Mr. Speaker, I am desirous of saying a few words upon a matter of great interest and importance to the House, because it bears upon one of our most important privileges—I mean that privilege which is sanctioned by ancient customs, and I believe confirmed by the Bill of Rights—that there shall be perfect freedom of speech in debates of this House. It is our privilege to say whatever we think right in Parliament, and it is a breach of the privileges of this House that what any Member says in this House should be questioned out of this House by any person whomsoever. That is the corporate privilege of Parliament, and a most important one it is; for without freedom of speech on the part of Members of this House the proper functions of this House could not be adequately and usefully discharged. To counterbalance that latitude we have rules and regulations of our own. We have rules and regulations by which any Member is liable to be stopped by the person who sits in your chair, Sir—the Speaker for the time being—if he says anything contrary to the usages of Parliament, and contrary to those rules and regulations which, for the dignity and decorum of this House, have been established and practised, and which ought to be observed. But beyond this there is another rule established. Where it happens that the Speaker may not feel or understand the offensive force of some expression bearing on a Member of the House, it is competent for the Member with regard to whom any expression is used which is wounding to his feelings, or derogatory to his honour, to get up then and there, to stop the person who is speaking, and to appeal to you, Sir, and to the House to pronounce whether such expression is proper to be used or not. The way in which these general principles bear on the matter which I feel it my duty to state to the House is this:—In the course of 'Friday evening my right hon. Friend the Secretary for Ireland (Sir Robert Peel) used some expressions which, later in the evening, I was informed were considered by the hon. Member for Tipperary (The O'Donoghue) to be offensive to him, and to bear personally upon him. The hon. Member took no notice of these expressions at the time, and therefore nothing passed at the moment to lead anybody to think that consequences of any kind would follow from what I have stated. But late at night, after the House had been counted out on a division in Committee, and was therefore adjourned, it was intimated to me that the hon. Member for Tipperary had taken offence at some expressions used by my right hon. Friend, and that it was likely that results out of the House would ensue. Bearing in mind what the privileges of this House are, and that it is a distinct breach of privilege for any Member of this House to notice hostilely out of the House any expressions which have been made use of in debate within these walls, I thought it right, before quitting the House, to write to my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary for Ireland. If any intimation had been made to me before the House adjourned, then, of course, it would have been my duty immediately to have made some communication to you, Sir; but, the House having adjourned, that course was out of my power. I deemed it my duty to take this step of writing to my right hon. Friend, because, having the honour to be at the head of the Government of which my right hon. Friend is a member, and also having the honour to be charged with the conduct of the business in this House, I thought it was my duty to see that the privileges of this House were not violated in a manner which, I am sure, would have been painful to all parties in this House. This, then, is the letter—

"House of Commons, Feb. 21, 1862.

"My dear Peel,—It has been suggested to me that The O'Donoghue may contemplate sending you a hostile message in consequence of what he considers your allusion to him in your speech this afternoon; and I think it right, therefore, before I leave the House to remind you that such a proceeding by The O'Donoghue would be a breach of the privileges of the House, and that if you were to accept such a challenge, you would make yourself a party to that breach of privilege.

"Your duty, therefore, in such case would be to decline the invitation; and I should in such case deem it my duty to state the matter to the House at its meeting on Monday, in order that the House might deal with the matter in the manner which it has usually dealt with matters of the same kind on former occasions.

"It seems to me, moreover, that your official position renders it the more incumbent upon you to avoid infringing the privileges of Parliament and making yourself a party to what would be a public scandal.

"Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"The Right Hon. Sir Robert Peel, Bart., &c."

I wrote that letter late at night, and had it given to a messenger to deliver to my right hon. Friend early on Saturday morning. In the course of Saturday communications took place which led to a request,—not directly in the nature of the invitation which I had enjoined my right hon. Friend to decline—but proposals were made to him that he should name a friend. I requested my right hon. Friend to refer to me—not with a view of making arrangements for a meeting, but officially to refer to me the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had been commissioned to communicate with my right hon. Friend. I saw that hon. and gallant Gentleman this morning; I explained to him the bearing of the contemplated proceeding on the rules and privileges of this House, and I stated that I should deem it my duty to bring the matter under the notice of this House this day at half-past four o'clock, in order that you, Sir, and the House might deal with it in such a manner as might be deemed expedient. I also thought it right to inform the hon. Gentleman the Member for Tipperary that such was my intention, as he would probably think it right to be in his place at the time. I have now, Sir, done that which I think it was my duty to do; and I have only to say that, having brought the matter under the knowledge of the House, I leave it to you and the House to deal with it as you think fit.

It having been brought under the notice of the House that a distinct breach of its privileges has been committed by the hon. Member for Tipperary, it becomes my duty to call on that hon. Member to express his regret for the breach of privilege he has committed, and to give an assurance to this House that the matter shall proceed no further.

I beg, as the Friend of The O'Donoghue, that the House will allow me to say a few words in explanation; and I think when hon. Gentlemen have heard the statement, they will agree with me that I have nothing to regret in respect of the course I have taken in this matter. I believe that every one in this House read, if they did not hear, the debate on Friday night. They will recollect that in that debate very strong language was made use of by the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for Ireland in reference to my Friend the hon. Member for Tipperary. My hon. Friend, on hearing that language, did not avail himself of the rule which enabled him to call the attention of the Speaker to that language as a question of Order, but left the House very indignant and highly irritated. He called on me at the club on Saturday morning, and stated that he felt himself grossly offended at the right hon. Baronet's observations the previous evening. I begged him to put in writing the words which he felt hurt at, and he did so. I am bound to say that, having consulted with him, and having fully considered those words, I quite agreed with him in opinion; and for any act which may have been done I, and I alone, am responsible. The House heard the language used by the right hon. Baronet. As well as I can recollect, the language which was employed—refering to a meeting held at Dublin, and presided over by the hon. Member for Tipperary—the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary said that it consisted of "manikin traitors," who sought to imitate the "cabbage garden" proceedings of 1848, but that he was happy to say the call was not answered by a single respectable person. I think those were the words; if I am in error, let me be corrected. I thought over those expressions, and I arrived at the conclusion that they were words that no gentleman should rest under. I had the honour of being in the army for twenty-four years, and I am quite certain that no such language would be tolerated in that honourable profession. Entertaining that view, and having a very high opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary for Ireland, I was convinced that it would be only necessary for me to place before him the very injurious nature of the expressions made use of, and that he would give such explanations as would be satisfactory to my hon. Friend. I went to Sir Robert Peel's house on Saturday morning. He had just left to go to the Irish office. I followed, and had an interview with him there. I told him my hon. Friend the Member for Tipperary felt that the language which he had made use of on the previous night was such as one gentleman could not hear from another. I added that that was my opinion also; that my hon. Friend could not possibly rest under the words which had been used, and that I required an explanation. I told him the words attributed to him, and I asked him to let me convey to my hon. Friend that he meant no offence. I then went further, and tried by separating those words—I mean those expressions as to no respectable person having attended the meeting—from the other words in the offensive passage, and so to bring the matter to a satisfactory conclusion. The right hon. Baronet said he would adhere to the words in their integrity. I then asked him to refer me to a friend. He said I must write to him on the subject. I did write to him, and if the House wishes it, I will read the letter. It is as follows:—

"15, Charles Street, St. James's, Saturday.

"My dear Sir Robert,—As the explanation given by you to me regarding the words you made use of towards The O'Donoghue last night in the House is not satisfactory, and as the matter cannot possibly remain in its present position, I must request you at once to refer me to a friend.

"Faithfully yours, G. GAVIN.

"To the Right Hon. Sir Robert Peel, &c."

Well, Sir, on Saturday evening I received a letter from the right hon. Baronet, which was very short and sweet, Baying that he had referred it to a friend. I naturally supposed that I would hear the name, but no name was mentioned; and though the letter was written at four o'clock, I did not get it till very late at night. However, last night (Sunday) I got another letter from the right hon. Baronet, stating what the House has already heard—that I was to be referred to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. And the House will allow me to say that there is no one-in the House who, I think, would so readily respond to anything of the kind. This, Sir, is the letter:—

"Irish Office, Great Queen Street,

White-hall, Feb. 23, 1862.

"Dear Major Gavin,—In consequence of a communication I received from Lord Palmerston very early on Saturday morning, I referred to him the letter you addressed to me yesterday after- noon, and I have this instant received a reply from him desiring me to refer you to him."

I am yours very truly,

"ROBERT PEEL."

Major G. Gavin, MP."

Well, Sir, I did myself the honour of waiting on the noble Lord this morning. I stated to him that Sir Robert Peel had referred me to him for an explanation of the words which the right hon. Baronet had made use of on Friday night, and that I thought he would agree with me that such words were not to be passed over. The noble Lord then told me what the rules of the House were. I said, "Oh, my Lord, if this is to be taken up officially, there is no use in my taking up your time about it." I then inferred that the whole matter had been taken up officially—in fact, it had been reported to you, Sir, before I felt it necessary to wait on the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for Ireland for an explanation. I feel myself placed in a very painful position. I did what I considered to be my duty towards my Friend. I had to vindicate his honour, and I went about it in the only way I understood. The honour of the hon. Member for Tipperary was placed in my hands. It has now been handed over to yon, Sir, and the noble Lord at the head of the Treasury; and I hope you will preserve it.

The hon. and gallant Centleman the Member for Limerick, speaking on behalf of the hon. Member for Tipperary, has been permitted full latitude; but I must point out to the House that it would not be proper in the House to follow him to the extent he has gone, because one of the rules of the House is that any exception taken to words spoken in debate must be taken on the spot and at once; and no words spoken can be taken notice of afterwards in the House, if such exception has not been taken to them, and if the words themselves have not been taken down by the Clerk at the table. The value of that rule must be felt on the present occasion, because the hon. and gallant Gentleman has not professed to report to the House the exact words which have been complained of by the hon. Member for Tipperary. It is now my duty to inform the House that no discussion can take place on the words which were used on Friday evening. The time for discussing them has passed. A breach of privilege has now been brought under the notice of the House; and it is my duty to call on the hon. Member, who was guilty of what I must observe to him is an offence to this House, to express his regret that he has committed a breach, of privilege, and to give to the House an assurance that the matter will proceed no further.

Sir, I hope it is unnecessary for me to say that I should regret deeply to do anything to violate the privileges of this House. And I may say for myself that I would have been the last person in this House to say or do anything which might wound the susceptibilities of any hon. Member. I hope, however, that the House will accord to me for one moment the consideration which they invariably extend to any one who has a personal explanation to make. Having received this afternoon an intimation from the noble Lord at the head of the Government that he would feel it his duty this evening to make a statement with reference to me, I felt it my duty to attend in my place; and as I took it for granted that what the noble Lord had to say would refer to what passed on Friday night, I made a copy of the words used by the right hon. Baronet the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and which I considered personally offensive to myself. In rising to offer a very few words of explanation, I am sure I do not erroneously estimate the character of this House when I expect from it all the more consideration from the fact that the right hon. Baronet did all in his power to excite a prejudice against me. Perhaps the House will permit me to read the words which I considered offensive. Alluding to the alleged prosperity of Ireland, the right hon. Baronet said:—

"Of the justice of that opinion no more remarkable proof can be adduced than that which took place the other day, when there was danger of rupture with America, and Ireland was filled with American emissaries, who tried to raise there a spirit of disloyalty. A meeting was then held in the Rotunda, at which a few manikin traitors sought to imitate the cabbage-garden heroes of 1818; but I am glad to say they met with no response. There was no one to follow. There was not a single man of respectability who answered the appeal."

I felt that this language was personally offensive to me, and I thought that I could not let it pass. I felt that the right hon. Baronet had come down to the House, having made up his mind to disparage my social position, I would not attach any importance to assertions or insinuations made in the excitement of debate or in the heat of argument. I feel that great allowance must be made for speakers under such circumstances. But I am ready to do the right hon. Baronet the justice to say that his speeches bear the marks of very careful preparation. The meaning of the right hon. Baronet's observations was quite manifest, for his remarks drew the eyes of the whole House on me. What, then, was I to do? Could I submit to such an affront without forfeiting my claim to sit in the company of honourable men—without bringing disgrace on the memory of those whose honour I am bound to cherish, and entailing a legacy of shame on those who are to follow me? What was I to do? I am quite aware that the ancient mode of arbitrament has fallen into disuse; but, if it has, those unseemly manners which make it necessary have also disappeared. What course was I to take? I consulted with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Limerick, in whose hands I felt that my honour was perfectly safe, and on whose judgment—matured as it has been by experience acquired in the most honourable of professions—I could implicitly rely. I consulted with my hon. and gallant Friend; and he agreed with me that I was not only entitled to expect an explanation from the right hon. Gentleman, but bound to demand, and, if possible, to obtain that explanation. We did all we could to obtain an explanation. I am sure that the House will agree with me that there was nothing bullying in the tone we adopted. Well, we failed to obtain it; and, if I am forced to come to the conclusion that the right hon. Baronet is not in an eminent degree distinguished by those qualities for which his countrymen generally are remarkable, the fault is certainly not mine. I must say that whatever the right hon. Gentleman may think fit to say with regard to my political conduct or course of action, with regard to that I have nothing to say. He may talk as much as he pleases about cabbage-garden heroes, and with all the more freedom from the fact that the inferences which the right hon. Gentleman wishes the public to draw are based on the most flagrant misrepresentation of facts. When I state that the right hon. Baronet is perfectly at liberty to say what he likes of my political conduct, I may be allowed to explain it in this way—that I should consider myself perfectly justified, if I thought it worth while, to say that the right hon. Gentleman's conduct when he went to Derry and spoke, as he did of the Archbishop of Dublin was most discreditable. [Loud cries of Order!]But I do not feel myself justified in saying—

This is not an occasion on which it is competent for the hon. Gentleman to enter upon a general discussion of this nature. The matter is confined within much narrower limits.

I bow to your decision, Sir. But before I sit down I wish to say that I begin to be afraid that the mind of the right hon. Gentleman is not quite so hollow, and that there is much more of craftiness and cunning in his disposition than—[Loud cries of Order, order!] Then, in conclusion, I must say that the right hon. Gentleman is much mistaken if he supposes he can force me here to withdraw from a position [that I occupy elsewhere, or to renounce opinions that I conscientiously hold, and I which I conscientiously believe are held by the great majority of the Irish people, In conclusion, I have to thank the House for the attention they have accorded me, and I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the opportunity he has afforded me of exhibiting him in his real character. (Cries of Oh!)

I trust the hon. Gentleman is aware that the matter in question lies not between himself and the right hon. Baronet, but between himself and the House; and I hope he will not conclude his speech without some reference to the I position in which he has placed himself, with regard to the House.

I thought that I had already apologized to the House for committing a breach of their privileges. I think I may add—although after what has passed it is almost unnecessary to say so—but if it be necessary, I am ready to state the matter shall go no further. [Complaint being made to the House, by Viscount PALMERSTON, that The O'Donoghue, Member for the County of Tipperary, had sent a hostile Message to the right honourable Sir Robert Peel, baronet, Member for Tamworth, and Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in consequence of words spoken by the latter in Debate in the House on Friday last; and The O'Donoghue being in his place, Mr. SPEAKER called upon him to express his regret that he had taken a course inconsistent with the Privileges of the House, and to assure the House that this matter should not proceed further. Whereupon, after an explanation by Major Gavin, Member for the City of Limerick, who had conveyed the said Message, The O'DONOGHUE stated that he desired to acquit himself of any disrespect to the House, or its Privileges, submitted himself to its pleasure, and gave the required assurance.—Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, Lunæ, 24^o die Februarii, [862.]

Sir, I am induced to ask the question I have placed upon the paper from a personal experience which I have had of the great unhealthiness of the climate of Vera Cruz and the Fortress of San Juan d'Ulloa in, with slight exceptions, all seasons of the year. I make, Sir, no exception to the policy which directed the expedition to Mexico; but I shall lament beyond expression, if the fact be so, that, on the occasion of the French and Spanish troops marching into the interior, the English contingent be placed, not only in such a fatal, but in such an inglorious position as to remain in garrison of the places I have named, which will deny to that eminently distinguished corps the Royal Marines the opportunity of adding fresh laurels to those already gathered by long service. In a joint expedition all should share equality of fortune. I therefore ask the Secretary to the Navy, Whether the Royal Marines sent to act in conjunction with the troops of France and Spain upon service in Mexico were supplied with tents and field artillery; or whether their duties would be restricted to garrisoning Vera Cruz and the Fortress of San Juan d'Ulloa; and, in the latter event, whether due caution had been impressed upon the commanding officer to select a position where their health and sanitary arrangements could be best secured previous to their landing—Vera Cruz being surrounded with sandhills and pools of stagnant water?

in the Chair.

Sir, previous to bringing these Estimates before the Committee, I must briefly notice the remarks of my two hon. Friends in relation to the strength of the French navy. I am sorry to have to allude particularly to the number and classes of vessels of war belonging to that nation. We have had many discussions on this subject, and I am afraid they have often led to some ill-feeling on the other side of the water. I must say I think it undesirable at the present time again to enter upon this topic, more particularly as the public in this country has been convinced that the French Emperor has acted most honourably and fairly towards us. Under these circumstances, it would be much more pleasing to me to pass over this subject altogether, and confine my observations exclusively to our own affairs. But my hon. Friends seem to doubt the accuracy of the information of the Government; they seem to doubt whether the Government has not been deceived. But I am bound to tell the hon. Member for Sunderland and the hon. Member for Montrose, that every word the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) said last year with regard to the naval force of France is accurate; that every one of the iron ships mentioned exists. Six of them are afloat. [Ma. LINDSAY: Not afloat.] The Magenta and the Solferino are both afloat. I can give the names of the others if the Committee desire it. ["No, no."] It is true they are not all in commission, but they are afloat, and might be got ready for sea service in a short period of time. I am perfectly read to admit that we believe the preparations that have been going on in the French dockyards are not at this moment so great as they were at this time last year. But do not let anybody deceive themselves, or suppose that the French do not intend to add to their navy. We know that the Emperor and every lover of his country are desirous of having a powerful navy; and I can assure the hon. Gentlemen, without going further into details, that the force I enumerated to the House last year, all exists, and is all in a state of progress. However, I pass over this subject, at least for the present; and will now address myself to the Estimates I have to lay before the Committee. Sir, the total amount of the Estimates for the navy for the year 1862–3 is I £11,794,305. The amount of the same Estimates for the year 1861–2, including £250,000, the supplemental Estimate which Government asked and received in the summer of last year for iron-cased ships, and including the £364,338 voted a few days ago for an excess of expenditure to the 31st of March next, was £12,640,588. Consequently there is a decrease on the next year, as compared with the present, of £846,283. The decrease is caused partly by a diminution of the number of seamen proposed to be taken, and by the reduction under the heads of the purchase of naval stores, for building and repairing ships, and the purchase of steam machinery. There is another Vote on which there is a reduction—the Vote which refers to the transport of the army. On that Vote there will be a considerable reduction; and here let me say that in that Vote is included a sum of £42,000 for the paying off of the transports which have lately been employed in the North American expedition. I think I may truly state that when that £42,000 is paid, the whole expense incurred for that expedition, as far as the Admiralty is concerned, will have been completed. There will be no more to pay off. Upon some of the other Votes there is an increase. There is a considerable increase on the Vote for the Naval Reserve; and when I come to explain it, I am sure the House will be glad to agree to that increase, because it denotes that we are gradually bringing together a most valuable reserve. There is also an increase on the Vote for artificers, which is of no great importance. It is in consequence of our having decided that it was absolutely necessary that we should take on a considerable number of hired men for a limited time, with a view to repairing the ships employed in the China war, of which a great many have returned home. Their repairs are urgently necessary, and the Government therefore determined that there should be a slight increase in this Vote. Before I proceed to state the number of men we propose to take, let me ask hon. Gentlemen who study these Estimates to remark that though there appears on the face of the Estimates a decrease of no less than 9,000 men, yet that apparent decrease is simply in consequence of the Admiralty having thought it better this year to show distinctly the whole number of boys voted. In previous years the boys have been merged in the seamen, the only boys shown were the 2,000 under training. This year the men and boys employed are shown separately. The actual diminution of men is 2,000 seamen for the fleet, and 200 men of the coastguard. That is to say, for 1862–3 we propose to take a force, of officers, seamen, marines, and boys, of 76,000 men, against 78,200 for the past year. The proportion of boys remains exactly the same. I should inform the House that this reduction has already been partially effected. At page 16 of the Estimates will be found the number of men borne on the books in each month; and it will be seen that, of the whole reduction of 2,000, we have not now above 1,000 to reduce. The decrease will be gradual. There will be no breaking of faith with the seamen. As the ships come home and the men are paid off, all who desire to enter for continuous service, having good characters, will be permitted to do so; and, in fact, the only reduction will be by casualties, so to speak. An hon. Gentleman desired that I should state how the continuous service was working. I am very glad to say that it is working satisfactorily. Last year, I told the Committee that one-half of the seamen of the navy were continuous-service men. This year I am happy to be able to state that nearly two-thirds are continuous-service men. I propose now to follow the time-honoured custom of giving to the House some account of the state and condition of the navy. First of all as to our force in commission. We have at this time at home two line-of-battle ships, two iron-cased frigates, two frigates and corvettes, and four sloops; making a total of 10 ships in the Channel. In the Mediterranean we propose to maintain 9 line-of-battle ships, 4 corvettes, and 15 sloops, making a total of 28 vessels. On the American station we have, or rather had, 8 line-of-battle ships—a number which has been decreased by the lamentable loss of one, and that one of the finest vessels in the navy. The only consolation we can offer to ourselves is that there were no lives lost. She was lost upon a wild, broken coast, and it was a mercy that her crew were not lost also. We have also on that station 10 frigates and corvettes and 13 sloops, making a total of 31 vessels. On distant stations we have 22 frigates and corvettes, with 58 sloops, gunboats, and other small vessels, making a total of 80 vessels. The total force, therefore, is 19 line-of-battle ships, two iron-cased fri- gates, 90 sloops, gunboats, &c., 38 frigates and corvettes; making a total of 149 ships. We hope also to make a small addition to our Channel squadron. That is a general view of the intentions of the Government during the coming year. But I must also say that the Admiralty are very strongly of opinion that it is advisable—in some cases, at all events—to substitute frigates for line-of-battle ships. The frigates are, in many respects, in time of peace, better vessels. They are less costly, and require fewer men; they are good for evolutions for all service purposes; and, moreover, it is very desirable that we should have these large ships in reserve rather than always at work and necessitating repairs. I was asked the other day whether the Admiralty had not spent a great deal of money in preparing frigates for the North American expedition. The Admiralty did prepare a great many ships, but these ships will come in; part of them will be commissioned in lieu of several line-of-battle ships now coming home, and the preparation thus made will serve for the future requirements of the navy. In addition to the ships have enumerated, we have 2 coastguard ships and 9 blockships; making 11 ships in the coastguard service. Our total force afloat, therefore, will amount to somewhere about 160 ships of all sorts. With regard to our men, we propose to maintain on the home station during the coming year for service at sea a force of officers, marines, seamen, and boys, including the coastguard afloat, amounting to 15,200 men. In the Mediterranean we propose to maintain a force of 9,800 men; and on the North American and Mexican station 12,200, including 700 marines who are disembarked. That is a total of 37,200, which may be considered to be within call of home. In these days of steam it may fairly be considered that the whole of these men, and ships likewise, on the Mediterranean and North American stations, are practically available for all purposes of home defence, should it be necessary. We should have, besides, on distant stations protecting our commerce a force of 17,000 men, making a total afloat of 54,200 men. That is the total number of men we propose to maintain for the fleet and the coastguard afloat. I now desire to show the Committee that although we are asking for a smaller Estimate this year on account of the men, and, although hon. Gentlemen opposite may feel some alarm at any diminution of our force at the present time; yet when I state what force we have available for the year I do not think anybody on either side of the House will be of opinion that we are not in a fair state of preparation. At the same time, I do not think we have any too many men. The men that we have available for immediate service without calling on our reserves are the following:—We have in the home ports disposable—exclusive of boys in training—4,400 men and trained boys ready to go to sea. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich, when I made a similar statement last year, said, "But what are these men?" My answer is, that they are men we could put on board any ship we like. It was from this source that we manned three frigates at the late crisis, and there are nearly four frigates' ships' companies ready to put on board to-morrow. Then we have marines ashore 9,800, coastguard on shore 4,000, riggers in the dockyards—who are first-rate seamen, and ready to embark—700; able-bodied naval pensioners, 2,700; and able-bodied marine pensioners, 1,700—making a total force available, without calling on our reserves, of 23,300 men. That is our normal state of preparation, irrespective of everything in the shape of reserve. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Over and above the crews of all ships in commission?] Over and above the crews of ships in commission; including marines on shore, but excluding the training boys, who we think are not yet useful. We next come to that magnificent force which has just been created—the Royal Naval Reserve. It is impossible for me to say more than has been already said both in and out of this House as to the patriotic and noble conduct of the men composing that force. We may entirely rely upon those men. Everything which has occurred tends to show that they are men upon whom we may thoroughly depend. They are first-rate seamen. Every merchant gives them the preference in manning his ships. They are steady men, and all that we hear is to their advantage. Last year I was thought over-sanguine when I anticipated that we should raise 9,000 or 10,000 of these men within the year. To-day we have 10,000 and odd men either enrolled or just about to be enrolled. That is very satisfactory. It is quite right that we should be proud of this result, but it is also right that we should know the cost of it. We at the Admiralty have been at great pains to ascertain the cost of this force. If any hon. Member likes to move for the details, he will find them very interesting, and the Admiralty will be very glad to produce them; but, not to detain the Committee too long, I will state shortly that the cost per man, including the expense of training ships, their officers and crews, the retaining fees of the men, their lodging and provisions while on board, the pay of shipping masters, and every other detail, is about £13 per man per annum. Last year I put it at rather a higher figure; but of course as the men increase in number the expense per man diminishes, and therefore we may expect that when the full number is enrolled the cost will not quite reach that amount. That £13, however, does not include any provision for pensions. The Royal Commission recommended that a sum of money should be taken every year to be applied to the formation of a pension fund. The Government considered that scheme, but its advantages were not found to be such as to warrant its adoption. If we assume that the proportion of men obtaining pensions will be the same on the Reserve as among the seamen of the navy, the cost of pensions will average about £2 per man per annum. That of course is merely speculation, because as yet none of the men in the Reserve have arrived at the age at which they become entitled to pensions. I cannot pass from this subject without alluding to the scheme for officering the Reserve which the House approved last year. I am glad to be able to inform the Committee that the finest and best officers of the merchant service are flocking into our ranks. They are ambitious of serving their country, and I believe that we shall shortly have as many officers as we are authorized by Parliament to engage. It, therefore, becomes a most important question as to what is to be the future of this Reserve, especially as concerns their officers. Government have done everything that could be done in the way of giving full opportunities for drill—that is to say, by establishing at the principal ports drill-ships, superintendents of drill, and all that is requisite for that purpose. But what we can do in that respect must ever be limited to manual exercise at the gun. That which is essential to make a real gunner is target practice, and for that it is impossible that the Government can provide. I think it would be worthy of consideration in the future whether, when each one of these officers has studied the higher branches of gunnery, has proved himself competent to manage a gun, and has got a crew of Naval Reserve men, we might not supply a gun to his ship, exactly as they are supplied to the Volunteer artillery upon the coast. I throw that out for future consideration. If they are to be useful in action, they must have been taught to fire at a target; manual exercise can only be a very incomplete instruction for a gunner. I have stated that we have today more than 10,000 Naval Reserve men; we have likewise of Coast Volunteers 8,000. Taking the total force, including reserves, available for the defence of the country, irrespective of the fleet which is afloat, we have 40,800 men ready to go on board our ships if any emergency required their presence. And in making that statement I have made the proper deduction for the men belonging to the Naval Reserve who are on distant stations, and therefore could not be counted upon within, say, six months. Adding to this number our force in commission, we have a total force of, in round numbers, 95,000 seamen, marines, and boys. I believe that we are at last approaching a satisfactory state as regards our force afloat and our reserves. I now turn to another matter which is of vital and growing interest—the education of the force of boys which is maintained as a nursery for the navy. We maintain, at the present time, as I have stated, 9,500, of whom 6,500 are in the fleet, 500 are in the Coastguard ships, and 2,500 are in the training ships. We have at the principal ports five training ships, on board of which are 2,500 boys, and attached to these ships are four brigs, on board of which the lads are taken to practise them in seamanship.

Are the five training ships of the class recommended by the Commission?

Yes, certainly, they are line-of-battle ships; the Caledonia is one. These boys will, I believe, become a most superior class of sailors. They are well educated, and will turn out some of the most valuable men in the fleet, but they are very costly. I desire to impress this cost upon the Committee, because we are daily receiving requisitions from the great merchant ports, asking the Government to undertake the education of their boys. The Admiralty are fully sensible of the importance which is to be attached to the education of boys in the merchant navy; but, seeing how heavy our Naval Estimates are, I think that we are perfectly right in deferring what is called "the second or mixed boy scheme" of the Royal Commission until we can show some greater reduction in our normal expenses for the navy. These boys—and again if any hon. Member chooses to move for the detailed return, which will be found very interesting, I shall be glad to lay it upon the table—cost us nearly £45 per head per annum. The annual cost of each boy is within £5 of that of a marine, and within£15 of that of a seaman in the fleet. It is interesting to inquire how many seamen these boys supply per annum. We calculate that the waste of boys from discharge, death, desertion, and other causes, amounts to about 7 per cent per annum; and, taking the average period of training at three years and a half—they enter from 14 to 16—it gives us in round numbers 2,500 boys per annum; becoming seamen for the supply of the Royal navy. I now proceed to consider what is our annual waste, or casualties, in seamen. It is very remarkable what a small proportion of the whole number borne on the books is formed by the petty officers and seamen. Out of our total force of 76,000, including the Coastguard, we have only 40,000 petty officers and seamen. The Committee will be glad to hear that there has been a reduction in the number of desertions in the navy; so that, instead of taking 12 per cent for waste, as I did when I brought this subject before the Committee last year, I need only take 11 per cent this year. On the force of 40,000 the percentage of waste would therefore be about 4,400 per annum. Of these vacancies 2,500 are supplied by boys, leaving 1,900 seamen to be obtained from other sources. These details are important when considering how far we ought to carry the boy system—a subject which has very much engaged the attention of the Admiralty. Knowing the fine class of boys we can turn out, it might be argued that we ought to supply this deficit by increasing still further the number of boys; but ought we not to keep up a steady flow of seamen from the merchant service, in order that the distance and difference between us may be overcome? The Admi- ralty consider the present number of boys to be very much what is required for feeding the navy. As we are now happily at peace, and as I trust things on all sides look as if we need no longer entertain apprehensions of war, I think this may be a moment when the House will permit me to make some few remarks with regard to the condition of the seamen. My lamented Friend Lord Herbert, when he brought forward his Estimates, used yearly to devote a considerable time to informing the Committee how the soldiers fared in health, in position, and in prospects; and I will now endeavour in a few words to show the improving condition of the British seaman. A most important indication of the state of the Navy lies in the health of the seamen. We have Returns of the mortality of the fleet. The death-rate per thousand is, as compared with other branches of the Public Service, in some respects satisfactory, but in others, I am sorry to say, such is not the case. As regards the home station, the average is not above that of other public services—the police, soldiers, and so on; it is about 10 per thousand annually. But I regret to say that at some of the stations the death-rate has been very high—as high as 60 per thousand. These, I am bound to say, were exceptional cases, such as in the Chinese war, where the men were subject to great exposure. But the average on the whole of the navy is about 16 per thousand per annum. The Admiralty have been led seriously to consider whether some improvement might not be made, in regard, first of all, to the food of the seamen, and likewise with respect to the ventilation of their sleeping-places. We have had a Committee sitting some time, and the result has been that the Admiralty have decided to adopt every possible means of improving the ventilation of the ships. Hon. Gentlemen who have been on the lower deck of a frigate or line-of battle ship when the men are asleep will admit that the atmosphere there is enough to provoke disease. We have received reports from some of the large ships in the Mediterranean, showing that fatal diseases, phthisis, and fevers, are but too prevalent; and a principal cause of these is the crowded state of the decks This leads me to advert to what several Gentlemen—my gallant Friend the Member for Devonport among others—alluded to as being about to take place—the reduction of the complement of men in Her Majesty's ships. We propose as a tentative measure, that on hoard of certain large ships in the fleet the complement should be reduced in the following proportions:—In line-of-battle ships from 880 to 800 men; in some of the frigates from 570 to 510; in the smaller frigates from 350 to 310. I advert to this here merely to say that one of the principal reasons for reducing the complement of seamen is that ventilation may be improved. With regard to food, the House last year, at the suggestion of the Admiralty, allowed an establishment to be formed at Deptford where beef could be both killed and cured in our victualling yard. The operations there carried on have been productive of the greatest comfort and advantage to the seamen; but it is right to tell the House that its generosity to our navy has not been unattended with expense. The additional cost of providing first-rate beef is itself considerable, but depend upon it it is money well spent. The meat now purchased would be fit for any gentleman's table, and contrasts forcibly with the old "mahogany" we were used to in our young days. Both officers and men will now have very good corned beef. There are other measures which the Admiralty are desirous of carrying out; but these are matters requiring to be handled with the utmost consideration, delicacy, and care, because we know that seamen have a traditional suspicion of the Admiralty. Ever since the last century it has been the practice in the navy for seamen to receive allowances for "savings" of provisions. But this has been found to be a premium on starvation. Instead of being well fed, as we desire them to be, and as growing boys especially require to be, these latter, who are obliged to submit to the rules of their mess, together with the men, actually save so much out of their food often, in order that they may spend the amount on shore. The Medical Director General of the navy has reported that it would be greatly conducive to the health of the men if by any means that system could be done away with, but it is connected with the pay of the navy, and is therefore surrounded with great difficulties. With regard to the pay of the navy, I have often stated that the pay is above £3 a month, taking into account all the allowances they receive, and therefore higher than the pay of the merchant service, though sailors in the latter will not believe it. One can easily understand how this old-fashioned system of savings grew out of the wants of the day. The payments to men for their savings of provisions were very natural when the resources of the country were limited, and it was difficult to purchase provisions; but there is no similar object to be gained in the present day. I do trust, therefore, that whether by the present Government or by that of my right hon. Friend opposite some new scheme may be devised by which the men may be paid on a more simple plan, so that they will really know what they are receiving, and that, combined with that measure, this old-fashioned and detrimental saving system may be abolished. There are other matters also in which improvements may be made. On board the French ships, for instance, the sailors have baked bread as good as any gentleman could have in London or Paris. I think it very desirable that the British sailor should have soft baked bread instead of the perpetual hard biscuit. I state these matters to the Committee to show that we are alive to our deficiencies, and desirous in every way to improve the condition of our splendid service. We have received Reports stating that the greatest benefits have resulted from the distilling apparatus which enables the men in the fleet to have pure water. Every ship is now fitted with a distilling apparatus, so that in every part of the world our men are supplied with the best water. There are other points connected with their social condition, education, and other matters. As regards education, ought not our men to be educated as well as any men of a similar class in this country? I can assure the Committee that the desire of the governing body in the navy is that they should be. It is quite true that education has hitherto been given, but we called for Returns on the subject and could get none. We have had schoolmasters for a great number of years, but in most cases they were men of an inferior class, and the scholars could not have been expected to make much progress. However, we have applied to the Treasury lately for the means of appointing schoolmasters of a superior class, and we trust that education in the navy will be greatly improved. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty has undertaken to gather in statistics on this subject, in order that we may be in a position to judge of the results of the improved system. I cannot pass over another subject which indicates so clearly the amount of popularity of the Navy among seamen—namely, desertion. I hold in my hand a very interesting Return, to which I beg to call the attention of the Committee. It shows that a gradual improvement has been taking place, and that that improvement has not been checked since 1857, except in the year following; that in which the large bounty was given. In 1857 the desertions amounted to 5 per cent; in 1858 they fell to 4 ½ per cent; in 1859 to 4 per cent; in 1860 they jumped up to 5 ½ per cent; but in 1861 they had I fallen to 3 ½ per cent; From this Return the Committee will perceive that the desertions have fallen one-half per cent each year, with the exception of the year 1860. The high bounty was given in 1859, and in that year many men joined who ran away in the winter and spring following. One more Return and I will relieve the Committee of this branch of the subject. Corporal punishment in the navy has also been on the decrease. In 1857 it was administered to 3 per cent of the numbers in the fleet; in 1858 to 2 ½ per cent; in 1859 to 2 percent; in 1860, the date of the last Return, to only 1⅓ per cent. I think that decrease in corporal punishments is satisfactory; but hon. Members may wish to know the cause of the decrease. I may say that it is to be found partly in the fact that superior men are coming in; but it may also be traced to the disinclination of officers to inflict corporal punishment. We are to some extent substituting imprisonment for corporal punishment; but under existing arrangements imprisonment has its disadvantages, for by imprisonment in the ordinary gaols many a fine seaman is thrown into contact with immoral characters who send him back contaminated. What the Admiralty wish for, and for which we take a Vote in these Estimates, is a naval prison, governed by naval officers, and entirely under our own eye. We expect that out of such a prison men will come back to us improved instead of demoralized. There is one more point with regard to the condition of our seamen. I can assure the House that the subject of naval barracks has not been lost sight of. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphin-stone) has come down primed to attack the Secretary to the Admiralty on this point; but I do not think that my hon. Friend can have looked into the Esti- mates when he attacks us for not having provided for naval barracks; if he had done, so he would have found a very large item there for naval barracks at Devonport. [Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE: There is no provision for barracks at Portsmouth.] The hon. Gentleman is right there—there is no provision for barracks at Portsmouth. We admit the utility of such establishments; but we must not undertake too much at once—we must bear in mind the Italian proverb, Chi va piano va sano. We propose to commence with the construction of a barracks at Devonport. No doubt my hon. Friend would rather we began at Portsmouth. This question of barracks is one of immense interest, and the curious part of it is, how it has grown with the changes that have taken place in the last few years. My late gallant Friend Sir Charles Napier asked for barracks in order that our seamen might not be kept for four or five months aboard hulks while their ships were fitting out; but I must remind the Committee that we fit our ships out in a week now. Therefore on that ground we have no need for barracks; but we want them in order that our men may have a tour on shore. It would be very desirable to put them in barracks to go through a tour of duty on shore in the dockyards, where they would be eminently useful in fitting ships, and I trust will eventually enable us to dispense with a portion of the vast establishment of yard-craft men, riggers, labourers, &c. What the navy wants is organization. Hon. Gentlemen may have read Admiral Sir Frederic Grey's pamphlet on the subject. I am not bound to his or to any other particular scheme, but I do say that the navy wants to be organized. When our frigates were sent out last month, officers and men were put aboard them—but they were not organized—to use a vulgar expression, they were "chucked" aboard. Now, what we want is that they should be organized in barracks, that the men may know their officers and the officers their men. Let me now show the aggregate force of our navy, including all vessels afloat and building. I laid on the table of the House some few days ago a return showing all the ships now afloat and building. Hon. Members may have road that return; but it will be interesting to the public to know that on the 1st instant the number of screw ships of the line afloat was 57, and the number on the stocks building—or rather not building—for the operations have been suspended—4, giving a total of 61. I will advert to the iron-cased ships presently. The number of frigates was—screw, 37 afloat, and 7 on the stocks; paddle, 9; making a total of 44 screw and 9 paddle frigates. I will not detain the Committee by enumerating all the smaller vessels; but the grand total of our steam fleet was 580; composed of 525 afloat, and 55 building or on the stocks. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams) will admit that, however much he may deprecate our expenditure, we have something to show for our money. I will here advert to the question of the reduction of the armament of the ships, and I entreat the attention of hon. Gentlemen to this subject. The Admiralty receive reports from officers of various ships that they strain a great deal; and we know that these very long steamships, with engines in the centre, are liable to straining, and that in a great degree. Now, I know that some gentlemen, and among them naval officers, are of opinion that this straining is attributable to the ships being overmasted. I am not prepared to say that this is not the case in some instances; but what is manifest is this—that they are over weighted. Another thing which the Admiralty have to consider is that we have introduced Armstrong guns. Now, that means this—that our ships are now to mount a few guns carrying heavy shot instead of many carrying small shot. It is found that a 100-pounder striking a vessel does more damage than two 50-pounders. That is the principle. Our ships, to make any impression against iron-plated vessels, require very heavy guns—in fact, you might as well throw marbles against our iron-sides as shot of any smaller calibre. It was, therefore, necessary for the Admiralty to reconsider the armament of ships. Again, our present class of ships carry nominally a great number of guns, but many of these guns are utterly useless. You dare not fire them except right abeam, for fear of doing damage to the rigging. They cannot be trained to the right or left; and it is absolutely necessary on that account that we should get rid of some of these guns. Consider what an immense advantage it is to your ship if you can lighten your weight of guns and gun-carriages, and if you can keep up something like the weight of shot thrown from your broad- side. The result is—and it is a tentative measure—that the Admiralty have determined to try the experiment of reducing the armament of some ships of each class. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry) has moved for a return which will show in detail the reduction of the armament and complement in every ship, but it may be interesting that I should inform the House of some of the changes made. The Revenge class of 91-gun ships is the last type of the line-of-battle ships of our navy. The original armament before the introduction of the Armstrong guns was 34 8-inch guns of 65 cwt, 36 32-pounders of 56 cwt., 20 32-pounders of 45 cwt., and one 68-pounder, making a total of 91 guns. The weight of these guns was 533 tons. [Mr. CORRY: Including the gunners' stores] Yes. The weight of the guns of the Revenge class of ships—guns and gear—was 533 tons, carrying a broadside of shot 1,7801b. weight. The present scheme gives 30 8-inch guns of 65 cwt, 32 32-poundcrs of 56 cwt., 2 33-pounders of 45 cwt., 6 40-pounder Armstrong guns, and a 100-pounder pivot Armstrong gun. So that the weight, instead of being 533 tons, will be only 438 tons, being a saving of 100 tons in weight. Consider what a relief it is for a ship to have 100 tons taken off her decks. It is true we sacrifice the weight of the shot of the broadside. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: How many guns on the old and new principle?] 71 guns against 91, being a reduction of 20 in the complement of guns. We lose, I admit, the difference in the weight of the broadside between 1,7801b. as against 1,4841b.—that is to say, we lose 3001b. In the broadside. But that is made up by the advantage of having a few very heavy shot. I will not trouble the House any further on this head, as a full return on the subject has been moved for by my right hon. Friend. The Committee will observe that with this reduced weight of armament we are enabled to lessen the number of men to which I have already adverted, but my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphin-stone) complained that unless you also reduce the masts and yards, you will prevent the efficient working of the ships. Here is a proof that there need be no alarm on this subject. The Ariadne shas a larger area of sails, masts, and yards than Shannon, which is about to be reduced, yet the Ariadne has 100 men less. But there has been no complaint that I am aware of that the Ariadne cannot man her spars and sails. Every naval officer wishes to obtain as many men as possible for his ship. I always made a point of applying for more men; but it is for the Admiralty to judge in such cases. I now turn to our iron-cased ships, and it will be interesting that I should give the House some information as to their progress. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: What was the cost of the Warrior?] The cost of the Warrior, including all except her armaments, was £354,885. Her armament besides is about £13,000. We have now 15 iron-cased ships built and building, of which there will be, we hope, 11 afloat in the course of the present year. In the course of 1863 there will be 12 afloat—that is, one more—and in 1864 there will be 15; and in addition there will be a new ship, provided the Committee agree to the construction of a novel ship, to which I will presently allude. If the Committee desire it, I can give the tonnage and horse-power of these vessels. The first class of ships, including the Agincourt, the Minotaur, and the Northumberland, were agreed to last summer; they are in process of building, and they will be ready in 1864. They are 400 feet long, and it is expected they will attain a speed of 14 knots an hour. They will be of 6,621 tons. These ships carry their plating right round. The Warrior and other iron ships are only partially plated up to a certain distance from the bow and stern, but these vessels of the largest class are to be plated right round. The next class comprises the Warrior (which has been at sea, and about which I shall have a few words to say presently), the Black Prince, and the Achilles. They are of 6,100 tons, and have a speed of 14 knots. The next class of ships comprises the Hector and the Valiant, each of 4,063 tons, with a speed of 12 knots. The next class includes the Resistance and the Defence, which are of 3,668 tons, and have a speed of 11.45 knots, all these are iron vessels and to be partially plated. The next class is that of the Prince Consort, the Ocean, the Caledonia, the Royal Alfred, and the Royal Oak, which were begun as line-of-battle ships, and are now being converted to iron-plated frigates, and which are to be plated right round. Their tonnage is 4,045. They are wooden ships, and they are lengthened. The Prince Consort and the Caledonia will have en- gines of 1,000 horse-power, and an estimated speed of 12·41 knots. The Royal Alfred and the Royal Oak are of the same tonnage, with 800 horse-power and a speed of 11·52 knots. I am now obliged to ask the attention of the Committee to a totally novel class of vessel which we ask the Committee to consent to construct. Every one will remember the controversy with regard to the construction of Captain Coles's cupolas. Last year we carried on a series of extensive experiments with one of these cupolas. We put it on an old floating battery; we tried firing from it, and then we tried firing at it; and the result was that it stood the most complete hammering without- showing any considerable signs of weakness. The Admiralty were so impressed with this that they have since gone carefully into the matter, and we are now preparing an improved cupola—a double cupola—to carry two guns. And we are now proposing to construct a ship which shall carry six of these cupolas. She is to be of 2,529 tons, of 500 horsepower, and will carry 12 breech-loading Armstrong 100-pounder guns in these six cupolas. Her length is to be 240 feet, and her draught of water 20 feet. It is very important to consider whether we cannot construct efficient armour-plated ships of considerably less draught, and we propose to try the experiment with Captain Coles' vessel. She will have rather a singular appearance, as she will have no masts whatever, and will trust entirely to steam. Rigging is out of the question, as it would prevent her training her guns. She is intended for coast defence; and if she proves serviceable, she will have this very great advantage over other vessels—that her cost will be much less. I hope, therefore, the Committee will consent to our carrying out the plan. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: What will she cost?] I should be glad to state the precise cost for the satisfaction of the curiosity of hon. Members, but it would be very disadvantageous to the public interests that contractors should discover the cost of each separate vessel. It is in order to prevent that, we put the various vessels in one vote. I wish to say a word as to the Warrior. It is quite natural that a vessel of novel construction which everybody is watching should be made the subject of evil report and exaggerated statements. I will therefore state what I know concerning her. We have received a series of reports, from Captain Cochrane (who is one of the most skilful and valuable officers in the service). Everybody knows what weather the Warrior had to go through. Captain Cochrane describes it as terrific. It was so very bad that even that noble vessel had to lay-to. Such was the awful sea, that had she exceeded the rate of four knots an hour, her bowsprit would have gone under. In spite of the gale, however, she arrived at Lisbon without damage, except some trivial accidents, such as those to which every vessel is subject under the same circumstances. A vessel that could go through such a trial is fit to go round the world. It has been said, however, that she will not steer properly. It is quite true that such was the case. In her construction a detail of importance of the ship was neglected. The yoke was fitted in such a manner that she had not sufficient play for her helm. We usually give 36 degrees each way for the helm to move in; that is a quadrant of 72 altogether, but in this case only 26 degrees each way were allowed. It was only natural, therefore, that the Warrior could not answer to her helm; but that was the only serious defect in the vessel. I had the pleasure of being on board of her on her first cruise, and I must say she was the most wonderful vessel in which I ever put to sea. No doubt in the trough of the sea she has a tendency to roll; but she is fit to go anywhere in the world. I have made these remarks because there are several sinister reports abroad on the subject, which I believe are totally without foundation. A series of experiments is to take place next week, which will, in a great measure, determine the future of our iron fleet. Most of our present vessels, as you are aware, carry four-and-a-half inch armour plates, backed by 18 inches of teak. But we are going to make some experiments to test the value of some proposals which have been submitted to us: one plan is to have thicker plates and thinner wooden backing. Mr. Fairbairn declares that the wooden backing is disadvantageous, for it is liable to decay, and, owing to its thickness, interferes with the training of the guns. He proposes that we should have the armour bolted on to iron plates, instead of wood. Next comes Mr. Scott Russell, who says Mr. Fairbairn is right, as far as concerns the iron-backing instead of wood, but that bolt-holes weaken the plates, and who accordingly suggests a system of clamping between the plates, by which it would be unnecessary to perforate the iron plates. Lastly, Mr. Samuda insists that there is no necessity for the backing at all, and that it would be better to have much thicker plates, and incorporate them with the frame of the ship. Which of these gentlemen is in the right will be shown by our experiments. I now quit these subjects and come to the specific Votes. Vote 1 includes £82,117 for seamen's clothing. I am bound to say that the state of the accounts is not altogether satisfactory, and the Admiralty is anxious to devise a better system. Hitherto, ships' accounts have been made up only once in three years, and in consequence the annual Votes for clothing (which are repaid by deductions from the pay of the men) have been very irregular in amount; sometimes we have to take a large grant, sometimes a very moderate one, or perhaps none at all. We are going, however, to introduce a system of annual accounts, by which we can keep this Vote more uniform. I have looked into the accounts for the last few years, and I find that the deductions from pay have replaced the outlay for the purchase of clothing. A novelty in this Vote is the appointment of an Inspector General for the Marines, which has been deemed necessary, in the same way as appointed for the Line and the Cavalry. As to Vote 2, while there is a reduction in the number of men, there is an increase in the estimate for victuals. That is caused partly by the curing at Dept-ford being more expensive than when performed by contract, and partly by the rise in the price of flour and beef. I now come to Vote 3, to which I must ask the attention of the Committee. You are aware that a Royal Commission which inquired into the affairs of the Admiralty reported to the effect that if the Naval Department was to work with due efficiency it must have all its Officers under one roof. That recommendation had been made over and over again during a course of many years. The late Sir James Graham, as far back as 1835, recommended to bring the several branches of the department together. Well, I believe measures are at last about to be taken to accomplish this desirable object, by the construction of a wing to the Admiralty, which will correspond with the rest of the building, and will face the Park, and then all the departments will be contained under one roof. The Vote for that purpose is not in the Estimates now before the Committee; but if it is possible to commence operations this year, they will be brought in by the First Commissioner of Works; and it is my business to inform the House that, after careful consideration, Her Majesty's Government have resolved to propose this matter to Parliament. There are two or three points connected with this Vote which I shall mention. There is one Office which we have found it necessary to create—namely, that of Acting Constructor. The work in the Controller's Office has been vastly increased, chiefly in consequence of the building of iron cased ships, and the improvements that are constantly being adopted. The Admiralty, therefore, with the consent of the Treasury, have appointed an Acting Constructor. Two important appointments in connection with the shipbuilding department, and recommended by the Royal Commission, have also been made. I beg j to call the attention of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Mr. Dalglish) to this matter. There has been appointed, first of all, a Deputy Accountant General, who is to relieve the Accountant General of a portion of his vastly-increased work. There is likewise to be an auditor of yard accounts, who will be an independent officer, and is to serve as a check upon the expenditure in each dockyard. Now, I am informed by the Accountant General that the very best effects have already followed in the dockyards in consequence of the new system of accounts; but every effort should be made with a view to bringing the system to still greater perfection. Lastly, we have a proposal for a transport Department, as recommended by the Transport Committee of last year. As far as the Admiralty are concerned, they have thought it desirable that there should be a distinct transport office. The War Office, I believe I may say, thinks so too; j but the heads of the Colonial Office are entirely averse to the scheme. They have given strong reasons against it, and have altogether declined to entertain it. The Indian Department also object to the change at present. They think that, upon the whole, the present system of transport of troops to India is at once most economical and satisfactory. The result, however, is that the War Office and the Admiralty have taken up the scheme, and it is intended that there shall be a transport officer to manage the transport busi- ness. I have already gone into the question of the Naval Reserve and the additional cost in consequence of the increase of numbers, and therefore I will say no more upon Vote 4. With regard to Votes 5, 6, and 7, I do not know that there is any need I should trouble the House with any remarks. With regard to Vote 8, it is intended to reduce the establishments of the dockyards to the standard recommended by the Committee of 1850, and in the event of our requiring at any time an increase in the number of men, instead of adding to the permanent establishment—which would give a title to superannuation—we shall take on hired men. This year we take £30,000 for a certain number of hired men. The men we propose to take are for the repair of the ships which have come lately from China. They will be discharged in the summer, when they will have opportunities of obtaining work elsewhere. I pass over Vote 9, and I come to the great Vote of all, Vote 10. Hon. Gentlemen complain that we do not give information as to how the money is really spent, or how it is intended to be spent; which is voted for naval stores, for; the building and repair of the fleet, for: steam machinery, and ships built by contract. I must say that each year lets more daylight into this Vote, and it will be observed that it is this year divided into two sections. I wish to inform the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) that his good advice with regard to timber has been followed by the Admiralty. We have now 74,000 loads of timber. We expect to consume during the next year about 43,000 loads; last; year we consumed nearly 80,000; but we are now returning to more quiet times, and the result is that our expenditure of this article is much reduced. If the Committee agree to the sum which we ask, we shall find ourselves at the end of this year with nearly 80,000 loads of timber, which I think a very good and satisfactory stock. The reduction in the Vote would have been considerably greater but that the St. Petersburg crop of hemp failed last year; the result was, that we got scarcely any, and we had to take a very large vote for hemp this year in consequence. One word with regard to the framing of this Vote. It has hitherto been one Vote, but the Admiralty, with the view of giving to the House of Commons greater facilities for checking the amount, have divided it into two wholly distinct Votes; thus taking away from themselves the power of transferring the money that had been voted for one purpose to another. Now, let me state what we propose to do with the money which we ask for in this Vote. We propose to build 20 1–8 of wooden iron-plated frigates—which is equal to 2½ vessels. In line-of-battle ships we do not wish to make any progress at all; and to sloops and smaller vessels we intend to devote our best energies. Where the navy requires the greatest amount of energy at the present time is in sloops and a superior class of gunboats, of which we intend to build eighths—equal to about fourteen vessels. Some hon. Gentleman has said that we have vast numbers—more than all the world besides—of these smaller vessels. So far from that being the case, I could show that we have not in proportion a number sufficient to maintain that superiority at sea which we must ever maintain in all classes of vessels. Now we come to the next point—steam-engines. I ask the Committee to attend to this, because a question as to the liabilities of Government arose last year in dealing with this subject. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droit-wich (Sir John Pakington), who generally speaks with great kindness, attacked me for stating that we were already pledged to certain sums. I think it right and fair, when you are asked to agree to a Vote, to tell you what is the ultimate cost of that Vote. The Admiralty, therefore, desires to show the expenditure which a vote entails not only in the present but during future years. If you turn to page 63 I will explain the new system. It will be seen that the Vote for engines already ordered is £415,880. That is what we propose to take in this year and next year. Deducting £108,900 to be voted in future years, we require for engines already sanctioned by the House £306,980. I am also going to ask the Committee to agree to order a certain number of new engines, the cost of which will be £276,000, of which we propose to take during the present year, £130,440. As to that branch of the Vote, it is entirely within the power of the Committee to give the whole or a part of it. None of those engines are ordered; but if you consent to it, you will of course be pledged to the remaining sum of £145,560 in future years. That is what we ask you to allow us with regard to steam-engines. With regard to ships building by contract, some hon. Gentleman moved for a return of the cost of these ships. I stated why it was not advisable to give the cost of each ship. The ships building by contract are, besides the Hector and Valiant, two troop-ships, and four iron-cased ships, three already sanctioned, and one, Captain Coles' ship. Therefore the House has already agreed to three out of the four iron-cased ships, and it is for the Committee to decide whether we shall commence the fourth ship. The effect of all this is that the Vote is £966,141 for vessels building by contract, both the new and those sanctioned by Parliament. There is one item with which I must trouble the Committee. It is the last item which is altogether a novelty—"for experimental purposes, sundries, and possible contingencies, £40,000." This is a large sum, I admit. But let it be clearly understood that if we are going to build these novel vessels we must, if we are to have anything like a certainty of success, experimentalize on a large scale. It is the worst policy in the world to stint your experiments, and I must tell you that in the course of building these iron ships we continually see that some little change is necessary. I have a great dislike to alteration of ships, and I have often expressed it; but it is inseparable from the very novelty of these ships that we should have here and there to make alterations. I will state frankly that I am not prepared to say we shall spend it all; but you must remember that in contracts we are tied down to a certain sum, and there must be some margin in case any little alterations should be required. I have only a word or two to say upon the next Vote, 11—the expenditure on docks. The great want of the day is large docks. We hear on all sides that we have not docks enough, and that we must have larger docks. It is true, that if we are to build these very large ships, we must enlarge our docks. The Committee last year agreed to the enlargements of Chatham Dockyard, and I have no doubt it will become a magnificent arsenal. In the present year we propose to lengthen one of the docks at Portsmouth within the basin, to enable such ships as the Minotaur and Warrior to enter. We likewise propose to lengthen a dock at Keyham for the same purpose. We ask for money to commence our naval barracks at Devonport. We likewise ask for a Vote to allow of building at each of our great yards ma- chinery for bending iron plates. One of the most difficult processes is bending the plates. It is very easy to get plates either rolled or hammered. An hon. Gentleman asked whether we were going to use rolled plates. From experiments we have made we find there is very little difference between rolled plates and hammered plates, only the machinery must be very powerful to roll plates above five inches. At present nothing exists to roll plates above five inches in thickness. We propose to erect at each of the five building yards hydraulic machinery, by which the plates when supplied may be bent on the spot, and put on the ships there and then. It is right I should allude to the Vote 16, for civil pensions. The increase caused by the Superannuation Act of 1859 is very considerable; in fact, my belief is, that if you take the average, you will find that the Superannuation Act very nearly doubles the pensions of artificers. It is a serious question, and I call the attention of the Committee to the probability that these civil pensions will increase year by year. Then we come to the last Vote—namely, the Vote for the transport department of the army; and here we have a considerable decrease. But I wish again to repeat that the £42,450 which stands at the head of the Vote is the last instalment for freight of ships on monthly pay, and that with that exception the Supplementary Vote included all the expenses for North America. I cannot leave this subject without one word in recalling to the Committee that which, no doubt, has struck many before—namely, the marvellous power of this country, which enabled us to send off this mass of transports at a short notice and at such a time of year without in the least degree disarranging the intercolonial and packet service. I merely mention it as interesting to every one. I now thank the Committee for having listened to me so patiently. I can assure hon. Gentlemen that we are fully impressed with the magnitude of these Estimates. I am quite sure that there is no department which more earnestly desires reduction of expenditure than the Admiralty. But remember that we have been constructing a new navy; that we are constructing a new navy. Remember that we are organizing a vast corps of Reserves, upon whom in all future time the power of this country will greatly depend. It is the bounden duty of every department of the Government to look first to the protection of our country. We have lived in troublous times. If we can live at peace with all the world the Government will be only too thankful to decrease the Estimates. At the same time, I will be no party to any great and sudden reduction which will cripple the navy and imperil the safety and honour of the country. The noble Lord concluded by moving the first Resolution—

"That 76,000 Men and Boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services, including 18,000 Royal Marines."

I think the noble Lord who has just sat down has shown himself fully entitled to the attention which he acknowledges to have received from the Committee. The noble Lord has made a statement—which, indeed, occupied a considerable time; but it is full of interest, and he has made it with that degree of clearness and frankness which has characterized his statements on previous similar occasions. I agree so very much in what has fallen from the noble Lord that I am happy to say it will not be necessary for me, in following him, to trouble the Committee at any very great length. There are, however, one or two points in the statement which, I confess, I am unable to regard with feelings of entire concurrence, and with regard to which I shall be glad to elicit some further information. The noble Lord explained what was the amount of force kept in commission; he also explained the manner of its intended distribution; but the noble Lord appeared to reduce the Channel Fleet within limits which are hardly consistent with what of late years has been acknowledged to be fairly required by the interests of the nation. I understood the noble Lord to say that the Channel Fleet was to be reduced to two line-of-battle ships—two of the iron-plated ships—I suppose the noble Lord means the Warrior and the Black Prince; and then he mentioned—

Two frigates and corvettes.

That would amount to some six or seven sail.

Ten sail.

I am glad to hear the correction, for I did not understand from the noble Lord that the Channel Fleet was to consist of so many as ten sail. I even now feel afraid that that limit will be too narrow. I am sorry to learn that there are only to be two line-of-battle ships in the Channel Fleet; because I am of opinion that maintaining a strong Channel Fleet is not only connected with the question of national defence, but with a most important question, also, with regard to the existence of a first-class school for training and disciplining our men. In these days nothing is more desirable than that attention should be paid to steam tactics; but up to the present moment, notwithstanding the large steam fleet which has been spoken of, there is a great want of practice in steam tactics, and I could have wished that the Channel Fleet had been still larger than I now hear it is to be. To the next statement of the noble Lord I attach great importance. I allude to the amount of men not at present in barracks, but who may probably before long be provided with barrack accommodation; and who are at this moment at the disposal of the Admiralty over and above the crews of the ships in commission, and to afford relief as the existing crews are paid off. As I understand the noble Lord, there are at this moment sufficient men in hand to man four frigates. If that is so, I heartily congratulate my noble Friend on the fact that the Admiralty has approached nearer to that state of things which it has on all hands been confessed we ought to be in than was ever the case before. This is, I think, essential to the power and dignity of the Royal Navy; it is a power which, I think, we should never be without. As to the amount of our Reserves, what was stated by the noble Lord was also very satisfactory. I could not help remarking that the noble Lord seemed to draw in to his aid every possible element of which that relief could exist; and I am not quite sure that he did not attach more importance to the Coast Volunteer force than it deserves. But here, again, it is impossible to deny, with any candour or truth, that there is a material and gratifying advance, very much owing, no doubt, to the labours of that Commission of which my hon. Friend opposite was a distinguished member; and I am exceedingly glad to hear that the present Admiralty are carrying out the recommendations of that Commission. Already we have derived great advantage from carrying out their recommendations; and we shall derive still more and more benefit in proportion as we persevere in that course. I have always believed that one of the most important parts of the recommendations of that Commission was that relating to the school training ships. I am glad, therefore, to be able to infer from what fell from the noble Lord that the five training ships to which he referred are, in fact, a portion of that new system; and I attach importance to this part of the plan, because it will, more than any other portion, tend to connect the Royal navy and the merchant service; and I am glad to find that the noble Lord is thoroughly aware of the importance of establishing a good understanding between those two services. We must look to the Royal Navy not only to give us additional strength when the day arrives that we may require it, but I look to it as the source of the great improvement which, I think, will be derived from it by our mercantile marine. I have heard with sincere pleasure that so many men of the mercantile marine have enrolled themselves in the force. I am also exceedingly glad to hear of the success of that new plan, which was announced by the noble Lord during the last Session of Parliament, of deriving officers from the mercantile marine for the Royal Navy. It was a very bold experiment on the part of the Board of Admiralty; and I have heard with great pleasure this evening that so many officers of the mercantile marine have been willing to comply with the terms offered and to tender their services as part of the reserve on which we depend for officering the Royal Navy in times of emergency. The next point on which I wish to say a few words, and which I am afraid is one of the portions of the noble Lord's statement in which I am least able to agree with him, is the reduction of the complement of our ships. This subject was adverted to early in the evening. I am sorry to say that while willing to allow full weight to any explanation which the noble Lord may still afford us, I am at present obliged to say that I do not regard the explanation which the noble Lord has already given as quite satisfactory on this point. Much to my surprise, the noble Lord, when he spoke as Secretary of the Admiralty, attributed the diminished health of the men to the ships being overcrowded; but when, immediately afterwards, he spoke as a sailor he told us he had ever been anxious to get as many men as he could. He did not seem to have any misgivings about the state of the lower deck; he was only anxious not to see the ships under-manned. So far as my noble Friend's speech went in dealing with the necessity of ventilation as a means of increasing the health of the British sailor, to that extent I go with him; but when he says we are to be so anxious for the health of our crews that we are going to reduce our complement of men, I fear the effect will be to weaken the efficiency of our men-of-war, and I do not at all go with him. This is not a new question. What was it that induced that very distinguished sailor, Admiral Berkeley, to resign his seat at the Admiralty a few years ago? Was it not this very question of reducing the number of our crews in time of peace? and that to such an extent that the ships could not be worked—that is to say, that they could not be worked without imposing undue labour on the men, and placing our officers in a humiliating position when they came to work their ships in the presence of men-of-war of other countries. I believe the question immediately involves the honour of the nation. There is another matter. You will not find our sailors satisfied and willing to embark in the service of the Royal Navy, if they are to be over-worked because the ships are under-manned. The matter is worthy of attention, in reference to the complement of men to be awarded to the new class of ships coming into existence. Our former principle of manning ships-of-war turned on the number of guns. That, of necessity, is at an end. You can no longer judge by the number of guns the size of the ship. The largest ship in the navy is the Warrior, but she has only forty guns. So that the system of regulating the crew of a ship by the guns must be abandoned. Hereafter you must regulate the crews of ships by the size of the ships and the work to be performed, and I am afraid that the Admiralty have fallen into a mistake when they propose to reduce the crews in the large ships from 880 to 800, and in first-class frigates from 570 to 510. I am afraid the result will be dissatisfaction to the crews; and that they will be found insufficient in numbers to work the ship. The next point related to the savings of the crews. I am very happy to say that, so far as I can form an opinion on the subject, I believe the decision of the Admiralty to be perfectly right. The practice of allowing men to make savings is false in principle, and the change which they propose is most judicious. I was also very glad to hear of the intention of the Admiralty to establish prisons especially for the navy. I doubt how far it is wise to adopt the general principle of shutting up sailors in gaols instead of giving them a flogging and sending them again to work. I am somewhat afraid that there has been a tendency in successive courts of Admiralty to interfere too much with the discretion of the captain in the command of his ship, and to deter him from carrying out that discipline which is so essential to the welfare of the navy. Of this, I have no doubt, however, that the Admiralty are perfectly right in avoiding the practice of sending our sailors to the common county gaols. That, I think, has been attended with the worst results; and if seamen are to be shut up in gaols, I think they should be confined in prison under the authority and regulation of the Admiralty. My noble Friend has spoken in a tone of pride of the manner in which ships have been fitted out in a week. Well, I was one of the first to draw the attention of the House to the state of things which formerly existed, when three, four, or five months were consumed in obtaining a crew. I hope that is for ever at an end. At the same time, without a pressing emergency, I doubt the wisdom of fitting out our ships in a week; and I am satisfied that the Board of Admiralty are going much too fast when they fit out a ship in a week. I doubt much whether, with so small a preparation, a ship can be sent out in a condition to do us credit as a part of the British navy. The next point is the reduction of armaments. On this point I speak with diffidence. It is one of very great importance, and I have heard the statement of my noble Friend with very great doubt. I believe he rested the necessity of the change on the straining of our ships. But is the weight of the guns the cause of the straining of our ships? Is that the real cause? I believe the fact to be, without question, that many of the men-of-war have strained. But why? I believe, not on account of the weight of their guns, but on account of the weight of their engines. I am afraid that the tendency to strain lately found in our largest ships is the unavoidable result of the adoption of steam, and of the use of those heavy engines down below which are now held to be necessary. I doubt the policy of reducing the armament, and thus impairing the efficiency of our ships. I should be glad to hear what is said on this point by experienced judges; but I hope that this point, as well as the reduction of the crews, will be further considered before the Admiralty determines finally on its adoption. It was with great satisfaction that I heard of the determination to try an experiment with Captain Coles's invention. Having had the plan explained to me, my strong desire was that the Admiralty should determine on a fair trial of the experiment; and I hope the feeling of the House of Commons will be, that, whatever the cost, the Admiralty are only taking a prudent course in fairly trying, in these days of science, any new invention which holds out a fair prospect of success; and I do think it only fair to say that Captain Coles's invention does seem to hold out a fair anticipation of the result. With regard to the Warrior, I was glad to hear the statement of my noble Friend; but I wish the noble Lord had gone on to state whether or not the deficiency or defect in the construction of her helm could be remedied. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: It has been remedied.] But my noble Friend did not tell us that it was altered, or even that it was considered capable of alteration. Well, then, it appears to be a defect in the Warrior no longer. I have also heard with great satisfaction, that the Admiralty is about to leave Somerset House. I hope that is finally determined upon, so that the whole of the Admiralty business may be brought together at Whitehall. I understand the noble Lord to say that this will be effected by the building of a new wing. I did not, however, understand where that was to be. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: Spring Gardens Terrace.] No one who has had any experience of the Admiralty can doubt the very great inconvenience that has arisen from the division of the business between Somerset House and Whitehall, and I am glad to hear of the removal, which I am sure will effect a great improvement. There is only one other point on which I would still detain the Committee, and that is with regard to the extension of our docks and dockyards. The Committee must be of opinion that the extension of our navy and the great change which has taken place of late in the class of our ships, lead indisputably to the necessity of an extension of our dockyards; and I heard last year with great satisfaction of the determination of the Admiralty to make a further extension in the dockyard at Chatham. I am sorry, therefore, to perceive that comparatively a very small sum is taken in the Estimates of the year for that purpose. The sum is so small as even to raise doubt in one's mind whether the Admiralty are proceeding with the extension at Chatham at all. I hope there is no vacillation on that subject; but that we are going on with the extension of the dockyard at Chatham. I need not detain the Committee with any further observations. I hope that my noble Friend will be of opinion that I have met his statement in a fair spirit. I have taken that course with great pleasure, because, I trust, that in these Estimates I see that determination on the part of the present Board of Admiralty to take the course which I believe to be the imperative duty of whatever Government may be in power—namely, not to allow themselves to be diverted from any steps that may be necessary to maintain the strength, the efficiency, and the glory of the British navy.

said, he would admit that nothing could be more clear and able than the statement of the noble Lord; but he was astounded at the vast increase of the expenditure of the naval department within the last few years. He should like to know the ultimate object of these vast increases in our naval armament. Our navy was already double that of France, and exceeded that of all the rest of the world put together. In 1852, the number of men voted for the navy was 39,000, and in the hottest year of the Russian war, the number was 76,000, including 10,000 boys. The Government wanted 74,850 for the present year, and that number was exclusive of 10,000 for the Reserve. He was anxious to maintain the efficiency of the navy, but he objected to uncalled-for extravagance, and thought the time had arrived when Parliament ought to interfere. The saving of £481,000 on the expenditure of last year was wholly accounted for by the smaller quantity of timber and machinery required for the present year, and in the majority of Votes there was a decided increase of expenditure. He asked the Secretary to the Admiralty to explain under what authority the Government employed about 1,880 men more than were voted last Session?

said, he had heard the very able statement of the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty with the greatest pleasure, and he was not about to say anything that would impugn it. At the same time, he had been much struck at the observations of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay), to whose speech he had listened with the greatest attention. That hon. Gentleman had said that he would support, any measure which would render the navy of the British nation superior to that of any other Power in the world; but there was not much use in announcing such a determination if, at the same time, he roundly asserted that there was no necessity for the existence of that navy—for that was what his hon. Friend had in effect said. The hon. Gentleman had told them that notwithstanding all the reports made to the House, and the statements which had been from time to time made; it was quite a delusion to imagine that the French had been making great exertions to construct an iron-plated navy, and that there was no real cause for apprehension on that account. That was a matter which he (Mr. Bentinck) thought might be easily disposed of by referring to proper authorities. His hon. Friend went on to argue that no preparations on our part were called for, because he had a strong conviction in his own mind that the Emperor of France had no intention to go to war with this country. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that that was correct, and that the Emperor, from policy or other motives, was not disposed for a rupture with England, he (Mr. Bentinck) asked if the disposition of one man—whether he were an autocrat or an Emperor—was to be a guide to us as to the naval establishment of this country; because his hon. Friend wanted to persuade us to place our naval armaments on such a footing as would accord with the sentiments and opinions of one individual. We ought not, in common prudence, to consider in the slightest degree what might be the determination and temper of any one man, or even any one country in the world. It was admitted by his hon. Friend that our navy ought to be superior to that of any other country in the world, and in that opinion he (Mr. Bentinck) quite concurred. Let them base their proceedings on that axiom, and they would pursue a much safer and more economical course than by attempting every year to cut down their Estimates according to what might be the state of feeling existing at the time in any other country. In the statement of the noble Lord there was one thing which was not easily understood, and that was with respect to ventilation. The noble Lord spoke of the ventilation being bad; but he (Mr. Bentinck) did not see that that was a sufficient cause for reducing the number of men.

had only said that that was one reason; but he by no means meant to convey to the House that it was the principal—which was because the ship strained very much, and they were obliged to lessen the weight.

My noble Friend also stated that he believed the ships were overmasted.

In some cases.

was inclined to believe, that the true reason for the straining was to be found in the disproportionate length of the vessels to their breadth of beam, and the fact of their being over-weighted by the guns placed in the bow and the stern. We had long departed from what was formerly considered the proportionate length for a good sea-going ship of war, and if we built long vessels with fine ends, we must sacrifice something to speed, and relieve them of the weights which they now carried. The noble Lord said that it was the Admiralty who had to determine the question of manning the navy; but he wished to know whether it was the First Lord or the Naval Lords who were the paramount authorities on that point? There was one item referred to by his noble Friend which he had heard with very great pleasure; that was with regard to experiments. He thought it important that there should be placed at the disposal of the Admiralty a sum of money annually to enable them to make experiments which they might think it desirable to make. Many valuable improvements were lost, owing to the Admiralty not having the means of testing them. He was very glad, therefore, that his noble Friend contemplated the introduction of this Vote. His noble Friend said he was making his proposals in what he called a quiet time. He (Mr. Bentinck) was not prepared to say that they were not quiet; but how long would they continue so? He was glad, therefore, that there was no material reduction in the efficiency of the navy, as he believed that nothing would be more injurious either to the interest of the country or the credit of the Government than to deal with our naval system as though we were always to remain at peace.

said, he had always advocated the efficient maintenance of the navy as our right arm, and that it ought to be so maintained at all hazards. He had always said that our ships ought not only to be equal to those of France, but equal to France and any other nation. But we had now ships more than equal to all the navies of Europe. What more was required? There were ships enough to meet the world in arms. He could understand our being at war with two or even three European powers at the same time; but he could not conceive England being at war with all the world. No doubt the first duty of that House was to look to the safety of the people, but the second duty was to see that the public money was not unnecessarily spent; and he was sorry to see that those who spoke so much out of doors on the subject of economy were not in their places when the money was actually voted. There were a great many points in which he agreed with the noble Lord. On these he would not touch; he would restrict himself to those on which he differed from his noble Friend. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) agreed with his noble Friend in almost all he said; especially he agreed with him in spending a great amount of money. He even went further, for the right hon. Gentleman appeared to think that the Channel Fleet was not large enough. It had been the policy in that House to measure our armaments by what was supposed to be possessed by other countries. But these comparisons had often been fallacious. Last year the noble Lord had spoken of six iron-cased ships which the French had launched, and had obtained a large Vote in consequence. Why two of those ships—the Magenta and the Solferino—would not be ready for sea even now for three or four months. This year his noble Friend proposed to take votes for fifteen ships, eleven of which were to be completed this year. In all, there would be close upon 70,000 tons of iron shipping built. Even if that was necessary, surely they had a right to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government what was the state of our foreign relations? Against danger from what fo- reign Power was it that these increased armaments were being prepared? It was said that there was to be a reduction of 2,200 in the number of men, and some hon. Members had objected to it; yet, in fact, there would be no such reduction, but rather an actual increase. Last year the strength of the Naval Reserve was 25,000; now it was 40,000. Allowing that one-fourth of the entire number would not be ready for service when called upon, there would still remain at the lowest computation 5,000 more men of the Reserve available for any emergency this year than last year. Instead, therefore, of a decrease of 2,200 seamen, there was an increase of nearly 3,000; for it must be remembered that the Reserve cost a considerable sum to the country. He would divide the Committee on this Vote if he saw any chance of doing so with effect; but, perhaps, the feeble words that fell from him might yield some fruit in another year. Although we were at peace with all the world, it was a curious fact that the occupants of the Treasury and the Opposition benches always combine to chant the old strain of "Rule Britannia"—a song which, whenever sung by any Ministry, was sure to obtain for them any amount of money from the country. He was glad that such harmony prevailed between the Royal Navy and the merchant service, since the officers of the latter had been introduced into the reserve. He had striven earnestly, in the Commission of which he was a member, in favour of the admission of those officers; but the measure had been strenuously resisted by naval men, who had a prejudice against the officers of the merchant service, on the ground, as one witness alleged, that "they were not gentlemen." The noble Lord said that the boys now undergoing training made the best class of seamen; but there was a limit to that argument. If lads who had been first employed in colliers upon our iron-bound coast afterwards received a short training for the navy, they would make seamen whom he would fearlessly back against the whole world. It appeared that a ship of an entirely novel construction was to be built; but before she was laid down, the opinion of the most eminent practical shipbuilders should be taken as to her probable sea-going qualities. He was himself, on his return from Lisbon, crossing the Bay of Biscay, when the War-rior was going out; and although he had been in many heavy gales of wind, yet he had never witnessed such a tremendous sea as was running when he passed the Warrior. He would just say that a ship of her weight that could live in such a sea and get to Lisbon without any damage, was fit to go to any part of the world. The result obtained in her case was therefore very satisfactory. Reference had been made to the transport service. The Committee which sat upon the transport service had recommended some important improvements. While that report had been adopted by the Admiralty and the War Departments, it had been ignored by the Colonial and the India Departments. He intended to call the attention of the House to the subject to-morrow evening, when he hoped to be able to induce them to support the recommendation of their own Committee.

said, the able statement which his noble Friend (Lord Clarence Paget) had made was most satisfactory. There was one point to which he wished to direct the especial attention of the Committee, and that was the question of reducing the armaments of the ships. If that question had been referred to a Committee of gunnery officers, and they had come to the conclusion that such a reduction would be judicious, he (Mr. Corry) would not have said a single word against such a decision. No such inquiry had been entered into, and the solo reason alleged for the reduction in the existing armaments was that the ships strained very much in bad weather. He must say that during the whole time he (Mr Corry) was at the Admiralty there was no general complaint that our ships were overweighted, although there had been a report that particular vessels laboured in very bad weather. Moreover, the introduction of the Armstrong gun had tended to reduce the weight of the armament. Under the old system of armament the 68-pounder weighed 95 cwt., the 8-inch gun 65 cwt., and the 32-pounder 58 cwt. The corresponding Armstrong guns were the 100-pounder, which weighed 81 cwt., the 70-pounder of 60 cwt., and the 40-pounder of 31 cwt., so that a reduction in the weight of the armaments might have been effected without the removal of a single gun. He admitted, however, that it would be inexpedient to substitute to too great an extent rifled guns for the old smooth bore guns, as while the former were more effective and certain at long distances, yet the latter were more decisive at close quarters. If his noble Friend had taken out a few guns, he (Mr. Corry) would not have objected; but he could not approve of the wholesale reduction of 16 guns in a ship. Why, the Shannon was to be reduced from 51 to 35 guns—a reduction of one-third of the whole number. It might be true that the reduction in her armament might make her a better sea-boat, but it would not improve her as a vessel for war, and that he took to be the first consideration. Suppose we had the misfortune to be at war with France, and the Shannon had to engage a French frigate of 50 or 60 guns, would she, he would ask, be most effective with the old armament of 51 guns or with the new armament of 35? He thought the former; and in that opinion he was confirmed by that of one of the first gunnery officers of the navy. He had been told that, in the event of war, the old armament would be restored, and that wear and tear would be saved in the mean time; but there was one thing he could not understand, and that was a man-of-war on a peace footing. A man-of-war should always be a man-of-war—always on the war establishment—always ready for any emergency that might arise. This question gave rise to another collateral question of great importance. The Admiralty were converting five 91-gun ships into iron-clad frigates. This, he thought, a very questionable course. He thought iron and wood did not combine well. The Committee had been told that the Royal Oak had been so converted at Chatham; and the weight of her armament as a 91-gun ship was 260 tons, which his noble Friend said was more than she could carry.

It was 540 tons.

That included the weight of shot and shell, and other gunnery stores, but the weight of the guns was 230 tons. He was aware that the Royal Oak had been lengthened 20 feet and lightened 280 tons by the non-building of the upper deck. But the weight of the armour plate was 930 tons; and if armed as a 50-gun frigate, the weight would be 1090 tons, guns and armour plate included. In other words, after abating the weight of topsides and upper deck, she would have to carry 810 tons, as compared with the 260 tons which was stated to be more than a ship of her class ought to bear.

wished to correct an impression which he thought he had conveyed to the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington), that during the coming year there would be in the Channel only two line-of-battle ships and two iron-cased frigates. What he had stated was the force they now had; but he gave the force of men they proposed for next year, and this would suffice to maintain three line-of-battle ships, three iron-cased frigates, two wooden frigates, and four corvettes, making a total of twelve instead of ten. The hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) had stated correctly that our ships had very fine ends, and the guns could not well be put there. It was certain that these ships would not bear any great weight of guns in their extremities. The new plan was of a tentative nature only. He had attempted to show that the introduction of a certain number of Armstrong guns would makeup the weight of broadsides caused by the reduction of guns. Thus the loss of weight upon the broadside of the Shannon in consequence of the new arrangement was no more than 100lb. or three 32lb. shot. Captain Dickson of the Trafalgar had reported that he had no difficulty in manning his guns and in working his yards, and he believed that the objections to the plan would soon vanish.

on behalf of his colleagues in the Navy Manning Commission, wished to correct a mistake made by the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay), who seemed to suppose that there existed an objection to the plan of the Secretary to the Admiralty for enabling the Officers of the merchant navy as well as the men to join the Reserve. The hon. Member had stated that he was alone in advocating this proposal; but, on his own part, as well as on the part of his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, he (Mr. Cardwell) could say that they were ardent supporters of it, and were most anxious to carry it into effect, though it was omitted from the Report because the subject was not within the order of reference. At that time there seemed to be an alienation between the Queen's and the merchant services, and it was thought hopeless to expect a Reserve furnished by volunteers. It was gratifying, therefore, last autumn, when an emergency did arise, to see that so noble a spirit was manifested in the merchant service. This association of the two navies would be beneficial in every way. We had now 10,000 men, forming the cream of the merchant service, and he was informed that the members of this Reserve force even obtained higher wages on this account in their ordinary employment, since an engagement in the Reserve acted as a premium against desertion and gave a higher tone to the morals of the men. The country were under a deep obligation to the officers of the Board of Trade, and especially to Captain Brown, the Registrar of Seamen, for their aid in breaking down the barrier which existed heretofore between the two services.

I must reiterate my objection to the proposed reduction of men in the several ships, but I am sensible it will be useless to press it further. Now, the hon. Member for Sunderland has asked why we should have a navy beyond the navies of all other nations. I make this brief reply—because we have a more extensive commerce than all other nations combined, and because England, the first maritime nation in the world, should maintain a navy proportionate to her extensive commerce and her wide-spread Colonies and Dependencies. I give my unqualified support to the training ships for boys, and the introduction of the greater number proposed, a measure I have not ceased to advocate for many years past. I concur with the hon. Member for Sunderland in all he has said as to the value formerly acquired from our collier crews as seamen into the royal service. They were acquainted with the coasts of Ireland, and were formerly invaluable as pilots, and many of a superior class had been brought into the navy as masters. I am glad to hear a Committee is at this time sitting to inquire into the position of masters, for they are a most valuable class of officers hitherto sadly overlooked. I gave my voice in favour of building two additional troopships in the last Session of Parliament—valuable as I consider these ships are in instruction afforded to our officers and men in embarking and disembarking troops under all circumstances of weather and danger, berthing them when on board, and in many other particulars of no small importance looking to their comfort and health. Above all, paramount in importance to the material efficiency of our navy, it is an indispensible necessity to have practical officers and practised crews. To secure this end we must assure the officers be- yond a suspicion that reward will follow merit, that equal opportunities in so far as possible will be afforded to every one alike, and equal favour shown to all who display zeal and honourable ambition and deserve well of their country. Let every officer see his way clear to the Admiral's cabin and the highest rewards, although he has no other recommendation but his own exertions.

said, in explanation, that the main reason of his dissent from the Report of the Commission on the manning of the navy was, that he wished to see better measures provided for inducing the men in the merchant service to join the Naval Reserve; and he thought that as such measures had now been adopted he was entitled to some little portion of the credit due to the improvement.

said, he had no wish to deprive the hon. Gentleman of any credit to which he was entitled. Neither himself nor his colleagues were ever indifferent as to the subject; but, as it was not in the order of reference, it could not be mentioned in the Report.

thought some reduction in the weight carried by some of the iron ships would be very advantageous. They would be less affected by the strain when being forced through the water at high rates of speed. The experiment might, perhaps, be carried further, by the reduction of some of the weight in the masts and rigging.

said, he believed that the combination of wood and iron in the construction of ships of war was injudicious. Ships should be constructed either of wood or iron. To combine both would only result in having a weak vessel. The shaking of the screw would in two or three months make a ship so leaky as to be unsafe. This arose simply from the fact that wood could not be so strongly bound together as iron could be by riveting. The Government was entitled to the greatest possible indulgence. In the last fourteen years the changes in scientific knowledge of the construction of ships had been great and rapid. He hoped that the Government would not be in too great haste to build more iron ships than those already ordered, but would first thoroughly try those they had already got. The whole matter was completely experimental. The Warrior, all perfect as she was represented to be, was but an experiment, and in building her the Government must have discovered many defects which it would be desirable to avoid in other ships. He believed that the time would come when, owing to the improvements in naval ordnance and the facilities thus given for attacking large ships by swarms of gunboats, the ships in our Channel fleet would carry neither sails nor masts. An iron-cased vessel, with its present-sized furniture, if in action, surrounded with gunboats armed with guns, as was now the case, so improved in construction that great precision was attained at a distance of five miles, would be like a large horse stung with hornets. It would be unable to protect itself against its numerous powerful assailants, and it would be completely disabled by the fall of its own masts if that event occurred. The less the encumbrance about it the more effective the ship would prove. He hoped the Government would examine narrowly into the state of the establishments, to see that none were maintained which modern improvements had rendered unnecessary. It would be far better to come down to the House and ask for a good round sum for retiring allowances for old public servants than to keep up enormous establishments which were no longer of use. As to our future requirements for docks and dockyards, they had now in the House a gentleman who could give them more information on the subject than any other person—the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird); and he was sure that hon. Gentleman would tell them that the course of repairs for the future would be a very different thing from that which was needed when our navy was of wood. Although we might be spending large sums of money now in building an iron fleet, we should not have occasion to spend those enormous sums which annually appeared in the Estimates for the repair of our wooden ships. He doubted if it was a wise expenditure to attempt to make Portsmouth harbour fit for the large and heavy vessels which would henceforward resort to it for shelter; and it was useless to spend large sums in fortifying Portsmouth if it could not be rendered efficient for the purposes for which it was required. He had always maintained that Portsmouth Dockyard was utterly unfit for the repair of our iron ships, and it would be much wiser for Parliament to vote a sum of money which would put the country in possession of a dockyard thoroughly efficient for this purpose. It ought to be some little distance inland, so as to be out of range of attacks from the sea, and Southampton Water would be a much fitter place than Portsmouth. With regard to the transport service, he believed it was far better to trust to the great steam companies and the mercantile marine than to build a fleet of Government transports which in time of peace would be of no use.

said, that his hon. Friends the Members for Sunderland and Montrose seemed to imagine that he had been very much deceived when he made his statement last year as to the strength of the iron fleet which the French Government was building. He could assure them, that if there was any delusion upon the subject, it was on their part, and not on his. He did not want to repeat every year the names of the ships which the French were building and the places at which they were being built, but he might assure the Committee that the statement which he made last year was perfectly accurate. The twenty-six iron ships which he then said were some of them completed and others in progress, were now either completed or in progress; and so far was their number from being diminished that, unless he was greatly misinformed, the French Government not a long time ago ordered the construction of ten more of what they called floating batteries, which were iron ships of a smaller description.

explained, that he had not attributed the straining of vessels solely to their great length, but in part to the misplacement of weight; nor had he, in referring to the subject of troop-ships, intended to imply that the mercantile marine was not equal to the performance of any service which might be required of it.

said, that by the application of steam power you might dredge any quantity of soil you pleased from the bottom of Portsmouth Harbour, and it would not silt up again. The labouring of ships of war might be diminished by a better arrangement of the weight of machinery and coals which they carried, by diminishing the height of their masts, and by sailing ships of equal capacity together, so as to avoid the necessity for one vessel shortening sail in order that others might overtake it. He fully agreed with what his right hon. Friend had said as to the Manning Commission. The Members of that Commis- sion thought that the great task which they had to perform was to get the House of Commons to adopt some scheme for a Naval Reserve, and they were convinced that if such a scheme were adopted and succeeded, the matter of the officers must follow. They were bound by the order of reference, but they had not the slightest idea that a reserve force could be brought to such a point as that which it had now reached, without to a large extent calling in the assistance of the officers of the mercantile marine.