said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for India, Whether terms have been made with the Rajah of Sikkim, by which increased facilities for communication will be opened from India to Thibet?

said, that before the right hon. Gentleman answered the question, he wished to ask him whether he will introduce, before or after the Whitsuntide holidays, the Bill relating to India, which has been so long under his consideration?

said, in answer to the question of his hon. Friend behind him (Mr. W. Ewart). he had to state that he had no official information upon the subject, but he learned by private letter addressed to the Governor General by Mr. Eden, who had conducted the negotiations at Sikkim, that he had effected an arrangement for opening the communication between the territory of Bengal and Sikkim. No duty was to be imposed on goods passing through our territory into Sikkim, and a low rate of duty would be imposed on all goods passing from Thibet to Sikkim. It seemed that both the merchants of Thibet and the people of Sikhim were very well disposed to avail themselves of the advantage which this road would give them. With regard to the information asked for by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Vansittart), he (Sir Charles Wood) had hoped to have been able to introduce the measure alluded to before Whitsuntide; but the House was so occupied with the discussions on the financial proposals of the Government that he was afraid it would not be in his power to do so.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether the ratifications of a Commercial Treaty between England and Turkey had been exchanged, and, if so, when a copy of the Treaty would be laid upon the table of the House; and whether any correspondence had taken place between the Governments of England and France relating to the conclusion of a similar Commercial Treaty between France and Turkey; and, if so, whether there would be any objection to lay copies of that correspondence and of the correspondence between the English and Turkish Governments on the subject of either Treaty on the table of the House?

said, that the treaty in question had not yet been finally concluded, but when it had been ratified, as was expected to be the case soon, it would be laid upon the Table. With respect to the second part of the hon. Member's question, he had to say that the French Government had informed him some time ago, through their Ambassador, that they agreed in the general principles of the Treaty between England and Turkey, and Her Majesty's Government afterwards communicated to the Government of France some amendments which they proposed in it. There had, however, been no regular correspondence between the Governments of England and France relative to the conclusion of a similar treaty between the latter Power and Turkey.

said, he rose to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Whether he can explain the discrepancy which appears to exist between the increase in the quantity of paper manufactured, and in the amount of duty received in 1860, as compared with 1859?

Sir, the explanation is one which I could easily have given yesterday if I had had the paper in my hand at the time the question was put to me. It is very simple. In fact, both accounts are perfectly correct. The one statement refers to the paper manufactured, and on which duty was charged; the other to the amount of duty received. By the Excise system the year is divided into eight rounds, and the paper duty charged on each round is collected in the following round. Consequently it follows that when a Return is called for limited to the period between two given dates, the Return includes the duty charged upon seven rounds made in that year, and one round made in the year before; while as respects the weight it represents the actual quantity manufactured within the year. The quantity in each round depends on a variety of circumstances that cannot always be traced; but in the present instance the last round of the last financial year derived a considerable increase from the fact that it was compared with a round in the year 1859–60, during which the repeal of the paper duty had been commenced, although the arrangements as to the drawback had not been made. Until those arrangements had been made there was a considerable stagnation in the trade; and that I apprehend is substantially the cause of the considerable difference between these two rounds.

said, he wished to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether the Board of Admiralty intend taking any steps with regard to Mr. George Gill's Patent for Improvements in Ships of War, either by suppressing the Patent, or in any other way; whether the Board intend testing his plans for accelerating the speed and diminishing the vibration of ships, which have lately been communicated to the Admiralty?

said, that Mr. Gill sent to the Admiralty some time ago a proposal for the improvement of steam ships of war, which was examined by professional officers and pronounced by them not calculated to benefit the public service. He afterwards had an interview with Mr. Gill, by that gentleman's request, at the Admiralty, and having received his explanations of his plans, in the presence of the Comptroller of the Navy and other officers of his department, it was not thought that their adoption would be expedient. It was not, therefore, the intention of the Admiralty to take any steps either for the suppression of Mr. Gill's Patent, or for having it tested.

said, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, When it is intended that the portion of Edinburgh Castle which was pulled down with a view to improvements shall be rebuilt?

said, that the plans for rebuilding part of Edinburgh Castle, though they had been under consideration for some years, had not yet been decided upon by the Secretary of State for War. The plans, if carried out, would involve a considerable expenditure, and no sum had been taken for them in this year's Estimates. He could not, therefore, give any positive answer as to the rebuilding of that portion of the Castle.

said, he wished to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the absence of the noble Lord the head of the Government, If he will state when it is proposed to adjourn for the Whitsun- tide holidays, and for how long? Some information on the subject would enable the Committees to make their arrangements.

said, that he would rather not answer that question in the absence of the noble Lord, because he was not perfectly aware what arrangements had been made.

said, that in rising, according to notice, to call the attention of the House to the affairs of Austria and Italy, his intention was to afford to the Government an opportunity of giving to Parliament some indication of the policy they were now pursuing, and were likely in future to pursue, rather than to excite any angry recriminations between the partizans of hostile States. The most impartial persons would, he thought, admit that it was neither possible to defend all the acts of the Italian Governments which had been overthrown, nor to defend all the acts of that country which had been the instruments of their subversion. He must say he had risen from the perusal of the despatches which had been laid on the Table with an opinion by no means unfavourable to the policy of our Foreign Secretary, who had, on the whole, more or less, fairly adhered to the principle of nonintervention which he had laid down as the rule of our relations with Italy. He could have wished, however, that the noble Lord had more strongly condemned the invasion of Naples by Sardinia—conduct as much a violation of that principle of non-intervention as an invasion of Piedmont by Austria could possibly be. From what he had himself seen in Italy last autumn, he thought the noble Lord had done wisely in advocating a system of duality as more likely to prove beneficial to that peninsula than a system of unity. He found the greatest jealousy prevaling between the North and the South of that country, great clashing of interests, conflicting opinions, the most marked distinction between the habits, customs, races, and, he might add, language of the people. He witnessed the entry of King Victor Emmanuel into Naples, and the enthusiasm displayed upon that occasion, and for a Neapolitan population it was not excessive, was much less for the monarch than for Garibaldi, who sat by his side. He further knew that the Piedmontese troops within a fortnight of their entry into Naples were everywhere complaining that they were received by the Neapolitans rather as conquerors and aliens than as liberators and allies. It was not surprising that in Italy there should exist considerable jealousy of the supremacy of Piedmont, and some aversion to Turin as the metropolis, when it was found that the very first despatch written by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in this country respecting the proclamation of the King of Italy, was written in the French instead of the Italian language. He did not think that hon. Members could approve the means by which Piedmont had brought about the unity of Italy. Hon. Members no doubt supposed that that union had been brought about by the ardent patriotism of the Italian people; whereas, had they been at Florence or Naples they would have known that that result had been brought about by corruption which would have done honour to a contest for Sudbury or St. Albans, and which quite justified the expression which had been used in the French Chamber, that Piedmont did far more to promote the cause of Italian unity by putting her hand into her pocket than by laying it upon her sword. But however that might be, he did not wish now to revive the discussion as to whether union or dualism would be best for Italy, because a practical Government must recognize accomplished facts, and, looking to what had been done, he thought that it was for the best interests of England, of Europe, and of Austria herself that the union and independence of Italy should be secured. It was true that Austria retained possession of Venetia; but, in his opinion, that province was a source of weakness rather than of strength to the Austrian Empire. In peace it was a festering sore eating into the finances of Austria, and in time of war its people were a hostile population menacing her flank. He might be reminded of the strength of the Quadrilateral; but any military man knew that a general who should for strategical, and not political purposes, invade Austria on the side of Italy, would be fit for a lunatic asylum. Austria was not menaced from Italy, because as regarded war the Germans were a superior race to the Italians. Her hereditary enemy was France, and where Austria was vulnerable was upon the Rhine and Danube, and if a French army were to menace Vienna the troops must be immediately withdrawn from the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and removed to the field upon which the decisive battle was to be fought. If the Austrians were defeated in the plains of the Danube, and Vienna fell into the hands of the enemy, these fortresses would fall, as military men term it, "by position," and any troops that might be in them would become prisoners of war without striking a blow. The only purpose which the possession of the Quadrilateral by Austria could serve was to act as a menace to Italy; but he believed that there was nothing so fatal to the interests of Austria as the maintenance of such an attitude towards that country. As long as the fortresses of the Quadrilateral frowned upon the independence of Italy so long would the King of Italy be reduced to the condition of a mere Prefect of France. If, on the other hand, that menace were withdrawn there was every reason why France and Italy should be on the worst terms, because they both had large seaboards on the Mediterranean, and consequently there would be great rivalry between them for supremacy in that sea. If Austria retired within her natural boundaries, the Alps, she would, in case of a war with France, have her flank protected by a neutral Power, instead of having it menaced by 20,000,000 Italians. He made these observations in no spirit of hostility to Austria, because he believed that a powerful and united Austria was necessary to the best interests of England. Austria had had recently but a scant measure of justice dealt out to her by the people and press of this country. She was for more than a quarter of a century our faithful ally in withstanding the aggressive designs of the First Napoleon, and it was in the wars which she then carried on, that she had incurred the greater portion of that debt by which she was now weighed down. Austria was, indeed, our natural ally. There were many persons who had feelings and prejudices against Austria; but when material interests were at stake, sentiment must yield to geography, and he believed that if war broke out again in Europe England and Austria would be found fighting side by side. It was often said that Austria was a despotic Power. But that was no longer the case. Austria now possessed a Constitution as free as that under which we lived, and had recently given to her provinces an autonomy and independence which would only be paralleled on the other side of the Atlantic in the Constitution which lately existed in the now dis-United States. Those provinces would now enjoy a far larger amount of autonomy and self-government than we gave to Scotland or Wales, and much more independence than we were willing to grant to Ireland. For federal and imperial purposes Austria now possessed a Constitution fashioned after the likeness of our own. She had a Lower Chamber elected by the Diets of the Empire, which were in their turn elected by a suffrage which not even the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright) would call illiberal, because every man who paid five florins, about 9s., in taxation, had a' right to rote. In addition she was to have an hereditary Upper Chamber and an hereditary Sovereign. The Hungarians objected to this, and wished to have separate Ministers for finance, war, and he believed foreign affairs. If Austria granted these demands she might as well dismember her empire. If we made such concessions we should not only repeal the union, we should re-establish the heptarchy. Austria ought to be encouraged and cheered on in the path of constitutional reform on which she had entered, rather than checked and arrested in her progress by having made upon her demands with which it was impossible that she should comply. It was with particular satisfaction that he at this moment pointed to the existence in Austria of an hereditary Upper Chamber founded upon a territorial class, because recent events had shown that an independent territorial class was the safest breakwater against both the tyranny of despotism and the disorders of democracy. It was not the power of every country to possess an hereditary Upper Chamber, because some countries had not within them the essential element, an independent territorial class. Italy possessed that advantage, but had not availed herself of it. In the States of the Church and in Lombardy there was a law of primogeniture, and consequently a territorial class; but M. Cavour had declared that he would introduce the Code of Piedmont and under it the forced division of property into every portion of Italy which was annexed to that kingdom. Already he had endeavoured to introduce it into Lombardy; but the attempt was so unpopular that he had been forced to desist from his efforts. Under the Constitution of 1812—commonly called Lord William Bentinck's Constitution—the forced division of property did not exist in Sicily; but when the Bourbons were restored they re-established that law, because they were unwilling that an independent territorial class should stand between a servile people and their leaden sway. If he had any fault to find with the despatches of the noble Lord, it was that he did not find in them a single word of protest against the decision of M. Cavour to introduce the forced division of property throughout Italy. He felt strongly upon this subject. He thought that it was the duty and the mission of England to proclaim the doctrine of primogeniture throughout Europe, in contradistinction to that of the forced division of the soil, because in every country in which there was a forced division of property we found sympathy with the institutions and greatness of France, while, where a law of primogeniture existed, there we found sympathy with England, with her institutions and with her greatness. In moving for these papers he could assure the noble Lord that he did not wish to cast the smallest reflection upon his foreign policy, because he believed that, upon the whole, that policy deserved the approbation of his countrymen, that the honour of England was safe in his hands, and that his displacement from office at the present moment would be a most untoward event.

said, it was not his intention to follow the hon. Gentleman throughout his statement. In reference to the case of Austria it was evident that her internal affairs were so rapidly approaching a crisis that the well-founded opinions of to-day might be scattered to the winds by the events of the morrow: he would, therefore, confine his remarks to the general question of the independence and unity of Italy, and the future pros- pects of the Italian peninsula. He believed that nine out of ten Members of that House, and of thinking persons in this country, were anxious to see a united and independent Italy. But he was not one of those who could view with satisfaction the dismemberment of the Austrian empire. He believed it was the interest of all continental nations, and especially of this country, that a powerful State should exist in the centre of Europe—a State, not merely powerful in the affections and good dispositions of its subjects, but also powerful in the administration of good government. Austria, it was said, was now going in that direction, and so far it ought to possess our warmest sympathies. But the retention of Venice did not strengthen Austria. The case of Venetia was not like that of Hungary. The Venetians were Italians, and they alone of all Italians were now under the domination of a foreign and oppressive Government. It could not be supposed that the Venetians would be content with this state of things. They felt as the men of Kent or Sussex might be supposed to feel if they alone of all Englishmen were subject to a government alien in race, in manners, and in language. Under those circumstances Austria could not hope to maintain a hold upon the affections of the inhabitants of Venetia, who would assuredly, on some day or another, emancipate themselves from her thraldom. He mentioned these things for the sake of Austria herself, which must feel her power more or less crippled so long as such a state of things was allowed to continue. She was at an immense expense, both as regarded money and men, in order to maintain her position in this discontented province, and it must be for her own interest, both as regarded Italy, and as it regarded her position in Europe, that she should withdraw from her Italian province. But even if Austria withdrew from Venetia there was another obstacle to complete Italian unity—the delicate subject of the occupation of Rome by the French troops. The affairs of Rome were complicated by considerations other than those which affected the nationality of Venetia. The position of the Pope as spiritual head of the Catholic Church had immensely complicated the affairs of Italy, in consequence of the occupation of that capital by the French army. Opinions, he believed, were rapidly gaining ground amongst the Roman Catholics that the Pope would be best able to discharge the duties of his spiritual office by being relieved of his temporal authority. To the French Emperor and the French people generally the Italians owed a deep debt of gratitude, and it was in his power to assist them to the possession of their ancient capital, and so complete the work he had begun. He did not think it was too much to say that without the intervention of the Emperor of the French the power of the Italian people to obtain their liberty would have been utterly hopeless; now, on the other hand, by refusing to accede to the reasonable demands of the people of Italy the Emperor was gradually destroying his own influence upon the affairs of the Continent generally. The withdrawal of the French troops from Rome appeared to him (Mr. St. Aubyn) to be the only step that could obviate the disasters of a long and bloody war, that could strengthen the Imperial policy and ensure the peace of the civilized world. He regretted that the Motion of the hon. Gentleman opposite was not one that was calculated to elicit a strong feeling on the part of the House of Commons. It was possible that a Resolution of the House of Commons might have some little influence upon that arm that was directing the movements of so many men around the capital of Rome. It was not the less important and necessary, when a question of vital importance was brought before the House, that they should give expression to their views. He regretted the hon. Gentleman had not taken the opinion of the House upon the Italian question. He trusted, however, that during the debate sufficient evidence would be given to prove the real opinions, not only of this House, but of the country generally, on this important subject of Italian affairs.

said, he should not have intruded himself if he had not heard some very strong opinions expressed by the two hon. Gentlemen who had preceded him; but he thought that neither Austria nor the Pope were likely to feel very grateful for the good advice tendered them by the hon. Gentleman opposite and his hon. Friend—the one of whom advised Austria to cede Venetia and the other the Pope to retire from Rome. His (Mr. Cochrane's) views, and he believed those of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who, a few nights ago, insisted on the importance of keeping Austria strong, were that she should continue to possess the important province of Venetia. He did not regret that this sub- ject had been brought forward. The Italian question had not been properly discussed hitherto, but it had been brought forward on occasions only to be made a question bearing upon the conduct of the Pope and the King of Naples. He said the question ought to be, What was the interest of England in the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government? He, for one, did not think that our foreign policy was such as to promote the interests of England on the Continent. Our position with regard to the Continent was an exceptional and an extraordinary one. We had at that moment literally not one ally in Europe. We had estranged ourselves from France by our ridiculous fears of invasion from that quarter. We had estranged Austria and all our old allies by our unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of other countries. And at the present moment Her Majesty's Government were arming the whole country from dread of the only Power which we professed to have as an ally. He was struck by the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Home Department yesterday, and he was desirous of seeing how the principle which that right hon. Gentleman then enunciated was to be carried out by Her Majesty's Government. Those observations arose on the question of the war in America. The right hon. Gentleman said it was in the contemplation of the Government to issue a Proclamation for the purpose of cautioning all Her Majesty's subjects from interfering in the hostilities that were going on between the Northern and Southern States of America, and that in that Proclamation the general principle of our laws would be laid down—that principle being that no British subject should enter the service of any foreign Power or engage in any hostilities carried on between foreign States. This was an admirable principle. But had this admirable principle been always applied? He thought he had heard of a foreign legion being recruited for service in the Neapolitan States. He thought he had heard that an office had been opened in Westminster in order to recruit a legion for Garibaldi. He asked whether, if the principle laid down in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was a sound and proper principle, why it was not consistently carried out? He asked whether it was straightforward and consistent to allow recruiting to go forward in this country to assist an ambitious Power in an aggression upon an old ally? Prussia, too, was a most faithful ally, which had rendered us the most important services in 1814. Without referring to the merits of the case of Captain Macdonald, he thought it was to be regretted that the noble Viscount at the head of the Government should have made such observations against the Government of Prussia as he had done the other night—observations which had excited the strongest feelings of disapprobation in Prussia towards the Government of this country. They had heard statements made about the peaceable state of Italy. The telegrams, however, which arrived every morning from that part of the Continent informed us that there existed now in Italy all the elements of disorganization. The noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had in his memorable despatch of October last laid down the principle that if a majority of the people chose they might change their form of Government. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Nothing of the kind.] The noble Lord might not have used those precise words, but he said that each nation was the best judge of the form of Government to which it was to be subject [Cheers]. He (Mr. Cochrane) regretted that cheer, because it struck at the root of all constitutional order. Why, then, was not that principle applied to the Ionian Islands, the inhabitants of which almost unanimously desired to get rid of British authority? The noble Lord stated the other night that there had been no disturbances in the Ionian Islands.

said, the hon. Gentleman was out of order in referring to a past debate on the Ionian Islands on a Motion for copies of despatches relating to the Austrian Constitution.

said, he was merely referring to the case of the Ionian Islands as an illustration of the argument of nationality. Although the noble Lord stated there had not been any disturbances in the Ionian Islands, the newspapers of that morning mentioned the fact of some serious disturbances having occurred in Zante. Referring to the despatch of the noble Lord, he thought that the policy therein laid down was calculated to prejudice English interests on the Continent instead of creating respect for our power and our institutions.

I wish to make some observations upon the speech of the hon. Member who has brought forward this subject. I do not think it would be advisable to produce the despatches to which he referred. They are despatches not entering accurately, or with much of remark, into the present constitution of the Austrian Empire. Of course there are among them official papers, but those papers have appeared in the Vienna Gazette; they have been copied into the newspapers of this country, and, on the whole, I do not think I should be justified in producing these papers to Parliament. Undoubtedly it is a matter of great interest to this House and the country, but at the same time it is a matter the primary decision respecting which must rest with the Government of the Emperor of Austria. The Emperor of Austria has changed the institutions of his country, and has given his people a constitution, founded upon free principles. He has very lately declared the entire religious freedom of his Protestant subjects—a question upon which I had ventured more than once to remark that the Protestants of the Empire were entitled to greater consideration than they then received. With regard to the general constitution which he has given to the empire, it is, as the hon. Gentleman very fairly says, founded upon the principles of the United States' Senate. There are separate local bodies of representatives in Bohemia and in various other provinces, and each of these bodies sends members to the governing body—the Reichsrath. How this system will answer it is beyond our power to say. At all events, we cannot but rejoice that the principles of representative government are recognized, and that the representatives of the people are called together, and that to them will be submitted questions affecting the taxes and expenditure. We cannot but see in those provisions the germs of free representative government. And I hope there is no man so prejudiced against Austria as not to desire to see the Emperor and his people proceed together in the path of free representative institutions. But this grant of a constitution to Austria raises other questions which are of a very difficult nature. It is to be observed, with regard to the recent constitutions which have been created on the continent, that, while they give great satisfaction to the nation at large, in those States which are composed of people of different races and nationalities you do not excite the people against the Government, but you give greater scope to those popular feelings of jealousy, and perhaps of dislike which prevail among those races. Thus, in regard to Poland, since Alexander I. established a constitution in that country, there has been a strong feeling on the part of the Russian subjects of His Majesty against further concessions and further liberty being granted to Poland; and in the same way we find that the Liberal press of Vienna is quite against making further concessions to Hungary, The dissensions, therefore, which have occurred are not owing to attempts on the part of the Sovereign to coerce or act tyrannically towards his subjects, as to the efforts of the several national parties against each other. The Emperor of Austria, I believe, has intended to act fairly towards Hungary; but the people of Hungary are, as I think, very naturally attached to the ancient principles of their constitution. I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that if the constitution of 1848, with a Foreign Minister, a War Minister, and a Finance Minister to Hungary, were effectually carried out, it would lead to the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire. What one must wish is that the principles of that ancient constitution may he observed, and that the Emperor as King of Hungary may be able to reconcile the desires of the people of Hungary for the continuance of their ancient national constitution with the unity of the Empire at large. It is a question of the utmost importance, requiring for its solution the wisdom of statesmen who thoroughly know those countries, and it would be very presumptuous, therefore, for any foreign Government to say in what way those great problems should be solved. All we can do is to show our sympathy both for the Sovereign of Austria, who is endeavouring to effect those great improvements, and for the people of Austria and the people of Hungary, and to express our heartfelt wish that they may be able to overcome these difficulties, and to give fresh stability to that ancient Empire of Austria and that ancient kingdom of Hungary by whose side we fought, not yesterday, or the day before, but throughout many of the troubles of old times. On the subject of Venetia I cannot venture to pronounce a positive and dogmatic opinion; but I must say that the inclination of my mind very much agrees with the opinion expressed by the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr. Peacocke). For a long period the empire of Austria had attached to it those provinces which now form the kingdom of Belgium, and the Austrian statesmen found that a great burden was imposed upon them by provinces so far removed from the seat of Government, in which there were fortresses which they were obliged to defend at very heavy cost whenever war took place between France and her neighbours. Any one looking at the diplomatic correspondence of that time will see that Austrian statesmen were always anxious to get rid of that burden; and at last, after the defeats which they sustained in Italy in 1796, they made what I have no doubt they thought a very beneficial arrangement, giving up the Low Countries altogether, and obtaining in their place the provinces on the Adriatic which had belonged to the Venetian Republic. I must say that I do not think that was a well-considered or well-principled arrangement. The Venetian Republic, which had never been an enemy of Austria, and which had been faithfully neutral in that war, was absolutely destroyed, and Austria obtained what was no less a burden to her than the Belgian provinces had been. The people of Venetia are not well affected towards Austria, and the attempts made by her to conciliate them seem always to have failed. The attempt now made to obtain representatives from Venetia to be sent to Vienna have failed also from that national feeling which prevails in Venetia, and which we are told would make it unsafe for anybody to go from Venice to Vienna. That is a most unsafe tenure for any governing Power to have of its provinces. I must say, at the same time, that the accusations against Austria on this subject are often very incorrect. This House and the English public have lately read a very able despatch from Count Cavour on the subject of the formation of the kingdom of Italy and the conduct of that kingdom towards Austria; and hon. Gentlemen will probably have observed in that despatch an assertion of Count Cavour that for a long time there has been a state of siege in Venice. But the Austrian Ambassador brought me a despatch the other day from Count Rechberg, in which he says that a short time after the Treaty of Villafranca the state of siege was raised, and has never since existed in the province at all. He denies, also, some other assertions; but, although those assertions may be inexact, and although many of the charges of tyranny against the Austrian Government are not true, it is quite true that there are continual attempts in Venice to show their dislike and disaffection towards Austria, and that those attempts are punished by the Austrian Government. There seems, unfortunately for Austria, such a disaffection in Venice towards the Austrian Government that, in my opinion, Venetia can never form part of the strength of the Austrian Empire; nor, as long as Venetia forms part of the Austrian Empire, can it be said that Austria and Italy, or even Germany and Italy, can ever be on those terms of amity which are so desirable for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. How that problem is to be solved I know not; but he would be no true friend of Austria who would tell her that the provinces of Venetia formed part of her strength, or that she ought to waste her military power or impose heavy burdens on her people for the sake of maintaining them. I speak of these things, not as matters of internal concern, but as matters which affect the general interests of Europe. I trust, with Count Cavour, the day may come when this question may be settled without war by a general agreement between Austria, Italy, and the Powers of Europe. We have yet to hear what the Austrian Chamber of Deputies—what their House of Commons—may think with respect to these questions; what they may think as to the heavy taxes which the Austrian people have to pay, how these taxes will be best distributed, and what amount of army they should maintain. All these are questions for the representatives of the Austrian people to settle with their Government, and it is for them to consider in what way the empire can best be served. I have already stated that I do not think that, although there is no secret about the matter, it would be desirable to produce the papers asked for, and which relate so entirely to the internal affairs of Austria. I will only repeat, whatever reproaches I may bring upon myself of being an old-fashioned politician holding obsolete notions, I have undoubtedly formed and do entertain the strongest desire for the prosperity and the reviving strength of the empire of Austria.

said, he would withdraw his Motion.

rose to call the attention of the House to certain papers recently presented to Parliament relative to the affairs of Syria, and to move an Address for a copy of the final recommendations of the International Commission for the future government of the Lebanon, and to ask Her Majesty's Government whether it was their intention to urge the adoption of the plan of Her Majesty's Commissioner for the government of Syria upon the Sublime Porte? Although questions connected with the finances of the country naturally occupied the public attention at that moment, a little consideration would show that the affairs of Syria were not unworthy of deliberation, for those remote occurrences often exercised more influence even on the financial affairs of the country than would at first sight be believed. The China war in its beginning was insignificant enough, but it since attained a formidable magnitude in its bearing on our financial affairs, and probably we had not yet heard of it for the last time in our Estimates; and when we considered that a question relative to Syria led to the Crimean war, in which we lavished so much blood and treasure, and remarked the language held by more than one great Power in Europe—bearing so remarkable and significant a resemblance to the events that led to that fearful struggle, he thought the House would not do amiss if they considered the question which now presented itself with regard to Syria in all its bearings, and pressed on the Government the pursuit and the perseverance in a policy which being at once avowed and unswerving should steer clear of those dangers which had ever beset a vacillating policy. He did not think it necessary to go deeply into the history of the civil war which broke out in Syria last year. At first the sympathy of the British was naturally with those who were Christians, at least in name. He ventured at the time to express a belief that the quarrel would be found to be one, not of religious differences, but of hostile race; and he only referred to this now because it was a great satisfaction to him to find that the noble Lord who had so well represented this country in the internecine commotions of Syria had now come to be entirely of the same opinion. He would refer briefly to the account which Lord Duffer in, with his mature experience, gave of the outbreak amongst the tribes of the Lebanon and the outrages that were committed north of Damascus. In reading the blue book one could not fail to be struck with the firmness which Her Majesty's Government had shown in dealing with so difficult a ques- tion. From the first the Government saw the difficulties that were likely to arise from the occupation of Syria, and he did not doubt that they regretted the hasty consent they had given to the mission of the French troops to that country. He thought they had great reason to contratulate themselves on the universal meed of approbation which had been accorded to their representatives in Syria. Nor had there been wanting a manifestation of a spirit of benevolence by British officers, who, travelling in Syria for their own pleasure, had yet been instrumental in warding off many of the evils of civil war and of attaching the population to England, inasmuch as their conduct had well exhibited the unselfish policy of this country with regard to other nations. It would have been matter of further congratulation had we succeeded in doing more in procuring the administration of unswerving justice in Syria. It was to him matter of astonishment, after reading the opinion of Lord Duffer in on the history of the quarrel, to find that punishment had been meted out to only one party in that quarrel;. and that although it had been proved on the clearest evidence that not only the Druses but the Maronites were guilty of premeditated war. In one of the despatches in the blue book which he held in his hand, our Government were congratulated by Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer on the success of their endeavours to rescue from an unmerited death one of the great chiefs of the Druses. If they had succeeded in nothing else it was a great thing to rescue from undiscriminating punishment one who, so far from having been proved guilty, had been proved to be innocent. He was sorry to say that the congratulations were at least premature; for just before he entered the House that evening he received a letter which filled him with pain and regret. He had believed that when Her Majesty's Commissioner in Syria had expressed a decided opinion of the injustice of the proceeding by which the condemnation of Said Bey had been obtained his liberation would have been at once brought about. But he had received a letter from a gentleman now residing in Paris, who had often furnished him with valuable information, which letter he would hand over to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office presently. The writer said, "I have just heard that poor Said Bey is dying in prison, with many suspicions of foul play. For God's sake interfere, so that a despatch or telegraph from the Government may desire his liberation." The letter went on to say that the continuous French occupation of Syria had greatly diminished our influence there. No doubt the noble Lord had received information on the same subject, and he trusted that if the Government gave the slightest credence to the rumour, they would not allow the man in whose innocence they believed to languish or die in prison. Lord Duffer in, in a despatch written on the 24th of February, said that when he first went to the country he was actuated by feelings of indignation against the Druses for their attack on the Maronites. But he soon found the affair was complicated; he saw there were two sides to the story; and that as the true state of the case unfolded itself, it became a certainty that, however criminal might have been the excesses of the Druses subsequently, the original provocation came from the other side. A despatch of Mr. Brandt, Her Majesty's representative at Damascus, expressed his opinion that the quarrel was one of long standing, and that it was an old wound re-opened. He attributed the outbreak there to the weakness of the Government in the provinces. The Pachas had no money to pay their troops; no means of repressing disorders; they had gone on careless of what took place; they were not troubled by the passions of the Mahommedans which always disturbed them, and at times broke out in a general massacre. This was different from the quarrel in the Lebanon. There it was a contest between hostile races. The disturbances in the towns were of a kindred nature to those in India. They were temporarily checked in 1858, when the first outbreak took place in Jeddah; and in his opinion they might have been checked in Syria, had the same vigorous action been continued. What, then, had been the conduct of the English and French Governments? When the outbreak took place, when the news of the massacres in the Lebanon reached this country, Her Majesty's Government took proper measures, which were consistent alike with the independence of Turkey and their duty to British subjects in Syria. They gave orders to despatch ships to the coast of Syria, and called on the Porte to repress the disorders. At first the French Government took the same course, as appeared by a dispatch of M. Thouvenel on the 16th July. He expressed himself satisfied with what had been done by the Porte, and declined to take any part with either of the two populations. But on the 17th M. Thou- venel wrote a second dispatch, in which he said he had been to St. Cloud and seen the Emperor, who considered it absolutely necessary that troops should be sent to sustain the authority of the Porte and to prevent the recurrence of fresh disorders. It was true that news had, meanwhile, arrived of the massacre at Damascus; but the information which the French Government had received years before must have convinced them that such an occurrence was to be expected; and it was remarkable that one day should have sufficed to make such changes in the views of the French Government. The Emperor concluded that the Porte had no authority left, and that it was impossible for it to send to Syria the necessary troops. Then the noble Lord took a step which he (Sir James Fergusson) thought he must have repented ever since. On the 18th of July he consented to the occupation of Syria by French troops. By the 21st he saw reason to change his opinion, and said he thought the despatch of troops unnecessary. But in the meantime the Moniteur announced that the English Government concurred in the step of sending troops to Syria. Then it was that the French were able to establish what he might call their leadership in the intervention in Syria. The noble Lord having consented to the step, seemed to think that that would satisfy Fiance, and for some time afterwards he took no further steps in the negotiations. But the Porte protested against the sending of troops, and the British Consul at Damascus reported that the Turkish Government had succeeded in re-establishing order there. The despatch of the troops had therefore become unnecessary; but here was the point on which all the after negotiations turned. The noble Lord having consented to the despatch of French troops, did not insist on limiting their action to the occupation of the towns on the coast, where they would be able to give a moral support to the Turkish Government. It would be seen that most of the troubles of the French occupation were caused by the troops not being confined to these towns, where, if they had remained, they would not have roused the passions of the country in the manner that they had done. The Emperor agreed in the Conference to send his troops to act in concert with those of the Porte; but the language held to the troops themselves was hardly consistent with that idea, for in the "general order" issued to them on their leaving all the tra- ditions of the First Empire were invoked; they were told that they were charged with a great mission to the East—that they were going in the spirit of the first Crusaders. At the same time the other Powers were assured that the occupation was to be wholly a peaceful one, its object being to give moral support to the Turkish Government. On the 3rd of September the real policy of the French Government was made plain, when the French General, Beaufort, protested against the French troops being left inactive at Beyrout, and applied for permission to march up the country. Remonstrance was in vain, and the consent of the Turkish Government was unwillingly given to their advance upon the Mountain, where the General insisted on the occupation of the hostile territory of the Druses. About this time the noble Lord thought fit to interrogate the French Government, wanting to know how long the French troops were to say in the country; but he could obtain no satisfactory answer, and matters went on till, on the 7th November, he wrote a despatch stating that he saw insuperable objections to a prolonged occupation. Still the French made no sign of moving, though the Emperor continued to profess his anxiety to withdraw as soon as a settled government could be established in the country—but he refused to see that it was the continued occupation of the French troops that led to disorder. The negotiations became rather angry, the noble Lord again requesting that the troops might be withdrawn, and M. Thouvenel reiterating his opinion that the state of the country rendered that step impossible. On the 28th of January a despatch was written by M. Thouvenel which appeared to him to contain the key to the whole policy of the Syrian occupation. He stated that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as it was clear that the Maronites were not placed in a worse position than they were before, and that it could be made clear to the Catholic world that they had done all that could possibly be done for their protection; for if there should he a renewal of these atrocities after the evacuation the whole blame would fall on the French; and he (M. Thouvenel) would not deny that the French Government placed a certain value on the preservation of their influence over the Maronites. He thought the French Minister had been seized with an unwonted fit of candour when he wrote those words. He would not, then, inquire whether it was not that influence which for a great number of years had proved most detrimental to the good government of the country, by setting the Maronites against the Turkish Government, and leading them to expect aid from France. But by this despatch he thought it was clearly proved that the object of the French occupation of Syria was to encourage the Christian population to lean upon France for protection rather than on the Government of the country to which they belonged. It was originally agreed that the occupation should terminate in March, and some curious negotiations had taken place as to the prolongation, which, to speak fairly, were as unworthy of a great country as it would be of a private gentleman. After some difficulty it was agreed that the evacuation should be postponed to the 5th of June. M. Thouvenel then made objections to the evacuation being made effective on the 5th of June, and proposed that it should be enough if the transports were off the coast by that day. The English Government agreed to waive the term that the troops "shall" leave the country on the 5th, and substituted the word "ought," but insisted that there should be a "terme definitif." The French Government objected to the word "definitif" and that was struck out. Then the French Government applied that the evacuation should be postponed for ten days more; and then the noble Lord, in a despatch which must commend itself to the approbation of every gentleman who had read it, as the firmest that he believed was ever written by an English Minister, wrote that there must be an end to these discussions. Well, what had been the effect of this occupation? Had it tranquillized the country? His conviction was that the manner in which the French occupation had been carried on, so far from being conducive to the tranquillization of the province, and the re-establishment of the Sultan's authority, had had quite the contrary effect, and that every day it was prolonged it rendered more hopeless the restoration of a state of things in which commerce could be expected to flourish, and the peace of the Turkish Empire be preserved. This led him to the point which induced him to bring forward this question. It was a very serious matter for any one who advocated the early evacuation of Syria to consider what events might follow that evacuation. He had received letters during the last month from gentlemen holding different opinions on Syria; but all entertained the greatest dread of what might follow the evacuation of the country by the French. He received a letter yesterday from a gentle man at Beyrout, in whose statements he had reason to place every confidence, describing the state of uneasiness which existed at Beyrout as very serious, and mentioning that families which had been there for twenty-five years were now talking of leaving the country. There were several passages also in Lord Dufferin's despatches indicating his dissatisfaction at the state of affairs, and his anxiety as to what might follow the evacuation. He made these statements in all candour, as not wishing to keep back anything that ought to be known; not because this was an argument to prolong the occupation, but to show the necessity of early measures being taken to make a fresh outbreak impossible. If Englishmen were to shut their eyes to the dangers which undoubtedly existed, they would lay themselves open to the imputation—which the French would not be slow to cast upon them—that the jealousy of France rendered them insensible to the real interests of the country. To show that these imputations were already cast, he might refer to a clever article which appeared three months ago in the Revue des Deux Mondes; —and, by the way, he might observe that it was a most extraordinary thing that this article was written three months ago on a paper which had only just been presented to Parliament. That paper contained the reports of the British Consuls in various parts of Syria; they were confidential reports, and were printed only for the use of the Foreign Office. Until quite recently the noble Lord said it would not be for the public advantage that they should be presented to Parliament; yet this was the document on which a writer in the Revue des Deux Mondes commented three months ago. The commencement of that article was cercertainly the coolest he ever read. The writer said he would give a free translation—

"We have before our eyes certain reports which were sent by the British Consuls in Syria to Sir Henry Bulwer and to Lord John Russell. These reports were not intended for the public or for Parliament. We see that they were printed confidentially for the use of the Foreign Office; but we have thought that it would be good that these valuable and curious reports should be printed, in part, at least, for the guidance of public opinion, and for that reason we give an exact analysis of their contents."

It was clear, therefore, that documents which had only just been submitted to the British Parliament, were in the possession of a French pamphleteer as early as February last. The writer then proceeded to make a careful analysis of these reports, and he hinted that the jealousy of England was such that she would rather see a recurrence of these outrages than the continued occupation of the country by the French. He concluded by stating—

"Unhappy country! there is on its horizon a cloud of blood, which, if it falls, will fill Europe with remorse and shame. Think of the effect which the cry will have in history when it is stated that 30,000 Christians were massacred in Syria in 1860, and 30,000 more in 1861, because England did not wish that they should be saved by France, as that would increase her influence in the East."

Now he thought this justified him in urging on the Government that they should insist on the Turkish Government taking those steps at once which would alone be sufficient to prevent any evil consequences from the withdrawal of the French occupation. Lord Dufferin pointed out in his despatches that the Maronites were increasing in insolence, that they depended on France, and that so long as her shelter was thrown over them they neither knew nor cared for any other Government. What propositions had been made for the amelioration of Syria? Lord Dufferin had addressed himself to that question with great ability, and he had gradually brought round to his opinion the other members of the International Commission. It was to be regretted that the necessity of concluding these deliberations, so that there should be no excuse for the further occupation by the French, had obliged him to limit his deliberations to the settlement of the Lebanon, and prevented him from extending his plans to the future Government of Syria. He had, however, laid down important principles for that Government. He pointed out the viciousness of the present system, arising from the farming out of the taxes, and the rapacity of the Pachas, who knew they would not be continued in office long. Mr. Skene, the Consul at Aleppo, dwelt on the same grievances, and showed that the vices of the existing Government sprung from the weakness of the central authority and the mischievous practice of farming out the revenue. The peasantry were driven to despair, because if a man had more than an ordinary crop he knew he would be subjected to fresh exactions. The Pachas were never secure of their position for a year; and when, as sometimes happened, they were honestly inclined and wished to make roads or carry out other improvements, they found themselves surrounded by greedy followers who had friends at Constantinople, and whose rapacity they were compelled to satisfy for their own interest. Lord Dufferin represented that the future Governor of Syria must be a man who would be able to be independent of the hateful influences of Constantinople, who should be relieved from the necessity of paying black mail for his appointment, and who would he independent of the sinister influences of the different European Consuls, who were too often engaged in furthering other interests than those of the country. The noble Lord further stated that his scheme would fail unless a man was appointed who would command the respect of the European Powers; and that the people naturally looked on Fuad Pacha as the proper person—a view taken also by Sir Henry Bulwer. The noble Lord pointed to the absolute necessity for the de-centralization of Syria from Constantinople and the centralizing of power in Syria. Now it might be said that Fuad Pacha already possessed these powers. But he had not the power of appointing or removing his subordinates, he had no control over the commander of the army, who received his orders direct from Constantinople, or of distributing the revenues of the country, after a fixed tribute had been sent to Constantinople. Both Sir Henry Bulwer and Lord Dufferin stated that, unless in these respects the Governor had full and complete authority, it was useless to expect good government in the future. Lord Dufferin pointed out the absolute necessity of separating Syria for administrative purposes from Constantinople, and centralizing authority in that country. A plan for the Government of the Mountain had been prepared by the International Commission, according to which it was proposed that a Christian should be placed at the head of it, but that the Druses should be under a Druse, the Maronites under a Maronite, and the Greeks under a Greek. This plan was entirely in accordance with the suggestions contained in a remarkable Memorial which was presented to Lord Malmesbury in 1852, in which it was pointed out that the Lebanon could never be tranquil under the arrangement which divided the Mountain between two Kaimakans, leaving in some places Druses under the Government of a Maronite, and in others Maronites under that of a Druse. The Commissioners, with the exception of the French Commissioner, were unanimously of the opinion that the head of the Mountain ought not to be a native; but, unfortunately, the French Commissioner insisted that a Maronite should be appointed to that office. At that point the real information contained in the blue book ended, and the House was not informed whether the International Commission had come to any decision, or whether its appointment had been a failure. In the mean time, there appeared on the part of the French a disposition to throw on the English the responsibility of removing the troops, and of those torrents of blood which it was predicted would flow on their removal. The French had pointed out to the Maronites that their troubles were at an end, and that they would take care of them for the future, and in consequence of these assurances the Maronites had used language as against the Turkish authorities to which they had never before been subjected. It was probable, therefore, that, unless active measure were taken to induce the Porte to improve the Government of the country, and to give to one man power to repress disorder for the future, disturbances would again break out which would give France a colourable excuse for the despatch of a fresh expedition, without the consent of the Powers, for a new occupation of Syria, which might be indefinitely prolonged. In this state of things a good opportunity presented itself to England. Turkey regarded this country with a friendly eye, and although Turkey had protested against the establishment of an independent province in Syria, as fatal to the existence of her authority elsewhere, he thought that a middle course could be adopted, by the appointment of Fuad Pacha, not with a perpetual tenure of office, but with a power of continuance until he had had time to reform the Government. The Government of the Emperor of the French must, he thought, feel embarrassment on this question, and instances were not wanting in the despatches of M. Thouvenel which would lead to the belief that his Government would not be unwilling to recede from the position they had assumed. In this matter England could not be charged with pursuing any selfish policy, notwithstanding what had been stated by some French pamphleteers; and if we could prevent fresh disasters in Syria we should only be adding another to the many ser- vices we had bestowed on Turkey. We had already, through our Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, done much to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and the policy recommended by that noble Lord might, if fully carried out, become in the future, the foundation of the stability of the Turkish Empire. When the results of selfish ambition and aggression should have passed away, there would remain the fruits of the honourable policy which have ever characterized England, and which would bring eternal lustre upon the name of the Minister who should more successfully carry it out.

Sir, the hon. and gallant Gentleman has called attention to the condition of Syria, the policy of the European Powers who have intervened in its affairs, and the course of Her Majesty's Government with respect to that policy. After the able speech of my hon. and gallant Friend, I think it right that I should state, as far as I can, the present position of these affairs, and the views of her Majesty's Government with respect to them. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says truly, the papers that have been produced contain various recommendations with regard to the Lebanon that have been offered from time to time. One of those recommendations is that there should be a Governor General of Syria having extensive powers, and under him a Christian Governor of the Lebanon. I own it appeared to me that this arrangement would have been to the advantage of Lebanon, would have conduced to the welfare of the inhabitants, and been on the whole the best arrangement that could have been made. The Porte, however, felt great objections to the proposal to appoint a Governor General of Syria, apprehending he might assume an independent position, and imitate in Syria what has taken place in Egypt. As there were no means of deciding this point in opposition to the wishes of the Porte, the Commissioners thought that there might be a three-fold division of authority—that a Kaimakan might be appointed for the Maronites, another for the Druses, and a third for the natives belonging to the Greek Church. It was also proposed that a system of "disaggregation" should be adopted. The word is used to describe the process by which certain villages inhabited by Maronites should be taken from under the authority of the Druse Kaimakan, and transferred to the Kaimakan of the Maronites; and vice versa other villages inhabited by Druses taken from the Maronite authorities, and transferred to that of the Druses. But this arrangement could not be easily accomplished; it was much opposed by the French Commissioners, who were supported in their view by their Government in Paris; and it became impracticable. It then appeared to me that the best plan was to go back to the original proposition, leaving out those points to which the Sultan objected; the best solution of the difficulty seemed to be the appointment of a Christian Governor; and it had the merit of having received in its former shape the concurrence of all the Commissioners. Their only differences of opinion were on the point—certainly one of great importance—whether the Christian Governor should be a native or not. Four out of the five Commissioners thought he ought not to be a native; and it struck me as obvious that there would be a danger, if the Governor were a native of the Lebanon, that he would retain in his own breast, and cherish in the breasts of his family and tribe, those resentments and hatreds which have caused so much desolation and bloodshed already. My own opinion is that the arrangement to which I have just referred should take effect; but the French Government are still of opinion that a Maronite chief would afford the best kind of Government for the Lebanon. The last Report of the Commissioners I have not yet seen, but I believe it is nearly in accordance with what I have stated; it has been sent to Constantinople in order to be considered there. The hon. Baronet will see that I cannot produce the further papers he asks for. We are just at that point of the negotiations at which it is the general rule and practice not to produce to the House such documents, and some of them, indeed, have not yet reached my hands. I hope, with the Iron. Baronet, that we may be able to find some means for the future good Government of Syria. I quite concur with what the hon. Gentleman has said of the merits of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's exertions in Turkey. But there is this diffi- culty that has since arisen, and still continues; the Russian Government has always considered itself bound to take under its special protection the subjects of the Sultan who belong to the Greek Church. The French Government, on the other hand, considers it a matter involving the pride and glory of France that it should extend its protection to the Roman Catholic Christians. Our course has been, and we have invariably pursued it, to induce the Sultan to endeavour to give to all his subjects the protection and good Government they are entitled to, whether they are of the Greek Church, Roman Catholics, Maronites, or Druses. We think they are all equally entitled to good Government. We see with great pleasure the improvements that have been made from time to time; they constitute, on the whole, vast changes from the condition of the Christians in Turkey twenty or twenty-five years ago. Other questions remain, in some parts of the Sultan's dominions, with regard to those changes. I cannot now enter into the particulars, but the negotiations now cannot last very long, as the points under discussion have been reduced to very few—almost to one. With regard to the evacuation of Syria by the French troops, we have every reason to rely on the good faith of the Emperor of the French in carrying out the engagements into which he has entered.

thought the present question involved precedents of very great importance, not alone as far as Syria was concerned, but as applicable hereafter to other parts of the Turkish empire. The House was indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite for the able manner in which he had, on more than one occasion, dealt with this matter. They could not doubt that the hon. Gentleman was well informed, as the facts he had stated had always turned out to be true. He was himself not prepared to go to the extent the hon. Gentleman did in the policy he advocated; but the Motion would tend to strengthen the hands of the Government. The papers laid upon the table of the House proved three things: first, that there was great difficulty in governing Syria; next, that mischief under foreign occupation had already occurred; and, thirdly, that in the past outrages the Christians were the aggressors. It would appear that the Maronites were instigated to the aggression by their priests, or by foreign agents; that the Druses, convinced at last they should be attacked, endeavoured to anticipate the Christians; that sanguinary battles ensued in which, as in all barbarous warfare, there was much unnecessary slaughter. The papers proved also that some of the Turkish population of the towns, generally of the lowest order, joined the Druses and took advantage of the outbreak for the purpose of plundering. On the other hand, it was proved that a large number of the higher class of Mahommedans gave protection to the Christians. Before the French occupied Syria it had already been shown that the Porte could repress these disturbances; some of the guilty it had already punished, but it allowed others to escape who ought to have been punished—for which it deserved reprobation. It was evident that since the French occupation an unsatisfactory state of things had prevailed in Syria, arising out of the misconduct and irritating attitude assumed by the Maronites, who had, murdered a large number of men, women, and children in cold blood. The French occupation had only led to mischief, as it had encouraged ideas of vengeance on one side and retaliation on the other. He believed the French would leave Syria in June, according to the Convention; but what was to be done with Syria when they did leave? The difficulty of governing Syria was increased by the fact that it was inhabited by ten races divided into seventeen fanatical sects. Lord Dufferin was a high-minded, liberal gentleman, possessed of good sense and judgment, but before he had been in Syria two months he proposed a plan for the government of that country—a problem which had for years puzzled those best acquainted with the East. That plan was sent home, accepted by the Foreign Office, and Sir Henry Bulwer was instructed to press it on the attention of the Porte. The Porte, however, very naturally protested against this scheme on the ground that it would place Syria in the same position of virtual independence as Egypt. It was first suggested that the mountains should be divided into two parts with a Christian and Mahommedan governor. Then Lord Dufferin and the Commissioners agreed that there should be one Christian governor for the Lebanon, but the French said he must be a Maronite. Lastly, it was suggested that there should be three governors—a Greek, a Druse, and a Maronite; but all these plans appeared to him equally unworkable. He thought they ought not to suggest to the Porte any plan whatever. It was unjust to force on the Porte a plan for the government of Syria, and then to make it responsible if that plan did not succeed. Either the Great Powers should take the government upon themselves, or they should leave it to be administered by Turkey, holding Turkey responsible in case of failure. It was admitted that the Porte was fully alive to its responsibility towards the civilized world, that it would do its utmost for the good government of Syria. But the greatest difficulties the Porte had to contend with arose from the Christians themselves. When Fuad Pasha left a Christian governer at Damascus he was actually obliged to turn him out on the complaint of the Commissioners, because of his oppression towards both Christians and Mahommedans, and because he committed outrages upon unhappy women who went to him for redress; and Lord Dufferin stated that the worst and most bloody feuds on the mountains had been between the Christians themselves. Any general principle or precedent which might now be laid down for the Government of Syria required the utmost consideration, because they might hereafter become applicable to other parts of Turkey. If the principle now attempted to be established with regard to Syria were accepted, Russia had an equal right to claim the application of the same principle to the rest of Turkey. Allusion had been made to an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes, as containing misrepresentations. Unfortunately it was the custom of French writers to endeavour to give a false notion of our policy in the East. If he should not be out of order he wished to refer to an instance which involved a matter personal to himself. An article had appeared in the Débate grossly misrepresenting him.

said, the hon. Member might refer to anything which he construed into an attack on his personal character, but it was not in order to quote documents referring to debates in this House.

was aware of this, but the statement to which he was alluding did affect his personal character. It represented him as having said that the English Government should ask the Sultan to send two Albanian regiments, whose pay was in arrears, to the Ionian Islands, and that then the Ionian Islands would know how to appreciate the English rule. No English gentleman would have expressed such an opinion, and to impute it to him was a reflection on his character as a Member of this House. With regard to the state of Christians in Turkey, the consular reports recently laid upon the table, showed that, after all, their condition had very much improved, and if it had not it was due to themselves rather than to the Turks. They would not help themselves. The papers would show that many of the so-called Christians were a shame to the name of Christianity. He thought these papers creditable to Turkey, but at the same time complained that it was a hard thing that they should be published. Fancy sending to Ireland a Consul from every nation in Europe, and inviting them to make a report upon the differences between Catholics and Protestants in that country. It would be impossible to govern Ireland a week after the publication of such a report. It might appear a paradox, but it was literally true that the present position of Turkey was entirely owing to her toleration of religious creeds. It was a mistake to suppose that when the Turks conquered the provinces now forming that empire they found a highly civilized people. Any student of history would know that the Byzantine Empire was at that time so low that it was falling to pieces of its own accord. A Christian body would have exterminated the conquered race as the Spaniards had exterminated the Moors, or as Russia was now ruthlessly exterminating the Tartar races in the Crimea; yet Russia had the audacity to complain of the conduct of Turkey! There was, no doubt, a great deal of misgovernment in Turkey, but any one who read those papers would see that there was a steady desire on the part of the Sultan, and on the part of the higher dignitaries, at least, to introduce improvements; and in a few years' time the country might be expected to be in a far better position than at present. It appeared from the report of Mr. Consul Skeen that in Northern Syria there was an absence of crime of any kind, which could not be recorded by any civilized country in Europe. He asked them to leave the Porte to govern Syria, and to make the Porte responsible. To do this they must stop consuls and priests from being political agents. He could tell them the present position of a Governor of a Turkish province. When a new Pasha was appointed he was waited upon by the English Consul, who recommended the imposition of such and such taxes, and the remission of others. The French and Russian, and Russian and Greek Consuls called and made their recommendations in the same way; of course, the unhappy man could not adopt them all, and then those consuls whose suggestions were not adopted wrote to Constantinople that the Pasha was corrupt and unfit to govern a province, and in a short time the unhappy Porte was compelled to withdraw him; and so it went on, Pasha after Pasha, till government was utterly impossible. Of all the curses to a country the greatest was the political agitator in the garb of the soutane, and Turkey suffered more than any other country from this source. All sects were alike in this respect. As a general rule there was no systematic oppression of the Christiana in Turkey. He desired to see them flourishing and happy, but a great deal depended on themselves; and he hoped, therefore, that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would support the Turks in this matter, and would not force upon them an impracticable plan, which could only end in failure.

said, he felt greatly indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for having brought forward this subject, and begged to remind the House that he had been the first to warn it to suspend its judgment when the conflict broke out last year. He (Mr. C. Clifford) spoke from his own personal experience of the miserable condition of the Lebanon, in consequence of the political intrigues of the Christian priests. In 1844, when he was over there, a war broke out, which was begun by the Maronites, and had it not been for the interposition of a gallant officer an equally dreadful massacre would have been perpetrated to that which had horrified them last year. The country was deeply indebted to Lord Dufferin for the manner in which he had made a stand against the wholesale massacre of the Druses which was at first demanded by the Maronite bishops, and also against the heavy fines it was proposed to levy on them. Those priests handed in at first a list of 4,600 persons whose death they demanded, and that list was subsequently reduced to 1,200; but that sanguinary suggestion, thanks to Lord Dufferin, was not carried out; and next to impose a fine of 1,000 piastres, or about £8, upon each male Druse above fifteen years of age, which would have produced heartrending misery. The plan developed by Lord Dufferin in his despatch of the 3rd of November was very well calculated to remove the difficulties which beset the government of the Lebanon, though he despaired of seeing the time when the hostile tribes would be brought into true reconcilement with each other. He could not, however, agree with that part of the plan which proposed a loan, to be guaranteed by the different Governments of Europe. The manner in which the great offices at Constantinople were disposed of was most scandalous. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the foremost defender of Turkey, admitted the corruption which was practised, and all he could say was "corruption was not long ago also rife in England, and even now the words of Mr. Burke are ringing in our ears." But, if corruption did at one time prevail in England, we had never appointed as governors of provinces persons who would become the accomplices of murder and treason. When he (Mr. C. Clifford) was in Beyrout information arrived there that a Christian garrison had been shut up in a fortress, and that they had surrendered to the Druses. It appeared that those Christians were subsequently led captive into a certain ravine, with the intention of being massacred. A gallant officer, however, went to their rescue, and by his influence over the Druse chiefs saved them from the fate which threatened them. The Christians, numbering 160, and composed of men, women, and children, were brought in safety back to Beyrout. The gallant officer to whom he alluded was the same who had marched from victory to victory in India, and had retrieved our fortunes there when they looked gloomy in the extreme. His name was Sir Hugh Rose, whom he (Mr. C. Clifford) was proud to call his friend.

addressed the House and was proceeding to point to the corruption and mal-administration that pervaded the Turkish Empire; when— Notice taken, That Forty Members were not present; House counted, and Forty Members being present,

proceeded to say that this corruption and mal-administration were at the root of all the disturbances in Syria and other parts of the Turkish Empire; and that it was to the remedying of those evils that attention must be turned if we hoped to avert the danger arising to Europe from the present condition of the Turkish Empire. The hon. and gallant Member was very imperfectly heard.

thought that the House had diverged from the important question brought before it by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite. The object of the hon. and gallant Member was, he believed, to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of devising some reliable security that the disgraceful scenes which took place last year in the Lebanon should not be repeated. The hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) was for leaving matters entirely in the hands of the Turks; but he (Mr. Monsell) would venture to suggest a difficulty in the way of adopting that proposition, and that was that this country had entered into solemn engagements with reference to the Government of the Lebanon. In the year 1842 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a despatch that he had communicated to the Christians of Mount Lebanon the pledge that their ancient rights should he respected, and one of those ancient rights was that they should be governed by rulers selected from among themselves. The suggestion, therefore, of the hon. Member for Southwark was entirely inconsistent with the honour and good faith of this country. It was one of the first statements made by Lord Dufferin—and he repeated it over and over again—that if a tolerable Government existed, and no sinister influences were allowed to engender discord between them, the Druse and Christian populations would be inclined to live in perfect harmony; and that view was supported by the fact that there had been no massacre without the presence of Turkish troops. He utterly denied the statement of the noble Lord, that the bloody encounters of hostile tribes had been for ages the scourge of Syria; and everybody who had looked but cursorily into the history of that country must know that religious wars never took place there until 1838. Since the influence of the Turkish Pachas was introduced in 1841 the tribes had been set one upon the other, and the Turks were at the bottom of every single disturbance that had since broken out in the country. If the Turks were allowed to arrange the affairs of the Lebanon the result would be most disastrous. A remarkable petition, signed by 438 merchants and traders in that part, belonging to all the different nations of Europe, had been presented to the Commissioners, and the persons signing the petition expressed their belief that nothing but ruin and misery would befall the Christians in the Lebanon, if European occupation were withdrawn before some proper system of government was established. It would be an outrage against humanity if this country were to permit such a result. He thought that, when all the sufferings of the Maronites were considered, they ought to be spoken of in more tolerant language than was used when they were described as being Christians only in name, and some allowance should be made for the feelings of persons who had had such horrible atrocities perpetrated upon them. There had been 288 murders of Maronites by Druses since Fuad Pacha arrived in the Lebanon; so that, if the Christians had committed outrages, the Druses had committed outrages likewise. He concurred in thinking that neither of these tribes ought to be hardly dealt with. Each was necessary to the other, and the true policy was to endeavour to bring them together in the same state as they were in about twenty-five years ago, and to place them in a position to be able to resist any attempt on the part of the Turks to intrude on the Government of the Lebanon. Unless that were done, any scheme that might be proposed would entirely fail, because the Turks would endeavour to change their suzeraineté into a sovereignty. The influence which this country possessed with Turkey imposed on it in the eyes of Europe the solemn responsibility of compelling the adoption of a fair and just system of government in the Lebanon, and he entreated the Government not to allow European occupation to cease until some security against the repetition of these terrible massacres was obtained.

said, Sir, I am sorry that I did not hear the commencement of the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayrshire. I understand that he paid a high tribute to Lord Dufferin, and I should not do justice to my own feelings if I did not express my deep conviction that the Government of this country have been exceedingly fortunate in their choice of a Commissioner for Syria. Lord Dufferin, in circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has shown an amount of energy, sagacity and firmness, and, in dealing with the cases of particular prisoners, a judicial impartiality most honourable to him and creditable to the country of which he is the representative. There are many points connected with the question now before us, which, although discussed at length in the papers which we have received, we cannot, I think, discuss with advantage in this House. Such, for instance, are the different degrees of criminality attaching to the Turkish and Druse prisoners at Beyrout and the Druses imprisoned at Mokhtarah. I allude to this point only for the purpose of stating that to M. Thouvenel we are indebted for the merciful suggestion that one or two only out of twenty-two Druse prisoners set apart for execution at Mokhtarah should be executed. This suggestion must be regarded as highly honourable to M. Thouvenel when we consider the peculiar and delicate position in which France stands relatively to the Maronites. It was, moreover, at variance with the opinion of the French Commissioner in Syria, who had thought that a much larger number should be executed. I am glad to find also from, the papers before us that M. Thouvenel has expressed his satisfaction at the conciliatory spirit shown by Her Majesty's Government as regards the proposals for prolonging the occupation. I trust sincerely that a spirit of conciliation may animate all the great Powers of Europe in arriving at a solution of this question, and that they will not act as the patrons of the Greek Church, or the Maronite Church, or of the Druses, but as the apostles of humanity. With regard to the term of the French occupation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has taken up a very decided position, and I think that this matter may very safely he left in his hands. In his presence, I hardly like to say how much I admire his foreign policy, not in Syria only, but in Italy. I think, however, that my hon. and gallant Friend opposite, in commenting on the proceedings of M. Thouvenel, has hardly made sufficient allowance for French sympathies and for the extent to which, in connection with Syria, ecclesiastical influences have been brought to hear on the French Government. The question as to the origin of the disturbances in Syria is, no doubt, a question of great interest. I will not now refer to it except to state my opinion that as between the Druses and the Maronites, the latter, instigated, as I believe, by the intrigues of their priesthood, were the aggressors. Sir Henry Bulwer, Lord Dufferin, and M. Novikow are of this opinion. M. Thouvenel speaks fairly enough on this point, and hardly disguises his opinion, as regards the Maronites. He states, moreover, that he has no wish that the truth should be concealed. But after all there can be no doubt that the chief blame lies with the local authorities and the Ottoman Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs attributed in one of his despatches the whole misfortunes to the connivance of Khoorshid Pasha at Deir el Kamar and the cowardice of Achmet Pasha at Damascus. Sir Henry Bulwer writing to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 27th of June, 1860, says—

"I must add with deep regret that the Ottoman Government is the more to blame for what has occurred in Syria, since assuredly a week has not passed during the last year that I have not been constantly bringing the state of that province under the attention of Fuad Pasha, and the three grand Viziers who have succeeded each other."

That is what Sir Henry Bulwer says; but what did the Turkish Government do in the teeth of all these warnings? What says Consul Brant, writing from Damascus to Sir Henry Bulwer in May of the same year? After speaking of the disordered state of the Lebanon, he adds—

"Unfortunately, there are very few troops here, the greater portion having been recalled to Constantinople; our Pasha is, therefore, almost powerless."

In the teeth of all these warnings the Turkish Government withdrew its troops to Constantinople. I am, therefore, Sir, unable to concur with my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark in the extent to which he goes in his eulogiums on the Turkish Government, though I honour the spirit in which his speech was made. As to the future, we cannot here discuss in detail any plans for the Government of Syria. But it seems to me that, in any settlement of this question, there are two main points which ought to be attended to. The first is, that the Government of the whole of Syria, as well as that of the Lebanon should be provided for in the settlement. The other, that Syria should be governed in the interest of the Native races and not in the interest of this or that particular Power. I do hope that some plan may be adopted to prevent a recurrence of those terrible calamities which have been so feelingly referred to by my right hon. Friend behind me, the Member for Limerick. No doubt it may be difficult to devise a plan. But the greatest difficulty appears to me to be to obtain a guarantee for the faithful carrying out of the plan, whatever it may be, and of any reforms promised for Syria by the Ottoman Government. It may be said, there is the good faith, there are the promises of the Ottoman Government. Well, but that good faith is pledged already. The Hatti Sherif of Gulhane in 1839, the Tanzimat of 1844, the Hatti Humayoun of 1856, promised reforms large enough to regenerate, not Turkey only, but every empire in Europe. Have those reforms been yet accomplished? The Hatti Humayoun promised reforms in the provincial and metropolitan police. But, has the police system been yet reformed? Murders and pillage are the reply. The system of farming the taxes, too, was condemned, but is not yet abolished. Reforms were promised in the provincial councils, but the Medjlis is still the centre of misgovernment and corruption. Canals and roads were promised. How many have been made? How do matters stand as regards agricultural produce, and the mode of collecting the Government tithe? Major Cox speaks of crops having been cut and then left three weeks on the ground; and one of our consuls speaks of a case in which they remained on the ground two months before the tithe collector could be found to assess their value. No doubt, in 1860, the tour of the Grand Vizier Mehemet Kibrisli Pasha was attended with beneficial results; and I have great hopes of reforms, looking to his past history, from the proposed mission of Omar Pasha to Bosnia. But these are partial reforms only. Large and general reforms are needed. I am told that the most necessary reform is that which is required in the Seraglio. The extent of that establishment, with its countless women and troops of enuchs is something beyond belief, and the cost of it bears a proportion by no means inconsiderable to the entire expenses of the Turkish army, the payment of which is often left in arrear. If Her Majesty's Government are desirous of saving Turkey they must speak plainly to the Turkish Government. They must urge it to adopt at once some comprehensive plan of Reform, and obtain if possible some guarantee for its being carried into execution. By this course they may confer enduring benefits on the population of the Turkish dominions—Mahommedan as well as Christian. By this course they may fulfil the expectations of Europe, and give stability to what is now a tottering empire.

said, that we had endeavoured to support the Turkish Empire, but had not found the means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Serious evils had arisen from French influence in Egypt, and from the Turkish law of succession to the Sovereignty. The principle which we ought to adopt was, to prevent foreign conquest of Turkey; but while encouraging liberty in other parts of the world it was impossible for us to stay the march of progress in its effects on the Turkish Empire.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, When the Papers relating to the affairs of Mexico will be laid upon the Table of the House, and whether any instructions have been sent to Sir Charles Wylie to enforce the Conventions relative to the appropriation of the Customs' Duties?

was understood to say that he was not in a position to give further information than this, that instructions had been sent out.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department when the yearly Indemnity Bill will be brought in, whether the form and purport of it will be the same as have been used annually since 1828, and whether he will cause it to be printed in the way usually done on the introduction of other Bills for consideration and discussion? The late Government had neglected to take the test required, and, therefore, all their subsequent acts while in office were, in point of fact, void. He wished the Bill should be brought in regularly, and printed, circulated, and discussed. At present it was brought in a manner which precluded any hon. Gentleman from expressing an opinion upon it—it had certainly never caught his eye.

said, he was afraid it was his unfortunate fate to dispute both the facts and the law of his hon. Friend. His hon. Friend had said the Indemnity Bill was not brought in a manner before the House that any Gentleman could express an opinion upon it; that he had never been able to keep bis eye upon it as it passed through the House; and that Parliament passed it without any knowledge of its contents. His hon. Friend was entirely mistaken in that supposition. The Indemnity Bill was annually brought in by the Under Secretary for the Home Department. It was a short Bill and was printed at full length. It was by no means treated like the Mutiny Act or the Appropriation Act, which were sometimes not presented in a printed form, but was presented in such a form that every Member had an opportunity of fully considering its contents. With regard to the law of the case, his hon. Friend spoke of the neglect of the late Ministers to take what he called an obsolete test. There was no test now in force; there was only a declaration, and no doubt persons were required annually by law to make it when they took office. But if they did not make it, they were saved from the consequences by the annual Indemnity Act, which relieved them from all penal consequences. No doubt it only saved them for the year; but, practically, it afforded entire exemption, as the Bill was passed annually. If the House should be desirous of making any alteration in the Bill they would have abundance of opportunity while the Bill was before the House.

said, he wished to draw the attention of the House to a discrepancy in the accounts relating to manufacture of small arms at Enfield; which, in 1854, were stated to he £352,583, and in 1858. to be £305,798. This arose from certain items in the former being omitted in the latter. The Small Arms Commit. tee had recommended the introduction of a careful and accurate system of accounts, but their recommendation had not been attended to. The object of this recommendation was not merely to obtain a supply of arms, but to keep a check on the trade; but it was impossible to constitute a fair comparison, unless the House had an account of the whole of the money expended on these works. It was necessary, in order to arrive at a reliable opinion of the cost at which rifles were manufactured, that there should be included in that cost the interest on the outlay on the establishment. A Return presented to the House showed the number of muskets made at Enfield, and any person looking at the Return superficially would think that if they divided the expenditure of the year by the number of muskets produced they would get at the cost per musket. That, however, was not the case, as there were many items of expenditure which were not included in the Return. Two separate Committees had recommended that full Returns should be laid before the House, and he hoped that these recommendations would at last be complied with, and that the Government would lay before the House a complete account of the expenditure up to the 31st of March of last year. The House ought not, indeed, to entertain these Estimates until the accounts were laid before the House in the manner recommended by the Committee. He was also anxious to direct the attention of the Government to the increase of manufacturing establishments. There was a manufactory at Millbank, for which £16,000 was charged for the item of wages; and another at Weedon which cost £3,000 for wages. He could not think that this increased number of establishments was necessary for the purpose of carrying on the manufacture of arms.

drew attention to the large increase in the local expenditure and travelling items, and in that of the lodging money.

wanted to know why the Vote for the present year was £24,695 in excess of that of last year? The lodging money to married soldiers was increased, as well as other items.

said, the Government were deserving of every praise for the provision they had made in respect to the allowances for the lodgings of married soldiers. Nothing they had done had so much attached married soldiers to the service as the granting them lodging mo- ney when there were not special quarters for them in the barracks. He fully supported the application of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire for full and complete information respecting the cost of manufacturing arms at Enfield; but it would be absolutely necessary, in order to arrive at the fact, that there should he a full account of expenditure, an account of the building and plant, fuel, gas, lighting, and other expenses, which would be included in an account of ordinary commercial character. But he thought that even if they could attain the utmost degree of economy, it would be better to keep up small manufacturing establishments, and employ private firms as much as possible.

stated that it had been on several occasions recommended and promised by the Government that a complete debtor and creditor account of the establishment at Enfield should be laid before the House, but no information of the sort had yet been given. There was no doubt that the accounts were admirably kept by the officer in charge at Enfield, but the House was in all but complete ignorance on the subject. He had never been able to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to the cost of a rifled musket, and, indeed, it was a most complicated statement of accounts which was necessary in order to arrive at this result. The sums that had been laid out since 1854 upon the establishment at Enfield, exclusive of the building and repairs, had been, so far as he could make them out, £910,000. Add to this, that during the last seven years, a sum of £2,795,000 had been expended in the purchase of small arms; making together a total, in round numbers, of not less than £4,000,000 for the purchase of small arms. He wanted to know what we had obtained for this expenditure, and where ail the small arms had gone to, They all agreed in wishing that our men should be armed in the most efficient and economical manner—but the question was were we going economically to work? He would say the same with regard to clothing. He had called for returns on this subject, and so had the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Horsfall). The prices given in those returns varied. The one was correct, the other incorrect; 20s, 6d. was given as the price for the tunic of a private of the Line; but the actual price was only 18s. 6d. Why was this? The hon. Under Secretary for War should take care that his subordinates gave proper returns. He very much feared there was a disposition in some of the public offices to evade the returns ordered by the House of Commons as far as possible. Lodging money had been increased, much to the advantage of the soldier; and yet at Aldershot Engineers had been put into huts to live, and were charged as much for their accommodation in them as they would have to pay in respectable lodging-houses in the town. As to married soldiers, he protested against the right of soldiers marrying at all. It was perfectly absurd to load the army with a number of married people. When soldiers enlisted for twenty-one years it was not unreasonable that they should think of marriage; but when they entered the service for ten years, limited service, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, they might very reasonably be required to remain unmarried until that period had expired. There was no necessity to have such a mass of married men in the army as was now the case. When a man entered the service, he gave up a certain amount of comforts, and married life was one of these. If he (Colonel Dunne) or any other young man—or, rather when he was a young man—joined the service, he knew he should have to endure hard work, and he thought then, as he thought now, that a wife was no part of a soldier's necessaries. Then, again, barracks made for 1,000 men, from the superior comforts that were allowed, could only accommodate 700. The same thing was carried out in almost every department of the State, and the Estimates were framed on a corresponding scale. He was averse to divide the House or vote against any of these Estimates. They were made up on the returns, but it was necessary that Members should speak their mind upon them; and economy had to be pressed on every Government. If he were in the hon. Under Secretary's position he should take all the good advice he received, and follow it as far as possible.

wished to call attention to a particular item in the Estimate—196 clerks of works from £110 to £300 per annum, £35,395. besides a sum nearly as large for extra clerks of works. He could not understand how such a demand arose. When the New Houses of Parliament were building, two clerks of the works were found sufficient to superintend the whole. This was just one of those things which showed that a Go- vernment, in carrying forward any department, without in the slightest degree intending to act otherwise than economically, ran into an amount of expenditure which no private person or man in business would do. He could not conceive it possible that Government could have an amount of works that would render one quarter of that number necessary. This was a very unsatisfactory state of things. He did his best before passing these Estimates to master the details; but from the want of explicitness in the details it was impossible for any one not connected with the Department to do so. With every desire to do his duty, he felt himself in a perfectly helpless position. When he compared the French army and its total expenditure with ours he was perfectly frightened. But when he came upon items such as that to which he had referred he could well understand that there was something rotten in the state of Denmark. He did not attribute any motives to Government for permitting such extravagance. The real fact was that as soon as a Minister was really becoming acquainted with the just demands to be made on the public purse some change of Government displaced him, and all his acquired knowledge of his Department became useless. The mischief would never be got rid of until the commercial and business duties of the public departments were separated from party politics, and men of official experience were retained in their situation until men of still greater efficiency were ready to take their places. In France, Prussia, and other States the personnel of the departments was not changed frequently as in this country. With respect to the Vote before the House, he could not see how it was possible that 198 clerks—to say nothing of temporary additions—could be profitably employed in the superintendence of barracks and similar works, at a cost to the country of £34,000 a year.

said, that successive Secretaries of State for War, being necessarily dependent for their information upon their subordinates, who were permanently employed, could not exercise an effective control over the profuse expenditure connected with their office. He thought the hon. Baronet had hit the right nail on the head in drawing attention to the number of clerks. In fact, we were governed by clerks at the War Office, and the constant changes in the heads of that Department made them entirely dependent on the advice of those clerks. He could not understand why the officers of the Engineers could not be trusted with the works of the country, and why they must have 198 clerks to superintend them. He hoped the Government would look into this matter, and that if a reduction could not be made this year it would be next. He was ashamed again to refer to the absence of those Gentlemen who had signed the document urging economy on the Ministers, but there were very few of them now in their places. There was the hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham, who told the country that the army was kept up for the benefit of the aristocracy and their hangers-on; but he, as usual, was not in his place when the expenses of the army were under discussion. The real economists must do as well as they could without their assistance. The Army Clothing Department in Pimlico was defended the other night on the ground that on one occasion, when the clothing of an entire regiment was lost, it was supplied within a fortnight. Now, in a town with which he was connected, he was informed that a private contractor lately received an order for 800 tunics for the 60th Rifles on a Monday, and actually delivered the whole number in London on the Friday week following, although in the interim they had had to telegraph to Yorkshire for the cloth. He was diposed to vote for a larger reduction than the hon. Member for Lambeth had proposed; but he would certainly go into the same lobby with him, and if they went on dividing, they would, perhaps, at last force some economy on the Government.

said, he hoped the Committee would keep on dividing, for he did not see how economy in the gross was to be accomplished unless they insisted on economy in details. Remonstrances had been repeatedly made to him out of doors against their constantly-increasing expenditure, to the magnitude of which the country had at last awakened. When the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Morton Peto) complained of the increase of clerks, and professed his inability to understand it, he would suggest to him that probably one cause might be that we lived in a free country, where we had constituents, and where it was thought necessary to provide an unreasonable amount of patronage for the benefit of those who sent them there. It became the more necessary, therefore, for the House to redeem its own character by watching the more narrowly this expen- diture. He wanted especially to know why they maintained two establishments abroad for the manufacture of arms? and why the English workmen employed in those establishments could not be employed at home, under the superintendence of the existing staff in this country? If the hon. Member received a satisfactory explanation as to the soldiers' lodging money he should recommend him not to propose the diminution of that item, because he thought that it was desirable that married soldiers should be accommodated in the manner which had been mentioned. He spoke quite disinterestedly, because he had lived to a considerable age without the advantage of a wife; but he thought that it was necessary for the morality of the army that some such provision as this should be made for married soldiers. But he did not understand how, if the amount was fixed last year, it should have increased this.

said, he could not assent to the proposition laid down by the hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto), that there was no proper control over this expenditure because it was in the hands of gentlemen who were appointed for political reasons, and who were changed so frequently that they had no time to learn their business. The practical effect of the change which he recommended would be to place the control of the expenditure in the hands of permanent officials, who would become, in fact, the Members for their several Departments. Instead of a Parliamentary Secretary of State for War, the hon. Baronet wished to have a permanent Minister for War, who should not have a seat in that House, He could not conceive anything which would tend more directly to destroy our whole system of Parliamentary Government. We had been accustomed to think that the practical responsibility of Ministers to Parliament was enforced by their having seats in that House, and being liable to he called upon to defend their conduct face to face before Parliament. If those who had the control of expenditure were removed from Parliament it would soon be found that the House of Commons had lost its control and almost its influence over the management of departments, and, although the name of Parliamentary Government might be preserved, the substance would be at an end.

thought that some light might be thrown upon the Estimates, and some assistance afforded to the Members of the House in considering them, if they were accompanied by annual reports similar to those which were presented to Parliament by the Post Office and the Customs and Excise Departments. He thought some explanation of the 198 clerks should be given to the House.

entirely concurred with what had fallen from the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) with reference to the proposal of the hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury. The fact was that they already had a permanent Establishment whose constant effort was to increase the Estimates which the Parliamentary Secretaries were engaged in a constant struggle to keep down. He wished the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State to give some explanation as to the cost of supervision compared with the amount expended upon works abroad. From the detailed statement which accompanied this Vote it appeared that at Gambia £320 was paid for the supervision of the expenditure of £463; at Honduras, £277 for the supervision of the expenditure of £82; at Jamaica, £550 for supervising an expenditure of £623; at New Zealand, £300 for supervising an expenditure of £352; and at the Windward and Leeward Islands, £1,411 for supervising an expenditure of £2,869. It was possible that the persons to whom these largo sums were paid might have other duties to perform, but no mention of such duties appeared in the Estimates.

admitted that there was in some cases an apparent disparity between the cost of supervision and the work done, but there was a good deal of work done in the way of ordinary repairs which had to be superintended and which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Ayrton) had omitted to include in his calculations. He admitted that greater economy might possibly be introduced into the system of superintendence. That subject had not escaped the notice of his noble Friend (Lord Herbert), and a Committee bad been appointed to consider whether a more economical system might not he devised. The plan now in existence was too military in its nature; a little more of the civil element might be introduced, he thought, with advantage. With respect to the local expenditure his explanation was that the actual amount of the expenditure of former years had been inserted in the Estimates. With respect to the civil allowances, the increase in the Vote had been caused in conse- qnence of a new warrant as to the rank of civil officers, which had recently been altered in a very liberal manner; and the increase in reference to stationary quarters was in consequence of adopting the report of a Committee of that House. As to the comparison between the expense of our army and that of the French which had been drawn by the hon. Member for Finsbury, it should be borne in mind that there was an essential difference between an army raised by conscription and one raised by voluntary enlistment. But beyond this we had not the means of a fair comparison. In the French Estimates they would find that the expenses for the defence of Algeria were omitted, as well as other most important portions of the expenditure upon the army, so that it was difficult to get at the real cost. He agreed with the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) that it was important they should have correct accounts from our great manufacturing departments, and there were ample materials for giving the House complete accounts. It should be his duty to get such an account prepared for the past year for the Enfield Factory, upon correct commercial principles. As to the discrepancies alluded to, they amounted simply to this—that there was difference of opinion as to what should be included in the capital and plant of the factory and what not, and he repeated that all the authorities wished was to have an account prepared upon a satisfactory principle. The establishment at Pimlico was not for the manufacture, but for the repair of arms; and the Committee must be prepared for a further expenditure under that head, now that there was such a large quantity of arms in the hands of the Militia and the Volunteers. The attention of the Secretary of State would be directed to the various suggestions which had been made, and in the Estimates of next year they might expect some reduction in the expenditure comprised under the vote now under discussion.

explained that what he meant to draw attention to was that these Government establishments had a tendency to perpetuate and increase themselves; and he repeated that the supervision was hindered by the frequent changes in the political heads of Departments and that directly Under Secretaries became competent to their duties they were removed from their offices.

thanked the hon. Gentleman for promising to give Dr. and Cr. accounts of the expenditure of the manufacturing establishments. Seven years ago a Committee recommended that a proper Dr. and Cr. account, in reference to these establishments, should be prepared, and he hoped that that recommendation would be at length complied with, so as to enable Parliament to judge of the expense. It would form a most important precedent in reference to the one establishment to which he had referred; and if the account were properly prepared, any private Member could judge of the expense the same as he could that of any private establishment of his own. Another object to be gained by such an account was that it would enable them to check the charges made by private manufacturers, and, above all, they would cease to be in that state of positive ignorance which they now were in reference to these matters.

said, that having been for years connected with one of these factories, he wished to express his opinion that the system of manufacturing by the Government ought not to be carried beyond the point necessary to ascertain the actual cost of the articles, and check the prices of the contractors. Nothing, he thought, could be more pernicious than that we should keep all the work in Government establishments without giving anything to contractors. The more we could disseminate the manufactures for Government over the country the more we should increase our supplies in case of need. If we concentrated all our resources in Woolwich we should render that an extraordinary object of attack to an enemy. The reason why the French, in their wars with Austria, aimed at Vienna was not simply to possess the capital, but because the Austrians had concentrated round Vienna their military manufactures, and to lose Vienna was, therefore, a most serious disaster. If all our resources were in Woolwich it might be a gain to any enemy who landed to carry it with a loss of 20,000 men; but this would not be so if our supplies were manufactured in various parts of the country. The present case of the United States was exactly in point. The United States had only two establishments—one at Harper's Ferry and the other at Springfield—and the first they had been obliged to destroy; and if a blow were struck by the South it would, no doubt, be at Springfield. The position which America was in in consequence of the system pursued was that she was obliged to send to this country for arms with which to carry on the war. He was glad to see that this principle was being recognized in the manufacture of the Armstrong guns, some of which were made at Woolwich, and some at Newcastle.

thought that after the distinct pledge they had received from the Under Secretary for War, that the subject of this debate was under consideration with a view to economy, it would be best that the hon. Member for Lambeth should withdraw his Amendment, and allow the Vote to pass.

said, the Under Secretary for War had not touched the point he raised.

said, they had to consider along with this Vote the Vote of £2,200,000 for stores, or a total sum of more than £3,000,000. He wished to know what had become of the enormous accumulation of stock which the large sums voted under this head for the last few years must have produced. At present the Government would be able to produce, with the machinery at their command, in six months, as many guns as were used during the Crimean war. That, of course, diminished the necessity of keeping an enormous amount of warlike stores on hand. About £1,400,000 of the Vote was for the navy, the remainder for the army. They were expending £724,000 on small arms alone, which was very nearly as much as the French spent on their stores of every kind. If he did not get a satisfactory explanation with regard to the stores in hand he should move a reduction of the Vote.

said, that we were completely in a transition state as regarded fire arms, and he was afraid we must submit to a large expenditure under this head, not only for this year, but for many years to come. It was only within the last three years that the principle of the rifle cannon had been adopted in Europe. The French commenced the system, and France was followed by Austria. He thought it was to the credit of England that she waited for some time before she commenced. The result of that delay was that England had the finest artillery in the world. For this they were indebted principally to that great philosopher, as he might well be called, Sir William Armstrong. He had not only produced a powerful, but a most simple gun, which could easily be worked. Nor was the country more indebted to Sir William Armstrong for his rifled gun than for his admirable system of preparing the fusee and filling the shell. There was not a wooden ship which his guns would not blow out of the water in a very short time. They had heard a good deal of the iron-built ships of the French, and they were obliged to build such if they wished to resist the large shells which were now thrown by the Armstrong guns; but, at the present moment, our ships were in a condition to attack an iron-built ship, which could not be said of any other country in the world. We must be prepared to look the matter in the face, for, as he had said, the present great expense was due to the transition of the system. The adoption of this gun had rendered necessary a complete change of the armament of our troops and ships. During the Chinese war the French officers had sent home such favourable accounts of the effects of the Armstrong gun, that the Emperor of the French, who was himself an artillerist of no small reputation, adopted the plan of getting a number of articles written in the French newspapers depreciatory of this very gun, which General Collineau had asked Sir Hope Grant to let a column of his troops have for the attack in Pekin. No country could produce the iron to resist these guns in such quantity as this country, but all these changes required a great deal of expenditure, and justified the largeness of the present Vote in some respect. They could not make 100 pounder gun at less than £800, and that showed how great must be the cost of arming their ships and fortifications with such an arm. In his opinion, the Government could not have taken a smaller sum for the Estimates for this head this year.

wanted an explanation of the fact that, after nearly two years of preparation for putting the country in a thorough state of defence, £3,000,000 were required for warlike stores, with every prospect of its being increased in future years. They were perfectly ready to meet any expenditure necessary to obtain the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, but the Committee ought to require a clear and satisfactory explanation.

gave Her Majesty's Government great credit for placing the country in such a position as to be perfectly safe. He was not himself a man for war, but he was strongly attached to his country, and he could easily understand that it must always be necessary for a country like England to make a large and liberal outlay in order to keep the several departments in a state of efficiency. The whole world was in that condition that the Government would have betrayed their trust if they had neglected to make due provision against a war breaking out, and he feared that they would have to make it while the French Emperor ruled in France.

said, the Committee ought to watch the casual expenditure rendered necessary by the improvements in weapons, lest it should become the normal expenditure of the country.

, in reference to the observations of the hon. Member for Limerick (Mr. Monsell) said, that the Vote for wages was intimately connected with the Vote for warlike stores, and the main part of the money voted for wages was spent in the preparation of rifles, great guns, and ammunition. He would remind the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) that only a small proportion of the whole expense of the Armstrong guns was for the gun itself, the carriage, equipment, and ammunition requiring the rest. The whole cost of the Armstrong guns would be at least £800,000. The ammunition for these guns would come to £500,000, making the total expense £1,300,000. For small arms making under contract the sum of £500,000 was taken, and for those manufactured by the Government £370,000, and these two sums being added to £1,300,000 made about £2,000,000 out of the £3,000,000 which the two Votes together came to. He could account for the whole of the expenditure in detail, if he were not afraid of too far troubling the Committee. With respect to the expenditure, it was to be considered whether it was not wise in the present condition of the armaments of other nations to supply the army, and especially the navy, with the most perfect weapons. The Committee must bear in mind that the state of the other warlike stores had been very unsatisfactory of late years, and it had, therefore, been necessary to increase the expenditure on that account. It was hoped, however, that the increase was temporary, and that the expenditure would he less next year, and still less in the year following. He was certain that the Commitee would be of opinion that this Vote was the last that should be reduced. They might rely that every care would be taken in the expenditure of the money.

thought the hon. Gentleman had not answered the question of the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) as to what had been done with guns and ammunition hitherto manufactured, and also the small arms. They had sold this year an enormous quantity of stores, amounting to £275,000. He should like to know what they were, and why they would not answer for the purposes of the country?

said, that those who paid the best would naturally get the best iron. This country produced a very limited supply of the first quality of iron, and could not afford to sent it abroad; but by going into the market the Admiralty would get iron of the best quality by paying the best price.

said, that the Tower was one of the largest military store establishments in the country, and a large number of assistants was required. The arms manufactured had been given out to Her Majesty's regiments, to the Militia, and to the Volunteers. A largo number had also been distributed to the navy, a large number had been assigned to the Government of India and the store was rapidly assuming respectable proportions.

hoped the hon. Gentleman would allow the next Vote to be taken.

said, he would withdraw his Motion.

said, that some time ago he moved a Resolution for the discontinuance of the stoppage from cavalry officers in respect of forage. The Government opposed that Resolution, and continued the stoppage. He saw in the present Vote charges for forage for the Staff. (Cries of "Read!") He was reading. It was his duty to read. The Estimates were put into the hands of Members that they might read them. Hon. Gentlemen who signed a "round robin" to the Minister in January last, calling for a reduction in the public expenditure, ought to assist him and other hon. Members who in that House made practical efforts to keep down the Estimates. He begged to move the reduction of the Vote by a sum of £12,454, which would be equivalent to a stoppage of the amount expended in forage for the Staff.

said, he was glad to hear the observations of the hon. Member. Sixty Gentlemen had written to the Prime Minister, enforcing the necessity of economy, and many of those sixty hon. Members were now found voting steadily with Government against those Members below the gangway, who really endeavoured to enforce reduction.

said, that though the hon. Member for Devizes objected to the system of stoppages, his present Amendment would have the effect of extending that system.

wished to explain that, in voting for the Resolution of the hon. Member for Devizes for discontinuing the forage stoppage from cavalry officers, he did so because he saw that the effect of stoppages was to make it impossible for any one but one man of fortune to hold a commission in a cavalry regiment. The present Secretary for War and his right hon. predecessor in that office had both spoken in favour of doing away with the stoppage for forage from cavalry officers.

was aware that the officers of the cavalry were justly anxious to see the forage stoppage done away with; but he would not rob Peter to pay Paul by voting for the Amendment.

said, that his intention in moving the Amendment had been to bring the argument of the Under Secretary for War to a reductio ad absurdum; but having made that demonstration he begged to withdraw the Amendment.

proposed that the Vote be reduced by the sum of £4,500.

explained that there was no allowance made to officers of the Guards for mess.

said, he would withdraw his Amendment.

inquired what was the cause of the great increase in the cost of fuel and lighting, the amount being £172,000 as compared with £112,000 last year.

said, that the reason of the increased cost was that it had been found that the cost of last year considerably exceeded the amount voted. The sum now asked represented, he believed, the actual amount which would be required, and it had been carefully estimated this year.

said, the Under Secretary for War had several times told the Committee that the amount actually expended exceeded the estimate. He thought they had a right to know out of what funds the excess was paid.

inquired why the Resolution had been taken in Committee of Ways and Means; and also how it happened that the Excise duties on chicory were 8s. 6d. while the Customs' duties amounted to 12s. 6d.?

said, notice had originally been given of the Resolution in Committee of Ways and Means, and it was thought better to adhere to that arrangement. The difference between the Customs and Excise duties would be intelligible when he stated that chicory being a plant which only ripened every second year it would not have been fair to impose the full duty on a crop which was not grown in contemplation of it; or, on the other hand, to give the benefit of the increase to the British grower exclusively in one year.