said, he could not but express his surprise and regret at the opposition of some hon. Members on that side of the House. That opposition was neither consistent with Liberal opinions nor was it calculated to advance the Liberal character of the House, and he could only account for it by supposing that through pressure of business those hon. Members had been unable to study the subject. The objects of the Bill had been some what misrepresented. Originally no person, of whatever set, was absolved from the necessity of taking oaths. Afterwards the Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists were excused from taking oaths, and by a subsequent Act the exemption was extended to those who had formerly belonged to either of those sects, and who, though they had left those bodies, yet retained the scruple. In 1853 the Common Law Commission recommended that persons holding conscientious religious objections to the taking of an oath should be allowed to make an affirmation, it the Judge was satisfied of the sincerity of the objection. In, 1854 a clause was introduced into the Common Law Procedure Act to carry out the suggestion with regard to civil cases, and the objections taken to the clause were rather on the ground that it left too much to the Judge than on any ground relating to its principle. The present Bill only proposed to extend the present law in civil cases to criminal cases. That extension was even more safe than in the former case, for in civil cases witnesses had more frequently an interest in the matter in dispute, whereas in criminal cases the witnesses were for the most part persons accidentally present at the circumstances to which they deposed, and who had no interest in the matter. In 1849 a Bill to that effect passed through the House, and it was then as now alleged that persons did not usually object to be sworn. It was proved, however, that numerous persons had been sent to prison to mix with common felons because they objected to swear on a book, which, as they conscientiously believed, forbade them to swear at all. He believed that the Bill under consideration had not had fair play, as it was confounded with a Bill which had also been introduced this Session, and which had been lost. That Bill was intended to abolish oaths in a certain sense, and he had supported it because he believed to abolish oaths in a certain sense, and he had supported it because he believed that the oath had not that religious sanction which was supposed to form its whole vitality. But the Bill under consideration had no connection with or resemblance to that other Bill. On the contrary, it preserved the religious character of the proceedings. He believed, however, that many Gentleman had formed an opinion against the Bill solely because they thought it was similar to that other Bill which had been lost. The effect of the existing state of the law was that well known offenders often escaped punishment because the most material witnesses might have a religious scruple against taking an oath. He had no hesitation in stating that in his opinion the evidence of an objecting witness, whose sincerity was above suspicion, was more credible and trust worthy than nine-tenths of the persons who too often rushed into the witness-box without thinking of the responsibility they were incurring in taking an oath. As an example of the cases in which conscientious objectors were imprisoned, he might mention the case of a lady of birth and position, who was called as a witness in a case at Lewes in 1848, and who, though informed by the Judge, the late Mr. Baron Alderson, that she must take the oath or he would be compelled to send her to prison, respectfully but firmly re- fused, on the ground that she considered it to be unlawful according to the literal interpretation of the text in Scripture. She was accordingly sent to prison. She afterwards wrote to the plaintiff in the case, saying that she could not bear that he should be put to the loss of the money to which he was entitled through the want of her evidence, and she, therefore, begged him to accept a cheque which she enclosed for the amount of his debt and costs. Was that a person whose evidence ought to be rejected as unworthy of belief? And yet if a murder were committed, and that lady were the only witness, she would be rejected under the present law, and the murderer would escape. He hoped the House would allow the Bill to go into Committee, in which case he thought there would be no objection to the clauses, for they were identical with the enactments of the Common Law Procedure Act.

, having presented a petition from the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce in favour of the Bill, said, the object of the Sheriff Small Debt Courts Extension Bill is simply to extend the summary jurisdiction of these Courts from £12 to £25. It allows actions of greater value to be tried by consent of parties, admits the attendance of agents, settles the amount of fees, and provides an appeal on points of law. The Bill is, therefore, merely an extension of the existing system, and the adoption of certain principles sanctioned by seventeen years' experience of the County Courts in England. But each point now introduced was proposed when the present Act was discussed in 1853. It is not correct, therefore, to say that there is anything new, crude, or merely technical in the change now proposed. When the English County Courts were first established, the summary jurisdiction was limited to £20, but after four years' successful trial that limit was raised to £50. In Ireland it had been gradually raised from £10 to £50. Now the Scotch resident Sheriff is an educated lawyer, and holds a similar position to that of a County Court Judge. He is reckoned competent to decide summarily in cases up to £12, and, if so, is equally competent to decide cases up to £25. For the importance of a correct decision on a question of £12 is surely as great to a poor man as is £25 to a man in better circumstances. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Sheriff in his ordinary Court is unlimited in amount, so that it can hardly be argued that the present Sheriffs are not competent to deal summarily with cases up to £25; but in Scotland we have a system of double Judges in our County Courts which does not exist in England, and which does not exist in England, and which leads to great expense and delay. It introduces the most objectionable practice of appealing the whole facts and circumstances of a case by written pleadings from the Judge who has heard the evidence and seen and examined the witnesses to one who has not had that opportunity. The expense and delay thus caused in cases up to £25, is out of all proportion to the value of the sum in dispute, and is in many cases practically a denial of justice. In the Summary Court, the Judge's decision up to £12, as compared with the tedious processes of the ordinary Court in all cases above £12, is, in cost and delay, as shillings to pounds, and days to months. I have obtained returns of the actual cost and delay in several of the most important Scotch Courts from the year 1853 to the present time, from which it appears that, on litigated cases between £12 and £25 in value, the average amount of expenses found due by the unsuccessful party was about £15, and the average duration of the cases about ten months; that is to say, that, by the present system, it costs £15 in expenses, and takes ten months to establish a claim of between £12; and £25; in the Sheriffs' ordinary Courts. But, whilst that is the average delay, a litigant who is fighting for delay may stave off a decision for two years. I have had a case sent to me in which the arts of the system are very foreibly illustrated. The sum at issue was £13 14s. The first proceedings were taken on the 27th July, 1859; proof in March, 1860; judgments given in September, 1860, and January, 1861; and final judgment on the merits in March, 1861. But this did not end the matter, for the case was still in Court on the question of expenses, the amount on which, on one side, was between £60 and £70, and this, too, when the original sum in dispute was only £13 14s. It may be stated broadly, that in no litigated case can a decision be ob- tained in the ordinary Court in less than six months, or at a less cost than the whole amount in dispute up to £25, the proposed limit of this Bill; whereas by this Bill all cases to that amount may be settled in a few days, and at a cost of a few shillings. But there is a peculiar hardship in cases where no defence is made, and these comprise more than 60 percent of the whole. In the Summary Court, such cases, "decrees in absence", cost 3s. 7d. each; in the ordinary Court between £2 and £3. Now, as the number of such "decrees in absence" in the ordinary Courts amounts to upwards 6,000 in the course of a year, this Bill will effect a saving, in such cases alone, of utterly useless expense to the amount of near £12,000. By this Bill I propose to continue the system of allowing no appeal up to £12, but to give an appeal on points of law above that sum. This system, but with no appeal up to £20, has worked admirably in the County Courts in England, in which 5,440,000 plaints have been entered between 1847 and 1857, involving a sum of upwards of £16,000,000 sterling, and from which there has been only 177 appeals to the Courts at West minister. I regret that the Government have not themselves taken up this question, which has long been most anxiously desired by the people of Scotland. Petitions in favour of it have been presented from the most important seats of industry—from Glasgow, Edinburgh, the county of Lanark, Forfarshire, Aberdeen, and the Convention of Royal Burghs, and I have this day presented one from the Chamber of Commerce of Edinburgh. In 1852 the whole country was agitated on the subject, and the claim was then for extension to £50. The Lord Advocate passed a Bill in 1853 which raised the summary jurisdiction from £8 6s. 8d. to £12 only. In England after four years' trial it was raised from £20 to £50. I now ask that in Scotland after eight years' trial it should be raised from £12 to £25. In so moderate a measure I trust that the House will be guided by common sense, and by the experience both of England and Ireland. It is no fault of mine that the measure has not been brought forward by the law officers of the Crown, and the House will, perhaps, recollect that the County Courts Act, from which England has derived so much advantage, was originated by a private Member, and was at first opposed by the legal advisers of the Crown. This is a question of principle, on which laymen are quite as capable of judging as lawyers; there are no technical points of detail, and such Amendments as are required can be introduced in Committee. I regret that, owing to the late period of the Session, I cannot now hope to carry through this measure. But I have been anxious to state its object; and, as it has been very favourably received in Scotland, I shall now give notice, in withdrawing the Bill this year, that early next Session I shall introduce a measure with the same object.

said, before the hon. and learned Gentleman expresses the opinion of the Government with regard to this measure, I am anxious to address a few words to the House. I am extremely sorry that my hon. Friend has felt it incumbent upon him to withdraw the Bill. The questions involved in it are so simple a character, are so thoroughly understood, and are so desirable, that I think the Bill, late as the Session is, might have been assented to without discussion, and have passed on the spot. For my own part, I must confess that I cannot see why the Judges of the Sheriff Courts in Scotland should not be as capable of performing the duties of Judges in Small Debt Courts as the Judges who now so advantageously preside over the County Courts in England. I believe that the Bill of my hon. Friend merely provides for Scotland that which it fully deserves—namely, a cheap and expeditious mode of recovering small debts. The Bar of Scotland holds as high a rank as that of England; and there is no reason, therefore, to presume that justice could not be as well administered in Scotland under the change proposed by my hon. Friend as is now the case in England. There is consequently, in my opinion, no reason for maintaining a distinction in such a matter as this between England and Scotland; and I cannot conceive that any difficulty could have arisen if my hon. Friend had persevered with the Bill. The only difficulty which could have been anticipated must have been the apprehended indisposition of the House of Lords to pass such a measure at so advanced a period of the Session, and I am convinced in my own mind that that apprehension has really no foundation. The House of Lords fully appreciates the advantages which the establishment of County Courts has conferred upon the people of this country, and I for one have not the slightest doubt that even at this advanced period of the Session they would not have interposed obstacles to the introduction of the same benefits into Scotland.

After what has been stated by my hon. Friend (Mr. Caird), that it is not his intention to persevere with the Bill this Session, I shall reserve any opinion I might have had to express in reference to the merits of the propositions contained in the measure until it may be brought forward for discussion in a future Session. At the same time I feel it my duty to say a few words upon the conversation which has taken place in regard to this Bill. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, who has just addressed the House, appeared to think that, as the law with regard to the recovery of small debts now stood, Scotland laboured under some considerable disadvantage in comparison with England. Now, my own opinion is that, instead of sustaining any injury, Scotland is at present particularly favoured. There exists in Scotland what I believe has no existence either in England or Ireland—namely, a local jurisdiction, which is reasonably rapid and comparatively cheap. Therefore, before such a change as that proposed by the present Bill is introduced, it behoves us to consider what great advantages would be conferred upon Scotland by an Amendment of the existing law. The present jurisdiction for the recovery of debts, leaving out of the question the Sheriffs' Court jurisdiction, which extends only to debts up to the amount of £12, is not even confined to £20, but is without any limit whatever, and embraces within its scope a great variety of subjects. It is much cheaper than the Queen's Courts, which, before the establishment of the County Court system, were the only resources for the recovery of debts in England. Returns which were moved for some years ago when this question was brought under the discussion of Parliament, showed that the average cost of litigated cases in the Sheriffs' Courts are exceedingly moderate; and as the jurisdiction is summary as well as cheap, there have been no complaints of the law as it now stands. No doubt there are cases between £12 and £25 which may involve as difficult points of law as much larger sums, but at present no difficulty is experienced even upon that point. I fully admit that under the English County Court system the recovery of small debts is both expeditious and economical; and in the large towns of Scotland, the extension of the principle may be attended with advantage; but it is extremely problematical whether, in country towns, where now for a few pounds a decision can be readily obtained from the Sheriff, the same advantages will be derived. If my hon. Friend had simply proposed to raise the small debt jurisdiction to £25, I do not know that there would have been any objection to his Bill; but he proposes to complicate matters by granting an appeal to the Court of Session. I am not prepared to say at present whether that would be advisable or not, but I am fully prepared to state that the machinery which would be introduced under the Bill would be much more cumbrous than that which now exists.

I understand that in contested suits the expense now reaches about £15. That is much higher than the cost of a contested suit in this country, under the County Court system; and I think the introduction of a system that would render the process of the recovery of small debts in Scotland more economical would be a great boon. I sincerely trust that the hon. Gentleman will renew his application for a Bill next Session; and I have no doubt that if it succeeds in obtaining the sanction of this House, the people of Scotland will derive great advantage.

said, he objected to the Bill, on the ground that it would abolish Grand Juries within the metropolitan district. It seemed to him that, although the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Walpole) had moved the second reading of the Bill on a former day, no one really cared about it—not even the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge, who was not in his place to take charge of it.

said, that any- one was at liberty to move an order that stood upon the paper. He was favourable to the Bill, and he, therefore, in the absence of the right hon. Gentleman, opposite thought himself at liberty to move the second reading.

said, he should move the adjournment of the debate. It would be extremely inconvenient if, in the absence of hon. Members who had charge of Bills, other hon. Members, without being authorized by them, were to move the Order of the Day. An hon. Member might for some good reason determine not to proceed with a Bill, and then next day he might find that some one behind his back had forwarded it a stage.

said, that the course he had taken was by no means unusual, for at the end of the Session scarcely a night passed over without some instance of the practice. He had, however, just heard that the right hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill wished the Order of the Day to be postponed.

said, he had given notice of his intention to move a clause on the rating of coal mines, but that owing to the lateness of the Session, he would withdraw the clause, reserving to himself, however, the right to move for the appointment of a Select Committee next Session to consider the subject.

remarked that an Act was passed some few years ago consolidating the law relating to the assessment and collection of county rates, and he believed the law had been found effective, but the Metropolitan Board of Works desired to introduce a new system of assessing and collecting its own rates, instead of adopting the law on the statute book. It was a very inconvenient course of proceeding, and was adopted because the representative of the important parish of St. George's, Hanover Square, had assumed a disagreeable attitude. The better course for the Metropolitan Board of Works would be to introduce a short clause, giving them the same power to collect their rate as the justices had for the collection of the county rate. In that way the Board would be relieved from the inconvenience of exercising their patronage in appointing a great number of rate-collectors. There would then be one law for collecting both rates, and much inconvenience would be saved to the ratepayers.

said, the original Bill was faulty in this respect, that though it enabled the Board of Works to levy a precept if the parish refused to raise the money, they had no power to compel it. In the absence of his hon. Friend (Mr. Tite) he could not consent to striking out the clauses, but he would rather that the Chairman report Progress.

said, that the proposal of the hon. learned for the Tower Hamlets was a very reasonable and proper one. The rates which were levied by the Metropolitan Board were imposed upon the basis of the county rate, and that being so all that was required was that the Metropolitan Board were imposed upon the basis of the county rate, and that being so all that was required was that the Metropolitan Board of Works should have the same power of levying the rates as the county magistrates had. He should move, therefore, the omission of the clauses on the subject, or would consent that they should pass on the understanding that upon the Report a clause should be introduced which would carry out the object of the hon. and learned Gentleman.

said, that he would undertake to bring up such a clause upon the Report.

said, that he was informed that the Metropolitan Board had no distinct principle as to the mode in which they exercised the power which this clause conferred; and, therefore, they sometimes allowed an encroachment, and sometimes refused a very necessary work. For instance, there had been what he might term a monstrous exercise of power on the part of the Board of Works with reference to a church in Penton Street. They alleged that the church encroached on the road, which it did not do to the extent of one inch. In the same street there was a ginshop which the Board of Works had taken under their protection which projected more than the church did. A suit was instituted by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and Vice Chancellor Stuart had given judgment for them, and in the course of it made some strong observations on the conduct of the Board. On appeal that judgment was over ruled by Lord Chancellor Campbell on a dry point of law, yet the latter said that the Board had the right to give their assent to the projection, and that they ought to have given it. Since that decision had been given the Board had been written to for its assent, which had been refused. The consequence was that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had been compelled to take down the chancel of the church.

said, that in respect to the case referred to, the Lord Chancellor decided that the Metropolitan Board of Works was right—["No, no!"]— that they had kept within the scope of the Act of Parliament. The clause under discussion was considered by the Committee upstairs to be a proper one. The old Act gave to the Metropolitan Board of Works the power to assent to or dissent from any projection beyond the line of frontage in any particular street, and the way that power was exercised was this:—When any person wanted to make a projection he made application to the Metropolitan Board for leave, and the Board sent their superintending architect to examine into the matter, and upon his report the Board generally acted. Some twenty or thirty cases of that kind came before the Board every week, and it was very creditable to the Board that, having been in existence for several years, there was only one case to which exception was taken. Now the object of the clause was to give the Board power to carry out their own orders, a power which they had not at present. The clause would give the Board power to summon a person who might have put up a projection of which the Board did not approve, and a justice might order the alteration or removal of the obstruction, and the expenses to be paid by the parties acting in contravention of the orders of the Board.

observed that the Lord Chancellor expressly disapproved the judgment displayed by the Metropolitan Board of Works in the case he had alluded to.

said, he conceived that the explanation given of the expediency of the clause was quite satisfactory. The hon. Member for Southwark stated that in respect to a particular case the Metropolitan Board of Works had been guilty of misconduct; but, considering that twenty or thirty of these cases came before the Board every week, if their course of practice was a wrong one there would be numerous remonstrances against it, and that there were many was not alleged.

said, he was of opinion that the instance which had been adduced showed that the Metropolitan Board of Works had stretched their powers beyond a reasonable extent, and he objected to the present clause, because it would give the Board additional power to enforce their dissents. At present the power of enforcement was left to the local authority of the different vestries, which acted in this respect as a species of Courts of Appeal, and he for one was more inclined to trust the authority to them than to the Metropolitan Board.

said, he knew nothing of the particular case, but he knew as a member of the vestry that the present law worked inconveniently, inasmuch as the order was given by one body and had to be carried out by another, while sometimes the two bodies differed as to the propriety of the order. The clause would remove the difficulty, and he should, therefore, vote in favour of it.

said, that the Committee was about to inflict on individuals the necessity of defending themselves against the arbitrary discretion of the Metropolitan Board of Works; and he trusted, therefore, the intervention of the vestries would be retained. If, however, the Committee decided on abolishing such intervention they ought to give the parties the power of appealing directly to the Quarter Sessions. At any rate such an appeal would be better than one to the Court of Chancery.

said, he objected to old streets having their names altered at the pleasure of the Metropolitan Board, and he would, therefore, propose an Amendment providing that the re-naming of streets should not be left to the mere will of that Board, who might call them after their own names, but should be subject to the approval of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works.

said, he was surprised at the Amendment. The Government were quite ready to vote in support of the Board in reference to such matters as the pulling down of houses and the projection of buildings, and were content to oppose them when it came simply to a question of giving names to streets.

said, he believed the scheme adverted to by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Works—namely, that it had been proposed that streets should be called after the members of the Metropolitan Board—had originated in Punch. He trusted the Amendment would be withdrawn.

remarked that the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Works was hardly justified in endeavouring to throw ridicule on a body of men who, he felt bound to say, did not, as time would prove, deserve all the attacks which had been made upon them.

said, he had read the statement to which he had called the attention of the Committee in the newspapers, and if he were wrong in deeming it to be correct, he was glad to find he was mistaken. He had no wish to say anything against the Board of Works, for, as an hon. Member had stated, there was no lack of persons to do that.

said, he thought the power conferred by the clause of allowing the Board to name, or alter the name of, any street at their pleasure ought to be confined to cases in which there were duplicate streets, or in which several parts of the same street were called by distinct names—as, for instance, in the case of several blocks of buildings in the New Road.

said, he could bear testimony from personal experience of the inconvenience and confusion caused by streets in London being called by the same name.

said, that it was not a matter of first-rate importance, but it was as well that any legislation which took place upon it should be proper. In accordance with the existing law the Board of Works might, "where more than one street in the Metropolis was called by the same name, alter the name of all such streets, except one, to any other which the Board might think fit, subject to the approval of the First Commissioner of Works". The effect of the clause under discussion would be so to enlarge the power thus enjoyed as to enable them to alter the name of any street, whether there was a duplicate or not, and to make that alteration without the sanction of the First Commissioner. Unless some good reason were urged for conferring these enlarged powers he did not see why they should be given.

said, he would undertake, if the clause were passed in its present shape, to bring up a clause on the Report which would confine the power of the Board to the alteration of the streets in those cases in which they found more than one street of the same name.

said, he did not see why there should be any objection to the sanction of the First Commissioner being rendered necessary in these cases.

moved the insertion of a clause continuing certain exemptions from paving rates. He stated that in the case of Dock Companies, though they used the pavement in the neighbourhood for which they ought to pay, yet that they ought not to be assessed at the full value of their property, as a great part of their profit was made out of goods re-exported in bond, which passed over no pavement. This had been decided in a Court of law.

said, that the case referred to had been overruled; and that it was no longer held that the benefit derived ought to be taken into consideration.

opposed the clause, which was negatived.

then moved the insertion of a clause giving a right of appeal against the decisions of vestries and district Boards under sec. 159, 18 & 19 Vict.

objected to the clause, because there was an appeal at present in respect of all matters with regard to which parties ought to have an appeal.

opposed the clause.

said, the clause would virtually transfer to the justices the duties which Parliament had intrusted to the vestries and district Boards.

said, he not would press the clause, though he doubted whether the right to appeal was sufficiently clear.

moved to insert the following clause:—

"Notwithstanding anything contained in the 11th section of an Act passed in the 14th and 15th years of Her Majesty, chapter 104, any rector, vicar, perpetual curate, or incumbent, shall have such and the same powers of sale, exchange, and enfranchisement as are possessed by any Ecclesiastical Corporation, sole or aggregate, under any Act now in force; and the provisions of an Act passed in the Session held in the 23rd and 24th years of Her Majesty, chapter 124, shall, so far as the same relate to powers for the raising or application of money by trustees, allowances to lessees, arbitration, valuation, rate of interest, apportionment of rent, and substitution of titles on exchange, be applied, mutatis mutandis, to sales, exchanges, or enfranchisements of any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments in this Act comprised; but the proceeds of any such sales or enfranchisements, and any monies received by way of equality or exchange, shall be applied according to the provisions in that behalf contained in the said Act passed in the Session held in the 5th and 6th years of Her Majesty, chapter 108, and in the 21st and 22nd years of Her Majesty, chapter 57."