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Commons Chamber

Volume 169: debated on Thursday 19 March 1863

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House Of Commons

Thursday, March 19, 1863.

MINUTES.]—SELECT COMMITTEE—Thames Conservancy, &c., appointed ( List of Members).

PUBLIC BILLS— First Reading—Public Houses [Bill 67]; Local Government Act (1858) Amendment [Bill 69]; Vaccination (Ireland) [Bill 70]; Judgments Law Amendment (Ireland) [Bill 71].

Second Reading—Marine Mutiny; Inclosure.

Committee—Tobacco Duties [Bill 56]; Corrupt Practices at Elections [Bill 8]; Telegraphs [Bill 16] r. p.; Mutiny; Trustees (Scotland) Act Amendment [Bill 59].

Report—Tobacco Duties [Bill 66]; Corrupt Practices at Elections [Bill 68] Mutiny; Trustees (Scotland) Act Amendment.

Third Reading—Hares (Ireland) [Bill 51]; and passed.

Public Houses Bill

Bill for closing Public Houses on Sunday, presented, and read 1o . [Bill 67.]

The Clothing Factory At Pimlico

Question

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is true, as asserted, that an order has been issued by the Director of Clothing to the women employed at the Royal Clothing Factory at Pimlico by which they are ordered to provide themselves with the undermentioned articles by the first of April next—namely, one black lace cap, trimmed with scarlet riband, one Garibaldi jacket of violet llama, and one large jean apron, the cost of which articles will be 10s. at least; and that those not complying with the order are to be dismissed; and whether it is true that the average amount earned by those women does not exceed 10s. per week?

said, in reply, that the adoption of the uniform dress, to which the question referred, was purely voluntary. He understood that those work women who were willing to adopt the dress were furnished with it for 3s. 5d., which sum they paid by weekly stoppages of 3d., and their wages were between 9s. and 10s. a week.

Retirement On Half Pay

Lieutenant Colonel Charteris

Question

said, he rose to ask the Secretary of State for War, Why the Royal Warrant, dated 28th March 1861, which prescribes twenty-five years as a necessary preliminary to the privilege of retiring on half-pay, was departed from in the case of Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable Richard Charteris, who was on the personal staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and who only completed his twenty-one years of service in October 1861; also, for what, reason a similar indulgence has been refused to other Officers of the Army?

said, in reply, that Colonel Charteris had not retired under the warrant of March 1861. He had exchanged with an officer on the half pay list, in accordance with a regulation which he (Sir G. Lewis) understood had been rarely refused to be applied in the case of officers who were recommended by the Commander-in-Chief. Any officer who had served twenty-five years might claim to go on the half-pay list without any exchange.

said, the hon. Baronet had not answered the latter part of the question.

said, he was not aware of any case of refusal. If the hon. Gentleman would mention any such case he would undertake to make inquiry into it.

The Island Of San Juan

Question

said, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, What progress has been made towards a settlement of the dispute between the Government of Great Britain and the late United States of America, as to the Island of San Juan; if any Correspondence between the two Governments has recently taken place on that subject, and if there be any objection to lay the same before this House?

, in reply, said, since the breaking out of civil war in the United States the communications between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States on the subject had been suspended. No communications had recently taken place on the subject, and those that did take place some time ago were not complete, and it would be inexpedient, therefore, now to place them on the table of the House.

Naval Aid To China—Question

said, that he wished to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether the Officers of the Royal Navy now in the service of the Emperor of China have received permission from the Admiralty to wear the uniform of Her Majesty's Navy during the period of such service; and whether there would be any objection on the part of the Government to produce a Copy of the Instructions given to Commodore Sherard Osborn on his proceeding to China?

said, in reply, that the officers who were about to serve under the Chinese Government were not entitled to wear Her Majesty's uniform in that service. As to that part of the question relating to instructions given to Commodore Osborn, he had to state that the Admiralty issued no instructions whatever to that officer. He was absent on foreign leave, and would obtain his half pay, as he and other officers were, by an Order in Council, allowed to serve under the Chinese Government.

said, he wished to know whether the noble Lord was aware that the naval uniform was worn by those officers.

said, he believed that the Emperor of China had established a uniform for the naval officers.

said, he spoke from information he had received when he stated that officers with Commodore Osborn were wearing the naval uniform.

replied, that all he could say was, that they were not entitled to wear Her Majesty's uniform.

The Debate On Greece—Mr Elliot

Explanation

Perhaps the House will allow me to detain it for one moment on a personal matter. It will be remembered that the other night, in the course of the observations that I made in the debate on the subject of Greece, I alluded to Mr. Elliot. I mentioned that Mr. Elliot had been sent to Greece, thereby virtually superseding Mr. Scarlett; and I also alluded at the same time to a report which was current at one time that it was the intention of the Foreign Office last year to remove Sir James Hudson from Turin, and replace him by Mr. Elliot. I am sure the House will remember that the observations were made merely in a spirit of banter, and not in the least with the idea of giving offence. But I regret to hear that those observations have given pain to Mr. Elliot's family. I am told also that I have been entirely misinformed as to any steps ever having been taken by the Foreign Office for replacing Sir James Hudson and substituting Mr. Elliot; and further, that it never was the intention of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office to make any such change. I extremely regret that I made any such observations, and thus gave pain to a gentleman who, I believe, is a most honourable and deserving servant of the Crown.

Tobacco Duties Bill—Bill, 21

Committee

Order for Committee read.

, in moving that Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair, appealed to the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) to allow the Motion to pass in lieu of raising the preliminary question of referring the Bill to a Select Committee. He made the appeal first, be- cause he believed that it was wholly without precedent, when a proposal affecting the revenue as well as the trade of the country had been submitted to the House by the executive Government on their own responsibility, that the House should decline to pronounce judgment on the proposal and refer it to a Committee upstairs. He would not, however, rely upon that precedent if he did not believe that it was founded in wisdom, and that much inconvenience would arise from the departure from it in the present instance. He believed there was no more searching examination than that which a responsible Minister of the Crown underwent in a Committee of the Whole House. The effect of sending a financial proposal to a Select Committee was entirely to shift the responsibility from the Finance Minister to his permanent advisors, the officers of the Customs and Inland Revenue Departments. The Finance Minister, if he were indolently disposed, might sit with folded arms, and allow those officers to fight it out as well as they could. But who was to be responsible for the Bill afterwards? The House had uniformly acted upon the principle that the Minister alone was to be held responsible for Bills of this description. If, on the other hand, matters of the kind were to be bandied about in a Committee, the only effect would be to relax the rules upon which public business was conducted, and to weaken the hold of the House over the executive Government. Wishing to avoid this, he deprecated the Motion of which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Ayrton) had given notice. But great inconvenience would also arise from dealing with the proposal in the manner suggested. The hon. and learned Gentleman had held communications with his constituents and with others in the trade; but he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) might venture to say that the communications which the Government had had the opportunity of holding were much more comprehensive and varied than it was possible for the hon. and learned Gentleman to have held. It was the duty of the Government to make as good an investigation as they could into a subject before they made any proposal to the House. Then, after the proposal had been submitted, it was their further duty to avail themselves of every opportunity for improving the details of the measure. And in an experience of twenty years he had uniformly seen mea- sures thus brought in and discussed by all parties, either directly or by their representatives in a Committee of the Whole House. He felt entitled to say that the hon. and learned Gentleman, in the Motion which he was to make, was not acting in conformity with the wishes of those who were interested in the matter. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had seen parties interested in the trade who came from Scotland and Ireland, and the Bill, with the further Amendments which it was proposed to introduce, was satisfactory to them. He was afraid it was not satisfactory to the constituents of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Ayrton); but the difference mainly was upon the duty upon segars, and he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) contended that that was a question which ought to be dealt with in a Committee of the Whole House. A statement had been circulated that the dilatory proposal of the hon. and learned Gentleman need not, in carrying out, occupy more than a fortnight. He did not know who drew up that statement, but it must have been some one unacquainted with Parliamentary business, and especially with that relating to the Tobacco Duties. A Select Committee was appointed to sit on the Tobacco Duties in 1844. It was appointed on the 14th March, and it reported on the 1st August in that year. If the hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal was carried, his Committee would be appointed about the same time as that of 1844; it would begin to sit just when the Finance Minister had to submit to the House the financial measures for the year; it would report somewhere towards the close of the Session; and the object of certain parties would be gained, by all legislation being put off for the year. He ventured to say that that was not what was desired by those who were most interested in the subject. He had received a letter from one of the largest importing houses in London—a house than which there was none, he believed, better entitled to speak on behalf of the trade—he meant Grant, Hodgson, & Co., of Fenchurch Street—and the purport of that letter was to state the apprehension with which they viewed the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and the inconvenience to which long delays in the settlement of commercial questions necessarily gave rise. They further expressed a hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman's Motion would not be adopted. It was really for the interests of the trade that this question should be settled without delay, and that the decision of the House should not be postponed to meet the views of those whose object, like that of all traders in every branch who were apprehensive of a change, was to defeat effective legislation. On these grounds he appealed to the hon. and learned Member to withdraw his Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

said, nothing would afford him greater pleasure personally than to accede to the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If, however, any new argument were wanting to confirm him in the intention which he had formed, it would be the speech which the right hon. Gentleman had just made. It now appeared that the Bill before them was to be subjected to further Amendments in order to propitiate the Scotch and Irish trade, while a less influential interest was to be left with its grievances unredressed. He denied that his Motion was in substance a novelty. He had not searched the Journals of the House for precedents; but as long as the proposal was not inconsistent with their forms, it was perfectly competent to adopt it, if the novel circumstances created by the Chancellor of the Exchequer necessitated it. It was certainly something new in the history of legislation that a measure of this kind, affecting both trade and finance, and contradicting the deliberate opinion of a Select Committee, should be pressed through the House without any fresh examination of the subject and without a fraction of unprejudiced and authentic evidence to support it. The right hon. Gentleman had not always been so averse to Committees. He was very fond of representing himself as solicited by two ladies in opposite directions, and last Session two rival charmers appealed to him in regard to the sugar duties. The free-trade party demanded equal duties, and the manufacturers a scale of duties. Under those circumstances, the right hon. Gentleman agreed to a Committee. Again, when those imposts which were called the "vexatious trade duties," and of which the right hon. Gentleman was the author, came before the House, his parental fondness for them inclined him one way and the menace of the City merchants another way. In order to solve the difficulty, a Committee was appointed, with the right hon. Gentleman's consent. What ground, then, had the right hon. Gentleman for saying that the proposal now made was a dangerous novelty? The Chancellor of the Exchequer's argument was based on the gratuitous assumption that the appointment of a Committee would diminish his official responsibility. It would do no such thing. It would merely collect all the information that could be got, make a Report, and leave the right hon. Gentleman to form his own conclusions It was idle to say that the proposal to refer the Bill to Select a Committee would have the effect of removing responsibility from the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he made such a statement, must have forgotten that the Bill would come back from the Select Committee, and would then be considered in a Committee of the Whole House. Let him remind the House of what was done only a few years ago. No subject was more invested with the sacred attribute of responsibility than the patronage involved in the promotion and retirement of officers of the Crown; yet, when that matter was brought forward, the Government were quite prepared to divest themselves of responsibility, and to send the question to a Committee upstairs, where the Members chosen for the purpose were proceeding as if they were executors disposing of an estate. He hoped the Chancellor of the Exchequer would recognise the precedent thus set by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Surely they were not going to be told that one Minister might have a policy of his own, making a reputation at the expense of another, for that was a kind of political morality which the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be the first to disclaim. If, then, the right hon. Gentleman was bound by the precedent of his own Colleague, he could not set up the bugbear of responsibility in opposition to the proposal for an investigation by a Select Committee. No doubt, when the Bill first came before the House, it had the weight of the previous knowledge and the acquired certainty of judgment of the Government; but it had since undergone very extensive alterations, and, in point of fact, none of its original propositions remained. Upon what ground could the Government now ask the House to rely on their judgment? What guarantee had the House that their present judgment was better than the one which they sub- mitted on the introduction of the Bill? If there had been so much acknowledged error—if the House had got rid of those pretensions to infallibility which free-trade enthusiasts too frequently set up—surely he had a right to imagine that something still remained requiring careful and deliberate investigation. He accepted the principle that there was to be a duty equivalent to that imposed upon the imported article, and that there was to be a surcharge by way of compensation for the increased expense put upon the English manufacturer by reason of his working a highly-taxed commodity under a most oppressive system of combined Customs and Excise; but be denied that the application of that principle in the present instance was either just or honest towards the English manufacturer and English workmen. How could the contradictory statements upon that point be examined in anything like a satisfactory manner in a Committee of the Whole House? The elements of the difference between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and himself were of a most complex and confused character, and embraced many facts requiring minute investigation. One of them was the loss in weight of tobacco by reason of the diminution of moisture; and the result of the whole was, that the English manufacturer, not desiring to prevent or delay a change, but wishing to meet the question fairly, declared that the equivalent of all the difficulties he had to encounter was a duty of 6s. per pound. But there were other and greater difficulties which required to be examined in a Committee. When the English manufacturer had to make cigars, he must make them as he could out of whole bales of tobacco; and the consequence was, that when he had made good cigars at a profit, be had to make up his waste material and sell it at a loss. Thus cigars were actually sold in this country at 6s. 3d. per pound, duty and all. The foreign manufacturer laboured under no such disadvantage. Moreover, the English manufacturer was not allowed a drawback, so as to enable him, when his market was glutted with a particular quality, to relieve himself by exportation. The circumstances of a trade so hampered as that could not he properly dealt with by a Committee of the Whole House. The English manufacturer ought to have an equivalent for the prohibitions to which be was subject, and to be put upon a par with the foreigner by being released from vexatious restrictions. The trade had not slighted the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this matter, but the right hon. Gentlemen had declined to accept their statements. How, then, was the House to decide between the two? The ground on which he asked that this whole question as regarded the makers of cigars should be investigated was, that when all the evidence had been obtained, the Government might be able advisedly to come down with a proposition doing justice to this branch of manufacture. He was glad that he had not to enter into the other branches of the trade, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had assented to what was necessary for the protection of their interests. But there still remained other points demanding consideration. One manufacturer might say he was satisfied with an assurance from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that this Bill would not be worked to his prejudice; but another man might prefer to have the security of an Act of Parliament to a letter from that right hon. Gentleman. The provisions of the Bill, as they stood, were perfectly illusory; because they proposed a system of charging the duties according to the quantity of moisture in tobacco, without defining what moisture was, or stating the principle on which it was to be calculated. The amount of alcohol in wine could be told by any chemist; but no chemist could tell bow much moisture there was in tobacco, so as to bring it within one scale of duty or another. Instead of its being left absolutely to the discretion of the officers of Excise in cases of dispute, the principle on which the duty was to be computed should be contained within the four corners of the Act, so that the trader might easily calculate it for himself. He would not enter into further details, lest the Chancellor of the Exchequer should charge him with wishing to envelope the question in a cloud of mystification. The petition presented to that House by the working men, and endorsed by their masters, was based on the circumstances under which that manufacture was carried on in this country and on the Continent respectively. These persons said, the result of this Bill would be to reduce them to destitution. The Chancellor of the Exchequer might say, "Oh! these are phantoms which you have raised up on the side of protection." Now, it might be very pleasant for a man to indulge in the dreams of his own imagination, and to fancy that all the prosperity of the country sprang from his measures. But death from starvation was no phantom, but a stern reality; and that stern reality he wished to avert from the borough he had the honour to represent. It had been the fashion to gloss over the sufferings of other branches of trade by vague talk about the prosperity of Lancashire, and to say that the giant industry of that county would absorb all the unemployed operatives in other districts. But what had now become of the boasted prosperity of Lancashire? Five hundred thousand of her working people were now the pauperized recipients of the public bounty. Was this a time, then, for even running the risk of creating further distress? The Chancellor of the Exchequer might rely upon the classical maxim, "Divide et impera;" and having got rid of those who were most troublesome by their numbers, he might think he could easily deal with some 2,000 persons who had only one or two representatives in that House. But was it right to consign them to the condition which they said would be the inevitable result of this legislation? History abounded in instances where very small circumstances had seemed to produce very great results; but that had only happened in countries which had fallen into such a condition that, it needed but a spark to produce a conflagration. Was there no fire now smouldering? There was not a Lancashire manufacturer who dared to stand up in that House and speak upon the condition of that county at this moment; and when a notice was given by an hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ferrand) to call attention to that subject, it had struck all the manufacturers with terror, and they were quaking in their shoes at the possible consequences which might ensue. He knew that the curtain raised the other day by a leading public journal, just to give nice, fashionable people a glimpse of what was going on in Lancashire, was only lifted up in part, and that what was thereby revealed was as nothing compared with what still remained undisclosed. If they chose to send these people to starve, they had the power to do so, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had the eloquence to excite them to do it; but he, at least, would have the satisfaction of knowing that he had made an appeal to the justice and generosity of the House of Commons. He begged to move the Amendment of which he had given notice.

Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the Bill be committed to a Select Committee,"—instead thereof.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The Mouse divided:—Ayes 170; Noes 87: Majority 83.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Clause 1 (Duties on Manufactured Tobacco).

said, he thought it would be for the convenience of the Committee that he should state, in a very few words, some of the changes or adjustments which he proposed in the Bill. He had hoped that the Bill would pass through its remaining stages very speedily; but as those changes, though simple, would be numerous, he should propose to reprint it after it had gone through Committee. The first change was with regard to the duty on high-dried snuff. That was a very peculiar question—it was highly improbable there would ever be a large trade in this commodity. He proposed then, first, to raise the duty upon high-dried snuff, or rather to lessen the diminution of duty, so as to leave it at 4s. 6d. instead of 4s. 2d.; and secondly, to alter the standard of what should be called high-dried snuff from 10 to 13 per cent. The next change which he proposed to make related to foreign cavendish in bond, the duty on which he proposed to fix at 4s. 6d. instead of 4s.; and to fix the duty upon British cavendish in bond at 4s. instead of 3s. 8d. The third change he proposed was to make a very small addition to the drawback. At present the drawback was fixed by the Bill upon the assumption of a certain average amount of moisture, and that drawback as now fixed was an exact measure of the amount of duty. But wishing to make the measure as liberal towards the trade as he could consistently with the interests of the revenue, he had thought it fair and right to propose to the Committee to take into view the fact that upon all descriptions of tobacco manufactured there was a certain amount of inevitable waste, from absolute loss in the manipulation, the cutting, grinding, &c., amounting perhaps to 1 or 2 per cent. In the particular case of high-dried snuff it amounted to much more. Persons engaged in the manufacture were aware of the difficulty, and that it was found impossible to arrange the drawback upon this material differently. He therefore proposed, with regard to all kinds of drawback, to raise the standard—or rather the pivot, if he might so speak—of drawback from 3s. to 3s. 3d. a pound all round. This would be a considerable advantage to the export trade in general. The fourth proposed change related to the provisions contained in the Bill, according to which 3s. 6d, would be chargeable upon the importation of all tobacco which contained less moisture than 10 per cent. There had been a very justifiable anxiety on the part of the importers that the bearings of this question should be carefully explained. One gentleman, named Lloyd, to his great astonishment, had sent in a statement which he thought would make the hair on the head of his hon. Friend the Member for the City (Mr. Crawford) stand on end. It was the desire of this gentleman, and of the trade which he represented, that all tobacco, on its importation, should be tested in order to ascertain what quantity of moisture it contained. The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Ayrton) would probably take up the cudgels for Mr. Lloyd, who was one of his constituents; but this view was so diametrically opposed to anything that had been stated by any person acquainted with the sentiments of importers and manufacturers that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could only condole with the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets with regard to the errors of those whose organ—a most able zealous one, he admitted—he was. The hon. Member for the City had expressed a hope that nothing of the sort would take place, inasmuch as the proposition would have the effect of barring a trade that was special and indirect, and had for its aim a sort of evasion of duty. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), acting upon the representations of some gentlemen from Liverpool, represented by the Members for that town, had inserted in the Bill a few words, in the first clause, making provision that no tobacco which, when imported into this country, was packed in the usual manner, should be subject to testing for moisture, unless by the special order of the Board of Customs. There was a reservation, however, that the test should be applied if the Board considered it necessary. These were the only changes, beyond mere verbal alterations, which he proposed to make in the Bill.

wished to ask, with reference to the first clause, whether there was to be a limit to the drawback on stalks? He understood it was to be limited to those stalks only which were used in the manufacture of snuff.

said, that there was no change whatever on the point referred to. The intention had never been to allow a drawback upon stalks, for reasons connected with the revenue laws. But by the Bill a drawback was to be allowed on snuffs, of which stalks were the raw material, and on the stalks when cut up in the regular process, along with the leaf, as "bird's-eye tobacco."

said, he wished to correct one error into which the right hon. Gentleman had fallen. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the trade was in favour of discriminating duties the fact was, that the trade did not wish for discriminating duties at all; but they said, that if they were to have them, they preferred to have them more reasonable than they were in the Bill; they desired that they should not proceed by jumps of 10 per cent, but by steps of 5 per cent.

said, he read a letter from Mr. Charles Lloyd, who, he believed, was the feeder of the hon. and learned Gentleman of all the information he possessed on the subject, in which he stated that it was perfectly necessary for the establishment of fair competition between the home producer and the foreigner that there should be paid on moist tobacco a proportionate rate of duty with that levied on dry tobacco. Why, this was the very thing to which the hon. and learned Member was opposed; but Mr. Lloyd said it was one of the three things that were essentially necessary.

said, that no doubt the hon. and learned Gentleman was entitled to the benefit of the whole of the contents of the letter. With regard to segars, he would not detain the Committee at length, but he would be prepared to answer any questions which might be put to him on that point. The case of segars must be considered as one involving various features, because segars were made from tobacco coming from many different quarters. He would illustrate the case of segars by two examples—one of average tobacco made into segars, the other an extreme ease with a view of testing the proposition of a 5s. duty. He held that it was not the duty of Parliament to undertake to cover every extreme instance in every minute ramification of trade. That, he thought, was a sound principle, and a principle on which their legislation had hitherto proceeded; but in the present instance he did not hesitate to say that his proposal covered every case that had been brought within his knowledge, and every case that he believed existed in the ordinary course of trade; and if they had known as much before his proposal was made as they knew now, he did not think he should be justified in proposing so high a discriminating duty as 5s. on the foreign article. Now, with regard to the example of segars made from tobacco of ordinary quality, including Havannah of a somewhat dry kind. Yarra, German, and Dutch tobacco, he would assume, for the purpose of calculation, an importation of 100 lbs. of tobacco. He would first calculate the duty directly paid by the manufacturer on that 100 lbs., next any indirect charges entailed upon him, and then he would put down, on the other side, any sets-off that might be made. He would take the number of pounds of segars which the manufacturer could make out of 100 lbs. of tobacco, and divide the total amount of duty paid, directly or indirectly, by the number of pounds of segars made out of the 100 lbs. of tobacco, and that would give the amount of countervailing duty. Now, 100 lbs. of Havannah leaf, of a somewhat dry quality, yielded 17 lbs. of stalks, which, though not worth anything for entering into segars, would sell for 2s. 4d. a pound in the market. There would be 14 lbs. of refuse and moisture from such an amount of this tobacco. Deducting 17 lbs of stalk and 14 lbs. of refuse, or 31 lbs., from 100 lbs., there would remain 69 lbs. of segars to be got from 100 lbs. of tobacco. Now, the duty paid, including the allowance for interest on the duty between the time when the article was imported and the time when the duty was received back from the consumer, and other contingen- cies, was,£16 1s. 9d. Deducting from that the sum of £1 19s. 8d., the value of 17 lbs. of stalks, there remained £14 2s. 1d. Dividing this by 69 lbs. of segars, it would be found to represent a payment in duty of something like 4s. 1d. per lb. He proposed to allow 5s., in order that the labourers who were employed in the manufacture, amongst whom were women and children, might be well looked after. His real difficulty, therefore, was not to defend the 5s. duty against those Gentlemen who thought it ought to be increased, but against those who, in the interest of a rigid free trade, considered it ought to be diminished. He would now take the extreme example of Havannah tobacco. This might be stated to contain about 23 per cent of moisture, and therefore a case most unfavourable for his purpose. He had heard of cases of 24 and 25 per cent of moisture, but no case of that kind had been strictly verified. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets asked what was moisture? He did not know whether the House was capable of appreciating the process by which the moisture of any given article was ascertained; but there was, or used to be, at the Kensington Museum, a very interesting-looking vessel, the inscription on which set forth that it contained the constituent elements of the human body; and, as far as he recollected, out of 150 or 160 parts into which the whole was divided there were 110 or 112 parts of moisture. [An hon. MEMBER: Oh! more than that.] He hoped the hon. and learned Member would take up the moisture question on his behalf. It was true that many of those for whom the hon. and learned Member spoke knew little about the moisture in their tobacco. It often happened, that when a trade lived under the warm shelter of protection, and secure of monopoly, those engaged in the trade were not driven to ascertain the minute particulars of the trade they carried on. But taking the extreme case of Havannah—here at all events the amount of moisture could be ascertained by chemical analysis. Allowing, then, 23 per cent for moisture and a corresponding amount of stalks the case would stand thus:—100 lbs. of Havannah leaf of the wettest description contained 23 lbs. of moisture, 18 lbs. of stalks, and 2 lbs. of refuse, smalls, and waste. It followed that there were 43 lbs. to be deducted from the 100 lbs; which left 57 lbs. of stgars to be got out of the 100 lbs. But then the 18 lbs. of stalks sold for 2s. 4d. the lb.; and making the calculation and allowances as before, the result showed that the duty which the manufacturer paid on 57 lbs. of segars was £13 19s. 9d., or 4s. 107/8d., or say in round numbers, 4s. 11d. per lb. Perhaps it would be said this was running it rather close, and that in the extreme case 5s. did not cover the manufacturer. That remark would be true but for one element in the calculation, which he had not yet presented to the House. In the calculations made it was assumed that the segars were perfectly dry; but the ordinary state of foreign segars imported into this country was that they contained 16½ per cent moisture; and British segars, made from Havannah leaf, contained 15½ per cent of moisture. The consequence was that the duty of 5s. gave the home manufacturer the whole advantage of 15½ per cent of moisture in every 100 lb of tobacco. The hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets had made himself the mouthpiece of persons who stated that one good and profitable mode of making segars was to take tobacco of a certain description, and to reduce it one-half its weight, and that such was the process pursued on the Continent. Such, said the hon. and learned Member, was the extraordinary nature of tobacco leaf that it was capable of being increased or diminished in weight 100 per cent. That statement was made on a former evening, but it had not been repeated to-night. He (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had been given to understand, in his own room, that if you brought down 2 lb. of tobacco to 1 lb. you would get a good tobacco; but then the argument he founded upon that alleged fact was that the British manufacturer was entitled to a 6s. 4d. countervailing duty. Of course, you might reduce paper one-half or more by burning it, and so you might reduce meat more than one-half by burning it to a coal. Would the hon. and learned Member rise in his place and repeat what he said the other night on this subject? He would tell the hon. and learned Member, that if tobacco were reduced one-half in weight, there would remain nothing but a woody fibre—everything would have been taken from it that constituted tobacco, and no smoker would be induced to put it to his mouth. It was true that an insignificant trade in which reduction was adopted was carried on upon the Continent. For any reduction that could be effected by importers consistently with the making of a good merchantable article, British manufacturers would have an ample allowance in the 5s. duty upon foreign segars proposed by this Bill. That duty was proposed with the view of compensating the British manufacturer for everything that he had paid, and for all the pecuniary disadvantages he might have to incur in consequence of the law.

said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made certain statements which he had no doubt were in the main correct, for they were arithmetical calculations based on certain given quantities of tobacco. But he (Mr. Ayrton) had also calculations made by Cope Brothers and Co., of Liverpool, and based on very much the same quantities as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given, from which it resulted that out of 100 lbs. of tobacco there would remain 49½ lbs. of leaf, and that consequently the duty ought to be 5s. 7d., and not 4s. 1d., as the right hon. Gentleman had calculated. But, independently of this, there were many incidental points to be brought into the account as between the manufacturer in England and the manufacturer abroad, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had not taken into calculation. For instance, the duty on foreign segars at present was 9s. a pound. That was a prohibition, except as regarded the slave-made segars of Cuba, and the segars of the royal monopoly at Manilla. One of the great disadvantages under which the British manufacturer laboured in comparison with the foreign manufacturer was that the latter had frequently a monopoly of the market. The Havannah manufacturer, for instance, had so completely the control of the market, from the limited supply of the particular article he manufactured, that if the dealer in this country chose to purchase one box of the best, he was compelled to buy also one box of the second-best, and one box of the worst. The British dealer, on the other hand, was compelled to sell the inferior article separately and at a great loss. Now, this was an important incident, because if the English manufacturer could only sell the first quality at a profit, and the inferior qualities at a loss, the amount of duty became a large figure. Again, the longer a segar was kept the less moisture it contained, and the more valuable it became. The foreigner would be able to keep his segar in bond, and the less moisture it contained the better it would be for him, as he only paid duty upon the weight; whereas in the case of the English manufacturer, the more the loss of moisture the greater the loss to him, because he had paid duty upon the moisture. He must charge a higher price on the residue, in order to cover that loss. The more the value of the commodity rose to the foreigner, the greater was the relative loss to the English manufacturer. These were serious elements, because, when they came to close competition, they had to be taken into account. With regard to the process of steeping, what he (Mr. Ayrton) said was, that in an extreme case it could be shown that tobacco lost half its weight, and he contended that in a question of duties and equivalents they must have regard to extreme cases, and for this reason:—That if a man had a commodity, though it were a woody fibre, it was still a fibre of tobacco wood, that could be used to mix for the purpose of keeping up the bulk, and at the same time of diminishing the weight of segars. They had positive experience with regard to the steeping process in the class of segars known as Swiss or Vevay segars. These segars were imported, and could pay a duty of 9s. They were made of steeped tobacco, and when weighed against tobacco of the same sort manufactured in this country, it turned out that there were 240 segars in the pound of those imported, and only 120 in the pound of those made in this country. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said this was an extravagant case; but it was still a case of business actually going on, and such was the gain to the continental manufacturer resulting from this process of steeping, that he could actually make his segars pay a 9s. duty and yet exhibit them for sale. Nevertheless, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that a 5s. duty was sufficient. That was an important question—for this reason, that having established a prohibitory duty except as regarded Havannah and Manilla segars, it had been the interest of the manufacturer to keep up his weight, because upon his weight he had paid duty; and there being no such obligation on the foreigner, he could reduce the specific gravity as much as possible, and get the largest bulk for the smallest amount of duty; and if the foreigner could do this to an enormous extent in one class of segars—the Vevay segars—what would the industry of Germany do when it came to treat tobacco under the new regulations? Why, every class of tobacco would be subject, to a greater or less extent, to this steeping process, and the English manufacturer would be driven out of the market. The gain to the foreigner would be enormous. In the first place, he could use a coarse tobacco which the English manufacturer could not use, because it was too coarse, and thus he gained fourpence per lb. on the mere value or cost price of the tobacco. That was a subject which the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to consider. When they dealt with revenue, they were bound to regard extreme cases, otherwise those extreme cases might be used for turning the scale of the market. Now, he asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to put a clause in his Bill which would place the English manufacturer on exactly the same footing as the foreigner as to the steeping of tobacco in bond. If he would do that, he would admit he was dealing with his argument in a practical way. The right hon. Gentleman had not dealt with another question inseparably connected with this, for which he was bound to make provision. The English manufacturer was obliged to buy his tobacco with the stern in it, for which he paid duty; but the foreigner took out the stem before he paid any duty. On what principle could that be justified? He would ask the right hon. Gentleman to allow the tobacco to be stemmed in bond, and thus to place the English manufacturer in the same position as the foreigner. He wanted to hear upon what principle it was that the manufacturer in this country was not allowed to export his segars? Let the Chancellor of the Exchequer answer that on the principles of free trade. The English manufacturer was compelled to take in his tobacco, and make his segars, and then he was not allowed to send them out unless he paid as much duty as amounted to a positive prohibition. Facility for exporting segars would be the greatest possible relief to the English manufacturer, because he could sell very fine segars to gentlemen of fortune in England, and send out the coarser qualities to the people in the colonies, who were not so nice.

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had asked him several pointed questions, and had at the same time indulged in vague statements and been very shy of matters of fact and computation. The extreme case, as he had called it, of tobacco being reduced, by steeping, 50 per cent, did not exist, and was impossible. It was not in the nature of the tobacco plant that it should exist. A good merchantable segar could not be made in that way. As to the inquiry whether he would introduce a clause into the Bill for steeping in bond, he had to state, that having seen the hon. and learned Gentleman's constituents and other manufacturers of tobacco from Liverpool, Ireland, and Scotland, not one of them had made the slightest reference to the subject; and therefore there was no primâ facie case for such a thing. With regard to the Swiss segars, they were told that by some wonderful hocus-pocus a Swiss manufacturer could make 240 out of a pound of tobacco, and the English manufacturer could only make 120. Why, he should think that in England, if they knew how to bisect them, they might make nearly 240, though not quite. The Swiss segars had been examined, and, instead of having been reduced one-half, according to the plausible and bold statement put forward, they had only 20 per cent taken out, and 80 parts of the old plant remained. With regard to the clause suggested, if it was a matter of extensive interest, it was a fair subject for consideration; but as it had never before been raised, it was impossible for him to give a pledge at the present moment. The hon. and learned Gentleman had stated that there was no allowance for stems in bond. That was to be considered in two points of view; and when they came to the question of drawback he would give an answer upon the subject. He would not enter upon it now, because the argument was as to segars, with which it had no connection whatever. The hon. and learned Member asked why they did not permit segars to be exported. He answered that they did permit segars to be exported. The Importer brought 100lbs. of leaf Into this country. In the manufacture he took out a certain quantity of stalks, and a small amount of absolute waste. He paid 3s. and 5 per cent, and they gave him back 3s. 3d. upon every pound of segars, and upon every pound of stalks manufactured in this country. His belief was that that came as near to a fair and sufficient drawback upon the manufacture of tobacco in general as could be calculated; but, at the same time, he admitted frankly that it was not possible so to construct a system of drawback as to make it cover everything that might be quoted in the nature of an extreme case. He certainly should hope that the export of segars would be a profitable business, and that a great stride would he given to it by the new enactment as compared with the present state of the law. The quotation of the hon. and learned Gentleman from Mr. Cope was perfectly fallacious. In that statement it appeared that 49½lbs. of segars were the proceeds of 100lbs. of Havannah leaf. He wanted to ask if those 49½lbs. were dry or not—was all the moisture taken out of them? [Mr. AYRTON: They are dry.] Dry was a relative term. What was the meaning of it? Did Mr. Cope mean that the moisture had been taken out of that tobacco or that it had not?

said, the statement explained itself. It meant 49½ lbs. of marketable segars.

said, that if it was 49½ lbs. of marketable segars, his answer was that the computation was wholly fallacious, because it was made upon an extravagant supposition (the fact never having happened) that the whole of the moisture had been taken out of the segars; whereas in marketable segars from Havannah there was 15½ per cent of moisture; and thus came to grief the calculation of Mr. Cope and his hon. and learned Friend.

said, be should like to know how the sudden conversion of the Irish trade had been effected. In the afternoon they were by no means satisfied with the answers they had received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but as they had now disappeared from the lobby, he supposed that by some means they were appeased. He wished particularly to know what provision would be made for providing bonded warehouses in various small towns in Ireland through which tobacco manufacturers were dispersed. If small manufacturers were not to be allowed the advantage of bonded warehouses, it would, in fact, ruin their business. He also wished to know the reasons which had induced the Chancellor of the Exchequer to deal in the manner he had with cavendish tobacco.

said, he would explain the provisions for bonding at a future stage. It had been arranged with the Irish manufacturers that the duty on sweetened British tobacco should be 4s. instead of 3s. 8d., and on foreign tobacco of the same description 4s. 6d. instead of 4s. It was possible that the Irish part of the deputation which waited on him last night might have been dissatisfied with the tone of the discussion; but he begged to inform the hon. and gallant Gentleman that upon questions like this he had always taken care to obtain the assistance of some of the officers of the Revenue Department conversant with the matter; and having heard the statement of the deputation and advanced all the objections which struck him, it was his custom to debate the matter with the revenue officers before he came to the conclusion as to what step should betaken. That course had been pursued upon the present occasion, with what result the hon. and gallant Gentleman had seen. It would have been very wrong if, until he had an opportunity of talking the matter over, he had made the concessions there appeared to be fair ground for. The general rule in the tobacco trade at home, and, he believed, in foreign countries—certainly in France—was to allow the admixture of no foreign material excepting water. There had grown up in this country, notwithstanding this prohibition, a taste for a particular kind of sweetened tobacco. The question was whether this taste should be supplied in the irregular manner it was at present through the medium of smuggling, or by allowing the general sweetening of tobacco of all descriptions, or by distinguishing the ordinary manufactured tobacco from the sweetened cavendish. He thought the prohibition of cavendish would act as a stimulus to smuggling. Neither could he allow that the use of sweetening matter should be generally permitted. For he could not recommend the House to adopt provisions in the revenue law which he had been told by the executors of that law would be impracticable. Then came the question, what they were to do with cavendish? The anxiety of the Irish manufacturers was—if you will not permit us to use sweetening materials in the manufacture of British cavendish and of the roll tobacco, then take care you make the sweetened cavendish a great deal dearer than the roll tobacco, so that the two may stand upon tolerably fair terms. This was the demand to which he had acceded.

said, seeing that the statements made by the trade through him were denied by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the whole matter must rest upon his responsibility. It was useless to prolong the discussion. He suggested, how- ever, that as moisture had been made an element with regard to the duty on tobacco, the same principle should be applied to segars, and that high dried segars should be subject to a duty in excess of 5s.

said, he was not aware of the existence of a class of segars to which the principle could be applied. The importer from Havanna now paid 9s. upon segars containing 16½ per cent of moisture. He was not likely to be anxious to spoil his segars by reducing the moisture when the duty was only 5s. If a distinction were introduced, it must be by reducing segars which were not high-dried; but he did not believe there was any difference.

In reply to Mr. BUTT,

said, that it was absolutely necessary in the working of the bonded system to hold the manufacturer responsible for the acts of his servants. At the same time, it would not be competent to any common informer to inform against a breach of the revenue laws. All informations must be laid by the revenue officers.

reminded the right hon. Gentleman that he had not answered his question with respect to warehouses in Ireland.

said, that it was not intended to confine bonded warehouses to ports or large towns, but to place them where urgently required. At the same time, he should give no pledge with respect to establishing them in any particular district.

suggested, that the allowance for waste, instead of being left to the discretion of officers of the Revenue Department, should be made upon fixed rules.

approved of the suggestion, and altered the clause to the effect that such allowance should be made according to rules laid down by the Commissioners of Customs.

Clause amended, and agreed to; as were the remaining Clauses.

House resumed.

Bill reported; as amended, to be considered on Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 66.]

Corrupt Practices At Elections Bill—Bill 8—Committee

( Progress 2nd March.)

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Clause 8 (Evidence of Witness on Election Committee, and before Commission).

said, that on the last discussion of this Bill he had been strongly pressed to consent to an alteration in the indemnity, so as to make it absolute instead of dependent upon the pleasure of the Committee or Commission. He had since consulted with the Attorney and Solicitor General, and as they saw no objection he had agreed to make the alteration. It was only fair that the witness should answer every question addressed to him; and if he did, under the provision he now proposed the Committee or Commission would have no choice, but would be bound to give him a certificate. Of course, if the witness perjured himself, an indictment would lie against him. He therefore proposed, in line 40, to leave out from "and" to "examined" in page 4, line 4, inclusive, and insert—

"Provided always, That where any witness shall answer every question relating to the matters aforesaid, which he shall be required by such Committee or Commissioners (as the case may be) to answer, and the answer to which may criminate, or tend to criminate him, he shall be entitled to receive from the Committee, under the hand of their clerk, or from the Commissioners, under their hands (as the case may be), a certificate stating that such witness was, upon his examination, required by the said Committee or Commissioners to answer questions or a question relating to the matters aforesaid, the answers or answer to which criminated or tended to criminate him, and had answered all such questions or such question."

said, that the clause as proposed to be amended by the right hon. Gentleman made the protection depend entirely upon a person obtaining a certificate from the Commissioner, and upon his answering not merely a question tending to criminate himself, but upon answering all questions that might be put to him. He (Mr. Butt) thought, that when a question had been extorted from a man which tended to criminate himself, the indemnity should be complete and unconditional, and not made to depend upon anything he might do hereafter. He should therefore propose to insert in the clause a proviso to this effect—

"Provided always, That when any person shall be compelled under the provisions of this Act to give, and shall give, any answer criminating or tending to criminate himself, such person shall not at any time thereafter be liable to any indictment, prosecution, or penal action, for or in respect of any act or matter by him done or committed before his examination, in connection with any election forming the subject of such inquiry, for which he might have been prosecuted or proceeded against under such Acts."

said, he had placed a verbal Amendment on the paper, much shorter in its terms than that of the hon. Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt), but intended to effect the same object.

said, the effect of the Amendment proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Youghal would be that a man having answered one single question which criminated himself, he would be indemnified, not only against the consequences of that answer, but also against proceedings in respect of all corrupt practices in which he might have been concerned at the election. Now, he thought that would open the door to great fraud, and, in fact, defeat the object of the Bill. The purpose of the Bill would be frustrated unless the Commissioners were vested with a discretion as to granting their certificate to a witness who prevaricated, or made but a partial and incomplete disclosure of facts within his knowledge.

said, he had given notice of a Motion to strike out the clause, but the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman had entirely removed all his objections, and therefore he had very great pleasure in withdrawing his proposed Motion.

hoped the hon. Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt) would not press his Amendment.

said, that the right hon. Baronet had had the courtesy to give him an opportunity of considering the proposed Amendment, which seemed to him—although as to terms it might have been framed more accurately for the purpose it was intended to effect—substantially to meet the whole of the difficulties—and they were numerous—that had existed in regard to a clause providing, that when a witness compelled, contrary to the constitutional rule, to criminate himself by answering the questions put to him, it should be left in the discretion of the tribunal before which he appeared to determine whether he should be protected or not.

having intimated that under these circumstances he would not propose his Amendment—

Amendment agreed to.

then proposed a further Amendment, to insert, at page 4, line 6, after the word "Acts," the words "or for which he might have been prosecuted or proceeded against under such Acts."

Amendment agreed to.

said, he thought this clause would bear hardly upon candidates and sitting Members, who did not stand in the same position as other witnesses. A sitting Member might be summoned by an adverse party to give evidence, and by his own testimony alone he might be made to forfeit his seat. That was a dilemma in which he ought not to be placed. He therefore moved the addition of the following words:—

"Provided also, That nothing in this section contained shall apply to the case of any sitting Member or defeated candidate called as a witness before any election committee.

said, he regretted the hon. Member had not given notice of his Amendment. It involved an important principle, and at present he could not support it. The exemption of Members, he thought, would be most invidious.

said, with his present feeling he should be prepared to support the proviso. The object of the Bill was to protect from penal consequences those who gave evidence; but if the man against whom the petition was presented were unseated on his own evidence, they did not protect him against the penal consequences. He did not wish to expose a man to the terrible temptation of saying what was untrue, and as far as he could see at present he was inclined to support the Amendment. He suggested that the proviso should be withdrawn now, and proposed again on bringing up the Report.

thought it would be very invidious and unjust to exempt Members from the extraordinary and unconstitutional liability which it was deemed expedient to impose on the rest of the community. He likewise believed that the proviso in itself would be almost nugatory, as it would be impossible for any Member to defend his seat if he refused to answer any proper question addressed to him, on the ground that it might criminate himself.

said, the question in- volved was one of great magnitude, and should not be discussed without previous notice. He hoped his hon. Friend would consent to defer his proposal to a future stage.

denied that an investigation before an Election Committee was a penal proceeding; it was a mere contention for a civil right, as a lawsuit for an estate would he, though the defeated party would necessarily be sensible of the loss. He hoped hon. Members would continue to be examined as they had been, for he must say the effect of personal examination had very often been to enable Members to keep their seats by clearing themselves of any personal knowledge of bribery, where without such testimony the evidence would have led the Committee directly to the conclusion that bribery had been committed.

said, he trusted the Amendment would be withdrawn. So far from protecting themselves from answering these questions, if any exception were made, it ought to be the other way, and they should rather incline to the side of severity than indulgence. A Member of Parliament owed more to the Constitution than any mere private voter.

said, that there was another reason for withdrawing the Amendment, and that, was that it placed the elected in a better position than the elector. The elector was compelled to answer, and if he were proved guilty of bribing, or being bribed, was liable to be struck off the register: a Member refusing to answer should be liable to lose his seat.

hoped the question, which was one of importance, would not be prejudiced by a hasty decision. He thought they should fix some time for its special consideration.

said, he thought the hon. Member ought not only to withdraw the proviso, but never to introduce it again, either on the Report or at any other stage. If such a proviso were seriously attempted to be introduced into the Bill, the country would never believe they were in earnest, as he believed they were, in their endeavours to put down bribery.

said, that in moving the proviso he had no intention of giving Members any advantage over the rest of the community. He only desired to give them the same rights as any other witnesses examined before an Election Committee. But after such an expression of opinion as he had heard he would not press his Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 9 (Regulations for Election Committees).

put it to the Secretary of State whether it would not be well to leave out those words of the clause which referred to treating, on the ground that he believed it was impossible to conceive an election in which there would not be some cases of treating. Treating was very much a question of degree. By that clause the mere giving of a glass of beer to a voter would bring the candidate, if the act were traced to any of his agents, within the penal enactments of the measure. He moved to omit the first paragraph of the clause.

supported the clause as it stood. No doubt treating was a matter of degree. There might be a small amount of treating, but there might be extensive treating. The Committee had unanimously recommended that the proof of agency with regard to treating should be placed on the same footing as the proof of agency with regard to bribery. In some cases that had been brought before the House, the treating was so extensive as to be merely another form of bribery.

observed, that a bribe was a bribe, and when once given and taken there was no doubt of the character of it; but it was a question whether giving a glass of beer was treating. He thought they ought not to take evidence of treating until they had established the connection between the sitting Member and the acts complained of.

said the hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the clause made it incumbent on Election Committees to receive evidence of treating before proof of agency was offered. But he did not read the clause in that way. It would, he thought, be in the discretion of the Committee, according to the circumstances of the case, to receive evidence of acts of treating independently of any proof of agency. The clause merely said it should not be necessary to prove agency in the first instance, before giving in evi- dence the facts whereby the charge of treating was to be sustained.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

suggested the insertion of the words "unless the Committee shall otherwise decide."

Amendment agreed to.

proposed to extend the operation of the clause to cases of undue influence.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 10 (Prosecutions for Bribery) agreed to.

Clause 11 (Suspension of Writs).

moved an Amendment, to leave out "House of Commons resolves," and insert "the Houses of Parliament separately resolve." The suspension of the writ by a Vote of the House of Commons alone was an infringement of the prerogative of the Crown and the privilege of the House of Lords.

pointed out, that as the powers would be exercised under an Act of Parliament which had received the sanction of the House of Lords and the assent of the Crown, there would be no infringement either of the privileges of the House of Lords or of the prerogative of the Sovereign. If the concurrence of the two Houses was required, the House of Commons might, if the assent of the Lords was refused, be tempted to suspend the writ during the continuance of the Parliament. This power, he thought, was open to abuse, and he should be glad to see it abolished.

said, he had always voted against the suspension of writs; for he could never understand why innocent voters should be deprived of their rights because a number of other electors had been guilty of malpractices. It seemed to him that the clause unduly restricted the prerogative of the Crown, and he should therefore propose the omission of the clause altogether.

observed, that if the concurrence of the other House were required to the suspension of a writ, the consent of the Crown would also be necessary. If an Act of Parliament gave the House of Commons the power, he did not see why they should hesitate to accept it. There would be little fear of their misusing it.

said, he could not support the Amendment, as he did not think the House of Lords should be permitted to interfere directly or indirectly with elections of Members to serve in the House of Commons. Looking, however, at the clause as a whole, giving power to suspend writs for a period of five years, which might extend beyond the duration of the Parliament, he thought there was matter worthy of further consideration.

wished to know whether the clause would supersede the ordinary Parliamentary right of suspending a writ; and whether, if a writ were once suspended for five years, that term could be afterwards shortened if the circumstances should seem to justify it?

said, the Bill contained an express provision that it should not affect the right of Parliament to alter or suspend the right of voting of all or any of the electors in any place for which the writ was suspended. It gave power to suspend a writ for five years absolutely, even though the House should not continue in being so long; and when once a writ had been suspended under this clause for five years, there was no power to shorten the period.

protested against the unconstitutional suspension of writs proposed by the clause. It was well known that when a Motion for suspending a writ was brought forward it was turned into a party question, and that the issue or non-issue of the writ depended entirely upon whether the constituency whose bribery was in question would return Members in favour of the majority in the House.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved the omission of the clause, with the view of substituting for it a clause of which he had given notice. He did this because he believed the clause to be unjust and unnecessary, and because he believed that, with all its unnecessary injustice, it would be found inoperative to produce the good result expected from it. Unless the clause was absolutely necessary, its injustice was so palpable that he did not propose to detain the Committee at any length by exposing it. What the Committee was asked to do was in effect this:—That whenever a Commission of Inquiry should report that in a constituency, say of 2,000 voters, they had discovered, after diligent scrutiny, some 200 or 300 of those voters were habitually corrupt, the House should disfranchise the whole 2,000, for the sake of punishing or purifying the 200 corrupt persons. Such a proposition wais so monstrous that it must strike everybody with conviction that nothing but the sternest necessity could justify it; and he therefore passed on to consider whether it was necessary. Now, it could easily be demonstrated that it was not necessary. What was the object of their legislation on this subject? He presumed it was to purify, and not to disfranchise, the constituencies. And how could they best purify without disfranchising them? Why clearly by excising from them the corrupt members. But how were they to find them out? Why, they would be already found out and reported to them by name by the very Commissioners and the very Report on which the House was asked, because of those corrupt persons, to disfranchise also the best and worthiest members of their community. But then, it might be said, how could they rely on the Report of those Commissioners? how could they know that they had fully inquired and faithfully reported? The answer was first of all, whether they knew it or not, the Bill proposed to rely on their Report to disfranchise not a part only but the whole of the community; and secondly, that all experience of these Commissions and Commissioners authorized them to place implicit confidence in them. They were gentlemen of great experience, they were armed with all the powers necessary for inquiry, and he had never heard a doubt suggested as to their perfect impartiality. Several witnesses examined before the Committee, in 1860, gave their testimony on this subject. One of them, who had been secretary to several Commissions said, "I think they always get at the truth," and strongly recommended, that instead of the present system of trying petitions by Committees, they should be tried by Commissioners on the spot, which it was shown would be a much more effective and a much less expensive method of procedure than by Committee. When a Commission of this kind visited any place, the whole constituency was put upon its trial. If any one had anything to allege against the purity of the place generally, or of any electors in particular, he was at liberty to state it. The persons accused were sent for, heard in their own defence and by their witnesses, and might in their turn accuse others, who would have to go through the same process. The Commissioners then reported that certain persons named had been guilty of corrupt practices; and in their schedule they included every person against whom the evidence of guilt was deemed sufficient. It was material to observe that they arrived at this result, in a great measure, through the assistance rendered to them by the honest portion of the community. Gentlemen who were disgusted at the corrupt practices which had prevailed at and disgraced the place they resided in, rendered the Commissioners all the information and assistance in their power, and thus enabled them to get at the truth. The inquiries of the Commissioners were thus made very searching, and the result was that the House knew who the corrupt persons were, and knew also that substantially all the rest of the community were not corrupt. The necessity, therefore, which could alone justify disfranchising a whole constituency did not exist. Moreover, this provision, like other things of its kind, would nullify itself by reason of its injustice. At present they had in their favour all the honest men in the community—such men were equally interested with the House in getting rid of the corrupt, and did all they could to assist in doing so. But how would this clause operate? Why, it would give every honest man the same interest as the rogue in concealing corrupt practices. How could they expect a man to expose the offences of others, when he was himself to be punished for them? He wondered what result the right hon. Gentleman would expect from an enactment to the effect, that it being necessary to put down bribery and corruption, every person reported as guilty of those offences should receive a certain number of lashes, and then going on to enact, that it being extremely desirable that such persons should be brought to justice, every honest man who would give such information as should lead to the conviction of offenders should receive precisely the same punishment. [A laugh.] They laughed at that as absurd, but in principle it was precisely what the right hon. Gentleman proposed to do. It might be said, that a great evil existed, and something must be done. To this he replied, adopt the natural and just course of disfranchising those, and those only, who deserved disfranchisement. If difficulties were objected, let them examine them. It might be said, that as these Commissions were not part of the ordinary tribunals of the country, it would be unsafe to deprive a man of his franchise simply upon their Report. It might also be said that to do so would be a breach of the certificate of indemnity given to those who made a full disclosure before the Commissioners. A short examination would show the fallacy of those objections. First of all, if they were objections, they were as much so to the Government clause as to that which, he would substitute for it; for as they were going to disfranchise all upon the Report of a Commission, it could not be more objectionable to disfranchise a portion only on the same Report. As to the exceptional character of the Commission, that might be easily provided against by giving a power of appeal under proper restrictions; and as to the certificates of indemnity, the Government proposed to disfranchise those who had them as much as he did, and in fact, if they did not, the only persons who could be disfranchised would be those innocent persons who had not got, because they had never needed, certificates of indemnity. Surely the guilty would not be the less disfranchised because the innocent were disfranchised with them; and surely the legislature, when it passed the indemnity clause, never contemplated that it should be not only a shield from the consequences of past offences, but a licence to commit the like offences for the future? He was aware the right hon. Gentleman contended that he was not introducing a new principle, and that the law of making a community responsible for the misconduct of individuals was of very ancient origin, and was still in existence. But surely there was no analogy between making a hundred responsible for the damage done by rioters, and making the inhabitants responsible criminally and subjecting them to the same punishment as the rioters whom they had vainly tried to resist. And if the right hon. Gentleman wished to revert to the rude or simple legislation of our Saxon ancestors, which made every tithing man responsible for the good conduct of every other man in the tithing, let him at least accompany it with the wise and just proviso which characterized the Saxon law—namely, that if a man could purge himself of the offence by proving that he was no party to it, he should not be amerced for it. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving the omission of the clause; and said if it were carried, he would propose a clause for disfranchising such persons as a Commission should report to have been guilty of corrupt practices.

said, he should vote for the omission of the clause, because he thought the penalty under it was not sufficient. There were certain places, that were very well known, that ought to be disfranchised altogether.

said, there was nothing in this clause which would prevent Parliament disfranchising any place where corruption was almost universal. It was intended to meet those cases in which, although corruption was extensive, there might be a majority who were not corrupt. The principle was this:—To enable the House, if it thought bribery had been so extensive as to call for a temporary suspension of the writ, to act upon the whole community of electors, and therefore create an interest in preventing corruption altogether. It was true that in some cases, where Commissions had reported extensive bribery, acts of corruption had not been proved against one third of the individual electors. But it was impossible to read the Reports without seeing that countenance had been given to bribery by persons not engaged in it. It was clearly impossible to prevent corrupt practices being carried on if this clause were altered so as not to affect the whole community. It did not follow that in every case the House would support the Resolution. If a large proportion of the electors appeared to have taken steps to prevent bribery, it would be competent to the House to abstain from doing so. They would simply have the power, wherever there was proof of the corruption of a number of electors, and connivance or indifference on the part of the rest. His hon. and learned Friend proposed to deal only with individual electors; that individual electors guilty of bribery should be struck off the poll, and that where the proof before the Commission was not conclusive an appeal should be had to the Court of Queen's Bench. Upon what ground was it persons were reported guilty of bribery? Upon their own evidence, subject to the indemnity to which they were entitled; and the Bill declared that such evidence should not be used in any court of law. If therefore persons came before a Commission and declared their own corruption, and were reported to be guilty of bribery, they would have nothing to do but appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench; and if an issue were tried, the evidence upon which the Commission reported would be excluded, and they would be, by an easy process, restored to the fran- chise. He hoped the House would retain the clause in its integrity, which he believed would have a very beneficial effect.

said, that if the hon. and learned Gentleman had been returned for Gloucester free from any taint of corrupt practices, it was a clear proof of the beneficial influence of suspending a writ. If any appeal were given, it must be to the County Courts, for the expense of the Queen's Bench would deter those electors who wished to adopt that very certain mode of being restored to the register. He thought that where corruption existed to a considerable extent without affecting the character of a borough, there should be some minor punishment short of total disfranchisement, and that some time for suspension should be fixed. He thought that in fixing five years the Committee had not gone too far.

wished to know whether the Resolution of one Parliament was to bind another, and whether the House of Commons was to have the power to make a hard and fast bargain which might extend over two or three Parliaments? It would be a very strong proceeding. He could quite understand resolving that during their own life-time they would suspend the issue of any writ; but he was not aware of any precedent for giving to a Resolution of that House the power of law, and he thought that if they wanted to go beyond the Parliament in existence when the Resolution was passed, they should have the sanction of the other House, and of the Queen. Without reference to the merits of this case, it was a serious thing to make a precedent for giving to a simple Resolution of one House in one Parliament the power of effecting certain things after the Parliament itself had come to an end, either by efflux of time or dissolution by the Crown.

said, that the House now had power to suspend a writ during the existence of the Parliament in which the Resolution was passed, and this Bill would give legislative sanction to suspension beyond a dissolution, so long as it did not exceed five years.

thought it a most dangerous precedent to delegate to this House the power to do by Resolution that which a separate Act of Parliament only could effect. Parties might be so balanced that one vote might determine the fate of a Government; and in case of an appeal to the constituencies it was very undesirable to deprive any constituency of the privilege of expressing an opinion upon the question on which the Crown resorted to the country for advice.

In reply to Mr. CHILDERS,

said, that if the five years expired while Parliament was sitting, the writ would issue by Resolution of the House; and if the five years expired between a dissolution and the assembling of the new Parliament, by the authority of the Crown.

said, he must object to the clause. the ground on which he must resist the clause was, that although it was expedient that a Parliament should have the power of suspending a writ during its continuance, he did not understand why, for the offences of a small portion of a constituency, the House of Commons should have the power of encroaching on the prerogative of the Crown, and disfranchising, perhaps, a very meritorious portion of the constituency for a longer period than its own existence. He thought it highly inexpedient to give the House of Commons such a power to hind the whole Legislature for years to come.

pointed out, that if the clause passed as it stood, the House of Commons might go on suspending the writ of a particular place, and then just at the end of the Parliament pass this Resolution; so that in effect the writ might be suspended for two Parliaments.

said, that the right hon. Gentleman had not answered the question whether the effect of the clause would not be to enable one Session of Parliament to suspend a writ during part of a subsequent Session.

said, that clearly the effect of the clause would be that the suspension might extend over a future Parliament. The writ would be suspended, not by the action of the House of Commons, but by virtue of an Act of Parliament; and the House of Commons would be bound, by the Act, just in the same manner as all the other parties were.

said, he was in favour of the clause, and thought it would be an improvement in the law, that instead of disfranchising a borough, which was the only punishment it was at present in the power of the House to inflict, they should have the power of suspending the writ. He thought that the five years might well run over a dissolution, for the constituency would be thereby warned, that if their evil practices were continued, they would be disfranchised altogether. Still he was of opinion that the clause required guarding, as he thought the Secretary of State would see from attention to two considerations. First, this suspension might be effected simply by a Resolution of the House, and there was no guard against the Resolution being taken at a distant sitting of Parliament; and he thought that in all cases the Resolution ought to be moved within one month after the date of the Report of the Committee. Secondly, the Resolution ought to be passed in a Committee of the Whole House, and for this reason, that the House might not be taken by surprise. The Report of the Committee would then be laid on the table, and the House would have an opportunity of confirming or of rescinding it.

also thought the clause too general; for, as at present framed, the House of Commons, if it thought fit, might act on a Report several years old, even though a general election had intervened.

allowed that there ought to be some limit in point of time, and said he would introduce words on the Report. As to the other point raised by the right hon. Gentleman, he scarcely thought that the practice of the House should be regulated by an Act of Parliament. It was rather a matter for the Standing Orders.

said, the many difficulties which had been raised about this clause only made it clearer that there was considerable danger in passing it. His right hon. Friend, who was in favour of it, could not harden his heart to the Resolution being passed at once, but wanted the House to have a second opportunity of considering it. It was suggested that the Resolution should be passed within a month of the presentation of the Report; but considering what thick blue-books these Reports generally made, it was hardly likely that many Members would be ready in that time to give their verdict. He saw great harm in enabling the House to do by Resolution that which had hither to been done by the Legislature. It was a bad precedent, and might hereafter be used for drawing the whole power of Parliament into the House of Commons.

pointed out, that if this Resolution, which was to have force for five years, were passed at the beginning of a Parliament, and that Parliament lasted seven years, the writ would not be suspended for a whole Parliament.

said, that it was not intended necessarily to carry the suspension over a whole Parliament; but there would be a period of five years during which the place would be unrepresented.

asked by whom the writ would be issued if the five years happened to expire when the House was not sitting.

said, the writ would issue in the usual manner, under the authority of the Act of Parliament.

said, he scarcely thought it was the intention of the right hon. Baronet to suspend the disfranchisement of a borough over a dissolution, and during part of a future Session.

said, that that was the intention, if it should be necessary. The object was that a constituency found guilty of malpractices should remain unrepresented during the full period of five years.

asked how the culpable electors were to be punished. A man received £10 for his vote; the writ was then suspended for five years, and before that Parliament was dissolved the writ would be issued and the same elector would have another opportunity of receiving another bribe.

replied, that if the House saw fit, it might suspend the issue of the writ over the five years, or until the summoning of a new Parliamennt.

said, he had heard no reason why the whole body of the electors in any borough should be disfranchised because a few were guilty of bribery, and he should therefore divide the Committee on the clause.

Question put, "That the clause stand part of the Bill."

The Committee divided:—Ayes 113; Noes 48: Majority 65.

Clause agreed to; as were also Clauses 12 and 13.

, with a view to prevent disorder at elections, proposed a new clause—(Treating), providing that every candidate who should directly or indirectly pay for any meat, drink, entertainment, or provisions for any person other than an elector, with a view to influence the election, on the nomination or the polling days, should be deemed guilty of treating and should forfeit £50; and that any per- son furnishing such meat, drink, or entertainment, should pay 40s., and, if an elector, be incapable of voting at such election.

said, that the law as it stood afforded sufficient security against treating, and certainly thought the proposal of the hon. Member would be no improvement, but rather a change for the worse. A great portion of the proposed clause was unnecessary, as it merely re-enacted that which was provided by the present law. In fact, while the existing law was of a general character, prohibiting treating before the polling-day, on the polling-day, or after, the clause would limit the prohibition.

Clause negatived.

moved a clause—(Persons who are under a Recognizance, or have been served with a Subpoena, not appearing, to be guilty of Contempt of Court).

saw no reason in this particular case for departing from the ordinary practice or for making the offence in question a contempt of court.

pointed out that the hon. Gentleman who moved the clause seemed to be of opinion that bribery was worse than murder, for the witness was to be subjected to a greater punishment for non-appearance.

Clause negatived.

moved a new clause—(Judge of a Superior Court may order Trials to be held in the Central Criminal Court, or in a neighbouring County).

opposed the clause, on the ground that no necessity for the proposed change in the practice of the law had been shown.

Clause negatived.

moved a new clause to follow Clause 10—

"Any person who shall be convicted of bribery or undue influence at an Election, or against whom judgment shall have been obtained for any penal sum by the Corrupt Practices Prevention Acts made recoverable in repect of the offences of bribery, treating, and undue influence, or either of them, shall, in addition to any other punishment or forfeiture, be incapable of being elected or sitting in Parliament during the five years next after such conviction or judgment."

I am not disposed to object to this clause, which provides a temporary disqualification only on a conviction by a court of law.

Clause added to the Bill.

moved a clause (Votes for Candidates Guilty of Bribery thrown away). The object of the clause was, that where a candidate petitioned and claimed the seat and proved bribery against the sitting Member, such candidate should be declared the sitting Member, if no recriminating case of bribery could be proved against him. At present, unless such candidate could strike off so many of the voters of his opponent as would place him in a majority, he would not be entitled to the seat. All he could do was to stand again; but he would present himself under the disadvantage of having proved bribery amongst the constituency, and would stand a small chance of being returned. The effect of the clause proposed would be to make bribery defeat its own end, and as a consequence to diminish it throughout the country. The only objection he saw to his proposal was that it would give the seat to the person who represented the minority. But he thought that was a mere verbal objection, for the real majority consisted of those who honestly exercised the franchise.

said, that this was not the first time his hon. Friend had brought forward this proposition, nor the first time that he (Sir George Grey) had stated his objections to it. These objections remained unchanged. Votes could only properly be held to be thrown away where the disqualification of the candidate was patent and known to the electors. His hon. Friend's proposal struck directly at election by majority. Thus, if in a constituency of 3,000, the candidate elected had 2,000 votes, and the other candidate 1,000, and if the person elected was unseated for bribery through a single act committed by an agent, the candidate with the 1,000 votes would become the representative of the constituency. In such cases he thought that the electors, not having any knowledge that acts of bribery had been committed, should have an opportunity of again exercising their choice, and giving their votes for another candidate.

Clause negatived.

moved the addition of a clause (Recovery of Cost by Member declared duly elected by unanimous Resolution of Committee), such Member to be entitled to recover from the petitioners against him his costs and expenses.

said, the Com- mittee had at present a discretionary power to declare a petition frivolous and vexatious, and the petitioners then had to pay costs. He believed that arrangement was sufficient. It would be rather hard to inflict costs where a petition had been presented in good faith. The effect of the clause would probably be to discourage petitions, and would so far foster bribery, He thought it would be better to leave the law in that respect as it stood.

believed the effect of the proposed provision would be to deter parties from presenting petitions, even in the most justifiable cases.

said, the objection to the clause was its want of mutuality. To make it complete, there ought to be also a provision that the sitting Member, if unseated, should be liable for costs. Even where there were strong grounds of suspision, a petition might fail for want of technical evidence, and in such a case the petitioners ought not to be mulcted in the expenses of both sides.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

then moved the addition of a clause (Provision for Payment of Costs of Commission of Inquiry), providing that where any Commission issued to inquire into the extensive prevalence of bribery, or treating, or other corrupt practices, in any county or borough, shall report that such practices have extensively prevailed in such county or borough, the Commission of the Treasury shall certify to the Treasurer of such county or borough the total amount of the cost of the Commission; and the Treasurer shall within two years pay the same, the amount to be levied by a borough or county rate.

Clause agreed to.

moved the insertion of a clause (Unlawful Payment of Travelling Expenses to be deemed Bribery).

said, that in the framing of the Bill, interference with the subject of travelling expenses was studiously avoided. The law as it at present stood worked satisfactorily. The effect of the clause would be to declare that to be bribery which was not bribery.

Clause negatived.

rose to propose a clause (Provisions for Elections for Places for which Members have been unseated). The clause contained sections A to L constituting a code of provisions applicable to such cases. The hon. Member, in support of his clauses, said that in the great majority of intances bribery at elections was committed late in the afternoon on the day of polling. That arose from the circumstance that in the afternoon the votes of the several candidates were nearly equal, and electors held back their votes in order that they might become more valuable. He proposed a very simple remedy. He did not propose it with respect to all boroughs, but only such as had been affected by bribery. He proposed that in a constituency amongst which bribery had been committed, the state of the poll at all future elections should not be made known during the day. And he proposed to effect that in this manner:—Instead of a vote being given publicly, an elector, after he had satisfied the returning officer that he was entitled to vote, would receive a paper with the names of the candidates, to which would be attached the number of the elector on the register—that paper, which would indicate for whom the elector voted, would be put into a box, which at four o'clock would be opened, and immediately after four the returning officer would publish the votes in the most formal manner.

Clause (Provisions for Elections for Places for which Members have been unseated) brought up, and read 1o .

said, that the clauses proposed by his hon. Friend were long and important enough to form a separate measure. He would not consent to their incorporation into the present Bill.

Question put, "That the Clause be read a second time."

The Committee divided:—Ayes 55; Noes 131: Majority 76.

House resumed.

Bill reported; as amended, to be considered on Tuesday next [Bill 68].

Telegraphs Bill—Bill 16

Committee

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Clauses 1 and 2 agreed to.

Clause 3 (Interpretation).

asked the meaning of the words "lands continuously built upon," which occurred in two paragraphs of this clause.

said, they were inserted to define streets—which were "lands continuously built upon."

said, if the Committee could not understand the interpretation clause, they could not understand the clauses to which it referred. The words were very vague, and many questions would arise unless a clearer definition were given of them.

said, the words had been judicially interpreted; that he knew of his own knowledge.

referred to a case in which the city of Cork and a railway company were concerned, but he could not undertake to say what the decision was.

asked what the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade meant by these words?

said, the words were plain English. He did not see how they could better define a street. The words were most reasonable. Did the right hon. Gentleman object to them?

said, he did not object to them, but he wanted them to be explained, clearly and properly.

Clause agreed to; as was also Clause 4.

Clause 5 (Provisions as to Notices and Consents).

proposed, alter the third paragraph, to add a provision to the effect that after a company had given due notice of its intention to pass along a certain road, the absence of dissent in writing on the part of the proprietors on either side of such road should, after the lapse of fourteen days, be equivalent to their consent.

said, the proposed concession would no doubt be very beneficial to the companies, and he at first thought it was one which might properly be granted. But, on further consideration, it had been thought better that the companies should incur the trouble of ob- taining the express consent of the parties interested.

Proviso negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 6 (General Description of Works which a Telegraph Company may execute, subject to the restrictions of this Act).

Question, "That Paragraph I stand part of the Clause," put, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

proposed the insertion of words for the protection of water and gas pipes; he also objected to the sufficiency of the notices provided.

Whereupon Debate arising,

Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again," put, and agreed to.

House resumed:—Committee report Progress; to sit again on Monday next.

Mutiny Bill—Committee

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

said, that in one sense there was a change, and in another sense there was no change. Instead of passing a separate Act for the European troops in India, the India clauses were incorporated in this Bill, and one or two minute differences were preserved in the incorporation that had been made. The Native troops in India were under a separate jurisdiction. There were no other changes in any of the clauses of the Mutiny Act.

Clauses 1 to 22, inclusive, agreed to.

Clause 23 (Power to inflict Corporal Punishment).

Question put, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

The Committee divided:—Ayes 34; Noes 7: Majority 27.

Clause agreed to.

Remaining Clauses agreed to.

House resumed:—Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read 3o To-morrow.

Thames Conservancy, &C

Select Committee Moved For

moved for a Select Committee to inquire into the operation of the several Acts of Parliament relating to the Conservancy of the river Thames, to the buoyage, beaconage, and ballastagc of that river, from Staines to Yantlet Creek, and to the regulation of vessels navigating or plying on the river within the aforesaid limits.

Motion agreed to.

Select Committee appointed,

"To inquire into the operation of the several Acts of Parliament relating to the Conservancy of the River Thames, to the Buoyage, Beaconage, and Ballastage of that River from Staines to Yantlet Creek, and to the regulation of vessels navigating or plying on the River between the aforesaid limits."

And on Thursday, April 16, Committee nominated, as follow:—

MR. HUTT, The LORD MAYOR of LONDON, Sir JOHN HANMER, Mr. WESTERN WOOD, Mr. JOSEPH EWART, Mr. ALDERMAN SALOMONS, Mr. LONOFIELD, Mr. LOCKE, Mr. CAVE, Mr. SOMES, Mr. RICHARD HODGSON, Mr. LINDSAY, Mr. BLACKBURN, Mr. SHAFTO, and Mr. CUBITT.

Vaccination (Ireland) Bill

On Motion of Sir Robert Peel, Bill to further extend and make compulsory the practice of Vaccination in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Sir ROBEET PEEL and Mr. LOWE.

Bill presented, and read 1o . [Bill 70.]

Local Goyeenment Act (1858) Amendment Bill

On Motion of Sir George Grey, Bill for amending the Local Government Act (1858), ordered to be brought in by Sir GEORGE GREY and Mr. BRUCE.

Bill presented, and read 1o . [Bill 69.]

Judgments Law Amendment (Ireland) Bill

On Motion of Mr. Whiteside, Bill to further amend the Law concerning Judgments and Recognizances in Ireland, ordered to be brought in by Mr. WHITESIDE and Mr. GEORGE.

Bill presented, and read 1o . [Bill 71.]

House adjourned at One o'clock.