Sir, the mode in which taxes are now submitted for our consideration, although it may successfully assert the privileges of this House as regards the interference of the House of Lords, has also the effect of curtailing those privileges, and that must be my excuse for again calling the serious and earnest attention of the House to the state of our finances. This is a subject which requires some discussion before it is thoroughly understood by many hon. Members, who with regard to it have only that general acquaintance which under ordinary circumstances is quite sufficient, but who may not be always prepared to give that close attention which is required by the present state of the public finances unless discussion is sometimes repeated here. It is for this reason, that having made a few observations to the House upon the second reading of this Bill, I now wish again to call attention to the subject. The state of our finances is one which cannot engage the consideration of this House at a more fitting moment than when a Bill is submitted imposing an immense amount of taxation upon the country, and imposing it only for a year. There is also, I frankly admit, another reason why I wish to trespass upon the House for a short time this evening, because I know that some of my friends— for whom I entertain the most sincere respect— are of opinion, that with the expenditure of this country are necessarily associated the security of our shores and the maintenance of our empire. Now, I think that those objects are far above all financial considerations, and should be secured at all costs and at all hazards. But those who—perhaps through not having given all the investigation which is necessary to this subject—associate these important objects with our expenditure, should take care lest they err in so doing, and lest, in the present condition of our finances, they should sanction an expenditure which is not required for the perfect defence of our country and the complete maintenance of our empire. It is unnecessary that I should, except with extreme succinctness, remind the House of our financial position—no surplus; enormous and continuous deficits for the last two years; utter exhaustion of all extraordinary aids; and, after having experienced a relief of £2,000,000 per annum in the shape of interest paid to the public creditor, an ordinary revenue resting in a great degree upon our financial reserve, those very taxes a portion of which we are asked to pass to-night. Now, I look upon that as the most alarming feature in our financial position. Reviving trade and a good harvest may supply a deficiency, and may create a surplus; but it is difficult to see that those means can materially change a financial system in which we find our ordinary expenditure mainly depending upon sources of income which should form our financial reserve. Her Majesty's Government have told us, that this is not a wholesome state of finance. They have told us so in this House more than once. They have told us so in the country. But the most remarkable thing is, that a Government which informs the House of Commons that the state of our finances is not healthy, should take no step to bring back the salutary condition which is wanted. The only thing more surprising would be a House of Commons who, after such an announcement had been made, and after such neglect had been experienced from the Government, should think that it was not their duty to inquire into such a serious state of affairs, and should, under such circumstances, remain silent and uninterested. I wish to-night to call attention to that great branch of our public expenditure which is occasioned by our military and naval forces. The first point in such an investigation is to ascertain practically and temperately what really has been the increase of our expenditure in this respect. Generally speaking, when these subjects are brought under the consideration of the House, reference is made to the Government of the Duke of Wellington or to the Government of Sir Robert Peel; our expenditure is contrasted with that which existed under those Governments, and an abstract Resolution is moved, which, in nine cases out of ten, is defeated by an immense majority, but which is sometimes accepted by an adroit Minister, who knows that when the abstract Resolution has been accepted he will hear no more about retrenchment or reduction from the House of Commons. Who can deny that the arguments offered by a Government under such circumstances are quite irresistible? Who can deny that the circumstances of the country when the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel were in office differed from those of the present day, and that it is quite impossible to draw any practical conclusion from such a contrast? As my object in this discussion is, if possible, to load to some practical result, I will take for a starting-point a period at which we may fairly compare the naval and military expenditure with that which is now going on—a period when the expenditure was incurred under similar conditions to those which prevail at present. The Duke of Wel- lington and Sir Robert Peel were Tory statesmen, and were never unmindful of the traditions of Tory policy practised by Mr. Pitt—namely, that in a time of peace economy to a nation is a source of strength. But the practice under the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel cannot really guide us, because they had to deal with a state of affairs totally different from that of which we now have experience. I therefore propose to take a period with which every one is familiar, when the conditions under which the expenditure was incurred were, I think, perfectly similar to, indeed identical with those now existing. I propose to take the year 1858 and the five ensuing years, including the Estimates of the expenditure now on the table. In the year 1858 I was myself responsible for the administration of the finances, and I am therefore familiar, I hope, with the financial details of that year. It is my object to place a fair statement before the House. I will therefore erase from the last three years all the Votes of Credit for the China War which do not apply to the preceding years. I will also deduct from the year 1862 that sum of £730,000, an equivalent for which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, under the new arrangement, expects to receive from India. But 1 will do more than this. The House has been reminded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the expense of wars like that in China is not merely to be measured by the Votes of Credit the House has granted for it. That war has had an indirect effect on the military Estimates, and in making any comparisons of the expenditure of the different years I will so frame them that I trust the House will admit they are made fairly. I will even go further. No doubt there has been a great increase in the expenditure of the army, occasioned by the measures adopted for improving the physical and elevating the mental and moral condition of the soldier. With respect to that expenditure, I think there cannot be two opinions in the House. From the highest motives, we should, on both sides of the House, sanction that expenditure; but 1 should support it even on the lower, but equally powerful, ground of economy. I have therefore reckoned under trious heads the increase in the Estimates that has been occasioned by these measures, and I shall at the proper period make the necessary deductions in consequence. I hope, therefore, the House will agree with me, that I have placed the case fairly before it. All I would require from it in return is, that it will give it its earnest and serious attention. Now, in stating to the House the amount of our expenditure for the army and navy in the year 1858, let me first remind it that the expense of the packet service is comprised in it. In 1860 there was a change in that respect and the packet service was then and is now voted separately. But in order to give a just account to the House, I have, in the last three years, added the amount of the packet service. The House will therefore understand that in stating the amount of the Estimates for those years the expense of the packet service is always included. Now, in the year 1858, the expenditure of the army and navy amounted to £22,297,000. I need not remind the House of the circumstances under which the Government of the Earl of Derby acceded to office at the commencement of 1858. At that time considerable irritation existed between the Governments of France and England. Steps were immediately taken which, certainly as far as France was concerned, removed the cause of that misunderstanding; and after that representations took place between the two Governments which went on for some time, the result of which was to establish between the two Governments a thoroughly good understanding; otherwise Her Majesty's Government would not have advised Her Majesty to make that visit to Cherbourg which I dare say most hon. Gentlemen can remember. We took office in the month of February, 1858, and I would allude to this to show that the disposition of the Government was not in favour of unnecessary expenditure. Early in March the Estimates were laid on the table. In those Estimates there was some—though not a considerable—reduction, amounting to £300,000 or £400,000. Shortly after that I had the honour to propose the Budget for the year. It was a peace Budget. In that year the income tax fell to 5d. in the pound, and Her Majesty's Government were of opinion it was of great importance that the amount of the rate of the tax should not be increased. They hoped that if peace were maintained, and there was an average degree of prosperity in the country, the Chancellor of the Exchequer might in 1860 be in possession of a surplus, which, with the £2,000,000 of terminable annuities then falling in, might accomplish that wise and statesmanlike measure, the extinction of the income tax, planned by the right hon. Gentleman. But in 1859 clouds arose. Europe, which had been so tranquil, was suddenly agitated. There was in Germany an excitement, that almost equalled the ferment of the revolutionary year 1848. There was a united sentiment throughout Germany, and that sentiment was directed against any Power suspected of an intention to disturb the peace of Europe. We had Austria at the head of an immense army, supposed to be in the highest state of discipline and efficiency—an army that had not, indeed, reaped any laurels in the Crimean war, but neither had it suffered any of its exhaustion. We had France undisguisedly preparing for a contemplated struggle, whether it was to arise from aggression on her part or in her own defence. Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government had to consider what measures it was their duty to recommend to Her Majesty. It has been said that the Government at that time was under the influence of panic. But what was the condition of England at that moment in regard to its defence? It was not so complete as I am proud to recollect it afterwards became, but it was considerable. The regular army was, of course, the main source of our defensive power; and at no time when we were in office was the army in the United Kingdom less than 100,000 men. We had in addition a well-organized militia, and we had a Channel fleet. We certainly had not that great domestic arm, which I trust will be as permanent as it is effective—I mean our Volunteers; that force wee in its infancy, its organization being effectively aided by the gallant General near me (General Peel). The Volunteers were not then to be counted on as an effective means of defence. But with the regular army, at that time exceeding 100,000 men, in a perfect state of organization, with the militia and with the Channel fleet, no Ministry could have felt apprehension for the security of our shores or the safety of our homes. But what was our state generally with regard to that great arm on which the safety of our commerce, the security of our colonies, and the general maintenance of our national power depends? The navy of England was obsolete. That was not then discovered; it had engaged the attention of our predecessors, and we were endeavouring cautiously, and with a gradual expenditure, to supply what was wanting. But in this alarming state of affairs it was for us to consider whether a great effort should not be made at once. It was our opinion that it should. It was a policy which Parliament sanctioned, which public opinion ratified, and, after all that has passed, it appears to me to have been a wise and sound policy. The consequence of adapting to sailing vessels the scientific inventions of the day was, of course, very expensive. At the time it was suggested that the expense might be defrayed by a loan; but Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that that was not a legitimate mode of providing the means. I am speaking from memory, but I believe the extra expenditure under that head was about £3,500,000. After we quitted office upon another matter there was a further increase in the military expenditure of the year, by our predecessors, but of no great amount. The result was, that the expenditure for the army and navy, which for the year 1858, when we came into office, was £22,297,000, became ultimately for the year 1859, £26,308,000, being an increase in round numbers of £4,000,000. Now, I will ask the House to consider the state of Europe at the present moment. Is it the same as it was in 1859, when Her Majesty's Government proposed this increase in our military expenditure? Is there any great agitation throughout Europe? Is there any united feeling resulting in warlike determination throughout Germany? Is Prussia about to declare war? Is Austria meditating the invasion of Italy? Is France recruiting her army, calling in her reserves, and making preparations which we know forebode a conflict? On the contrary, all the circumstances which exist are diametrically different. Germany was never more tranquil and never less united. Prussia is thinking of anything else than of declaring war. Austria has retired to her stronghold, and has oven ostentatiously declared that her future policy is to be defensive. France is reducing her armaments, and must reduce them, because the state of her finances renders it absolutely necessary. Well, Sir, the first question which I wish to ask the House is, how is it that when all the circumstances which occasioned the great expenditure of 1859 have disappeared, the Estimates still remain at the same amount? We have heard a great deal of late of "exceptional circumstances." We have had "exceptional expenditure" vindicated by Her Majesty's Government on the ground of being occasioned by "exceptional circumstances." I have always failed in obtaining from Her Majesty's Government any definition of what is meant, by "exceptional expenditure," or "exceptional circumstances." But I think all will agree with me that the circumstances which produced the expenditure of the year 1859 were exceptional. They were circumstances which suddenly arose and suddenly disappeared, and which do not at the present moment exist. It may be a fair question whether the increased expenditure which we recommended in 1859 was a wise or an unwise policy; but that docs not affect the facts before us— namely, that unquestionably that expenditure was occasioned by extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, and that those exceptional circumstances no longer existing, the expenditure does exist. I have shown that between 1858, the last starting-point, and 1859, you have an increase of your naval and military expenditure to the amount of £4,000,000. But, Sir, that is not the most remarkable or the most alarming feature in our position. The expenditure for the army and navy, which, increased by £4,000,000, was £26,308,000 in 1859, became in 1860 £29,218,000, and became in 1861 £29,443,000. But I do not wish to carry on any comparison between the increased Estimates of 1859 and those of 1860 and 1861; and I will tell the House the reason why. In the first place, there was unquestionably in those Estimates that indirect influence of the war in China to which the Chancellor of the Exchequer called our attention the other night, and justly so. There was also in 1861 the expenditure suddenly occasioned by the expedition to Canada. I am not prepared to say that these were legitimately and clearly exceptional circumstances, but, for the sake of argument, 1 will admit that to-night the question may come with even extreme fairness before the House. I will not, therefore, compare 1859 with 1860 and 1861. I will omit them from the calculation. I will take the year 1862, of which we have not the realized but the estimated expenditure given us within a few weeks by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The expenditure for the army and navy in 1859 was £26,308,000; but it became in 1862 nearly £28,000,000. Now, Sir, the increase between 1858 and 1862 will be nearly £5,700,000; but from that year and 1862, the estimated expenditure of which is before us, I intend to deduct a considerable sum. I will deduct every item that has been expended on what may be called the comfort of the soldier, under the head of clothing, provision, fuel, light, civil buildings, barracks, education, &c. In 1859 the expenditure for these purposes was £3,276,000, and in 1862 the expenditure was £4,070,000, being an increase of about £793,000. I therefore intend, in addition to all other deductions, to deduct from the expenditure of the army and navy in 1862 that sum of £793,000, and then it will be found that the increase of our expenditure between 1858 and 1862 amounts to about £4,900,000. Therefore the result is that between the expenditure of the army and navy in 1858 and in 1862 there is nearly an increase of £5,000,000 after making every deduction for the indirect influence of the Chinese war, and that large and wise increase of expenditure which has been occasioned by studying the comfort of the soldier. I say that is a very grave result, and the House is bound to consider it. I certainly hoped that Her Majesty's Government would have thrown some light on this state of affairs. I hope the House now clearly apprehends what the real increase for the army and navy, after making all the omissions to which I have referred, has been in the course of five years; and, if so, I think they will be disposed to inquire what is the cause of this great increase. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will not assist us. I thought at the beginning of the Session he had an intention of that kind. He seemed pensive and disquieted. The right hon. Gentleman expressed himself now and then in ambiguous words, which gave relief to some and caused alarm to others. He unhesitatingly denounced the condition of our finances as unsound and unwholesome, both in the House and out of it. But, after all this, the Chancellor of the Exchequer returned after the holidays, threw no light whatever on the subject, but accepted his share of responsibility for the expenditure and for the policy which occasioned it, and, as far as 1 could understand, gave no further hope to the House that he should interfere in the matter. I must say the Chancellor of the Exchequer seems hardly to approve of any other person attempting to explain or investigate the circumstances of the case. If you maintain that there is no surplus, he says, the man who makes that remark must be influenced by a feeling of personal animosity. Only state, as I have been obliged to do, in the present position of our affairs, that we have had several years of continuous and enormous deficit, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer throws at your head a shower of secondhand sarcasms and stale tu quoques. But merely enlarge upon the fact that all your extraordinary aids are exhausted, and that a great reduction in the interest of the national debt still leaves you with your ordinary expenditure mainly dependent on your financial reserve, and all the Chancellor of the Exchequer tells you is, that you tried once to establish a party on the principle of Protection. Now, what I may have done has nothing to do with the present question. Indeed, the present question is of such importance that it is really beginning to be little matter what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has done. The question is, what we are to do. And as to forming parties on the principle of Protection, I certainly did not think we should hear anything more about that in this House and from such a quarter. There was once a great party formed on the principle of Protection who turned out of office the Whigs because they proposed certain moderate measures for ameliorating the tariff, and we know what was the fate of the great party who thus entered office. I should have thought that a devoted adherent and pupil of the master who, in consequence of that change, for some time ruled this country, would never have dwelt unnecessarily upon the folly of attempting to establish a party on the principle of Protection. This, however, I will say, that although the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not throw any light upon the question, the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government, with that frankness which is his characteristic, has unhesitatingly informed us what is the cause of our great expenditure. The noble Lord has told us there is no disguising the fact that France has for a long time been labouring to equal, and even to surpass, the naval power of England. Now, I agree with the noble Lord, that if France is contemplating such a result, and has been for a long time working for that end, it is a ground for armaments on the part of this country far greater even than those which we are now creating. But the noble Lord, after making this announcement, tells us in the same breath that he finds no fault with France for pursuing that policy. There I join issue with the noble Lord. If France is really attempting to rival or excel the naval power of England, I say 1 do entertain great objection to that policy. What does such a policy mean on the part of France, with whom we are in cordial relation? It means that France, which has, compared with England, a very small foreign trade, which has no transmarine possessions demanding the services of a great part of her fleet, is arming in a manner which must occasion great disquietude and distrust among us, and must of necessity seriously augment the burdens of the taxpayers of this country. Can we accept a Power which behaves in that manner as a friend and ally? Can we cherish cordial relations with her? 1 repeat, if France is acting as the noble Lord says, it is a cause of grave distrust and jealousy on the part of England—nay, more than that, it might even justify this country, pressed by increased taxation, and disquieted by these feelings, if the opportunity offered, in declaring war against France. We heard the other night something of servility to France; but what shall we say of the Minister who, believing that France is pursuing this policy, announces to the House of Commons that he sees no reason to object to it, but that, on the contrary, he has the most cordial and confidential relations with France? It is not servility which describes such conduct—it is submission. I think the question stands thus:—If France is clearly attempting to rival the naval supremacy of England, then we ought not to have an intimate alliance with France; but if, on the other hand, France is not pursuing that course, what is the necessity for our extraordinary armaments? Well, then, I ask, is France following this line of policy? That is a most important question for the House of Commons fairly to consider. In speaking of the year 1858, I referred to the communications which then took place between the Government of England and the Government of France, and which resulted, as I believe, in a mutual feeling of cordiality and friendship. At that time the policy of France with regard to her naval power was very frankly and distinctly stated. The Emperor of the French, without any impeachment on the valour of his seamen or the skill of his officers, was not satisfied with the conduct of his fleet in the Crimean war. He found that navies as then organized were in arrear of the scientific invention and skill which were developing themselves in warfare, and which have since produced such remarkable results; and he determined, to use a phrase well known in this House, to "reconstruct his navy." The Emperor formed an estimate of what he believed to be the naval power required by the country with regard to the protection of its coasts, the guardianship of its commerce, and even to those military movements which might occasionally be required. His estimate was formed both as to the amount and character of the force which he held France ought to possess, and the English Government was frankly informed of that determination. Certainly there was in it nothing, to use the language of the noble Lord, to which we could object. It seemed to me, it seemed to all of us, that the plans of the French Government were neither irrational nor extravagant, but such as the necessity of the case sanctioned. No secret was made either of the amount of force which France intended to establish, or the time which it was contemplated the work would occupy. But that communication to this country was coupled with another. The French Government said—"Although we freely acknowledge that it would be a subject of distrust, jealousy, and suspicion on the part of England, if after this communication we exceeded this force, do not suppose there will be any such feeling on our part if we find that you are greatly increasing your fleet; we do not wish to place any limit to the amount of naval power which you may possess. Looking to the position of the two countries, we conceive," said they, "that the fleet of England is to be placed in comparison with the army of France. We have an immense extent of frontier, to be counted not by hundreds but almost by thousands of miles; and we can communicate with all Europe by our armies. You have vast transmarine possessions; and as you are in an island, you must communicate with them by ships. You have an immense foreign trade, quadrupling ours, and require for its preservation a force which we have never contemplated; but as we expect no jealousy from you on account of the amount of our military force, so you will experience none from us on account of your naval force." That was a fair and temperate statement of the question. A plausible representation, some may say; but has it been acted upon? I have investigated the subject as well as I can. We have some of the documents of the French navy, and some authentic information from other sources. As far as I can form an opinion, the French Government have not yet realized the programme which was put before the Government of England in 1858, and which justified the visit of Her Majesty to Cherbourg. The French Government have not yet completed their programme. The noble Lord takes a different view of the case; but the House will agree with me that this is a question which must be decided by facts. The noble Lord gave us the other night a comparison of the forces of England and France. He said that France had four times, and might have six times, the amount of force in her country that we have in ours. I hardly need dwell upon that. France has a frontier of at least 1,500 miles, covered with fortified places, which must be filled with troops; she has a number of great cities, which all have garrisons; she has a capital, which has a colossal garrison. She has plenty to do with her troops, and I think that, as to forces at home, we are probably as well off as France; but that is a matter of which every hon. Gentleman can form his own opinion. Let us come to the navy, because that is the real question. The noble Lord says that not only has France a great military superiority over us, but that she has more iron ships than we have, and is building more. Sir, I must protest against any reference to iron ships as a practical test of the relative naval power of England and France at this moment. The building of iron ships is much too green, too much in its infancy, to be adduced as a test of the relative naval power of the two countries. But, as the noble Lord has made that statement, I will express my impression, that if our relative naval strength is to be decided by armour-plated ships, we have more armour-plated ships and better ones than the French have, that we are building more armour-plated ships than they are, and that of the class of vessels upon which, when these inventions are developed, it is probable that naval war may mainly depend — not great ships, such as the noble Lord referred to, but gunboats and floating batteries—we have a very considerable force, and France has a very small one. But I deny that that is the proper way to test this ques- tion. I will not even remind the House that we have double the number of seamen and treble the number of ships that France has. That is not the point. It is by these details that the public mind has been misled, and the real issue has been obscured and clouded. The real question for the House and the country is this: — There is no doubt that we must retain the supremacy of the sea. There is no sacrifice that we ought to hesitate to make to secure that object. There is no doubt that of every real improvement in naval warfare, of every sound application of scientific discovery that may conduce to our strength, we must without hesitation avail ourselves. But the real question, which has never been fairly put to the country, and which has always been hidden under this critical controversy as to details, is this—Are these preparations and improvements to be made by England on the assumption that France is her friend, or on the assumption that France is her enemy? On the assumption that France is our friend, these preparations will be made gradually, considerately, with due caution, and in a spirit of temperate expenditure; and you will reap the reward of such qualities —you will obtain efficiency. But on the assumption that France is your enemy, what do you have? Panic, precipitation, extravagance, wastefulness, squandering, blundering, and—inefficiency. You get the worst article at the greatest cost; and that is and must be the inevitable result of the policy of the noble Lord—a policy as regards France, as I have shown you tonight, the most inconsistent and incoherent that can animate a man or regulate the conduct of a Minister. Here is a Minister who comes and tells you, "France is our cordial ally; there are between the Governments of the two countries the most friendly and confidential relations; but France, it cannot be denied, is aiming, not only at rivalling, but at surpassing the naval power of England. France can have only one object in establishing that mighty naval power. She has no colonies, she has comparatively little trade; yet I entirely approve her policy. I see no cause of objection (to quote the noble Lord's own language) in that policy. She is our ally; she is pursuing a policy dangerous, perhaps fatal, to this country, but she is our cordial ally, and all that I will do under the influence of these feelings is as fast as I possibly can to prepare to meet her upon the ocean." Well, if we examine facts, in my opinion this is a great bugbear. It does not appear, that France has, as far as her navy is concerned, ever deviated from the policy of 1858, has ever questioned our right to have treble the naval power which she possesses, or that in the conduct of France there is anything to justify extraordinary armaments on our part. I want to know what there is in the conduct of France to justify on our own part a greater expenditure than that of 1858. That is a practical question. I have such an opinion of the noble Lord, his great experience, talents, and sense, that I cannot believe that he can be deceived upon this point. It is impossible that the noble Lord, who has had his eye upon Europe for so many years, who has had such immense experience in public affairs connected with our external relations, could be less informed upon the subject than the great majority of the Members of this House. And 1 am the more inclined to adopt this opinion, because I have always found the noble Lord pursuing this policy. I said the other night that all this is done under the name of exercising moral power. But I remember when it used to be done under another name. It used to be done under the pretext of keeping up our prestige. We all remember the case of the Chinese war. I do not suppose that there are now two opinions upon that subject in any assembly of Englishmen in the world, except perhaps among the members of the present Cabinet. In the Chinese war we expended more than £10,000,000, because the Government chose to defend the blunder of a presumptuous subordinate. That was nothing; that would only be a financial mistake, and would only contribute to the financial embarrassment from which we are now suffering. But the political blunder of the Chinese war was greater, because we enfeebled a Government which was already too weak, and which we are now obliged to recognise as the only machinery for governing in China. However, upon that question the noble Lord dissolved Parliament; and I remember that after that triumphant return, when he was at the very height of his power, a very extraordinary circumstance occurred, which I think will throw considerable light upon our naval and military expenses, and upon the necessity for the Bill the third reading of which is now under the consideration of the House. If there be an occasion in her modern his- tory in which England has especially distinguished herself, I think it was by her conduct during the Crimean war. Never was a Government supported by a people more cheerfully or with a higher spirit, and never were taxes paid by a people with greater readiness. I need not remind the House how great an amount those war taxes reached. I will, at the present moment, confine myself to one illustration, that of the income tax, which is now before us. The House will recollect that during the Russian war the income tax was raised from 7d. to l6d. in the pound. The war income tax was 9d., giving to the Government nine millions per annum as a war tax. In the Act by which that tax was imposed the Government asked that it should be levied for a year after the termination of hostilities, and the House, entirely sanctioned by the public voice, made that liberal donation to the Government. I say that it was an act of high spirit to vote such heavy taxes, and to agree to bear them for a year after the termination of hostilities. The Act by which the income tax was imposed was by a technical error so drawn that after the termination of hostilities nine millions of war income tax might have been levied for two years. When this became known, in the year 1857, there was considerable anxiety about it. The noble Lord decided upon levying that war tax for the two years. He said that he wanted the nine millions for the armament of the country; that those armaments were not in a proper state, and that he wanted the nine millions to strengthen them. The people of this country, who had during the war displayed so much spirit, were sadly soured; there was great discontent upon the subject during the autumn, and when Parliament met — on the very night on which Parliament met — I called the attention of the House of Commons to the general principles upon which the foreign policy of this country was conducted. I showed the House—at least, I adduced facts and arguments to show the House—that the noble Lord pursued a policy which, although it gave to this country peace, deprived it of the fruits of peace, deprived it of the enjoyment of peace, and that because in a time of peace the noble Lord would have war armaments. I illustrated that position in a variety of ways, and, as the practical consequence of those observations, I gave notice that on the earliest available day I should bring forward a Motion calling upon this House to declare that the nine millions of income tax for the second year after the termination of hostilities should not be levied. When the day came, the noble Lord and the Government yielded; the nine millions were not levied, and the armaments of the country remained as they were. None of those nine millions was expended upon our armaments, but we did experience a very beneficial result of another kind, for in the year 1857–8 we had a great monetary crisis in this country, which pulled down some of the leading houses; but, though it occasioned the greatest distress, the revenue never fell, because the consuming power of the country was stimulated by that very remission of £9,000,000 of taxation. The noble Lord still pursues the same policy that he did in 1857, and which I have described to the House. But then the noble Lord can say, if those are your views, why did you let the Estimates pass? Well, I think that a very futile observation. When the Civil Estimates are before the House, it has the power as well as the right to investigate, to criticise, to amend, or to reduce them. The circumstances under which these Estimates are framed are as well known to Members of this House as to Her Majesty's Ministers—in some points possibly they are even better judges, and therefore they can give their opinions upon them with effect. But the Military and Naval Estimates must be voted as an act of confidence in the Government, or, if opposed, that confidence must be challenged. Now, what would have been the effect of challenging the naval and military expenditure at the meeting of Parliament? I should probably have obtained very slight support. I put out of sight the inexpediency of interfering with the Government at that particular moment. I do not wish to find refuge under any recollections of that sort. But a Motion of the nature I have adverted to ought either to fail or to succeed. If it failed, it would give a great triumph to the Government—a great triumph against those principles of reduction which the Motion would seek to establish as necessary and expedient. If it succeeded, what would have been my situation? It is not at all impossible that the vote would have been accepted by the Government as a condemnation of their policy, and they might have been so gracious as to have resigned their seats and to have recommended Her Majesty for the third time to ask a body of gentlemen to carry on the business of this House in a minority. Although I would never shrink from the responsibility of any act of my own, I do not think I am bound to seek a division of that kind unnecessarily. And the observation of the noble Lord, I repeat, is perfectly futile, that because neither the Opposition nor any Member of this House challenged the Military and Naval Estimates—that is to say, because they did not challenge the whole policy of the Government—they are thereafter, during the Session, to be debarred from giving their opinions on our financial condition, or upon the expenditure to which they object. But that is not the case, nor by any means the whole case. I admit that the naval and military expenditure of this country depends, and should depend, on political, and not financial, causes; and therefore these Estimates are framed and brought in and passed before the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivers his financial exposition. But though, in the primary instance, these Estimates depend on political reasons, and you cannot challenge them unless you think you have a chance of carrying an opposite policy, still, in a secondary sense, they must depend on your financial condition. And what was the financial state in which we found ourselves after these Estimates were passed? Although we have reason to suspect that the political causes of these Estimates were not sufficient, we have positive evidence before us that our financial condition is one which renders economy on our part—all the economy that is consistent with the great object of military and naval armaments, the defence of our country, and the maintenance of our empire—not merely a duty, but a necessity. Considering, therefore, that the noble Lord, when these Estimates were brought forward, did not take the course which he adopted in 1857, when the £9,000,000 of income tax were remitted, of bringing them forward himself and expounding his policy; and considering that they were passed almost, he will allow me to say, in silence by the Government, we find ourselves in this position, that it becomes our duty—our urgent duty—notwithstanding we may have omitted at the moment to challenge the propriety of that expenditure at the commencement of the Session, now to call the attention of the House seriously to it. In what way has attention been directed to this subject? We have not brought forward any Motion hostile to the Government. Having passed the Estimates, and being prepared, I have no doubt, to pass the Ways and Means, the Government on this occasion has a right to expect great forbearance. But it is not less the duty of the House of Commons, if they believe the expenditure is not justified, to place their views before the Government, and to appeal with confidence to the Government to reconsider its position. If the Government does not reconsider its position, it will be time enough for the House of Commons to see what is the course it should adopt. But I hope it will be a practical course. I hope these discussions—which must lead to beneficial results in time, because they are founded, I trust, on sound argument and certainly on actual facts—will be followed by practical results, and not by some abstract Resolution which, perhaps, it may be even convenient for the Government to adopt. I hope, and more than hope, that the Government, in the present position of the country, will do that which the Government has done before—reconsider its expenditure, and adapt our charge more to the state of our revenue. Before I sit down, there is only one topic on which for a moment I wish to dwell, and I do so with regret, because it is about myself. But I really do it out of respect to the House. The other night I made a statement illustrative of the relations that existed between the Governments of France and England with regard to America. I was then urging upon the House that it was inconsistent with our cordial relations with France to hear the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs inveigh against our ally; but I said I thought, at the same time, that if there were any place where France and England had a common object, and should have a common course of policy, that place was America; not withstanding which, I regretted to add, it had reached my ears that there was the same want of accord between the representatives of the two Governments there which we find in other places. I did not say much on the subject; it was a delicate one. I might have said a great deal more. But I said that there was a sort of constant management, an attempt to obtain rival influence, which, considering that they were accredited to the President of a republic, and were in direct commu- nication with the Minister of a republic, seemed to me quite out of place, and more in keeping with the intrigues round the capricious tyrant of a Divan. I said that; I could have said much more. I refer to a past debate, with the permission of the House, because this is a personal matter. The noble Lord, when he replied, contradicted me on that head in terms which, allow me to say, were neither social nor Parliamentary. The noble Lord said the statement was false. Well, I did not interfere at the moment, because, to tell the exact truth, I really was so pleased to see the noble Lord at the end of a long debate disporting himself with so much vigour, that 1 could not bring myself to interrupt him by an interference, which, though it would not have been angry, would have been serious. But I also thought probably this House would believe that one filling, however unworthily, the position which I now occupy, would not have made a random statement on such a subject. I knew the matter would keep, and therefore, being here again, I must tell the noble Lord that I believe the statement that I made was most accurate; and although, from its particular character, it is not capable at this moment of mathematical proof, before very long, perhaps, there may be even on the table of this House, but certainly in a form scarcely less authentic, sufficient proof of that statement. And, as I am speaking in the presence of a great many gentlemen who are fortunately what are called young Members of Parliament, I may be permitted to state that this is not the first time that the noble Lord has contradicted statements that I have made, in a manner equally peremptory and equally fallacious. Some years ago there was a debate in this House of a dry and diplomatic character, the merits of which depended a great deal upon the guarantees which England had given to foreign Powers. The noble Lord was then Secretary of State, and I asked him how he would meet the guarantee which England had given to Prussia for her Saxon provinces. The noble Lord, immediately interrupting me, said there was no such guarantee in existence. Well, Sir, I mentioned the treaty which contained the guarantee; and, as treaties are no longer merely manuscripts, it was thought convenient that this one should be brought into the House of Commons. Even while it was being sought for, the noble Lord more than once contradicted me; and such is the attractive audacity of the noble Lord, that his contradiction was received with cheers. But the treaty was brought in, and the guarantee was found in it. As regarded my assertion that there was such a guarantee, the matter might not have been of much importance; but it was a matter of some moment that a noble Lord who for so many years had been the Foreign Secretary of this country should not have been aware of an important guarantee, remembering that during that long period he must continually have been called on to give his advice in respect of circumstances of which he could form no just appreciation if he were not aware of the existence of that guarantee. In more modern times—I think it was in 1857—when I had occasion to refer to and criticise some proceedings at the Conference of Paris, I spoke of a secret treaty by which France had guaranteed to Austria her Italian provinces. What did the noble Lord do then? After I sat down he addressed the House in that peculiar style with which the House is so familiar. It is not wit. No one pretends to say it is wit. A Secretary of State who sat in this House once wrote an essay on humour. I defy any person to arrange the noble Lord's style under any of the heads in that essay of Mr. Addison. But I will tell you what the noble Lord's style is. It is what in the 18th century was known as "banter," but which in the 19th is described by a monosyllabic term which has not yet found its way into our Parliamentary vocabulary. What did the noble Lord say on the occasion when he thus contradicted me? He said that in the days of my youth I had been distinguished for imagination, and had written some works under the influence of that fine quality; but that I had never before invented such a romance as this treaty. The noble Lord was scoffing, gay, and airy, and described me as sauntering along the Boulevards and catching canards. And, Sir, of course there were loud cheers and laughter. All I had to do on that occasion was that which. I now do, in reference to what I said a few evenings ago —reiterate the statement, and tell the noble Lord that he was very ill served by some of those who acted under him if he were really ignorant of the existence of this guarantee. Well, after ten days—and the interval must have been a very uncomfortable one for the noble Lord to pass through—the noble Lord was obliged to come down to this House and make a recantation. I must say that he swallowed the leek with a grace peculiarly his own; for, with as much coolness as if he were merely moving the adjournment of the House, he informed us that he found there was such an instrument in existence, that it had been executed, and, in fact, that everything which he had previously stated on the subject was entirely erroneous. But this is the Minister so distinguished for his knowledge of foreign affairs ! For the possession of which invaluable speciality Reformers resign reform, and Economists relinquish retrenchment! Rightly is the noble Lord the head of the Liberal party; for their only remaining title to that once illustrious epithet is their lavish expenditure of the public money.

Sir, the first duty which, under present circumstances, I feel it incumbent on me to perform is to assure the right hon. Gentleman, that if on a former occasion I stated that the assertion which he made, not on his own authority—of course, he could know nothing about it—but upon the assertion of some one else, as of course it was—did not accord with the facts, nothing could have been further from my intention—I should be ashamed of myself if I had any such intention—than to impute to the right hon. Gentleman that he had stated anything which he did not himself believe to be perfectly true. I am surprised, in fact, he could have supposed that I meant anything of the kind, because, if my memory serves me rightly, I went on to say that the right hon. Gentleman must have been deceived by some information which he had received, and I cautioned him not to trust to the same source in future, inasmuch as that information was totally devoid of foundation. To the latter part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech I may be allowed to refer in the first instance. He stated on a former evening that Washington was the scene of intrigue between the English Minister and the French Minister. He has again stated that they are undermining each other by their intrigues, and that it is a struggle between them for influence. That assertion I denied when the right hon. Gentleman made the statement on a former evening, and I repeat the denial now. Every one who knows Lord Lyons knows that a man like him, who is a mirror of honour and frankness and straightforward dealing, would be incapable of intriguing and planning against a colleague in any country to which he is accredited. I have not the pleasure of knowing M. Mercier personally; but I have watched his progress through the many diplomatic missions which he has fulfilled, and I believe him to he a man as incapable as Lord Lyons of doing anything which a gentleman and a colleague could not manfully avow. Therefore I must again assure the right hon. Gentleman that he has been totally misinformed, with regard, to the assertion which he has made. At the same time, it is certain that there are persons who by the extreme simplicity of their character are led away—are induced to believe easily and hastily that which is told to them by individuals whom they supposed to be possessed of accurate information. Whatever the right hon. Gentleman may think of former assertions, I again assure him that he is completely mistaken as regards our Mission and the French Mission at Washington. Lord Lyons and M. Mercier, I am happy to say, are in constant and friendly communication—neither of them has done anything without communication with the other. There has been no concealment; there has been what I may call joint action. The two Ministers have worked and co-operated almost as if representing the same Government; and they have exhibited the most perfect good faith towards each other in their negotiations with the Cabinet of Washington. The right hon. Gentleman has referred to a former assertion of his, and to a denial which he says I gave to that assertion. At this distance of time I forget what I said on the occasion in question with reference to the treaty of Vienna. I must, however, say that it was strange if I or any other gentleman forgot one of the guarantees in that treaty, because there were only two of them—one a guarantee to Prussia of her possessions in Saxony, and the other a guarantee of the integrity of the Helvetic Republic. The other statement of the right hon. Gentleman is as to a secret convention by which France had guaranteed to Austria her possessions in Italy, at, I think the right hon. Gentleman said, the special request of the British Government. The knowledge of that treaty must not have been very general, if, as the right hon. Gentleman says, it took us more than a week to find out whether it was in existence. It appears, however, that France made war with Austria, and turned her out of most of her Italian possessions; and a recollection of those circumstances is not a very complimentary one to France, according to the view of the right hon. Gentleman—that France had guaranteed to Austria territories of which she deprived Austria by war. The right hon. Gentleman takes his starting point in 1858, and says the relations established between the Government of which he was a Member and the Government of France present a striking contrast to the insecurity and suspicion now existing in the relations between the two Governments. But does the House recollect what led to the change of Government in 1858. The Government of which I had the honour to be a Member proposed a measure eminently calculated to conciliate the good-will of the Emperor of the French and of the French nation as far as they were attached to him. I mean the Conspiracy Bill. And who was the main instrument in rejecting that Bill? Certainly the right hon. Gentleman opposite. [Cries of No!] Well, when I moved for leave to bring in that Bill, I was strongly supported by Gentlemen on that side of the House, and I had every reason to suppose that they would give the Bill a steady and unflinching support. But the moment that a Motion aimed at the measure was made from below the gangway on this side of the House, they teemed to think that by throwing their weight into that scale they might strike a fatal blow at the Government; so they broke their pledges, and departed from the principles which a fortnight before they had proclaimed. They had given leave to bring in the Bill with the most cordial zeal; with unmitigated hostility they resisted the second reading. No wonder that circumstance created ill feeling on the part of France towards the Government of England. Naturally the French Government said, "Why, here is a party coming into power which took a stand upon refusing that which we think a just and fair protection to our Sovereign against murderous conspiracy in England — and they have turned out a Government which proposed a measure of protection." But what did the right hon. Gentleman say afterwards? Did he not tell us that when he came into office we were within a day, if not an hour, of war? Well, then, that was the starting-point of the friendship, cordiality, and mutual confidence of which the right hon. Gentleman boasts, and that was the position in which his Government stood with respect to the Government of France. But soon after they came in— the year after—he admits they deemed it right to increase the armaments of the country, and he instituted a comparison between the year 1859 and the present year. He admits that the excess of expenditure now, as compared with 1859, is only £1,600,000. But then, he says, there were peculiar circumstances in 1859. Well, what were those circumstances as far as they regarded this country? There was a war breaking out in Italy between France and Austria. Was it likely to involve us, through the Government of that day, in a war on the side of Austria against France? If that was at the bottom of their thoughts, then, undoubtedly, as far as England was concerned, it was an exceptional year, and the same reason for expenditure does not apply in the present state of things. We have no intention of asking the country to go to war to prevent the freedom and liberation of Italy. Well, then, Sir, where is the force of the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to our present scale of expenditure as compared with that which his Government, upon full deliberation, thought necessary at a time when England was at peace—for evidently there could be no obvious danger of war with France, unless England was the aggressor, because France was not likely to quarrel with England at a time when she was engaged in a great struggle with Austria? The difference between the expenditure of 1859 and 1862 is only £1,600,000. But are there no circumstances at present, having reference either to periods just gone by, or to the possibility of future events, which may account for this difference? Why, on a former occasion, it was stated that there was still a claim on account of the China War, that we still were incurring expenditure on account of the disturbances in New Zealand, and on account of the despatch of troops to Canada. Well, no doubt, Sir, it is quite possible to suppose that any Government, for its own sake, if not for the sake of the country, would be anxious to reduce expenditure whenever a fair opportunity arose. We have this year cut off about a million of our army and navy expenditure; and, if next year we should find that any portion of the expenditure now going on could be dispensed with, I am sure it is not taking any credit to ourselves, but only stating what any men in our situation would do, when I say we should most cheerfully avail ourselves of the circumstances to make any reduction that it was consistent with our public duty to propose. But the right hon. Gentleman says, "You ask me why, if I entertain those opinions—that your army and navy are too great, that your establishments are too large—why I did not come down and say so when the Army and Navy Estimates were before the House?" The right hon. Gentleman says, "It is a futile question." I admit it is a futile question, because the answer is sufficiently obvious. In fact, the right hon. Gentleman has given the answer himself, because he said, "Questions about museums, education, the fine arts, science, and matters of that kind are things upon which every one can form an opinion;" and certainly we have had the advantage of a variety of opinions upon these subjects. Many men think themselves as competent to judge as the Government which proposes the Vote. "But the question," he says, "as to the amount of your military and naval establishments is a question involving political considerations, considerations which must be known better to the Government of the day than to Members of this House; and therefore the House reposes a sort of confidence in the Government of the day, let that Government consist of whom it may, in not objecting to the amount of force which maybe proposed." Well, that is not an invariable rule, because we had this Session a Motion by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. White), proposing to diminish the number of the army by 10,000 men; but it did not meet with much support. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman foreseeing the fate of that Motion did not wish to be the twelfth in that division. But the right hon. Gentleman gave a very satisfactory reason why he himself made no Motion of this kind. He says, "That Motion would have been successful or it would have failed. In either case the result would have been deplorable. If it failed, it would have given strength to the Government which I oppose; if it succeeded, by displacing the Ministry it would have produced the calamitous consequence of bringing in a Government in a minority and thus necessitating an appeal to the country. Between those two evils I have had no choice but to remain silent." I quite appreciate the motives which led him to that conclusion. Of course he would have had the joy of a better division than that of the hon. Member for Brighton; but if I am not mistaken in my recollection of very recent events, I think he would not have carried with him many of those hon. Gentlemen who repose their confidence in him, and are supposed to follow him whenever any elasticity of opinion will enable them to do so. Now, Sir, with regard to the army, I have never heard those on that side of the House, more especially the right hon. and gallant Officer who was at the head of the military department (General Peel), say that the force is too large. On the contrary, he found fault with us from time to time last year for not making sufficient provision for the force which we proposed to maintain —in fact, he said our expenditure was not adequate to our wants. Well, that is not an objection which at all meets the view which the right hon. Gentleman has this evening propounded. I think, before he comes down to propose to us a diminution of our military establishments, he had better settle that question with his right hon. and gallant Friend; and then, when they agree both as to the amount of force and the amount of money requisite for that force, they will be in a better position to bring their views before the House. The right hon. Gentleman said that the military force in the United Kingdom in 1859 during the administration of the late Government was only 100,000 men. Well, our force was just about that number before we sent 8,000 men to America. Having sent 8,000 men to our Canadian Provinces, it follows that we have now in the United Kingdom a smaller force than what the right hon. Gentleman and his friends thought no more than adequate for the protection of our shores and the maintenance of our empire. The right hon. Gentleman has also adverted to our naval forces, which he thinks too great. There again is a question very difficult for the right hon. Gentleman to settle with his late colleagues; because not only did the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) propose, when in office, a reconstruction of the navy—an alteration necessarily accompanied with very considerable expense—not only did he begin to turn sailing vessels into screws, and then again to substitute iron ships for wooden ships, according to his own plan, but last year, somewhere about this time, the right hon. Gentleman came down and made a great flourish about information which he had received, and which he thought it a reflection on the Government not to possess. But we did know all about it all the time. The right hon. Baronet came down with information which he had derived from Admiral Elliot, showing the extensive preparations which the French were making in the construction of iron vessels, taunting us with not keeping pace with those preparations, and urging us to accelerate our movements by increasing the number of our vessels, whatever the cost might be, and placing ourselves upon a footing of equality with France. This, I am sorry to say, we have not yet quite done. The right hon. Gentleman says that when his Government were in office they had a communication with the French Government; that the French Government gave them a programme, to which they did not object, of the amount of their forces; and I understood him to say that the French Government have not even yet exceeded or even completed that programme. If the Government of the right hon. Gentleman were content with that programme, why are we to object to it? The right hon. Gentleman says, "Either you are friends of France or expect to be her enemies. If you are friends of France, you need not mind any amount of armament she is preparing. If you are enemies, you should not simply object, but should declare war to compel her to stop." That is going rather farther than some of those hon. Gentlemen who seem to concur with him are likely to agree to. It is, certainly, much farther than I am prepared to go. The right hon. Gentleman says, "You have said you have no objection to these armaments—you approve of them." I have never said anything of the kind. I never said we did not object to them. It is because we objected to them that we proposed to this country to increase our own. What I said was that we had no right to make an international objection to them, that we had no right to dictate to France the amount of naval force which it was necessary for her own purposes to maintain. France, the right hon. Gentleman says, has her own shores to defend, her own commerce to protect. Her interests are in every part of the world; and France has a right to judge what amount and what kind of naval force it suits her purpose to keep up. But we have the same right; and it does not follow, be- cause we are on good terms with France, and hope so to continue, that we should on that account allow her, exercising her own freedom of choice, to become stronger at sea than ourselves. The right hon. Gentleman says we ought to maintain our naval supremacy at any cost, and that it is our national interest to do so. He might have said much more than he did on this point, but he said enough, and he showed that whatever kind or description of naval force France may have, we are bound, without anticipating hostility, without saying that we look upon her as intending to be our enemy—it is a matter of necessity and national interest, according to his own statement—that we should be not only equal, but superior to France in naval power. There are obvious reasons why it should be so. We have possessions all over the world, our commerce floats on every sea, and we are vulnerable in hundreds of places where we can only be protected by our naval forces. It is, therefore, obvious that, whether for domestic security, the protection of our commerce, or the safety of our possessions abroad, it is essential that we should be as strong at sea as any other Power that may be at war with us. Then are we expecting that France will be our enemy? Well, no! we do not expect France to be our enemy—provided always that we are able to defend ourselves. The Government of France is on friendly relations with England, but, at the same time, Frenchmen are but men. The Government of France consists of human beings, and it is not in human nature, if you are placed in a position in which you are likely to have collisions of interest with another Power, not to take occasion of superior strength to obtain superior advantage and to coerce the weaker Power. And therefore I say, because I wish this country to remain at peace with France, and because I wish the alliance between the two countries to be lasting, for that very reason I would not tempt France or any other Power with which we wish to be on a friendly footing, by allowing them to obtain such an evident superiority, both by land and sea, as to place this country at the mercy of the forbearance of that Power. The right hon. Gentleman seems to deride the military superiority of France. We do not pretend to rival France in her military preparations. But what is the fact? Before these 8,000 infantry and artillery went to Canada we had in this country about the force which he says existed during the time of his Government —namely, 100,000 men. What is the military force of France? On the 1st of January last France had 446,000 men, under arms. She had, in addition, 170,000 men of reserve, liable to be called back to the ranks at a fortnight's notice. Besides that, she has upwards of 200,000 National Guards. Therefore her regular forces under arms or liable to be called on at a fortnight's notice are 616,000 men to our 100,000. The French Government have since determined that towards the end of the year 31,000 of the 446,000 shall be transferred from the active army to the reserve, making no difference in the amount available, but diminishing the expense without diminishing the eventual efficiency. I should say that, besides the 616,000 men, there are 70,000 of the conscription of the present year, who might be called out at any moment if necessary. The right hon. Gentleman says the French have fortresses and garrisons. So they have. They have the garrison of Paris, and he omitted to say, but I allow, that they have a force in Algeria—all making a certain amount of diminution in their disposable force. But, allowing for all this deduction, and then assuming, first of all, that anything arose likely to cause a serious collision between England and France, and that the events of the war should be such as to give France a superiority at sea—then tell me whether France will not be likely to land a force on our shores much greater than it Would suit our army to encounter. Therefore it comes to this, that besides the limited and reasonable amount of military force which we may think proper to maintain, it is necessary for the interest and safety of the country that we should have a navy—be it of wooden ships when sailing ships were employed, be it of screws when screws were employed, or be it of iron now that iron-clad ships are most likely to be employed—it is absolutely necessary for our purposes (and I quite agree with the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich) that we should be at all events equal, and, if possible, superior to the French in our naval armament, of whatever description it may be. Well, Sir, but this cannot be done without considerable expense, and each successive improvement in nava warfare brings with it additional expense. A screw line-of-battle ship was more costly than a sailing ship. The old rule was that a 100-gun line-of-battle ship cost £100,000. When we built screw line-of-battle ships, or lengthened others and fitted them with the screw, they cost £150,000. Then, as soon as you resort to iron-clad ships the expense is increased; and as the cost of each individual ship is increased, so for the time you increase the Naval Estimates. The alternative, therefore, is between a temporary increase of expenditure or leaving yourselves in a condition in which your peace and tranquillity, and all the blessings which they bring with them, depend upon the forbearance and goodwill of a great Power that may be tempted by a hundred different causes to place you in a situation in which you will have no choice but to acquiesce in submission. Well, then, I appeal to the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Pakington) for a justification of that portion of our naval expenditure which has been necessary for the purpose of beginning the reconstruction of our navy. And what is the condition of our navy? I will talk now of iron ships. I am aware that we have a greater number of wooden line-of-battle ships than the French. But we were told not long since in this House that the days of wooden ships have gone by, and that no wooden ships would stand against such vessels as the Merrimac or the Monitor, and that war at sea hence-forward must be determined by iron ships alone. It may not be amiss to mention, in passing, that the Monitor, in its passage from New York to the scene of action, was as near going to the bottom, by the sea breaking over her and going down her tower, as was possible without actually sinking. Then, what is our relative position? The right hon. Gentleman says the French Government gave him their programme, and that it has not been fully carried out. The number of French ironclad ships either built or building—some of them launched and some going to sea— is thirty-five or thirty-six. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: Thirty-six.] The number we have either built or building is twenty-five. So that France is already ahead of us by eleven, and their programme, according to the right hon. Gentleman, is not yet fully carried out. I do not know what that programme was. If they gave a statement to the Earl of Derby's Government, which that Government acquiesced in, it is rather too late for us to make any formal representation to France; and, moreover, I do not know, when we consider France as a great Power, having great naval interests and liable to be brought into conflict with other States—I do not know that we could reasonably say to France, "You ought to stop where you are, and wait till we get ahead of you." But, we being eleven ships behind the French, 1 think there is no ground for stating that in regard to our naval, any more than our military establishments, we are going beyond what the true interests of the country require. I shall not trouble the House with any further statement, except to say that I think the right hon. Gentleman judged wisely in abstaining from asking the House to do that which he says would have been tantamount to a vote of want of confidence—namely, to determine for itself the necessary amount either of our military establishment or of our naval establishment. We shall be ready next year, when the circumstances of the time will be patent to all mankind, and of which, with his peculiar knowledge, the right hon. Gentleman will be well able to judge, especially if he does not trust too implicitly to those sources of information of which I have already spoken—we shall then be ready to discuss with him what may be the proper amount of our naval and military establishments; and I can assure him and the House, that if by a change of circumstances it shall appear that any considerable reduction worth offering to the House can be made in our establishments, we shall be too happy to avail ourselves of that opportunity. We can have no interest in enlarging establishments and in increasing expenditure, and imposing thereby charges and burdens on the people. Nothing makes a Government more popular than diminishing burdens. Perhaps it is a wrong thing for me to say this, because the attempt made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer last year to diminish the burdens of the country by repealing taxation did not make him very popular with some classes in this House. Nevertheless, that attempt was by the country at large fully appreciated; and, not intimidated by these reproaches, nor daunted by the reception which the reductions proposed by my right hon. Friend met with from some persons in this House, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman opposite and the House that it will be our duty, as we shall feel it also a pleasure, to avail ourselves of any change of circum- stances which might enable us by reducing our establishments to diminish in any degree the burdens bearing on the people.

observed, that the noble Lord, when he stated that France had, built and building, thirty-six iron-clad ships, and that this country had only twenty-five, ought to have mentioned the size of the ships, for that was an important point. Taking the case of La Gloire and the Warrior, the latter was equal to two of the former; so that if the twenty-five iron-clad ships of this country were in like manner double the size of the thirty-six French (though he did not think that France had at this moment so many, built and building), England would have practically fifty ships to the thirty-six of France. He conceived that the noble Lord had not answered the statement of the right hon. Gentleman; for it was extraordinary that during the last three years the expenditure of this country had been increased, because it was said that France was adding to her military and naval armaments, and did not intend long to maintain her friendly relations with England. He had all along contended that France did really mean to remain on friendly terms with England, and of this intention she had given convincing proof in joining her armaments to those of England in the Crimea, China, and Mexico. Last year, too, when England got into trouble with the United States, the French Government again came forward in a friendly way, and the despatch of M. Thouvenel did quite as much, or more, than all the preparations made by the British Government to obtain the release of the persons seized on board the Trent. The right hon. Gentleman stated that he had reason to believe that this country was not on such friendly terms with France in respect to American policy as might be desired. He could confirm substantially all the right hon. Gentleman had said on that point; and the noble Lord was not justified in giving a flat denial to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. Before long, the country would find that the right hon. Gentleman's representation was substantially correct.

said, that the difficulty which a preliminary exciting discussion, like the one just terminated, threw in the way of those who really desired to address the House on the subject of the Bill before it, was very great. The Bill itself was the most volu- minous tax Bill ever submitted to the House. In his opinion, the attempt to combine together in one measure various separate matters of taxation only caused great inconvenience, and rendered it almost impossible fairly to consider the subjects of taxation. He wished to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether there was any Supplemental Estimate to be brought forward, or any Vote of Credit for the expenses of the China war. If so, he should question the propriety of that proceeding, and perhaps submit a Motion on the subject. With regard to the Bill under consideration, he felt great objection to the manner in which the income tax was to be collected, but the difficulty of discussing the different points of an omnium gatherum measure like the present was almost insuperable. He also wished to direct the attention of the Government to the necessity of issuing some instructions directing the surveyors of the Inland Revenue Office to adopt a less vexatious system of collecting the income tax. The fact was, that if an income tax payer wanted to know the law, he ought to be an attorney, and a very sharp one too—so many Acts of Parliament had to be referred to. He wished also to call the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to another point. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue were, he found, empowered to appoint collectors under the Bill and to take security, but they might also make the appointments without security in the event of their not being able to find anybody to undertake the responsibility. Now, in his opinion, security ought to he required in each case, as was the case in Scotland by virtue of a special law. It was universally felt to be a great hardship that parishes should pay twice over because collectors made default; and by altering that practice a sense of being unfairly treated would be got rid of. The two evils to which he had drawn attention could, he believed, be remedied by the action of the Executive alone. He regretted that the House did not seem to pay that attention to matters referring to oppression upon the taxpayer which was their first duty. He was prepared to discuss foreign politics at the proper moment, but he thought that it was an extremely desirable opportunity for discussing those special matters that pressed upon the people in reference to taxation under this Bill.

said, he thought that the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could not be at all aware of the ill-feeling that existed in the county which he (Mr. Hunt) represented on account of the overcharges which had been made. It was almost wholly an agricultural district, and it was next to impossible to get up an agitation upon any subject; but still the whole country round was in a state of ferment in consequence of the vexatious proceedings to which the taxpayers had been exposed. The subject had been brought under his (Mr. Hunt's) attention, not only by taxpayers, but by the Commissioners themselves; and having made inquiries at Somerset House, he had drawn up the form of the Return which had been laid before the House in concert with one of the heads of departments there. The right hon. Gentleman stated the other night that the Return did not give a fair statement of the operations of the surveyors, and that might be very true; but then, upon the other hand, it did not give a fair statement of the grievances of the taxpayers. His Returns, however, in fact, showed all that it was intended to show—how many persons had been brought up on appeal by the action of the surveyor, and how many had been unwarrantably brought up; and if he had moved for a Return in reference to what had been done by the local assessors, it would have shown a still greater amount of hardship. The right hon. Gentleman had told the House that 3,248 cases had been wholly omitted from charge by the local assessors; but having spent some time at the department which had the control of these matters, and pursued investigations there, he (Mr. Hunt) could say that in many of these cases the fault of the assessors was only a technical one, for many of the persons omitted from charge were people who were not liable to be taxed. He had ascertained that in 1,229 of these cases the persons were not liable to the tax. It was very true that the assessors ought to have brought them into the assessment, and then they ought to have stated their exemption; but it was very difficult to make people who were not liable understand that. He would admit that in 1,876 out of the 3,248 cases the surveyor had done his duty by bringing them under assessment. The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned that there were 2,720 cases where the surveyor had charged persons in excess of the amount charged by the assessors; but he (Mr. Hunt) had ascertained from Somerset House that 477 of these persons were not liable to be charged at all; and in the remainder there might be many cases in which the overcharge was so small that it was not thought worth while to appeal. In the three divisions of Northampton. Wellinborough, and Kettering, which fell under the supervision of one surveyor— 962 appeals had been heard against the assessments under Schedules A and B—he was not speaking of the number entered— and that out of that number the charge had in 337 instances been reduced, while in 409 it was wholly disallowed. In the district of Kettering there were most complaints. Under Schedule A there were 272 appeals against the surveyor's charges, which were confirmed in only 38 instances, they were reduced in 92, and in 142 the parties were discharged. Under Schedule B there were 185 appeals, and in only 14 were the surveyor's charges confirmed; in 46 they were reduced, and in 125 they were wholly disallowed. These circumstances, he considered, fully justified the ratepayers of Kettering in signing that declaration in which, while expressing their readiness to make all reasonable allowances for the officers in question in the discharge of their duties, they stated that they naturally felt that it was not just they should be put to the expense and inconvenience which those appeals involved. His complaint resolved itself into two heads, that of speculative overcharge made upon persons who were liable to pay something; and the other, the cases of small occupiers who had been charged, but who were not liable at all. As to the latter class, he must lay some part of the blame on the right hon. Gentleman himself; because he believed it to be an indirect consequence of his financial policy. It had hitherto been the practice, when a new assessment was made, for the surveyor to meet the parish assessors and go through the rate books; and if the assessors were satisfied that any small occupiers had not sufficient income to render them liable to the tax, the exemptions were allowed without troubling them to appeal. It was true the claims for exemption ought to be made; but it was very hard that from a technical omission persons should be put to the inconvenience of appealing. At Kettering, hundreds of persons had to attend for three days; and when their cases were heard, their appeals were at once allowed. The excuse given was, that the Act of last Session passed at so late a period, and the tax was wanted so quickly, that there was not time to consult the parish assessors. He believed that it was the present hand-to-mouth financial policy which had caused the necessity for this hurried collection, by which such great inconvenience had been caused. He also believed, that if the balances in the Exchequer were such that they could give the taxpayers more time, and if the quarter's tax had not been wanted immediately after the passing of the Act, the taxpayers need not have been put to so much inconvenience. The subject was one of importance to many persons, and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would turn his attention to it.

said, that his information to a great extent confirmed the statement of the hon. Gentleman; but he thought that much weight was due to the observation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that a great deal of the inconvenience had arisen from the fault of the local assessors. A very considerable number of the Commissioners were in favour of the assessment being more under the control of the Government; and he himself could speak from personal experience of great inconvenience being caused by there not being sufficient control over a young surveyor. He thought that considerable improvement might be effected by giving to those who had to make returns a notice which should be a little fuller and clearer.

I must take the liberty of telling the hon. Member for Northamptonshire, that I think two of the steps taken by him in this matter are very inconvenient. In the first place, he has, unfortunately caused to be laid upon the table a Return which is wholly fallacious, and which gives unjust and inaccurate expression of the case. Any one would suppose from that Return, that the surveyor had had to deal with some 900 cases, in the majority of which he had been wrong. I must again remind the House that the surveyor, in consequence of the total break-down of the local machinery, was called upon to go down and to deal with 6,000 cases. Of that number in only one in six were there appeals. In only one out of eight of those cases was the surveyor's judgment at all declared to be wrong, and in one out of fifteen only was he declared to be entirely wrong. I must again express my sincere regret that the hon. Member, in discharging the duty which it was quite right for him to have undertaken, has taken such insufficient means of bringing the truth before the House. But I must also venture to say, that nothing can be more inconvenient —not for the Government, but for the public—than to bring such cases before the House without previously making an appeal to the executive Government. The consequence of the hon. Member's mode of proceeding is, that I never heard of these cases until they were brought to my notice by the paper that has been laid upon the table. I would again suggest, that according to the usual and almost universal practice of hon. Members, in the first instance, when any complaint is made of the collection of taxes, the facts should be made known to the responsible Minister, and he then will have a full opportunity of inquiring and of forming his judgment upon the facts. If that judgment is dissented from, of course the appeal to this House still remains; but then the time of the House is only occupied in considering the real points in dispute. I have no doubt that many of the parties referred to have suffered great inconvenience, but it is only upon the most particular statement that I can take any useful step. The particulars of individual cases would enable me to judge whether there has been any excess in the conduct of the surveyor, but I cannot gather from this paper the particular facts. If the hon. Member will give me the particulars of any case which he thinks will illustrate the complaint he makes, I will examine into them, and give the proper instructions. It is impossible for us to have a staff of officers all over the country adequate to discharge their own duties and also the duties of the local officers. Their proper business is to check the local officer. If, however, the local officers fail so egregiously as in the case before us, I am afraid great inconvenience must ensue. As to the connection between these grievances and the financial policy of the Government, I may say that the financial policy of the Opposition had as much to do with it as ours, because the hon. Gentleman will recollect that the Bill was, I think, three months in this House in consequence of questions that were raised upon it. I do not wonder at his laying the blame upon us, but we say that the Opposition is equally culpable. There is no doubt that with the new assessment there was considerable pressure at the close of the year, in order to bring into the year the revenue that legitimately belonged to it. As to the points raised by the hon. Baronet (Sir H. Will-oughby), I agree that nothing can be more hard than that persons should be called upon to pay a second time on account of the default of collectors in cases where the parishes have not availed themselves of their legal remedies. In 1854 a Bill was introduced to give the Government the power of appointing collectors where proper securities had not been taken. I could not gather from the hon. Baronet the precise suggestion he makes for the improvement of that Bill; but if he will be good enough to send it to me in writing, it shall receive my best attention. The hon. Baronet asked whether there would be any Supplemental Estimates this year. It does sometimes happen, as last year, that Supplemental Estimates are necessary, and in the last Session there were two Supplemental Estimates amounting to £180,000 for expenses which were more or less in view at the time the Budget was brought forward, and which the surplus then proposed was sufficient to cover. At present we have no surplus, or nearly none; for 1 cannot speak positively as to how many persons will export hops to claim the drawback; but it would have been dishonest if, in bringing forward a budget without a surplus, I had been aware that Supplemental Estimates would be required. I refer, of course, to matters of new and considerable charge. As far as I know, no such charges are likely to be brought forward during the present year, though, of course, I cannot pretend to foresee what may occur. With respect to the Vote of Credit on account of China, that is a mere point of form. I believe it will not be necessary to ask the House for a Vote of Credit; but a sum of £500,000 must be paid on account of the China War; and if it be found that legal authority is requisite for the payment of that sum, the question will, of course, come before the House of Commons.

said, that the noble Viscount had alluded to his Motion for a reduction of the army by 10,000 men. He would admit that on that occasion he was not very well supported, as only eleven Members voted with him. But he had since received assurances from a number of Members expressing great regret that they had not voted with him in that division. On another occasion, when the opinion of the House would be tested again, the numbers would therefore be much more considerable. He could assure the noble Lord that, in consequence of what he had said, and of the promises of support which he (Mr. White) had received, should he have the honour of a seat in that House next Session, he should feel it his duty, if the Army Estimates were upon the same scale of magnitude as they were that year, to move a reduction not of 10,000, but of 20,000 men; and he thought he could safely prophesy that he should be supported by more than double the minority he had upon a late occasion. He might be permitted to add, that so curiously constituted was the House of Commons, that although on that occasion only eleven gentlemen went into the same lobby as himself, the House, on the very next night, affirmed an abstract Resolution which, if carried into effect, would have led to a reduction of 20,000 men, and to a diminution in the annual expenditure of £3,000,000 sterling. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire had said that abstract Resolutions, or declamatory declarations of opinion, with regard to economy and retrenchment, were of no use; and he had given evidence of the sincerity of his wish to abridge our enormous expenditure, by joining those who were opposed to spending more on the fortifications at Alderney. If the right hon. Gentleman were now in his place, he (Mr. White) should have told him, that if in the changes of parties he should happen again to come into power, he (Mr. White) and his friends would support him if he only persevered in the course now indicated. They would forget and forgive, and offer the right hon. Gentleman's Government no factious opposition if only they would keep down extravagant expenditure. He (Mr. White) and his friends might deplore the foreign policy of the right hon. Gentleman as one not consonant with their opinions, and as one which nine-tenths of the people would repudiate; but, as regarded domestic policy, the differences between the two sides were unimportant; and if the right hon. Gentleman would diminish the public expenditure, he would certainly meet with no factious opposition. At the same time, he (Mr. White) should be glad to have some test of what the right hon. Gentleman intended to do. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Rochdale had shown that the Government of this country could be carried on, without any diminution of its prestige, at a cost of £10,000,000 less than was now spent. Be that as it may, he (Mr. White) believed that a very important reduction could be made; and he had a strong opinion that at least £5,000,000 per annum might be saved without any diminution from our prestige. If the right hon. Gentleman could make such a reduction as that, he would gain a fair hold on the sympathies of the country.

said, that he only wished to say one word. He was one of those who had never been in love with the income tax; he considered it oppressive in its nature, and the cause of extravagance in the Government and Legislature. It should be considered rather as a subsidy than as a regular source of revenue. In anything he said he did not wish to he considered as commending the tax. He merely rose to express a hope that in any arrangement the Chancellor of the Exchequer might make with reference to the assessment of the income and property tax he would be careful to strengthen the local machinery—to assist, but not to supersede it. He had received information that alarm had been occasioned in the country by the belief that the tax would be assessed by the Government officials. It was thought that this would be a denial of appeal, as the appeal would be from the Government assessor to the Government. At present it was from the local assessor to the officer in immediate connection with the Government, and that was satisfactory. He hoped, therefore, that the local machinery—which was, perhaps, somewhat rusty —would be rendered more effective rather than be superseded by central authority.

Sir, I stated generally in introducing this Bill what was its general character and purport; and, in point of fact, the object and the justification of the measure will be best gathered from the papers laid upon the table. These papers show in what manner the Government and a large majority of the trustees have arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to separate the collections of the British Museum; and, taken in conjunction with other papers, they also show what are the collections which the trustees and the Government have, upon the whole, deemed it most expedient to remove from the present site to one at a considerable distance. As respects the measures which are intended to be taken for this purpose, the Bill itself completes, in the main, the necessary explanations. The site to which it is intended to remove is perhaps the only one which would occur to the minds of those hon. Gentlemen who are prepared to contemplate the removal at all—I mean, South Kensington, that being the only desirable place in or about London where it is possible to have the necessary command of land at a moderate price, combined with the means of effecting almost any expansion, which can be required for the Museum in the lifetime of any person now living. I promised that on the second reading I would state briefly the views of the Government respecting the expenditure likely to be incurred in consequence of the measures now proposed; and it will be a mistake on the part of the House to imagine that this is not a very important measure in regard to the demand upon the public purse to which it will give rise. It is not practicable to keep collections like the British Museum without a very heavy charge. The present establishment although not less economical than other public establishments, involves an expenditure which, combined with that for additions to the collections, will convey some notion of what the cost of providing accommodation for such an establishment will be. But the Government think it would be absurd, at the point which things have reached, to propose to this House any half measure. There were, indeed, differences of views as to the amount of additional space which would be required, and that is, perhaps, the point upon which it is most easy to suppose that differences of opinion may arise in this House. But we have thought it best to follow what appeared to be the highest authority—that of Professor Owen, backed by precedents and illustrations which he has adduced from the practice of other countries—and these convince us that it is impossible to regard as a sufficient provision for the wants of the Museum any less space than five acres of ground, with a capacity of further expansion hereafter. The extension, of course, must remain vague, and incapable of minute inquiry till further progress has been made in the execution of the plan. This, therefore, is the basis of the plan proposed; and we ask the House for the means of finding five acres of ground at the least— probably somewhat more—and in a place too, where, in case of need, there will be a possibility of some extension. A committee of the trustees have investigated the question of expense, and they state that the cost of five acres of ground, near the site of the present Museum, will be in round numbers £50,000 per acre; the cost of the necessary buildings to be erected on that site will be £100,000 per acre. The total cost of the ground, therefore, will be £250,000, and that of the buildings £500,000. The estimate of the committee was, indeed, somewhat greater, but these sums may be taken as the amount in round numbers. The estimate for the building, however, does not include any charge for fittings; nor for enlarging the present buildings, to which considerable additions will have to be made. As to the readjustment of the present buildings, it will be better to keep that out of view, as the expense of that rearrangement will be about the same, whichever plan is adopted. At South Kensington the ground can be obtained for £10,000 an acre; this, on the five acres required, will be a difference in favour of the public on the South Kensington site of £200,000. Besides this difference, another item ought to be taken into view. I have examined the plans, and I am able to give a conjectural estimate of the probable cost of covering the ground with buildings, but I must not be considered as offering more than a reasonable conjecture. It appears to the Government that the cost of the building at Kensington will be from 20 to 25 per cent less than the cost of building on the site of the present Museum. The reason is, that on the latter site the style of the new buildings would be fixed by that of the existing edifice; whereas, by building at Kensington, we shall be able to employ a lighter style, with a greater amount of window space, and secure a cheaper and more convenient structure. The present building is in many departments extremely inconvenient from the deficiency of light, while a considerable portion of the collections require an abundance of light. The whole difference of cost in favour of the Kensington site will be £200,000 on the ground, and £100,000 on the building, or £300,000 altogether. As to the readjustment and enlarging of the present Museum, the alterations are described in the papers before the House; the effect of them will be to add largely to the available space. From 60,000 to 70,000 feet will be gained to the Museum by the removal of the natural history collection, and about half that amount, or altogether not less than 100,000 feet, by a readjustment of the present site. The plan of readjustment is regarded as a necessary consequence of the removal of the natural history collection; and it is a plan by which a very large amount of additional space will be obtained at a cost; comparatively very small. If am correctly informed, the readjustment will add at least 40,000 feet of available space to the Museum, at a cost of about £120,000, or at the outside of £130,000. Summing; up the whole figures, whichever way the question is viewed, it is a matter of considerable public outlay. The whole of the charge for the purpose at Kensington will be from £670,000 to £680,000. But, if the same amount of accommodation is provided at the present Museum, the charge: will be about £960,000 or £970,000. It is a great national undertaking. The national collection is one of the ornaments and treasures of the country, and both the Parliament and the country will readily recognise the duty of keeping it in a state of efficiency. After the long delay that has occurred, and the urgent demands made for complete facilities for exhibiting the collections, I think it would not be wise in the Government to ask the House for means of extension less than will be thoroughly sufficient for a long period of time. It is for a long period of time, therefore, that these plans have been framed and submitted to the House. A space of one, or perhaps two acres, in the immediate vicinity of the Museum, would cost less than the five acres at Kensington; but that would not meet the exigency of the case. The structure would hardly be completed before the demand for a fresh extension would be revived. We believe, therefore, we have proposed what will secure the largest amount of extension at the most economical rate.

said, he felt exceedingly sorry that the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) was not in his place, because in the remarks which a few minutes before he had made upon the finances of the country he had observed upon the great discrepancy of opinion with regard to the expenditure in our museums; and if he had been present, would surely have reiterated those statements, and would have been of opinion that the time had come to make a stand against the enormous expenditure proposed in the scheme of the Government. He (Mr. Gregory) was not one of those who had opposed in the abstract the removal of the natural history collections from the British Museum, or who had insisted upon the necessity of works of nature and works of art being exhibited under one roof. Upon the whole, he thought that the diffusion rather than the concentration of the national collections should be their object. But his objections to the removal of the natural history collections from the British Museum were threefold. He objected to the removal, first, because of the central position of the building and its accessibility to the lower and middle classes, among whom these collections were extremely popular; secondly, because the alterations contemplated would be a kind of patchwork which would bring discredit upon the country; and lastly, because it would involve an expenditure utterly disproportionate to the object in view — an expenditure entirely disapproved by every man of science with but one exception. Professor Owen seemed to be the person upon whose sole authority the outlay of £700,000 or £800,000 was to be justified. But the Professor had stated to the Committee that he wished the collections to remain at Bloomsbury, if he could only obtain the requisite space. His expression was, "Not that I love Bloomsbury less, but that I love space more;" and he was the advocate of the abstract principle of retaining the collections of art and science under one roof, for he signed a memorial in 1858 against the removal in which was contained this passage—

"Her Majesty's Government, we trust, will never yield to the argument, that because in some countries the products of nature and art are exhibited in distinct establishments, therefore a like arrangement must be copied here. Let us, on the contrary, rejoice in the fact that we have realized what no other country can boast—a vast and harmonious collection of art and science, round a library which illustrates part of each branch of knowledge."

With regard to the second objection—that it would lead to patching the Museum, by the formation of certain rooms for the sculpture—it was obvious that it would be, if he might use the phrase, a mere avoirdupois arrangement—not systematic or chronological, but one in which the statues would be placed according to weight, and the rooms most capable of sustaining the greatest pressure devoted to those of the largest size. Upon this point he quoted last year the opinion of his hon. Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard), and he would quote it again, as an opinion in which every man who cared for the artistic reputation of England must concur. The hon. Gentleman said:— "In the British Museum we have erected a building without reference to its purpose, and which is the very worst of its kind for the exhibition of works of art;" and in the plan now proposed the object seemed to be the mere gaining room, without taking into consideration in the slightest degree to what collections the space was to be devoted, or in what manner the collections ought to be exhibited. He had always advocated a plan which was inexpensive and which was approved by all the artistic feeling of the country—namely, that the second floor of the Museum should be given up to natural history, and the sculpture placed in cheap galleries capable of continuous extension westward. They had evidence that the expense of such an arrangement would not amount to one-half the expense of the plan now proposed, which would provide both for natural history and antiquities. The House must remember that on the assumption that the present plan of the Chancellor of the Exchequer provided for natural history, there would still remain a heavy outlay for the arrangement of the antiquities; both which objects would be obtained at a comparatively small expenditure by the plan he recommended. The last and not the least objection was upon the score of the cost, and that turned on one thing— whether the House was prepared to adopt the plan of Professor Owen, or whether it was prepared to adopt the plan of the other scientific men who were examined before the Committee. They had on the one side, and standing alone, Professor Owen and his ten-acre scheme, and on the other all the other scientific gentlemen, who were perfectly unanimous in condemning the plan of Professor Owen as being utterly useless and bewildering. Amongst those gentlemen were Professor Maskelyne, Mr. Waterhouse, Dr. Gray, Sir R. Murchison, Mr. Bell, Professor Huxley, Dr. Sclater, Mr. Gould, and Sir B. Brodie. In his letter to the Trustees, of the 10th of February, 1859, Professor Owen said—

"Due regard being had to the utmost economy, he should require for the proper exhibition of the collections of his department, and the accessions likely to accrue in thirty years, a building of one story covering more than ten acres, or a building of two stories covering five acres."

The questions of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Puller) proved that Professor Owen had not fully considered his plan, because his hon. Friend pointed out, that if he could not do with less than a ten acre building of one story, a five-acre building of two stories would be quite inadequate, inasmuch as through the spaces which it would be necessary to leave for the lighting of the two-storied building, there would be a considerable loss of room. To give the House some idea of that gigantic plan, he might mention that a part of it consisted of galleries of 850 feet in length for the exhibition of whales. The scientific men examined on the subject one and all disapproved of that plan in toto, and they advocated what was technically called a "typical" mode of exhibition—that was, a system by which all the genera, the species, and the striking varieties, and, in short, everything calculated to attract attention or be useful to the public, should be shown, without distracting and bewildering the spectator with innumerable specimens of every description, resembling each other so nearly that even the most experienced person could not detect the difference between them except by holding them in his hand and closely examining them. When asked whether, as a scientific man, he thought it for the interest of science that there should be the immense collection contemplated by Professor Owen, Sir Benjamin Brodie replied that he did not believe it to be at all necessary, but thought the whole thing might be done in a very much smaller space. One of the witnesses examined argued that the House of Commons would more readily vote £160,000 or £180,000 if split into two and divided between two different establishments than if asked for in one sum for one establishment. The witness was perfectly right, because nothing in the world was easier than to bamboozle that House. Sir Benjamin Brodie, however, gave it as his opinion, that looking to the state of the finances, the public would not approve the House of Commons being so lavish in these matters as it had been, and in that view, he must say, he (Mr. Gregory) himself entirely concurred. What the Select Committee proposed was that there should be an exhibition of all objects of general interest and utility, that there should be drawers in which all other specimens should be kept, and that there should be studies to which scientific men could resort for the purpose of comparing and examining those specimens. Common sense must point out to every man, save the mere enthusiast, that that was the proper course to adopt. And certainly it was astounding that a conscientious and honourable man like the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who went itinerating about the country to lecture and denounce the extravagance of the House of Commons, should, with all his professions respecting economy, venture to propound a scheme of the kind before the House, the first cost of which would amount to £790,000. Why, the calculation had been made that any person visiting the projected Natural History Museum, if he wished to inspect the whole of the glass cases from beginning to end, would have to traverse no less a distance than five miles to accomplish it. He next came to the estimate of the expense, and here he was glad to find himself in such entire accordance with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. His own estimate of the cost of Professor Owen's plan, without any architectural front, amounted to about £720,000; and in that estimate the Committee over which he presided generally coincided. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's estimate for the building at Kensington was £680,000; but the right hon. Gentleman had not allowed anything for the new library, for which it was proved before the Committee that a sum of £30,000 more would be requisite. Then there was also to be taken into account the probable charge for new fittings and glass cases, which Mr. Smirke, the architect, stated in his evidence last year would amount, under Professor Owen's scheme, to about £80,000. These various sums, in round numbers, would give a total of £800,000 to be expended, and they must remember that the expense of the library was continually increasing, and that the cost of transferring that immense collection to Kensington would be very great. Now, it was a financial age, and they required to look a little closely into these things. The annual expenditure on the British Museum was now £98,000—a very large sum indeed. The time would come, although not in that Session, when he should pull in pieces that item, and when the House must deal with the enormous expenditure upon that establishment. He found, on examining the Estimates of the year, that, taking away the Natural History Collections from the Museum, all they could expect to gain in the diminished expense of that institution was not more than about £12,000 a year. In that estimate he had debited the Natural History Department with half the cost of the staff of the Museum; therefore there would remain an annual charge of some £86,000 to be met for the British Museum deprived of natural history, and there would also be the heavy annual cost of the new Natural History Museum, together with the enormous outlay of £790,000 as a first estimate upon Professor Owen's scheme. And then let them look at the large staff which they would have to employ at the new Museum at Kensington. The old stereotyped phrase on the Treasury Bench was, when undertakings were commenced, that since they had begun, they must go on, and carry out their scheme; but they had not begun the proposed scheme, and he hoped the House would take care it was not begun. He would express no opinion as to the removal of the collection of natural history, but that it should be removed at such expense in the present state of our finances was, if not an insane proposition, one which, at least, he could not understand. Dealing with scientific men, they might rely on this—when they said they wanted a very small space for the exhibition of their collections, they might place confidence in them; but if they encouraged them to set to work in order to contrive what they might consider desirable, they would have to excavate another Serpentine for an aquarium, or build another crystal palace for butterflies. He had very grave objections to the Bill. The general artistic feeling was that the drawings of the great masters should be placed with the national pictures, that artists might have the opportunity of studying the original designs; but the Bill provided that while the pictures were in the National Gallery, the prints and drawings should remain at the British Museum. He had no objection that the prints should remain in the British Museum —they were more in the antiquarian line of research; but that the drawings should be classed among the objects that should not leave the British Museum was, he thought, something monstrous. There was another blot in the Bill which, if it stood alone, would be sufficient to condemn it. He meant the proposal to transfer to the new institution at Kensington a form of government which had been disapproved of by every witness who had been examined. The trusteeship was to be carried down to Kensington along with the natural history collection. He could understand that there might be objections to break up a system which had lasted so long; but that they should extend to a new institution a system which had been condemned as involving every fault that could be imagined, surpassed his comprehension. They should rather have taken advantage of the present opportunity of getting rid of that noxious system, which had been condemned by all Committees and Commissions. He even claimed the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Walpole) as an authority on his side —that to transfer a trust to look after the natural history collection, when many of the members constituting the trust rested their sole claims on the fact that some of their ancestors had contributed some statues or books to the Museum, was a most illogical proceeding. What he advocated, if the removal were determined on, was, that Sir Roderick Murchison and Sir Philip Egerton, together with five or six other scientific Gentlemen, should be appointed trustees, not as an executive body, but as visitors; the management being placed in the head of the department; and that a Government officer should be responsible for the Estimates of the Museum, and bring them before Parliament. In conclusion, he sincerely hoped that any observations he had made would not be imputed to pique on his part because the suggestions made by the Committee of which he was Chairman were entirely set aside. That was not the case. Yet he was bound to say it did appear extraordinary that every provision had been framed with the view, as it were, of contravening the decisions at which the Committee of last year had arrived. It appeared as if the trustees of the British Museum considered it quite beneath them to brook or tolerate any interference of the House of Commons, which annually voted £98,000 in support of that institution, which they conceived to be their own particular domain. He could only say, with regard to the removal of the natural history collection, if they found a suitable structure, in a suitable position, under suitable management, and at a moderate expense, he could have no objection to it; but he did, unquestionably, object to the enormous expenditure that would be entailed by the Bill for alterations in the Museum, which would be a discredit to the country, and were condemned by nearly every man of science. Influenced by such motives, he should give every opposition in his power to the passing of such a measure, not being one of those Members of whom the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) said a short time since, that they showed their liberality by the reckless manner in which they advocated every attack on the public purse.

Sir, it was the saying of an old wit that whenever there was a topic in vogue he went out of town, by which, I suppose, he meant that when there was any idea very prevalent in the minds of people it was apt to infect all their conversation and views on other subjects, to pervert in some degree their judgment and even to render them dull. Although the last malady has not overtaken my hon. Friend who has just sat down, he has allowed himself to be too much engrossed by the prevalent topic of economy. If subjects like this, involving great public interests, are converted into mere questions of economy, they are apt to sink somewhat in the respect of the public. Such matters are entitled to be judged on their own merits. I do not see, moreover, that the question of economy is very much affected by the Bill before us. It is intended to authorize the trustees to remove certain portions of the national collection to some other locality, but contains no reference whatever to the cost of the operation, or to the different plans which may be adopted. My hon. Friend has anticipated all those questions which may be brought legitimately before the House when we are desired to vote the money for the alterations. The Bill gives the Government no power to appropriate any money to carrying it out, and whatever the sum required may be—a million, or half-a-million—it can only be voted after full discussion on the Estimate. The object of this Bill is one which I have long had at heart, because I have always been of opinion that the British Museum ought to be divided, and that the proper method in which to carry out that division was to remove the natural history collection to some other locality. In this opinion I have had the support of the best officers of the institution and of almost every authority abroad. In no other country could the collection under one roof of this enormous and heterogeneous collection of articles have occurred, and in England it was not the result of any system of theory, but solely of accident. If the constitution of the British Museum had been other than it is—if that institution had been a great public establishment of science, literature, and art, somewhat of the nature of a college, where all those subjects might be studied with the assistance of professors, and where men of different pursuits might meet together, modify their opinions, and become acquainted with the limits of their knowledge, then there might have attached to the present state of things some advantages which would have given it permanence and strength; but the fatal constitution of the Museum seems to render it impossible that these collections can any longer remain united. The recommendations of the Commission which sat many years ago, and of which I had the honour to be a member, were, that the Museum should be separated into two great divisions, one including literature and art, and the other science; that these divisions should be under the superintendence, one of a first-rate man of letters, and the other of a first-rate man of science, and that at the head of the whole institution there should be some nobleman or gentleman of high social power and reputation. If that plan had been adopted, you might have kept all the collections under the same roof but under the existing system of management by trustees, you will not much longer be able to keep them in the same locality. It will be impossible to retain the new establishment under the government of the trustees of the British Museum. Although it is very important that the natural history collection should be removed, it is equally important that it should be placed under such an administration as will render that removal most advantageous to the public. The two establishments in this country which have had the most complete success are the Observatory at Greenwich and Kew Gardens; and each of those places is under the sole management of a perfectly capable man, communicating directly with the Government and perfectly understanding what expense he will be allowed to incur. I trust that the natural history collection will, when it is removed, be placed upon a similar footing, and that the system of trustees will, if continued at all, be confined within the present boundaries of the British Museum. My hon. Friend went into great detail about the plan of Professor Owen, and produced several authorities to show that it is entirely objectionable. But those authorities did not object to the system of Professor Owen; they merely stated that they did not think it necessary for purposes of scientific demonstration or of public amusement. The question, how much is to be shown in the Museum, depends upon the further question, whether the Museum is intended for purposes of public amusement or of scientific demonstration. If you are to have a great first-rate museum of natural history, you must not have any strict limitation for want of space; you must allow the exhibition to be commensurate with the present state of science. The old idea of a museum of natural history was the exhibition of a whale, a tiger, and a few birds of Paradise, what are called specimens interesting to the public in general. Such an exhibition could not now be passed off as a museum. Every day science is becoming more and more clearly defined; every day distinctions, imperceptible to the public and even to well-informed men, open to the minds of men of science new regions of discovery and new realms of thought. Look at that great work, the publication of which last year formed the commencement of a new era of science in England—Mr. Darwin's work upon the Origin of Species. It is clear that a museum, to be complete, must include many specimens which, although of the greatest importance to the man of science, are of no interest to the mere visitors to the institution. I hope that whatever we do we shall do in a serious and scientific manner, and not establish a mere natural raree-show. What we want to do is to rival that magnificent establishment, the Jardin des Plantes; an establishment which has satisfied the aspirations of all scientific men, but which it never occurred to any Frenchman to unite with the Louvre. I know there is something to be said for the present state of the British Museum as a mere exhibition. It may amuse a great many people. The amusement of the people is a very important object; but I do not attach the same importance to the removal to South Kensington that some people do, because I think that too much weight may be given to the miserable moment in which we live, overlooking the time before us, when perhaps South Kensington will become the very centre of London. The main question is—is this to be a scientific institution or not? If it is, let the matter be treated with the liberality with which a great nation ought to treat questions of science, and do not let us be influenced by the fact that we have heard a capital speech in favour of economy in the early part of the evening. I do not understand that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer is pledged to any particular details either as to space or arrangement, and so far from desiring to encourage extravagance, I gathered from his speech that he is taking the economic line; and that it is my hon. Friend, who, by desiring to keep all the collections in Bloomsbury, is the advocate of extravagance. There can be no doubt that the cost of building at Kensington is less than in Bloomsbury; therefore if you go for cheapness, you will go for Kensington. Any building to be erected on or near the present locality must be built to some degree in accordance with the style of the existing structure; but at Kensington we may have a building almost as light, although perhaps more permanent than that now occupied by the International Exhibition. If we leave the British Museum in its present state of congestion without trying to provide a remedy, I do not think we shall do our duty by the collection of science and art in this country. It behaves those who oppose this Bill to say what is to be done with our multifarious collections. If, some ten years ago, when the most distinguished men in the country concurred in opinion that a great museum of art should be formed at South Kensington, that plan had been carried out, great benefits would have been conferred on the public. I trust, now that a wise scheme has been matured by thoughtful men, that the House will not refuse to read this Bill a second time, but will reserve the discussion of details until we get into Committee.

said, he would not venture to give an opinion in direct contradiction to that of Professor Owen on the scientific question. His plan certainly seemed a very extensive one; but the House should remember that in this, and in most other cases, it was easy to obtain great authorities on either side of the question. There were two points included in the proposition before the House to which he wished to direct attention— the question of finance, and that comprised in the saving clauses of the Bill. He could not agree with the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken that the House was not entitled on that occasion to discuss the financial part of the subject. True, the question of finance was not included in the Bill, but it formed the staple of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and therefore the House was bound to take it into serious consideration. He confessed, for his own part, that he had heard with dismay the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the Contemplated removal would cost about £600,000. Hon. Members could not have failed to remark that the Chancellor of the Exchequer refused to bind himself as to the amount of the actual expenditure required, contenting himself with submitting what he had called, in his own dexterous way, a "preliminary and conjectural" estimate. Now, the House ought by this time to be pretty wide awake as to the meaning of such a phrase. Not many years ago a First Commissioner of Works laid before the House a preliminary and conjectural estimate for the building in which they were then assembled. That estimate amounted to the modest sum of £700,000, but the actual expenditure up to that time might be stated at £2,400,000. In the face of this and other equally startling precedents, he could not help regarding with alarm, especially since a removal of some kind must take place soon, the "preliminary and conjectural estimate" of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He supposed, that if there was to be a removal at all, the most economical site which could be fixed upon was South Kensington. [Cries of No !] Even among those who were opposed to removal altogether the opinion was almost universal that there was a considerable difference in point of expense in favour of South Kensington, and this opinion was strongly shared in by the hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Walpole), who had thoroughly investigated the matter; and to his mind that site had this additional advantage—that, whatever the original outlay might be, there was so much available land that there could be no question of further removals. But the great and radical defect of the present Bill was the saving clause, which proposed to transfer to South Kensington that distinguished and mysterious body of trustees which had heretofore flourished in Bloomsbury. Only a short period had elapsed since the right hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Walpole), and the hon. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Layard) acknowledged, that if they had to found the British Museum over again, the existing system of management was not the one which they would select. And yet six weeks had scarcely elapsed, and the House was called upon to vote £600,000 for a new museum at South Kensington, at the head of which it was actually proposed to put the very identical body of trustees whose mismanagement had been so often and so generally condemned. At the same time, he thought it a question whether the hon. Member for Galway should persist in his Amendment. It might convey to the country the impression that the hon. Member was opposed to any removal to South Kensington, whereas his real meaning, according to his speech, was that it was neither the time nor the place; to vote so large a sum as £600,000, and that some change should be made in the system of management. This was an early stage of the Bill, and he should be sorry to give any vote which could infer hostility to the principle of removal, or to the site chosen; but if his hon. Friend should persist in his Motion, he should have his support, as he should feel bound; to show his sense of the crude and unsatisfactory nature of the Bill, and of the arguments by which it had been introduced to the House.

said, that if a foreigner had been listening to the debate of that evening, it must have struck him that it was, to say the least, a rather curious coincidence that a proposal to vote £600,000 for a new collection of birds, beasts, and fishes at South Kensington should have been brought forward on the very evening when the leader of the Opposition had made a speech denouncing their exorbitant expenditure—a speech, he might add, which was re-echoed by many Liberal Members in that House, as well as by the press generally throughout the country. The Government might be said to be employed at present in digging its own grave. The expenditure about to be made so recklessly was not one on which people were agreed. There were many who thought that the money might be more beneficially applied in other directions for the promotion of art. Far from thinking it desirable that the collections should be separated, he could not conceive a more fortunate circumstance than that they should be near one another, because they knew that a simply scientific mind was too apt to despise the works of imagination, and ima- ginative minds were too apt to despise the works of science; but by bringing the two classes together the faults of both were corrected. A great deal was said about educating the masses, but how were people in the south and east of London to get to Kensington? Moreover, who could answer for the vagaries of fashion? For his own part, he believed that its tendency would not be always westward, but towards some of the newer parts of London, either north or south, where the situation was more picturesque and the soil more favourable. Why did the Commissioners of 1851 wish to bring down everything to South Kensington? The National Exhibition of 1851 was intended for the good of the country, and the surplus funds ought to be applied in that sense. If it were determined to be for the public interest that the collection should be maintained at the British Museum, what right had the Commissioners to draw it down to South Kensington against the wish of the nation? The name of Professor Owen had been mentioned frequently. He had conversed with Professor Owen, and he had said that he did not care where the collection was placed, so that he had plenty of room. He would, however, of course, prefer being near the library of the British Museum.

observed, that they had been many years employed in concentrating the public offices, but the Bill was one for separating a great department. The trustees of the British Museum had conducted the business in Russell Square very much through the hands of their secretaries; and if the management were to continue as hitherto, after effect had been given to the proposed removal, there would be a divided, and perhaps conflicting administration, which would lead to great expense and great uncertainty, and no one would be satisfied. He thought, therefore, before they consented to the second reading of the Bill, the House should understand that the trustees of the Museum had some plan for dividing the government, so that the department at South Kensington should not be interfered with, or be under the influence or control of the central department in Russell Square. If that were not so, constant complaints would arise, and dissatisfaction would exist between the officers of the Museum. In the event of the natural history collection being removed, it would be absolutely necessary to have a further large outlay for a library in connection with the department, as it would be impossible to separate that portion of the library from the Museum; and he had been credibly informed that such a library for South Kensington would cost many thousands of pounds.

said, he had listened with great astonishment to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, which was one of the most remarkable instances of a petitio principii he had ever heard. His calculation that the expense of the collection maintained at Bloomsbury would be £980,000, while if removed to South Kensington, it would be only £680,000, proceeded upon the assumption that Professor Owen's plan was to be adopted. [The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I said so.] Yes; but his right hon. Friend treated that part of the case as if it was a thing about which there could be no question, and as to which it was not incumbent upon him to offer a single argument. From what did all the discussions upon the subject arise? Was there any pressure for the removal of the natural history collection? No. All the scientific men examined, with the exception of Professor Owen, stated that the more limited mode of exhibition was the best—part to be kept in drawers for the use and study of scientific persons, and part to be fixed in cases for public inspection. The unscientific visitors would only be wearied by having to pass along miles of glass cases, containing in one place several hundred varieties of rooks, in another several hundred varieties of pigeons, and so on; differing, indeed, one from another, but differing, for the most part, by such minute distinctions as would hardly be appreciable except by a well-instructed eye. On the other hand, a specimen shut up in a glass case was comparatively of little use to the naturalist. What he wanted was to take the skin of a bird in his hands, to examine it all round, to hold it up to the light, and perhaps to extend its wings and take accurate measurements of its different parts. Then, as regarded expense, if every species were exhibited, as proposed by Professor Owen, not only would there be a vast expense at first for the building and fittings, and for obtaining and preparing those species, such for instance as the whales, of which there were not at present any specimens in the Museum, but there would be a further and very considerable expense continually recurring for the renewal of the collections, if they were to give any true idea of the creatures as they existed in life. Because it was well known that the colours of many specimens, more especially those of delicate shells and the skins of the mammalia, entirely faded after a certain period of exposure to the light. He might mention as an instance the case of a valuable collection of differently-coloured kangaroos, presented a few years back, which after a short time were found to be all one colour. What they really wanted space for was not the natural history collection, but the collection of antiquities. There was at the Museum a large and continually-increasing collection of sculptures, many of them of great interest, which for want of room could not be exhibited at present, and which were now in a state that was really discreditable to the nation. The proposal of the trustees to find room for these sculptures in the present building by removing the natural history collections to Kensington, was open to various objections. All persons who were really interested in the study of antiquities would wish to have the remains of any one country and period brought together without reference to their size or weight, so that one object might illustrate another. But such a chronological arrangement would be impossible on the plan of the trustees. The lighter articles must be placed upstairs, the heavier sculptures must remain on the ground floor, where they could not have that sky light which the witnesses most conversant with matters of art considered so desirable for exhibiting them to advantage. Then as regarded the comparative expense. If the whole of the first floor at the Museum were given up to the natural history collections, it would be amply sufficient on the more limited plan of exhibition; and the expense of adapting it for that purpose would not exceed the sum proposed by the trustees to be spent at the Museum. For the existing collections of sculptures ample accommodation could be provided, and with sky light to most of the rooms, by purchasing one acre of ground between the Museum and Charlotte Street and covering it with buildings on some such plan as that proposed by Mr. Oldfield. That would cost £50,000 for the ground and £100,000 for the buildings, or £150,000 altogether. On the other hand, it was admitted that for the building at Kensington more than £500,000 would be required; and it must be remembered that by that plan, although the sculptures now at the Museum might be accommodated in the existing building, no provision was made for further additions to the collection of antiquities, so that they must sooner or later extend their buildings at Bloomsbury. With respect to the question of site, he did not lay much stress on the facilities which the position of the British Museum afforded for the visits of the labouring classes; for, having regard to the extension of the metropolis, and the increased means of communication between the different points, South Kensington might perhaps become almost as convenient in a few years; but in considering this question he would have regard to the convenience of scientific men. South Kensington would be an expensive place for them to live in, while the neighbourhoods north of Tottenham Court Road were comparatively cheap. Taken as an abstract question, he had no objection to a separation of the collection; but if there was to be a separation, his feeling was that the sculptures ought to be taken to South Kensington, because they were a portion of the collection which possessed more interest for the persons who lived at South Kensington. He should like to hear the opinion of his hon. Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) as to whether it would not be better to move the sculptures than the natural history collection.

Sir, as one of those who have taken some interest in the proposals before the House, perhaps I may be permitted to say a few words in support of the Bill of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I do so the more willingly, because I believe it is known to those who take an interest, in the British Museum that up to this time I have always been of opinion, that it would be better to enlarge the Museum buildings than separate the collection, and take a portion of it to another place. I wish to guard myself on this point, because I still think, that if it could be done, we ought to enlarge and extend the present Museum so as to keep the collection together; but I shall presently bring before the House the reasons which have convinced me that we have no longer to deal with this question as a matter of choice, but as a matter of necessity. The House may judge, from the diversity of opinions expressed in the course of this debate, of the very great difficulty there is in dealing with this subject in a satisfactory manner. Of those who have spoken, no two Gentlemen have agreed in opinion. Some hon. Members are for one plan and others for another. Some are for having the collection arranged typically, some for exhibiting them in parts, and some are for the plan suggested by the most scientific man of the day in his particular line. It may be said, and, indeed, it has been said by Professor Owen —and it must come home to any one who wishes that this great collection should be available for all the great purposes to which it can be applied—it may be said, and it has been said, that the great object of having these collections together, and of exhibiting these specimens in the form and to the extent Professor Owen desires, is that we may show—to use his own words—the one creative principle extending and manifesting itself through all parts of creation. I do not presume to give an opinion upon that point; but this I do say, that when it has got the opinion of Professor Owen, the House will do well to hesitate before it decides against the opinion of such a man. If the present Museum is to be extended, we shall want a very large additional space. Professor Owen thinks that less than five acres will not suffice; and in order to gain that space around the Museum, it will be necessary to buy all the houses on three sides of the Museum, to pull them down, and construct buildings on the site to hold the entire collection. The cost will be £50,000 an acre, or £250,000 for the purchase of the land alone. By going down to South Kensington—and this is the great argument for removing a portion of the collection—the same quantity of ground can be purchased for one-fifth of that sum. That is a consideration which, when we are dealing with the matter financially, we ought not to lose eight of. Ten years ago, the trustees applied to the Government for the opportunity of extending the space of the present Nuseum. The Government replied, they were not prepared to sanction the extension of the old building. In 1857 the trustees, among whom were Earl Russell, Lord Macaulay, Earl Stanhope, Sir Roderick Murchison, and Sir Benjamin Brodie, came to a resolution, urging the Government to enable them to buy some of the houses to the north of the Museum, that they might provide accommodation for the sculpture then in glass sheds under the portico. The Government referred the matter to a Commission. Thus the trustees neither neglected their duty in 1851 nor in 1857; but the action of the Government, the appointment of a Commission, and the difference of opinion in this House, prevented the recommendation of the trustees from being acted upon. If their suggestions had been adopted, the gradual extension of the Museum would have been commenced ten years ago, new space might have been added as circumstances required, and one-half, if not the whole, of the ground required might have been by this time purchased. The refusal of the Government, however, the action of this House, and the inquiry by a Commission and a Committee, have prevented this great good from being achieved. What is our present position? At the present moment the rooms of the Museum are so crowded that neither the antiquities nor the natural history collection can be exhibited to advantage. That has been the case for the last five or six years. Let me ask the House, whether they would wish all these antiquities from Halicarnassus, Cyrene, and Cnidus to remain in glass sheds under the portico of the Museum, because they will neither grant the extension of the Museum on its present site nor allow the antiquities to be removed to any other spot? We have the finest collection in the world in natural subjects, as well as in subjects of art and literature; and the real way for the House to regard this matter is to take care that at the end of fifty years those who come after us may not look back with regret at the want of due accommodation for this magnificent collection. The question is, whether you can provide the additional space necessary for keeping the Museum where it is, or whether you are not driven by necessity to go elsewhere. If you reject this Bill, what do you intend to do? To purchase the houses around the Museum? If so, your expenses will be financially greater. Will you leave the objects where they are? If so, the trustees will every year be unjustly reproached for having a collection which they do not exhibit. If the House declines to adopt either of these alternatives, will any hon. Member get up in his place and say that we could find a better site for a portion of the collection than South Kensington? If no better site can be found—if nothing financially more economical can be proposed, the expense being diminished, moreover, by spreading it over a period of years, can we do a better thing than to pass this Bill? My noble Friend (Lord H. Lennox) says there is a saving clause that the trust is to remain with the present trustees, and the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory) reminds me that I have expressed an opinion, if the matter were res integra, in favour of having one responsible person at the head of an executive body. I adhere to the opinion that in every department of the Government the principle of individual responsibility in executive matters is the best. That is, however, no reason why you should intefere with a trust that has long existed, unless that trust has been mismanaged. I defy any hon. Gentleman to show mismanagement in the present trust. So difficult are these questions that when the hon. Member for Galway considers what would be the trust that he would substitute for the present, he creates a similar trust; for he would put upon it Sir Roderick Murchison, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheshire (Sir P. Egerton), and one or two gentlemen at the head of departments at South Kensington, to see that all is properly managed. That would be really a revival of the present trust in a more limited form. The real truth is, that the best management is by making the keepers of every department responsible for that department. They are always on the spot; they apply their minds to the subject of their collections, and it should be their duty to suggest to the trustees the additions that ought to be made, and the measures necessary to be taken. By that means you get an individual responsibility, and at the same time a superintending control. That is exactly what you have got now, and it is far better to continue the present management than to hand over the Museum to a new set of men, because that will only increase the expense instead of diminishing it. If, then, the removal or extension of the Museum is no longer a matter of choice, but of necessity—if the expenses to be incurred will be less by removing to South Kensington that portion relating to natural subjects, retaining at the Museum the collections relative to literature and art — I ask the House to pause before it rejects this Bill, unless it is prepared to agree to some plan that is preferable to the present. If I could have my own way, and could be sure that the House would consent, by purchasing the houses around the building, to make the present Museum the receptacle for holding the entire collection, I should be in favour of that plan. As, however, that course is not likely to be sanctioned either by the House or the Government, I trust that the House will agree to this Bill, and that when we get into Committee we may make provision for the proper reception of this collection, so that, in the words of the Act, it may "remain and be preserved for public use to all posterity."

said, the Bill involved an expense of nearly £700,000. As the national expenditure was £70,000,000, and as the noble Lord did not hold out the slightest hope of reducing it, he hoped the House would not sanction a further outlay, for which no necessity whatever had been proved. Under present circumstances they might very well wait until they saw the result of the right hon. Gentleman's (Mr. Disraeli's) administration. When they had realized the reduction of the five or six millions per annum which the right hon. Gentleman had shadowed forth, it would be time to talk not about removing any portion of the Museum, but about adopting the plan which the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken admitted that he should himself prefer, and having one great collection in one building. Besides, he (Mr. Cox) did not think the scheme proposed was the best that could be adopted, even if the division of the collection was really a necessity. After the experience they had had of the tens of thousands of persons who every holiday visited the Museum, they must be aware that the natural history collections were precisely those which afforded most amusement, and, he hoped, instruction to the masses. If, therefore, they must take anything to the West End, it should be not that which interested the millions, but that which interested the few. He must say he had been much struck with the phraseology of the schedules contained in the Bill. It was not stated what was intended to be removed, but what was "capable of being removed." Surely books and manuscripts and antiquities were as capable of being removed as the natural history collections. If the books were removed, they would be removed from a place where they could be generally used to a place where they would be used in a very minor degree, because they would be removed from a very populous to a less populous locality.

Sir, this subject is fortunately not new to the House, and I am certainly not desirous of occupying its attention more than a few minutes. The question has undergone so much consideration by different Go- vernments, and has so frequently been brought under the notice of the trustees of the Museum, of whom I have the honour to be one—[Ironical cheers.] I confess I do not understand the meaning of that cheer. I have taken part in various debates on this subject, and have therefore acquired some knowledge of it, which, perhaps, other hon. Members of the House may not have obtained. This question has at different times been referred by the executive Government to the trustees of the British Museum, and I apprehend that nobody is so well qualified to form an opinion upon the interests of that institution, or the management of its collections, as the trustees, who are persons of all opinions, representing all departments of science and art. After many decisions, which I admit have been various and conflicting, they have ended by agreeing almost unanimously to the adoption of the plan which has lately been brought under the notice of the House. They say it has become practically impossible to maintain all the collections which are now united in the British Museum, that some separation has become a matter of necessity, and that some arrangement by which the natural history collection shall be provided for in some other building than the existing British Museum, is, on the whole, the most expedient. Now, an hon. Gentleman has told the House to-night that it is only the collection of antiquities and not that of zoology which is inadequately provided for. Now, to that statement I wish to give an entire denial; and if it is the wish of the House that that splendid collection now located at the Museum should be adequately accommodated, it has become a matter of necessity either to enlarge sufficiently the present buildings or to provide others elsewhere. The trustees have considered the propriety of purchasing land in the vicinity of the Museum. To that there are two objections—one that the land in the immediate vicinity of the Museum is more expensive ["No"]—yes, it is more expensive than land in a less central and more suburban position—and the other and most powerful objection is, that by attempting to combine large and miscellaneous collections in one building you prevent that efficient management which would be better secured if some of the collections were otherwise located. We have only to consider, then, where a site may be found. It may be proposed to obtain a site in the Regent's Park or some other place in the neighbourhood of the most frequented part of the metropolis; but the offer of the trustees of the Exhibition of 1851 to give the land at Kensington Gore at a moderate price, determined the trustees and the Government in favour of that scheme. And I cannot conceive a more wonderful scheme than that of the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. H. Seymour), that the trustees should give the land at a less price—

said, the land would bring £10,000 per acre. What he proposed was that the Commissioners should give the land, which was half paid for by public money, that it should be sold, and the proceeds be applied to purchase land near the Museum.

That makes the case rather worse, because the hon. Member says that this land was bought by the public money. [Mr. H. SEYMOUR: One half part of it.] The land was purchased by the Commissioners of the Exhibition of 1851. But then came another proposal from his hon. Friend in his zeal for economy.

"—Medio de fonte leporum

"Surgit amari aliquid."

There came out a plan for a great street, from Trafalgar Square to the British Museum, with a view to diminish the public burdens. Now, I should think, if we were to purchase all the land through the Seven Dials, Holborn, and that part of the town, the probability is that we should not pay the bill with less than £2,000,000. When hon. Members bore in mind that the plan had been carefully examined and ultimately agreed to by the trustees of the British Museum, the executive Government, and those most competent to form a judgment, they would see that it would be plainly out of place, upon the Motion for the second reading, for the House to resolve itself into a Committee to examine into the question of square feet, and of all the details involved in a plan of such magnitude.

said, that he for one would accept the advice of the Secretary for War, and would confine himself in the few remarks he had to make, to criticising, not the details, but the outlines of the Bill; and he must say that in the speeches made in its support he remarked one singular omission. They had had an aesthetic speech from the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes), who, eschewing all notion of economy, seemed to have adopted the motto of Charles Surface, in the School for Scandal, and to say, though he did not actually use the words, "D—n the expense." They had also had two speeches from trustees of the British Museum, and he would warn the House not to be led away by speakers who spoke as trustees. He offered no opinion on the judiciousness of separating the collections, because that was a matter which stood on its own merits, and he did not intend to give his vote as to that part of the question; but he wished the House to consider the very important question "Where was the money to come from?" They had a Government who represented themselves tonight to be a purely economical Government, and anxious on the first occasion to make any retrenchment, for the very natural reason of gaining popularity, and here was their first essay in retrenchment. He would not complain of this, if there was a flourishing state of affairs in Ireland, if there was no distress in Lancashire, and if there was a surplus in the Exchequer. It might, then, be natural for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to come down and put forward a conjectural estimate of £650,000, which would involve an expenditure of a million and a half. The real position of the question was this—were this little estimate to remove a portion of the Museum to another place to be agreed to, where did the Chancellor of the Exchequer propose to get the money from? It was called a great national undertaking, and they might easily guess what the expense would be when the nation had to pay the piper. Therefore he hoped, in going to a division, that all trustees, and hon. and right hon. Gentlemen, and aesthetic Members of Parliament, would have some consideration for economy, and not vote the proposed removal at the present time, when there was no surplus in the Exchequer, and when there was great distress in the country. Let them not now undertake new, and, as he thought, most costly plans of building, and upon whose recommendation? Certainly, upon that of one of the most profound zoologists of the age—Professor Owen. But if hon. Gentlemen read Professor Owen's evidence before the Committee over which the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory) presided, they would have a knowledge to what that Professor's plans extended. Were they aware that he called upon the Committee to build a hall 850 feet in length for the reception of whales, of which there were no less than fifteen different species? Professor Owen also advocated the preparation of apartments for every variety of elephant, and he (Mr. Osborne) would put it to the House whether the sum of £680,000, as proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would cover all the expense? This is no joking matter. The fact was that the whole financial part of the question had been left completely in the dark that evening. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who could lecture so wisely at Manchester on the unwholesome state of the finances, had said nothing on that part of the question that night. Let not the House be led away by that most questionable of all matters—a matter of taste. Let them beware of the hon. Member for Pontefract when talking, in a manner which showed a contempt for economy, of Darwin's Origin of Species, and everything but the real topic for the consideration of the House.

"What brought Sir Visto's ill-got wealth to waste? "Some demon"—

(in the shape of a Chancellor of the Exchequer)

— "whisper'd, 'Visto ! have a taste.' "

Let the House delay the Vote until the finances of the country were in a better position to allow of such an expenditure. Let them test the Government to-night as to the sincerity of their promises of economy, and show that they wished to place the finances of the country in a wholesome state; if they did, they could have he hesitation in supporting the Motion of the hon. Member for Galway.

said, he wished the House to bear in mind that the Museum was established not merely for the upper ten thousand, but for the working classes also. He thought that wherever was the focus of population, there the national museum ought to be.

Sir, undoubtedly, this is a question involving a principle of economy. But the curious circumstance connected with the debate is, that those gentlemen in this House who profess themselves to be the stoutest advocates for economy are recommending that plan which would be by far the most expensive. It is admitted by all that the present building of the Museum is choke-full of objects. With regard to natural history, persons who go there will see specimens of animals huddled together in cases and cupboards like sheep in a fold, and in a state of crowding in which it is perfectly impossible to see them with the necessary attention, or to study the object which they come to look at. It being agreed by all that extension of space is required for the proper enlargement of the collections contained in the British Museum, the only question really is whether that extension shall be acquired in the neighbourhood of the Museum, or whether it shall be acquired as proposed by my right hon. Friend by additional ground at Kensington. Well, then, the question is, do you prefer to pay £50,000 an acre for the land you want, or will you be content with paying only £10,000. And strange to say, the advocates of economy, those gentlemen who profess an earnest desire to put a limit to the expenditure of the country, have a preference to pay £50,000 an acre instead of £10,000. Now, the Bill of my right hon. Friend does not specify the quantity of land to be acquired. You may have five acres or one acre, as you choose. The only effect of the Bill is, that you are to get the land you want, be it more or less, at the rate of £10,000 an acre, instead of the expensive rate of £50,000 an acre. My hon. Friend who spoke last is alarmed at the notion of the vast space required for the accommodation of whales. Let me propose a compromise to my hon. Friend. Let him, when the House shall go into Committee on the Bill, introduce a clause prohibiting any whales. I have no doubt whales are objects of great curiosity; but sooner than go to the expense of paying £50,000, when we can get land for £10,000 an acre, I, for my part, shall be willing, with my hon. Friend, to exclude whales altogether from disporting themselves in Kensington Gardens. As my hon. Friend says, this is not a joking matter. It is no joke to compel the country to pay £50,000, when you can get what you want for £10,000; and therefore I hope that the House will support the Bill of my right hon. Friend.

said, he did not wish to give a silent vote on what seemed to him a curious Bill; still less so when he heard from his right hon. Friend near him that the sum to be expended was not quite agreed upon. But it was not on account of the disagreement that he objected to the Bill. He objected to it on this simple ground—that it was a Bill professing to give power to the trustees of the British Museum to do something; and it had been stated indirectly that it would entail upon the country an expenditure of between £600,000 and £700,000. He did not wish to say much about economy, but he had always deemed it to be his duty to vote against what he considered to be extravagance, and he did not feel disposed to depart from the rule in the present instance. He should remind the House that there was no plan before it, and he for one should decline to give his assent to a measure which might lead to an expenditure of which he did not know the amount. When they had a plan before them, they would be in a better position to judge whether the arrangement was economical or not, whether £600,000 or £700,000 was to be expended, or whether double that amount would not be required. Without expressing any opinion on the question whether the collections in the Museum should be divided, or whether they should all be kept in one place, he should vote against any of these short Bills, which would involve an expenditure of no one knew what, and hardly any one knew what for. All that the House knew was that a building was to be put up somewhere. He considered this a had way of doing business, particularly at a time when nobody could be sanguine that the finances of the country were in a flourishing state; and if there could be one circumstance worse than another, it was the dragging-on of a matter of the sort by small and miserable instalments. If it was necessary to have a building of the kind, let the House look the question boldly in the face, and ascertain what it would cost, and erect it at once. If they, were to go dragging on for four or five years, it would be ten to one that the plans would be changed over and over again, and instead of the building costing £600,000 or £700,000, the amount would be much nearer £2,000,000 or £3,000,000. Let the stone once be set rolling, and then all gentlemen of taste would have a kick at it, and it would be kicked from one to the other, and none of them probably would ever live to see an end of the expense.

, in rising to move for Returns upon the subject of iron-plated ships of war, said, that on a late occasion, when he troubled the House with regard to the public expenditure, the Chancellor of the Exchequer recommended that a practical issue should be taken on particular items, in order to secure retrenchment. That was now his object. Since the year 1854, when the value of iron-plated ships had been proved as vessels of war, no less than £10,000,000 had been wasted in building wooden ships; even this year twenty-two ships of 13,900 horsepower were being built; and the Admiralty were about to launch into an enormous expenditure in constructing cupola ships, without knowing what was the best form for such vessels. If the best form were already known, why had it been laid by for eight years, and wooden ships built instead? There might, in a similar manner, be plans of a better form, collecting dust in a pigeon-hole of the Admiralty, which would also not be regarded until they had already done execution in the hands of the Americans. The iron vessels suggested twenty years ago had met the same fate. It was known that iron vessels, of plates only ⅜ in. thick, required few or no repairs. Some had lasted for twenty years with almost no repair. In the merchant service they had for a long time been preferred because of their cheapness; the annual cost of repairs being about one per cent of the original cost. On the other hand, a wooden line-of-battle ship was built, and then laid up in ordinary for four or five years; when the dry rot was found to have invaded her timbers, and half the original cost had to be expended in repairs. Iron ships also retained their form longer than wooden vessels, as the Mosquito and other famous yachts had shown, notwithstanding the great strain caused by the enormous spars which were carried by racing craft. The Fairy was built in 1844, and was still in perfect form. It was found, too, that iron vessels built of plates only ⅜ in. thick were valuable as ships of war. The Nemesis frigate was built of ⅜ in. plates. Yet Captain Hall wrote of that vessel—

"The Nemesis was frequently struck, as often as fourteen times in one action, and much damaged in her upper works. But only one shot can be said to have gone straight through the vessel. …Other shot struck the Nemesis in a slanting direction, and merely indented the iron, glancing off without penetrating. …I should give the preference to an iron over a wooden steamer, as a command under all circumstances."

These facts had long been patent; yet how had the Admiralty taken advantage of the knowledge? When Sir Robert Peel came into power in 1841, he found six iron ships were being built. Two of them had, indeed, already been nearly finished. He took the opinion of Sir Howard Douglas, who said of them that "iron ships were utterly unfit for purposes of war, whether armed or as transports for troops" That was u mere expression of opinion, not founded upon experience; for there had been no investigation. The object of this Motion was to substitute knowledge for opinion. The suggestion which he should make was, that the Government should appoint a Committee of scientific men, who would investigate the subject of ship-building with a desire to obtain a real knowledge of facts, instead of relying upon empty opinions. He would next turn to the question of armour-plated ships. In 1840 some experiments were made in the United States to test the effects of heavy shot upon iron plates. The results were so astounding that other experiments were made in 1842, at Portsmouth, in order to verify the results arrived at in America. One was against fourteen plates, making; together six inches of thickness. Now, it was known that such a combination was not so strong as a single plate of much less thickness. The result, however, was that shot from an 8-inch gun, at 400 yards range, against those plates could make no impression. Even the plates of the Simoom, of ⅝ in. in thickness, were found to break up the shot, although the pieces went through. The next experiment was during the Russian War. But then we never thought of building iron batteries until the French had done so. We were content to follow the French; and therefore ours were not ready when theirs were tried at Kinburn. Upon that point the present head of the Indian Department (who was over the Admiralty) told the Admiralty Committee that—

"The result of the experiment, or rather the conclusion to which we came in consequence of what we had learnt of the iron-cased batteries, was that we were considering whether it would not be advisable to build a ship coated with iron."

The matter, however, remained under consideration until 1859, while the French were building armour-plated ships; and, as Sir Charles Wood said, "While the Admiralty were consulting, the French were acting." The Commissioners on the Management of Naval Yards, in their Report (p. 12), said—

Q. 51, "In 1854–5 several floating batteries were constructed with iron defence-plates of great thickness. These batteries were never practically tried, although similar batteries belonging to your Majesty's allies were used at Kinburn and found highly efficient. The principle of the protection afforded by iron defence-plates was proved; but no attempt was made to apply it to ships of war generally until 1858."

It might be said that all these references were to past events; that we should not revert to the past, but consider the future. However, they could only judge of the future conduct of the Admiralty by considering what had been their conduct in past times. Captain Coles's invention, of which so much had been heard from the columns of the leading journal and the debates of that House, was made as far back as 1855. At that time there was a scientific Committee in the Black Sea, during the Russian war, to whom that invention was referred; and they reported, on the 13th of November, 1855, that "the invention was one of the greatest practical value," and "we are further of opinion that this invention merits the immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government." That was not the only invention that was brought under the notice of the Government at that time; for on the 15th of November, 1855, Captain Halsted wrote to them giving plans of iron-cased vessels. He said—

"About five years ago the eminent steam-ship builder of America, Mr. R. L. Stevens, communicated to me the result of a long series of experiments made, at the expense of the United States Government, by himself; the chief practical result of which was, that iron plates of five inches in thickness were absolutely impenetrable by the heaviest shot, fired by the longest guns in the service, the heaviest charge of powder, and at the shortest distance."

Although Captain Cole's invention was supported by the independent testimony of Captain Halsted and the experiments of the United States Government, yet the British Government refused to notice the invention. Hopes of peace were made an excuse for passing over the inventions of war. In 1856 peace was concluded. Then the Emperor began to build; but it was not till 1859 that we commenced to make experiments, to see whether we would build or not. A short time since the Duke of Somerset had said in another place—

"I considered the question of building a vessel specially for this purpose, and I arrived at the conclusion that to this end the cupola ship recommended by Captain Coles would be very well adapted. But the experiment has never been tried; and I therefore caused a tower upon this pattern, which had been commenced a year or two before, to be finished and put on board a ship. The officers reported very favourably."

There was a little story attached to that tower. It appeared that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) ordered on February 14th, 1859, a battery upon Captain Coles's principle to be built at Shoeburyness, the cost being limited to £1,000. He also appointed a scientific and professional Committee, of which Captain Coles was one, to investigate the invention. The Earl of Derby's Government went out of office, and the present Government came into power; and upon the 30th of July of the same year the contract for the tower was given to Mr. Scott Russell, and the price was raised to£2,650, upon condition that it should be finished by the 1st of November, 1859. On the 1st of August, 1860, the cupola shield was yet unfinished; and the Admiralty were then requested to finish it. On the 9th of August the Admiralty refused, saying it was "inexpedient to undertake experiments with the shield in the manner proposed." On the 21st of January, 1861, the War Office again requested the Admiralty to take the unfinished shield in hand; and the Admiralty at last consented. Scott Russell's unfulfilled contract was then terminated by the payment of £3,000. On the 12th of March the unfinished shield was removed to Woolwich; and the scientific Committee was dissolved. On the 12th of August, the shield was at last ready for trial, and on the 24th of September, 1861, it was reported on as "most satisfactory." That was the story about the tower. The Duke of Somerset continued—

"I was at once satisfied that we had got a vessel which would be most useful for the protection of our harbours; but as there was no pressure for defence, and no alarm about the safety of our harbours, I did not think it necessary to apply to the Treasury for authority to commence that vessel at once. I thought I might leave the matter to be discussed by Parliament."

At last the news of the engagement between the Monitor and the Merrimac arrived in England, to urge the case with increased energy, and make it meet with a tardy success. For the news rolled like a thunder peal over the country and aroused the Admiralty from their dilatory proprieties, and sleepy considerations. Immense sums had of late years been spent upon wooden ships, and the reason assigned by the Duke of Somerset to Question 451 of the Admiralty Committee was, that he found that the Government of the Earl of Derby had left a recommendation that a large addition should be made to the wooden fleet. Now, what was the amount of expenditure, or rather of waste, occasioned by this? Last year (Account of Naval Expenditure, No 27) there was an excess of £266,276 on Vote 10 for naval stores. The note at the foot says that this arose from "large quantities of timber, ordered after the Estimates had been prepared, to meet the unprecedented expenditure in building ships." Yet the amount of timber alone in Vote 10 was £1,351,520 (see Return 44, 1862). The Votes for labour, timber, and stores during the six years, from 1852 to 1858, amounted to £14,105,000 (see Report of Committee of 1858 on Navy Expenditure, and the Commissioners' Report on Navy Yards, p. 426). The price paid for ship-building timber from 1854 to 1859–60 was £2,622,691; the sum in 1854–5 being £284,301; and the sum in 1859–60 being £672,373 (see Admiralty Committee, p. 543). In August, 1859, Lord Clarence Paget urged on his colleagues that it would be well—

"to pause in the enormous expenditure on wooden line-of-battle ships. …The French are devoting their full energies to the construction of iron-cased ships. …Would it not be well to put a stop to the preparation of timber, &c., for the three new line-of-battle ships ordered to be laid down, and to substitute three iron-cased ships?"—[Commissions on Naval Yards, p. 45.]

Yet the Admiralty never attended to this advice. The French had abjured wooden line-of-battle ships in 1855. Yet we never began to build armour-plated ships till 1859; and even then there were none built under 4,000 tons till 1862. From the returns, he found that the the expense of converting and repairing wooden ships from 1854 to 1858 was £5,500,000; in 1858–9, £900,000; in 1859–60, £2,000,000; and in 1860–1 £2,500,000. These sums do not comprise the expenses of fitting. So that as wooden ships were proved to be useless, so the Government increased their expenditure upon them. In 1858–9 there were twelve wooden line-of-battle ships being built, at a cost of £250,749. In 1859–60 there were thirteen, at a cost of £485,662; and in 1860–1 there were seventeen, at a cost of £275,623. Of wooden frigates and smaller vessels there were built in the same years 26, 36, and 65 respectively. The total amount for building and converting wooden ships from 1854 to 1861 was £7,653,099. The total amount for the repairs of sailing ships was £2,933,571, making a total of no less than £10,500,000. That money had been thrown away and wasted. During the Earl of Derby's Administration the Admiralty began to follow the example of France in building iron-cased frigates; but the Warrior was only partially plated, on the presumption, that if she were plated fore and aft, she would not be a good sea-going ship. She was therefore vulnerable at her unprotected parts. La Gloire, on the other hand, was armed all over, and she was incontestably a good sea-going vessel. Again, since then they had discovered a gun which would penetrate the sides of the Warrior; so that the country was as a pendulum swinging betwixt iron ships and Armstrong guns; and each oscillation cost us millions. He contended that the Admiralty had entirely ignored the experience of which they might have availed themselves. The war with Russia might have taught them two facts. At Sebastopol they might have learned that wooden ships were of no use against forts; and at Kinburn, that forts were of no use against iron ships. The French had profited by by these facts; we had not. They were quicker both to try what iron ships could do, and quicker also to profit by the experiment. They set about to build; we set about to consider of it. The facts upon which the Emperor of the French acted with such promptness and decision only seemed to produce vacillation and indecision in the mind of the English Government. It was this indecision which had cost us £10,500,000. The battle of Hamp- ton Roads similarly proved two facts: first, that wooden ships were of no use against iron; and, secondly, that iron ships were of no use against iron ships. Now, should we act upon this knowledge, or merely consider of it? The value of the ram principle was amply demonstrated by the Merrimac. That, also, was an old plan; it was suggested in February, 1853, and was published in the Liverpool Albion; and in 1854 Mr. Ward, of Liverpool, offered to build a ram with ball-proof sides which would sink a line-of-battle ship; but this offer was scorned by the Admiralty. Carelessness, vacillation, delay, and negligence were the tale of a century; they were the traditionary policy of the Admiralty. Screws were once about to be applied in the navy. But in 1846 a new Government came into office; and thinking it necessary to do the exact opposite of their predecessors, they actually issued circulars to know if the machinery for screws could be adapted to paddle-wheel steam-ships; the machinery, however, was nearly completed; and to that accident alone was owing the salvation of the screws from being strangled at birth. The delay in the application of screws to line-of-battle ships enabled the French to exceed us by 15,000 horse power in the course of two or three years, although the screw was entirely an English invention. This was stated in evidence, before the Admiralty Committee by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich. He said, also—

Q. 1706. "We were strongly of opinion that no time ought to be lost in endeavouring to recover the superiority thus taken by France; but the lead which France had taken was irrecoverable."

England had by nature the two things most essential for the creation of a powerful navy—iron and coal—of which France had been deprived by nature. Yet the French were the first to apply steam to their men-of-war, and the first to build iron-plated ships. They had not the same advantages as we had; but by treaty we supplied to them the defects of nature. There were also many other glaring cases of neglect. For twenty years after the merchant service had adopted lightning-conductors, the Admiralty refused to adopt them in line-of-battle ships and frigates, notwithstanding the loss of men and spars. Captain Sullivan gives the following evidence before the Admiralty Committee:—

Q. 5818. "I think there has been a great defect in our naval administration since I have been in the service, in not adopting sufficiently soon evident improvements, which have been urged on the Admiralty in different ways. I would instance the non-adoption of lightning-conductors in the navy; which I think took twenty years to introduce. ….. It was only after twenty years of sad loss of life and property, and expense to the country through their not being adopted, that they were at last permanently adopted, and from that time there has not been the loss of a man or a spar by lightning."

The same neglect was shown in reference to Trotman's anchor; for though they were 29 per cent better than all others, the Admiralty still held to their old anchors, and would not avail themselves of the improvement. This was given in evidence by Captain Denman be-before the same Committee. It had been shown that in the Admiralty we had delay and hesitation without either investigation or thought. It was possible, however, to have hurry and haste, without thought or foresight. Let them pause to consider the probable effect in war of armour-plated ships. Let it be supposed that they had been generally adopted, and the theory of the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden) had also been adopted, namely, that war, on the seas, was to extend to navies alone, while all private property was to be considered safe. There would then be no stores to be burnt; for the Commissioners recommended that iron ships should be built at private yards. The navies would be unassailable; the ships invulnerable. Naval warfare would be entirely at an end, and our naval supremacy would be gone. We should then have, in self-defence, to return to the right of search, and the taking of prizes, as the only means of defending ourselves or ending a war; for a nation's resources were at sea, and by seizing those resources the nation's power was crippled. For this purpose it would be necessary to have a light class of ships, either of thin iron or wood, to damage trade, as well as the heavy ironsides which we were building now, because such a ship, being heavier, must be built fuller, and with a greater displacement, and could not have "fine lines." Or else we might hand over this duty to privateers. Now, what remedy was there for this alternate neglect and panic—for this hesitation and delay, and then this needless haste and anxiety? How should we prevent an invention from being cast aside, until we were forced by circumstances to adopt it? and how obviate the reckless manner in which we then rushed into un- bounded expenditure, to find, after all, that there was some other invention also shelved which would have been more efficacious and less expensive? This was a question affecting the financial interests of the country; for we lost power by neglecting inventions, and we wasted millions by hastily adopting them. The only remedy was the appointment of a Committee of scientific persons to consider and report upon all new inventions. That proposal was approved by the Duke of Somerset and the noble Lord the present Secretary; in their evidence before the Admiralty Committee. Admiral Elliott gave the following evidence:—

Q. 4021. "I think that the present constitution of the Surveyor's office is very obstructive to improvement. There is not time to give sufficient consideration to scientific inventions and improvements; and there is a disinclination to take the responsibility of making trials of them, until they have become in general use elsewhere."

Q. 4069. "Generally speaking, if it is a matter connected with ship building or fitting, it is submitted to the Surveyor of the Navy, and, in common language, he pooh-poohs it.…. I very much question whether you will find one single instance in which an inventor has gone to the surveyor's office and received an acknowledgment of his invention having been good; I never heard of one myself."

Q. 4059. "I think that our changes have been generally put off until, from some sudden emergency, they have assumed a hurried appearance, and not been duly considered; whereas, if you had a permanently consulting Committee, you would have moved more gradually, and not in such convulsive starts—more economically, and 1 think more efficiently, without being behind other people."

The Duke of Somerset (Q. 509) also approved of "a Committee of scientific men to inquire into novel inventions, such as iron-plated ships," and thought this "very desirable (688) that there should be every means of examining into every invention that is submitted to any Government department." Lord Clarence Paget said (to the Commissioners on Naval Yards, 150), he thought it most desirable that a Committee of Inquiry into inventions should be instituted, similar (159) to the French "Conseil d'Amirauté" and "Conseil desTravaux Publiques." He also stated (164) that he had made a written proposal on this subject in 1859, but the Board had not acceded to his proposal." The reason why he did not move for the appointment of such a Committee was, because he did not wish to hamper the Government. He therefore moved for these Returns as an expression of the desire of the House. If the Government refused them, it would be from a consciousness of neglect; for if they had done their duty, they would only be too glad to publish their good deeds, and turn this Motion, into an encomium and panegyric on themselves.

Sir, I shall have no objection whatever to the production of these Returns; but, in mercy to himself and the House, I trust the noble Lord, when he hears that inventions in reference to iron-cased ships come to us at the rate of about 100 a month, will not insist on printing such a blue-book as they would make, if carried back to any remote period. I can assure him that they are receiving very careful attention. I cannot follow the noble Lord through all the topics he has introduced, but I shall be happy to give him all the information I can as to what is being done in ship-building. I regret the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) is not present, as I think he would probably administer some little rebuke to an ardent supporter for coming before the House with a grand proposal for building an iron fleet, and adding very considerably to the large Navy Estimates. The noble Lord accuses all Governments, but lays the principal blame on the present Government, for continuing to build wooden ships after France had begun to build them of iron. I am anxious to say a word on this matter, because I have heard from several quarters that the present Government has proceeded recklessly in the construction of wooden line-of-battle ships long after it was evident that these vessels would be useless. I beg the noble Lord's attention to this point. There are at present fifty-seven screw line-of-battle ships afloat. The late Government were in office rather more than a year, and they originated the conversion of eight of these vessels within that year. The present Government has been in office three years, and they have only commenced the conversion of four sailing line-of-battle ships into steamers. The late Government converted eight vessels in one year; the present Government in three years have only converted four. Now take the question of building line-of-battle ships. The late Government in its one year of office began to build no less than six line-of-battle ships. The present Government in three years have only commenced three; of these, only the frames were begun, and they have since been converted for iron-cased ships, and will, I hope, be afloat in this year. This accusation, therefore, against the present Government is unfair. And what is the history of the ships that have been built and converted? The present Government came into office in the month of July, 1859. They naturally adopted the programme of their predecessors; and whatever may be the responsibility for the programme of the year 1859–60 must rest principally with the late Government. The noble Lord had mixed up a great many matters together; but the vexata quastio was the cost of building wooden line-of-battle ships. The House must not take the noble Lord's figures for granted. In 1858–9, the year of the Earl of Derby's Government, the sum expended in building and converting line-of-battle ships was £442,000. In 1859–60, after the French had begun to build iron-cased ships, but when the programme of the late Government had to be carried out, £786,000 were expended for the same purpose. But in 1860–1 the present Government, who are wholly responsible, have expended only £416,000 in building and converting this class of ships. We had, on taking office, the Report of the Committee ordered by the Earl of Derby's Government to take into consideration the state of the navy. That Committee proposed that there should be six ships immediately built to raise the number of English screw ships of the line to fifty-six, and the Report contemplated that these ships should be complete by 1861. Nothing is easier than to get up in 1862, after we have made all these discoveries regarding the power of the iron-cased ships, and tell us what we ought to do. It is easy to be wise after the event. But, if the noble Lord had given his advice when the late Government was in office, he would have done some good. The noble Lord has quoted me as evidence in reference to speeches of mine in 1857, 1858, and 1859, and my evidence before the Committee on Dockyards condemnatory of line-of-battle ships. Having commanded a line-of-battle ship, I certainly was of opinion that the wooden ships could not long retain the position they had held in the navy of England, and that iron ships should be built; but I was in the minority, though I rejoice that subsequent events have brought others to my opinion. As to the Vote for timber, who has been the most eloquent advocate in this House for that vast expenditure? Why, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), who was a Member of Lord Derby's Government. That right hon. Gentleman over and over again called the attention of the House to the deficiency in the supply of timber; and when it has been procured, then the noble Lord complains of the large outlay for that article. The noble Lord has also referred to Captain Coles's cupola vessel, and charges the Admiralty with supine ness in not adopting it till after the action of the Monitor and the Merrimac. But, as long ago as February last, the drawings for a vessel on Captain Coles's plan were prepared, and only the consent of the House was wanted to issue calls for tenders for its construction. The hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Osborne) took me to task the other night, and charged me with having said the vessel was being built, when it was only ordered; but my only object was to show that the matter had not been neglected. I understood the noble Lord to say that the Warrior is totally unprotected at her two ends, which are made of wood, and that she is entirely unfit to go into action. He is quite mistaken in that. He is, perhaps, not aware that the Warrior is wholly an iron ship, though it is true her extremities are not provided with armour plates; but she has transverse iron bulkheads to protect her guns. That is a system on which opinions greatly differ. I, for one, frankly admit that I think a system of armour plates all round in the case of long ships with very sharp bows is attended with considerable disadvantage, although some eminent judges are in favour of that mode of construction. The noble Lord says we never take up an invention till it is very late. Why, if he will only come to the Admiralty, he will see that we have no less than seven different classes of ships in progress of the iron-cased family, by various inventors, some of which are iron-plated right round, and others plated only amidships. We are going on with reasonable speed, but not too fast. It is inadvisable to rush all at once into a condemnation of our wooden fleet, and to build only with iron. We are, however, constructing, as I said, various classes of iron-cased ships, some of them as low as 1,000 tons. It remains to be seen whether they will carry their armour and be fit for foreign service and all weathers. I think we have not been behind-hand, but are progressing with sufficient despatch to maintain our position as a great maritime Power. Reverting to Captain Coles's cupola, it should be remembered that the late lamented Prince Consort had the sagacity first to discern the value of that plan. I was sent for two years ago by His Royal Highness, who urged and entreated me to prevail upon the Admiralty to try that invention, the original merit of bringing which to public notice belonged to that great Prince, and I told His Royal Highness we were preparing a cupola for trial. I am afraid I cannot follow the noble Lord through all his statement of the misdeeds of various Boards of Admiralty; but the gist of his complaints was, that we do not institute due inquiry into inventions, that we have no machinery by which they may be tested, and that inventors feel that we regard them, as it were, as our natural enemies. That is very far from a correct representation. I am bound to admit, as he justly states, that I have always advocated that there should be a scientific Committee attached to the Admiralty, exactly as that attached to the Ordnance. When I had the honour of being connected with the Ordnance, there was a Select Committee, to which all matters affecting the construction of guns, &c., were referred. I have often expressed my opinion on this point very frankly at the Admiralty; and I must say, that without going quite as far as I go, the Board have taken very great steps in what I must call the right direction in this respect. First of all, let me allude to the Scientific Committee, pr the Iron-plate Committee, which has now been sitting for two years. If its Chairman, the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield (Sir J. Hay), were not now before me, I should say something of his merits, but his name is a guarantee that the Committee is well constituted. Its other members are—Colonel Henderson, R.A., the Vice Chairman; Colonel Jervois, R.E., Secretary to the Defence Commission; Dr. Percy, Superintendent of the Museum of Practical Geology; William Fairbairn, President of the British Association, and a most eminent engineer and author; William Pole, a very eminent civil engineer, who has been connected with the iron question for many years, and is now, in addition to other duties, Professor of Civil Engineering in the London University. Everything connected with plating iron-cased ships is examined by that Committee, and experiments are continually carried on under their supervision. The Admiralty have also lately called in the assistance of many eminent shipbuilders, and among others the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird), who has been asked to report on a most important matter, on which the future of our navy greatly depends—namely, the possibility of sheathing the bottoms of iron vessels. The Messrs. Samuda, of the Thames Iron Company, and Mr. Napier, the famous shipbuilder of Glasgow, have likewise been requested to give their opinion on the sheathing of iron ships. Within the last fortnight we have had Committee sitting at the Admiralty on submarine rams—a subject which the noble Lord said we had never thought of. We have, besides, a standing Committee at Somerset House, composed of practical officers, who have laid before them a vast number of proposals relating to matériel for the navy. The noble Lord accuses us of never listening to anybody about anchors. Why, we have been testing a new anchor during the last month at Woolwich. It is quite true that Mr. Trotman has a standing grievance against the Admiralty, because naval officers do not altogether approve his anchor, which I, indeed, hope may answer, although it is to be doubted whether, taking all the roughs and smooths of a sea-going fleet, it will be as useful as the ordinary anchor. That, however, is a matter of opinion. Meantime it is now undergoing a trial in the Warrior. I might also advert to the experiments which daily go on at Portsmouth on board the Excellent and Cambridge, under officers experienced in gunnery. When I bring in our account for experiments at the end of the year, the House, I believe, will not think that we have been niggardly in these matters. I can only assure hon. Gentlemen, that we have at this moment before our attention a considerable change in regard to our navy; and I am bound to say—and it has been alluded to to-night by the noble Lord the First Minister—that it is necessary, for we have intelligence that the French have made considerable progress in their iron-cased fleet since I delivered my statement last February, in which I gave a list of their ships of that description. I do not express any opinion for or against what the French have done since then. I, however, regret it, because as soon as the French build, we shall build too, and so we ever shall do. Remember, then, that the French now have built and building thirty-six iron-cased ships of various sizes. I say we must have a corresponding increase. We have various vessels that will very shortly be commenced in our dockyards—vessels that were already partly built, and which will be eminently useful as iron-cased ships; and I also trust, at least as far as we can at present see, we shall not have to call for any increase in the Estimates of the present year. I have endeavoured to answer the questions of the noble Lord, and with regard to the Motion, there will be no objection to give him the Returns he wishes for provided his Motion is confined to the last three years.

said, he wished to know if he had rightly understood the noble Lord to say that he had been appointed a Member of the Committee to which he had referred.

I signed a letter to the hon. Gentleman myself on Monday.

said, he much regretted that there was no tribunal before which inventors might have their plans and projects properly investigated by scientific men. A vast number of them were mere rubbish, and might be discarded at once. The noble Lord said the Admiralty had seven different descriptions of iron ships in a progressive stage of construction. That was a state of things which he considered peculiarly alarming, especially when taken in connection with what he afterwards stated, that in the race of construction we were certain to succeed. The noble Lord had formerly praised the Warrior as a sea-going vessel, but the fact was she rolled 45 degrees. She was un- easy and unseaworthy, because the requisite consideration had not been bestowed on the stowage of her waist. She was also badly masted. The first thing that should be done was to take her three masts out of her, and her bowsprit, which was that of a 90-gun ship, to shift her motive power into the middle of the ship, and to give her another mast, probably two. She would then be more seaworthy. They had heard little of the Warrior lately, but after all the repairs and alterations which had been made, till her rigging was entirely altered she would never be a seagoing ship, fit to point her guns under any circumstances of bad weather. We had sacrificed stability and the comfort of our crews to speed. As an old sailor said to him of the Warrior— "Why, Sir, that ship is like a musical snuff box—it is all music and no snuff." Let them have the reports of the Warrior on her passage to Lisbon, and let them know her capabilities. They were going to strip some of the old wooden line-of-battle ships, and clothe them with iron; let the Royal Sovereign be completed as fast as possible, let her be fairly tried, let a committee of naval officers go in her, and let them report on her. After that the Admiralty might proceed with other ships, and, as the noble Lord said, in the race of construction this country must succeed.

said, he felt it his duty to call the attention of the Government to the murder which was committed on the person of a young gentleman named Fitzgerald, in the broad day, on the previous Friday, in the county of Limerick. Mr. Fitzgerald, who was a resident landlord in that county and an intimate friend of his own, was walking with his wife by his side within a few yards of his residence, and consequently within a very few yards of a somewhat important town adjacent, when two men—one armed with a gun and the other with a pistol—accosted him. Whilst Mr. Fitzgerald was telling one of them to come to his house, the other suddenly fired a pistol at him; and as he fell wounded, his wife flung her arms around to shield him against further injury. The second assassin deliberately removed her arm, and despatched the victim by a second shot. He demanded the special intervention of the Government in that case, not because Mr. Fitzgerald was one of his most intimate friends, but because it was the third murder which had been committed during a very brief period, within a limited area of country. Very recently another friend of his had been attacked, and he escaped by a miracle, and he had in his pocket a list of five gentlemen whose lives had been threatened. The present state of Ireland was due to the gross misgovernment of successive Governments. In no other country could such deeds be perpetrated in broad daylight, and without the instant apprehension of the murderers. It was surely high time the Government took up the matter. They ought not to be contented with petty legislation on the subject, but ought to grapple thoroughly with the condition of the people, investigate the cause of these horrible outrages, and take effectual measures to prevent a repetition of them. The first thing that should be done was the punishment of the assassins. If the Government did their duty, and the police force for which the country paid so much were worth its salt, they would be hung within three days. The cause of these crimes was the tenure of land and the position of tenants in Ireland. Being a landlord himself, he was not likely to be without due sympathy for the landed interest; but he held that the present relations of landlord and tenant required amendment. It was impossible to legislate for Ireland in the same way as for England. Her case was quite exceptional, and allowance must be made for her unfortunate condition. Apart from the crimes connected with land, Ireland was singularly virtuous. Much was said of the rapidly increasing prosperity of the country, but there was a great deal of exaggeration on that point. Throughout the whole of the land there was a wide-spread undercurrent of misery and despair, and the people were inspired with a feeling of hatred and disaffection towards the British Government, whom they regarded as the authors of their desolation, and who were certainly the cause of their prolonged unhappiness. He entreated the right hon. Baronet to consider whether the time had not come for a reconstruction of the police force, which as a detective force was utterly useless, and whether it was not the duty of the Government to institute some inquiry into the present state of Ireland, and ascertain what steps should be taken to place her in that position she ought to fill, surrounded as she was by Providence with every element of prosperity.

It is unnecessary for me to say that Her Majesty's Government share with the hon. and gallant Gentleman and the House the deep feeling of horror and detestation of these crimes, but it is obviously impossible for the Government to foresee occurrences, or to prevent the commission of such murders us have occurred in Tipperary and Mayo. The hon. and gallant Gentleman suggested that there should be some summary jurisdiction to hang the murderers in three days; but I think, in his calmer moments, he will see that, it will be better to have recourse to the issuing of a Special Commission. That is a rapid way of dealing with criminals, and I think it is better to act with forbearance and judgment than to rush at once upon the unhappy prisoners, and, without following the forms of law, to execute them as the hon. and gallant Member suggests. [Colonel DICKSON: I did not say without form of law.] I am anxious that there should be as summary a jurisdiction as is consistent with the forms of the law, but I should be the last man to wish to see a prisoner executed without a fair and lawful trial. The murder to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has referred was committed on the afternoon of the 16th. The murderers escaped and got some distance off, but that very night one of them was apprehended and taken back, and identified by Mrs. Fitzgerald, and has since been committed to gaol. The other has escaped; but we have sent to Cork, to another port, and to Liverpool, in order to render it impossible that he should effect his escape to America or elsewhere; and I have great hopes that within twenty-four hours he will be arrested. That shows that in this instance we have not been remiss, because I believe that not three hours elapsed before one of the murderers was arrested and identified by the unfortunate widow of the murdered man. I should be sorry to trespass further upon the attention of the House with regard to this painful subject, but I do protest against the remark of the hon. and gallant Gentleman that these murders and these agrarian outrages are owing to the state of the land tenure in Ireland. In his calmer moments he will, I am sure, see that he has cast an imputation upon the landlords which is not justifiable. In some newspapers the murder of Mr. Thiebault has, shocking as it may appear, been justified; and it is unfortunate that any hon. Gentleman should in his place assert that these horrid murders result from a state of things which the law has sanctioned. In all these cases great activity has been manifested by the police, and I have here a letter from Colonel Larcom, in which he says—

"In the midst of all the abuse of the constabulary, it is something to see how promptly in every one of these terrible tragedies the murderer has been taken, almost with a red hand. The difficulty we have to overcome is the determination of the people to screen the murderers."

That is the unhappy state of things on which the hon. and gallant Member observes. I hope it will not be of long duration. I shall be glad to have the documents referring to the five persons whom the hon. and gallant Gentleman has mentioned, and will, without a moment's delay, take steps to have them properly warned, and for the adoption of measures to prevent the commission of the crimes which are threatened.

said, that the right hon. Baronet had misunderstood what he said about the tenure of land. He had cast no imputation upon the landlords of Ireland; but what he meant was that the land was the only support of the people, and that the moment they lost their land they were driven to despair and starvation. Some inquiry was needed to see if means could not be devised to put an end to so miserable a state of things.

said, that in South Leitrim there had recently been a great deal of crime; but the provisions of this Act had enabled the magistrates to prevent much more. He regretted that it was not to be continued for ten, instead of for two years.

said, that the sole object of Irish Members ought at present to be to express their abhorrence of the crimes which had stained their country, and to support the Government in the adoption of measures to prevent their repetition. The constabulary force was more an army of occupation than a police force, and measures ought to be adopted to make it more efficient for the detection of crime; and he would also suggest the desirability of bringing it more in contact with the magistracy, as in England. It was understood that the murderer in one of the recent cases was a returned convict, and he would further recommend that some supervision should be provided when returned convicts were let loose upon society. He was opposed to the taking of anything like hasty vengeance for the recent murders. The duty of the Government was calmly to mete out justice, and not to execute revenge. What was wanted was, not that a victim should be sacrificed, but that the guilty parties should be brought to punishment.

said, it was a matter of painful consideration that while intense distress had prevailed in many parts of the west of Ireland, crimes of unusual atrocity should have been perpetrated in the south. Something had been said of uncommon modes of vindicating the justice of the country. He knew of no mode but one—the honest, prompt, efficient, and impartial administration of the law; and he did not believe that, in the hands of a firm and competent Executive, that mode could fail. Some eight years ago, when the Earl of Eglinton, first became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the new Irish Government found Louth in a state infinitely worse than anything he had heard of that night. Several gentlemen had received notices to prepare for death, and one was actually attacked and wounded. However, there was no violence done to the law or the justice of the country, and he recollected the Earl of Eglinton saying to the head of the police, that no Government was fit to exist which could not protect life and property. All the gentlemen who had received notices were protected, he would not say how; the guilty suffered the penalty of their crimes, and that district of Ireland had been perfectly quiet ever since. In those instances, many of which it was his duty to investigate, he never found any case of cruelty on the part of the landlords, nor did he hear or see anything to warrant the imputation that the crime of murder was to be committed because men asserted the rights of property. That was a rather dangerous idea to promulgate. Something had been said about the tenure of land, but, without expressing any opinion upon that subject at present, he thought it was monstrous that any people in Ireland should imagine that a legal question justified the commission of any species of crime. He was not quite satisfied with the speech of the Chief Secretary, because he did not understand what the right hon. Gentleman intended to do. No additional power was required, for he was convinced that the laws of the country, firmly and promptly administered, were sufficient to put down crimes such as those which had recently been perpetrated. He believed the Irish Government would do everything it could to prevent the repetition of these outrages; but, nevertheless, he could not help saying, that a Government to be strong ought to have sympathy with some section of the people which it ruled.

My right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary has already stated that he deprecates any departure from the ordinary forms of law, and that it is the duty of the Government—a duty it is now fulfilling—to endeavour to bring the perpetrators of the recent murders to justice by a prompt, firm, and impartial administration of the law. He informed the House that the police have already apprehended some of the persons suspected of having committed these murders, and that as soon as the Government feel that those persons can be put upon their trial with a reasonable hope of a conviction, no time will be lost in bringing them before a jury according to the ordinary forms of the law. If the Government were to pledge itself to issue a special commission, it might take a step calculated to defeat the very purpose for which the law is to be enforced. Its first duty is to collect evidence, and then, instead of taking any steps of a vindictive nature, it must follow that course which it may think best fitted for bringing the criminals to justice.

said, he entirely agreed that the law, if firmly and properly administered, was sufficient to repress such crimes as those which had recently occurred. But, as representing the county where the murders had taken place, he could not agree with the Chief Secretary that it was not within the power of the Government to foresee and prevent the commission of such atrocious outrages. The late murders were perpetrated in a very small district, on the high road, and in the light of day. When such crimes were committed one after another in rapid succession, the Government ought to have sent down a police force to watch what was going on, and to give notice and protection to the persons whose lives were threatened. He believed that Ireland was subject to those terrible occurrences, because there was nobody connected with the Government who, knowing the country and its condition, could take the necessary steps not only for punishing crime when it was committed, but also for discovering and bringing to justice the organized conspirators who directed the actual assassins in the execution of their terrible work. It was to be regretted, moreover, that an admirable police force had been converted into a quasi military body, and he trusted that something would immediately be done to render them more capable of discharging the duty for which they were originally constituted—the prevention as well as the detection of crime.

said, it was only due to the Government to correct the error which appeared to exist as to Mr. Thiebault not having been warned. He had been told that he was in danger, and two policemen were placed at his disposal; but he would not accept their protection, or admit that his life was in peril.

said, the House was agreed in opinion as to the atrocity of these outrages, and the necessity of preventing them by any means known to the law. He himself would vote for any measures, however stringent, having that object; but he believed these Peace Preservation Acts were utterly ineffectual, and that the constabulary, by the military character of their training, were powerless for the detection and suppression of crime. The root of the evil, however, lay in the land system; for Sir Matthew Barrington, in 1852, declared, as the result of thirty years' experience, that there had not been a single occurrence of a nature similar to those which lately attracted attention, which was not traceable either to the eviction of tenants or to the changes in the ownership of land. That it was idle to proclaim districts was shown by the fact that murderers always had weapons in their hands when they required them, for the commission of crime. The people, he maintained, no longer communicated with the police, as they used to do before they were armed with the Enfield rifle, were moustaches, and carried the Zouave bayonet; for a murder which was known in the evening to the inhabitants of the village of Golden was not known to the police till seven o'clock the following morning. He thought it only required energy on the part of the Government to put an end to these crimes.

said, he did not think that a change in the organization of the constabulary would effect any good. Some of his hon. Friends had formed erroneous opinions upon that subject. A police force that would be merely detectives in every village, would be objects of suspicion to those who committed petty larceny and other small crimes, and would not be so popular with the people as the present system.

said, he should protest against the notion that any law to be passed by that House relating to the law of landlord and tenant would be adequate to put down these crimes. The idea of fixity of tenure was a mere delusion, and the sooner it was removed from the minds of the ignorant peasantry the better. He did not recommend the slightest straining or tampering with the law in dealing with these crimes; but the law ought to be rigorously exercised, and the most extraordinary precautions ought to be taken by the Government to prevent the commission of these crimes on persons who were known to be threatened.

said, he differed from the noble Lord as to the advisability of altering the law of landlord and tenant. The present law was in the most unsatisfactory condition possible. He believed, if the law were improved, the hand of the murderer would be struck down, and that he would be tracked to justice by the hands of the peasantry themselves. He was no friend to Ireland who did not advocate an alteration in that law. The question was whether the Bill should be read a third time or not; but had a single reason been alleged for the Motion? In Leitrim there was a proclaimed district, and what had the Bill done for that district? He believed the laws properly administered were adequate to deal with the state of thing, and he protested against the Bill as useless and unnecessary.

said, he was sorry that the question of landlord and tenant had been raised on that occasion. He should be glad to know if the police who warned M. Thiebault of his danger gave any notice to any local magistrate. [Sir ROBERT PEEL: The matter was very generally talked about.] The local magistracy were generally ignored by the police. No reports were made to them, and the preservation of the peace was too much left to the police on the one hand, and the stipen diary magistrate and the authorities in Dublin on the other. Until the Government took the gentry into their confidence, they would never govern the country efficiently.

said, he should oppose the Bill. It could have no earthly effect in preventing crime, which could be traced distinctly to the question of tenure of land.

said, that the whole of the present Opposition in 1846 voted against the Bill introduced by Sir Robert Peel, and what was the result? The next Government were compelled to introduce a similar measure. Let the House remember that, and he trusted he should never see any party again take advantage of an opposition to such a Bill to assist them into power. He believed that the crimes which the measure was intended to meet had a political origin, and the system of brigandage which existed in Ireland was fostered by the debates in that House.

said, the crimes arose entirely out of the tenure of land question.

lamented that the subject of landlord and tenant had ever been introduced. He, for one, could not parley with assassins. When persons were lying dead was no time to make election speeches. The British House of Commons could never for one minute parley with assassins. Let justice take its course, but let not apologies be made and sympathy almost be expressed with assassins. The police were excellent as a military body, but they were totally inefficient as detective police. The police officers were above their duty, owing to the system of competitive examination. In Dublin they had a mess and a band, and there was such a system of centralization going on as would be most disastrous in its results. The day was fast coming when the whole, system of the executive would have to be overhauled. From the Lord Lieutenant to the lowest understrapper of Dublin Castle every man that had anything to do with the Government of Ireland would be brought to account. He did not mean to attribute blame to his right hon. Friend. On the contrary, he sympathized with his right hon. Friend, because he was without a law officer, and he was unacquainted with the affairs he had to administer. Everything was done by centralization in Ireland. The local gentry, the county lieutenants, were not consulted. When there was a change of Government, the lawyers got something; another Lord Lieutenant went over; he might be a man of great personal energy, or he might probably be contented with racket, cricket, or playing smaller games; but the poor, wretehed country remained as it was. As for the present Bill, let them protect life in the first instance, and then he would go with those who wished it into other questions.