I have to ask the Secretary of the Admiralty whether he has any objection to lay upon the table of the House the Correspondence which might have arisen between Captain Cowper Coles, of the Royal Navy, and the Board of Admiralty, on the subject of his Shot-proof Shield; the Report thereupon of the late Admiral Lord Lyons, in the year 1855; and the Report of Captain Powell, of Her Majesty's ship, Trusty, in the year 1861.

said, he would be glad to give every possible information to his hon. and gallant Friend; but the fact was that the correspondence to which he referred took place in the year 1855, during the Russian war, and there was a great deal mixed up in it which it would not be advisable to make public. The cupola which was about to be built on Captain Coles plan was provisionally proposed to the Admiralty in the year 1855, and there was no essential difference in the proposal recently adopted as compared with that made in 1855. Some improvement, however, had been introduced.

said, he would beg to ask, Whether the Government have received official information relative to the Convention said to have been entered into at Soledad between the Allied Powers and the Government of Mexico; whether the British Force has been, or is about to be, withdrawn from the territories of the Republic; and whether instructions have been sent out to the British Minister approving the terms of the Convention?

replied, that the Government had received official information that a Convention had been signed—not between the Allied Powers and Mexico, but between the Commissioners of those Powers and the Government of the country. It was true that the British Force—if it might be called a force—might probably have been withdrawn from Mexico by the present time, with the exception of a small body of men. That force originally consisted of 600 marines, but a reference to the papers which had been laid on the table on the House, would show that it had never been the intention of the Government that those marines should take part in any expedition into the interior of the country. They would, therefore, be withdrawn, with the exception of 100, who would he left to carry on the ordinary duties at Vera Cruz and San Juan. As regarded the Convention, he might add that Her Majesty's Government had approved of it as a whole; for although they could not approve all the articles, yet they believed that the general spirit carried out the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. The Convention distinctly disclaimed all desire, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, and encouraged a hope that the present differences would be satisfied by negotiation and pacific means, and that any hostile measures would be unnecessary. It was to be hoped that these expectations would be fulfilled, and that it would not be necessary to go to war with Mexico.

asked, whether papers on the subject would be laid on the table immediately?

said, the hon. Gentleman had given notice of his intention to move for those papers after Easter. He could not at present say whether there was any objection to lay the Convention on the table, but he should probably be able to inform the hon. Gentleman on Monday.

said, it was for the purposes of his Motion that he was anxious to have the papers.

said, he wished to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, When the Returns of Convictions at the Curragh Court House and Petty Sessions of Kildare, in Ireland, ordered by the House, will be laid upon the table of the House.

said, that the hon. and gallant Gentleman appeared to overlook the fact that the Returns which he applied for were presented on the 28th ultimo and ordered to be printed.

Sir, in the year 1858 a vote was obtained from the House of a sum of £6,000 towards the completion of the Monument of Lord Nelson in Trafalgar Square. The design of the granite lions, which are indispensable to the adornment of the base, was subsequently intrusted, not to a sculptor, but to a very distinguished artist; and although nearly four years have elapsed, they have not been completed. During the present year we may expect a very large concourse of foreigners as visitors in London, and I cannot but think that the sight of the incomplete memorial to the greatest of our Admirals will be regarded as a national reproach. I remember reading in the works of one of the greatest of Roman historians (Sallust) that his nation—a nation of conquerors—in their palmiest days would say that the sight of the statues of their distinguished men wonderfully inflamed their minds to the love of virtue; that it was not the speaking brass, the likeness or the figure, which possessed such intrinsic power, but that the memory of their exploits was revived in their hearts, and kindled a flame which was not to be quenched before they had striven to rival their fame and glory. Such are the motives with which we raise statues to the departed: not only to express gratitude and admiration, but to quicken in the minds of their successors the type of excellence, and animate them to like imitations. The monument of Nelson, I regret to think, was not completed even in its present state without the aid of a munificent foreign Emperor. We may be unable to afford a parallel to the splendid buildings, the magnificent collections of art, and the richly-stored galleries of the continent; but at least we may show that we have the will and purpose to attest an equal reverence with them for the memory of the men who have deserved well of their country. It is distressing—it cannot be otherwise than distressing to every Englishman—to see in the grandest portion of the capital—in the greatest thoroughfare, leading to the wealth of the City, the chambers of legislation, and the palace of the Sovereign— the monument of the first and noblest of our Admirals left incomplete, owing to a remissness which I cannot think excusable. I therefore will ask to what quarter we are to attribute the lamentable delay which amounts almost to neglect? If ever there was a man of whom there was but one opinion, that man is Nelson: endeared to the nation not only by the devotion of a life, but by the sacrifice of the body, pale n and mutilated in his country's service. Kept alive for years, as I may say, only by the undaunted spirit within. One of whom, as Tacitus said of his great countryman, Agricola, "we may reiterate, what we loved, what we admired, in him dwells, and will ever abide in the hearts of men with the eternity of time and the glory of it." I hope that hon. Members on each side of the House will respond to the appeal I will now make to the Government no longer to permit this disgrace, but at once determine, with justice and prudence, to complete the Nelson Monument in a perfect state, agreeably with the original design.

said, he rose to move an Address for Copy of the Agreement entered into by the Government of India with the Bank of Bengal, for the issue of Paper Money in India. The establishment of a paper currency in India was a question of importance. It had excited considerable interest among the commercial classes out of doors; and, naturally enough, some difference of opinion had arisen on the subject. A paper currency would, no doubt, be a great advantage to the commercial and mercantile classes in India. It would enable merchants to pay sums of money in distant parts of India with far less trouble and expense than at present. So far it would be a great commercial convenience; but that commercial convenience would be very dearly purchased if the currency to be established were not based on sound financial principles. A very general feeling prevailed, that if there was to be a paper currency in India, the paper to be issued should proceed from a bank authorized by the Government, with a separate department of issue, like the Bank of England, but that the paper should not be issued by the Government itself. The reasons for that were sufficiently obvious. India was a country peculiarly sensative and peculiarly liable to sudden commercial and monetary panics. Those panics some times occurred in India without any assignable cause; and if during one of them a run for coin or, bullion should take place, which it naturally would do, to such an extent as to induce a suspension of cash payments as a temporary expedient, it would be far better that such a course should be taken by a bank rather than by the Government itself. In the former case the Government might come forward to assist the bank, to proclaim the frivolity of the panic, and to offer to accept the notes of the bank; but in the latter case, where the notes were issued by the Government itself, the Government, being unable to meet its engagements, would stand discredited in the eyes of the people, and would be practically insolvent. It might be said that that could hardly occur to a Government which usually kept from £14.000,000 to£15,000,000 cash balances its treasury. That, however, was a delusion which prevailed in this country, even among those who professed to instruct the public on matters of Indian finance. Those persons seemed to suppose that the cash balances in the Indian treasury were as available resources to the Indian Government as the cash balances in Her Majesty's treasury would be to the Govern- ment at home; and that therefore they might be used as a security for an issue of paper money. To a certain extent that might be true, but to a certain extent also it was fallacious. What were called the cash balances in the Indian treasury were cash balances in about 300 treasuries, scattered over every part of the Indian empire. Some of these treasuries were 1,000 miles from the seat of Government, and, with the usual modes of conveyance, it would take two months to bring the balances from those distant treasuries to the treasury at Calcutta. It was obvious, therefore, that these cash balances could not be made available at the seat of Government for any sudden commercial panic, and that the only cash balances which could be made available under such circumstances would be those that might be found in the treasury at Calcutta. Now, the cash balances in the Calcutta treasury usually amounted to about 10 per cent of the whole; so that if they calculated the cash balances in all the Indian treasuries at £15,000,000, they might assume that there was about £1,500,000 in the treasury at Calcutta which might be made available for a commercial panic. It was useless, however, to discuss that question; because, by an arrangement to which he was about to call attention, the cash balances were made to disappear and vanish altogether from the scene. When Mr. Wilson was first appointed Financial Secretary to the Government of India, he left this country fully prepared to carry out a system of paper currency in India. He had the advantage of consulting the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India, than whom there was no one either in or out of that House who, from his previous studies or his great knowledge of the subject, would have been able to give him better advice; and he also consulted the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, who expressed themselves favourable to his views. Accordingly, Mr. Wilson did not lose much time after his arrival in India before he published his programme which was contained in a minute dated from the camp at Meerut, on the 25th of December, 1859. That minute had been justly characterized by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India as a very able document. Mr. Wilson did not conceal from himself the difficulties with which he would have to contend in first introducing into the Indian Empire that great invention of modern civilization, the abuse of which had caused such incalculable evils in almost every country in Europe, as well as in America. He understood the character of the people; he knew how suspicious they were of modern innovations; and therefore he endeavoured to take every possible precaution to secure the confidence of the people in the convertibility of his notes. How, then, did Mr. Wilson propose to carry out his plan? He proposed that a paper issue should take place, the security being two-thirds of Government Stock and one-third of coin. That plan came home to this country, and was submitted to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India, who disapproved of it, being of opinion that it did not give sufficient security for the convertibility of the notes. The proposal of Mr. Wilson, therefore, was disallowed, and very properly. The right hon. Gentleman had not left them in doubt as to what were his views on the subject. They were expressed in a despatch to the Governor General after Mr. Wilson's minute; and the despatch might be considered as the answer to that minute. In that despatch it was stated by the right hon. Gentleman that so indispensable was it in the first instance to establish confidence in the notes, that beyond the reserve of coin and bullion in the hands of the Currency Commissioners it should be provided that the cash balances in the Indian Treasury should be available to meet any unforeseen demand in payment of the notes. The plan of the right hon. Gentleman was briefly this:—that there should be an issue of £4,000,000, on Government Securities, but all beyond that should be secured by coin; but he was so anxious to secure the convertibility of the notes that he further provided that the cash balances of the Indian Government should be available to meet any unforeseen demand for the payment of the notes. But, in spite of these instructions, the Indian Government had devised, and actually carried into effect, a plan, he presumed under the presiding genius of Mr. Laing, far more dangerous than the scheme of Mr. Wilson—providing, as it did, that Government notes should be issued on the security alone of Government Stock. He referred to the agreement of the Indian Government with the Bank of Bengal for keeping the cash balances. That agreement, which came into operation on the 1st of last March, provided that the Government should open an account with the Bank of Bengal for keep- ing its cash balances there in place of in its own treasury; that the bank should have an allowance of £4,360 yearly, besides being reimbursed by the State for all its expenses; that the State should retain at the Bank a monthly average balance of £700,000; and that the Bank should be at liberty to employ it for its own commercial purposes, just as it did the money of other customers. That privilege would be equivalent to the payment to the Bank of no less than £42,000 a year. When the balances were under £500,000, the State was to pay the Bank on such deficiency the same rate of interest as the Bank charged its other customers. When the average balance exceeded £700,000, the directors were to keep the excess in cash or to invest it in Government Securities. The Bank would adopt the latter course, as it was to receive the dividends. The Bank would thus be always selling and buying Government Securities, and receiving the dividends, whilst the Government would pay any loss there might be upon the transactions. He did not pretend to calculate what might be the loss of the Government under the agreement, but the gain of the Bank would be large indeed. That consideration had caused the enormous rise of £10 per cent which had taken place in the shares of the Bank. He wished the House to observe that the cash balances of the Government, which the Secretary of State deemed so necessary to give security and confidence to the notes, were made entirely to disappear, for they were invested in Government Securities; and that the notes were to be issued upon the security alone of Government Stock. He could not understand how Government Stock could be a security for notes that were convertible and payable on demand.

seconded the Motion.

said, that the hon. Member had correctly enough stated the early proceedings with reference to the establishment of a paper currency in India. He believed that a paper currency there, resting on sound foundations, would tend much to develope the resources of India, and promote its commercial interests. The late Mr. Wilson had proposed a plan for that purpose, which in some respects had not been deemed satisfactory. Directions had therefore been sent out from this country on the subject, and an Act had been passed in entire conformity with those directions, it did not provide for the issue of notes for £4,000,000 without any deposit of bullion or coin; but £4,000,000 was the limit beyond which such issue was not under any circumstances to be carried. He had heard with surprise of the arrangement which had been made by the Government of India with the Bank of Bengal. It was not in accordance with the instructions which had been sent out, and it undoubtedly was one such as he should not have been disposed to sanction. But the hon. Gentleman would see that in this case, as sometimes happened in Indian matters, they were in this difficulty—that an arrangement had been made in India, on the faith of which persons were acting, and it would not be fair now to disturb it. The arrangement was, however, only temporary, and must come to an end in five years; and he could assure his hon. Friend that there would be little chance of its being renewed if be had the honour of holding office when the time arrived. The hon. Member was under a mistake in saying that the notes were issued upon Government securities. For every note issued by the Bank coin had been deposited, and at this moment there was coin deposited to the full extent of the paper issue. The temporary arrangement with the Bank could not, as he had stated, very well be overturned. The terms on which it should hereafter be renewed would require very careful consideration, and the hon. Gentleman would allow that he was only exercising a sound discretion in refraining from entering upon that point. As to the production of the papers now asked for, he would suggest that the hon. Member should postpone his Motion for a short time to allow of the receipt of further despatches from India.

said, he wished to answer a question that had been put in his absence by the hon. and gallant Admiral opposite, who had called attention to the incomplete condition of the Nelson Monument. Like the hon. and gallant Member, he greatly deplored that that monument was unfinished. The order for the execution of the lions was given in 1858 to Sir Edwin Landseer, a man of great genius in the representation of animals. But genius was not to be commanded at all seasons, and Sir Edwin Landseer had not yet been able to satisfy himself as to the work of art which he was to place upon that monument, and could not yet name any time when the lions would be completed. All he could say was that Sir Edwin Landseer was now very accurately studying the habits of lions, and was to be seen in the Zoological Gardens making himself thoroughly acquainted with their attitudes. It was to be hoped that all the delay would secure their ultimately having a work of art of still greater perfection than if it had been executed as rapidly as had been expected. Sir Edwin Landseer was quite aware that a great monument was in a very imperfect state while the portion of the work intrusted to him remained unfinished.

said, he rose to call attention to the condition of Poland, and to move for certain papers relating thereto. Those who might be prepossessed against the discussion of the question to which his Motion referred at that time would, he thought, if they only patiently listened to the facts which he had collected, be convinced that it was a fitting occasion for the British House of Commons to entertain it. Indeed, if he wanted any justification for the course he was about to take, it would be found in the numerous petitions from different parts of the kingdom which had been presented to the House that very day, signed by persons of all classes in society, and anxiously entreating that the subject of Poland should be brought under its notice, and that the Russian Government might be reminded of its duties and obligations towards that country. He wished to approach the question in the spirit breathed by that memorable declaration of Lord Lyndhurst, who, when speaking on the same subject some years ago, said, that it was the duty of every person placed in a position where his voice could be heard to raise that voice in denouncing injustice, tyranny, and oppression; that if to commit injustice was a crime, to treat it with silence was to participate in its criminality. He did not intend to enter upon the early history of Poland, but he wished to call attention to the basis of our relations with the Government of Russia and with other Powers of Europe, which gave this country the right on any occasion to raise its voice on behalf of the kingdom of Poland. All our great statesmen and great writers had been of opinion that the partition of Poland was the origin of all the mischief that had since existed in that country, and that it was a standing reproach to Europe. Lord Macaulay had described it as that kind of partition which consisted in tearing a living man limb from limb. The Treaty of Vienna provided that Poland should remain in possession of its nationality, and should have given to it, by the countries among whom it had been partitioned, institutions which should be national in their character. They were not to be deprived of their language, their education, their religion, or their nationality. The Treaty of Vienna offered a certain latitude of construction, which had been taken advantage of by the Powers who were parties to it—except England and France—to place a construction upon that treaty which had been repudiated by our greatest statesmen, and especially by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. The spirit of the Treaty of Vienna was best expressed by the words of Alexander I., who in 1815 promised a constitution appropriate to the wants of Poland, preservation of the language and institutions of that country, the restriction of public appointments to Poles, freedom of commerce and navigation, and free communication with other portions of the ancient kingdom which were under the government of other Powers. There was, however, another and a peculiar feature in the Treaty of Vienna to which reference had been made in many of the petitions that had been presented that evening, and to which he wished to call the attention of the House. By that treaty England bound herself to pay a certain sum, which at this time was £75,000 a year, to Russia, on account of the Russo-Dutch Loan, and Russia bound herself to observe the stipulations of the Treaty; and some of the petitions suggested that it was the duty of this Government to withhold payment of that money until Russia had complied with her obligations under the treaty. And it was for the House to consider how long they ought to continue to pay Russia for stipulations which had never been fulfilled. In 1815 a sort of constitution was granted to Poland, which from that time to 1830 was systematically violated. In 1830 the insurrection of Warsaw occurred; and when the outbreak was finally extinguished, the constitution was completely abolished, and. another so-called constitution given by an organic statute, creating a Council of State under the influence of the bureaucracy of Russia, and making Poland a mere province under the despotic sway of the conquering Power. In 1833 the state of Poland was brought under the notice of the British Government, and a correspondence took place, in the course of which Russia contended that the insurrection of 1830 had relieved her of all previous obligations to grant a constitution. The noble Lord now at the head of Her Majesty's Government opposed that view, contending, with all other English statesmen, and proving conclusively, that this was not a fair or statesmanlike way of dealing with the case, but that it was a shirking by Russia of its treaty obligation. And it was important to state, that the Earl of Derby, then Lord Stanley, emphatically concurred in the view taken by the noble Lord. If, however, the treaty was violated in 1833, it was still more violated in 1842, when the Supreme Court of Justice was transferred to St. Petersburg, the Russian language became the authorized language, and the Catholic clergy were deprived of their property. From that time to 1860 the condition of Poland had been as bad as it could be. The country was practically in a state of siege, and the people were subject to be transported, without trial, to Siberia. But none of these violent proceedings had succeeded in destroying the national feeling in Poland, which now burned more ardently in the public mind than even in the days of the greatest prosperity of that kingdom. From 1848 to 1856 the events which occurred in other parts of Europe had their natural effect upon the Poles. They could not witness the recovery of liberty by the Italians without hoping that a good time was coming for Poland to recover her liberty, and her institutions. There was a growing love of liberty in Poland, encouraging hopes which he trusted the turn of events would realize, by making Poland, as it once before was, one of the great nations of Europe. In 1856, at the close of the Russian war, the relations of Russia towards the other nations of Europe, as laid down in the Treaty of Vienna, were considered. The discussion turned on what should be done with Poland. And how did it come to an end? The Earl of Clarendon was assured by Russia that certain things would be done for Poland; and we had it upon Lord Clarendon's own authority, that upon this assurance only the English and French Governments abstained from pressing the matter further. Her Majesty's Government were probably in possession of some correspondence which took place then on the subject; and, if so, he thought they would do well to publish it as an act of justice not only towards Poland, but also to this country, as showing that they had not been slack, when opportunity arose, in endeavouring to bring other countries to an acknowledgment of their duties under the Treaty of Vienna. He therefore should be disposed to move that the despatches relating to Poland, which passed in 1856, should be laid on the table. In 1860 it became more apparent than ever that the Poles still cherished a national feeling; and Russia then, for the first time, seemed to apprehend with some thing like uneasiness the real condition of the public mind of Poland. Then followed those demonstrations and subsequent collisions with which the House was familiar. In November, 1860, the anniversary of the revolution was celebrated, and the Russian authorities made no objection to the assembly of the people. There was, in fact, no intimation that the proceeding was at all offensive. In February, 1861, the people of Warsaw announced their intention of celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Grochow, in which the people of Warsaw had held their own so bravely against the whole Russian army. But the Russian soldiers were ordered to meet and celebrate the event on the same spot, and the intention of the Poles was therefore frustrated. After that, there being few troops in Warsaw, the Agricultural Society, which had been encouraged by the Russian Government, and consulted by them as to the best mode of putting an end to the soccage tenure which prevailed throughout Poland, took part in trying to prevent disturbances. At the head of that Society was Count Andre Zamoyski, and it was chiefly to his influence that the prevention of a collision on the occasion to which he had alluded was owing. On the 27th of February, 1861, one or two funerals took place, and happened to be numerously attended, though there was no pretence for saying that they were got up for the purpose of political disturbances. The troops, however, regarded these funerals as a political movement, and fired on the people, several of whom were killed. The affair was magnified to an insurrection. It was telegraphed all over Europe, with the usual addition, that order had been restored. The leading Poles attempted then to show that the friends of order and of liberty in Warsaw were one; and they sent to the Viceroy a petition to be presented to the Emperor, in the name of the people of Warsaw, in which they referred to the deep expression of the unsatisfied wants of the country, and declared the attachment of the Poles to the principles of nationality. Permission was obtained to forward the petition to the Emperor. It was idle to say that that was contrary to Russian law. It was the right of every people to make their grievances known to their governors. Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Governor, having but few troops, took a wise course on the occasion. He made an arrangement with Count Zamoyski for the preservation of order. That arrangement was that the people themselves should be intrusted to keep order. And the people kept order. Before the Emperor replied, it was announced throughout Europe that concessions would be made, that there would be a Council of State, that public instruction should be given in the Polish language, and that the municipality should be elected by the citizens—reforms which, if carried out, would have been of some importance and would have been gladly accepted by the people. Afterwards came the Emperor's answer, which spoke contemptuously of the petition—a most moderate, earnest, and constitutional document—designating it as the act of a few individuals, as an act of entraînment; expressing no regret for the loss of life which had taken place through the misapprehension of the troops, and saying nothing calculated to allay irritation throughout Poland. This description of the petition, as the act of a few individuals, was not calculated to gain a favourable reception for the Emperor's answer, as the petition had been signed by the President of the Agricultural Society, the Roman Catholic Archbishop, the Chief Rabbi, and other persons of the highest character in Warsaw. Between February, 1861, and April, the garrison was greatly increased; troops were brought into the city in such numbers that by the beginning of April there were from 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers in Warsaw, a city containing only 160,000 inhabitants. On the 6th of April the Agricultural Society was suddenly dissolved. That measure naturally excited great discontent; and on the following day, the 7th, there was a popular demonstration, the inhabitants merely marching about the streets. But on the 8th the people wished to enter the courtyard of the Viceroy's palace, to ask him to present another petition to the Emperor. What was the result? The people assembled were charged by the military, and by the Russian account 10—by the Polish accounts, from 30 to 100 of the citizens were killed. This was the state of things at Warsaw on the 8th of April last year. Had matters improved since that time? In 1861, on April 1, a circular was issued by Prince Gortschakoff announcing the improvements that would be made. But the people, when they learned what the council of state was to be, found that it gave them nothing more than they had had fifteen years before; and which had been of no use to them: it gave them no representative power. Then the provincial and municipal councils were supposed to be more satisfactory, because it was hoped they would be representative in their constitution. The House knew what those councils had turned out to be. He could find no indication on the part of the Russian Government to give the Poles anything like representative institutions. Then the most childish orders had been issued by the Russian Government; for instance, the people were not allowed to be out after nine o'clock; no person was permitted to carry a stick, or to wear boots of a particular description; and other orders of a similarly puerile character were made, and were carried out with remarkable and absurd, if it were not cruel, severity. For instance, a man who could not walk without a crutch was on that account imprisoned for waking in the streets with a stick. A doctor, while visiting his patient, was imprisoned because his visit necessitated his being out after nine o'clock. Another man was imprisoned fur the same reason, while going to fetch a midwife; and while he was hurried off to prison his wife, and the child to whom she gave birth, both died for want of attendance. While these things were going on, the Russian Government took umbrage at the singing of a national hymn, which had become a universal practice. The practice was forbidden. These demonstrations of national feeling in such matters as costume and singing had sometimes been called childish. But were they so? If the Poles were to be condemned for thus showing their feeling of nationality when no other mode of expressing it was left to them, some of the noblest passages in history must be regarded as childish. Then, there were certain hymns the people used to sing in the churches. The Archbishop, when he was called on to prohibit them, refused to do so, as the hymns were those which had been sung in the churches for many years and had no exclusively political bearing. It was then said that the Pope had condemned the conduct of the Archbishop in thus refusing to forbid the hymns the people had been accustomed to sing. But the statement as to the Pope's interference was utterly unfounded. The Pope never disapproved what the Archbishop, as a good Churchman, was bound to do—to resist the dictation of the Viceroy as to the services in the Church. In May, 1861, Prince Gortschakoff died. His successor adopted the practice of riding about Warsaw with a guard of cavalry, and making an ostentatious and offensive display of the military power. In July, 1861, the Council of State was appointed, and no unwillingness was shown on the part of the Poles who were asked to serve upon it to take part in the proceedings, but nothing resulted from the institution of that body. On the 28th of August General Lambert was appointed Governor, and seemed to be instructed to act upon the policy of conciliation. The troops were withdrawn, arrests were diminished, and the people again began to wear the national boots and the national costume, such as had been previously allowed. That was a wise policy, for it was impossible to keep a kingdom in a state of siege when no acts of violence were committed by the people. On the 25th of September the elections for the great Municipal Council which was to constitute such a mighty improvement in the state of the Polish people took place, and the electors chose respectable, worthy, well-conducted citizens, and not firebrands or revolutionists. It seemed as if the Russian Government were disappointed at the order with which the elections were conducted and at the class of persons elected, for without further notice the state of siege was proclaimed in Warsaw. The reasons for that proceeding, as given by General Lambert, were, that at the funeral of the late Archbishop a banner with the arms of Poland had been displayed, that the Municipal Elections had resulted in the election of persons hostile to the Government, and that persons had signed a petition to the Czar in reference to the elections, which was characterized as an act tending to the overthrow of lawful authority. The state of siege had been continued, allowing the Cossacks, though there might be no disturbance, to arrest and drag to prison whom they pleased, and then, without form of trial, the unfortunate persons were liable to be sent to Siberia On the 15th of October it was intended to keep the festival of the birth of Kosciusko by closing the shops and having funeral services in the churches; but the Russian troops assembled, and the people as they left the churches were attacked, many received fatal wounds, and a great number were arrested. Taking the lowest estimate, the number of persons arrested amounted to 1,657, and among them were many highly-respected members of the Municipal Council. An incident then occurred which gave great umbrage to the Russian Government. The head of the Church at Warsaw, feeling discouraged by what had taken place on the 15th of October, and deeming it to be only a useless proceeding to keep the churches open if the people were not allowed to worship according to their consciences, caused them to be closed; and consequently they remained closed for a considerable time. He knew that that had been regarded by some as an act of Popish pride, but the same thing occurred at the synagogues and Lutheran churches, for one and all felt that the Russian soldiery might take advantage of their meeting in church and singing their national hymns, and might attack them and drag them to prison. What did the Russian Government then proceed to do? When he spoke of the Government, he did not mean to say that the Russian Emperor was aware of all that took place; he was not attacking any individual, but only the system, which was in contravention of the Treaty of Vienna, and on which this country ought to keep its eyes. The head of the Catholic Church, a man 78 years old, infirm and sick, was condemned to death by court-martial, and then credit was claimed for the Russian Government, because that sentence was commuted to imprisonment in a fortress for one year. The churches remained closed during Christmas, and the people were deprived of the rites of religion during that holy season. In February, 1862, a new Archbishop was appointed; who had since fortunately turned out to be a man who had the heart of a Pole, and had not acted so subserviently to the subordinate Russian authorities as it at first appeared likely he would. He began by re-opening the churches, and issued a conciliatory address, in which he spoke of rendering to Caesar the things that were Caesar's, and to God the things that were God's; and he implored the people to give up singing the national hymn. They obeyed, and he believed it had not been sung since. He further said that he had a positive assurance that the promises of the Emperor in behalf of the people would be fulfilled. He would fain believe that the Emperor of Russia was humane and sincere, and wished to fulfil his promises; but if so, there must be between him and the Polish people advisers who prevented him from giving effect to his wishes. What was the actual state of things at that moment in Warsaw? In illustration of that, he might refer to two letters which he had received, giving an account of the oppressive conduct of the Russian authorities. One day two gentlemen were brought before the judges—who were Russian Generals— and sentenced to pay a fine of 150 silver roubles and to be imprisoned two days for singing in the churches. They paid the fine and were imprisoned, but the day after their release they were seized again and banished for life. Ladies were arrested because they wore black or white on some portion of their dress, as those colours were considered to be the symbols of mourning for their country, or for fallen; victims of Russian tyranny. The schools were closed, and persons were not permitted to dine together even in groups of three. As many as twenty-five persons have been sent from Warsaw to Siberia in one day, and thousands were victims to the conscription. The pay of the army was increased so long as the state of siege lasted, so that the military authorities had a positive interest in prolonging the present state of things. He had received also a variety of proclamations which showed the arbitrary spirit of the Government in an equally strong light. The proprietors of all inns and hotels were obliged to give notice to the police of all strangers who visited them; they were compelled to act as spies upon them, and were made responsible for them. The heads of families were ordered not to allow any of the female members of their families to wear any portion of mourning, under pain of being arrested themselves and brought before the military authorities. He contended that no real and serious attempt had been made through such means as would alone be effectual to give the Poles that national Government to which they had a right under the: Treaty of Vienna. If it was only by statements in the British parliament that the Emperor could be made acquainted with what was really going on there, then it was more than ever incumbent to protest on behalf of a suffering people who were deprived of rights which England had guaranteed. It was perfectly plain that the bureaucracy of St. Petersburg governed at Warsaw, and would continue to do so until the Emperor saw fit to put a stop to it; and that until it was put a stop to, there could be no real remedy for the state of things which he had described. It was said that the Polish people were discontented, and would not be satisfied with the constitution which the Treaty of Vienna guaranteed them. But it was a great injustice to make that charge against men who had never been tried, and who never had the institutions which had been guaranteed to them. It was next said that imprisonment and deportation were incident to a state of siege. But the state of siege had been most wantonly imposed at a time when the Poles were behaving in an orderly manner, and had just completed the elections to municipal offices which the Government had conceded. It was not fairly to be called a state of siege, considering that the people were totally unarmed; and things were done under it he hoped without the knowledge of the Emperor; because, if not, as a humane man he would punish the delinquents for their misuse of his name. The last act of this cruel and despotic Government was stated in correspondence from Warsaw under date of March 17, and it had not been officially contradicted. M. Alexander Zamoyski, the editor of a newspaper at Warsaw, called the Pilot, wherein articles on the proposed constitution had been published distasteful to the authorities, was arrested, and, having refused to name any accomplices, declaring that he had none, was subjected to the question. The meaning of that was that he was flogged so that the flesh was cut from his bones, and his spine was seriously affected, and it was reported that he had since died. Unless the public opinion of this country reacted upon Russia, such events would be of constant occurrence. He believed that, so far from having exaggerated, he had understated the condition of things in Poland. He hoped he might hear some contradiction of these statements, although he believed they rested upon good authority. At all events, he trusted the noble Lord at the head of the Government would say that he still adhered to the opinion which had been often expressed, that the Treaty of Vienna had been violated. It might not be wise or right to involve Europe in war because the Treaty of Vienna had been violated; but he thought the fact should be stated over and over again in the face of Europe as long as they received such melancholy and deplorable accounts from the people of Poland.

Sir, I wish, in the first place, to set my hon. and learned Friend right upon on historical point, as to which he has, I think, been misinformed. My hon. and learned Friend stated that the engagement contracted with Russia, with regard to the Russo-Dutch loan, had reference to the Treaty of Vienna generally, and specifically to the state of Poland. The condition of the Russo-Dutch loan was this—that Great Britain engaged to pay that interest so long as Belgium remained united to Holland. And when, by the action of a conference, Belgium separated from Holland we might, according to the strict letter of the treaty, have refused to continue to pay the interest. But Her Majesty's Government thought—and Parliament, after an animated discussion, which those who were in the House at the time must remember, agreed—that, as the separation of Belgium from Holland was brought about in a great degree by the diplomatic exertions of Great Britain, and had been forced on Russia, it would be a great injustice to visit Russia with punishment for an event induced by England and France jointly, and against the wishes of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. No transactions in Poland can give us the right to refuse payment which was sanctioned by a subsequent convention and an Act of Parliament passed in consequence of the change of circumstances. My hon. and learned Friend has brought under the attention of the House the state of Poland and the condition of the Polish people. It is not necessary to say that every body who has turned his mind—and who has not done so?—to the history of Poland must feel towards the Poles great admiration for their high qualities and great sympathy for their misfortunes. The qualities which we admire are the highest qualities which belong to nations—great intelligence, great energy, but above all, an unconquerable, inextinguishable, and unquenchable love of country. Their feelings of nationality, indeed, remind us of the fable of the traveller and his cloak. The more the piercing blast from the north endeavoured to blow that cloak away, the more they have clung to it. There was one occasion when they may have thought a summer's sun was coming to their aid — when the First Napoleon occupied then-country. But "that pale sun in distance rolled away," and faded behind the clouds which obscured it. It did not suit the policy of France at that time to render them the aid they required; and then reverses came upon France, and the condition of Poland remained to be settled by the Treaty of Vienna. The interest which the Powers of Europe felt with regard to Poland was manifested in the very first article of the great European settlement to which my hon. and learned Friend has referred, which provided that Poland was to be erected into a kingdom irrevocably attached to Russia by its constitution, and that the Polish subjects of Austria, Russia, and Prussia should enjoy a national representation, and institutions regulated in accordance with the mode which each Government might find to be applicable to the case. There can be no doubt that that article required that the link between Poland and Russia should be a constitutional link; and a constitution was given to the kingdom of Poland, not altogether had in its details, but, as my hon. and learned Friend has truly said, it became almost from the first practically a dead letter, and from that period down to the events of 1830–1 the Poles did not certainly enjoy the full benefit of the constitution which had been accorded them. In 1830 came the French Revolution. The flame which it kindled spread, and the Poles thought a good opportunity presented itself to emancipate themselves from what they considered the intolerable condition to which they had been reduced. They then started under great advantages. They had an army numerous and well appointed. They had magazines, and, indeed, all the resources of war; but, after two campaigns, they were subdued, and the authority of Russia was re-established. The Russian Government, having quelled the insurrection, thought they were entitled to abolish the constitution, which had been given to Poland by the Emperor Alexander; and if the question had been simply one between that Government and the Poles, no other Government—whatever might be said as to the equity of the matter— would be entitled to expostulate with Russia on the fact that the constitution had been arbitrarily superseded. The engagements between that country and Poland were, however, engagements also contracted between Russia and the other Powers of Europe; and we, the English Government, thought therefore that we were fairly entitled, as parties to that European arrangement, to remonstrate against the abolition of a constitution which we held was, under the stipulations of the treaty, to form the link between those two nations. Our representations on the subject, as the House well knows—for the papers relating to it were laid on the table—were in vain; and as my hon. and learned Friend justly observed, it was not thought expedient, however deplorable the circumstances of the case might be, that we should make them a ground on which the friendly relations between this country and Russia should be disturbed or war between the two nations entered upon. The grievance inflicted upon them was, nevertheless, one of which the Poles might justly complain. Then came those events to which my hon. and learned Friend has alluded. An organic statute came into operation, far different from the constitution of which I have just spoken, and not, in my humble opinion, at all corresponding with the engagements of the Treaty of Vienna. If, however, that organic statute had been fairly and fully carried out, it might have made the internal condition of Poland tolerable, and might have been found compatible with a good deal of internal contentment and prosperity. But, unfortunately, that was not the case. There is, I may add, one circumstance connected with the relations subsisting between Poland and Russia, which ought not to be forgotten, which is, that there exists, I am afraid, a great national—I will not say antipathy, but antagonism between the two nations; and that there is a tendency on the part of Russian officials to regard the Poles with a feeling which probably prevents them from being animated by a disposition to put the best interpretation on any regulations which they may have to carry into effect. Then we must not lose sight of the fact of the absorption of the Republic of Cracow by Austria, which, although it may not exactly apply to the kingdom of Poland, yet is connected with the Polish nationality and cause. Republics, it is true, are rather at a discount at present, but still that little Republic was a respectable State; and I took the liberty of saying at the time when we remonstrated against the manner in which it was dealt with, that if the Treaty of Vienna was set at naught on the Vistula, it might possibly at some future day not be very much respected on the banks of the Po. Events have proved that my anticipations were not wholly without foundation. I now come to those recent events to which my hon. and learned Friend has called our attention, and which are greatly to be lamented. It does not, perhaps, become any one in this House to assume the character of a judge between the Poles and the Russian Government. But when, at the same time, my hon. and learned Friend calls on the House to express an opinion on this question, it is difficult to refrain from giving utterance to those sentiments with respect to it which one may entertain as an individual Member of Parliament; and I therefore feel myself at liberty to answer the appeal which my hon. and learned Friend has made. I must admit that the Poles have, as he says, great cause of complaint; that they have been deprived of constitutional rights, which, by European treaties, they were entitled to retain; and that they have not even been allowed the enjoyment of those institutions of a limited character which their Sovereign granted them. It seems to me, however, that a nation under the circumstances in which Poland is placed ought well to weigh the consequences of the adoption of any line of conduct which it might be advised to pursue The revolt of 1830 was intelligible. They thought at the time they were strong enough to break the bonds under which they suffered. They fought gallantly. They fought with great means. They failed, and had to submit to their fate. But in the case of those transactions to which my hon. and learned Friend adverts they did not feel—they could not feel—there existed a fair prospect that by means of any popular movement or any military insurrection they could obtain that which they desired—either better institutions or national independence. Was it wise, then, on their part, I ask, to adopt that line of offensive demonstration which my hon. and learned Friend has described? It may be said, to be sure, that there can be no great harm in a multitude of people following a funeral. We had an instance of the sort not long ago in Ireland. Great numbers of persons there followed the funeral of a gentleman who had not been particularly distinguished by a regard for the laws of the land, but no notice was taken of the fact. Those who attended the funeral, in all probability, might have seized the opportunity to add to the revenue of my right horn Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer by libations of whisky; but the whole thing passed off quietly, and it would have been an act of folly on the part of the Government to have interfered in the matter. In the same way the funeral at Warsaw might have been permitted to pass over quietly. But then there were emblems displayed, and hymns were sung. Now, these were acts which could produce no effect on the condition of Poland, but which were calculated to irritate and provoke the Russian authorities. My hon. and learned Friend says the hymns sung were of a national character, such as an Englishman might like to sing in memory of his country, if he happened to be in any other part of the world. They were not, however, exactly of that description. They had something of a religious character, and implied an earnest application to Divine Providence to emancipate Poland from Russian rule. They might, therefore, not unnaturally be considered offensive to the Russian Government. That being so, I cannot help thinking, with great deference, that the Poles would have better consulted their own interests if they had applied their energies to the improvement of agriculture, and the endeavour to promote the general prosperity of their country, and if they had borne as well as they could the evils which, unhappily, they endure, instead of going out of their way to do things which were calculated to irritate and provoke the Russian authorities, without being likely to produce any good result. I must, however, on the other hand say—feeling, as I do, the full force of that which my hon. and learned Friend has stated—that I think it was totally unworthy of the Russian authorities to have recourse to those acts of severity with which they visited this in itself harmless demonstration of the people of Warsaw. Nothing can justify the cruelty and the persecutions to which they have resorted. It is not, at the same time, for us to interfere between the two nations, except so far as we are warranted in so doing by those common principles of humanity which apply to all countries, and which, I think, have been greatly violated by the proceedings of the Russian Government. As I said before, a feeling of strong antagonism exists between Russia and Poland, and I therefore hope and believe that the acts of the Russian authorities in Warsaw, and in other parts of the kingdom of Poland, have not been sanctioned by—probably they have not even been known to—the Emperor. I had the honour some years ago of seeing His Imperial Majesty when in this country, where he remained some weeks, and I must say he appeared to me to be a most kind-hearted and benevolent man. Now, we all know that men's natures — whatever may be the case with their opinions—do not, generally speaking, much alter with the advance of years, and that those who at an early age possess kind hearts are not likely to become different in character when they have grown older. I feel, therefore, persuaded that the Emperor of Russia personally would prefer the adoption of a kind and liberal policy towards the Polish nation. But, as I said before, there are parties around a monarch who represent things their own way, and who, from love of authority and other feelings, are frequently disposed to abuse the powers intrusted them for good, and to apply them for evil. With respect to the future, if one felt called upon or had any right to give advice to the Poles, one would recommend them to trust to the future, and not to go out of their way to draw upon themselves inflictions which they could not prevent if they came upon them, and which are intolerable to bear. Recollect that which is now passing in Russia. A great political and social change is taking place in Russia, and a change which cannot be single. There is a great operation in progress—one of the greatest, perhaps, ever performed in a short space of time in any country—the emancipation of the serfs. Does any man believe that the emancipation of the serfs must not, sooner or later, lead to some extension of political privileges, and power, and authority to the Russian nation? I should advise the Poles, then, to wait for that, remembering, that though the Russians may not wish them to obtain or keep political liberty beyond that which they themselves enjoy, yet they will be disposed to extend to the Polish people everything which may be granted to themselves. The Poles will best consult their own interests by endeavouring to conciliate, and by taking advantage of what I must believe to be the kind and humane feelings of the Emperor of Russia. At all events, the matter is not one in which the Government of this country could wisely or usefully interfere. No doubt the recital here of facts which may not have come to the knowledge of the Russian Emperor may be useful, by bringing to his cognizance things which have been done in his name, but to which he has not been a party. On the other hand, an expression of sympathy for Poland must be grateful to the feelings of the Poles. It is quite unnecessary for them to make any demonstration in order to satisfy Europe that their aspirations for nationality continue undiminished. Nobody who knows anything of them could believe that their patriotic feelings are in the least degree quenched by time. Therefore, in that point of view, nothing further is required. But, as far as an expression of sympathy on the part of this House may tend to conciliation, to induce the Russian Government to mitigate the system of rule which now prevails at Warsaw, and to persuade the Poles to abstain from drawing down upon themselves any more inflictions by demonstrations which cannot do any good, but which may do a great deal of harm, I agree with my hon. and learned Friend that his Motion may not be without a useful result. I cannot, off hand, say whether there are any papers which could be produced; but I will inquire into that matter, and on some future day will let my hon. and learned Friend know how it stands.

said, that in rising to support the Motion, he wished to say a few words—first, as to how far England was really concerned in the Polish question; and then, as to how far that question was in truth a practical one. What hold, he would ask, had Poland upon England, and why should England mix herself up in the Polish question? The answer to that, he thought, was contained in the papers laid before Parliament at the close of the last Session. Those papers were far and away the most important that had ever been published in this country relating to Poland. He had no doubt that such hon. Gentlemen as had not read them would be surprised to learn that the important despatch communicated by Prince Talleyrand to the noble Viscount, though laid on the table in 1861, bore the date of 1831. For thirty long years a State Paper, which furnished the key to English policy with respect to Poland, had remained in the archives of the Foreign Office. The despatch submitted by Prince Talleyrand, demanding, in language not usually found in diplomatic documents, the co-operation of England on behalf of Poland, and the reply of the noble Viscount had been moved for over and over again, long before he was born; but until the close of last Session they had always been refused, on the ground, among others, that their production would tend to embroil this country with the other Powers of Europe. In 1831 the Poles were up in arms, and war was actually raging between Poland and Russia. The despatch communicated to the noble Viscount by Prince Talleyrand was written by Count Sebastiani, and dated Paris, July 7, 1831. It was as follows:—

"The King, touched by the evils which the Polish war has already caused to two nations in which he takes so lively an interest, eager to ensure the maintenance of peace, compromised daily by so prolonged a contest, and no less engaged in preserving the West of Europe from the fearful sufferings which this war entails, has addressed himself confidentially to the Emperor of Russia in order to put an end to so many disasters, and to bring to an end blood-shedding over which humanity has only too long groaned. The King's intention was also to preserve the political existence of a people which has shown itself so worthy of it by so great courage and patriotism, and which has the guarantee of the Treaties of Vienna for its nationality. Up to the present time the King's efforts have not achieved the results which he had the right to expect. Notwithstanding their small success, His Majesty does not consider it his duty to renounce the generous and pacific mediation which his personal feelings recommend and which the condition of Europe prescribes to him. He believes, especially, that were England to act in agreement with France for giving to this salutary intervention all the force of which it is susceptible, the effect might be made certain by the combination of these two Powers The King is sufficiently acquainted with the feelings which animate His Britannic Majesty to entertain the hope that he will not refuse to give his frank and complete adhesion to our advances, and to join his powerful action to our efforts, at a time when the question of the welfare of humanity and of the general interest of Europe transcends all others. The desire of His Majesty, mon Prince, is that you should make immediate and pressing overtures to the English Government with reference to this subject. We are awaiting their result with much impatience.

The latter part of the despatch contained language not often found in diplomatic documents. The reply of the noble Viscount, who was then at the Foreign Office, was dated July 22nd, 1831. It first recapitulated the demands made in the despatch from Paris, referred to the friendly feelings of England towards Poland, and then, after describing the state of things, went on to say—

"Can it, then, be expedient to make a proposal which there is no ground to hope would be accepted; and which, if refused, would leave to the two Governments the embarrassing alternative of either aquiescing in a determined rejection of their proposal, or of taking measures to enforce it by means of a more direct and effectual interference? The British Government certainly is not prepared to adopt the latter course. The effects and bearing of the contest upon the security of other States have not hitherto been such as to warrant measures of such a description; nor has the conduct of Russia towards England been calculated to excite any unfriendly feeling; she has, on the contrary, performed towards this country all the offices of a good and faithful ally, and, in the late difficult negotiations for the purpose of effecting a settlement between Belgium and Holland, she has acted with perfect fairness in her co-operation with the other four Powers. Under these circumstances His Majesty, deeply lamenting the calamities of a disastrous and desolating contest, does not think the time has yet arrived when he could be justified in adopting a proceeding which, however conciliatory in form, could not fail to alarm an independent Power, naturally jealous of its rights, and sensibly alive to everything which might appear to affect its national honour. For these reasons His Majesty feels himself under the necessity of declining the proposal which the Prince de Talleyrand has been instructed to convey."

In that despatch the noble Viscount spoke of Russia being jealous of her rights, but he had admitted to-night that the rights in question were in reality Polish rights, "guaranted," to use his own words, "by European treaties." The Emperor of Austria suggested to France the course which the French Government took; France and Austria were willing to support Poland; the despatch he had read was written to the noble Lord; the noble Lord replied; and from that hour the fate of Poland was sealed. England, at that critical moment, refused her co-operation; she must therefore be considered a party, and he thought the chief party, to the present position of Poland; and the British House of Commons, therefore, was the most fitting assembly in the world in which to advocate the rights of Poland, and put forward a claim to more than sympathy with her in her wrongs. The question was a practical one. In France there was one European question on which no diversity of opinion existed, and that was Poland. On that subject it might be said that statesmen of every party and at every time— from the partition to the Treaty of Vienna, and within the last few weeks—had uniformly expressed the same opinion. It was Louis Philippe who awaited with impatience the answer of England in favour of Poland, and in his Government, from which emanated the despatch inviting the co-operation of England, were Casimir Perier and Guizot. Then, again, MM. Odillon Barrot, Villemain, Montalembert, and recently Count d'Ornano, Chamberlain to the Emperor, Count Segur de Aguesseau, and Count Latour, were all advocates of Poland In fact, the feeling in France was universal. But it was not confined to France. In high quarters in Austria there was a strong feeling of friendship for Poland. Prince Metternich was an advocate for Poland. Could Austria have had her way at the time of the Treaty of Vienna, Poland would have been restored to complete independence, and the same course would have been followed in 1831. Since then an event had occurred which threw much light on the attitude Austria might assume towards Poland in the event of an European convulsion. At the time of the Crimean war the allies endeavoured to gain the assistance of Austria; Austria agreed, on one condition, that the war should be made continental, and that 100,000 men should be sent into Poland. Prussia entertained feelings of an equally friendly nature to-wards Poland. During the Conferences at Vienna in 1815, the Prussian General von den Knesebeck exposed in the most forcible terms the danger threatening Europe, and above all Prussia, so long as Russia was permitted to aim at making Poland an instrument of aggression. Even in Russia the people entertained very friendly feelings towards Poland, and would not be unwilling to see her restored to a state of inde- pendence. In proof of this he would read to the House a translation of some remarks which had recently appeared in a journal published at St. Petersburg. The hon. Gentleman then read the following extract from the Russian journal Wielikorus:—

"All the Russians, partisans of legality, ought to demand the liberation of Poland. It is now become evident to every one that our domination in Poland is only maintained by armed force; and as long as the authority shall be maintained by the system of a military despotism in one part of the State, the Government cannot give up this system in the rest of the empire. Let us bear in mind the words which Chatham uttered at the time of the revolution of the American colonies—'Should England subdue America to despotism, she would not fail to subject herself to the same rule;' consequently, he wished, in concert with all the friends of liberty in England, the recall of the British troops from the dissatisfied colonies. In like manner the interest of Russian liberty calls for the liberation of Poland. Our national pride, our love of the country, our financial situation, demand the same. Our dominion in Poland rests solely upon violations of all the conditions by which the Congress of Vienna had consented to the union of that kingdom with Russia."

That feelings such as those should be expressed in Russia, the House would understand, was of the greatest practical importance. The question was, then, in this position. Nobody denied that the desire to be restored to their ancient independence was universal among the Poles. It was evident that France would be willing to see the independence of Poland accomplished, that Austria tit the very least would offer no opposition, and no opposition would come from Prussia. The Russian people were not enemies of the Poles—the only obstacle to their progress towards independence was to be found in the Russian Government. He would not therefore hold two kinds of language to the Poles; he would not tell them to pray for reform and concession from the Czar; he would tell them simply to wait, and they would get that without which they ought not to be satisfied—their total independence. Until Poland was restored, until the ancient laws, the ancient constitution, the ancient throne of Poland were restored, the question would not be set at rest. Without using the term in a party, but in a European sense, he believed it would be an eminently conservative policy to restore the ancient Kingdom of Poland, which had been placed in its present position in consequence of European treaties. To give the alternative of maintaining those treaties or of restoring the ancient Kingdom of Poland—whichever course was taken—would, to his mind, be a conservative course, and would tend to promote the peace and Security of Europe.

said, that the speeches of the noble Viscount and the two hon. Members were so satisfactory to the friends of Poland, that he should not have uttered a word did he not think that sufficient justice had not been done to the Poles for their remarkable forbearance, under the very exasperating circumstances in which they had been placed, the self-control, moderation and wise abstinence from. provocation they had shown entitled them, not only to look for the sympathy of Europe, but to expect that at no distant time their anticipations would be fulfilled. It was not merely among the Poles in their own country, but also among those who resided in foreign countries, that the opinion prevailed that it would be for the advantage of Poland, and would tend to diminish the sufferings under which she laboured, to put before the public a calm and unexaggerated statement of her position and of the feelings of the English people in consequence. It had been well remarked that they ought not to allow any interference with the Treaty of Vienna without noticing it in that House. It was for the interest of England, and of the whole of Europe, that the Treaty of Vienna should be abided by. Whenever an attempt to infringe that treaty was made, they appealed to it; and when, in the words of the noble Lord, "the most flagrant Violation of any treaty in modern days" took place, it was incumbent on them to give expression to the feelings of horror and detestation which they entertained at the state of things existing in Poland, which obliged 200,000 Russian soldiers to be kept there. He denied that there was any conspiracy in Poland which could be legally dealt with, and he maintained that it was of the utmost importance, not only to Austria, but to the whole of Germany, that a barrier should be raised up between them and Russia. According to treaty, the kingdom of Poland was to be garrisoned by Polish soldiers, and Russian soldiers were not to be admitted. But treaty engagements had been violated, and therefore not only had they a right to speak, but they lay under a responsibility to do so. At the same time, it would be cruel to the Poles themselves, if they were to hold out to them the hope that there was in this country any party who would desire to plunge the nation into a war for the purpose of effecting the liberation of Poland. Such was not the case. The best policy the Poles could adopt under present circumstances was to continue to pursue that course of moderation and forbearance which they had hitherto practised.

said, he wished to correct a remark made by his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Hennessy), which, if allowed to pass unnoticed, might lead to a wrong interpretation of a very important point in the diplomatic history of this country. His hon. Friend would induce the House to believe that it was owing to the action of the British Government that the great Revolt of Poland, which followed the days of July, had not come to a successful termination. But if his hon. Friend would look back to the history of that period, he would find there were many circumstances which ought to have made the English Government unwilling to make any demonstration against Russia at a time when any hostile proceedings might have assumed the dimensions of a European war. There was at that time a change of dynasty in France, and the French Government were anxious to preserve their popularity with the people of that country. It was quite true that there was no question which touched the imagination of the French people so much as the question of Poland. If, however, the Government of France had offered the active interposition of that country in behalf of Poland, the result must have been a European war. He could not concur in the opinion that the great Powers of Germany would have acceded to the independence of Poland at that time, and the result would probably have been that France and England would have taken one side, and Germany and Russia the other, the issue of the conflict being that France might have got the Rhine, and Poland would have been left in the lurch. All such speculations, however, were useless. All that could be said was that Poland had preserved that permanent interest in the European mind which, so far as it was permitted to look into futurity, led to the belief that there must come, at some time or other, a solution of the question favourable to the liberties of Poland. Russia, it might be seen, was undergoing a great transformation. Not only did the liberation of the serfs agitate that country in all its territory, but questions of political freedom were slowly making their way. The very fact that such sentiments as had been quoted by the hon. Gentleman were printed at St. Petersburg was a singular proof of the progress of public opinion in Russia. It had been truly shadowed forth by the Prime Minister that the political freedom of Russia was the best guarantee for the Liberty of Poland. A desire was being expressed by the people of Russia to participate in the government of that country, and it was impossible for Russia to advance materially and morally side by side with a continually subjected and degraded Poland. The great difficulty in assisting the Poles had always been a geographical one. It was the difficulty on the part of the nations that sympathized with Poland, of getting at her. If Poland had a seaboard, the whole condition of the question would have been changed. As it was, the nations inclined to assist her could not reach her territory without either traversing in a hostile spirit the circumjacent countries, or persuading them to join in the undertaking. Every person of humanity must commiserate the destinies of Poland. But let the House also commiserate the state of Russia in regard to Poland, which obliged her to play the part of her gaoler and executioner. Vain, however, would be the attempt of Russia to govern Poland by a system of force and repression. Russia would before long see, that although her government of Poland was nominally kind and generous, yet that when she intrusted the execution of measures of policy to a body of ferocious soldiery, events of individual cruelty and scenes of riot would occur such as had lately excited the horror of Europe. If certain unwise demonstrations of the Polish people had been put down by the ordinary police, he could not say that the Russian Government had not been in the right. But scenes of such terrible dramatic interest as the twenty-seven hours' siege of the Cathedral of Warsaw by an indignant and ferocious soldiery—the people inside praying, and singing, and working themselves into a state to resist the soldiery, and the latter ultimately forcing their way into the Cathedral to the indiscriminate injury of the people—were not worthy of Russia as a great civilized empire, and Europe, he trusted, would not hear of their recurrence. Such Debates as the present were only of use in acquainting the Government of Russia of the general and, indeed, unanimous feeling of the Parliament and people of this country. Englishmen were not an imaginative people, and, as a rule, cared little for the liberties of other nations; yet the Government of Russia could not fail to see, that although the people of this country might not express the same enthusiasm for the independence of Poland as the people of France, yet that all parties in Parliament were unanimous in their sympathy with Poland. No one rose to vindicate the conduct of the Russian Government. Hon. Members on all sides lamented that so great and noble a nation, with such mighty prospects before it, and living under the sceptre of a Czar whose generosity and humanity were admitted by all, should perpetrate such lamentable scenes. He trusted that the Government of Russia would perceive that acts of repression, stained by such violence as had recently been witnessed in Poland, could do no good, and could end only in the exacerbation of one party and the degradation of the other.

said, that he entirely agreed with the observations which had been addressed to the House by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and he could not but express his gratification at the conciliatory tone which had characterized the debate. It was a great advantage that nothing had been said which could justly give offence to the authorities concerned. After the House had expressed its feelings of humanity in regard to recent events in Poland, the question arose, what was the ground of quarrel between that unfortunate country and her rulers, and what was the leading object she desired. Did she complain of the non-execution of the Treaty of Vienna, or did she demand complete independence? It was only in the former of these two cases, that this House or Government would have the right to express any opinion on the subject. Did any hon. Gentleman believe that it was possible to reverse the course of events which had so extensively altered the map of Europe during the last century, and to bring back the Poland which existed before the first partition? Lord Castlereagh did his utmost on behalf of the Poles at the Congress of Vienna, but his efforts were far from obtaining the effect for which he contended. The answer of the Czar to Prince Metternich on the subject of Poland simply was, "I am in possession of the country, and have 300,000 men there; if you do not like my retaining it, come and take it from me if you can." The Treaty of Vienna had been often referred to, but its terms were very ambiguous, and contained no trace of a specific constitution for Poland. It only said that Poland should be united to Russia "by its constitution," but it in no way laid down what the nature of that constitution was to be, Napoleon I., with all his alleged sympathies for the Poles, had never seriously proposed to restore their independence; but what he did was to unite their country to his quasi kingdom of Saxony, under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The noble Viscount now at the head of Her Majesty's Government, as was shown by the papers which had recently been published for the first time, warmly pleaded the cause of Poland some thirty years ago; but the difficulties in the way of the success of his endeavours proved insuperable. He (Mr. Griffith) should not have sought to address the House upon that occasion had it not been that he was able to speak from personal knowledge and experience—from his having lately paid a visit to Warsaw, and having witnessed some of the occurrences that have been referred to. He had been present at the head-quarters of Comte de Lambert, soon after his appointment by the Emperor of Russia. Horrified at the massacres which had taken place there, the Emperor Alexander II. sent the Comte de Lambert thither with the view of carrying out a healing and conciliatory policy. He had himself the honour or holding personal conversations on these subjects about that period with the Comte de Lambert, and be could state that that Viceroy had evinced every desire to correct abuses and remedy the reasonable complaints of the Poles. He expressed, indeed, a hope that they would abstain from political demonstrations, but he assured them that they should be allowed to elect their local assemblies freely, and without interference from the soldiery. In fact, it was impossible to exhibit greater humanity or more perfect candour than he had done in conversing on these subjects with him (Mr. Darby Griffith); but, unfortunately, he did not meet with a corresponding spirit on the part of the people. The old antagonism between the different races surged up on every occasion. However liberal the disposition might be with which the Comte de Lambert went to Warsaw, it could not be expected that he would consent to sacrifice the rights of the Government that employed him. But he did not receive fair play in this matter, and was not enabled to realize his good wishes towards the Poles. The desire of the union of Poland and Lithuania was at the bottom of the whole question; and if the Poles insisted, on every occasion, on raising that question of the union between the two, that would raise a savage controversy between Poland and Russia. Russia would, he feared, resort to every barbarity rather than entertain a proposition for such a union. In conclusion he would express a hope that the painful influences that had been awakened by the recent unhappy collisions would speedily cease to be manifested, and that a hopeful future was in store for the people of Poland.

said, that as the noble Lord at the head of the Government had said he would inquire as to what papers there were, and consider as to what papers he could lay on the table, he should not press his Motion.

Sir, if any apology were needed for reviving a discussion which has been lately—although I think very partially—before the House— it might be found in what I consider to be the overwhelming importance of the subject, not merely as regards the enormous outlay and expense involved, but also as regards our position and existence as a naval Power. I must say, and I think the House will not be disinclined to agree with me, that the answers which proceeded from the Treasury bench upon the late occasion were eminently unsatisfactory. What was the reply made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War? The right hon. Gentleman said he could hold out no hope that the construction of the proposed forts at Spithead, for which contracts had been entered into, would be abandoned. In presuming to bring this question before the House, I do not ask that the works should be at once abandoned. My Motion goes only to suspend the construction of the proposed forts until the value of iron-roofed gunboats for the defence of our ports and roadsteads has been fully considered. I think the House will agree that this is no excessive demand to be made upon Her Majesty's Government under the peculiar circumstances of the case. But, before coming to the more immediate question, I think it right that I should take a rapid and brief review of the history of this question of national defences. I find that the question of national defences first came before this House under most peculiar circumstances. In 1786 Mr. Pitt, then in the plenitude of his power, came down to this House with a Resolution calling upon it to vote £700,000 for the fortifications of the dockyards of Great Britain. And what was its treatment by this House upon that occasion? A long debate ensued—a debate which has almost been revived in the present century—whether floating or permanent batteries were best, and the House came to the conclusion — for the Resolution, 169; against it, also 169; and your predecessor, Mr. Speaker, gave his casting vote against the construction of the forts proposed; but I hope, Sir, that upon this occasion you will not be put to that inconvenience. The Resolution was lost, and nothing more was heard of national defences until in an evil moment, and under the panic of invasion, some ingenious Minister of the day hit upon the wonderful invention of martello towers. A million was expended upon those towers, and I believe the great blunder was made, that being constructed for two guns, it was found that only one could be placed upon each, and at last they were discovered to be totally useless. Thus remained the question of national defences until 1859, when a gallant officer not now in his place, the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) urged upon the Government the necessity of appointing a commission to inquire into the national defences. The Government, not unwilling to be urged, granted the commission, and it was appointed in 1859. Now, without wishing to criticise too closely the constitution of that commission, I must take upon myself to say that although the names of the commissioners were highly respectable, there were no men upon that commission whose opinions gave weight to the report they made and the conclusions they arrived at. However, that commission made a report to this House, which was laid before Parliament on the 7th of February, 1860, and the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown came down to the House some time after the report had been presented, and he moved the following Resolution on the 23rd of July, 1860: —

"That to secure the Royal dockyards and arsenals, and the ports of Dover and Portland, and for the creation in some central point of an inland arsenal, to serve as a substitute for and assistance to Woolwich—"

And he called upon the House to grant for that purpose, in the first instance, a sum of two millions to be devoted to the fortifications of Portsmouth alone, and not including; in that amount the purchase of land. The noble Lord's speech upon that occasion was remarkable. The reasons given were pointed expressly to our next-door neighbour, France, with an army of 600,000 men; and altogether the noble Lord pointed to the possibility of an invasion, and that invasion not very long deferred. The House was carried away at the time—and I must say that the House generally manifests a great deal of, I was going to say, feminine fear whenever invasion is mentioned—and it it was almost prepared to pass the Resolution on that evening; but it reflected, and delayed, and the Resolution was not passed on that evening. I have said the demand was at first for two millions; but the total estimate proposed to be made for the entire fortifications of the country amounted to £11,850,000. That sum was proposed to be spread over three or four years, although we were told that invasion was imminent and was not likely to be long deferred. But I am prepared to show that the estimates given in the first instance offered no fair idea of the real sums that would be eventually expended. In the first place, to come to the question more immediately under notice—I mean the forts at Spithead—the sum of £1,192,000 was designed to be expended upon Portsmouth alone. That was the original estimate, but at that time the forts on the Spits were designed to be made of granite alone. Subsequently it was found that forts constructed of granite would not be likely to stand against the heavy guns that would probably be brought against them, and accordingly a proposition was made by one member of the Royal Commission—Admiral Elliot—that we should not be content with making the forts of granite, but that they should be covered with iron, of, I believe, 10 inches in thickness. [Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE: Wrought iron?] Whatever the coating was to be, it is evident that the estimate of £1,192,000 was an incorrect estimate, if these forts are to be covered with wrought iron or any other material of that kind. What was the course taken in this House when these Resolutions were brought forward? My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) who on all occasions has resisted the building of wooden ships—much to his credit and, I think, his foresight—brought forward an Amendment calling for time. His Amendment was rejected by an overwhelming majority; only 39 members voted for it. Not satisfied with that result, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Limerick (Mr. Monsell) moved the following Amendment, which is revived on the present occasion:—

"That in the absence of sufficient engineering and artillery information, it is not expedient to incur any extraordinary expenditure on permanent works."

That Amendment met with the same fate as the other Motion; it was rejected by a considerable majority, there being only a minority of 35 in its favour. I cannot help rejoicing that the Motion is not likely to be so ignominiously defeated on the present occasion. In the course of that discussion the late Secretary for War, then Mr. Sidney Herbert—all honour to his memory—made a most remarkable admission. He gave as his reason for preferring forts to floating batteries, which he argued were not likely to be as available and efficient—

"At present we know little of the way of making them invulnerable by iron coating, and all the works we propose will be of a lasting and permanent character."

At that time the Government, in fact, had not sufficient information to state what the structure of these floating batteries ought to be; they declared their preference for forts, being utterly ignorant that batteries could be made available to the degree lately exemplified in the Hampton Roads. I wish to show the House what was the description of the forts proposed to be constructed at Spithead. I am, fortunately, able to give the description exactly in the words of the Royal Commissioners. I ought to have said that the original intention was to construct five forts at Spithead, but on further inquiry the number was reduced to three, which were to be coated with wrought iron. The following is the description:—

"The forts now designed for erection on the shoals at Spithead will be of peculiarly formidable description, and essentially different from any works that have been hitherto built. They will each be constructed for 120 guns, in four tiers, of iron 10 inches in thickness from low-water mark, unless it is found expedient to carry the foundations of solid granite up to high-water mark, They will be armed with ordnance of the heaviest description and of the greatest penetrating power, provided also with mortars for vertical fire. They will thus be individually in every respect invulnerable to any species of projectile, and impregnable by any force of ships that can be brought against them or by any conceivable mode of assault."

It is somewhat strange that after the description here given of these forts, as un-attackable by any ship, there should be found in the report of the Commissioners such a paragraph as the following:—

"We are, however, convinced that no practical amount of fire from batteries can be depended upon to stop the passage of steam-ships, if the Channel be sufficiently clear to allow of their proceeding at great speed."

Why, here, at the outset, is the whole case admitted. Granted that you even have the forts armed with heavy guns, the Commissioners admit that it will be totally impossible for them to stop the passage of iron-plated steamers, coming at full speed into Spithead. So struck was the late Sir Richard Dundas with this view, that after the Report was brought in and laid on the table of the House, he wrote a most important letter to the Commissioners of National Defences. The House will bear with me while I give the most material extract from that letter; for Sir Richard Dundas was himself no mean authority, having been present at the bombardment of Sweaborg. The gallant Admiral, writing from the Admiralty, of which he was then the First Sea Lord, says in his letter, dated February, 1861—

"It appears to me important to suggest for the consideration of the Defence Committee, the expediency of modifying to a certain extent, and before it be too late, the recommendations of the Committee in so far as they relate to the construction of some of the most costly batteries; and I would suggest the possible substitution of iron-cased ships in certain localities for such of the permanent defences as can be constructed only at large cost, and cannot, in all probability, be completed for a long period of time."

I rejoice to give his reason—

"I consider that much importance attaches to recent experience of the nature of iron-cased ships, not only as exemplified in the French ship La Gloire, but also in connection with many other details demonstrating the possibility of adopting movable ships of considerable power in preference to stationary forts for the defence of Spithead and other anchorages of similar character."

Let the House bear in mind that this question not only involves the safety of Spithead, but also rules many other cases. Sir Richard Dundas, in his letter, goes on to say—

"I entertain no doubt whatever that it will be practicable, at a cost of about £60,000 for each ship, to convert ships of the line which are now available into iron-cased ships, with steam power capable of propelling them at a speed of from seven to eight knots, and with an armament of 30 guns of the heaviest and most improved description on batteries at a height of about six feet above water."

He proposes that those ships should be "constantly available for local purposes;" which is a material consideration; for the House has been led away a good deal with the notion that these ships are to be moved about. Looking to the contingency that stationary batteries alone might not be sufficient to prevent the passage of iron-cased; ships, Sir Richard Dundas lays it down;that—

"Any immediate outlay of money to be expended in the course of the ensuing financial year would be more profitably employed upon the equipment for purely defensive purposes of ships of this description; and it might be proper that the attention of the Secretary of State for War should be called to the subject, in order that reports, if necessary, from the Controller of the Navy may be called for without loss of time."

That letter, I am sorry to say, was not treated by the Commissioners with the consideration to which I think it was entitled. They decided on building these batteries, and a contract has accordingly been entered into. On a recent occasion the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War gave a reason, or, I should rather say, indulged in a speculation, why we shall not be able to give up shore batteries; because, as he said, we do not yet know the weight of the gun which we shall get that will be able to smash the armour of these iron-sides. I would not attempt to predicate for a moment what the science of this country may achieve in the way of producing monster guns—it would be foolish and absurd in me to do so. I know that at this moment, in America, Captain Rodman is designing a gun of 20 inches bore which will throw a shell of 900lb. weight or a solid ball of 1,000lb. But still there are reasons which may be fairly adduced in answer to the speculations of the right hon. Gentleman. While the Government are considering how to arm these forts, I do not think the subject of the armament of the navy has received proper attention. I speak under correction; but I should like to hear from the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty whether it is not the fact, that after we have spent £3,000,000 upon the Armstrong gun with a view of trying to pierce the sides of armour-plated vessels, the only weapon with which that result has yet been accomplished is the old 68-pounder? At the present moment the way armour-plates are tested at Portsmouth is with the old 68-pounder. Therefore, after all the money we have spent, and after all the laudation which the Armstrong gun has received, the armament of our ships is at this moment in a most unsatisfactory condition. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War must also remember that the larger a gun is, the more difficult is its management, and, above all, the greater becomes the difficulty of aiming with any accuracy at a movable object like a ship. That in itself, I think, is an answer in some measure to the speculations of the right hon. Gentleman. I think there is a case in point in the old sailing days, which shows that these large guns have been tried before. In the year 1807, when Sir John Duckworth went up the Dardanelles with a fleet of eleven sailing ships, towing mortar boats, the reception which he met with was rather warm. He was fired at from both sides of this narrow strait, and his ships were repeatedly struck with marble balls weighing 750 lb. It may be said that when he was going up in February he had in his favour the very bad gunnery of the Turkish artillerists. But he returned in March, and in the mean time the fortifications had been thoroughly repaired under the supervision of French engineers, and were to some extent manned by French gunners. The fleet came down towing the mortar-boats as before, and when they attempted to force the passage, a very warm resistance was made. One of the ships was struck by a ball of 800lb. weight and 26 inches in diameter; another, the Windsor Castle, was struck by a shot of 700lb., and the fleet was rather mauled. But he got through without losing a ship, and from Allen's Navy List I see that the English loss was no more than 46 killed and 235 wounded. This was with sailing ships, against French gunners, and it shows that a movable object is not so easy a thing to hit with a gun, however large it may be. So much for the reason adduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War. The noble Lord the Secretary for the Admiralty rather shirked giving any decisive opinion about these forts; and probably, if we could examine the noble Lord in the lobby, we should find; him altogether averse to them. However, he, very properly backing up his superior officer, said, "Look at the advantage of these forts in case a fleet of merchantmen should run in under their protection." Now, of what avail would such forts be to merchantmen running into Spithead? Let us suppose that those forts were built, armed with very large guns, and commanded by the best men in the service. One morning the telegram announces that there are six or seven iron-clad French ships at St. Helen's. They come in, running the gauntlet of the forts, as we are told they can, and get intermixed with the wooden merchantmen. What would the forts do then? Why, they dare not fire, for fear of destroying the merchantmen. And in that instance, therefore, as a protection for merchantmen, they must be totally useless. So much for the reasons given by the noble Lord. Now, I do not expect a display of Spartan virtue; but I think, that if the noble Lord were allowed to do as he liked, he would desire to retreat to the protection of some other forts, and avoid this division. I am convinced that his real opinion is, that the erection of these forts is useless, and the money spent upon them is money thrown completely away. Now, the Commission which sat upon the subject of fortifications made some curious admissions. "The mode of fortification," they say, "must advance with the development of the means of attack. Experience shows that it is less liable to fluctuation than almost any other element of defence." Of course, when the Report was written the Commissioners could not foresee what was done the other day by the Merrimac, or the Virginia, as she is now called; and, by the way, when we remember that the Southerners raised this 3,000-ton ship, cut her down, and plated her with iron from the railway, it says a great deal for their energy and ability. Well, how did the Merrimac deal with the forts opposed to her? I have taken some pains to inform myself on this point from gentlemen who have seen the forts. The Merrimac comes out of Norfolk, and steams by Fort Monroe, one of the most powerful forts in America, and provided, I believe, with two enormous guns. These guns open upon her; she is fired upon by the shore batteries, but she takes no notice of them, and goes straight towards the Cumberland. This wooden vessel was lying under the batteries of Newport News, which are armed with heavy Columbiads—heavier than our 68-pounders. These guns struck her frequently without producing any effect, and in spite of the batteries she destroyed the Cumberland in half an hour. The shore batteries were very powerful ones, but so little did the Merrimac care for them that she merely occupied herself in shelling the camp. It may be asked, "Why did she not shell Fort Monroe?" If the Monitor had not appeared on the scene, the Minnesota would have been burnt to the water's edge; and I think there can be no doubt that the Merrimac would have ended by shelling Fort Monroe. The Americans were much, afraid of this themselves, and go great was the panic at New York that a meeting was called to consider whether, in spite of the fortifications at Sandy Hook, which are of a powerful description, the harbour of New York should not be blocked up to prevent the Merrimac from coming in. But the Monitor made her appearance, and saved New York from that degradation. Here is a vessel which was built in three months, at a cost of £60,000. It has been most unjustly called Captain Ericsson's invention, but it is, indeed, the invention of a gallant countryman of our own, Captain Cowper Coles, of whom I hope the country will hear much in future. As long back as 1855 this officer laid before the Admiralty his plans for the construction of such a boat. A Committee was appointed; they highly approved his plans, and—the plans were laid aside. We hear no more of his plans and of his vessel until they start up in another form under the name of the Ericsson battery; and the Americans, who believe that Captain Ericsson was the inventor of the Monitor, should know that the credit really belongs to Captain Coles. More recently, however, the invention has been tried here on the Trusty, and approved. Now, when I asked the noble Lord the other night, "Why don't you build some of those ships?" what was his reply? We know how suave and bland the noble Lord is in answering questions in this House; and he said that a ship was now being built on Captain Coles's cupola principle. I ask, where is that ship? Where is it building? There may have been a rambling intention on the part of the Admiralty to build such a ship, but I deny that at this moment any such ship is being built; and I want to know why this plan, having been approved by a Committee six years ago, has been quietly put to bed so long, and why the construction of these expensive, and, as I believe, inefficient forts, is proposed in their place? I cannot help thinking that the noble Lord has been leading the House to believe what was not exactly the fact. Of course, the Admiralty cannot resist now, and the noble Lord will no doubt tell us by-and-by that this vessel is intended to be built. The Admiralty know now that the ships must be built, though the plans have been before them for the last six years. But while we have been thinking, the Americans have been acting. They have been satisfied by the experiment, which is doubted upon the Treasury bench here, in the same way as the efficiency of the matchlock was doubted when it superseded the crossbow; of "Brown Bess," when it superseded the matchlock; and of the Enfield rifle, when it superseded Brown Bess. Our great men are very slow to be convinced; and unless the House of Commons urges them on— unless a lesson is taught us on our own shores by the burning of some of our own ships—they will be as slow as the men of former times were. In America there has been promptness of action. A Bill has been introduced into the Senate for the construction of an iron-clad steamer of 5,000 tons, and the completion of an ironclad battery, called the Stevens' battery, in the Hudson River; and it is proposed to spend £2,600,000 in the construction of iron-clad steam gunboats for the defence of the whole Atlantic coast from Portland to the mouth of the Chesapeake. Do they appoint a commission to inquire and talk about building expensive forts? No; they come down to the Senate with the experience of the engagement in Hampton Roads, and the Senate acts upon it. They do not attempt to defend their coasts by costly forts, but construct floating batteries on the plan invented by Captain Coles six years ago. So much for the Ericsson battery, which is really the invention of Captain Coles. But there is another consideration, also most material, which it will be well for the House to take into its consideration before it decides on this question of the erection of forts. It has been stated by the lay Lord of the Admiralty, the hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread), that the Admiralty hesitates to increase the dock accommodation at Portsmouth, because it is only at certain periods of the month that the new class of vessels of war, such as the Warrior, drawing twenty-six feet of water, can get over the bar into Portsmouth harbour. What are we about to do after such a statement? We are about to lavish money on the construction of forts, when there is doubt on the part of the very Admiralty itself whether Portsmouth can be made accessible to the larger class of vessels. But should we precipitately rush into voting away money when we have such evidence as this, given by a Member of the Government intimately acquainted with the working of the Admiralty? That is a consideration the House will do well to weigh maturely. Now, it may be said that it will be very expensive to put a stop to the contracts for the construction of the forts. I do not know whether I am correctly informed, but I believe the contract that has been made extends only to the foundations of these works, not to the entire construction of the forts, or casing them with wrought iron. The Government, therefore, can stop the works at any time, of course making that compensation to the contractor for his plant which he has a right to demand. And will it not be good economy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, should the House be of opinion the forts are not likely to be efficient, to pay that compensation, and not send good money after bad? While I am on this question of economy, let me say I would never, with so grave an object in view as the defence of this country, urge merely economical reasons against it. I would only ask that the money should be well spent, and the works well built. But it has been said that, even on the ground of economy, forts are less costly, because they are more durable than ships. The answer to this is so admirably put by Captain Coles, in his pamphlet on national defence, that I will read it. He says—

"As to the argument that forts are less costly than ships because more durable, the answer is obvious. The value of an engine of war is measured by its efficiency; and if forts will neither stop iron vessels from entering a harbour, nor prevent them from bombarding the dockyards, forts are extravagantly dear at any price. One iron ship may stop, at least, one other, while she engages her muzzle to muzzle, runs her down, or boards her but no fort will stop an iron vessel."

And that has been acknowledged by the Commissioners themselves, and therefore the argument that forts, being permanent, are less costly than ships, when we know that a floating battery can be built for less than £60,000, according to its size, entirely falls to the ground. The whole spirit of modern warfare, I take it, is this; it is mobility against permanence. That, I take it, is the whole soul and spirit of modern warfare as applied to forts and ships. I am not speaking of inland forts, but of such works as we have now under consideration—such works as the forts as Spithead and Portsdown-hill. And they have also had an unfortunate tendency to turn attention too exclusively to the construction of guns that may be placed in such forts, not guns that may be placed on board ship. In spite of the Armstrong guns, and the money that has been lavished on them, I believe the old 68-pounder is the only thing we can rely on at sea to penetrate iron plates. But the whole system of artillery is being, and must be, reconstructed; and in doing so, it will be well to insist on more attention being paid to the armament of ships. It is all very well to lead the country on this wild-goose chase, and make it believe that all difficulties may be met by the erection of forts. But there are other considerations to be taken into view. All the officers who were examined before the Commission were of opinion that the forts will be useless unless you raise your army to the extent that will enable you to garrison them; and that not with hastily raised volunteers: to work the guns, especially the Armstrong guns, will require skilled artillerymen, not volunteers with three or four weeks' training. Therefore, when these forts are erected, you must be prepared—and I do not think you are prepared—to augment your army. What was the opinion of one of the greatest naval commanders on the subject of fortifications? What was the opinion of the man who had seen more service, and done greater things with small vessels against fortifications, than any commander of ancient or modern times? What was the opinion of Lord Dundonald when speaking of the forts at Spithead? His words are somewhat remarkable. He says—

"Full discussion of this matter would require more space than can here be devoted to it; and should my life be spared I will, on a future occasion, enter more extensively into this and other cognate subjects. Were I now to do so, I am afraid public faith in some of its newly-cherished fortifications would be materially shaken, and will therefore refrain from so doing, in the hopes that improvements in our navy, the only true basis of national safety, will render such remarks unnecessary. In short, immovable stations of defence, as a protection against invasion, are not only costly and of doubtful utility, but a reliance on them is, in my mind, an indication of a declining state. It is little short of national imbecility to suppose that, because we erect imposing fortifications an enemy will come to them, when he can operate elsewhere without the slightest regard to them; and the more so, as the common experience of warfare will tell him, that numerous fortifications are in the highest degree national weakness, by splitting into detail the army which ought to be in the field against him, but who are compelled to remain and take care of their fortifications. Yet half the sum required for fortifications as defences in case of war would suffice to place the navy in a condition of affording far more effectual protection. There is no security equal to that which may be obtained by putting it out of the power of an enemy to execute hostile intentions."

I hope I have fairly brought the matter before the House. I have endeavoured to avoid any highly-coloured statements. I have not been induced to introduce the subject from any Utopian ideas of universal peace, though certainly, in some measure, with a view to retrenchment. And whatever the issue of the discussion may be, I do intreat the House to give its serious consideration, and not allow the Government of the country to plunge into a useless expenditure for the erection of still more useless fortifications.

:^* I have much satisfaction in seconding the Resolution so ably introduced by the hon. Member for Liskeard; and I must congratulate the House on the altered tone and feeling with which the subject is now regarded. When I introduced to the House last year a substantive Resolution of a similar kind, I did not get one supporter. The hon. and gallant Member for Chatham and the gallant Member for Harwich on that occasion both spoke against the Resolution; and in stating to the House frankly, and candidly as they did the other evening their change of opinion, they took a course which, in my opinion, is honourable to themselves and advantageous to the country. The Commissioners appointed to consider the Defences of the United Kingdom recommended the erection of forts on two grounds. 1st. As part of the most available and least expensive means of protecting our coasts against the landing of an enemy. 2nd. As the best means of protecting the Royal Dockyards, as a vital point, against attack from the sea. First I would desire to consider how far their recommendation met the first condition. They stated in their Report that it is not possible to fortify the entire line of coast, as there is an aggregate of nearly 300 miles on which a landing might be easily effected. We may therefore dismiss entirely the consideration of its in any way preventing an invasion, and look simply at the second—namely, the protection of the dockyards. I find the number of guns and men, by their Report, required for the Portsmouth Works are—guns, 1,267; men, 8,820. For the entire defence of dockyards— 3,721 guns, and 30,580 men—itself a large army of artillerymen and sailors; and looking at the aggregate of our army, I must at once press on the House to consider the policy of such an abstraction. It may be said that these forts might be manned by Volunteers; but Volunteers are understood to be a class of men to be depended upon to resist the landing of an army, and it was never contemplated that they should be placed in forts during the continuance of a war; and it is obvious, therefore, that the effect would be, as Lord dundonald has stated, that forts only split into detail the army which ought to be in the field against an enemy, but which would be compelled to remain to take care of the fortifications in which they were placed. Lord Dundonald further states that half the sum required for fortifications as defences in case of war would suffice to place the navy in a condition to afford far more effectual protection. But let us look at the utility of these forts at Spithead. The recent engagement in America has shown that an iron ship can pass forts within range without injury; but this is not new. The evidence before the Commissioners clearly shows this fact. Captain Sullivan in his evidence states—

Evidence, Q,. 84. "If casemated works of three tiers of guns are placed on the Horse-shoe and Noman's Land, will the anchorage at Spit-head be secure?—Most assuredly not. The forts will be 2,000 yards apart, and, however strong, could certainly be passed by wooden ships at night and by iron-cased ships by day or night."

Q. 87. "Have you had any experience of ships running past forts?—Yes; I have formed; this opinion from what I saw first, on a small scale, in the Parana. However small the vessel, and however slow the speed, it seemed almost impossible to stop a vessel passing batteries, even at a close range."

Q. 98. "Have you ever heard of any one instance of a ship being sunk by a fort either when attacking or running past?—I do not know of one."

Q. 102. "The conclusion I draw from your; evidence is that no amount of direct fire will stop even wooden ships which are determined to pass batteries?—I would not say even wooden ships, because in a very narrow channel, and with very heavy batteries, they might disable a single ship; but certainly not in the case at Spithead, which we are alluding to here. I doubt whether a single vessel, although a wooden ship, could be stopped even in the day time by the heaviest batteries you could build there."

The late Admiral Sir Richard Dundas, K.C.B., said—

Evidence, Q. 3. "The proposed forts at Horseshoe Buoy and Noman's Land will not, in my opinion, be sufficient to prevent the approach of an enemy in force."

"Taking into account all the expense and all the difficulty which must necessarily attend the construction of batteries upon the shoals at Spithead; and looking also to the contingency that stationary batteries alone might not be sufficient to prevent the passage of iron clad ships, and would imperfectly defend the entrances to Spithead, against ships so protected, I am of opinion that any immediate outlay of money would be more profitably employed upon the equipment, for purely defensive purposes, of ships of this description."— Letter to Major Jervois, dated 8th Feb., 1861.

Captain Robert Hemlett, R.N., C.B., said—

Evidence, Q, 251. "Do you consider that forts of any size or description would: prevent the passage of iron-plated ships through a clear channel?—Most certainly not."

And the Defence Commissioners themselves reported—

"We are convinced that no practicable amount of fire from batteries can be depended upon to stop the passage of steam-ships, if the channel is sufficiently clear to allow of their proceeding at great speed."

It is, moreover, evident from the report of the Commissioners, that a vessel, without approaching nearer to the Dockyard than 3,000 yards, could bombard the Dockyard with comparative impunity, and this might be done by taking such a position that the vessel bombarding would be so far out of range as to render the fire from the forts, with the most powerful artillery which we can conceive, comparitively harmless. I believe it will be generally admitted, that the effect of a ball at a mile distance of 1000 lbs. weight would be less destructive than one of 100 lbs. weight with an ample charge at close quarters. The examples of Sebastopol and Cronstadt may be quoted as cases in which forts were available as a protection to those cities—but neither Sebastopol nor Cronstadt were attacked by heavy iron-plated ships. I must call the attention of the House, also, to the fact that the Monitor has no plates on her of any single thickness of more than one inch; and all who have given attention to the subject will know that four single thicknesses of one-inch plate, as it is technically termed, sand- wiched together, would not give a greater strength than a solid plate of two inches. In the construction of the Merrimac, railway iron was first used and afterwards discarded, and the greatest difficulty was experienced in obtaining plates at all suitable for her construction. Yet, amidst these difficulties, we have it clearly shown, that a wooden vessel can never again be used by any Government to oppose an iron one; and when I reflect that, in 1855, the experience at Kinburn led the French to altogether discontinue the construction of any wooden vessels, and that in that year Captain Coles laid before the Admiralty his plane, of which the Monitor is but a bad copy, I cannot but wish that Captain Coles had taken them, when so coldly received by our Admiralty, to the Emperor of the French, for had His Imperial Majesty ordered one ship, and had the fact been known at our Admiralty, we might have saved at least some part of the ten millions uselessly spent since that period in the erection of wooden ships. In a recent debate the noble Lord the Secretary for the Admiralty observed—

"He should like to know, if they left the defence of Spithead entirely to ships, how were they to find refuge for those thousands of merchantmen, who were continually running up and down the Channel, and which, in any emergency, would make for the best of all the Channel harbours?"

And Sir Richard Dundas observes in his evidence—

"It should be borne in mind that in all former wars Spithead has been a perfectly secure rendezvous, for the fleet convoys of 100 merchant vessels at a time have been assembled there."

Now suppose such a fleet reassembled under these batteries, could the fortresses protect them? There are good grounds for believing they could not. 1st. The iron vessel would be protected from the ball fired from the forts, even if it touched her at the distance at which she could place herself. 2nd. Considering the low angles at which the heavy guns from the fortresses must be fired, there is reason to think they would not touch her at all. 3rd. If they did not touch the enemy, they would, probably, create mischief and slaughter on board the ships to be protected. 4th. A vessel engaging the fort always has the advantage of being enveloped in her own smoke; and being a small object, the fort cannot obtain her range. 5th. This difficulty is immensely increased when the vessel, being propelled by steam power, is able to move in any direction under cover of the smoke from her own fire. The all-important question which really arises here is the comparative value of fixature and mobility. The fort fixed and immovable has only one power of destruction, limited to the power and range of its guns. The iron-ship is practically a fort, with the advantage of being able to move out of range—to avoid action or close with its adversary, as may be desirable—to act as a steam-ram, and, by constantly moving, destroying the accuracy of the range of the fixed fort. The noble Viscount at the head of the Government in a late debate said—

"I defy you to construct a ship covered with iron-coating of sufficient thickness to repel the heavy shots which may now be sent from cannon, and yet be buoyant enough to float on the water."

But the answer to the noble Viscount is, that the iron-coated ship is proved to be as impregnable as the fort, with the superior advantage of mobility. The noble Viscount further said in the same debate, "There is a limit to the resisting power of ships." This is not proved by the American action; but it is proved that the mobility of the ship gives her great superiority in action with a fort. I would beg further permission of the House to refer on this important point to a letter from Captain Sherrard Osborne, C.B., of H.M.S. Donegal, 101 guns. He states—

"The Donegal under steam drawing 27 feet of water shall rattle about the waters at Spithead at 8 knots an hour, hit a fixed object every time with her hundred-pounders, and that not one in 200 shots would hit her. As to mortar shells, the air will have to be filled with such falling projectiles to ensure lodging one on her decks; and all the engineers in all the forts shall fail to get her range or position for more than one minute at a time— her change of position being at 8 knots an hour equal to 16,000 yards in 60 minutes, or 266 yards per minute."

It is well known to all engineers that it is the most difficult thing possible to hit a moving object from a fixed battery; the artilleryman having not only to allow for the time taken by the projectile in its passage through the air, but for the motion of the object to be struck, and for the alteration of his elevation so as to allow for the variable increase of range. Apply these reasons to vertical firing from mortars as Captain Osborne indicates, and it becomes a mere accident to hit the object fired at. Fixed forts, therefore, can be no protection to ships liable to be cut out by iron- cased vessels, or to be run down by the steam-ram; and therefore these Spithead forts are practically useless in protecting merchant shipping against the enemy. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton laid great stress on the larger guns which the forts might carry. But I would ask the noble Lord of what use is the larger ordnance, if there is so little probability of the object itself being struck? The next point to which I would wish to ask the attention of the House is, the large cost of these forts. They are thus estimated by the Defence Commissioners—

"Spithead Forts	£ 1,100,000
Needles	150,000
Isle of Wight	130,000
Portsdown Hill	650,000
Gosport and Gosport advance	370,000
Total	£2,400,000"

and this without land, which, from all I have heard, would be a very large item indeed.

Sir, after the notice which I have ventured to put on the paper, I need hardly say that I concur with the Motion of the hon. Gentleman opposite on the subject of the forts. But when I read the notice of the hon. Gentleman, it appeared to me that it did not go far enough—that it went in the right direction, but that it stopped far short of the point; which we seek to attain. Looking on this subject, not as one of the most important, but as the most important subject that could be brought before this House at the present moment, I ventured to put on the paper the Motion which stands in my name, which is—

"That this House will, on an early day, resolve itself into a Committee to empower the Government to apply monies voted for the construction of forts to the construction of iron-sheathed vessels, or to the conversion of wooden vessels into iron-sheathed vessels."

I wish, however, before I address myself to that part of the question, to refer to one or two points in the speeches of the two hon. Gentlemen opposite. The hon. Gentleman who proposed the Motion, in a very able speech, urged one argument which will, I am quite sure, from the acuteness of the Treasury bench, be brought, against him; therefore perhaps, it will be better to dispose of that at once. He quoted the case of Sir John Duckworth, who passed up and down the Dardanelles. Now, that of course is a question that is very easily answered, by the simple fact that the current in the Dardanelles always sets one way. The going up may be very difficult, but coming down is easy enough. In one case the ships would pass at four or five knots an hour, in the other fourteen or fifteeen, when of course it would be very difficult to hit them. The other point that I wish to refer to was in the speech of the hon. Baronet who spoke last. I take it for granted, that the question is — Supposing these forts to be useful; supposing them to be built, how do you propose in time of war to garrison them? That is the question that is always lost sight of, and I am glad that the hon. Baronet has prominently brought it under the attention of the House. I have always contended that the forts at Spithead, one on the No-man and the other on the Horse Sand, would be perfectly useless alone as defences. But assuming that they would be useful, we are told by the Government that it will take five years to complete them, and we are also told, that when they are completed, we must not judge of their efficiency by the modern ordnance, but that we shall have guns of such a gigantic description that they would blow everything out of the water. We are, however, at the same time told, by eminent authorities, that the success of these gigantic guns is extremely hypothetical. What, then, is the position in which you place us? You ask the country to wait five years for adequate means of defence, and you then tell us that you will use guns the success of which is a matter of doubt. Now, supposing the guns to be mounted on the forts, I ask any man who is conversant with the subject—any one who is commonly conversant with the means of defence—to say what sort of action would take place between the forts and any ships that might attempt to run through the anchorage at Spithead. Why, would not the success of those forts depend entirely on the success of one shot? I defy any number of gunners, however well trained they may be, to reload and retrain a heavy piece of ordnance in time to get a second shot at the same vessel. Supposing, then, that these forts are constructed to receive these enormous guns, the whole success of the forts will depend upon every shot being successful. I would ask, then, of what use would such weapons be against a small object passing in the night, or in very thick weather? It appears to me that the use of the forts alone will be perfectly chimerical. The point, however, to which I want to come, is that at which I conceive the Motion of the hon. Gentleman stops short. The hon. Gentleman proposes that we should suspend the construction of these forts. Assuming for a moment, for the sake of argument, that all we have heard from the other side of the water is true, what position does that place us in? Why, you suspend your land defences without at the same time increasing them at sea. Nor are you preparing the means of defence against this tremendous agent, this new description of weapon. We have learned two most important facts from the action that has occurred on the other side of the Atlantic. We have, in the first place, learned what really are the comparative powers of forts and ships. There was an impression some time ago, and that impression was strengthened by the Russian War, that ships were perfectly harmless in front of forts; but I appeal to the House whether that idea is not now, to a certain degree, dispelled, and whether it has not been shown that iron ships can range for hours within reach of the guns of a fortress. There is, however, another and a more important lesson to be gathered from what we have recently heard. We have learnt what if two months ago any man had asserted he would have been scouted as a lunatic; we have learned that the boasted navy of Great Britain, when opposed to iron vessels, is useless as a fighting navy. There is no blinking that question. That is what we have learnt. I should be very glad if any Member of the Government, or of this House, were able to get up and disprove what I assert. I wish to refer to what is reported to have been said by a high authority in another place. I read it with very great pleasure, as it appeared to me to be a brilliant speech, entering into all the circumstances, and, but for one exception, a speech of great promise. The Duke of Somerset, in the course of his able speech, is reported to have said, speaking of the late action, "It is said that it alters everything;" and he says, "Now I should wish to state what I think it alters and what it leaves unchanged." Now, I beg leave to call attention to the next sentence, because it appears to me that the whole question hinges upon it. "It leaves unaltered the relation between iron ships and wooden ships. We knew before that iron vessels could destroy wooden ones." It is precisely because I entertain the conviction that, so far from what has occurred having left the relations of iron and wooden vessels unaltered, it has completely and entirely altered those relations, that I think we are called upon to deal with this question. The noble Duke is reported further to have said, "We knew before that iron vessels could destroy wooden vessels." Well, we knew it so far that we had that impression; but formerly it was matter of opinion; it is now matter of fact— fact confirmed by circumstances so remarkable that I was much surprised when I read the opinion, "that the relations of iron and wooden vessels remained unchanged." Suppose a man, a month ago, had told us that a first-class American frigate, fully manned, armed, and equipped, had been found to be a perfectly impotent opponent to a much smaller vessel, carrying a fewer number of guns, what would have been said? Who would have believed his statement? But what has been the double result of this engagement between the Merrimac and the Monitor? First, as to the action between the Merrimac and the wooden frigate; the latter was destroyed in a few minutes, without the slightest impression having been made on the Merrimac. The next fact we have is, that the Monitor, a comparatively small vessel, a shapeless monstrosity, engages the Merrimac. These two contend with each other for several hours, and apparently with perfect impunity. It is even now a moot question whether the one was damaged by running down the other or by shot; while we have very good evidence that the other vessel was not damaged at all. If further confirmation were wanted, what did we hear from one of the highest authorities on such a point? I allude to the hon. and gallant Member for Wake-field (Sir John Hay), one of the most distinguished members of his distinguished profession, who said that a man would be a fool to fight in a wooden vessel against such an antagonist; and further, that the man who sent another man to fight under such circumstances would be a wicked man. Can any one suppose that my hon. and gallant Friend would make such an admission without deep regret? Could any sailor, holding the high position occupied by my hon. and gallant Friend, tell the House of Commons that our navy is useless, unless he has had the conviction forced upon him by circumstances which he could not dispute? And could there be a higher authority— one more competent to form an opinion upon this question—than the hon. and gallant Member? But supposing, for the moment, that any one could be found to doubt the authority of my hon. and galland Friend, do you think it possible to find any member of his profession who does not agree with him, and who will not confirm the opinion he has expressed? I have, however, another authority—one coming from a quarter of which I think the House will not think lightly, I have here an American newspaper—not a mere gossiping journal of the day, but a scientific journal—which gives an account of these vessels, their different modes of fighting, and the different effects of their shot. I will read to the House one or two of the statements made in the paper, and then I will ask whether they do not fully bear out the opinion I have quoted from my hon. and gallant Friend. Speaking of the Merrimac, it says—

"The Merrimac's projectiles were mostly percussion shells, fired from 10 or 11 inch rifled pieces. Twenty-three shot struck us, including two from the Minnesota, which during the engagement fired over our heads. The deepest indentation on our turret was 2½ inches, produced by an 150 lb. percussion shell, fired at a distance of 20 feet perpendicular with the side. Our deck received four shot, making slight depressions."

Now it may be said by those who are captious on this point, that that was only the effect of shells, which are much lighter than shot. We will therefore see what description they give of the effect of the shot. It is as follows:—

"Now the 11-inch guns of the Merrimac carry balls weighing 180 pounds—nearly three times heavier than the most destructive shot ever tried against iron plates in England. These shots were fired at exceedingly short range, some of them said to be at only 10 feet distance; and 37 struck the turret of the Monitor without inflicting the slightest injury."

The next sentence shows that what ever the course determined on by this country our American cousins are not wanting in energy and activity—

"This contest was the most severe test to which armour plates have ever been subjected, and it puts the final seal to the fate of all wooden ships of war. Calling upon Captain Ericsson the day after the fight to congratulate him upon the brilliant success, we found him engaged upon the drawings of a large sea-going steamer, after the plan of his battery, with the proper modifications for that class of vessel."

That shows, then, that the Northern States of America are perfectly alive to the discovery in which this action has resulted, and are fully prepared to act upon it. Now, I want to ask this question, and I put it more particularly to those hon. Gentlemen who are largely connected with our great seaport towns—I want to know what is the position of our seaboard? What means of defence have we for the Clyde, the Mersey, the Cork Harbour, and every description of great estuary of the kind frequented by large numbers of merchant shipping, when it is in the power of any country possessing even a small naval force to build at a very short notice, in a very short time, and at a very small expense, a class of vessel which is perfectly invincible because it is perfectly invulnerable? Do not let me be told that the Monitor cannot cross the Atlantic. I shall probably be told that; but I beg to remind the House that it is perfectly easy to construct vessels quite as invulnerable, and therefore quite as invincible as the Monitor, and yet possessing all requisite sea-going qualities for making a passage to any part of the world. What, then, I ask, is the position of our seaboard? I do not wish to raise any question as to the probability of war with this country or with that country. But all these speculations are based upon the probability of a war; and I say, therefore, but merely for the sake of argument, that if we find ourselves at war with France or the Northern States of America, we shall find it in the power of these countries, within a few weeks, to construct, at a very small cost, a description of vessel which would devastate and lay waste the whole of the localities to which I have alluded. Such is the position in which this country has been placed by circumstances over which neither Her Majesty's Government nor any one else has had any control; but is it a position in which this country ought to be allowed to continue one moment longer? Now, what is the converse of the remedy which I propose? It is that we are to do nothing for the present, and suspend operations; but assuming that those operations are resumed, at the end of five years we are to have a number of forts which, in the opinion of those best informed on the subject, will, as the sole means of defence, be perfectly useless. Will you, I ask, allow this state of things to exist when you have at your command means of an unlimited character over and above every other country for supplying the want which exists? Sir, I am not putting this question in a tone of despondency. So far from it, everything that we have heard and all that we know tends to show that our fate is in our own hands. Our resources are unlimited. We have the invention of the distinguished officer, Captain Cowper Coles, which I believe has been already submitted to and approved of by the Admiralty. We have several other suggestions by other scientific men. We have, in fact, everything but the requisite amount of determination and energy to make use of the means we possess. I have no wish, in putting forward the views I have expressed, other than a desire to put my shoulder to the wheel for the purpose of doing all I can to assist in remedying the defects at present existing. I say that no man should attempt to make a question of this kind a party question. Let us all work together. Let us meet a common difficulty with a warm and cordial spirit of assistance towards each other. Let no man attempt to mix up in this discussion anything that can be at all construed into an irritating or party feeling. I only ask the Government not to pursue that course which has been too often pursued, and that they will not attempt to postpone what is looked upon by all Governments as an "evil day," namely, the day of coming to a decision. No blame attaches to them. They could not have dealt with this question before, because it had not arisen. But now that it has come before us, I ask them to deal with it at once, and not to convert merely difficult circumstances into circumstances of danger by any want of the energy and spirit which has always been claimed as one of the attributes of this country. With that view I will propose the addition to the Amendment of which I have given notice.

said, it was not competent for the hon. Member to move the addition at that moment.

The subject which has been brought under the consideration of the House by my hon. Friend behind me, and the hon. Gentleman opposite is one the importance of which it is difficult to exaggerate, because it involves nothing less than some of the dearest and most vital interests of our common country. Therefore I trust it is unnecessary for me to say that I accept cordially and frankly the assurances which have been given by those who have made this Motion, and supported it, that they do so in no party spirit; that they do not propose this as a party question; that they do not seek to obtain any momentary party triumph; but that they are actuated by a sincere and patriotic desire that that course should be pursued which is most conducive rapidly and efficiently to provide for the defences which are requisite for the interests of the country. I can assure the House on the part of the Government that we go into the consideration of this subject upon precisely the same principles. We should be ashamed of ourselves if we were to be led by previous opinions, or if, by a desire to adhere strictly to plans and opinions which at a former period have been entertained, we were to shut our eyes and to close our ears against facts and reasonings which are entitled to mature reflection, and which may alter previous opinions or confirm them. Those facts and reasonings deserve, and not only deserve, but require, the most calm and deliberate investigation. They are not matters which tarn on one accidental event, or on the opinion of this or that man, however distinguished by professional knowledge and merit either in the army or navy. These are questions involving great expenditure and great outlay, and an outlay and expenditure which the Government, undoubtedly, ought not to undertake without having ascertained beforehand, as far as experiment can ascertain it, that that which they are about to do, and which they call upon Parliament to furnish the means of doing, will be really effective for the purpose for which it is intended. I am not surprised that the public in general should have been struck with the encounter in the American waters, not having turned their minds attentively to the question as to the degree to which iron plating is proof against cannon shot, and not aware of the degree to which the question has been investigated by the Government, or the extent to which experiments have been made. I am not surprised that the public at large should have their eyes opened, and their minds struck, by the conclusions naturally derived from the event which has taken place. But I can assure the House, although it may be unnecessary to do so after the statements and explanations made by the First Lord of the Admiralty, that these matters have occupied the anxious attention of the Government for a great length of time. Experiments have been made in order to test questions of great importance with a view to the conclusions at which we could safely arrive. Take one instance, which has been adverted to by one of my hon. Friends—the relative value of rifled cannon and smooth-bored cannon in attacking iron plating. The impression originally was that rifled cannon would be more destructive. But, on the contrary, it is found by careful experiments that within those short distances at which ships are likely to engage, the smooth-bored gun is more effective than the rifled gun. When you come to think of it, it is natural that it should be so, because a smooth-bored gun sends out a ball with much greater initial velocity than a rifled gun. The shot from a rifled gun, being longer than the spherical shot from a smooth-bored gun, and meeting with less resistance, though it goes further and straighter, preserves its velocity longer, and at a distance is more effective. But the solid sphere—the solid ball coming out of a smooth-bored gun, starting with greater initial velocity, does not get that velocity diminished within a certain limit of distance; and, the momentum being a compound of velocity and weight, strikes with greater momentum within 300 or 400 yards than the rifled shot. That is one instance in which experiments carefully made have altered the opinion which was previously entertained. Well, then, with respect to the power of the armour to resist shot. That has been tried, and very successfully tried, on a target representing the sides of the Warrior, at a very short distance—some 300 or 400 yards, or less—200 yards, indeed,—and it has been found that the largest shots we are now in the habit of using have not succeeded in piercing that target. These experiments have naturally led the Government for some time past to that conclusion to which the public mind has suddenly arrived by a knowledge of what has taken place in the American waters. But that which happened there, though a lesson in one way, is also a warning in another; because it not only shows us what armour will do, but what kind of vessel will not do for the general service which we require of our ships. In the first place, with respect to the power of that American armour to resist shot, I should say that the great part of the shots fired in the recent engagement were hollow shots; and it is well-known that hollow shots will not make that impression on armour which solid shots are enabled to produce. On the other hand, though the Monitor and Merrimac were well enough adapted for the smooth water in which they had to act, yet those who happened to look at the report which was published as coming from America, would see that the crews of those ships were very nearly suffocated, because, being very low in the water and confined below, they had not sufficient air when the action began; and, moreover, the decks were so near the water's edge that, in the case of Ericsson's vessel, the sea, in roughish weather, got over and came down the funnel, so that there was a chance of all going to the bottom. Therefore it will not do to take these vessels as your model; and when the House is told that they cost comparatively but a small sum, and were completed in a short space of time, I must say that is not ground sufficient for us to go on with respect to the ships we may construct. My hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard went through a list of improvements which have taken place in implements of war. He told us about the crossbows, the matchlocks, the flint locks, the percussion locks, the Brown Bess, and the Enfield rifles. No doubt, human ingenuity and the progress of science from time to time make great changes in the implements of destruction. So for a long time we were content with sailing ships. Not many years ago, it was found that a sailing ship was no' match for a ship propelled by steam, and then the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Pakington) began, with great credit to himself, what he announced as "the reconstruction of the navy"— namely, the substitution of ships propelled by steam for sailing vessels. That was a great improvement' at the time. Since then other nations have covered their ships with iron sides. We have not failed to follow their example. The Admiralty is busily engaged in doing so. The right hon. Baronet led the way by ordering that very splendid ship the Warrior. On that model the Black Prince was also made, and these are sea-going vessels, which those floating batteries are not. In addition to these, my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has ordered others, and in the course of this year there will be four iron ships afloat and fit for sea. In the course of the next year two other iron ships will be afloat and fit for sea; and by the end of this year, I believe, five wooden ships will be plated with iron and fit for sea, and the Achilles, a large ship, is to be built next year. Besides all this, four other iron ships are ordered, and are in progress of construction, and tenders are sent out for the construction of a ship on the cupola system—that of Captain Coles—which, I believe, will turn out most effectual for coast purposes. Whether it can be made capable of going to sea is another thing, but for all purposes of coast defence we are of opinion that the construction of that vessel will turn out most effectual. The experiments made on these cupolas are perfectly successful. They have turned out proof against any shot fired against them, and I have no doubt that a ship so constructed will prove to be of the greatest possible value. I mention these things to show that the Admiralty is not inattentive to the matter, but has been actively engaged in the work, as far as the means afforded by Parliament permitted, and has already realized some means of defence of this kind; and other means are in preparation which will provide us in the year 1864 with 16 iron ships, of different, sizes, but all of a very respectable and formidable character. Then comes the question whether, with respect to the defence of Portsmouth and the anchorge at Spithead, forts or iron vessels are the best. Much has been said in disparagement of the report of the Defence Commission, but hon. Gentlemen seem to forget that the recommendation of that Commission was that both forts and floating batteries should be constructed, and that £1,000,000 should be allotted to the construction of floating defences. We felt, in considering the question of the expenditure of several millions of money for the purpose of creating defences for our chief ports and dockyards, which I humbly think are of great importance, that we were justified, inasmuch as the fixed defences were permanent works, which would last for a great many years to come, in dealing with them as improvements of the freehold, and in charging the expense on the freehold for a certain number of years, by means of a loan, or terminable annuities for a limited period of time We doubted, however, whether we should be justified in applying the same principle to floating defences, inasmuch as, however constructed, they cannot be considered as equally durable and permanent with fixed forts. Therefore we omitted to recommend to Parliament to provide for the construction of the floating defences out of a loan, and left them to be provided for out of the annual Votes. It appears now that it is the opinion of the House that no time ought to be lost in multiplying these floating defences. If we were to follow the advice of the hon. Member who has just sat down, and to provide for all commercial ports ships on Captain Coles's principle, the expense certainly might be very considerable; but probably the hon. Member would be content with such a number as would be sufficient for the defence of our dockyards and most vulnerable ports. Some hon. Gentlemen have said that it is nonsense to think of fortifying the coasts to prevent invasion. No one ever dreamt of that. It is obviously impossible. It is said, that if you erect forts, the enemy would not come near them, but would land elsewhere; and that you cannot fortify the coast so as to prevent a landing. Well, all you can do is to take certain vulnerable points of the utmost importance, such as the dockyards, and leave the rest to be protected by the army on land, and by the navy. The navy only can prevent an enemy landing. Ridicule has been attached to the Martello towers. I do not believe that they deserve any ridicule of the kind attempted to be thrown on them. Taking ships as they were when those towers were built, and the modes of warfare then pursued, I am inclined to think that the Martello towers constituted a respectable means of national defence. They have now gone by, like Brown Bess and other things; and now the chief use of those towers is to test the power of guns to destroy. One of them has proved a very useful target, and has been employed to; test the relative value of projectiles of different kinds. Therefore the real question, which the House is now considering, is whether it is desirable to suspend for a time, and until a more serious decision can be arrived at upon fuller information, the construction of the forts at Spithead, for; the purpose of applying, in the meanwhile, to the construction of iron ships that amount of money, which otherwise would ' be spent on the forts. Well, I do not mean to deny that there is a great deal of plausibility in that recommendation, nor do I at all mean to say that the Government are indisposed to adopt that course. The contracts for these forts as already stated by my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard, are not contracts for completing the forts. They are contracts for the foundations up to the level of low or high water, as it may be. Indeed, the Government have not yet made up their minds as to what would be the best construction of; forts to be built on those foundations. It was thought at one time that a certain thickness of iron—ten inches—would be sufficient. It was found by experiment I that that would not do, and that further power of resistance would be necessary. So far, therefore, from the Government having entered into a contract for the erection of these forts, they have not as yet been enabled accurately to ascertain what would be the best description of fort to be constructed. The contract simply relates to the foundations, and undoubtedly, if the House thought some delay would be advisable in regard to proceeding with those foundations—there is only one quarter in which a large amount of work is already laid down—that opinion might be acted on; but you would, of course, under those circumstances, have to make amends to the contractor for the loss of time, for the discharge of workmen with whom he may have entered into engagements, and also for the materials provided. Some expense would therefore be entailed by such a course of proceeding, but it might be prudent to incur that expense for a time, until this question can be more fully, deliberately, and calmly considered. The state of the matter at present is this:—I proposed to the House the year before last a Bill to enable the Government to raise £2,000,000, for the purpose of erecting dockyard fortifications at Portsmouth and Dover. This was a sum, as it were, on account, for the purpose of beginning and carrying on to a certain extent, as far as Could be effected in the course of that year, the different works specified in the Estimate laid before Parliament. More time was found to be necessary than was then imagined for the purpose of making accurate working drawings and arranging the purchase of land; and, though I am speaking of what took place nearly two years ago, the £2,000,000 which I have mentioned will not be payable for work done until the early part of this summer, about June or July next. It will, however, be payable at that time for works sanctioned by Parliament, and undertaken in consequence of that sanction. Well, it would then be our duty in the course of the present Session to apply to Parliament for further powers to issue terminable annuities to continue those works, among which would naturally be the forts proposed to be erected at Spithead. It would, however, be perfectly in order—and, if the House wishes it, there would be no difficulty on the part of the Government to take this course:—My right hon. Friend the Secretary for War has already instructed the Defence Commission to examine the question as to the utility of those forts, as compared with floating defences, and as combined with those defences, and has asked them to send in a report on the subject. That report will be in the hands of the Government, in all probability, before the lapse of any great length of time. No great expense would, perhaps, be incurred by desiring the contractor to suspend for a couple of months—say the works in connection with those foundations which he has laid. When that time has expired, we should have to submit to Parliament a Bill for the further issue of those terminable annuities, and then it would be for Parliament to decide whether, with the information which they would have before them, they would think fit wholly to discontinue those forts, or to suspend for a longer period their construction; and to what extent they would think it desirable to devote a portion of the terminable annuities to the rapid construction of floating batteries for the purposes of our coast defence. That floating defences can be constructed more rapidly than forts there is no doubt, and there is, perhaps, as little doubt that so long as those floating defences were not sent elsewhere—so long as they were available, and had their machinery in order, they would, in all probability, be as effectual, for the purpose of which I am speaking, as forts. There is, however, this consideration to be borne in mind with regard to the relative power of forts and iron-cased ships. A limit it set to the weight of armour and the weight of guns in the case of a ship which has to float. The whole weight of a ship's armour and guns included must not be greater than the weight of the water which she displaces. If it were greater, the ship would go down. Now, there is no such limit to the weight of guns or means of defence which you can employ in the case of forts, because it is obvious you may have in connection with a fort any thickness of rampart or bastion you please, and you may place upon it a gun of any weight you can work. But it is said that it would take several thousand trained artillerymen to man these forts. Now, I feel assured my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Frederic Smith) will not back that assertion, because it is well known that the working of the guns in batteries is to a great extent performed by what are termed handspike-men, and two trained artillerymen to a gun are quite sufficient. It is not true, therefore, that the whole number of men required to work a gun should be necessarily trained artillerymen, or that men taken from our dockyards and militia—men not skilled in the science of artillery practice—could not discharge many of the duties which would be required. In the first place, therefore, the number of trained artillerymen which we should want to man our forts would not be so great as is represented; and, in the next place, I am convinced that the improvements in guns will keep full pace with the improvements in armour-plates. I am told that the French have already constructed a gun which has pierced their armour-plates. Their iron is, perhaps, not so good as ours; but they boast that they have a gun which will penetrate armour-plates. I have no doubt we shall have a gun of the same sort, and it is clear in my opinion, that, with a view to permanent defence, a combined fixed and floating defence is that which would most completely answer the purpose which we have in view. There is at the same time no doubt that time is a great element in this matter, and that if you can get your floating defences rapidly, you had better do that than wait for a long time for your land defences. It ought, however, to form a question for careful consideration whether you should only postpone or abandon these permanent defences, which would, I believe, be found to be of great value, especially in connection with floating defences. This, then, is the state of the case. We are quite willing to accept the disposition which I think seems to prevail in the House, and to facilitate the more rapid organization of floating defences. A question arises in connection with this subject— the relative advantages of ships built entirely of iron, like the Warrior, with only wood interposed between two iron skins, and ships such as the five now being constructed, wooden ships simply cased with iron—which admits of two opinions. Each has its advantages. There is no doubt that a ship with iron ribs, and an iron skin with teak beyond it, and iron plating on the teak, is a much better sea-boat than a wooden vessel, because the iron ribs will not give way to the same extent as wooden ribs when exposed to the agitation of the sea. Upon the other hand, iron bottoms are liable to get foul, and hitherto no method of securing them from becoming so has been discovered; whereas wooden vessels may be coppered below the water-line and would not stand in need of the cleansing which iron-bottomed ships would require. It must also be borne in mind that line-of-battle ships, such as those now existing, can be more rapidly converted into iron-cased ships than you can build iron ships from the beginning. We have a great many three-deckers and two-deckers of wood, which I quite admit are not competent to meet in action iron ships. It would seem, therefore, to be the most economical arrangement to convert more of them into iron-cased ships, and that could be done more rapidly than you could construct a vessel like the Warrior or Achilles made entirely of iron. One great change in naval warfare has not, I may add, been adverted to much in the course of this discussion. I allude to the introduction of large guns sending hollow shot and shells. It is quite clear, as was proved by the fire of the Merrimac on the Cumberland and afterwards on the Congress, that shells sent into wooden ships are most destructive. Now, on e great advantage of iron casing is that shells, at all events, will not penetrate it, though solid shot will; and we all know that a shell bursting between decks, as in the case of the Congress, is a missile of a very formidable character. But, be that as it may, what we propose is, that my right hon. Friend having already instructed the Defence Commissioners to reconsider their former Report, and to state again what, with all the knowledge they have since acquired, especially from the events which happened the other day in America, they consider to speediest and most effectual method of providing for the defence of the country, we should give notice to the contractors to suspend for the present any further works upon the foundation upon the Horse Sand which has been begun. I would also propose that soon after the recess we should bring the matter again under the consideration of the House, lay the whole thing before them, and ask them to say what they think, upon the whole would be the best course to pursue—whether we should include in the terminable annuities a sum for the more rapid and more extensive creation of armour-cased vessels for defence purposes: and whether we should on that account, for the present at all events, suspend any further operations upon the Spithead Forts. That would be a matter which the House would have under their full consideration. Our only wish, as I am sure it is the wish of the House, is to do that which is best for the public interest. We have no personal feeling. We have no official feeling, we have no party feeling in the matter. There can be but one common object am0ong us all, and that object is far too important to be rashly and hastily decided. It requires to be fully and fairly considered, and we are quite ready to go with the House, after the recess, into that full, fair, and calm consideration.

Sir, I am sure we have all heard the speech of the noble Lord with the greatest possible pleasure; and after the announcement which the noble Lord had made, it will not be necessary for me to detain the House for more than a few minutes. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is quite impossible to exaggerate the importance of this question. I believe the noble Lord has only done justice to the motives of those who have brought it forward, when he has expressed his conviction that they have been influenced only by a desire to promote the real interests of the country. I think the noble Lord has exercised a very wise discretion in meeting the Motion of the hon. Member for Liskeard in a spirit and a manner which, I believe, are in accordance with the general sense of the House. The Motion of the hon. Member consists of two portions. One part of the Motion refers to the suspension of the works upon the forts at Spithead; the other relates to the construction of iron-covered ships. I think that upon the question of carrying out the construction of the forts at Spithead, recommended as that measure had been by the Royal Commission, it would have been hardly right to interfere with the discretion of the Executive Government; but upon the other portion of the Motion—namely, the building of iron-cased ships—I cannot say that the explanations of the Government have been quite satisfactory, or what we might fairly have expected. The noble Lord has alluded to the recommendations of the Royal Commission but the noble Lord cannot have forgotten that the Royal Commission distinctly recommended, not only the construction of the forts at Spithend, but also that £1,000,000 should be devoted to the building of iron-covered vessels. I am sorry to say the noble Lord; has given us no information as to the extent to which that second recommendation of the Commissioners has been carried out by the Government. The Government, as far as we know, have taken no steps in that direction. In 1860 the noble Lord came down to this House and announced the plan which the Government intended to pursue—namely, to raise by terminable annuities £9,000,000 for the construction of land fortifications; but the Commission recommended, in addition, that £1,000,000 should be devoted to the construction of floating batteries, and £500,000, I think, for armaments. The Government, how-ever, decided that the £1,000,000 which the Royal Commission had recommended should be devoted to the construction of floating batteries ought to be charged upon the Estimates of the year. It has not been; charged upon the Estimates, and up to this moment the Government have taken no measures whatever to carry out that portion of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. I the more regret the neglect of the Government to act upon the recommendation of the Commission with respect to the building of floating batteries, because I am obliged once more to remind the House and the Government of the unsatisfactory position in which we stand relatively to other Powers upon this most important point. Upon the authority of a statement made elsewhere by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the noble Lord has told us that we shall, during the present year, have four iron-covered ships in water. I think the noble Lord has rather understated the case, for, as I read the statement made in another place, we shall have five of these vessels afloat during the present year. The noble Lord has also informed us that next year we shall have two more; but in the mean time, if we may believe the accounts published in the newspapers, for I do not pretend to speak from official information, the French Government at this very moment have five iron-cased vessels ready to put to sea. They have another which will be ready shortly, and I am told that two of the largest class—the Magenta and the Solferino—might be prepared for sea within three months. It is broadly stated in the newspapers that within eight months it would be in the power of the French Government, in the event of war, to place twenty-four of these iron-covered ships in line. I have not seen that statement contradicted, and it is asserted in addition that the French Government have in preparation sixty gunboats which are more or less covered with iron. I am afraid the noble Lord will be unable to tell us that we have any gunboats at this time covered with iron, or that the Government are constructing gunboat3 of that description. Last year I was reproached for having wished to excite alarm in the country. I have no such desire, but I cannot imagine any greater impolicy than to shut our eyes to the facts I have stated. The noble Lord himself has justly said that the importance of this question cannot be exaggerated. I rejoice sincerely in the concession which the noble Lord has made to the feeling of the House, but I wish he had spoken more decidedly with respect to the intentions of the Government as to carrying out that which they should have carried out long ago —namely, the construction of a large number of iron-covered ships. The noble Lord has used language to-night which seems to imply that he wishes that matter to be further considered by the Royal Commission. I submit that the Royal Commissioners need not be asked their opinion upon it. Their opinion is now before us. We know what their recommendations are. They have distinctly recommended that £1,000,000 should be devoted to the construction of iron-covered ships, and we want no further reference to the Commission upon the point The question of forts is a doubtful one. It is notorious that the most experienced officers differ in opinion upon it. I have myself, within the last two or three days, consulted naval officers of the highest reputation, and I have received from them conflicting opinions. Some regard forts as comparatively useless; others think them of the highest importance; but as to the importance of an iron covered fleet there is no difference of opinion, no doubt at all. I do hope, therefore, that we shall hear from some other Member of the Government that the recommendation of the Royal Commission upon this subject will be forth-with attended to, and that the noble Lord will consent to the Amendment of which notice has been given by the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck)—namely, that a portion of the money raised for defensive purposes shall be devoted to the immediate construction of iron-covered vessels, without waiting to charge the cost upon the Estimates of the year. I believe Parliament would cordially approve that appropriation of the money.

said, the opinions expressed by the noble Lord on the subject of iron vessels had over and over again been urged upon the House by hon. Members below the gangway, and it would have been well for the country if they had been listened to many years ago. The noble Lord had intimated his willingness to refer the question raised by the Motion of the hon. Member for Liskeard and the Amendment of the hon. Member for West Norfolk — though, by the nay, the latter was not before the House—to the Royal Commission. He confessed he could not see the use of referring the question to that Commission, as the members of it would, no doubt, report in the same manner as they had done before. It was upon their report that he and other Members two years ago divided the House, and protested against the grant of £3,000,00 as an instalment of £12,000,000 for fortifications. The Government were perfectly competent to deal with the question themselves; but if they did refer it, let them do so to persons who had not already expressed an opinion on the question, and who would impartially take into consideration all the circumstances which now surrounded it. The House had already voted £11,800,000 for the navy, partly for the construction of 16 iron vessels. The Warrior and Black Prince were double the tonnage of any ships possessed by any other country; and if the noble Lord proposed to turn over to the Admiralty the money voted for the construction of fortifications, in order to build more iron ships, he must protest against such wanton expenditure. What the Monitor and Merrimac had done was nothing more than was known would take place years ago. It was well known one iron ship would destroy a whole fleet of wooden ships. He had over and over again stated so in his place years ago. Yet since he had divided the House on this question they had been spending millions in the building of wooden ships. Within the last two years they had voted a million and a half for timber. Why, then, could they not appropriate some of that money in building more iron vessels, if they were necessary? He would admit that at all hazards England must maintain her supremacy at sea. But he repeated he must protest against the Fortification Vote being so appropriated.

said, that the noble Lord had admitted that iron plates on the forts 10 inches thick would not afford sufficient resistance. The Defence Commission, however, reported that the estimated cost of these forts was £840,000, and that there was no reason to believe that this sum would be exceeded. But if iron thicker than 10 inches was to be used, the£840,000 would be quite inadequate for the iron work alone.

Sir, I should not have thought it necessary to say anything on this occasion, for I think the House is perfectly prepared to listen to the proposal of my noble Friend at the head of the Government — namely, that after the recess this subject shall be fairly and fully discussed, and that Government shall then be prepared with a proposal. My only object in rising is to call attention to a statement by my right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) that the Government had altogether neglected that part of the recommendation of the Royal Commission which had reference to the floating batteries. My right hon. Friend must have forgotten that principally in consequence of the strong recommendation made by the Commission in re- gard to floating batteries, with a view to assist the forts at Spithead and other places, the Government thought it right to convert the frames of five line-of-battle ships into iron-cased ships, to be plated as floating defences. The only distinction I know between the proposal of the Commission and that carried out by the Government is, that instead of taking a part of the Vote of Credit for those ships, the Government thought it better to include them in the ordinary Estimates for the year. I will only add this, that in deference to the opinion of the House upon that most important matter, Which is growing every day in importance — namely, the question of the defence of our coasts — the Admiralty have taken still further steps to augment our fleet of iron-plated ships without increasing the ordinary Estimates of the year. I may tell the House that we have ordered a considerable number of the men who were to be employed in building small vessels to undertake the work of cutting down one or more of our large line-of-battle ships. A three-decker is about to be cut down, She will be either fitted upon Captain Coles' cupola plan, or, at all events, she will be plated. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: For harbour defence?] For Channel defence. Our line-of-battle ships are very superior to this Monitor or Merrimac, and they will be fit, not only for harbour defence, but for taking their part anywhere on the coast of England. Not only that, but we have under consideration the cutting-down of more line-of-battle ships. At this moment, if we chose — if it were necessary — we have twenty line-of-battle ships that we believe would make very efficient plated ships for the defence of our coasts. It is said that the Americans in the course of a few months plated the marvellous Monitor, and we in this country are behindhand; but supposing we were at war to-morrow, do you suppose we could not put forward our energies and create monitors by the dozen in a few months? We have given large Estimates, and I believe in these Estimates we are gradually preparing and adapting our fleet to the wants of the day. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Sunder-land (Mr. Lindsay) talks of timber ships. Now, I think there is a great confusion among the public in regard to this question of wooden and iron ships. It is thought that because these iron-plated ships are impervious to shot the whole navy should be built of iron. But nothing is more vulnerable than an iron ship, unless it be iron-plated. Small iron ships, with merely an iron skin, such as the Himalaya, and vessels in the merchant navy, are the most vulnerable of all. If a shot strikes them, it splinters the iron, and is fatal to the crew on board. For that reason and others, it is very undesirable that we should give up building small wooden vessels for the protection of our commerce. If the House should deem it necessary that a larger sum should be appropriated to the navy, all I can say is, that no opposition will be offered by the Admiralty.

said, he wished to ask what draught of water would those line-of-battle ships draw when cut down?

My belief is that they will draw about twenty-six feet.

said, he begged leave to ask whether it was the intention of the Government to discontinue the building of wooden vessels altogether.

To a very great extent. There will be scarcely any building of wooden vessels at all.

said, he congratulated the Government upon the decision they had come to; but he regretted that the right hon. Baronet the Minister for War should propose to refer the question of defence to the same gentlemen who had reported on it before. He had the most unfeigned respect for the individual intelligence, ability, and zeal of the Commissioners; but he thought it would be much better to refer the question to another set of gentlemen; and if they also should come to the same opinion that the former Commission had arrived at, their recommendations would have great weight with the House of Commons. He wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War whether, if armour-plated vessels were found serviceable for the defence of Portsmouth, it would not be well that they should supersede land fortifications in the case of some of our other great ports also. He was very much surprised to hear the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty say that line-of-battle ships were to be cut down for the purpose of taking part in the defence of Portsmouth. That was not the description of vessel proposed by the Commission. He understood that it was a small vessel, possessing a small draught of water. If they were to give up the Spithead forts, as he hoped they would, he trusted they would have vessels smaller than the one Captain Coles was now about to construct, but larger than the Monitor, as they would effect thereby an enormous saving in cost, in men, and in guns. Hon. Members might not be aware that there were many large forts around Portsmouth already, and he wanted to know where the vessels that were to bombard Portsmouth were to place themselves? They were told that now, with guns having an effective range of five miles, batteries might be constructed on the Isle of Wight which would destroy Portsmouth. But, on the other hand, what would Southsea Castle be doing, and the other forts capable of mounting large guns along the coast? How was it that our ports were to be attacked now, when they had not been attacked in former times? They had the finest fleet in the world at present, and when the measures of the Government were carried into effect in respect to the increase of our fleet, no enemy would dare to enter the Solent. But let them not squander millions in constructing forts, putting stores into them, and garrisoning them with men, many of whom, notwithstanding what the noble Viscount had said, must be trained gunners. It is true that in sieges troops of the Line were used as assistants to the artillerymen; but in positions requiring the most rapid filing, such as coast batteries, where the guns are fired at moving objects, all, or nearly all, the men who work the guns should be expert and well-trained artillerymen; for in such cases rapid firing is of the utmost consequence. Without speed it would be as well not to have guns. He might mention that some years back he went down to Hurst Castle with the late lamented Prince Consort, and they tried the experiment, with the Royal yacht going ten knots an hour, what effect shot was likely to have on a passing vessel. A 68-pounder and 54-pounder were tried with blank cartridge, and in no one case could a second shot have been fired before the vessel had gone out of the limits of training that the embrasure allowed. It was quite evident that it was all moonshine to suppose that a vessel passing could be destroyed by heavy guns. He had received a letter from a gentleman, whose name he would not mention, but who knew more about the navy than almost any other man, and he stated that they had hardly a wooden vessel which could not be made formidable at very little cost, instead of being, as now, almost useless, but that they must make them with shot-proof bows and sterns. He was sorry to hear that it was intended to construct a large number of small wooden vessels to serve as convoys; because, in case of war, to attempt convoying large fleets of merchantmen with such vessels would be likely to be attended with great loss to the country, as they would be captured or sunk by any iron-clad ship of the enemy that might fall in with them.

said, he was delighted to find that the Government had fallen in with the views of the hon. Member for Liskeard; but he thought the money voted for the navy ought to be sufficient for the construction of many Monitors. What was the use of discovery and invention if, instead of diminishing expenditure, they led to greater expense? He thought they ought not only to save £ 1,000,000 in the construction of the forts at Portsmouth, but also the money which would go to pay for the large purchases of timber. It was hard for poor men to get a living now, and for their sakes it was high tune that they should have an eye to economy.

said, that forts were being erected in the Isle of Wight, a military road was to be constructed, and land was to be purchased. He wished to know whether these works would also be suspended. It was desirable to know whether the several works at the Isle of Wight were to be suspended until the House came to a decision with respect to the forts at Spithead. The works in the Isle or Wight were mainly intended to protect the forts at Spithead, and there: were other works intended to protect the protecting works. A decision on a question involving such an amount of expenditure could not be too soon arrived at.

said, that the observations of his noble Friend at the head of the Government applied only to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman the member for Liskeard, which referred to the forts at Spithead. Those forts defended the roadstead and the entrance into Portsmouth harbour, and had no reference to the works in the Isle of Wight, which were intended to prevent a landing by boats or otherwise, and not to prevent the passage of armed ships. The intention of the Government was not to make any alteration or to extend any works that had been erected in the Isle of Wight.

said, that both his hon. Friend (Mr. B. Osborne) and himself strongly objected to refer the question back again to the Defence Commissioners, who, with Captain Coles's pamphlet and the evidence of naval officers before them, distinctly stating that these forts would in no way impede the entrance of iron-plated vessels, had nevertheless decided upon recommending their construction. The matter ought rather to have been referred to some tribunal which had not committed itself, Granting that these forts were armed in the best manner, and manned by the most expert artillerymen, did any one imagine that either the Merrimac or the Monitor could not steam into Portsmouth harbour with perfect safety and destroy everything in the dockyard? He would admit that his hon. Friend's Motion did not refer to the Isle of Wight. But did it refer to every fort that was about to be erected for the defence of our commercial harbours or dockyards, and the feeling of the House clearly was that the proper way of protecting our dockyards or commercial ports was by means of movable, and not immovable batteries. It appeared that £ 3,000,000 had been spent on Armstrong guns, yet it had been stated by the noble Lord at the head of the Government that the old smooth-bore 68-pounder was still the most effective weapon in the service against iron-plated steamers. It hadcome to his knowledge that on board the Trusty, in October last, 146 rounds had been fired with Armstrong guns, and that not less than twelve vents had been blown out. The same thing had happened in other cases. The House might with some reason expect that after Easter the Government would give some further information about these guns. He protested for himself and his hon. Friend, the Member for Liskeard, against being bound by the Report of the Defence Commissioners, and he trusted that there would be no delay in the communication after the Easter recess by the Government of the decision to which they had come.

Sir, what I stated was that it is the intention, and it must be the intention, of Her Majesty's Government to bring the matter before Parliament early after Easter, because a further issue of Terminable Annuities may be necessary and can only be done by Parliament. I never said that the House would be bound by the Report of the Commissioners, but that the matter would be referred to them for reconsideration, and the Government and the House would then judge of the recommendations in their Report as they may see fit.

said, he could not agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Monsell) that the debate had left the conviction that iron-clad ships were the only means of defending our ports and arsenals. On the contrary, the debate seemed to prove that these vessels were no defence at all for such places. It was stated that the two American ships had hammered away at each other for five or six hours without inflicting much damage. They could not be run down, for the Merrimac had tried to run down the Monitor, and had only injured herself in the attempt. Neither could these vessels be boarded, for they had a deck of iron, and one had a cupola. Suppose an iron-plated French ship thus armed entered Portsmouth. If she went straight on, she might run past the Warrior; and what was to hinder her from sinking every merchantman she came near, destroying the arsenal, and then running out again? The proposition of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government seemed to him to be the only reasonable one — that the matter should be referred for the reconsideration of the most competent persons. It would be, he thought, invidious to choose any other tribunal at present.

said, he thought that the country would receive the statement of the noble Lord at the head of the Government with great satisfaction. It was to be regretted that the noble Lord had not been in his place on Monday night, for then the present Motion might have been rendered unnecessary. He thought the hon. Member for Liskeard ought to accept the proposal of the noble Lord, as before any further action was taken by the Government the matter must be submitted to the House. Having seen the Merrimac, his opinion was that there was a tendency in the public mind to be too much led away by the great success that had attended her. The Merrimac was a totally inefficacious vessel, except in water as smooth as the floor of that House. Nor was the Monitor much of a sea-going vessel. The moral of the action in Hampton Roads was that drawn by the Motion of the hon. Member for Liskeard — namely, that our old wooden ships might be cut down and plated with iron, when they would form a more effectual and more economical defence for our dockyards and coasts than the erection of stationary fortifications. The noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty had said that the Merrimac was covered with railway-iron bars. This he wished to correct. Taking the Merrimac in the state in which they found her, the Confederates proceeded to cover her with iron railway bars. As that interfered with her flotation, they next tried to make iron plates for her, and they would have heard of her achievements long before except for the want of material to fit her out. Commodore Forest, the officer commanding on the station, told him that after he returned to England he would hear of the Merrimac that she would steam out of the James River and destroy every blockading ship on that part of the coast, and then shell the garrison of Fortress Monroe. Great part of that programme had been fulfilled, and the whole might have been executed but for the arrival of the Monitor. Now, having himself been among the Confederate officers, and received the greatest civility at their hands, he could not help stating, without entering at all into the right of their cause, that, cut off from communication with Europe, and left entirely to depend upon their own energies and resources they had shown qualities which he could not help admiring. Instead of what had been demonstrated in that case being detrimental to England, it would prove a great blessing to her. England's policy was defensive, and it had been one of her greatest difficulties how to protect her extensive coasts effectively. If recent events had helped to solve that difficult problem, the country must rejoice at that result.

said, that as the hon. Member for Liskeard had thrown some doubts on the possibility of ships getting into Portsmouth harbour, it was desirable that that point should be placed on a proper footing. He had obtained from the Tide Gauge Office of Her Majesty's Dockyard a statement of the tides at Portsmouth for the first three months of the present year, and he should move on a very early day that that document should be laid upon the table. It would show that out of 180 tides in those three months there were only forty-three in which the Warrior, assuming her to draw twenty-six and a half feet of water, could not have entered with a foot to spare, leaving 137 tides out of the 180 in which she could have entered with a foot to spare. He might add that out of the forty-three tides in which she could not have entered with a foot to spare there were fifteen in which she could have entered with six inches to spare.

said, that he thought that the country ought to be assured that the tribunal to which the subject of this Motion was to be referred was one perfectly free from all preconceived prejudices. The Commission had reported twice; and as the pamphlet of Captain Coles had in some sense led to their second Report, and yet the Commission had not thought fit to call that gallant officer as a witness before them previous to coming to their second conclusion, it could hardly be expected that the question would be fairly examined if its investigation were now intrusted to the same Commission. It was most indecorous, under the circumstances, not to have examined Captain Coles, who, moreover, had also been refused an inspection of the Commissioners' Report, though that Report was founded on a revision of his own work. Every reform seemed to be postponed until after Easter; but when they had had their holidays, he trusted that the House would not rest till it had taken care to have this vital question sifted by a tribunal in which the country could place perfect confidence.

said, he wished to prevent an erroneous impression from going forth owing to what had fallen from the hon. Member for Liskeard and the right hon. Member for Limerick with regard to the Armstrong gun. The former hon. Gentleman had made a comparison between the old Brown Bess and the Enfield rifle. He could assure the hon. Member that the Armstrong gun was as great an improvement on the smooth-bore 68-pounder as the Enfield rifle was upon the old Brown Bess. Exceptional circumstances had occasionally caused some failures, which had been much magnified. The particular circumstance which occurred on board the Trusty was quite exceptional, and had since been perfectly remedied. It was desirable it should be known that the initial velocity of a shot from the Armstrong gun and the old smooth-bore 68-ponnder was exactly the same where the weight of the shot and the quantity of powder used were equal. The rifling of the gun made no difference whatever in the velocity.

explained, that what he and the right hon. Member for Limerick had stated was that the Arm- strong gun was an excellent weapon for long distances, but that the old 68-pounder was used at Portsmouth to test the strength of iron plates, against which the Armstrong gun was inefficient.

said, he thought the answer of the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty to one of the questions of his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich very unsatisfactory. The Defence Commission had recommended that we should have a fleet of vessels drawing not more than sixteen feet of water. Neither that recommendation, nor what seemed to be the desire of the House would be carried out by the conversion of large wooden ships into iron vessels, Which would not be capable of following vessels like the Monitor coming in close to the shore.

said, he had by no means intended to convey that the Admiralty were insensible to the advantages of vessels of light draught. He might state further, that the Admiralty were preparing plans, and had under consideration plans for putting plates on vessels of a much lighter draught of water. There were vessels at present built which they thought might be converted into vessels of that class. He wished also to take that opportunity of observing that in several newspapers he had been accused of deceiving the House in a statement made by him in respect of one of Captain Coles's vessels. Instead of saying that the Admiralty were "building," he had merely said that they had "ordered" one of Captain Coles's vessels.

said, he wished to know whether hon. Members were to understand from the noble Lord (Viscount Pal-merston's) statement that £ 2,000,000 had already been expended on the fortifications.

I meant to say that the £ 2,000,000 had been expended, or were due, for the purchase of lands or for works in progress under the provisions of the Act of 1860.

said, he would then move, as an Amendment, to add the following words: —

"and that this House will, on an early day, resolve itself into a Committee for the purpose of empowering the Government to apply any portion of the monies which shall have been voted for the construction of forts, to the construction of iron-sheathed vessels, or to the conversion of wooden vessels into iron-sheathed vessels."

said, he was afraid it was impossible for the Government to accede to this proposal, for the simple reason that there was no part of the present loan of two millions which it would be possible to appropriate to the building of vessels. The House was doubtless aware that there was a plan, which he thought amounted to about £ 6,000,000 on the whole, and which was described by the late Secretary of War when he opened the plan of fortifications but that the Bill which he introduced, and which ultimately became an Act of Parliament, merely authorized the Government to raise a loan of £ 2,000,000 by terminable annuities, and to appropriate that sum to certain specified works which were set out in the schedule of the Act. After taking into account the sums already expended at Portsmouth, and the amount which was virtually pledged, the House would see that it was impossible that any considerable sum should remain applicable to the building of gunboats out of the money voted last year; so that if the Motion of the hon. Member was agreed to, it would be perfectly nugatory. All that the Government could offer to do was, when they proposed an additional loan for further works, to ask the House for power to appropriate a portion of such additional loan to the building of iron-cased vessels. That would, in fact, be an addition to the Navy Estimates, by way of loan, and it was a matter entirely for the consideration of the House.

said, he was in this difficulty, that having understood that the Government were prepared to assent to the principle of his Resolution, he had stated his belief on that subject to many of his hon. Friends, who had, in consequence, left the House. The Amendment would go a good deal further than the Motion of the hon. Member for Liskeard, and would establish a new and distinct principle. He would propose to insert after "forts," the words "and not already expended or appropriated."

said, the Government had substantially accepted the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman, and he only raised a difficulty upon a point of form that could not be got over. The money upon the present loan was already expended or engaged to be paid, as, if the present plans were not carried out, there would be compensation to contractors and payments for land.

said, he only wanted to assist the Government and himself out of a difficulty. As the Government had accepted the spirit of his Amendment and only opposed him on a matter of form, he thought that the difficulty could be met by his inserting the words he had mentioned into his Resolution. As altered it would not bind the Government to spend any money which was virtually laid out already.

said, he considered that the fact of £ 2,000,000 having been spent upon the foundations of these fortifications, was quite sufficient to prove that this subject ought not to be referred again to the Defence Commission.

said, he supposed that the defence of the commercial harbours would not now be proceeded with, and he would therefore suggest that the money intended for that object could be applied to the present purpose.

said, that the proposition was virtually one that the National Debt should be increased for naval purposes. He thought that in the then state of the House such a proposition ought not to be decided.

said, the Motion was only that the House, at a future day, would resolve itself into a Committee on the subject before the House. When the Motion was made for going into such Committee, after Easter —and the subject must be reconsidered after Easter—and when the Government should propose means for carrying out the work, the hon. Member for Norfolk could propose the application of a portion of the money for the object he had in view.

said, he thought the Amendment would entail an addition to the National Debt for the construction of iron cased ships, and he should oppose it.

said, he wished to ask the Chief Secretary for Ireland, If it is the intention of the Government to introduce any measure during this Session that will have for its object the alteration of the Law of Landlord and Tenant, with a view to secure to the Tenant the value of any permanent improvement he may have made in his land, if he should be dispossessed of it, or the value raised on him?

said, the Irish Government were fully alive to the great importance of the subject as well as to the difficulties which surrounded it. Both private Members and the Ministers of the day had tried their hands at it, and had failed. In 1852, for example, the Earl of Derby's Government brought forward a Bill, which was referred to a Select Committee, and there ended. The Government did not intend to introduce any Bill bearing upon the subject in the present Session. The encouragement of industry was a matter of vital importance to Ireland, but he was disinclined to see any measure introduced which would affect the rights of landlords in relation to their tenants. It was not a question to be settled by political agitation, but by the ordinary course of events.

observed, that he would congratulate the Government on their full consciousness of the extent of their failure in the Bill of last year.