country had declined in extent one-sixth as compared with what it was in 1857. He did not know nor did he think that there was a diminution to the same extent in England; but, though they had no accurate statistics to guide them in respect to the extent of the crop, they did possess some facts which enabled them to form an opinion as to the yield. During many years observation he had found the Board of Trade returns to afford good comparative data of the yield. He had examined those returns from the various market towns; and, taking the five months from the 1st of September to the 1st of February for the last five years, he found that the returns for the last year showed a deficiency of no less than 36 per cent from the average. Besides the Returns taken by the Board of Trade, very praiseworthy efforts were made by newspapers to supply the public with authentic data. The Agricultural Gazette had done much in that way, and as a result of its inquiries made an estimate in August which was subsequently confirmed by a Return published in February in The Mark Lane Express. He found that out of 313 Returns regarding the wheat crop, more than three-fourths represented that there was a deficiency varying from 20 to 60 per cent below an average crop. There was a similar deficiency in potatoes. He had made private inquiries of eminent agriculturists in various parts of the country, and had received full corroboration of the facts which he had now laid before the House. Other evidence also confirmed these facts. The returns of railways, running through corn-producing counties, did so. The Great Northern Company complained that, for the last six months, there had been a falling off in the traffic in consequence of the deficiency; the Eastern Counties repeated the same tale, and the North Western had suffered from the same cause. With all these facts before him, he came to the conclusion that, estimating both quantity and quality—for there was even a greater deficiency in quality—the yield of corn at the last wheat harvest would prove at least one-third deficient. In Scotland, he was happy to say, things would be very different. The wheat harvest there had been favourable; but hon. Gentlemen would understand how little that told on the general consumption of the country when he stated that the entire wheat yield of Scotland would not supply more than ten days' consumption for the whole country. From Ireland the accounts were conflicting. It appeared that in the earlier districts there was an average, but that, in the later, the results had been, as disastrous as in England. But the best proof of the deficiency of our own crops would be found in the consumption of foreign corn. He had obtained from the Custom House the comparative returns of imports during the last five years. From these he found that, for the five years preceding last year, the imports of wheat and flour, during the six months from August to February, were on the average 2,438,000 quarters, while for the six months from August to February last they were 5,627,000 quarters, or more than double the average of the preceding five years, and more in those six months than in any one whole year, except the year 1853. Such had been the beneficent results of free trade. While there was famine in our fields there was none among our people. He believed that we had just reaped the worst crop since 1846–47, the time of the failure of the potato crop. He would say a few words on the result of previous deficient harvests. In 1828, 1829, and 1830 there were throe consecutive deficient crops, which were not—as was very much the case with the present deficiency—confined to this country, but extended over Europe. These were followed by the French and Belgian revolutions, and in this country the great agitation for the Reform Bill. From 1836 to 1841 there were six partially deficient crops. In 1839 there were large imports and severe pres- sure, and discounts rose. In 1845, 1846, and 1847 there were bad crops, with the potato famine in Ireland. There were many failures in 1847, and high rates of discount; and the second French revolution and disturbances in all parts of the Continent took place in the following year. They then came to the period when free trade was in operation. The first deficient harvest after 1848 was in 1853. It was a deficiency of 29 per cent, as tested by the com returns of the Board of Trade. That of the present year he took, by the same test, at 36 per cent; but the deficient harvest of 1853 was followed by a magnificent harvest in 1854, and there was no monetary pressure of any serious character, and no disaster occurred in the country. They now came to 1860, which appeared to be the worst crop we had had since free trade; and, unlike 1853, we had not only a bad crop, but a bad crop following a series of years of great public expenditure, while the deficient crop of 1853 followed a series of years in which there was only a very moderate expenditure. Mr. Porter, in his work on the Progress of the Nation, calculated that during the first fifty years of the present century this country did not on an average receive more than three weeks' consumption of foreign corn in each year. In the present year it would probably receive not less than six months' consumption for the whole population. The demand for meat and wool had naturally turned the attention of the farmers more to that branch of their business. Accompanying that there had been a gradual rise in the rate of agricultural wages throughout the country. Both tended to diminish the breadth of corn. The consequence of this had been that within the last six months we had imported more foreign grain than we had done in the ten years between 1820 and 1830. "We had the satisfaction of knowing that, while there had been a shortcoming in this country, there had been a good crop on the Continent of Europe, and a superabundant crop in the United States of America; so that the people of this country had no reason to fear that bread would, get either excessively dear or scarce. During the six months that elapsed between August and January, 1859, our imports of corn from America amounted to 148,000 quarters; for the corresponding six months of the last and present year our imports were 2,195,000 quarters, for which we paid nearly twenty times as much as the American corn cost us in the previous year. From Russia and France the imports of corn were also large. Altogether, and looking to the increased prices, we had already paid for our imports of corn of this year an excess of £12,200,000 over last year. In making these largo imports of grain we had necessarily incurred a great expense, and the increase in the price of bread to the people of this country had been very considerable. If we assumed, which he thought we might fairly do, that the wheat consumed in this country amounted to 20,000,000 quarters annually, it was obvious that Is. a quarter on that quantity, when the price rose or fell, amounted to £1,000,000. We had, during the last six months to pay 14s. a quarter more than in the preceding year, so that the cost to the country was thus an increase of £14,000,000. In the last deficient year, 1853, the crops were one-fourth better than this year, and there was then no severe pressure of expenditure upon the country. But now, with a much worse crop, with an increased population, with money at 8 per cent, and apprehensions of commercial distress, with our trade with America interrupted, the pressure upon us would prove much greater than in 1853. In these circumstances the Army and Navy Estimates had been laid before the House. The reductions in these Estimates were very small and did not in any degree correspond to the great loss we had sustained in our resources from the causes he had stated. The circumstances of the country this year were very different from the last. Then there was great uneasiness on the Continent, and we were engaged in a war with China, the expense of which could not be computed. There was now less apprehension of the peace of Europe being disturbed, we had security at home, and the war with China had been brought to a close. In those circumstances, he thought there ought to be a far greater reduction in the expenditure of the country, and he trusted the House would not consent to pass one item of expenditure that was not strictly demanded by the necessity of the country.
Affairs Of Syria—Question
said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "Whether he has received any information as to a Note said to have been presented by Prince Labanoff to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Constantinople, commenting on the Report made by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan of the result of his inquiries into the complaints of the Christian subjects of the Porte; whether that Note has received the support of the French Minister; and whether the subject of that Note, and the demands it contains, are to be brought under the notice of the Conference at Paris? He did not desire to detain the House long upon the subject of his notice, but it involved a question of so much importance that he hoped he might be allowed to make a few I remarks. His hon. Friend the Member for Ayrshire (Sir James Fergusson) had put upon the paper a notice in respect to a kindred subject, and he would rather have followed his hon. Friend, as no one was better qualified than he was to address the House on the subject. But as that was; not possible according to the rules of the House, he would put the question of which he had given notice to the noble Lord. Before referring, however, to the circumstances that had made it desirable to give this notice, he would venture to call to the memory of the House and of the noble Lord an incident of great gravity that occurred not long ago, but which, in his opinion, threw no dubious light on the policy of certain foreign Governments. Shortly before the present Government came into office an announcement appeared in the public journals, both of this and foreign countries, to the effect that an alliance offensive and defensive had been entered into between the Governments of France and Russia. The importance of this announcement could not be overrated, and such was its gravity felt to be that the funds of this country fell in one day not less than 5 per cent. It was considered by the Government then in power to be their duty to ask for some information with reference to such an announcement from the Government of Russia. The reply of Prince Gortschakoff to the inquiries made produced a great effect at the time, and attracted the particular notice of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle. The reply was, that he would not deny that there might be an understanding between the Governments of France and Russia, but all he would undertake to say was, that that understanding contained nothing hostile to the interests of England. He should not have recalled that incident had it not in his mind an important bearing on what since had occurred with respect to Turkish affairs. In the early part of last year he had felt it his duty to call the attention of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) to a circular addressed by Prince Gortschakoff to the representatives of Russia at the various Courts of Europe. That circular declared that from information possessed by the Russian Government, it appeared that the condition of the Christian population of the European provinces of Turkey was so deplorable, and that they suffered under oppressions so grievous, that it became the duty of the European Powers to interfere; and collectively to call upon the Porte to fulfil the promises obtained after the Crimean war, and from which it had up to that time grossly departed. The importance of that circular could not be overestimated, because it was clear that the Court of Russia still persisted in that policy which had for years exorcised such a disturbing effect on Europe, that it was still desirous of putting itself forward as the protector of the Christians in the European provinces of Turkey; and that, notwithstanding the result of the Crimean war, it still pursued what had been its constant policy of interfering actively in the internal affairs of Turkey. The noble Lord did not conceal from the House his sense of the important character of that circular, and he insisted in his remarks on the importance of maintaining the prestige of the Sultan's authority, which he said was menaced by the circular in question. The noble Lord added that, so far as he could learn, the statements of the Russian circular were not accurate; that the Christian subjects of the European provinces of Turkey were not suffering under any exceptional system of oppression; and that, although defects existed in the Turkish system of government, there was no reason for thinking that the condition of the Christian population was such as to call for European interference. The noble Lord applauded the resolution of the Turkish Government to issue a Commission to inquire into the subject. At the head of that Commission was the Grand Vizier, who made a tour through these provinces, and himself inquired into the condition of the Christian population. He satisfied himself that the representations made by the Russian Government were not founded in fact, and the information since received by the noble Lord confirmed the representations of the Grand Vizier. He must now pass from this subject in order to point out how the interference on the part of Russia with the Christian population of Turkey naturally led to discontent and disorder in those provinces. Contemporaneously with the publication of the Russian circular Achmet Pasha was Governor of Damascus and the representative of the Sultan there. He felt it his duty to represent to the Government of the Sultan at Constantinople that, owing to the interference and intrigues of foreign emissaries, so much irritation and uneasy feeling had been caused that it was impossible for him to become responsible for the maintenance of the public peace. He represented that his force was so feeble that, if disorders did occur, it would be impossible to interfere by force of arms, and that if he were unsuccessful the authority of the Sultan would not only be disturbed in the districts of Syria, but also that the prestige of the Sultan's name and authority would be greatly compromised elsewhere. Shortly afterwards, it was announced by the Turkish Government to Achmet Pacha, that in consequence of the circular of Prince Gortschakoff, the tendency to discontent and irritation had so much increased among the European provinces of Turkey, that it was impossible to spare him any reinforcements. Achmet Pacha sent in his resignation, which was accepted, and, at the time of the outbreak of the disturbances, he only held office until the arrival of his successor. He wished the noble Lord to observe, that the very first effect of the interference of Prince Gortschakoff by means of this circular, to which he had called the noble Lord's attention last year, was this—that it rendered it impossible for the Sultan to support his officer even where his authority was menaced; and, therefore, led in no ambiguous degree to the disturbances that had since occurred. At the present time the position of affairs was somewhat altered. For some time the attention of those who were interested in Turkish affairs had been drawn to the approaching termination of the French occupation in Syria. He had already expressed his opinion with respect to that occupation. He believed that by its continuance not only was the peace of Syria endangered, but that a hostile spirit was rapidly growing up between the various sects and creeds in those countries, the result of which it was impossible to foresee. The fanaticism caused by the presence of the French troops would provoke fanaticism on the other side, violence would be met by violence, and it would be impossible to tell where these troubles would stop. Prom Syria they might spread to Arabia and to further countries in the East, and even to India. The question was, whether a prolongation of the French occupation in Syria were necessary? The Turkish Government denied its necessity, and alleged that they were ready to make themselves responsible for the preservation of the peace in Syria; and, where able, to protect the Christian population. At that very moment, when it would be supposed that the interest of every European power was to support the prestige of the Sultan's name to the very utmost of its authority, the Minister of Russia again came forward with a proposition which the noble Lord himself had described last year as materially interfering with the authority of the Sultan. He impugned the veracity and even the honesty of his highest officer, and at the very moment when it was important that the Sultan's power should be supported the representative of the Russian Government did his best to sap and undermine that authority. Nothing could be further from his object than to say one word which would add to the embarrassment of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary; he understood and appreciated the difficulty of his position, and delicacy of the case with which he had to deal. He did not wish to raise a discussion on the general question of the occupation; his object was to strengthen the hands of the noble Lord to the utmost, and to urge the necessity of maintaining that course of policy which had been so long advocated by the noble Lord at the head of the Government—namely, that of supporting to the utmost the independence of the Turkish Government at this time. In the most earnest words at his command he would impress upon the noble Lord that by no vacillation at the approaching Conference, by no concessions against his better judgment, should he consent for one moment to the adoption of any steps on the part of the Governments of France and Russia which should promote, in the smallest degree, that policy which he honestly believed they were at that moment endeavouring to carry out. On that account it was that he desired to put the Question of which he had given notice. He wished to say a few words on another subject before he sat down. When the attention of the noble Lord was called the other night to the case of the unfortunate men who had been lately tried and condemned for their alleged participation in the outrages in Syria, he (Mr. FitzGerald) thought the noble Lord had not given the House satisfactory assurances, and he entreated the noble Lord, in the interests of humanity and justice, to take more decisive steps in their behalf than he seemed up to that moment to have adopted. It was notorious that from the beginning to the end of the outbreak one of them—Said Bey—had done his very utmost to maintain tranquillity, and that hundreds of Christians owed their lives to him. He was tried and on certain evidence condemned to death. On a reperusal of the evidence it was held to be insufficient to justify his sentence, and he was a second time put upon his trial. He was again sentenced to death, yet after that second trial the evidence was not considered sufficient to justify his conviction. The House would scarcely believe that that unfortunate man was at present undergoing a third trial, and he had no doubt that if the British Commissioner retired from Syria that person, who had done so much to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte, would be ruthlessly condemned. In the name of humanity and justice he appealed to the noble Lord to take some prompt steps in this matter, more efficient than those indicated the other night. With respect to the other wider and more important question which he had put, he had already said that he did not desire for one moment to embarrass the noble Lord. All that he urged the noble Lord to do was steadily and earnestly to pursue that policy which so distinguished the present Prime Minister when at the Foreign Office, and he was convinced that the only means of maintaining peace was by arresting, at the very outset, those intrigues which he believed were going on at present against the independence of Turkey.
said, he rose to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Whether, in the event of the French occupation being prolonged beyond the period fixed by the Convention of July, 1860, Her Majesty's Government are prepared to act upon the right reserved to the other Powers by that Convention of uniting bodies of their troops with those of France in the occupation; and whether Her Majesty's Government are in possession of further information upon the subject, which it will be consistent with the interests of the Public Service to communicate to the House? He hoped the House would not charge him with presumption in again calling its attention to a subject on which he had felt it his duty more than once to address it, but that it would show that tolerance to him on this occasion which it never failed to exhibit towards those who addressed it upon questions of great moment, when they were actuated by sincere convictions. The question was one of great and pressing importance, and he bogged to remark that, if the influence of Parliament was to be brought to bear upon it at all, it should be exercised at once and without any delay. The question of the prolongation of the occupation of Syria by France was one which would probably be decided very shortly, if it had not been already decided. The House would recollect that a short time since the country was startled by a rumour that France was preparing to annex certain provinces belonging to her neighbour, questions were asked in that House with a view of ascertaining what information the Government had received in reference to the matter. The Government, in the first place, expressed their ignorance of any such intentions on the part of the French Government, and afterwards deprecated any remonstrances or discussion upon the subject. No discussion consequently took place on the matter, and before Parliament became possessed of accurate information the time had passed by for interference—the annexation of Savoy and Nice had taken place, and the frontiers of Switzerland were destroyed. Now, although the responsibility attaching to Members of that House was such as to induce them to abstain from irritating discussions, or from interfering with the free action of the Government, yet it was equally the duty of Members not to suffer the influence which Parliament had ever exercised on the affairs of the world to be silent upon a matter such as he was about to draw attention to. When the Convention that sat in Paris last summer arranged that an armed occupation of Syria by France should take place, it was stated that that occupation would be only for a limited period. He thought that this country had looked with some jealousy upon that occupation, as an infraction of the principle of that treaty for the support of which so much money and so much blood had been expended. It was, however, hoped that the Government would take every step to prevent that occupation being prolonged. Nevertheless the French press were allowed to advocate the prolongation of the occupation, and the projected adulatory address of the French Senate to the Emperor claimed it as a right for France to protect distressed nationalities, and praised the Emperor's policy in avenging the slaughter of their fellow-Christians. It was evident that unless the other Powers of Europe interfered the occupation of Syria would be prolonged. If so, no one could fortell when it would cease. It behoved them, therefore, at such a crisis of affairs to express themselves in language becoming that House, and to urge upon the Government the duty of interfering to prevent this country from being, by as grave a departure from a just policy as led to the Russian war, again drifted into a conflict, the consequences of which might be more serious than any the world ever saw. It was by vigorous action adopted in time that such evils were prevented. He would beg the House to bear with him while he gave a slight sketch of the circumstances preceding the recent outbreak, as up to the present time they had not looked into the origin of those disasters. It was not because the intrigues which had been going on had not been mentioned that they had been overlooked. For a long time Syria had been exposed more than any other part of the world to the interference of foreigners. A multiplicity of races and religions combined to produce anarchy and discontent. The races differing in their superstitions which occupied the Lebanon had never become united; but from generation to generation they had been engaged in bloody strife. It was most unfortunate that a country so divided should be placed under the authority of a minister so incapable as that of the Turkish Government. It was to be regretted that the weakness of that Government had been taken advantage of by the other Powers to gratify their personal ambition, and to promote their intrigues. The Russian war commenced by the interference of Russia and Turkey in Syria. It was not the sudden incursions of the Druses and Maronites that produced those massacres, as was evident from the contents of the despatches which had been received on the subject. The Foreign Office must have been aware that when the massacre of Jedda broke out there was a feeling of animosity brooding over the whole of the East. The mutiny of the Indian army was connected with the massacre of Jedda. There was a massacre at Aleppo, and at another place. And as it appeared by a despatch received at the Foreign Office it was at that time hourly expected that there would be a fanatic outbreak in the shape of an attack by the Mussulmans on the Christians. That impression was increased by the fall of Delhi. But by the vigorous action of the Government of that day in punishing the leaders in the massacre of Jedda those additional horrors were averted. The letters which he had received from that part of the world expressed gratitude to our Government for having saved the people there from the murder and rapine with which they had been threatened. The energy of our Government had the effect of changing the demeanour of the aggressors from insolence and brutality to that of politeness to the Christians, and subserviency to the European inhabitants of that part of the world. Amongst the Christian population were persons who were possessed of considerable wealth. Documents were in existence to prove that intrigues were fomented in which the Maronite bishops were mixed up—the people were, in fact, entreated to rise up against their superiors. Arms were said to have been forwarded from Beyrout to the extent of 200,000 weapons. He had himself seen a despatch from our consul at Jerusalem, in which he stated that not less than 30,000 weapons had been sent from Jerusalem alone. It was further stated that the Bishop of Sidon was concerned in those matters. That Bishop had been educated in France, and was subsequently introduced into Beyrout by the Consul General of France. At that place he had been for years the active promoter of French intrigue, and his exertions in that respect were rewarded by the gift of a silver sword. He (Sir James Fergusson) was informed by a gentleman of the highest honour and veracity that the vigilance of the Turkish army officials had been eluded by a gross trick. A quantity of arms had been conveyed in coffins, over which the priests had actually read a religious service, in order to carry out the deception. Whilst he (Sir James Fergusson) was there, a civil war took place, which resulted in the feudal lords being driven out of the country. That temporary outbreak ended, the country continued in so bad a state that a fresh outbreak was expected. The conviction in that country, which had never wavered, was that French agency was actively at work stirring up the Maronites to a sense of their dependence upon Prance, and to an expectation that if they rose upon the Druses their acts would be commended. Finally, last year that contest broke out which had led to such disastrous results. He would not dwell on that subject longer than to show how unjust were proceedings founded upon the idea that the Druses were alone in fault. The noble Lord stated that attacks had been made by the Druses upon the Maronites, and by the Maronites upon the Druses. He did not want to palliate those atrocities. All he said was, it should not be assumed that all the injustice of the case lay with the one side alone. Mr. Grant, in his despatch from Damascus, said that for some time previously in every part of the mountains there were going on preparations for war; and there was in existence a letter addressed to a Maronite bishop, which showed that a plan had been concerted for the destruction of the Druses, and that the war which took place was as much the work of the Maronites as of their opponents. He believed, however, that if the British Government had stationed a small force on the coast no outbreak would have occurred. Much of the evil which had happened was owing to the defective character of the Turkish system of administration. Of late years there had been a succession in Syria of weak and sometimes culpable governors. The troops, moreover, behaved very ill in Damascus and the places of the Lebanon. His hon. Friend the Member for Horsham had stated that the Governor of Damascus was not so culpable as he was alleged to be, inasmuch as he had only a force of 400 men at his command to keep order in a city of more than 10,000 inhabitants. A few years since a conscription was ordered in Syria, and particularly in Damascus. It appeared there was a difficulty in obtaining the proper number of troops, and a peremptory order was issued that the prisons should be opened. That order was acted upon, and all the scoundrels that had been confined in them were drafted into regiments. These men, by a counter order, were brought to Damascus. They were quartered in the towns where the massacres took place, and accompanied the troops in the atrocities that took place after the Druses were victorious over the Maronites. One of the officers against whom the gravest suspicion existed at Baalbec only saved his own life by assist- ing in the conviction of his superior officer. Again, he was prepared to show that the most scandalous influence was used by the French authorities in all these affairs. Immediately after the signing of the Convention of Paris last summer the French troops sailed to the East—so immediately afterwards, indeed, that preparations for their departure must have been made long before the consent of the European Powers had been obtained. Those preparations were of a very extensive character, out of proportion to the number of troops sent; while the troops themselves were in excess of the 6,000 for which permission was given by the other European Powers. They exceeded the proper number by about 1,500 in the first instance, and reinforcements had since gone to Beyrout. At present the French force in Syria consisted of upwards of 8,000 men—the very flower of the army. It was remarkable that they were told in 1859 that the French army which was sent to Italy was intended for Cochin China. In the same way the army which was sent out last year by France to Syria was said to have been intended as a reinforcement of the army in China. Before their arrival peace had been signed between the Maronites and the Druses; the country had tranquillized itself, and the best policy would have been to let it alone. By the vigorous action of the Turkish Pacha at Damascus, a number of the guilty had been brought to justice, and the pacha was proceeding as rapidly as possible to punish the remainder. Had the French remained at Beyrout to support the Turks, as they were expected to do, they would doubtless have afforded material assistance to the Turkish Government in chastizing the authors of the disturbances; but they advanced into the interior of the country as soon as they could, and their passage through the mountains of the Lebanon was marked by pillage, murders, and atrocities of every kind, committed by the Maronite mob who followed them, and revenged themselves under their protection. He was afraid, moreover, that in many instances the French soldiers were far from being free from blame with respect to some of the vilest atrocities that were perpetrated. The accounts which he had received of the manner in which the French troops had conducted themselves included a number of cases—not doubtful, but well authenticated, guaranteed by British gentlemen, with the names and dates all given with perfect accuracy, which might well stain with disgrace the force under whose auspices they occurred. Out of more than 100 persons who were murdered he would mention a few examples of the barbarities committed. At a little village occupied by the French six individuals, some very young, others very aged, had their throats cut. At another place a child of not more than six years of age, was torn asunder by a man, who was named. At the same place several children, from two to six years of age, were strangled or had their throats cut. These atrocities were committed on the 27th and the 28th of September. At another place, within a short distance of where the French General was sitting at breakfast, a man was barbarously murdered. At another place, near the French head-quarters, a Druse woman was stoned by boys until she fell, and was then beheaded with a sword taken from a French soldier by a Maronite woman who had been cohabiting with the Zouave immediately before. An Englishman standing by told him (Sir James Fergusson) of this fact, and that the woman when first assailed had applied to the French for protection and was refused. In another place a bedridden man was dragged out of his house with many wounds in his body, and when he was found by his (Sir James Fergusson's) informant a ploughshare was sticking in his throat. These were the acts of the Maronites, and many of them took place under the eyes of the French soldiery, who made, no efforts to interfere. Such instances as those would, he was sure, plead his excuse for detaining the House. In addition the Maronites were everywhere allowed to uproot the mulberry trees, destroy the villages, and carry off the property of the unfortunate Druses. Moreover, the French exactions, imposed as indemnity for the Maronites, far exceeded anything that the Druses possessed, suffering as they were under a deficient harvest. In some instances these exactions were enforced by French soldiers; while in many others acts of cruelty were only prevented by the interference of the British Commissioner, who had, by his justice and impartiality, earned the honour and respect of every honest man in Syria. The noble Lord said last year that nothing could be more unfortunate than that anything could be done which should destroy or weaken the independence of Turkey; but the conduct of the French commander towards the Turkish troops was likely to produce precisely the effect which the noble Lord deprecated. Not only had he insulted the Government of the Sultan in every way, but he had so acted as to compel the Turkish General, Ismail Pacha, one of the European officers who fortified and defended Ears, to resign his command in disgust. Again and again had the French troops been quartered upon ground already occupied by the Turkish soldiers, and in one instance the French, in defiance of the guards, pillaged a village which was occupied by the Turks. These and other circumstances had compelled General Kmety to retire from his command. The tone adopted by the Druses presented so marked a contrast to the desire of the Maronites for the wholesale slaughter of their enemies that he must beg permission to read a few words of a petition from the former people which had appeared in the newspapers, and which had been forwarded to him from Beyrout. After stating that the two nations—the Druses and Maronites—had long lived together, some times in peace, and at others at war, the petition went on:—
The criminality, however, was to be fixed upon the Druse chiefs, and, accordingly, a trial took place at Beyrout. These chiefs, he must observe, voluntarily gave themselves up, and went to Beyrout under an assurance from the British Consul General that they should have a fair trial. What sort of a trial they had received he would give the House some little idea. He had seen two gentlemen who were present at the trial, and one of them, Mr. Bourke, told him that this was the manner in which the proceedings were conducted:—If evidence was inconclusive to convict, if it reflected on the Turkish officials, if it was not expressed in language adequately strong, the witness was withdrawn, conversed with, and made to understand that which was required of him, and in some instances had stated diametrically opposite to his original testimony. At Said Bey's trial the prisoner had no assistance; the evidence against him was given in his absence, though he was allowed to peruse it afterwards. The Court was violent against him, and if he cross-examined the answers were omitted or altered. Evidence tending to innocence was omitted. Upon the last case mentioned here he must say one word. It would be a lasting disgrace to this country if the head of Said Bey fell. The despatches which had been laid upon the table showed that his sister had protected 400 or 500 Christians from massacre; before the disturbances broke out he warned the consuls at Beyrout of what was to be expected, and implored that active measures might be taken to prevent them. No man had stronger motives for desiring peace than he did; a rich landed proprietor, he had nothing to gain but everything to lose by violence. Seeing that the testimony against him was, as he was assured, perjured; that Christians who wished to give evidence in his favour had been beaten and ill-used, and that, contrary to all principles of justice, he had, under the eyes of the European commission been placed upon his trial three times at the dictation of the French officers, he said that it was incumbent upon this country, unless it would be shamed before the nations of the East, to interfere for Said Bey's protection. What must decide as to whether the occupation by the French troops should be prolonged was, did the aspect of the country justify their withdrawal? He believed that every day the French troops remained in Syria the prospect of its ultimate pacification became less. Their avowed predilection for the Maronites, their refusal to recognize criminality on any but one side, and their disregard for the principles of justice could not produce other than injurious consequences. The view which their generals took of their mission was very different from that entertained in regard to it by our Government; we were responsible for their deeds, because we were re- presented by them, and if their stay in Syria was to be prolonged we ought to have troops of our own side by side with them, in order that if we had a common responsibility we might at least be the guardians of our own honour. We had no military commissioner with the French army; our Government had no official connection with that army, nor had the commission which sat at Beyrout, and of which Lord Dufferin was a member, any control over it. The French commander received instructions different from those which were given to the French commissioner at Beyrout; and how, under those circumstances, could we take care that we were not disgraced by an army which acted in our name? If there was danger in weakening Turkey—if Turkey as had been alleged, when interfered with would only break into fragments, how could it be strengthened by insulting the Turkish functionaries, by preventing the Turkish soldiers from pacifying the country, and by committing in the name of justice atrocities which were a disgrace to humanity?"At all times, great as is the calamity of war, it is one which happens here below among God's creatures. Even as it has broken out at different times between the great and small Powers of civilized Europe, so, in the course of past times, it has taken place more than once between the two nations of the Druses and the Christians. Each war has been followed by a renewal of peace, of alliance, and of friendship, as will be again the case, we hope, after the late hostilities; for in all the wars which have taken place in the world, no one has ever sought to confound those who have bravely fought as men and soldiers with the criminals who have assassinated or who have acted as brigands. The first are considered as worthy of honour, because of their courage; the latter are deemed worthy of punishment, because of their crimes. In like manner, no one confounds peaceable people, who have not even taken part in the war, with those who have acted either in one category or the other. Thus, one portion of your slaves have taken no part in the last war, and the rest have fought honourably for the defence of their persons, their families, and their hearths."
said, that he hoped the House would kindly extend to him its indulgence while he addressed a few words, to it on the subject. He would in the outset say, that there was so much of the foreign policy of the Government which he believed really represented the feeling of a large majority of the English people that he should be sorry to say anything which might lead them to think that he differed from them with reference to that policy. Moreover, with regard to Turkey, the noble Lord at the head of the Government had always pursued a wise and consistent policy, and one in accordance with English interests, and he, therefore, trusted that he should not be misunderstood in the remarks which he was about to make. The subject, however, was one of such enormous importance that the House ought not to be silent upon it, and he should therefore express himself with frankness in regard to it. He must say that he looked upon the Convention and upon the occupation of Syria as a most disastrous occurrence. He believed it to be disastrous on account of the principles and precedents which it had established; he believed it to be disastrous in the results which it had already produced; and he believed that it would be disastrous in the results which were likely to follow. What were the principles and precedents to which he had referred? The representatives of the great Powers met at Paris and laid down the principle that they could interfere in the affairs of a foreign State, and not only interfere, but occupy a portion of that State with an army. He might be told—and from the observation of the noble Lord (the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) he apprehended that that would be the answer—that Turkey was a consenting party. It appeared to him that the consent given by the Turk came under Dr. Johnson's definition of a congé d'elire—throwing a man out of a three pair of stairs' window and recommending him to fall soft. It was true the Turk had been to a certain extent a consenting party to the Convention, but he should like to know whether he had not been forced into being a consenting party. He was well acquainted with the eminent Turkish statesman now representing the Ottoman Porte at Paris, and with the opinions which he entertained, and he knew that he, for one, would never freely consent to see his country occupied by a foreign army. Would they have pursued the same policy with regard to a Power not in the same position as Turkey? If so, why did they not go into Austria and occupy Venetia, where he hesitated not to say there existed more cruelty, oppression, and injustice than in any part of Turkey? But mark what a principle the action taken in pursuance of this convention would establish. If one country could interfere in the internal affairs of another, and could occupy that country with its army, why might not another Power be at liberty to do the same? There was a report that Count Orloff had gone to Constantinople—might it not be to act the part of another Menschikoff? For a long time the thunder had been rolling on the Danube; accounts of intrigues had been received, massacres had been reported which had never taken place, and exaggerated accounts had been forwarded of facts in themselves of small importance. What did all this foretell? There was another Power, which might, and which could with great ease bring about disturbances and massacres in portions of the Turkish dominions; and would she not at once say that she had a right to send an army to keep down the outbreaks which the Sultan himself was unable to repress. Bulgaria had a mixed population, and he undertook to say that the agents of Russia could in a very few days get up a movement there. What would be the consequence? Why, Russia would apply to England—as she would have a right to do—and say, "France occupied Syria to put down disturbances, I will now occupy Bulgaria with the same object, and I have a greater right to do so, because Bulgaria is nearer to my frontiers than Syria is to France." Persons expressed surprise at the facility with which Russia consented to the occupation of Syria, but it had never surprised him. On the contrary, it was what he had expected. Russia had no interest in Syria; but she had a strong interest in Bulgaria, and would justify the occupation of it on precisely the same grounds. But in Asia there were also mixed populations. In Armenia there were both a Christian and a Mussulman population; the Patriarch of Armenia at this moment was a Russian subject, and Russia could get up a movement there any day. The result would be, that in a short time they would have a Russian army in Bulgaria, a French army in Syria, and another Russian army in Armenia; and the very thing for which England went to war some years ago, and for which she spent so much blood and treasure, would be filched from her. The plain and simple course when the Convention was proposed would have been to call on Turkey to put down the insurrectionary movement in Syria. She knew at the time that she could put it down. She stated that she could do so, and she proved her ability to do so; because, as they had heard that night, before a French soldier put his foot on the soil of Syria the disturbances had ceased, the massacres were at an end, and a reconciliation had taken place between the Druses and Maronites. He did not blame the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary for the course which he had taken; he had acted under pressure, and he trusted he would be able to show the House that he had protested against the occupation of Syria. But the policy of intervention, whether regarded in its present effects or in its future aspect, was equally disastrous. One element to be eliminated from the discussion was, that portion of the inhabitants of Damascus and other cities, an idle and vagabond population, which professing to act from religious feeling, but more probably animated by motives of plunder, had murdered Christians and sacked houses. He did not care how severely they were dealt with, or how many of them were punished; but the quarrel between the Maronites and Druses stood on a very different foot- ing. A long series of feuds existed between them which broke out last year, as they knew, with deplorable results. In paliation of these he would not say one word; they all remembered too well the heartrending accounts which reached this country. But it had been asked again and again who were the cause of the outbreak? The document read by the hon. Member for Ayrshire (Sir James Fergusson), which was published at the time, showed beyond question with whom the strife originated. In that and other documents the Maronite bishops called upon their flocks to spare neither man, woman, nor child, but to exterminate the whole Druse race. He knew from the best authority that when that proclamation was given to the French papers the French Government refused to allow it to be inserted, although the proclamation was perfectly genuine. These announcements heralded a terrible massacre; but for that the Maronites were the responsible parties, and it was now known that the Druse chiefs expressed their readiness to treat on any terms which might be recommended by the consul, and even to give hostages to the Christians to avoid going to war. What had subsequently taken place? The French, under the Convention, sent an army to Syria. With what object did they go there? It was stated that they went there for the purpose of maintaining the cause of Christianity and of humanity. Was it the way to maintain Christianity to be guilty of most atrocious acts of injustice? If so, then he would say, shame on such Christianity! The statements they had heard from the hon. Gentleman opposite he hoped were not true; at all events they seemed to require some explanation. But they had another remarkable statement, from the highest authority, in "another place," no less a person than the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The words of the noble Lord seemed rather doubtful, but they read as if under the sanction, or at any rate with the cognisance of the French army, 150 unoffending Druses had been put to death, among them being 25 women and 86 children. If that were true, and if the French had sanctioned the destruction of the Druse people by the Maronites, then it ought to be distinctly stated that we had no part in such deeds, that English honour was clear, and that our Christian sympathy was better than that. It was now twenty-two years since he first went to Mount Leba- non. At that time the magnificent slope was covered by the most industrious, peaceable, contented, and happy population he had ever seen; every square inch of ground was cultivated like a garden, and where the rock pierced out from the bosom of the mountain, earth had been brought from a great distance and with extreme toil to form a little patch of cultivation. Never had he seen anything to be compared to it. Every traveller who visited the place was lost in astonishment at the beauty of the scenery, and the wealth and tranquillity of its inhabitants. In other parts of Syria travellers met wild Arabs and encountered danger; caravans, too, were sometimes plundered. But in the Lebanon the greatest security existed; the traveller was received everywhere with welcome by a mixed population, at the head of whom was the old Emir Beshir, at whose palace all guests were welcome, and whose house was full of feudal retainers of both creeds, with their horses and arms. The old man's toleration was so great that even his orthodoxy was suspected, for, it was whispered, that whilst outwardly a Druse he kept in his private apartments a Catholic priest who performed for him the services of that faith. Compare with that picture the ruin, the desolation, burnt houses, destroyed villages, a scattered population in a starving state, and the old Emir Beshir murdered, and let it be asked to what causes these horrible results were attributable. To foreign ambition, foreign intrigues, foreign missionaries, foreign consuls, foreign intervention, and foreign protection. Wherever the same causes existed the same results would be found. He trusted that what they had heard of atrocities committed by French troops with the sanction of their officers would be denied.
I beg to explain. I should be sorry that any misapprehension existed about so serious a matter. I did not intend to say that acts of violence were committed by French soldiers; but that on certain occasions they were present, and therefore I thought not free from blame.
said, he was glad the matter had been explained. But the hon. Member certainly did say that one of those occurrences took place within fifty yards of General D'Hautpoul's tent. He hoped these charges would be repudiated by the French nation; but it was of no use denying that the state of things which had existed for the last twenty years was mainly owing to French intrigues. France united herself with the Maronites; and eventually England, if she did not ostensibly unite herself with the Druses, no doubt came to be regarded by them as a friend and supporter, as against the French, who were the upholders of the Maronites. He knew to what extent this system had been carried in the East; and he wished the noble Lord the Minister for Foreign Affairs would lay before the House the Reports drawn up by Mr. Alison, a distinguished member of the Diplomatic Service, who had officially visited Syria on more than one occasion. Those Reports had been drawn up before the outbreak of the disturbances, and he ventured to say that anybody reading them must feel that, sooner or later, the massacre which had occurred would sure to take place as a necessary result of those intrigues. He would next refer to the conduct of the Christians. He should be glad if the ideas entertained by many in England with regard to Christianity in the East were somewhat enlightened. The noble Lord had told the House with how many lives the Christians thought they could be satisfied; they had only required 4,000 out of an entire male population of 8,000, and when beaten down by a kind of Dutch auction, they put their very lowest demand at 1,200; and who was it that had made this request? Why Bishops—those Christian Bishops whom some people were benighted enough to imagine represented the primitive Church; and he had even heard of some deluded persons who had desired to put themselves under their ministry. Let them compare the conduct of the Christians with that of the Druses. He had the honour of being a member of the committee for the distribution of relief to the suffering persons in Syria; and he was glad to say that the committee was founded on most liberal principles. He joined it upon the ground—and would not have been tempted to do so on any other consideration—that the word "Christian" should be struck out of every document connected with it. Their principle was that relief should be given to all without distinction of person—Christians, Jews, Mahomedans—to whoever was suffering. They were a committee for the purposes of humanity, and not of politics. What was the result? The Christians in Syria for the most part, when they heard relief had arrived, left their work and came seeking for assistance; and he was informed, on good authority, that in many cases they had blankets and other objects given to them, which they went round the corner and sold, and then came back for more. He had received from a gentleman in Syria a letter of which he would read the following extract:—
What had the Druses done? The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir James Fergusson) had read their petition. It was a remarkable fact that, while the Christians came down in numbers to seek relief, not a single Druse did so. Noble men! With true fortitude they lived on bread made of acorns, and died one by one sooner than come in and ask for charity. Let the House contrast their conduct with that of the Christians. It was always so. A brave nation was always generous, and possessed of high qualities; and a cowardly nation, bloodthirsty. He believed that nothing could be more disgraceful than the conduct of the Christians in the mountains, and during the trial of those Druses. He was not advocating the cause of the Druses, but when such occurrences as had been described took place, it was the duty of hon. Members to examine matters fairly and impartially; and, viewing all the circumstances, he did not hesitate to assert that it would be to the infamy of this country if the execution of the Druses who had been condemned took place. The effects of the Convention had been disastrous, and so would be its results in future. Further intervention in the way provided by it should be renounced. The Turkish Government did not want a prolongation of the armed intervention in Syria. They might, perhaps, be got to consent to it. But had they not told the European Powers that they did not want it, and that they were able to keep down the disturbing parties in Syria without it? Yet, in opposition to that statement of the Turkish Government, the French were allowed to keep their troops there. What was the logical conclusion from that? Why that the five great Powers assembled in conclave could dispose of any part of the territory of a weak State. That conclusion was a most dangerous one; but it nevertheless logically followed from what was being done in the case of Syria. If the Turkish Government were able to take care of the country, they ought to be allowed to do so; but the French said, "If we leave Syria, the events of last year will again occur there." No doubt they would; but, who would make them occur? Who but the French themselves? Had they not got every bishop and priest in Syria under their thumb? Could they not to-morrow, if they left, get up a rebellion there? Of course they could, and then throw the responsibility on this country, because their troops had been withdrawn. How long was that state of things to continue? If the people were left to themselves a reconciliation would take place, and an end would be put to these feuds; but if occupation were countenanced when the French departed, of course, they would get up another disturbance in Syria; and, of course, that could not be the end of it. Whatever might be the opinion of the other Powers, England ought to act on one great principle—namely, that foreign occupation should cease. Turkey ought to be left to govern Syria if she could; and if she could not, those in the country itself, who could govern it, would do so. What we ought to do was—let them alone. He believed that if the French withdrew their troops, and the people were left to themselves, the Druses and Maronites would soon find out that their best plan was to make peace and to cultivate their lands again. Such a desirable state of things was impossible so long as the French troops were left in Syria, and the European Powers gave their sanction to the occupation. He repeated that the Convention was the most dangerous political measure that had been adopted in Europe for years. In conclusion, he wished to repeat that his observations were made in no spirit of hostility to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, or the Government. He made them in the hope that he would be supported by the House and the country when he asked the noble Lord, for the sake of peace, to use his influence to put an end, as early as possible, to this disastrous Convention."The righteous Christians of Damascus are making a trade of the calamity. They give certificates of good offices rendered to Turks who shared in the massacre (who can pay), for a heavy sum, of course; and, on the other hand, they denounce Moslems to whom they owe money—the rope extinguishes the debt. The Russian Consul complains bitterly of a case of the first kind, where 200 signatures testified the innocence of a man who was concerned in the attack on his Consulate."
Sir, I will endeavour, with respect to the very serious discussion that has arisen, to be as impartial as possible, because I feel it is of the utmost importance. I do not question the right of hon. Gentlemen to find fault, if they so think fit, with much that has taken place in Syria; but, on the other hand, we ought not to make charges against the Government or the army of a great nation with whom we are in alliance without the strongest proof and evidence that that which we impute to them is founded on truth. Now, Sir, I will in the first place reply to the observation of the hon. Member for Horsham, and then refer to what has taken place with regard to Syria. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. FitzGerald) asked me a question with respect to a note presented by Prince Labanoff to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Constantinople; and he has referred correctly to what I stated last year with respect to occurrences which had taken place at St. Petersburg, and the proposition to the Turkish Government that there should be a joint commission. I was convinced that such a joint commission would impair the authority of the Turkish Government. I was more convinced of that by the answer of Prince Gortschakoff to our objections. He said that unless European Commissioners were present, the witnesses who were brought forward to prove abuses and crimes committed by the Turkish officials would be afraid to tell the truth; but, if that were so, it was obvious that the presence of the European Commissioners might be made to serve as a protection to Turkish witnesses when they came to tell falsehoods of their own Government in order to weaken its authority. The plan of an European Commission, as the hon. Gentleman knows, was relinquished. They have lately made a new proposal—I am not sure whether it is a note or not—that an inquiry should be instituted at Constantinople with the Grand Vizier or some other high officer of the Porte at its head; but that proposal has been rejected by the Turkish Government, and, I believe, has not been renewed. The Prussian Government have made another proposal—namely, that the reforms now in contemplation by the Grand Vizier should be communicated to the Foreign Ambassadors. In that proposal Sir Henry Bulwer, our Ambassador, concurred, and thought the step a desirable one. I agree with him that it would be very desirable; but of course it is not intended that those Foreign Ambassadors should do anything more than point out the way in which the proposed reforms might be effected, leaving it to the Turkish Government to adopt such suggestions, or reject them, as they might think fit. With regard to bringing the note to which the hon. Gentleman refers before the Conference at Paris, that is not necessary. It is founded on the Report made by the Grand Vizier to the Sultan. It states that that Report was founded on very defective information given to the Grand Vizier, and that many evils and abuses exist which were not brought to his knowledge; and it gives details in support of that allegation. But that is not a question for the Conference. It is a question for the Porte. "We have said at Constantinople that it was our desire that the Grand Vizier, or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, should make an answer to that note because the charges are very grave, and ought not to be passed over without some notice. I come now to the affairs of Syria, and I am very sorry—speaking not only from official sources, but also from the reports of officers and other gentlemen who have travelled in the country—that I am obliged to concur in much of what the hon. and gallant Member for Ayrshire(Sir James Fergusson) has mentioned. It should be stated, in the first place, that by an arrangement made in 1842, and confirmed and enlarged in 1845, two separate authorities were set up in the Lebanon, to a great degree independent of the Turkish Governors of the provinces in Syria. One is a Christian, and is called the Christian Caimakan; the other, who is over that part particularly inhabited by Druses, is called the Druse Caimakan. Those two officers exercise their authority under an European arrangement come to by the great Powers, and it has been stated, and I believe it, are viewed by the Turkish Government with considerable jealousy. The Turkish Government would have preferred—and I do not blame them for it—to have their own authority paramount, and not to have separate authorities, under an European arrangement, who, to a great extent, were independent of the Sultan. Now the hon. and gallant Member for Ayrshire stated part of what occurred at Damascus; but there are other statements which I have heard, which I am inclined to believe, and which should be told, because when we have to consider this question, so vast in its extent and so great in its importance, it is not desirable to avoid the difficulty of the situation, or to shut out from view any errors which we should endeavour to repair. The officials sent by the Porte into the provinces are, in some instances, found to be worthy, ex- cellent, and honest governors. But there are others who make it their object to amass wealth as rapidly as possible by means of oppression, and by withholding from the Sultan that which is his due. It has been stated that the Governor of Damascus was instructed to levy a certain body of troops, which troops were to be at the disposal of the Government for service in any part of the Empire when required. The Governor did not raise those troops, but he informed the Sultan that he had done so, and regularly received the means of paying them. He went on for two or three years receiving pay for the troops, and was at length desired to take them to the provinces on the Danube, where their presence was required. He had no troops at his command; but he then did what the hon. Gentleman has alluded to—he cleared the prisons, took the most notorious murderers and robbers who had infested the province, and enlisted them in regiments that were to be sent to the extreme frontiers of the empire on the Danube. In that way he thought he would be able to answer the demands of the Sultan, and at the same time rid the province of some of the worst characters to be found in it. But, unfortunately for him, there arrived information that his own province was likely to be immediately disturbed, and would require the protection of the troops he had raised, so that he had to call back those very men of whom he had hoped to get rid, and to employ them in putting down the revolt, when, in fact, they were the men most likely to join in the plunder. They did, in fact, join in the plunder, and to them was owing much of the loss of life and property which shocked us so much last year. I state this, not only because I believe it to be the fact, but because when we are called on, and justly called on, to pursue our ancient policy with regard to Turkey, we should not lose sight of the maladministration that pervades the provinces of Turkey. These are occurrences which are liable to occur, and which it is impossible for us to foresee or prevent. Sir, the hon. Gentleman who spoke last, said, with great truth, that for many years there has been a great amount of foreign intrigue in the dominions of the Porte in Syria. I have been told, and the story is not unlikely, that a certain Maronite bishop used to pay visits to the French Consul, and talk with him over the topics of the day, and afterwards point out to the Maronite chiefs how constant he had been in paying those visits, and impress upon them the belief that this was a sure sign they would receive the support of the French Government whenever they came to require it. That is a probable story, because, while it is true that persons in the situation of consuls, in order to give themselves importance, often take too great a part in the local affairs of the provinces in which they are placed, it is likewise true that the inhabitants of a country such as Turkey are very guilty of setting up parties by which they hope to gain supremacy—more especially when they have, as in the present case, persons whom they have considered their enemies for centuries. The Maronites were able to introduce a vast quantity of arms into the country, and, on the other hand, the Druses also had prepared to arm. I stated last year that I believed these two parties were waiting for and watching each other, and that each of them had long been prepared to enter into deadly conflict. I should say that while the one party, the Druses, had nothing like true religion about them, being partly Mahomedans but still more idolaters, those who are called Christians have no right to that title, unless you gave it to those who are totally ignorant of the doctrines and who violate all the principles of Christianity. It happened that a dispute of no great importance took place on the road between Beyrout and Damascus, A person, either Druse or Maronite, was killed in the dispute. The parties who heard of it—I believe the Christians—came down and killed three or four or more of the opposite party. The two parties then assembled in arms; and were ready to enter into conflict with each other, but the Druses, being superior not in numbers, but in strength and valour, got the ascendancy and committed those horrible massacres which shocked the feelings of all Europe last year. We cannot forget that in two or three towns, and in some of the villages, every person found armed or unarmed was put to death; and that the streets were so crowded with corpses that the stench became intolerable. These and other details, which I need not refer to, were related to us on the authority of Mr. Cyril Green, who knows the habits of the people, and who visited the scenes of the massacres. All Europe was shocked by these accounts. Nothing at that time had taken place at Damascus, but there was great fear lest massacres should also occur at Damascus and other places, and the great Powers of Europe met in conference at Paris. The French Ambassador stated to me, and I stated it to the Cabinet, the apprehension of the French Government, and their intention to propose at the Conference that a body of European troops, without mentioning the nation to which they should belong, should be sent at once to Syria. It has been mentioned to me very lately by the gentleman who, I believe, was one of the informants of the hon. Baronet opposite that it was his belief that if foreign troops had not been sent to Syria there would have been the same massacres at Bagdad and Jerusalem that had taken place in other parts of the province. My hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) has stated that the Turkish Government were not disposed to consent that foreign troops should be sent to Syria, and that they were coerced into a consent. I say to this, in the first place, that unless the Turkish Government had consented, I should have thought it my duty not to have directed our Ambassador at Paris not to sign any protocol; but, in the next place, I must confess that the consent of the Sultan was not a willing, but a reluctant consent. It was founded, I imagine, on this ground, which cannot be controverted, that if the massacres had extended to Bagdad and Jerusalem, and if intelligence of them had been circulated throughbout all the fanatical portions of the Mahommedan population in other parts of the Turkish empire, and if other massacres had taken place, so that no safety remained for the Christian subjects of the Porte, then some at least of the Powers of Europe would have interfered, not in Syria alone, but in other parts of the Turkish Empire. If in such a case I had come to this House and stated the fact that thousands on thousands of the Christian subjects of the Porte—men, women, and children—had been destroyed by the fanaticism of the Turks; that the secret societies known to exist in the Turkish provinces had set on foot these massacres, and that the Turkish soldiers had not interrupted them; that the Turkish regiments stood quietly by and saw the massacres taking place; and that in consequence of this other European Powers threatened intervention—and that I called upon the House to assist the Turkish Government and defend the authors and spectators of these massacres—would that have been a good case to have placed be- fore the House? Would the House have consented to it? Would the hon. Baronet who complains of the occupation by the French—would my hon. Friend, if he had then been a Member of the House, have stood up and defended such a course? The course we adopted was designed to limit the extent of the disaster as much as possible. At the same time I think few greater misfortunes can happen to a country than an occupation by foreign troops. But this I must say for the French Government, that from the beginning of the discussion and during the execution of the Convention up to within a few days ago, they have said that if it were the wish of the European Powers to send other than French troops to take part in that occupation they were quite as willing to see them in Syria as the troops of France. I believe that the French Government were quite sincere in that declaration which they have repeatedly made. I may be blamed for not taking advantage of it; but I considered that there were serious evils in a joint occupation. Only a few days ago I received from the Earl of Elgin a representation that he hoped we should soon be able, together with the French Government, to put an end to the occupation of Canton, because, he said, that a joint occupation by the troops of two different nations would surely lead to differences and dissensions, jealousies of command, and various difficulties that would make that occupation a misfortune to the place itself, and inconvenient to the occupying forces. But if that is the case with Canton, where neither England nor France have any sympathies with the Chinese, what might have been the case with Syria, where, as it has been truly said, the Maronites have constantly looked to France as the protector of the Roman Catholic Christians, as they call themselves, and where the Druses have as constantly turned to the English as their protectors. What unfortunate consequences might have arisen if the French detachment had gone up to Haurân, and if the English being there also had thought the Maronites had too much protection and the Druses not enough? Therefore, although I did not say I never would consent to it, I was unwilling to make it a joint occupation, and I always thought it should end as soon as possible. Every hon. Member will remember a letter published by the Emperor of the French, in which he declared that he had consented very unwillingly to the occupation of Syria by the French troops, and that if it lasted only three months it would please him much better than if it lasted six. The conduct of the French troops has, indeed, been such as to expose them, or a part of them, at least, to the remarks that hon. Gentleman have passed upon them. It is not that they have taken any part in these murders by the Maronites. But I am sorry to say that my reports from Syria, from Her Majesty's Commissioner there, from a gentleman who went there as an agent from the English to be with Fuad Pacha, and from officers who were there on leave, and remained there—all concur that the Maronites, under the protection of the advance of the French into the Lebanon, took the occasion to wreak their vengeance upon those whom they considered their enemies, and that old men and women and very young children were murdered in cold blood by these Maronites, and without even the semblance of their being brought to justice. But this is one of the circumstances which make me wish to see that foreign occupation ended. That foreign army is placed in this dilemma:—It sees committed atrocities such as I have mentioned. It knows, perhaps, the persons who have committed them. If it does not interfere it is said that it has almost sanctioned, that it has permitted murders to take place without punishment. But, on the other hand, if these troops sent sergeants, or corporals, or officers to take these persons and bring them to trial, then they would be justly liable to the charge of taking upon themselves the administration of the Turkish authority in a Turkish province, and it would be said it was no longer a Turkish but a French authority that prevailed in the Lebanon. That is the dilemma—that is the consequence of a foreign occupation, and it is not a reason for continuing that foreign occupation, but for discontinuing it. I must add, however, that we have stated these matters to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he says that his accounts from Syria are entirely the reverse, and that he does not believe a word of what our Ambassador was instructed to say. I stated the matter quite lately to the Count Flahault, a man who has himself fought in the wars of Europe, a man of distinguished military character, who in the wars of the Empire was a distinguished officer. He naturally was shocked at such an imputation. He could not believe that the honour of the French arms could be so called in question, and so tainted by charges of this kind. It was the natural and honest indignation of a man of honour upon hearing such things imputed to the arms of his country. I can only say that I do not believe while the French occupation continues, we can provide a remedy against those acts of individual vengeance; for they are merely individual instances, as there has been no such massacre as that of the Druses last year. The only remedy we can have is by a cessation of that occupation. The case of Said By has been mentioned, who, I believe, was perfectly innocent of the charge of taking part in these massacres. Lord Dufferin, Her Majesty's Commissioner in Syria, has used every effort to obtain a fair trial for this man. He has desired persons to attend the trial, and has remonstrated against what he considered the injustice and the false evidence to which he was exposed. He has done his utmost to save him from an unjust condemnation. I have no doubt he will continue his efforts, and I expect that the life of this man will be saved. But hero, again, we have to contend with the defects of the Turkish administration and the Turkish character, because our notions of justice consist in bringing the witnesses face to face with the man who is accused, and allowing him to cross-examine them with the view of proving the falsehood and defects of their story if any exist. But in Turkish justice it is much more common to say, A crime has been committed; we must inflict punishment for that crime. A life has been taken; we must have a life." But as to the particularity of the evidence, as to the minutiæ which prove a man to be guilty, all that is superfluous. All they say is, "Here is a crime committed; hero is an accused man brought into court; let that man be punished; and then the ends of justice will be satisfied." Let that be recollected, too, which I have before stated, that with regard to the Druses and the Maronites the Turk does not willingly see the authority of the Sultan defied. Therefore, when the French say, "Let the Druses be punished," the Turks are willing to listen to those representations, and heartily agree that the Druses ought to be punished. When, on the other hand, the English say, "These Maronites have committed great atrocities," the Turks agree that punishment should fall upon them. The Turk, of course, holds that the Turkish power ought to over-ride both the Maronites and Druses, but between the two it is very difficult to get justice done. Well, I can say little as to the Conference at Paris, but some little I can add to what I stated the other day. When that Conference met, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs stated all the apprehensions that were entertained in Syria that if the French troops go away the massacres will be renewed. Such was the statement he had received, and he laid it before the Conference of the Powers. The Turkish Ambassador said, on the other hand, that he believed tranquillity had been restored, that the Turkish power was sufficient to maintain that tranquillity, and he saw no reason why the occupation should not end at the time fixed by the Convention. But, on further discussion, the Ambassador of Austria—and Austria is a power like ourselves anxious to maintain the independence of Turkey—said he thought that some time might be fixed, and that until the Lebanon was more settled, and that some authority more capable of keeping order was established, it was desirable that the French troops should remain. He suggested that a period, such as the 1st of May, should be fixed at the time at which the occupation should cease. The Turkish Ambassador received that proposition and said he was willing to transmit it to his Government; and there the matter rests. I quite agree in all that has been said as to the desirability of an evacuation taking place. We must, of course, act partly for ourselves, and partly in combination with the other great Powers, more especially with Austria, who in all these discussions as well as in all former discussions has shown herself sincerely desirous to maintain the independence of Turkey. Without saying anything in reference to other Powers, I will state with respect to Austria that I believe she is sincere in her wish to maintain the independence and integrity of that country. I certainly will do my best to put an end to the French occupation, which, I believe, was useful in the beginning, not only in the places I have mentioned, but in other parts of the Turkish Empire, when there was a notion that but for it massacres might have occurred which would have been attended with dreadful consequences to Turkey itself. Now, however, the danger and the occasion have passed away, and I wish to see the occupation at an end.
said, he wished to explain that the Governor of Damascus to whom he had alluded was the last Governor, and not the one to whom the noble Lord had referred.
said, he thought the discussion had opened up a much larger question than the temporary occupation of Syria. It showed that the authority of the Sultan within his own dominions was incapable of maintaining order and administering justice between the mixed subjects under his rule. The noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was ready to proclaim the principle of non-intervention in some cases, but he had not acted rigidly up to his principle in the case of the French intervention in the Turkish dominions. He wanted to know whether, in the not very remote contingency of a revolution in Hungary, the English Government would enforce the principle of non-intervention, or allow the troops of Russia to inarch into that country? He had such an opinion of the spirit of the British people, whatever might be the professions of the noble Lord, that he would be compelled, and that in no hesitating manner, to act upon the principle of non-intervention. When the intervention of Sardinia in the affairs of Venice had been expected, the noble Lord had written an emphatic despatch, which he could not sufficiently condemn, and, considering the Power represented by the noble Lord, that despatch amounted to a virtual command to Sardinia not to interfere. He believed, if Turkey had been allowed to settle her own affairs there would be no great difficulty in effecting such a settlement. The struggle on the European Continent was as to who was to have the mastery. It was for that the Emperor of the French was struggling, and struggling bravely, for he sought to uphold the honour and dignity of the French nation. What he found fault with in the British Government was that they carried out a timid and halting policy, instead of manfully and openly upholding the Liberal cause in Italy and throughout the world; sometimes supporting Austria, at other times encouraging the revolutionary party in Italy against French interests. The fire of revolution was fermenting over the whole of the nations of central Europe; and he believed the day was not distant when they would secure their freedom, as the people of Italy had done.
The State Of The Navy
Resolutions
said, he rose to move the series of Resolutions of which he had given notice on the condition of the Navy. They had recently renewed the navy by the addition of a magnificent steam fleet, and they now found that they must begin the work of re-construction by the adoption of a kind of vessel entirely unknown before, constructed on principles as yet very imperfectly understood; for, in fact, the whole theory as respected building iron-cased ships was at present in the most uncertain condition. During the last twenty years they had spent an enormous sum of money in the construction of shipping, notwithstanding which the idea had been steadily gaining ground among every class of the community that the government of naval affairs had not been found equal to the national exigencies. The administration of naval affairs was so clumsy that it was utterly impossible that they could be carried on with efficiency. For this he blamed entirely the system, and not the individuals who performed the duties of that department. The question did not at all involve the character of the many eminent men who had managed our naval affairs during past years. On the contrary, they resembled the crew of a ship sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, which it was impossible to keep afloat, and not the slightest slur could be cast upon them in the matter. Although the administration of the Admiralty was admitted to be bad, and although its machinery had grown entirely out of date, the question had always arisen—how were they to repair it; by what means were they to reconstruct it so as to enable it to perform its functions properly. He had consulted many high authorities upon this subject—men rising in the profession, and upon whom in times of trouble would devolve the duty of conducting our fleets—and he had always found them agreed not only on the point that there must be some change, but on the main features of the change In order to place his views before the House he had drawn up a statement showing the various reforms which were needed, and a series of Resolutions which followed as a mere corollary from his statement. He did not expect, on the very short notice it had received that the House would adopt those Resolutions at once, but, no doubt, they would lead to a full consideration of the question, and if eventually adopted, he thought they would go very far to get them out of their present difficulty. It was plain to every one who had looked into the matter, that it was of great importance that naval affairs should be conducted with efficiency and economy, and that to ensure the efficiency of the navy, upon which the safety of the country and its best interests depended, it was necessary to have a sufficiency of active experienced officers, and a highly disciplined, well-trained, and contented body of seamen, with a reserve of each for war. At present we had a sufficiency of active experienced officers, but we had not a highly disciplined, well-trained, and contented body of seamen. Accounts from all quarters agreed in stating that the discipline of the navy at the present moment was much below par. He had not himself, within the last three years, seen a single one of Her Majesty's ships in what he could call really smart order or a state of perfect cleanliness. The crews were unusually defective, and he could read extracts on that subject which would surprise the House. Boys trained to the service were equal in value to more than two of such men as now entered it; and they could have plenty of boys trained to it if they only increased the number of their training schools. Another indispensable requisite was the construction of ships armed on the most improved system of modern warfare. The strength of our fleet ought to be equal to the strength of the combined naval forces of France and Russia, and the introduction of iron-cased ships established a new feature in the character of war, rendering an immediate reconstruction of our fleet absolutely necessary. It was a matter of complaint that ships of an obsolete character had continued to be built long after the other nations of Europe had seen the necessity of change. When the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich was at the head of the Admiralty, he began to build iron-clad ships, and it certainly seemed to him that some of those ships ought to have been completed long before this time. The Warrior was to have been launched in May, last year, and he could not imagine why it was thought necessary to extend the time which wa3 allowed to the contractor. She was not launched until the 28th of December, and then the Admiralty deliberated a long time with regard to the plates with which she was to be covered, and declared eventually that the plates should be grooved. The result was, that although the planing machinery, both at Woolwich and the Thames Iron Works, had been employed ever since in planing the edges of the plates, they were not even yet in such a forward state as to enable the Admiralty to form an idea as to when the vessel would be ready. Then, again, the Black Prince was only launched yesterday. How long would it be before they would be able to send those two ships to sea and discover whether they were after all the right thing or not? Our neighbours on the other side of the water had a considerable number of those ships; we were very inferior to them in that respect, but it did not appear to him, from the Navy Estimates, which had been laid on the table that evening, that there was any intention to take a Vote for the purpose of increasing the number of our iron-clad ships. Then, again, it was evident that by the present mode of manning the fleet they did not obtain the best class of seamen. In order to obtain a ready supply of seamen in all emergencies, a sufficient staff of well-organised recruiting officers was necessary. The Naval Commission which sat two years ago recommended that school-ships should at once be established at all the outports of the kingdom. Had that been done at once, and had a sufficient number—8,000 or 10,000—been entered, those boys would then have been sixteen or seventeen years of age; and he would rather go to sea with well-trained boys of that class than with such seamen as were now found on board the ships. The bounty had brought utterly unfit men into the navy; it had collected the scum of the seaports—men who were both morally and physically incapable of forming good seamen, who required punishment to keep them up to a proper state of discipline; but whose enfeebled and diseased bodies were unable to bear that punishment. The Naval Reserve was a very good idea, but it had only answered to a very limited extent. They had only got 3,000 or 4,000 men, but they wanted at least 40,000. They had discovered at Hastings and in other places that the men at the outports were perfectly willing to enter the service as a volunteer force, and to practise at the guns, and he thought that if the gentry of the neighbourhood took this matter up they would be able to get together a body of about 300,000 men—aquatics of all kinds, such as fishermen, longshore men, cobble-men, and men of every sort who got their bread upon the water, and who were as accessible to the influence of men of respectability in the neighbourhood as those of the rural districts were. Such was the kind of naval reserve which he desired; and he believed those aquatics would be a material aid to our navy in the event of any disturbance taking place. To render the service more attractive, it was necessary to establish a complete system of barrack accommodation, where the seamen might remain embodied under good officers, and the practice of disbanding whole crews which had arrived at a perfect state of discipline ought to be discontinued. The practice of paying off ships and turning the men on shore to ruin their health, and to fall into the hands of all sorts of cheats and sharpers by whom they were robbed and plundered, was a relic of barbarism, the existence of which was irreconcilable with the maintenance of a proper state of discipline. Docks or basins ought to be provided, in connection with which each ship might have her own storehouse, an exercising ground, and barracks, in which the men should remain under the charge of their officers. In that way a great part of the men might be barracked in the towns to which they belonged, near to their families and friends, and by that means gradually weaned from those temptations which at the present moment were cast in their way. The practice of paying off ships, he repeated, was perfectly incompatible with the maintenance of an efficient state of discipline, and it was impossible to stigmatise it in too harsh terms. It was melancholy to see a fine ship come home, all in the smartest trim, her hands under the most admirable discipline, knowing what each other could do to a pound, and all of them fit for the most arduous duty, and to reflect that in a few hours the ship would be stripped and her men sent adrift only to return miserable wrecks of their former selves; or, in most cases, he was afraid not to return at all, but to die of disease and neglect. The system was a disgrace to the age, and nothing more or less than a relict of barbarism. Last year, at the close of the Session, the noble Lord came down to the House, and in a speech replete with brilliancy, asked for £10,000,000 to fortify our dockyards. Why, if he had asked for £10,000,000 more for the purpose of making docks and barracks, and had ex- plained the reasons, the House would have given it at once. All that the House required to know was that there was a real and actual necessity for the outlay, and that it was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the efficiency of the navy that boys should be trained up to it, and it would give any money they asked for. Nor would the provision of such a system of dock accommodation be attended with any enormous expense. At Aberdeen a dock containing 39 acres of water, larger than any at Cherbourg, with an average depth of 19 feet, and 22 feet over the sole of the gate, had been constructed for £150,000 or £160,000. At Portsmouth there was an extent of mud beyond the north-wall of the docks, where, for a couple of hundred thousand pounds, we might excavate docks to hold 30 sale of the line; and there were 120 or 130 acres of Government land which would afford space for barracks, exercising grounds, and all other necessary accommodation. It was astonishing to him how little importance the Government had attached to dock accommodation. It was not so with the merchant shipping. Look at the docks at Plymouth, Stonehouse, Southampton, London, Grimsby, Leith, and Aberdeen. Why at Liverpool and London alone the merchant shipping had twenty times as much dock accommodation as was possessed by the whole of Her Majesty's Navy. So alive were the East India Company to the importance of dock accommodation, that as early as 1784 they built one of their extensive docks near Blackwall, and ten years afterwards they built the other, whereas, with the exception of a small basin of about seven acres and the dock at Keyham, Her Majesty's Navy were completely destitute of dock accommodation, and all the ships which came home were obliged to be stripped in the stream or alongside the dock wall. The next point was that the transport service ought to be extended so as to meet all the requirements of peace, and thereby to increase the school for training men who would be available for war. This was a most important point. Many ships which were useless for the direct purposes of war might be with advantage devoted to the transport service, and form an important auxiliary to the marine of the country. It was with the view of creating an administration capable of carrying out these objects that he had framed the following Resolutions:—
said, that in rising to second the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member, he was anxious to explain the reasons which induced him to prefer the Resolutions to the Motion for a Com- mittee to inquire into the administration of the Admiralty of which notice had been given. A Committee of Inquiry was, no doubt, under certain circumstances, very useful and advantageous, but there were occasions on which it became practically an obstruction in the way of reform. When, for example, it was adopted by the Government in answer to remonstrances which were backed up by public opinion, and which, though distasteful to the Government, could not be resisted, such a Committee impeded reform, instead of aiding it. A Committee of Inquiry was an amusement in which the House of Commons delighted. Hon. Members were anxious, and even canvassed to have the opportunity of serving upon it, and knowing that he was not surprised at the willingness of the Government to appoint one; but what would be its result as regarded the public interest? No doubt the Committee would be impartially constituted. Hon. Members would be chosen from both sides of the House. It would sit during the whole of the present and perhaps of the next Session. A vast mass of evidence would be taken. Two ponderous blue books would be produced, and in the year following the question of Naval Reform would stand exactly in its present position, except that the Government would be armed with just as much evidence against reform as there was evidence now in favour of reform. Now, if the Government were of opinion that no such reform was required at the Board of Admiralty, they would be quite right in granting the Committee; because the Committee would, to a certain extent, satisfy public opinion. But if the Government thought that a reform in the Admiralty was necessary, and that changes might be made in that body with advantage to the public service, then it was the duty of the Government to make those changes without delay, and on their sole responsibility as Ministers of the Crown. But he feared the Government had no intention of carrying out any reform, and he was induced to draw that inference from an answer given by the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty to a question put by his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth. The question was, whether the Government intended to appoint a new Controller of the Navy, the office being vacant, before they had received the Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the management of the dockyards. The question was a pertinent one; but the answer was, that a naval officer had already been appointed as controller for a period of five years. Now, that appointment was a very important one, and as it had been already made, it did not appear that any immediate change at the Admiralty was contemplated. He believed he should be able to show and prove that most of the waste and extravagance of the naval administration had been caused by the imperfect manner in which the duties of the office of controller had been performed. That being the case, he need not apologise for occupying the attention of the House for a short time while he entered into some details on the subject. He would first state what the duties of the surveyor or controller of the navy were; for, considering the appointments that had been made to the office, he almost doubted whether the Admiralty quite appreciated those duties. The terms surveyor and controller were used indifferently. Captain Symonds was called Surveyor of the Navy; Sir Baldwin Walker was called the Controller. Now the duties of the Surveyor of the Navy, as officially laid down by the Commissioners of Naval Revision in 1806, were these:—
The House would observe that these duties involved the whole science of naval construction, the economy of labour, its adjustment and superintendence. All these were intimately connected with the office of Surveyor of the Navy. Previous to the year 1832 these duties were performed by a Board called the Navy Board, consisting of the controller and two surveyors, sometimes three. The duty of the second surveyor was to attend to the department of construction; the junior surveyor had the exclusive superintendence of the dockyards. In 1832 the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham) was First Lord of the Admiralty, and a change was made as to the Navy Board. There was no man to whose opinion he would yield greater respect on this subject, or any other, than to that of the right hon. Baronet, who he regretted was not in his place. But when he made this change he was only at the beginning of his brilliant ministerial career; and the change was avowedly made as an experiment. By that change the Navy Board was abolished altogether; the surveyor at that time was Sir Robert Seppings, who had built some of the finest ships of war the country possessed. In place of the Board the right hon. Baronet appointed a single naval officer to do the whole duty, and that officer was Captain Symonds. He was distinguished in his own profession, was a man of ability, and had been an amateur shipbuilder; but it was avowed that he had no scientific or practical knowledge of naval construction. The appointment naturally caused a good deal of controversy. A debate on the subject took place in the House of Commons; and on referring to that debate he found that the most distinguished naval officers then in the House unreservedly condemned the appointment. It was condemned also by the most distinguished Radicals, among them by Mr. Joseph Hume. He mentioned that to prove that it was not made a party question, for the Radicals were at that period stanch supporters of the Government. It was about that time Mr. Hume declared he would vote that black was white to keep in the Ministry. But the appointment was strongly condemned by Sir Byam Martin and Sir George Cock-burn. Sir Byam Martin regretted that the then First Lord of the Admiralty, passing over the pupils of the School of Naval Architecture, many of whom had had seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen years' experience of the duties of a shipwright, had appointed a gentleman as controller who, "though of acknowledged abilities, had no practical knowledge of the building of a ship. The very ship he was employed to build he was unable to make the necessary calculations for, and he actually sent to the Navy Board to ask them to make the calculation, so utterly incapable was he of doing it himself." Sir Byam Martin added that if none of the young men of the School of Naval Architecture were considered competent, there were still the master shipwrights of the dockyard to select from, many of whom had been practically engaged in the duties of their profession for forty years. Sir George Cockburn declared that the pupils of the Naval School were much more fit to be appointed to the office of surveyor than Captain Symonds. It had always been considered that the Surveyor of the Navy should be the actual superintendent of everything done in the building of a ship, and be able to tell the master shipwrights where they might have committed an error. Such were the opinions of two distinguished officers of the navy on the appointment. But he could adduce a much older authority against the principle of appointing as Surveyor of the Navy a man without practical experience of shipbuilding. It was that of Mr. Samuel pepys, Secretary to the Admiralty in the reign of Charles II. He expressed an opinion almost identical with that of Sir George Cockburn. He describes the ruinous condition to which the Navy of England had fallen in consequence of not having a practical shipbuilder as a surveyor. He states that in 1679, when the Duke of York, who was Lord High Admiral, went abroad, he left the duties of the office to be discharged by Lords Commissioners; and such were the corruptions and abuses then prevailing that Sir Anthony Dean, the surveyor, and a man of practical experience, resigned his office in disgust. Upon the accession of James II., who was anxious to improve the state of the navy, he sent for Mr. Samuel Pepys, who recommended him to send for Sir Anthony Dean, a practical shipwright, assuring him that the want of such a person in the Civil Department of the Admiralty had cost His Majesty and his Royal brother no less than £500,000, no small sum in those days. The Board of Admiralty, however, did not take advantage of that example, and Sir William Symonds retained his position for fifteen years, building ships upon erroneous principles. During that period he launched sixty-four ships, and laid down forty-two others. The results of Sir William Symonds's proceedings were set forth in a pamphlet, published in 1847, by a naval officer, who based his statements upon official documents. He said that we had then twenty-nine sail of the line of from 2,000 to 3,000 tons burden, twenty-five frigates of various classes, and a host of corvettes and smaller vessels, besides fifty steamships; and scarcely one of those vessels swam upon the lines origi- nally laid down for her construction, while many could not carry their armaments. The displacement of the Queen varied 270 tons from her lines as laid down, the Albion 250 tons, the Superb 230 tons, and the Vanguard 100 tons, while the experimental brig Flying Fish, if all her stores, guns, and deadweight had been left on shore, could not have swum at the line intended by her construction. The steamship Retribution of 1,600 tons, which cost £100,000, could only carry six guns, for although she had a magnificent row of maindeck ports she could carry no guns in them. In 1844–5–6 experimental squadrons were sent to sea in order to determine the merits of certain vessels, and the result was to arrest the progress of five first-rates building after the model of the Queen, and six 90-gun ships after the model of the Albion. In 1846 the Admiralty was further alarmed at the numerous failures of their ships to carry their guns and stores at the expected displacements, and a Committee was appointed to inquire into the subject. That Committee made a Report which resulted in an order to pull to pieces six 90-gun ships, and to construct others upon a different model. Those statements, he repeated, were made by the author of the pamphlet from which he quoted upon the authority of official documents. He (Mr. Baillie) would ask whether such a state of things did not need reform, and did not those hon. Gentlemen who lately signed a memorial to the noble Lord the Prime Minister for a reduction in our public expenditure think that it would be well for them to turn their attention to a system which involved such an enormous waste of public money? He was persuaded that the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty agreed with him in that statement, for the noble Lord himself had said, "There has been a system of extravagant expenditure pursued in the shipbuilding department of the Admiralty which should be thoroughly looked into." He (Mr. Baillie) wanted to know whether that system had been thoroughly looked into. Pursuing the history of the Admiralty system of shipbuilding he next came to the year 1847, and then the career of Sir William Symonds closed. But he was not dismissed then for all the blunders and mistakes he had committed. He dismissed himself, or he would probably have been allowed to remain much longer in his office. The occasion of his retirement was remarkable. In 1847 the Board of Admiralty received information that the French had constructed an 80-gun screw ship to steam ten knots an hour. This took him by surprise, and they sent immediately for the Surveyor of the Navy and told him they must have a steam line-of-battle ship laid down. Sir William Symonds disapproved screw ships, and he immediately resigned his office. Then Sir Baldwin Walker was appointed, although why that officer was selected he (Mr. Baillie) could never discover. Whether they supposed that by his serving with the Turks he had acquired a knowledge of shipbuilding he (Mr. Baillie) did not know; but certain it was that Sir Baldwin Walker was much surprised himself at his appointment. Sir Baldwin Walker went before the Admiralty and plainly told them that he knew nothing about shipbuilding or scientific naval architecture; but the Admiralty said that was of no consequence, he would make a good surveyor, and he was appointed. It was fortunate for the country that Sir Baldwin Walker was a man of sound common sense, and did not, like his predecessor, appoint as his assistant a man who was as ignorant as himself; but he selected from the school of naval construction a most distinguished man, Mr. Isaac Watts, and to the assistance of that gentleman we were indebted that the ships built of late years could swim at the calculated displacement and could carry their armaments. Undoubtedly a superior class of ships had been built during the administration of Sir Baldwin Walker under the superintendence of Mr. Watts; but the right course would have been to appoint Mr. Isaac Watts the Surveyor of the Navy, and thus have had complete responsibility. As the case stood, if any blunders were committed, and fault were found with Sir Baldwin Walker, that respectable functionary might say that it was Mr. Watts who had built the ships. If, on the other hand, they complained to Mr. Watts, he might say that Sir Baldwin Walker had ordered the lines of the ships. He did not know to what extent Sir Baldwin Walker might have interfered with Mr. Watts, but certain it was that the administration had not been quite free from blunders. One of those blunders was the construction of the iron-cased ships during the Russian war which were sent out to the Crimea. Anything more extraordinary than the construction of those ships he supposed no naval man ever conceived. He was told that any shipwright would at a glance have told the Admiralty that it was impossible the vessels could be either propelled through the water or steered, so imperfectly were they built. He would like to know who was responsible for their construction—Sir Baldwin Walker, Mr. Isaac Watts, or who? Those ships, as his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth said on a former occasion, were sent out from this country; but as they could not be steered or propelled they were for weeks tossed about at the mercy of the winds and waves, and either never reached their destination at all, or only reached it after the war was over. Not so the French vessels of the same description. Having been made both to be propelled and steered they did arrive at the Crimea in time, and were present at the siege of Kinburn. There they were placed within 500 yards of the Russian batteries; those batteries they destroyed, the balls of the Russians falling harmless on their sides. The English officers who visited those French vessels alter the action admitted that then and there the question of iron-cased ships was solved; the French recognized the same fact, and from that day directed their attention to their construction. Not so the Admiralty of this country. Whether it was that Sir Baldwin Walker was disgusted with the utter failure of his own ships it was impossible to say, but certain it was that he never turned his mind to the construction of iron-cased vessels; and it was not till the advent of the right hon. Member for Droitwitch to the Admiralty, who forced their attention to the matter, that the subject was entertained. All credit was due to the right hon. Baronet for that; for had it not been for his efforts we should have been much more behindhand in the construction of proper ships of war than we now were. We were still, it was to be feared, far behind the French; for it was said they would have twenty of those ships afloat before we had ten. However, we had made a commencement in this respect, and the result of our experiments remained to be seen. He now came to the resignation of Sir Baldwin Walker; and here he must remark the curious coincidence that Sir William Symonds should have retired just as we began to reconstruct our navy by the introduction of the screw propeller, and that Sir Baldwin Walker should have done the same just as we commenced the building of iron-cased ships. The officer appointed to succeed Sir Baldwin Walker was Admiral Robinson. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty gave rather an amusing reason for that appointment. He told the hon. Member for Portsmouth that Admiral Robinson was selected because of his knowledge of steam machinery. Now, steam machinery was precisely the thing which was not constructed in Her Majesty's dockyards. It was all manufactured in private establishments. We had, indeed, in the Royal dockyards workshops for repairing machinery; but it was evident that Sir Baldwin Walker's successor was chosen for his knowledge of that which was unnecessary. He knew not how foreign nations carried on such affairs; but he was inclined to think we should be much less tolerant of their errors and mistakes than we were of our own. What, for example, should we say if told that at Constantinople it was the practice, when an officer was wanted to superintend the dockyards and arsenals, to select a man who was openly declared to know nothing at all of the business which he was called upon to perform? What should we say if told that it was also the practice there, when a man was wanted to superintend shipbuilding, to appoint one who understood steam machinery? We might not be surprised at such things happening in Turkey, and we should feel infallibly certain that the sick man's days were rapidly drawing to a close. But as they were happening among ourselves we passed them by unheeded; and so in that happy-go-lucky fashion the Navy of England was constructed—that navy upon which the greatness, the power, and even the existence of our country as an independent nation absolutely depended. In making these observations let it not be supposed he had any wish to cast any reflection on those who constituted the present Board of Admiralty. It was the system of which he complained. He confessed that he thought the present Board the best we had had for many years. He reely admitted the honesty and great industry of the noble Duke at its head, as well as the great industry and practical ability of the noble Lord its Secretary. The other naval Lords, too, were all distinguished officers, and perfectly competent to discharge any duties they might fairly have cast upon them. What, however, he asserted was that the present system prevented them from devoting their abilities to the greatest advantage of the service. His hon. Friend had intimated that he did not intend to press his Resolutions to a division. But those Resolutions had not been hastily prepared; they had been drawn out with great deliberation by officers of distinguished merit. No doubt, they bore a strong resemblance to the system which prevailed in France; but, surely, that ought not to be any disparagement to them if the French system was found to work well in practice, while it also gave satisfaction both to the public and to the service. That he believed to be the case with the system in France. He for one feared that the system in this country gave satisfaction neither to the one nor the other. For these reasons he trusted that the House would take his hon. Friend's Resolutions into its favourable consideration."The senior surveyor, besides the ordinary duty of his office in the committee of correspondence, is to direct in preparing the drawings of ships and vessels ordered to be built for His Majesty's service, either in the King's or merchants' yards, and to determine the dimensions and scantlings of their frames and masts and yards; to examine and approve all notes from the yards for task and job-work; to propose prices to be allowed to workmen not already established; to correspond with the officers of the yard respecting the propriety of estimates from the several dockyards, for an explanation of such parts thereof as do not appear clearly stated, and to make such alterations and additions therein as may be necessary; to consider the prices proposed by the officers of the yards for all works performed by contractors upon valuation; to visit the several dockyards, and to inspect the building and repairs of King's ships in merchants' yards," &c.
Amendment proposed,
"To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'the mismanagement of Naval affairs is due to the inefficiency of the present means of Naval Administration.'"—instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
said, the Resolutions moved by his hon. and gallant Friend raised three distinct and separate questions. First, had they received full value for the large sums of money they had voted for the navy? secondly, had they kept pace with the progress of science in the description of vessels they had added to the navy list? and third, had they based their estimates on accurate information as to the naval armaments of foreign Powers? On each of these important questions he wished to say a few words, and first of all he wished to call attention to our total expenditure. It would conduce to the clearer understanding of the matter if the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty would lay on the table in a condensed form a Return, first, of the total expenditure on the navy for the last ten years; second, the number of ships they had added to the navy in that time; and, third, the number of ships in commission on the 1st of January in each of these years, with the names of the ships, the number of guns, and the number of men employed in each ship. He had himself taken the expenditure from the Naval Estimates for the last four years, and he found that the Votes for 1858–59 amounted to £9,140,000, for 1859–60 to £9,800,000, for 1860–61 to £12,860,000, and for this year to £12,029,000. These were vast sums of money, and he feared when the House came to examine them they would be found not to have produced the results which they had a right to expect. That arose from various causes. Some of them had been dealt with by his hon. and gallant Friend who moved the Resolutions, and by his hon. Friend who, in a speech of great clearness and information, seconded the Motion. But there were others. Amongst them was the conversion of ships where in many cases it would have been better if they had built new ones; the constant changes at the Admiralty, every new set of Lords that came in having different notions; and the inability to fix responsibility upon any one. It was true the Secretary to the Admiralty had a seat in the House, but no one would think of fixing on him the responsibility of constructing their ships of war. He had long been one of those who felt that there was room for great and radical changes in the administration at the Admiralty. But, in his opinion, the House was the proper place to deal with this question, and though he could hardly go along with all the Resolutions of his hon. and gallant Friend, he thought they formed a step in the right direction. He agreed with the first, second, third, and fourth of the Resolutions, and with a portion of the seventh; though the duties at the Admiralty were divided into too many heads. He could not, however, agree with the fifth Resolution. He objected to the proposition that the Minister of Marine should be assisted by a Council composed entirely of Naval Officers; because, with all respect to naval officers, they were, as a rule, not the best administrators. Besides, the proposal would lead to the same state of things that existed at present, for a distinguished Member of the House, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, who had always been regarded as a great administrator, had distinctly stated in evidence before a Committee of the House, that the First Lord of the Admiralty was virtually supreme, that he was not bound to take the opinion of any of his colleagues at the Board, but that he could act perfectly independent of them, and only took their advice when it suited his purpose. If they had not value for their money the fault arose in a great measure, if not entirely, from the system. He would illustrate that by one case. They had now at the dockyards Admiral Superintendents, men of high position, and receiving large pay; and yet he did not hesitate to say that from the system which prevailed a clerk with a salary of £100 a year would fill the office equally well. And why? Because these officers had no power whatever; they could not send so much as a barrel of tar on board a ship without consulting "My Lords." Again, the captains of vessels had no power; they were treated as mere machines, and the sailors knew it. They could not punish an offender without reference to the Board; and how could the House expect either discipline or economy in the navy without responsibility? Give the captains responsibility and they would feel a pride in the condition of their vessels. He was sorry to say they had no inducement for such pride now. He would also give the Admiral Superintendents at the dockyards a discretionary power, subject to the control of the Admiralty, and then they might expect a competition between Portsmouth and Plymouth as to which could turn out the most efficient ships at the lowest cost. The question of the manning of the ships had also been brought under discussion. They had spent a large sum of money upon that matter, and he was sorry to say to a large extent in vain. He had the honour to be named a Member of a Commission appointed to inquire into that subject. He considered the question calmly and seriously in all its bearings; and though it might be considered a bold thing for a person in his humble position to differ from the noblemen, Cabinet Ministers, and Admirals, who were his colleagues, yet he did differ from them, and after grave consideration, he entered his protest against their scheme, which he felt to be a clumsy one, and ill-suited to effect its purpose. At the same time, he could assure the House that he regretted as much as any one that that scheme had failed, which was a serious thing for any scheme launched by the Government, as there would be a great, difficulty in retracing the step. He did not believe, however, that they would ever, under that scheme, get one-half the number of men they wanted; indeed, at present he believed they had not raised more than a tenth part. A question was put to the noble Lord the other night about placing a gun boat at the service of the long-shore men who had offered to volunteer, and he was very sorry his noble and gallant Friend did not think the scheme worth consideration. He knew there were difficulties in the way; but it would have been a great thing to secure the services of such men who were willing to incur all the expense and trouble of naval drill. To use a homely phrase, his noble Friend had given these men a great slap in the face, but he hoped it was not yet too late for him to take the scheme into consideration. He would now come to the next question, whether they had kept pace with the progress of science in the description of vessels they had built? He found from various reports and pamphlets that as far back as 1855 gentlemen competent to form an opinion on these matters had distinctly stated that steam would entirely change the mode of naval warfare, and that the adoption of a description of gun which had the power of throwing shell, would bring all actions at sea to a speedy conclusion. The hole which an ordinary shot made in the side of a wooden ship could easily be plugged up by the carpenter. But if a wooden ship were struck by a shell between wind and water, the hole would he so large that it would be impossible to repair it, and the vessel must speedily sink. Now, those statements were made by scientific men certainly not later than 1856, and not in this country only hut in France. The French Government were aware of this opinion; and since that time he was informed the French Government had not laid down a single wooden line-of-battle ship. They had directed all their attention to the building of iron-plated vessels which scientific men told them were, for all practical purposes, invulnerable. The fact was known in this country also. It was stated in the Report of a Commission of Officers on Naval Gunnery. But the Admiralty went on building large line-of-battle ships, notwithstanding that scientific men told them they would be sunk by the stroke of a single shell; and, further, that one iron-plated vessel would walk through a whole fleet of wooden ships, and sink the half of them, receiving very little injury in return. He came next to the third question, whether the Estimates had been framed on an accurate information of the preparations of foreign Powers. It was especially the duty of the Government to know what France was doing with regard to her naval armament. Now, he had been much in Paris during the last six weeks—he was happy to say on very different business from that they were now discussing. But he there heard a statement with regard to the naval power of France which, he would confess, had alarmed him. Because, although he had ever been, a humble advocate for economy, he had always felt that they must, at all hazards, maintain their maritime supremacy; that if France went on building ships of the line, they must go on building, not merely a sufficient number of ships to cope with her, but a sufficient number to cope with France and any other of the great Powers of Europe combined. However much he might deplore it, it was a necessity. Their very existence depended upon it. They had Colonies in all parts of the world to protect, they had transactions with every part of the world, they had a flag in every sea, they lived surrounded by the ocean, and they had their homes to guard. Therefore, it was the first necessity of the ministers of the day to see that they had a navy, not only equal to that of France, but equal to the navies of France and any other Power combined with her. Well, as he had said, when he was in France he had received from this country a statement which had alarmed him, believing it to be accurate in all its details. It set forth that at the end of the last year France possessed 448 ships, of which 327 were steamers and 121 sailing ships. Many of these were transports, and gunboats, and small vessels; but the ships of the line were—35 steamers afloat and 2 building or converting, and 8 other effective sailing ships; total, 47. The frigates afloat were 36; building or converting, 12; sailing ships, 27; total, 75. Well, that was a large fleet. But another statement alarmed him still more. It was that France was building no less than 15 iron-plated vessels independently of the 5 floating batteries built during the Russian war. Those 15 vessels were to mount 318 guns, throwing 22,2601b. of shot, and having an aggregate horse power of 6,360. Two of these vessels were to mount 52 guns each, with 1,000 horse power; one was to be of 40 guns, and 900 horse power; three of 36 guns, and 900 horse power; 4 of 14 guns, and 150 horse power. The other 5 were gunboats, mounting each 2 guns and having 33 horse power. Now that was a large force; but when it was stated distinctly that all those vessels could be ready for sea by midsummer he must say he felt very uneasy. He said to himself he could not understand it. France was entering into treaties of commerce with us, apparently friendly and desirous to maintain peace with Europe, and, above all, with England. He was at a loss, however, to understand why the Emperor was building so large a number of iron-plated vessels, to be ready in the month of June. Although he had never entertained the idea that France contemplated invading England, it would be a very awkward thing to have a neighbour with such a number of iron-cased vessels ready by June, while we had not even one. He mentioned that to his friend M. Chevalier, who said the thing was impossible, that the votes would not admit it, but suggested that he had better at once speak frankly on the subject to the Minister of Marine. "Well, he did so. He put into the hands of the Minister of Marine the piece of paper which had been sent him with the statement, and asked, "What means this mighty armament? Whatever you may think of the party who wish to maintain peace, there are 991 English people out of every 1,001 who are resolved to make any sacrifice to maintain our maritime supremacy; and if you build fifteen of these vessels they will insist that we build thirty; and if you build fifty, England will have one hundred." "But," he (Mr. Lindsay) added, "what is all this rivalry in arms leading us to? We are saddling the people of the two countries with extra taxes; we are engendering an ill-feeling between the two peoples; making them jealous of each other." The minister smiled, and said, "I did not think you believed those stories." He said, "They are sent to me in a form in which I cannot deny them. I wish you would put it in my power to to do so." The minister went into the matter fully, analyzed every one of those statements, and showed him that of this supposed fleet of fifteen iron-plated vessels only one was now ready, La Gloire; another would be ready in the course of the present year; that the Magenta and the Solferino would not be ready till at least a year hence; that three of those vessels of fourteen guns were not suited to go to sea, but were built as batteries for the protection of their harbours; and, in fact, that those fifteen vessels could not be ready for two years-and-a-half from the present time. That entirely altered the case, more especially when it was considered that the Emperor of France had not laid down a single wooden ship since 1856; and, as he must have a navy to protect his shores and his commerce, he would have that description of ship which his scientific men told him was the best for the purposes of war. No doubt he looked at wooden ships as being nearly obsolete. It had been further stated that he was about to build immediately ten more vessels of the size of La Gloire—even the names of three were given. There was no truth, however, in that. The Minister said, "If you go through our docks you will find blocks laid down, but no orders have been given for these vessels. I do not mean to say that in the course of years we shall not have ten more ships. In 1847 we laid down a policy under Louis Phillippe; and we go on, step by step, building a certain amount of vessels every year, and keeping pace with the improvements of the age." Not satisfied with making that statement, the minister presented him with a copy of the estimates for the navy, the statement recently laid before the legislative body, as to the condition of the empire. In that document, under the head of "Marine," he found the actual number of ships given. It was very different from the other statement; very different also from the belief generally entertained in this country. The only French men-of-war really worthy of that name were steamers. There were 88 altogether. Of these 12 were screw ships of the line, 23 mixed; total, 35. There was 1 iron-plated frigate, 10 ordinary frigates, and 6 mixed frigates; 17. There were 7 corvettes, and 28 despatch boats; making altogether 88 vessels afloat and equipped. The minister did not wish him to understand that that was the whole fleet. On the contrary, he gave him a small book published on the first of February, which contained a description of the whole of the ships of the French navy, and the stations at which they were. He had carefully analyzed it, and he found that France had 35 steam ships of the line afloat, and 2 building; total, 37. He would not trouble the House with the sailing vessels. Well, by the Return laid on the table of the House the other day, he found that this country had afloat at the present moment 53 screw line of battle ships, and 14 building or converting— total 67, besides 9 block ships—in fact, altogether 76 steam ships of the line, as against the 37 steam ships of the line belonging to France. Therefore, as regarded ships of the line they need not fear France, even were she combined with any other Power. Of frigates France had 17 screw ships afloat, and 8 building or converting. But what did they consist of? Five of them were of only 200 horse power, and one building was of 480 horse power. So that France had really, as stated in the Return, only 11 effective screw frigates. On the other hand, we had 31 screw frigates, effective vessels, and 12 building; a total of 43 as against the 25 built and building belonging to France. On neither of these heads, then, ships of the line or screw frigates, was there anything to alarm us. Resides, our frigates were vastly superior to any of the French. Any one of our frigates was superior to any one of the French. In paddle-wheel frigates France was before us. We had 8, France had 17; but the House was aware that for war purposes these were of little use, as one shot would completely disable the paddles. Taking all together, then, we were far before France. With regard to those instruments of destruction, the iron-plated ships, France had one afloat and ready for sea, and she would have another ready in the course of the year. Well, we had the Warrior launched, and she would be ready, as he understood, for sea in August. If we had done as we ought to have done—turned our attention to the building of iron-cased ships earlier, and he thought the country was deeply indebted to the right hon. Member for Droitwich for introducing the matter as he did when at the head of the Admiralty— we might have been in a very different position. France, as he had stated, had at present only one iron-cased vessel afloat, La Gloire, and he went over her at Toulon. In the dockyards of that place there did not seem to be that extraordinary activity in the construction of vessels of war which some people talked about. He had also been over the Warrior, and, looking at both ships with the eye of a sailor, he could say that he would not be afraid to meet in the Warrior two La Gloires as enemies. The Warrior was double the size and threw double the weight of metal. There was, then, nothing to alarm us with regard to French vessels of war. The Minister of Marine was anxious that the feeling of alarm in England on that subject should be got rid of. He said, "I have shown you everything; I have given you of- ficial documents; I will do more, if you desire. Will you go and visit our dockyards and arsenals? I will send a gentleman with you who will throw open everything to you, and you may see with your own eyes everything" He (Mr. Lindsay) declined, saying he was tired of wandering about; but the statement which he had received, confirmed by these books, was so different from what was commonly believed, that he had sent the figures of the Minister of Marine to his noble Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty, and extended to him the invitation of the Minister of Marine to visit the French dockyards and arsenals. He had received a reply in which the noble Lord pleaded want of time and pressing engagements, but still seemed to entertain doubts as to the accuracy of the statements. After receiving that reply from the noble Lord, he mentioned the subject to his Friend, M. Chevalier, and told him that he feared many of his (Mr. Lindsay's) countrymen were still unbelievers in regard to the naval preparations of France. Subsequently he received a letter from M. Chevalier, in which that gentleman made the following observations:—
He quite agreed with that letter; it confirmed what he said to the House last year, when he opposed the measure for fortifications, when there was such a fear of invasion. An invasion! Did they mean to say any nation would attempt to invade 30,000,000 of free people? It was an idle dream, or something worse. Did they think any Power in Europe would attempt it? It was as idle as it was insulting to this country. He had no doubt several hon. Members still doubted the accuracy of his statement, and expected all these iron ships belonging to France to be afloat in July. If they would not believe the statements solemnly made by France; if they would not believe what he had seen, would a statement of the money the French spent annually in their navy be of any avail. He had examined the accounts minutely, and running over the expenditure he found France did not spend on her navy on an average more than £5,200,000 a year, including everything. He had taken the votes from the Estimates of 1858 and 1859, and compared them with the English Votes. He took 1858, it being a year of peace, when the expenditure of England was rather small, as compared with the three succeeding years. He took, first, the administration of the Admiralty in France in 1858, and it cost in round numbers £40,000; in England the Admiralty administration for that year cost £140,000; and in France they seemed to build ships in accordance with the improvements of the age, whilst in England they did not. Then the scientific branch in France, in 1858, cost £18,000, in England £60,000; and judging by results they found France had been producing the best description of vessels, whilst England still built on the old school in opposition to that very scientific knowledge for which it paid £60,000 a year. Altogether the sixteen Votes in France, in 1858, amounted to £5,274,000; and the seventeen Votes in England amounted to £9,140,000, and this year they amounted to £12,802,000. Of course he admitted that England had a larger navy to support and more ships in commission; but that could not account for the difference between £5,000,000 and £9,000,000, nor would it account for the difference between the £9,500,000 of 1858, and the £12,500,000 for the present year. With regard to the Motion for a Committee to inquire into the Admiralty, he quite agreed with the hon. Gentleman the seconder of the Motion before them, that the House had sufficient information to deal with the whole question. They had various Reports on the Admiralty already before them, and, having some experience in Committees and Commissions, he had no hesitation in affirming that if they sent that question up- stairs it would not come down for a couple of years; and whenever, in the meantime, any complaint as to the Admiralty arose, the Committee would be referred to as a means of putting an end to the complaint for the time. The hon. Member for Portsmouth had given them an outline of the direction in which they should go. and it would be well if the House would go in that direction instead of deputing its power to a Committee. Considering the statements of the hon. Member for Portsmouth, and the hon. Gentleman the seconder of the Motion—considering further that they might expect the Report of the Commission appointed last Session to be before them in about ten days, it might be well to allow this question to rest till they had the Report of the Royal Commission on the table. Unless there was any urgent necessity for haste, the Estimates could rest for ten days; and then, having the Reports before them, they could deal with the question with greater facility, and with a better opportunity of having full information. In conclusion, he had to thank the House for the attention they had paid to him in making his somewhat lengthy observations."We have in this country an old proverb: 'None so deaf as those who won't hear,' and I begin to fear it is pretty much so in this instance. You have a full statement of our navy—you have it in a blue book—you are told officially by the Government, and privately, in the most friendly and honest manner, by our Minister, that of iron-cased vessels France has only one fit for use, that in a short time we are to have a second, but that a full year must elapse before we can get two more, and two years before we shall be in possession of a fleet of six iron-cased vessels; and it is in the face of such a fact that England feels herself so dangerously menaced, that she spends millions without number to get rid of the peril of an invader. The Government here, and I may say the people at large, except some few individuals, are making all their exertions to give you the evidence of their feelings of friendship. It is of no avail; then what have we to do on this side of the water? Nothing, indeed, but to wait patiently until you have recovered full possession of your renowned wisdom and much-esteemed sagacity.… Our frigates are only eleven, and not forty-eight, as you have been told.… As to the expenses of our navy, I have minutely gone over with you all the accounts, and you have seen how small they are compared with yours."
Sir, I think the debate has afforded ample proof how very extensive and complicated this question of naval administration is, and how desirable it is, if we wish to effect any practical good, that we should endeavour as far as possible to confine our attention to one part of it at a time. The Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth proposes certain very great reforms; but his speech consisted almost entirely of remarks, I am afraid only too well founded, on the present defective state of the crews and discipline of our men-of-war. In seconding the Motion my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness-shire adverted chiefly, if not entirely, to the question whether the building department of the Admiralty should be presided over by a naval officer or a professional builder? Again, the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, distinguished as it was by the acuteness, clearness, and industry which always characterises his speeches, was not addressed to the question immediately before us, but to naval affairs in general, and the superiority of armour-plated over wooden-ships in particular. These are subjects pressing for a decision, and upon which we have a right to receive—and I have no doubt we shall receive—a full explanation of the views of the Government. I doubt, indeed, whether we ought not to defer the discussion of these matters until after we have heard the noble Lord's explanation of the intentions of the Government. We could then consider these important subjects seriatim, and decide what policy we ought to adopt. I dissent from the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sunderland in thinking that it would be wise to affirm these Resolutions which my hon. Friend (Sir James Elphinstone) said he would not to-night press to a division, and that the House of Commons could thereafter decide what should be the constitution of the Board of Admiralty. Such a course would be without precedent, and I think it would be most inconvenient to settle these details of a great department of the State by a debate in the House of Commons. We have, however, to thank my hon. Friend for having drawn up a series of Resolutions, as a means of showing his views on this important and interesting question. Without approving all the details contained in the Resolutions of my hon. Friend, I agree with the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Lindsay) in thinking that they are a step in the right direction, and will commend themselves to almost everyone who has given his serious consideration to the subject. I will go further, and say that one main object at which we ought to aim is expressed in the second Resolution—namely, the necessity that exists for increased responsibility in every part of the government and management of the Royal Navy. I concur with my hon. Friend (Mr. Baillie) in his doubts whether a Committee of the House of Commons is a good machine for investigating this subject. I certainly gave notice of a Motion for a Select Committee, which I waived in favour of my hon. and gallant Friend, for reasons that I have already stated to the House. To-morrow I intend to give my support to the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend for this reason, that the Government leaves us no alternative. I still think that the right mode of dealing with this subject is for the Government to undertake it. I think that the interests of the public require that the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty should be investigated and improved, but I have much more confidence in an investigation by the Government than in one conducted by a Committee upstairs, which must of necessity be a laborious and prolonged inquiry, occupying more than one Session, and thus making it a long time before we arrive at that reform which is necessary. If the Government is not disposed to enter upon this inquiry itself, I should prefer an inquiry by a Royal Commission to an inquiry by a Select Committee. The Government, however, have decided not to do this reform themselves, or to grant a Royal Commission; and, therefore, there only remains to support the Motion for a Committee of this House. I will assume that it is the intention of the Government to accede to the Motion to be made tomorrow for the appointment of a Committee of this House, and I will, therefore, say no more on that subject. I wish before I sit down to put a question to the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, of which I gave him notice this morning. My question is whether it is the intention of the Admiralty that Sir Baldwin Walker should leave England before he gives evidence to this Committee? I have heard with great surprise a report that Sir Baldwin Walker is to sail for the Cape on Saturday next, although the Committee is to be moved for to-morrow. Now, Sir Baldwin Walker, after his long experience in the building department, is, if not the most important witness who can be examined before that Committee, at least one of the most important witnesses whose evidence they will take. I will suggest to my noble Friend whether, if Sir Baldwin Walker is allowed to leave England the very day after the Committee is appointed, an impression will not be created in the public mind that the Admiralty do not desire to have him examined before that Committee? The noble Lord shakes his head, and I do not say that is the feeling of the Admiralty; but there is an obvious danger that such will be the impression on the public mind. I adverted to this subject in my place a few days ago, and I had hoped that the intention to allow Sir Baldwin Walker to leave England before he gave his evidence would be abandoned, I hope that my noble Friend will be able to assure the House that evidence so important as that which Sir Baldwin Walker can give will not be lost by a few days' delay in taking his departure.
said, that when the right hon. Gentleman alluded to Sir Baldwin Walker's departure a few days ago he consulted the hon. and gallant Admiral who had given notice of his in- tention to move for a Committee (Admiral Duncombe) to ascertain whether he and the other Gentlemen whom he intended to propose as Members of the Committee desired the attendance of Sir Baldwin Walker to give evidence before them. He added that if it were the desire of the Committee that Sir Baldwin Walker should remain, the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty would offer no objection, although very important duties called Sir Baldwin to his station. After consulting with those Gentlemen, the hon. and gallant Admiral stated that it was not necessary for Sir Baldwin Walker to remain and give evidence, because he had already given his evidence at large before a Royal Commission on the constitution of the Admiralty, so far as related to the department of shipbuilding. That was all the evidence he could give on the subject, and if he remained he could add nothing to that evidence. Even now, if it were the wish of the House of Commons that Sir Baldwin Walker should remain a few days to give evidence before the Committee, the noble Duke would not put himself in opposition to its wishes. With regard to the Question before the House, he was not prepared to do justice to all the important topics which had been started in the course of the discussion. The House had, in fact, a little anticipated the Navy Estimates. The Motion of the hon. Member (Sir James Elphinstone) was couched in rather strong terms. It was like hanging a man first and trying him afterwards, and was not altogether consonant with the English love of fair play and of giving every man a fair trial before he was condemned. No doubt, the hon. Gentleman's sole object was to discover the best way of remedying what he considered to be the defects in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, and some of his Resolutions contained suggestions that were certainly valuable. He was not prepared to agree in all the matters mentioned, and there was one most important omission, for the accountant's branch was not even adverted to. He wished to correct a statement which had been greatly misunderstood with respect to the Volunteer Marine Artillery. He could assure the House that, as he stated the other night, the Admiralty would do anything in their power to forward that great national movement. He was instructed to state to the House that if they could see their way to some prac- tical plan of giving the Volunteer Marine Artillery proper practice with great guns they would be glad to do so. It must be obvious that if ships were to be placed all along the coast of England for the purpose it would be necessary to add largely to the naval expenditure. In practically considering such a project, it must always be borne in mind that a ship might be caught in a gale of wind, and the men might then be kept on board for several days, and the Volunteers fed and lodged at the public expense. The Admiralty were considering a proposition for erecting batteries with ship guns and all the necessary gear at various places on the coast, with the view of affording facilities for exercise to the Volunteer Marine Artillery to the Coast Volunteers and others. He was not prepared to say that means might not be found for giving greater assistance to these Volunteers, but all that he now stated was that the Admiralty were deliberating on the erection of batteries, as far as possible, along the coast. The hon. Member for Sunderland had referred to the appointment of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. That question of officers had been dealt with at the Admiralty, and after a plan had been prepared in connection with the Board of Trade it was found that an Act of Parliament was required. His intention, therefore, was to bring in a Bill to enable the Admiralty to enrol merchant officers as officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. He thought such plan would be very popular in the merchant navy and useful to the country. The hon. Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. Baillie) had called attention to the appointment of the Controller of the Navy; and, beginning with Mr. Pepys, gave an interesting history connected with the matter; but, Mr. Pepys, clever and honest as he was, had some prejudice against naval men, and was not a very fair judge as to propriety or impropriety of appointing a naval man to the situation. It must be borne in mind that the building of ships in former days required two branches of knowledge—shipbuilding and practical seamanship. In the present days a knowledge of engineering also was required. The question, then, was which of these branches should be deemed the first? It had always been held that the practical naval officer had on the whole the most important duty to perform, as he had to see to the arming, rigging, and fitments of the vessel, and therefore it had always been held that at the head of the ship building department there should be a naval officer. It had been asked whether it was respectful, when the Commission was just about to report, to appoint a naval man to the office for five years. His answer was that a naval officer never could be said to be appointed permanently to such a post, as he might he got rid of to-morrow by his services being required in another way. Therefore he held that the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty had done wisely in filling up the office, and had chosen, on the whole, the best man for it. He would now make a few remarks in answer to the statement of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) in respect to the French navy. The hon. Member had been in Paris, and appeared to have gained the confidence of all the most important persons there; and he was very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the information he had given to the House respecting the French navy. The hon. Member said that the French navy was composed of very few ships, and that, in fact, there were only eighty-eight screw ships afloat. Well, a return might be made of the English navy showing not a very much greater number if all vessels were excluded, such as the French excluded, from calculation; he had looked to the French return of eighty-eight ships with a considerable amount of interest, and he found that it excluded all ships in reserve, all paddle ships, all small vessels, and all transports; and let the House remark that the French transports were magnificent vessels, and would do good service in war. He had no doubt that the Return was a perfectly honest Return in its way, but it was not, according to the English view, a correct Return of the navy. With regard to the British Navy he had laid on the table a return showing every ship building and afloat. The hon. Member talked about people being alarmed. There was no alarm, for there was nothing to be alarmed at, as the British fleet was in a very satisfactory state. However, though there was no cause for alarm, there was cause for making progress in the construction of iron-cased vessels. The hon. Member had told the House that France had fifteen of these ships, but that five of them were the old floating batteries used in the Crimea, that only La Gloire was launched, and the Magenta and Solferino would not be ready under two years, while the rest were in their infancy. That was all a matter of opinion, and he had reason to believe that those ships were very nearly ready. He believed that every one of those ships, if the French desired it could be afloat this summer. He had had curiosity like other men, and had seen some of them. A sister ship of La Gloire was launched, another was ready to be launched, and he believed that the others were in a fair state of preparation. Let the House remember that the French had fifteen iron cased ships, two were vessels of 52 guns, of a very large class. There were four others, sister ships of La Gloire; and four more of a very formidable character, which they called floating batteries. That made ten, and five iron-cased gunboats gave a total of fifteen, exclusive of the old floating batteries of the Russian war. We had only seven under construction. It was true ours were finer ships. He agreed with his right hon. Friend that they were much finer ships; but he said this, that if they found much more progress made over the water or among any other nation in building these ships it would be the bounden duty of the Government to come down to the House and state frankly and fairly what was going on with a view, if necessary, to extend the number of our iron-cased vessels. With regard to other questions to which reference had been made he would postpone his remarks until his general statement in Committee.
said, he could assure his noble and gallant Friend that he did not share the views of his distinguished predecessor, which had been adverted to; nay, he went further, and would say that he was exceedingly glad to see his noble Friend holding the post which he now occupied to the great advantage of the service. But he believed that with all the independence of character of his noble and gallant Friend even he was not entirely exempt from those inconvenient trammels which surrounded official men. He thought that he traced symptoms of these trammels in the remarks of his noble and gallant Friend upon the subject of the Naval Volunteers. No doubt every hon. Member had perused the printed statement which he held in his hand, and which was signed by Captain Harcourt. The document contained a statement of facts, and some correspondence with his noble and gallant Friend, and in the course of the statement Captain Harcourt said that the two remarks which his Lordship made to him were that in all probability the Board of Admiralty would not incur the expense of feeding these men if the ships in which they were driven to sea by stress of weather; and, also, that they would not consent to put on board men who were not subject to the laws of naval discipline. He (Mr. Bentinck) thought that he saw the trace of official trammels in that answer, for he could not but think that when the object to be attained was so obviously advantageous, and where the expense was so comparatively trivial, his noble and gallant Friend, if he had taken the course which he himself approved, would at once say "Even if you go to some expense there is no possible way in which you can get such an efficient class of men so cheaply as this." Even if the expense of keeping the men on board in a case of bad weather coming on were incurred the expense would be perfectly absurd as compared with the advantage of giving the men an opportunity of training. Surely if they were to give the system official encouragement so slight an additional outlay ought not for a moment to be considered. He hoped that his noble and gallant Friend would induce those who influenced him to reconsider the matter, and that before the Estimates were passed the Government would be prepared to make the trivial outlay which would be necessary for an object already sanctioned, and the utility of which was generally acknowledged. He had listened with great attention to the hon. Member for Sunderland, but he was not going to touch upon those parts of his speech which had been answered by his noble and gallant Friend. There were, however, one or two other points to which he must advert. Everybody must concur with him that, at all costs, the maritime supremacy of this country must be maintained; and he was glad to find that his hon. Friend held the view that our navy ought to be equal to that of France and of any other country combined with it, which meant that it ought to be equal to compete with the whole world. His hon. Friend had given them some curious and interesting anecdotes with reference to the French navy, and had also entered into the very broad and intricate question of the intentions of France. His hon. Friend rather inferred that they were to anticipate, as one of the results of the Treaty with France, a continuance of amity with that nation. All he (Mr. Bentinck) could say was that in so doing they would be trusting to a broken reed. His hon. Friend went on to say that the French were only doing that which they were required to do in order to maintain their position as a first-class nation. He (Mr. Bentinck) should like to know what possible argument could be urged to show that France required any navy at all, comparatively speaking, in order to maintain her position as a first-class nation. He apprehended that France was exclusively a military nation, and that she did not require a navy like that she now possessed to maintain her position. He contended that the naval strength which France now possessed could only be used for the purpose of aggression; and that to buoy themselves up with the idea that France in constructing these vessels meant peace was absurd, and such an opinion was clearly not worthy of the great ability of his hon. Friend. His hon. Friend then touched upon the discipline of the navy, and suggested that the constant system of telegrams from the Admiralty had an injurious effect, but he (Mr. Bentinck) should like to remind his hon. Friend that there were other causes which affected discipline. The tone of the discussions in that House, the tone of the public prints, and other circumstances affected it. Every jury which had to try a question between a foremastman and the master of a merchant ship wore doing all in their power to subvert it. On the question of commanders he had to remark that there was a great deal of hardship in the system adopted; and he thought that he could show at the proper time that the new arrangements were not over liberal. The hon. Member for Inverness had expressed his regret that the earliest opportunity had not been taken for trying every possible experiment with these iron-sheathed vessels. It appeared to him (Mr. Bentinck) that a greater mistake could not be committed than laying the vessels up in ordinary without first testing their sailing qualities. Then came the important question, who were the responsible parties in the management of the different branches of our naval service? He would state a fact for the purpose of illustrating the difficulty in which that point was involved. In the course of last Session he had been a Member of the Committee appointed to inquire into the defective condition of our gunboats; and in order to ascertain who was answerable for that evil, he had made a Motion to the effect that certain right hon. and other Gentlemen who had been members of the Board should be examined; but that Motion had been rejected by a majority of the Committee, and as he had been persuaded that that was the only effective mode of arriving at the whole truth in the matter, he had not any further attended its sittings. He hoped that the course which that Committee had pursued would not be followed by any members who might hereafter be appointed to inquire into the administration of the navy, but that they would sift the subject referred to them to the bottom.
said, he wished to make a single observation. He thought that the question as to the persons on whom the responsibility as to the gunboats rested had been once for all put an end to by the Report of the Committee which his hon. Friend (Mr. Bentinck) seemed to have deserted. Two or three years ago his hon. and gallant Friend, the late Sir Charles Napier, persisted in stating that he (Sir Charles Wood) had ordered those gunboats to be built without the slightest communication with the naval Lords. He had been surprised to hear that some difficulty had been thrown in the way of allowing evidence which would elucidate that subject to be brought before that Committee, but ultimately Sir Maurice Berkeley was examined, and gave most clear evidence that those gunboats were built with the entire concurrence of every naval member of the Board. The fact was, that he (Sir Charles Wood) had never had a misunderstanding with any member of the Board, and upon no material point connected with his office had there been any difference of opinion between him and the members of the Board over which he presided. There was another point to which he wished briefly to refer. The hon. Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. H. Baillie) had stated that the building of iron-plated batteries had been neglected in this country. But the fact was that in the year 1855 the French sent two of those floating batteries to the Crimea, and we also sent two; while in the following year we had not less than eight of them to the two possessed by the French.
said, that he had made no allusion to the question who had ordered the gunboats to be built. The only point into which the Committee had to inquire was the condition of those boats at the end of a period of two years.
said, he thought the navy would be very much disappointed by the speech of the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty, since there was a general feeling among them that the affairs of the navy were not managed in a satisfactory manner. The system of administration was condemned by all. In the matter of building ships they might not be so much behind their neighbours, but in the manning of the navy they were vastly inferior. They had nothing to fall back upon in time of emergency. When the Russian war broke out they resorted to all sorts of modes of manning the fleet; but, though they had plenty of time for preparation, everybody knew that the fleet was most inefficiently manned. The arrangements they had recently made for the purpose also seemed to be inefficient, and their reserve was in anything but a satisfactory condition. He was very sorry to hear that the noble Lord was not able to announce that means were in preparation for putting us in a position to meet an emergency.
said, he thought it was quite clear that some change was necessary to meet the complaints of the unsatisfactory manner in which the business of the Admiralty was transacted. He was not one of those who thought that politics had influenced the Board of Admiralty of late years, at least to any great extent; but, undoubtedly, a contrary impression prevailed both in the Naval Service and in the country at large. The time had arrived when great public advantage might be derived from the labours of a Committee or of a Commission, although he was bound to say, at the same time, that successive Boards of Admiralty had worthily fulfilled the trust reposed in them by the country. Nor ought it to be forgotten that, under their guidance and control, the Navy of Great Britain had maintained the independence and dignity of our flag. Perhaps the greatest difficulty was the manning of the navy. Every attempt recently made to man our ships or to form a reserve had been a failure. The bounty had not succeeded, and the measures adopted upon the Report of the Manning Commission of 1853 had produced only a comparatively small addition to our force of seamen. At present we had actually not the means in reserve for manning a single ship. Whether the ballot should be put in requsition was a point upon which he would give no opinion, but the whole subject connected with the manning of our navy deserved the most careful consideration. He hoped that whatever might be done in future in the extension of the navy would be in the direction of iron-plated ships. He even thought it was worth consideration whether some of the line-of-battle ships ought not to be brought forward and plated. He agreed with the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) when he said the discipline of the navy ought to be such as to bear strict inquiry. He hoped it would always be such as to bear the most open criticism.
said, that with respect to the reconstruction of the fleet, it could not be denied that all scientific men were unanimously of opinion that the time had come when the Government should build no more timber vessels, and should expend no more money in altering the wooden ships already built. France had relinquished any such expenditure for some time past, and was building iron-sheathed vessels. He wished that some commission could be appointed to procure accurate information of what was being done across the Channel, for he had no faith in the statements which were made on that subject when a large expenditure was proposed here. The French did not come to a conclusion with regard to the discontinuance of wooden ships without good experience. In the attack on the fort of Kinbourn it was demonstrated that iron-plated ships would be the only safe ones. So in the attempt to force a passage into Sebastopol it was shown that our wooden walls could not cope with stone forts. The French government profited immediately by the experience thus acquired in actual warfare, but the English Government moved more slowly. The fact was that our dockyard staff had been trained to the construction of wooden ships, and when a man had once got into a particular groove, it was very difficult to move him out of it. Thus, the Admiralty and the dockyard staff had constantly opposed the introduction of iron vessels. Twelve years since he had entreated the Government to pause in the expenditure on wooden vessels, and a right hon. Gentleman on the Treasury Bench answered him by quoting the miracle performed by Elijah when he caused the hatchet to swim. Since then he had observed that the introduction of iron vessels into our navy had met with no encouragement whatever at the Admiralty. If he had anything to bring to the notice of the French Government, he always felt sure that it would receive the most careful consideration, and would be adopted if it seemed of practical value; but he should never think of going to Whitehall to propose anything, being confident that official routine would render its adoption practically hopeless. He was quite sure that the noble Lord, from whom they expected so much, found himself perfectly powerless at the Admiralty, and could only register the decrees of the Board. He (Sir Morton Peto) would resist the expenditure of a single shilling more upon the construction of wooden ships. He was sure of this, that no wooden ship ever constructed would live for five minutes before the broadside of such projectiles as now used from such a vessel as the Warrior. If that was the case, ought the Government to go on spending million after million on wooden ships when every shilling of the money would be utterly wasted? The fleet prepared under the last Administration, and added to by the present, was sufficient to meet every emergency. The French Government had ceased to build wooden ships; then, why should this country be put to such enormous expense for them? He was in Algiers when the Emperor arrived there, and he saw the Gloire enter the port with the Emperor's yacht, though it was very bad weather; the other steamers of the squadron were not then in sight, and did not arrive till some hours afterwards. The Gloire, therefore, had one element of superiority—speed; and any Admiral would admit that the commander who had the fastest ship had in his power one great means of success, as he could always choose his position. He had been told that the Gloire was not an easy ship in bad weather. That was possible; but they might rely on it, with the practical and scientific men the Emperor of the French employed, any defect found in one vessel would be remedied in another. The greater durability of iron-ships was also an important question. An iron-ship would be as good fifty years after she was built as on the first day she floated on the water. He knew from experiment that the wear of iron so applied was scarcely appreciable. In 1859, the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) quoted a report of Sir Baldwin Walker, stating that, with the exception of the ships that had then been recently built, there was scarcely a vessel fit to go to sea without extensive repairs. Was not that an important consideration in reference to iron vessels? If they could never know whether their ships, when built, were seaworthy, was not that an important point for the House to consider when dealing with the question? They had been told by the right hon. Member for Droitwich that the expenditure for new works and alterations in the dockyards themselves had increased 120 per cent. As their ships yearly increased in size, so the docks had to be enlarged also. If everything connected with wooden ships was constantly changing, and causing a constantly growing demand on the Chancellor of the Exchequer, should not the element of superior durability in iron ships claim the serious attention of the House? If they could get what would answer the purpose, and permanently, they should hesitate to spend millions on wooden ships when the only nation that could oppose England had ceased to build them. Let the Government effect some reasonable reduction in what was non-essential. Let them have what was efficient, and what the country could perfectly rely on; lot them treat the question as men of business would treat it. They would not go on building vessels on an exploded system; they would only use their dockyards to repair the ships they had already built. But, unfortunately, the Government never took such a position. Its workmen were brought up only to build wooden ships, and if the Government constructed iron vessels, "Othello's occupation would be gone." Another consideration was that on board an iron vessel the same effective force of powerful guns carried by a wooden ship could be worked by one-third of the number of men the wooden ship required. With the difficulty experienced in obtaining sailors, that was an important consideration. Now, to construct an iron steam navy might require a large outlay of money. But that large expenditure might be spread over a number of years; and it would not press so heavily as the present continual large expenditure, the results of which were so unsatisfactory, while the after expenditure would be almost nominal. He believed the country was prepared to meet any expenditure necessary for its safety. But it would demand of the House that the money so given should not be wasted, that the country should have value received for all it gave. He knew there was a deeply-rooted feeling of dissatisfaction in the public mind on this subject; the coun- try felt that this question required solution, and they would not do their duty to their constituents unless they met that feeling, and fully settled the question for ever. The hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) he had remarked, often indulged in observations on the motives and intentions of the French Emperor and the French people. Now, he ventured to say that very few Members of that House knew anything at all of the real feelings of the French people. They judged foreigners too exclusively from the statements of the representatives of the English Government at Foreign Courts. These official persons were in the habit of mixing only among one certain set of people; they never descended to the under strata of society where alone they could learn what were the sentiments of the great mass of the people. For a number of years he had employed large numbers of people in France, sometimes as many as 10,000 or 12,000. That had brought him in contact with all classes of French society; and he could assure the House that there did not exist among the people of France the feelings they had been led to suppose. On the contrary, the general feeling towards this country was of a genial, friendly, and cordial kind. They were often told that the French were anxious to wipe out the recollection of the Battle of "Waterloo. There was no feeling of the kind; the idea was without foundation. He had often talked over the Battle of Waterloo good-humouredly with Frenchmen, and he had always found it their firm belief that they won the battle, only another large army came up, and deprived them of the advantages of the victory. But the French were fast becoming a commercial people, and with a reciprocity of trade, good feelings would soon increase between the two nations. As to the Emperor of the French, he had personally received great kindness from him, and had been frequently honoured with his confidence in regard to public works. And he would undertake to say that there was not a Sovereign in Europe who so well understood the interests of his country as the Emperor of the French. He was sure that no person was more desirous of maintaining friendly relations with this country than the Emperor, and he was also sure that the Emperor's policy was peace and alliance with this country, because nothing could add more to the welfare and happiness of the French nation or conduce more to the stability of his dynasty. He gave the Emperor credit for wishing for that which was his interest to wish for; and whenever that House or the public press took an opposite course, or attributed motives, or excited suspicions, they were not acting for the welfare of the country or doing justice to that alliance which he believed to be sincere, honourable, and trustworthy.
said, that the country was thoroughly dissatisfied with the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty. Since the year 1828 to the present time there had been no less than sixteen First Lords of the Admiralty, and the number of secretaries and naval Lords in that time was nearer one hundred than fifty. The Board charged with one of the highest, most difficult, and responsible departments of the public administration has no permanency. The knowledge it has acquired of the actual state and urgent requirements of the naval service is lost with its displacement. Like the stone of Sisyphus it is a hopeless wearisome task. Another Board succeeds, labours, and toils with equal diligence; and over and over the work, like Penelope's web, has to be taken up and begun again. An influential member of a former Board is seldom retained; and, if he preserves his seat, has the disadvantage of serving under another chief and with different coadjutors. Yet to these ever-changing Boards we are content to entrust the right arm of our strength, the supervision of our dockyards, the building, equipment, and manning of our ships, the determination of the mode and materials of construction, the distribution of our fleet, the maintenance of the navy equal to any emergency, the supply of stores, the control of expenditure, the victualling, the medical and transport departments—a never-ending supervision which is indispensible to the safety of our commerce—the security of our shores, and the continuance of our reputation and stability as a nation, and yet it was liable to sudden and constant change. Such a state of things could not he satisfactory.
explained that the reason he had communicated to the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty his opinion that Sir Baldwin Walker might proceed at once to his destination was that that station had been now six or eight months without a Commander-in-Chief, and that Sir Baldwin Walker had recently given evidence before the Dockyard Com- mittee, which could be considered by the Committee about to be appointed.
said, he felt it due to the officers who had endeavoured to get their ships into good order to deny that the Admiralty had any reason to believe that the discipline of the navy was at all impaired. As soon as the few remaining men who had entered solely for the sake of the bounty were got rid of he had no doubt the fleet would be in a highly satisfactory and creditable condition.
said, he would withdraw his Motion.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Main Question put, and agreed to.
Supply considered in Committee.
House resumed.
Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.
House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock.