said, he rose to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If any and what steps have been taken, or are intended to be taken, by the Government, for carrying into effect the prayer of the Memorial presented to the Lord Lieutenant on the 10th May, 1861, relative to the planting of ornamental and other trees and shrubs, and the making of walks and pleasure-grounds, in the Phœnix Park, Dublin, as has been done in Kensington Gardens and in the Victoria and Battersea Parks?

in reply said, that that subject had been under the consideration of the Irish Government, and they had given their sanction to a plan for the improvement of Phœnix Park, by planting it with ornamental and other trees; but the question was still under the consideration of the Treasury.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, If he will lay upon the table of the House a copy of the Commission recently issued to inquire as to certain classes of Mines?

said, that Commission did not at all refer to collieries, ironstone mines, or mines which were now the subject of inspection. He had no objection to lay a copy on the table if the hon. Gentleman would move for it.

said, that it would be in the recollection of the House, that rather more than a fortnight previously his hon. Friend, the Member for Taunton (Mr. A. Mills) called their attention to the Report of the Select Committee which sat last year on the subject of Colonial Military Expenditure, and on that occasion his hon. Friend moved a Resolution that the colonies should provide for their own inter- nal order and security. Quite concurring with that Resolution, but thinking it did not go far enough, inasmuch as it embraced only one of the three principal points which had been insisted upon both in the Report of that Committee and in the evidence taken before it, he (Mr. Baxter) placed on the notice paper an addition to the Resolution, to the effect that the colonies should not only provide for their own internal order and security, but should also assist in their external defence, and that for the future there should be no charge upon the Imperial Treasury for fortifications, unless in the case of great fortresses. The House unanimously adopted the Resolution of his hon. Friend, and the first part of the addition which he (Mr. Baxter) proposed to it; but in regard to the second part of that addition his hon. Friend, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that it was unnecessary and needless, because neither the existing nor any other Government would multiply those fortifications, which he agreed with him (Mr. Baxter) in condemning. That statement was quite satisfactory, and the second part of the addition was, therefore, not moved. Only three days after the Resolution was passed, however, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, who, no doubt, had not had as much time as the hon. Under Secretary to look into the question, came down to that House, and in moving the Fortification Vote in Committee insisted that the Government had expressed their dissent from the second part of his (Mr. Baxter's) Resolution; and therefore that he was quite consistent in proposing in Committee Votes, not only for the current expenditure and repairs of those fortifications, but also for new works. The policy thus indicated in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman made it incumbent on him (Mr. Baxter) to bring the question again before the House, and to invite a distinct expression of the opinion of that House, which might remove all misapprehension on the subject. Now, the Report of the important Committee, and the evidence taken before it, on colonial military expenditure, enabled him to submit a Resolution which, if not couched in the very words, certainly expressed the opinions of very distinguished members of Her Majesty's Government, who had had more leisure to investigate the subject than the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War. The views embodied in the Resolution he was about to propose were the views not only of humble Members of the House, who, like himself, believed that in the event of war they must trust to their naval supremacy for defending their distant colonies, and who also desired to see some of their colonies more self-reliant than they were, but they were also the views expressed, and very ably advocated, before the Select Committee by the late lamented Lord Herbert, Earl Grey, to some extent by the Duke of Newcastle, very strongly and forcibly by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and by the Right Hon. Robert Lowe. That being so, it would be necessary for him, with a view to prove his case, to read a few extracts to the House from the evidence given by those right hon. Gentlemen. The two last paragraphs of the Report of the Select Committee which sat to consider the question of colonial military expenditure were to the following effect: First—

"That the multiplication of fortified places, and the erection of fortifications in distant colonial possessions, such as Mauritius, on a scale requiring for their defencea far greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involve a useless expenditure, and fail to provide an efficient protection for places the defence of which mainly depends on superiority at sea."

Second—

"That the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a hostile Power, and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire."

Any hon. Gentleman who took an interest in the subject, by referring to the terms of his Resolution, would find that the first part of it was expressed in the very language of the Report of the Committee, and his object was to get that House to confirm recommendations which were passed unanimously by that Committee. He was firmly convinced, that until the House look a decided stand, and gave a decided expression of opinion, there would be no adequate guarantee against expenditure of that kind. If hon. Gentlemen would look back to the Army Estimates for the last few years, they would find a vote of money, which varied in amount, but which was always to be found, not only for the repair of fortifications in the colonies, but also for carrying on forts that had recently been erected there, and for new defences at places which every witness who appeared before the Committee told them they would never venture to garrison, for that it would be a positive source of danger to attempt to do so in time of war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer told the Committee—and the words struck him (Mr. Baxter) forcibly at the time—that what he was afraid of was, not any grand or comprehensive scheme of fortifications, for that would alarm the House of Commons and the country, but he was afraid of minute demands insidiously made to the House of Commons. That was what was going on at the present moment, and it was that which it was the object of his Resolution to guard against and prevent for the future. That very year they had already voted £43,000 for fortifications of that kind, and that was quite exclusive of the expenditure at Malta and Gibraltar, which he did not for a moment complain of—and they were distinctly told in the Army Estimates that a further sum would be required, for that the works in progress would have to be completed. Doubtless, by-and-by, they would be told that those works required to be greatly extended and enlarged, and that was the way in which the "insidious" process went on. They were asked every year to vote a small sum, which very soon ran up to a large sum. Almost every witness who appeared before the Committee, except Sir John Burgoyne, gave it as his opinion that those fortifications were of no manner of use. Mr. Elliot, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his memorandum, which was laid before the House, told them that the Government offices were full of schemes of colonial fortifications on a grand scale; and Earl Grey made this very just observation, he (Mr. Baxter) thought, before the Committee, that of late years the House of Commons had shown such a lavish disposition in regard to public expenditure that really he did not know to what a length of extravagance they might be induced to go in spending money upon colonial fortifications. He wished to give the House a few examples of the sort of expenditure of which he complained. One of the most important witnesses examined before the Committee was the late lamented Lord Herbert, who had thoroughly studied the question, and who favoured the Committee with most admirable and distinct evidence. Lord Herbert was asked by the chairman (Question No. 3,559)—

"It has been stated by some witnesses that in the Bahamas we have spent since the general peace two millions of money, and that we have never kept up a force there sufficient to resist the crews of two frigates; do you approve of that expenditure of money?"

To which Lord Herbert replied—

"All I can say is, that if I were asked to do it, I should not do it."

Mr. Under Secretary Elliot was asked—

"It is stated in your memorandum that it was proposed to expend £ 85,000 on the works at New Providence, in the Bahamas?"

His answer was, "It was." With regard to Bermuda, it was impossible to ascertain the full amount of the enormous expenditure incurred in times past; but let the House consider what was in store for it. Sir John Burgoyne was asked—

"I presume we have not come to the end of our expenses with respect to the fortifications of Bermuda?"

He answered, "Oh dear, no." He was then asked by the hon. Member for Coventry (Mr. Ellice)—

"Has there been any Report with respect to the further fortifications which may be necessary for Bermuda?—We have full Reports now, but we have to make out the estimates before we come to a decision as to what part of the Report we shall adopt."

"But in any view of the case, the expense of those fortifications will be very considerable?—It will be, I dare say, £ 200,000 or £ 300,000."

So much for the Bahamas and Bermuda. He would next ask the attention of the House to the case of the Mauritius. It would be altogether out of place and presumptuous for him to offer any remarks with regard to the works at Mauritius, or to say whether the money which had been spent there had been thrown away or not. But he should summon before the House witnesses whose opinions hon. Members would, no doubt, consider of value. Thus, the Duke of Newcastle said to the Committee—

"I am not in favour of a very extensive system of fortifications for the Mauritius. The Mauritius must in the long run depend upon the fleet; and although I think it important that we should have a certain amount of fortification to enable the troops we maintain there to hold their position until relieved by a fleet, still I should be sorry to see fortifications carried too far, because I should look upon them then rather as a source of danger than as a protection to the colony."

Earl Grey told them that—

"To spend money upon the Mauritius so as to be able to defend it against an enemy superior to us upon the sea, seems to me a great waste of money."

The third witness was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to whom this question was put by the Chairman of the Committee—

"We have evidence before us from Sir John Burgoyne, the chief authority among engineers, that even the money we have already expended upon the Mauritius would be by no means sufficient to complete the defences of the island, but a much larger sum is, in his opinion, necessary. Would you be of opinion that it would be wise to continue this system of fortifying a possession like the island of Mauritius, at a great expense to the taxpayers of this country?—"No; I should say the proper mode of defending the Mauritius is by our fleet, and that the mere fortifying it to prevent the landing of an enemy, if that be the idea referred to, is an idea that ought not to be entertained."

The case of the Ionian Islands was one which did not, perhaps, come so distinctly within the scope of his (Mr. Baxter's) Resolution. But he would give to the House the evidence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the enormous expenditure there. The right hon. Gentleman stated to the Committee—

"With regard to the question of Corfu, there, and there alone, we have extensive fortifications, of a class that are termed defensible; but although they are termed defensible, I am extremely sceptical as to the question whether they can be defended."

Again, he added—

"With respect to the fortifications of Corfu, I confess it appears to me, without presuming to give an authoritative opinion, that there must be the greatest difficulties arising out of the possession of these fortifications, in the event of a war."

What he maintained was, that for the defences of our distant possessions they must trust to our naval supremacy. As long as that supremacy was upheld, these fortifications were of no use. The House ought not to forget that the introduction of steam power had given them great advantages in time of war. Indeed, it had entirely changed the State of things on which the system of which he now complained was based. In former times it was impossible for them to defend their distant possessions without something of the kind, but now the facilities of locomotion were so great, and the means of communication so rapid, that they bad no occasion to scatter their army all over the world to garrison those forts. So far from the garrisoning of the forts being an advantage to us, it was a source of danger and disadvantage to us in time of war. What did Admiral Erskine say on that point before the Commitee? The Chairman put this question to Admiral Erskine—

"Earl Grey, who has given evidence before this Committee, said, 'The experience we have had of the past seems to me to lead to the conclusion that almost the whole of the money we have spent upon colonial fortifications has been so much absolutely wasted; and that with respect to many of those fortifications erected at great expense, the wisest thing we could now do would he blow them up again.' Do you agree in that opinion?"

Admiral Erskine's reply was—

"I think that many of our colonial fortifications might be destroyed with great advatage."

Lord Herbert took precisely the same view of the question. If that convincing and overwhelming testimony were not sufficient, he did not know what the House would require before it passed the first part of the Resolution which he had to submit. The second part of the Resolution was couched in the very words made use of before the Committee by Lord Herbert. That noble Lord was asked—

"What is your general opinion as to the expenditure upon such fortifications as are necessary in colonies; is that a charge properly falling upon the British Treasury?—I am against them altogether. You allude to such as the Bahamas.

"I exclude simply Imperial fortresses, and refer to such fortifications as are necessary in harbours, or at seats of government of colonies, properly so called?"

Lord Herbert's reply to that question was:—"I should say that the expense is not properly chargeable upon the Imperial Exchequer." Those were the very words of the second part of the Resolution. Exclusive of Halifax, or any other part of the self-governing colonies which might be considered necessary as great naval stations, it would be found that they had gone on continually voting sums of money for fortifications in Canada, Newfound-land, Jamaica, Cape of Good Hope, and other colonies which ought to pay their own expenses. He contended that it was the bounden duty of the House to step in and pass such a Resolution as that which be proposed, which should assert that the expense of these things should be borne by the colonial treasury. Nor could these colonies come to the House and say there were none which took a better part than themselves. The little colony of British Guiana paid for its own defences, and its former governor, Mr. Woodhouse, said they had lately expended large sums of money. New South Wales not only paid every shilling required for its fortification and for barracks, but it had provided artillery. The Colony of Victoria, also, besides paying for its necessary fortifications, had gone to great expense for ordnance. These were the reasons which induced him to ask the House to affirm the Resolution which he had to propose. He was sure that no one who had looked into the subject would be of opinion that the Resolution would have the remotest ten- dency to alienate the affections of the colonies from the mother country. He believed that the Resolution, if acted on, would, while lightening the weight of the British Estimates, enable this country to concentrate its strength, and thereby aid the colonies in time of war. A perseverance in the policy enunciated in his Resolution would also encourage among the different members of the colonial empire that spirit of self-reliance which must always constitute their best strength and prove their truest bulwark. The hon. Member concluded by moving an Amendment—

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, the multiplication of fortified places in distant Possessions involves a useless expenditure; and that the cost of erecting and maintaining Fortifications at places not being great Naval Stations, in self-governed Colonies, is not a proper charge on the Imperial Treasury,"

—instead thereof.

said, he rose to second the Resolution. The first part of it was word for word a repetition of a passage in the Report of the Select Committee, whilst the second was taken from the language of the late Lord Herbert; and the only objection which he conceived could he raised was that it was unnecessary, as in point of fact no Ministry would carry out any different policy from that pointed out in the Motion. He would, however, venture to say a few words in its support in a colonial point of view. Speaking especially of the colonies referred to in the second part of the Resolution, he would remind the House that it was not dealing with colonies governed as they used to be; and though it would be well for the War Office and Colonial Office to lay down such principles as were embodied in the Resolution, yet it would be far more satisfactory to the colonies having a free form of government, if the adoption of those principles were the act of the British House of Commons. The adoption of that course would be most likely to attain the end which this country had in view, and he would upon that ground strongly urge the House to adopt the Resolution. In the case of some of the less wealthy and thinly-populated colonies, no doubt the paucity of the means at their disposal rendered it expedient that the proposal should be gradually applied; but there was, it was very clear, a disposition among them to act on the principle which had been pointed out, if the path in that direction were only distinctly laid down.

said, the points mooted in the hon. Member for Montrose's speech appeared to be of a twofold nature—the distribution of the expenditure for necessary works, and the formation of works which, in his opinion, were unnecessary. These were clear and distinct issues. The first appeared to be the same as that lately raised by the hon. Member for Taunton, and would lead to a renewal of the debate which took place on that occasion. He would avoid as much as possible ground already trodden. There was an important consideration, which was too much lost sight of—namely, the fund from which colonial contributions were to be derived. The House knew that in young and thinly-peopled countries direct taxation to any great degree was impossible, and that the larger portion of the revenue must be raised by import duties. Now, complaints had lately been made of the high import duties levied in Canada, which were detrimental, it was said, to our manufacturing interests. But it was argued in Canada, that if the mother country insisted upon larger contributions from Canada towards her military expenses, she could no longer object to those duties from which the funds must come; nor, indeed, to differential duties, or the introduction of favoured nation clauses into their Customs Acts—thus pointing to a disability incurred by the connection with the mother country which was often much felt in the colonies. He confessed to regarding with much distaste the habit which seemed periodical in this country, of looking too closely into the money cost of our dependencies. Without going into the general advantages of colonies, or what he, thought Lord Overstone called the actual money value of the reputation of power given by extended empire, he would set against this cost the trade, which was far greater per head with our colonies than it would be if they were independent, and far less liable to interruption. The instance of the United States proved both these propositions. He would point to the effect of that trade, especially of late years, in raising the value of property and the rate of wages in the mother country, and thus contributing in a great degree to her marvellous prosperity. To pass to the second point of the hon. Member's speech. With regard to the Ionian Islands and the Bahamas, he was disposed to concur with him. In the latter case he thought that Bermuda and Jamaica, if sufficiently fortified, would be sufficient for those seas; but on the subject of Jamaica, he might say he remembered several years ago going over a formidable battery in Port Royal, and being much surprised at being told by the artillery officer who was his guide that he would rather stand before than behind it when fired, because the platform was so rotten. He mentioned that as a reason for his concurrence in the position that we wasted large amounts of money by driblets in keeping many of our fortifications in a normal state of inefficiency, and that it would be better not to spend any at all than to do it in that manner. That, however, was not quite what the hon. Member intended. With regard to Mauritius, he did not think that a place of greater importance to this country for Imperial purposes could be mentioned. It seemed to him at least of equal value with Gibraltar and Malta, as being on the direct track of our Indian trade. So great a thorn in our side was it during the Revolutionary war that, as stated by Sir John Burgoyne to the Committee, English property to the value of £ 7,000,000 sterling was captured and carried in there by French cruisers. The Marquess Wellesley, who was constantly urging the absolute necessity of its capture, estimated the loss at £ 3,000,000 as early as 1798, The Baron Dupin wrote—

"The Isle of France was to the French what the Cape was to the Dutch—a military and naval station of the greatest possible importance. These two stations formed the military chain of the great Indian navigation."

Let it not be supposed that the inhabitants of Mauritius would contribute to their fortifications. They did not want them. They were French in language, habits, and sentiments, and would not regard with any dissatisfaction the return to their old allegiance; and when they saw the Emperor straining every nerve, going even to the verge of European war, to supply the neighbouring Island of Bourbon with labour, they might possibly think a change of masters would not be disadvantageous in a material point of view. It was well to speak 6ut upon these matters when so suicidal a policy was advocated as intrusting the defences of Mauritius to its French inhabitants. It was said that such a fortification as now existed would be powerless, and unable to resist attack, and that the extended works recommended by the Engineers Commission would be too costly. In that last position he entirely agreed, but it should be remembered that in 1810, with far weaker defences, the Isle of France, as it was then called, kept at bay for some time General Abercromby with 10,000 men and a fleet (including transports) of seventy sail. The Committee, however, said that the tactics of war were changed, and that the enemy would now strike at the heart, and neglect the extremities. There was no surer road to disaster than to commence a war with preconceived notions on these points; besides, if the enemy could not strike at the heart, he would rather attack the extremities than do nothing. In one point, however, there had been a great change since Admiral Suffrein cut up our Indian trade from Mauritius. He meant that which had converted our men-of-war into steamers. Formerly vessels could keep at sea as long as their provisions lasted, but now a frequent supply of coal was necessary for the efficiency of our fleet; and, as it was suggested by one of the witnesses before the Committee, it would be cheaper to abandon our stations and retake them at the close of the war. Let the House suppose an engagement in those seas, which left each fleet pretty equally disabled, would not the ships which could creep into a place like Mauritius to coal and refit have a great advantage over those which were obliged to depend upon their own resources? It seemed to him that the command of the sea and the possession of fortresses were concurrent advantages, and that the Committee were hardly right in supposing that one superseded the other. But Earl Grey's opinion had been relied upon, and no man had ustly greater weight. He would read his reason for slighting the importance of Mauritius, and he commended it to those hon. Members who would rest on the Conference of Paris of 1856. Earl Grey said—

"The point is now conceded that the neutral flag shall protect all the property it covers; and the consequence of that is, that the moment war breaks out, the flags of the belligerent Powers will be almost abolished from the sea, and all trade will be carried on under neutral flags. We cannot expect to have, as in old times, enormous convoys of British merchantmen sailing at an immense expense under the protection of powerful fleets, when the same cargoes may be brought in Bremen or other neutral ships at peace charges. We must be prepared, when another war takes place, to see the whole commerce of the country carried on under a neutral flag, and therefore it is not of the same importance as formerly to take places which may be retreats of privateers and hold them against an enemy."

That was intelligible and consistent. When our ships and commerce had disappeared, by all means abandon our naval stations. It would matter little how soon our colonies set up for themselves or joined themselves to a foreign country, which, perhaps. would not be long after they became dependent for their communications on foreign ships. But was the House prepared to adopt that policy? Was it prepared to see the empire which had for so many years been the envy of the world "ending like a shepherd's tale"? We might be sure that such policy, though it might not, perhaps, when understood, be popular in this country, would certainly not want friends abroad—

"Hoc Ithacus velit, et magni mercentur Atridæ."

He could have wished that Her Majesty's Government had met the Motion with the Previous Question. We had already had a debate upon colonial military expenditure. That was inevitable after the Committee of last Session. It was generally considered that this was practically little more than a lecture to the colonies on self-defence, be cause the Resolutions could only be carried out with extreme deliberation, and with the greatest tact and circumspection. There was no harm in that; quite the reverse. But he feared that the reiteration of the subject would do harm in our distant possessions, where every word said about them in that House was discussed with great anxiety, and sometimes, perhaps, invested with undue importance. Therefore feeling, as he did, that the loss of a single rock on which the flag of England floated would rouse even the Peace Party to arms, and endanger the existence of any Ministry which caused it by pursuing the policy recommended by the hon. Member, and fearing that the adoption of the Resolution might be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the remote dependencies to which it referred, he should, if the hon. Member divided the House, unhesitatingly record his vote against him.

said, he was induced to take part in the debate by the fact that the Resolution recently submitted to the House by the hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. A. Mills) on the subject of the military defence of the colonies had been used in the discussion of the Army Estimates to coerce the Government in the matter of colonial fortifications in a manner which he was sure was never intend d by many hon. Gentlemen. The hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) had brought forward an abstract Resolution, but he had explained it in a sense very different from that in which nine-tenths of hon. Members would have understood it. The hon. Member objected to money being spent upon fortifications in any places but those which might be regarded as great naval stations, and, in order to prove his point, he had quoted the cases of Bermuda, the Mauritius, and Corfu. Why, every one of those places was a great naval Station of the utmost importance. Bermuda was of use as a great naval station for the coast of America; while the Mauritius was the only station for our men-of-war and merchantmen between the Cape and India. The case of the fortifications in the Ionian Islands was misunderstood. Far from expending money in these islands in the erection of fortifications, we had incurred a large expenditure in throwing down the fortifications which existed there when we assumed the protectorate. The magnificent fortifications first erected by the Venetians in Corfu and afterwards strengthened by the French requiring between 15,000 and 20,000 men to man them, we had thrown down at vast cost, and in their stead we had erected only a very small line of works which could be defended by a small force. He mentioned these instances to show, that if they agreed to such a Resolution without the most careful examination, they might place themselves in a very false position. The hon. Member for Montrose had said that we had spent about £ 2,000,000 at the Bahamas. Hon. Members, if they would study the blue-books as he had done, would look in vain for any proof of that expenditure. At one time it was proposed to erect a work at New Providence, but that work had not only not been carried out, but he believed it was never intended to be carried out. With respect to the nature of the fortifications at the Mauritius, he regarded Sir John Burgoyne as a better authority than Earl Grey, whose evidence was entirely based on the Declaration of Paris, He agreed with the hon. Member for Montrose that large colonial fortifications should be as few as possible, and should be erected only in carefully-selected positions; but all such matters must be left to the discretion of the Government for the time being. Colonial ports were continually changing in point of importance. Not long ago it was the fashion to ask why we should keep Quebec, or even Kingston. We had recently found the importance of retaining those places in our own hands. So with the Mauritius. Thirty years ago the Mauritius was not an important station, but since the introduction of steam it had become a sort of half-way house between Aden and Australia; and, consequently, a place of great importance. He hoped the House Would not agree to an abstract Resolution, which, if adopted, might seriously interfere with its free action at some future time.

Sir, the question of fortifications in our colonies is part of the more general question of the military defence of the colonies. It is impossible to disassociate the one altogether from the other. The military defence of our colonies has already been the subject of a debate, and I think the House came to the conclusion that it should be regarded partly as a colonial and partly as a military question. Therefore, before we can form an opinion upon the Resolution of the hon. Member for Montrose, it is necessary that we should make up our minds, in the first place, as to the view we ought to take with respect to the military defence of the colonies, and how far we think it desirable that the Imperial; Treasury and the Imperial army should assist in defending the colonies against their external enemies. When we have made up our minds upon that question, we have next to consider how far it would be expedient to make colonial fortifications a part of colonial defence. With regard to the view which the House may be inclined to take of the more general subject of the defence of our colonies, much depends upon the opinion which it may form of the general relations in which the colonies, according to the most recent views, stand to the mother country. There are at present in the world two great nations which act upon the principle of subjecting to their rule as large a portion of the surface of the globe as it is possible for them to govern. Those two countries are Great Britain and the United States of America. There were in former times two other nations which made an attempt to establish, if not a universal monarchy, at all events a monarchy on a very wide scale. Those two countries were Spain and France. They have now abandoned the project of governing any large portion of the surface of the world, and for the most part their dominions are confined to the territories which are directly subject to their centres. But England and the United States have attempted, each of them, to govern a very large portion of the surface of the earth. The way in which the United States have made the attempt has been by aggregating all their territories under one Federal Government—having. State Governments charged with the principal management of State affairs, and a Federal Government intrusted with the care of a limited portion of the common interests. We know that the United States, until the recent secession, included a very large part of North America, and according to what is known as the "Monro doctrine," it was the policy of a large number of the politicians of the United States gradually to extend their limits to the South, and to include practically the whole of South America ultimately within the dominions of the United States. The effect of that would be to make Washington the centre of American Government, and to unite all the countries of America in one great confederation, composed of semi-independent States. England has adopted a different course. The territories which have been annexed to the British Crown have not been incorporated with our central Government. They do not send representatives to the House of Commons; and when we create a new colony, we do not cause any disturbance in the Imperial representation. In that respect we differ essentially from the United States, which, when they create or annex a new State, always disturb the relative proportions of the members of their Senate and Congress, and this again disturbs the constitution of their central Government. We have followed a different course. As each colony or colonial possession is annexed to the Crown we place it under a local Legislature, and we do not incorporate it into the Imperial Government. With great variety in the constitutions of these local Governments, we have secured, by paying due regard to colonial independence, and by introducing into colonies with a considerable English population the principle of responsible Government, such relations between the colonies and the mother country as enable us to administer their affairs as far as we could administer them, with contentment and tranquillity. It is a matter assumed in this country, and held as not requiring any demonstration, that the mother country derives great benefits from the possession of colonies. I merely assume that as an axiom which an Executive Government is bound to adopt. The Executive Government is bound to take things as they exist, and to adopt all measures which may be expedient or necessary to maintain the integrity of these territorial possessions. But then, on the other hand, the colonies ask themselves, "What benefit do we derive from our connection with the mother country?" And I think the answer to that question must be this—that the mother country, being the stronger and wealthier community, protects them against their external enemies by her army and navy. This is the great advantage which our colonies derive from their connection with the mother country; and if that advantage were withdrawn, unquestionably the desire of the colonies to remain in their present relation to the mother country would be materially diminished. Well, if that be correct with regard not only to the smaller colonies, which are manifestly dependent, hut, as must be admitted by all who observe what is passing around them, equally with regard to the larger colonies of English race enjoying responsible Government, it behoves us to be cautious how we lay down any general formulas affecting the discretion of the Executive Government with regard to the military defence of the colonies. Well, my hon. Friend says we ought not to incur any expense for the fortification of distant colonies, inasmuch as they are defended by the fleet; but every one must see that as in time of war it is of the greatest importance to the country that the Channel fleet should be powerful, and that our own shores should be protected against any dangers of invasion, it is impossible for us to lay down abstractedly any principle which would make it necessary for us to scatter our fleet over the whole world, and to defend each of our colonies by a separate squadron. I do not mean to dispute, as a general rule, my hon. Friend's principle, that our distant and scattered colonies must mainly depend on naval defence, but it is impossible to do more than assent in general terms to such a general proposition. To lay it down in inflexible terms, and to say that we are in no case to resort to fortification with regard to distant possessions, seems to me to be an incautious and unwise declaration on the part of this House. Well, Sir, there is another view that may be taken of fortifications in the colo- nies, which is, that if it be necessary to defend our colonies in time of peace and in time of war, and therefore to send detachments of troops to them, great hazard would be incurred by small detachments if they were entirely undefended by fortifications or batteries; and, on the other hand, it might be inexpedient or dangerous to strengthen those detachments and to send out additional troops in consequence of the undefended state of the frontiers they were called on to garrison and defend. It seems, therefore, to me that, looking to the great diversity of the circumstances of our colonies, the number of the naval and military stations they contain, the complicated relations of this country with other nations, and the variety of hostilities in which we may possibly be involved, it becomes almost impracticable to lay down any general formula on the subject which it would be the duty of the Executive to observe; and therefore I would only say that, in general terms, I concur entirely in the view taken by my hon. Friend, that it is not expedient for this country to erect new fortifications in colonies where they do not exist, or to enlarge fortifications that do at present exist, or even to incur any great expense in maintaining those already constructed. But I can easily conceive that circumstances might arise in which it would be a prudent and economical expenditure, with a view to guard against a probable danger, or a danger that might be calculated on, to incur expense to fortify some particular colonies. Take Halifax, for instance. I can conceive that circumstances might arise in which it would be a prudent and economical expenditure to strengthen the fortifications of our colonies, and I will instance the case of Halifax. There is a great difficulty in construing an intricate Resolution of this kind, and I confess I object to such general formulas as to which doubt arises afterwards, and questions are raised with regard to the good faith of the Government that adopts them. But the main argument on which I rely for not assenting to this Resolution is, that the House has, in fact, the question completely in its power with respect to the Votes upon the annual Army Estimates. My hon. Friend says that the House is not, in fact, free to Vote on these questions, because it is told that a Vote this year is a continuation of a Vote of a former year, and it is necessary to continue or complete a work that had been begun. That argument would avail against my hon. Friend's Resolution, because it would be said that this Resolution was not intended to apply to works then in progress. The question, in fact, is with regard to the commencement of new Works of fortification in the colonies, and the House has a complete control over that matter by refusing to agree to any Vote proposed in the Army Estimates. Now, with respect to the question of the Mauritius, I will only say that Sir John Burgoyne before the Committee, to which my hon. Friend adverted, mentioned his having himself prepared, but not his having obtained the consent of the Government to an extensive plan for enlarging the fortifications of the Island. He had done so on the supposition that he should be called on as an engineer to propose a complete plan for the fortification of Mauritius; but I do not believe that he even recommended it except as a scheme which an engineer would propose; and certainly it is not the fact that that plan was ever adopted by the Executive Government. I myself proposed in the Army Estimates a sum of £15,000 for completing the work that had been begun in the port of St. Louis in the Mauritius, and stated it was not my intention to ask for any Vote in, addition to that sum; and I think any hon. Gentleman who examines the plans will see that it would not be possible to make a more moderate demand than was made: by the Government. Having gone through the different cases adduced by my hon. Friend and stated the views which seem to be expedient to be followed by the Government in dealing with this question, and having shown that so far from any wish being entertained by the present Government to adopt any extensive system of colonial fortification, their views are diametrically opposed to any such system; but that, nevertheless, it is extremely difficult, looking to the question of the military defences of our colonies, to define exactly in formulas of this kind the precise circumstances in which it may be desirable either to fortify colonies or abstain from fortification, I trust he will be satisfied with the assurance I have given him, and not think it necessary to press the House to a formal Vote on the subject.

said, he confessed that he was unable to coincide with all the observations of the right hon. Gentleman, and especially with that in which he had alluded to the United States and to England as similarly acquisitive nations. The difference in the mode adopted by the two countries in the defence of their increase of territory was an argument in favour of the Motion before the House. The United States managed to defend their extended territories without throwing the, expense on the original, or on any particular portion of their country, whereas England undertook the defence of her colonies all over the world, and accumulated the expense, both of men and money, upon the central island. The Resolution of the hon. Member did not raise the mere question of colonial defence, for he first sought to take the Sense of the House upon the wisdom of multiplying our distant possessions; and, secondly, he raised the question of the expediency of maintaining the defences of self-governed colonies. He could not agree with the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Cave) who seemed to be in favour of fortifying barren rocks in all parts of the world. If it were true that the loss of any one of those rocks on which the English flag waved would produce so much commotion in England, surely it would be most impolitic to extend the number of those rocks. The hon. and gallant Member for Harwich (Captain Jervis) said that Port Lewis presented a capital port for the protection and supply of ships sailing between England and India; but the erection of larger fortifications would not render it a better place for ships to run into. If in war any nation sought to impede our use of it for that purpose, we could always enforce it. Another hon. Gentleman had observed that sums had been freely voted for the purpose of strengthening the Ionian Islands, but that we did not direct its expenditure. But he would ask whether it would not have been better not to have voted it at all. The hon. and gallant Member for Harwich, however, had explained that the money had been spent in pulling down fortifications. He trusted that statement would be a warning against further outlays upon such works. It was really a serious question whether this country could effectually fortify places like the Mauritius. The authority of Sir John Burgoyne on that point was conclusive in favour of the view of the hon. Member for Montrose. Sir John Burgoyne showed that it would require an enormous expenditure to render the fortifications the Mauritius efficient, and that they must fortify not only Port Louis, but the whole island, and that then we should have to garrison it with 6,000 men. Nothing that we could possibly do would give so much satisfaction to an enemy as that we should carry out those extensive works in the Mauritius, and lock up a garrison of 6,000 men in them, and multiply that folly so as to dissipate the strength of our army throughout our Colonial Empire. Some time ago, when the French were about to garrison St. Pierre and other islands at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, the attention of that House was called to the subject by an hon. Member. On that occasion a sagacious person remarked that the wisest course would be to take no notice whatever of the matter, but to let the French go on and make that deduction from their military strength, and the larger the garrisons they so locked up in remote parts of the world the better for us. It was well known that the First Napoleon confessed that he suffered great mischief from such a system, large garrisons which he kept in the Ionian Islands being rendered wholly useless to him, when much needed, by a single British ship of war. No doubt it was right, for Imperial objects, to maintain such great naval stations as Bermuda and Halifax; but if we went beyond that, we should not only waste the resources of the mother country, but expose the colonies to the greatest possible risk. Of what use were the fortifications and garrison of Quebec when we were recently threatened with war? They were not enough in themselves, and they had only prevented the colonists from arming themselves. It had been stated by an important witness before the Select Committee that for every soldier that England sent out she had prevented 100 Canadians from arming themselves. The result was that when danger lately came the colonists were wholly unprepared; and their only chance of safety consisted in the succours despatched from this country, which, but for the remarkable mildness of the season, and the fact that our troops were not wanted for other duty, it might not have been in our power to send out. He saw that the hon. Member for Launceston (Mr. Haliburton) dissented from that observation; and we could hardly anticipate much thanks from Canada for the effort that we did make. He had told us that the threatened war was no affair of theirs, though one would have thought an insult to the British flag affected their interests quite as much as ours at home. The Secretary of State for War spoke of the possibility of the colonies not wishing to remain connected with this country if we did not bear the burden and expense of defending them. If that were so, what would be the value of such a connection? For his part, he believed that the attachment of the colonies to the mother country rested on a much stronger basis than the right hon. Gentleman's argument would imply. He was glad that the hon. Member had called attention to the recommendation of the Commission; and if he proceeded to a division, he (Mr. Adderley) should divide with him. It was no use wasting money upon stations like St. Helena, Mauritius, and similar places; and with respect to stations like Quebec, it would be much better to let colonists come forward more generally to aid in their own defence. In times of peace they should garrison themselves: and in times war we should always be ready to help them.

said, he rose to express a hope that his hon. Friend would be induced to withdraw his Resolution. The right hon. Secretary for War had, as he understood, assented substantially to its general principle. The right hon. Gentleman had given them a philosophical treatise on the system of acquiring territory adopted by America and by England. The truth was, they followed no settled plan in regard to the erection of fortifications in our various colonies. The right hon. Baronet had stated that it was not the intention of the Government to propose a grant of additional sums for erecting fresh fortifications, or making a larger expenditure than that now in existence. He (Lord Harry Vane) was very glad to hear that promise made, for it seemed to be extremely doubtful whether the fortifications of the Mauritius was desirable. He agreed with the right hon. Baronet that it was impossible to lay down any abstract rule to be invariably pursued with respect to the defence of our colonial possessions, but in the event of war they must defend their possessions against any enemy.

said, he would not attempt to go over the ground which had been so fully trodden by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, in the opinions so well expressed by whom he quite concurred. Indeed, he should not have trespassed upon the patience of the House had he not felt it necessary to make a few observations in reference to what had fallen from the right hon. Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley). That right hon. Gentleman seemed to address certain portions of his observations to himself personally, and with some warmth. He (Mr. Haliburton) would not follow the bad example set him elsewhere by losing his temper, but would; reply to the tight hon. Gentleman with the greatest possible good humour. He should always listen to the right hon. Gentleman with pleasure whenever he talked about anything of which be knew something. The remarks which he had made respecting the Canadians were inopportune and misapplied, especially when he said that we were not likely to get many thanks from them. That observation might as well have been omitted. Nothing in the conduct of the Canadians had merited such a remark, the utterance of which if reported in the Canadian newspapers was likely to do England more harm than the absence of fortifications. These general Resolutions ought not to be introduced, because they could not apply to all cases, and therefore the best way was to judge the case of each colony by itself. The Resolution before the House was—

"That the multiplication of fortified places in distant possessions involves a useless expenditure, and that the cost of maintaining fortifications at places not being great naval stations, in self-governed colonies, is not a proper charge on the Imperial Treasury."

The hon. Gentleman who moved the Resolution had once, be believed, made a trip across the Atlantic, and had ever since taken as a hobby the subject of Atlantic steam navigation, but he did not know whether the hon. Gentleman had ever been at Quebec. At that city there were fortifications, but it was not a naval port; and if this Resolution were carried, no further appropriation could be made for those fortifications, although they commanded the River St. Lawrence, and there was no naval station within 2,000 miles of Quebec. The real meaning of the Resolution appeared to be, that where fortifications were not required it was very useless to make them, and the House ought to feel indebted to the hon. Member for Montrose for having so admirably and perspicuously elucidated that principle. If that Was the meaning of the Resolution, he could vote for it; but at the same time he must protest against these continued attacks upon our colonies and colonists. As far as the North American colonies were concerned, he could state that they had never asked for any fortifications; but the repetition of Motions like this gave them the appearance of being akin to the daughter of the horseleech, continually crying, "Give, give." Such things must cause pain in the colonies, and were not at all calculated to do, any good. If war ever occurred with the United States—the only Power which could invade Canada—it would be a war not of Canada's seeking. Those colonies were on good terms and upon intimate relations with the States, who would only attack them in case of a war with England, as being an assailable point of British territory, and to destroy the property of loyal British subjects.

explained, that he had quoted the hon. Gentleman's own words when he said that no thanks were due to the country for sending troops to Canada.

was understood to deny ever having used those words.

said, that the Resolution was nearly identical with one arrived at by a Select Committee of the house of commons, and founded upon the evidence of the late Lord Herbert and other distinguished men. As the hon. Member (Mr. Baxter) had, however, succeeded in eliciting a distinct disclaimer from the Secretary at War of the intention of the Government to lay out large sums of money upon these fortifications, he (Mr. A. Mills) thought that the object of the Resolution was sufficiently attained, and he would therefore advise the hon. Member to withdraw his Motion.

said, he could not concur with the hon. Member (Mr. A. Mills) that the Resolution was nearly identical with that of the Committee to which he had referred. There were, in fact, very essential points of difference between them.

said, he rose to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether it was intended to continue to withhold from the Captains on the Reserved List the pay to which they were entitled under the Order in Council of 1851, and to move for an Address to Her Majesty to take into con- sideration the case of those officers. The question turned on the legal construction of an Order in Council, by which certain officers of Her Majesty's navy had consented to accept a position which, according to the strict terms of the order, would have been a boon to them. A breach of faith had, however, been committed by the Board of Admiralty towards them, by which the position accepted by those officers had become to them a serious detriment instead of a boon. The facts were these:—In 1851 the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir Francis Baring;), then First Lord of the Admiralty, found himself in a difficulty how to give promotion to a number of deserving officers whose advanced years rendered it impossible that they could be as efficient in the higher ranks as was to be desired. There were then a variety of retired lists, all in inextricable confusion. These officers objected to being made to retire, because they all felt that they had some work left in them, and each man preferred to stand on his own merits. In consequence of that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth drew up a reserve list, and these fifty captains were persuaded to go on it as a sort of post of honour. They were told that, according to the terms of the document put before them, with the exception of active employment, they were to receive the same benefits, promotion, and rewards as their brethren of the active list. The House was probably aware that when a captain on the active list rising gradually had arrived within 170 of the top, he received an increase of pay to the amount of 2 s. per day, but when Captain Gordon, who was put at the top of this reserved list, arrived within 170 of the top of the active list, he applied for the increase of 2 s. per day, but it was refused to him. That occurred in 1859, and all the others who had applied since at the Admiralty had been in like manner refused. They contended that they had a legal right, and they had obtained an opinion from an eminent Queen's Counsel (Mr. Lush), that if the bargain had been one between private parties, they could have enforced it in a court of law; but, of course, they had no such remedy against the Admiralty, The claim of those officers was also supported by opinions which had been expressed by Lord Chelmsford and Sir John Pakington in favour of the construction put on the arrangement by them. The right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir Francis Baring) had also stated that in drawing up the order it was not his intention that it should bear the construction which those officers put upon it. That, however, did not affect the legal meaning of it—it only showed that the right hon. Gentleman had made a mistake in drawing up the order, and it was hardly fair that those Gentlemen, who had been cajoled into accepting the offer, should be the sufferers by the mistake. By an Order in Council, captains who had been ten years on the list of captains, and had not been employed, if they had passed the age of fifty-five years, had the option of accepting, in place of all further promotion, the sum of 18s. a day, and he had no doubt that a great number of these officers would be glad to accept the benefit of this order, which they contended ought to be common to them with their brethren of the Active List. He had calculated that the charge to the country of the concession of their claim would be equal to an annuity, on lives over sixty-five years, of £6 16s. 1d. per day.

I have much satisfaction in giving my support to the Motion before the House, convinced as I am, from the inquiries I have not failed to make, that the officers, at the time they accepted the captain's rank on the Reserved List, did so on the clear understanding that the construction they put on the order was the correct one, though I dissent from the opinion expressed by the hon. and gallant Officer that they had been cajoled into accepting it; because every one acquainted with the public and private character of the right hon. Member for Portsmouth must know that he was incapable of any act not strictly consistent with truth and honour. Believing then, as I conscientiously do, that both in reason and in justice these officers are entitled to their demands, I with all my heart, beg to second this Motion, and I will hope my noble and gallant Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty, will have the grace and wisdom to accede to it.

said, he quite agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend (Admiral Walcott), that Whatever Was thought of the order in Council, it would have been better to abstain from accusing so distinguished a statesman as the right hon. Member for Portsmouth of cajoling those officers into the acceptance of their present position. His right hon. Friend had carried away with him from the Admiralty the high opinion of the whole navy for his fairness and ability; and cajolery was a thing which no First Lord of the Admiralty at the present day was ever guilty of. With regard to the reserve captains, he had often stated that a great many of those gallant officers believed that they had been wronged. But he was positive that neither the form of their commission nor the circumstances under which they received these appointments gave them any fair reason to suppose that they were to remain in the same position as the active officers of the navy. Two categories of officers were comprised in the Order in Council of 1851: first, a certain number of commanders, who would not have been entitled to promotion to the captain's list until they had arrived at the head of the list of commanders, were promoted to the reserve list of captains; and, secondly, a number of commanders and lieutenants were removed compulsorily from the active list on to the reserve list of commanders and lieutenants, but without promotion, being told that this change should not damage their prospects. The officers, however, who were promoted from the active list of commanders to the reserve list of captains never had the hopes of further advancement held out to them at all. They were old officers, who might have remained for years in the commanders' list; and his right hon. Friend offered to promote them at once to the rank of captain upon the reserve list, giving them distinctly to understand that they were no longer liable to serve. But, he should be asked in that case what was the distinction between promoting them on the reserved list and the retired list. Well, the distinction was that the officers put on the retired list came upon it by seniority, but these officers were put upon the reserve list out of their turn, so that the position of the two classes was quite distinct. The Admiralty were not entitled to promote officers to the retired list of captains until they obtained their promotion by seniority; and therefore his right hon. Friend, in order to lighten the active list, chose from among the commanders a certain number and made them reserve captains, upon the distinct understanding, he believed, that they were not to serve nor to rise pari passu with the officers of the active list. Any departure from that understanding would, he contended, be unjust towards the officers of the active list; for why should a body of men be put upon the reserved list; to rise pari passu with them, and yet not be liable to serve? But more than that, his hon. and gallant Friend was asking the House to inflict a great hardship upon these officers themselves. It was perfectly true that the Order in Council was not worded so distinctly as he wished it had been. But what had the Admiralty done in consequence of that supposed ambiguity? They took the case of the officers into consideration two years ago, and he had proposed, not to make their position the same as that of officers on the active list, but that those who had served a certain number of years should be allowed at once a considerable increase of pay. There were 90 officers on the reserve list, and upwards of 70 had benefited by the arrangement to which he referred, some of them receiving 6s. a day more than they would have received if they had been On the active list. Thus, three-fourths of those 90 officers were at that moment getting higher pay than their brethren on the active list, because it was said that there might have been in their minds a doubt of what their position was to be under the order in Council. If, therefore, they were now allowed to rise only as the officers on the active list rose with regard to pay, their extra allowance must be taken away, and the position of three-fourths of them would be damaged by the Concession which was now asked for in their name. Under those circumstances, while their position was positively better than that of their brethren on the active list, to allow of their also rising to the higher grade of admiral with the officers of the active list would be unjust and unfair to the navy generally, and would produce great discontent and dissatisfaction. He therefore trusted that the Motion would not be pressed to a division.

explained, that he had not intended to say that the right hon. Member for Portsmouth, for whom he entertained the greatest respect, had cajoled these officers, but that they had been cajoled by the wording of the Order in Council.

said, he was glad to hear the explanation just given by the hon. and gallant Member, as he agreed with his noble Friend that no First Lord of the present day would attempt to cajole the officers of the navy. As, however, he formerly had the honour of filling the office, he was anxious to know what construction the noble Lord put upon the words "of the present day."

I wish my right hon. Friend to think that I included him amongst the number.

said, in that case he fully agreed with his noble Friend. He repeated he believed that the right hon. Gentleman (Sir F. Baring) was incapable of cajoling the officers of the navy, and it was satisfactory to find that the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not intend to make the imputation which his words seemed to convey. The question was as to the construction of an Order in Council which was ambiguous and badly worded. On the last occasion when it was brought forward the right hon. Gentleman declared that it was not his intention that these officers should have the benefits which they sought; but in a spirit of great generosity he distinctly stated that he should be glad if the Admiralty could see their way to make the concession. As to what the intentions of the right hon. Gentleman might have been, it was most dangerous to construe any public document by considering what were the intentions of the Minister who proposed it. The right hon. Gentleman might have lost his seat for Portsmouth, in which case he would have been unable to tell the House what he intended. The only safe rule was to consider what the Order in Council itself expressed. Having studied the Order in Council, he not only found it ambiguous, but he was supported by high legal authority in stating that its fair construction was favourable to the officers who were now seeking this benefit. That being so, it was with great regret that he heard his noble Friend, who was himself a distinguished sailor, opposing the claims of these officers. In point of amount the concession would involve but a small matter. The officers asked for that concession, and he doubted whether it was worth while to go on year after year contending against a claim that had a legal opinion in its favour. He should be glad to hear, if there was any doubt on the subject, that the Government would give the officers the benefit of it.

said, be thought if the concession were made a financial question, as the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty appeared to put it, the amount was very trifling; but the officers looked on the matter as a recognition of their position in the service. The noble Lord himself said the Order in Council was ambiguously worded, and he hoped the House would consider the question as one of justice and right.

explained, that he had not said the order was ambiguously worded, but that the officers considered it was so. He thought himself that the order was clear; he could not assent to the opinion that it was ambiguous.

said he could not allow the discussion to close without giving some information to the House that might assist it in coming to a decision. The right hon. baronet (Sir J. Pakington) assumed that he (Sir F. Baring) had not intended by the order to interfere with the just rights of any officers. With that he quite concurred; but, at the same time, when the meaning of a public document was to be ascertained, it was not unusually thought worth while to refer to those who framed it. He quite admitted, that if a promise had been made by the order, though against his intention, such a promise ought to be performed; but he denied entirely that by the wording of the document a promise was conveyed in any shape whatever. As to the legal opinion of its construction, unless a lawyer knew all the facts of the case, and all the details and circumstances that might affect the warrant, it was impossible for him to give a fair account of its meaning. He must state to the House that by the Order in Council he intended to deal with two classes of captains. A certain number of old captains he promoted, but with no intention of giving them any further advantage than the promotion they so received, and at the time very gladly received, without any condition or persuasion on his part. The other class of officers were commanders promoted to the rank of captain, and removed from the active to the reserved list. To these officers it was his intention to retain all the advantages they had before they were so transferred. All that was done for them was to remove them from one list to the other. The plan was fully stated in the Navy List, in these terms—

"While my Lords have recommended the abandonment of the system of brevet promotion in future, they are nevertheless desirous of meet- ing the claims of old officers when hare served long and well, and who seek their promotion rather as a reward for past services than in the expectation of further employment. To meet these claims equitably, and, at the same time not to fill the active list with officers who cannot long continue fit for service, their Lordships will promote by selection fifty commanders to the rank of captain. These officers will be placed on reserved half-pay.

With respect to one class of officers, there was no promise of any advantage beyond the promotion. But the other class, who were placed an reserved half-pay, were allowed to retain all the advantages of rising to higher rank and receiving pensions. As to any question of law, it was rather for the law officers of the Crown than the House; but he doubted whether the opinion of a lawyer on the subject was of very great value. He had no hostility to these officers; far from it. He was the first to recommend the arrangement, from which he believed the service had derived considerable advantage. When he was asked to state his opinion on the case of the officers in the House, he had gone through the papers fully, and he was obliged to tell them he was sorry he could not support their case; he was satisfied they had no claim.

said, he had no doubt the right hon. Gentleman had correctly stated what bad been his intention); but the real question was this—what was the natural, fair, and ordinary interpretation of the Order in Council, and in what sense was it accepted by those it affected? Now, they had the opinion of one of Her Majesty's counsel that if the order could be submitted to a court of law, its decision would be in favour of the officers; that such would be the decision on a contract between man and man drawn in the language of the order. They also had for that the high authority of a noble and learned Lord in another place to the same effect. The noble Lord admitted that the order in Council, if not ambiguous, was not as clear as could be desired, and if there were a doubt likely to lead to injustice, it was easy to modify the order in Council, or to issue a new order. Common justice and equity required that the construction should he put upon it which was contended for by these officers.

said, that as a naval officer, sympathizing with men who believed that their claims were founded in justice, be should support the hon. and gallant Officer if be went to a division. At the same time, there was a still larger question remaining for determination—namely, the whole scheme of retiring allowances in the navy. The present scheme (that of 1860) was partial in its character, utterly excluding from its operation the higher class of officers; and it was impossible it could become permanent.

said, he thought the time had arrived when justice should be done these officers if they had right on their side. They asked to be put on the same footing of equality with brethren by whose side they had stood for many years. The sum required to effect that object was not more than £2,000 a year, and he would recommend that a mixed Committee, consisting of two generals, two admirals, and two civilians, all Members of the House, be appointed to settle the matter in dispute.

said, that there were three points which required to be borne in mind by the House in dealing with the subject. The first was, that in 1851, when these officers were placed upon the Reserved List, they got a step in rank and a large increase over what would be their normal half-pay for the next eight or ten years if they had gone on in their ordinary course. The next point was, he could not understand how they could expect to rise on that list of half-pay pari passu with other officers, when staring them in the face in every Navy List which had been published from that time was the announcement that the increase of half-pay which they claimed was only given to the first seventy and the next hundred on the active list. In the third place, these officers must either be treated as on the half-pay or the retired list. The Admiralty, taking the latter view, had extended to them the benefits which were given to other retired officers under the Order in Council of last year. He wished the House to bear that in mind in considering the claims of these officers. They could not be treated at once as officers on the active list and on the retired list. If they were treated as officers on half-pay, and allowed to rise in the same ratio as other officers, there would be taken away from the large majority of them those emoluments and advantages which the Admiralty had given to them, in common with other officers, on retirement for length of service. They could not have the advantages of half-pay and those of the retired list at the same time.

I wish to call attention to the facts proved on the recent trial in Dublin of Hamilton Conolly, a clerk in the Ordnance Department, and of John M'Ilvaine, a contractor with the Government; and to ask Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Secretary to the Treasury, to explain in what manner the Ordnance Accounts are kept and audited, which allowed the proceedings by the parties convicted at such trial; and whether any and what changes have been effected in the mode of keeping the Public Accounts calculated to prevent a repetition thereof? These two persons were tried for conspiracy. The one, Hamilton Conolly, was a clerk in the Ordnance Department, drawing a very respectable salary, and bearing, of course, a good character. The other, John M'Ilvaine, was a contractor with the Government, and, according to the evidence of several witnesses who were called on his side, one of the most respectable men that ever lived. The frauds for which they were brought to trial and convicted were committed in the following manner:—It appears that when a contract is made in Ireland—say, for the repair of barracks—the estimate is considered and the prices are fixed in a most methodical manner. When the work is done, it is carefully examined. The head of the department in Dublin, Colonel Durnford, an officer of Engineers, and, I need hardly gay, a man of unexceptionable character, retains a facsimile of the Account, and gives the counterpart to one of the clerks to forward to the Ordnance Department in London. Conolly availed himself of this practice to alter the account before sending it away. Sometimes he inserted £300 or £400, or sometimes £500 extra. The account which bore Colonel Durnford's signature was next examined by a number of very able gentlemen in London. When, however, they were satisfied of the correctness of the account, they did not communicate with Colonel Durnford or any of the officials in Ireland, but sent a check direct to the contractor. In this case the contractor, M'Ilvaine, was in collusion with the clerk Conolly, and therefore, when he received a letter authorizing him to draw on the Treasury for a sum perhaps twice the amount of his account, it was thankfully received and immediately obeyed. In passing sentence on the offenders, the Judge enumerated some of the instances of fraud which occurred between February and July, 1861. A sum of £323 17s. was altered into £628 7 s.. 2d.; another of £271 11s. in £576 1s.; another of £361 14s. into £706 17s.; another of £221 16s. into £445 18s.; and another of £268 into £501. Of course, had the head of the department in Dublin caught sight of any of the altered accounts or orders to pay, the fraud would have been at once detected. But, with singular ingenuity, all the checks were arranged so that there was no safeguard whatever against conspiracy between a clerk and a contractor. It was chiefly in the items for slating that the figures were altered. A gentleman told me that there were charges for slates enough to cover the Isle of Wight. Any one who knew anything of the barracks for which it was pretended that these slates were required, could see at a glance that it was utterly impossible such a preposterous quantity could have been used. On the trial the Judge observed, that although he was, of course, bound to confine himself to the frauds disclosed in the evidence, he had a shrewd suspicion that they were but a small portion of the system which had been carried on in the department for a series of years. I have been told that these two gentlemen, one very religions, and the other a very fashionable man, have been making nearly £2,500 a year by their dishonesty. Indeed, they might, perhaps, but for an accident, have been still pocketing large sums. The report is, that the fraud was discovered only through a clerk from Dublin happening, when in the London office, to set eyes on one of the cooked accounts. Upon that the law officers were called in, and the two gentlemen were arrested, one of them as he was going to a dinner party, which was clearly very inconvenient for him, and very distressing to his feelings. It was discovered that the two rogues had an agreement to divide the spoils. They were convicted, and the justice of the country was vindicated. I wish to know from the Government what sums of money have been abstracted from the public treasury in this manner; and what steps, if any, have been taken to prevent a repetition of this systematic and long-continued plundering?

The statements of the right hon. Gentleman are perfectly correct as far as they went. The information I have received is, that a clerk named Conolly, who was formerly in the Ordnance Department, and afterwards on the Consolidated Staff of the War Department as chief clerk of his branch, conspired with a contractor named M'Ilvaine to defraud the Government. My information leads me to the belief that their frauds extended over the years between 1848 and 1861. It is plain that as the amalgamation of the Ordnance and War Departments took place in 1854, these offences were not due to that measure. The manner in which the frauds were committed was this:—The Commanding Officer of Engineers certified the value of the work done, and delivered the certificate to the chief clerk, who, in collusion with the contractor, increased the amount, and transmitted it to the War Office in London, where it was examined, and whence the order for payment on the paymaster was sent to the contractor. That was the system of checks; the chief clerk was supposed to be a check upon the officer of Engineers, and the contractor to be a check upon these two officers. It was the practice of the old Ordnance Office, and no alteration was introduced by the combined departments. The right hon. Gentleman said, that if payment had been made on the order of the officer of Engineers, the possibility of fraud would have been avoided. But, without intending to cast any imputation upon the honour of officers of the army, he must say, that if there bad been collusion between the officer of Engineers and the contractor, such a system would have led to a precisely similar result. [Mr. WHITESIDE: Then we have no hope?] Your hope is in this, that you may have a system of checks which will make fraud extremely difficult. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? No system of checks can be devised which, by means of forgery and conspiracy, may not be defeated. I believe that at first the frauds were not large, but impunity rendering the parties bolder in late years the amounts of which the public were defrauded became more considerable. As these persons were only convicted of frauds to the extent of £1,400, I feel some difficulty in stating, upon what may be con- sidered official authority, the extent of the frauds which they actually committed, as they may have friends and relations whose feelings would be hurt by such a statement. If the House thinks I am justified in making the statement I have no objection to do so; but I will hot voluntarily state the amount, though I may say that it considerably exceeds that which was proved at the trial. The frauds were detected by a clerk in the office, who suspected something was wrong, and wrote to London. Inquiry was made, and the irregularity was at once found out. The rule which has been adopted to prevent the recurrence of such practices is, that the Commanding Officer of Engineers should send to the London office a duplicate statement, which will be a check upon the clerk. This will prevent the recurrence of any precisely similar frauds, but it is impossible to provide securities against every possible fraud which ingenious rogues may devise. Means have also been taken, with which I need not trouble the House, to prevent such frauds as these leading to the expenditure of more money than has been voted by this House.

said, that in England the system was very simple. The works were executed by contract and measurement, and when complete the contractor, the clerk of the works, and the executive officer of Engineers, each of whom kept a book, checked one another. The check was complete, for there must be collusion between all four persons before any fraud could be effected. It appeared that in the instance referred to the amount paid was more than the work could cost. It should be known that in these cases there was an estimate, and every sum paid upon it was entered in a hook. Now it was the duty of the clerk who made the entries, the moment there was an excess of payment over the estimate, to state the fact; and therefore the contractor would be called upon to know why there was an excess. He contended that the practice should be that no bill in which there was an erasure or interlineation should be paid, and he would suggest that there should be a positive order to that effect.

said, he rose to call attention to the delay in presenting the Civil Service Estimates. Although the House had been sitting six weeks, no progress had been made with these Estimates. Last year Parliament met in the first week of February. On the 15th of the same month the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) asked when the Miscellaneous Estimates would be produced. He was told they would be ready in a fortnight. That promise was not fulfilled, and on the 7th of March the hon. Baronet (Sir S. Northcote) repeated the question. The hon. Secretary to the Treasury stated that he would not fix the time. On the 19th the hon. Baronet said it was highly desirable the Miscellaneous Estimates should be laid on the table before the Easter recess. They were then promised for the following Friday. The House rose that very day for the recess, and although the Estimates were laid on the table on that day they were not printed until the House re-assembled on the 11th of April. They were supplied to the House separately and at intervals, and it was not until the 19th of April, nearly a month after, they were laid on the table, that the Estimate No. 1 made its appearance. He was afraid a similar course was about to be pursued this year, but he was glad to see that soon after he had placed his Motion on the paper part of those Estimates had been laid on the table and some had been printed. Perhaps the Government would state when the others would make their appearance. The Select Committee on Public Monies, on Miscellaneous Expenditure, and on Public Accounts had all recommended that the Miscellaneous Estimates should be laid on the table as soon as possible after Parliament met, and the House had a right to know whether the Government intended to carry out these recommendations. He believed that all balances of a former year would not now be applied to a subsequent year, and that was an additional reason for expedition. On comparing the dates, however, there did not appear to have been any greater expedition that year than during the last.

said, he would remind the hon. Gentleman that a decision having already been taken upon the question that the Speaker should leave the chair, his Resolution could not be entertained, according to the forms of the House; but that was no reason why an explanation of the points on which the hon. Member desired to be informed, should be refused. The principle, no doubt, was a sound one, that the Miscellaneous Estimates should be prepared as early as possible, and discussed with deliberation while the House was full. There were, however, important limiting considerations interposing considerable difficulties, which could only be gradually overcome. It was true that the Naval and Military Estimates were laid on the table within a week after the meeting of the House; but they were Estimates prepared within the departments to which they referred. The Miscellaneous Estimates, on the other hand, were of the most varied and diverse character, and the Treasury were dependent not only upon public departments for their production, but also on Members of Commissions, the governing bodies of Institutions, and even on others who gave their gratuitous services to the public. The Treasury had to enter into correspondence with these persons; it was sometimes necessary to see them on the business of the Estimates; and these interviews could not he obtained except when people usually came to London. He could not affirm, therefore, that it would be possible to present the Miscellaneous Estimates with the same regularity and certainty as the Military and Naval Estimates. At the same time, he agreed that it was the duty of the Government to endeavour to overcome the difficulties which now caused delay, and that the Government were endeavouring to do. It must be remembered the Government had no power to fix the time when, if ready, the Miscellaneous Estimates would be considered. There was no fixed time even for the Military and Naval Estimates; and as for the Miscellaneous Estimates, they had to take their chance. They were elbowed about by the mass of public business, and they were taken when the Government could get a night. In cases when the House was not able to consider them until the month of June it was not desirable they should be laid on the table in February, because during so long an interval they would require in many respects to be altered. It was most desirable that the time of their preparation and introduction should have a certain reference to the time when the House would be able to consider them. He trusted, therefore, that no attempt would be made to bind the Government by a stereotyped Resolution. If the House laid down a fixed rule that the Treasury should present the Miscellaneous Estimates within a fortnight, for example, after the House met, the Treasury would do it. But the effect would be that the Miscellaneous Estimates would be imperfect, and the practice of presenting supplementary Estimates—one of the greatest financial evils the House could endure—would of necessity prevail. With respect to the public balances, he proposed to take the Vote on the Miscellaneous Estimates, subject to the condition that the balances would, as he hoped, be surrendered next year.