said, he wished to ask the First Commissioner of Works, Whether, with a view of relieving the crowded state of Park Lane, there will be any objection to open Hyde Park, between Stanhope Gate and Apsley Gate, for the passage of cabs while the International Exhibition is open?

said, Hyde Park was already so crowded with carriages on ordinary occasions that he thought there might be great reason to doubt whether the public convenience would be consulted by allowing public carriages to pass between Stanhope Gate and Apsley Gate when the great influx of additional traffic that might be expected during the Exhibition set in. The road near Hyde Park Corner had already been widened to the full extent that the trees would permit. At present it would be difficult, to make any calculation as to the number of vehicles that would pass through Park Lane. It might be wise, therefore, to postpone any decision till they should have had some experience as to the direction which carriages would chiefly take.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Why the 3rd, 4th, 13th, and 14th late Light Dragoons were changed into Hussars, and whether there is any difference in the weight of their appointments; also if the Officers have received, or will receive, any compensation in consequence of the expense they have been put to by the change of uniform, and if the men of those regiments have or will receive any compensation in lieu of their old clothing?

said, that the alteration referred to by the hon. and gallant Gentleman had been made in consequence of the Report of a Committee of Cavalry Officers, presided over by His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge. It consisted merely in converting four regiments of Light Dragoons into Hussars. The change in the uniform was very trifling; and in the case of privates it was principally in the stable-dress. Time had been allowed for the present clothing to be worn out before the change was to come into operation, and when that was the case it was not the custom to give compensation to the Officers. In the ease of the privates also, time was allowed for wearing out the old uniform.

said, be wished to ask the Secretary of State for India, If he will lay upon the table the Report of the Commissioners who were assembled in India to consider upon what terms Officers of the Indian Army for whom no active employment could he found should be permitted to retire; and also the decision of the Home Government in reference to the recommendation of such Commissioners. In case the right hon. Baronet should refuse the Return he asked for, he would beg to inquire of him whether he ban state the number of promotions which will be made in consequence of the retirements sanctioned by the Home Government?

said, he did not think it was desirable to lay on the table the Report alluded to by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. It was the Report of a Commission appointed by the Indian Government. The Indian Government disapproved the Report; and all the Home Government had done was to concur in disallowing the recommendations of the Commission. The Government of India thought that a smaller retirement was desirable, and a retirement of such a character had, in the mean time, been made out by the Home Government. Their scheme was for the retirement of Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Captains, to the number of 300 in all. Up to the date of the last accounts, 122 Lieutenant Colonels, 83 Majors, and 30 Captains had accepted the proposal, and the Government had reason to believe that the full number of 300 would avail themselves of the retirement. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had also asked him as to the number of promotions. One-half the vacant Lieutenant Colonelcies, and the whole of the vacancies in the rank of Major and in that of Captain would be filled by promotion. There had been 59 promotions to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, consequent on the 122 retirements; 83 to that of Majors—equal to number of retirements; and 30 to that of Captain, the same as the number of retirements. It would thus be seen that there had been 235 retirements and 172 promotions. The Government had reason to believe that there would be 65 more retirements of Captains; and, if so, there would be 65 promotions.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the promotions will be by seniority?

All promotions in the Indian army are by seniority.

said, he would beg to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government, Whether he has received any confirmation of the report that Baron Ricasoli had resigned, and that Signor Ratazzi had been sent for by the King of Italy?

Her Majesty's Government have received information, which they have reason to believe it authentic, that Baron Ricasoli had tendered his resignation; that that resignation had been accepted; and that Signor Ratazzi had been commissioned by the King to form an Administration.

said, he rose to call the attention of the House to the want of system which prevails in relieving Her Majesty's Troops serving in India and in the Colonies. In the first place, he was anxious to remind the House that two years ago a Bill Was passed for amalgamating the Indian army with the Royal Army; and that on that occasion the House abolished the system of governing the Indian army that at that time prevailed. Whatever might have been the inherent defects of that system, the army of India had achieved great conquests and won great glory under its auspices on every field of battle, and had won for Her Majesty the most extensive and most magnificent empire on the face of the globe. The House took upon itself to abolish the system under which the army had accomplished those deeds, by introducing a Bill at the end of the Session, which passed through its various stages with a very small attendance of Members. The truth was, the House did not appreciate the importance of the subject, nor did it recognise an important feature of the Bill—namely, that it effected a great change in the nature of the service of the Royal Army. Previous to the Indian rebellion the Royal Army was only called on to furnish 20,000 men. After the passing of the Bill the Royal Army was called on to furnish 80,000 men. That was a great change in the nature of the service of the Royal Army. Practically it reduced the Royal Army to the condition of a colonial army. All that might be for the good of the army—he did not wish to enter into that question—but it should not have been carried into effect until the Government had been able to give full and ample ex- planation to the House of the nature of the system which for the future it was intended to adopt. No such explanation was given. His right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India (Sir Charles Wood) frankly confessed that the Government had not matured their plans. He stated that a Royal Commission was sitting to draw up a scheme for the amalgamation of the Royal Indian army; and it was under these peculiar circumstances that the House of Commons decided to place implicit confidence in the Government, and to leave the details of the measure in their hands. Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State for War could not be surprised that Members should now come forward and ask how that confidence had been justified—what was the result—what, in short, was the future of the scheme and plan which the Government with reference to the service in India had finally decided to adopt? Before he proceeded further, it might be well to remind the House of the evils complained of under the old system, and what were the reasons assigned by the Government for the introduction of the Bill. The evils complained of were these. It was said that the Indian army had been in a state of mutiny; that the European troops of the Indian army had been in a state of mutiny. It was asserted, on the authority of distinguished officers who had served long in India, and who had given their evidence before the Royal Commission, that the European troops of the Indian Government had for a series of years been in a chronic state of indiscipline. It had been stated by some, that such was the effect of the climate of India on the health of officers long subject to its influence, that it rendered them less capable of employing that vigour which was necessary for strict discipline and the good of the service; and I think it was stated that no regiment of Her Majesty could serve for a longer period than ten years in India, without being seriously deteriorated, for these causes. These were the evils complained of under the old system. And what was the remedy proposed by the Government? It was stated by the Government that thenceforth reliefs should take place more frequently, and that no regiment of Her Majesty's Army should be compelled to serve for longer than ten years, either in India or in the Colonies. In the course of the discussion which ensued, he ventured to observe that however desirable such an arrangement would be, it might possibly be found difficult to carry it into operation, for that the House of Commons, or even some Chancellor of the Exchequer, might object to vote the number of men that would be required for a standing army at home, in order to relieve so large a force as would be stationed in India every ten years; and that if those obstacles or difficulties should arise, the result would be, that Her Majesty's troops would be left for an indefinite period in India or in the Colonies, and that they would practically become local troops without any of the advantages of the local troops under the Indian Government, Now, what were the advantages enjoyed by the local troops under the Indian Government? Every officer who entered into that service knew beforehand what was the nature of the service; he knew beforehand what would be required of him; he knew that he would be required to serve for tea years in India; be knew that at the expiration of the ten years he would have two years' leave to return to Europe to renovate his health; that after the expiration of his leave he would be compelled to return to India for another ten years' service; that after that he would have again two years of leave, or if his health had suffered from the climate, he could then retire from the service with the full pay of his rank. These advantages served to mitigate the evils of long service in a tropical climate; but no such advantage was enjoyed by the troops in the service of Her Majesty. When one of Her Majesty's regiments went to India it was for an indefinite period—ten years, twenty years, thirty years. There were instances of Her Majesty's regiments being left in India for twenty-eight years. No officer, therefore, who went with his regiment to India could reasonably calculate that he would be able to return to his native country with his regiment; he must make up his mind to leave his regiment or to leave his bones in India. This was a species of cruelty that was practised by no other Government in the world. There were other Governments which had colonies in tropical climates, where they maintained large bodies of troops—for instance, the Governments of France, of Spain, of Holland—but in all cases the periods of service of the troops were always limited. It was in England alone that a contrary practice had prevailed. Did the Government assert that the practice was a good one? On the contrary, the Government denounced the practice—they said it led to relaxation of discipline in the army. Then why had the practice been retained? It was simply a question of economy. The Ministers of the Crown had always been afraid to come to Parliament and ask for the number of men that would be required to relieve the troops in India and the Colonies at a stated period. The Duke of Wellington never was able to effect that object, although very anxious to accomplish it. Now, this he (Mr. Baillie) believed to be the only reason. He believed the Government would be anxious to relieve the troops with regularity if they had the requisite number of men; but he doubted whether they had the number of men. In order that the House might understand the question, he would just state, in the first instance, what was the number of troops now required to be stationed in India and the Colonies; secondly, what would be the force required for a standing army at home in order to relieve those troops every ten years, allowing them on their return from foreign service five years at home; and after that he would state to the House what number of troops they now had in the country to perform that service. First, take the case of India. The Secretary of State had informed the House that the number of troops fixed for India was 73,000. He (Mr. Baillie) believed this to be the lowest amount of force with which we could ever govern India with security. He knew that a difference of opinion existed on this point; but his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes) who held a contrary belief overlooked the fact, that although there appeared to be 73,000 on paper, practically there were not more than 50,000 fit for active service, as an average of one-third of the Europeans would always be in the hospital. Now, would any one say that 50,000 would be too high a number to be maintained for active service in India. We had only 50,000 men in India when the rebellion broke out, and did not every one admit that the rebellion broke out solely owing to the want of a sufficient number of European troops? It should always be borne in mind in considering this subject what an enormous extent of country we bad to govern, with upwards of 180,000,000 of people and 1,200 miles of frontier, inhabited by fierce, warlike, and hardy mountaineers, always anxious for war, and always making inroads upon us. He did not think that any one would say that 50,000 were too large a force under such circumstances. They must therefore maintain 70,000. Now, what was the force at the present time stationed in the Colonies? The House would be surprised to hear that the force stationed in the Colonies was, as well as he could calculate, upwards of 61,000. From that force, however, must be deducted the colonial troops that did not require relief, which he estimated at 8,000; leaving 53,000 men stationed in the Colonies who would require relief; and that added to 73,000 men in India would give an army of 126,000 men requiring relief. Now, what amount of force for a standing army at home would that necessitate in order to relieve the force every ten years, and allow the troops who returned from foreign service five years at home? The amount, as far as he could make it, would be not less than 112,000 men; and he would give the House the data upon which that calculation was made. In the first place, there was the relieving force, amounting to 63,000. To that should be added the Guards, 8,000; the depots, 16,000—a very small estimate; 10,000 always at sea, because, if they had to send to India every year 13,000 and bring home 13,000, there must be 13,000 for the wear and tear of the army and the men whose period of service had expired. Some persons had calculated that 15,000 men would be always at sea, but he had put it down at 10,000. There then remained a certain proportion of Artillery and Waggon Train to be maintained at home, with a certain number of men for contingencies, by which he meant a force to send out to any colony that might require it. The force necessary for these purposes he put at the very moderate number of 15,000; making a total of not less than 112,000 men if the system of relief was to be carried out. He then came to the third point. What was the force which they actually had at home at the present time? So far as he could estimate that force, not having official papers, it did not at the present time amount to 90,000 men. So that the number was less by upwards of 20,000 men than was absolutely required to relieve the men now serving abroad. He was aware that many Members of that House thought the Votes for the army of last year were too high, and no doubt many had the same opinion of the Estimates this year. It was even said that such was the opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If that really were his opinion, he ought to state to the House the calculations upon which he arrived at that conclusion. He ought to state to the House what number of men should be stationed in India and what number in the Colonies, and the period of service, as the number of men required depended upon that. Of course, if the service was for twenty years, only half the number of men would be required for relief that would be required for ten years' service. The House should bear in mind that the military establishment of this country mainly depended on the policy that was adopted with reference to the Colonies. He knew there were many Gentlemen, both in that Mouse and out of it, who believed the colonial policy of this country to be erroneous, who believed the Colonies were a burden to us, and drained the resources of this country both as to men and money, and that we should have just as much trade and commerce with the Colonies if they were altogether free and independent of us. There were others who contended that our magnificent Colonies contributed to the greatness, power, and glory of England, and that they ought to be maintained at any cost and at any price. He would not offer any opinion on that subject at present, as he was not called upon to do so; but he would say, that if the Colonies ought to be maintained, the people of England must be prepared to maintain a force adequate for their defence. Hon. Gentlemen were in the habit of going back twenty years, and comparing the amount of the Estimates then with the amount at the present day. The hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams) did so. Did he reflect on, or did he know of, the great extension of our Colonies during those twenty years, and, consequently, the much greater demand there was now for military support as compared with twenty years ago? He (Mr. Baillie) would give a few illustrations. He first took the Colony of New Zealand. Twenty years ago we had no Colony in New Zealand. We had now not only a magnificent Colony, but there was an army there of 6,000 men, who were engaged in active hostilities with the natives, and consuming a vast amount of military stores. Fur an army of 6,000 men in a Colony they must have 3,000 men at home for their relief, so that New Zealand cost us the maintenance of 9,000 men. Take the case of the Cape of Good Hope. Twenty years ago we had not extended our frontier as we had recently done, and now we were in contact with fierce and warlike tribes of Kaffirs, who had engaged in war with us, and not without success; and in order to defend the frontier we were obliged to maintain in South Africa at the present time double the force of twenty years ago, and in addition a force at home competent to relieve it. The colony of [long Kong had a regiment, and so had Swan River and Victoria. Take the case of the military stations in the Mediterranean. Twenty years ago the Government felt so secure of peace that they did not think it necessary to keep up the fortresses in a common state of defence, and the garrisons were reduced so low that they did not amount to 3,000 men. He remembered a Governor of Malta stating that he had not got one ordinary gunner to every five guns. The fortresses, besides, were without military stores. The Government a few years ago very wisely thought it was necessary to place these fortresses in a state of defence, considering that the preponderating power of France and the increasing power of Spain left them no other alternative. For the garrison of Malta there were now 6,000 men, at Gibraltar 6,000, and added to that must he 3,000 for the relieving force at home, so that the Mediterranean fortresses required 9,000 men more than they did twenty years ago. Take the case of Canada, the best illustration of all, for it was the most magnificent of all our Colonies, rich, flourishing, and populous. It had an independent Government of its own, and a Parliament that legislated without reference to the interests of England, as was sufficiently illustrated by the tariff that was lately passed, and which he was assured upon the highest authority was very little, if at all, better than the celebrated Morrill tariff of the United States. Twelve months ago the Government did not think it necessary to defend Canada, and only one of Her Majesty's regiments was there, and a few artillerymen; and an order was sent out to the officer commanding the artillery at Quebec to knock off the trunnions of the guns and to sell the guns for old iron. The officer who received that order was in this country now, and he very wisely took upon himself not to obey the order, and the guns were there now. Such were the views of the Government twelve months ago. They now took a totally different view of the question, for with the entire approbation of the people of this country, they had sent 15,000 men to Canada. Nobody could suppose that force had gone to Canada for a temporary occasion; because it must be perfectly obvious, when we considered the hostile feelings of the people of the United States, when we considered the great anxiety they had always exhibited to annex Canada, and when we considered the great military force that would be at their disposal at the end of the civil war—it was obvious to every one that that force must be retained in Canada. Under these circumstances the Government might have been expected to come to the House and say that having been obliged to send 15,000 men to Canada, there must be an addition to the army of an equal number. That course they had not adopted; they had not increased the army; and the consequence would be that when the time came for relieving the troops, those troops which should go to relieve the army in India would have been sent to Canada. That was a question in which the officers of the army were deeply interested; every young officer who entered the army was entitled to know what was the nature of the service and what was required of him. He had a right to know whether he would be obliged to serve in India ten years or twenty years. And not only were the officers of the army entitled to the information, but the House of Commons were entitled to know what the intentions of the Government were, as the House of Commons, when the Amalgamation Bill passed, placed implicit confidence in the Government, and left all the details in their hands. These were the reasons which had induced him to bring this subject under the notice of the House, as it was a subject well worthy of their serious attention. He therefore trusted that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India would be prepared to give the information required, which it was his duty, and, no doubt, his wish to do. He (Mr. Baillie) had no complaint to make with regard to the Estimates. His only fear was that they were too small, and would not enable the Government to do justice to the army.

begged to reply to the observations of the hon. Gentleman, and he trusted that the statement he had to make would prove satisfactory. It had been asked what change had been introduced in respect to the system of reliefs in consequence of the amalgamation of the forces in India, as the present mode of relieving the Queen's troops in India and elsewhere was stated to be unsatisfactory, imposing on them hardships. When the time arrived for considering the conversion of the European regiments in the Indian Establishment into regiments of the Line, it was necessary to consider what would be the demands on the regiments, in order to know the number of battalions that should be added to the army, and the question of reliefs was carefully gone into by the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Herbert, and himself; and they also consulted various military authorities on the subject. It was quite true that there had been instances, but not recently, of regiments serving abroad for periods nearly approaching to twenty years; but it had been the great object with the military authorities to bring the system of reliefs to ten years abroad and five years at home, being about equivalent to two-thirds of the army abroad and one-third at home. In this calculation the Guards and the Cavalry were excluded, and the question was really confined to infantry. When the question of the formation of regiments of the Line from the local troops in India was under discussion, the number was determined by the consideration to which he had adverted—namely, that such a number of battalions should be formed as would enable one-third always to be at home. According to this principle, there would be fifty-six battalions of infantry in India, thirty-eight abroad in the various colonial possessions, and forty-seven at home, making 141 battalions of infantry of the Line. It was true that latterly there had been an extraordinary demand for troops in various parts of the world. A much larger force had been sent to Canada, and a larger force was also employed in New Zealand, than usual; but when the demand for men beyond the ordinary number in various places should cease, then some of the regiments would return home, and would enable that arrangement, which was a desideratum both for officers and men, of ten years' service abroad and five years' service at home, to be carried out. It was the object of the Government to attain that most desirable state of things; and he believed that there never was a period when it was more neatly approached than at present, when the numbers of battalions at present in India was 56, abroad 45, and at home 40. Of course, circumstances might arise occasioning a temporary demand for additional regiments abroad; but, under ordinary circumstances, the arrangement he had mentioned would he the rule.

said, he had given notice of a Resolution which he believed to be in the interest of the taxpayers both in this country and in India, for his objection to the amalgamation scheme was the enormous cost that would he incurred in the transport of the military backwards and forwards. His Motion was to the effect that all monies required for raising and training officers and men for service in India should be voted in that House in a separate Estimate, and repaid into the British exchequer by the Indian Government, and he suggested that the repayment should take place by monthly instalments. His proposition was supported by the highest authority, and was founded, he believed, on common sense. It had been his intention to have brought the subject before the House last Session; but he was advised by the late Sir James Graham, whom he had the honour of consulting, to wait to see if any action in respect to the matter would be taken by the Government. It had been proved that the accounts in the War Office were not kept in a state of perfection. The hon. and gallant General the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) had given notice of his intention to make a statement on the want of control on the part of that House over naval and military expenditure, He would not therefore enter into that question now, except to say that it was the clear duty of the House not to add to the difficulties in the War Department, or, by mixing up Indian with British accounts, to render quite unintelligible that which at present was far from being so clear as it ought to be. It was easy to see that the question raised was one of the greatest importance. They had imposed upon the British taxpayer during the last three years for the army a charge of forty-five millions and the greatest confusion had been created by mixing up the Indian and British accounts. The House was now called upon to vote £15,300,000 for the army, and the Estimates for the army and navy together amounted to twenty-seven millions. He observed a remarkable and most important change in the Estimates. A sum of upwards of £900,000 on account of certain home charges for the army in India was now, for the first time, included in the estimate of military expenditure. That charge would be imposed, in the first instance, upon the British taxpayers, whom it was the duty of that House to protect, and they could be protected best by keeping the accounts separate. It was also the interest of the Indian taxpayers that the accounts should be kept separate. There had been a feeling generated in India akin to that which prevailed in the American Colonies before they separated from the mother country. The people of India held the opinion that vast home charges for military purposes were inflicted upon their country by the authorities here, and it appeared that last year they had had to pay under that head a sum of no less than £1,619,000, and it behoved that House to prove, by a thorough discussion of the Estimates, that everything in financial matters was fair and aboveboard. To the Secretary of State for India and his Council the sanction of Parliament would be invaluable, for it would enable them to resist a pressure which papers on the table showed was now brought to bear upon them, and to which they were, perhaps, sometimes obliged to yield. Mr. Laing, who might be called the Chancellor of the Exchequer of India, when addressing the Madras Chamber of Commerce in December last, and alluding to those import duties on British manufactures which many hon. Gentlemen considered so injurious, stated that relief should he looked for in a reduction of the home charges, and of Indian military expenditure. The same view was entertained by the press and the leading men in India, and if the House of Commons desired to give contentment to the people of that country it must see that the military expenses were fairly calculated. He was persuaded that an honest and straightforward conduct on the part of that House, assisted by the publicity which was always given to its proceedings and by the comments of the press, would be found the best means of preventing discontent and maintaining tranquillity and order in India. Supposing the military expenditure for India to be properly discussed and voted, the question then arose, who was to pay it? He hoped the British taxpayers would be kept clear of that burden at least. What authority had Ministers for the feasibility of their scheme that the money voted should be repaid into the British Exchequer by the Indian Government in monthly instalments? In 1860 a very laborious and able Committee was appointed to consider the military organization of the empire. He might cite in favour of his view the opinion of every Gentleman who took part in that inquiry. The report of the Committee, which was drawn up by the late Sir James Graham, stated that the accounts as between India and the British Exchequer were in a most unsatisfactory state. Why were they in an unsatisfactory state? Simply because they were never settled. It was proved before the Committee that certain accounts were kept open for a period of five years. The Committee discovered that at the time they were sitting the accounts of the Persian war had not been closed, while those for the China war of 1856 were only settled, by a sort of compromise, in 1860. Mr. Anderson, the financial Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Arbuthnot, of the same department, the Accountant General, and the late Lord Herbert, all admitted, in reply to questions from Sir James Graham, that nothing could be more unsatisfactory than the state of the accounts between this country and India. There were accounts kept open for years, disputed balances, and no settlements. But we had now got into a new phase of Indian accounts. The sums were enormous. Last year no less a sum than nearly a million was spent in this country on account of the Indian army. Who was responsible for that expenditure? A large portion of it was prospective—for invaliding and pensions which would fall due at some future period. Who was to look after the fair distribution of that expenditure if the House of Commons did not take the matter in hand? Mr. Anderson told the Committee of 1860 that the best mode of meeting the difficulty would be to arrange that all monies required to be expended in this country on account of the army in India should be voted by that House; that they should be issued under proper checks; that they should be repaid into the British Exchequer by the Indian Government; and that the accounts, after being audited, should be laid before" Parliament in the usual way. That was an admirable suggestion, and it could be easily carried into effect. If hon. Mem- bers looked at the present Estimates, they would find that in no less than seven Votes they were referred to a certain note, which informed them that the sums included something relating to the Indian army. Of course, that struck at the accuracy of our own Estimates, but it also muddled up British and Indian finance in a manner which should not be tolerated for a single day. These were the grounds on which he thought his Motion might be fairly supported; and he thought this was the proper time for submitting it to the House, when they found for the first time Indian accounts muddled up with the English Estimates. Above all he thought it was but justice to the English taxpayer that he should not be charged with these payments. It was a most curious thing to find a necessity for an additional penny per pound on the Income Tax on account of India, and the import duties maintained in consequence of the charges on India in this country. He therefore did hope that the House would uphold its own character by keeping these accounts clear. Whatever control they now had over the army expenditure would be much weakened by mixing up, as a new element of confusion, British with Indian finance. Amendment proposed,

"To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words' it is the opinion of this House, that all monies required on account of the raising, training, &c. Officers and Men for Service in India, and all other expenses connected therewith, shall be voted in this House in a separate Estimate; and that all such monies shall be repaid into the British Exchequer by the Indian Government "

—instead thereof.

I do not at all dispute the right of the hon. Baronet to bring forward this Motion upon going into Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates for this year; but I think the House will see that it can have no bearing on the Estimates that are now on the table, when, in order to give effect to the Motion, these Estimates must be withdrawn and entirely recast, and considerable delay necessarily incurred for the purpose of that double operation. Therefore, whatever importance the Motion may have must be considered as limited strictly to its future operation. But I confess, if the Government had taken the course which the hon. Baronet recommends in his resolution, I should have expected to hear the hon. Baronet himself, as a financial reformer, protest against a system so defective, and call on the House to adopt the course actually followed in these Estimates; because it is an unquestionable fact that the system which has been heretofore followed in presenting to the House the cost of the Indian military expenditure has been imperfect and anomalous. There was a charge of £60,000 for the non-effective service, which was paid into the Exchequer; on the other hand, with regard to the effective service and the Indian depots in this country, the matter was arranged between the Indian Government and the War Department. The War Department incurred the expense in the first instance, and kept a separate account. That account was presented to the Indian Government and the expense paid; but no trace of that transaction appeared in the Army Estimates. And it is an entire mistake when the hon. Baronet says that now for the first time the Ways and Means are affected and the English taxpayer is called on to advance the money. The money was as much advanced before from the British Exchequer as it will be under the present system; the only difference is that there was a transaction between the War Office and the Indian Government of which the House had no cognizance, but which is now brought under the cognizance of the House. The hon. Baronet is therefore entirely mistaken in representing the change made as a retrograde movement. It is a decided improvement on the former system. The whole expense incurred and paid out of the English Exchequer in the first instance appears in the Votes, and we make now a statement of the repayment we are to receive from the Indian Government. That repayment has been arranged on a fixed and simple principle. It admits of being liquidated according to the number of men on the Indian establishment; and there can be no dispute between the Home and the Indian Government as to the amount. Therefore it seems to me that the matter now is placed on the most simple and intelligible footing, of which this House can have no reason able ground to complain. In fact, the whole object of the Government, with a view to simplify these accounts, to make them intelligible, and bring them before the cognizance of this House, has been in a diametrically opposite direction to that described by the hon. Baronet. Their object was to place the whole military ex- penditure in the account, and to show the set-off obtained in a gross sum from the Indian Government. What is meant by the amalgamation of the Indian and the English armies? Assuredly it means that instead of being two they are branches of the same army; and if the army be amalgamated surely the accounts should be amalgamated. It must be useful as far as our Indian depots are concerned, and the expenses in this country on account of India, that they should appear in our army accounts, I cannot admit that the smallest advantage can arise from adopting the plan recommended by the hon. Baronet. But if it were desirable that there should be such a separation between the two Estimates—that we should have one for the English army employed in India and another for the British army—I very much question whether it would be practicable. I trust, therefore, the House will not agree to the Resolution of the hon. Baronet.

rose to second the Motion. In the present year there were 75,899 European troops in India, and 7,629 belonging to the regiments in India in depot here making about 83,500 men. A capitation of £10 upon that number would yield a sum of £835,000; and allowing £3 10s. for the non effective service, this would give a sum of £1,132,500 transferred from India annually, and put into the English Exchequer. He thought the hon. Baronet was right in saying that the House ought to have there accounts separately, and ought to be able to trace what became of the money. When the mutiny broke out, in 1857, there were not 45,000 European troops in all India, and there were not 12,000 in active employ against the 100,000 veteran Bengal sepoys. When Oude was in rebellion, and many Native Princes were hostile, nevertheless that small body of men crushed the mutiny before the arrival of reinforcements from Europe, and in testimony of this he would read to the House the general order of the Governor General, dated the 5th November, 1857—

"Before a single soldier of the many thousands who are hastening from England to uphold the supremacy of the British power has set foot on these shores, the rebel force, where it was strongest and most united, and where it had the command of unbounded military appliances, has been destroyed or scattered by an army collected within the limits of the North Western Provinces and the Punjaub alone. The work has been done before the support of those battalions which have been collected in Bengal, from the forces of the Queen in China and in Her Majesty's Eastern Colonies, could reach General Wilson's army; and it is by the courage and endurance of that gallant army alone that the head of rebellion has been crushed, and the cause of humanity and rightful authority vindicated."

Could it be possible, now that the whole of India was at our feet, and no enemy to oppose us, that we required 83,000 troops? He appealed to common sense whether that could be necessary. Of the European troops maintained in India, 7 per cent died annually, and 3 per cent were invalided; and the people of England had a right to inquire whether it was necessary to spend so much of the youthful blood and sinew of the country in India. The fact was, they had lost that confidence in themselves which they possessed when India was under the rule of the East India Company. They had it on the authority of Mr. Laing, in his letter to the Chamber of Commerce at Madras, that it was the expense occasioned by this large number of troops that necessitated an import duty of 10 per cent on the cotton goods sent from this country to India, and the imposition of an Income Tax in India; and till the European army was reduced those imposts could never be remitted. If the twenty-one nations composing our dominions in India had been inclined to shake off the British yoke, they could have done so when the mutiny broke out; and it was not therefore from necessity, but from the lust of power and patronage, that our large standing army was maintained at the expense of the tax-payers in India. His hon. Friend the Member for Inverness (Mr. H. Baillie) was mistaken in supposing that the massacres in India would not hare taken place if they had had a larger force in India at the time of the mutiny, for these massacres took place in out-of-the-way localities, which would not have been adequately protected even if they had had 200,000 European troops in the country. If the hon. Baronet divided the House he should vote with him.

said, the hon. Baronet, and his hon. and gallant Friend who had just sat down, objected originally to the amalgamation of the two services, and it was but natural that they should now object to the amalgamation of the accounts. But the Government, be thought, would have exposed themselves to serious animadversion if, after combining the Indian and English services, they had kept the accounts separate. They proceeded on the more intelligible and satisfactory principle that the whole army should be treated as a single body. In that way they hoped to attain three great desiderata. Firstly, a complete and uniform management of the whole of the army in this country; secondly, that the whole of the expenditure should be submitted to the House of Commons; and, thirdly, that the accounts between the Indian army and the English Exchequer should be placed on a clear and well-defined basis. Economy, too, had been a strong inducement in adopting the amalgamation, inasmuch as several unnecessary appointments, the expense of duplicate depots, duplicate sets of officers, duplicate establishments, were by the amalgamation extinguished. By these means the vast expense of keeping up in this country a subsidiary army, distinct from the British army, would be avoided, and proper supervision and economy would be insured in appointments and establishment charges, over which it would be otherwise impossible to keep any adequate check. No difficulty could arise with the Indian Government, because there was a fixed charge per man, and there never could be any doubt as to the number of men serving there; and there never could be any doubt as to what the cost of the Indian establishment was, as there always had been under the old system. He could not conceive how any objection could be taken to the course pursued by the Secretary for War, except, possibly, that he had not carried economical principles sufficiently far; but he certainly had done all in his power to give that House direct control over the matters which formed the subject of discussion.

said, that if he understood correctly the statements of the hon. Member who had just spoken, his constituents in the Tower Hamlets would have the pleasure of contributing their share to provide the funds for the whole Indian army, inasmuch as his proposal was, that in consequence of the amalgamation of the two armies it was the duty of the Government to bring forward the entire charge for the Indian army—he did not say whether he included Blacks as well as Whites in his proposal—for payment in this country. [Mr. AYRTON: I said the whole charge in this country in respect to Queen's troops in India, not the whole charge of the Indian army in India.] Then, if that were the hon. Gentleman's view, he did not see how it applied to the Estimates on the table, because, so far as he could understand anything in them, they gave what was to be the whole expense in this country. The Government simply said it is estimated that the sum of £985,000 should be charged on account of raising, training, &c.; and the el cetera was, no doubt, a very accommodating ending for a thing which was only estimated in the beginning. But what he was anxious to know was, what amount of money the Chancellor of the Exchequer was going to ask for in Committee of Ways and Means for the service of the year. It was clear that there would be a penny in the pound additional for the taxpayers of the Tower Hamlets, as well as the rest of the country, if the new system of keeping the accounts were adopted. The ordinary course pursued by a Chancellor of the Exchequer in making his financial statement was In say, "You have voted the Army and Navy Estimates, which amount to a certain sum; the Miscellaneous Estimates will amount to so much more, I want you to provide for these amounts in the Ways and Means for the year;" but in the present instance the House would be told that the Army Estimates were £15,000,000, and then they were told in a foot-note, printed in italics, that there was a sum of £900,000 odd which was estimated to be paid back again. Was that, he should like, to know, a satisfactory mode of keeping the public accounts? For his own part he did not think so, and he quite concurred in the opinion that it would be desirable the estimate of the sum which it was said was to be paid back were given in a more detailed shape, for then the House would not be so much at the mercy of the Government when the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer were made in Committee of Ways and Means. He, for one, did not see that the amalgamation of the two armies had anything to do with the question which had been raised. They now happened to require 70,000 of the Queen's troops instead of 30,000, and the expense was proportionately greater.

I rise to answer the appeal made by the right hon. Gentleman, and I am not at all sorry he has made it, because, as this is a novel arrangement, it is quite right the subject should be discussed in this House, and that hon. Members should obtain a clear view of the grounds on which the alteration was made and what its operation is likely to be. In dealing with the matter I would, in the first place, call the attention of the House to the nature of the old system; and I may observe, in doing so, that I think the right hon. Gentleman was quite right in his concluding observation, that the change recently effected with respect to the settlement of accounts relating to our Indian forces stands entirely apart from the question of the amalgamation of the two armies. This change, in fact, so far as it is a financial improvement and tends to simplicity in our accounts, might and, indeed, ought to have been adopted if the Indian and British establishments had continued upon their former footing. We must bear in mind that there were two great heads of expenditure incurred by Great Britain—in the first instance, with a claim to reimbursement from India, on account of the non-effective service; and, in the second place, on account of that which the right hon. Gentleman had described by the words "raising, training, &c," which I suppose I shall be correct in designating the effective services. Now, the old system has been this, that the Indian Government paid £60,000 a year into the British Exchequer, which was supposed to be a reimbursement of our charge on account of the non-effective service of India. Of the charge or the reimbursement the House of Commons never heard, because the whole of the non-effective services were voted together in the British Estimates, there being no means of knowing how much lay to the charge of one service, or how much to that of the other. Neither was the reimbursement of this amount of £60,000 ever heard of by the. House. [Mr. HENLEY: It used to be.] Not of late years. [Mr. HENLEY: Yes, within a few years.] Well, not, at all events, during the period for which I have been responsible for the finances of the country. The amount was simply paid into the Exchequer and taken credit for by the Finance Minister in Committee of Ways and Means as a portion of the miscellaneous Revenue of the country. Now, the alteration which has been made is this. The whole subject of the justice of this charge has been reconsidered, and in lieu of a fixed payment of £60,000 a year we shall now have a payment varying according to the number of men serving in India. The right hon. Gentleman will see, therefore, that it is impossible we could do more than we have done—namely, estimate approximately the amount forthcoming under this head. We do not. in short, now proceed on the principle of charging a lump sum on India. To do so would invoke the risk of undue gain or loss to the Exchequer of one country or the other. Instead, we have fixed a certain sum per man, which is to be payable to this country according to the number of the force maintained. We get, in fact, £3 10s. per man on the non-effective services, in lieu of £60,000. With regard to the effective services, the old principle was that the War Department and the Indian Government settled the matter together without ever presenting the Estimate to the House, the War Department being subsequently reimbursed the exact amount the Indian depots cost in the first instance. The recommendation made under these circumstances—and it was one, I think, in accordance with the soundest principles of financial administration—was that, in lieu of that system, a new one should be established, in accordance with which the whole charge for those depots should be voted by the House of Commons; that the total cost of them to this country should be estimated as nearly as possible; and that on that Estimate as a basis the calculation of repayment from the Indian revenue should be made. Having, after a careful calculation, fixed £3 10s. for the non-effective, the Government arrived at the conclusion that £10 per man was the proper sum to fix for the effective service. As the system now stands, therefore, you will be called upon to vote, in the first instance, in one single Estimate the whole of this country's charge, both for the non-effective and effective services in India. These charges were estimated for the purpose of reimbursement at so much per head upon the army serving in India. On that basis the repayment will be made into the Exchequer, and will form part of the Miscellaneous Revenue. Some apprehension appears to have been felt in this discussion lest the people of this country should be placed in the position of being under a permanent advance to India in respect of these military charges. On the contrary, the arrangement which has been made will operate in such a manner that practically this country will be under no advance to India at ail. Heretofore, indeed, this country has been under very serious advances of this nature; but now the basis of the settlement that has been adopted will enable us to make the payments from time to time at very short intervals. I do not remember the precise terms, but I think they will be made from month to month; and the arrangement has been come to with the object on the part of the British Exchequer of bringing back into that Exchequer as nearly as possible within the financial year, under the head of Miscellaneous Revenue, the precise sum which will have been paid out within the same financial year under the head of Army Expenditure. Therefore nothing can be more simple than the answer I have to give to the right hon. Gentleman as to the effect which this arrangement will have on the financial statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The first effect will be a certain apparent increase in the amount of charge to be borne by the country; because when he proceeds to state the amount which the House will be called on to vote, or may have voted during the financial year, he will have to include under the Army Estimates the cost of certain effective forces in India, which have never appeared in them before. But it is asked whether increased ways and means will not have to be found in proportion. My answer is, that those increased ways and means will find themselves, because the payments will come back from the Indian Government almost literally as quickly as they go out from the War Department; and therefore the financial Minister will take credit on the other side of his account in the shape of Miscellaneous Revenue to the exact amount of the addition to the Military Estimates.

asked, whether they were to understand that the expense of the depots in England was borne under these Estimates, and was to be repaid in a capitation upon the army in India? [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Yes.] Then the smaller the army in India, and the greater the number of these depots, the greater would be the expense to this country, and the smaller the proportion which the Indian Government would have to pay?

Of course every estimate of this kind must be made upon an average. The estimate of £10 per head was very carefully prepared last year by a Committee composed partly of Members of the Indian Department and partly of Officers of the War Department. Different estimates were put forward on each side, and at last it was generally agreed that upon an average of the strength of the Indian Establishment £10 per head would be a fair charge. Of course extreme cases may occur.

£10 per head—that is, on the total number of troops in the Estimate?

No-on the muster-roll.

asked for some explanation of the data on which the £10 per man was reckoned, and hoped that the Report of the Committee to which reference had been made would be laid before the House.

In answer to the contradiction which I received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I have to say that I now hold in my band the Estimates for 1854, when the right hon. Gentleman held his present office, and it is there stated that under an Act of George IV. the sum of £60,000 was paid into the Exchequer from the East India Company.

It was not deducted.

In reply to the questions of hon. Gentlemen, I may state that the old practice was that the moment an English regiment was put upon the Indian establishment the whole expenses Connected with that regiment were transferred to the Indian revenue. The payment of the regiment in India was made in India, and all the charges in respect of it payable in this country were paid by the War Office, and repaid by the Indian Government. The payment for these charges had been commuted into a sum of £10 per head, which included not only the cost of recruiting and training, but covered tinder the term "&c." all other items of charge whatever (which were too many to be enumerated) incurred in this country in respect of a regiment in India. The War Office has no interest in keeping down this expense; while, on the other hand, the Indian Government—which, being charged with the payment, has such an interest—has no means of keeping it down. The consequence is that much disagreeable correspondence has been going on between the two departments; and to that state of things it is desirable to put an end. A Committee was appointed, as my right hon. Friend has said, of which Sir Alexander Tulloh was chair- man; and on that Committee sat on the one side the Deputy Paymaster General and the Revenue Clerk of the Treasury, and on the part of the Indian Department, the Auditor of the Indian Office and the Chairman of the Military Finance Commission of India. They ultimately arrived at the conclusion—which they reported in very general terms—that they had quite satisfied themselves that the arrangement detailed by my right hon. Friend was a fair one, and they accordingly recommended its adoption as a temporary measure, until there had been a further opportunity of going more fully into the matter. On an average of many years hack £8 per head has been found to be a fair charge; but, as everybody knows, many additional advantages have of late years been afforded to the soldier, such as good-conduct pay, greater luxuries in barracks, and the like; and on due investigation it was thought that £2 more per head would be the proper allowance for these extra charges. £10 per head on the effective force mustered in India for the charges at home, and £3 10s. as our contribution towards the pensions and dead weight, is, we think, a fair scale. We therefore introduced it for one year, and it is proposed to continue it for another year, subject to further consideration hereafter. This arrangement, I believe, will greatly simplify matters, and be perfectly just both to this country and to India.

doubted whether £10 per head per annum would cover the whole charge of all kinds for the effective force, and thought that in a matter of so much importance the House ought to have the detailed figures of the calculation placed before it.

should like to have more clearly pointed out by what means the British Exchequer was to be so quickly repaid the advances.

observed, that a monthly muster-roll of the Indian army was sent home every month, and payments were to be made once a mouth to the Exchequer from Indian funds.

asked, whether the muster-roll necessarily conveyed the amount required?

remarked, that if there were 60,000 troops in India, their cost under the arrangement would be known; under the old system the difficulty arose as to striking the balances.

rose, pursuant to notice, to call attention to the want of control on the part of the House of Commons over the naval and military expenditure of the country. After having given notice of his intention to submit this subject to the consideration of the House, he found that his hon. Friend the Member for Stamford (Sir Stafford Northcote) had taken up the matter and introduced the question to the House. Notwithstanding, however, that fact, and that a discussion arose on the occasion, he thought the subject so important that it could not be too frequently urged upon the attention of her Majesty's Government. It appeared to him that nothing Could be more unsatisfactory than the position in which the House, stood as regarded the control of the money voted for the naval and military expenditure of the country. In point of fact, the House exercised no control whatever over this expenditure. They all professed themselves to be advocates of the strictest economy, and he had no doubt those professions were sincere. But what steps did they take to carry them into effect? He could assure the House that the observations he was about to make were dictated by no party feeling, and were not meant to apply to any particular Government, far less to any individuals. If any fault attached, it lay with that House generally for not having exercised a more effectual control over the expenditure. It was true they had always the Estimates before them, and it might be said that the House had the power of reducing the Votes. All he could say in reply to that was, that the exercise of that power involved a degree of responsibility which he for one should be sorry to share. It should be recollected that the Estimates were always proposed on the responsibility of the Government of the day, and that they alone were fully competent to judge of the number of men required during the course of the financial year. He looked upon the Estimates for the Army and Navy as implying to a certain degree a vote of confidence in the Government, and he could not well understand upon what grounds the House could take upon itself the responsibility of refusing them. He did not suppose that any Ministry could remain in office if their Estimates were materially interfered with. It had frequently been suggested that the Estimates might be referred to a Select Committee of the House. To such motions, however, he had been always opposed, believing that it was peculiarly the province of the Government to decide upon them; that the Government alone were competent to form a judgment upon them; and that they were responsible for the number of men necessary to maintain the efficiency of the service, and for the means of providing for them. A Select Committee could not possibly be supposed to possess all the information necessary to guide them to a proper judgment in the matter, and he should be sorry to see the security of the country dependent on an irresponsible Committee of the House. Moreover, he thought it would be anything but promoting a wise economy to authorize those Estimates to be framed by a Select Committee of the House. The main portions of the increased Estimates had arisen from the Resolutions of the House. It appeared to him, that if they delegated to a Select Committee the power of framing those Estimates generally, the result would be a considerable increase in the expenditure of the country. For example, a rule had been laid down with regard to reliefs; namely, that every regiment should be called on to serve ten years abroad and five years at home; but if that rule was fully carried out, they would require a very large increase of men. The House had also approved of the report of the Army Sanitary Commission, which recommended a space of 600 cubic feet to each soldier in the barrack dormitories. Now it was obvious, that if such a recommendation were acted upon, it would involve a great increase of expenditure for further barrack accommodation. The Estimates, as laid before the House, do not embrace all the demands made by the various departments in military districts; they are cut down to the lowest point consistent with the efficiency of the services. Indeed, he thought a larger amount might not only be asked for with a due regard to efficiency, but also on the score of economy. A Select Committee would have great difficulty in resisting a demand for outlay founded on a Resolution of the House, and based upon the principles of economy. He thought, therefore, we must always be prepared to consider the Estimates as proposed by the Government; and his experience told him there was little hope of materially reducing them, and that it would very rarely be desirable to do so. He thought it most objectionable that they should have Supplementary Estimates. Supplementary Estimates, in his opinion, should always be avoided as much as possible. They deranged the whole financial arrangements of the year, and the Estimates for the year ought to pro vide, as far as can be foreseen, for the services of the year. There was no objection, as far as he was concerned, to the form in which the Estimates were laid before them. There were, however, grave objections as to the manner in. which they were appropriated. He thought that the audit of the expenditure should be expedited as much as possible. It generally took eight months for the audit of the Admiralty Estimates and thirteen months for those of the army. Considering the facilities of communication that now existed, he thought it might be effected within a much shorter period; but be the time sooner, or be it later, he would have the audit of the expenditure submitted to a Committee of that House. That Committee should be called upon to examine the expenditure, and to compare the sum voted with the expenditure, with the view of seeing whether the number of men voted had been actually raised; what money had been transferred from one service to another; and if such transfer had taken place, they should inquire whether the money so transferred had been actually a saving, or merely arose from a postponement of the service for which it had been voted. The adoption of such a course would lead to accuracy in the Estimates and economy in the expenditure far more than by referring the Estimates themselves to a Committee. They had the Estimates laid on the table of the House, and the Estimates of the former year to compare with them. But neither the House nor the Government knew whether the Estimates voted for the former year were sufficient for the purposes for which they bail been voted. It would be much better to have the Estimates of the previous year that had been audited before them. [Sir GEORGE LEWIS: The accounts?] He meant the audited accounts. With regard to any account of the expenditure of the money they would be called upon to vote to night, if any very industrious or inquisitive Member should two years and a half hence—say at the end of 1864—search very diligently in the library of the House, he might then find an audited account of the expenditure of the money voted this year: but, whatever the excess of the expenditure might be, or whatever transfers might have been made from one service to another, he ventured to say he would never be able to attract the attention of the House to it. It would have been met by Supplementary Estimates, by votes of credit, or by transfers of votes; and as the House would not be called upon to vote any further sum in regard to those Estimates, its attention could not be enlisted to the subject. It might be asked, what was the use of a control over expenditure which could not be carried into effect until eighteen months after the expenditure had taken place? He admitted it would have no effect on past expenditure, but it would have the greatest possible effect on the expenditure for the future. The next improvement that he would suggest would be an alteration in the Appropriation Act as regarded the manner in which sums were permitted to be transferred from one service to another. At present the heads of the departments were obliged to obtain the sanction of the Treasury to such transfers. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer told them last year that the Treasury had neither power nor responsibility in the matter; that if the money were there, and was required by one service, it was the duty of the Treasury to sanction the transfer without coming to the House. He (General Peel) did not mean to say that this power of transfer might not be necessary in some cases, but he would leave the power and the responsibility with the Secretary of State or the First Lord of the Admiralty. If, for example, they had more men than they had money to pay, it would be certainly necessary that this transfer should he made. Those transfers, however, never took place until near the end of the financial year, when the Votes were exhausted. But Parliament was always sitting at the time, and the Secretary of State might come for the sanction of Parliament, and not act upon the sanction of the Treasury, for those transfers. If Parliament were not sitting, he might make the transfer; but it should be imperative on the Secretary of State to report the circumstance to Parliament when it assembled. This system, of course, would only apply to what was voted for the naval and military services. Another improvement he would suggest was, that no service of the past year should be paid for out of the money voted for the service of the present year. Nothing was more easy than to obtain the postponement of the delivery under contracts until after the expiration of the financial year; and then the money so voted for this purpose might be applied to another purpose. The noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty gave them an instance the other night, when he told them that a sum of £50,000 which ought to have been paid in the one year became a charge on the next year.

It was re-voted in the next year.

Exactly. He had known a case, not of £50,000, but of hundreds of thousands, which became a charge on the ensuing year; and he doubted much whether they should have heard anything about the matter unless the Government had been obliged to come down to the House for a Supplemental Estimate. He did not mean to say that the money had been improperly expended. On the contrary, he thought that the large outlay for the last few years on the military and naval services had placed those services in a state of efficiency which redounded much to the credit of all the departments. He believed that the expenditure had been most economical—had saved the country the necessity of going to war, and that the state of preparation in which the country had been found had saved us the expenditure of many millions. He did not object to the expenditure that had been incurred, but that the House had not that control ever the money voted which it ought to have. For instance, from the years 1858 to 1861, Indian troops were employed in China who had had never been voted by that House, and had never been included in the Estimates. He had the greatest doubt whether the provisions of the Mutiny Act could be applied to men so engaged and not included in the Act. What he meant to say was that the men who had been so employed were employed without this House having authorized such a proceeding. They were paid for in one lump, and no account that he knew of had ever been given to the House of that ex- penditure. Surely that was not a satisfactory state of things. With reference to the transfer from one Vote to another, he might state that in the financial year 1860–1 the sum of £250,000 was voted for iron-plated ships, No portion of that money, however, was employed during that year for that purpose; the whole was transferred to the expenses of the Admiralty on account of the Chinese war; and that portion of the Vote of Credit which the Admiralty was to have had was transferred to the army in order to meet their expenditure, which greatly exceeded the Estimates. Again, £250,000 was voted this year for the same purpose, to which he understood only a portion of it was applied; another portion had been applied to some other object. Thus the House might go on voting money for a specific purpose over and over again, and it might be transferred to another purpose over and over again. They had nothing to do but to take up the Estimates and look, for example, at the Vote for barracks, fortifications, and civil buildings; they would see how much money had been voted, and how small the portions were which had been expended upon the objects for which it was voted. What had become of the balance? This system ought surely to be put an end to. The House should have a more direct control over the expenditure of the country. He was perfectly aware that those things could be better discussed in Committee than across the table of that House. He should have moved for a Committee if he did not think he should be interfering with a motion of a noble Friend of his (Lord Robert Montagu) which was to come on next week. To that motion, however, shaped as it was, he could not give his assent. If his noble Friend would change the terms of his Motion, and move for a Committee to consider how a more direct control could be given to the House over the expenditure of the country, he should give him his support. He did not profess to be a great economist. He thought that the best economy was true efficiency. Nothing however could be more unsatisfactory than the present position of the House in respect of those matters.

said, it was remarkable what coincidences of opinion were to be found between Gentlemen who were in office and Gentlemen who expected to be in office. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had been Secretary for War justified the extraordinary expenditure for the army asked for by the present Secretary for War. To him (Mr. Williams) the Estimates proposed for the Army this year appeared perfectly incomprehensible, when he looked at the circumstances of the country and compared them with those of former times. The Estimates for the army this year amounted to £15,300,000, independent of the Militia Estimates; and if the latter were the same as last year, it would make a total expenditure for army and militia of nearly £16,000,000. Some expectation had been raised that they should get a reduction of a million. Nothing could justify this expenditure but a preparation for war, and the amount of the present Estimates exceeded the Estimates for the year in which preparations were made for the Russian War. And yet Her Majesty by Her Commissioners had assured the House that her relations with all foreign Towers were perfectly good. An hon. Gentleman (Mr. H. Baillie) had complained that he (Mr. Williams) was constantly comparing the expenditure of late years with that twenty years ago; but the only instance that the hon. Gentleman brought forward to justify the extravagant expenditure into which they had fallen was the increase of our Colonies: but those Colonies had not required an increase of 5,000 men more than they had when the expenditure was so much less. Now, taking the period from 1822 to 1852, the expenditure proposed for the present year was nearly double the largest amount expended in any of those years. In 1830, the last year of the Tory unreformed Parliament, when the Duke of Wellington, the greatest soldier this country had ever produced, was Prime Minister, the amount actually expended on the army was only £7,238,000. In the first year of the reformed Parliament, when Earl Grey was Premier, the amount required was £7,900,000. In another very remarkable year, where one of the greatest Statesmen, as well as the greatest General of the time, was in office—the year 1835—the amount expended for the army was £7,550,000; and in the year 1852–3, the last before the preparations for the Russian war, the army expenditure was £8,540,000—very little more than half what was required this year. The expenditure upon the army and navy which was now proposed would amount to £27,500,000; but if the present Government could carry on public affairs with the same amount of expenditure as had taken place under the four Governments which he had mentioned, there would be a saving in those services of something like £14,000,000 this year. The amount of force of a military character maintained in Great Britain and Ireland, inclusive of militia and volunteers, but, exclusive of the force in India and the Colonies, was extraordinary. He calculated it at 400,000 men, taking the militia at the number of last year, and the volunteers according to the latest report. In respect of the Volunteers, he regarded that body of men as most valuable. It had inspired a sense of security into the minds of the most timid—the oldest of old women now thought themselves perfectly secure from invasion; and though there was now an attempt in some quarters to throw cold water on it, he believed that it deserved the highest respect and confidence. He wished to know what was the reason of this great accumulation of military force year after year? Invasion' by the Emperor of the French was made a bugbear, but he doubted whether any French Sovereign could be named who had had a greater desire than the present Emperor for peace and friendship with this country. hi the present Estimates the amount to be expended on the Colonies was astounding—it amounted to £3,718,000 for the army alone; and what was spent, in addition, on the navy for protecting the Colonies, on colonial bishops, en clergy of various denominations, on magistrates, governors, and other official, increased the amount to £4,700,000; and what they contributed towards that vast sum was no more than £109,000. It was most unjust that the people of this country should be taxed for the protection of communities which would be perfectly aide to take care of themselves if they would only follow the noble example which had been set them by the Volunteers of Great Britain. There was a time when the commercial relations between the mother country and the Colonies were reciprocally advantageous. But that had now ceased. The Colonies were now in no way constrained to take their manufactures from this country, but had the liberty to purchase in the cheapest market, and could impose any amount of duty on what might be sent from this country; he knew not that Great Britain derived any advantage from them, except the patronage exercised by Her Majesty's Ministers of appointing the governors; but he must not be supposed as desiring to sever the connection between the Colonies and the mother country. The fact, however, was, that the only benefit that we derived from them was the patronage, in the shape of governorships, which they placed in the hands of Her Majesty's Ministers for the time being.

said, he was sure the House would be thankful to the right hon. and gallant General (General Peel), and also to the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir Stafford North-cote) for having called attention to this difficult and important subject. It showed their zeal as financial reformers; because on all hands it was admitted that the Army and Navy accounts were the most correct and the most strictly kept of all the public accounts. That, therefore, was the most unfavourable ground that a financial reformer could take up. The inference which must, however, be drawn from this was, that it required a much less knowledge to make a successful attack on the miscellaneous accounts and the other Estimates. He was, however, not about to enlarge on that point at present, because that was the subject of the Motion that he should bring on next week, in virtue of the notice which he had given on the 11th of February. He desired, however, to remove a few of the prejudices that might be raised in the minds of hon. Members by the speech of the hon. and gallant General. The first thing he said was that he objected to a Committee of that House being appointed for the examination of the Estimates. Now, that had been a constitutional practice of a very old date. Committees had been appointed frequently in former years for the examination of the Estimates, and the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer last year said that the only way of meeting the wishes of the House—the only mode of fulfilling the recommendations of the Public Monies Committee—was to appoint a Committee, to be annually appointed in that House, to take into consideration the Army and Navy Estimates. [Mr. PEEL: The Accounts, not the Estimates.] He was nearly certain that the right hon. Gentleman said "Estimates." He was not, however, sure that this was the case. The thing to be considered, the right hon. Gentleman below (General Peel) had said, was whether the audit of the accounts could he expedited, and that ques- tion should be submitted, and that alone to the Committee. But the first thing, he (Lord Robert Montagu) apprehended, was, to consider whether the audit itself was efficient or was not efficient. Now, if the right hon. Gentleman had read the evidence before the Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure he would have seen that the Audit Board was a mere delusion, and that they did not really audit the accounts at all. Some of the heads of accounts were submitted to them, and they added them up to see if they correctly added. He (Lord Robert Montagu) did not believe that they even saw the vouchers. Mr. Romilly, the Chief Commissioner of the Audit Board, said that the accounts could not be got from the Secretary for War, and he said that Parliament was greatly mistaken if it supposed that the accounts were efficiently audited. It was useless, therefore, to talk about expediting the audit when that audit was a delusion. They would be only expediting the influence of a delusion. Something should therefore be done to obtain a correct audit of the accounts. The right hon. Gentleman (General Peel) had alluded to a vote of £250,000 for iron ships that was taken in 1859. Now that would show how these things were done. The Minister went down to the House at the end of the session, and was in the greatest hurry for the Vote, which he brought forward in a special Bill. He said the Emperor of the French was building iron ships at such a rate that it was absolutely necessary that we should enter into competition with him, and strive to rival him successfully in that race. The hon. Members for Birmingham and Lambeth both objected, but their objections were overridden, because it was considered that there was no time to be lost in building these ships. What then was the astonishment of the House to find that not a single penny of the vote of £250,000 was expended on iron plated ships, and that all of it was transferred to military stores? Other cases might be cited which were even worse; but he (Lord Robert Montagu) would defer his observations on that subject until his Motion next week, when the whole question would be laid before the House. The gallant General had said he could not support that Motion in its present form. He was sorry for that; and from the speech of the hon. Baronet the Member for Stamford (Sir Stafford Northcote) he feared he was labouring under a similar intention. He (Lord Robert Montagu) had, he acknowledged, prepared the Resolution with out consultation with any Member of the House, He had, however, taken it bodily from the report of the Public Monies Committee. He therefore was not responsible for the terms of his Motion, and he really would not like to change it unless the House expressed a strong opinion on the subject. There had been frequent promises of financial reform from the other side of the House, but there bad never been any fulfilment, nor any steps taken towards that end. In 1859 there were empty promises of financial reform; in 1860 there were similar promises of financial reform, and in 1861 they had two such promises. On the 8th of February the Chancellor of the Exchequer came down to the House and said (hat the only way of meeting the wishes of the House and of fulfilling the recommendations of the various Committees, was to appoint a Committee annually; he moved for the appointment of such a Committee, and promised the House, that if that Motion were granted, he would then move that the appointment of that Committee should become a Standing Order of the House. That promise had never been fulfilled to that day. He (Lord Robert Montagu) thought it rested with the independent Members on the other side of the House—Members who professed so much to their constituents, and were so lavish in promises to restrain the reckless expenditure. This was growing worse and worse every year, and he (Lord Robert Montagu) rejoiced when he heard the speeches of the two right hon. Gentlemen, because, as there had teen plenty of empty promises from the other (the Ministerial) side, without performances, they were going now to get performances on that (the Opposition) side of the House even without any previous promises.

The speech of the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams) in favour of limiting the expenditure for the defence of our Colonies might advantageously have been reserved until to-morrow, when a special Resolution upon that very subject will be submitted to the House. As to the remarks of the right hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) upon the general question of the control exercised by this House over the Army and Navy expenditure, I can only express my opinion that if he investigates the matter more closely he will find that many of the defects he believes to exist are imaginary, because there can be no doubt that, as far as the army and navy are concerned, the check of this House is very complete. The speech of the gallant Gentleman may be regarded as a sort of epilogue to the proceeding's of the Committee on Public Monies which sat two years ago, and of which I had the honour of being a Member. Our object was to assimilate the practice with regard to the. Civil Service Estimates to the practice with regard to those for the army and navy. It was admitted that the practice in the Army and Navy Estimates was, as far as the check of this House is concerned, almost perfect, and the difficulty was so to arrange the votes of the Miscellaneous Estimates as to bring them under the same rule. That rule is, if the money voted is not expended within the year the power of expenditure granted by the Vote ceases. For instance, if £100,000 is voted this year for a barrack, and it is not expended before the 1st of April next, the power is gone, and the War Department cannot spend the money until it is revoted by this House. When the year has passed away, and all the payments made within it have been calculated together, the expenditure is audited—for it then becomes an account, and not an estimate. The noble Lord who spoke last (Lord Robert Monttagu) said the Government were guilty of a breach of faith in not moving the reappointment of a Committee which sat last Session. [Lord ROBERT MONTAGU: In not making it a Standing Order.] I know nothing about a Standing Order. I believe it is the intention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to move the reappointment of that Committee, and then the audited accounts for the army and navy can be referred to it. But let the House observe the great distinction between an audited account and a payment upon estimate. All the payments made by the Government in the course of a year are in the nature of cash payments founded upon the authority of this House. When payments are made they become matters of account, and then they are audited by the Board of Audit. It has been said that some payments have been made for service in China in excess of the Votes of this House. My firm belief is, that the Executive Government never does make any payment in excess of the Votes of this House. If it does, it is certainly liable to impeachment. It is possible—though I have no personal knowledge that the fact is so—that some regiments on the Indian establishment may have been serving in China, and their pay may have come out of the Indian treasury. It is also possible that their pay may have come out of the Vote of Credit for China; but that any English regiment serving in China should have been paid without the authority of Parliament I hold to be utterly impossible, and I venture to affirm that the statement which has been made rests upon some delusion or misapprehension. The House may be assured that no Executive Government, to whatever party it may belong, ever knowingly makes any payment in excess of the Votes of this House. There may be wasteful expenditure—expenditure over which the Government has not sufficient control from the distance at which it is incurred, or from some other cause; and I am afraid, indeed, that when hostilities are going on no Government can find means of preventing undue expenditure. It is impossible at such times to hold the purse-strings quite close, I appeal to any Gentleman who knows what expenditure in the field is, whether it is possible to exercise a strict Parliamentary control over it; but that any executive department knowingly sanctions any payment in excess of the Votes of this House I do not believe, and I feel satisfied that if any such case appears to exist it will be found upon investigation to be a mistake. Having made these remarks, I trust the House will now go into Committee of Supply.

believed the light hon. Gentleman was in considerable error as to the impossibility of troops being employed without the cognizance of Parliament. It would be found that during the Chinese war a regiment had been employed through the agency of the Commissariat chest.

thought that the hon. Baronet must he referring to native Indian troops.

Precisely.

urged several objections to the measure, which he conceived was calculated to produce difficulties rather than remove them.

said, the Bill was to be referred to a Select Committee, in which, if the hon. Member would lend his assistance, his suggestions would no doubt be duly considered.

believed that the measure was unnecessary, it being quite competent for the Queen in Council, at this moment, to do all that it proposed to accomplish.

admitted that the matter was not one of any very great moment; but the Bill was intended to remove doubts as to the legal position of officers of the army, with respect to which it was undesirable that any uncertainty should exist.