said, he would beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, Whether his attention has been directed to a pamphlet, published by Captain Cowper Coles, R.N., purporting to contain a correct statement of the comparative expense of building Iron Ships of War to carry broadside guns, and Ships of War with the same weight of mettle fitted on the Cupola system, and whether the statement therein contained is accepted by him as correct?

said, he had had the pleasure of reading Captain Coles's pamphlet, and he had found it very interesting. But he should be sorry to guarantee the correctness of any estimate of a, comparative cost of iron ships and Cupola ships. He had no doubt that Captain Coles had taken great pains in forming his estimate, but they had reason to know that no estimate of the cost of iron cased ships that had yet been made had turned out to be correct.

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Whether the Building intended for Criminal Lunatics is ready; and whether those Criminal Lunatics now confined at the Private Asylum at Fisherton, near Salisbury, amounting to the number of 284, are likely shortly to be removed to the new Asylum?

, in reply, said, he was informed that a large portion of the building referred to by the hon. and gal- lant Member was now nearly ready, so that about 100 patients might shortly be removed to it. He did not know at what time a larger number could be received. He understood that the first hundred patients to be placed in the Asylum would be females.

said, he rose to ask the Under Secretary of State for War, When certain Returns, ordered at the beginning of the Session, concerning expenses incurred at the Ionian Islands, will be laid upon the table?

, in reply, said, the Returns would be furnished by the Colonial Office. The War Office had furnished the Colonial Office with all the information in their power, and had written on the 27th of March to the General commanding at Corfu to give to the Lord High Commissioner information with reference to military expense, to be transmitted to the Colonial Office. The answers were expected in about a fortnight, and the Returns would then shortly be ready.

said, he rose to bring forward the subject of which he had given notice relating to Distinguished Service Colonels, He might state at the outset that it was not his intention to ask for any expression of opinion on the part of the House; his only desire was that the subject to which his Motion referred might be thoroughly investigated by persons of high character and competent authority. Much misapprehension prevailed on the matter both in and out of the House. The case was somewhat complicated and difficult to explain, but the misapprehension in relation to it had arisen more from the appearance than the reality of its complication. He regretted to be obliged to bring forward this Motion. He had endeavoured, as far as he could, to get it settled outside the House; but he felt that he brought it forward with considerable moral influence, for he found his views were supported by no less than three Secretaries of State and a considerable number of prominent officers. The facts of the case were these:—A Royal Commission was appointed in 1854 which recommended the abolition of general periodical promotion, and the establishment of a new system of promotion from the rank of lieutenant colonel to colonel after three years' service, the interests of those who were then lieutenant colonels being protected. If the recommendation of the Commission had been carried out, it would not have been necessary for him to bring forward his case. A warrant was issued which left out the protection recommended. Lieutenant colonels were promoted who had completed three years in command, passing over existing lieutenant colonels who had not. In 1855, while the Russian war was going on, it pleased Her Majesty, under the advice of the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief, and acting on her own Royal prerogative, to select for promotion as aides-de-camp to the Queen a certain number of officers serving in the rank of lieutenant colonels for good service in front of the enemy; and these officers, by the recommendation of the Royal Commission, had been deprived to an undue extent of the position they attained by the promotion which had been conferred upon them. In 1858 the grievance was found to be so great that General Peel, then Secretary of State for War, had appointed another Royal Commission, who recommended that the whole of those lieutenant colonels passed over should be reinstated above those who passed over them by the three years rule. In carrying out that recommendation they thought it would be least invidious to the officers who had been promoted under the three years rule if the commissions of the other officers were antedated four years. That was done, and the effect was that those aides-de-camp who had been promoted for service in the field fell at once, some to the bottom of the list; and some of them, who had been colonels before June 1854, lost all the promotions they had gained by service in the field, and, indeed, might as well have been in bed instead of in the Crimea. No complaint was made that the ninety officers who had been superseded by the three years colonels were restored to their position, which was but a just proceeding; but there were other officers, about sixty in number, who were in no way entitled to take rank above the Queen's aides-decamp. The question was no new question; for as soon as the Commission of 1858 had reported, he applied upon the subject to the gallant General who was then Secretary for War; but he shortly afterwards went out of office and was succeeded by Lord Herbert, who, upon the case being stated to him, admitted that the case of those officers had been overlooked by the Commission of 1858, and immediately proposed their restoration to their rightful position. Lord Herbert, however, proposed to restore them in a manner which was not approved by the Commander-in-Chief—namely, by antedating their appointments to November 28, 1854; but Sir Charles Yorke wrote that the Commission had assumed that all lieutenant colonels who held that rank before June 1854 had claims in the nature of vested interests not to be passed over in any promotions made in consequence of any regulations not then existing. But the Commission of 1858 had made no such assumption, as they were fully aware that the right to promote Queen's aides-de-camp existed. He afterwards moved in that House an Address to the Crown, which was acceded to by the Under Secretary for War, in consequence of which a Committee of general officers was appointed to investigate the subject. He could not but think that that Committee was not quite fairly constituted, and that some other person than Sir Charles Yorke, who had expressed a decided opinion on the case, should have been placed at its head. That Committee made a Report, which did not touch upon the merits or the justice of the case, but came to the conclusion that it was inexpedient to disturb the existing arrangement. As a Member of the Committee, he dissented from the Report, and made a counter Report. Sir George Lewis, whose loss he, in common with the whole House, deeply lamented, put aside Sir Charles Yorke's Report, and adopted a portion of his (General Lindsay's) counter Report. He had suggested, as one mode of meeting the difficulty, that these officers should be made, as their turns came, supernumerary generals, and that the Treasury should be requested to allow them to remain so until they should be absorbed. Sir George Lewis adopted that suggestion, and proposed to the Treasury to pay £11,000 to enable justice to be done to these officers. Lord Herbert, in a letter to the Military Secretary, expressed his opinion that the plan he proposed would be least detrimental to the colonels in the army generally, and at the same time would be fair and equitable to the general service officers. That suggestion, however, found no favour with the Commander-in-Chief, who thought it objectionable that the commissions of these officers should be antedated to a period when the service for which they were promoted had not been performed. Lord Herbert again returned to the charge. He stated in 1860 that these officers appeared to be entitled to some remedial measure, and he suggested that his Royal Highness should reconsider the subject; but the answer of the Military Secretary referred Lord Herbert to the concluding paragraph of his former letter on the subject. The next proceeding was taken by Sir George Lewis. Sir Edward Lugard, writing by his direction, reminded the Treasury of Lord Herbert's opinion, in which Sir George Lewis fully concurred that these officers were justly entitled to some relief, and suggested that the distinguished service officers should be made supernumerary major-generals. That was followed by a minute signed by Mr. Frederick Peel, writing on behalf of the Treasury, who appeared to recommend that these officers should stand next in the list to the three years qualified colonel who was promoted immediately before the Queen's aides-de-camp were selected. Sir George Lewis adopted that suggestion, and wrote to the Military Secretary to say, that if it were inexpedient to antedate the commissions of these offi- cers, they should be promoted to the vacancies on the regular establishment of general officers next after officers who had qualified by the three years rule. The Military Secretary, writing on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, said that his Royal Highness would not object to the course proposed by the Treasury. Accordingly, in January 1863, Colonel Gordon, of the Royal Engineers, was informed that the case was decided in his favour, and that the Commander-in-Chief would promote these officers to vacancies in the regular establishment. Among those who had appeared before the Commission, to remonstrate against any alteration in favour of the Queen's aides-de-camp, were Colonels George and O'Halloran. He did not ask the House to express any opinion upon the merits of any of these officers. They had to deal with facts, and not with feelings. It had pleased Her Majesty, under responsible advice, to select certain officers as her aides-de-camp with the rank of colonel. He deeply regretted to say, that as Colonels George and O'Halloran had not served in the Crimea, they could not be selected, and others wore chosen who, serving as lieutenant colonels at the time, were placed before them. These two officers, having no claim in June 1855 to be colonels at all, either upon the old or the new system, had no right whatever to be placed above those officers promoted to be aides-de-camp of the Queen. Then there was the case of Colonel Brownrigg, who was one of the distinguished service officers, and who, being an officer in the Guards, said that his promotion in the Crimea was withheld because he was in the Guards. The facts were these:—That Colonel Brownrigg was promoted in November 1855 for distinguished services, and that others had been promoted in June who were his junior officers. The Commander-in-Chief had recommended him to be promoted in November; and unless he could show that he was a colonel before those officers, he had no right to complain. Colonel Brownrigg was opposing his own class, because service staff offificers were promoted before them. If they had any right, he ought not to take his place before those other Queen's aides-decamp who were promoted before them. There was another case which he wished to mention to the House—that of Colonel Gordon, of the Engineers, who by his conduct at Sebastopol had won a world-wide fame. He was promoted to a colonelcy, but for the rank of general he had been twice passed over. He ought to hare been a general a year ago, but in consequence of the proceedings consequent on the Warrant of 1858 he might not have a chance of promotion for four or five years to come if something were not done to remedy the existing evil. Lord Herbert had not known that the interests of those officers would be affected by the Commission of 1858, and he had the authority of General Peel for saying, that if he had known it before he took the warrant of the Queen, he would have referred back to that Commission the case of those officers. He had also the right hon. and gallant General's authority for saying, that if he did not ask the House of Commons to decide on the merits of the question, he would support him in asking for an inquiry. He regretted that a domestic calamity, of which the House were aware, prevented the right hon. and gallant Gentleman from being present to give him his valuable support. The opinion of the noble Lord the present Secretary of State for War was well known, and other distinguished authorities had also pronounced a strong opinion on the subject. He only asked for an inquiry of such a character as would set the question at rest, and do justice between competing claims; and it was important to bear in mind that the inquiry would be a limited one. No court of inquiry would be more fitting to investigate the matter, or to do justice to all parties than a Royal Commission; and to show how strongly it was felt in the army that injustice had been done, he would conclude by quoting a letter from one of the veterans of the Peninsular war—an officer of the highest character and of unblemished honour—which showed what a noble soldier thought of the case. Sir William Napier, writing to one of the officers on the 10th of December 1858, who had brought his case before him, said that he had never heard of such flagrant injustice or shameful treatment, and he recommended his correspondent to address an earnest and respectful memorial to the authorities, stating all the particulars of the case. He thought he had shown sufficient reasons why there should be such an inquiry as he demanded, and he hoped the House would agree with him in addressing the Crown for the Commission he asked for.

seconded the Motion.

said, that although it was his duty to ask the House not to agree to the Motion which had just been made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, he hoped both he and the House would acquit him, in the very few remarks with which he should have to trouble them, of any intention either to depreciate the services which had been rendered by the officers in question—which services he begged to assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman he fully appreciated—or for one moment to deny that those officers had a claim to their most attentive consideration for certain injuries and losses which they had sustained. He had little to object to in the statement of facts made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, though at the same time he must remind him that the terms of his Motion did not altogether bear out what he had said at the outset—that he did not wish the House to come to any decision on the matter on that occasion. The Motion towards the end referred to these officers as having been "deprived, to an undue extent, of the position they had obtained by the promotion conferred on them;" and if the House affirmed that statement, the Commission which would have to be appointed would be one not to inquire simply, but it would be directed to inquire with a particular object and intention. Though he had little difference with the hon. and gallant Gentleman as to the facts which he had stated, some of them might certainly be viewed in a different light, and he hoped the House would excuse him if he travelled briefly over them. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that the Commission of 1858 did not take the case of these officers into their consideration. It was true that no mention of them was made in the Report of the Commission, but on referring to the Minutes of Evidence it would be seen that the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself was examined on their case before the Committee, and the following was the Report of the most important part of his examination:—

"CHAIRMAN.—Do you consider that by that arrangement you will get all those officers to stand in the same relation to one another, just as if the warrant had never been in operation?—No doubt of it. But there is one class of officers who intersect them, and those are officers who have been promoted for distinguished service, and they will occasionally intersect their dates.

"But if an officer, being a lieutenant colonel, is promoted to colonel for distinguished conduct in the field, he would not carry anybody up with him; would you not consider that an exceptional case?—Yes, in this way; if what we are calling justice was given to those officers who are passed over, they would have been promoted to colonel before the officers who were promoted for distinguished conduct in the field; and therefore they would be above them. In that way the officers who are promoted from lieutenant colonel to colonel will be affected, and in no other way."

Therefore, though the case of these distinguished service officers was not mentioned in the Report, the Commissioners did take it into their consideration, and the fact of their having omitted all mention of it in their Report was as completely decisive as if they had devoted a special paragraph of it. The Commission was composed of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, six ex-Secretaries of State, and six distinguished officers of every branch of the service, and it must be admitted that no Commission could have been more competent to inquire into a complicated question like promotion by service or otherwise. It was scarcely possible for the House to conclude that such a Commission would altogether overlook the case of twenty-two distinguished officers, not obscure men, but well known to every Member of the Commission. The next circumstance in the case was the letter of Mr. Sidney Herbert, written on the 24th of September 1859, when it was found that the Commission had taken no action upon it. In that letter Mr. Herbert stated that in his opinion these distinguished officers had a grievance, and proposed to the Commander-in-Chief a mode of redressing that grievance. Sir Charles Yorke replied on the 26th, and in his letter were contained some of the principal and most material arguments against proceeding further in the matter. Sir Charles said—

"It is, of course, to be assumed that what was then done should have been done in 1854; and if it had, the officers then promoted, being full colonels before the promotion of any of the lieutenant colonels promoted for distinguished service, could not have been passed over by any of them. Their claim having been thus admitted, and deemed strong enough to justify so extraordinary a measure as that which was adopted, in order to remedy what was considered to have been an injury done them, it is difficult to reconcile with justice to them the placing subsequently any officers over them whose claim to promotion did not exist before the following year."

He then proceeded to state a material objection to the plan which Mr. Herbert had proposed—

"Nine of them were lieutenant colonels prior to the 20th of June 1854, and would therefore have been promoted with the other lieutenant colonels in the brevet given in that year, standing exactly in the places that they now do; and being full colonels previous to the war, could have obtained no further promotion, unless their services should have been of that distinguished character as would have justified their advancement to the rank of major general from a very low position in the list of colonels. Five others were not lieutenant colonels on the 28th of November 1854, and four more were not at that time majors, The plan therefore proposes to antedate the commissions of lieutenant colonel of the first five, and of major and lieutenant colonel of the four last, in order to make it possible to antedate their colonel's commission to the 28th of November 1854."

Mr. Herbert again called the attention of the Horse Guards to the subject on the 25th of July 1860, and on the 7th of August a reply was received stating that His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the convenience of the proposed change. The next important step was the Committee of 1861, appointed by the War Office, chiefly on the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman. The gallant General had objected to the constitution of the Committee. He said that Sir Charles Yorke, having given a strong opinion against the claims of these officers, ought not to have been a Member of the Committee; but surely if that were a reason against his appointment, the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself, who had given quite as strong an opinion in favour of their claim, ought not to have been appointed on it. It was natural, that if the hon. and gallant Gentleman was appointed as an advocate of these officers, Sir Charles Yorke was equally eligible as an advocate of the views of the Horse Guards. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said the Committee in their Report did not go into the merits of the case. That, however, was entirely a matter of opinion. The Committee had all the evidence before them. They had the letter of Sir Charles Yorke before them, and they stated very clearly the reasons of the decision to which they came. On the 22nd of May Sir George Lewis wrote a letter to the Treasury, making a proposal, which was rejected by the Treasury, who were not willing to sanction an expenditure of some £11,000. They suggested another mode by which the same object might be obtained. The Commander-in-Chief then gave an unwilling assent to the proposal made by the Treasury, and threw the responsibility of it on the War Office. His Royal Highness showed that he was not prejudiced against these officers, but that he was willing to relieve them, if he could consistently with his public duty. The assent of the Commander-in-Chief was followed by many interviews between his Royal Highness and the Secretary of State, the result of which was that on the 7th of February General Foster wrote to the Secretary of State, stating that the Commander-in-Chief could not entertain the proposal. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had referred to the case of Colonel Gordon, as having been taken into consideration, but no sort of promise whatever had been made in that case. Sir Edward Lugard's letter contained no promise to Golonel Gordon that anything would be done for him, and therefore it was perfectly open to the Secretary of State and Commander-in-Chief to subsequently alter their decision. Within the last few days papers had been laid on the table of the House which were before, the Secretary of State and Commander-in-Chief during those conferences, which had a large share in influencing them in the decision to which they came. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had referred to one or two of them, and he would entreat the patience of the House while he read one at length. The letter was from Colonel Yorke—

"11, Gloucester Terrace, St. George's Road,

Pimlico, Jan. 17th, 1863.

"Sir,—Hearing a rumour that I am in danger of being superseded by twelve junior officers, may I be permitted to compare my case with that of the senior officer who thus claims precedence over me?

"I find I am the senior officer in the army disabled during the Crimean War, and beg to state that I was lieutenant colonel in command of my (late) regiment for a considerable period prior to the war. On the 25th of October 1854 I was disabled at the head of my regiment, and ten days subsequently the officer I allude to was likewise disabled, but as junior major of his. We were therefore both incapacitated from further active service in the field. The officer I allude to, however, was specially promoted three times since he was disabled, whereas I received no promotion beyond my just claims on the Royal Warrant of the 6th of October 1854.

"May I therefore beg the favour of your consideration in my behalf with his Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to spare me from being thus superseded?—I have, &c.

"JOHN YORKE,

Colonel, late 1st Dragoons.

"The Military Secretary, Horse Guards,

Whitehall, S. W."

Another letter, from Colonel Brownrigg, was too long to read; but that letter and others received in the interval between the decision and the reconsideration by the War Office were such as to show the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State that such a change would create widespread dissatisfaction in the army. It seemed to him that the hon. and gallant Member wished the House to understand that the distinguished service officers had derived no benefit from their promotion. [General LINDSAY said he never wished to lead the House to understand anything of the kind.] He certainly understood the hon. and gallant Member to say that they might as well have been in bed. [General LINDSAY: Hear, hear!] Sir T. Troubridge gained 109 steps. He was a major when wounded. He was made lieutenant colonel on the 9th of March 1855, and in ordinary course he would not have been lieutenant colonel until the 9th of March 1858. Colonel Gordon gained 499 steps. He was made lieutenant colonel on the 1st of August 1856, whereas in ordinary course he would not have been lieutenant colonel until the 1st of August 1861. Although the rewards had not been so great as it was intended these distinguished service officers should receive, they had not been wholly neglected, and there was a difference of opinion among themselves whether the change desired by the hon. and gallant Gentleman would be of unmixed advantage. It was not worth while for an ambiguous benefit to disturb the Army List, which had now been undisturbed for five years, and to introduce a feeling of uncertainty and confusion. For these reasons he submitted that it would be better not to reopen the question, although, on the part of the Secretary of State and on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, he was authorized to say that they had no objection to a Commission to re-investigate that which had been already very fully investigated, if it were the desire of the House of Commons that a Commission should be appointed.

Sir, as I had the honour to be a Member of the Commission which sat in 1854, and as my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (General Peel) is prevent- ed from being present by a domestic affliction, I hope the House will allow me to intrude upon it for a few minutes. I am sure I need not say that it was not the intention of the Commission to do injustice to any class of officers. Nor, indeed, would any injustice have been done if the recommendations of the Commission had been carried out. But the warrant which was drawn up was not in accordance with the views of the Commission. The result was that some officers found that injustice was done to them, and their claims were submitted to a Commission in 1858, which sat when my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire was Secretary for War. I think the noble Lord was incorrect in saying the Commission was quite aware of the claims of those distinguished service officers, whose claims have been brought forward with such perseverance and ability by my hon. and gallant Friend. The noble Lord admits that the Report of the Commission does not touch the case of these officers, and my right hon. and gallant Friend who was then Secretary of State for War, if he was here, would tell you, that had he been conscious that such would have been the effect of the Report of the Commission, he would have referred the subject back again to the Commission for further consideration. The noble Lord has made no answer to this case. His speech has not touched it, and I appeal to the House whether it is a light consideration, that officers who have gallantly served their country with such distinction as to receive rewards and honours, should feel aggrieved by the conduct of the War Department. And who are those officers? I will mention only two of them. The first is a most gallant officer, who some time since was a distinguished Member of this House—I mean Colonel Percy Herbert. He left this House because, though but a young man, his services have been so conspicuous that he has been called on for employment by the Horse Guards. He has served his country with the greatest distinction in Africa, in the Crimea, and in India. Colonel Percy Herbert gave evidence before the Commission which took these complaints into consideration, that a number of officers, over whom he had been promoted in the field, were afterwards put over his head. Another officer has been already mentioned—that very distinguished man, who has been mutilated in the service of his country, Sir Thomas Tronbridge. Many hon. Members will remember seeing Sir Thomas Troubridge pass in his wheeled chair before Her Majesty, when she distributed the Crimean medals at tile back of the Horse Guards. He passed in that way because both his feet had been shot off. Now, it is no light matter that such men should labour under a sense of injustice. All they ask for at the hands of the Government is inquiry. But if these men are suffering under a sense of injustice, the question will immediately arise whether that feeling is well founded or not. Have they any good reason for thinking so? What is the answer to that question? And let me again remind the noble Lord that it is a question which he has passed over. The answer to that is, that their case has been recognised by three successive Secretaries of State. General Peel not only says that the case is a case of injustice, but that he never would have taken that warrant to the Queen if he had known its effect. And who are the other two? They are men whose memory Her Majesty's Government would not wish to treat with disrespect. The one is the late Lord Herbert; the other is that distinguished man whom, I am sorry to say, we have just lost. Was Lord Herbert a man likely to arrive at an unsound conclusion on this point? Was Sir George Lewis likely to be led into an erroneous opinion about it? What were the opinions of Lord Herbert and of Sir George Lewis? In a letter written by Sir Edward Lugard, in the name of Sir George Lewis, he says—

"It was the opinion of Lord Herbert—in which Sir George Lewis fully concurs—that these officers had reasonable grounds of complaint."

And immediately afterwards General Lugard says that Sir George Lewis, though fully alive to the inconvenience which might be occasioned, is nevertheless of opinion that these officers are justly entitled to some relief. Well, what is the answer of the noble Lord? That it would be inconvenient to disturb the Army List. That is the only answer that we get in the case of men who have bled for their country. Now, I repudiate such an idea, and I tell the noble Lord I do not believe that there are a dozen men to be found in the army who would not rather have the Army List disturbed than that injustice should be done to these officers. This may be a complicated matter, but the issue before the House is a simple one. There are twenty-one distinguished men who say, "You have done us injustice," and there are three successive Secretaries of State all acknowledging the justice of the plea; but all the answer the Government can give is that it would be inconvenient to disturb the Army List.

said, he had looked very carefully into the case; and while there could be no question whatever as to the grievance, the only question was whether the injustice could be properly remedied. There were upwards of twenty officers in the Crimean War who by their bravery and skill had obtained great distinction, and the Queen was advised to make them colonels. Two years afterwards a very large body of officers were also made colonels, but their commissions were antedated by four years, and the consequence was that the men who had been first made colonels found themselves planted at the bottom of the list. It was easy to understand what a blow that must have been to their professional prospects. In a case of such extreme importance as that those who had distinguished themselves, and had been promoted for merit, should not be deprived of the advantages of the promotion which the Queen had given them, there were grave public considerations which ought to induce the Government to consent to the Motion.

said, he happened to have been a Member of the Royal Commission of 1858, and he felt bound to state that in the investigation, which was presided over by Lord Herbert, and was carried on with great care, the question of these officers he believed never came before the Commission, and they were lost sight of in the Report. He hoped, therefore, the inquiry which was asked for would be granted, as, if the decision of the Commission of 1858 were right, it might be re-affirmed; and if wrong, it might very properly be set aside. Those distinguished officers were very deserving of the rewards which had been given them, but they were deprived of those rewards by having a vast number of officers put over their heads. The least the Government could do was to have the matter reconsidered by a subsequent Commission, and then no one would have grounds of complaint.

, said, he was rejoiced to observe that the noble Lord the Under Secretary for War (the Marquess of Hartington) was too honest to undertake very seriously the task of making the worse ap- pear the better cause. He (Mr. Kinglake) had made it his duty to look a little into the question, and he could honestly say, the moment the mass of technicality which covered it was removed, no one could doubt for an instant the justice of the claim. The clearness of the case might be seen in this way. It would have been possible to describe the effect of what was done by the Warrant of 1858 in two ways. It might have been said either that the 140 colonels who were then placed over the 21 should have been raised in the Army List; or the 21 colonels—to use a public school phrase—should be "turned down." The form of expression that was used referred to the exalting of the 140 officers, and therefore the objectionable character of the transaction did not appear. But had the other form of expression been used, had it been proposed that Sir Thomas Troubridge and the other officers in the same position should be degraded in the Army List, he would venture to affirm that not a man in the country would be found to support the proposal. They must not be told that it was a case of military technicality. It was not. It was true his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief had been eon-suited, but the wrong had been done by a Secretary of State, who had admitted that he had done it. Under the circumstances, he trusted that the Government would act according to the all but complete concession which was afforded by the noble Marquess the Under Secretary for War, and assent to the Motion, with the omission of the three objectionable words, which, as being argumentative only, were not necessary to give effect to the gallant Officer's intention. He admitted that there was a good deal of difficulty in repairing errors of the kind, but that was a difficulty which must be met by the Royal Commission. He believed that there was one simple mode of rectifying it, without endangering the position of any other officer—namely, by granting so small a sum of money as £11,000; and he was told that the only objection which the Treasury had felt to asking the House to grant that sum was, that the injustice was so obvious that it ought to have been remedied in the other way.

Sir, there are two things which I think it desirable to avoid, if possible. One is, the habitual interference of this House with the detailed management of the army, because that is no part of the constitutional functions of the House of Commons, and, if continued, must naturally lead step by step to very objectionable results; and the other is, the presence in the public mind of any circumstances which give rise to the opinion that injustice has been done to any class of deserving public servants. I will not enter into the details of the question. I think that what was stated by my noble Friend shows, that when the matter was last looked into by a Committee of officers in 1861, the majority—I believe all the Members, with the exception of the hon. and gallant Member—were of opinion that it was not advisable to disturb the existing arrangement. At the same time, I can quite understand that the parties concerned and their numerous friends, interested in regard to all that concerns them, and impressed with the distinguished services which they have rendered, may leave, not only upon the minds of hon. Members of this House, but also of the public, the impression that some wrong has unintentionally been done which will admit of a remedy. The course which I should venture to suggest to the hon. and gallant Member opposite, would, in my opinion, meet both objections. I should propose to him to withdraw his Motion, thereby avoiding committing this House to an interference with the detailed military administration of the army; and, if he adopts that course, I will, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, engage that a Commission shall be issued. I trust that that will show that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to avoid inquiry, and have no wish to resist any suggestion which is founded upon a sense of injustice, whether rightly or wrongly entertained. Whatever that Commission may recommend will probably meet the merits of the case, as regards these officers, on the one hand, without doing injustice to the corresponding claims of other officers on the other.

If I understand the speech of the noble Lord, in substance the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend is conceded, and I am sure I never heard a case recommended to the consideration of Parliament on a clearer principle of justice, or one which so completely enlisted the sympathies of both sides of the House. I should not have risen had it net appeared to me that the advice given by the noble Lord might really place the House in an inconvenient and almost ridiculous posi- tion, and I must say to a certain extent even the Government itself. The constitutional practice, entirely recognised, that it is not the business of Parliament to interefere with the Government of the army—is one which I am sure no one will dispute; but surely the noble Lord does not lay it down as a principle that Parliament, and especially the House of Commons, which is called upon yearly to consider the Army Estimates and to Vote large sums for the maintenance of the army, cannot exercise its privilege in a constitutional manner of expressing its opinions upon any point connected with the management and organization of the army. It is necessary, and the practice of this House has provided, that this privilege of Parliament should be exercised with a due deference to the prerogative of the Crown. And how has it made that salutary provision? In this way. If it be the opinion of the House of Commons that some arrangement with respect to the management of the army is faulty, it cannot, and it does not, presume to pronounce a decision to that effect by a Resolution of this House, but it humbly approaches the Throne with a respectful and loyal Address praying Her Majesty to exercise her prerogative, and to take those steps which may bring about the result which the House desires. There is therefore nothing unconstitutional in proposing an Address to the Crown on the subject of military affairs, and requesting Her Majesty to deign to interfere to bring about the result which the wisdom of Parliament suggests. But it is not constitutional, when the House of Commons unanimously agrees that a grievance exists in the management of the army, that it has not been redressed, and that it ought to be redressed, and at the same time confesses and announces, under the advice of the leader of the House and the chief adviser of the Crown, that this House has not the power of redressing the grievance, that they should be silent, with the secret understanding that the Government is to take some step behind the scene that will accomplish the redress which the House has acknowledged to be absolutely necessary. The advice which the noble Lord has given to the House to my mind is erroneous. The course which my hon. and gallant Friend has adopted is a constitutional course; it is the only decorous mode in which the result which every Member on both sides of the House wishes to be accomplished can be really effected. The feeling of the House having been evidenced by the discussion which has taken place, the Government have conceded the object of the Motion; and I should not have interfered had I not thought that the House was taking a course which they might regret hereafter, and that the Government was adopting a step which I do not think wise or dignified. I think that Her Majesty's Government will upon second thoughts feel, that if redress is to be given, there is only one constitutional manner in which this House can act, and that is by humbly placing ourselves at the foot of the Throne, and begging Her Majesty to exercise her prerogative, and redress those grievances which Her Majesty's subjects have experienced, and which Her Majesty's Government have acknowledged.

said, in bringing forward his Motion, he considered he had adopted the most constitutional form of procedure. He had not asked the House to decide the question, but he had moved an Address to the Crown, the legitimate authority, from whence sprang command in the army. With regard to the offer made by the noble Lord, he had had the pleasure of sitting opposite to him for seventeen years, and during that time he did not think he had ever seen anything in the noble Lord's conduct which could at all warrant him in declining the pledge the noble Lord had offered. Therefore, in faith that the noble Lord would, on his own authority, appoint a Commission, he would be most happy to withdraw his Motion.

said, he rose to call attention to the correspondence which had recently been laid before Parliament between Her Majesty's Government and the Governors of Canada and of New Zealand respectively, concerning the military defences of those Colonies. In the course of the discussions which had taken place on the Army Estimates he (Mr. Arthur Mills) had been requested by several hon. Members to originate a debate in which the general question of the relations between Great Britain and her Colonies, in respect to the defence of the Empire might fairly be raised. He wished to disclaim any desire to alienate the allegiance of any of the Colonies, or to precipitate the dismemberment of the Empire; while, on the other hand, he did not desire to retain them in subjection one hour longer than they chose. Nor had he any wish to enter into the question of colonial party politics, which more particularly belonged to the colonists themselves. He would briefly state the facts of the case to which he wished to call attention. During the last year a commission had been appointed in Canada, consisting of eight members, seven of whom, he believed, were Canadians, to inquire into the defences of Canada. They recommended to the local Parliament that a militia force of 50,000 men should be raised and trained, together with a reserve force of the same number. He believed that the recommendation of the Commissioners was unanimous. A Bill was brought in to carry it out, but the Canadian Parliament did not adopt it. And instead of a local force of 50,000 men they embodied and trained only 15,000—not much more than one-fourth of the force recommended by their own Commission as absolutely essential for the defence of the Colony. At the present moment there were little more than the above-named number of Volunteers and militia-men armed with Enfield rifles in Canada. In addition to the local force of 15,000 there were about 10,000 or 12,000 Imperial troops in Canada. The Canadians justified themselves for their apparent shortcomings in self-defence, on the ground that they were in no danger, and did not think they ought to submit to the inconvenience and expense of raising a large force when they were in no peril. He admitted that the Canadians were the best judges as to whether they were in peril or not. But he would put the case thus. They were cither in peril or they were not. If they were in peril, then they ought to have raised a larger force for the defence of the province; for if Canada were really in danger of invasion, it was worse than ridiculous to suppose that a frontier of 1,000 miles, assailable by land or water at every point, could be adequately protected against the incursions of a hostile army by ten or a dozen British regiments. If they were not in peril, then they did not require 10,000 or 12,000 Imperial troops in Canada, whose expense was defrayed by the taxpayers of this country. It might be said that to advocate the withdrawal of the troops from Canada would, on grounds of Imperial policy, be to make a monstrous proposition; but when the House of Commons accepted, by a formal Resolution last year, the liability of England for the protection of her Colonies from perils occasioned by "Imperial policy," could it be contended for a moment that Canada was thereby released from all responsibility for her own defence. If England had bombarded New York or Portland, or any city on the American seaboard, and had thereby provoked an attack on Canada, England would undoubtedly be bound to bear the brunt of such an invasion as her own policy had invited; but he should wish to know in what estimation the loyalty of the Canadians was to be held, if they showed no sympathy with us in such cases, for example, as that of the Trent, and upon what grounds they would be justified in casting upon the mother country the whole of the responsibility which she was willing to share with them? The relations which ought to subsist between this country and Canada in respect to the question of her defence had, he thought, been very well laid down in a despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, in which he stated that the main security against aggression which the latter enjoyed consisted in the fact that a war with Canada meant a war with England; but that it did not therefore follow that England could afford to maintain there an unlimited number of troops, while it still remained true that the defence of Canadian territory must mainly depend on the Canadians themselves. In bringing the subject forward he was not actuated by any spirit of hostility to Canada; on the contrary, he introduced it because he believed the executive Government of this country needed the support of Parliament in carrying on a correspondence in which it appeared from the papers Canada acted the part rather of a hostile Power than of an integral portion of the empire. The total sum paid by the Parliament and people of Canada in 1862, for the various purposes to which he had referred, was only between £60,000 and £70,000, as against a sum (exclusive of extras) paid by this country of little less than a million sterling. He did not think that they ought to be carrying on protracted negotiations on the subject with the Government of Canada. He considered that the time was come for taking a more decisive attitude, and for putting an end to the undignified and unsatisfactory wran- gling between the Secretary of State and the Parliament of Canada, whether by the Canadians increasing their militia force or the Government of England withdrawing the troops from Canada he did not pretend to say; but one of those two courses ought to be adopted. Passing from Canada to New Zealand, he might observe, that though the case of the latter colony was widely different from that of Canada, they were almost similar in that both were nearly independent. The colony of New Zealand had possessed a constitution for ten years. When that constitution was granted, the Crown thought proper to make a reservation with reference to the right of dealing with the native races—not in the spirit of interference with the Powers of the local Parliament, but in obedience to the principles which had always actuated this country in dealing with those portions of the empire which were inhabited by warlike tribes. Whether that reservation was wisely made or otherwise he would not discuss, but its effect had been from that time forward to throw nearly every expense incurred for the defence of the colony upon the Imperial Government. Was the claim on the part of the people or the Legislature of New Zealand well founded? They said, "You, the Crown of England, by your representatives have been meddling in colonial affairs, so you must bear all the responsibility of conflicts with the natives." But to what extent, as compared with the Colonial Legislature, had the Crown of England interfered? In 1858 alone, no less than four Acts dealing with the natives were passed in the Colonial Legislature, none of which were disallowed or interfered with, but received the Royal assent. The Imperial Parliament, during the same period, had only passed two principal Acts—one by which the Queen relinquished any scintilla of power that might previously have been reserved, and the other guaranteeing a loan of half a million to New Zealand. In the mean time, the war expenditure, occasioned by settling disputes in which we as a nation had not the minutest interest, had been almost entirely borne by Great Britain. For five years negotiations had been carried on between successive Secretaries of State in England and the New Zealand Government, with the object of inducing the colony to pay the moderate sum of £5 a man for the soldiers employed in its defence. Every one of those soldiers cost England £100 per man per annum, and it was sought to make New Zealand bear one-twentieth of their cost. Sanguine economists hoped that such an arrangement had been effected; but it would appear from the latest accounts, that of the proportion of £35,000 to be sustained for the year 1862 by the colony £25,000 were swept away by various deductions, leaving only £10,000 to be contributed by the colony towards the vast military expenditure of which Sir George Grey spoke in the following terms:—

"The rate of military expenditure now going on, allowing nothing for the cost of operations in the field, amounts to nearly £400,000 a year, and to this a sum of £260,000 will have to be added for each six months' operation in the field, or a sum of £520,000 a year, making a total of £920,000 a year if operations are continued; and I concur with the Lieutenant General in thinking that the sum actually expended would be more likely to exceed than to full short of this sum. When to this amount are added the sums due to the services not included in the Estimates, the total military expenditure will be very largely increased."

The Colonial Treasurer, moreover, gravely suggested that no present attempt should be made to meet these liabilities; but after the Native difficulty was at an end, and the respective proportions to be borne by the Imperial Government and the colony had been ascertained, that a loan should be raised to cover the latter. The practical inference to be drawn from the correspondence was, in his mind, that the time had come, not for negotiation, not for despatch writing, but for distinct and definite action. That action need not involve any hardship upon the people of New Zealand. The case was argued as if England was leaving the colonists to their fate, or, still worse, leaving the colonists to murder the Maoris, a supposition which was shocking to those philanthropists who before contended for the granting of representative institutions and for absolute rights of self-government. Surely, if men were capable of managing their own affairs, they ought to know how to behave in face of a warlike race like the Maoris. He did not say that England would be able to retire altogether from these contests; but if the colonists, without being deserted, were taught to lean more on themselves, there would be fewer disturbances, and they would behave with greater circumspection towards the native race, knowing that they would no longer be backed up in all their unrighteous claims. Accusations of injustice might be levelled against the parent State for such a course, but it must be remembered that the relations of England towards her Colonies had entirely changed. She could no longer legislate for them; she could not recall the days when they were bound to her by exclusive commercial treaties, or when they were compelled to receive her criminal population. The question in the present day was no longer whether Great Britain should tax her Colonies, but to what extent the Colonies should be permitted to tax Great Britain. Men were now asking, very naturally, whether at this time especially of severe commercial distress at home, the distant Colonies of our Empire were to be permitted permanently to garrison their frontiers with our troops while they excluded our manufactures from their markets. He believed that Great Britain had it in her power to retain her Colonies not in inglorious and unlovely subjugation, like the colonies of ancient Rome, but in an affectionate and far more enduring allegiance. If the Home Government were really about to inaugurate a better system, he believed, that so far from the days of their colonial empire being numbered, the affections of the Colonies for the mother country would be more closely cemented than if they continued to be alternately dandled and overawed. The Colonies had shown the most generous feelings towards the mother country by their benevolent contributions during the Russian war, the Indian mutiny, and now during the distress in the cotton districts. What they had now to be taught by a resolute and decisive policy on the part of that House was that communities must share in the burdens and responsibilities if they would participate in the privileges of free men. The hon. Member concluded by moving an Address for the Correspondence.

said, he rose to second the Motion. The facts brought before the House were most important, and he should like to be informed by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies what were the advantages they derived from the two dependencies to which his hon. Friend had referred, as a counterbalance. The Canadians levied a duty of 20 per cent on some of their most important manufactures. Yet Canada looked to England to keep up a large military force for her protection, and there were about 5,000 British troops in that Colony. The last Returns gave an annual expenditure on the Colonies of about £4,250,000, of which, he doubted not, about £3,000,000 might be saved. It was said that "the sun never set upon the British dominions," but that was a large sum to pay for the vainglorious boast. Whenever they had any dispute with the United States, they always threatened to take Canada, just as though Canada was of any advantage to England. Of course, it would be extremely unpleasant to have Canada wrested from them by force of arms; but he thought that the people of Canada should, to a greater extent, undertake the duty of their own defence, especially as they were better able to bear taxation than the people of this country.

said, he was glad to find that his hon. Friend (Mr. A. Mills) looked with a favourable eye upon the correspondence which had taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of Canada and New Zealand. He (Mr. C. Fortescue) quite agreed in much which had been said by his hon. Friend as to the course that should be pursued by Her Majesty's Government; and, indeed, it was evident from the papers before the House that Her Majesty's Government thought that the Canadian Government had performed but a very slight portion of their duty in reference to the defence of the province against any dangers that might arise, and that opinion had been very frankly conveyed by the Colonial Office to the Canadian Government. The Governor General of Canada (Lord Monck) had expressed a similar opinion in a despatch which did him great credit for frankness and honesty of tone; and the Home Government, agreeing in the opinion expressed by Lord Monck, had stated that they thought that the Governor General of Canada had consulted the real interests of the Colony in the language he had adopted, and thus had, with all courtesy, but with perfect frankness, conveyed that opinion to the Canadian Government. In his opinion, the Home Government was under an obligation to protect the distant provinces of the Empire against such dangers as they could do but little themselves to avert or incur, so far as the policy which they maintained towards other Powers was concerned. So far as regarded her internal affairs, however, a colony such as Canada might do much either to incur or avert any blow to which she might be liable, according as she maintained towards other Powers a resolute and well prepared attitude, or exhibited a posture of indifference and unreadiness, trusting to chance or the strong arm of the mother country to protect her. While he fully agreed with his hon. Friend that it was the duty of the Home Government to impress these opinions on the Government of Canada, he would not have the House underrate the exertions which the Canadian Government and people had made under the existing circumstances. Too little, it was true, had been done; yet something had been accomplished, and still more was in progress. According to the last accounts they had from Canada, the Volunteer system was carried on there with considerable activity and spirit. At the beginning of the year there were some 25,000 Volunteers actually organized and under training, and that number was rapidly increasing. In addition to that, attempts, and apparently successful attempts, had been made to render the rural militia of Canada fit for service in any emergency which might arise. The real difficulty connected with military organization in Canada occurred in the rural districts. As might to a great degree be expected, the Volunteers were found in the towns. The rural districts were thinly peopled, with great intervals between them; and it was far less easy to draw any large bodies of men together from their farms for any length of time to undergo training than was the case in this country. Yet that difficulty ought to be encountered and overcome. But the officers and non-commissioned officers of militia throughout the rural districts of Canada were forming themselves into drill associations, and no officer was allowed to remain on the list of the militia without qualifying himself as such. [A laugh.] The hon. Gentleman might laugh, but that was a great improvement on the previous state of things, and he could tell his hon. Friend that the highest military authorities in Canada were of opinion that the rural population—a hardy race, accustomed to field sport, the use of fire-arms, and an active self-reliant life—would, under the command of trained officers and non-commissioned officers, who were being provided, easily and in a short time be formed into a most efficient body of troops for the defence of their country. That was not merely the sanguine hope of the Home Government, but the deliberate conviction of military critics in the Colony. He was far from saying that enough was done to meet the requirements of the case, or that the Canadian Government and Legislature had proved themselves equal to their duties. Still, there could be no doubt that the people of Canada were in this matter in advance of their political leaders; that there was among them the strongest feeling of loyalty and attachment to their institutions and to their connection with the mother country; and that, in the event of danger arising, there would in a very short time be a large and valuable force raised by the people of Canada, who would be as ready as on any previous occasion to sacrifice life and property in defence of their liberty and of the British connection. There had been very considerable difference of views between the Home Government and that of Canada upon some points, and one of these points was a very important one. His noble Friend at the head of the Colonial Office had, in reference to taxes, expressed his opinion to the Governor General that the finances and credit of Canada would never stand upon the footing that they ought to occupy until the Canadian Government made up its mind to incur the unpopularity of proposing a measure of direct taxation. Her Majesty's Government, however, could do nothing in the matter but use their moral influence, and they had freely expressed their opinion that nothing would tend so much to raise the credit of Canada as a measure for direct taxation, which would enable her to lower her duties upon imports. He must, however, observe, that in his opinion those duties had been misrepresented as duties for protection. He was convinced that they were not imposed for that purpose, although, no doubt, the duties were higher than the manufacturers and the importers of this country had a right to expect. The greatest part of the correspondence which had been referred to related to the vexed question of the relative proportion of the cost of troops and of the defence of the Colony which should be borne by the Home and the Colonial Governments respectively. It was impossible to lay down any definite rule upon the subject, but his noble Friend had endeavoured to convince the Colonial Government of their obligation in the matter; without denying, however, the obligation of England. Now, as to the obligation of the Imperial Government to defend the Colonies, They constantly heard Gentlemen of high authority representing that the great and beneficial changes which had taken place of late years in the commercial and political relations of the Colonies towards the mother country had almost discharged the Imperial Government from the duty of defending the Colonies. Without at all wishing to lighten the duty of self-defence which rested upon any colony, and on Canada in particular, he thought that it was quite necessary that the House should understand the nature of the change which had taken place, and what were the obligations which rested upon the mother country. The changes in reference to colonial affairs had put an end for ever to any attempt to subordidate the interests of the Colonies to the interests of the mother country by commercial arrangements. The Colonies were left perfectly free to pursue their own views of their own interests in all fiscal and commercial matters, which were within the limits of Imperial treaties with foreign Powers, according to their own views; and every idea of controlling the commercial legislation of the Colonies for the supposed benefit of the mother country had been abandoned. He said "supposed benefit," because the new system was really more advantageous than the old one for the mother country. In regard to their own political affairs, the largest and most liberal powers of self-government had been conceded to the colonists within their own limits; but it appeared to be forgotten that beyond those limits those great changes had changed nothing. It was forgotten that in reference to all external affairs, either in connection with another Colony or with a foreign Power, no change had taken place; and, indeed, it was essential to the very nature of a dependency that its relations with foreign Powers should be controlled by the central and Imperial Government. For all practical purposes many of the Colonies, with reference to their domestic and internal affairs, were about as free as any country in the world; but in all those questions upon which the issues of peace and war depended, in all negotiations and treaties with other States, the authority of the Imperial Government and Parliament was supreme. They must be the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies; and therefore the obligation of assisting them in case of war still rested on the mother country. That obligation the Home Government had fully and frankly acknowledged in the correspondence under discussion. It must be a matter of discretion in the Government for the time being whether it would not be safer and cheaper in the long run, as a measure of protection, even in time of peace to maintain a certain moderate force in a colony like Canada; and certainly, considering the times in which we lived, it did seem pretty certain, if such a course had not been followed, if no Imperial force had been sent to Canada or maintained there, the conclusion which must naturally have been drawn would have been that this country had repudiated all obligation of defending any portion of its Colonial Empire. The Government thought it their duty, in the despatch which had been quoted by his hon. Friend, to admit to the Canadian Government the obligation he had described. But that obligation of the Imperial Government in no degree impaired the obligation under which Canada lay to defend herself to the best of her power. The defence of Canadian territory must mainly depend on the Canadian people themselves. At the present moment Canada was more prosperous, more contented and loyal, than at at any former period; Canada was better able to defend herself than she ever was before, and in spite of the shortcoming of the Government she would be found, in case of danger, more willing than ever to fight in defence of the institutions she enjoyed. The Government felt that the public men of Canada had not shown that foresight which might have been expected, and had not yet provided that organization in time of peace in which confidence might be placed for a time of war; but the Government had not neglected to enforce their views on Canada, and would continue to do so. So much with regard to Canada. He next came to New Zealand, which, however interesting in itself, was a very special case, and did not raise any general question of Imperial expenditure on account of the Colonies, of which Canada was the most important instance. The collision which had taken place in New Zealand was between the native tribes and colonists within their own territory, and was not a question of the defence of the Colony against any of the great Powers of the world, in which the empire at large was interested or involved. The persons who settled on the island of New Zealand found it peopled by a powerful and formidable race. There were difficulties in founding a settlement under those circumstances—difficulties which were not met with in the formation of other colonies. Ten years ago representative institutions and a constitution with a popular assembly were given to New Zealand. Two or three years afterwards that system was completed by a grant of responsible government. As a rule, the mother country would increase her obligations if the causes which led to war were under her control, and hitherto the Imperial Government had increased its obligations towards New Zealand by endeavouring to maintain a separate system of native management apart from the government and the control of the settlers. That system had been maintained since popular institutions were granted to the colony of New Zealand, and had been known as the system of double government. Various efforts were made to carry out this separate government for the natives, but it became evident from experience, that whilst the system of double government prevented some evils, it also prevented much good being done in the shape of various necessary improvements. It permitted the King government to grow up, and in fact entirely failed. The natives were allowed to arm themselves in the most efficient manner, because the New Zealand authorities were afraid of incurring the unpopularity of putting the law against them in force. The Crown had done all it could to maintain a system of government which should alike protect natives and the settlers from the evils of war; but in that object it had failed. In reference indeed, to this New Zealand war, he still, as he had always, believed that the chiefs and the natives had no ground to complain of any wrong done to them, and that the colonists did them no injustice. But war had come, and Imperial control had failed to avert it. Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government made up its mind, under the advice of Sir George Grey, to resign the attempt of performing a duty which they could no longer fulfil. They had long felt their obligations to the natives of New Zealand, and they did not surrender them till by painful experience they convinced themselves that the grant of popular institutions left no alternative but to intrust the local Government with unlimited authority over all the inhabitants of the island. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government did not repudiate any of the responsibilities which might justly be supposed to attach to them, although the Address of the New Zealand Parliament would seem to anticipate some such repudiation. The Government, in sending a large body of troops to New Zealand, had recognised the responsibility which the Imperial control over native affairs had imposed upon them. They did not at present call upon the Colonial Government for any contribution towards the cost of those troops, but only made a reasonable demand for repayment of advances made for the maintenance of the local military and volunteers in the Colony, and for the construction of military roads, which were of incalculable benefit to the Colony. Those demands they were enforcing against New Zealand, and forewarning them of their obligations in regard to their self-defence. They admitted, however, their obligation to carry the Colony through the present crisis, and once more to establish peace and tranquillity, and Her Majesty's Government was prepared for a limited time to continue the forces necessary for that purpose. Having said thus much concerning Canada and New Zealand, he did not think it necessary to dwell upon the latter part of the Motion, which the hon. Gentleman did not seem much inclined to press. He would only say that other correspondence was going on, but it was in such a state that it would not be for the public interest to produce it. His noble Friend was giving his best attention to the important subject of military protection of the Colonies, with a view of making such arrangements as would enable this country by degrees to reduce its expenditure, at the same time that it faithfully performed all its just duties towards the Colonies.

said, he had hoped that the Motion would have led to some explicit declaration of the intentions of the Government, but from the speech of the hon. Under Secretary he could gather nothing but that it was the intention of the Government to continue in the course they had pursued since the affair of the Trent. He had thought the policy of the Government was that so long as a Colony was in its infancy, and unable to defend itself, this country was bound to defend it; but when the Colony became capable of doing-something for its own protection, the mother country was only bound to supply any deficiencies; and when the Colony was out of its infancy, and became able to protect itself, then the duty of this country ceased altogether. It appeared, however, that such was no longer the policy of the Government, as in the case of Canada—a Colony in an advanced stage of prosperity, and able in a great measure to defend itself—the Government had just declared its acquiescence in a course which simply meant, on the part of the colonists, that they meant to do nothing for themselves. Canada was a great and powerful country with 2,500,000 inhabitants, not very rich perhaps, but in thriving circumstances. The latest statistics showed that in 1859 the two provinces possessed 1,900 miles of railways, that the exports and imports each amounted to £7,000,000 annually, and that the revenue was between £1,800,000 and £1,900,000 a year, or, deducting interest upon debt, the net revenue was £1,200,000. Why should not such a country do something towards its own protection? The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary said that the Canadians, although they had not done all that might have been expected of them, were doing a good deal. But what was the military and naval expenditure of Canada as compared with that of England? It appeared that during the last few years the people of this country had been paying about 17s. a head per year for military and naval forces to defend not only this country, but also the Colonies, while the Canadians had only paid towards their own defence a sum equal to less than 5d. per head, having deemed it an act of great liberality to vote £50,000 towards that object. It appeared that Canada had raised only 15,000 men, not regular troops, but militia, for the defence of their country. From the correspondence he found that in August the Colonial Secretary had transmitted a despatch to the Governor General of Canada, and in October the Executive Council sent an answer to that despatch in which they stated their explicit intention of doing nothing more than they had hitherto done, as it would be too great a drag on their resources. Their feelings were exceedingly friendly; he did not ac- cuse them of any want of loyalty, and he had no doubt that they wished to continue their connection with this country; but they said that to do anything more than they were now doing would be too great a strain upon their resources. Now, what did Her Majesty's Government intend to do? In July last a debate took place, in which the noble Lord at the head of the Government stated that the Government had done for the Canadians all that they intended to do, and that it rested with the Canadians to do the remainder, and that they did not intend to recall the troops then in Canada or to send additional troops there. But in the event of the contingencies which had been referred to, it was impossible that the small number of English troops in Canada could suffice to defend that Colony if it were seriously invaded. If war occurred with America, it would be absolutely necessary to send out additional troops, or our army there would be humiliated by having to abandon the country, or would be exposed to annihilation. Other Colonies, and in particular the Australian Colonies, had made large contributions towards their own defence; and if Canada, which was older than they were, was allowed to rely on the parent State, other Colonies would complain with reason of the injustice of putting them on a different footing. In the case of war, the English army would not receive much assistance from the Canadians, who were not training themselves to any considerable extent, and the result would be, that this country would be completely drained of its garrisons for the protection of Canada. Could Her Majesty's Government contemplate such a result with satisfaction? Another point was the effect which such a state of things might produce upon public opinion. At present public opinion was, generally speaking, in favour of the connection with the Colonies; but if war were to break out with the United States, it would not be war on a small scale. It would become necessary to increase the burdens of this country in order to defend Canada against invasion; and the effect upon public opinion would be disastrous, and might prove unfavourable to a continuance of our connection with Canada, and afterwards even with other Colonies. In a commercial point of view, and as affording a field for our surplus labour, he thought that such a connection was of great advantage to this country. But as he could not help feeling that the course which the Government were pursuing in Canada was calculated neither to propitiate the colonists, nor to render certain our connection with Canada, he had heard with extreme regret what must be regarded as an intimation that the Government meant to make no change in their policy on the question.

said, he could not agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just spoken, in thinking that the Government had no intention to make any change in the relations existing between the Colonies and the mother country. It seemed to him, both from the speech of the hon. Under Secretary and from the papers presented to Parliament, that they had arrived at a crisis in their relations with the Colonies, and he believed that the noble Duke the Colonial Secretary, and the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary, were entitled to the credit of having boldly faced the question, and brought it to an issue. He had foreseen long ago that the present state of things could not go on for ever, and his anticipations on the subject were at last fully verified. They had at length come to the end of the third phase of Colonial government. At first they left the Colonies very much to themselves, only imposing restrictions upon their commerce, for a supposed advantage to the mother country. Those two things did not agree with each other, freedom and subserviency; and when they attempted to tax the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, they separated themselves from the mother country on that ground. They attempted to govern the next Colonies from Downing Street, and for many years there was constant interference from that quarter. Not many years had elapsed since New Zealand, for example, found it impossible to build a lighthouse without a tedious process of obtaining sanction from the Crown in London. The departments of France were never more under the control of the Minister in Paris than the British Colonies were then, at least in theory, under that of the Colonial Secretary in London. Such a system could not last, and eventually it broke down completely. About thirty years ago England entered upon the third phase of Colonial government, extending to her Colonies the privilege of self-government—nay, more, stimulating their adoption of constitutions far more democratic than her own—and yet, at the same time, retaining in her own hands their protection and de- fence. They now saw the end of this confusion of two principles. The Colonial authorities, who represented the principle of self-government, and the Colonial Minister at home, who represented the principle of external defence, were diametrically opposed to each other, and the incongruous system was working out another change in the relations between the Colonies and the mother country. At that crisis he was anxious to point out that the sole remaining argument advanced by the Colonies for the continuance of England's protection and defence, while they were allowed to govern themselves, was a complete fallacy. The issue to which he alluded had assumed a very marked character, in two of their most important Colonies—namely, Canada and New Zealand. In dealing with the subject he would refer more especially to Canada, because it was the most important Colony, and because it was, at that moment, by far the most critically circumstanced. Indeed, the position of Canada was so critical that to to speak any incautious words about her would be madness, but to be altogether silent would be criminal. He believed, that if an earlier understanding had been come to between the mother country and Canada upon the question which the House was then considering, they might have looked to that Colony with confidence, and relied on her as an addition to our strength, whereas she formed at present our chief source of anxiety. Let them consider the point on which the Colonial Minister was at issue with the representatives of the people of Canada. The Colonial Minister said, in effect, to Canada, "You cannot be defended by troops from England; your main defence must be yourselves; your preparations are utterly inadequate; the Governor General calls your plans completely illusory;" and he laid down the general principle "that the right of self-government had the correlative duty of self-defence." To that the reply of the Colonial Executive Government was, "Your principle is not applicable to a Colony; your theory of colonial relations is novel and untried,"—so little cognizant were they of the early and more brilliant history of our Colonies; "we must rely mainly upon you for our defence; we have a decided aversion to military service, except in the presence of danger "—that is, they prefer danger first and preparation afterwards; "we consider the Intercolonial Railroad the primary consideration, and we must think of it before we develop the military resources of the Colony." They add, "We do not intend to do anything to cause war; if you are going to cause a war, you must fight it yourselves; we have enough to do to manage our own internal affairs and to suffer the effects of your policy." No two things could be more opposed than the respective theories of Downing Street and Canada. The principle at issue was the applicability to a Colony of the obvious maxim that self-government and self-defence were correlative terms; and the question which the House had now to consider was, whether a Colony enjoying self-government was to be freed from taking its share of the burden of military service alike with the taxpayers at home. He contended that there was not a shred of soundness in the sole argument of the Canadians in defence of such an immunity, that the foreign policy of the Empire was in the control of the Home Government, not in theirs, and that wars resulting from foreign policy should be fought at the sole expense of the central portion of the Empire. It was to be regretted that the Colonial Minister should have given the slightest countenance to such an argument by admitting that it involved a principle to some extent, merely reminding the colonists that they should do something on the ground that they were benefited by the protection of England; that their interests were promoted by their being an integral part of the Empire; and that a powerful navy, to which they contributed nothing, guarded their shores, their commerce, and their lives. He could not admit, that even if no such considerations existed, the argument for colonial inaction would have the slightest foundation. The foreign policy of the Empire, according to the Constitution, did not rest with the people at Home or in any Colony, or in any part of the Empire more than in another; it rested with the Crown, and the Crown was as much resident in Canada as in England. They had more than once been dragged into war without Parliament being aware of it. There was a recent war with Persia begun without the cognizance of Parliament. The control possessed by that House over the foreign policy of the Government consisted in their power to refuse supplies. The Colonies had the same power. It was a power which in England was seldom used, but habitually in the Colonies. The Crown at home may involve a Colony in war, but so may the Crown in a Colony, represented by the Governor, involve the Empire in war; and Governors had run us to the verge of war, as was the case in Canada when local struggles, under Sir Francis Head's government, led to American embroilment. The Parliament of Canada had unlimited powers, and might involve them in a war by enacting hostile tariffs. Besides, the circumstances, interests, and position of Canada, were not unlikely to bring war on England on her account. England's monopoly of foreign policy afforded no justification for Canada presenting a roll of 15,000 volunteers, and telling them that was its quota towards a defence of the Empire in America. It was nothing short of insolence for Canada to take up such a pretext. But he was afraid the question had been brought forward too late to have a bearing on any contingency that might presently arise in that quarter. In such an event, they must rather look to the 12,000 troops which, owing to the foresight of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, had been sent to Canada; though it was very likely that in case of a war they would rather want those men in this country, and then Canada would see the hollowness of her confidence. It had been well said that every soldier sent to Canada represented 100 Canadians who would have been enrolled and equipped if that soldier had not been sent out. [Mr. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE: That was said of Australia.] He understood it to apply to Canada, and thought it specially applicable there. He would then proceed to say a word or two on the case of New Zealand. In that Colony the same issue was raised, and was raised in a still more striking form, for the question there was not of foreign war, but of Native rebellion. The Governor of New Zealand and the Colonial Government in this country thought that the colonists ought to take upon themselves the charge of suppressing such a rebellion, but the Governor had announced that there were very unsatisfactory relations between him and his responsible advisers on that point. He said his Ministers were ready to assume the Native administration, but not so as to bind the Colony to any liability. The House of Representatives also declined to take any responsibility on themselves for the Native policy, and founded that refusal upon the ground that the right of deter- mining the policy to be pursued towards the natives of New Zealand had been reserved for the Crown. The Colonial Minister, too timidly, replied that that reservation had been made for the benefit of the Colony, and that the Governor who represented the Crown could do very little without supplies from the Colonial Parliament. The real answer was that the reservation of Native policy to the Crown was not a reservation to England, but to the Crown in New Zealand, as distinct from the Parliament there; and such a reservation gave them no claim on English taxpayers to pay for, nor on English soldiers to fight their Native wars. By the Constitution Act of 1852, the entire administration of its own affairs was transferred to New Zealand, and it was a mistake of that Colony and of Canada to suppose that they should have complete self-government, and at the same time throw the burden of their defence on the mother country. He agreed with the Colonial Minister that the time was come when a clear understanding should be arrived at with respect to the relative position of this country and the Colonies, and that the principle was a good one, that primarily the cost of wars should be borne by those for whose benefit they were carried on. He was glad that the subject had been discussed, and the important papers referred to by his hon. Friend (Mr. Mills) brought under the notice of the House. He regarded the policy of the Colonial Minister as deserving in every sense of the support of the House. He had only stopped short of what might, and he thought ought to have been done; but he trusted that the noble Duke would meet and overcome the difficulties which admittedly lay in his way, and carry the courageous policy he had adopted to its legitimate conclusion.

observed, that no subject was more worthy of the immediate and serious attention of the Government than the defences of Canada. There appeared at present to be a greater likelihood that England would be involved in a war with what were formerly the United States of America than with any other country. Every one in England would, he was sure, deprecate such an occurrence; but there was undoubtedly on the part of the Northern States a strong feeling of irritation against England, which might probably be fanned into a greater flame by the remarkable speeches of some hon. Gentlemen in the House. It was evident that great standing armies and navies would henceforth become habitual to North America, as they had hitherto been to Europe. It seemed a short-sighted proceeding to take a half-and-half policy with respect to the defence of the Colonies, and to throw small bodies of troops into them merely as objects for attack. If they came to the conclusion that it was their duty to defend the Colonies against every attack, they had no alternative but to keep large armies in them; but he gathered from the speech of the hon. Under Secretary of State that the Government were beginning to make a change with respect to the military defences of the outlying portions of the empire; and though it was obviously not a case in which any sudden change could be made, yet the impression conveyed by the hon. Under Secretary was that the dawn of a new state of things had begun. The House could not forget what it had been told only a short time back, that the reason why so large a force was kept up within the borders of England, was not for the defence of this country, but for the purpose of providing reliefs for the Colonies, and that a reduction in the large amount of troops scattered among the British possessions would provide means for the reduction of the army at home. No doubt, the amount of money that might be saved thereby every year would have to be calculated by millions. It would, indeed, be a great advantage to the taxpayers in this kingdom if the amount paid annually for the military and naval defences could be materially reduced; and no evil, but great good, I would ensue both to this country and the Colonies. It was shown by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his evidence, and by other statesmen, that it was a bad thing for the Colonies—prejudicial to feelings of independence and self-reliance—not to have the duty of self-defence thrown on them. Instead of the British Empire being weakened, it would be strengthened by the policy, he advocated; and, in case of a war arising, the military force of the country would be more powerful than now, for they all knew that in the present day the very essence of war consisted in the concentration of force and in massing the soldiers about a few of the most important points, and not in scattering them in small bodies over different points. The fact of this country keeping soldiers for the Colonies was a great inducement to those Colonies not to arm them- selves. One of the most important considerations connected with the question was what would be the result on the native tribes. He did not think that the present system gave any protection to the natives, and at the Cape of Good Hope and in New Zealand the colonists had shown themselves more ready to get into quarrels and wars with the natives than they might have been if they had foreseen that they would have had to pay the bill themselves. But there had arisen among the colonists a different feeling with regard to the natives, for whom more consideration was now entertained, and the colonists might be trusted not to enter upon cruel and oppressive wars against the natives. The only great argument against the withdrawal of troops from the Colonies was the idea, that as it was the Imperial policy of this country which involved the Colonies in war, this country was therefore bound to maintain their defence in the event of war arising. He could not go the length of saying that they had no claims on that account, but he thought that all fair demands would be met by giving them absolute security against the possibility of any enemy attacking or blockading their sea cost. Besides, if this Empire went to war again, it was to be hoped and believed that it would do so on just grounds, and in vindication of some sound principle; and in that case it was surely the duty of every part of the Empire, whether outlying or near at home, to take a share in the war. It appeared to him that a war such as that which occurred with Russia, when this country believed it was standing up for great Imperial interests, was as much for the advantage of every other part of the Empire as for this particular part at home. Undoubtedly, were it not for the protection of the British Empire, some of the Colonies might be exposed to the attacks of any strong Power which might feel inclined to take possession of them. With regard to Canada, for instance, who knew but that Russia might not have stretched out her long arm to take possession of the northern portion of the continent if it had not been that England stood in the background. By stationing small bodies of troops in distant and scattered Colonies, they were placing them in great danger. Ultimately, of course, the nation which had the dominion of the sea must conquer in any hostilities of this sort, but it was always a temptation to the enemy to attack a Colony where there was only a small body of troops, for the sake of getting hold of them. To scatter our forces all over the face of the earth, "dandling" the Colonies, as the hon. Member expressed it, and leading them away from a natural sense of independence, was a grievous mistake, and he hoped the Government would make up their minds to some decided policy.

said, that as the correspondence was incomplete at present, he had no desire to press his Motion for its production; and on the understanding that when it was in a condition to be produced Government would do so, he had no objection to withdraw it.

said, that his hon. Friend might be sure that when it was in a fit state to be produced he should have no objection to lay upon the table such portions as might he deemed advisable.

said, he rose to move an Address for a Commission to inquire into the best mode of constructing Iron-clad Ships. He was sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not in his place, for he should have claimed his support for the Motion, since its object was not only to place our navy on the best footing, but I also to effect a large saving of expenditure. The noble Duke who presided over the Admiralty with so much ability, and had shown himself a laborious public servant, had some time since, in his evidence before the Committee on the Admiralty, stated his opinion that the Members of the Board of Admiralty were overworked, and he had repeated it the other day at Sheffield, when he said that the absence of the Lords of the Admiralty from town for a day or two would greatly increase their work when they got back, and would cause serious embarrassment to the public service. At that moment they were engaged in the third costly reconstruction of the navy within his (Sir James Elphinstone's) time, and that change was not only one of form but of material. The whole responsibility of this enormous change rested on a body which, by the acknowledgment of its chief, was overworked. The evidence given before the Select Committee showed that there was not one officer of the Board who was not overworked, and under these circumstances he asked the House to refer the important question to which he referred to a great council, which, not relieving the Admiralty of its responsibility, would advise them on the results of the various experiments which had recently been made. The first nucleus of their iron fleet were the batteries built after the model of those sent by the Emperor of the French, which acted at Kinburn. From their peculiar square shape, they could not be moved about very easily from one part of the world to another; but he thought that the Admiralty, by putting bows and sterns to them, might have made them capable of being moved from one part of the coast to another, and exceedingly effectual for coast and harbour defences. The importance of iron vessels was then thoroughly proved, bat the Admiralty went on building wooden ships, though it was beyond a doubt that they were little better than floating slaughterhouses. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich, in the time of the Earl of Derby's Government, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to build iron sea-going vessels, and he did then very much what it was proposed by his Motion to do—he assembled a council of most able scientific men who, though not a Commission in form, partook of the nature of a Commission in every essential respect. They determined on the form of the Warrior and the Black Prince, and certainly nothing could surpass those vessels as models of naval architecture. He had recently been on board the Black Prince, and had examined every part of her which would be likely to show signs of distress after an eight or nine months' cruise and a good deal of bad weather. Certainly, a more durable structure he had never looked upon; and if it had not been for the discoloration of the paint inside and out, it would have been impossible to perceive that she had gone through such work. Still, her extraordinary length and her limited power of steerage would completely prevent her from being serviceable when she had lost her way in action. He was told that the manœuvre of wearing had been carried out off Lisbon, and that on one occasion, if not on more than one, there was an interval of seven miles between the first and the last ship when they came round. It was impossible in any sea whatever to get these ships round to the wind, and he was given to understand that it had been necessary to apply extra steam power to work the helm. These ships, 400 feet long, were rigged with three masts—those of 90-gun ships. While the size of the ships was enormously increased, the stature of the men remained the same. A ship's company did not average more than 5 ft. 5 in. or 5 ft. 6 in. in height, and they could not furl the sails of such masts or do anything smartly aloft. The ships ought to be masted with four masts, and a just proportion obtained between the size of the rigging and the size of the men. The other ships were more manageable, but he was not at all clear they were not also too large. They were certainly more easily handled, and were more comfortable to work, but he was not sure that they would not be condemned on account of size. There was another objection to the iron fleet, in the diversity of size. The ruling speed of a fleet was the speed of the slowest ship in it; and while vessels like the Warrior could go fifteen or sixteen knots an hour, there were some which, after a few weeks at sea, would scarcely maintain a speed of nine knots. In his opinion, equality of speed should be more rigidly maintained. The House had so lately heard from the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty a statement as to the French iron-clad fleet, which he believed was only being strictly worked up to the programme laid down by the French marine policy, that he would say nothing more upon that question. But, with regard to the iron fleet of America, events which had taken place had thrown a strong light upon the subject. In the construction of iron ships the American naval administration had been most completely untrammelled, and it was an extraordinary tiling that with the skill in shipbuilding which the Americans undoubtedly possessed they had not yet succeeded in constructing one serviceable iron-clad ship. The most reliable information as to the American iron fleet to which he had access was contained in a French work, Revue Maritime et Colonials, in which the American ships were minutely described. It appeared that there were eight or ten different classes, that the vessels varied in size from 4,000 tons down to 700, that they were of every variety of speed, and that they had every variety of coating. Yet in the recent attack on Charleston the nine iron-clads were entirely defeated, one being sunk and the others got off with great difficulty. One ship, to which he would beg particularly to call the noble Lord's attention, because she greatly resembled the Warrior in construction, the Ironsides, totally and entirely refused to answer her helm. The Indianola, one of the largest of the iron-clad ships, having lost her way, was attacked by two small gunboats, who punished her to such a degree that they were obliged to run her aground, and she then became a prey to the Confederates or was destroyed. The iron fleet of England was entirely destitute of ships of the description which thus subdued the Indianola. "We had no vessels laid down to carry a single heavy gun and to go at a good rate of speed; so that in the event of a ship like the Warrior being brought to a standstill by an attacking ship, they could fire at those points of infirmity, such as the screw gearing, sternpost, or part below the water line, which would undoubtedly bring the enemy's ship into such a position that her crew must abandon her. It was a pity the paper which contained reflections on the builders of iron ships in private yards had ever been written, and a still greater pity that it had ever been published, he had always said that it would be an imprudent thing for the Government to resort to private yards for wooden ships of war, because the private yards could never have such a large stock of seasoned timber as the Government yards, and, do what they would, could never turn out such ships as the Government. But iron shipbuilding was a totally different thing, and he defied any one to say that the iron ships built in private yards were not the perfection of naval architecture as far as structure was concerned. He thought, however, that as shipwrights were really the best class of workmen for iron ships, and by education and intelligence superior to ordinary blacksmiths, the Government should without delay set about building iron ships in all the dockyards. It was idle to say that there was any difficulty in that; for wherever the tide rose in a river to the height of some twenty feet, the manufacture of iron ships could go on to any extent. His object in moving for the Commission was not to interfere with the construction of those ships which it had been the pleasure of Parliament to sanction. It was with regard to the fleet of the future that he wished inquiry should take place; and that when the ships were completed, which he thought had been erroneously sanctioned, they should fall into an intelligible rule and obtain vessels of a more serviceable nature. He would express no opinion as to the comparative merits of broadsides and turret ships. He left that matter to be disposed of by the Commission. But the Admiralty would fail altogether in their duty if they laid down another ship without making allowance for the adoption of an invention almost, if not quite, perfected, which could alone overcome the fault of unwieldiness through length; he meant the invention of the double screw. He had the pleasure of witnessing on Saturday the trial of a vessel called the Hebe, an account of which many hon. Members had seen in The Times newspaper. The Hebe was fitted with two engines and two screws working entirely independent of one another. She possessed the same advantage over a ship having but one screw that a two-armed man might be supposed to have over a man with only one arm. If one of her screws were disabled, she could go three-quarter speed with the other. With one screw going ahead and the other reversed, she was able to turn on her axis, and in twenty seconds she could bring her guns to bear on any object. The two engines weighed little more than half the weight of one single direct screw engine; and from having those engines in the lower part of the ship they were enabled to put her coal bunkers up to protect her boilers from shot. The great advantage, however, of her construction was the power of manœuvring—the power of going ahead or astern and of turning round—which it gave her; a desideratum in warfare which it was impossible to overrate, and which the Achilles, the Warrior, and the Black Prince did not possess. He wished next to observe that the Iron Committee, over which his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay) presided, had now, in his opinion, proceeded so far in its inquiry as to have rendered the subject ripe for the consideration of such a council as that which he proposed. He should also press upon the Government the necessity of finishing those ships which were intended for the navy, of making trials of them, and of placing themselves in a position to refer to authentic reports emanating from the captains of ships new in commission. The re- suit of such reports, if laid before the Commission, would, he felt assured, be completely to put an end to those unwieldy structures, which it was as impossible to manœuvre in action as to render capable of being controlled by their crews. The great object of the Admiralty had, it appeared to him, for some time past been to wait until they could construct ships which would be practically invulnerable; but the principle of action would, he apprehended, be in all future warfare much the same as it was in the days of our ancestors. The great reason why speed was desirable was, that a ship might be able to close with the enemy; and having done so, he saw only one thing which a naval officer, following the example of those who fought under Nelson, had to do, and that was to lay himself as near to the enemy as possible and batter him till he surrendered. One shot-hole, he might add, never destroyed a ship. In the action before Port Constantine, for instance, the Sanspareil, a wooden vessel, was exposed for five hours to an exceedingly severe fire. She was struck by twenty-four shells and nine round shots, and what was the effect? Why, that the first blow tore off her skin, and laid open her timbers for a space of from ten feet long to one foot four inches broad. Other shots laid open her timbers to a like extent; her funnel was broken, and her rigging set on fire; yet she not only continued in action till the end, but when the signal to discontinue was made, at five o'clock in the afternoon, she was enabled to get away, was eventually repaired, came home to England, and was still in the service, There was a circumstance took place in the case in question to which he did not think the attention of the Admiralty had been sufficiently directed, and that was that the smoke and vapour from the fighting decks of the vessel descended into her engine-room so as almost entirely to put out her fires and to prevent the generation of steam; so that when the signal was made to discontinue the action, she could only make a knot and a half until the vapour had cleared away. It was the opinion of the officer who had charge of the engine-room, who now occupied a high official position at Portsmouth dockyard, that after ten minutes of close action the whole of the ships might be brought to a standstill from that cause. In that ease the small gunboats to which he had referred might deliver from their 100-pounder guns with impunity a fire which would disable those ships and compel their crews to quit them. He next came to that which was the most material part of the observations which he had to address to the House—he meant the dock and basin accommodation which it was necessary they should provide for their iron fleet in different quarters of the world. It was a most remarkable fact, that while they had a navy which penetrated every sea, the Government had out of England but one dock in which they could dock an old line-of-battle ship, and that was at Bombay. At Quebec and Halifax they had no dock of the kind. The same might be said of Bermuda and of Port Royal; while in the whole British American possessions there was no dock in which they could dock a frigate. At the Mauritius there was a mercantile dock 300 feet long, another 318, and a third 378. At Singapore a dock was being constructed, while at Calcutta the Government dockyard was for sale; the dockyard at Bombay being for sale also, if he was rightly informed. Now, if a war were to take place, the number of iron transports in their employ would keep the private mercantile docks constantly engaged, and there would therefore be no space available for Government vessels. An iron man-of-war could not keep the sea unless her bottom could be cleaned at short intervals. The zoophytes which attached themselves in tropical climates dropped off as soon as the ship got into fresh water, but the crustaceous mollusca could not be got rid of except by scraping. The fish died in fresh water, but the shells still adhered to the iron. He himself had seen chain cables rendered useless from such incrustations. He thought that he had shown ample reasons for the inquiry for which he was seeking; and believing that it was his duty as an independent Member to protest against further action being taken with regard to iron ships building without the consultation of the greatest authorities of the country upon the matters which had come under the observation of scientific men during the last year or two, he would move an Address to Her Majesty that she will be graciously pleased to appoint a Royal Commission to consider the best mode of construction and form of the Iron-clad Ships which are to compose the future Navy of England; to report upon the Ships presently built and building, and the amount of Dock and Basin ac- commodation required for their use at Home and Abroad.

said, that it had been generally confessed that there was a fault somewhere in the Admiralty; and that the tendency of a great many of the speeches in that House, during the Session, had been to show that the country did not get value for the money it had expended; he thought therefore that the hon. and gallant Gentleman had only given expression to the general opinion of the House, and of the country, when he complained of the mistakes which were made in the construction of ships. Money was completely frittered away in dockyards; ships were constantly altered while in course of construction, at the whim of successive projectors; when the frames had been put up, they were often taken down to be altered in form; when the hull had been finished, it was frequently cut in half to be lengthened; and after ships had been constructed at vast expense, they were sometimes never sent to sea, but ultimately sold as old stores. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had said, the other night, that the fate of the country might depend upon the issue of a single naval combat. How important was it, then, that ships should be well built; for if, in a squadron of vessels, a large proportion of them proved to be slow sailers, the vessels that came up first might be overpowered, and the fleet defeated in detail. If, on the other hand, we had a powerful navy, we could afford to look on, and husband our resources while other nations were weakening themselves by war; and then, at the last, we could step in, as the arbiters of the difference, and the balance of Power, in Europe. While, however, he agreed with the hon. and gallant Gentleman as to the grievance, he could not but distrust the remedy which he had suggested. If the hon. Baronet had proposed, as from his speech he had appeared to desire, that there should be a permanent council to advise the Admiralty, he would have concurred with him. What he had moved for, however, was a Commission. Now, a Commission was expensive; it sat for many years, did but little work, and if it came to any conclusion, that conclusion was shelved in a blue-book, and never acted upon. The remedy proposed was, moreover, transitory and ephemeral. The Commission was to sit for two or three years to examine the ships being built at that time; in this its effects would not extend beyond the present moment. It was, however, also to consider the best mode of construction and form of iron-clad ships. If they had on the Commission no one who knew enough of naval architecture to lay down the law upon the subject, the Commissioners would sit merely as students of that science. What he desired to see was a permanent benefit from a self-supporting institution, such as had existed in France for many years, with great success. He looked for the establishment of a body of naval engineers. In order to explain this institution, he would adopt that division of the naval administration which was current in France. First, there was the Political Division, which regarded the connection of the navy with the Foreign and Colonial departments, as well as the patronage which it involved. Secondly, there was what was called, by the French, the "Personelle," which concerned the supply of men; and thirdly, the "Construction," which had reference to the supply of ships, and the construction of the fleet. With the first and second divisions he would not interfere; he would eliminate them altogether, and apply himself to the consideration of the third. In this country 9,000 men were employed in the construction of ships. These were divided into thirty-two or thirty-three trades: of these, sixteen or seventeen were unvarying, or stationary in their application; such as joiners, painters, smiths, &c.; and the remainder, which had reference to the building of ships, varied in their requirements; because no two ships were ever built precisely alike. It was with the latter class of trades alone that he desired to interfere. He would eliminate the former, and deal with the shipwrights' trades alone. They comprised 4,000 men, who had over them 152 officers—namely, a First Constructor of the Navy, with a salary of £900; two second constructors, seven master shipwrights, seven timber inspectors, nine master shipwrights' assistants, thirty-two foremen of the yard, seven first converters, five second converters, twenty-two measurers, seventeen first-class inspectors of shipwrights, and forty-three second-class inspectors at salaries of £125 each. The wages of the men varied from 6s. to 7s. 6d. a day. The officers rose from the ranks, promotions being governed by fixed rules. First, let the House consider the age which a man would attain before he could become Chief Constructor. He must pass all the grades before he could get to the top; not to do so would be a violation of the rules. By these rules it was specified that he must serve seven years before he could become an artificer, three years as second leading man, three years as leading man, three years as a writer; and then three years for each of the officers' grades—in all twenty-seven years, making a total of forty-three years as the shortest period within which a man could rise to the highest grade. If, therefore, he entered the service at sixteen or eighteen years of age, he would be over sixty before he became Chief Constructor. Secondly, without wishing to disparage this body, he must call the House to their standard of education. What knowledge of the science of naval architecture, involving the highest mathematical science, could be possessed by men whoso whole time was absorbed in severe manual labour. In fact, it was only the few remaining pupils of the old school of naval architecture who had any knowledge of the science, or were fit to design a ship. This source, the House was aware, had long since been dried up. The Government, having felt this difficulty, had upon a recent occasion broken through their rules; they had gone outside the body to find a Constructor; and had appointed Mr. Reed. And why? Because they had not an abler man than Mr. Reed in their service. He thought that the Government were right in doing so. They were in a difficulty, and could not act otherwise. His point was this: that they had not, within the service, as able men as could be found outside. This should not be so. In France things were managed differently. There, for the construction of the navy, there was an institution called the Génie Maritime. It comprised a chief equal to our Controller of the Navy, and 123 officers, who were called Ingénieurs Constructeurs de la Marine. First, with regard to their education. Those officers passed three years at the Ecole Polytechniqne. The Polytechnique was a feeder to all the highest branches of the service; it supplied the Artillery, the Engineers, the Staff, and the Génie Maritime. It was, in fact, a superior kind of Woolwich College. Afterwards they spent three years in special education at a naval college, working at the ship's side in summer, and studying naval science in winter. They then became Engineers of Naval Constructions. Mr. Scott Russell had recently delivered a lecture, at the Institute of Naval Architects, from which he (Lord Robert Montagu) had derived much information. After stating (p. 7) that the preliminary college, the Polytechnique, contained youths from all parts of the world; who, by favour of the Emperor, had been allowed to learn shipbuilding in France, he said—

"And what is the highest ambition to which these educated youths aspire? It is to be admitted by competition into the School of Naval Architecture. They pass into the School of Naval Architecture on full pay, they remain for three years students of the school—students in winter only, for all the summer they are workmen in the dockyards practising their craft."

Secondly, with regard to the functions of this body. It was to officers trained thus that the French Government looked for everything relating to the construction, preservation, and arming of ships. They tried the value of new guns and the quality of iron. In fact, it was this body of men which was reponsible for the whole department called the "Construction." Mr. Scott Russell stated, as a result of that mode of training, that such was the demand for naval architects so trained that they could hardly be permitted to complete their third year's course before they were invited to undertake important duties in private yards; in fact, all the great shipbuilding and engineering establishments of France were under their control and management. Mr. Scott Russell used these words (p. 3)—

"To show the result of this school, and the manner in which its pupils are appreciated in France, I have only to say, that so great is the demand for these trained naval architects, and so highly are they valued, that they can hardly be permitted to complete their third year of instruction… The best pupils are to be found managing the largest and most prosperous engineering and shipbuilding establishments in France. …. I ask you to turn once more and look at the ruinous state of professional affairs in England. …. Although the sailors of England are better than the sailors of any other country, the ships of England are in every respect their inferiors."

He need not remind the House that recently they had seen the Government of this country appealing in an official do- cument, to a French authority upon a question of naval construction. The French system, too, was superior to the English in point of economy. Now, why were these things so? Because they had a trained body of men equal to any emergency, while the English draughtsmen were very imperfectly taught. But the most extraordinary result was that the French were gradually dispossessing England of the carrying monopoly which hitherto she had enjoyed. The Peninsular and Oriental Company had been deprived of nearly all the coasting trade in the Mediterranean by a powerful rival in France, the heads of which were pupils of this Naval School, and whose ships and machinery had been constructed by them. The West India Mail Company had to contend for the trade of Brazil with vessels built by the officers he had described; and the direct transit of the Peninsular and Oriental Company was also subject to similar competition. "And thus" (to use the words of Mr. Scott Russell) "by sheer force of talent and skill, appreciated and fostered, France is snatching from us some of the valuable trades we had fancied were exclusively our own." He thought he had made out his case for the necessity of providing the service with a permanent staff of naval architects equal to the investigation of the scientific problems of the day, and to give advice and assistance in the councils of the Admiralty, he was aware that there were objections that would be raised to his plan. Probably he should be met with the preliminary objection that vested interests would be interfered with, but he contended that it need interfere very little with those interests. That, however, was a difficulty which he had left to the Admiralty to solve; he had avoided it in his Resolution. Out of the 4,000 men employed in the dockyards only one-fourth had even a chance of becoming one of the 152 officers. Those therefore who could surfer would be very few in number. One third of this number might be introduced every year to undergo such a training as, in the end, would enable them, by degrees, to supersede the present staff. He might also be told, that if such a school were established as he should desire, as soon as men became competent they would leave the service and enter private yards. That he regarded as an argument in his favour, because it would prove their superiority as shipbuilders. Yet even that danger might be prevented by very simple means. They never heard of officers of the army or navy running away when they had learnt their business. Why was that? Because they had a certain rank and position which they valued. The same rule might apply to naval architects. They might receive rank; and instead of buying commissions, as in the army and navy, they might be required to deposit £500 on receiving their commission, the money to be returned upon completion of a certain term of service. He would suggest that an apprentice should rank as a military cadet. After five years of service and passing an examination they might rank as lieutenants of artillery; and after two years' voluntary sea service to learn seamanship, they might be ranked as captains. A third objection might be raised, on the ground of expense. He would not advert to the amount of patronage at the disposal of the minister as an equivalent for the expenditure But he must remind the House that a boon would be conferred on the community; there would be an opening for younger sons; there would be a means of attaining rank and position. Why was it that officers of the army or navy, or that barristers, or, above all, that the clergy chose a profession where they had hard work and bad pay, instead of entering some of the lucrative trades and employments? Merely for the sake of the station which they acquired. Here also, then, a boon would be conferred; and a return might be expected. Upon first entering, they should pass a preliminary examination, in order to acquire a status; and then during the first two or three years they should not receive any pay. In the Diplomatic Service no pay was given until after four years of service. When they were qualified to become sub-inspectors of shipwrights, they should be allowed pay at the rate of £90 per annum instead of £125, as at present paid to those officers. For £90 is the pay in the lowest grade of the Civil Service. The system which he advocated would thus be self-supporting, and would moreover effect a saving in many items which now burdened the Estimates. Nay, more; it would be economical, for they would get more for their money. In the lowest grades there would be scientific men; in the highest, men who would still be young; and in every case, men who would use their heads. There would not only be less waste of material in consequence, but there would be an improved system of inspection. At Sheerness a partial émeute had taken place, owing in some degree to the fact, that as the inspector of shipwrights had risen from among the men, he had not proper moral influence over the gangs. Such occurrences would be less likely to take place if the men were superintended by others in the position of officers. The Constructor of the Navy would also be supported by a body of scientific men, some of whom could be stationed at Columbia, Australia, Hongkong, the Cape, or at other points. It would be attended with this further beneficial effect, that scientific inventions, like Captain Cowper Coles' cupola ships, would not be east aside by the Government for nine years, until the Merrimac had sunk wooden line-of-battle ships, and the Monitor had scared nations from their proprieties. All inventions would at once be submitted to proper scientific investigation. He did not wish to make quotations from the blue-books, though their contents fully warranted and proved his assertions, but he might refer to one passage in the evidence of Sir James Graham, given before the Dockyard Commission, in which he said—

"I have been very much blamed for it [abolishing the School of Naval Architecture], and I am not sure, looking back, whether, if it were to be done again, I would advise it."

What had been stated on the subject by Mr. Lang, master shipwright at Chatham? The following question was put to him:—

"You have no doubt, that with a view to the supply of good candidates for the higher class of offices in the dockyards of this kingdom, it would be desirable that there should be some establishment of that kind [a school of naval architecture]?"

Mr. Lang replied—

"I have no doubt whatever of it; it is absolutely necessary. It is the same principle as that on which you officer your army and navy."

"The fact is, that there is no supply of that class now rising up?—None whatever. We are not feeling the effect of it so much at the present moment, because nearly the whole of the senior officers of my rank have been educated at the School of Naval Architecture."

And Mr. Abethell, after asserting that there is a want of an institution like the School of Naval Architecture, gives as his reason—

"I think that there is scarcely sufficient provision for a scientific instruction at present;".… "a higher class of education is desirable than any which is now obtained in the dockyard."

His object in moving the Amendment was not to press upon an unwilling House a matter which had not yet received sufficient investigation; but rather to throw out hints worthy of its consideration. In doing so he was not speaking the language of theory, but had been uttering the doctrines of experience. In France a system of the kind had been established more than a hundred years ago, and with slight modifications had been maintained to the present day. In consequence, the vessels of their navy were not only better than those of England, and the economy of the French Admiralty was greater than that of the English, but there was this further result, that ships built in private yards in France were actually superior to British vessels, and were driving them out of trades of which we had enjoyed until now a monopoly. The noble Lord concluded by moving an Amendment to the Motion.

seconded the Amendment.

said, he thought that the noble Lord was under some misapprehension in regard to some of the points to which he had referred. No doubt, the School of Naval Architecture in France had done much to produce a certain class of vessels superior to those of this country, but he was also certain that the French ships of war produced in the French dockyards were of a lower class than those of this country. He concurred with the noble Lord as to the greater economy observed in the administration of the French navy than that which marked the administration of the British navy, but he differed entirely from him on the question of the merits of the respective ships. There was not the smallest doubt but the iron-clad ships built in England were vastly superior to those of France. The School of Naval Archi- tecture in France had nothing whatever to do with the loss of trade suffered by England through the spread of French ocean lines of steamers in many cases where the former had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly. That result arose simply from the great increase of trade generally, and the excessive subsidies granted to French companies. The Brazil Company, for example, received from the French Government a subsidy four times greater than was granted to the West India Mail Company; and the Messageries Impériales, which superseded the Peninsular and Oriental Company in the trade referred to, received a subsidy four times greater than that given to the former. The greatest steam company in France—namely, the Transatlantic Company—had just contracted for eight ships of about 4,000 tons each. All those, however, were being constructed by a Scotch house; three of them were building in Greenock, and five others in France, but under the direction of Mr. Scott. And for these ships so building in France the contractors received 10 per cent more than for those being built in Scotland. That fact afforded the best proof that we could compete successfully either with the iron or timber shipbuilders of France. At the present cost, notwithstanding that by the laws of that country a duty of 10 per cent was levied on all foreign vessels registered in France, she was obliged to come to this market for a great number of steamships. In introducing the Original Motion, the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth was hardly as consistent in his arguments as usual; for though he condemned wooden line-of-battle ships, he referred to the Sanspareil as having come successfully out of action. The hon. Baronet condemned shipbuilding in the Government dockyards, and yet he recommended the House to enforce the necessity of paving the way for the construction of iron ships in the Government dockyards, which seemed to indicate that the hon. Baronet had an eye to the interests of his constituents. It was only fair towards private establishments to remember in what splendid condition the Warrior had been turned out. He had examined her carefully, and had no hesitation in saying she was the finest man-of-war afloat. At first, some doubts were expressed as to her capacity for steering. Curiously enough, he had that day received a letter from Captain Cochrane in which he said—

"You will be glad to hear that we shall be ready for sea in a few days. We have been fitted with an hydraulic steering gear, by which, among other advantages, one person will be enabled to steer the ship and put the helm over with the same facility at full steam as at slow, and we shall be able to turn a complete circle in six minutes, which will be a feat never yet accomplished with a vessel of this size."

During the recess he had inspected the cupola of Captain Coles, and his impression was that it was a much more effective ship than the port-sided ship; but it struck him that there was one defect—namely, the liability of the gun to get jammed when the ship listed, and so to render the ship unserviceable. In the attack upon Charleston it appeared, that though the shots from the forts did not go through the turret towers of the Federal Monitors, yet that the force of the shot was such as to jam them against the pivots, and so to render them as unserviceable as if they had been totally destroyed. He did not think that much could be learned from the attack on Charleston, because the vessels in action were vastly inferior in strength to our own. Still, the resistance of those inferior ships to heavy shot showed the advantage of armour-plating, one having received as many as ninety shots, and yet she came out of action. He believed their own armour-plated ships were superior to any in the world, and the only complaint he had to make was that they cost a great deal of mony. He was not disposed to support the Motion; and whilst admitting that there was much in the Amendment, what he would recommend was that there should be a board of five or six competent men, to whom all matters connected with ship-building should be referred, and who should report to the Controller of the Navy for his guidance and that of the Admiralty. It was almost impossible for one man to keep himself acquainted with all the changes and improvements that were being constantly effected.

Sir, I think it would be very unadvisable to intrust the department of ship-building to such a Board as my hon. Friend recommends. We have already got the Controller of the Navy, with a staff of able assistants to test and report upon all improvements and inventions, who has charge of this department. This debate is a fair illustration of the difficulties attendant upon ship-building, and ought to convince the House that the proposal of the hon. Baronet ought not to be agreed to by this House. I am quite aware that upon many definite and abstract questions, such as the pay of the navy, the manning of the navy, or harbours of refuge, the labours of a Royal Commission are exceedingly valuable. But what Commission could make a Report of any value on the construction of ships, seeing that their form is altering daily? During the Admiralty administration of my right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) the question of ship-building occupied a great deal of attention, and the Government appointed a body of gentlemen of high talent, of whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry) was one. That Committee, which was very like a Commission, made inquiry into the subject of ship-building. They compared the French navy with that of England; they compared the French dockyards with ours; and they came to the Government with a proposal for what was called the reconstruction of the navy. I mean to impute no blame to my right hon. Friend, but according to the lights we now possess the sums then expended in line-of-battle ships would have been better expended in iron-cased ships. That vast expenditure was entered into by the Government of which my right hon. Friend was a Member, and continued by the Government that followed it, very much in consequence of the Report of this Committee; and to-morrow, if a Committee or Commission were appointed, before they could get intelligence or evidence on which they could found a Report, it might turn out worthless, because from day to day the changes in naval constructions are going on. Only yesterday an experiment was tried, which, if it should turn out in all respects successful, may alter the construction or rather the framework—the upper works—of our armour-plated ships. Take another example: any Commission appointed a few months ago would have recommended us to build turret ships, but what is the news we get from Charleston? We have nothing official as yet, but such information as we have is rather against turret ships. It is therefore quite impossible for any inquiry to do justice to the subject, or for a Commission to make any Report that would be of any assistance to the Admiralty. We are all of the same mind; we want to construct a navy of the greatest possible efficiency, and worthy of the power and dignity of this country. But there are not two people who agree either as to the class, the form, or the armament of ships. My hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir J. Elphinstone) would say, for example, of the Warrior that she is too long and too big, and that she would be damaged by smaller and handier ships constructed at much less expense. We are now ascertaining what is the smallest class of vessels to which armour-plating can be applied. Indeed, with regard to armour-plated ships the Government are engaged in carrying on experiments in every direction. We have got an Armour-plate Committee—a most valuable body, upon a most important branch of the business, and one which requires the undivided attention of scientific men, because upon the iron plates, their capability of resistance, and their fastening, the whole of the efficiency of our armour-plated vessels depends. I could not discover in my hon. Friend's observations any real grounds of complaint against the Admiralty; nevertheless, I have no doubt that these discussions are extremely useful, because they call the attention of the Government and the public to the various improvements that may be made in the construction of our vessels. One matter has been alluded to which may turn out to be of great importance,—namely, the construction of twin screws. My hon. Friend assumes that a construction of that kind has no defects. My own belief is that in some class of vessels it may prove to be a very valuable invention. But the Admiralty do not think it advisable to order vessels of that construction without awaiting the result of the full trial of the ships which are now constructed upon that principle. With regard to the old floating batteries, my opinion is, if you were to lengthen them, you would make a very bad job; because, in the first place, their state of repair is not very satisfactory; and in the next, I would defy any practical naval man to make anything worth the expense out of them. My hon. Friend asks us to put more than three masts into the very long ships, but I think he might have learned at Portsmouth that we are putting five masts into the Northumberland, and vessels of that class. Again he says, "Build your iron ships in your own dockyards." When he said that, I looked towards my hon. Friend on this side of the House (Mr. Lindsay), and also to the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird); but neither of those hon. Gentlemen appeared to agree in that proposition. For my own part, I should be sorry that the Admiralty should never employ any of the great shipbuilding establishments of the country. We do not think it at all advisable that our dockyards should be considered as the only places where we could build armour-plated ships; or, on the other hand, that the Government should be thrown entirely into the hands of contractors. There is a juste milieu. It has been said that it was matter for regret that the Achilles should have been built at Chatham. But I challenge my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland—now that we have got our dockyard accounts in as good a state as his own can be, for they are no longer under the Controller of the Navy, who is a spending officer, but under the Accountant General—to show that our ships built in the dockyards are so expensive as he alleges. He says the Achilles will be found to have cost vastly more than any of the armour-plated ships built in the merchant yards. Now, we will remember that when the accounts for that ship are closed, and we shall see whether it is so or not. My belief is that she will be found not to have cost much more, if any more. My hon. and gallant Friend proposes that we should go to a large expense in docks and basins. Well, I must say I admire his modesty in not having alluded to Portsmouth, because I think he must have been disappointed that the Government had not commenced a basin there. The remarks which have been made about the want of dock accommodation in foreign stations are quite true. In the East and West Indies, China, and North America, there is a great want of dock accommodation; but Her Majesty's Government have not lost sight of that. We have not thought fit to propose to Parliament the construction a dock at Hongkong; but a very intelligent and enterprising gentleman has undertaken to build one which will contain the Warrior, upon obtaining an advance of money from the Government upon certain fair conditions; and my belief is that we shall have a dock constructed there available for the Warrior. In like manner, at Bermuda, where one of those docks is wanted; I have very little doubt, should I continue to sit on this bench, that it will be my duty to propose to Parliament to vote a sum for that purpose. But we have taken a very large sum—no less than £104,000—this year for docks and basins, for two docks at Ports- mouth, one at Devonport, for enlarging the basin there, for the Chatham basin, and the Malta dock. We hope to have the dock at Malta on cheap terms, because the Maltese Government are going to share the expense. I think the House will see that it would be very unadvisable for any Commission to take away from the Government the responsibility of keeping this country at all times in a proper position as a great maritime Power. That is our constant business, it is for that we are paid and for which we are responsible, and I do trust that the House will not now or at any future period do anything to set aside the responsibility of the Government upon this point. The observations which have been made by the noble Lord the Member for Huntingdonshire (Lord Robert Montagu) upon the former School of Naval Architecture were worthy of attention. That was a most valuable institution. A great class of young naval architects was trained there; and when they had finished their education, it was found that the Government had not the moans of employing them all upon high wages—for they would not accept any but high salaries. The result was, that when they had completed their training at the public expense, they were spread about the world, and it was thought that the Government would not be justified in keeping up that expenditure. The school was afterwards revived on much the same plan, but again fell to the ground. My noble Friend the Duke of Somerset has felt very much the want of some satisfactory arrangement by which we should obtain scientific architects for the benefit of the public service. Various proposals with that object have been put before him. The right hon. Member for Droitwich was good enough to call upon my noble Friend and make proposals, when I believe he was received in the most, friendly manner, and assured that any really tangible scheme submitted to him would be attentively considered. In whatever way the end in view may best be attained, whether by the establishment of a public school for the benefit of the ship-building interest generally, to which some assistance might be given by the Government, whether by founding scholarships at one of the Universities, or by any other means, we are fully sensible that a great want exists in this respect, and any scheme which promises real and permanent success will meet with our earnest attention. With that assurance I trust that the noble Lord will not press his Amendment. As to the Motion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I think it would be very unadvisable that the subject which it embraces should be referred to any Commission. The Government have the means of obtaining information from all quarters as to the best contrivances for the building, masting, or arming of ships; and as they are responsible to the House and the country, I sincerely hope the matter will be left in their hands.

said, he rose to ask his hon. and gallant Friend not to press his proposition for a Commission, because it would not be the best way of constructing our navy. At the same time, he was not satisfied with the assurances of the noble Lord, who had travelled over a wide field without coming to the real question—namely, how they were to go on for the future. No doubt, changes took place very rapidly, but why could not the Government bring their master shipwrights and some of the most experienced naval officers together, and let them form a committee for considering the best plan for constructing ships? By that means they would obtain that scientific and practical knowledge which could not be obtained at the Admiralty. That was the rule followed in the army, where questions of gunnery were submitted to officers of artillery. Why should not an analogous practice be adopted in regard to the navy? The heads of the leading ship-building firms of the country should also be invited to give the assistance of their advice and opinion. He believed the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty desired to do what was right; but unless some reform was made, he should advise his hon. and gallant Friend to bring the matter again before the House.

, in reply, maintained his opinion that the ships which had been referred to were exceedingly ill-masted; and as to dockyards, it had been admitted that there was great deficiency of accommodation of that kind. He still thought that the proper solution of the question would be found in a reference of the whole matter to a Committee or a Commission of the most scientific men in the country, but he should content himself with leaving the public to draw their own inferences from the debate, and would withdraw his Motion.

, in moving that the Analysis of Evidence appended to the Report of the Select Committee of 1862 on the subject of the utilization of sewage be cancelled, said, he had two objects in view—first, to induce the House to take cognizance of an irregularity which had occurred in the proceedings of the Select Committee; and next, to obviate, if possible, the serious practical difficulty likely to flow from that irregularity. The Committee was moved for and obtained early in the last Session by the hon. Member for Leitrim, and met in March. It took a great deal of very valuable evidence, which was closed on the 26th of May. Then a very long and unusual adjournment, which he should like to hear explained, occurred till the 3rd of July. In the absence of the Chairman, a further adjournment to the 24th of July took place, and on the 28th of that month the Committee produced its Report. The Report was drawn up by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets, and contained little or no debatable matter. He now came to the analysis of evidence prepared by the Chairman. He could assure the Members of the Committee that whatever conclusions they might have arrived at, and however he might differ from them, he should not presume to impugn them in that House. What he complained of was this, that all debatable matters, being excluded from the Report, were produced and brought prominently forward in the analysis of evidence. It was not the duty of the person who drew up the analysis to pass by one whole class of evidence, and to give prominence to the evidence of certain other witnesses who agreed with him in their views. This was the complaint which he made of the analysis in the present case. It imputed to Professor Way, who was one of the witnesses, that he had suppressed the truth, and also unfairly represented his evidence in other respects. Indeed, what purported to be an analysis of the evidence was in substance a second Report, and evidently that was the view taken at a meeting of the Farmers' Club, where the analysis had been spoken of in a very irreverent manner. He was sure, however, that if the analysis had been discussed as a Report, paragraph by paragraph, it never would have been agreed to. His other object was to obviate the mischief the analysis was calculated to do. As he had observed, the agriculturists were not likely to be deceived by it, and in that he was borne out by the report in the Mark Lane Express of the fanners' meeting, where Mr. Mechi and Mr. Campbell, of Rugby, an excellent authority on the subject, had condemned the analysis as fallacious and dishonest. But town councils and other municipal bodies not conversant with agricultural questions might be misled by the analysis of evidence, and induced to incur expenses which would be ruinous to the ratepayers. As to the value of sewage as manure, he believed that when sewage was properly applied it was very useful in that respect, but he could not think the mode of application recommended by the hon. Member—namely, that of spreading small quantities over large areas by means of jet and hose—was a good one. The House was much guided by precedents in the matter, and he found that in one instance, where a Report had been drawn up by the Chairman after the Committee had ceased to sit, that Report, upon investigation, was cancelled. He did not believe that exactly such a case as the present had before occurred; but, as he contended that this was really not an analysis of evidence, he should move that that so-called analysis, appended to the Report of the Select Committee on Sewage of Towns, in Session 1862, he cancelled.

said, he would second the Motion. Although a Member of the Committee, it was not for a long while after the "analysis of evidence" was ordered to be printed that he discovered that it was not an analysis but consisted of deductions from evidence, animadversions upon evidence, and statements as to the opinions of the Committee upon such and such points. It was not right that such a document should be published to the world as containing the opinions of the Committee when that Committee had not enjoyed the usual opportunity of expressing those opinions.

said, that had certain Returns connected with the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the best mode of utilizing the sewage of their towns and cities and applying it to beneficial and profitable purposes been given to him in time, he should have been able to prove that, strictly speaking, there was no Commission; that it had merged into one gentleman's hands, and that gentleman the largest manufacturer of artificial manure in the kingdom, who naturally had a direct interest in trying to show that sewage was not comparable in point of value to artificial manures. When the question was last under discussion the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cowper) lauded Mr. Lawes as a great benefactor to his country; but Baron Liebeg in his pamphlet on The Principles of Agricultural Chemistry, referring to that gentleman's experiments, said—

"With regard to the scientific principles by which Mr. Lawes is guided, it is worthy of notice that all these mixtures [of fertilizers] are made without any understanding of the case and without reflection, as if determined by more chance,"

And again—

"I should gladly have renounced all endeavours to oppose the errors of Mr. Lawes if his experiments had contributed ever so little to the scientific restoring of the fertility of the land."

There were three propositions which he wished to submit to the House—First, that the agriculture of England at present suffered from the want of manure; secondly, that that want was, to some extent, supplied by the importation and manufacture of artificial manure; and thirdly, that it was not for the interest of those engaged in that trade that any change should be made in the existing state of things.

said, he rose to order. The hon. Member should confine himself to the subject before the House—namely, the analysis of evidence appended to the Report of the Committee.

said, he could not say that the hon. Member was out of order.

said, he denied that the question of sewage utilization was one of mere abstract science; it was nothing more nor less than a mere trade question, and those who, under the cloak of science, were pretending to deal with and examine into it in the interest of the public, were, almost without exception, themselves deeply engaged in the manure trade, and in the enjoyment of the profits derivable from the present monopoly. It was buzzed about in that House, and in a journal specially devoted to the interests of the artificial manure manufacturers, that he was actuated by a personal and sordid motive. That was openly stated in that journal because he happened to know Mr. Ellis, who was the promoter of a plan for the utilization of sewage. He (Mr. Brady) had only simply to say that there was not a word of truth in those insinuations. With reference to the analysis of evidence which, at a great expenditure of time, labour, and anxiety, he had prepared for the information of the Committee, and to assist them in the preparation of their Report, did the hon. Mover of the present Motion mean to assert that he had not a perfect right to draw up that document for the instruction of the Committee? Did he mean to say that the Committee over which he had presided were not entitled to examine the document, reject it, or amend it, or order it to be reported to the House with the evidence? His Committee took it into consideration for two days, and ordered it to be printed and reported to the House. In consequence of the premature closing of the labours of the Committee, he had not thought himself in a position to prepare a Report: but instead, he prepared an analysis of the evidence as far as it had gone, giving to the Committee his opinion as to what had been proved. Amongst other things, he stated that in his opinion it had been proved that in 1,250 tons of town sewage there was an amount of manure which, if extracted and dried, would correspond to one ton of Peruvian guano. Even Mr. Volcker, the bitter enemy of a proper utilization of sewage, admitted that all chemists were agreed on that point. The observations he had made in his analysis had given great offence to Mr. Way, but he contended that those observations were perfectly justified by the evidence of Mr. Way. Another of his statements was that sewage was suited to all crops. Mr. Lawes thought differently, but he (Mr. Brady) was supported by no less an authority than Lord Essex. The value of sewage, when applied to land in a proper way and at a proper time, was abundantly and conclusively proved by the experiments of Lord Essex and others. The great thing was not to pour more sewage upon the soil than it had power to absorb. The hon. Gentleman had treated his friend Mr. Miles with scant courtesy. In fact, he had scarcely given him credit for veracity.

said, he rose to order. The question before the House was whether the hon. Member for Leitrim, in his capacity of Chairman of the Committee, had not laid before the Committee an analysis of evidence which did not fairly represent the evidence. Consistently with the rules of debate, he believed the speech of the hon. Member ought to be addressed to that point, whereas it seemed to be rather a general summary of the evidence itself than any reply to the Motion before them.

said, he was very unwilling to say anything to curtail the observations of the hon. Member, but the Motion before the House certainly was whether the analysis of the evidence was a correct one, and drawn in the regular Parliamentary form. That was not the question to which the hon. Gentleman had been addressing himself for some time past. He had been discussing rather the evidence itself than the correctness of the analysis which was before the House.

said, he was sorry to trespass on the time of the House; but as the hon. Member had attempted to prove from the evidence that the statements made in the analysis were not correct, he thought he was justified in the course which he had taken. The public mind was sensitively alive to the subject, and it was clear now that it could not be burked. He hoped that there would be further inquiry by a Committee, and that the important question of utilizing sewage would at length be solved.

said, he regretted that the objections to the analysis of evidence had not been limited to the matter of form, instead of introducing a controversy which had been for six months raging out of the House. As to the informality, the Committee shared the blame with the hon. Member for Leitrim. The analysis of the hon. Member who was the Chairman of the Committee was questioned, and the Committee adopted his Report. He, however, thought that as the hon. Member for Leitrim had taken great pains in preparing his document, it should be printed with the Report, and the Committee assented to it. He believed that it was technically wrong, and that it was absolutely necessary it should be withdrawn; but there would be no reflection on the hon. Member.

said, that after what had fallen from the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, he supposed there could be no objection to the Motion. If an hon. Member submitted a draught Report and took a division upon it, it would appear as part of the proceedings; but it was not competent to print the individual opinion of a Member without any vote upon it. There had been a mistake, and the document, therefore, ought to be removed from the records of the House.

said, he was not responsible for the mistake, any more than the rest of the Committee, but under the circumstances he would assent to the Motion.

observed, that he must protest against any imputation on Mr. Lawes.