, Treasurer to the Royal Household, appeared at the Bar, and reported Her Majesty's Answer to the Address of Condolence on the Death of the Duchess of Kent, as follows:—

"I thank you for your loyal and dutiful Address, and for the expression of your sympathy and condolence on the death of My beloved Mother.

"The assurances of your loyalty and attachment, as well as of the interest which you take in everything that concerns Me and My Family, are most grateful to My feelings."

said, he rose to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Under what circumstances the Appointment by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue in January last of three Excise Officers—namely, Messrs. Conran, Bell, and Esner, to collect the Income Tax in one of the districts in Islington parish took place, and why the nomination of a collector was taken out of the hands of the Local Commissioners? Also, what sum is paid to those officers for making the collection, and if they are to receive any advantages not enjoyed by the other collectors in the district of Finsbury? Also, if they have been sworn to secresy, and if so, on what day or days, and by whom

said, it was quite open to his hon. Friend if he thought fit to call for a detailed account of the proceedings and of the circumstances under which the Excise Officers had been appointed to collect the Income Tax, and the Assessed Taxes, in the parish in question. It had been done under the Act which was passed in 1854. The appointment in the first instance came into the hands of the Board of Inland Revenue, in consequence of the failure of the persons appointed by the Local Commissioners to find securities. The Board endeavoured to find fit persons for the office, but failing in that they thought it best to appoint trustworthy persons in their own employ, namely, the Excise officers. The oath of secresy was administered to them on the 23rd of January, and they received no remuneration for making the collection beyond their salaries.

said, he wished to ask the Under Secretary for War, Whether it is the intention of the Government to place District Adjutants on the same footing, as regards pay and allowances, as Adjutants of Depot Battalions, in accordance with the recommendation of a Royal Commission

said, the suggestion of the Recruiting Commission, that District Adjutants should be placed upon the same footing as the Adjutants of Depô t Battalions, had been considered by the Secretary of State for War, who did not think that the duties of the two classes of officers were sufficiently similar to justify the increased expense which would follow from the adoption of that suggestion.

said, he wished to ask, Whether there would be any objection to produce Copies of any Correspondence or other Documents 2'elating to the National Defences addressed to the Board of Admiralty or Commissioners for the National Defences by Captain Cowper Phipps Coles, R. N., and any subsequent Reports from the Commissioners for the National Defences, particularly relating to the sunk fort at Spithead

presumed that, by "documents relating to the national defences," the hon. Member meant the very clever pamphlet which Captain Coles had written on Spithead Forts. Any hon. Gentleman who wished to read that pamphlet could buy it in the usual way at the publisher's. The question relating to the construction of forts at Spithead had been referred to the National Defence Commissioners, not for decision, but for any observations they might have to offer. Their Report would receive from the Government that consideration which the importance of the subject demanded; but it would be premature at present to lay the papers on the table of the House.

said, he wished to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether it is intended to introduce, in the present Session, a Bill to amend the Law of Settlement and Removal, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Committee of last year

said, he was not aware of any intention on the part of the Government to bring in a Bill during the present Session for amending the Law of Settlement and Removal.

said, he wished to know, Whether it is true that the Court of Policy of Demerara have passed a Bill allowing the surrender of French political prisoners who may escape from Cayenne; whether the assent of the Colonial Authorities will be given to that Bill, and, if so, whether a copy of the Bill will be laid upon the table before the sanction of the Crown is given

said, he could not state the exact nature of the Bill lately passed by the Court of Policy of Demerara. He could, however, state that Her Majesty's Government would not give their sanction to any Bill having for its object the rendition of political prisoners escaping from neighbouring colonies.

said, he had had several representations made to him during the day on the subject of the amount of stamp duty, and he believed if the hon. and learned Attorney General would consent to a reduction of the duty to 5s., and a limitation of the amount to £200, that that would meet general expectation. It was said that a duty of 5s. would produce a much larger amount than the Attorney General expected. He hoped, therefore, under those circumstances, it would not be asking too much for the Attorney General to give an assurance that, if the amount should be larger than he expected, he will be prepared at some future time to propose a reduction.

said, the Bill had been accidentally printed with 7s. instead of 5s., the amount which he desired. The Bill provided that an accurate financial statement of the affairs of the Court should be laid before Parliament every year. If the Report, at the end of the first year, showed that the stamp duty had been more productive than he at present expected, it would give him great pleasure to propose a reduction; but at present it would not be consistent with ordinary prudence to propose a less amount than 5s., which sum he should propose as an Amendment to be introduced into the Resolution instead of 7s.

moved the addition to Clause 201 of these words—

"That in addition to the ordinary stamp duty, there shall be charged an ad valorem duty of 5s. upon every £100 of property comprised in every trust or other deed or instrument required to be registered by any Act of the present Session for amending the law relating to bankruptcy and insolvency in England."

moved that the House at its rising do adjourn to Monday, the 8th of April.

said, he rose to call the attention of the House to the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Salmon Fisheries of England and Wales, and to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the intention of Government on the subject? The Commission had been appointed in consequence of a Resolution which had been come to by the House last Session with a view of increasing the supply of a valuable article of food. The Commissioners had visited the different salmon-producing districts of the country, and come to a Report which was now before the House. Having studied that Report, he believed its principles to be sound and correct. The Report dealt, first, with the past and present productive powers of the salmon rivers; secondly, on the causes of the depreciation of those powers; and, thirdly, on the means of providing a remedy for that depreciation. It appeared clearly that whereas the rivers of this country had formerly produced a large amount of valuable and nutritious food—so large that it frequently formed an essential element in the food of the people, so great had been the decrease that salmon was now confined to the opulent classes. This was a great evil, and any suggestion for its removal ought to meet with the attention of Parliament. The causes of this decrease were various. One was the obsolete nature of the laws on the subject. They were not only obsolete but contradictory, and so unintelligible that any attempt to enforce them was unavailing. The Report recommended that immediate legislation should take place, by which all these old laws should be repealed, and a simple and uniform law passed on the subject. It recommended, also, the establishment of local boards in the different salmon producing districts, and of a central board to control and direct the different local authorities. This plan had been tried in Ireland with the most satisfactory result. The salmon rivers there had become very much depreciated, and legislation had taken place; local boards were established, and a central board sitting in Dublin. The result had been a continuous increase in the production of salmon. Last year between £400,000 and £500,000 worth of this valuable and nutritious article of food had been produced. He had been told that these boards ought not to be established at the public expense because the salmon fisheries were not public but private interests. But he did not concur in that view. The Commission had been issued on the supposition that it was a matter of public interest, and from the earliest times it had been so considered in this country. In Magna Charta itself there were provisions regarding the salmon fishery. From that time to the present the various Acts of Parliament showed that it was a matter of public interest, and certainly it was so viewed in the Report of the Commissioners. The salmonidœ inhabited the sea as well as the rivers, and, by the common law of the land, every person had a right to fish in the sea and in the tidal and navigable waters; therefore, so much of the fishery as had reference to the tidal and navigable waters was clearly a matter of public interest, and public interest alone. There was a precedent for the application of public money to this purpose in Scotland, where £12,000 was annually voted for fishery purposes; as also in Ireland, where a Fishery Board was paid out of the public revenue of this country for the purposes of the salmon fishery. He begged, therefore, to ask the Home Secretary whether it was the intention of the Government to deal with the question during this present Session?

, in rising to put a question to the Secretary for the Home Department relative to the Kossuth notes, took occasion to refer to an answer which he had a few days ago received from the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs with respect to a sharp look-out being kept on Kossuth, intimating a wish to know whether the noble Lord, whose memory in connection with the matter seemed then to have failed him, had since refreshed his recollection with respect to it, and stating it to be his intention again to bring the question under the notice of the House at no distant day. He desired also to know whether the attention of the noble Lord had been drawn to a statement which appeared in The Times of yesterday in the letter of its Constantinople correspondent, and which was to the following effect:—

"Her Majesty's ship Banshee, Captain Madden, left here on Wednesday last for Galatz, with Mr. Ward, our New Consul at that place, on board. The Banshee is, I am informed, to take the arms conveyed there some time since in Sardinian vessels back to Genoa—that is, if she can get them; for it has been hinted that their being forthcoming on demand is far from matter of certainty. What on earth our Government has to do with the matter I confess my inability to understand."

Those arms, it would appear, the noble Lord was afraid would not fall into the hands of his pet Government of Austria, and had ordered them to brought back in one of Her Majesty's ships—a fact which betoken a somewhat active interference on the side of a despotic Government. The question, however, which he had more immediately risen to put related to a reply which he had received from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department, which was of a most unsatisfactory character, and which bore on a subject in reference to which the right hon. Gentleman's memory also would appear to have failed him" He wished to know from the right hon. Gentleman, how Sir R. Mayne became possessed of, and who translated for him, "the Kossuth note," manufactured by the Messrs. Day, upon which he gave Sir R. Mayne instructions; and whether the said note was the same that was afterwards exhibited by Count Apponyi in the Court of Chancery? It would be in the recollection of the House that the Secretary of State stated on a former occasion that neither Sir R. Mayne nor himself understood the Hungarian language, and that, therefore, they did not know what the note contained. He understood, however, that Sir R. Mayne had in his possession at the time a translation of the note; and, if so, both he and the Home Secretary must have been acquainted with its purport. Upon his knowledge of the note the Secretary of State founded his instructions to Sir R. Mayne. Sir R. Mayne wrote to Mr. Day requesting him to call upon him. Mr. Day complied with the request and had two interviews with the Chief Commissioner of Police. In the evening of the same day Sir R. Mayne wrote again to Mr. Day saying he hoped he would call upon him the folio wing forenoon. The House would recollect that the Secretary of State stated distinctly that that interview did not take place, and that nothing further transpired in writing. The right hon. Gentleman must have been misinformed, because something further did transpire in writing. Mr. Day, on the 14th of February, in answer to the request of Sir R. Mayne for another interview, addressed to the Chief Commissioner a letter than which nothing could be more creditable to an Englishman. It was as follows:—

"To Sir R. Mayne.—Sir, in the interval between the last visit of our senior to you and this day we have taken the advice of several constitutional lawyers of eminence, and those gentlemen cannot see that in lithographing the notes in question our firm have infringed any provision of either the common or statute law of this country. At the same time we feel the greatest repugnance to being supposed to be indifferent to even a suggestion that in carrying out the order of our customer we are breaking or evading any law of this realm, especially when that suggestion comes from so high an authority as yourself. Before, therefore, deciding finally upon the course we should pursue, I will ask you, from whom I have, up to the present time, experienced every courtesy in the execution of what must be to you as an Englishman a very unpleasant duty, to favour us with a reference to the statute law against the provisions of which you deem our firm to have offended, or to the principle of common law you think we are infringing. Permit us to say, that in the interview between our senior and yourself on the 12th instant he did not promise to detain the notes in question on receiving a notice to that effect, but simply to respect any notice from the Government which they had a right to give. We are at present advised that they have no such right. We think it right to inform you that while our principals in this matter desire to avoid unnecessary publicity they are prepared, on the other hand, by every constitutional means to protect and assert their rights."

Here he might state, in passing, that the Hungarian arms, which had so much alarmed the Government, were placed at the head of every advertisement in the Hungarian newspapers, were exhibited on the labels attached to wine bottles, and were used for a variety of other purposes. The House, he was sure, would agree with him in thinking that the Home Secretary ought to explain his statement that nothing further transpired in writing. He wished the right hon. Gentleman to state also from whom Sir R. Mayne received the note, whether it was not translated at the time Sir Richard brought it to the Home Office, and whether it was the same note which was produced in the Court of Chancery.

My hon. Friend has said that my memory has been at fault, and that I gave incorrect information to the House on a previous occasion. I expected that he would state in what that incorrectness consisted, but I confess I do not exactly understand what was the inaccuracy of which I have been guilty. Upon a former occasion I merely referred to the communication which Sir R. Mayne had made to Mr. Day. I read the letters to the House, and stated that nothing further bad taken place between them. I meant of course on the part of Sir R. Mayne; because I did not think it was necessary for me to refer to communications which Mr. Day had made to Sir R. Mayne, which were not in my possession at the time I answered the question—and, moreover, the question that was put to me had reference to the conduct of Sir R. Mayne and not of Mr. Day. Here I may state that I am far from imputing any blame to Mr. Day. I think he has acted with perfect propriety throughout. No question was put to me with respect to Mr. Day. My hon. Friend simply asked for an explanation of Sir R. Mayne's conduct and my own, and I stated to him all that had passed on the part of Sir R. Mayne and myself. I think, therefore, he has altogether failed in showing that my memory has been at fault. He now asks me how SIR R. Mayne became possessed of the note. Sir Richard became possessed of it in consequence of its having been brought to him by a policeman. I wish to state in the most distinct and explicit manner, and upon the authority of Sir R. Mayne himself, that he never employed any policeman or any person whatever to obtain information with respect to the proceedings of M. Kossuth. He knew nothing of the existence of these notes until the note was brought to him. That was the first information he received on the subject. When the note was brought to him he thought it his duty to lay it before me. I can only repeat what I stated on a former occasion, that there was no person in the Home Office who understood Hungarian, and that I requested Sir R. Mayne to procure a translation of the note. Sir R. Mayne went to the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office furnished him with a translation of the note. So much for two of the questions which my hon. Friend has put to me. His last question is whether the note produced in the Court of Chancery was the same note which Sir R. Mayne brought to me. It was the same note. It was upon my authority that the note was handed over to the Austrian Embassy for their information. Having thus answered the questions of my hon. Friend, perhaps the House will allow me to give a few words of explanation. I have already stated that I do not impute any blame to Mr. Day; that, on the contrary, I think he has acted with perfect propriety in the whole transaction. Mr. Day wrote two letters to Sir R. Mayne. I have not those letters here; but Sir R. Mayne has furnished me with what is more material, the substance of what passed at the interview which took place between them after the first letter. The interview took place at the Police Office on the 12th of February, and the following is Sir R. Mayne's account of it:—

"Mr. Day stated that before he undertook the order he was advised that there was nothing illegal in the transaction. He brought with him two large sheets of the notes (unseparated), which he showed Sir R. Mayne. He stated that he brought them, because he supposed that it was with reference to them Sir R. Mayne had asked him to call; that he had made no concealment of them; that if Sir R. Mayne had visited their establishment they would have been shown to him."

I state this because my hon. Friend by his previous statement led the House to suspect that this was a clandestine operation on the part of Mr. Day; that the ma- nufacture of these notes was carried on as if it had been the coinage of base money or the forgery of bank notes, and that great secresy was used. I do not at all collect from the statements or the conduct of Mr. Day that such was the fact. Mr. Day is a highly respectable tradesman; he is lithographer to the Queen; he has acted under legal advice, and believed himself to be conducting a perfectly regular and legal operation. I never imagined that the manufacture of the notes was concealed. It must have been known to a considerable number of persons connected, and perhaps unconnected, with his establishment. My hon. Friend seemed to me to put Mr. Day in rather an unfavourable position by representing that it was impossible that a knowledge of these notes could have got abroad without some breach of confidence. I gather from the statement made by Mr. Day himself that such was not the fact. I shall now briefly state the course which the Government took on becoming possessed of the note. As soon as I saw a translation it became evident to me that this was a preparation of notes to be used by a Government to be established in place of the existing Government of Hungary. Such being the nature of the operation in which Mr. Day was concerned it behoved the Government to consider whether it was a legal operation or not. I could not help remembering the opinions which were expressed some years ago in the House of Lords, particularly by Lord Lyndhurst, when that distinguished lawyer generalized the legal doctrine laid down in the case of "The King v. Peltier," that any person who, either by a single act, or by a combined act, tends to embroil this country with any foreign Government in amity with Her Majesty is guilty of a misdemeanour. That doctrine was laid down by Lord Lyndhurst on March 4, 1853,and it was acquiesced in by several other learned Lords, But the question arose also in this House of Parliament in the course of last Session on the Motion of the Member for the King's County (Mr. Hennessy), with reference to the assistance sent out to Garibaldi. On the 17th of May last that question was discussed, and upon that occasion my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General laid down the law, and I believe it passed without any dissent, although several hon. and learned Members on both sides of the House took part in the debate. This was what my hon. and learned Friend said:—

"The law prohibits anything that may en. danger the peace between the Sovereign of England and the Sovereign of another State. That great principle of the law must be accepted by every person; and the common law of England, although it may have provided no particular remedy, yet in conformity with general good faith and expediency, lays down in the strongest manner the principle that all subjects of the realm are bound to abstain from every interference that tends to excite the subjects of another country against its lawful authorities. What those authorities may be is not the question. It matters not that they may be cruel or tyrannical; that is not the question. If the Sovereign be in amity with this country it would be wrong and illegal for any persons here to interfere with the affairs of his kingdom."—[3 Hansard, clviii., 1383.]

That doctrine so laid down by my hon. and learned Friend on the 17th of May was unchallenged. In the course of the debate the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Guildford (Mr. Bovill) said—

"It is, I maintain, an offence of the most serious description for any individual—even though he may do it without concert with others—openly to invite subscriptions—it matters not whether they be or be not collected—for the purpose of aiding the revolt of the subjects of a foreign Country against their Sovereign. Such a proceeding is a direct violation of international law, and ought to be held liable to punishment."—[3 Hansard, clviii, 1387.]

Well, then, if the collection of subscriptions for such a purpose be a violation of the comity of nations, by parity of reasoning the fabrication of money—the sinews of war—to be used avowedly by a Government which is contemplated to be established on the ruins of an existing Government—must be considered as coming within the principle of the prohibition. Bearing in mind these dicta of eminent lawyers, I thought it my duty to take the opinion of the law officers of the Crown upon this question. That opinion was not favourable to the legality of the proceeding, but they did not recommend the Government to take any active steps in the way of indictment or other legal proceedings. Having received that advice, and Understanding that the Austrian Embassy regarded this as a matter which might be made the subject of a civil remedy, however little the Government might have contemplated that it could be so treated, yet when asked by the Austrian Embassy to assist them in carrying their civil remedy into effect, we thought we were bound to furnish them, as a Government with which we were at amity, with the evidence by which they sought to enforce their rights. That, Sir, is the extent to which the Go- vernment have interfered in this matter, and I trust the House will feel that we have not exceeded our duty. In answer to the question which has been put to me by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Fenwick) as to the Report of the Commissioners on the subject of salmon fisheries, I shall only say that I have read that Report with very considerable interest; and it appears to me that the Commissioners have discharged their duty in a highly satisfactory manner with regard to a subject which is not of paramount though of considerable secondary interest. It is a subject requiring technical knowledge, and was, therefore, properly subjected to special inquiry. I quite concur with the view which has been expressed that the supply of salmon has been greatly diminished of late years, and that that diminution to a considerable extent might be prevented by means within the reach of legislation. That has been proved by the example of Ireland, and, to a certain extent, by the example of Scotland. As to how far it is a matter of private and how far of public interest, I will only say that will depend mainly on the question how far legislation is applicable to it. Any measure which, to a considerable extent, insures the supply of an article of food is in itself a subject of interest. The question is whether that supply can be augmented by legislative means? I confess it seems to me that it can. In connection with the spread of manufactures and impediments in rivers, no doubt, the subject is one of considerable intricacy and difficulty. But there arises another objection—that in order to render any inspection by public officers effectual it is necessary to a certain extent to make a draught on the public Treasury. I have had the subject under consideration, and I can only say that I am sanguine of being able to devise some means by which that kind of protection may be reduced within the narrowest limits. It will not be necessary to create a central board; it will only be necessary to have some inspectors to report to the Government. The expenditure will be experimental, and the inspectors will, in the first instance, be appointed only for a limited number of years. I should be disposed, if I thought the House would be likely to agree with me to ask for leave to introduce a Bill founded upon the Report of the Commissioners soon after Easter.

said, he rose to call attention to the mode in which the Vote of Credit of £850,000 for Naval and Military services in China for the year 1859–60 has been dealt with, and to the importance of regulating the system of dealing with the unexpended balances of Votes for Army and Navy services. It had been his wish to call attention to this subject when the House went into Committee of Supply, but although they had now arrived at the Easter recess they had taken Supply only on two occasions. No longer ago than last night, however, a step was taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which very much diminished the interest the House might take in the question. What he had to say, therefore, would only go to the importance of proceeding rapidly with the Committee on Accounts which his right hon. Friend was to move on the first day after Easter, leaving the general question to he investigated by that tribunal. At the same time the case was one in itself of considerable importance, particularly as showing the necessity of putting some limit to the powers of the Government, and confining the expenditure of money in the way the House understood it to be voted, and intended it to be applied. About this time last year Government came down to the House and asked for £850,000 as a Vote of Credit for naval and military services connected with the war in China, intimating at the same time that £500,000 would be applied to the army, and the remainder to the navy. At that time his right hon. and gallant Friend, the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel), challenged the accuracy of the statement of the Secretary of War, and laid calculations before the House to the effect that £500,000 would not be sufficient to cover the excess of expenditure over the army Votes of 1859–60. Lord Herbert, however, maintained that it would be sufficient. Later in the Session, Lord Herbert came forward and proposed another Vote of Credit—£3,800,000, of which the greater part was for the service of the present year connected with the naval and military expenditure in China. He then stated how the money already voted for China had been expended. Of the Vote of Credit, he said, last year for £850,000, the amount which went to the army was £578,648, and to the navy £268,452. Again, his right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon stated that the Army Estimates would be deficient and that the Government would require to apply for a supplementary Estimate. This was the state of things at the end of last Session. Now what he maintained was this—when a Secretary of State came down to the House and asked for a certain sum for the expenditure of any branch of the service, and maintained that that sum was sufficient, he was morally bound to confine himself within the grants made by Parliament; and if his calculations turned out wrong it was important that the House should know that he would be obliged to come down for the extra sum required, and present a supplemental Estimate. In July, Lord Herbert distinctly stated that the sum of £578,648 which was added to the £12,859,000 previously voted for the services of the year would be sufficient for the army, and he was bound in the face of the House to those Estimates and no other. As to the other sum of £268,452 that was apportioned for the navy, he had no more moral right to take that for the purposes of the army than he had to take any other sum expressly voted for the navy. Now, what actually happened? A Vote of £250,000 was placed to the credit of the navy in order to meet extra demands arising out of the war in China. That amount appeared to have been rightly calculated, because the item for stores connected with that expedition reached to about that sum. But there was an excess in the Vote over the expenditure upon another head belonging to the navy—namely, the building of certain vessels by contract. That excess was not a real saving, because it was not owing to a service having been performed at a lower cost than the estimate taken for it, but simply to a particular service having been partly postponed instead of being performed. It would be necessary in another year to execute the work thus put off, and the money voted for it ought to be held over for that purpose or handed back to the Treasury. The amount not expended in the construction of vessels by contract was about £250,000. Finding that to be the case the Government did not apply the £250,000 of the Vote of Credit to the purposes for which it was wanted, but they took the balance upon the item for vessels which ought to have been built, and devoted it to the payment of the charge for stores, handing back the sum given for the Vote of Credit. He would now turn to the accounts for the army; but here he was met by a difficulty. Although the Admiralty had, in conformity with the Appropriation Act, laid on the table, along with the Navy Estimates, the correspondence between that department and the Treasury relating to the transfer of the surplus of one Vote to supply the deficiencies of another, the War Department had failed to comply with the like statutory condition. The latter department had fallen into the bad habit of not laying such papers on the table; and therefore it was impossible to say positively what had taken place in regard to the army expenditure. As far, however, as he could collect from the explanations given in that House, it would seem that as the year grew on the Government began to suspect that his right hon. and gallant Friend was right, and that more money would be needed to make up the deficiencies of the Army Estimates for 1859–60. Finding that to be so, he contended that it was their clear duty to come to the House for a supplementary Vote. He did not say they were bound to do that legally, but morally, after what happened in July. But they did no such thing. They made the Vote for the building of ships do duty for the Vote applicable to the purchase of stores, and handed the £250,000 of the Vote of Credit over to the Treasury chest, where, as he understood, it was still applicable to the army service. They had thus done indirectly what they could not do directly, thereby utterly frustrating the checks which the jealousy of the Legislature had imposed upon the appropriation of public money. In fact the proceeding amounted almost to an abuse of the confidence of Parliament. As, however, the House had now the prospect of having a Committee of Accounts, this matter could be more satisfactorily looked into. His object in bringing it forward was not to prefer any accusation against the Government, and when he placed his Notice on the Paper he did not know that the nomination of that Committee would be proceeded with. With respect to the Vote for building ships by contract, he did not impute the delay in constructing these vessels to the Government; he believed it was entirely due to the contractors, or to other circumstances. But if the money granted, for that particular purpose was to be applied as it had been in this case, and the transaction was allowed to go unchallenged by the House, it was obvious that they would open a door to the most grievous irregularities, since it would be easy for the Government, if they found their Estimates insufficient, to put off important work for which provision had been made, and to apply the money voted for it to another purpose. It was obvious that Votes of Credit must be much less under the control of Parliament than others, and he thought the matter deserved the special attention of Parliament. He wished, therefore, to ask his right hon. Friend whether the sum of £250,000 had been dealt with in the way he had described, and whether papers giving a detailed account of the application of the Vote of Credit would be laid upon the table

said, he had one or two questions to put before the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) replied to the questions just put to him. The right hon. Gentleman had the other night told him that no portion of the Vote of Credit of £850,000 would be applicable to the charge of £610,000, which the Indian Government stated in January would be required for army purposes early in the spring; because, he said, the expenditure for which the latter was voted would not fall within the financial year. The question was whether any part of the expedition of that item of £610,000 would come within the financial year 1859–60. He believed that if the right hon. Gentleman had the good fortune to see a settlement of accounts between the Indian and the British Governments he would find that a great part of that money would be applicable to 1859–60, and could not be applicable to any other year. And in this way:—The European troops going from India to China were upon the Indian establishment, therefore, it was very probable that the European portion would not be chargeable to England until the year 1860–61, when they arrived in China. But it was very different with regard to the Indian troops. The troops who volunteered in India to go to China were, from the moment of so volunteering, chargeable upon the British establishment. They were told that from the time of volunteering they would receive half batta; and, therefore, whether the men were afterwards in India or China, they were upon the English establishment; and, therefore, it was clear that that part of the expenditure in respect of Indian troops which took place in 1859–60 must be paid out of the Vote of Credit for that year. He should be glad to hear from the right hon. Gentleman how he had intended, when he made his financial statement last year, that that sum of £610,000 was to be paid? No provision had been made for it in the Estimates for the subsequent year, and no further Vote of Credit was hinted at beyond the £500,000 for the war in China. That amount would not have paid the expenses of the Indian Government, and would not have sufficed to pay one month's expenditure in carrying on the Chinese war. In his financial statement, the right hon. Gentleman professed to give an account of all monies that would he required to cover the expenditure, not only of the year 1859–60, but also of the year 1860–61. Upon the faith of that statement the House was called upon to make great changes in the taxation of the country. But what could be said of the accuracy of the statement if £610,000 due to the Indian Government, which they had stated would be required early in the spring, was unprovided for, either in the Estimates of the year 1859–60 or 1860–61? He wished to ask how the right hon. Gentleman, at the time he made his financial statement, proposed to meet that £610,000? He also wanted to know if the Vote of Credit for £850,000 was not based on the account received from the Indian Government, for what and when it would be required? It could not have been wanted on account of the navy because the navy would not need it; nor could it have been required by the Secretary of State for War, who, only ten days before the close of the financial year, said not only was there no excess of expenditure, but there had been an actual saving of £5,000. He (General Peel) had been recommended to wait until the accounts were on the table; but it was unnecessary for him to do so, as a Return which he had moved for gave all the information that was necessary. From that Return he found that the total number of effective men upon the army establishment in 1859–60 was 136,436, not including officers and staff. He did not know whether the cost of officers and staff was included in the gross amount taken for the effective strength of the army as given in the Return. [Mr. T. G. BARING: It is!] The Return showed that the cost of each man was £54 4s. 3d., and the aggregate amount was £7,389,759 2s. 8d.; while the total amount in the Estimates was only £6,693,627, so that the excess of expenditure was £696,132 2s. 8d. How the Secretary for War within ten days of the close of the financial year could make the statement he did it was difficult to understand. If he (General Peel) was correctly informed, one-third of the excess would arise upon the embodied militia; and, if so, it would puzzle the ingenuity even of the right hon. Gentleman to show how the excess arose out of the China war. He wished to know whether any supplemental Estimate was required in addition to the Vote of Credit to supply the excess of expenditure upon the Army Estimates.

said, that before the Under Secretary for War answered the questions of his right hon. relative, he would reply to those of the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir Stafford Northcote). He could not admit that the Vote of Credit of £850,000 had been applied by the Government in any way inconsistent with a fair construction of the statements made by the Ministers of the Crown, or to any purpose not contemplated by the special grant. That sum was voted last Session to defray the extraordinary expenses of the expedition to China, to the close of the year 1859–60. Of course, the amount of that Vote must have been fixed after calculation of what the extraordinary expenses would probably be. It was supposed that the extraordinary expenses of the military department would be £500.000, those of the navat department £250 000, and that the expenses paid in India would have to be met by the balance of the Vote of Credit. But it would have been preposterous to require that when the Government in March, 1860, were asking for a Vote of Credit, the amount of which had to be fixed by them at that time, they could pledge themselves to the actual expenditure which was taking place in the very same month in three several departments, and in places so distant as India and China, or that they could make it correspond exactly with their own calculations as to the probable apportionment of the Vote. They did, however, show this degree of confidence in their own Estimates, that, when the money was voted they made an issue in the proportions which they had mentioned—namely, £250,000 to the navy and £500,000 to the army; but with this distinct understanding that, in the event of the ordinary grants for the year sufficing both for the ordinary and for the extraordinary expenditure of the particular departments, then that special issue should be returned to the Exchequer, and not be made use of. The hon. Baronet's view was that because there was an excess in some particular Vote on the Navy Estimates, the amount so taken in excess should not have been paid over for some excess of expenditure over the Vote of Credit, assuming this to have been due to the war in China, was founded on a misconception of the scope and purport of the Appropriation Act. The Appropriation Act did not permit, under such circumstances, the application of the Vote of Credit to the general expenditure of the navy, and therefore the Government had not got it in their power to apply any portion of the Vote of Credit to cover any excess there might be in the expenditure over the Navy Estimates, unless it could be shown to be chargeable to expenses incurred in China. But if, in closing the account of the expedition, there had been a general result, an excess upon the Vote of Parliament, then to the extent to which that excess was due and chargeable to the expenditure for the Chinese expedition, to that extent it must have been paid out of the Vote of Credit. When it appeared, therefore, that the ordinary grants for the year would be sufficient, that sum of £250,000 was returned, and placed to the account of the special grant for China, so that it now remained available, in the event of its being necessary, to pay for the excess of the army expenditure of 1859–60, if that were due to any expenses incurred in China. He thought that was a sufficient answer to the observations of the hon. Baronet, and a sufficient justification of the course which had been pursued by the Government.

rose to call the attention of the House to the Customs' duties new levied on tea and sugar, and to suggest to the Government that they should take the subject into their early consideration. The hon. Member spoke nearly as fellows:—After the discussion which has just taken place on an item in the War Expenditure for China, I turn with pleasure to a more agreeable subject relative to our commercial relations with that country, and I have now to beg the indulgence of the House, feeling that I may be thought to have undertaken a hopeless task in appealing for a reduction of the Customs' duties on tea and sugar, especially after the recent decisions of the House against the repeal of the hop duty, and the modification of the fire insurance duty. I am aware also that many hon. Members may say, if any reduction of taxes be practicable let us have a reduction of the income tax, and the hon. Member for Birmingham will call out for the abolition of the paper duty; but it must be borne in mind that some of these reductions would involve a partial and others a total permanent loss to the Revenue, while the two great commodities of which I speak being of universal consumption are classed in the demand for them, and would by a reduction of duty not only in a short time restore but absolutely improve the Revenue. Tea and sugar are now as necessary to us as our daily bread. I propose, first, to show the very heavy duties imposed on the importation of tea and sugar; and then to endeavour to prove from past experience that a reduction of duty would lead to a great increase of consumption and a consequent increase of Revenue. The stock of tea in this country on the 1st of January, 1861, was 69,000,000 of lbs., the average value of which was 1s. 3d. per lb., amounting to £4,000,000 sterling, while the duty at 1s. 5d. per lb. amounted to £4,500,000, being equivalent to a duty of 110 percent. rather different from the import duty at which by the new treaty we have stipulated for the admission of our manufactures into China, namely, at about 5 per cent. The heavy duty on tea may be shown in another way:—Average price in bond 1s. 3d. per lb.; duty, 1s. 5d.; 2s. 8d.; trade profit say 1s.; duty paid, 3s. 8d. per lb. The dealer in tea must, of course, as in other commodities, take his profit on the whole cost to him, whether it be in the value of the tea or the duty comprising his cost. Thus the consumption in 1860 being 77,000,000 of lbs., the dealer's profit on his outlay for duty at 6d. per lb. would be nearly £2,000,000 additional paid by the consumers; a charge which does not fall on the public in the case of the income tax, directly paid to the Government collector of that tax. The Revenue from tea at a duty of 1s. 5d. per lb. is larger than it was when the duty was 2s. 2¼ d. per lb. fourteen years ago. Duty in 1846, 2s. 2¼ d.; Revenue, £5,000,000; in 1857, 2s. 2¼ d.; Revenue, £5,700,000; in 1860, 1s. 5d.; Revenue, £5,400,000, being equal to 110 per cent on the gross market price, which includes prime cost in China, insurance, freight, and all charges; and if the duty were reduced to 1s. per lb., it would be 100 per cent on the probable price when the trade is permanently established in peaceful intercourse. The consumption of tea was in 1846, 47,000,000lb.; in 1851, 54,000,000lb.; in 1860, 77,000,000lb.; and though this is a surprising increase, it gives only about 2½ lb. per annum per head for the whole population, while in the Channel Islands it is stated at 4 lbs. per head. In Australia 10lb. to 12lb. per head. In this country the allowance to domestic servants at ½ lb. each per week would be 13lb. per annum. An increase of 1lb. per head on the general consumption would bring up the quantity to 100,000,000lb., and the duty at 1s. per lb. would amount to fully £5,000,000. I shall now advert to Sugar, but not in the same detail. A very large increase of consumption has followed the reduction of duty, and the admission of Mauritius and Bengal sugar. The consumption was in 1843, 200,000 tons; in 1853, 370,000; in 1860, 440,000 tons; but the duty is still too high, being 50 per cent on the gross market price. The cost of sugar consumed in 1860 was—price in bond, £12,000.000; duty, £6,000,000; together, £18,000,000; and the cost of tea consumed was—price in bond, £5,000,000; duty, £5,000,000: total, £10,000,000. Thus—

	Sugar.	Tea.	Total.
Duty	£6,000,000	£5,000,000	£11,000,000
Cost	£12,000,000	£5,000,000	£17,000,000
Total	£18,000,000	£10,000,000	£28,000,000

First wholesale cost, the retailers profit to be added. This is a marvellous amount, partly owing to increase of population, but mainly owing to the increased ability of the people, consequent upon the extension of commerce by free trade, a very gratifying result of that policy. I may give another instance in coffee, which is not in the same universal demand as tea and sugar. In 1800, the consumption was 750,000lbs.; in 1860, 40,000,000lbs. The duty in the first period at 1s. 6d. per lb. was £12,000; in 1860, the duty at 3d. reached £500,000. I will now refer to the Acts imposing Customs Duties on tea and sugar. Tea, by the Act of 1853, to pay 1s. 10d. per lb. until it gradually descended in 1856 to 1s. per lb.; but the decline in 1854 was arrested and 1s. 9d. imposed, but to continue only till twelve months after peace with Russia; in 1857, to be 1s. 3d. per lb; in 1858, and after, 1s. per lb. Another disappointment oc- curred, in 1857 the duty was altered to 1s. 5d. per lb., which in 1860 was again continued till the 1st of July, 1861, and it is now to be hoped these repeated disappointments will not be continued. The duty on sugar, which in 1852 had descended to a uniform rate of 10s. per cwt., was raised in 1854 to a complicated differential scale of about 14s. per cwt., varying from 18s. 4d. to 12s. 8d. per cwt. This mode of assessment is very inconvenient and uncertain, and encourages the production of a lower quality of sugar to save the higher rate of duty, while a fair uniform rate encourages the importation of the best sugar, and I hope before the expiration of the Act on the 1st of July next this grievance will be remedied. The progress of the trade with China since the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly is well worthy of observation. The India Company imported annually about 3,000 bales of silk. In 1860, free trade brought us 70,000 bales, increase more than twenty fold: value, in the East India Company's time, £300,000; in 1860, £7,000,000. Likewise in tea—it was said by the Company Free-traders would not be able to procure tea, and the quality would be inferior; the result is, as good tea comes in abundance, and, while the annual supply by the East India Company was 24,000,000lbs., in 1860 we imported 92,000,000lbs., the increase being nearly four-fold. But it may be asked if silk, a luxury, has increased so enormously, why has not tea, a necessary of life, increased in the same proportion? The great reason is silk was then subject to a high duty on importation—it is now entirely free, while tea is still taxed more than 100 per cent. I will now very briefly draw attention to the large amount of shipping engaged in carrying these two commodities. Tea, 95,000 tons; sugar, 440,000 tons; together, 535,000 tons; and I contend that this tonnage is susceptible of great extension by a reduction of duties. Even the addition of 1,000,000lbs. of tea gives employment to 1,000 tons of shipping. Let the duty be made 1s. per lb. on tea; the duty on sugar uniform at 10s. per cwt., and the good effects will soon appear. I beg to thank the House for this patient hearing, and I will conclude by addressing a few words to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I do not ask him to give me any answer now, but I do earnestly entreat him to ponder these facts during the rather long Easter recess. I hope he will proceed in that course which he has so ably and successfully pursued in the reduction of Customs' duties; and especially with regard to tea and sugar, I ask him to consider the commercial, the shipping, the social, the moral, and, for his revenue, even the fiscal bearings of this subject: and I do hope on all these grounds he will give further encouragement to "The cup which cheers but not inebriates."

As it would have been very disagreeable to me to decline any request proceeding from a Gentleman so much respected as my hon. Friend (Mr. Gregson), I am exceedingly glad that he does not ask for an answer to his statement. It would have been quite out of my power now to enter into a discussion of any subject connected with the duties upon tea and sugar. The facts given as to the growth and the consumption of tea and sugar, and as to the trade with China, are facts of the highest interest and importance, and I am only sorry that there has not been a more favourable opportunity of bringing them under the notice of the House, proceeding, as they did, from one who is entitled to speak with the highest authority upon the question. To one administrative question relating to the classification of the duty upon sugar, apart from the amount of the duty, I may for a moment refer. With respect to that, I must remind my hon. Friend that it is a subject of the greatest difficulty; that it embraces not merely the classification or non-classification of the lower descriptions of sugar, but, likewise, whether the uniformity of duty for which he would call is to be extended to refined sugar or not; because the duty upon unrefined and refined sugar is a matter of degree just as much as the difference between different sugars of any other classes. This being so I am not sanguine that the difficulty will within any reasonable time be entirely overcome. I now proceed to answer what has been said by my right hon. and gallant Friend (General Peel). He is not precisely accurate when he represents me as saying that no portion of the £850,000 Vote of Credit for 1859–60 would be applicable to defray in part the £610,000 claim which was coming in from the Indian Government. That is little more than I stated. What I said was that with regard to the £430,000, which was the most bulky item of that claim, I did not conceive it to be a proper object of the Vote of Credit of £850,000 to provide for meeting that sum; nor, indeed, I may say, to meet the Indian claim, excepting in a very small degree. I do not agree in the opinion that when a certain estimate is framed as to the amount of any amount of incoming claim the amount of that estimate ought to be asked from Parliament forthwith, irrespective of the period when demand for payment is likely to be made. I may be wrong, I do not know of any absolute rule in the laws of this House or in the law of the land which determines the principle; but, undoubtedly, I have always, generally speaking, considered it to be the duty of the Government to ask the House from year to year to meet what is likely to be the probable demand upon the Exchequer within the year for each particular service. Consequently, if we had attempted to found a statement for a Vote of Credit for £850,000 in 1859–60 upon a notice from the Indian Government that early in 1860-61 they considered they would be in a condition to make that claim, we should, in ray opinion, have committed a great error. I do not say that we had a discretion, and exercised that discretion in a particular manner, for, upon that point, I think we had no discretion. There is another point to which I may refer. I do not think my right hon. and gallant Friend takes an altogether accurate view of the responsibility of the Treasury in proposing Votes of Credit. In my opinion the primary responsibility for proposing Votes of Credit rests with the military department, and the responsibility of the Treasury lies in the manner in which they deal with the demands made by the military department. If, for example, the Treasury undertook to cut down the demands made by the military department, it would incur serious responsibility, and would be exclusively bound to show the grounds upon which. those demands were cut down. The primary responsibility as to the sufficiency of a particular Vote of Credit lies with the particular department in which the demand originates. However, as regards the £850,000, we acted with strict propriety in bringing together first of all the demand made by the War Department; secondly, the demand made by the Naval Department, and in adding, thirdly, a small residue on account of any possible charge in India, or rather by way of margin, over and above these demands. My right hon. and gallant Friend then says—" If you had in view a demand amounting to £500,000, which was not provided for by the Vote of Credit in the year 1859–60, why did you come to Parliament at the time of our Budget for so small a sum on account of China as £500,000, which sum undoubtedly did not include a margin to cover that demand? "My answer is two-fold. In the first place, at that period—namely, in January—I had not the smallest means of judging from former practice, and from the system pursued in the settlement of accounts between the Indian and the British Governments, as to the time when the demand from the Indian Government would be made. It is true it was to be made in respect of expenditure incurred by the Indian Government for an expedition to sail in May, 1860; but I ask my right hon. Friend to look back at the manner in which the whole of these war accounts have been conducted between the two Governments for a series of years. I beg him to bear in mind the principle I lay down, and which I am prepared to defend—namely, that it is the business of a Government to ask in each year for the sums which will probably be payable within the year; and then he will see that the question whether that particular sum would be claimable and claimed even in 1860–61 was a question of a very shadowy description and exceedingly difficult to deal with. It is true we have now materially altered that system, and, that though the formal settlements of accounts with the Indian Government are still unsatisfactory, yet we are paying up with great comparative rapidity, so as not to be heavily indebted on account of charges incurred. But that is a practice which grew up only in the course of the last year. At the time we speak of the orders had hut recently been sent out, That is the first element of my answer to my right hon. and gallant Friend. But there is another most important one. When we asked Parliament for £2,500,000 for the expenses of the Chinese expedition, that was an arrangement based strictly upon the facts before us—namely, that we had failed to obtain the ratification of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and had in consequence ordered an expedition of considerable numbers and charge to go to China. But the calculation was not based on the knowledge of the contingency of absolute war. There are some hon. Gentlemen here who saw—after the fact—that war would occur; but, even had we been among the fortunate individuals who foresaw what would take place in China, we should not have been justified in asking Parliament to provide a war expenditure till we were certain there would be war. But, suppose the war had not broken out, the question was would the Treaty of Tien-tsin be ratified? If it had been, then, in a few months we should have come into the receipt of a considerable sum of money from the Chinese Government that would have been applicable to the Ways and Means of 1860–61. There would have been ample means from that source of covering the outside of the Indian demand. That is the answer I must give the right hon. Gentleman. Looking back at the circumstances of the time, I do not think we should have been justified in asking Parliament for a larger sum than we did ask on account of the expenditure for the Chinese expedition. With regard to the question raised by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Stamford (Sir Stafford Northcote) it was quite a different one. It would be unreasonable to complain of the hon. Gentleman raising a discussion upon it. He is one of the few who are acquainted with the dry details of accounts, than which nothing is more difficult to make intelligible across the table. But I think the principle he lays down as to Votes of Credit is entirely wrong. He says we asked for a Vote of Credit of £850,000, and that in doing so the Secretary for War was bound to state as clearly as possible the reasons for asking for it. The hon. Gentleman also says that this information having been given, the money is to be considered as a formal addition to the Vote for the two services, and that the Government is not at liberty to use the money except according to the explanation. But all the information respecting this war expenditure was essentially uncertain, and to say that giving that information tied up the hands of the Government—the same as if half a million had been added to the Vote for the army and a quarter of a million to the Vote for the navy—is a doctrine that would destroy Votes of Credit altogether. The Government must have a larger discretion in the application of the money between all the services engaged in the operations of the war. If the hon. Gentleman's doctrine is a sound one, no such thing as Votes of Credit can be asked of the House of Commons. But, as this subject is to be referred to a Committee which will examine the accounts, I shall be happy to render every assistance to the elucidation and dis- cussion of the matter. It is one of great importance; but the principle laid down by the hon. Gentleman is wholly opposed to the public convenience and the practice and usage of all Governments. The time is near when the army account will be closed, and only then can the real issue be raised.

Sir, the House will probably be of opinion that it has had enough of Sir Baldwin Walker. ("Hear!") I was fully prepared for a responsive cheer to that sentiment; but I hope the House will allow me a moment to explain the reasons which induced me to put on the paper another question relative to this subject. I have no personal motive whatever in putting this question. Sitting below the gangway I do not feel any deep interest in showing the faults of the present Board of Admiralty, nor have I any reason for showing that they are faultless. I have no personal interest in the question; for, although I have the pleasure of the acquaintance of the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, I am not one of his intimate personal friends. But I do feel an interest in this question, which I am sure every Member must feel, as it affects the character and credit of our public men. An impression has gone abroad, whether rightly or wrongly, that an attempt has been made on the part of the authorities of the Admiralty to evade a promise made by the First Lord of the Treasury with reference to the detention of Sir Baldwin Walker—an impression which I do not think is advantageous to the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty. I believe, from circumstances which have recently come to my knowledge, and which I believe to be accurate, that that impression is unjust as regards the course pursued by the noble Lord; and, therefore, I thought it my duty to put this question on the paper. I have had no communication with the noble Lord on the subject. I placed the question on the paper without his knowledge, and no conversation or allusion has passed between us on the matter. The circumstances as to this unfortunate affairs as related to me appears to be this—that immediately after the promise made by the First Lord of the Treasury that Sir Baldwin Walker should be detained, the Secretary of the Admiralty wrote two telegraphic messages, which it was intended should be immediately forwarded to the Admirals at Portsmouth and Plymouth to detain Sir Baldwin Walker. That intention, however, of the noble Lord was overruled through the intervention of one of the Naval Lords of the Admiralty. The question as to whether these messages should be forwarded that night was referred to the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty. Unfortunately, however, that noble Duke is reported to have retired early to rest that evening. He was supposed to be dreaming of the destruction of the iron fleet of France by the wooden fleet of England; and it was not thought desirable by those who watch over the slumbers of that noble Duke to awake him on that occasion. Being unable, therefore, to communicate with the First Lord, communication was held with the First Naval Lord. What has been stated very recently in "another place," by the First Lord of the Admiralty explains the view taken by the first Naval Lord on this question. But although that explanation has been given in "another place," I put this notice on the paper to enable the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, if he should feel desirable, to give any further explanation on the subject. I, therefore, beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether, in fulfilment of the promise made by the First Lord of the Treasury, that Sir Baldwin Walker should be detained to enable him to appear before Admiral Duncombe's Committee, he immediately wrote two telegraphic messages, the one to the Admiral at Portsmouth, the other to the Admiral at Plymouth, desiring them to take all possible means to overtake or intercept Sir Baldwin Walker; whether the cause of these messages not being immediately forwarded by telegraph arose from circumstances over which he had no control, and whether he would state those circumstances to the House; also whether any instructions were sent through Admiral Bruce, or through any person, to Sir Baldwin Walker, desiring him to go to sea immediately, and not to allow himself to be caught

said, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty what number of Boys are on board the Training Ship Britannia, at Portsmouth, if it is true that there is considerable sickness on board from overcrowding; and if it is true that the sewers of Gosport are discharged into the Harbour in the vicinity of where the Britannia is moored?

said, it was due to a gallant Admiral now on foreign service (Sir Baldwin Walker) to state that he had already been examined for three days before a Commission on which he (Sir Henry Willoughby) had sat, and that he had given his evidence in a full, free, and straighforward manner which showed that he had nothing to conceal.

In answer to the question relative to the cadets of the Britannia, it is, I admit, impossible to overrate the importance of a healthy situation for the education of these youths, who are, I trust, to be the future Nelsons of the navy. I can assure the hon. Gentleman and the parents who may send their sons on board the Britannia that the Admiralty are continually inspecting her and receiving reports upon the state of the vessel, and upon the progress and health of the cadets. I believe that these young gentlemen since the establishment of this training vessel have been on the whole, very healthy. It is true that late last autumn a disease or diseases, in the shape of measles and fever, broke out on board. This occasioned great anxiety to the Admiralty, and it was a question at one time whether it would not be necessary to break up the establishment altogether. An inquiry was instituted, with a view of discovering, if possible, the origin of the sickness that had occurred, but it was never made out that it was due to the drains in the neighbourhood. The Britannia lies at a considerable distance from the shore, and I cannot think that the breaking out of these maladies was due to the effluvium from the drains. It is true that a great number of these youths were taken ill. At one time there were 38 cadets, out of 200, who had measles and fever; but the health of the cadets has since gradually improved. The best proof that there is nothing against the Britannia as a healthy vessel is that at this moment there are but two cadets on the sick-list, who are ill of catarrh. In the hospital there are three cadets—one ill of fever, another of measles, and a third of catarrh. That is the whole number of sick cases out of 204 cadets now on board. The parents of these children have, therefore, no occasion for alarm. I now turn to the question of the noble Lord with regard to the supposed abduction of Sir Baldwin Walker by the Admiralty. I should have been contented to rest under the stigma cast upon me by two or three Gentlemen in this House. I think that the hon. Member for Portsmouth stated—and really I almost dreamt I was the First Lord of the Admiralty, he seemed to consider me so powerful—that I had ordered Sir Baldwin Walker to proceed to sea, "blow high, blow low; "that I had risked the lives not only of himself and of his wife and children, who were on board, but also of his ship's company; and that I forced him to sea with the view of getting rid of his evidence before the Admiralty Committee. That was one accusation. Then the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakiugton) accuses me of neglecting to send a telegram when my noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury stated to the House that he would give immediate orders that a vessel should be sent to intercept Sir Baldwin Walker. The right hon. Gentleman told the House that I had gone home, taking no notice whatever of the wishes of the House; that I had only at half-past eleven next day communicated with my colleagues, and that then a wretched small vessel was sent after him. I should have been perfectly satisfied to rest under the indignation of the right hon. Gentleman and of the hon. Member for Portsmouth, for it did not give me much uneasiness. I knew I had acted as it was my duty to act during the whole of these proceedings, and, therefore, I took no notice of these insinuations. So the matter would have rested, and I should have taken no notice of it if it had not been that unfortunately two gallant brother officers were joined with me in this dreadful conspiracy. First of all, with regard to the abduction of Sir Baldwin Walker, a gallant officer, the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth, wrote to me, after reading a leading article in a paper, the name of which I need not mention, but which we know is conducted by a very able and distinguished gentleman. This paper stated at the conclusion of its article that it would recommend the Committee to ask the Port Admiral at Portsmouth whether anything did pas3 on this subject—that is, whether the Port Admiral had been sent out with orders to Sir Baldwin Walker to proceed to sea, blow high or blow low. Now, the Admiral at Portsmouth did not bear his stripes so easily as I do mine. He thought that this was a reflection on his honour, and this is the letter he wrote to me. It is from Admiral Bruce, the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth:—

"Admiralty House, Portsmouth,

"March 8, 1861.

"My Dear Lord Clarence,—The Times of today says that I ought to be questioned respecting a parting communication (said to have been) held with Sir Baldwin Walker. The fact is, that I did detain the ship about an hour to put on board her some ordnance stores, without which her Armstrong gun would have been useless, and which Captain Caffin came to me about. The Narcissus being steaming away at the time, and the stores having been sent out in a sailing hoy from the gunwharf, they would not otherwise have reached the ship. I went out myself to see that there was no unnecessary delay, but I did not want to see the Admiral, nor did I see him, as he had gone to Osborne to wait upon the Queen. So—like Canning's needy knife-grinder—'Story! Lord bless you, I have none to tell, Sir.' " I trust this will answer the question of the noble Lord as to "whether any instructions were sent through Admiral Bruce, or through any other person, to Sir Baldwin Walker, desiring him to go to sea immediately, and not to allow himself to be caught." With regard to this matter, it appears to have been stated by a noble Lord in "another place," that at table, in a post-prandial communication—after, as we sailors should say, they had "piped to grog" T—some one declared that he positively knew of his own knowledge that Admiral Bruce or some other person had been sent out to hasten Sir Baldwin Walker's departure. Sir, I feel almost ashamed to repeat, upon my honour, that neither the noble Duke nor myself, nor any one connected with the Admiralty, either publicly or privately communicated with Sir Baldwin Walker any desire that he should proceed to sea. The noble Duke has already stated, and I have also told you before, that Sir Baldwin Walker's orders were sent out to him on the morning of the 27th, the previous Wednesday. Sir Baldwin Walker's orders were made out on Tuesday, the 26th of February, and were delivered to him at the Admiralty on the morning of the 27th. He left London on Thursday, the 28th, and sailed from Portsmouth on Saturday, March 2nd, putting back to Yarmouth Roads on account of bad weather. I now pass to the other portion of the question put to me. The noble Lord asks, "whether, in fulfilment of the promise made by the First Lord of the Treasury that Sir Baldwin Walker should be detained to enable him to appear before Admiral Duncombe's Committee? I immediately wrote two telegraphic messages—the one to the Admiral at Portsmouth, the other to the Admiral at Plymouth, desiring them to take all possible means to overtake or intercept Sir Baldwin Walker." I should have had great pain answering that question, if it had been asked on any previous occasion; but I am relieved from such feeling by the handsome manner in which my noble Friend the Duke of Somerset, and, indeed, the whole Board of Admiralty have acted towards me. I will now read a letter which I have received from the Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty, who has the whole management of the movements of Her Majesty's ships, and in which he explains the circumstances relating to these telegrams—

"Admiralty, March 22, 1861.

"Dear Lord Clarence,—I observe in the Notices of Motions in the House of Commons for today that there is notice, by Lord Elcho, Of questions to be put to yourself in reference to the two telegraphic messages sent ready written by you with a view to the recall of Sir Baldwin Walker. It is, I think, important to the Board, and it is of consequence to me, that the answers to be given should be clear and distinct, and I write this letter in order that there may be no misapprehension, and with the express wish that it may be read to the House. The two telegrams written and signed by yourself are still in my possession. They were left at my house on the night in question by Admiral Pelham, accompanied by a note from himself, stating the substance of what had passed in the House of Commons, which he had heard in the strangers' gallery; and he mentioned to me that he had left them in order that I might do as I thought right in the matter.

"I wish it to be understood that I had no hesitation in deciding that it would have been highly improper in me to have acted at all upon such information. The Commissioners for Executing the Office of Admiralty are the servants of the Crown, and I believe I am correct in thinking that the proceedings of the House of Commons cannot be officially known to them at all; and, if known, cannot be regarded in the light of orders for the distribution of the fleet, or the movements of particular ships. Such orders, when sent to the Admiralty, can come only by command of Her Majesty, and should be communicated by letter from the Secretary of State, or by similar established authority. No such authority was received by me, and, under all the circumstances of the moment, I considered that a most unsafe precedent might be established in practice if I had consented hastily to act in the manner contemplated by you.

"It will be apparent to everybody that you could give no orders upon your own authority.

"Very truly yours,

"R. S. DUNDAS."

"Rear Admiral the Lord Clarence Paget."

All I can do is to state again that nothing would have induced me to go through these details had it not been the earnest wish of the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty and of Sir Richard Dundas that I should do so. I cannot conclude without stating my belief that there is not a better officer in the navy than Sir Richard Dundas, and that he acted on this occasion according to what he considered his duty towards the Admiralty.

I must say I do not consider the explanation of the noble Lord at all satisfactory, and I desire to put another question, hut I wish to found that question on the only two points in this subject which I have ever regarded as being of a serious nature. I regard them as being serious, because they bear directly on the relations which do, and ought to, exist between the Ministers of the Crown and the House of Commons. Sir, I have never for a moment attached the slightest importance or credit to the rumour which has been floating about the town, and which my noble Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty has completely disposed of to-night, that Admiral Bruce on the morning that the Narcissus sailed, had taken out any instructions to Sir Baldwin Walker to hurry out to sea, and to keep well to the south of the Channel. But I must say that there are two points connected with the departure of Sir Baldwin Walker to which the House of Commons ought to give serious attention, for the reason I have stated. First, I entertain a strong opinion that after the Admiralty had consented to the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, it was an act of great impropriety on the part of the Admiralty to allow, quite unnecessarily, the departure of one of the chief witnesses likely to be called upon to give evidence. I cannot for one moment admit the excuse of the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, that he had applied to a Member of this House, who was about to move for that Committee (Admiral Duncombe), and had heard from that lion, and gallant Member that he thought Sir Baldwin Walker's evidence unnecessary. I say that there was no Member of this House who could without presumption pretend to say whether that Committee would require Sir Baldwin Walker's evidence or not. On the contrary, Sir Baldwin Walker had for fourteen years held one of the most important posts in the Admiralty 4 and it was a self-evident fact—at least it was a matter of strong probability—-that that Committee would require his evidence. Whether he proceeded to the Cape a week sooner or a week later no one could pretend to think a matter of the slightest importance, and I now repeat my opinion in the face of this House that it was a great impropriety on the part of the Admiralty, and an act of disrespect to this House to allow Sir Baldwin Walker to leave England, even if no opinion had been expressed in this House on the subject. The other point to which I wish to allude, and which has been touched upon by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire, is this:—It is indispensably necessary to the conduct of our proceedings in Parliament that everything like engagements or promises made to the House of Commons by the Ministers of the Crown should be faithfully and honourably carried out. I am sorry to say that in this case a promise was made by a Minister of the Crown, and that that promise was broken. ["Hear hear," and "No, no."] I beg the attention of the House while I touch upon this point, the gravity of which I entirely feel. I say, deliberately, a promise was here made by the Prime Minister, and that promise was broken, because due means have not been taken for its fulfilment. Sir, I greatly regret to hear what has been the conduct of a gentleman and an officer for whom I entertained the most sincere regard and esteem. I mean Sir Richard Dundas. I think Sir Richard Dundas, taking the statement we have heard read by the noble Lord as accurate, has committed a very serious error, in that Sir Richard Dundas knew perfectly well that, in order to fulfil the promise that was given, every moment was precious. Sir Richard Dundas has written that he was afraid he would be establishing a bad and dangerous precedent if he, as First Naval Lord of the Admiralty, consented to receive orders from the House of Commons. Why, Sir, surely a gentleman of his experience must have known that he could not take anything as an order from the House of Commons unless it came in the name of the Speaker of the House of Commons. But, Sir, the order conveyed to him was through a brother naval officer who had heard what passed, and who knew that a promise was given by a Minister of the Crown, that Minister being the Prime Minister. What was that promise? It was that "immediate steps" should be taken to detain Sir Baldwin Walker. I must do the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty the justice to say that the statement he has made to-night completely exonerates him, and proves that he did take immediate steps. I was under an erroneous impression, and was afraid he had disregarded the promise he made that "that very night" steps should be taken. The fault, therefore, consists in what I must hold to be the serious error of Sir Richard Dundas. If Sir Richard Dundas understood his duty his business clearly was not to neglect the matter for the whole of that night, but he should have taken immediate steps to ascertain upon what authority the communication which he received rested. But here the explanation of the noble Lord ends, and I beg the attention of the House to this important fact—that the noble Lord, in answering the inquiry of the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), has confined himself to what took place on that night. Let me, however, call the attention of the House to what took place upon the following day. What was Sir Richard Duudas's reason for not sending the telegram to the Port Admirals until eight minutes before twelve on the following day? The noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty has stated that that was the hour at which the first telegrams were sent to the Port Admirals. I have already said, and everybody must feel, that every moment was precious. Sir Baldwin Walker had sailed on the Monday morning, and the conversation took place in the House of Commons on Monday night, and if it was possible to fulfil the promise of the Prime Minister it was only by prompt and immediate action. Prompt and immediate action was not taken, and I blame Sir Richard Dundas for not taking the course he should have taken on the Monday night. But at eight minutes before twelve on Tuesday morning a telegram was sent to Portsmouth ordering to be sent out that which was notoriously the slowest ship in the port. My gallant friend Sir Houston Stewart, the Port Admiral, naturally thought that as a communication of that kind was sent from the Admiralty they were in earnest in wishing to stop Sir Baldwin Walker. He immediately telegraphed, and said, "Steam up in the fastest ship here—the Himalaya. "("No, no!") If I am wrong in fact. I am open to correction.

The Himalaya was outside the harbour, but her cylinders were in such a bad state that she was unfit to go to sea. She was merely on trial with diseased cylinders.

Was that the telegram? I thought the noble Lord was stating the opinion of the Admiralty rather than the contents of the Port Admiral's telegram. What was Sir Houston Stewart's telegraph? ("Order, order!") I am speaking from memory; but I believe that Sir Houston Stewart's telegram did not speak of the diseased cylinders of the Himalaya, and the noble Lord does not venture to tell me that it did. It was a case in which every moment was precious, and my recollection is that Sir Houston Stewart's telegram was that the "Himalaya is under steam—should she not go too?" The Admiralty was bound to accept the information sent by Sir Houston Stewart that the Himalaya was fit for sea, and that information they got the next morning, and the matter about her diseased cylinders was no answer to the information then. More than that there were the Jason and other fast ships in Portsmouth Harbour beside the Himalaya. If the Admiralty had wished to fulfil their promise they should have sent the telegram over night; at all events, they should have sent it early next morning, and ordered the fastest ship to go, instead of the slowest one. Sir Houston Stewart telegraphed, "Why should not the Himalaya go to sea?" and what did the Admiralty say, "Yes" or "No?" They did not do this; but they telegraphed back, "How is the weather?" and this when every moment was precious. I am sorry to have to relate such things, but are the facts before us, and these are the facts upon which the country is to form its opinion whether or not the Government did that which they were bound to do—take all reasonable steps to fulfil the promise which had been given to this House. I am sorry to say no such steps were taken, and that the Government must labour under the discredit of not endeavouring to fulfil the promise given to the House of Commons. Having recorded my strong opinion on this act of great impropriety in sending away a necessary witness, and having said also that any promise given to this House should be fully and faithfully redeemed, I desire to ask whether there is any truth in the report which I see in most of the London newspapers to the effect that the Admiralty have sent out directions to Sir Baldwin Walker to return from Ascension to this country

said, he should not have risen to make any observations if he had not been directly alluded to. In his observations on this subject he had accused the Admiralty, but not the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty, of not detaining Sir Baldwin Walker, because he (Sir James Elphinstone) knew that the noble Lord's power at the Board was not sufficient to make him responsible for anything of the sort. It was necessary to look back a little to understand the circumstances of the case. This Committee on the Admiralty should have been appointed on the first day of the Session, or immediately afterwards; but it was not, in fact, appointed until his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich put his notice on the paper, when he was informed that he was taking the wind out of another hon. Gentleman's sails. They had all forgotten that the hon. and gallant Member for the East Riding (Admiral Duncombe) had mentioned his intention of bringing this matter before the House when the right hon. Baronet gave his notice. There was a belief, in which he (Sir James Elphinstone) shared, that it was the intention of the Admiralty not to appoint this Committee until Sir Baldwin Walker was well out of the country. It was clear to him that if this Committee was intended to inquire bond fide it was impossible to go on without Sir Baldwin Walker; from what he had seen of his evidence before the Commission upon dockyards it was perfectly clear that his high character and his position made him the witness upon whose evidence the Report would most probably turn; and he (Sir James Elphinstone) could not see how it was possible that they could substitute the evidence before the Commission for the viva voce evidence of Sir Baldwin Walker before the Committee. He supposed that as the Committee had power to send for persons and papers, they would sooner or later send for Sir Baldwin Walker. There was no doubt that the cylinders of the Himalaya turned out to be in such a state that she was not fit for any long voyage; but Sir Houston Stewart would never have telegraphed "Why not send the Himalaya?" if he had not thought that her cylinders were perfectly fit for a short journey such as, he thought, would have been sufficient to catch the Narcissus. As to the ship Britannia, he believed that that ship was overcrowded; and that she was liable to be unhealthy in the summer, for there was no doubt that the sewers of Gosport were emptied out upon that mud-flat, and the ship was so close to the shore that at low water you might throw a biscuit on shore. There should, in his opinion, be a college, instead of a ship, for the purpose.

Sir, I was in hopes that this stock piece, "Sir Bald- win Walker," which has had an uninterrupted run for so many nights would at length have been withdrawn from the boards; but the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich has been so successful in performing his part that he seems determined to make an Easter-piece of the entertainment. I am really sorry that the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty has condescended to go into the details which he has given to the House this evening; because I think that for every one who knows him his simple denial would have been sufficient. No one could ever have believed that a thing had been done when he told the House that it had not. I cannot understand how any one but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich—who is so singularly fussy when anything relating to the Admiralty is before the House—could attack the noble Lord; but not satisfied with that the right hon. Gentleman has to-night gone out of bis way to attack another gallant officer, Sir Richard Dundas, who he ought, from his official experience, to know is incapable of saying anything that is not strictly accurate. I regard this as a sort of monomania with which the right hon. Gentleman is afflicted. The ailment seems to affect his memory, for whenever Sir Baldwin Walker is mentioned he gets up and over and over again makes the same speech, in the course of which we are sure to have the Avon and the Jason and the cylinders of the Himalaya. We are now going to adjourn for the Easter holydays, and he makes this, I suppose, as his last speech. I shall now offer a recommendation. The right hon. Gentleman is very anxious to get hold of Sir Baldwin Walker, and thinks that his evidence will be of great value, as no doubt it will. I see from the Report of the evidence before the Dockyard Commission that he has been asked a thousand questions, and has given a thousand answers. And, by-the-way, as that Commission has reported that the Admiralty ought to be reconstructed, why this Committee should sic I am at a loss to understand. Well, the right hon. Gentleman wants to get hold of Sir Baldwin Walker, and I think it would be a relief to the House if we sent out a Commission to the Cape to examine him, composed of the right hon. Baronet himself, his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Christ church (Admiral Walcott), and the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth. I see no other way of getting the Sir Baldwin Walker case out of this House. The right hon. Baronet will have a pleasant trip; he will, no doubt, acquire a great deal of useful information; and the House will be rid of Sir Baldwin Walker.

said, he rose to call the attention of the House to the recent occurrences at Warsaw, and to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Government have received any other intelligence of those events than that furnished by the public newspapers? He was not about to make any charge against the Russian Government; on the contrary, he was happy to find that it was admitted on all sides that the recent occurrences at Warsaw were not premeditated, but were entirely fortuitous, and that the conduct of the higher Russian authorities afforded better hopes for the future. It appeared that a sentiment of nationality of more than usual intensity having sprung up in the breasts of the inhabitants of Warsaw, on the 29 th of last November a spontaneous demonstration in celebration of the anniversary of the Polish revolution took place, which the Russian Government, acting with more moderation and prudence than in previous years, allowed to pass. On the 24th of February following it was announced that a very large meeting would be held on the next day to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Grochow, which had been gained by the Poles over the Russians. The Russian authorities interposed no objection. Accordingly, the meeting was held on the 25th, when, unfortunately, in consequence of the interposition of the Cossacks, at least one death was caused directly, and certain other persons were trampled down. That created great exasperation, and a funeral procession was appointed for the 27th. The Russian authorities offered no impediment to the procession; but unhappily the Russian troops were simultaneously conducting a funeral of their own, and they got mixed up with the large popular assemblage, and confusion ensued. Either General Zabocky, the Russian General in command, or Colonel Trepow, the head of the police, gave orders to the troops to fire, and the result was that one of the members of the Agricultural Committee, who was just then leaving the place of assembly, was shot. At first there was a great show of resistance on the part of the populace, but Count Zamoysky, the head of the Agricultural Committee, interposed, and through his interference it was arranged that the troops should withdraw. The Russian Government, informed of what had occurred, by telegraph acceded to the representations of Prince Gortschakotf that no coercive measures should be adopted, and that a conciliatory policy should be enforced. He mentioned these things to show that he did not accuse the Russian Government with having acted with undue severity, but rather attributed these occurrences to the feeling of nationality which was rife throughout Poland. At the same time it was equally true that the Russian Government had of late acted upon very different principles in the government of Poland from what they had done in years gone by. Happily, too, there had been no attempt at insurrection on the part of the people, and therefore there was no pretext for the employment of force against them. Now, he was aware, it was a very delicate matter for the English Government to interfere between Russia and her own subjects; nor did he even wish that Her Majesty's Ministers should make any strong representations on the subject to Russia. He would freely admit that, in his opinion, the popular doctrine as to nationalities had its limits; but much was to be said in favour of the nationality of Poland. The nationality of Poland had received European recognition, for it was expressly conceded by the Treaty of Vienna. And, indeed, the Russian Government had of late evinced a disposition to return to the ancient state of things—that was, to the state of things previous to the year 1830. Let it be borne in mind, too, that the Emperor of Russia governed Poland, not as Emperor of Russia, but as King of Poland. He was far from saying that the Government ought to interfere actively in the matter, but at the same time it would be well if the Government brought all those facts to the notice of the Russian Government, provided a favourable opportunity offered. It was impossible but that a feeling of sympathy for a people who had adhered with such pertinacity to their ancient constitution, and who, at the same time, had exhibited so much wisdom, should not be inspired throughout the rest of Europe. Nothing would be more impolitic than for this country to evince any bitterness in the matter; nothing less likely to conduce to the benefit of the Poles themselves; but he did hope the Government would seize every opportunity of urging the claims of that noble people upon the Government of Russia.

said, he wished to ask the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a question respecting the present state of affairs in Mexico. The House was aware that General Miramon had committed all kinds of excesses, raised forced loans on Her Majesty's subjects, hutchered his fellow countrymen in cold blood, and completed the catalogue of his crimes by breaking into and violating the sanctity of the British Legation in Mexico, and stealing from thence the sum of 600,000 dollars, the property of British bondholders. For this gross breach of international law his punishment had been demanded by the British Government; but his escape had been permitted by the French Minister; he had been allowed to assume and to desecrate the French uniform, and in that disguise he reached the French ship of war Le Mercure, commanded by Captain Le Roy. Captain Aldham, the commander of Her Majesty's brig Valorous, on hearing of this, addressed a letter to Captain Le Roy, informing him

"That General Miramon had been guilty of a gross violation of international law in having authorized and caused the house of the British Legation to be broken into, and a large sum of money to be seized belonging to British subjects; and trusting that, if any who may be implicated in so grave an offence should be on board, or under the protection of the French flag, Captain Le Roy would see the imperative necessity of their being handed over to the authorities at Vera Cruz for the purpose of their being brought to trial."

After receipt of this letter, General Miramon was transferred to a Spanish ship, and the French captain sent a short and not very courteous answer, justifying his conduct on the ground of giving protection to a political refugee. To this Captain Aldham sent a reply, in which he stated—

"The undersigned would remark that no allusion whatever was made in his letter to the political acts of General Miramon; but, as a British officer, he would have been highly wanting in his duty had he not notified to Captain Le Roy what he probably was not aware of, the flagrant viola tion and spoliation of the British Legation by General Miramon, an outrage that was most indignantly protested against by the Spanish Ambassador. Such outrages against legation rights and international law the undersigned submits all nations are equally interested in repressing. Captain Le Roy is well aware that British ships have ever been an asylum for purely political refugees, and a British officer would be unworthy of his position should he suggest anything at variance with the principle so well recognized; the present case is of a widely different nature, and it was in this light that the undersigned submitted it to the notice of Captain Le Roy."

To this Captain Le Roy returned a more courteous answer, but still eluded the question whether General Miramon had been received on board the French vessel or not. He quite agreed with Captain Aldham that General Miramon could by no means he regarded as a mere political refugee; he might be designated a robber and a burglar who had broken into a house and stolen money and was out of the pale of international law. If the privileges conferred by the assumption of the French uniform, the protection of the French Minister, and the sanctity of a French ship of war were thus abased and prostituted, international law would become a farce. Believing that the French captain had exceeded his orders, he begged to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he has received any information respecting the proceedings of the French Minister in Mexico, and Captain Le Roy, commanding the French brig of war Le Mercure, in assisting the escape of General Miramon from Mexico; and if so, whether he has applied to the French Government for any explanation of such proceeding?

asked the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, What system of Government was to be established in the Lebanon upon the withdrawal thence of the French troops? It seemed to him that the interests of humanity were deeply involved in this question. The noble Lord in stating in June or July last the reasons which led to the armed intervention of the great Powers in Syria, observed that "the object of the intervention was to secure such measures being adopted as would prevent a repetition of those outrages to which the Christian population had been exposed." On Monday last the noble Lord informed the House that arrangements had been come to by the Five Powers, according to which the armed occupation of Syria was to cease on the 5th June next. He (Mr. Monsell) thought it a mistake that any one Power should have been allowed alone to hoist her flag in that country; the intervention ought to have been jointly prosecuted, and in that event the indisposition which naturally existed to allow any one foreign nation to get a footing in Syria would not have clashed with the interests of the Syrian Christians as was now, unfortunately, the case. He wanted to know what would be their position on the 5th of June when the French troops were withdrawn? Were these poor people to be handed over to Turkish protection? For the last twenty years—since the period when a change was unfortunately made by the influence of this country in the system under which the Lebanon had been governed—the Christians in Syria had been entrusted to Turkish protection, which had proved to be nothing but Turkish oppression of the worst kind. Hon. Members who had looked into the blue books which from time to time had been laid upon the table, must be aware that in 1841 Lord Aberdeen complained that the Turks were the cause of the sufferings of the Maronites by arming one portion of the population against the other. Colonel Rose made a similar statement in 1845. The late Admiral Sir Charles Napier declared that, notwithstanding all the glory he had won at Acre, one of his bitterest thoughts was that he had any part in establishing the Turkish domination in that country. Could Turkish protection, he ventured to ask the House, be more trusted now than at any of these periods? The Turks made the fairest promises, but they always broke them in the most shameless manner. Besides, Mahomedan fanaticism was now deeper and more extended than ever. It had shown itself at Jeddo, at Mosul, at Aleppo; and only the other day the preliminaries of a massacre were discovered at Damascus. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary had endeavoured, rather unfairly, to prejudice the House and the country against the Christian population of the Lebanon. The fact was that the Maronites were as industrious and as well-conducted a people as any to be found in Europe. The noble Lord had stated that great atrocities had been perpetrated upon the Druses by the Maronites. It was a fact, however, that during the time of the French occupation not more than 200 Druses were put to death by the Maronites, while no fewer than 400 Maronites were assassinated by the Druses. In one small village, during the residence there of a gentleman of the name of Scheffer for one week in the last winter, nine Maronites were murdered. He called upon the noble Lord to recollect that we occupied a very peculiar position with respect to the Syrian question. If through our influence all protection was taken away from the Christians of the Lebanon, and if afterwards a massacre such as took place last year occurred, it would be impossible to prevent the other Powers of Europe from taking far stronger measures than they had yet done. The people of the Lebanon were once a happy and contented race; but the Government under which they lived was destroyed by our influence, and that fact imposed upon us a heavy weight of responsibility. He entreated the noble Lord to take care that before European protection was removed such a form of government should be established as should enable the Druses and Maronites, who, if they were left alone by the Turks, would live together as peaceably as they had done in former times, to protect themselves against Turkish intrigues. No long time could be necessary for arriving at such a state of things, and his own impression was that if a fitting person were placed at the head of affairs in the Lebanon he would find little difficulty, without European aid, in reuniting the Druses and the Maronites, and in reinstating them in that position of happiness from which they had so long been displaced. He would conclude by asking the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what system of Government is to be established in the Lebanon upon the withdrawal from thence of the French troops?

begged to say, before putting the question of which he had given notice respecting the case of the fugitive slave Anderson, that he did not ask the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to produce any papers that could cause inconvenience or detriment to the public service. He saw by an American newspaper that all the papers had been laid, or were going to be laid, before the American Senate; and if any portion of the Correspondence should see the light, it was better they should not have it in bits and scraps as received second-hand from America, but that it should be laid before the House in a complete and direct shape. He might mention a circumstance not generally known—namely, that at the time the Extradition Treaty was discussed in the Senate of the United States in 1842, it was clearly recognized in the debate that took place at that time that a case perfectly parallel to the present case of the slave Anderson might, and probably would, arise in which a person endeavouring to escape from servitude might in self-defence take away life. The person who brought the case prominently before the Senate of the United States, and showed that the case would in all probability arise, was the Senator from that very State from which this slave had escaped—namely, Mr. Benton, the Senator for Missouri, lie made use of these words in that portion of his speech referring to the extradition clause of the Ashburton Treaty—

"This Treaty intervenes the judiciary, and requires two decisions from a judge or magistrate before the governor can act. This nullities the Treaty in all that relates to fugitive slaves guilty of crimes against their master. In the eye of the British law they have no master, and can commit no offence against such a person in asserting their liberty against him, even unto death. A slave may kill his master if necessary to his escape. This is legal under British law. Killing his master in defence of his liberty is no offence in the eye of British law or British people, and no slave will ever be given up for it.

"Better far leave things as they are. Forgers are now given up in Canada, by executive authority, when they fly to that province. This is done in the spirit of good neighbourhood, and because all honest Governments have an interest in suppressing crimes and expelling criminals. The Governor acts from a sense of propriety, and the dictates of decency and justice. Not so with the Judge: he must go by the law. and when there is no law against the offence he has nothing to justify him in delivering the offender."

It was very clear, therefore, that we were not endeavouring to strain the provisions of the treaty. In conclusion, he begged to ask the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether it is his intention to lay before the House the Correspondence that has passed between the English and American Governments on the subject of the fugitive slave Anderson

I must say that it is not very convenient to the public interest that the state of our foreign relations should be made the subject of weekly discussion in this House. At the same time I wish to give every explanation I can in answer to the numerous questions which have been addressed to me. The hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. Duncombe) has asked for information with reference to a transaction which has naturally attracted considerable attention—namely, the sending of Her Majesty's ship Banshee to bring certain arms from the Principalities to Constantinople. The facts are somewhat complicated, and would lead me far if I were to enter upon a full explanation; but the main points may be briefly stated. It became known to the Government a year ago that there was a party on the borders of Austria and on the borders of Turkey who had conceived the plan of throwing off the authority both of the Austrian Government and the Turkish Government, and of making a considerable State out of Hungary, the Principalities, Bosnia, and other Provinces in that part of Europe. It was for some time supposed that this was a very wild scheme and one not likely to gain support; but in the course of the year it was rumoured that arms were about to be conveyed to Constantinople, and thence to the Black Sea. The Government of the Sultan naturally felt alarmed at this proceeding. They considered that Prince Couza being one of the tributaries of the Porte, and the Principalities being in fact Turkish territory, it could not be permitted that great depots of arms should be formed in them, and that refugees from various parts of Europe should assemble there with the view of making war upon the two Governments of Turkey and Austria. Some correspondence took place upon the subject; the vessels in which the arms—cannon and muskets—had been taken to the Principalities were Sardinian vessels; and in the end the Turkish Government applied to the representatives of the different Powers. Our opinion was that these arms should be taken back to Constantinople and sequestrated there. The opinion of the French representative was that the arms should be taken back to Genoa whence they had come. In the end Prince Couza agreed that this latter course should be adopted. At that time the Danube was frozen over, and it was, therefore, impossible to remove the arms. Lately there has been some difficulty as to the removal, owing to the Sardinian vessels having gone away with other freights. The British Ambassador at Constantinople said that, if permitted to do so, he was quite ready to send Her Majesty's ship Banshee to bring the arms away; and upon his applying to me I said that Her Majesty's Government would, if the representatives were agreed that these arms should be brought away, have no objection to the employment of that vessel. Accordingly the Banshee was sent, and a great part of the arms were brought away. It seems to me that this was a measure of salf-defence on the part of the Sultan's Government, and that, in acting as we did, England had only acted as one friendly Power towards another friendly Power. A question was asked by the noble Lord opposite (Lord William Graham) with respect to the proceedings of the French Minister in Mexico and Captain Le Roy. Neither in the Foreign Office nor in the Admiralty are there any despatches upon that subject. I have seen a private letter stating that General Miramon had escaped on board a French man-of-war; but I have no official intelligence of such an occurrence. General Miramon was for some time, it must be recollected, the head of a Government which was recognised by Great Britain, by France, by Spain, and by other Powers. His acts were at no time very commendable; and in some cases generals, who were acting under his orders, committed what we thought were horrible atrocities; and towards the close of his reign, when it seemed hopeless that he should be able to maintain himself in Mexico, he broke open a room in the British Legation where certain merchants had deposited a very large sum of money. That was a clear act of robbery; and our Chargé d'Affaires naturally and properly asked that those who had been concerned in that act of robbery, in the name of the Government, should be made personally responsible for their misdeeds. One person was, I believe taken, but General Miramon escaped through the villages of the country, and it is said embarked on board a French ship of war. Whether there is any truth in that report I cannot say, and until I know all the circumstances of the case I should not undertake to make any representation to the French Government on the subject. A very important question has been raised by my noble Friend the Member for Hastings (Lord H. Vane) with regard to the condition of Poland. I wish to speak upon that subject with very great reserve. There is at present no question which immediately concerns the interests of this country, and the conduct of the Government of Russia is not sufficiently known to us to justify us in pronouncing an opinion; but this much I must say, that according to the reports of our Consul, there having been an unfortunate conflict in the streets of Warsaw, and several persons having been killed, the conduct of the people immediately after that occurrence, and while they were moved by great indignation and excitement, showed on their part great forbearance and a great desire to keep the peace of the town. A popular committee was organized, and one of the first acts of that committee was to desire that all persons should give up their arms; and, accordingly, a great many arms were given up both in Warsaw and by farmers and peasants in the neighbourhood who brought their weapons into that city. The people of Warsaw are at present, therefore, entirely disarmed, possessing, of course, the moral power which belongs to them, but with directions from their leaders that no breach of the peace should be permitted. I think that that conduct on their part has entitled them to be heard upon any petition which they may present to their Sovereign the Emperor of Russia, as King of Poland, with reference to any grievances from which they may have suffered. As to the petition which is said to have been presented to the Emperor and the concessions which have been made we are perfectly uninformed; but there are two things which we may take as certain—one, that instead of any measures of severity having been adopted towards the people of Warsaw all the measures which have been taken have been measures of mildness and conciliation; and, therefore, it is open to us to hope that whatever further measures may be adopted will be directed to the improvement of the condition of the people of Poland, and not to their punishment for the attitude which they have assumed. There is another observation which cannot fail to be made, which is, that the Emperor of Russia has since his accession to the throne shown the greatest desire to improve the condition of his subjects. He has relieved from servitude many millions of his people—a measure which has often been proposed but always rejected as dangerous, but one which is about to be carried out. These are reasons why we should hope well as to the future condition of the Polish subjects of the Czar of Russia, and should act according to our well-known and recognised rule of not interfering with regard to the internal affairs of other countries without some very great and influential reasons. I certainly do no not think it necessary to make any representation to the Emperor of Russia. No doubt every one in this country will watch with great interest the course of these proceedings; but I do not think that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the present state of affairs. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the County of Limerick (Mr. Monsell) asked me a question with reference to the future government of the Lebanon. That is a subject which is attended with many and serious difficulties. The opinion of the British Commissioner in Syria is that the best course to take would be to establish, if possible, a good Government over the whole of Syria with a special arrangement for the protection of the Christians. To that is was objected that such an arrangement would be injurious to the rights of the Sultan. Other plans have been suggested, and the last accounts from Syria represent the Commissioners as being still engaged in endeavouring to establish good government in Syria. I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman in thinking that the Christians of Syria are the only persons to whom our humanity ought to be extended. [Mr. MOXSELL: I never said so.] The right hon. Gentleman spoke entirely of the sufferings of the Christians, and did not take any notice of what bad been suffered by others. Now, while it is our duty as far as possible to provide a Government which shall secure the Christians against the repetition of these atrocities, I cannot but think that it is also our duty to secure, if possible, justice for the Druses, many of whom have, as described by the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir James Fergusson) confined their attention to the cultivation of their gardens or small possessions, and have conducted themselves in a most inoffensive manner. What we are endeavouring to do is to establish a Government which shall equally protect all the inhabitants of the Lebanon. The right hon. Gentleman says that it was not right to have an exclusively French occupation, hut seems to approve of having an European occupation as long as there is any fear of massacres being repeated. Now, I must say that all the accounts which I have read have shown that the Marouites and the Druses have violent animosities against each other; that the Turks have not behaved well with regard to either of them; and, therefore, that you can have no perfect security that there may not be outrages, that murder may not be com- mitted, that villages may not be destroyed by Maronites or Druses, without sufficient protection being given by the Turks. But this question occurs—The dangers which existed last year having been overcome, and the presence of European troops and the intervention of Europe having shown both to the Turks and to other persons that the nations of Europe are disposed to interfere when necessary, are we to go on for ever with an European occupation of Syria? If so that occupation would amount to taking the country out of the hands of the Turks. We may say—and say truly—that the Government of the Turks is a very imperfect Government. Still Syria is a country subject to the Sultan—one of the provinces of an empire the integrity of which we have guaranteed; and if we were to say that we would undertake, not by French troops—I do not mean to raise that question—but by French, Russian, or British troops, permanently to occupy that country, that would be, in fact, transferring its sovereignty to the other Powers of Europe. Well, the Sultan declared the other day that the Pasha whom he has sent, having the command of 25,000 troops, is able to maintain tranquillity in Syria; and Her Majesty's Government are disposed to put faith in that declaration. But the other Powers of Europe are determined that the occupation shall continue for some time longer—till the 5th of June; but before that time—I expect in the course of the present month—the future government of the Lebanon will be discussed. Having performed the duty of suppressing the massacres, we certainly do not think it desirable that there should be a permanent occupation of Syria by foreign troops. With respect to the last question put by the hon. Member for Galway County (Mr. Gregory) as to the correpondence that has passed between the English and American Governments on the subject of the fugitive slave Anderson, the hon. Gentleman seemed to think that there had been some remonstrance on the part of the Government, or some correspondence, after the case of Anderson had been considered both in Canada and this country. Now what the American Government did was of the very simplest character. They stated that a man of colour had been guilty of murder, without saying what his name was or anything else; and we said, on our part, that the man should be given up, if there was found to be no objection. I have no objection to give the Correspondence; but if produced there ought to be added to it the directions of the Secretary of State to the Governor of Canada, upon whom depended, in the first instance, the question whether the man should be given up. The hon. Gentleman had made a very valuable and important quotation of what was said by Mr. Benton, the senator of Missouri, to the effect that slaves were not to be given up on account of crimes they might commit in order to vindicate or secure their freedom. A statement to this effect was made in the English House of Commons as well as in the American Senate. This being the case, he could not see that any difficulty was likely to arise between the two Governments.

moved "That the Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Civil Service Appointments proves that the present system of Examination should be modified, in order to meet the requirements of the Public Service. The hon. Gentleman was proceeding to comment upon the Report of the Select Committee, when—